Environmental Law - Justia Case Law Summaries

Center for Bio Diversity v. TRAN

2026-07-07T15:30:30-08:00

Delfin LNG sought approval to construct and operate a deepwater liquefied natural gas export facility in the Gulf of America, consisting of onshore infrastructure in Louisiana and floating offshore vessels. The Maritime Administration (MARAD), after extensive environmental review and public comment, initially approved the project in 2017. Over subsequent years, Delfin altered key aspects of the project, including its design and financing. MARAD determined these changes required further review and asked Delfin to submit an amended application, which Delfin did not do. In 2025, following a presidential executive order, MARAD concluded that the modifications would not cause significantly different environmental impacts and issued the license. Three environmental organizations challenged MARAD’s decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. They argued MARAD violated the Deepwater Port Act by not requiring an amended application and additional public comment, the National Environmental Policy Act by not preparing a supplemental environmental impact statement, and the Administrative Procedure Act by issuing a license after finding the prior approval was insufficient. They requested the court vacate MARAD’s licensing decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that none of the petitioners demonstrated Article III standing. The court held that the organizations failed to identify a member who suffered a concrete and particularized injury fairly traceable to MARAD’s licensing decision. The declarations submitted did not show a personal and project-specific harm, nor did they establish a sufficient geographic nexus to the affected area. As a result, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits and denied the petition for review. The main holding is that, in the absence of standing, the court cannot reach the substantive environmental or procedural claims. View "Center for Bio Diversity v. TRAN" on Justia Law

Burton v. Flathead Conservation Dist.

2026-07-07T14:10:55-08:00

Dennis and Jeannette Burton own property along the Flathead River near Kalispell, Montana. Their land contains a pond, historically a “scour feature” of the river, which has existed for decades and was enhanced by a man-made channel connecting it to the river, likely predating their ownership. The property frequently experiences flooding in a pole barn during high river flows. In 2024, the Burtons applied to the Flathead Conservation District (FCD) for a permit under the Natural Streambed and Land Preservation Act to dredge the pond and channel and to use the dredged material to build a berm to protect the pole barn from flooding. The FCD conducted a site visit and, based on findings that the project could cause erosion, alter river flows, and have negative impacts on aquatic habitat, denied the permit. The FCD reasoned that the project conflicted with its rules, which discourage or prohibit dredging connected artificial or in-stream ponds. The Burtons sought judicial review and declaratory relief in the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, arguing that the FCD’s decision was unsupported and that its rules did not apply to their project. The District Court upheld the FCD’s denial, finding the FCD had jurisdiction because the pond and channel were connected to the river and that the project fit the definition of a regulated off-stream pond. The court also concluded that the FCD’s consideration of prior applications for the property was not improper. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that the FCD had jurisdiction, that its rules applied to the project, and that there were sufficient legal grounds for the permit denial. The Court further concluded that any deficiencies in the FCD’s explanation were harmless given the record support for the decision. View "Burton v. Flathead Conservation Dist." on Justia Law

RINNAI AMERICA CORP. V. SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT

2026-07-02T08:31:35-08:00

A regional air quality agency responsible for the South Coast Air Basin, an area with some of the nation’s worst ozone pollution, amended its regulations to phase in zero nitrous oxide (NOx) emissions standards for certain appliances, such as water heaters, boilers, and process heaters. The agency determined that only widespread adoption of zero emissions standards across stationary sources could bring the region into compliance with federal ozone requirements imposed by the Clean Air Act (CAA). The rule’s implementation was staggered over several years, with the goal of achieving significant NOx reductions. Plaintiffs, including manufacturers and industry groups, challenged this rule, arguing that it was preempted by the federal Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), which sets national energy efficiency standards for consumer products. The United States District Court for the Central District of California considered the plaintiffs’ facial preemption challenge. The district court granted summary judgment to the air quality agency, finding that the rule did not concern the “energy use” of appliances as defined by EPCA, but instead addressed air pollution and health risks. The court concluded that the rule did not trigger EPCA’s preemption provisions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that EPCA does not preempt the agency’s amended rule because nothing in EPCA’s text, structure, or history indicates Congressional intent to interfere with state and local efforts to achieve federal air quality standards under the CAA. The court also found that plaintiffs had not shown any EPCA language preempting CAA-based emissions regulations, and distinguished its earlier decision in California Restaurant Association v. City of Berkeley as inapplicable here. Finally, the court held that the facial challenge failed because the rule applies to some products not covered by EPCA, and thus was not unconstitutional in every application. The judgment for the agency was affirmed. View "RINNAI AMERICA CORP. V. SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT" on Justia Law

Association of Contracting Plumbers v. City of New York

2026-06-30T07:00:04-08:00

New York City and New York State passed laws that effectively prohibit the use of fossil-fuel-powered appliances in new buildings as part of broader efforts to address pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. These measures ban, for example, installing gas stoves or other fossil-fuel-based heating or cooking appliances in new construction. Trade associations, contractor and builder groups, and unions whose members would be affected by these prohibitions sued, arguing that the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), a federal law that sets efficiency standards for certain appliances, expressly preempts these state and local laws. In the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the plaintiffs challenging the New York City law lost when the court granted the City’s motion to dismiss, finding that EPCA did not preempt the local law. In a separate case in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, plaintiffs challenging the State law were denied relief at the summary judgment stage against the remaining state defendant, with the court again holding that EPCA’s preemption provision did not apply. In both cases, the plaintiffs appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed both appeals together. The court held that EPCA’s express preemption provision only preempts state and local “energy conservation standards” for covered appliances and a limited class of related regulations. The challenged New York laws, which prohibit the use of certain types of appliances but do not set standards for the amount of energy those appliances use, do not fall within the scope of EPCA’s preemption. Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgments of the district courts, allowing the state and city laws to stand. View "Association of Contracting Plumbers v. City of New York" on Justia Law

State of Iowa v. Lilly

2026-06-30T06:05:55-08:00

The State alleged that two corporate officers of companies specializing in recycling fiberglass waste failed to properly dispose of approximately 1,300 decommissioned wind turbine blades, instead allowing them to accumulate at several sites in Iowa without legitimate recycling. The Iowa Department of Natural Resources (DNR) investigated the sites beginning in 2018, raising concerns about speculative accumulation. The DNR subsequently engaged with the companies to develop compliance plans, resulting in consent orders requiring proper recycling and financial assurances. When the companies failed to comply, the State sought civil penalties and a permanent injunction against both the business entities and their corporate officers. The Iowa District Court for Jasper County reviewed the officers’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The officers had argued they had never been to Iowa and were not personally involved in the conduct at issue. The district court denied their motion, finding sufficient minimum contacts through their roles as responsible corporate officers of the involved entities. The court also deemed both officers as “persons” subject to liability under Iowa Code section 455B.307(3). The officers sought interlocutory appeal, which was granted. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. It held that the State had adequately pleaded claims against both officers as individuals potentially subject to liability under Iowa’s solid waste and recycling statutes, applying the responsible corporate officer doctrine. However, the Court determined that only one officer, who had signed compliance documents and directed company activity in Iowa, had sufficient minimum contacts for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. The other officer, lacking direct involvement or contacts with Iowa related to the violations, was not subject to personal jurisdiction. The Court affirmed the district court’s ruling as to one officer, reversed as to the other, and remanded for dismissal of claims against the latter without prejudice. View "State of Iowa v. Lilly" on Justia Law

Western Watersheds Project v. Forest Service

2026-06-26T08:32:06-08:00

Several conservation groups challenged a 2020 amendment to the management plan for Thunder Basin National Grassland, alleging that the United States Forest Service violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The State of Wyoming intervened in the case. After the case was transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, the district court upheld the agency’s plan amendment, ruling that it complied with both statutes. The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit found that the Forest Service’s amendment did not comply with NEPA, specifically because the agency issued an unduly narrow Purpose and Need statement, failed to consider a reasonable range of alternatives, and did not take the required “hard look” at environmental consequences. The Tenth Circuit did not reach the ESA claims. Instead of determining the appropriate remedy itself, the Tenth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to decide whether the plan amendment should be vacated or remanded without vacatur, instructing the district court to apply the two-part Allied-Signal test. On remand, the district court considered additional briefing and ordered remand to the Forest Service without vacatur of the 2020 Plan Amendment, finding that both Allied-Signal factors favored this approach. The plaintiffs then sought appellate review of the district court’s refusal to order vacatur. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s remand order because it was not a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and no exception to the administrative remand rule applied. The appeal was therefore dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Western Watersheds Project v. Forest Service" on Justia Law

Commonwealth of Kentucky v. EPA

2026-06-26T07:01:49-08:00

The case concerns a challenge by several states and industry groups to a 2024 rule by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that revised the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for fine particulate matter (PM2.5), lowering the annual standard from 12 µg/m³ to 9 µg/m³. The revision followed new scientific assessments and a unanimous recommendation from the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC) that the prior standard was inadequate to protect public health. Petitioners argued that the EPA lacked statutory authority to promulgate the new rule, that the decision-making process was improperly influenced by environmental justice considerations, and that the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously under the Clean Air Act. Previously, in 2020, the prior EPA Administrator chose to retain the 12 µg/m³ standard, citing scientific uncertainties and a divided CASAC. That decision was challenged but held in abeyance after a change in administration. The Biden-appointed EPA Administrator initiated a review, which led to the 2024 revision. After a further change in administration, the EPA itself moved to vacate the 2024 rule, now agreeing with challengers that the agency had exceeded its authority and failed to consider costs. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the 2024 rule and the EPA’s motion to vacate. The court held that the EPA had statutory authority to revise the NAAQS outside the five-year review cycle without performing a “thorough review” of all criteria, that the agency was not required to consider costs or attainability when revising or setting the standard, and that the decision was not arbitrary or capricious. The court denied both the petitions for review and the EPA’s motion for vacatur, upholding the 2024 rule. View "Commonwealth of Kentucky v. EPA" on Justia Law

Sunflower Alliance v. Dept. of Conservation

2026-06-25T09:02:41-08:00

A company with a lease in the Brentwood Oil Field, Contra Costa County, proposed to convert an inactive oil and gas extraction well into a water injection well for disposing of treated wastewater, a byproduct of oil and gas drilling. The well in question had been built in 1963, used for extraction until 1984, and then plugged. The company currently disposed of wastewater by trucking it offsite but sought to inject it underground instead. Regulatory agencies, including CalGEM, the State Water Board, and the Regional Water Board, expressed concerns about potential contamination of local clean water sources due to possible migration of wastewater. After additional technical analysis and the imposition of specific project conditions, these concerns were resolved, and CalGEM approved the project, issuing a notice of exemption (NOE) under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), relying on the “class 1” categorical exemption for minor alterations of existing facilities with negligible expansion of use. The Contra Costa County Superior Court found substantial evidence did not support CalGEM’s determination that the project fell within the class 1 exemption, concluding that converting an oil and gas well into a water injection well did not constitute negligible or no expansion of former use. CalGEM agreed to comply with the writ. On appeal, the First Appellate District, Division Five, reversed, holding that the exemption applied because the environmental risks of the new use were negligible. The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeal’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that the phrase “negligible or no expansion of existing or former use” in the class 1 exemption refers to the nature or degree of a structure or facility’s use, not to the risk of environmental harm caused by such a change. The court remanded the case for reconsideration under this proper framework and did not reach the additional question regarding project conditions as mitigation. View "Sunflower Alliance v. Dept. of Conservation" on Justia Law

Wash. Farm Bureau v. Dep't Of Ecology

2026-06-25T06:46:26-08:00

The Washington State Legislature enacted the Climate Commitment Act (CCA) in 2021 to address climate change by capping greenhouse gas emissions from major sources, such as large fuel suppliers. The CCA included a specific exemption for motor vehicle fuel or special fuel used exclusively for agricultural purposes, provided that the buyer supplies the seller with an exemption certificate. The Department of Ecology was tasked with adopting rules to implement this exemption and determining a method for expanding it to include fuels used for transporting agricultural products on public highways. Ecology promulgated rules in 2022 that allowed suppliers to claim the exemption if they could document, through an exemption certificate, that the fuel was used for agricultural purposes. Some suppliers began imposing surcharges on fuel, including fuel for agricultural purposes, to offset compliance costs. The Washington Farm Bureau (WFB) petitioned Ecology to create a more accessible exemption mechanism and a process for refunds of surcharges, but Ecology denied the petition, reasoning that existing guidance sufficed and it lacked authority to issue refunds. WFB then filed a petition for declaratory judgment and agency review under the Washington Administrative Procedure Act in the superior court, arguing that Ecology’s rule and denial of further rulemaking exceeded statutory authority and were arbitrary and capricious. The superior court dismissed WFB’s action with prejudice. On direct review, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington affirmed the superior court’s dismissal. The court held that Ecology’s rule was reasonably consistent with the statutory language and structure of the CCA, did not exceed Ecology’s statutory authority, and was not arbitrary or capricious. The court also found that Ecology’s denial of WFB’s petition for rulemaking was based on due consideration and within the agency’s discretion. The court affirmed that Ecology was not required to implement WFB’s preferred exemption method. View "Wash. Farm Bureau v. Dep't Of Ecology" on Justia Law

Monsanto v. Durnell

2026-06-25T06:45:09-08:00

Monsanto Company manufactures Roundup, a glyphosate-based herbicide. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has repeatedly evaluated glyphosate and concluded it is not likely to cause cancer, and as a result, EPA has not required a cancer warning on Roundup’s label. John Durnell used Roundup for about 20 years and developed non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. He sued Monsanto in Missouri state court, asserting a failure-to-warn claim, arguing that Monsanto should have included a cancer warning on Roundup’s label. A jury in the Missouri trial court found in Durnell’s favor on the failure-to-warn claim and awarded him more than $1 million in damages. Monsanto argued that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) expressly preempted the state-law failure-to-warn claim because it would require labeling different from what the EPA mandates. The Missouri trial court rejected this argument, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that Missouri’s failure-to-warn requirements were consistent with FIFRA’s misbranding provisions. The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case. It held that FIFRA expressly preempts Durnell’s state-law failure-to-warn claim. The Court reasoned that EPA’s approval of Roundup’s label—without a cancer warning—constitutes a federal labeling requirement. Because FIFRA’s preemption clause prohibits states from imposing labeling requirements “in addition to or different from” federal requirements, Missouri’s requirement for a cancer warning is preempted. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the Missouri Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Monsanto v. Durnell" on Justia Law

Garfield County v. Biden

2026-06-23T11:03:00-08:00

President Biden expanded the Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monuments in Utah, designating over 3.23 million acres under the Antiquities Act and identifying more than 500 items for protection. Plaintiffs—including the State of Utah, two counties, individuals, and an organization—objected to the scope of these expansions. They argued that the President exceeded his authority by designating items and reserving land that, in their view, did not qualify under the Act’s requirements for “historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest,” and by not limiting the land to “the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management” of those objects. Reviewing the case, the United States District Court for the District of Utah dismissed the claims. It held that sovereign immunity barred review of the President’s actions, found some plaintiffs lacked standing, and concluded that challenges to agency management plans were not ripe because those plans were not final agency actions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in concluding that sovereign immunity barred all review of the President’s actions under the ultra vires doctrine, since the Antiquities Act imposes discernable statutory limits on presidential authority. The court found that plaintiffs could bring ultra vires claims alleging that the President exceeded specific statutory limits, and remanded for the district court to consider whether the President’s actions were indeed ultra vires. The Tenth Circuit also vacated and remanded the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ Administrative Procedure Act claims due to subsequent agency action, but affirmed the dismissal of claims by individual plaintiffs and one organization for lack of standing. View "Garfield County v. Biden" on Justia Law

Craig v City of Richmond

2026-06-18T13:00:56-08:00

An industrial facility in Richmond, Indiana, owned by both private parties and the City of Richmond, caught fire in April 2023 and burned for more than a week. The fire caused the evacuation of nearby residents and allegedly released hazardous substances that damaged hundreds of properties and caused various injuries. Plaintiffs—both individuals and businesses—claimed that the private property owners’ failure to maintain the site and the City’s failure to remediate hazardous conditions after acquiring part of the property led to the fire. The lawsuit sought compensatory and punitive damages under several tort theories, including negligence, nuisance, trespass, and emotional distress. The plaintiffs initially filed their suit in the Wayne County, Indiana Circuit Court, but the defendants removed the action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, arguing it qualified as a “mass action” under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), and thus belonged in federal court. The district court, after briefing on whether the action fell within the CAFA “local event or occurrence” exception, concluded that the exception applied. The court found that all claims arose from the single fire event, which occurred in Indiana, and remanded the case to state court for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s remand order. The court held that the local event or occurrence exception in CAFA is jurisdictional, meaning it can be raised at any time and by the court sua sponte. The appellate court determined that all claims indeed arose from the single fire event and that the exception applied. Therefore, federal jurisdiction was lacking under CAFA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order remanding the case to state court. View "Craig v City of Richmond" on Justia Law

Sable Offshore Corp. v. Cal. Coastal Commission

2026-06-17T11:04:37-08:00

Sable Offshore Corp. and Pacific Pipeline Company acquired the Las Flores Pipelines, which run through the coastal zone in Santa Barbara County, California. After the 2015 Refugio Beach oil spill, the pipelines were inactive until Sable purchased them in 2024 and began repair and maintenance work at numerous sites. The California Coastal Commission sent Sable a Notice of Violation, then issued Executive Director Cease and Desist Orders, directing Sable to seek permits for both prospective and already completed work. Sable submitted zoning clearance applications to the County, which declared the repair work authorized by existing permits and declined to act on the applications. The Commission subsequently issued further cease and desist orders and filed a cross-complaint seeking injunctive relief. After observing ongoing construction, the Commission requested a preliminary injunction. The Superior Court of Santa Barbara County held hearings and ultimately granted a preliminary injunction enforcing the Commission’s cease and desist order. Sable appealed, arguing the Commission lacked jurisdiction to issue the order because the County had determined no new permits were necessary and had declined enforcement action. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. It held that under Public Resources Code section 30810, the Commission was authorized to issue a cease and desist order when the County declined to act regarding an alleged violation, regardless of the County’s reasons for its decision. The court found that the trial court properly issued the preliminary injunction upon a prima facie showing of a Coastal Act violation, and no balancing of equities was required under section 30803. The court also rejected Sable’s due process and federal preemption arguments and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Sable Offshore Corp. v. Cal. Coastal Commission" on Justia Law

