Gaming Law - Justia Case Law Summaries

In re: Three PA Skill Amusement

2026-06-15T13:20:24-08:00

The cases concern the legal status of so-called “skill game” devices, specifically the “Pennsylvania Skill Amusement Device,” under Pennsylvania law. These devices, which resemble slot machines but include a “skill” component called “Follow Me,” have proliferated in various establishments throughout the state. The central issue is whether the unlicensed operation of these devices is subject to regulation or prohibition under Pennsylvania’s Gaming Act and Section 5513(a) of the Crimes Code, which generally outlaws gambling devices unless specifically exempted. Previously, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania addressed these issues in two separate but related cases. In POM of Pennsylvania, LLC v. Department of Revenue, the Commonwealth Court held that the Gaming Act did not regulate unlicensed skill game devices, reasoning that the Act applied only to licensed entities and facilities. In a second case, In re: Three Pennsylvania Skill Amusement Devices, the Commonwealth Court concluded that the unlicensed operation of these devices was not prohibited under Section 5513(a) of the Crimes Code, relying on the “predominant factor test” to find that the skill element of the game meant it was not a gambling device per se. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed both cases and concluded that the Commonwealth Court’s interpretation was incorrect. The Supreme Court held that, under a plain reading of the relevant statutes, “skill game” devices are subject to both the Gaming Act and the Crimes Code. The Court determined that the Gaming Act’s definition of “slot machine,” as amended in 2017, includes devices where skill or a mix of skill and chance determines the outcome. As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s orders in both cases, holding that “skill game” devices operated without a license are unlawful under existing statutory law. The Supreme Court stayed its order for 120 days to allow for transition. View "In re: Three PA Skill Amusement" on Justia Law

Kalshiex LLC v. Flaherty

2026-04-06T10:00:36-08:00

KalshiEX LLC operates a federally licensed designated contract market (DCM) that allows users to trade event contracts, including those based on sports outcomes. In late 2024, after Kalshi began offering sports-related event contracts similar to those offered by a competitor, New Jersey issued a cease-and-desist letter. The state asserted that Kalshi’s activities violated the New Jersey Constitution and state gambling laws, particularly regarding betting on collegiate sports, and threatened legal action with significant penalties if Kalshi continued its operations within New Jersey. In response, Kalshi initiated proceedings in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of New Jersey’s gambling laws against its federally regulated contracts. The District Court granted the injunction, finding that Kalshi had a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, would suffer irreparable harm without relief, and that the public interest favored enjoining enforcement of potentially preempted state law. New Jersey appealed this decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s factual findings for clear error, legal conclusions de novo, and the decision to grant the preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s order. The appellate court held that the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) grants the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) exclusive jurisdiction over swaps, including sports-related event contracts traded on CFTC-licensed DCMs. Both field and conflict preemption principles bar New Jersey from enforcing its gambling laws against these contracts. The court concluded that Kalshi demonstrated a likelihood of success on the preemption claim, irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction, and that the equities and public interest favored injunctive relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the preliminary injunction. View "Kalshiex LLC v. Flaherty" on Justia Law

FRIEDLANDER VS. TAMARACK JUNCTION RACE & SPORTS BOOK

2026-03-12T10:09:25-08:00

An experienced sports bettor placed two winning wagers—one boxed exacta and one boxed trifecta—on the 2019 Kentucky Derby at a nonpari-mutuel sports book operated by William Hill in Reno, Nevada. The sports book had house rules capping payouts for these wager types at 150-to-1 for exacta and 500-to-1 for trifecta, significantly lower than the full track odds. Multiple signs and betting sheets at the location indicated these limits, but the bettor claimed not to have seen the notices and argued he was entitled to full track odds. After William Hill denied the full track odds payout, the bettor filed a complaint with the Nevada Gaming Control Board. A Board agent investigated and found the signage at the sports book sufficiently disclosed the limited odds. The Board affirmed this finding after a hearing, concluding the signs were conspicuous and provided adequate notice. The bettor then petitioned the Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County, for judicial review. The district court upheld the Board’s determination, finding it supported by evidence and not arbitrary or capricious. The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the district court’s affirmance of the Board’s decision. Applying a deferential standard of review, the court held that the Board’s findings were supported by evidence in the record, including the signage and house rules. The court further concluded that the Board’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law, as it properly applied gaming regulations and contract principles. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the judgment, holding that the house rules, conspicuously displayed, controlled the payout terms of the bettor’s wagers, regardless of his actual knowledge. View "FRIEDLANDER VS. TAMARACK JUNCTION RACE & SPORTS BOOK" on Justia Law

In the Matter of the Minnesota Racing Commission's Approval of Running Aces Casino, Hotel & Racetrack's Request to Amend its Plan of Operation

2026-01-22T02:19:41-08:00

A federally recognized tribe, which operates casinos under a tribal-state compact allowing video games of chance, objected when the Minnesota Racing Commission approved a 2023 amendment to a racetrack’s card club plan. This amendment allowed Running Aces Casino, Hotel & Racetrack to add an additional dealer table and 11 player stations featuring electronic table games. These electronic games use a live dealer and transmit images of physical cards to player stations, where patrons interact via video screens. Minnesota law limits commercial operation of such gambling devices and video games of chance to tribes and restricts the number of card tables at racetrack card clubs. The tribe argued that the Commission’s approval constituted an unlawful expansion of gambling, infringing upon its statutorily protected competitive environment. After the Racing Commission approved Running Aces’s request, the tribe petitioned the Minnesota Court of Appeals for review. The tribe contended that the Commission erred by permitting racetracks to operate devices reserved for tribes, by exceeding the statutory table limit, and by applying an unpromulgated rule. The Racing Commission and Running Aces challenged the tribe’s standing. The Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that the tribe had standing due to its legally protected market-restricted interest, but rejected its arguments on the merits, affirming the Commission’s decision. On further appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the issue of standing de novo and held that the tribe does have standing to challenge the Commission’s decision, as the statutory scheme creates a competition-restricted environment protecting the tribe’s interest in operating video games of chance. However, because the Supreme Court was evenly divided on the merits of the tribe’s challenge to the Commission’s decision, it affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision without expressing an opinion on those merits. View "In the Matter of the Minnesota Racing Commission's Approval of Running Aces Casino, Hotel & Racetrack's Request to Amend its Plan of Operation" on Justia Law

Churchill Downs Tech. Initiatives Co. v. Mich. Gaming Control Bd.

2025-12-16T11:01:00-08:00

TwinSpires, an Oregon-based electronic wagering platform, facilitates interstate betting on horseraces. Under the federal Interstate Horseracing Act (IHA), such betting is lawful if the operator obtains consent from both the state where the bet is accepted and the state where the race occurs, as well as the relevant racetrack. Michigan, however, enacted a law requiring additional state-specific licensing for platforms like TwinSpires to accept bets from Michigan residents. After TwinSpires partnered with Michigan’s only racetrack and obtained the requisite license, its license was suspended when the racetrack temporarily lost its own license. Even after the racetrack’s license was restored, Michigan maintained the suspension of TwinSpires’ license, prompting the company to sue, arguing that Michigan’s requirements conflicted with the IHA. The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan granted a preliminary injunction, preventing Michigan from enforcing its licensing requirements against TwinSpires. The district court found that the IHA preempted Michigan’s additional licensing regime, concluding that TwinSpires was likely to succeed on the merits of its preemption claim and that other injunction factors favored TwinSpires. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion, applying de novo review to legal conclusions and clear error review to factual findings. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order, holding that the IHA conflict-preempts Michigan’s licensing requirement for interstate wagering platforms. The court concluded that Michigan’s law imposed an additional regulatory hurdle beyond what the IHA requires, interfering with the federal scheme and frustrating Congress’s intended objectives. The court also found that the remaining factors for a preliminary injunction—irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest—favored TwinSpires. View "Churchill Downs Tech. Initiatives Co. v. Mich. Gaming Control Bd." on Justia Law

Picayune Rancheria v. North Fork Rancheria

2025-12-16T10:30:57-08:00

In this case, two federally recognized tribes in Madera County, California, were involved in a dispute over the authorization of a casino. One tribe, North Fork, sought to build and operate a large off-reservation casino on a 305-acre site near State Route 99. To do so, North Fork obtained a favorable “two-part determination” from the Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior, followed by a concurrence from the Governor of California, and the negotiation of a tribal-state compact. The compact was ratified by the Legislature. However, a statewide referendum (Proposition 48) resulted in California voters rejecting the ratification statute. The other tribe, Picayune-Chukchansi, which operated its own on-reservation casino, challenged the validity of the Governor’s concurrence, arguing it was rendered void by the voters’ rejection. Prior to this appeal, the matter was litigated in multiple forums. In the Madera County Superior Court, Picayune-Chukchansi sought declaratory relief to have the Governor’s concurrence declared void ab initio. Proceedings were stayed pending appellate decisions in related cases, including United Auburn Indian Community of Auburn Rancheria v. Newsom by the California Supreme Court, which recognized the Governor’s implied authority to concur, and Stand Up for California! v. State of California (Stand Up II) by the Court of Appeal, which held that the people retained the power to annul the Governor’s concurrence through a referendum. The trial court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of Picayune-Chukchansi, declaring the Governor’s concurrence void from the outset. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that the people of California, by rejecting Proposition 48, exercised their retained power to annul the Governor’s concurrence, and that this annulment rendered the concurrence void ab initio—meaning it never took effect and is not in effect. The court also found that the dispute was not moot and that the Governor’s authority to concur is subject to the electorate’s overriding power under California constitutional law. View "Picayune Rancheria v. North Fork Rancheria" on Justia Law

United States v. Weiss

2025-08-28T13:00:18-08:00

James Weiss owned a company that manufactured sweepstakes machines, which in 2018 operated in a legal gray area under Illinois law. Seeking to secure favorable legislation, Weiss arranged for his company to make monthly payments to a lobbying firm owned by State Representative Luis Arroyo, who then became a vocal advocate for legalizing sweepstakes machines. After initial legislative efforts failed, Weiss and Arroyo sought to amend existing gaming legislation by enlisting the support of State Senator Terrance Link. Unbeknownst to them, Link was cooperating with federal authorities. During meetings, Arroyo assured Link he would be compensated for his support, and Weiss’s company provided checks intended for Link under a fictitious name created by the FBI. Weiss was later stopped by FBI agents, interviewed without Miranda warnings, and made false statements during the encounter. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, denied Weiss’s pretrial motions to suppress his statements to the FBI and to exclude Arroyo’s recorded statements. At trial, the jury heard evidence of the bribery scheme, including testimony from Link and federal agents, and found Weiss guilty on all charges after deliberation. The district court sentenced Weiss to 66 months’ imprisonment, exceeding the calculated guidelines range, and declined to delay sentencing for anticipated changes to the Sentencing Guidelines. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Weiss’s challenges to the admission of his statements, the admission of Arroyo’s statements as coconspirator statements, the jury instructions regarding “official acts,” and the sentence imposed. The Seventh Circuit held that Weiss was not in custody for Miranda purposes during the FBI interview, the district court did not err in admitting Arroyo’s statements, the jury instructions did not constitute plain error, and the sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "United States v. Weiss" on Justia Law

Davis v. BetMGM, LLC

2025-07-23T05:00:03-08:00

Jacqueline Davis filed a lawsuit against BetMGM, LLC, in the Wayne Circuit Court, claiming fraud, conversion, and breach of contract after winning over $3 million on BetMGM's online gambling platform. BetMGM approved her withdrawal of $100,000 but later suspended her account, citing a game malfunction that erroneously credited her winnings. BetMGM refused to remit the remaining winnings, leading Davis to file a complaint with the Michigan Gaming Control Board (MGCB) and subsequently in court. The Wayne Circuit Court granted BetMGM's motion for summary disposition, ruling that the Lawful Internet Gaming Act (LIGA) preempted Davis's claims and that the MGCB had exclusive jurisdiction over online gambling disputes. The court relied on caselaw interpreting the Michigan Gaming Control and Revenue Act (MGCRA) and administrative rules under the LIGA, concluding that the LIGA precluded inconsistent common-law claims. Davis's motion for reconsideration was denied. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision in a split decision. The majority agreed with the lower court's reasoning, while the dissent argued that the MGCB did not have the authority to resolve individual patron disputes and that Davis's claims were not inconsistent with the LIGA. The dissent also noted that the MGCB's role was limited to investigating violations of the LIGA and did not extend to adjudicating disputes between patrons and licensees. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that the LIGA did not abrogate common-law claims of fraud, conversion, and breach of contract. The court clarified that the correct principle to apply was abrogation, not preemption, and found no clear legislative intent to abrogate these common-law claims. The court also determined that Davis's claims were not inconsistent with the LIGA, as the MGCB did not have the authority to resolve such disputes. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Davis v. BetMGM, LLC" on Justia Law

IGT v. Zynga, Inc.

2025-07-22T06:31:27-08:00

IGT owns an expired U.S. Patent No. 7,168,089, which addresses secure communication in gaming environments. In 2003, Zynga's predecessor copied claims from IGT's application into its own, leading to an interference declared by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences in 2010. Zynga moved for judgment that IGT's claims were unpatentable for obviousness, but the Board dismissed this motion as moot, terminating the interference because Zynga's claims lacked written description support. In 2021, Zynga petitioned for an inter partes review (IPR) of certain claims of IGT's patent, alleging obviousness based on new prior-art references. IGT argued that interference estoppel barred Zynga's challenge. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) instituted the IPR, rejecting the estoppel argument, and the Director of the PTO affirmed this decision. The PTAB ultimately found all challenged claims unpatentable for obviousness. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the PTAB's decision not to apply interference estoppel was unreviewable under 35 U.S.C. § 314(d), as it was closely tied to the decision to institute the IPR. The court also found no "shenanigans" or legal errors in the PTAB's decision. On the merits, the court affirmed the PTAB's findings that the prior art taught the claimed elements, including the "software authorization agent" and the required messages for authorizing gaming software transfers. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the PTAB's findings and affirmed the decision. View "IGT v. Zynga, Inc." on Justia Law

Zynga, Inc. v. Mills

2025-04-25T06:30:09-08:00

The plaintiffs filed lawsuits against two online-game companies, alleging that the companies' casino-themed social gaming applications constituted illegal gambling. The plaintiffs sought to recover money lost by Alabama residents who played these games, on behalf of the players' families, under an Alabama statute that allows such recovery. The plaintiffs did not play the games themselves and did not name any specific Alabama residents who had played the games. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreements included in the terms of service for the games, which players agreed to when they downloaded the games. The defendants also moved to dismiss the cases, arguing that the plaintiffs could not pursue mass claims on behalf of all Alabama residents who played the games and that the games were not gambling. The Franklin Circuit Court denied both the motions to compel arbitration and the motions to dismiss. The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and held that the plaintiffs, in asserting claims under the Alabama statute, were standing in the legal shoes of the players who had agreed to arbitrate their claims. Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims must be arbitrated. The court reversed the trial court's orders denying the motions to compel arbitration and remanded the cases for the trial court to grant the motions. View "Zynga, Inc. v. Mills" on Justia Law

