Environmental Law - Justia Case Law Summaries

INLAND EMPIRE WATERKEEPER V. CORONA CLAY COMPANY

2026-09-03T08:30:38-08:00

The plaintiffs, projects focused on protecting water quality, brought a suit against a clay recycling facility located near Temescal Creek in California, alleging violations of stormwater-permit requirements under the Clean Water Act. The facility, operated by Corona Clay Company, discharged stormwater into Temescal Creek, a tributary of the Santa Ana River. Regulatory authorities had previously issued violation notices to Corona, but no enforcement action was taken by the state. The plaintiffs sought relief for both substantive discharge violations and procedural violations such as monitoring and reporting. The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially found in favor of Corona following a trial. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, citing an intervening Supreme Court decision, County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, which expanded the scope of the Clean Water Act to include indirect discharges that are the “functional equivalent” of direct discharges. On retrial, the plaintiffs prevailed, and Corona was assessed significant penalties. After the Supreme Court’s Sackett v. EPA decision, which narrowed the definition of “waters of the United States,” Corona moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and alternatively sought a new trial. The district court denied both motions, holding that the jurisdictional requirement was met and the issue of whether Temescal Creek qualified as a water of the United States had been conceded. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Corona’s post-judgment motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that whether a waterbody qualifies as a “water of the United States” is a merits question, not a jurisdictional one. However, it reversed the denial of Corona’s motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, concluding that the intervening Sackett decision rendered a previously foreclosed issue viable. The panel remanded for further proceedings to determine, under Sackett’s standard, whether Temescal Creek is a water of the United States. View "INLAND EMPIRE WATERKEEPER V. CORONA CLAY COMPANY" on Justia Law

Booth v. District of Columbia

2026-09-03T06:01:51-08:00

A group of residents in the District of Columbia challenged amendments to the District’s Comprehensive Plan, a document that guides land use decisions. The 2021 amendments, enacted after a lengthy planning and public comment process, increased land use densities in certain neighborhoods, prompting concerns among residents about potential harms such as increased risk of displacement, infrastructure strain, and changes to neighborhood character. The residents sued, alleging that the Mayor’s Office of Planning failed to produce an adequate environmental assessment and did not give proper consideration to their Advisory Neighborhood Commissions. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia reviewed the complaint and dismissed it with prejudice, finding that none of the plaintiffs had standing. The court determined that the alleged injuries were too hypothetical and amounted to generalized grievances rather than concrete, particularized harm. Additionally, it concluded that there was no causal link between the Office of Planning’s actions and the claimed injuries, and that the injuries were not redressable because the court could not prevent implementation of the enacted Plan. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals agreed that the appellants lacked standing, holding that none had alleged an injury-in-fact that was sufficiently concrete or imminent. The court explained that most harms were generalized or speculative and not tied to any specific development project at the time the Plan was enacted. However, the appellate court found that the Superior Court erred in dismissing the suit with prejudice; dismissals for lack of standing should be without prejudice. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal for lack of standing but remanded for the trial court to revise the judgment to reflect that it is without prejudice. View "Booth v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Aldin Associates Ltd. Partnership v. State

2026-09-02T04:02:56-08:00

The plaintiff, a limited partnership, initiated an action in 2019 against the State of Connecticut and its Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection, alleging unreasonable delays in processing applications for reimbursement under the underground storage tank petroleum clean-up program. The plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus to compel payment for approved claims and adjudication of pending claims, as well as damages for alleged constitutional violations and unlawful taking of property. The Superior Court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing sovereign immunity. On appeal, the Connecticut Appellate Court reversed the dismissal as to the mandamus claim and remanded for further proceedings, but affirmed dismissal of the damages claims. Following remand, the plaintiff amended its complaint to seek only a writ of mandamus for payment of approved claims. The trial court denied this request, finding the plaintiff did not show a complete and immediate right to payment. The Appellate Court affirmed, and the plaintiff was granted certification to appeal to the Supreme Court of Connecticut. After certification was granted, the legislature enacted Public Act 25-168, which cancelled all applications under the program, transferred remaining funds to the state’s general fund, and repealed the statutory scheme governing the program. The Supreme Court of Connecticut concluded that these legislative actions rendered the plaintiff’s appeal moot, as no practical relief could be granted. The court dismissed the appeal and vacated the judgments of the Appellate Court and the trial court pertaining to the writ of mandamus, but declined to vacate prior judgments in unrelated claims from earlier proceedings. View "Aldin Associates Ltd. Partnership v. State" on Justia Law

Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA

2026-08-25T07:01:08-08:00

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducted a periodic review of the national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for nitrogen oxides, sulfur oxides, and particulate matter, as required by the Clean Air Act. After an extensive eleven-year process, EPA decided to retain the existing standards for nitrogen oxides and particulate matter, while lowering the secondary standard for sulfur oxides. EPA also issued a memorandum explaining its view that the new rule would not change air quality or emissions and thus would have no effect on endangered species or their habitats. Previously, EPA published its proposed rule in April 2024, followed by the final rule in December 2024. The agency’s no-effect determination stated that the revisions would not trigger additional emissions reductions or affect listed species. The Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) challenged EPA’s rule, arguing that the agency violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA) by failing to consult with federal wildlife agencies before issuing the rule. CBD asserted that ongoing and cumulative pollutant effects could harm species, and that EPA’s effects determination was both arbitrary and untimely. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that CBD had standing to bring the challenge, but ultimately determined that EPA’s no-effect finding was reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious. The court explained that the rule would not cause any changes to air quality or emissions, and thus would not trigger consultation obligations under the ESA. The court also held that EPA’s timing of the effects determination was appropriate under regulatory requirements. The main holding is that EPA reasonably determined the rule would have no effect on protected species or critical habitat, and the petition for review was denied. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA" on Justia Law

For a Better Bayou v. FERC

2026-08-25T07:01:03-08:00

Venture Global CP2 LNG and Venture Global CP Express sought authorization from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to construct and operate a liquefied natural gas (LNG) export terminal and an 85-mile pipeline in Louisiana. FERC’s review included extensive environmental analysis in compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), resulting in an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and a Supplemental EIS (SEIS). Both assessments concluded that, with recommended mitigation measures, the project’s environmental impacts, including those on air quality and the commercial fishing industry, would not be significant. Individuals and advocacy groups challenged FERC’s authorization, raising eleven alleged errors under the Natural Gas Act (NGA) and NEPA. After FERC’s initial order in 2024, the challengers sought rehearing. FERC partially granted rehearing to address concerns raised by recent D.C. Circuit decisions and directed additional environmental review, which led to the SEIS. The SEIS found no exceedances of relevant air quality standards for the terminal and compressor station. FERC reaffirmed its authorization in 2025, and subsequent rehearing requests were denied. The challengers then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that FERC’s interpretation and application of the NGA was lawful and not arbitrary, emphasizing the presumption in favor of terminal authorization under Section 3, absent an affirmative showing of inconsistency with the public interest. The court found FERC’s NEPA analysis reasonable, deferring to FERC’s use of established air quality standards and its reliance on expert agency data. The court also upheld FERC’s treatment of cumulative impacts and harm to commercial fisheries as sufficiently addressed and explained. The petitions for review were denied in full. View "For a Better Bayou v. FERC" on Justia Law

Friends of the Earth v. Export-Import Bank

2026-08-18T08:03:30-08:00

The Export-Import Bank of the United States (Eximbank) agreed to lend up to $5 billion to support the development of a major liquefied natural gas project in Mozambique. After insurgent attacks in the project area halted operations, Eximbank approved an amendment in 2025 to allow disbursement of funds on a revised schedule. Two environmental organizations, Friends of the Earth U.S. and Justiça Ambiental, argued that Eximbank’s actions violated statutory requirements by failing to provide a notice-and-comment period or disclose certain economic and environmental analyses before approving the amendment. The organizations claimed the project’s restart would intensify local conflict, cause environmental harm, and impair their ability to serve affected communities. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that the plaintiffs were unlikely to show standing for most of their claims, including lack of a notice-and-comment period and diversion of organizational resources. However, the district court concluded they had a substantial likelihood of standing on an informational injury theory relating to Eximbank’s failure to provide environmental information, but determined the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits for any of their claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the denial of the preliminary injunction. The court affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that the plaintiffs failed to establish organizational standing because their alleged injuries were either not particularized or too attenuated. The court concluded the plaintiffs demonstrated a substantial likelihood of informational standing for environmental information but failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits, because NEPA does not apply to projects with effects entirely outside U.S. jurisdiction and Eximbank’s disclosure obligations were not triggered. The denial of the preliminary injunction was therefore affirmed. View "Friends of the Earth v. Export-Import Bank" on Justia Law

Chamber of Commerce v. EPA

2026-08-18T08:03:18-08:00

Two synthetic chemicals, PFOA and PFOS—members of the PFAS group often called “forever chemicals”—have been widely used since the 1940s and are highly persistent in the environment and the human body. Scientific studies have linked exposure to these chemicals to serious health conditions, including cancer and developmental delays. In 2024, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) designated PFOA and PFOS as “hazardous substances” under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), which governs the cleanup of hazardous substances and allows for cost recovery from polluters. This designation was challenged by seven industry groups representing entities that use, transport, or discharge PFOA and PFOS. The challengers argued that EPA misinterpreted CERCLA’s standard for designating hazardous substances, failed to provide adequate notice regarding its cost-benefit analysis, and acted arbitrarily and capriciously by regulating in the face of scientific and economic uncertainties. They also argued that the designation violated the Administrative Procedure Act and constitutional doctrines. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that EPA acted within its statutory authority: CERCLA allows EPA to designate substances that “may present substantial danger” upon release, and the agency’s interpretation of “may” as requiring only the possibility, rather than certainty, of substantial harm was consistent with statutory text and precedent. The court concluded that EPA provided adequate notice and opportunity for public comment regarding its cost-benefit analysis, and that the agency’s rulemaking was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court also held that the agency’s actions did not violate constitutional doctrines. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review, upholding EPA’s designation of PFOA and PFOS as hazardous substances. View "Chamber of Commerce v. EPA" on Justia Law

Friends of Eastern Bay v. Department of Marine Resources

2026-08-18T07:12:51-08:00

Acadia Aqua Farms applied in 2019 for a twenty-year aquaculture lease in Eastern Bay, Maine, proposing to cultivate blue mussels using floating equipment, including a harvesting machine and a permanently moored storage raft. The company planned to operate seasonally, with routine maintenance and harvesting involving mechanized equipment. The Department of Marine Resources held a public hearing, allowing testimony from Acadia, intervenors such as Friends of Eastern Bay, and the public. Concerns were raised about noise impacts on nearby research facilities, especially the Mount Desert Island Biological Lab. After review, the Commissioner of the Maine Department of Marine Resources approved the lease in October 2024, but reduced its area from the requested 48.11 acres to 19.71 acres and imposed several conditions aimed at mitigating noise and visual impacts. Friends of Eastern Bay challenged the decision in the Superior Court (Kennebec County), which, after transfer to the Business and Consumer Docket, affirmed the Commissioner’s decision. Friends then appealed, arguing the Commissioner lacked statutory authority, that the noise and other impacts were improperly assessed, and that the lease should have been treated as a discharge application requiring additional environmental review. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The Court held that the Commissioner had statutory authority to grant the lease, including approval of the storage raft as part of the aquaculture operation. It concluded that the Department’s noise mitigation requirements and factual findings were supported by substantial evidence and complied with legislative and regulatory standards. The Court also found no error in the Department’s decision not to treat the application as a discharge application, given the lack of evidence that the proposed equipment would discharge pollutants. The judgment was affirmed. View "Friends of Eastern Bay v. Department of Marine Resources" on Justia Law

BIO-LAB, INC. v. TARTT

2026-08-18T04:05:57-08:00

In September 2024, a major fire at the Bio-Lab chemical facility in Rockdale County, Georgia, caused the release of a toxic chemical plume, resulting in an evacuation order for over 17,000 nearby residents. Many local residents subsequently sought medical attention for symptoms related to exposure to hazardous substances, including hydrogen cyanide. A group of affected residents and businesses filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against Bio-Lab and related entities, alleging negligence, trespass, nuisance, and strict liability. However, the plaintiffs did not claim present physical injury; instead, they asserted an increased risk of future disease and sought, among other remedies, an injunction requiring the creation of a defendant-funded medical monitoring program. The defendants moved to dismiss the request for equitable relief, arguing that Georgia law does not permit medical monitoring as a remedy absent allegations of present physical injury. The federal district court, finding Georgia law unclear on this issue, certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Georgia: whether a plaintiff exposed to toxic substances without present physical injury may obtain equitable relief in the form of medical monitoring, and if so, what standard applies. The Supreme Court of Georgia responded that, under Georgia law, the availability of equitable relief depends on whether the plaintiff has suffered a legally cognizable injury and whether that injury meets the established criteria for equitable relief, including the absence of an adequate remedy at law and the imminence of harm. The court declined to decide whether the specific facts of this case warranted such relief, leaving that determination to the district court. Additionally, the court concluded that the precise form and scope of equitable relief in a federal diversity case is likely governed by federal law, not state law. The certified questions were thus answered only in part. View "BIO-LAB, INC. v. TARTT" on Justia Law

CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF RECLAMATION

2026-08-17T08:01:24-08:00

Water districts in California that received water from the federal Central Valley Project sought to convert their water service contracts into repayment contracts under the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation (WIIN) Act. This conversion allowed the districts to prepay construction costs in exchange for contracts that would last indefinitely, rather than for a set term. The Bureau of Reclamation, which manages the Central Valley Project, converted 67 contracts upon request from water districts, modifying only the payment terms and leaving other contractual rights unchanged. The Bureau did not conduct contract-specific environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) or consult with wildlife agencies under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) before making these conversions. The Center for Biological Diversity and other plaintiffs challenged the Bureau’s actions in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. They argued that the Bureau was required to undertake NEPA review and ESA consultation before converting each contract, because the conversions would impact the environment and protected species in the Bay-Delta ecosystem. The district court compelled joinder of the affected water districts and granted summary judgment to the Bureau and the water districts. The court found that the WIIN Act imposed a mandatory duty on the Bureau to convert contracts upon request, and that the Bureau lacked discretion to alter terms for environmental protection, so NEPA and the ESA did not apply. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that section 4011(a) of the WIIN Act requires the Bureau to convert water service contracts upon request, permitting only changes related to payment structure and not to other contractual rights. Because the conversions are nondiscretionary, the Bureau is not required to conduct NEPA review or ESA consultation. The Ninth Circuit also found that this interpretation does not violate the WIIN Act’s savings clauses. View "CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF RECLAMATION" on Justia Law

Citizens for Clean Air v. Department of Transportation

2026-08-12T15:30:41-08:00

A company applied to construct a deepwater port off the coast of Texas, including a pipeline that would cross the pipeline of another recently approved deepwater port. The relevant federal statute, the Deepwater Port Act of 1974 (DWPA), requires that only one deepwater port be licensed per “application area.” An environmental group, comprised of local residents near the proposed pipeline and tank farm, objected to the approval, claiming that the pipeline should have been included in the application area. Their concerns included increased risks of flooding, pollution, and negative impacts on property value and quality of life. The United States Maritime Administration (MARAD), acting under authority delegated by the Secretary of Transportation, processed the application. Unlike with previous applications for similar projects, MARAD excluded the proposed pipeline from Texas GulfLink’s application area, reasoning that the DWPA gave it discretion to do so. MARAD then approved Texas GulfLink’s application. The environmental group filed a timely petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, challenging MARAD’s decision on the basis that it violated the DWPA. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the DWPA requires the application area to encompass the entire deepwater port site, including pipelines located seaward of the high water mark. The court found MARAD’s designation of the application area to be unlawful because, if the pipeline had been properly included, the application area would overlap with that of another approved port, contrary to the DWPA’s requirement. The court granted the petition for review, vacated MARAD’s approval of the application, and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Citizens for Clean Air v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Friends of Animals v. FWS