YUROK TRIBE V. KLAMATH WATER USERS ASSOCIATION

2026-06-17T08:01:18-08:00

A dispute arose over the operation of the Klamath Project, a large federal water management system serving both agricultural and wildlife needs in Northern California and Southern Oregon. The Bureau of Reclamation manages the project, which involves distributing water from Upper Klamath Lake, a reservoir that also provides habitat for endangered and threatened species, including two species of suckers and coho salmon. In response to ongoing drought and the listing of these species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the Bureau consulted with federal wildlife agencies and adopted procedures requiring minimum water levels and stream flows to protect the listed species. Competing interests include tribal fishing rights, agricultural irrigation, and wildlife conservation. The conflict intensified when the Klamath Water Users Association and Klamath Irrigation District challenged the Bureau’s authority to release water from Upper Klamath Lake to comply with the ESA, arguing such releases diminished water available for irrigation and exceeded the Bureau’s authority under state and federal law. The Oregon Water Resources Department issued an order to halt these releases, which led federal agencies and tribal groups to seek declaratory and injunctive relief in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The district court held that the Bureau's operations were subject to the ESA and enjoined enforcement of the state order. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the ESA applies to the Bureau’s operation of the Klamath Project, whether the district court’s order constituted a judicial taking of water rights, and whether the district court had jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit held that Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA applies to the Bureau’s Klamath Project operations, reaffirming its precedent that the ESA governs such federal water management actions. The court rejected the judicial taking claim, finding no adjudication of water rights occurred, and determined that neither prior exclusive jurisdiction nor Colorado River abstention doctrines barred the district court from deciding the case. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. View "YUROK TRIBE V. KLAMATH WATER USERS ASSOCIATION" on Justia Law

Dan River Basin Association v. Virginia Department of Environmental Quality

2026-06-11T10:30:37-08:00

A group of environmental organizations challenged the decision by the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (VDEQ) to grant a water quality certification for the Southgate Project, a proposed pipeline crossing parts of Virginia and North Carolina. The organizations argued that the certification was improperly issued because VDEQ failed to adequately address the pipeline developer’s past record of environmental violations and did not include all necessary conditions to ensure compliance with water quality standards. VDEQ had previously approved the developer’s erosion and sediment control plans, received public comments, and ultimately issued the certification after addressing those comments. After VDEQ issued the certification, the petitioners sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and filed a motion to stay the certification pending judicial review, pointing to the imminent start of pipeline construction. Their main contentions were that VDEQ did not rationally justify its prediction that the pipeline would not violate water quality standards, especially given the developer’s history of noncompliance, and that the certification failed to explicitly require compliance with certain state environmental plans and agreements. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered the motion for a stay and denied it. The court found that the petitioners had not made a strong showing that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. The court noted that VDEQ provided a detailed explanation for its decision, including differences between the current project and past projects, and incorporated relevant environmental plans by reference in the certification. The court also determined that the remaining factors supporting a stay did not outweigh the petitioners’ failure to demonstrate likely success on the merits. The motion for a stay pending review was therefore denied. View "Dan River Basin Association v. Virginia Department of Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

Sierra Club v. North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality

2026-06-11T10:30:36-08:00

A proposed pipeline project, known as the Southgate Project, is planned to traverse portions of North Carolina and Virginia. This project is an extension of an existing pipeline system, and its construction has generated substantial environmental and legal concerns. The Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, sought a water quality certification from the North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality (NCDEQ), which is required under the Clean Water Act for such projects. After considering public comments, a public hearing, and a report from its hearing officer, NCDEQ issued the necessary certification in November 2025, finding that the project, if conducted according to specified conditions, would comply with state water quality standards. Previously, in 2020, NCDEQ had denied a water quality certification for the project, but that decision was vacated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 2021. After the main pipeline was completed in 2024 and project plans were revised to reduce its length in North Carolina, NCDEQ reviewed and ultimately granted the new application. Environmental groups then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for review of NCDEQ’s decision, and, as construction appeared imminent, sought a stay to prevent the project from proceeding while the case was pending. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied the motion for a stay, applying the traditional four-factor test for such relief. The court held that the petitioners did not make a strong showing that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their challenges to NCDEQ’s decision, particularly given the deference owed to the agency’s expertise under the Administrative Procedure Act. As a result, the motion for preliminary relief was denied, though the underlying merits of the challenge remain for later determination. View "Sierra Club v. North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

FORWARD, INC. V. MACOMBER

2026-06-09T08:32:52-08:00

Forward, Inc. operates a landfill near Stockton, California, which is bordered by several state facilities. Forward was required by a local water quality board to remediate groundwater contamination at its landfill. During this process, Forward suspected that nearby state facilities—including correctional and health care centers—were contributing hazardous waste to the groundwater, hindering its remediation efforts. Forward entered into an agreement with two California state agencies to access these facilities and collected data suggesting ongoing hazardous waste generation stemming from activities such as dry cleaning, solvent use, and well-water treatment at the state facilities. Forward filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and the Director of the California Department of General Services (DGS). Forward alleged that, due to their official positions, these defendants had control over the generation, handling, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste at the relevant facilities. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Forward had not established a sufficiently direct connection between the defendants and the alleged violations under the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. It affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that Forward failed to establish the “fairly direct” connection required by Ex parte Young. The court found that the defendants’ general supervisory roles over their respective agencies did not suffice to subject them to suit for the alleged RCRA violations, as neither their statutory duties nor alleged actions were directly tied to the waste management at the specific state facilities. The Ninth Circuit’s disposition was to affirm the district court’s dismissal. View "FORWARD, INC. V. MACOMBER" on Justia Law

West Virginia Rivers Coalition, Inc. v. The Chemours Company FC, LLC

2026-06-03T10:30:30-08:00

The case centers on the operations of a chemical manufacturing facility in Parkersburg, West Virginia, owned by The Chemours Company. Chemours used hexafluoropropylene oxide dimer acid (HFPO-DA), a member of the PFAS class of chemicals, as a processing aid in polymer production. The company discharged wastewater containing HFPO-DA into the Ohio River under a Clean Water Act (CWA) permit that established specific effluent limits. However, from 2022 onward, Chemours exceeded these limits on multiple occasions. Local water testing showed that HFPO-DA concentrations sometimes surpassed newer, not-yet-enforceable federal health standards but did not exceed West Virginia’s own goals. Chemours entered into an administrative consent order with the EPA to address permit compliance. The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia reviewed a citizen suit brought by West Virginia Rivers Coalition, Inc., seeking a preliminary injunction against Chemours for ongoing permit violations. The district court found that the Coalition had Article III associational standing through a member who avoided boating in the Ohio River due to Chemours’ discharges. The court granted the preliminary injunction, enjoining Chemours from exceeding permit limits and requiring remedial measures. Chemours appealed, challenging both the standing determination and the irreparable harm finding. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit examined both issues. The court agreed that the Coalition had established a substantial likelihood of standing at this stage. However, it found that the district court committed legal errors in its irreparable harm analysis, including incorrectly presuming harm from permit violations and conflating harm to the public with harm to the plaintiff. The Fourth Circuit also found clear error in the factual findings regarding irreparable harm. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction granted by the district court. View "West Virginia Rivers Coalition, Inc. v. The Chemours Company FC, LLC" on Justia Law

City of Idaho Falls v. Department of Water Resources

2026-06-01T13:35:58-08:00

A group of Idaho cities, collectively known as the Coalition of Cities, hold junior ground water rights in the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer (ESPA). These cities became involved in ongoing water rights litigation after the Surface Water Coalition (SWC), representing senior surface water right holders, initiated a delivery call in 2005. The SWC argued that junior ground water pumping reduced water availability for senior surface water users due to the hydrologic connection between the aquifer and the Snake River. This dispute led to a series of orders by the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources (IDWR) that established and modified the methodology for determining whether pumping by junior users caused material injury to senior rights. Following the issuance of the Fifth Amended Final Order (Fifth Methodology Order) and a subsequent Post-Hearing Order, the Director issued a Sixth Methodology Order, which superseded all previous orders. The Cities filed a petition for judicial review in the Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA) district court, challenging only the Post-Hearing Order (which addressed the Fifth Methodology Order) and not the operative Sixth Methodology Order. The district court affirmed the Director’s Post-Hearing Order, rejecting the Cities’ challenges to various factual findings and methodological choices. The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case. It concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the Cities’ appeal because they failed to timely challenge the Sixth Methodology Order—the operative agency action currently in effect. As a result, the appeal was dismissed. The court awarded costs, but not attorney fees, to the IDWR and SWC, ruling that the statutory basis for attorney fees was inapplicable. The primary holding was that failure to timely appeal the operative final order deprived the court of jurisdiction to grant relief. View "City of Idaho Falls v. Department of Water Resources" on Justia Law

Dummer v. City and County of S.F.

2026-05-29T11:03:02-08:00

A licensed California fisherman sought public access to fish at the Calaveras Reservoir, which is owned by the City and County of San Francisco and managed by the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission. The reservoir, a source of drinking water for millions, is governed by a watershed management plan that currently prohibits public access and fishing. After the City determined that, subject to environmental review and regulatory approval, shoreline fishing could potentially occur without compromising water quality, it began planning for a fishing program, which included infrastructure improvements and compliance with environmental laws. Previously, in a related proceeding, the Alameda County Superior Court ordered the City to determine whether fishing could occur without affecting water purity, but it did not require the City to immediately open the reservoir or apply for a permit. The City complied by starting the environmental review and planning process. Dissatisfied with the pace, the fisherman filed a new petition for a writ of mandate, seeking to compel the City to immediately apply for an amended water supply permit and open the reservoir for fishing. The Superior Court denied the petition, finding no ministerial duty requiring the City to proceed immediately and concluding that legal requirements, including environmental review and program planning, must be satisfied first. On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the lower court's judgment. The appellate court held that the plaintiff had not established a clear ministerial duty requiring the City to immediately apply for a permit or open the reservoir for fishing. The court found that the governing statutes and regulations allow for the exercise of discretion and require compliance with environmental and permitting processes before fishing access can be provided. The judgment was affirmed. View "Dummer v. City and County of S.F." on Justia Law

VINTON HARBOR & TERMINAL DISTRICT VS. REUNION ENERGY COMPANY

2026-05-29T07:15:47-08:00

The dispute centers on land in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana, owned by a public entity, where oil and gas exploration occurred for decades under a mineral lease originally granted in 1943. The plaintiff acquired several tracts of this land between 1968 and 1987, with prior owners reserving mineral rights. The mineral lease was assigned multiple times before terminating in 2020. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants, or their predecessors, caused environmental damage to the property through oil and gas operations predating the plaintiff’s ownership, and sought damages under both tort and contract theories. Defendants filed exceptions of no right of action, arguing that under the “subsequent purchaser rule” articulated in Eagle Pipe and Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp., a property owner cannot recover for damage inflicted before their purchase unless assigned the prior owner’s rights. The trial court denied these exceptions. On appeal, the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, reversed in part. It dismissed all claims against one defendant (Honeywell) for preacquisition damage, and limited claims against the other (Texas Pacific) to an 87-day period when both the plaintiff and Texas Pacific’s predecessor simultaneously held interests in one tract. The Supreme Court of Louisiana granted review. It extended the subsequent purchaser rule from Eagle Pipe to cases involving mineral leases, holding that a purchaser of property, absent an assignment or subrogation, has no right of action for preacquisition property damage caused by mineral lessees. However, the court recognized an exception for damages occurring during the period when the plaintiff owned the property and the defendant held lease rights. Additionally, the court held that a current surface owner may enforce the prudent operator standard under Mineral Code article 122 for end-of-lease obligations that become due upon termination, but not for historic operational damage. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "VINTON HARBOR & TERMINAL DISTRICT VS. REUNION ENERGY COMPANY" on Justia Law

In re Application of Oak Run Solar Project, L.L.C.

2026-05-26T05:30:48-08:00

Oak Run Solar Project, L.L.C. sought approval from the Ohio Power Siting Board to construct a solar-powered electric generation facility in Madison County, Ohio. The proposed facility would occupy approximately 4,400 acres and include an 800 MW solar array, a 300 MW battery energy storage system, and two transmission lines. Oak Run entered agreements with landowners for the project site and committed to an agrivoltaics program, maintaining agricultural productivity alongside solar generation. Local governments and other parties intervened, raising concerns about environmental, visual, water, plant, wildlife, and safety impacts. The board’s staff issued a report, and a hearing was held, resulting in project approval subject to conditions for landscape screening and safety. Prior to reaching the Supreme Court of Ohio, the Ohio Power Siting Board considered Oak Run’s application and allowed intervenors, including several township boards and the county board of commissioners, to participate. After a hearing and review, the board granted Oak Run’s certificate for construction, finding the statutory requirements satisfied and imposing conditions related to visual screening and emergency response. The local governments filed an application for rehearing, which was denied. They then appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, arguing the board failed to obtain necessary information, especially regarding visual impacts and environmental effects. The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case, applying a standard of review for “unlawful or unreasonable” board orders. The court held that Oak Run failed to provide required photographic simulations or sketches of substations, as mandated by administrative rules, thereby depriving the board of necessary information to assess visual impacts. The court affirmed the board’s orders in part, reversed in part regarding the visual-impact information, and remanded the matter to the board for further consideration of the project’s visual effects. View "In re Application of Oak Run Solar Project, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Mobile Baykeeper, Inc. v. Alabama Power Company

2026-05-18T08:35:04-08:00

A local environmental organization brought a citizen suit against an electric utility company, alleging that the company’s plan to close a large coal ash storage impoundment at one of its plants violated federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations. The organization asserted that the plan would leave significant amounts of coal ash in contact with groundwater, causing toxins to leach into the Mobile River and surrounding waterways, which harmed the recreational and aesthetic interests of its members. The plant’s closure plan, already underway, was a cap-in-place strategy rather than removal, and the organization claimed this approach did not satisfy the federal performance standards meant to prevent further pollution. The case was first reviewed by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama. After briefing and a hearing, the district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the organization lacked standing for failing to establish causation and redressability, and that the claims were not ripe for review because the closure plan would not be completed for several years and its final form was uncertain. The court reasoned that the alleged harms predated the closure plan and that a judicial order would not provide immediate relief. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the district court’s findings. The appellate court concluded that the organization adequately pleaded standing by alleging concrete injuries caused by the utility’s ongoing implementation of a closure plan that did not comply with EPA regulations, and that a compliant plan would likely alleviate those harms. The court also found the claims ripe for review, as the legal issues were fit for decision and delaying consideration would further harm the organization’s members. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mobile Baykeeper, Inc. v. Alabama Power Company" on Justia Law

Ralston v. Board of Land and Natural Resources.

2026-05-15T10:02:31-08:00

A private company operating a hotel sought the renewal of a one-year, revocable state land permit for property fronting its hotel. A member of the public, who had long used the area for recreation, objected to the permit's renewal, particularly the practice of presetting hotel lounge chairs, which he argued deterred public use. He requested a formal contested case hearing on the permit renewal, asserting a property interest in the recreational and environmental quality of the public land. The Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR) denied his request for such a hearing, instead allowing only written and oral testimony at a public meeting. The objector appealed to the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, which upheld the BLNR's denial, finding that he had been afforded due process through the public meeting process. On further appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) reversed, holding that the appellant had a constitutionally protected interest in a clean and healthful environment and was entitled to a contested case hearing before the permit could be renewed. Because the permit had expired, the ICA remanded the case to the circuit court to determine what relief, if any, remained available. The ICA granted costs but denied the appellant’s request for attorney fees under the private attorney general (PAG) doctrine, reasoning that the requirements for such fees were unmet since the scope of relief was not yet determined. The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i vacated the ICA’s denial of attorney fees. The court held that the PAG doctrine does not require the prevailing party to obtain final relief before becoming eligible for attorney fees. Determining that all three prongs of the PAG test were met, the court remanded the matter for the ICA to determine the reasonableness of the appellant’s attorney fees and whether the hotel company was liable for them. View "Ralston v. Board of Land and Natural Resources." on Justia Law

YUROK TRIBE V. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

2026-05-13T08:01:14-08:00

Decabromodiphenyl Ether (decaBDE) is a flame retardant used in numerous products, including electronics, vehicles, and appliances, and is known for its persistence, bioaccumulation, and toxic effects on human and environmental health. In response to concerns about such chemicals, Congress amended the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) in 2016, adding a subsection mandating expedited risk-management rules for certain chemicals, including decaBDE. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated rules in 2021 and amended them in 2024, regulating some uses of decaBDE but declining to regulate exposures arising from recycling, disposal, wastewater, and sewage sludge in several contexts. Following the 2021 rule, several petitioners challenged the EPA’s approach in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The EPA voluntarily sought a remand to reconsider aspects of its rule, which the Ninth Circuit granted. After seeking additional public comment, the EPA issued the 2024 amendments, which still did not address all the petitioners’ concerns, particularly regarding the areas of recycling, disposal, wastewater discharges, and sewage sludge. The petitioners renewed their challenge, arguing that EPA’s failure to regulate these areas violated TSCA’s mandate. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the EPA’s decisions not to further regulate decaBDE exposures in recyclable articles, disposal, wastewater, and sewage sludge were not supported by substantial evidence as required by TSCA. The court held that EPA could not justify a failure to regulate based on low exposure levels or general policy preferences and found the agency had not adequately addressed evidence in the record. The court granted the petition for review, remanded the rule to the EPA for renewed rulemaking and further proceedings, but left the 2024 rule in place during the remand. View "YUROK TRIBE V. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY" on Justia Law

Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility v. Zeldin

2026-05-01T07:02:47-08:00

The case concerns two organizations that advocate for environmental health and public employee interests. They filed suit against the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), alleging that the EPA failed to meet its statutory obligations under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) to address risks associated with perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), a harmful chemical formed during the fluorination of plastic containers. The plaintiffs argued that, by March 2023, the EPA had sufficient information about the dangers of PFOA to trigger a nondiscretionary duty to act under TSCA section 4(f), and, alternatively, a duty under section 7(a)(2) to pursue enforcement actions against a specific company involved in the fluorination process. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the suit. It found that the EPA had fulfilled any nondiscretionary duty under section 4(f) by publishing a request for public comment, making the primary claim moot. Regarding section 7(a)(2), the court doubted that it imposed a nondiscretionary duty on the EPA but, even if it did, found that the duty had not been triggered under the circumstances. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the claims did not fit within the TSCA’s citizen-suit provisions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal, but on different grounds. The appellate court held that the organizations failed to plausibly allege associational standing. The court explained that neither organization was a traditional membership organization nor had they shown they were the functional equivalent of one. The court found insufficient evidence that the organizations’ employees, supporters, or board members constituted a constituency whose interests the organizations were entitled to represent in court. Accordingly, the appellate court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. View "Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility v. Zeldin" on Justia Law

Raptors Are the Solution v. Croplife America

2026-04-29T18:09:03-08:00

An environmental organization sought judicial review of the Department of Pesticide Regulation’s decisions to renew and not reevaluate registrations for several rodenticides, contending the Department violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and its own regulations. The organization argued these pesticides posed significant risks to wildlife. Trade associations representing pesticide manufacturers and distributors intervened in the case, stating both representational and direct economic interests in defending the Department’s actions, as their members produced and sold the challenged products. The Superior Court of Alameda County initially ruled in favor of the Department, denying the environmental group’s petition. The organization appealed, and the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reversed and remanded, instructing the Department to reconsider its decision regarding reevaluation of diphacinone, a rodenticide, focusing on its unique environmental impacts. Following remand, the Department agreed to reevaluate diphacinone, and the Legislature enacted a moratorium on its use during the reevaluation process. The environmental organization then sought attorney fees under the private attorney general statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5). The Superior Court found the organization was a successful party, having achieved its litigation objectives and conferred a significant public benefit. The court awarded attorney fees and costs of about $857,000, holding the Department, real parties in interest, and intervening trade associations jointly and severally liable. The trade associations appealed, arguing they were not “opposing parties” under the statute and lacked the requisite direct interest. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that intervenors with a direct pecuniary interest and active participation in the litigation qualify as “opposing parties” for purposes of fee liability under section 1021.5, even if they were not responsible for enacting or enforcing the challenged government actions. View "Raptors Are the Solution v. Croplife America" on Justia Law

People ex rel. Yolo-Solano Air Quality Management Dist.