FREMIN VS. BOYD RACING, LLC

2025-03-21T08:04:44-08:00

The case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of 2021 La. Acts, No. 437, which legalized historical horse racing without requiring voter approval in the affected parishes. Historical horse racing uses an algorithm based on the results of previously run horse races, with bets made at terminals similar to slot machines. Plaintiffs, residents of five parishes where historical horse racing could be conducted, argued that the Act violated Article XII, section 6(C) of the Louisiana Constitution, which requires voter approval for any new form of gaming not specifically authorized before the effective date of the amendment. The 19th Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the Act and granted summary judgment in their favor. The court declared historical horse racing a new form of gaming requiring local voter approval and declared Act 437 unconstitutional. The defendants appealed the decision. The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that historical horse racing is a new form of gaming not authorized in Louisiana before October 15, 1996, and therefore requires prior voter approval in a local election as mandated by Article XII, section 6(C) of the Louisiana Constitution. The court concluded that Act 437 is unconstitutional for allowing historical horse racing without the required voter approval. View "FREMIN VS. BOYD RACING, LLC" on Justia Law

Brozzetti v. PGCB

2025-03-20T06:13:25-08:00

Several applicants sought licenses to operate video gaming terminals under Pennsylvania's Video Gaming Act, which requires applicants to demonstrate "good character, honesty, and integrity." The Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board denied the applications of Todd Teitelbaum, Michael Brozzetti, and Frank Brozzetti, citing their involvement in the skill games industry, which the Board viewed as unregulated and problematic. The Board's decision was based on general criticisms of the skill games industry, including the lack of regulatory safeguards and the economic impact on casinos and the lottery. The Commonwealth Court reviewed the Board's decision and reversed it, finding that the Board's rationale was insufficient. The court noted that the Board's decision relied solely on generalizations about the skill games industry and did not provide specific evidence regarding the applicants' personal character, honesty, or integrity. The court highlighted the absence of any criminal convictions, tax evasion, connections to organized crime, or other nefarious conduct by the applicants. The Commonwealth Court concluded that the Board's decision was arbitrary and an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and agreed with the Commonwealth Court that the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious. The Supreme Court noted that the Board failed to provide specific evidence regarding the applicants' personal qualities and relied solely on general criticisms of the skill games industry. However, the Supreme Court vacated the Commonwealth Court's order to issue the licenses, remanding the case to the Board for further consideration of the applications without directing any particular outcome. The Supreme Court emphasized that the Board's discretion is not absolute and must be based on reason and specific evidence related to the applicants. View "Brozzetti v. PGCB" on Justia Law

Burt v. Playtika, Ltd.

2025-03-17T04:00:16-08:00

Gina Burt filed a lawsuit against Playtika, Ltd. and Playtika Holding Corporation in Tennessee state court, seeking to recover alleged gambling losses incurred by Tennessee residents who played Playtika’s online games. Burt's claim was based on Tennessee Code Ann. § 29-19-105, which allows recovery of gambling losses. Playtika removed the case to federal court, invoking jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) and traditional diversity jurisdiction. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee remanded the case to state court. The district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction because Burt’s suit was not a “class action” under CAFA, and the losses of the Tennessee players could not be aggregated to meet the amount in controversy requirement for traditional diversity jurisdiction. Playtika appealed the remand order under CAFA’s expedited removal appeal provision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s remand order. The appellate court held that Burt lacked Article III standing to proceed in federal court because she did not allege that she personally suffered any gambling loss. The court found that Burt’s claim to recover losses on behalf of other Tennessee residents did not satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for standing. Additionally, the court rejected Burt’s argument that she had standing under a qui tam theory, concluding that Tennessee Code Ann. § 29-19-105 is not a qui tam statute. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s decision to remand the case to state court. View "Burt v. Playtika, Ltd." on Justia Law

Flynt v. Bonta

2025-03-14T09:02:19-08:00

Plaintiffs, who are California residents and cardroom operators, challenged the constitutionality of California Business and Professions Code §§ 19858(a) and 19858.5. These statutes make a person ineligible for a California cardroom license if they own more than a 1% financial interest in a business that engages in casino-style gambling or if they have control over such a business. Plaintiffs argued that these provisions violate the dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce, regulating extraterritorially, and unduly burdening interstate commerce. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California initially dismissed the complaint as untimely, but the Ninth Circuit reversed that decision. On remand, the district court rejected plaintiffs' dormant Commerce Clause claims, concluding that the statutes did not discriminate against interstate commerce, did not regulate extraterritorially, and did not unduly burden interstate commerce. Plaintiffs appealed this decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the cardroom licensing restrictions do not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The court found that the statutes are not facially discriminatory, do not have a discriminatory purpose or effect, and do not favor in-state economic interests. The court also concluded that the statutes do not regulate extraterritorially because they condition a state license for conducting in-state activities on plaintiffs foregoing certain business interests, whether within or outside the state. Finally, the court determined that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a significant or substantial burden on interstate commerce under the Pike balancing test. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the California officials. View "Flynt v. Bonta" on Justia Law

Waukegan Potawatomi Casino, LLC v. Illinois Gaming Board

2025-01-24T07:06:39-08:00

In June 2019, the Illinois General Assembly amended the Illinois Gambling Act to authorize the Illinois Gaming Board to issue six new casino licenses, including one in Waukegan. Waukegan Potawatomi Casino, LLC (Potawatomi Casino) submitted a proposal, but the City of Waukegan certified three other applicants and not Potawatomi Casino. Potawatomi Casino filed a complaint seeking to prohibit the Board from issuing a casino license due to the City's alleged noncompliance with the statute. The Cook County circuit court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing. The appellate court reversed the circuit court's decision, finding that Potawatomi Casino had standing to bring the action. The appellate court concluded that Potawatomi Casino had a legally cognizable interest in competing in a fair and lawful certification process and that the alleged injury was distinct and traceable to the City's actions. The appellate court also rejected the argument that the absence of a private right of action under the Act provided a basis to affirm the dismissal. The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the appellate court's decision. The court held that the Board had jurisdiction to consider the applications once the City certified the applicants, and the license issued to Full House was not void. The court found that no effectual relief could be granted to Potawatomi Casino, rendering the appeal moot. Additionally, the court determined that Potawatomi Casino lacked standing to bring the suit because it did not have a legally cognizable interest in the casino licensing process when it filed the action. The court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Waukegan Potawatomi Casino, LLC v. Illinois Gaming Board" on Justia Law

CHEROKEE NATION v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

2025-01-22T08:26:25-08:00

Four Native American tribes operating casinos in Oklahoma filed a federal lawsuit in August 2020 to invalidate certain tribal-gaming compacts entered into by the Governor of Oklahoma and other tribes. These compacts were approved by the U.S. Secretary of the Department of the Interior by operation of law. The tribes argued that the Governor lacked the authority to enter into these compacts, violating Oklahoma law and their rights under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). The Governor, represented by private counsel, defended the compacts' validity under federal law, arguing that any provisions violating state law could be severed. In July 2023, the Oklahoma Attorney General filed a notice to assume control of the state's defense, asserting that the compacts were invalid under state law. The Governor moved to strike the Attorney General's appearance, arguing that he had the authority to retain counsel and that the Attorney General could not override this. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia certified a question to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma regarding whether the Attorney General could assume control of the defense over the Governor's objection. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that the Attorney General could not take control of the defense in this case. The court emphasized the Governor's constitutional role as the "Supreme Executive" with the authority to select and direct counsel for the state's interests. The court also noted that the Attorney General could appear in the case but could not override the Governor's choice of counsel. View "CHEROKEE NATION v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR" on Justia Law

Lucky Chances, Inc. v. Cal. Gambling Control Com.

2025-01-01T09:13:46-08:00

Lucky Chances, Inc. and its owners, Rommel and Ruell Medina, had their gambling licenses renewed by the California Gambling Control Commission with additional conditions. The Commission also imposed a 14-day suspension, stayed it, and ordered a monetary penalty based on findings that Rene Medina, a disqualified person, was materially involved in the gambling operation. The trial court issued a writ of administrative mandamus, ordering the Commission to reconsider the penalty, limiting it to $20,000 per violation. The Superior Court of Sacramento County found substantial evidence supporting the Commission's finding of Rene's material involvement but ruled that the monetary penalty exceeded statutory limits. The court ordered the Commission to set aside the penalty and reconsider it in light of the court's decision. The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the Commission was authorized to impose additional license conditions based on its findings. However, it determined that the Commission could not use California Code of Regulations, title 4, section 12554, subdivision (d) to impose discipline because the Commission did not find that the Licensees violated any relevant law, regulation, or previously imposed license condition. The Court of Appeal modified the judgment to order the Commission to reconsider the discipline imposed under California Code of Regulations, title 4, section 12554, subdivision (d) in a manner consistent with its opinion. The judgment, as modified, was affirmed, and costs on appeal were awarded to Lucky Chances, Inc., Rommel Medina, and Ruell Medina. View "Lucky Chances, Inc. v. Cal. Gambling Control Com." on Justia Law

POM of Kansas v. Kobach

2024-12-27T07:35:14-08:00

POM of Kansas, LLC, owns and distributes Dragon's Ascent, an arcade game where players shoot dragons for prizes redeemable for cash. Concerned about the game's legality under Kansas law, POM sought approval from state agencies, which declined to provide a formal opinion. POM proceeded with the game's launch and filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the Kansas Expanded Lottery Act does not apply to Dragon's Ascent, that the game complies with Kansas' criminal gambling statutes, and that those statutes are unconstitutionally vague. The Shawnee District Court dismissed the claims against the Kansas Racing and Gaming Commission and the Douglas County District Attorney, ruling that no real controversy existed as neither had investigated the game nor threatened prosecution. The court retained the Kansas Attorney General in the case due to the constitutional challenges raised. The district court later dismissed POM's claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and ruled against the constitutional challenges on the merits. The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and focused on the issue of standing. The court held that POM lacked standing to seek a declaratory judgment about the Kansas Expanded Lottery Act because no defendant suggested the Act applied to Dragon's Ascent. The court also found that POM lacked standing to seek a declaration that Dragon's Ascent is lawful under Kansas criminal gambling statutes, as there was no credible threat of prosecution or seizure of the devices. Finally, the court concluded that POM lacked standing to raise a constitutional vagueness challenge to the gambling statutes, as there was no credible threat of prosecution. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of POM's claims regarding the Expanded Lottery Act and the legality of Dragon's Ascent, vacated the ruling on the constitutional vagueness challenge, and remanded the matter for dismissal. View "POM of Kansas v. Kobach" on Justia Law

Maverick Gaming LLC V. United States

2024-12-13T09:00:23-08:00

Maverick Gaming LLC, a casino gaming company, filed a lawsuit challenging the State of Washington's tribal-state compacts that allow sports betting on tribal land. Maverick argued that these compacts violate the Indian Regulatory Gaming Act (IGRA), the Equal Protection Clause, and the Tenth Amendment. Maverick sought to invalidate the gaming compacts and amendments that permit sports betting on tribal lands, which would allow them to offer similar gaming activities at their cardrooms. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed Maverick's lawsuit. The court found that the Shoalwater Bay Indian Tribe, which intervened for the limited purpose of filing a motion to dismiss, was a required party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a). The court determined that the Tribe had a legally protected interest in the lawsuit that could be impaired or impeded in its absence. The court also concluded that the Tribe could not be feasibly joined in the litigation due to its sovereign immunity. Consequently, the court ruled that the litigation could not proceed in equity and good conscience without the Tribe and dismissed the case. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit agreed that the Tribe was a required party with a substantial interest in the legality of its gaming compact and sports betting amendment. The court also found that the federal government could not adequately represent the Tribe's interests, as their interests diverged in meaningful ways. The court held that the Tribe's sovereign immunity prevented its joinder, and the litigation could not proceed without the Tribe. The court rejected Maverick's argument that the public rights exception should apply, as the suit threatened the Tribe's legal entitlements and sovereignty. View "Maverick Gaming LLC V. United States" on Justia Law

Lucky Chances, Inc. v. Cal. Gambling Control Com.

2024-10-29T19:09:07-08:00

Lucky Chances, Inc., Rommel Medina, and Ruell Medina (collectively, Licensees) had their gambling licenses renewed by the California Gambling Control Commission (Commission) with additional conditions. The Commission also imposed a 14-day suspension, stayed it, and ordered a monetary penalty based on findings that Rene Medina, a disqualified person, was materially involved in their gambling operation. The trial court issued a writ of administrative mandamus, ordering the Commission to reconsider the penalty, limiting it to $20,000 per violation. The Licensees appealed, arguing that the imposition of any discipline was unauthorized. The Commission cross-appealed, contending the trial court misinterpreted the relevant regulations and statutes. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The appellate court concluded that the Commission was authorized to impose additional license conditions based on its findings. However, it determined that the Commission could not use California Code of Regulations, title 4, section 12554, subdivision (d) to impose discipline because the Commission did not find that the Licensees violated any relevant law, regulation, or previously imposed license condition. The court modified the judgment to order the Commission to reconsider the discipline imposed in a manner consistent with its opinion and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "Lucky Chances, Inc. v. Cal. Gambling Control Com." on Justia Law

KalshiEX LLC v. CFTC

2024-10-02T06:30:37-08:00

KalshiEx LLC, a regulated commodities exchange, sought to offer "Congressional Control Contracts" allowing individuals to bet on the outcome of the November 2024 congressional elections. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) prohibited these contracts, arguing they constituted gaming or election gambling, which is illegal in many states. Kalshi challenged this decision under the Administrative Procedure Act, claiming the CFTC's determination was arbitrary and capricious. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in favor of Kalshi, finding that the CFTC erred in categorizing the contracts as gaming or gambling. The court vacated the CFTC's decision, reasoning that the term "gaming" did not apply to election contracts and that the contracts did not involve illegal activity under state law. The CFTC then sought a stay of the district court's judgment while it pursued an appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the CFTC's emergency motion for a stay pending appeal. The court denied the motion, concluding that the CFTC failed to demonstrate that it or the public would suffer irreparable harm without a stay. The court noted that the CFTC's concerns about potential harms, such as market manipulation and threats to election integrity, were speculative and not substantiated by concrete evidence. The court left open the possibility for the CFTC to renew its stay request if more concrete evidence of irreparable harm emerged during the appeal. The administrative stay was dissolved. View "KalshiEX LLC v. CFTC" on Justia Law

United States v. Dequattro

2024-09-27T13:30:03-08:00

In 2020, a federal grand jury indicted David DeQuattro, an architect, and Cedric Cromwell, Chairman of the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council and President of the Mashpee Wampanoag Gaming Authority. They were charged with various federal offenses, including bribery and extortion, related to Cromwell allegedly soliciting and DeQuattro allegedly providing checks and other items of value to protect a contract between DeQuattro's firm and the Gaming Authority for building a casino on tribal land. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held a jury trial where DeQuattro was convicted of one count of federal-program bribery, and Cromwell was convicted of two counts of federal-program bribery and multiple counts of Hobbs Act extortion. However, the District Court later entered a judgment of acquittal on the Hobbs Act-related counts, determining that the Hobbs Act did not clearly abrogate tribal immunity. Both defendants appealed their § 666 convictions, and the government cross-appealed the judgment of acquittal on the Hobbs Act counts. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed both the § 666 convictions and the judgment of acquittal. The court found that the evidence did not suffice to show that the RGB contract was "business" of the Tribe, as required under § 666, because the Gaming Authority, which entered the contract, was a separate legal entity from the Tribe and received almost all its funding from a third party. The court also reversed the District Court's judgment of acquittal on the Hobbs Act convictions, holding that tribal officials do not enjoy immunity from federal criminal prosecution and that the evidence was sufficient to show Cromwell's intent to engage in a quid pro quo arrangement. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "United States v. Dequattro" on Justia Law