2026-08-12T10:33:05-08:00

A federal agency developed a plan intended to protect Utah prairie dogs, a threatened species, while accommodating land development in parts of Utah. The plan streamlined the permit process for developers and allowed for “incidental take”—harm to prairie dogs and their habitat—on the condition that developers and agencies would minimize and mitigate those impacts. Two main types of land were involved: “major development areas,” where most development was expected, and “minor development areas,” which were less likely to be developed. The plan called for relocating prairie dogs from development sites and offsetting habitat loss through measures such as translocation, conservation banks, land acquisitions, and conservation easements. The plan anticipated the take of up to 7,152 prairie dogs and 1,750 acres of habitat over ten years. When challenged, the United States District Court for the District of Utah upheld the agency’s actions and denied the plaintiff’s claims under the Endangered Species Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. The plaintiff, an animal advocacy organization, argued that the agency’s plan and related permits failed to adequately minimize and mitigate impacts, did not ensure the survival and recovery of the species, and did not satisfy legal requirements for environmental analysis. The district court found the organization had standing but rejected its substantive claims. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to compare the biological value of lost and replacement habitats, a necessary step for meaningful mitigation. The court also found the agency’s environmental analysis under the National Environmental Policy Act deficient for relying on unsupported assumptions about habitat replacement. Other aspects of the plan, including reliance on translocation and funding mechanisms, were upheld. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision on the Endangered Species Act and National Environmental Policy Act claims and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to determine the appropriate remedy. View "Friends of Animals v. FWS" on Justia Law

Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

2026-08-12T10:02:22-08:00

A nonprofit organization challenged a decision by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which approved a request by a fertilizer company to use phosphogypsum—a radioactive byproduct of fertilizer production—in the construction of a pilot road on the company’s private property in Florida. Phosphogypsum is typically stored in stacks due to its emission of radon gas, a known carcinogen. Federal regulations issued under the Clean Air Act generally prohibit its use outside of certain exceptions but allow the EPA to approve other uses if public health is protected as much as it would be by storage in stacks or mines. The EPA, after a multi-year review, found that the company's proposal included all necessary information and that the risks to workers, nearby residents, and the environment were below the applicable health thresholds. The EPA concluded that the road’s use of phosphogypsum posed no greater risk than storage and imposed ongoing monitoring requirements. The nonprofit submitted public comments opposing the approval, arguing that EPA’s action violated regulations and was arbitrary and capricious. After considering these comments, the EPA finalized its approval. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court first determined that it had jurisdiction because the petitioner had associational standing and the case was not moot. On the merits, the court held that the EPA did not violate its regulations, as the relevant rules unambiguously permit case-by-case approval of “other uses” of phosphogypsum, including road construction, provided health protections are adequate. The court also found that the EPA’s technical review and risk assessment were reasonable and well-supported, and any alleged procedural errors were harmless. The court denied the petition. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Friends of Animals v. Williams

2026-08-11T07:02:48-08:00

The case centers on the interpretation of a provision in the Endangered Species Act (ESA) related to how the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (the Service) can extend protections to species based on their similarity in appearance to listed endangered or threatened species. In 2019, the Service listed various subspecies and distinct population segments (DPS) of the scarlet macaw as endangered or threatened. It used its authority under the ESA to treat one population segment as threatened due to its similarity in appearance to listed groups. However, it did not conduct a "similarity of appearance" analysis for a population segment that was already listed as threatened, which would potentially have resulted in stronger protections. A lawsuit was filed challenging the Service’s interpretation, arguing that the ESA requires the Service to consider whether a threatened population should be treated as endangered due to its resemblance to an endangered group. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia agreed with the challengers. It found that the Service’s reading of the relevant statutory provision was flawed and that the Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously under the Administrative Procedure Act by not performing the analysis for the already-listed threatened segment. The District Court partially granted summary judgment for the challengers, ordered remand for further explanation, and set parameters for that remand in a later order, after which the Service filed this appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision. The appellate court held that the statutory text of the ESA only authorizes the Service to treat "unlisted" species as endangered or threatened based on similarity of appearance, not species that are already listed. The court found the Service’s longstanding interpretation, regulatory practice, and the statute’s legislative history supported this reading. Thus, it ruled that the Service did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in declining to conduct the analysis for an already-listed species. View "Friends of Animals v. Williams" on Justia Law

PACIFICORP V. SIXKILLER

2026-08-07T08:31:45-08:00

A multi-state utility company operating a gas-fired power plant in Washington alleged that the state's Climate Commitment Act (CCA) impermissibly discriminated against interstate commerce by allocating no-cost greenhouse gas emissions allowances only for electricity sold to Washington customers. Under Washington’s Clean Energy Transformation Act (CETA) and the CCA, utilities serving in-state customers receive no-cost allowances to offset compliance costs, while electricity exported to customers in other states does not receive this benefit. The company argued that this scheme increased costs for its non-Washington customers and potentially its shareholders, as out-of-state sales from the Washington facility required purchasing emissions allowances at auction. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington reviewed the complaint and found that the electricity generated for export was not subject to CETA’s decarbonization mandates, distinguishing it from in-state electricity. The district court concluded that the two categories were not similarly situated for purposes of Dormant Commerce Clause analysis. The court reasoned that utilities serving Washington customers were already subject to more aggressive decarbonization requirements under CETA, justifying the allocation of no-cost allowances under the CCA. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding no plausible claim of unconstitutional discrimination, and denied the motion for preliminary injunction as moot. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal and denial of the injunction. The Ninth Circuit held that because the regulatory schemes governing in-state and exported electricity are distinct, the emissions associated with each are not similarly situated. Therefore, Washington’s allocation of no-cost allowances did not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. The court further held that dismissal without leave to amend was appropriate, as any amendment would be futile. The decision was affirmed. View "PACIFICORP V. SIXKILLER" on Justia Law

National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States v. NPS

2026-08-07T06:32:12-08:00

President Trump, without congressional approval or proper consultation, demolished the White House East Wing over three days in October 2025 to build a privately funded 90,000 square-foot ballroom. The National Park Service’s environmental assessment acknowledged that the project would cause permanent and adverse impacts on President’s Park’s historical landscape, disrupting architectural integrity and historical continuity. The National Trust for Historic Preservation, a congressionally chartered organization with longstanding ties to President’s Park, challenged the construction, citing irreparable harm to the historic, aesthetic, and cultural interests of its members. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia first denied a temporary restraining order, relying on government assurances about the timing and separability of underground and above-ground work. Later, after the National Trust amended its complaint and renewed its request, the district court issued a preliminary injunction against above-ground ballroom construction, but exempted below-ground work and measures necessary for safety and security. The court found both statutory (APA) and ultra vires claims likely to succeed, concluding that neither the President nor the National Park Service had congressional authority for such dramatic alterations. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s modified preliminary injunction. The court held that Congress exercises exclusive control over federal property, including the White House, under the Property and District Clauses. Statutory language and appropriations history did not authorize unilateral demolition and replacement of the East Wing with a privately funded ballroom. The court ruled that the National Trust had associational standing, that the Trust was likely to succeed on the merits, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored the injunction. The court vacated its prior administrative stay and stayed its ruling for fourteen days to permit further review. View "National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States v. NPS" on Justia Law

PSEG Renewable Transmission LLC v. Arentz Family, LP

2026-08-06T11:00:34-08:00

A transmission development company sought to build a high-voltage transmission line across three Maryland counties to address a regional electricity shortage. After receiving federal approval, the company was required to obtain a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) from Maryland's Public Service Commission (PSC) before construction. As part of the CPCN application, environmental and socioeconomic field studies needed to be conducted on properties along the proposed route. The property owners refused access for these surveys, prompting the developer to submit desktop studies instead, which the PSC's Power Plant Research Program (PPRP) found inadequate, deeming the application incomplete. The developer then sought an injunction to enter the properties for the necessary field studies. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted the developer's motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the developer was likely to succeed on the merits under Maryland law, particularly Section 12-111(a) of the Real Property Article, which allows entities with eminent domain powers to access private land for surveys. The court determined that the developer had a viable claim to such power for the purposes of conducting the surveys, even though it could not condemn property until it obtained a CPCN. The court also found irreparable harm due to lost revenues from project delays, that the balance of equities favored the developer, and the public interest supported the injunction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision under an abuse of discretion standard. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the developer likely possessed the statutory right of access to conduct surveys prior to obtaining a CPCN, and that all four Winter factors for injunctive relief were satisfied. View "PSEG Renewable Transmission LLC v. Arentz Family, LP" on Justia Law

COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER ARVIN V. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

2026-08-05T09:02:30-08:00

Several environmental nonprofit organizations challenged a final rule issued by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approving California’s State Implementation Plans (SIPs) for air quality in the San Joaquin Valley. The SIPs, developed by the San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District and the California Air Resources Board, were intended to satisfy contingency measure requirements under the Clean Air Act for three particulate matter (PM2.5) standards. The approved measures included stricter wood burning restrictions, enhanced dust control, and expanded vehicle smog checks. However, the groups argued that these measures failed to provide sufficient emissions reductions, particularly for nitrogen oxides (NOx), and contended that the EPA improperly relied on feasibility analyses to justify the shortfall. Prior to reaching the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the SIP submissions underwent notice-and-comment review by the EPA. Despite critical feedback from environmental advocates, the EPA finalized the rule, accepting the agencies’ infeasibility demonstrations and lowering the progress standard for contingency measures from its traditional requirement. This departure from stricter standards allowed approval of the SIPs even though they did not meet the longstanding emissions reduction benchmarks. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the EPA’s approval under the Administrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary, capricious, or not in accordance with law” standard. The court held that the EPA exceeded its statutory authority by reading a feasibility exemption into Section 172(c)(9) of the Clean Air Act, which does not expressly allow for such consideration. The panel concluded that the statute’s best meaning does not include a feasibility exemption and remanded the rule to the EPA without vacatur, citing the potential disruptive consequences of lacking contingency measures. The court also awarded litigation costs and attorney’s fees to the petitioners. View "COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER ARVIN V. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY" on Justia Law

INLAND EMPIRE WATERKEEPER V. CORONA CLAY COMPANY

2026-08-05T08:31:21-08:00

Plaintiffs, Inland Empire Waterkeeper and Orange County Coastkeeper, brought a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act against Corona Clay Company, alleging violations of stormwater-permit requirements at a facility near Temescal Creek in California. The facility discharged stormwater during rainfall, potentially reaching Temescal Creek, a tributary of the Santa Ana River. Plaintiffs claimed Corona failed to implement best management practices, develop a compliant stormwater pollution prevention plan, monitor its facility, and submit accurate reports as required by the permit. Corona defended primarily by arguing it had not discharged pollutants into the creek. The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially granted partial summary judgment for Plaintiffs, but denied it on certain claims. The case proceeded to trial, where the jury found in favor of Corona. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial, in part due to an intervening Supreme Court decision, County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, which expanded the Clean Water Act’s coverage to indirect discharges that are the functional equivalent of direct discharges. After a second trial, Plaintiffs prevailed, and the district court entered judgment and assessed penalties against Corona. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Sackett v. EPA, which narrowed the definition of “waters of the United States” under the Clean Water Act, Corona moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and alternatively sought a new trial. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the question of whether Temescal Creek is a “water of the United States” is a merits issue, not one of subject-matter jurisdiction, affirming the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. However, due to the intervening change in law announced in Sackett, the court reversed the denial of the motion for a new trial under Rule 59 and remanded for further proceedings to litigate whether Temescal Creek falls within the Clean Water Act’s scope. View "INLAND EMPIRE WATERKEEPER V. CORONA CLAY COMPANY" on Justia Law

Russian Riverkeeper v. County of Sonoma

2026-08-04T14:32:40-08:00

Sonoma County amended its ordinance regulating groundwater well permits in 2023 following a prior appellate decision requiring counties to consider the public trust doctrine in such permitting. The Russian River, which runs through Sonoma and serves as habitat for threatened salmonids, is a navigable waterway protected by the public trust doctrine. Sonoma’s new ordinance established a framework for reviewing well permit applications based on their location and potential impact on public trust resources, particularly sensitive aquatic habitats. The amendment process involved extensive public engagement, technical review by experts, and adoption of conservation measures. Some categories of wells were exempt from heightened review due to low impact or overriding public interest. After the amendment, Russian Riverkeeper and California Coastkeeper Alliance filed suit in Sonoma County Superior Court, seeking to invalidate the ordinance. The superior court found Sonoma had failed both to fulfill its public trust obligations and to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). It issued a writ of mandate, set aside the ordinance, rescinded the claimed CEQA categorical exemptions, and suspended non-emergency well permitting. Reviewing the case, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, applied a deferential standard to the public trust claim and concluded that Sonoma’s amendment process was not arbitrary, capricious, or devoid of evidentiary support, given the data gathering and balancing of interests. Thus, it reversed the superior court’s determination on the public trust doctrine. However, the appellate court found that Sonoma failed to demonstrate substantial evidence supporting its claimed CEQA exemptions, as required by law, and affirmed the superior court’s ruling on that point. The judgment was reversed in part and affirmed in part, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Russian Riverkeeper v. County of Sonoma" on Justia Law

City of Brunswick v. Honeywell International, Inc.

2026-08-03T11:31:54-08:00

A city in Georgia experienced ongoing pollution of its property from hazardous substances, including mercury and PCBs, allegedly released as a result of historical industrial operations at a nearby plant site. Georgia Power initially owned the site and later sold it to a Honeywell predecessor, with both companies involved in activities that contributed to the contamination. Over decades, these pollutants migrated into the city’s property and surrounding waterways. In the 1990s, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) intervened and required the companies to investigate and remediate the site’s contamination under its oversight, culminating in a consent decree that obligated the companies to implement EPA’s official remediation plan. The city filed suit in Georgia’s Superior Court of Glynn County, asserting state-law claims for continuing nuisance and trespass, seeking damages and remediation costs. The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, arguing several grounds for federal jurisdiction, including federal officer removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). The district court rejected all removal grounds and remanded the case to state court, finding that the defendants were not “acting under” a federal officer. The defendants appealed the remand order while litigation continued in state court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the remand order, finding that the defendants’ notice of appeal triggered an automatic stay of the district court’s remand, rendering subsequent state court proceedings void for these purposes. On the merits, the court held that federal officer removal was proper because the defendants’ remediation obligations arose from and were controlled by the EPA under a consent decree. The court reversed the district court’s remand order, allowing the case to proceed in federal court. View "City of Brunswick v. Honeywell International, Inc." on Justia Law

GreenLatinos v. Suncor Energy (U.S.A.)