2026-04-27T10:32:30-08:00

A local air quality management district initiated legal action against an engineering company, its chief executive officer, and a related business, alleging they committed statutory and regulatory violations connected to their agricultural service operations. The district claimed that the defendants failed to correct their conduct after being issued several notices of violation for operating equipment without proper permits and failing to comply with emission controls. The defendants, in response, asserted that the notices were based on an internal district policy that had not been properly adopted through the required public rulemaking procedures. The defendants filed a cross-complaint in the Superior Court of Yolo County seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. They argued that the district relied on a “secret” policy (Policy 24) not properly promulgated under statutory procedures, which unfairly deprived them of certain agricultural exemptions. The district responded with an anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) motion under section 425.16, asserting that the cross-complaint targeted protected regulatory and legal activities, including the investigation, issuance of notices, and initiation of litigation. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion, finding that the cross-complaint was a challenge to the validity of the underlying policy, not to the enforcement actions themselves. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed whether the cross-complaint arose from activities protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court held that the causes of action in the cross-complaint were directed at the validity of the district’s internal policy rather than at the district’s protected enforcement activities. Therefore, the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order denying the anti-SLAPP motion and awarded costs on appeal to the defendants. View "People ex rel. Yolo-Solano Air Quality Management Dist." on Justia Law

In re: Whittaker Clark & Daniels

2026-04-27T09:00:10-08:00

Whittaker, Clark & Daniels, Inc. and three affiliates, historically involved in the manufacture and distribution of asbestos-containing talc, faced thousands of personal injury and environmental claims. Over the years, the companies divested their operating assets, notably selling them to Brenntag North America in 2004 while expressly excluding pre-sale asbestos and environmental liabilities. As liabilities mounted, one plaintiff obtained a large jury verdict in South Carolina and successfully moved to put Whittaker into receivership, with a receiver appointed to administer its assets. Following the South Carolina receivership, Whittaker's board authorized a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey without consulting the receiver. The receiver moved to dismiss the bankruptcy, arguing that under the receivership order, only he had authority to file such a petition. The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion, finding that the receivership order did not displace the board’s authority. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey affirmed this ruling. While bankruptcy proceedings moved forward, the Debtors negotiated a $535 million settlement with Brenntag to resolve successor liability claims. However, the Official Committee of Talc Claimants argued that certain product-line successor liability claims belonged exclusively to talc creditors and not to the bankruptcy estate. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed two central issues. First, it held that the propriety of Whittaker’s bankruptcy petition did not affect the bankruptcy court’s subject matter jurisdiction and that, under New Jersey law, the board retained authority to file for bankruptcy because the South Carolina receiver had not obtained recognition or ancillary receivership in New Jersey. Second, the court held that product-line successor liability claims, like other derivative claims based on injury to the debtor and available to all creditors, are property of the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). Accordingly, the Third Circuit affirmed the lower courts’ judgments. View "In re: Whittaker Clark & Daniels" on Justia Law

FORWARD, INC. V. MACOMBER

2026-04-27T07:32:10-08:00

A company operating a landfill in California suspected that neighboring state facilities were contributing hazardous waste, complicating its efforts to clean up groundwater contamination. The company alleged that activities at several state-run institutions bordering its landfill—including a correctional facility and a health care center—involved the use and disposal of hazardous substances that were leaching into the groundwater. In response, the company entered into an agreement allowing it to collect data from these state facilities, which it then used to support its claim that hazardous waste generation at those sites was undermining its remediation efforts. The company brought a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) against the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and the Director of the California Department of General Services. The lawsuit alleged that, by virtue of their official positions, these state officials controlled the generation and management of hazardous waste at the implicated facilities. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the officials’ general supervisory roles were insufficient to establish the “fairly direct” connection to the alleged violations required for an exception to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity under the doctrine established in Ex parte Young. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a “fairly direct” connection between the named officials and the alleged RCRA violations. The court clarified that general supervisory authority or oversight of state agencies does not, by itself, subject state officials to suit under Ex parte Young; a more specific connection to the alleged unlawful conduct is required. Thus, the action against these particular officials could not proceed. View "FORWARD, INC. V. MACOMBER" on Justia Law

Town of Pine Hill v. 3M Company, Inc.

2026-04-24T05:30:52-08:00

The Town of Pine Hill sued several corporations and individuals in the Wilcox Circuit Court, claiming that chemical contamination from upstream industrial facilities, including per- and poly-fluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), polluted the Town’s drinking water supply from the Alabama River. The Town alleged that these chemicals, released via wastewater, air, and stormwater emissions, exceeded federal health guidelines, could not be removed by current treatment processes, and caused harm. The Town sought damages for remediation, future filtration costs, and injunctive relief. The complaint stated that no federal cause of action was asserted and noted that most defendants were out-of-state corporations. After the suit was filed, 3M Company, Inc. removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, citing federal-officer removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 and diversity jurisdiction. The district court remanded the case to state court, but 3M appealed the remand order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The district court stayed its remand order pending appeal, even after transmitting it to the state court. The Town argued that jurisdiction returned to the circuit court upon remand, and the Wilcox Circuit Court agreed, ordering litigation to proceed. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that because the removal was under 28 U.S.C. § 1442, the remand order was appealable and the federal district court retained jurisdiction to stay or reconsider its remand order, even after transmitting it to the state court. The circuit court acted without jurisdiction by proceeding while the remand order was stayed. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Alabama issued a writ of prohibition, requiring the circuit court to vacate its order asserting jurisdiction and to stay proceedings until the federal appeal is resolved. View "Town of Pine Hill v. 3M Company, Inc." on Justia Law

COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO V. INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

2026-04-23T08:31:16-08:00

The dispute centers on insurance coverage for environmental remediation costs incurred by a county at an airport property it owned. The activities causing contamination began during and after World War II, including industrial waste disposal and manufacturing by various tenants. In the 1990s and beyond, state authorities ordered the county to investigate and clean up hazardous groundwater pollution. The county sought coverage under a series of insurance policies issued by its insurer between 1966 and 1975, which provided both excess and umbrella liability coverage. The core disagreement was whether the insurer’s liability for property damage was limited to $9 million per occurrence, as the county argued, or subject to a $9 million annual aggregate limit, as the insurer contended. Initially, the United States District Court for the Central District of California allowed the insurer to withdraw an admission that no aggregate limit applied. The district court ultimately sided with the insurer, holding that the policies imposed an annual aggregate limit on property damage claims and relying on a California appellate decision, Garamendi v. Mission Insurance Co., to support this view. After granting the insurer’s motion, the district court dismissed the county’s claim for declaratory relief, reasoning that no further controversy existed and that any determination of future benefits would be speculative. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that, under California law, the aggregate limit provisions in these policies were ambiguous regarding whether they applied to property damage. The court found that Garamendi did not bind its interpretation, considering the policies’ language and extrinsic evidence, including industry practice and the insurer’s own statements. Concluding the policies did not specify an aggregate limit for property damage, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO V. INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA" on Justia Law

White's Landing Fisheries, Inc. v. Ohio Dep't of Nat. Res. Div. of Wildlife

2026-04-22T21:02:32-08:00

A commercial fisherman from Erie County, Ohio, who owned a fisheries business, challenged a state rule that amended commercial fishing regulations to exclude seine fishers from receiving yellow perch quotas. The rule, promulgated by the Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR), Division of Wildlife, allocated quotas exclusively to trap net fishers and prohibited the transfer of quotas to seine licenses. The fisherman alleged that this rule deprived him of economic value and constituted a taking without compensation, and further brought claims for breach of fiduciary duty and civil conspiracy against both state and federal defendants. The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The district court dismissed with prejudice all claims against Ohio and the state officials, holding that there was no protected property interest in the value of a fishing license or uncaught fish under the Takings Clause. The court also found that sovereign immunity barred all claims against the state and its officials, even if the claims otherwise had merit, and determined the state law claims were insufficiently pled. Claims against the federal defendants were dismissed without prejudice for defective service of process. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings de novo. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that sovereign immunity barred the takings and state law claims against Ohio and the state officials, rejecting the appellant’s arguments that these defendants had waived immunity or that recent Supreme Court and Ohio Supreme Court decisions required judicial review of the state rule. However, the appellate court held that because the dismissal was based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the claims against the state defendants should have been dismissed without prejudice. The court affirmed the dismissal of claims against the federal defendants. The judgment was thus affirmed in part and reversed in part, with instructions to dismiss the state claims without prejudice. View "White's Landing Fisheries, Inc. v. Ohio Dep't of Nat. Res. Div. of Wildlife" on Justia Law

Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security

2026-04-21T21:07:45-08:00

State officials in Florida constructed an immigration detention facility at the Dade-Collier Training and Transition Airport, located in the Florida Everglades, using state funds and employees. The facility was built on state property and managed by state law enforcement, although federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials inspected the site and occasionally coordinated the transport and detention of individuals there. The state planned to seek federal reimbursement but had not received any federal funding at the time of the events in question. Several state agencies operated under agreements with the federal government, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g), allowing them to assist with immigration enforcement, but Florida retained control over the facility’s management and construction. The Friends of the Everglades, the Center for Biological Diversity, and the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. They alleged violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), claiming that officials failed to conduct a required environmental review before constructing and operating the facility. The district court issued a preliminary injunction halting further construction, requiring removal of certain structures, and prohibiting detention of additional individuals at the site. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits, concluding that the construction was a final agency action and a major federal action under NEPA, and that federal officials exercised substantial control over the project. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate either a final agency action under the APA or substantial federal control necessary to trigger NEPA, given that Florida constructed and controlled the facility without federal funding or operational authority. The court also found that the district court’s injunction violated a statutory prohibition against enjoining immigration enforcement. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. View "Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish

2026-04-19T22:15:05-08:00

During the Second World War, Chevron’s corporate predecessor operated oil fields in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, producing crude oil that was refined into aviation gasoline (avgas) for the United States military under federal contracts. Decades later, following the enactment of Louisiana’s State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act of 1978, which imposed permit requirements on certain uses of the coastal zone but exempted uses lawfully commenced before 1980, Plaquemines Parish and other parishes brought suit in state court. They alleged that Chevron and other oil companies had failed to obtain required permits and that some pre-1980 activities, including those during the war, were illegally commenced and not exempt. The parish’s expert report specifically challenged Chevron’s wartime crude-oil production methods, including its use of vertical drilling, canals, and earthen pits, as harmful to the environment and not in compliance with the Act. Chevron sought removal to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. §1442(a)(1), arguing that the suit was “for or relating to” acts under color of its duties as a federal contractor refining avgas. The United States District Court granted the parish’s motion to remand to state court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that although Chevron acted under a federal officer as a military contractor, the suit did not “relate to” those acts because the federal refining contract did not govern how Chevron obtained or produced crude oil. The Supreme Court of the United States held that Chevron plausibly alleged a close, not tenuous or remote, relationship between the challenged crude-oil production and its federal avgas refining duties. The Court concluded that the suit satisfied the “relating to” requirement for removal under §1442(a)(1), vacated the Fifth Circuit’s judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish" on Justia Law

TEXAS COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY v. PAXTON

2026-04-17T06:24:44-08:00

A state environmental agency received a broad public records request from a nonprofit organization seeking documents related to a recent assessment on ethylene oxide. The agency responded the next day, asking the organization to clarify whether it wanted confidential information, which would require a formal opinion from the state attorney general and could delay production. The requester promptly confirmed it sought all responsive records, including any considered confidential but subject to disclosure under the public records law. The agency believed many documents were exempt under a deliberative-process exception and, within what it believed to be the deadline, sent a request to the attorney general for a ruling. The attorney general later determined that the agency had missed the ten-business-day deadline by two days, so the information was presumed public unless there was a compelling reason to withhold it. The agency then provided additional evidence that it was closed on July 5 due to the Independence Day holiday, that its request was timely mailed, and that it had sought clarification from the requester. Nonetheless, the Attorney General declined to reconsider. The agency filed a declaratory judgment action in district court, and the nonprofit intervened, seeking to compel disclosure. The Office of the Attorney General later conceded its original calculation was mistaken, but the district court granted summary judgment for the nonprofit, ordering disclosure of over 6,000 pages. The Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas affirmed, holding the request for a ruling was untimely and rejecting the agency’s arguments about deadlines and clarifications. The Supreme Court of Texas held that the ten-business-day deadline for the agency’s request was reset by its timely, good-faith request for narrowing or clarification, and that the agency established timely submission of its request under the mailbox rule. It reversed the judgments below and remanded for further proceedings to determine if the deliberative-process privilege protects the records. View "TEXAS COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY v. PAXTON" on Justia Law

G.B. V. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

2026-04-09T08:31:15-08:00

A group of eighteen minors residing in California filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other federal officials, claiming that the government’s policy of discounting future costs and benefits in cost-benefit analyses for greenhouse gas (GHG) regulations discriminates against children. The plaintiffs alleged this practice favors present-day consumption, benefiting adults over minors, and leads to under-regulation of GHG emissions. They argued this under-regulation contributes to climate change, which, in turn, causes them various harms including property damage, health issues, and psychological distress. The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. That court dismissed the action, ruling that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. The court found that the plaintiffs’ claims did not establish a cognizable injury-in-fact, that the alleged environmental harms were not fairly traceable to the government’s discounting policies, and that the requested declaratory relief would not redress their injuries. The district court allowed the plaintiffs one opportunity to amend their complaint, but after the plaintiffs did so, the court again dismissed the case and denied further leave to amend, finding further amendment would be futile. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to allege a viable injury to their equal protection rights, as the government’s discounting policies were not shown to be motivated by discriminatory intent toward children. The court also found the alleged environmental harms too attenuated and speculative to be fairly traceable to the challenged policies. Additionally, circuit precedent foreclosed the requested declaratory relief, as it would not redress the plaintiffs’ injuries. The Ninth Circuit concluded that denying further leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion. View "G.B. V. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY" on Justia Law

BROWN LOPEZ V. USA

2026-04-08T10:06:22-08:00

A group of environmental organizations, Native tribes, and individual plaintiffs sought to prevent a land exchange in Southeast Arizona’s Tonto National Forest, mandated by the Southeast Arizona Land Exchange and Conservation Act. This exchange would transfer nearly 2,500 acres of federal land, including Oak Flat—a site of religious significance to the Apache—and a large copper deposit to Resolution Copper Mining LLC. In return, the company would provide over 5,000 acres of equally appraised land to the federal government. Plaintiffs raised concerns under several statutes, including the Land Exchange Act, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Free Exercise Clause, alleging procedural and substantive flaws in the exchange. The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied motions for preliminary injunctions, finding that plaintiffs failed to show likely success or serious questions on the merits of their claims relating to appraisal, NEPA compliance, tribal consultation, and religious liberty. In a related case, Apache Stronghold v. United States, the district court’s denial of an injunction on religious liberty grounds was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit and not disturbed by the Supreme Court. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The court held that plaintiffs had Article III standing and that their NEPA claims were justiciable as “final agency action.” However, it concluded that plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their appraisal, NEPA, consultation, or religious liberty claims. The court further determined that existing precedent foreclosed the RFRA and Free Exercise arguments. The court did not address other injunction factors and dissolved the administrative stay. View "BROWN LOPEZ V. USA" on Justia Law