Schuster v. Wynn Resorts Holdings, LLC

2024-09-23T16:00:04-08:00

A patron at Encore Boston Harbor Casino challenged the casino's practice of redeeming slot-machine tickets. When patrons finish using a slot machine, they receive a TITO ticket, which can be redeemed for cash. The casino offers two redemption options: cashier cages, which provide full cash value, and self-serve kiosks (TRUs), which dispense only bills and issue a TRU ticket for any remaining cents. The TRU ticket can be redeemed at the cashier cage or used in another slot machine. The plaintiff argued that this practice was unfair and deceptive, violating Massachusetts regulations and consumer protection laws. The case was initially filed in Massachusetts state court and then removed to federal court. The district court dismissed the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim, ruling that an adequate legal remedy was available under Chapter 93A. The court later granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the remaining claims, including breach of contract, promissory estoppel, conversion, and unfair and deceptive business practices. The court found that the casino's practice did not violate its internal controls or Massachusetts regulations and that the plaintiff failed to show the practice was unfair or deceptive. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim, agreeing that Chapter 93A provided an adequate legal remedy. The court also upheld the summary judgment on the remaining claims, concluding that the casino's practice of issuing TRU tickets for cents did not violate regulations or constitute unfair or deceptive practices. The court found no evidence that the practice was immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous, and ruled that the plaintiff's common law claims also failed. View "Schuster v. Wynn Resorts Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

Wynn v. The Associated Press

2024-09-05T10:12:29-08:00

Steve Wynn, a prominent figure in Nevada gaming and politics, filed a defamation lawsuit against The Associated Press (AP) and its reporter, Regina Garcia Cano. The lawsuit stemmed from an article published by AP that reported on allegations of sexual assault against Wynn from the 1970s. The article was based on complaints obtained from the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. Wynn claimed the allegations were false and that AP published the article with actual malice. The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County granted AP's special motion to dismiss under Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes, which are designed to protect free speech and petitioning activities from meritless lawsuits. The district court found that the article was a good faith communication related to an issue of public concern and that Wynn failed to show a probability of prevailing on his defamation claim. Wynn appealed this decision. The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that AP met its burden under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis by showing the article was a good faith communication on a matter of public interest. The court also clarified that under the second prong, a public figure plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably infer, by clear and convincing evidence, that the publication was made with actual malice. Wynn failed to meet this burden, as his evidence did not demonstrate that AP published the article with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court's order granting the special motion to dismiss. View "Wynn v. The Associated Press" on Justia Law

Sutter's Place, Inc. v. City of San Jose

2024-08-30T10:02:57-08:00

Sutter’s Place, Inc., which operates Bay 101 Casino, challenged the City of San Jose's annual cardroom regulation fee, arguing it was an unconstitutional tax imposed without voter approval and violated due process. The fee was equally divided between Bay 101 and Casino M8trix, the only two cardrooms in the city. The plaintiff contended that the fee included costs outside the constitutional exception for regulatory charges and that the equal allocation was unfair. The Santa Clara County Superior Court held a bench trial and found the fee valid, covering reasonable regulatory costs and fairly allocated between the cardrooms. The court determined the fee was for regulatory functions, the amount was necessary to cover costs, and the equal allocation was reasonable given the equal number of tables and benefits to both cardrooms. The court also excluded certain expert testimony from the plaintiff and denied a separate due process trial. The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It upheld the trial court's finding that the equal allocation of the fee was reasonable but reversed the judgment on other grounds. The appellate court found the trial court erred by not specifically determining whether all costs included in the fee fell within the constitutional exception for regulatory charges. The case was remanded for the trial court to identify and exclude any non-permissible costs from the fee and to conduct further proceedings on the due process claim if necessary. The appellate court also reversed the award of costs to the city and directed the trial court to reassess costs after applying the correct legal standards. View "Sutter's Place, Inc. v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law

Stadium Casino RE, LLC v. Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board

2024-07-17T07:09:46-08:00

Stadium Casino RE, LLC ("Stadium") contested the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board's ("Board") decision to award a Category 4 slot machine license to SC Gaming OpCo, LLC and Ira Lubert (collectively "SC Gaming"). Stadium argued that Lubert's bid was invalid because it was funded by individuals not authorized to participate in the auction, and that the Board should have awarded the right to apply for the license to Stadium as the second-highest bidder or conducted another auction. The Commonwealth Court initially reviewed the case, where Stadium sought declarations that Lubert's bid was invalid and that the Board lacked authority to consider SC Gaming's application. Stadium also sought an injunction to stop the Board from considering SC Gaming's application and requested a mandamus order to allow Stadium to apply for the license or to conduct another auction. The Board and SC Gaming filed preliminary objections, which the Commonwealth Court overruled, ordering them to file answers. Meanwhile, the Board proceeded with SC Gaming's licensing application, allowing Stadium to intervene but denying its discovery requests. The Board ultimately granted SC Gaming's application and issued an adjudication supporting its decision. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case, focusing on whether the Board exceeded its statutory authority and failed to comply with mandatory directives in the Gaming Act. The Court found that the Board had the authority to conduct the auction and licensing proceedings and that Section 1305.2(c) of the Gaming Act did not impose jurisdictional limitations on the Board's ability to act. The Court held that the Board's procedures and findings, including the determination that SC Gaming was wholly owned by Lubert, were within its discretion and supported by the evidence. Consequently, the Court affirmed the Board's decision to award the license to SC Gaming and dismissed the action pending in the Commonwealth Court as moot. View "Stadium Casino RE, LLC v. Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board" on Justia Law

BETEIRO, LLC v. DRAFTKINGS INC.

2024-06-21T06:31:48-08:00

The case involves Beteiro, LLC, which owns several patents related to facilitating gaming or gambling activities at a remote location. The patents disclose an invention that allows a user to participate in live gaming or gambling activity via a user communication device, even if the user is not in the same location as the gaming venue. Beteiro filed multiple patent infringement cases against various companies, alleging that they infringe certain claims of the patents by providing gambling and event wagering services. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed Beteiro's cases for failure to state a claim based on the subject matter ineligibility of the patent claims. The court found that the claims were directed to an abstract idea and did not contain an inventive concept. Beteiro appealed the decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court agreed that Beteiro's claims were directed to the abstract idea of exchanging information concerning a bet and allowing or disallowing the bet based on where the user is located. The court also found that the claims did not provide an inventive concept because they achieved the abstract steps using several generic computers. The court concluded that Beteiro's claims amounted to nothing more than the practice of an abstract idea using conventional computer equipment, including GPS on a mobile phone, which are not eligible for patent under current Section 101 jurisprudence. View "BETEIRO, LLC v. DRAFTKINGS INC. " on Justia Law

City of Baton Rouge v. PNK

2024-06-18T15:30:15-08:00

The case involves two casino operators, PNK (Baton Rouge) Partnership, PNK Development 8 LLC, PNK Development 9 LLC, and Centroplex Centre Convention Hotel, LLC, who incentivize their patrons with rewards, including complimentary hotel stays. The City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge Department of Finance and Linda Hunt, its director, discovered through an audit that the operators had not remitted state and local taxes associated with these complimentary stays for several years. The City argued that the operators needed to pay these taxes, while the operators presented various arguments as to why they did not. The City filed a lawsuit in state court, which the operators removed to federal court on diversity jurisdiction grounds. The operators' removal of the case to federal court was challenged by the City, which argued that the tax abstention doctrine (TAD) warranted abstention in this case. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana agreed with the City, finding that all five TAD factors favored abstention: Louisiana's wide regulatory latitude over its taxation structure, the lack of heightened federal court scrutiny required by the operators' due process rights invocation, the potential for the operators to seek an improved competitive position in the federal court system, the greater familiarity of Louisiana courts with the state's tax regime and legislative intent, and the constraints on remedies available in federal court due to the Tax Injunction Act. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The Appeals Court found that the District Court had correctly applied the TAD and had not abused its discretion in deciding to abstain. The Appeals Court agreed that all five TAD factors favored abstention and that any doubt about the propriety of removal should be resolved in favor of remand. View "City of Baton Rouge v. PNK" on Justia Law

City of Baton Rouge v. Centroplex Centre Convention Hotel, LLC

2024-06-18T15:30:14-08:00

The case involves two casino operators, PNK (Baton Rouge) Partnership, PNK Development 8 LLC, PNK Development 9 LLC, and Centroplex Centre Convention Hotel, LLC, who incentivize their patrons with rewards, including complimentary hotel stays. The City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge Department of Finance and its director, Linda Hunt, discovered that the operators had not remitted state and local taxes associated with these complimentary stays for several years. The City argued that the operators needed to pay these taxes, while the operators put forth various arguments as to why they did not. The City filed a suit in state court, which the operators removed to federal court on diversity jurisdiction. The operators' cases were initially heard in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. The City filed a Motion to Remand, arguing that the tax abstention doctrine (TAD), as put forth in Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., warranted abstention. The District Court agreed with the City, stating that all five TAD factors favored abstention: Louisiana's wide regulatory latitude over its taxation structure, the lack of heightened federal court scrutiny required for the operators' due process rights under the Louisiana Constitution, the potential for the operators to seek an improved competitive position in the federal court system, the familiarity of Louisiana courts with the state's tax regime and legislative intent, and the constraints of the Tax Injunction Act on remedies available in federal court. The case was then reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The court affirmed the District Court's decision, agreeing that the TAD applied and that all five factors favored abstention. The court concluded that the District Court's decision to abstain was within its discretion. View "City of Baton Rouge v. Centroplex Centre Convention Hotel, LLC" on Justia Law

Attorney General v. Wynn

2024-06-14T07:01:12-08:00

The case revolves around Stephen Wynn, a casino owner and real estate developer, who was accused by the Department of Justice (DOJ) of acting as an unregistered foreign agent for the People's Republic of China in 2017. The DOJ alleged that Wynn lobbied then-President Trump and his administration on behalf of China to cancel a certain Chinese businessperson's visa or to otherwise remove that person from the United States. Wynn's lobbying efforts ceased in October 2017, and he never registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). The DOJ sued Wynn in 2022, seeking to compel him to register as a foreign agent under FARA. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, holding that since Wynn's alleged agency relationship with the Chinese government ended in October 2017, FARA no longer required him to register. The DOJ appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that under the precedent set by United States v. McGoff, Wynn's obligation to register under FARA expired when he ceased acting as a foreign agent. The court rejected the DOJ's argument that the civil enforcement provision of FARA allowed for an injunction to compel compliance for past violations, stating that the provision only applies to ongoing or imminent violations. Therefore, the court concluded that there was no legal basis for the government to compel Wynn to register now. View "Attorney General v. Wynn" on Justia Law

Sipp v. Buffalo Thunder

2024-06-01T09:11:42-08:00

The case involves a dispute over the jurisdiction of personal injury claims arising from incidents at tribal gaming facilities. The plaintiffs, Jeremiah Sipp and Hella Rader, filed a complaint against Buffalo Thunder, Inc., Buffalo Thunder Development Authority, the Pueblo of Pojoaque, the Pueblo of Pojoaque Gaming Commission, and Pojoaque Gaming, Inc. (collectively referred to as Petitioners), alleging that Sipp was injured due to the negligence of the casino's employees. The complaint was initially dismissed by the district court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but this decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals. The district court had granted the Petitioners' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the plaintiffs' claims did not fall within Section 8(A) of the Tribal-State Class III Gaming Compact (the Compact), which provides for state court jurisdiction over certain claims unless it is finally determined by a state or federal court that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) does not permit the shifting of jurisdiction over visitors’ personal injury suits to state court. The Court of Appeals, however, held that the plaintiffs' claims did fall under Section 8(A) and that neither of the two federal cases cited by the Petitioners, Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Nash and Navajo Nation v. Dalley, had triggered the termination clause in Section 8(A) of the Compact. The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that the jurisdiction shifting under Section 8(A) of the Compact was terminated by Nash. The court reasoned that the plain language of the termination clause in Section 8(A) was clear and unambiguous, and that the federal district court's final determination in Nash that IGRA does not permit such a jurisdictional shifting constituted the qualifying event that terminates the Tribe’s duty to provide its “limited waiver of . . . immunity from suit.” Therefore, the court concluded that state courts do not possess subject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs' underlying claim. View "Sipp v. Buffalo Thunder" on Justia Law

USA V. GROPPO

2024-05-24T08:30:31-08:00

In 2014, Salvatore Groppo pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the transmission of wagering information as a "sub-bookie" in an unlawful international sports gambling enterprise. He was sentenced to five years' probation, 200 hours of community service, a $3,000 fine, and a $100 special assessment. In 2022, Groppo moved to expunge his conviction, seeking relief from a potential tax liability of over $100,000 on his sports wagering activity. He argued that the tax liability was disproportionate to his relatively minor role in the criminal enterprise. The district court denied Groppo's motion to expunge his conviction. The court reasoned that expungement of a conviction is only available if the conviction itself was unlawful or otherwise invalid. The court also stated that the IRS's imposition of an excise tax does not provide grounds for relief as 'government misconduct' that would warrant expungement. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that because Groppo alleged neither an unlawful arrest or conviction nor a clerical error, the district court correctly determined that it did not have ancillary jurisdiction to grant the motion to expunge. The court explained that a district court is powerless to expunge a valid arrest and conviction solely for equitable considerations, including alleged misconduct by the IRS. View "USA V. GROPPO" on Justia Law

Mattera v. Baffert

2024-05-02T12:00:18-08:00

The case involves a group of bettors who sued Churchill Downs, Inc., and trainers Robert Baffert and Bob Baffert Racing, Inc., after the horse they bet on, Medina Spirit, was disqualified from the 2021 Kentucky Derby due to a failed post-race drug test. The bettors claimed that they would have won their bets under the new order of finish after Medina Spirit's disqualification. However, under Kentucky law, only the first order of finish marked "official" counts for wagering purposes. The plaintiffs brought claims for negligence, breach of contract, violation of the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act, and unjust enrichment. The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, which granted the defendants' motions to dismiss and denied the plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint. The court found that the plaintiffs' claims were based on the theory that they had "unpaid winning wagers," but under Kentucky law, the first official order of finish is final. Therefore, the plaintiffs' wagers were lost, and the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The case was then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing that the plaintiffs' claims were based on the theory that they had "unpaid winning wagers." However, under Kentucky law, the first official order of finish is final for wagering purposes. Therefore, the plaintiffs' wagers were lost, and the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court also found that the proposed amendment to the complaint did not cure this flaw, so the lower court properly denied leave to amend. View "Mattera v. Baffert" on Justia Law