2026-08-03T08:01:53-08:00

The case involves environmental organizations seeking to enforce the Clean Air Act (CAA) against a petroleum refinery in Commerce City, Colorado, now operated by Suncor Energy. The refinery emits significant air pollution, affecting nearby residents' health and quality of life. Over twenty years ago, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) entered into consent decrees with Valero Energy Corporation and Conoco Phillips to enforce the CAA at these refineries. Suncor later acquired the facilities and became subject to the consent decrees. Despite ongoing EPA and Colorado enforcement actions, including compliance orders and notices of violation, the organizations allege continued violations of CAA standards and the consent decrees. The environmental groups, including GreenLatinos, Sierra Club, and 350 Colorado, filed a citizen suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging 28 CAA violations and violations of the consent decrees. Suncor moved to dismiss, arguing that the suit was barred by the CAA’s diligent prosecution provision, which prevents citizen suits if EPA or a state is diligently prosecuting a civil action in court for the same violations. The district court granted Suncor’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), holding that ongoing enforcement actions by EPA and Colorado, including the consent decrees and administrative actions, triggered the diligent prosecution bar. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed whether the diligent prosecution bar precluded the organizations’ claims. The court held that only standards or limitations being diligently prosecuted through a present judicial action (such as a consent decree) in court are preclusive, not merely similar standards enforced in administrative actions. The district court erred by applying the bar to claims that were only substantially similar or based on administrative actions. The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, instructing the lower court to apply the correct standard and to assess diligence only for claims identical to those enforced in the consent decrees. View "GreenLatinos v. Suncor Energy (U.S.A.)" on Justia Law

In Re Application Of Enbridge Energy To Replace & Relocate Line 5

2026-08-01T05:00:03-08:00

Enbridge sought approval to construct a tunnel beneath the Straits of Mackinac to house a new segment of its Line 5 pipeline, as part of a negotiated agreement with Michigan aimed at decommissioning the existing dual underwater pipelines. The project would replace the above-lakebed pipelines with a 30-inch pipe inside a concrete-lined tunnel, with ownership of the tunnel transferring to the Mackinac Straits Corridor Authority (MSCA) and Enbridge receiving a long-term lease. Several environmental groups and tribal communities opposed the project, citing environmental and public trust concerns, while labor and propane associations supported it. The Michigan Public Service Commission (PSC) referred the matter to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who largely limited the scope of review to the tunnel project itself and excluded broader issues such as the overall public need for Line 5, its operational safety, and climate impacts beyond the new segment. The ALJ found that prior approvals in 1953 established Line 5’s public need indefinitely. The PSC affirmed the ALJ’s approach, restricted its environmental review under Michigan’s Environmental Protection Act (MEPA) to the replacement project, and approved Enbridge’s application, finding no feasible or prudent alternatives and declining to examine the common-law public trust doctrine. The Court of Appeals affirmed the PSC’s decision, applying a deferential review standard. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, holding that courts must review agency MEPA determinations de novo, regardless of procedural origin. The Court found the PSC erred by not considering whether the tunnel project would factually and proximately cause the continued operation of Line 5 and attendant environmental harms, by inconsistently comparing alternatives, and by failing to assess impacts on public trust resources. The Supreme Court vacated the PSC’s order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In Re Application Of Enbridge Energy To Replace & Relocate Line 5" on Justia Law

Bad River Band of the Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa v Enbridge Energy Company, Inc.

2026-07-30T11:01:02-08:00

A company operates a pipeline transporting oil and natural gas liquids between the United States and Canada. A portion of this pipeline crosses twelve miles of land within a Native American reservation in northern Wisconsin. In 2013, the company’s rights-of-way over certain parcels of reservation land expired. During the intervening years, the tribal band acquired ownership interests in a number of these parcels. The company continued to operate the pipeline without securing the tribal band’s renewed consent for the necessary easements. Following a breakdown in negotiations, the tribal band filed suit, alleging trespass and public nuisance. The band also pointed to the risk of a pipeline rupture near a river bend where erosion threatened pipeline safety. The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment for the tribal band on its trespass and unjust enrichment claims, and against the company on its breach-of-contract counterclaim. After a bench trial, the district court awarded the band restitution for past trespass, ordered future disgorgement of profits, and issued an injunction requiring the company to cease operations across the affected parcels within three years and to implement a monitoring and shutdown protocol to abate the alleged nuisance. Both parties appealed; the district court stayed the shutdown portion of the injunction while the appeal was pending. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the finding that the company was trespassing on the parcels at issue and that restitution and injunctive relief are appropriate remedies. However, the court vacated the district court’s restitution calculation and the three-year shutdown deadline, remanding for a new determination of remedies that accounts for the public interest and ongoing pipeline reroute efforts. The court also held that federal statutory law displaced the band’s federal common law nuisance claim and vacated the related injunction. View "Bad River Band of the Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa v Enbridge Energy Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Harris Investment Holdings, LLC v. BFJ of USA, LLC

2026-07-30T10:30:32-08:00

A Georgia limited liability company purchased property in Greensboro, North Carolina, next to a gas station and convenience store owned by the defendants. After environmental testing revealed hazardous chemicals in the soil and groundwater on the company’s property, the company installed a vapor barrier and sought to recover the associated costs from the gas station owner and its members under both CERCLA and North Carolina law. The evidence showed that both properties had a long history of commercial and automotive use, with various underground storage tanks having been installed, removed, or closed in place over several decades. Notably, a waste-oil tank installed in the 1950s was closed in 1996 after evidence of petroleum and other contaminants was found in the soil. The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. The court held that the plaintiff had not produced sufficient evidence that the contamination on its property was caused by releases from the defendants’ property, and that any released substances were covered by CERCLA’s petroleum exclusion. The court also excluded the plaintiff’s expert’s later declaration referencing chromium contamination, finding it was untimely new opinion testimony. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment. The Fourth Circuit clarified that the petroleum exclusion in CERCLA covers unadulterated petroleum and its fractions, but not petroleum contaminated with hazardous substances not normally found in such products. The appellate court found that evidence regarding the leaking waste-oil tank raised a factual question as to whether a contaminant outside the petroleum exclusion was released. The Fourth Circuit vacated the summary judgment and the exclusion of certain evidence, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Harris Investment Holdings, LLC v. BFJ of USA, LLC" on Justia Law

AquAlliance v. Vina Groundwater Sustainability Agency

2026-07-30T10:11:05-08:00

Several environmental organizations brought an action contesting a groundwater sustainability plan that had been adopted by two local groundwater agencies under California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (the Act). The plaintiffs alleged that the plan failed to achieve sustainable groundwater management, specifically raising concerns about inadequate measurable objectives, unreasonably low minimum thresholds for groundwater levels, and insufficient measures to address impacts on surface waters and land subsidence. After the plan was adopted, it was submitted to the California Department of Water Resources (the Department) for review as required by the Act. The Superior Court of Butte County initially overruled the defendants’ demurrer, finding that the Act permitted reverse validation actions by interested parties, and allowed the action to proceed even though the complaint was filed slightly before the statutory waiting period had expired. The court later denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, holding it was premature and that an administrative record was necessary. While the litigation was pending, the Department completed its review and approved the plan, finding it likely to achieve the basin’s sustainability goal, though it identified corrective actions to be addressed going forward. The defendants then moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the Department’s approval rendered the judicial challenge moot. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case, reasoning that further judicial review would improperly intrude on the Department’s administrative functions. The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s orders. The appellate court held that while the Act permits reverse validation actions by interested parties, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the action under the primary jurisdiction doctrine after the Department completed its evaluation. The court concluded that, where a plaintiff’s challenge is based on the same sustainability evaluation committed to the Department’s expertise, courts may defer to the agency’s process to ensure uniform and technically informed application of the Act. View "AquAlliance v. Vina Groundwater Sustainability Agency" on Justia Law

The Town of Pine Hill, Alabama v. 3M Company

2026-07-29T07:31:42-08:00

A municipality in Alabama brought a lawsuit against a chemical manufacturer, alleging that the company’s products containing per- and poly-fluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) contaminated the Alabama River. The contamination allegedly originated from PFAS-containing wastewater discharged by paper mills, which used the manufacturer’s products. The municipality relies on water from the river for its drinking supply, and PFAS are difficult to remove with its current filtration system, necessitating expensive upgrades. After being sued in Alabama state court for negligence, nuisance, and trespass, the manufacturer removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, asserting jurisdiction under the federal officer removal statute. The municipality expressly disclaimed any claims related to PFAS contamination from aqueous film forming foam (AFFF), a firefighting product produced by the manufacturer for the military. The district court found that the heart of the claims was the supply of PFAS products to paper mills, not federal conduct, and remanded the case to state court. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision de novo. The appellate court held that the manufacturer sufficiently alleged facts supporting federal officer removal jurisdiction. It concluded that the manufacturer plausibly acted under a federal officer when producing AFFF and that the complaint’s gravamen encompassed PFAS contamination generally, not just from paper mills. The court found the municipality’s disclaimers to be mere artful pleading that did not sever the causal connection required for removal. The manufacturer also plausibly asserted a colorable federal government contractor defense. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s remand order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "The Town of Pine Hill, Alabama v. 3M Company" on Justia Law

Davis v. Lockheed Martin Corp.

2026-07-28T11:32:05-08:00

The key facts concern allegations that Lockheed Martin improperly handled volatile organic compounds at its Orlando facility, resulting in environmental contamination that plaintiffs claim caused neurological illnesses, including multiple sclerosis and Parkinson’s disease, among workers and nearby residents. Plaintiffs relied on expert testimony to show that exposure to specific chemicals could cause the diseases in question. In the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, the plaintiffs presented two general causation experts who used epidemiological and other scientific methodologies to link the chemicals to the illnesses. Lockheed Martin challenged the admissibility of these experts’ opinions, arguing they were unreliable. The district court agreed, finding that the first expert failed to adequately explain or reliably apply his “weight of the evidence” methodology and did not sufficiently analyze the Bradford Hill factors. The second expert’s opinions were largely based on the first expert’s report and a statistical analysis that did not properly assess background risk. As a result, the district court excluded both experts’ testimony and granted summary judgment for Lockheed Martin, concluding that plaintiffs lacked admissible general causation evidence. In the related DeMilt case, the summary judgment was partial, but the district court certified it for immediate appeal under Rule 54(b). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding the experts and granting summary judgment. The appellate court held that the district court acted within its discretion, as the experts did not adequately explain or reliably apply their methodologies, and their testimony was thus properly excluded. Without this expert evidence, plaintiffs could not establish general causation. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders excluding the experts and granting summary judgment in favor of Lockheed Martin. View "Davis v. Lockheed Martin Corp." on Justia Law

Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA

2026-07-28T07:02:15-08:00

Several environmental organizations challenged a rule issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that modified how the agency determines whether a stationary source of air pollution requires a permit for modifications under the Clean Air Act’s New Source Review (NSR) program. The core factual issue concerned whether, in assessing if a physical or operational change at a facility triggers the need for an NSR permit, the EPA may consider both emission increases and decreases attributable to a single project (“project emissions accounting”) at the initial step of the permitting process. Previously, the EPA used a two-step process: Step One evaluated whether a proposed project would itself cause a significant emissions increase, and Step Two determined whether any source-wide emissions decreases would offset that increase. The challenged rule allowed for netting both increases and decreases within a single project at Step One. Petitioners argued that this change would allow regulated entities to avoid NSR by aggregating unrelated activities and relying on emissions decreases that were not contemporaneous with increases. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the petitions after several environmental groups sought judicial review following the EPA’s adoption of the project emissions accounting rule and related interpretive guidance. The court found that at least one petitioner had standing based on alleged injury from increased emissions at a specific facility. The court held that the EPA’s rule was not contrary to law and did not violate the Clean Air Act, as it consistently applied the statutory definition of “modification” and fell within the agency’s reasonable interpretive discretion. The court further held that the rule was not arbitrary or capricious, finding the EPA’s explanations for its approach to project aggregation and recordkeeping requirements sufficient. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA" on Justia Law

Audette v. Lake of the Woods County

2026-07-24T07:31:08-08:00

Robert and Jennifer Audette purchased a lakefront property in Minnesota and constructed a 12-foot-wide concrete ramp from their home to the lake’s ordinary high-water mark without first obtaining approval from Lake of the Woods County. County officials had previously advised them about permissible improvements, including limitations on new concrete and the importance of staying within existing fill, but the Audettes exceeded these instructions. Subsequent inspections revealed substantial wetland impacts, and the County issued restoration orders and identified violations of both zoning ordinances and a state-funded shoreline stabilization project. After the ramp was constructed, the Audettes sought an after-the-fact conditional use permit, citing the need for handicap accessibility for Jennifer Audette, who has multiple sclerosis. The Lake of the Woods County Planning Commission recommended approval with conditions, but the Lake of the Woods County Board denied the permit, emphasizing environmental concerns, procedural violations, and the availability of less impactful alternatives. The Audettes then applied for approval under the Wetland Conservation Act, which was also denied by the County and, upon appeal, by the Minnesota Board of Water and Soil Resources. The Minnesota Department of Natural Resources later cited the Audettes for failure to comply with restoration orders. The Audettes filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, alleging discrimination under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act due to denial of their permit application. The district court granted summary judgment for the County, finding the Audettes had not timely requested an accommodation and had violated County instructions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo and affirmed. The Eighth Circuit held that the County did not violate ADA accommodation duties, as the Audettes never sought a reasonable accommodation at the appropriate time and provided no evidence of intentional discrimination. View "Audette v. Lake of the Woods County" on Justia Law

Maui Tomorrow Foundation v. Maui Planning Commission

2026-07-22T12:04:05-08:00

A nonprofit environmental organization challenged the Maui Planning Commission’s amended rules, which governed development in Maui’s Special Management Area (SMA), a protected coastal zone. The amendments created fifteen categorical exemptions from environmental assessment, some with monetary thresholds and some based on landowner declarations. The rules also allowed continuation, repair, or renovation of previously approved developments without new environmental review, and replaced the requirement for a final environmental assessment (EA) with a draft EA for permit applications. After the rules were enacted, the nonprofit filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, arguing that the commission’s rules unlawfully bypassed the Coastal Zone Management Act’s (CZMA) required assessment process, shifting the duty to regulated parties and undermining statutory and constitutional protections. The commission responded that its exemptions were within its rulemaking power, claiming they excluded non-development activities from the CZMA process. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the nonprofit, invalidating the relevant rule sections and restoring the final EA requirement. The Maui Planning Commission and County of Maui appealed. The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the commission’s rules exceeded its statutory authority by creating categorical exemptions from the CZMA’s assessment process and unlawfully delegating assessment duties to private parties. The court also found that replacing the final EA with a draft EA undermined required environmental safeguards. The Supreme Court clarified that counties may streamline permitting but cannot eliminate the statutory assessment process or delegate it to applicants. The court affirmed the invalidation of the amended rules. View "Maui Tomorrow Foundation v. Maui Planning Commission" on Justia Law

Beyond Nuclear, Inc. v. NRC

2026-07-21T08:02:27-08:00

The case concerns a challenge brought by two environmental organizations to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) 2024 revision of its Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS), which is used to evaluate the environmental effects of renewing operating licenses for nuclear power plants. The petitioners argued that the NRC inadequately considered how aging reactor components and the impacts of climate change could increase the risk of severe nuclear accidents, which in turn could have significant environmental consequences. Previously, the NRC revised its GEIS to generically determine that the environmental risks from “severe accidents” at nuclear plants during license renewals were “small,” relying on updated data and a conservative risk analysis. This revision classified most severe accident risks as “Category 1,” meaning they did not require further plant-specific analysis unless new and significant information arose. The NRC also determined that plants that had previously completed an analysis of severe-accident mitigation alternatives (SAMAs) did not need to repeat that process unless new circumstances warranted it. The petitioners sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, challenging these determinations. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the NRC’s actions under the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard, which is deferential to agency expertise in matters of environmental impact analysis. The court found that the NRC had reasonably considered both aging and climate change as factors influencing accident risk, explained its reliance on regulatory oversight and conservative assumptions, and provided adequate opportunity for site-specific review if new information emerged. The court held that the NRC’s generic analysis and procedures did not violate the National Environmental Policy Act or the Administrative Procedure Act, and it denied the petition for review. View "Beyond Nuclear, Inc. v. NRC" on Justia Law

Save the Sound, Inc. v. FAA

2026-07-21T08:02:24-08:00

A regional airport in Connecticut faced operational challenges due to a short runway and an outdated, flood-prone terminal. To address these issues, the airport authority proposed a project to extend the runway by about 1,000 feet and construct a new terminal. The authority also planned, in its long-term Master Plan, to upgrade taxiways, but those upgrades were not part of the immediate project seeking final approval. The expansion aimed to allow full-capacity flights for common aircraft and improve passenger facilities. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) provided conditional approval for all projects in the Master Plan but granted final approval only for the runway extension and new terminal. The FAA conducted an environmental assessment (EA) for these two elements, concluding there would be no significant environmental effects, and thus did not prepare a full environmental impact statement (EIS). The EA included projections for increased passenger enplanements, consideration of air pollution, and mitigation measures for flooding and wetlands. The FAA determined the taxiway upgrades were not part of the current project because they were not expected to be pursued within five years and had independent utility. Petitioners, an environmental group and a town, challenged the FAA's approval in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. They argued the FAA violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in several ways, including improper segmentation of the project, failure to consider cumulative effects, and inadequate analysis of environmental impacts. The Court applied a highly deferential standard of review, consistent with Supreme Court precedent in Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, and found the FAA acted reasonably in its project definition, environmental analysis, and mitigation measures. The Court denied the petitions for review, holding that the FAA’s approval complied with NEPA’s procedural requirements and was not arbitrary or capricious. View "Save the Sound, Inc. v. FAA" on Justia Law