ENG V. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

2026-04-08T08:32:20-08:00

A resident living near a Los Angeles refinery operated by Ultramar Inc., a subsidiary of Valero Energy Corp., challenged the renewal of the refinery’s operating permit. The facility, located in Wilmington, is subject to Title V of the Clean Air Act, which requires certain air polluters to obtain operating permits. The resident argued that the permit should include additional conditions to address the potential for a catastrophic release of hydrogen fluoride or modified hydrofluoric acid. He pointed to alleged deficiencies in the refinery’s Risk Management Plan (RMP), Emergency Response Plan, Emergency Response Manual, and other documents, claiming these left the refinery unprepared for such an event. The South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD), acting as the Title V permitting authority, solicited public comments before issuing the permit. The petitioner submitted objections during this process, but SCAQMD rejected them and issued the permit. The petitioner then filed an administrative petition with the Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), asking the EPA to object to the permit. The EPA Administrator denied the petition, concluding that issues related to risk management plans and accidental release prevention fall under a separate regulatory program, not the Title V permitting process. The Administrator also found that the requirements referenced by the petitioner were not “applicable requirements” of the Clean Air Act for Title V purposes. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the EPA’s decision. The court held that the Administrator’s denial was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. It concluded that the petitioner failed to show that additional permit conditions were required to ensure compliance with the Clean Air Act’s risk management requirements. The court also found that the petitioner’s arguments based on state law did not qualify as applicable federal requirements. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review. View "ENG V. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY" on Justia Law

Citizens for Constitutional Integrity v. United States

2026-04-07T07:32:35-08:00

A mining company sought to expand its underground coal mine situated beneath Indian lands. To proceed, it needed approval for a revised permit, a new federal lease, and a modification of its operations plan. The Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement and the Bureau of Land Management jointly conducted an environmental assessment, solicited public comments, and ultimately granted the necessary authorizations for expansion. Two advocacy groups opposed the expansion, citing potential impacts on water resources and basing their challenges on the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. They previously sued, raising claims under the rescinded Stream Protection Rule, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected those claims. The groups later amended their complaint to invoke different provisions of the Act, specifically Sections 1270 and 1276. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied their petition for judicial review, concluding the claims were substantially similar to those previously rejected and finding the agency had fulfilled its nondiscretionary duties. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the advocacy groups could not obtain relief under Section 1270 because they failed to provide adequate notice of the alleged violations and had advanced claims implicating discretionary, not mandatory, agency actions. The court also found that Section 1276 did not authorize judicial review for the groups because they had not participated in the permit-review process as required by the statute. The court clarified that commenting on an environmental assessment was not a substitute for objecting to the permit application itself. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the petition for judicial review. View "Citizens for Constitutional Integrity v. United States" on Justia Law

Alon Refining Krotz Springs, Inc. v. EPA

2026-04-07T07:02:31-08:00

Several oil refineries with average daily crude oil throughput below 75,000 barrels in 2024 applied to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2025 for exemptions from their obligations under the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program for the 2024 compliance year. The RFS program, established under the Clean Air Act, requires refineries to blend renewable fuels into transportation fuels. The Act provides for a “small refinery” exemption for facilities that do not exceed the 75,000-barrel threshold in a calendar year. The petitioning refineries did not seek exemptions for 2023 and based their applications solely on their 2024 throughput. After the refineries submitted their applications, the EPA informed them that, under its 2014 regulation, eligibility required a refinery to meet the “small refinery” definition both for "the most recent full calendar year prior to seeking an extension" and for "the year or years for which an exemption is sought." The EPA interpreted this to mean petitioners needed to satisfy the throughput limit in both 2023 and 2024. Since the refineries exceeded the threshold in 2023, the EPA denied the exemption requests. The refineries then sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The D.C. Circuit held that the EPA’s interpretation of its 2014 regulation was contrary to the regulation’s plain text. The court found that, because the applications were filed in 2025 for the 2024 compliance year, both the “most recent full calendar year prior to seeking an extension” and “the year for which an exemption is sought” referred to 2024. Since the petitioners met the threshold in 2024, they were eligible under the regulation. The court vacated the EPA’s denial orders and remanded for further proceedings. View "Alon Refining Krotz Springs, Inc. v. EPA" on Justia Law

Center for Biological Diversity v. Zeldin

2026-03-27T06:33:18-08:00

Florida sought approval from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to assume authority for issuing permits under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, which would allow parties to discharge pollutants into state waters. To streamline the process for permit applicants and reduce the burden of complying with the Endangered Species Act (ESA), Florida proposed a permitting program in which the state would monitor and protect ESA-listed species primarily through a “technical assistance process,” with only advisory input from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). The EPA and FWS approved Florida’s proposal after the FWS issued a programmatic Biological Opinion (BiOp) and Incidental Take Statement (ITS) that found no jeopardy to protected species and exempted permittees from further ESA liability, relying heavily on Florida’s assurances rather than detailed, up-front analysis. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the actions of the EPA and FWS after environmental groups challenged Florida’s permitting program, asserting violations of the ESA and Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court found that the FWS’s BiOp and ITS were unlawful because they failed to conduct the required analyses and deferred essential protections to a less rigorous state-run process. The court also determined the EPA’s reliance on these documents was impermissible and that the EPA had wrongly failed to consult with the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). As a remedy, the district court vacated the EPA’s approval of Florida’s permitting program along with the BiOp and ITS. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the environmental groups had standing and their claims were ripe. It concluded that the FWS’s BiOp and ITS did not comply with the ESA, that the EPA’s reliance on those documents was unlawful, and that the EPA erred by not consulting with the NMFS. The court required vacatur of the EPA’s approval of Florida’s permitting program and the associated ESA documents. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Zeldin" on Justia Law

Bair v. Cal. Dept. of Transportation

2026-03-26T11:32:34-08:00

A group of local residents and environmental organizations opposed a California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) highway project in Humboldt County that would reconfigure a stretch of U.S. Highway 101 through Richardson Grove State Park, an area containing old-growth redwood trees. The opposition centered on concerns that the project would damage the trees and their root systems. Caltrans initially certified an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) for the project, concluding there would be no significant environmental impacts. Over the years, the challengers brought multiple legal actions, arguing that Caltrans’ environmental review failed to meet the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). After the initial EIR was invalidated on appeal for not adequately analyzing impacts on redwood tree roots (Lotus v. Department of Transportation), Caltrans prepared an Addendum with new analysis and recertified the EIR. However, a second trial court judgment found Caltrans violated CEQA by not allowing public review of the Addendum, ordering that it be circulated for comment. Caltrans complied, and both previous writs were eventually discharged. The plaintiffs did not appeal the discharge orders. The present case arose from a third petition challenging the substantive adequacy of the Addendum and Caltrans’ compliance with CEQA. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that the lower court’s discharge of the initial writ (the Lotus writ) necessarily determined that Caltrans’ revised analysis complied with CEQA. Because the plaintiffs did not appeal that decision, the doctrine of res judicata barred them from relitigating the adequacy of the Addendum in this new action. The court affirmed the judgment denying the third petition, thus precluding further CEQA challenges to the Addendum’s substantive analysis of impacts on the redwoods. View "Bair v. Cal. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

STATE OF ALASKA V. NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE

2026-03-25T08:01:10-08:00

The case concerns the National Marine Fisheries Service’s (NMFS) designation of critical habitat in 2022 for two species of Arctic seals, following their listing as threatened under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in 2012. The designated areas covered waters off Alaska’s north coast and were based on findings that those areas contained physical and biological features essential to the conservation of the seal species. Alaska opposed these designations, contending that they were too broad and provided minimal benefit, and requested that certain coastal areas be excluded due to economic impacts. NMFS excluded an area used by the Navy for training but declined to exclude others requested by Alaska and the North Slope Borough, finding no significant economic impact. The United States District Court for the District of Alaska largely agreed with Alaska, holding that the critical habitat designations were unlawful. The court vacated the rules and remanded the matter to NMFS, concluding that NMFS had not adequately explained why the entire designated area was necessary for the seals’ conservation, had failed to consider foreign conservation efforts and foreign habitat, and had abused its discretion by not considering certain exclusions. The Center for Biological Diversity intervened as a defendant and appealed the district court’s decision. The district court did, however, reject Alaska’s argument that NMFS had failed to comply with the ESA’s “prudency” requirement. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that it had jurisdiction, reversed the district court’s rulings that the designations were unlawful, and affirmed the court’s ruling on the ESA’s prudency requirement. The Ninth Circuit held that NMFS’s designations complied with the ESA, that the agency was not required to consider foreign conservation efforts or habitat, and that the decision not to exclude certain coastal areas was within its discretion. The critical habitat designations were reinstated, and the case was remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the Center and NMFS. View "STATE OF ALASKA V. NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE" on Justia Law

Mayor & City Cncl. Of Balt. v. B.P. P.L.C.

2026-03-24T10:05:41-08:00

Several Maryland local governments, including Baltimore City, Anne Arundel County, and the City of Annapolis, filed lawsuits in Maryland circuit courts against 26 multinational oil and gas companies. They alleged that the defendants’ extraction, production, promotion, and sale of fossil fuels—combined with deceptive marketing about their products’ climate risks—substantially contributed to global greenhouse gas emissions, resulting in severe local impacts such as sea-level rise, flooding, and heat waves. The local governments sought damages and equitable relief based on Maryland common law claims of public nuisance, private nuisance, trespass, negligent failure to warn, and strict liability failure to warn. In the trial courts (the Circuit Courts for Baltimore City and Anne Arundel County), the defendants successfully moved to dismiss the complaints. The courts found that the local governments’ claims were preempted by federal law, specifically by federal common law and the Clean Air Act, and that the complaints failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted under Maryland law. The cases took a procedural detour through federal courts due to removal attempts, but were ultimately remanded to state court. The Appellate Court of Maryland consolidated the appeals, and the Supreme Court of Maryland granted review by writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the dismissals. The court held that the local governments’ state law claims, though pled as torts, effectively sought to regulate interstate and international air emissions—an area governed exclusively by federal law. Relying on United States Supreme Court precedent, the court explained that such claims are displaced by federal common law and, in turn, by the Clean Air Act, which does not authorize broad state law claims in this context. The court further held that, even if not preempted, none of the plaintiffs stated valid claims under Maryland law for public or private nuisance, trespass, or failure to warn. View "Mayor & City Cncl. Of Balt. v. B.P. P.L.C." on Justia Law

In the Matter of Jibsail Family Limited Partnership

2026-03-18T06:06:01-08:00

A property owner on West Point Island sought to extend an existing dock into Barnegat Bay. The owner obtained permits from both the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) and the Army Corps of Engineers, and received a tidelands license from the Tidelands Resource Council (TRC). After the extension was completed, it was found to be slightly south of the permitted location, prompting the owner to seek a modified permit and license for the as-built dock. The adjacent property owner objected, arguing the extension created navigational hazards and interfered with their own dock’s use. The TRC held public hearings, considered testimony and written submissions, and ultimately approved the modified license, finding the extension complied with applicable rules and did not interfere with navigation or the rights of the objecting neighbor. The DEP approved the decision. The neighbor appealed to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, arguing that the TRC lacked authority to set or modify pierhead lines through individual license proceedings and that such lines must be established uniformly around islands in advance under Section 19 of the Tidelands Act. The Appellate Division affirmed the TRC’s decision, finding it was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and holding that the TRC was permitted to establish or modify pierhead lines in connection with individual licenses. The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that the Tidelands Act authorizes the TRC to set or modify pierhead lines in the context of reviewing individual tidelands license applications, rather than requiring the TRC to establish uniform pierhead lines around all islands prospectively. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment, concluding that the TRC did not exceed its statutory authority in issuing the licenses at issue. View "In the Matter of Jibsail Family Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

ARIZONA MINING REFORM COALITION V. UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE

2026-03-13T16:01:23-08:00

A federal land exchange was mandated by the Southeast Arizona Land Exchange and Conservation Act, requiring the United States Forest Service to transfer approximately 2,500 acres of National Forest land, including Oak Flat—a site of religious significance to the Apache—to Resolution Copper Mining, LLC, in exchange for over 5,000 acres of private land. The legislation included requirements for tribal consultation, land appraisal, and the preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS). Following the issuance of a revised Final EIS in 2025, several environmental and tribal groups, as well as individual Apache plaintiffs, challenged the exchange. Their claims spanned the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Free Exercise Clause, alleging procedural and substantive deficiencies. Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied the plaintiffs’ motions for a preliminary injunction, finding that they had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on any claims relating to the appraisal process, NEPA, consultation, or the National Forest Management Act. A separate group of Apache plaintiffs brought similar claims, including religious liberty challenges, which were also denied—particularly in light of circuit precedent established in Apache Stronghold v. United States. All plaintiff groups appealed and sought further injunctive relief pending appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion and affirmed. The court held that plaintiffs had standing and their claims were justiciable, but that none of their arguments were likely to succeed on the merits or raised serious questions. The court specifically found the appraisals and environmental review sufficient, the agency’s tribal consultation adequate, and the religious liberty claims foreclosed by circuit precedent. The denial of a preliminary injunction was affirmed, and all related motions for injunctive relief were denied as moot. View "ARIZONA MINING REFORM COALITION V. UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE" on Justia Law

COCKRELL INVESTMENT PARTNERS, L.P. v. MIDDLE PECOS GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT

2026-03-13T12:18:33-08:00

Cockrell Investment Partners, L.P., owns a pecan orchard in Pecos County, Texas, and relies on several wells to irrigate its trees using water from the Edwards–Trinity Aquifer. Its neighbor, Fort Stockton Holdings, L.P. (FSH), historically used water from the same aquifer for agricultural purposes and later started selling it to nearby cities. FSH sought to significantly increase its permitted water usage, leading Cockrell to object due to concerns about the aquifer’s finite supply. FSH pursued several permit applications and amendments, some of which involved Republic Water Company of Texas, LLC, and ultimately resulted in settlement agreements that altered FSH’s permit terms. Cockrell attempted to participate as a party in administrative proceedings regarding these permit applications but was denied party status by the Middle Pecos Groundwater Conservation District. The district court in one instance granted the District’s plea to the jurisdiction, and in another instance granted summary judgment in favor of the District after denying its plea to the jurisdiction. Cockrell appealed both decisions to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas. The appellate court affirmed the lower court rulings, determining that Cockrell had not exhausted its administrative remedies because it filed suit before waiting the required 90 days after submitting reconsideration requests, as prescribed by Section 36.412 of the Texas Water Code. The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed both consolidated cases. It held that the 90-day exhaustion requirement applies only to permit applicants or parties to the administrative proceeding, which Cockrell was not, since it was denied party status. The Court concluded that Cockrell met all statutory requirements for judicial review under Section 36.251 of the Water Code and properly exhausted its administrative remedies according to local Rule 4.9, which required only a 45-day waiting period. The Court reversed the judgments of the court of appeals and remanded the cases for further consideration. View "COCKRELL INVESTMENT PARTNERS, L.P. v. MIDDLE PECOS GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT" on Justia Law

Clean Fuels Alliance America v. EPA

2026-03-13T06:35:20-08:00

The case concerns a challenge brought by two renewable fuel industry groups to a 2020 rule issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Clean Air Act’s Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) Program. The challenged rule established the percentage of renewable fuel that refiners and importers must include in their annual fuel output. The groups objected to EPA’s refusal to adjust the 2020 standard to account for renewable fuel shortfalls resulting from past retroactive small refinery exemptions. While the case was pending, EPA issued a new rule in 2022 that recalculated the 2020 standards and reaffirmed its approach of not making up for past exemptions. In addition, Congress altered the statutory framework, granting EPA broader discretion in setting future renewable fuel volumes. Following the issuance of the 2022 rule, most petitioners dismissed their challenges, and the two remaining groups shifted their focus, no longer seeking to set aside the 2020 rule but instead seeking a ruling that would require EPA to change its policy in future rulemakings. They did not challenge the 2022 rule, nor did they request its invalidation. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the case was moot. The court reasoned that the 2022 rule superseded the 2020 rule, eliminating any live controversy over that agency action. The court further explained that the legal landscape had changed due to statutory amendments, so the original dispute no longer presented the same question. Because petitioners were not seeking to overturn any concrete, current agency action, their challenge amounted to a request for an impermissible advisory opinion. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petitions as moot. View "Clean Fuels Alliance America v. EPA" on Justia Law

DiBiccari v. State of Rhode Island

2026-03-10T10:16:42-08:00

The plaintiff owned a vacant parcel in Westerly, Rhode Island, and sought to construct a single-family home. To do so, he needed approval from the Department of Environmental Management (DEM) for an onsite wastewater treatment system (OWTS). He applied for a variance from DEM’s regulations, asserting that his proposed system satisfied the general standard for granting variances. However, DEM denied the variance because the property’s water table was at zero inches from the original ground surface, failing to meet a specific regulatory requirement. After DEM’s denial, the plaintiff did not appeal to DEM’s Administrative Adjudication Division (AAD), arguing that such an appeal would be futile since the AAD purportedly lacked discretion to overturn the denial and could not adjudicate constitutional claims. Instead, he filed suit in the Superior Court, seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, asserting both as-applied and facial challenges to the OWTS regulations under the Takings, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The state moved to dismiss, arguing failure to exhaust administrative remedies and the lack of constitutional violations. The Superior Court granted the state’s motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies and the futility exception did not apply. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court held that the plaintiff was required to exhaust administrative remedies for his as-applied challenges and that the futility exception did not apply because the AAD had independent authority to grant variances. For the facial constitutional challenge, the Court determined that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The judgment dismissing the complaint was affirmed and the matter remanded. View "DiBiccari v. State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law

Lucas Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Environmental Protection Agency

2026-03-09T11:30:36-08:00

This case concerns the approval of Ohio’s Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) for phosphorus in the Maumee River watershed, a key regulatory effort to combat harmful algal blooms in Lake Erie. The United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) approved the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency’s (Ohio EPA) TMDL for this region. Plaintiffs, including Lucas County, the City of Toledo, and the Environmental Law & Policy Center, challenged this approval under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), alleging that it was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law. During the litigation in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, several parties sought to intervene. The court allowed environmental groups and the Ohio EPA to intervene but denied intervention to two sets of proposed defendant-intervenors: various agricultural associations (“Associations”) and the Maumee Coalition II Association (“Coalition”). The district court found that neither the Associations nor the Coalition satisfied the criteria for intervention of right because it presumed the U.S. EPA would adequately represent their interests and that neither group overcame this presumption. The court also denied permissive intervention, concluding that their participation would unnecessarily complicate and delay the proceedings. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denials. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of intervention for the Coalition, finding it had not shown its interests were inadequately represented by existing parties. However, the appellate court reversed the denial for the Associations, holding that they intended to make specific legal arguments distinct from U.S. EPA’s, thereby overcoming the presumption of adequate representation. The court remanded with instructions to allow the Associations to intervene as of right, while affirming the denial of both intervention of right and permissive intervention to the Coalition. View "Lucas Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