Sutter's Place, Inc. v. California Gambling Control Commission

2024-04-30T14:01:31-08:00

The case involves Sutter’s Place, Inc., a cardroom operator in San Jose, California, and the California Gambling Control Commission. Sutter’s Place sought to increase the number of gambling tables in its cardroom from 49 to 64. The request was based on a local ballot measure, Measure H, which was approved by San Jose voters. However, the Commission denied the application, arguing that Measure H did not comply with the requirements of the Gambling Control Act (GCA), specifically a provision governing the text of local ballot measures authorizing expansions of gambling. The Commission's decision was upheld by the San Francisco County Superior Court. Previously, the Commission had denied Sutter’s application for more tables, concluding that the San Jose ballot measure authorizing the increase did not comply with the GCA. The superior court denied writ relief, and Sutter appealed. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, rejecting Sutter's arguments that recent state legislation validated San Jose’s ordinance and abrogated the Commission’s decision denying permission to expand. In the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sutter argued that the Commission lacked authority to deny a gambling expansion application on the ground that a local authorizing measure fails to comply with state law. However, the court rejected each argument and concluded that the trial court did not err in denying Sutter’s writ petition. The court held that the Commission had the authority to refuse an application that conflicted with state law. The court also found that Measure H did not substantially comply with the GCA's requirements for ballot language. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Sutter's Place, Inc. v. California Gambling Control Commission" on Justia Law

State of Alabama v. Jay's Charity Bingo

2024-04-19T05:30:05-08:00

The State of Alabama initiated 14 separate actions against various businesses, nonprofit organizations, property owners, and municipalities, alleging that they were responsible for the operation of illegal gambling activities. The State sought permanent injunctive relief on public-nuisance grounds. The Birmingham Division of the Jefferson Circuit Court issued temporary restraining orders (TROs) in each case and later transferred the actions to the Bessemer Division of the same court, extending the TROs in the process. Upon receiving the transferred cases, the Bessemer Division concluded that the Birmingham Division lacked jurisdiction to issue the TROs. As a result, the Bessemer Division dissolved the TROs and dismissed the actions. The State appealed these decisions, leading to the consolidation of the appeals. The Supreme Court of Alabama found that the Bessemer Division had erred in its conclusion. The court clarified that the Birmingham Division did have jurisdiction over the actions and had correctly transferred them to the Bessemer Division, which was the proper venue. The court explained that the Bessemer Division's dismissal of the actions was erroneous and that the correct course of action would have been to proceed with the cases. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the Bessemer Division's judgments and remanded the actions for further proceedings. The court instructed the Bessemer Division to conduct a hearing regarding the State's motions for preliminary injunctions at the earliest possible time. View "State of Alabama v. Jay's Charity Bingo" on Justia Law

West Flagler Associates, Ltd. v. DeSantis

2024-03-21T07:02:11-08:00

In this case, two companies and an individual, all involved in Florida's gaming industry, petitioned against the Governor of Florida and others, challenging a gaming compact between the State and the Seminole Tribe. The petitioners argued that a sports betting provision in the compact violated the Florida Constitution, which limits the expansion of casino gambling to the citizens' initiative process. They claimed that the Governor and Legislature exceeded their constitutional authority by allowing the compact to be enacted. The petitioners requested a declaration that the law implementing the compact was unconstitutional and sought an injunction to stop the Seminole Tribe from continuing to operate mobile sports betting. However, the Supreme Court of Florida rejected this petition on the grounds that a writ of quo warranto, which the petitioners used to challenge the compact, was not an appropriate means to question the substantive constitutionality of an enacted law. The court underscored that quo warranto is a common law remedy used to test the right of a person to hold an office or exercise some right derived from the state, not to challenge the constitutionality of a law. Therefore, the petitioners' claim was beyond the relief that quo warranto provides. The petitioners' reliance on previous cases, where the writ of quo warranto was used to question the Governor's authority to bind the state to a compact without ratification by the Legislature, was also rejected. The court pointed out that these cases were fundamentally different as they did not challenge the substance of the agreement enacted by the Governor and ratified by the Legislature. In conclusion, the Supreme Court of Florida denied the petition, stating that the relief sought by the petitioners was beyond what quo warranto provides and declined to extend the scope of the writ to test the substantive constitutionality of a statute. View "West Flagler Associates, Ltd. v. DeSantis" on Justia Law

In Re: Kevin Clarke

2024-03-01T16:30:14-08:00

This case concerns a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by various users of the PredictIt platform against the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The petitioners challenged the district court's decision to transfer their lawsuit against the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (D.D.C.). PredictIt is an online platform that allows users to trade on the predicted outcomes of political events. In 2022, the CFTC Division of Market Oversight rescinded a “no-action” letter it issued to PredictIt's operator, Victoria University, in 2014. The petitioners, claiming injury from the CFTC's decision, filed a lawsuit against the CFTC alleging that the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act and withdrew a license without following necessary procedural steps. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the district court abused its discretion by transferring the case to D.D.C. based primarily on court congestion. The appellate court noted that none of the factors used to evaluate whether a case should be transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) favored the CFTC's chosen venue of D.D.C. The court also pointed out that the district court's decision had implications beyond the immediate case due to the supervisory nature of writs of mandamus. Consequently, the petition for a writ of mandamus was granted, and the district court was directed to request the return of the case from D.D.C. View "In Re: Kevin Clarke" on Justia Law

State of Iowa v. Slaughter

2024-02-23T07:03:27-08:00

In this case, the Supreme Court of Iowa upheld the conviction of the defendant, Sydney Leiann Slaughter, for gambling and making a false claim of winnings. The defendant falsely claimed that she won a slot machine jackpot of $4,000 when her boyfriend was the actual winner. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to show that the defendant had the requisite intent to defraud and had not made a wager contingent on winning a gambling game. The court also held that expert testimony regarding the definition of a "wager" was admissible, and found that the lower court’s error of admitting reference to case law in the expert’s testimony was harmless. The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals in part and vacated it in part, ultimately affirming the judgment of the District Court. View "State of Iowa v. Slaughter" on Justia Law

Wynn v. The Associated Press

2024-02-15T16:02:42-08:00

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, the plaintiff, Steve Wynn, a prominent figure in Nevada gaming and politics, filed a defamation claim against the defendants, The Associated Press and its reporter, Regina Garcia Cano. The claim arose from an article that reported on two separate citizens' complaints alleging sexual assault by Wynn in the 1970s. The defendants responded with a special motion to dismiss the claim under Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes, which aim to protect the right to free speech and prevent meritless lawsuits intended to chill the exercise of these rights. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that the article was a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to free speech in connection with an issue of public concern and that Wynn failed to establish a probability of prevailing on the merits of his claim. Wynn appealed this decision, arguing that the district court erred in its analysis under the two-prong anti-SLAPP framework. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. Under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the court found that the defendants had established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the claim was based on a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern. Under the second prong, the court clarified that a public figure defamation plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence for a jury, by clear and convincing evidence, to reasonably infer that the publication was made with actual malice. In this case, the court determined that Wynn failed to meet this burden. Hence, he could not establish with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on his claim, leading to the affirmation of the district court's order granting the defendants' special motion to dismiss the complaint. View "Wynn v. The Associated Press" on Justia Law

AC Ocean Walk, LLC v. American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company

2024-01-24T07:05:05-08:00

Ocean Walk, LLC, a company that operates a casino and other entertainment facilities in New Jersey, sought coverage under its commercial property insurance policies for losses sustained during the COVID-19 pandemic. The company claimed that the presence of the virus in its facilities and the government-mandated temporary suspension of its operations constituted a “direct physical loss” or “direct physical damage” to its property under the terms of the insurance policies issued by several defendants. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, however, disagreed with this interpretation and held that Ocean Walk’s allegations failed to meet the policy language's requirements. The court ruled that to demonstrate a “direct physical loss” or “direct physical damage,” Ocean Walk needed to show that its property was destroyed or altered in such a way that rendered it unusable or uninhabitable. The court noted that the company’s allegations did not suggest that the property suffered a physical change; rather, the company was simply not allowed to use its property due to the executive orders. Furthermore, the court ruled that even if Ocean Walk had pled facts supporting the finding of a covered “loss” or “damage,” the losses it claimed were excluded from coverage by the policies’ contamination exclusion. The court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of Ocean Walk’s complaint. View "AC Ocean Walk, LLC v. American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Greenwood Gaming v. Dept. of Rev.

2023-12-19T08:22:48-08:00

In Pennsylvania, a group of casinos, including Greenwood Gaming and Entertainment, Inc., Mountainview Thoroughbred Racing Association, LLC, and Chester Downs and Marina, LLC, sued the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue. The casinos claimed that online games offered by the state lottery simulated slot machines, violating restrictions imposed by the state legislature and infringing on the casinos' share of the online market. The Commonwealth Court disagreed and dismissed their complaint. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the Commonwealth Court erred in its interpretation of the law by focusing on individual components of an online lottery game. The Supreme Court held that determining whether an online lottery game violates the prohibition against simulating a slot machine requires a subjective assessment of the game's overall appearance and effect when in play. The Supreme Court vacated the order of the Commonwealth Court and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to focus on the overall presentation and effect of the challenged game, not on individual features. View "Greenwood Gaming v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

Gattineri v. Wynn MA, LLC

2023-11-06T05:04:05-08:00

The Supreme Judicial Court held that an agreement entered into between Plaintiff Anthony Gattineri and Defendants Wynn MA, LLC and Wynn Resorts, Limited (collectively, Wynn) in San Diego California (the San Diego agreement) was unenforceable for reasons of public policy. Wynn entered into an option contract with FBT Everett Realty, LLC (FBT) to purchase a parcel of property. As Wynn's application for a casino license proceeded, the Massachusetts Gaming Commission discovered that there was a possibility of concealed ownership interests in FBT by a convicted felon with organized crime connections. In response, FBT lowered the purchase price for the parcel. The Commission approved the amended option agreement. Gattineri, a minority owner of FBT, opposed the price reduction and refused to sign the certificate required by the Commission. Gattineri alleged that at the San Diego meeting Wynn had agreed to pay Gattineri an additional $19 million in exchange for Gattineri signing the certificate. After the Commission awarded Wynn a casino license Gattineri brought suit claiming breach of the San Diego agreement because Wynn never paid Gattineri the promised $19 million. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the agreement was deliberately concealed from the Commission and inconsistent with the terms approved by the Commission; and (2) enforcement of such a secret agreement constituted a clear violation of public policy. View "Gattineri v. Wynn MA, LLC" on Justia Law

Dream, Inc. d/b/a Frontier Bingo v. Samuels

2023-11-01T12:41:49-08:00

Dream, Inc., d/b/a Frontier Bingo ("Frontier"), operated an electronic "bingo" facility located in Greene County, Alabama. Frontier refused to pay Tony Samuels $30,083.88 that he purportedly won playing electronic "bingo" at Frontier's facility. Samuels filed suit against Frontier alleging breach of contract and fraud. Following a jury trial, the trial court entered a judgment on the jury's verdict in favor of Samuels, ordering Frontier to pay Samuels $500,000, and Frontier appealed. Electronic "bingo" games, however, constitute illegal gambling in Alabama. Because Alabama will not enforce an illegal transaction, either in contract or in tort, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed the judgment and rendered a judgment in favor of Frontier. View "Dream, Inc. d/b/a Frontier Bingo v. Samuels" on Justia Law

Whaley, et al. v. Dept. of Alabama Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States

2023-10-31T19:51:14-08:00

This appeal related to "electronic-bingo" operations conducted by the Department of Alabama Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States ("the VFW") at some of its Alabama posts. Travis Whaley and Randall Lovvorn contracted with the VFW to superintend and promote its electronic-bingo operations. Between 1997 and 2013, Whaley served the VFW as adjutant, commander, and quartermaster at different times. For his part, Lovvorn served as the VFW's accountant. The VFW contracted with G2 Operations, Inc. ("G2"), to conduct its electronic-bingo operations. Under contract, G2 agreed to conduct electronic-bingo operations at VFW posts throughout Alabama, and the VFW would receive 10% of the gross revenue. All the proceeds from electronic bingo were deposited into a VFW bank account. The VFW also entered into contracts with Whaley and Lovvorn, assigning them specific roles in its electronic-bingo operations. Several years later, after being notified of a tax penalty from the IRS, the VFW discovered a shortfall of $1,782,368.88 from what it should have received under its contracts with G2. The VFW filed a complaint asserting claims against G2 as well as additional claims against other parties, which were eventually whittled down throughout litigation until only claims against Whaley and Lovvorn remained. A jury reached a verdict against Whaley and Lovvorn on VFW's claims of breach of contract, fraudulent suppression, and conversion, awarding $1,782,368.88 in compensatory damages and $2,000,000 in punitive damages. Because the VFW's claims rely upon its own involvement in illegal transactions, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and rendered judgment in favor of Whaley and Lovvorn. View "Whaley, et al. v. Dept. of Alabama Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States" on Justia Law

Cherokee Nation Businesses, LLC v. Gulfside Casino Partnership

2023-10-31T07:09:25-08:00

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court holding that the Arkansas Racing Commission's (ARC) decision to award the Pope County casino license to Cherokee Nation Businesses, LLC (CNB) and Legends Resort and Casino, LLC (Legends) was a "legal nullity, void and of no effect," holding that the circuit court did not err. In this third iteration of appeals involving the issuance of the license Gulfside Casino Partnership (Gulfside) argued that the ARC's action was ultra vires because it was issued in violation of the clear language of amendment 100 to the Arkansas Constitution. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Gulfside, concluding that the casino license issued by the ARC jointly to CNB and Legends was an ultra vires action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its decision. View "Cherokee Nation Businesses, LLC v. Gulfside Casino Partnership" on Justia Law

ARKK Properties, LLC v. Cameron

2023-10-26T06:04:33-08:00

The Supreme Court held that Senate Bill (S.B.) 126, which amended Ky. Rev. Stat. 452.005, was unconstitutional and declined to extend comity. Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of House Bill 594, which banned certain types of electronic gaming machines. In response, the Attorney General, who was a named defendant, invoked the newly-enacted provision of S.B. 126, seeking to transfer the case to another circuit court by way of a lottery selection. Plaintiffs responded by challenging the constitutionality of S.B. 126's mandatory transfer procedure. The circuit court temporarily stayed its ruling on Defendants' motion to transfer, and Plaintiffs sought a supervisory writ from the Supreme Court to prohibit transfer of the action and seeking a declaration that S.B. 126 was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted relief, holding (1) S.B. 126 violates the separation of powers doctrine, contrary to sections 27, 28, 109, 110 and 116 of the Kentucky Constitution; and (2) S.B. 126 is not extended comity. View "ARKK Properties, LLC v. Cameron" on Justia Law

Funvestment Group, LLC v. Crittenden

2023-09-19T04:31:32-08:00

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to decide whether revenue generated from the lease of a bona fide coin operated amusement machine (“COAM”) qualified as “gross revenues” exempt from taxation under OCGA § 48-8-3 (43). Funvestment Group, LLC, the lessee of the COAMs at issue and the owner of the location where the COAMs were available for play, argued that revenues generated from the lease of COAMs were considered “gross revenues” exempt from sales and use tax. The Court of Appeals concluded that the subject lease revenues were not “gross revenues” and that the exemption only applied to money inserted into COAMs for play. The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred in reaching this conclusion, and thus reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment. View "Funvestment Group, LLC v. Crittenden" on Justia Law

Corrales v. Cal. Gambling Control Com.