Clean Air Council v. EPA

2026-07-17T06:33:01-08:00

This case concerns the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) extension of compliance deadlines for steel mills to meet hazardous emission standards. The EPA initially issued an interim rule, then a final rule, extending deadlines for various emission controls and monitoring requirements. EPA explained that the original deadlines were technologically infeasible due to unforeseen technical challenges and incomplete data. The revised deadlines allowed steel mills more time—up to three years after the rule’s promulgation date—to comply with standards for emission sources such as bleeder valve openings, bell leaks, slag processing, beaching, and furnace emissions monitoring. EPA also revised the timeline for fenceline monitoring based on delays in developing testing methods. Environmental groups petitioned for reconsideration of the 2024 Rule, citing procedural and substantive objections. EPA first denied the need for reconsideration but later identified issues warranting further review, issuing a stay and an interim rule. After receiving public comments, EPA promulgated a final rule, confirming the extended deadlines and explaining the compliance difficulties. Petitioners challenged both the interim and final rules, arguing that EPA exceeded its authority and failed to set deadlines as expeditiously as practicable under the Clean Air Act. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the petitions. The court held that EPA’s revised compliance deadlines were consistent with the Clean Air Act and adequately explained, distinguishing the rulemaking from prior actions that merely delayed rules for reconsideration. The court determined that EPA had authority to reset deadlines based on substantive, technological challenges. The court dismissed the procedural challenge to the interim rule as moot, since EPA had followed proper procedures in the final rule. The challenge to the fenceline monitoring deadline was also dismissed, as the new and original deadlines had converged. The court denied all other petitions for review. View "Clean Air Council v. EPA" on Justia Law

ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. HIGGINS

2026-07-16T10:31:32-08:00

The case concerns a restoration project, known as the Hanna Flats Good Neighbor Authority Project, in the Idaho Panhandle National Forest. The United States Forest Service proposed this project to address insect and disease infestations and to reduce wildfire risks. The project was developed through a collaborative process with state actors, local landowners, and conservation groups. The Forest Service published a Scoping Notice describing the project's objectives and solicited public feedback, asserting that the project was entirely within the "wildland-urban interface," making it eligible for a categorical exclusion from the full environmental review typically required under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The Alliance for the Wild Rockies contested the Forest Service’s use of the Healthy Forest Restoration Act (HFRA) exemption, arguing that the project did not fall within the "wildland-urban interface" as defined by HFRA, and thus should not be exempt from NEPA review. The United States District Court for the District of Idaho granted summary judgment for the Forest Service, holding that the Alliance had forfeited its argument by not raising the specific issue regarding the definition of "wildland-urban interface" during the project’s scoping process—a concept known as issue exhaustion. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that neither HFRA nor any relevant regulations imposed an issue-exhaustion requirement for the HFRA scoping process, and that the nature of this informal, non-adversarial proceeding did not warrant a judicially imposed issue-exhaustion requirement. The panel further held that the type of claim brought by the Alliance—challenging the statutory authority for the Forest Service’s decision—was not the kind of claim that typically requires administrative exhaustion. The Ninth Circuit therefore reversed the district court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for consideration of the merits of Alliance’s challenge. View "ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. HIGGINS" on Justia Law

City of Chicago v BP P.L.C.

2026-07-15T14:00:48-08:00

The case involves a lawsuit filed in March 2024 by the City of Chicago against several major fossil fuel companies and a trade association. Chicago alleges the defendants misrepresented the effects of fossil fuel emissions on climate change, leading consumers to use more fossil fuels, which resulted in harm to the city such as increased illness, property damage, and environmental degradation. The city seeks damages only for harm attributable to increased fossil fuel usage due to the alleged misinformation, and specifically excludes claims related to federal property or specialized fuel sales to the federal government. After the complaint was filed in Illinois state court, the defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, invoking the federal officer removal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)). They argued that their work producing and supplying fossil fuels for the federal government brought the case within federal jurisdiction. The district court disagreed, finding the connection between the alleged misconduct and the defendants’ federal work too attenuated, and remanded the case to state court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s remand order de novo. The Seventh Circuit held that the federal officer removal statute did not support removal here because the defendants’ federal work was not sufficiently connected to Chicago’s claims, which focus on alleged misrepresentations to consumers and resulting non-federal harm. The court noted that the city’s complaint expressly disclaimed injuries related to federal activities, and agreed with the reasoning of other circuits in similar cases. The Seventh Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s remand order. View "City of Chicago v BP P.L.C." on Justia Law

Czerno v. General Electric Company

2026-07-14T13:30:03-08:00

A mother brought suit on behalf of herself and her minor son, alleging that the son developed leukemia after attending school near and residing close to a manufacturing plant operated by General Electric Company. The plant, located in Pittsfield, Massachusetts, produced electrical transformers and capacitors containing polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) for decades. The plaintiff claimed that GE’s use, disposal, and storage of PCBs caused the son’s illness, and sought recovery under various legal theories, including strict liability, negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation, nuisance, improper transportation of hazardous material, and loss of consortium. The complaint included claims related to the defective design and use of PCB materials, as well as their disposal and remediation. The plaintiff originally filed suit in Massachusetts state superior court. GE removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, asserting federal officer removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), based on its wartime production of PCB-containing devices for the federal government and its later remediation efforts pursuant to a consent decree with the EPA. The plaintiff moved to remand the case to state court, arguing that GE failed to meet the requirements for federal officer removal. The district court agreed, ordered remand, and stayed that order pending appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s jurisdictional determination de novo. It held that GE satisfied both the “acting under” and “for or relating to” elements of the federal officer removal statute, due to its extensive work producing PCB-containing devices for the federal government. The court reversed the district court’s remand order and remanded the case for the district court to determine whether GE has a colorable federal defense. View "Czerno v. General Electric Company" on Justia Law

Warren Livestock, LLC v. Board of County Commissione

2026-07-13T07:22:58-08:00

Several property owners and ranching entities challenged amendments adopted in 2023 by the Albany County Board of County Commissioners to the Aquifer Protection Overlay Zone (APOZ) regulations. The Casper Aquifer, which supplies drinking water to many residents of Albany County and the City of Laramie, had been the subject of prior regulatory efforts. The 2023 amendments included a 35-acre minimum lot size requirement and revised procedures for changing the APOZ boundaries. Appellants argued that the Board exceeded its authority, violated equal protection guarantees, and acted arbitrarily and capriciously in enacting the amendments. Previously, in Bienz v. Board of County Commissioners, County of Albany, 2024 WY 102 (Bienz I), the Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed whether amendments to the APOZ regulations were subject to direct judicial review under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA). The district court had concluded it lacked jurisdiction, finding the Board's actions legislative and not reviewable under the WAPA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that legislative agency actions are reviewable, and remanded the case for the district court to consider the merits. While litigation was pending, the Board further amended the APOZ regulations, requiring the district court to identify which amendments remained at issue. The district court ultimately upheld the Board’s authority and the amendments. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming addressed whether the Board exceeded its authority, whether the amendment procedures violated equal protection, and whether the arbitrary and capricious standard applied to agency legislative action. The Court held the Board acted within its statutory authority in protecting the Casper Aquifer, the distinct procedures for overlay zone amendments did not violate equal protection guarantees, and agency legislative actions are subject to the arbitrary and capricious standard. It concluded the 2023 APOZ amendments, including the 35-acre minimum lot size, were not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law, and affirmed the district court’s decision. View "Warren Livestock, LLC v. Board of County Commissione" on Justia Law

Gmeiner v. Kent

2026-07-10T10:31:23-08:00

Stephen and Deborah Gmeiner owned waterfront property in Michigan and sought a permit to construct a walking path through wetlands to the lake. The Michigan Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy initially denied their permit application, citing environmental concerns and suggesting a boardwalk as a less damaging alternative. The Gmeiners appealed, and an administrative law judge found that township ordinances made a boardwalk infeasible without constructing a home, so the permit was granted. When the Department issued the permit, it included an indemnification clause requiring the Gmeiners to hold the State harmless for claims arising from their actions in connection with the permit. The Gmeiners objected, arguing that the clause was unauthorized under Michigan law and imposed an unconstitutional condition on their First Amendment right to petition by potentially barring lawsuits against the State for its own misconduct. The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan denied the Gmeiners’ request for a preliminary injunction and dismissed their complaint. The court interpreted the indemnification clause narrowly, holding that it only required indemnification for claims resulting from the Gmeiners’ own actions, not for state misconduct. It concluded that the clause did not violate the First Amendment Petition Clause and that sovereign immunity barred the state-law claim in federal court. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court held that, even assuming the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine under the Takings Clause applied to the Petition Clause, the indemnification clause was limited to claims arising from the Gmeiners’ own conduct and did not bar them from suing the State for its own misconduct. The court also held that Michigan’s sovereign immunity barred the Gmeiners from seeking state-law relief against state officials in federal court. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Gmeiner v. Kent" on Justia Law

Center for Bio Diversity v. TRAN

2026-07-07T15:30:30-08:00

Delfin LNG sought approval to construct and operate a deepwater liquefied natural gas export facility in the Gulf of America, consisting of onshore infrastructure in Louisiana and floating offshore vessels. The Maritime Administration (MARAD), after extensive environmental review and public comment, initially approved the project in 2017. Over subsequent years, Delfin altered key aspects of the project, including its design and financing. MARAD determined these changes required further review and asked Delfin to submit an amended application, which Delfin did not do. In 2025, following a presidential executive order, MARAD concluded that the modifications would not cause significantly different environmental impacts and issued the license. Three environmental organizations challenged MARAD’s decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. They argued MARAD violated the Deepwater Port Act by not requiring an amended application and additional public comment, the National Environmental Policy Act by not preparing a supplemental environmental impact statement, and the Administrative Procedure Act by issuing a license after finding the prior approval was insufficient. They requested the court vacate MARAD’s licensing decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that none of the petitioners demonstrated Article III standing. The court held that the organizations failed to identify a member who suffered a concrete and particularized injury fairly traceable to MARAD’s licensing decision. The declarations submitted did not show a personal and project-specific harm, nor did they establish a sufficient geographic nexus to the affected area. As a result, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits and denied the petition for review. The main holding is that, in the absence of standing, the court cannot reach the substantive environmental or procedural claims. View "Center for Bio Diversity v. TRAN" on Justia Law

Burton v. Flathead Conservation Dist.

2026-07-07T14:10:55-08:00

Dennis and Jeannette Burton own property along the Flathead River near Kalispell, Montana. Their land contains a pond, historically a “scour feature” of the river, which has existed for decades and was enhanced by a man-made channel connecting it to the river, likely predating their ownership. The property frequently experiences flooding in a pole barn during high river flows. In 2024, the Burtons applied to the Flathead Conservation District (FCD) for a permit under the Natural Streambed and Land Preservation Act to dredge the pond and channel and to use the dredged material to build a berm to protect the pole barn from flooding. The FCD conducted a site visit and, based on findings that the project could cause erosion, alter river flows, and have negative impacts on aquatic habitat, denied the permit. The FCD reasoned that the project conflicted with its rules, which discourage or prohibit dredging connected artificial or in-stream ponds. The Burtons sought judicial review and declaratory relief in the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, arguing that the FCD’s decision was unsupported and that its rules did not apply to their project. The District Court upheld the FCD’s denial, finding the FCD had jurisdiction because the pond and channel were connected to the river and that the project fit the definition of a regulated off-stream pond. The court also concluded that the FCD’s consideration of prior applications for the property was not improper. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that the FCD had jurisdiction, that its rules applied to the project, and that there were sufficient legal grounds for the permit denial. The Court further concluded that any deficiencies in the FCD’s explanation were harmless given the record support for the decision. View "Burton v. Flathead Conservation Dist." on Justia Law

RINNAI AMERICA CORP. V. SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT

2026-07-02T08:31:35-08:00

A regional air quality agency responsible for the South Coast Air Basin, an area with some of the nation’s worst ozone pollution, amended its regulations to phase in zero nitrous oxide (NOx) emissions standards for certain appliances, such as water heaters, boilers, and process heaters. The agency determined that only widespread adoption of zero emissions standards across stationary sources could bring the region into compliance with federal ozone requirements imposed by the Clean Air Act (CAA). The rule’s implementation was staggered over several years, with the goal of achieving significant NOx reductions. Plaintiffs, including manufacturers and industry groups, challenged this rule, arguing that it was preempted by the federal Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), which sets national energy efficiency standards for consumer products. The United States District Court for the Central District of California considered the plaintiffs’ facial preemption challenge. The district court granted summary judgment to the air quality agency, finding that the rule did not concern the “energy use” of appliances as defined by EPCA, but instead addressed air pollution and health risks. The court concluded that the rule did not trigger EPCA’s preemption provisions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that EPCA does not preempt the agency’s amended rule because nothing in EPCA’s text, structure, or history indicates Congressional intent to interfere with state and local efforts to achieve federal air quality standards under the CAA. The court also found that plaintiffs had not shown any EPCA language preempting CAA-based emissions regulations, and distinguished its earlier decision in California Restaurant Association v. City of Berkeley as inapplicable here. Finally, the court held that the facial challenge failed because the rule applies to some products not covered by EPCA, and thus was not unconstitutional in every application. The judgment for the agency was affirmed. View "RINNAI AMERICA CORP. V. SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT" on Justia Law

Association of Contracting Plumbers v. City of New York

2026-06-30T07:00:04-08:00

New York City and New York State passed laws that effectively prohibit the use of fossil-fuel-powered appliances in new buildings as part of broader efforts to address pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. These measures ban, for example, installing gas stoves or other fossil-fuel-based heating or cooking appliances in new construction. Trade associations, contractor and builder groups, and unions whose members would be affected by these prohibitions sued, arguing that the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), a federal law that sets efficiency standards for certain appliances, expressly preempts these state and local laws. In the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the plaintiffs challenging the New York City law lost when the court granted the City’s motion to dismiss, finding that EPCA did not preempt the local law. In a separate case in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, plaintiffs challenging the State law were denied relief at the summary judgment stage against the remaining state defendant, with the court again holding that EPCA’s preemption provision did not apply. In both cases, the plaintiffs appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed both appeals together. The court held that EPCA’s express preemption provision only preempts state and local “energy conservation standards” for covered appliances and a limited class of related regulations. The challenged New York laws, which prohibit the use of certain types of appliances but do not set standards for the amount of energy those appliances use, do not fall within the scope of EPCA’s preemption. Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgments of the district courts, allowing the state and city laws to stand. View "Association of Contracting Plumbers v. City of New York" on Justia Law

State of Iowa v. Lilly

2026-06-30T06:05:55-08:00

The State alleged that two corporate officers of companies specializing in recycling fiberglass waste failed to properly dispose of approximately 1,300 decommissioned wind turbine blades, instead allowing them to accumulate at several sites in Iowa without legitimate recycling. The Iowa Department of Natural Resources (DNR) investigated the sites beginning in 2018, raising concerns about speculative accumulation. The DNR subsequently engaged with the companies to develop compliance plans, resulting in consent orders requiring proper recycling and financial assurances. When the companies failed to comply, the State sought civil penalties and a permanent injunction against both the business entities and their corporate officers. The Iowa District Court for Jasper County reviewed the officers’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The officers had argued they had never been to Iowa and were not personally involved in the conduct at issue. The district court denied their motion, finding sufficient minimum contacts through their roles as responsible corporate officers of the involved entities. The court also deemed both officers as “persons” subject to liability under Iowa Code section 455B.307(3). The officers sought interlocutory appeal, which was granted. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. It held that the State had adequately pleaded claims against both officers as individuals potentially subject to liability under Iowa’s solid waste and recycling statutes, applying the responsible corporate officer doctrine. However, the Court determined that only one officer, who had signed compliance documents and directed company activity in Iowa, had sufficient minimum contacts for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. The other officer, lacking direct involvement or contacts with Iowa related to the violations, was not subject to personal jurisdiction. The Court affirmed the district court’s ruling as to one officer, reversed as to the other, and remanded for dismissal of claims against the latter without prejudice. View "State of Iowa v. Lilly" on Justia Law