WYOMING TRUST CO. v. US

2026-03-06T07:02:52-08:00

The appellants, including trustees of several trusts and Hall Atlas, LLC, held coal mining rights to the Hall Ranch in Wyoming, containing significant coal reserves. In 1985, the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality (WDEQ) determined that a portion of the Hall Ranch was located on an alluvial valley floor (AVF), which limited mining under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA). For decades, neither the appellants nor Exxon Coal Resources, the lessee at the time, pursued a coal exchange. In 2010, Hall Atlas applied to the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) for a coal exchange. BLM initially rejected WDEQ’s 1985 determination but changed position in 2014, and Hall Atlas submitted a mine plan. In 2016, BLM determined the Hall Ranch AVF coal had a value of $0. In 2017, BLM reiterated its $0 valuation and rejected the appellants’ proposed exchange tract, instead proposing alternatives based on the same valuation. The United States Court of Federal Claims dismissed the appellants’ takings claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the claim was time-barred because it was filed more than six years after the claim accrued. The appellants argued that their claim did not accrue until BLM’s 2017 letter, but the court found that the relevant accrual date was in 2016, when BLM finalized its $0 valuation. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision. The Federal Circuit held that any takings claim accrued no later than 2016, making the 2023 filing untimely under the Tucker Act’s six-year statute of limitations. The court rejected arguments for equitable tolling and the application of the continuing claim or stabilization doctrines, and concluded the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was correct. The judgment was affirmed and costs were awarded to the appellee. View "WYOMING TRUST CO. v. US " on Justia Law

Las Posas Valley Water v. Ventura County Waterworks

2026-03-05T14:09:53-08:00

A group of landowners and mutual water companies in Ventura County, California, claimed rights to groundwater from the Las Posas Valley Groundwater Basin, which supplies water for agricultural, commercial, and domestic purposes. The groundwater basin had been subject to restrictions and management by the Fox Canyon Groundwater Management Agency (Fox Canyon), especially in light of overdraft conditions and the requirements of the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA). Disputes arose over groundwater pumping allocations, historical use, and the proper method for determining and allocating water rights among various landowners, mutual water companies, and public agencies. The case was brought as a comprehensive groundwater adjudication in the Superior Court of Santa Barbara County, proceeding in three phases. First, the court established the initial “Total Safe Yield” of the basin and allocated a portion to certain public water suppliers. In the second phase, the court, after a trial and a settlement agreed to by a large majority of parties, allocated the remaining rights among landowners, prioritizing overlying landowners and finding no surplus for appropriators. The third phase established a “physical solution” for basin management, appointing Fox Canyon as watermaster and integrating the settlement into a final judgment. Several parties, including Mahan Ranch and two mutual water companies, objected to aspects of the allocations and the final judgment, raising issues about the treatment of mutual water companies, the handling of dormant rights, and the legality of the court's actions. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court properly allocated water rights based on overlying landowners’ rights, not directly to mutual water companies, and that there was no surplus for appropriators. The court found the physical solution and allocations consistent with California law, the Constitution, and SGMA, and that non-stipulating parties were treated equitably. The judgment was affirmed. View "Las Posas Valley Water v. Ventura County Waterworks" on Justia Law

Physicians for Social Responsibility - Los Angeles v. Dept. of Toxic Substances Control

2026-03-04T12:31:56-08:00

For many years, the federal government and private entities engaged in activities at the Santa Susana Field Laboratory in Ventura County, resulting in significant environmental contamination. The Boeing Company, which owns much of the site, planned to demolish several buildings within a specific area known as Area IV. California’s Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) is authorized to regulate chemical contamination cleanup at the site, and its actions are subject to environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). In 2013, after Boeing notified DTSC of its demolition intent, the plaintiffs raised concerns about environmental impacts and filed a writ petition alleging DTSC failed to comply with CEQA. The Superior Court of Sacramento County denied the plaintiffs’ petition, finding that demolition activities were private actions not subject to CEQA’s discretionary approval requirements, and thus not subject to CEQA review. The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed this decision, and the California Supreme Court declined review. During subsequent events, DTSC voluntarily included an environmental analysis of the building demolition in its final Environmental Impact Report (EIR), released after the litigation had concluded. The plaintiffs then sought attorney fees under California’s private attorney general statute (Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5), arguing that their litigation was the catalyst for DTSC’s changed conduct. The superior court denied the fee request, finding the plaintiffs were not a “successful party” under the catalyst theory because their lawsuit had been resolved on the merits against them, and thus there was no “threat of victory” that motivated DTSC’s actions. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the denial. The court held that attorney fees under the catalyst theory are not warranted where the moving party lost on the merits, and there was no causal connection between the litigation and the agency’s subsequent voluntary actions. DTSC was awarded its costs on appeal. View "Physicians for Social Responsibility - Los Angeles v. Dept. of Toxic Substances Control" on Justia Law

Anadarko v. Alternative Environmental Solutions

2026-03-03T11:02:51-08:00

An environmental remediation company and an oil corporation entered into a Master Services Contract in 2008, which included a Texas choice-of-law and venue provision and an indemnification clause requiring the remediation company to defend and indemnify the oil corporation for claims arising from violations of applicable laws. In 2012, it was discovered that the remediation company’s then-president, along with subcontractors, had engaged in fraudulent overbilling for work performed for the oil corporation. Upon discovery, ownership of the remediation company changed hands, and litigation ensued in Louisiana state court. The remediation company’s new owner alleged that the oil corporation’s employee was complicit in the fraud, making the corporation vicariously liable. The oil corporation then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas seeking a declaratory judgment that the remediation company had a duty to defend and indemnify it in the Louisiana litigation, and also sought attorney’s fees as damages for breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment for the oil corporation, holding that Texas law applied, the remediation company owed both a duty to defend and to indemnify, and awarding attorney’s fees for both the Texas and Louisiana lawsuits. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings de novo regarding summary judgment and attorney’s fees. The appellate court held that Texas law governed under the contract’s choice-of-law clause since Louisiana did not have a more significant relationship or materially greater interest, and applying Texas law did not contravene Louisiana public policy. The indemnity provision was not void as against public policy or for illegality. The court affirmed the duty to defend and to indemnify, but vacated the judgment to the extent it would require indemnification for punitive and exemplary damages, and remanded for modification. It also vacated attorney’s fees awarded for the underlying Louisiana litigation, affirming only those fees related to the declaratory judgment action. View "Anadarko v. Alternative Environmental Solutions" on Justia Law

Adams v. FAA

2026-03-03T09:02:30-08:00

A commercial air tour operator, who had previously conducted flights over Bandelier National Monument under interim authority, challenged a final order issued by the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Park Service. This order established an Air Tour Management Plan (ATMP) for Bandelier National Monument, prohibiting all commercial air tours over the site. The agencies’ process included public comment, environmental assessment, and extensive consultation with Native American tribes, who strongly objected to air tours due to cultural and privacy concerns. The operator argued that his flights were minimally intrusive, carefully routed, and brief, and that banning them would negatively impact safety and his business. The agencies initially considered various alternatives, including allowing limited air tours or maintaining previous operations, but ultimately concluded that any commercial air tour flights would create unacceptable impacts to Bandelier’s natural and cultural resources and visitor experience. The agencies’ environmental assessment under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) found no significant impacts for NEPA purposes, but their record of decision emphasized significant adverse impacts to tribal cultural resources under the National Parks Air Tour Management Act (NPATMA). Upon petition for review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard and de novo for statutory interpretation, as required by recent Supreme Court precedent. The court held that NPATMA and NEPA use different significance standards, and that the agency’s path to finding significant adverse impacts under NPATMA was reasonably discernible in the record. The court also rejected the petitioner’s additional statutory and constitutional challenges, finding them either unexhausted or inadequately briefed. The Tenth Circuit denied the petition for review. View "Adams v. FAA" on Justia Law

CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

2026-03-03T09:01:07-08:00

The case concerns a challenge brought by an environmental non-profit against the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) relating to the agency’s 2016 national recommendations for allowable cadmium levels in water. The EPA, as required by the Clean Water Act (CWA), periodically issues nonbinding criteria for water pollutants, which states typically adopt as standards for their own waters. In 2016, the EPA updated its cadmium recommendations but did so without consulting the Fish and Wildlife Service or the National Marine Fisheries Service, as mandated under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) for actions that may affect protected species. Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona found that the Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) had standing to challenge the EPA’s failure to consult. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CBD, holding that the EPA’s issuance of the cadmium recommendations constituted “agency action” under the ESA that “may affect” listed species, thus triggering the consultation requirement. The court vacated the less stringent chronic freshwater cadmium recommendation and remanded all four 2016 cadmium recommendations to the EPA for proper consultation. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that CBD had Article III standing, finding a concrete injury to its members’ interests in protected species, that the injury was fairly traceable to EPA’s recommendations due to predictable state adoption, and that the injury could be redressed by stricter recommendations resulting from consultation. On the merits, the court concluded that EPA’s publication of nationwide recommendations was “agency action” under the ESA and that such action “may affect” listed species, thus requiring prior consultation with the Services. The district court’s vacatur and remand were affirmed. View "CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY" on Justia Law

City of Idaho Falls v. Idaho Department of Water Resources

2026-03-02T14:02:59-08:00

Several cities in Idaho that hold junior ground water rights within the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer (ESPA) challenged the methodology used by the Idaho Department of Water Resources (IDWR) to determine whether their groundwater pumping caused material injury to senior surface water right holders. The core factual dispute arose after the Director of IDWR issued a Fifth Amended Methodology Order in April 2023, updating the scientific models and data for evaluating material injury, followed by an order predicting a water shortfall for the senior rights holders. The cities requested a hearing, raising concerns about the methodology and specific factual determinations. After the hearing, the Director issued a Post-Hearing Order that modified and affirmed the Fifth Methodology Order and, simultaneously, a Sixth Methodology Order that expressly superseded all prior methodology orders. The cities then filed a petition for judicial review in the Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA) district court, challenging the Director’s Post-Hearing Order. The district court allowed intervention by senior water right holders and, after review, affirmed the Director’s findings and conclusions regarding the methodology and its application. The court found the agency’s factual determinations were supported by substantial evidence and that the Director’s legal standards were proper. The court’s judgment affirmed only the Post-Hearing Order and did not address the subsequently issued Sixth Methodology Order. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court considered whether it had jurisdiction to address the cities’ claims. The Supreme Court held that because the cities failed to petition for judicial review of the operative, currently effective Sixth Methodology Order in the district court, it lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief sought. The court explained that under Idaho law, only the currently operative order may be challenged, and failure to timely appeal the correct order is jurisdictional. The appeal was therefore dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and costs were awarded to IDWR and the intervenors. View "City of Idaho Falls v. Idaho Department of Water Resources" on Justia Law

City of Culver City v. Federal Aviation Administration

2026-03-02T11:03:47-08:00

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) introduced new and revised air traffic procedures in the Southern California Metroplex as part of its Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) initiative in 2016, affecting airports including Los Angeles International Airport. These procedures, specifically the HUULL, IRNMN, and RYDRR routes, relied on satellite navigation and were subject to an environmental review, which concluded there would be no significant noise impacts. In 2018, the FAA amended these procedures, making minor changes to altitude and speed restrictions at certain waypoints, with no changes to flight paths, number of flights, or aircraft types. Only one amended waypoint affected Malibu, and none affected Culver City. Previously, Culver City and other parties challenged the FAA’s 2016 approval in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which upheld the FAA’s decision. After the 2018 amendments, the City of Los Angeles and Culver City (as intervenor) challenged the FAA’s actions in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which found violations of environmental statutes but remanded for further review without vacating the procedures. The FAA then conducted additional environmental consultations and issued a Record of Decision, concluding the amendments qualified for a categorical exclusion from further environmental review. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the petitions from Malibu and Culver City regarding the FAA’s 2018 amendments. The court held that only challenges to the 2018 amendments were timely, dismissing any challenge to the original 2016 procedures as untimely. The court determined that neither city demonstrated standing to challenge the 2018 amendments: Malibu’s evidence addressed only the 2016 procedures, and Culver City failed to provide evidence of injury. The petitions were dismissed for lack of standing. View "City of Culver City v. Federal Aviation Administration" on Justia Law

EGGER ENTER., LLC VS. STATE ENGINEER

2026-02-26T11:19:07-08:00

Egger Enterprises, LLC acquired a ranch in Humboldt County, Nevada, which had previously shifted from flood to center pivot irrigation systems. This conversion left portions of water rights unused, and Egger sought to use the leftover water by acquiring adjacent public land through federal Desert Land Entry applications. Administrative delays between the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and Nevada’s Division of Water Resources (NDWR) prolonged this process. Meanwhile, a nonparty challenged Egger’s applications, asserting that Egger had not used portions of its water rights for over 16 years, and thus, those rights were forfeited. The State Engineer found, by clear and convincing evidence, that certain water rights had not been put to beneficial use for five or more consecutive years and declared them forfeited. Egger petitioned for judicial review in the Sixth Judicial District Court, which initially reversed and remanded for lack of proper notice. Once proper notice was sent and Egger requested extensions of time, the State Engineer granted one extension but denied a subsequent request, ultimately issuing a declaration of forfeiture. Egger again sought judicial review, but the district court denied relief, finding the State Engineer’s decision supported by substantial evidence and holding that Egger was not entitled to equitable relief. The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of Egger’s petition. The court held that the State Engineer is not required to make findings on every statutory factor when considering an extension request under NRS 534.090(3)—only those relevant to the case. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the forfeiture decision and that Egger was not entitled to equitable relief, as there was no beneficial use of the water within the statutory period, nor any estoppel or error by the State Engineer. View "EGGER ENTER., LLC VS. STATE ENGINEER" on Justia Law

City of Idaho Falls v. Idaho Department of Water Resources

2026-02-25T08:15:44-08:00

A group of cities in Idaho, each holding junior ground water rights within the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer, became subject to curtailment proceedings initiated by senior surface water users represented by the Surface Water Coalition. The Coalition argued that pumping by junior ground water rights holders diminished water available to senior rights holders drawing from the Snake River. In response, the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources has periodically updated the methodology used to determine whether material injury to the senior rights has occurred, issuing a series of orders—the most recent being a Sixth Methodology Order. Following the issuance of a Fifth Methodology Order and an associated Post-Hearing Order, the cities challenged those orders in the Snake River Basin Adjudication district court, raising several concerns about the Director’s factual determinations and legal standards. During the administrative process, the Director simultaneously issued a Sixth Methodology Order that expressly superseded all prior methodology orders. The cities, however, did not include a direct challenge to the Sixth Methodology Order in their petition for judicial review. The district court affirmed the Director’s Post-Hearing Order, supporting the agency’s methodology and factual findings. The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal because the cities failed to petition for review of the operative Sixth Methodology Order in the district court, as required under Idaho administrative law. As a result, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and declined to address the substantive claims raised by the cities. The court also denied requests for attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-117(1), finding the statute inapplicable, but awarded costs to the prevailing parties. View "City of Idaho Falls v. Idaho Department of Water Resources" on Justia Law

Environmental Health Advocates, Inc. v. Pancho Villa's, Inc.

2026-02-20T12:32:35-08:00

A nonprofit organization brought an action under California’s Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act (Proposition 65), alleging that a business’s tortilla products exposed consumers to acrylamide, a known carcinogen, without providing the required warnings. Before filing suit, the nonprofit sent the business and the California Attorney General a 60-day notice of violation, as required by Proposition 65. The notice identified the parties, the chemical, the product, and the exposure route, and included a certificate of merit and a summary of Proposition 65 (Appendix A), though it provided contact information for the nonprofit’s retained counsel rather than an individual within the nonprofit, and attached an outdated version of Appendix A. The Superior Court of San Diego County heard the business’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The business argued that strict compliance with the notice requirements was necessary, and that the nonprofit’s notice was deficient because it did not provide contact information for a responsible individual within the entity and included an outdated summary of Proposition 65. The trial court agreed, finding both deficiencies were fatal and granted the business’s motion, dismissing the action. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the dismissal. The appellate court held that the relevant regulation (section 25903) should be interpreted as directory rather than mandatory, meaning substantial compliance—rather than strict compliance—with the notice requirements is sufficient. The court determined that providing counsel’s contact information and an earlier version of Appendix A did not defeat the essential purposes of the notice requirement and that the nonprofit’s notice substantially complied. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s dismissal and remanded the case with directions to deny the business’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. View "Environmental Health Advocates, Inc. v. Pancho Villa's, Inc." on Justia Law

Friends of Animals v. United States Bureau of Land Management

2026-02-20T07:03:50-08:00

The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) issued four ten-year plans authorizing the gathering and removal of wild horses from public lands in specific areas to achieve and maintain population levels within approved management ranges. Friends of Animals challenged these plans, arguing that they allowed indefinite removals without specific findings of overpopulation, failed to rely on current information, and did not include proper consultation, contrary to requirements under the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act. The BLM responded that the Act permitted multiple removal operations over a period of years within a single plan. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case. The court held that the ten-year plans were unlawful to the extent they permitted additional gathers after achieving the approved management levels, and vacated those portions of the plans. The court also held that future removal operations must be based on current information and proper consultation, and must be conducted promptly, as required by the Act. The court remanded the matter to BLM to revise the plans and clarify which future gathers would require further process before proceeding. Notably, the court did not resolve the parties’ principal disputes, leaving them to be addressed on remand. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the appeal brought by Friends of Animals. The appellate court determined that the District Court’s remand order was not a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because it left the core dispute unresolved for further proceedings. As a result, the appellate court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the case and dismissed the appeal. The disposition was a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Friends of Animals v. United States Bureau of Land Management" on Justia Law