2023-07-10T12:01:01-08:00

The lawsuit giving rise to this appeal was brought by Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Corrales, on behalf of himself, against the California Gambling Control Commission (the Commission) and the two competing factions of the California Valley Miwok Tribe (the Tribe), including his former client, the "Burley faction." In the Court of Appeals' preceding opinion, CVMT 2020, the Court affirmed, on res judicata grounds, the dismissal of a lawsuit filed by attorney Corrales against the Commission on behalf of the Burley faction. Through this lawsuit, Corrales sought to ensure that he received payment from the Tribe for the attorney fees that he claims he was due under a fee agreement he entered into with the Burley faction in 2007. Specifically, even though the Tribe’s leadership dispute was still not resolved, Corrales sought either (1) an order requiring the Commission to make immediate payment to him from the Tribe’s RSTF money, or (2) an order that when the Commission eventually decides to release the Indian Gaming Revenue Sharing Trust Fund (RSTF) money to the Tribe, his attorney fees had to be paid directly to him by the Commission before the remainder of the funds were released to the Tribe. The trial court dismissed Corrales’s lawsuit because the question of whether Burley represented the Tribe in 2007 for the purpose of entering into a binding fee agreement with Corrales on behalf of the Tribe required the resolution of an internal tribal leadership and membership dispute, over which the courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction. After judgment was entered, Corrales brought a motion for a new trial and a motion for relief from default. Among other things, Corrales argued that the trial court should have stayed his lawsuit rather than dismissing it. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's dismissal, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Corrales v. Cal. Gambling Control Com." on Justia Law

West Flagler Associates, Ltd. v. Debra Haaland

2023-06-30T07:04:44-08:00

The Seminole Tribe of Florida (“Tribe”) and the State of Florida entered into a compact under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”). That gaming compact (“Compact”) purported to permit the Tribe to offer online sports betting throughout the state. The Compact became effective when the Secretary of the Interior failed to either approve or disapprove it within 45 days of receiving it from the Tribe and Florida. The Plaintiffs, in this case, brick-and-mortar casinos in Florida, object to the Secretary’s decision to allow the Compact to go into effect because, in their view, it violated IGRA. They also believe that the Compact violates the Wire Act, the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, and the Fifth Amendment and that the Secretary was required to disapprove the Compact for those reasons as well. The district court denied the Tribe’s motion and granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The DC Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the Secretary. The court explained that IGRA does not prohibit a gaming compact—which is, at bottom, an agreement between a tribe and a state—from discussing other topics, including those governing activities “outside Indian lands.” Accordingly, the court explained that the district court erred by reading into the Compact a legal effect it does not (and cannot) have, namely, independently authorizing betting by patrons located outside of the Tribe’s lands. The court held only that the district erred by reading into the Compact a legal effect it does not (and cannot) have, namely, independently authorizing betting by patrons located outside of the Tribe’s lands. View "West Flagler Associates, Ltd. v. Debra Haaland" on Justia Law

Santa Ynez Band of Chumash etc. v. Lexington Ins. Co.

2023-04-27T11:31:25-08:00

The Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Mission Indians of the Santa Ynez Reservation California (Chumash) appealed a judgment following the granting of a motion for summary judgment in favor of Lexington Insurance Company (Lexington) in Chumash’s lawsuit against Lexington for denial of insurance coverage. The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that, among other things, Chumash did not present sufficient evidence to show that the COVID-19 virus caused physical property damage to its casino and resort so as to fall within the property damage coverage provisions of the Lexington insurance policy. The court explained that had the Chumash Casino and Resort sustained property damage, it was required to specify what property was damaged and to submit a claim for the dollar amount of that loss. The absence of such information supports Lexington’s decision to deny coverage. View "Santa Ynez Band of Chumash etc. v. Lexington Ins. Co." on Justia Law

CHICKEN RANCH RANCHERIA, ET AL V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL

2023-04-25T08:30:45-08:00

The Tribes sued the State of California for its failure to comply with IGRA. In an earlier opinion (Chicken Ranch I), the panel ruled for the Tribes, first noting that California Government Code Section 98005 explicitly waived the state’s sovereign immunity from suit. The panel held that California violated IGRA by failing to negotiate in good faith a Class III gaming compact with the Tribes, and it ordered the district court to implement IGRA’s remedial framework. After prevailing, the Tribes sought attorneys’ fees spent litigating the Chicken Ranch I appeal. The Ninth Circuit denied the request for attorneys’ fees. The panel held that because the Tribes prevailed on a federal cause of action, they were entitled to attorneys’ fees only if federal law allowed them. Because it did not, the panel denied the Tribes’ fee request. The panel rejected the Tribes’ argument that there is an exception authorizing attorneys’ fees in federal question cases when the claims implicate “substantial and significant issues of state law.” The panel distinguished Independent Living Center of Southern California, Inc. v. Kent, 909 F.3d 272 (9th Cir. 2018), in which there was no federal cause of action but there was federal question jurisdiction over a state-law claim that fell within a small category cases where a federal issue is necessarily raised, actually disputed, substantial, and capable of resolution in federal court without disturbing the federal-state balance approved by Congress. View "CHICKEN RANCH RANCHERIA, ET AL V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL" on Justia Law

Gattineri v. Wynn MA, LLC

2023-03-22T12:30:49-08:00

In this case concerning the regulation of gambling licenses in the Commonwealth the First Circuit reversed in part the summary judgment for Defendants and certified questions of law to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC). An option contract for the purchase of land gave Encore Boston Harbor the option to purchase land from FBT Realty, LLC for $75 million should the Massachusetts Gaming Commission grant Encore a gaming license. The Commission ultimately conditioned the grant of the license on a $35 million purchase price for the sale of the land and signed certification by each member of FBT, except for Plaintiff, that they were sole members of the company. Defendants presented Plaintiff with an offer that would "make him whole" if he signed the certification in a contract. Plaintiff executed the required certification and then brought this action alleging, among other claims, breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, finding no valid or enforceable contract. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to certain claims and that the question of whether the contract was unenforceable as contrary to state law and/or as a violation of public policy must be resolved by the SJC. View "Gattineri v. Wynn MA, LLC" on Justia Law

Gostev v. Skillz Platform, Inc.

2023-02-28T11:08:35-08:00

Skillz provides a mobile platform that hosts games in which players compete for cash prizes. To participate in paid-entry competitions, a user must save the player account; after entering a date of birth, the user must tap a box with the word “Next.” Below the “Next” box is the advisory statement: “By tapping ‘Next,’ I agree to the Terms of Service and the Privacy Policy.” A hyperlink, if tapped, takes the user to Skillz’s terms of service. Gostev saved a Skillz player account in 2019. The Terms of Service then had 15 pages. Gostev sued Skillz, alleging that its games constituted illegal gambling, predatory and unlawful practices, and violated the Unfair Competition Law and the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Gostev alleged the arbitration agreement was unenforceable. Skillz argued that Gostev’s challenges to the enforceability of the arbitration provision had to be submitted to an arbitrator. The court of appeal affirmed a finding that the arbitration agreement was procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The court noted provisions that a plaintiff’s damages are limited, the arbitration must occur in San Francisco, a plaintiff only has one year to bring his claim, the parties must split the arbitration fees and costs, and the defendant can obtain equitable relief without posting a bond or security. Unconscionability ”permeates the agreement such that severance is unavailable,” View "Gostev v. Skillz Platform, Inc." on Justia Law

Campbell County Bd. of Commissioners v. Wyo. Horse Racing, LLC

2023-01-31T08:16:46-08:00

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court setting aside Resolution 2077, which was adopted by the Campbell County Board of Commissioners in 2021, holding that there was no error. Resolution 2077 "revoked and superseded" previous resolutions approving Petitioners - Wyoming Horse Racing, LLC and Wyoming Downs, LLC - to conduct simulcast operations under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 11-25-102(a)(vii)(B) and placed conditions on all future approvals. Petitioners filed a petition for judicial review, arguing that the resolution exceeded the statutory authority of Campbell County under the Wyoming Pari-Mutuel Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 11-25-101 et seq. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the County had authority under the Pari-Mutuel Act to revoke its prior approvals of Petitioners' simulcast operations. View "Campbell County Bd. of Commissioners v. Wyo. Horse Racing, LLC" on Justia Law

Brighton Ventures 2 LLC v. Alabama

2023-01-13T15:00:11-08:00

In consolidated appeals, Brighton Ventures 2 LLC and the St. John Life Center ("the Life Center") appealed a circuit court judgment order forfeiting $446,897.19 that was found to have been used as bets or stakes as part of an illegal gambling operation. The City of Brighton ("the City") had an ordinance permitting the establishment of charitable bingo operations within its city limits. In early 2019, an application for a charity-bingo business license was submitted to the City on behalf of Super Highway Bingo ("the casino"); the Life Center was listed as the named charity. In February 2019, the City issued the requested business license, and, in March 2019, the casino officially opened. According to the record, Brighton Ventures was responsible for the day- to-day operations of the casino and, in exchange for its management services, received 85% of the casino's profits. The Life Center, in return, received 15% of the casino's profits. Around the time the casino opened, the Alabama Attorney General's Office began an investigation into "electronic bingo" activity occurring there. "Electronic bingo is illegal in Alabama." An undercover investigator from the Attorney General's office was able to play electronic bingo games at the casino. The State executed multiple search warrants at the casino during which it seized, among other things, over 200 "electronic bingo" machines and large sums of cash. Relevant to these appeals, the State then initiated separate actions, petitioning the circuit court for an in rem civil forfeiture of the $446,897.19. Brighton Ventures and the Life Center denied that the funds seized were "used as bets or stakes in gambling activity" as described in § 13A-12-30(c) and argued that the State had unlawfully seized the funds. They also asserted counterclaims in which they alleged, among other things, that forfeiture of the funds constitutes an "excessive fine" in violation of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Alabama Supreme Court found no error in the circuit court's judgment and affirmed the order ordering the forfeiture. View "Brighton Ventures 2 LLC v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. Michael Houdyshell

2022-10-04T07:30:42-08:00

The Eighth Circuit reviewed a case for the second time regarding “whether a South Dakota tax on nonmember activity on the Flandreau Indian Reservation (the Reservation) in Moody County, South Dakota is preempted by federal law. On remand, and after a six-day video bench trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the Tribe, concluding again that federal law preempts the imposition of the tax. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that in light of guideposts from the Supreme Court, even with the evidence that the district court heard at trial, the court cannot conclude that the federal regulation in IGRA regarding casino construction is extensive. The court reasoned that even with a more factually developed record than the court considered on summary judgment, the Bracker balancing test does not weigh in favor of preemption under IGRA because the extent of federal regulation over casino construction on tribal land is minimal, the impact of the excise tax on the tribal interests is minimal, and the State has a strong interest in raising revenue to provide essential government services to its citizens, including tribal members. The district court thus erroneously entered judgment in favor of the Tribe based on IGRA’s preemption of the excise tax. View "Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. Michael Houdyshell" on Justia Law

White Hall Entertainment, et al. v. Alabama

2022-09-30T08:30:14-08:00

In 2017, the State of Alabama sued, among others, Epic Tech, LLC ("Epic Tech"); K.C. Economic Development, LLC, d/b/a VictoryLand ("KCED"); and Sheriff Andre Brunson, in his official capacity as sheriff of Macon County (referred to collectively as "the Macon County defendants"). At around that same time, the State sued, White Hall Enrichment Advancement Team d/b/a Southern Star Entertainment ("Southern Star") and White Hall (referred to collectively as "the Lowndes County defendants"). In each action, the State sought an order declaring the illegal gambling operations conducted by the defendants to be a public nuisance and related injunctive relief. The State's complaint in each action was also accompanied by a motion seeking the entry of an order preliminarily enjoining the defendants from engaging in illegal gambling operations. In case nos. 1200798 and 1210064, the State appealed Macon Circuit Court and Lowndes Circuit Court orders denying the State's requests for injunctive relief. In case no. 1210122, defendants/counterclaim plaintiffs White Hall Entertainment and the White Hall Town Council (referred to collectively as "White Hall"), cross-appealed the Lowndes Circuit Court's order dismissing their counterclaims against the State. The Alabama Supreme Court consolidated these appeals. In case no. 1200798, the Court reversed the Macon Circuit Court order denying the State's request for preliminary injunctive relief and remanded the matter for that court to enter, within 30 days, a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants' gambling operations in Macon County; in case no. 1210064, the Court reversed the Lowndes Circuit Court order denying the State's request for permanent injunctive relief and remanded the matter for that court to enter, within 30 days, a permanent injunction enjoining the defendants' gambling operations in Lowndes County; and in case no. 1210122, the Court affirmed the Lowndes Circuit Court's order dismissing White Hall's counterclaims. View "White Hall Entertainment, et al. v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Silva v. Farrish

2022-08-25T06:30:05-08:00

Plaintiffs are members of the Shinnecock Indian Nation and assert an ancestral right to fish in the Shinnecock Bay without interference. Over the past decade, state officials ticketed and prosecuted Plaintiffs for violating state fishing laws. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the further enforcement of the regulations as well as damages based on allegations of discrimination in past enforcement. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants. The Second Circuit found that Ex Parte Young applies to Plaintiffs’ fishing-rights claims against the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (“DEC”) officials— but not against the DEC itself—because Plaintiffs allege an ongoing violation of federal law and seek prospective relief against state officials. Thus, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the DEC officials on Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. However, the district court properly granted summary judgment on the discrimination claims because there is no evidence in the record that would permit an inference of discriminatory intent. View "Silva v. Farrish" on Justia Law

CHICKEN RANCH RANCHERIA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA

2022-07-28T09:05:02-08:00

The Chicken Ranch Rancheria of Mewuk Indians (“tribes”) alleged that California violated Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”) by failing to act in good faith in the parties’ negotiations for compacts for the tribes to conduct high-stakes Las Vegas style casino gambling, known as Class III gaming. The district court concluded that California’s demand for tribal enforcement of state domestic support orders “pulled negotiations into a field wholly collateral to the operation of gaming facilities” and thus constituted “per se evidence of bad faith.” The district court concluded that other disputed provisions were “somewhat connected” to gaming and thus not a per se violation of the State’s good-faith duty, but California nevertheless was required to provide “meaningful concessions” in exchange for demanding these provisions, and the State’s failure to do so was a failure to negotiate in good faith, triggering IGRA’s remedial provisions. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, on different grounds, the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the tribes. The court held that through its insistence on family law, environmental law, and tort provisions, California substantially exceeded IGRA’s limitation that any Class III compact provision be directly related to the operation of gaming activities. The court further held that when, as here, a State seeks to negotiate for compact provisions that fall well outside IGRA's seven permissible topics of negotiation, as set forth in an exhaustive list in 25 U.S.C. Section 2710(d)(3)(C), the State has not acted in good faith. View "CHICKEN RANCH RANCHERIA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA" on Justia Law

State of TX v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, et al

2022-07-21T09:30:33-08:00

The State of Texas sought to enjoin the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo from holding live-called and electronic bingo. The district court granted the injunction and the Fifth Circuit upheld it under its prior decisions. In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Texas v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, 955 F.3d 508 (5th Cir. 2020), overruled by No. 20- 493, 2022 WL 2135494 (2022), the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The court wrote that the Supreme Court granted the Pueblo’s petition and rejected Texas’s contention that Congress has allowed all of the state’s gaming laws to operate as surrogate federal law enforceable on the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo Reservation. Under the Court’s interpretation of the Restoration Act, “if a gaming activity is prohibited by Texas law”—that is, absolutely “banned in Texas”—then “it is also prohibited on tribal land as a matter of federal law.” But if the gaming activity is merely regulated by Texas law—that is, “by fixing the time, place, and manner in which the game may be conducted”—then it’s only “subject to tribal regulation” and “the terms and conditions set forth in federal law, including [the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act] to the extent it is applicable.” View "State of TX v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, et al" on Justia Law

Alabama Department of Revenue v. Greenetrack, Inc.