Western Watersheds Project v. Forest Service

2026-06-26T08:32:06-08:00

Several conservation groups challenged a 2020 amendment to the management plan for Thunder Basin National Grassland, alleging that the United States Forest Service violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The State of Wyoming intervened in the case. After the case was transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, the district court upheld the agency’s plan amendment, ruling that it complied with both statutes. The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit found that the Forest Service’s amendment did not comply with NEPA, specifically because the agency issued an unduly narrow Purpose and Need statement, failed to consider a reasonable range of alternatives, and did not take the required “hard look” at environmental consequences. The Tenth Circuit did not reach the ESA claims. Instead of determining the appropriate remedy itself, the Tenth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to decide whether the plan amendment should be vacated or remanded without vacatur, instructing the district court to apply the two-part Allied-Signal test. On remand, the district court considered additional briefing and ordered remand to the Forest Service without vacatur of the 2020 Plan Amendment, finding that both Allied-Signal factors favored this approach. The plaintiffs then sought appellate review of the district court’s refusal to order vacatur. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s remand order because it was not a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and no exception to the administrative remand rule applied. The appeal was therefore dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Western Watersheds Project v. Forest Service" on Justia Law

Commonwealth of Kentucky v. EPA

2026-06-26T07:01:49-08:00

The case concerns a challenge by several states and industry groups to a 2024 rule by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that revised the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for fine particulate matter (PM2.5), lowering the annual standard from 12 µg/m³ to 9 µg/m³. The revision followed new scientific assessments and a unanimous recommendation from the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC) that the prior standard was inadequate to protect public health. Petitioners argued that the EPA lacked statutory authority to promulgate the new rule, that the decision-making process was improperly influenced by environmental justice considerations, and that the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously under the Clean Air Act. Previously, in 2020, the prior EPA Administrator chose to retain the 12 µg/m³ standard, citing scientific uncertainties and a divided CASAC. That decision was challenged but held in abeyance after a change in administration. The Biden-appointed EPA Administrator initiated a review, which led to the 2024 revision. After a further change in administration, the EPA itself moved to vacate the 2024 rule, now agreeing with challengers that the agency had exceeded its authority and failed to consider costs. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the 2024 rule and the EPA’s motion to vacate. The court held that the EPA had statutory authority to revise the NAAQS outside the five-year review cycle without performing a “thorough review” of all criteria, that the agency was not required to consider costs or attainability when revising or setting the standard, and that the decision was not arbitrary or capricious. The court denied both the petitions for review and the EPA’s motion for vacatur, upholding the 2024 rule. View "Commonwealth of Kentucky v. EPA" on Justia Law

Sunflower Alliance v. Dept. of Conservation

2026-06-25T09:02:41-08:00

A company with a lease in the Brentwood Oil Field, Contra Costa County, proposed to convert an inactive oil and gas extraction well into a water injection well for disposing of treated wastewater, a byproduct of oil and gas drilling. The well in question had been built in 1963, used for extraction until 1984, and then plugged. The company currently disposed of wastewater by trucking it offsite but sought to inject it underground instead. Regulatory agencies, including CalGEM, the State Water Board, and the Regional Water Board, expressed concerns about potential contamination of local clean water sources due to possible migration of wastewater. After additional technical analysis and the imposition of specific project conditions, these concerns were resolved, and CalGEM approved the project, issuing a notice of exemption (NOE) under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), relying on the “class 1” categorical exemption for minor alterations of existing facilities with negligible expansion of use. The Contra Costa County Superior Court found substantial evidence did not support CalGEM’s determination that the project fell within the class 1 exemption, concluding that converting an oil and gas well into a water injection well did not constitute negligible or no expansion of former use. CalGEM agreed to comply with the writ. On appeal, the First Appellate District, Division Five, reversed, holding that the exemption applied because the environmental risks of the new use were negligible. The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeal’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that the phrase “negligible or no expansion of existing or former use” in the class 1 exemption refers to the nature or degree of a structure or facility’s use, not to the risk of environmental harm caused by such a change. The court remanded the case for reconsideration under this proper framework and did not reach the additional question regarding project conditions as mitigation. View "Sunflower Alliance v. Dept. of Conservation" on Justia Law

Wash. Farm Bureau v. Dep't Of Ecology

2026-06-25T06:46:26-08:00

The Washington State Legislature enacted the Climate Commitment Act (CCA) in 2021 to address climate change by capping greenhouse gas emissions from major sources, such as large fuel suppliers. The CCA included a specific exemption for motor vehicle fuel or special fuel used exclusively for agricultural purposes, provided that the buyer supplies the seller with an exemption certificate. The Department of Ecology was tasked with adopting rules to implement this exemption and determining a method for expanding it to include fuels used for transporting agricultural products on public highways. Ecology promulgated rules in 2022 that allowed suppliers to claim the exemption if they could document, through an exemption certificate, that the fuel was used for agricultural purposes. Some suppliers began imposing surcharges on fuel, including fuel for agricultural purposes, to offset compliance costs. The Washington Farm Bureau (WFB) petitioned Ecology to create a more accessible exemption mechanism and a process for refunds of surcharges, but Ecology denied the petition, reasoning that existing guidance sufficed and it lacked authority to issue refunds. WFB then filed a petition for declaratory judgment and agency review under the Washington Administrative Procedure Act in the superior court, arguing that Ecology’s rule and denial of further rulemaking exceeded statutory authority and were arbitrary and capricious. The superior court dismissed WFB’s action with prejudice. On direct review, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington affirmed the superior court’s dismissal. The court held that Ecology’s rule was reasonably consistent with the statutory language and structure of the CCA, did not exceed Ecology’s statutory authority, and was not arbitrary or capricious. The court also found that Ecology’s denial of WFB’s petition for rulemaking was based on due consideration and within the agency’s discretion. The court affirmed that Ecology was not required to implement WFB’s preferred exemption method. View "Wash. Farm Bureau v. Dep't Of Ecology" on Justia Law

Monsanto v. Durnell

2026-06-25T06:45:09-08:00

Monsanto Company manufactures Roundup, a glyphosate-based herbicide. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has repeatedly evaluated glyphosate and concluded it is not likely to cause cancer, and as a result, EPA has not required a cancer warning on Roundup’s label. John Durnell used Roundup for about 20 years and developed non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. He sued Monsanto in Missouri state court, asserting a failure-to-warn claim, arguing that Monsanto should have included a cancer warning on Roundup’s label. A jury in the Missouri trial court found in Durnell’s favor on the failure-to-warn claim and awarded him more than $1 million in damages. Monsanto argued that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) expressly preempted the state-law failure-to-warn claim because it would require labeling different from what the EPA mandates. The Missouri trial court rejected this argument, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that Missouri’s failure-to-warn requirements were consistent with FIFRA’s misbranding provisions. The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case. It held that FIFRA expressly preempts Durnell’s state-law failure-to-warn claim. The Court reasoned that EPA’s approval of Roundup’s label—without a cancer warning—constitutes a federal labeling requirement. Because FIFRA’s preemption clause prohibits states from imposing labeling requirements “in addition to or different from” federal requirements, Missouri’s requirement for a cancer warning is preempted. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the Missouri Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Monsanto v. Durnell" on Justia Law

Garfield County v. Biden

2026-06-23T11:03:00-08:00

President Biden expanded the Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monuments in Utah, designating over 3.23 million acres under the Antiquities Act and identifying more than 500 items for protection. Plaintiffs—including the State of Utah, two counties, individuals, and an organization—objected to the scope of these expansions. They argued that the President exceeded his authority by designating items and reserving land that, in their view, did not qualify under the Act’s requirements for “historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest,” and by not limiting the land to “the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management” of those objects. Reviewing the case, the United States District Court for the District of Utah dismissed the claims. It held that sovereign immunity barred review of the President’s actions, found some plaintiffs lacked standing, and concluded that challenges to agency management plans were not ripe because those plans were not final agency actions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in concluding that sovereign immunity barred all review of the President’s actions under the ultra vires doctrine, since the Antiquities Act imposes discernable statutory limits on presidential authority. The court found that plaintiffs could bring ultra vires claims alleging that the President exceeded specific statutory limits, and remanded for the district court to consider whether the President’s actions were indeed ultra vires. The Tenth Circuit also vacated and remanded the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ Administrative Procedure Act claims due to subsequent agency action, but affirmed the dismissal of claims by individual plaintiffs and one organization for lack of standing. View "Garfield County v. Biden" on Justia Law

Craig v City of Richmond

2026-06-18T13:00:56-08:00

An industrial facility in Richmond, Indiana, owned by both private parties and the City of Richmond, caught fire in April 2023 and burned for more than a week. The fire caused the evacuation of nearby residents and allegedly released hazardous substances that damaged hundreds of properties and caused various injuries. Plaintiffs—both individuals and businesses—claimed that the private property owners’ failure to maintain the site and the City’s failure to remediate hazardous conditions after acquiring part of the property led to the fire. The lawsuit sought compensatory and punitive damages under several tort theories, including negligence, nuisance, trespass, and emotional distress. The plaintiffs initially filed their suit in the Wayne County, Indiana Circuit Court, but the defendants removed the action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, arguing it qualified as a “mass action” under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), and thus belonged in federal court. The district court, after briefing on whether the action fell within the CAFA “local event or occurrence” exception, concluded that the exception applied. The court found that all claims arose from the single fire event, which occurred in Indiana, and remanded the case to state court for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s remand order. The court held that the local event or occurrence exception in CAFA is jurisdictional, meaning it can be raised at any time and by the court sua sponte. The appellate court determined that all claims indeed arose from the single fire event and that the exception applied. Therefore, federal jurisdiction was lacking under CAFA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order remanding the case to state court. View "Craig v City of Richmond" on Justia Law

Sable Offshore Corp. v. Cal. Coastal Commission

2026-06-17T11:04:37-08:00

Sable Offshore Corp. and Pacific Pipeline Company acquired the Las Flores Pipelines, which run through the coastal zone in Santa Barbara County, California. After the 2015 Refugio Beach oil spill, the pipelines were inactive until Sable purchased them in 2024 and began repair and maintenance work at numerous sites. The California Coastal Commission sent Sable a Notice of Violation, then issued Executive Director Cease and Desist Orders, directing Sable to seek permits for both prospective and already completed work. Sable submitted zoning clearance applications to the County, which declared the repair work authorized by existing permits and declined to act on the applications. The Commission subsequently issued further cease and desist orders and filed a cross-complaint seeking injunctive relief. After observing ongoing construction, the Commission requested a preliminary injunction. The Superior Court of Santa Barbara County held hearings and ultimately granted a preliminary injunction enforcing the Commission’s cease and desist order. Sable appealed, arguing the Commission lacked jurisdiction to issue the order because the County had determined no new permits were necessary and had declined enforcement action. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. It held that under Public Resources Code section 30810, the Commission was authorized to issue a cease and desist order when the County declined to act regarding an alleged violation, regardless of the County’s reasons for its decision. The court found that the trial court properly issued the preliminary injunction upon a prima facie showing of a Coastal Act violation, and no balancing of equities was required under section 30803. The court also rejected Sable’s due process and federal preemption arguments and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Sable Offshore Corp. v. Cal. Coastal Commission" on Justia Law

YUROK TRIBE V. KLAMATH WATER USERS ASSOCIATION

2026-06-17T08:01:18-08:00

A dispute arose over the operation of the Klamath Project, a large federal water management system serving both agricultural and wildlife needs in Northern California and Southern Oregon. The Bureau of Reclamation manages the project, which involves distributing water from Upper Klamath Lake, a reservoir that also provides habitat for endangered and threatened species, including two species of suckers and coho salmon. In response to ongoing drought and the listing of these species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the Bureau consulted with federal wildlife agencies and adopted procedures requiring minimum water levels and stream flows to protect the listed species. Competing interests include tribal fishing rights, agricultural irrigation, and wildlife conservation. The conflict intensified when the Klamath Water Users Association and Klamath Irrigation District challenged the Bureau’s authority to release water from Upper Klamath Lake to comply with the ESA, arguing such releases diminished water available for irrigation and exceeded the Bureau’s authority under state and federal law. The Oregon Water Resources Department issued an order to halt these releases, which led federal agencies and tribal groups to seek declaratory and injunctive relief in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The district court held that the Bureau's operations were subject to the ESA and enjoined enforcement of the state order. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the ESA applies to the Bureau’s operation of the Klamath Project, whether the district court’s order constituted a judicial taking of water rights, and whether the district court had jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit held that Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA applies to the Bureau’s Klamath Project operations, reaffirming its precedent that the ESA governs such federal water management actions. The court rejected the judicial taking claim, finding no adjudication of water rights occurred, and determined that neither prior exclusive jurisdiction nor Colorado River abstention doctrines barred the district court from deciding the case. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. View "YUROK TRIBE V. KLAMATH WATER USERS ASSOCIATION" on Justia Law

Dan River Basin Association v. Virginia Department of Environmental Quality

2026-06-11T10:30:37-08:00

A group of environmental organizations challenged the decision by the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (VDEQ) to grant a water quality certification for the Southgate Project, a proposed pipeline crossing parts of Virginia and North Carolina. The organizations argued that the certification was improperly issued because VDEQ failed to adequately address the pipeline developer’s past record of environmental violations and did not include all necessary conditions to ensure compliance with water quality standards. VDEQ had previously approved the developer’s erosion and sediment control plans, received public comments, and ultimately issued the certification after addressing those comments. After VDEQ issued the certification, the petitioners sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and filed a motion to stay the certification pending judicial review, pointing to the imminent start of pipeline construction. Their main contentions were that VDEQ did not rationally justify its prediction that the pipeline would not violate water quality standards, especially given the developer’s history of noncompliance, and that the certification failed to explicitly require compliance with certain state environmental plans and agreements. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered the motion for a stay and denied it. The court found that the petitioners had not made a strong showing that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. The court noted that VDEQ provided a detailed explanation for its decision, including differences between the current project and past projects, and incorporated relevant environmental plans by reference in the certification. The court also determined that the remaining factors supporting a stay did not outweigh the petitioners’ failure to demonstrate likely success on the merits. The motion for a stay pending review was therefore denied. View "Dan River Basin Association v. Virginia Department of Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

Sierra Club v. North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality

2026-06-11T10:30:36-08:00

A proposed pipeline project, known as the Southgate Project, is planned to traverse portions of North Carolina and Virginia. This project is an extension of an existing pipeline system, and its construction has generated substantial environmental and legal concerns. The Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, sought a water quality certification from the North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality (NCDEQ), which is required under the Clean Water Act for such projects. After considering public comments, a public hearing, and a report from its hearing officer, NCDEQ issued the necessary certification in November 2025, finding that the project, if conducted according to specified conditions, would comply with state water quality standards. Previously, in 2020, NCDEQ had denied a water quality certification for the project, but that decision was vacated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 2021. After the main pipeline was completed in 2024 and project plans were revised to reduce its length in North Carolina, NCDEQ reviewed and ultimately granted the new application. Environmental groups then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for review of NCDEQ’s decision, and, as construction appeared imminent, sought a stay to prevent the project from proceeding while the case was pending. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied the motion for a stay, applying the traditional four-factor test for such relief. The court held that the petitioners did not make a strong showing that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their challenges to NCDEQ’s decision, particularly given the deference owed to the agency’s expertise under the Administrative Procedure Act. As a result, the motion for preliminary relief was denied, though the underlying merits of the challenge remain for later determination. View "Sierra Club v. North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