Soscia Holdings, LLC v. Rhode Island

2026-02-13T12:00:10-08:00

Soscia Holdings, LLC operated the Flat River Reservoir Dam in Rhode Island. In July 2022, the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (DEM), acting under state law, ordered Soscia to reduce the Dam’s water flow to maintain specific water levels in Johnson’s Pond. Soscia was later assessed monetary penalties by DEM for alleged violations of the permitting statute. During these proceedings, the Town of Coventry condemned the Dam and Johnson’s Pond, paying Soscia just compensation for the property. The case was first reviewed by the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. This court dismissed all claims against the State of Rhode Island and DEM based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court also dismissed the § 1983 individual capacity claims against two DEM officials on the grounds of qualified immunity, and rejected Soscia’s claim under the Rhode Island Constitution. However, the court allowed § 1983 official capacity claims for prospective injunctive relief against the DEM officials to proceed. After Soscia amended its complaint, the district court ultimately dismissed the remaining federal constitutional claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the appeal. Soscia argued that it continued to face ongoing enforcement actions and monetary penalties, and thus maintained a property interest and the right to seek injunctive and declaratory relief. The First Circuit found that the district court’s opinions thoroughly and correctly explained why Soscia’s federal claims failed to state a plausible claim for relief, and that new arguments raised on appeal were either waived or did not meet the standard for plain error review. The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Soscia Holdings, LLC v. Rhode Island" on Justia Law

United States v. Carroll

2026-02-11T08:31:40-08:00

Christopher Carroll and Whiskey Dix Big Truck Repair, LLC (“WDBTR”) were charged with multiple offenses after Carroll, with an associate, falsely represented the use of Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) funds, which were instead used for personal expenses and to start WDBTR. Additional charges included tampering with Clean Air Act (CAA) monitoring devices on company trucks and witness tampering related to efforts to impede the investigation. Carroll’s prior parole status was relevant to the government’s allegation that he concealed this on the PPP application by omitting his name and submitting the application in his wife’s name. A United States Magistrate Judge recommended denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment, which argued that the grand jury had been improperly instructed to use a probable cause standard and that a higher standard should apply. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri adopted this recommendation, referencing Supreme Court precedent affirming probable cause as the standard for grand jury indictments. The district court also denied Carroll’s motion to exclude evidence of his prior conviction and parole status, determining it was relevant to Carroll’s intent to defraud and not unduly prejudicial. After trial, Carroll was convicted on multiple fraud, CAA, and witness tampering counts, and WDBTR was convicted on CAA charges. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed and affirmed the district court’s rulings. It held that the probable cause standard governs grand jury indictments, consistent with longstanding Supreme Court precedent. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Carroll’s parole status, as it was probative of intent and any error would have been harmless given the strength of the government’s case. The convictions and sentences were affirmed. View "United States v. Carroll" on Justia Law

In re Petition for Water Commissioner

2026-02-10T16:06:37-08:00

Several parties in Broadwater County, Montana, hold water rights to Beaver Creek based on a 1906 decree. In 1973, a major owner of these rights, Olive McMaster, transferred portions of her interest to others, including the predecessors of CX Ranch, Baum, and Riis. That conveyance imposed specific conditions for water distribution in times of shortage. Years later, disputes arose over changes to the period of use for some of these water rights and whether historical restrictions still governed distribution. In 2018, the parties reached a stipulation that added remarks about the 1973 restrictions to the official records for certain water rights. These remarks were incorporated into a 2018 Water Court order and, subsequently, into a 2022 Preliminary Decree for Basin 41I. During the 2024 irrigation season, the court-appointed Water Commissioner reduced water allocations pro rata among all rights holders due to low water levels and altered the method of delivery to facilitate Riis’ usage downstream. The Hoeffners, who own Pole Creek Ranch and Staubach Creek Ranch, objected to this administration, arguing that their rights were not subject to the 1973 restrictions and that the Water Commissioner’s practices were inconsistent with the applicable decree. The District Court denied their complaint, finding that only parties to the 1973 conveyance could enforce its terms, that the Hoeffners lacked standing, and that pro rata reduction and the delivery method used were permissible. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court’s decision. It held that the Water Commissioner was required to administer water rights in accordance with the 2022 Preliminary Decree for Basin 41I, which incorporated the 2018 Water Court order and its adjudicated terms, including the distribution remarks. The District Court erred by not first determining whether the Water Commissioner’s practices conformed with the decree. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with a decree-first analysis. View "In re Petition for Water Commissioner" on Justia Law

The Committee for Tiburon LLC v. Town of Tiburon

2026-02-02T14:31:39-08:00

A local government prepared and certified a program-level Environmental Impact Report (EIR) as part of a comprehensive update to its general plan, including an updated housing element. The housing element identified 17 sites, including Site H, to accommodate the town’s projected regional housing needs. Site H was proposed to be rezoned for very high density residential use, increasing its development capacity. No specific housing project had been proposed for Site H or the other sites at the time of the general plan update. The Committee for Tiburon LLC filed a petition for a writ of mandate in Marin County Superior Court, challenging the adequacy of the EIR. The Committee argued the EIR was deficient under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) because it failed to include a site-specific analysis of environmental impacts related to the potential high-density development of Site H. The petition also alleged the Town’s general plan was internally inconsistent and incompatible, and objected to the rezoning of Site H. The trial court agreed with the Committee and granted the petition, finding the EIR should have included a site-specific analysis for Site H. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that when a local government updates its general plan and housing element, and no specific project is proposed for a listed site, CEQA does not require the EIR to include a site-specific environmental analysis for that site. The absence of project-specific details makes such analysis infeasible, and site-specific review can be deferred until a project is proposed. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment granting the writ, and remanded the matter for further proceedings on the issues of CEQA exemption for rezoning and general plan consistency. View "The Committee for Tiburon LLC v. Town of Tiburon" on Justia Law

Byers Peak Properties v. Byers Peak Land & Cattle, LLC

2026-01-27T15:32:31-08:00

After a ranch was divided into two parcels, the owners of each parcel continued to share irrigation ditches and granted each other easements for water conveyance. In recent years, cooperation between the parties deteriorated, leading to disputes over water usage. The plaintiffs, who own one parcel, alleged that the defendant, owner of the other parcel, had diverted more water than entitled, causing excess runoff and flooding on their land. The plaintiffs claimed violations of Colorado statutes relating to waste of water, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and asserted trespass and nuisance claims. The parties also disputed the scope of the plaintiffs' easement in one of the ditches. The District Court for Water Division 5 found in favor of the plaintiffs on their statutory, trespass, and nuisance claims, concluding that the defendant had diverted excess water, wasted water in violation of statutes, and caused flooding. The court awarded nominal damages, attorney fees under section 37-84-125, and issued an injunction restricting the defendant's ability to divert water in excess of its decreed rights. The court also recognized plaintiffs' easement rights but declined to specify the extent of the easement in the Lower Gaskill Ditch, since that issue was not properly raised at trial. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a claim for a declaration of waste, that section 37-84-108 does not create a private right of action, and that sections 37-84-124 and -125 do not apply to injuries from excess irrigation runoff or flooding. The court ruled the water court lacked ancillary jurisdiction over the related trespass and nuisance claims and that the injunction must be vacated. The court affirmed the water court's refusal to address the scope of the Lower Gaskill Ditch easement, reversed the judgment on all waste, flooding, trespass, nuisance, and related injunctive claims, and remanded with instructions to dismiss those claims. View "Byers Peak Properties v. Byers Peak Land & Cattle, LLC" on Justia Law

Thompson Chain of Lakes Stewardship Coalition v. Lincoln County

2026-01-27T14:35:49-08:00

A nonprofit coalition and two individuals challenged a county commission’s conditional approval for the development of a large seasonal RV park on a 21-acre lot in a rural area that had previously been designated for such use in a larger subdivision plan. The proposed site was adjacent to other commercial activity and near two lakes, but had no on-site surface water. The applicants submitted an environmental assessment (EA), which included groundwater well data and described wildlife in the area. The application process included public hearings, during which concerns were raised about groundwater impacts, wildlife, public safety, and increased recreational use. Following the submission of the application, the Lincoln County Planning Department recommended approval, and the Board of County Commissioners held public hearings, received additional agency comments, and ultimately granted conditional preliminary plat approval, requiring, among other conditions, state environmental review and approval of the water and sewer systems. The plaintiffs filed suit in the Montana Nineteenth Judicial District Court, claiming the County’s approval was unlawful for not complying with statutory requirements for environmental review, consideration of probable impacts, and consistency with local plans. The District Court granted summary judgment for the County and intervenors, finding compliance with applicable statutes and plans. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the EA met statutory requirements, whether the County considered specific, documentable, and clearly defined impacts as required by law, and whether the subdivision was consistent with the local neighborhood plan and growth policy. The Supreme Court held that the EA satisfied statutory requirements by providing all available information; the County properly considered impacts using the required legal standard; and the County’s decision was consistent with the relevant policies and not arbitrary or capricious. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment. View "Thompson Chain of Lakes Stewardship Coalition v. Lincoln County" on Justia Law

Martell v. Gold Bess Shooting Club, LLC

2026-01-23T06:08:00-08:00

Twenty-three landowners brought suit against Gold Bess Shooting Club, LLC and Caulder Construction, LLC, alleging nuisance due to noise, environmental, and safety concerns from a shooting range established on Caulder’s property in Woodstock, New Hampshire. Gold Bess registered as an LLC and leased land from Caulder, constructing the range and opening it to the public in October 2020. Prior to its opening, the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services notified the defendants of alleged violations of state wetlands and terrain alteration statutes. The plaintiffs amended their complaint to add noise-related nuisance claims after Woodstock enacted a noise ordinance in April 2021. The Grafton County Superior Court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the plaintiffs’ noise-related nuisance claims, finding the shooting range immune under RSA 159-B:1 and RSA 159-B:2, which provide protection from civil liability related to noise for shooting ranges compliant with noise ordinances in effect when the range was established, constructed, or began operations. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and rejected their argument that alleged environmental law violations precluded immunity under RSA chapter 159-B. The court also granted summary judgment for the defendants on constitutional equal protection claims, and subsequently allowed the plaintiffs to voluntarily discontinue their remaining claims. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the statutory interpretation of RSA 159-B:1 and RSA 159-B:2 de novo. It held that these statutes require compliance only with noise ordinances, not with other laws such as wetlands or terrain alteration statutes. The court further determined that the shooting range “began operations” prior to the enactment of Woodstock’s noise ordinance, thereby qualifying for immunity from noise-related legal claims under the statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Martell v. Gold Bess Shooting Club, LLC" on Justia Law

S Texas Environmental Justice v. Commission on Environmental Quality

2026-01-14T16:30:12-08:00

Texas LNG, a company seeking to construct a liquid natural gas terminal in Brownsville, Texas, received a permit from the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) to build its facility. The company faced delays due to litigation and the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in three successive extensions of its construction deadline granted by TCEQ’s executive director. The South Texas Environmental Justice Network (STEJN), an environmental advocacy group, moved to overturn the third extension, arguing that Texas LNG did not meet the requirements under Texas law to receive it and that the executive director lacked authority to grant the extension. Prior to the current appeal, both federal and state agencies reviewed Texas LNG’s permit. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and TCEQ initially granted the necessary permits, but subsequent legal challenges led to a remand by the D.C. Circuit to FERC (which ultimately reaffirmed the permit) and a dismissal by the Third Court of Appeals in Austin for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction regarding the TCEQ permit. TCEQ’s Office of Public Interest recommended granting the motion to overturn on the basis of updated air quality standards, but TCEQ did not issue a decision, resulting in a denial of STEJN’s motion by operation of law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed STEJN’s direct petition for review of TCEQ’s denial. Applying de novo review under the Texas Administrative Procedure Act, the Fifth Circuit held that STEJN had standing but found that TCEQ’s executive director had the authority under section 116.120 of the Texas Administrative Code to grant the third extension. The court determined that Texas LNG met the regulatory requirements for a third extension, and substantial evidence supported TCEQ’s decision. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit denied STEJN’s petition for review. View "S Texas Environmental Justice v. Commission on Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

City of Vallejo v. City of American Canyon

2026-01-14T13:32:52-08:00

The case concerns the approval of the Giovannioni Logistics Center Project, a large warehouse development in the City of American Canyon, California. The project requires American Canyon to certify an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), specifically addressing water supply issues since the city relies on outside sources, including water purchased from the neighboring City of Vallejo under a longstanding agreement. Vallejo’s water comes from the State Water Project and its own appropriative water right (License 7848). Vallejo objected to the EIR, asserting that it did not adequately disclose limitations on water availability, including place of use restrictions on License 7848 and ongoing contract litigation between the cities. Vallejo filed a petition for writ of mandate in Napa County Superior Court, later transferred to Sacramento Superior Court, contending that the EIR failed to meet CEQA and Water Code requirements regarding water supply disclosures and contingency planning. The trial court reviewed Vallejo’s arguments, which included claims that the EIR did not account for actual water delivered, failed to assess legal restrictions on water use, neglected the implications of curtailments during drought, and ignored the impact of contract disputes. After argument, the trial court denied Vallejo’s petition and entered judgment for American Canyon and the project developer, Buzz Oates LLC. The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. It held that the EIR and water supply assessment complied with CEQA and the Water Code. The court found that the EIR provided sufficient detail about water supply sources and reliability, reasonably addressed foreseeable uncertainties, and did not require more specific disclosures or contingency planning absent evidence of insufficient supply. The court also concluded that any technical omissions were harmless and that Vallejo failed to demonstrate prejudice or a legal deficiency in the environmental review process. View "City of Vallejo v. City of American Canyon" on Justia Law

Paolino v. Ferreira

2026-01-14T10:17:22-08:00

The plaintiffs owned property in Cumberland, Rhode Island, adjacent to land operated as an automotive recycling facility by the defendants. They alleged that environmental contamination from the facility affected their property. The litigation began in 2006, and after years of procedural developments, the first jury trial in 2012 resulted in a judgment for the plaintiffs. However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court later found that the trial justice had erroneously excluded expert testimony and ordered a new trial. A second jury trial was held in 2020 in the Rhode Island Superior Court. During this trial, plaintiffs’ counsel objected to statements made by defense counsel in his opening, arguing that certain factual assertions were inaccurate. Plaintiffs also objected to the testimony of defense witness Karen Beck, claiming her expert opinion should not include references to a report she had not relied on when forming her initial conclusions. The trial justice issued a curative instruction addressing the opening statement objections and limited Beck’s testimony to certain aspects of the disputed report. The jury returned a verdict for defendants, except for a $10,000 punitive damages award against one defendant, which was later vacated by amended judgment. Plaintiffs appealed, and subsequent procedural delays occurred regarding the transmission of the appellate record. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island addressed whether the plaintiffs’ appeal should be dismissed for procedural delay and whether the trial justice erred regarding the curative instruction and Beck’s testimony. The court held that dismissal was unwarranted since plaintiffs timely ordered transcripts and took reasonable steps regarding the record. The court further held that plaintiffs had waived their objection to the curative instruction by failing to object at trial, and that the limitations placed on Beck’s testimony did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The amended judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "Paolino v. Ferreira" on Justia Law

FRIENDS OF ANIMALS V. BURGUM

2026-01-14T09:00:34-08:00

The case centers on the United States Bureau of Land Management’s decision to approve a contract with JS Livestock for a new off-range corral on private land near Winnemucca, Nevada, intended to house and care for up to 4,000 wild horses and burros removed from public lands. Friends of Animals, an advocacy group, challenged this decision, arguing that the Bureau’s actions violated both the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. The group raised concerns about the adequacy of animal welfare protections and environmental impacts, including the facility’s design, animal density, disease management, and mitigation of adverse effects on soil and groundwater. Prior to this appeal, the United States District Court for the District of Nevada reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court found no statutory violations, holding that the Bureau had complied with both the Wild Horses Act and NEPA. Specifically, the court determined that the Bureau’s reliance on its established animal welfare standards and contract requirements was reasonable and that the environmental assessment sufficiently considered the project’s impacts as required by law. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bureau and denied Friends of Animals’ motion. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s ruling, holding that Friends of Animals had representational standing to bring the case. The court found that the Bureau did not abuse its discretion or act contrary to law: it properly ensured humane treatment of the animals, took a “hard look” at environmental impacts as required by NEPA, reasonably relied on compliance with state permits, considered appropriate project alternatives, and adequately explained why the facility’s impacts would not be significant. The summary judgment for the Bureau was affirmed. View "FRIENDS OF ANIMALS V. BURGUM" on Justia Law

In re Fuel Industry Climate Cases

2026-01-05T12:01:21-08:00

Plaintiffs, comprised of several California cities and counties, initiated legal action against Citgo Petroleum Corporation and other fossil fuel companies, alleging that their purchase, distribution, and sale of fossil fuel products in California contributed to climate-related harms within the state. The plaintiffs asserted that Citgo and others participated in extensive business operations involving fossil fuels in California from the 1980s to the mid-2000s. They claimed the defendants knew about the environmental dangers posed by fossil fuels but failed to warn the public, instead allegedly engaging in deceptive marketing and disinformation campaigns to obscure climate-related risks. After identical complaints were filed against all defendants, Citgo moved to quash service of summons, arguing lack of personal jurisdiction. Citgo maintained its activities in California were too limited and lacked sufficient connection to the alleged injuries. The Superior Court of San Francisco granted Citgo’s motion, finding that Citgo’s contacts with California did not satisfy the “relatedness” requirement for specific jurisdiction, as there was insufficient evidence of deceptive conduct directed at California. The court denied similar motions by other defendants, concluding that their broader contacts with California supported jurisdiction. Reviewing the case de novo, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, determined that specific personal jurisdiction over Citgo was proper. The court held that Citgo’s direct involvement in the distribution and sale of branded gasoline in California, without providing warnings about climate risks, sufficiently related to plaintiffs’ claims. The court further found that exercising jurisdiction would be fair and reasonable given California’s significant interest in redressing local climate harms. The order granting Citgo’s motion to quash was reversed, with instructions to deny the motion, allowing the case to proceed against Citgo in California. View "In re Fuel Industry Climate Cases" on Justia Law