2022-06-30T09:30:05-08:00

In 2003, the Alabama Legislature and the citizens of Greene County voted to allow nonprofit organizations in that county to operate bingo games for fundraising purposes. Greenetrack, Inc. ("Greenetrack"), which was not a nonprofit organization, almost immediately began offering live and electronic bingo games at its gambling facility. From 2004 to 2008, Greenetrack reaped vast profits under the guise that its whole casino-style bingo operation was constantly being leased and operated by a revolving slate of local nonprofit organizations, whose nominal role earned them a tiny fraction of the bingo proceeds. Eventually, the Alabama Department of Revenue ("the Department") audited Greenetrack, found that its bingo activities were illegal, and concluded that it owed over $76 million in unpaid taxes and interest. Following a decade of litigation, the Alabama Tax Tribunal voided the assessed taxes on the threshold ground that Greenetrack's bingo business (regardless of its legality) was tax-immune under a statute governing Greenetrack's status as a licensed operator of dog races. The Department appealed, and the Alabama Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the statutory analysis offered by the Tax Tribunal and circuit court. Judgment was rendered in favor of the Department. View "Alabama Department of Revenue v. Greenetrack, Inc." on Justia Law

Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas

2022-06-15T07:35:13-08:00

In 1968, Congress recognized the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo Indian tribe. In 1983, Texas renounced its trust responsibilities with respect to the Tribe and expressed opposition to any new federal legislation that did not permit the state to apply its gaming laws on tribal lands. Congress restored the Tribe’s federal trust status in the 1987 Restoration Act, “prohibiting” all “gaming activities which are prohibited by the laws of the State of Texas.” Congress then adopted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), which permitted Tribes to offer class II games—like bingo—in states that “permi[t] such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization or entity,” 25 U.S.C. 2710(b)(1)(A). IGRA allowed Tribes to offer class III games—like blackjack and baccarat—only pursuant to negotiated tribal/state compacts. Texas refused to negotiate a compact regarding class III games. In 1994, the Fifth Circuit held that the Restoration Act superseded IGRA. In 2016, the Tribe began offering bingo, including “electronic bingo.” The Fifth Circuit upheld an injunction, shutting down all of the Tribe’s bingo operations. The Supreme Court vacated. The Restoration Act bans, on tribal lands, only those gaming activities also banned in Texas. Texas laws do not “forbid,” “prevent,” or “make impossible” bingo operations but allow the game according to rules concerning time, place, and manner. Texas’s bingo laws are regulatory, not prohibitory. When Congress adopted the Restoration Act, Supreme Court precedent held that California’s bingo laws—materially identical to Texas’s laws—were regulatory and that only “prohibitory” state gaming laws could be applied on the Indian lands in question, not state “regulatory” gaming laws. The Restoration Act provides that a gaming activity prohibited by Texas law is also prohibited on tribal land as a matter of federal law. Other gaming activities are subject to tribal regulation and must conform to IGRA. View "Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas" on Justia Law

FBT Everett Realty, LLC v. Massachusetts Gaming Commission

2022-05-24T04:30:00-08:00

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the superior court dismissing FBT's claim against the Massachusetts Gaming Commission alleging intentional interference with a contract and granting summary judgment on the remaining regulatory taking claim, holding that summary judgment on the regulatory takings claim was improper. Plaintiff brought this suit against the Commission alleging various claims including tortious interference with contract and a regulatory taking after the Commission refused to allow Plaintiff to receive a "casino-use premium" on the sale of a parcel of land in Everett. The superior court dismissed the tortious interference claim and granted summary judgment on the regulatory takings claim. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the grant of summary judgment on the regulatory takings claim, holding that there were material disputed facts at issue precluding summary judgment. View "FBT Everett Realty, LLC v. Massachusetts Gaming Commission" on Justia Law

SAN FRANCISCO HERRING ASSOC. V. USDOI

2022-05-10T09:05:14-08:00

Plaintiff, a non-profit group composed of small business owners who fish in the Bay Area, sued various government agencies seeking to prevent the enforcement of a commercial fishing prohibition that applies generally in national parks. Plaintiff claims that the Golden Gate National Recreation Area (GGNRA) does not confer with National Park Service with the ability to regulate offshore waters. The district court granted summary judgment to the government entities. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that the text and structure of the GGNRA Act confirm that Congress has given the Park Service administrative jurisdiction over the waters in question. Nothing in the GGNRA Act supports the Plaintiff's position, that the Park Service must first establish a property interest in the waters from the State of California. View "SAN FRANCISCO HERRING ASSOC. V. USDOI" on Justia Law

Swallow v. Cal. Gambling Control Commission

2022-04-27T10:30:49-08:00

After a hearing, the California Gambling Control Commission (Commission) revoked and refused to renew the gambling license of cross-appellant Eric Swallow. The Commission also imposed a monetary penalty and costs against Swallow. Swallow petitioned the trial court for a writ of mandate, challenging the revocation and nonrenewal of his gambling license, the amount of the monetary penalty, and the costs. The trial court granted Swallow’s petition in part and denied it in part, concluding the Commission did not violate Swallow’s due process rights when it revoked and refused to renew Swallow’s gambling license, except that the Commission may have relied on unproven misconduct. The trial court therefore remanded to the Commission “to ensure that Swallow is not disciplined based on misconduct that was not proven.” The trial court also concluded the amount of the monetary penalty imposed by the Commission was not supported by law, and the costs could only be assessed by the ALJ on remand. It therefore vacated the penalty and costs imposed and remanded for the Commission to redetermine the amount of the penalty and to refer the issue of costs to the ALJ. Both the Commission and Swallow appealed. The Court of Appeal concluded: (1) Business and Professions Code section 19930(c), when considered within the statutory and regulatory framework of the Gambling Control Act, did not authorize the monetary penalty; (2) the Commission had jurisdiction to revoke Swallow’s gambling license; (3) the Commission did not violate Swallow’s due process rights; (4) Swallow failed to present a proper argument challenging the sufficiency of the evidence; and (5) the trial court properly remanded the issue of costs for further proceedings. The Court modified the judgment granting the peremptory writ of mandate to order the Commission to reconsider the monetary penalty in a manner consistent with its opinion instead of the trial court’s order. View "Swallow v. Cal. Gambling Control Commission" on Justia Law

B.D. v. Blizzard Entertainment

2022-03-29T11:00:48-08:00

Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. (Blizzard) appealed an order denying its motion to compel arbitration. B.D., a minor, played Blizzard’s online videogame “Overwatch,” and used “real money” to make in-game purchases of “Loot Boxes” - items that offer “randomized chances . . . to obtain desirable or helpful ‘loot’ in the game.” B.D. and his father (together, Plaintiffs) sued Blizzard, alleging the sale of loot boxes with randomized values constituted unlawful gambling, and, thus, violated the California Unfair Competition Law (UCL). Plaintiffs sought only prospective injunctive relief, plus attorney fees and costs. Blizzard moved to compel arbitration based on the dispute resolution policy incorporated into various iterations of the online license agreement that Blizzard presented to users when they signed up for, downloaded, and used Blizzard’s service. The trial court denied the motion, finding a “reasonably prudent user would not have inquiry notice of the agreement” to arbitrate because “there was no conspicuous notice of an arbitration” provision in any of the license agreements. The Court of Appeal disagreed: the operative version of Blizzard’s license agreement was presented to users in an online pop-up window that contained the entire agreement within a scrollable text box. View "B.D. v. Blizzard Entertainment" on Justia Law

White v. Cuomo

2022-03-22T06:35:27-08:00

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the appellate division modifying and affirming the judgment of Supreme Court declaring that article 14 of the Racing, Pari-Mutuel Wagering and breeding Law violates the constitutional prohibition on gambling to the extent it authorizes interactive fantasy sport (IFS) contests, holding that Plaintiffs did not meet their burden to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that article 14 is unconstitutional. In 2016, the legislature enacted article 14, which authorizes and regulates IFS contests, upon determining that IFS contests are not unconstitutional gambling activities because they are skill-based competitions in which contestants have some influence over the outcome of the fantasy contests. At issue was whether the legislature properly determined that IFS contests authorized in article 14 are not unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals held that the legislature's conclusion that IFS contests are not "gambling" is consistent with precedent delineating the parameters of that term. View "White v. Cuomo" on Justia Law

Gift Surplus, LLC v. State ex rel. Cooper

2022-02-11T08:35:40-08:00

The Supreme Court held that chance predominated over skill in Plaintiffs' new video game and, therefore, this game was a game of chance that violated N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-306.4, which prohibits the operation of sweepstakes conducted through video games of chance. Plaintiffs sued Governor Roy Cooper and certain state law enforcement officials seeking a declaratory judgment that Defendants' operation of a sweepstakes through video game kiosks does not violate N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-306.4, which criminalizes certain video sweepstakes. The trial court held that the sweepstakes game was lawful, but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' new game was a video game of chance prohibited by section 14-306.4. View "Gift Surplus, LLC v. State ex rel. Cooper" on Justia Law

North Dakota v. Bala

2022-01-07T08:30:21-08:00

Debtor, licensed under North Dakota’s pari-mutuel wagering system, filed for bankruptcy in 2004. Ten years later, the district court ruled that the state was not authorized to collect certain taxes from the Debtor. North Dakota agreed to pay the estate $15 million. Creditors asserted claims. Although the state constitution provides that “the entire net proceeds of such games of chance are to be devoted to educational, charitable, patriotic, fraternal, religious, or other public-spirited uses,” North Dakota did not raise the rights of any charities. In 2018, the bankruptcy court ruled on the claims. North Dakota filed a new proof of claim. The court concluded that the state lacked parens patriae authority to assert claims on behalf of charities. The Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) remanded. On remand, the state attempted to add a breach of contract claim. The bankruptcy court denied that motion and concluded that the contract claim had no merit. The court also rejected a constitutional-statutory claim. The BAP affirmed, rejecting arguments that North Dakota law requires that charities, not Debtor, recover the remaining tax settlement funds and that the court erred when it disallowed the contract claim. The state constitution concerns the legislature and does not govern the actions of private parties such as Debtor. Debtor paid the taxes originally; the reimbursement of those improperly-paid taxes should inure to the benefit of Debtor after distribution under the bankruptcy priority scheme. View "North Dakota v. Bala" on Justia Law

Peveto v. State

2021-12-02T08:01:47-08:00

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order dismissing Appellant's complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, holding that there was no error. Appellant was cited for aiding and abetting two individuals in his boat who were violating Arkansas Game and Fish Commission (AG&FC) Regulation N1.03(B)(3)(i)(b), which prohibits using barbed hooks in designated areas, and Regulation 1.00-C. Appellant filed a complaint seeking declaratory judgment that the two regulations are unconstitutional because they are in direct conflict with Ark. Code Ann. 35, 8. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, determining that there was no conflict between the AG&FC regulations and the Arkansas Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the regulations in question were not unconstitutional. View "Peveto v. State" on Justia Law

Greenwood Gaming v. Pennsylvania

2021-11-17T06:38:31-08:00

Appellee Greenwood Gaming & Entertainment Inc. (“Greenwood”) operated Parx Casino (“Parx”), located in Bensalem, Pennsylvania. During 2014, as part of its efforts to encourage slot machine and table game play, Greenwood distributed to patrons of Parx who played its slot machines and table games various “promotions, giveaways and direct player development:” items given away included cash, department store gift cards, and items of personal property. Parx also gave away tickets to attend live concerts and entertainment performances. In 2016, Greenwood filed a petition for refund with the Board of Appeals of the Department of Revenue (“Board of Appeals”) for the calendar year 2014, contending that it was entitled under Section 1103 of the Pennsylvania Gaming Act to exclude from the taxable revenue attributable to its table games and slot machines the value of all cash and personal property it distributed to the players of those games. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that concert tickets were not services within the meaning of Section 1103, and so were excludible from these taxable revenues. View "Greenwood Gaming v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

Rincon Band of Luiseno Mission Indians etc. v. Flynt

2021-10-28T13:01:41-08:00

Plaintiffs, two American Indian tribes, business entities affiliated with the tribes, and individual tribe members, sued a number of non-tribal cardrooms alleging they were offering banked card games on non-tribal land, in violation of the exclusive right of Indian tribes to offer such games. Based on those allegations, plaintiffs asserted claims for public nuisance, unfair competition, declaratory and injunctive relief, and tortious interference with a contractual relationship and prospective economic advantage. The defendants demurred and, after two rounds of amendments to the complaint, the trial court sustained the third and final demurrer without leave to amend and entered judgment of dismissal. The court ruled that, as governmental entities, the Indian tribes and their affiliated business entities were not “persons” with standing to sue under the unfair competition law (UCL), and were not “private person[s]” with standing under the public nuisance statutes. The court further ruled the business entities and the individual tribe members failed to plead sufficient injury to themselves to establish standing to sue under the UCL or the public nuisance statutes. Although plaintiffs broadly framed the issue on appeal as whether they, as American Indians, had standing to redress their grievances in California state courts, the Court of Appeal determined it was much narrower: whether the complaint in this case adequately plead the asserted claims and contained allegations sufficient to establish the threshold issue of whether any of the named plaintiffs had standing to bring those claims. The Court agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that the complaint did not do so and, therefore, affirmed judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Rincon Band of Luiseno Mission Indians etc. v. Flynt" on Justia Law

Cherokee Nation Businesses, LLC v. Gulfside Casino Partnership

2021-10-21T07:01:11-08:00

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order finding that both Rule 2.13(b)(5) of the Casino Gaming Rules and Ark. Code Ann. 27-117-101(b) are unconstitutional, holding that the circuit court erred. In 2019, the Arkansas Racing Commission (ARC) adopted Rule 2.13(5)(b) (the Rule) of the ARC-Casino Gaming Rules, which provides that letters of support must be from the county judge, quorum court, or mayor holding office at the time of the submission of an application for a casino license. The General Assembly subsequently passed Act 371 of 2019 (the Act), which was identical to Rule 2.13(5)(b) and is codified at Ark. Code Ann. 23-117-101. Appellant applied for a casino license in May 2019, but the application was denied. Appellant filed the underling litigation challenging the denial of a license and the constitutionality of the Act. The circuit court declared that Rule and the Act were unconstitutional because they imposed an additional qualification to Arkansas Constitutional Amendment 100. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Rule is consistent with Amendment 100 and does not impose an additional requirement; and (2) the Act is consistent with Amendment 100 and does not impose an additional requirement. View "Cherokee Nation Businesses, LLC v. Gulfside Casino Partnership" on Justia Law

Ledyard v. WMS Gaming, Inc.