FORWARD, INC. V. MACOMBER

2026-06-09T08:32:52-08:00

Forward, Inc. operates a landfill near Stockton, California, which is bordered by several state facilities. Forward was required by a local water quality board to remediate groundwater contamination at its landfill. During this process, Forward suspected that nearby state facilities—including correctional and health care centers—were contributing hazardous waste to the groundwater, hindering its remediation efforts. Forward entered into an agreement with two California state agencies to access these facilities and collected data suggesting ongoing hazardous waste generation stemming from activities such as dry cleaning, solvent use, and well-water treatment at the state facilities. Forward filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and the Director of the California Department of General Services (DGS). Forward alleged that, due to their official positions, these defendants had control over the generation, handling, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste at the relevant facilities. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Forward had not established a sufficiently direct connection between the defendants and the alleged violations under the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. It affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that Forward failed to establish the “fairly direct” connection required by Ex parte Young. The court found that the defendants’ general supervisory roles over their respective agencies did not suffice to subject them to suit for the alleged RCRA violations, as neither their statutory duties nor alleged actions were directly tied to the waste management at the specific state facilities. The Ninth Circuit’s disposition was to affirm the district court’s dismissal. View "FORWARD, INC. V. MACOMBER" on Justia Law

West Virginia Rivers Coalition, Inc. v. The Chemours Company FC, LLC

2026-06-03T10:30:30-08:00

The case centers on the operations of a chemical manufacturing facility in Parkersburg, West Virginia, owned by The Chemours Company. Chemours used hexafluoropropylene oxide dimer acid (HFPO-DA), a member of the PFAS class of chemicals, as a processing aid in polymer production. The company discharged wastewater containing HFPO-DA into the Ohio River under a Clean Water Act (CWA) permit that established specific effluent limits. However, from 2022 onward, Chemours exceeded these limits on multiple occasions. Local water testing showed that HFPO-DA concentrations sometimes surpassed newer, not-yet-enforceable federal health standards but did not exceed West Virginia’s own goals. Chemours entered into an administrative consent order with the EPA to address permit compliance. The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia reviewed a citizen suit brought by West Virginia Rivers Coalition, Inc., seeking a preliminary injunction against Chemours for ongoing permit violations. The district court found that the Coalition had Article III associational standing through a member who avoided boating in the Ohio River due to Chemours’ discharges. The court granted the preliminary injunction, enjoining Chemours from exceeding permit limits and requiring remedial measures. Chemours appealed, challenging both the standing determination and the irreparable harm finding. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit examined both issues. The court agreed that the Coalition had established a substantial likelihood of standing at this stage. However, it found that the district court committed legal errors in its irreparable harm analysis, including incorrectly presuming harm from permit violations and conflating harm to the public with harm to the plaintiff. The Fourth Circuit also found clear error in the factual findings regarding irreparable harm. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction granted by the district court. View "West Virginia Rivers Coalition, Inc. v. The Chemours Company FC, LLC" on Justia Law

City of Idaho Falls v. Department of Water Resources

2026-06-01T13:35:58-08:00

A group of Idaho cities, collectively known as the Coalition of Cities, hold junior ground water rights in the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer (ESPA). These cities became involved in ongoing water rights litigation after the Surface Water Coalition (SWC), representing senior surface water right holders, initiated a delivery call in 2005. The SWC argued that junior ground water pumping reduced water availability for senior surface water users due to the hydrologic connection between the aquifer and the Snake River. This dispute led to a series of orders by the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources (IDWR) that established and modified the methodology for determining whether pumping by junior users caused material injury to senior rights. Following the issuance of the Fifth Amended Final Order (Fifth Methodology Order) and a subsequent Post-Hearing Order, the Director issued a Sixth Methodology Order, which superseded all previous orders. The Cities filed a petition for judicial review in the Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA) district court, challenging only the Post-Hearing Order (which addressed the Fifth Methodology Order) and not the operative Sixth Methodology Order. The district court affirmed the Director’s Post-Hearing Order, rejecting the Cities’ challenges to various factual findings and methodological choices. The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case. It concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the Cities’ appeal because they failed to timely challenge the Sixth Methodology Order—the operative agency action currently in effect. As a result, the appeal was dismissed. The court awarded costs, but not attorney fees, to the IDWR and SWC, ruling that the statutory basis for attorney fees was inapplicable. The primary holding was that failure to timely appeal the operative final order deprived the court of jurisdiction to grant relief. View "City of Idaho Falls v. Department of Water Resources" on Justia Law

Dummer v. City and County of S.F.

2026-05-29T11:03:02-08:00

A licensed California fisherman sought public access to fish at the Calaveras Reservoir, which is owned by the City and County of San Francisco and managed by the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission. The reservoir, a source of drinking water for millions, is governed by a watershed management plan that currently prohibits public access and fishing. After the City determined that, subject to environmental review and regulatory approval, shoreline fishing could potentially occur without compromising water quality, it began planning for a fishing program, which included infrastructure improvements and compliance with environmental laws. Previously, in a related proceeding, the Alameda County Superior Court ordered the City to determine whether fishing could occur without affecting water purity, but it did not require the City to immediately open the reservoir or apply for a permit. The City complied by starting the environmental review and planning process. Dissatisfied with the pace, the fisherman filed a new petition for a writ of mandate, seeking to compel the City to immediately apply for an amended water supply permit and open the reservoir for fishing. The Superior Court denied the petition, finding no ministerial duty requiring the City to proceed immediately and concluding that legal requirements, including environmental review and program planning, must be satisfied first. On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the lower court's judgment. The appellate court held that the plaintiff had not established a clear ministerial duty requiring the City to immediately apply for a permit or open the reservoir for fishing. The court found that the governing statutes and regulations allow for the exercise of discretion and require compliance with environmental and permitting processes before fishing access can be provided. The judgment was affirmed. View "Dummer v. City and County of S.F." on Justia Law

VINTON HARBOR & TERMINAL DISTRICT VS. REUNION ENERGY COMPANY

2026-05-29T07:15:47-08:00

The dispute centers on land in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana, owned by a public entity, where oil and gas exploration occurred for decades under a mineral lease originally granted in 1943. The plaintiff acquired several tracts of this land between 1968 and 1987, with prior owners reserving mineral rights. The mineral lease was assigned multiple times before terminating in 2020. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants, or their predecessors, caused environmental damage to the property through oil and gas operations predating the plaintiff’s ownership, and sought damages under both tort and contract theories. Defendants filed exceptions of no right of action, arguing that under the “subsequent purchaser rule” articulated in Eagle Pipe and Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp., a property owner cannot recover for damage inflicted before their purchase unless assigned the prior owner’s rights. The trial court denied these exceptions. On appeal, the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, reversed in part. It dismissed all claims against one defendant (Honeywell) for preacquisition damage, and limited claims against the other (Texas Pacific) to an 87-day period when both the plaintiff and Texas Pacific’s predecessor simultaneously held interests in one tract. The Supreme Court of Louisiana granted review. It extended the subsequent purchaser rule from Eagle Pipe to cases involving mineral leases, holding that a purchaser of property, absent an assignment or subrogation, has no right of action for preacquisition property damage caused by mineral lessees. However, the court recognized an exception for damages occurring during the period when the plaintiff owned the property and the defendant held lease rights. Additionally, the court held that a current surface owner may enforce the prudent operator standard under Mineral Code article 122 for end-of-lease obligations that become due upon termination, but not for historic operational damage. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "VINTON HARBOR & TERMINAL DISTRICT VS. REUNION ENERGY COMPANY" on Justia Law

In re Application of Oak Run Solar Project, L.L.C.

2026-05-26T05:30:48-08:00

Oak Run Solar Project, L.L.C. sought approval from the Ohio Power Siting Board to construct a solar-powered electric generation facility in Madison County, Ohio. The proposed facility would occupy approximately 4,400 acres and include an 800 MW solar array, a 300 MW battery energy storage system, and two transmission lines. Oak Run entered agreements with landowners for the project site and committed to an agrivoltaics program, maintaining agricultural productivity alongside solar generation. Local governments and other parties intervened, raising concerns about environmental, visual, water, plant, wildlife, and safety impacts. The board’s staff issued a report, and a hearing was held, resulting in project approval subject to conditions for landscape screening and safety. Prior to reaching the Supreme Court of Ohio, the Ohio Power Siting Board considered Oak Run’s application and allowed intervenors, including several township boards and the county board of commissioners, to participate. After a hearing and review, the board granted Oak Run’s certificate for construction, finding the statutory requirements satisfied and imposing conditions related to visual screening and emergency response. The local governments filed an application for rehearing, which was denied. They then appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, arguing the board failed to obtain necessary information, especially regarding visual impacts and environmental effects. The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case, applying a standard of review for “unlawful or unreasonable” board orders. The court held that Oak Run failed to provide required photographic simulations or sketches of substations, as mandated by administrative rules, thereby depriving the board of necessary information to assess visual impacts. The court affirmed the board’s orders in part, reversed in part regarding the visual-impact information, and remanded the matter to the board for further consideration of the project’s visual effects. View "In re Application of Oak Run Solar Project, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Mobile Baykeeper, Inc. v. Alabama Power Company

2026-05-18T08:35:04-08:00

A local environmental organization brought a citizen suit against an electric utility company, alleging that the company’s plan to close a large coal ash storage impoundment at one of its plants violated federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations. The organization asserted that the plan would leave significant amounts of coal ash in contact with groundwater, causing toxins to leach into the Mobile River and surrounding waterways, which harmed the recreational and aesthetic interests of its members. The plant’s closure plan, already underway, was a cap-in-place strategy rather than removal, and the organization claimed this approach did not satisfy the federal performance standards meant to prevent further pollution. The case was first reviewed by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama. After briefing and a hearing, the district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the organization lacked standing for failing to establish causation and redressability, and that the claims were not ripe for review because the closure plan would not be completed for several years and its final form was uncertain. The court reasoned that the alleged harms predated the closure plan and that a judicial order would not provide immediate relief. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the district court’s findings. The appellate court concluded that the organization adequately pleaded standing by alleging concrete injuries caused by the utility’s ongoing implementation of a closure plan that did not comply with EPA regulations, and that a compliant plan would likely alleviate those harms. The court also found the claims ripe for review, as the legal issues were fit for decision and delaying consideration would further harm the organization’s members. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mobile Baykeeper, Inc. v. Alabama Power Company" on Justia Law

Ralston v. Board of Land and Natural Resources.

2026-05-15T10:02:31-08:00

A private company operating a hotel sought the renewal of a one-year, revocable state land permit for property fronting its hotel. A member of the public, who had long used the area for recreation, objected to the permit's renewal, particularly the practice of presetting hotel lounge chairs, which he argued deterred public use. He requested a formal contested case hearing on the permit renewal, asserting a property interest in the recreational and environmental quality of the public land. The Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR) denied his request for such a hearing, instead allowing only written and oral testimony at a public meeting. The objector appealed to the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, which upheld the BLNR's denial, finding that he had been afforded due process through the public meeting process. On further appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) reversed, holding that the appellant had a constitutionally protected interest in a clean and healthful environment and was entitled to a contested case hearing before the permit could be renewed. Because the permit had expired, the ICA remanded the case to the circuit court to determine what relief, if any, remained available. The ICA granted costs but denied the appellant’s request for attorney fees under the private attorney general (PAG) doctrine, reasoning that the requirements for such fees were unmet since the scope of relief was not yet determined. The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i vacated the ICA’s denial of attorney fees. The court held that the PAG doctrine does not require the prevailing party to obtain final relief before becoming eligible for attorney fees. Determining that all three prongs of the PAG test were met, the court remanded the matter for the ICA to determine the reasonableness of the appellant’s attorney fees and whether the hotel company was liable for them. View "Ralston v. Board of Land and Natural Resources." on Justia Law

YUROK TRIBE V. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

2026-05-13T08:01:14-08:00

Decabromodiphenyl Ether (decaBDE) is a flame retardant used in numerous products, including electronics, vehicles, and appliances, and is known for its persistence, bioaccumulation, and toxic effects on human and environmental health. In response to concerns about such chemicals, Congress amended the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) in 2016, adding a subsection mandating expedited risk-management rules for certain chemicals, including decaBDE. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated rules in 2021 and amended them in 2024, regulating some uses of decaBDE but declining to regulate exposures arising from recycling, disposal, wastewater, and sewage sludge in several contexts. Following the 2021 rule, several petitioners challenged the EPA’s approach in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The EPA voluntarily sought a remand to reconsider aspects of its rule, which the Ninth Circuit granted. After seeking additional public comment, the EPA issued the 2024 amendments, which still did not address all the petitioners’ concerns, particularly regarding the areas of recycling, disposal, wastewater discharges, and sewage sludge. The petitioners renewed their challenge, arguing that EPA’s failure to regulate these areas violated TSCA’s mandate. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the EPA’s decisions not to further regulate decaBDE exposures in recyclable articles, disposal, wastewater, and sewage sludge were not supported by substantial evidence as required by TSCA. The court held that EPA could not justify a failure to regulate based on low exposure levels or general policy preferences and found the agency had not adequately addressed evidence in the record. The court granted the petition for review, remanded the rule to the EPA for renewed rulemaking and further proceedings, but left the 2024 rule in place during the remand. View "YUROK TRIBE V. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY" on Justia Law

Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility v. Zeldin

2026-05-01T07:02:47-08:00

The case concerns two organizations that advocate for environmental health and public employee interests. They filed suit against the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), alleging that the EPA failed to meet its statutory obligations under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) to address risks associated with perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), a harmful chemical formed during the fluorination of plastic containers. The plaintiffs argued that, by March 2023, the EPA had sufficient information about the dangers of PFOA to trigger a nondiscretionary duty to act under TSCA section 4(f), and, alternatively, a duty under section 7(a)(2) to pursue enforcement actions against a specific company involved in the fluorination process. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the suit. It found that the EPA had fulfilled any nondiscretionary duty under section 4(f) by publishing a request for public comment, making the primary claim moot. Regarding section 7(a)(2), the court doubted that it imposed a nondiscretionary duty on the EPA but, even if it did, found that the duty had not been triggered under the circumstances. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the claims did not fit within the TSCA’s citizen-suit provisions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal, but on different grounds. The appellate court held that the organizations failed to plausibly allege associational standing. The court explained that neither organization was a traditional membership organization nor had they shown they were the functional equivalent of one. The court found insufficient evidence that the organizations’ employees, supporters, or board members constituted a constituency whose interests the organizations were entitled to represent in court. Accordingly, the appellate court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. View "Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility v. Zeldin" on Justia Law

Raptors Are the Solution v. Croplife America

2026-04-29T18:09:03-08:00

An environmental organization sought judicial review of the Department of Pesticide Regulation’s decisions to renew and not reevaluate registrations for several rodenticides, contending the Department violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and its own regulations. The organization argued these pesticides posed significant risks to wildlife. Trade associations representing pesticide manufacturers and distributors intervened in the case, stating both representational and direct economic interests in defending the Department’s actions, as their members produced and sold the challenged products. The Superior Court of Alameda County initially ruled in favor of the Department, denying the environmental group’s petition. The organization appealed, and the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reversed and remanded, instructing the Department to reconsider its decision regarding reevaluation of diphacinone, a rodenticide, focusing on its unique environmental impacts. Following remand, the Department agreed to reevaluate diphacinone, and the Legislature enacted a moratorium on its use during the reevaluation process. The environmental organization then sought attorney fees under the private attorney general statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5). The Superior Court found the organization was a successful party, having achieved its litigation objectives and conferred a significant public benefit. The court awarded attorney fees and costs of about $857,000, holding the Department, real parties in interest, and intervening trade associations jointly and severally liable. The trade associations appealed, arguing they were not “opposing parties” under the statute and lacked the requisite direct interest. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that intervenors with a direct pecuniary interest and active participation in the litigation qualify as “opposing parties” for purposes of fee liability under section 1021.5, even if they were not responsible for enacting or enforcing the challenged government actions. View "Raptors Are the Solution v. Croplife America" on Justia Law

People ex rel. Yolo-Solano Air Quality Management Dist.