City of Idaho Falls v. IDWR

2025-12-31T11:03:16-08:00

A group of cities holding junior ground water rights in the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer sought judicial review of a final order issued by the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources. This order updated the methodology used to assess whether pumping by junior ground water users caused material injury to senior surface water rights holders who divert water from the Snake River. The Director’s Fifth Amended Final Order revised technical aspects of the model and data, and after a hearing on objections by the cities, the Director affirmed the methodology with modifications and issued a Sixth Methodology Order, which expressly superseded all prior methodology orders. The cities filed a petition for judicial review in the Snake River Basin Adjudication district court, challenging the Director’s Post-Hearing Order regarding the Fifth Methodology Order. The district court affirmed the Director’s findings and conclusions, upholding the methodology and the application of the clear and convincing evidence standard, and found that the Director did not prejudice the cities’ substantial rights. The district court’s judgment specifically affirmed the Post-Hearing Order but did not address the operative Sixth Methodology Order. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed whether the cities had properly invoked its jurisdiction. The Court held that the cities failed to challenge the currently operative Sixth Methodology Order in district court, and therefore, under Idaho law, the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal or award the requested relief. As a result, the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Court awarded attorney fees and costs to the Idaho Department of Water Resources but denied attorney fees to the intervening Surface Water Coalition, granting them costs only. View "City of Idaho Falls v. IDWR" on Justia Law

Krovoza v. City of Davis

2025-12-30T12:00:52-08:00

The dispute centers on the City’s decision to relocate a piece of playground equipment known as the Sky Track within Arroyo Park, Davis, California, due to noise complaints from nearby residents. After its installation in 2019, the City received complaints about excessive noise, particularly at night, and responded by commissioning noise studies and implementing mitigation measures, such as restricted hours and physical sound dampening. These measures proved challenging to enforce, leading the City to investigate alternative locations within the park. Expert analysis indicated that relocating the Sky Track to a specific area (Location B) would reduce noise levels at the nearest residences compared to its previous location. Following approval by the City Council to move the Sky Track and the filing of a notice of exemption under three categorical exemptions from the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the plaintiffs challenged the exemption. They filed a verified petition for writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Yolo County, arguing that the unusual circumstances exception to the categorical exemption should apply because of the potential for significant noise impacts. The Superior Court denied the petition, finding substantial evidence that the project fell within the scope of the exemptions and that relocating the equipment would reduce, not increase, noise impacts, thus failing to establish unusual circumstances. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed whether the unusual circumstances exception was triggered. The court held that mere violation of the City’s noise ordinance does not itself amount to substantial evidence of a significant environmental effect. Furthermore, it found no substantial evidence to support a fair argument that relocating the Sky Track would create a significant adverse noise impact. The court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, concluding that the City acted within its discretion and complied with CEQA’s exemption procedures. View "Krovoza v. City of Davis" on Justia Law

EMPLOYEES AT THE CLARK COUNTY GOVERNMENT CENTER V. MONSANTO COMPANY

2025-12-29T10:02:18-08:00

A group of 169 individuals who worked at the Clark County Government Center in Las Vegas brought claims alleging that they suffered serious injuries due to exposure to toxic chemicals, including polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), at their workplace. The site of the Government Center had previously been used as a rail yard by Union Pacific Railroad, and plaintiffs alleged that Union Pacific dumped waste, including PCBs manufactured by the former Monsanto Company, at the site. Plaintiffs asserted that Monsanto’s corporate successors inherited liability for harms caused by the production, sale, and distribution of PCBs, which allegedly caused a range of health issues for those exposed. The plaintiffs initially filed suit in Nevada state court against multiple defendants, including Union Pacific, the Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency, and Monsanto’s successors. The claims sought compensatory and punitive damages for injuries stemming from the alleged contamination. Monsanto’s successors removed the action to the United States District Court for the District of Nevada under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). The plaintiffs moved to remand the case back to state court, and the District Court granted the motion, finding that the local controversy exception to CAFA applied since the alleged injuries were localized to Clark County. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s remand order de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that CAFA’s local controversy exception did not apply because the principal injuries resulting from Monsanto’s conduct were not shown to have been incurred primarily in Nevada. The court found that plaintiffs’ allegations described nationwide distribution and harm from PCBs, with no facts indicating that Nevada experienced principal or unique injuries. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s order remanding the case and ordered the case to proceed in federal court. View "EMPLOYEES AT THE CLARK COUNTY GOVERNMENT CENTER V. MONSANTO COMPANY" on Justia Law

In re Application of S. Branch Solar, L.L.C.

2025-12-24T06:09:57-08:00

South Branch Solar, L.L.C. sought approval to build a 130-megawatt solar-powered electric generation facility in Hancock County, Ohio, on approximately 700 acres of agricultural land. The project included solar panels, related equipment, and infrastructure. Local government officials and residents had varied reactions, with some supporting the facility for its economic and environmental benefits and others expressing concerns about impacts on land use, aesthetics, property values, wildlife, and local drainage systems. Travis Bohn, who lives near the project site, opposed the project and intervened in the proceedings. The Ohio Power Siting Board reviewed South Branch’s application, which included environmental studies and mitigation plans. After a public hearing and extensive opportunity for public input, the board staff recommended approval subject to 50 conditions. A joint stipulation was agreed to by South Branch, the board staff, the county commissioners, and the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation, but not by Bohn. Following an adjudicatory hearing, the Board issued an order granting the certificate. Bohn unsuccessfully sought rehearing, arguing that the Board misapplied statutory criteria, failed to require adequate wildlife and flood analysis, and improperly weighed local opposition and economic impacts. The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the Board’s order using a standard that allows reversal only if the order was unlawful or unreasonable. The court held that the Board’s determinations under R.C. 4906.10(A)(2), (A)(3), and (A)(6)—concerning environmental impact, minimum adverse impact, and public interest—were supported by sufficient probative evidence and complied with statutory and regulatory requirements. The court found no reversible error in the Board’s approval of South Branch’s application and affirmed the order granting the certificate. View "In re Application of S. Branch Solar, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Make UC a Good Neighbor v. Regents of University of California

2025-12-19T14:00:50-08:00

A community group challenged the adequacy of an environmental impact report (EIR) prepared by the Regents of the University of California for UC Berkeley’s 2021 long range development plan and a specific student housing project at People’s Park. The plaintiffs alleged that the EIR failed to sufficiently analyze certain environmental impacts, including noise from student parties and the consideration of alternative sites for the housing project, in violation of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The Superior Court of Alameda County denied the group’s petition and entered judgment for the Regents. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal initially agreed with the plaintiffs on two issues: the EIR should have evaluated noise impacts from student parties and considered alternative locations for the housing project. Both parties sought review in the California Supreme Court. While the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs’ petition on one issue, it granted the Regents’ petition on the two issues where the plaintiffs had prevailed. During the pendency of the appeal, the Legislature enacted new statutes specifically addressing and abrogating the appellate court’s holdings on noise and site alternatives for residential projects. The California Supreme Court then reversed the appellate court’s decision on those two issues, holding that the legislative changes rendered the EIR adequate and directed judgment in favor of the Regents. After remand, the plaintiffs moved for attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine, arguing they had been a “successful party” by securing important legal precedent. The trial court denied the motion, finding the plaintiffs did not achieve their litigation objectives. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five affirmed, holding that because the Supreme Court reversed the rulings on which the plaintiffs claimed success, those opinions were no longer citable precedent and the plaintiffs did not qualify as a successful party under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. View "Make UC a Good Neighbor v. Regents of University of California" on Justia Law

Environmental Democracy Project v. Rael, Inc.

2025-12-18T12:30:54-08:00

A nonprofit environmental organization sued a manufacturer of feminine hygiene products, alleging that the company marketed certain products as “organic” or “made with organic ingredients” in violation of California’s organic products law. The complaint claimed that these products, such as period underwear, pads, and panty liners, contained much less than the minimum required percentage of certified organic materials, and included several synthetic or non-organic components not permitted under state and federal organic standards. The organization sought to prevent the manufacturer from advertising and selling these products as organic within California. The Superior Court of Alameda County granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the manufacturer. The court reasoned that California’s organic products law, known as the California Organic Food and Farming Act (COFFA), did not apply to personal care products like the ones at issue, but only to specifically enumerated items such as agricultural products, cosmetics, and pet food. Based on this interpretation, the trial court concluded that the plaintiff’s claims failed as a matter of law and entered judgment for the defendant. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case de novo. It concluded that the statutory text, legislative history, and public policy underlying COFFA support a broad interpretation. The Court held that COFFA applies to all products sold as “organic” or containing “organic” materials within California, including feminine hygiene and personal care products, unless specifically exempted. The Court rejected the argument that such products are categorically excluded and emphasized the statute’s intent to regulate consumer organic claims broadly. The judgment of the trial court was therefore reversed. View "Environmental Democracy Project v. Rael, Inc." on Justia Law

Bareilles v. State Water Resource Control Board

2025-12-16T11:31:16-08:00

The case concerns a property owner in Sonoma County who, after a fire, conducted timber operations under an emergency waiver of waste discharge requirements. Following observations of waste discharge violations and failure to comply with cleanup orders, the regional water quality control board issued notices of violation and ultimately imposed administrative civil liability, assessing a penalty of $276,000. The property owner did not file a petition with the State Water Resources Control Board within the statutory 30-day period to seek review of the regional board’s order. Subsequently, the property owner filed a writ petition in Sonoma County Superior Court to challenge the civil liability order, and later requested the State Board to review the order on its own motion under Water Code section 13320. The State Board declined to exercise its discretionary review. The property owner amended his writ petition to add the State Board as a party, alleging abuse of discretion in its refusal to review. The State Board and the regional board demurred, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies and that the State Board’s discretionary decision was not subject to judicial review. The Superior Court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered judgment for the respondents. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the State Board’s decision not to exercise its discretionary authority to review a regional board order under Water Code section 13320 is not subject to judicial review. The court rejected arguments that this interpretation violated the separation of powers doctrine, concluding that the State Board’s action was not quasi-judicial and did not adjudicate the parties’ rights. The court confirmed that only regional board orders, not the State Board’s discretionary refusals, are eligible for judicial review under the statutory scheme. View "Bareilles v. State Water Resource Control Board" on Justia Law

Seneca Meadows, Inc. v. Town of Seneca Falls

2025-12-16T08:30:11-08:00

A company that owns and operates the only landfill in a particular town challenged a local law that required the landfill’s closure by a specified date. The law was enacted after community complaints regarding odors. When the law was first passed, the town’s attorney acknowledged that a State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) review was required, but the Board adopted the law and related SEQRA documents without substantive discussion. After a subsequent law rescinded and then court action reinstated the original law, the landfill owner again brought a proceeding, claiming, among other things, that the Board failed to comply with SEQRA by not taking a “hard look” at environmental impacts. The Supreme Court initially dismissed the action on statute of limitations grounds, but the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, reversed that decision, holding the claim was timely. After the parties resolved all non-SEQRA claims, Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the landfill owner, finding it had standing and that the Board did not properly comply with SEQRA. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding the owner lacked standing because it had not shown it suffered or would suffer an environmental injury. The dissent argued that under Matter of Har Enterprises v Town of Brookhaven and Gernatt Asphalt Products v Town of Sardinia, property owners directly affected by a government action do not need to allege environmental harm to have standing under SEQRA. The New York Court of Appeals held that the landfill owner has standing to challenge the Board’s SEQRA compliance simply by virtue of owning property directly affected by the local law, following the holdings in Har Enterprises and Gernatt Asphalt Products. The Court further declined to review the statute of limitations argument at this stage, as that issue had already been resolved and was not properly before it. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case for further proceedings. View "Seneca Meadows, Inc. v. Town of Seneca Falls" on Justia Law

Neddo, as Guardian & Next Friend to Z.N.

2025-12-12T08:15:55-08:00

Plaintiff brought suit on behalf of her minor children and a proposed class of individuals who were exposed to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) while attending or working at certain Vermont public schools. The complaint alleged that defendants, as successors to Old Monsanto, manufactured and sold PCBs from facilities outside Vermont to third-party manufacturers, who incorporated PCBs into products such as fluorescent light ballasts and caulk. These products were later used in Vermont schools, where PCBs subsequently leaked into the air, allegedly resulting in toxic exposure. In the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Vermont’s medical-monitoring statute only applied to releases of toxic substances directly from facilities located within Vermont, and did not apply retroactively to exposures or sales occurring prior to the statute’s enactment in 2022. The District Court certified two questions to the Vermont Supreme Court for interpretation of the statute. The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the certified questions. The Court held, first, that the sale of a toxic substance from facilities outside Vermont, which was then incorporated into products that leaked PCBs into the air of Vermont schools, qualified as a “release” within the meaning of Vermont’s medical-monitoring statute. Second, the Court held that the statute does not provide a remedy to plaintiffs whose exposure occurred before the statute’s enactment, but it does allow claims against defendants who sold a toxic substance before enactment, if the plaintiff’s exposure occurred after July 1, 2022. The Court provided these answers in response to the certified questions and clarified the scope and retroactivity of the statute. View "Neddo, as Guardian & Next Friend to Z.N." on Justia Law

Sierra Club v. Environmental Protection Agency

2025-12-05T13:30:16-08:00

The case concerns two decisions made by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regarding air quality standards in the Detroit area under the Clean Air Act (CAA). Michigan sought to redesignate the Detroit area from nonattainment to attainment for the 2015 ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), relying on air quality data from 2019–2021. However, in June 2022, the area recorded exceedances attributed to wildfire smoke from Canada. Michigan requested the EPA to exclude these exceptional-event data points. Meanwhile, Detroit missed its attainment deadline and was reclassified from Marginal to Moderate nonattainment, triggering additional requirements for Reasonably Available Control Technology (RACT) implementation. After Detroit missed its attainment deadline, the EPA finalized its determination of nonattainment and reclassified the area as Moderate nonattainment, setting deadlines for Michigan to submit RACT revisions. Michigan submitted its redesignation request before these RACT requirements became effective. The EPA later approved Michigan’s exceptional-events request and redesignated Detroit to attainment, despite Michigan not having implemented the newly required RACT measures for Moderate nonattainment areas. Sierra Club challenged both the EPA’s approval of the exceptional-event exclusion and the subsequent redesignation. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed both EPA actions. The court held that the EPA’s approval of Michigan’s exceptional-event request was not arbitrary or capricious, finding that the agency had adequately explained its reasoning and considered the relevant data linking wildfire smoke to the ozone exceedances. However, the court vacated the EPA’s redesignation of Detroit to attainment, holding that the CAA requires a state to satisfy all requirements applicable at the time of redesignation, not merely those in effect when the redesignation request was submitted. Because Michigan had not met the RACT requirements by the time of redesignation, the EPA’s action was contrary to law. Thus, the approval of the exceptional-event request was affirmed, and the redesignation was vacated. View "Sierra Club v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

In re Petition of Randolph Davis Solar LLC

2025-12-05T08:38:17-08:00

A company sought approval to construct a 500 kW solar-energy project in Randolph, Vermont. The proposed project required a certificate of public good (CPG) from the Vermont Public Utility Commission (PUC). A portion of the project's infrastructure, such as its access road and interconnection line, would be located on land with slopes exceeding 25%. Local and regional planning commissions, as well as the Town of Randolph Selectboard, initially supported the project and jointly requested the site be designated as a “preferred site.” After neighbors raised concerns that some panels would be located on steep slopes in conflict with the Town Plan, the applicant agreed to revise the project so that no panels would be built on slopes over 25%. The Town conditioned its continued support on this revision and on receiving the final site plan. The PUC’s hearing officer initially recommended denying the CPG due to uncertainty about whether the Town’s conditions regarding slope measurement had been met. The PUC rejected this recommendation, refocusing on whether the Town itself was satisfied with the conditions. The applicant subsequently provided a letter from the Town confirming its support and satisfaction with the conditions. The PUC found the project's compliance with soil-erosion control measures sufficient, particularly in light of a stormwater permit issued by the Agency of Natural Resources (ANR), and ruled that the project would not unduly interfere with the region’s orderly development. The PUC granted the CPG; the neighbors’ motion for reconsideration was denied, and they appealed. The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case, giving deference to the PUC’s expertise and factual findings. The Court affirmed the PUC’s grant of the CPG, holding that the PUC correctly applied the legal standards under 30 V.S.A. § 248, properly considered the Town Plan’s land-conservation measures, reasonably relied on the Town’s assurances and ANR’s permit, and did not misapply its own rules regarding “preferred site” status. View "In re Petition of Randolph Davis Solar LLC" on Justia Law

SAN LUIS OBISPO COASTKEEPER V. COUNTY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO

2025-12-03T09:00:30-08:00

Several environmental organizations sued a California county, alleging that the county’s operation of the Lopez Dam and Reservoir had harmed the threatened South-Central California Coast steelhead trout by altering water flows and degrading downstream habitat. The steelhead population in Arroyo Grande Creek depends on high, pulsing freshwater flows for migration and spawning, but the dam’s operational schedule reduced these flows, impeded migration, and facilitated predatory species’ access to the creek. The plaintiffs claimed that these practices violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA) by causing unlawful “take” of steelhead and also breached California Fish & Game Code section 5937, which requires dam operators to maintain fish in “good condition.” The creek is also home to two other ESA-listed species: the California red-legged frog and the tidewater goby. The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted a mandatory preliminary injunction, compelling the county to take affirmative actions such as changing flow releases and implementing new habitat protection measures. The court ordered the county to consult with federal agencies about these measures but did not specifically weigh the potential harm to the frog and goby, which the county argued might result from the new water release schedule. Both sides presented competing expert evidence on the impact to all three species. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case. The appellate court held that when mandatory injunctive relief under the ESA could benefit one protected species while potentially harming another, the district court must consider the balance of equities and public interest as they relate to the other listed species. The court clarified that this balancing does not include economic or developmental interests but is limited to the welfare of other endangered or threatened species. Because the district court had not conducted this analysis, the injunction was vacated for further proceedings. View "SAN LUIS OBISPO COASTKEEPER V. COUNTY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO" on Justia Law

Environmental Democracy Project v. Rael

2025-11-26T14:07:00-08:00

A California nonprofit organization focused on preventing deceptive environmental claims filed a lawsuit against a manufacturer of feminine hygiene products. The organization alleged that the manufacturer labeled and advertised certain products, including period underwear, pads, and panty liners, as “organic” or “made with organic cotton” in violation of the California Organic Food and Farming Act (COFFA). The complaint stated that these products contained less than the minimum required percentage of certified organic materials and included nonagricultural and nonorganically produced components not permitted under state or federal organic standards. The case was first heard in the Alameda County Superior Court. The manufacturer moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that COFFA applies only to agricultural products, cosmetics, and pet food—not to personal care products such as feminine hygiene items. The Superior Court agreed with the manufacturer and granted judgment on the pleadings, concluding that COFFA did not govern the products in question. The nonprofit timely appealed that decision. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case de novo. The appellate court held that COFFA applies broadly to all products sold as “organic” or containing “organic” materials in California, unless specifically exempted, and that the statute’s plain language encompasses feminine hygiene products. The court found no basis for an implied exception for personal care products and determined that the trial court erred in its interpretation. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment, clarifying that COFFA’s standards and labeling requirements apply to the manufacturer’s products at issue. View "Environmental Democracy Project v. Rael" on Justia Law

In re E. Palestine Train Derailment

2025-11-25T13:00:15-08:00

A freight train operated by Norfolk Southern derailed in East Palestine, Ohio, in early 2023, releasing hazardous materials and causing widespread evacuations and concern over health, environmental, and economic impacts. Numerous lawsuits were filed by affected individuals and businesses, which were consolidated into a master class action. The parties reached a $600 million settlement, which included provisions for a settlement fund and attorney’s fees. The district court approved the settlement and the attorney’s fees request, designating co-lead counsel to allocate fees among the plaintiffs’ attorneys, including Morgan & Morgan, a firm representing some individual claimants. After the district court in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio approved the settlement and fee awards, Morgan & Morgan, despite having received nearly $8 million in fees, objected to the process and timing of fee allocation, specifically challenging the settlement’s “quick pay” provision and the authority given to co-lead class counsel to distribute fees. Morgan & Morgan also raised concerns about transparency and the adequacy of its own fee award, arguing that the allocation process might have undervalued its contributions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that Morgan & Morgan lacked standing to challenge the quick pay provision, as it did not suffer a concrete, particularized injury from the timing of payment and had assented to the settlement terms. The court also affirmed the district court’s decision to delegate initial fee allocation authority to co-lead class counsel, finding no abuse of discretion and noting the court retained jurisdiction for oversight. However, the Sixth Circuit found the district court had failed to address Morgan & Morgan’s specific concerns about its fee allocation and remanded that narrow issue for further consideration. The judgment was thus affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "In re E. Palestine Train Derailment" on Justia Law

Dennis v. Monsanto Co.