2021-10-06T09:02:55-08:00

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court reversing decision the judgment of trial court and directing summary judgment for the Town of Ledyard, holding that the ambit of Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-161a includes a directly related federal action that is determinative of a municipality's authority to pursue the underlying state collection proceeding. The Town brought a complaint to collect unpaid taxes for gaming equipment leased by WMS Gaming, Inc. to the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation, for its gaming operations. The Tribal Nation responded by filing a second action in the federal court challenging the Town's authority to impose the taxes. The parties eventually executed a stipulation and motions for summary judgment as to liability only with respect to the federal action attorney's fees. The trial court concluded that the Town was liable for the federal action attorney fees pursuant to section 12-161a. The appellate court reversed, construing section 12-161a to conclude that the Town's liability for attorney's fees under the statute was limited to the collection proceeding in state court and did not include the related federal court proceeding. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that WMS Gaming was entitled to reasonable attorney's fees within the meaning of section 12-161a. View "Ledyard v. WMS Gaming, Inc." on Justia Law

Cayuga Nation v. Tanner

2021-07-27T06:30:08-08:00

The Nation and some of its officials filed suit against the Village of Union Springs and certain of its officials, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) preempts the Village's ordinance regulating gambling as applied to the Nation's operation of a bingo parlor on a parcel of land located within both the Village and the Nation's federal reservation, and for corresponding injunctive relief. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Nation, agreeing with the district court that neither issue nor claim preclusion bars this suit and that IGRA preempts contrary Village law because the parcel of land at issue sits on "Indian lands" within the meaning of that Act. View "Cayuga Nation v. Tanner" on Justia Law

Yocha Dehe Wintun Nation v. United States Department of the Interior

2021-07-06T08:01:27-08:00

The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. 2719, allows a federally recognized Indian tribe to conduct gaming on lands taken into trust by the Secretary of the Interior as of October 17, 1988 and permits gaming on lands that are thereafter taken into trust for an Indian tribe that is restored to federal recognition where the tribe establishes a significant historical connection to the particular land. Scotts Valley Band of Pomo Indians regained its federal recognition in 1991 and requested an opinion on whether a Vallejo parcel would be eligible for tribal gaming. Yocha Dehe, a federally recognized tribe, objected. The Interior Department concluded that Scotts Valley failed to demonstrate the requisite “significant historical connection to the land.” Scotts Valley challenged the decision. Yocha Dehe moved to intervene to defend the decision alongside the government, explaining its interest in preventing Scotts Valley from developing a casino in the Bay Area, which would compete with Yocha Dehe’s gaming facility, and that the site Scotts Valley seeks to develop "holds cultural resources affiliated with [Yocha Dehe’s] Patwin ancestors.” The D.C. Circuit affirmed the denial of Yocha Dehe’s motion, citing lack of standing. Injuries from a potential future competitor are neither “imminent” nor “certainly impending.” There was an insufficient causal link between the alleged threatened injuries and the challenged agency action, given other steps required before Scotts Valley could operate a casino. Resolution of the case would not “as a practical matter impair or impede” the Tribe’s ability to protect its interests. View "Yocha Dehe Wintun Nation v. United States Department of the Interior" on Justia Law

DeCosmo v. Blue Tarp Redevelopment, LLC

2021-06-24T04:05:23-08:00

In this proposed class action suit challenging the rules of blackjack at the Encore Boston Harbor Casino the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the superior court judge granting the motion to dismiss brought by MGM Blue Tarp Redevelopment, LLC (MGM), holding that the rules authorized MGM to offer 6:5 payout blackjack. The Encore Boston Harbor Casino was operated by Wynn Resorts Holdings, LLC, Wynn MA, LLC, and Wynn Resorts, Ltd. (Encore). Plaintiffs, the gamblers challenging the rules of the game, sued Encore and MGM, contending that there were entitled to three dollars for every two dollars bet (3:2) instead of the six dollars for every five dollars bet (6:5) that they received when playing at tables requiring smaller bets. Plaintiffs argued that the Massachusetts Gaming Commission's blackjack rules did not clearly authorize payouts of 6:5 except with games played by dealing rules different from those used at Plaintiffs' tables. The superior court allowed MGM's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs understood the rules and the stakes and that deference was due to the Commission's interpretation of its blackjack rules. View "DeCosmo v. Blue Tarp Redevelopment, LLC" on Justia Law

Crazie Overstock Promotions, LLC v. State

2021-06-11T07:40:24-08:00

The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming in part and reversing and remanding in part and order entered by the superior court entering final judgment in favor of Defendants in this litigation to enjoin enforcement measures stemming from the belief that a Rewards Program encompassed within the operation of Crazie Overstock LLC's enterprise was unlawful, holding that the Rewards Program constituted an unlawful sweepstakes in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-306.4. Crazie Overstock brought this action to enjoin enforcement measures taken by the State and certain members of the State's Alcohol and Law Enforcement Division. The enforcement measures were taken on the grounds that the Rewards Program was unlawful. The superior court entered final judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that the Crazie Overstock Rewards Program may violate N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-306.4 and other North Carolina gambling provisions. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment for Defendants with respect to the issue of whether the Rewards Program violated section 14-306.4 but reversed and remanded as to the issue of whether the program violated section 14-306.1A. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that the Rewards Program constituted an unlawful sweepstakes in violation of section 14-306.4, and remand was unnecessary. View "Crazie Overstock Promotions, LLC v. State" on Justia Law

Kalispel Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Department of the Interior

2021-06-01T09:01:24-08:00

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the DOI, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, federal officials, and the Spokane Tribe of Indians, in an action brought by the Kalispel Tribe of Indians, challenging the Secretary of DOI's decision determining that the Spokane Tribe of Indians' proposed gaming establishment on newly acquired off-reservation land would not be detrimental to the surrounding community. Kalispel raised challenges pursuant to the the Administrative Procedure Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. The panel held that IGRA requires the Secretary to weigh and consider the various interests of those within the surrounding community when deciding whether additional off-reservation gaming would be detrimental to the surrounding community. A showing that additional gaming may be detrimental to some members of the surrounding community, including an Indian tribe, does not dictate the outcome of the Secretary's two-step determination. The panel agreed with the DC Circuit and rejected Kalispel's argument that any detriment to Kalispel precluded the Secretary from issuing a favorable two-part determination. Rather, the panel concluded that the Secretary had the authority to issue a two-step determination, and the Secretary's decision to issue a favorable decision here was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The panel declined to reach the merits of Kalispel's contention, which was not advanced in the district court, that the Secretary previously announced a policy that additional off-reservation gaming would not be approved if a nearby Indian tribe could show that additional gaming would be detrimental to it. Finally, the panel concluded that Kalispel has not shown that the Secretary failed to consider its claimed harms or to comply with the relevant statutes and regulations, and thus it has not shown that the Secretary violated the federal government's trust duty owed to Kalispel. View "Kalispel Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Department of the Interior" on Justia Law

Alabama v. Epic Tech, Inc., et al.

2021-05-28T07:30:09-08:00

The State of Alabama appealed a circuit court order that dismissed the State's claims seeking injunctive and declaratory relief "to abate a public nuisance of unlawful gambling," pursuant to section 6-5-120, Ala. Code 1975, against some, but not all, of the defendants. The circuit court certified its order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. However, we determine that the order was not appropriate for Rule 54(b) certification; therefore, the Alabama Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. View "Alabama v. Epic Tech, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Stand Up for California! v. California

2021-05-13T14:35:29-08:00

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the Governor's authority to concur in the decision of the United States Secretary of the Interior to take 305 acres of land in Madera County into trust for North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians for the purpose of operating a casino. The trial court sustained demurrers by North Fork and the state defendants. In 2016, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of dismissal, concluding the Governor lacked the authority to concur in the Interior Secretary's determination to take the Madera site into trust. The California Supreme Court granted review and held this case pending its decision in United Auburn Indian Community of Auburn Rancheria v. Newsom (2020) 10 Cal.5th 538. The Supreme Court transferred this case back to this court after deciding that California law empowers the Governor to concur. The Supreme Court directed this court to vacate its decision and to reconsider the matter in light of United Auburn. The Court of Appeal concluded that the facts of this case are distinguishable from those in United Auburn because at the November 2014 general election California voters rejected the Legislature's ratification of the tribal-state compact for gaming at the Madera site. The court concluded that the people retained the power to annul a concurrence by the Governor and the voters exercised this retained power at the 2014 election by impliedly revoking the concurrence for the Madera site. Consequently, the concurrence is no longer valid, and the demurrer should have been overruled. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of dismissal and directed the trial court to vacate its order sustaining the demurrers and enter a new order overruling them. View "Stand Up for California! v. California" on Justia Law

South Carolina Lottery Commission v. Glassmeyer

2021-04-21T06:08:22-08:00

George Glassmeyer sent Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to the South Carolina Lottery Commission for information relating to million-dollar lottery winners. The Lottery Commission claimed the information sought was "personal" and "disclosure . . . would constitute unreasonable invasion of personal privacy." Instead, the Lottery Commission disclosed the hometown and state of each winner, the amount of each prize, the date of each prize, and the game associated with each prize. Glassmeyer responded that the Lottery Commission's disclosure did not satisfy his requests. The Lottery Commission then filed this lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the release of lottery winners' names, addresses, telephone numbers, and forms of identification would constitute an unreasonable invasion of personal privacy under subsection 30-4-40(a)(2) and could be withheld. The Lottery Commission also sought injunctive relief preventing Glassmeyer from obtaining the information. The circuit court granted the Lottery Commission's motion and declared the release of the lottery winners' personal identifying information as an unreasonably invasion of personal privacy, and also entered an injunction permanently restraining Glassmeyer from seeking the lottery winners' full names, addresses, telephone numbers, and forms of identification. The court of appeals reversed, by the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed: "a proper injunction could restrict Glassmeyer only from seeking this information from the Lottery Commission. The Lottery Commission had no right to request an injunction permanently restraining Glassmeyer from seeking this information from any source, and the circuit court had no authority to prevent Glassmeyer from doing so." View "South Carolina Lottery Commission v. Glassmeyer" on Justia Law

Stand Up For California! v. United States Department of the Interior

2021-04-16T07:00:47-08:00

Wilton Rancheria, a Sacramento area Indian tribe, was federally recognized in 1927. The 1958 Rancheria Act disestablished Wilton and 40 other reservations. In 1979, several California rancherias, including Wilton, sued. The government agreed to restore Indian status. Wilton was erroneously excluded from the settlement. In 2009, the Department of the Interior restored Wilton’s federal recognition and agreed to “accept in trust certain lands formerly belonging to” Wilton. Wilton petitioned to acquire 282 acres near Galt for a casino. A draft environmental impact statement (EIS), under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321–4347, identified alternatives, including a 30-acre Elk Grove parcel. Wilton changed its preference and requested that the Department acquire the Elk Grove location. Objectors responded that acquiring the Elk Grove location would moot pending state-court suits. The Department’s final EIS identified the Elk Grove location as the preferred alternative. The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary– Indian Affairs, Roberts, signed the Record of Decision (ROD) pursuant to delegated authority. Roberts had served as Acting Assistant Secretary– Indian Affairs (AS–IA), but after his acting status lapsed under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act, Roberts continued to exercise the non-exclusive AS–IA functions. Black, who became Acting AS–IA in the new administration, signed off on the acquisition. Objectors filed suit before the issuance of the Department’s ROD and unsuccessfully sought a temporary restraining order. The D.C. Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the Department, rejecting claims that the Department impermissibly delegated the authority to make a final agency action to acquire the land to an official who could not wield this authority, was barred from acquiring land in trust on behalf of Wilton’s members, and failed to comply with NEPA. View "Stand Up For California! v. United States Department of the Interior" on Justia Law

Clay v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

2021-03-16T05:30:49-08:00

After taxpayers filed suit challenging the IRS's deficiency findings and penalties, the tax court sustained the deficiency determinations but rejected the accuracy-related penalties. In this case, the Miccosukee Tribe shared profits from its casino with Tribe members and encouraged its members to hide their payments from the IRS. The taxpayers here followed the Tribe's advice, and they are now subject to hundreds of thousands of dollars in tax deficiencies. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the tax court's judgment and rejected taxpayers' assertion that any taxes are barred by the Miccosukee Settlement Act that exempted an earlier land transfer from taxation. Even if the court interpreted the Act as providing an indefinite tax exemption for the "lands" conveyed under it or the agreement, the casino revenues still do not fit the bill because the casino's land was not conveyed under either the Act or the agreement. Furthermore, an exemption for "lands" only exempts income "derived directly" from those lands, and this court has already held that casino revenues do "not derive directly from the land." The court also rejected taxpayers' assertion that the payments are merely nontaxable lease payments from the casino, citing factual and legal problems. Rather, the court concluded that the payments are taxable income. View "Clay v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Sterling Suffolk Racecourse v. Wynn Resorts, Ltd.