2026-04-27T10:32:30-08:00

A local air quality management district initiated legal action against an engineering company, its chief executive officer, and a related business, alleging they committed statutory and regulatory violations connected to their agricultural service operations. The district claimed that the defendants failed to correct their conduct after being issued several notices of violation for operating equipment without proper permits and failing to comply with emission controls. The defendants, in response, asserted that the notices were based on an internal district policy that had not been properly adopted through the required public rulemaking procedures. The defendants filed a cross-complaint in the Superior Court of Yolo County seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. They argued that the district relied on a “secret” policy (Policy 24) not properly promulgated under statutory procedures, which unfairly deprived them of certain agricultural exemptions. The district responded with an anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) motion under section 425.16, asserting that the cross-complaint targeted protected regulatory and legal activities, including the investigation, issuance of notices, and initiation of litigation. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion, finding that the cross-complaint was a challenge to the validity of the underlying policy, not to the enforcement actions themselves. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed whether the cross-complaint arose from activities protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court held that the causes of action in the cross-complaint were directed at the validity of the district’s internal policy rather than at the district’s protected enforcement activities. Therefore, the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order denying the anti-SLAPP motion and awarded costs on appeal to the defendants. View "People ex rel. Yolo-Solano Air Quality Management Dist." on Justia Law

In re: Whittaker Clark & Daniels

2026-04-27T09:00:10-08:00

Whittaker, Clark & Daniels, Inc. and three affiliates, historically involved in the manufacture and distribution of asbestos-containing talc, faced thousands of personal injury and environmental claims. Over the years, the companies divested their operating assets, notably selling them to Brenntag North America in 2004 while expressly excluding pre-sale asbestos and environmental liabilities. As liabilities mounted, one plaintiff obtained a large jury verdict in South Carolina and successfully moved to put Whittaker into receivership, with a receiver appointed to administer its assets. Following the South Carolina receivership, Whittaker's board authorized a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey without consulting the receiver. The receiver moved to dismiss the bankruptcy, arguing that under the receivership order, only he had authority to file such a petition. The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion, finding that the receivership order did not displace the board’s authority. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey affirmed this ruling. While bankruptcy proceedings moved forward, the Debtors negotiated a $535 million settlement with Brenntag to resolve successor liability claims. However, the Official Committee of Talc Claimants argued that certain product-line successor liability claims belonged exclusively to talc creditors and not to the bankruptcy estate. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed two central issues. First, it held that the propriety of Whittaker’s bankruptcy petition did not affect the bankruptcy court’s subject matter jurisdiction and that, under New Jersey law, the board retained authority to file for bankruptcy because the South Carolina receiver had not obtained recognition or ancillary receivership in New Jersey. Second, the court held that product-line successor liability claims, like other derivative claims based on injury to the debtor and available to all creditors, are property of the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). Accordingly, the Third Circuit affirmed the lower courts’ judgments. View "In re: Whittaker Clark & Daniels" on Justia Law

FORWARD, INC. V. MACOMBER

2026-04-27T07:32:10-08:00

A company operating a landfill in California suspected that neighboring state facilities were contributing hazardous waste, complicating its efforts to clean up groundwater contamination. The company alleged that activities at several state-run institutions bordering its landfill—including a correctional facility and a health care center—involved the use and disposal of hazardous substances that were leaching into the groundwater. In response, the company entered into an agreement allowing it to collect data from these state facilities, which it then used to support its claim that hazardous waste generation at those sites was undermining its remediation efforts. The company brought a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) against the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and the Director of the California Department of General Services. The lawsuit alleged that, by virtue of their official positions, these state officials controlled the generation and management of hazardous waste at the implicated facilities. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the officials’ general supervisory roles were insufficient to establish the “fairly direct” connection to the alleged violations required for an exception to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity under the doctrine established in Ex parte Young. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a “fairly direct” connection between the named officials and the alleged RCRA violations. The court clarified that general supervisory authority or oversight of state agencies does not, by itself, subject state officials to suit under Ex parte Young; a more specific connection to the alleged unlawful conduct is required. Thus, the action against these particular officials could not proceed. View "FORWARD, INC. V. MACOMBER" on Justia Law

Town of Pine Hill v. 3M Company, Inc.

2026-04-24T05:30:52-08:00

The Town of Pine Hill sued several corporations and individuals in the Wilcox Circuit Court, claiming that chemical contamination from upstream industrial facilities, including per- and poly-fluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), polluted the Town’s drinking water supply from the Alabama River. The Town alleged that these chemicals, released via wastewater, air, and stormwater emissions, exceeded federal health guidelines, could not be removed by current treatment processes, and caused harm. The Town sought damages for remediation, future filtration costs, and injunctive relief. The complaint stated that no federal cause of action was asserted and noted that most defendants were out-of-state corporations. After the suit was filed, 3M Company, Inc. removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, citing federal-officer removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 and diversity jurisdiction. The district court remanded the case to state court, but 3M appealed the remand order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The district court stayed its remand order pending appeal, even after transmitting it to the state court. The Town argued that jurisdiction returned to the circuit court upon remand, and the Wilcox Circuit Court agreed, ordering litigation to proceed. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that because the removal was under 28 U.S.C. § 1442, the remand order was appealable and the federal district court retained jurisdiction to stay or reconsider its remand order, even after transmitting it to the state court. The circuit court acted without jurisdiction by proceeding while the remand order was stayed. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Alabama issued a writ of prohibition, requiring the circuit court to vacate its order asserting jurisdiction and to stay proceedings until the federal appeal is resolved. View "Town of Pine Hill v. 3M Company, Inc." on Justia Law

COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO V. INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

2026-04-23T08:31:16-08:00

The dispute centers on insurance coverage for environmental remediation costs incurred by a county at an airport property it owned. The activities causing contamination began during and after World War II, including industrial waste disposal and manufacturing by various tenants. In the 1990s and beyond, state authorities ordered the county to investigate and clean up hazardous groundwater pollution. The county sought coverage under a series of insurance policies issued by its insurer between 1966 and 1975, which provided both excess and umbrella liability coverage. The core disagreement was whether the insurer’s liability for property damage was limited to $9 million per occurrence, as the county argued, or subject to a $9 million annual aggregate limit, as the insurer contended. Initially, the United States District Court for the Central District of California allowed the insurer to withdraw an admission that no aggregate limit applied. The district court ultimately sided with the insurer, holding that the policies imposed an annual aggregate limit on property damage claims and relying on a California appellate decision, Garamendi v. Mission Insurance Co., to support this view. After granting the insurer’s motion, the district court dismissed the county’s claim for declaratory relief, reasoning that no further controversy existed and that any determination of future benefits would be speculative. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that, under California law, the aggregate limit provisions in these policies were ambiguous regarding whether they applied to property damage. The court found that Garamendi did not bind its interpretation, considering the policies’ language and extrinsic evidence, including industry practice and the insurer’s own statements. Concluding the policies did not specify an aggregate limit for property damage, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO V. INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA" on Justia Law

White's Landing Fisheries, Inc. v. Ohio Dep't of Nat. Res. Div. of Wildlife

2026-04-22T21:02:32-08:00

A commercial fisherman from Erie County, Ohio, who owned a fisheries business, challenged a state rule that amended commercial fishing regulations to exclude seine fishers from receiving yellow perch quotas. The rule, promulgated by the Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR), Division of Wildlife, allocated quotas exclusively to trap net fishers and prohibited the transfer of quotas to seine licenses. The fisherman alleged that this rule deprived him of economic value and constituted a taking without compensation, and further brought claims for breach of fiduciary duty and civil conspiracy against both state and federal defendants. The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The district court dismissed with prejudice all claims against Ohio and the state officials, holding that there was no protected property interest in the value of a fishing license or uncaught fish under the Takings Clause. The court also found that sovereign immunity barred all claims against the state and its officials, even if the claims otherwise had merit, and determined the state law claims were insufficiently pled. Claims against the federal defendants were dismissed without prejudice for defective service of process. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings de novo. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that sovereign immunity barred the takings and state law claims against Ohio and the state officials, rejecting the appellant’s arguments that these defendants had waived immunity or that recent Supreme Court and Ohio Supreme Court decisions required judicial review of the state rule. However, the appellate court held that because the dismissal was based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the claims against the state defendants should have been dismissed without prejudice. The court affirmed the dismissal of claims against the federal defendants. The judgment was thus affirmed in part and reversed in part, with instructions to dismiss the state claims without prejudice. View "White's Landing Fisheries, Inc. v. Ohio Dep't of Nat. Res. Div. of Wildlife" on Justia Law

Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security

2026-04-21T21:07:45-08:00

State officials in Florida constructed an immigration detention facility at the Dade-Collier Training and Transition Airport, located in the Florida Everglades, using state funds and employees. The facility was built on state property and managed by state law enforcement, although federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials inspected the site and occasionally coordinated the transport and detention of individuals there. The state planned to seek federal reimbursement but had not received any federal funding at the time of the events in question. Several state agencies operated under agreements with the federal government, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g), allowing them to assist with immigration enforcement, but Florida retained control over the facility’s management and construction. The Friends of the Everglades, the Center for Biological Diversity, and the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. They alleged violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), claiming that officials failed to conduct a required environmental review before constructing and operating the facility. The district court issued a preliminary injunction halting further construction, requiring removal of certain structures, and prohibiting detention of additional individuals at the site. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits, concluding that the construction was a final agency action and a major federal action under NEPA, and that federal officials exercised substantial control over the project. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate either a final agency action under the APA or substantial federal control necessary to trigger NEPA, given that Florida constructed and controlled the facility without federal funding or operational authority. The court also found that the district court’s injunction violated a statutory prohibition against enjoining immigration enforcement. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. View "Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish

2026-04-19T22:15:05-08:00

During the Second World War, Chevron’s corporate predecessor operated oil fields in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, producing crude oil that was refined into aviation gasoline (avgas) for the United States military under federal contracts. Decades later, following the enactment of Louisiana’s State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act of 1978, which imposed permit requirements on certain uses of the coastal zone but exempted uses lawfully commenced before 1980, Plaquemines Parish and other parishes brought suit in state court. They alleged that Chevron and other oil companies had failed to obtain required permits and that some pre-1980 activities, including those during the war, were illegally commenced and not exempt. The parish’s expert report specifically challenged Chevron’s wartime crude-oil production methods, including its use of vertical drilling, canals, and earthen pits, as harmful to the environment and not in compliance with the Act. Chevron sought removal to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. §1442(a)(1), arguing that the suit was “for or relating to” acts under color of its duties as a federal contractor refining avgas. The United States District Court granted the parish’s motion to remand to state court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that although Chevron acted under a federal officer as a military contractor, the suit did not “relate to” those acts because the federal refining contract did not govern how Chevron obtained or produced crude oil. The Supreme Court of the United States held that Chevron plausibly alleged a close, not tenuous or remote, relationship between the challenged crude-oil production and its federal avgas refining duties. The Court concluded that the suit satisfied the “relating to” requirement for removal under §1442(a)(1), vacated the Fifth Circuit’s judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish" on Justia Law

TEXAS COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY v. PAXTON

2026-04-17T06:24:44-08:00

A state environmental agency received a broad public records request from a nonprofit organization seeking documents related to a recent assessment on ethylene oxide. The agency responded the next day, asking the organization to clarify whether it wanted confidential information, which would require a formal opinion from the state attorney general and could delay production. The requester promptly confirmed it sought all responsive records, including any considered confidential but subject to disclosure under the public records law. The agency believed many documents were exempt under a deliberative-process exception and, within what it believed to be the deadline, sent a request to the attorney general for a ruling. The attorney general later determined that the agency had missed the ten-business-day deadline by two days, so the information was presumed public unless there was a compelling reason to withhold it. The agency then provided additional evidence that it was closed on July 5 due to the Independence Day holiday, that its request was timely mailed, and that it had sought clarification from the requester. Nonetheless, the Attorney General declined to reconsider. The agency filed a declaratory judgment action in district court, and the nonprofit intervened, seeking to compel disclosure. The Office of the Attorney General later conceded its original calculation was mistaken, but the district court granted summary judgment for the nonprofit, ordering disclosure of over 6,000 pages. The Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas affirmed, holding the request for a ruling was untimely and rejecting the agency’s arguments about deadlines and clarifications. The Supreme Court of Texas held that the ten-business-day deadline for the agency’s request was reset by its timely, good-faith request for narrowing or clarification, and that the agency established timely submission of its request under the mailbox rule. It reversed the judgments below and remanded for further proceedings to determine if the deliberative-process privilege protects the records. View "TEXAS COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY v. PAXTON" on Justia Law

G.B. V. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

2026-04-09T08:31:15-08:00

A group of eighteen minors residing in California filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other federal officials, claiming that the government’s policy of discounting future costs and benefits in cost-benefit analyses for greenhouse gas (GHG) regulations discriminates against children. The plaintiffs alleged this practice favors present-day consumption, benefiting adults over minors, and leads to under-regulation of GHG emissions. They argued this under-regulation contributes to climate change, which, in turn, causes them various harms including property damage, health issues, and psychological distress. The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. That court dismissed the action, ruling that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. The court found that the plaintiffs’ claims did not establish a cognizable injury-in-fact, that the alleged environmental harms were not fairly traceable to the government’s discounting policies, and that the requested declaratory relief would not redress their injuries. The district court allowed the plaintiffs one opportunity to amend their complaint, but after the plaintiffs did so, the court again dismissed the case and denied further leave to amend, finding further amendment would be futile. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to allege a viable injury to their equal protection rights, as the government’s discounting policies were not shown to be motivated by discriminatory intent toward children. The court also found the alleged environmental harms too attenuated and speculative to be fairly traceable to the challenged policies. Additionally, circuit precedent foreclosed the requested declaratory relief, as it would not redress the plaintiffs’ injuries. The Ninth Circuit concluded that denying further leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion. View "G.B. V. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY" on Justia Law

BROWN LOPEZ V. USA

2026-04-08T10:06:22-08:00

A group of environmental organizations, Native tribes, and individual plaintiffs sought to prevent a land exchange in Southeast Arizona’s Tonto National Forest, mandated by the Southeast Arizona Land Exchange and Conservation Act. This exchange would transfer nearly 2,500 acres of federal land, including Oak Flat—a site of religious significance to the Apache—and a large copper deposit to Resolution Copper Mining LLC. In return, the company would provide over 5,000 acres of equally appraised land to the federal government. Plaintiffs raised concerns under several statutes, including the Land Exchange Act, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Free Exercise Clause, alleging procedural and substantive flaws in the exchange. The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied motions for preliminary injunctions, finding that plaintiffs failed to show likely success or serious questions on the merits of their claims relating to appraisal, NEPA compliance, tribal consultation, and religious liberty. In a related case, Apache Stronghold v. United States, the district court’s denial of an injunction on religious liberty grounds was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit and not disturbed by the Supreme Court. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The court held that plaintiffs had Article III standing and that their NEPA claims were justiciable as “final agency action.” However, it concluded that plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their appraisal, NEPA, consultation, or religious liberty claims. The court further determined that existing precedent foreclosed the RFRA and Free Exercise arguments. The court did not address other injunction factors and dissolved the administrative stay. View "BROWN LOPEZ V. USA" on Justia Law

ENG V. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

2026-04-08T08:32:20-08:00

A resident living near a Los Angeles refinery operated by Ultramar Inc., a subsidiary of Valero Energy Corp., challenged the renewal of the refinery’s operating permit. The facility, located in Wilmington, is subject to Title V of the Clean Air Act, which requires certain air polluters to obtain operating permits. The resident argued that the permit should include additional conditions to address the potential for a catastrophic release of hydrogen fluoride or modified hydrofluoric acid. He pointed to alleged deficiencies in the refinery’s Risk Management Plan (RMP), Emergency Response Plan, Emergency Response Manual, and other documents, claiming these left the refinery unprepared for such an event. The South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD), acting as the Title V permitting authority, solicited public comments before issuing the permit. The petitioner submitted objections during this process, but SCAQMD rejected them and issued the permit. The petitioner then filed an administrative petition with the Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), asking the EPA to object to the permit. The EPA Administrator denied the petition, concluding that issues related to risk management plans and accidental release prevention fall under a separate regulatory program, not the Title V permitting process. The Administrator also found that the requirements referenced by the petitioner were not “applicable requirements” of the Clean Air Act for Title V purposes. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the EPA’s decision. The court held that the Administrator’s denial was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. It concluded that the petitioner failed to show that additional permit conditions were required to ensure compliance with the Clean Air Act’s risk management requirements. The court also found that the petitioner’s arguments based on state law did not qualify as applicable federal requirements. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review. View "ENG V. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY" on Justia Law