2025-11-24T12:01:27-08:00

Mike Dennis developed mycosis fungoides, a subtype of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, after regularly applying Roundup, a glyphosate-based herbicide manufactured by Monsanto, for approximately 20 years. Dennis claimed his cancer resulted from exposure to Roundup, which he alleged was sold and marketed without adequate warnings about its carcinogenic risks, despite Monsanto’s knowledge of the potential danger. He brought claims for design defect, failure to warn (under both negligence and strict liability), and negligence. At trial, the jury found that Monsanto was liable for failing to warn about the cancer risk, determining Monsanto knew or should have known of the risk, failed to provide adequate warnings, and acted with malice or oppression. The jury awarded Dennis $7 million in economic damages and $325 million in punitive damages. Following the verdict, Monsanto moved for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Monsanto’s requests to overturn the liability findings but reduced the punitive damages award from $325 million to $21 million, finding the original award disproportionate to the compensatory damages. Monsanto timely appealed, arguing that Dennis’s failure to warn claims were preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and that the punitive damages were excessive and unconstitutional. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. It held that FIFRA does not preempt state law failure to warn claims that parallel federal misbranding requirements, in line with United States Supreme Court precedent and California decisions. The court also found that the punitive damages award, as reduced by the trial court, did not violate due process, as it was based on highly reprehensible conduct directly related to Dennis’s harm. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in full. View "Dennis v. Monsanto Co." on Justia Law

Kings County Farm Bureau v. State Water Resources Control Bd.

2025-11-24T12:01:26-08:00

The dispute centers on the State Water Resources Control Board’s designation of the Tulare Lake groundwater subbasin as a probationary basin under California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (the Act). The Tulare subbasin is categorized as high-priority and critically overdrafted, requiring coordinated local management and submission of a sustainability plan. Local agencies formed a single groundwater sustainability plan, which the Department of Water Resources twice found inadequate, leading the State Board to designate the subbasin as probationary. Following this, the Board imposed monitoring and reporting requirements with associated fees, prompting farmers and landowners, including Kings County Farm Bureau, to challenge the Board’s actions as exceeding its authority and lacking proper notice. Before reaching the California Court of Appeal, the Superior Court of Kings County reviewed the matter. The trial court had issued a preliminary injunction against the State Board, barring it from enforcing requirements and fees related to the probationary designation. The trial court found the plaintiffs likely to succeed on several claims, including improper denial of “good actor” exclusions and failures in notice, and determined the balance of harms weighed in favor of plaintiffs. A nominal bond was set, and the trial court later denied objections to the bond amount. The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion by issuing an overly broad injunction affecting the entire Tulare subbasin, where only certain areas had plausible claims. The court clarified that the State Board must exclude any basin portion where a local agency demonstrates compliance with sustainability goals, but this exclusion does not require an independently approved plan for every area. The appellate court reversed the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the trial court to consider whether a narrower injunction may be appropriate. The petition for writ of supersedeas was denied as moot. View "Kings County Farm Bureau v. State Water Resources Control Bd." on Justia Law

State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Superior Court

2025-11-24T12:01:26-08:00

This case concerns the State Water Resources Control Board's intervention in the Tulare Lake groundwater subbasin pursuant to California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (the Act). After local agencies in the subbasin submitted a groundwater sustainability plan that the Department of Water Resources twice determined to be inadequate, the State Board designated the basin as probationary in April 2024. This designation triggered state-imposed monitoring, reporting, and fee obligations on certain groundwater extractors. In response, the Kings County Farm Bureau and others filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint, asserting that the State Board exceeded its authority and challenging the validity of the designation and associated fees on several grounds. The Superior Court of Kings County addressed both a demurrer filed by the State Board and a request from the Farm Bureau for a preliminary injunction. The trial court dismissed the equal protection claim with leave to amend, but overruled the demurrer as to claims that (1) the State Board used improper “underground regulations” not adopted under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), (2) the imposed extraction fee constituted an unlawful tax, and (3) general declaratory relief was appropriate. The trial court also granted a preliminary injunction, temporarily halting the State Board’s enforcement activities. The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the trial court’s order overruling the demurrer. The appellate court held that all actions by the State Board taken under sections 10735.2 and 10735.8 of the Act—including the designation of a probationary basin—are exempt from the APA unless the State Board voluntarily opts to adopt regulations using APA procedures. Therefore, the claim for improper “underground regulations” could not proceed. The court also held that a challenge to the extraction fee as an unlawful tax was barred by the constitutional “pay first” rule, as no exception applied. Lastly, the court determined that declaratory relief was unavailable because the Legislature provided for review of State Board actions exclusively by writ of mandate. The appellate court ordered the trial court to grant the demurrer without leave to amend as to these three claims. View "State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Maine v. 3M Company

2025-11-19T14:30:03-08:00

The State of Maine filed two similar lawsuits against 3M Company, alleging that per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) manufactured by 3M had contaminated various natural resources across Maine. One suit targeted PFAS contamination from 3M’s production of Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF), a firefighting product, while the other (the “non-AFFF” case) sought recovery for PFAS contamination not related to AFFF. Maine included a disclaimer in the non-AFFF complaint, stating it was not seeking relief for contamination related to AFFF, including military specification (MilSpec) AFFF, which was produced under federal direction and used at military and other federally regulated sites. 3M removed both cases to the United States District Court for the District of Maine under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), arguing that PFAS from AFFF and non-AFFF sources had plausibly commingled at various sites, giving rise to a colorable federal defense. Maine did not oppose removal of the AFFF case but moved to remand the non-AFFF case, contending that its disclaimer precluded any federal defense. The district court agreed with Maine, finding that the disclaimer shifted the burden to the State to prove contamination was not from AFFF, and thus remanded the case to state court. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the remand order. The court held that 3M’s theory—that PFAS contamination from MilSpec AFFF, for which it has a federal contractor defense, is commingled with other PFAS contamination—must be credited at this stage. The court concluded that the disclaimer did not eliminate 3M’s colorable federal defense or the “related to” nexus required for federal officer removal. The First Circuit ordered the case returned to federal court for further proceedings. View "Maine v. 3M Company" on Justia Law

Sterling v. City of Jackson

2025-11-17T16:30:16-08:00

Residents of Jackson, Mississippi, brought a class action lawsuit alleging that the city knowingly contaminated their drinking water with lead, failed to treat the water to prevent lead leaching, and misled the public about the water’s safety. The complaint details how city officials ignored warnings about the water system’s vulnerabilities, failed to repair critical treatment equipment, switched water sources in a way that worsened contamination, and delayed notifying residents of dangerous lead levels. Plaintiffs claim they and their families suffered significant health effects, including lead poisoning and related medical and developmental issues, as a result of consuming the contaminated water. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi granted the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to state a substantive due process claim against the city and that the individual city officials were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims, dismissing them without prejudice. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily integrity by claiming the city affirmatively introduced toxins into the water supply, misrepresented the water’s safety, and thereby deprived residents of the ability to make informed decisions about their health. The court also formally adopted the state-created danger doctrine as a viable theory in the circuit. The court reversed the dismissal of the due process claims against the city and vacated the dismissal of the state-law claims, remanding for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of claims against the individual city officials on qualified immunity grounds, finding the relevant rights were not clearly established at the time. View "Sterling v. City of Jackson" on Justia Law

Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. Dept. of Water Resources

2025-11-14T12:31:12-08:00

The California Department of Water Resources (DWR) planned to conduct geotechnical work, such as soil and groundwater testing, in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta as part of preparations for the Delta tunnel project, a major water conveyance initiative. Several municipal, tribal, and public interest groups objected, arguing that DWR could not begin this geotechnical work until it certified that the tunnel project was consistent with the Delta Plan, as required by the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Reform Act of 2009. The plaintiffs asserted that the geotechnical work was an integral part of the overall project and that separating it constituted impermissible “piecemealing” under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The Superior Court of Sacramento County agreed with the plaintiffs, issuing preliminary injunctions that barred DWR from conducting geotechnical work before submitting a certification of consistency. The court found that the geotechnical work was part of the covered action under the Delta Reform Act and that DWR’s project description in its Environmental Impact Report (EIR) included this work. The court also determined that the plaintiffs had a strong likelihood of success on the merits and would suffer procedural harm if the injunction was not granted. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reversed the trial court’s orders. The appellate court held that the Delta Reform Act does not require DWR to submit a certification of consistency before engaging in geotechnical work that precedes construction. The court reasoned that the purposes of CEQA and the Delta Reform Act differ, and the Act does not incorporate CEQA’s whole-of-the-action requirement or prohibition against piecemealing. The court directed the trial court to vacate the preliminary injunctions and reconsider the motions in light of this interpretation. View "Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. Dept. of Water Resources" on Justia Law

Orutsararmiut Native Council v. Boyle

2025-11-14T10:00:18-08:00

A mining company sought to develop an open pit gold mine in the Kuskokwim River watershed, on lands owned by Alaska Native Corporations. To operate the mine, the company needed state permits for a natural gas pipeline right-of-way across state lands and for water appropriations to dewater the mining pit and support operations. Local tribes objected, arguing that the mine and its associated infrastructure would have significant impacts on the watershed, which is culturally and economically important to them. The Department of Natural Resources approved the pipeline right-of-way and water use permits after considering the impacts of the permitted activities themselves, but not the cumulative impacts of the entire mining project. The tribes appealed the Department’s decisions to the Commissioner, arguing that both the Water Use Act and the Alaska Constitution required consideration of the cumulative impacts of the whole mining project. The Commissioner denied the appeals, finding that the Department was only required to consider the effects of the permitted activities themselves. The tribes then appealed to the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage. The superior court affirmed the Department’s decisions, ruling that the agency was not required to conduct a cumulative impacts analysis of the entire mine project under either statute or the constitution. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed whether the Department was required to consider the cumulative impacts of the entire mining project when granting the pipeline right-of-way and water use permits. The court held that neither the Water Use Act nor the Right-of-Way Leasing Act required consideration of downstream effects of mining activity enabled by the permits. The court also held that Article VIII of the Alaska Constitution did not require the Department to consider the costs and benefits of developing private resources on private lands when deciding whether to grant permits for the use of state resources. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgments. View "Orutsararmiut Native Council v. Boyle" on Justia Law

In re E. Palestine Train Derailment

2025-11-05T14:00:17-08:00

A train operated by Norfolk Southern carrying hazardous materials derailed near East Palestine, Ohio, in February 2023. The cleanup released toxic chemicals into the surrounding area, prompting affected residents and businesses to file suit against the railroad and other parties in federal court. These cases were consolidated into a master class action, and after extensive discovery and mediation, Norfolk Southern agreed to a $600 million settlement for the class. The district court for the Northern District of Ohio approved the settlement in September 2024. Five class members objected and appealed, but the district court required them to post an $850,000 appeal bond by January 30, 2025, to cover administrative and taxable costs. The objectors did not pay the bond or offer a lesser amount. After the bond order, the objectors filed a motion in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to eliminate or reduce the bond, but did not seek a stay. The Sixth Circuit motions panel explained that, absent a separate notice of appeal, it could only address the bond on a motion to stay, which the objectors expressly disclaimed. The objectors then moved in the district court to extend the time to appeal the bond order, but did so one day after the deadline set by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(A). The district court denied the motion as untimely, finding it lacked jurisdiction to grant an extension. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the deadlines for appealing and requesting extensions are jurisdictional and cannot be equitably extended. The court dismissed the objectors’ appeal of the motion to extend for lack of jurisdiction and granted the plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the objectors’ appeals of the settlement for failure to pay the required bond. View "In re E. Palestine Train Derailment" on Justia Law

Wille v. Lutnik

2025-10-31T11:00:35-08:00

Several individuals whose livelihoods depended on interacting with spinner dolphins challenged a federal regulation that restricted human proximity to these dolphins. The regulation, known as the Approach Rule, was issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service under the authority of the Marine Mammal Protection Act. The plaintiffs included a psychotherapist who used dolphin encounters in therapy, a boat captain who operated dolphin swim tours, and a dolphin guide and photographer. They argued that the regulation was unconstitutional because it was signed and promulgated by an official who, they claimed, was not properly appointed under the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland reviewed the case after the plaintiffs filed suit seeking to invalidate the regulation and enjoin its enforcement. During the litigation, Dr. Richard Spinrad, the Senate-confirmed NOAA Administrator and a principal officer, ratified the regulation, affirming that he independently evaluated and approved it. The district court found that this ratification cured any potential Appointments Clause defect and granted summary judgment in favor of the government. The plaintiffs appealed this decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that, under established principles of agency law, a principal officer’s ratification of a regulation can cure any constitutional defect arising from its initial promulgation by a non-principal officer. The court found that Dr. Spinrad’s ratification was valid and not impermissibly retroactive, as it did not impose new liabilities for past conduct but merely confirmed the regulation’s validity from the time of its original publication. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the suit. View "Wille v. Lutnik" on Justia Law

State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Super. Ct.

2025-10-29T13:30:55-08:00

The dispute centers on groundwater management in the Tulare Lake groundwater subbasin, a high-priority basin under California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (the Act). Local groundwater agencies developed and submitted a sustainability plan for the subbasin, but the Department of Water Resources twice found the plan inadequate. Following these determinations, the State Water Resources Control Board designated the Tulare subbasin as probationary, triggering state intervention and new monitoring, reporting, and fee requirements. In response, Kings County Farm Bureau and other parties filed a writ of mandate and complaint, challenging the State Board’s authority and actions, including the probationary designation and associated fees. The Superior Court of Kings County reviewed the Farm Bureau’s claims. It granted a preliminary injunction halting the State Board’s implementation of the probationary designation and denied in part the State Board’s demurrer to the complaint. Specifically, the trial court dismissed the equal protection claim with leave to amend but allowed the Farm Bureau to proceed on claims alleging improper underground regulations, unconstitutional fees, and general declaratory relief. The State Board then sought appellate review of the trial court’s order overruling its demurrer. The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the trial court’s decision de novo. It held that the Act exempts the State Board’s actions under the relevant statutory sections from the Administrative Procedures Act, precluding claims based on alleged underground regulations. The court further found that challenges to the extraction fees as unlawful taxes are barred by the “pay first” rule, requiring payment before judicial review. Finally, the court determined that declaratory relief is unavailable where the Legislature has provided a writ of mandate as the exclusive remedy. The appellate court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order overruling the demurrer and to grant the demurrer without leave to amend as to the sixth, seventh, and ninth causes of action. View "State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Kings County Farm Bureau v. State Water Resources Control Bd.

2025-10-29T12:30:56-08:00

This case concerns the State Water Resources Control Board’s designation of the Tulare Lake groundwater subbasin as a probationary basin under the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (the Act). The Act requires local groundwater agencies to develop and implement sustainability plans for high-priority basins, subject to state review. In the Tulare subbasin, five local agencies collaborated on a single plan, which the Department of Water Resources twice found inadequate. Following these findings, the State Board designated the basin as probationary, triggering additional monitoring, reporting, and fee requirements for groundwater extractors. The Kings County Farm Bureau and other plaintiffs challenged the State Board’s actions, alleging the Board exceeded its authority, failed to properly consider requests for exclusion from probationary status, and did not provide adequate notice. The Superior Court of Kings County reviewed the Farm Bureau’s petition and complaint, which included multiple causes of action. The trial court granted a preliminary injunction barring the State Board from enforcing requirements stemming from the probationary designation and imposed only a nominal bond. The court found the Farm Bureau likely to succeed on several claims, including improper denial of the “good actor” exclusion, exceeding statutory authority, and failure to provide required notice. The State Board appealed the injunction and related orders. The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion by issuing an overly broad injunction affecting the entire Tulare subbasin, when only certain claims regarding specific groundwater agencies were likely to succeed. The appellate court found the trial court erred in its analysis of some claims and that the injunction was not properly tailored to the harm at issue. The order granting the preliminary injunction was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. The petition for writ of supersedeas was denied as moot, and costs were awarded to the State Board. View "Kings County Farm Bureau v. State Water Resources Control Bd." on Justia Law