2021-03-03T14:00:05-08:00

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting Defendants' motion to dismiss this action brought under the civil portion of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1964(c), holding that Plaintiff had not and could not meet the causation of injury requirements set forth at 18 U.S.C. 1964(c). In 2014, the Massachusetts Gaming Commission granted a gaming license to Wynn, MA, LLC, a subsidiary of Wynn Resorts, Ltd. (collectively, Wynn), allowing Wynn to construct a casino in Everett, Massachusetts. Mohegan Sun Massachusetts had also applied for a license and had proposed a casino facility on a site in East Boston owned by Plaintiff, Sterling Suffolk Racecourse, LLC. Plaintiff brought this action alleging that Defendants, including Wynn, conspired to deprive Mohegan of a gaming license, therefore costing Sterling the opportunity to least its site to Mohegan. The district court dismissed the action. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff could not show a "direct injury" from Wynn's actions, and so its RICO claims failed as a matter of law. View "Sterling Suffolk Racecourse v. Wynn Resorts, Ltd." on Justia Law

Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head

2021-02-25T14:00:04-08:00

In this litigation surrounding the development of a gaming facility on the trust lands of the Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head, the Wampanoag Tribal Council of Gay Head, Inc., and the Aquinnah Wampanoag Gaming Corporation (collectively, the Tribe) the First Circuit affirmed the amended final judgment of the district court as to a permitting issue, holding that the district court did not err. The Tribe planned to build a gaming facility on its trust lands in Dukes County, Massachusetts, but the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Town of Aquinnah, and the Aquinnah/Gay Head Community Association sought to put a halt to the development until the Tribe complied with municipal and Commonwealth regulations that they claimed were applicable. At issue was whether a party who did not raise a particular issue, the permitting issue, in the first appeal to the First Circuit, though it could have, could do so on a successive appeal. The district court held that the Tribe had forfeited or waived the issue by not appealing the permitting issue. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that this case did not qualify as one involving an exceptional circumstance, and therefore, the permitting issue could not be raised on appeal. View "Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head" on Justia Law

Cherokee Nation Businesses, LLC v. Gulfside Casino Partnership

2021-02-04T08:00:59-08:00

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court refusing to allow Cherokee Nation Businesses, LLC to intervene in litigation brought by Gulfside Casino Partnership against the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration and the Arkansas Racing Commission, holding that Cherokee was entitled to intervention as a matter of right. Five applicants, including Gulfside and Cherokee, applied for a casino license during the May 2019 application period. The Commission denied each application on the grounds that each failed to include a letter of support from the county judge or a resolution from the county quorum court. Gulfside filed the underlying suit asking the circuit court to reverse the Commission's denial of its application. The application period was reopened in August 2019, at which time Cherokee submitted its application. Cherokee then moved for intervention to defend its right to have its application considered. The circuit court denied intervention. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Cherokee was entitled to intervention as of right under Ark. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). View "Cherokee Nation Businesses, LLC v. Gulfside Casino Partnership" on Justia Law

Treat v. Stitt

2021-01-26T11:03:12-08:00

The Oklahoma Supreme Court previously declared that certain tribal gaming compacts the Oklahoma Executive branch entered into with the Comanche and Otoe-Missouria Tribes were invalid under Oklahoma law because the gaming compacts authorized certain forms of Class III gaming prohibited by state law. While "Treat I" was pending before the Supreme Court, the Executive branch entered into two additional compacts with the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians and the Kialegee Tribal Town. The parties to the compacts submitted the tribal gaming compacts to the United States Department of the Interior, and the Department of the Interior deemed them approved by inaction, only to the extent they are consistent with the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). The Oklahoma Supreme Court determined these new compacts were also not valid: for the new compacts to be valid under Oklahoma law, the Executive branch must have negotiated the new compacts within the statutory bounds of the Model Tribal Gaming Compact (Model Compact) or obtained the approval of the Joint Committee on State-Tribal Relations. Without proper approval by the Joint Committee, the new tribal gaming compacts were invalid under Oklahoma law. View "Treat v. Stitt" on Justia Law

New Hampshire Lottery Commission v. Rosen

2021-01-20T08:00:02-08:00

The First Circuit held that the Wire Act's prohibitions are limited to interstate wire communications related to bets or wagers on sporting events or contests, thus affirming the district court's grant of Plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment. In 2011, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a legal opinion concluding that the Wire Act's prohibitions were uniformly limited to sports gambling. In 2018, the OLC issued an opinion, which was later adopted by the DOJ, that all prohibitions in the Wire Act, with one exception, applied to all forms of bets or waters. In 2019, the New Hampshire Lottery Commission and one of its vendors commenced this action seeking relief under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act. The district court granted relief, ruling that the Wire Act was limited to sports gambling. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) this controversy is justiciable; and (2) the Wire Act applies only to interstate wire communications related to sporting events or contests. View "New Hampshire Lottery Commission v. Rosen" on Justia Law

Commonwealth ex rel. Brown v. Stars Interactive Holdings Ltd.

2020-12-23T10:09:35-08:00

The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the court of appeals that the term "person" in Kentucky's Loss Recovery Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. Chapter 372, is limited to a natural person, holding that the Commonwealth had standing to bring this suit. The Commonwealth, through the Secretary of the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet, filed the underlying complaint seeking to recover under statutory treble damages for money lost by its citizens playing real-money poker on an illegal internet website called PokerStars, which was owned by Defendants (collectively, PokerStars). The court entered partial summary judgment against Defendants based on the actual amount Kentucky players lost on PokerStars' websites. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the Commonwealth lacked standing because it did not qualify as "any other person" under the Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Commonwealth qualified as a "person" under the Act; (2) the Commonwealth had standing to bring this lawsuit; and (3) the manner in which the trial court calculated damages in this case was proper. View "Commonwealth ex rel. Brown v. Stars Interactive Holdings Ltd." on Justia Law

RW Development, LLC v. Mississippi Gaming Commission

2020-12-10T11:33:28-08:00

In appeals consolidated for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review, the circuit court affirmed the decision of the Mississippi Gaming Commission (MGC) to deny the gaming site application of RW Development, LLC (RW). The MGC and the circuit court found that RW’s proposed gaming site failed to meet the governing statutory and regulatory requirements under Mississippi Code Section 97-33-1 (Rev. 2014) in the first instance, and 13 Mississippi Administrative Code Part 2, Rule 1.4(d) (adopted May 1, 2013), Westlaw, in the second. The Supreme Court concurred with the Commission and circuit court that: (1) in case No. 2019-SA-01813-SCT, RW failed to provide evidence that its proposed gaming site was within eight hundred feet of the MHWL; and (2) in case No. 2019-SA-01815-SCT, RW failed to establish that the mean high water line point of reference was located on RW’s premises, that RW owned or leased the land contiguous to the point of reference and its proposed gaming site, and that the land would play an integral part in RW's project. View "RW Development, LLC v. Mississippi Gaming Commission" on Justia Law

Lime Rock Park, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission

2020-11-12T09:01:25-08:00

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court sustaining in part and dismissing in part Lime Rock Park, LLC's appeal from the adoption of the Planning Zoning Commission of the Town of Salisbury of certain amendments to the Town's zoning regulations restricting motor vehicle racing activities on property owned by Lime Rock, holding that the trial court erred in part. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court erred when it (a) sustained the portion of Plaintiff's appeal claiming that the provision of the regulations prohibiting racing activities on Sundays was statutorily preempted, (b) denied the portion of the appeal claiming that the Commission lacked the authority to condition the filing of a petition to amend the regulations on obtaining a special permit, and (c) concluded that the amended regulation prohibited racing activities on Saturdays; and (2) the trial court did not err when it denied the portion of the appeal claiming that the restrictions on unmufflered racing are subject to the provision of Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-73(c) requiring the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection to approve municipal noise control ordinances. View "Lime Rock Park, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission" on Justia Law

Young v. Nevada Gaming Control Board

2020-10-08T09:11:54-08:00

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Appellant's petition for judicial review of the order of the Nevada Gaming Control Board affirming the decision of a Board agent that a casino's refusal to redeem Appellant's six $5,000 chips because it could not verify that Appellant had won them, holding that because Appellant was in fact a "patron" of the casino, the Board should have instructed the casino to redeem Appellant's chips. Nevada Gaming Commission Regulation (NGCR) 12.060(2)(c) provides that a licensee must promptly redeem its chips and tokens from its patrons. When a casino refused to redeem Appellant's chips, Appellant filed a complaint. A Board agent found that Appellant was a patron but concluded that because the casino could not verify that Appellant had won the chips, it need not have redeemed them. The Board affirmed. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Appellant was a patron of the casino, the casino should have promptly redeemed Appellant's chips under NGCR 12.060(2)(c). View "Young v. Nevada Gaming Control Board" on Justia Law

Family Trust Foundation of Kentucky, Inc. v. Kentucky Horse Racing Commission

2020-09-25T13:29:21-08:00

In this case considering the Kentucky Horse Racing Commission's regulations as applied to historical horse racing the Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court determining that the Encore system constitutes a "pari-mutuel system of wagering," holding that the trial court misapplied the applicable regulation as a matter of law. The Commission, the Department of Revenue and several horse racing associations sought judicial approval for wagering on historical horse racing. The Family Foundation of Kentucky, Inc. was permitted to intervene and challenged both the validity of regulations and the premise that wagering on historical horse races was truly pari-mutuel wagering. The trial court concluded that the Encore system constituted a pari-mutuel system of wagering approved by the Commission. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Encore system does not create a wagering pool among patrons such that they are wagering among themselves, as required for pari-mutuel wagering. View "Family Trust Foundation of Kentucky, Inc. v. Kentucky Horse Racing Commission" on Justia Law

Alabama v. Epic Tech, LLC, et al.

2020-09-25T08:00:10-08:00

Two appeals were consolidated for the purposes of this opinion: case no. 1180675 ("the Lowndes County case"), the State appealed the Lowndes Circuit Court's order granting the motions to dismiss filed by Epic Tech, LLC; White Hall Enrichment Advancement Team d/b/a Southern Star Entertainment; White Hall Entertainment; and the White Hall Town Council (collectively, "the Lowndes County defendants"); case no. 1180794 ("the Macon County case"), the State appealed the Macon Circuit Court's order granting the motions to dismiss filed by Epic Tech, LLC, and K.C. Economic Development, LLC, d/b/a VictoryLand Casino ("KCED")(collectively, "the Macon County defendants"). In 2017, the State sued the Lowndes County defendants asserting a public-nuisance claim. In a second amended complaint, the State asserted it was seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to abate a public nuisance of unlawful gambling through continued operation of illegal slot machines and other "unlawful gambling devices." The Lowndes County defendants moved to dismiss, raising, amongst other defenses, that the State failed to join the operators of two Wind Creek casinos. The Lowndes Circuit Court ultimately granted the motion to dismiss, finding it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to grant the relief the State requested. The State also sued defendants in Macon County Circuit court, again alleging public nuisance from operation of illegal slot machines. Again, the State requested declaratory and injunctive relief. The Macon County court likewise dismissed on grounds it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.The State argued on appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court that the circuit courts erred in concluding they lacked subject matter jurisdiction over their respective cases. The Supreme Court concurred with the State and reversed the circuit courts. The matters were remanded for further proceedings. View "Alabama v. Epic Tech, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Omaha Exposition & Racing, Inc. v. Nebraska State Gaming Commission

2020-09-18T05:34:41-08:00

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the district court reversing and vacating the order of the Nebraska State Racing Commission directing Neb. Rev. Stat. 2-1207(2) funds collected by the Nebraska Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Association, Inc. (HBPA) from Nebraska horse racing tracks be transferred to the Nebraska Thoroughbred Breeders Association (NTBA), holding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. At issue was money accumulated from deductions of horse racing wagers under section 2-1207(2) and 2-1207.01 for the support, promotion, and preservation of agriculture and horse breeding in the state. The Commission granted NTBA's request to order the HBPA to pay all NTBA accumulated funds in the HBPA's possession to the NTBA Omaha Exposition and Racing, Inc. (OER) submitted a petition for judicial review. The district court reversed and vacated the Commission's order, concluding that the Commission erred by appointing NTBA as custodian and granting NTBA the authority collect and determine distribution of the deducted funds. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order and dismissed this appeal, holding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to OER's failure to sufficiently serve NTBA and the Commission. View "Omaha Exposition & Racing, Inc. v. Nebraska State Gaming Commission" on Justia Law

Citizens for a Better Pope County v. Cross

2020-09-17T07:02:26-08:00

The Supreme Court dismissed as moot Appellees' motion to dismiss the appeal by Citizens for a Better Pope County, a local option ballot question committee, holding that the claims set forth in Citizens' appeal were moot. After the Pope County Quorum Court adopted a resolution in support of a casino license application, Citizens sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the circuit court requesting an order prohibiting and county judge and quorum court from taking any official action to expressly approve a casino applicant without first presenting the issue to voters in an election, as required by Ordinance 2018-O-42. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss. The day before the hearing on the motion Ordinance 2018-O-42 was repealed. The circuit court denied declaratory relief, concluding that Ordinance 2018-O-42 unconstitutionally conflicted with amendment 100 of the Arkansas Constitution, and further held that the mandamus request was moot. The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal as moot, holding that, due to the repeal of Ordinance 2018-O-42, this Court's judgment on Citizens' claims would have no practical effect on an existing legal controversy. View "Citizens for a Better Pope County v. Cross" on Justia Law

Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians v. California

2020-09-02T09:03:20-08:00

During negotiations for a new tribal-state compact between the Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians and California, Pauma sought authorization to offer on-track horse racing and wagering and an expanded set of lottery games. The parties met and corresponded. In 2015, Pauma triggered the 1999 Compact’s dispute resolution process. In January 2016, the state confirmed its agreement to renegotiate the 1999 Compact in full and told Pauma that it “look[ed] forward” to receiving a draft compact from Pauma with Pauma’s “plans for on-track betting.” Rather than propose a draft compact or disclose any information about the on-track facility, Pauma notified the state that it wanted to separately negotiate each item of the compact and proposed modifications to the 1999 Compact’s lottery game language. California rejected Pauma’s piecemeal negotiation approach, rejected Pauma’s lottery game language, and advised that it would send a “complete draft compact to guide our future discussions.” The subsequent 140-page draft addressed a broad array of topics. Pauma never responded but filed suit. The district court held that California satisfied its obligation to negotiate in good faith under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. 2701. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The state agreed to negotiate for the new types of class III gaming that Pauma sought authorization to offer, actively engaged in the negotiations, and remained willing to continue the negotiations when Pauma filed the litigation. View "Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians v. California" on Justia Law

United Auburn Indian Community of Auburn Rancheria v. Newsom

2020-08-31T09:31:06-08:00

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal concluding that the Governor acted lawfully when he concurred in the determination of the United States Secretary of the Interior (Interior Secretary) to allow casino-style gaming on tribal trust land in California, holding that California law empowers the Governor to concur. Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. 2701 et seq., the Interior Secretary may permit gaming on certain land taken into federal trust for an Indian tribe so long as the Governor of the state where the land is located concurs. At issue was whether the California Governor has the authority to concur in the Interior Secretary's determination to allow gaming on tribal trust land in California where the California Constitution has not granted explicit authority to concur in the cooperative-federalism scheme. The Supreme Court held that because the California Constitution, as amended in 2000, permits casino-style gaming under certain conditions on Indian and tribal lands and the Legislature imposed no restriction to the Governor's concurrence power, the Governor acted lawfully in concurring in the Interior Secretary's determination. View "United Auburn Indian Community of Auburn Rancheria v. Newsom" on Justia Law

Monarch Content Management LLC v. Arizona Department of Gaming

2020-08-20T09:03:58-08:00

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction in an action challenging Arizona Revised Statute 5-112(U). Section 5-112(U) requires, among other things, that any simulcast of live horseracing into Arizona that originates outside the state "must be offered to each commercial live-racing permittee … and additional wagering facility" in the state. The panel held that the Interstate Horse Racing Act of 1978 (IHA) does not preempt section 5-112(U). The panel also held that Monarch, a simulcast purchaser and sales agent for racetracks, and Laurel Park, a Maryland racetrack whose races Monarch simulcasts, had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The panel explained that the IHA does not address how the states can regulate simulcasts, and the Arizona statute does not address Laurel Park's statutory right to consent before interstate wagering on its races can be conducted. Therefore, it is not facially impossible to comply with both laws. Furthermore, the Arizona statute does not frustrate the intent of the IHA. The panel rejected plaintiffs' contention that section 5-112(U) is an unconstitutional regulation on commercial speech and a forbidden content-based restriction; rejected plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment and Due Process challenges; held that the Arizona statute does not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause; and held that the statute did not give rise to a Contract Clause claim. View "Monarch Content Management LLC v. Arizona Department of Gaming" on Justia Law