Citizens for Constitutional Integrity v. United States

2026-04-07T07:32:35-08:00

A mining company sought to expand its underground coal mine situated beneath Indian lands. To proceed, it needed approval for a revised permit, a new federal lease, and a modification of its operations plan. The Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement and the Bureau of Land Management jointly conducted an environmental assessment, solicited public comments, and ultimately granted the necessary authorizations for expansion. Two advocacy groups opposed the expansion, citing potential impacts on water resources and basing their challenges on the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. They previously sued, raising claims under the rescinded Stream Protection Rule, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected those claims. The groups later amended their complaint to invoke different provisions of the Act, specifically Sections 1270 and 1276. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied their petition for judicial review, concluding the claims were substantially similar to those previously rejected and finding the agency had fulfilled its nondiscretionary duties. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the advocacy groups could not obtain relief under Section 1270 because they failed to provide adequate notice of the alleged violations and had advanced claims implicating discretionary, not mandatory, agency actions. The court also found that Section 1276 did not authorize judicial review for the groups because they had not participated in the permit-review process as required by the statute. The court clarified that commenting on an environmental assessment was not a substitute for objecting to the permit application itself. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the petition for judicial review. View "Citizens for Constitutional Integrity v. United States" on Justia Law

Alon Refining Krotz Springs, Inc. v. EPA

2026-04-07T07:02:31-08:00

Several oil refineries with average daily crude oil throughput below 75,000 barrels in 2024 applied to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2025 for exemptions from their obligations under the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program for the 2024 compliance year. The RFS program, established under the Clean Air Act, requires refineries to blend renewable fuels into transportation fuels. The Act provides for a “small refinery” exemption for facilities that do not exceed the 75,000-barrel threshold in a calendar year. The petitioning refineries did not seek exemptions for 2023 and based their applications solely on their 2024 throughput. After the refineries submitted their applications, the EPA informed them that, under its 2014 regulation, eligibility required a refinery to meet the “small refinery” definition both for "the most recent full calendar year prior to seeking an extension" and for "the year or years for which an exemption is sought." The EPA interpreted this to mean petitioners needed to satisfy the throughput limit in both 2023 and 2024. Since the refineries exceeded the threshold in 2023, the EPA denied the exemption requests. The refineries then sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The D.C. Circuit held that the EPA’s interpretation of its 2014 regulation was contrary to the regulation’s plain text. The court found that, because the applications were filed in 2025 for the 2024 compliance year, both the “most recent full calendar year prior to seeking an extension” and “the year for which an exemption is sought” referred to 2024. Since the petitioners met the threshold in 2024, they were eligible under the regulation. The court vacated the EPA’s denial orders and remanded for further proceedings. View "Alon Refining Krotz Springs, Inc. v. EPA" on Justia Law

Center for Biological Diversity v. Zeldin

2026-03-27T06:33:18-08:00

Florida sought approval from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to assume authority for issuing permits under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, which would allow parties to discharge pollutants into state waters. To streamline the process for permit applicants and reduce the burden of complying with the Endangered Species Act (ESA), Florida proposed a permitting program in which the state would monitor and protect ESA-listed species primarily through a “technical assistance process,” with only advisory input from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). The EPA and FWS approved Florida’s proposal after the FWS issued a programmatic Biological Opinion (BiOp) and Incidental Take Statement (ITS) that found no jeopardy to protected species and exempted permittees from further ESA liability, relying heavily on Florida’s assurances rather than detailed, up-front analysis. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the actions of the EPA and FWS after environmental groups challenged Florida’s permitting program, asserting violations of the ESA and Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court found that the FWS’s BiOp and ITS were unlawful because they failed to conduct the required analyses and deferred essential protections to a less rigorous state-run process. The court also determined the EPA’s reliance on these documents was impermissible and that the EPA had wrongly failed to consult with the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). As a remedy, the district court vacated the EPA’s approval of Florida’s permitting program along with the BiOp and ITS. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the environmental groups had standing and their claims were ripe. It concluded that the FWS’s BiOp and ITS did not comply with the ESA, that the EPA’s reliance on those documents was unlawful, and that the EPA erred by not consulting with the NMFS. The court required vacatur of the EPA’s approval of Florida’s permitting program and the associated ESA documents. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Zeldin" on Justia Law

Bair v. Cal. Dept. of Transportation

2026-03-26T11:32:34-08:00

A group of local residents and environmental organizations opposed a California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) highway project in Humboldt County that would reconfigure a stretch of U.S. Highway 101 through Richardson Grove State Park, an area containing old-growth redwood trees. The opposition centered on concerns that the project would damage the trees and their root systems. Caltrans initially certified an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) for the project, concluding there would be no significant environmental impacts. Over the years, the challengers brought multiple legal actions, arguing that Caltrans’ environmental review failed to meet the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). After the initial EIR was invalidated on appeal for not adequately analyzing impacts on redwood tree roots (Lotus v. Department of Transportation), Caltrans prepared an Addendum with new analysis and recertified the EIR. However, a second trial court judgment found Caltrans violated CEQA by not allowing public review of the Addendum, ordering that it be circulated for comment. Caltrans complied, and both previous writs were eventually discharged. The plaintiffs did not appeal the discharge orders. The present case arose from a third petition challenging the substantive adequacy of the Addendum and Caltrans’ compliance with CEQA. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that the lower court’s discharge of the initial writ (the Lotus writ) necessarily determined that Caltrans’ revised analysis complied with CEQA. Because the plaintiffs did not appeal that decision, the doctrine of res judicata barred them from relitigating the adequacy of the Addendum in this new action. The court affirmed the judgment denying the third petition, thus precluding further CEQA challenges to the Addendum’s substantive analysis of impacts on the redwoods. View "Bair v. Cal. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

STATE OF ALASKA V. NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE

2026-03-25T08:01:10-08:00

The case concerns the National Marine Fisheries Service’s (NMFS) designation of critical habitat in 2022 for two species of Arctic seals, following their listing as threatened under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in 2012. The designated areas covered waters off Alaska’s north coast and were based on findings that those areas contained physical and biological features essential to the conservation of the seal species. Alaska opposed these designations, contending that they were too broad and provided minimal benefit, and requested that certain coastal areas be excluded due to economic impacts. NMFS excluded an area used by the Navy for training but declined to exclude others requested by Alaska and the North Slope Borough, finding no significant economic impact. The United States District Court for the District of Alaska largely agreed with Alaska, holding that the critical habitat designations were unlawful. The court vacated the rules and remanded the matter to NMFS, concluding that NMFS had not adequately explained why the entire designated area was necessary for the seals’ conservation, had failed to consider foreign conservation efforts and foreign habitat, and had abused its discretion by not considering certain exclusions. The Center for Biological Diversity intervened as a defendant and appealed the district court’s decision. The district court did, however, reject Alaska’s argument that NMFS had failed to comply with the ESA’s “prudency” requirement. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that it had jurisdiction, reversed the district court’s rulings that the designations were unlawful, and affirmed the court’s ruling on the ESA’s prudency requirement. The Ninth Circuit held that NMFS’s designations complied with the ESA, that the agency was not required to consider foreign conservation efforts or habitat, and that the decision not to exclude certain coastal areas was within its discretion. The critical habitat designations were reinstated, and the case was remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the Center and NMFS. View "STATE OF ALASKA V. NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE" on Justia Law

Mayor & City Cncl. Of Balt. v. B.P. P.L.C.

2026-03-24T10:05:41-08:00

Several Maryland local governments, including Baltimore City, Anne Arundel County, and the City of Annapolis, filed lawsuits in Maryland circuit courts against 26 multinational oil and gas companies. They alleged that the defendants’ extraction, production, promotion, and sale of fossil fuels—combined with deceptive marketing about their products’ climate risks—substantially contributed to global greenhouse gas emissions, resulting in severe local impacts such as sea-level rise, flooding, and heat waves. The local governments sought damages and equitable relief based on Maryland common law claims of public nuisance, private nuisance, trespass, negligent failure to warn, and strict liability failure to warn. In the trial courts (the Circuit Courts for Baltimore City and Anne Arundel County), the defendants successfully moved to dismiss the complaints. The courts found that the local governments’ claims were preempted by federal law, specifically by federal common law and the Clean Air Act, and that the complaints failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted under Maryland law. The cases took a procedural detour through federal courts due to removal attempts, but were ultimately remanded to state court. The Appellate Court of Maryland consolidated the appeals, and the Supreme Court of Maryland granted review by writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the dismissals. The court held that the local governments’ state law claims, though pled as torts, effectively sought to regulate interstate and international air emissions—an area governed exclusively by federal law. Relying on United States Supreme Court precedent, the court explained that such claims are displaced by federal common law and, in turn, by the Clean Air Act, which does not authorize broad state law claims in this context. The court further held that, even if not preempted, none of the plaintiffs stated valid claims under Maryland law for public or private nuisance, trespass, or failure to warn. View "Mayor & City Cncl. Of Balt. v. B.P. P.L.C." on Justia Law

In the Matter of Jibsail Family Limited Partnership

2026-03-18T06:06:01-08:00

A property owner on West Point Island sought to extend an existing dock into Barnegat Bay. The owner obtained permits from both the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) and the Army Corps of Engineers, and received a tidelands license from the Tidelands Resource Council (TRC). After the extension was completed, it was found to be slightly south of the permitted location, prompting the owner to seek a modified permit and license for the as-built dock. The adjacent property owner objected, arguing the extension created navigational hazards and interfered with their own dock’s use. The TRC held public hearings, considered testimony and written submissions, and ultimately approved the modified license, finding the extension complied with applicable rules and did not interfere with navigation or the rights of the objecting neighbor. The DEP approved the decision. The neighbor appealed to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, arguing that the TRC lacked authority to set or modify pierhead lines through individual license proceedings and that such lines must be established uniformly around islands in advance under Section 19 of the Tidelands Act. The Appellate Division affirmed the TRC’s decision, finding it was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and holding that the TRC was permitted to establish or modify pierhead lines in connection with individual licenses. The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that the Tidelands Act authorizes the TRC to set or modify pierhead lines in the context of reviewing individual tidelands license applications, rather than requiring the TRC to establish uniform pierhead lines around all islands prospectively. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment, concluding that the TRC did not exceed its statutory authority in issuing the licenses at issue. View "In the Matter of Jibsail Family Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

ARIZONA MINING REFORM COALITION V. UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE

2026-03-13T16:01:23-08:00

A federal land exchange was mandated by the Southeast Arizona Land Exchange and Conservation Act, requiring the United States Forest Service to transfer approximately 2,500 acres of National Forest land, including Oak Flat—a site of religious significance to the Apache—to Resolution Copper Mining, LLC, in exchange for over 5,000 acres of private land. The legislation included requirements for tribal consultation, land appraisal, and the preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS). Following the issuance of a revised Final EIS in 2025, several environmental and tribal groups, as well as individual Apache plaintiffs, challenged the exchange. Their claims spanned the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Free Exercise Clause, alleging procedural and substantive deficiencies. Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied the plaintiffs’ motions for a preliminary injunction, finding that they had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on any claims relating to the appraisal process, NEPA, consultation, or the National Forest Management Act. A separate group of Apache plaintiffs brought similar claims, including religious liberty challenges, which were also denied—particularly in light of circuit precedent established in Apache Stronghold v. United States. All plaintiff groups appealed and sought further injunctive relief pending appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion and affirmed. The court held that plaintiffs had standing and their claims were justiciable, but that none of their arguments were likely to succeed on the merits or raised serious questions. The court specifically found the appraisals and environmental review sufficient, the agency’s tribal consultation adequate, and the religious liberty claims foreclosed by circuit precedent. The denial of a preliminary injunction was affirmed, and all related motions for injunctive relief were denied as moot. View "ARIZONA MINING REFORM COALITION V. UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE" on Justia Law

COCKRELL INVESTMENT PARTNERS, L.P. v. MIDDLE PECOS GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT

2026-03-13T12:18:33-08:00

Cockrell Investment Partners, L.P., owns a pecan orchard in Pecos County, Texas, and relies on several wells to irrigate its trees using water from the Edwards–Trinity Aquifer. Its neighbor, Fort Stockton Holdings, L.P. (FSH), historically used water from the same aquifer for agricultural purposes and later started selling it to nearby cities. FSH sought to significantly increase its permitted water usage, leading Cockrell to object due to concerns about the aquifer’s finite supply. FSH pursued several permit applications and amendments, some of which involved Republic Water Company of Texas, LLC, and ultimately resulted in settlement agreements that altered FSH’s permit terms. Cockrell attempted to participate as a party in administrative proceedings regarding these permit applications but was denied party status by the Middle Pecos Groundwater Conservation District. The district court in one instance granted the District’s plea to the jurisdiction, and in another instance granted summary judgment in favor of the District after denying its plea to the jurisdiction. Cockrell appealed both decisions to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas. The appellate court affirmed the lower court rulings, determining that Cockrell had not exhausted its administrative remedies because it filed suit before waiting the required 90 days after submitting reconsideration requests, as prescribed by Section 36.412 of the Texas Water Code. The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed both consolidated cases. It held that the 90-day exhaustion requirement applies only to permit applicants or parties to the administrative proceeding, which Cockrell was not, since it was denied party status. The Court concluded that Cockrell met all statutory requirements for judicial review under Section 36.251 of the Water Code and properly exhausted its administrative remedies according to local Rule 4.9, which required only a 45-day waiting period. The Court reversed the judgments of the court of appeals and remanded the cases for further consideration. View "COCKRELL INVESTMENT PARTNERS, L.P. v. MIDDLE PECOS GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT" on Justia Law

Clean Fuels Alliance America v. EPA

2026-03-13T06:35:20-08:00

The case concerns a challenge brought by two renewable fuel industry groups to a 2020 rule issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Clean Air Act’s Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) Program. The challenged rule established the percentage of renewable fuel that refiners and importers must include in their annual fuel output. The groups objected to EPA’s refusal to adjust the 2020 standard to account for renewable fuel shortfalls resulting from past retroactive small refinery exemptions. While the case was pending, EPA issued a new rule in 2022 that recalculated the 2020 standards and reaffirmed its approach of not making up for past exemptions. In addition, Congress altered the statutory framework, granting EPA broader discretion in setting future renewable fuel volumes. Following the issuance of the 2022 rule, most petitioners dismissed their challenges, and the two remaining groups shifted their focus, no longer seeking to set aside the 2020 rule but instead seeking a ruling that would require EPA to change its policy in future rulemakings. They did not challenge the 2022 rule, nor did they request its invalidation. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the case was moot. The court reasoned that the 2022 rule superseded the 2020 rule, eliminating any live controversy over that agency action. The court further explained that the legal landscape had changed due to statutory amendments, so the original dispute no longer presented the same question. Because petitioners were not seeking to overturn any concrete, current agency action, their challenge amounted to a request for an impermissible advisory opinion. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petitions as moot. View "Clean Fuels Alliance America v. EPA" on Justia Law

DiBiccari v. State of Rhode Island

2026-03-10T10:16:42-08:00

The plaintiff owned a vacant parcel in Westerly, Rhode Island, and sought to construct a single-family home. To do so, he needed approval from the Department of Environmental Management (DEM) for an onsite wastewater treatment system (OWTS). He applied for a variance from DEM’s regulations, asserting that his proposed system satisfied the general standard for granting variances. However, DEM denied the variance because the property’s water table was at zero inches from the original ground surface, failing to meet a specific regulatory requirement. After DEM’s denial, the plaintiff did not appeal to DEM’s Administrative Adjudication Division (AAD), arguing that such an appeal would be futile since the AAD purportedly lacked discretion to overturn the denial and could not adjudicate constitutional claims. Instead, he filed suit in the Superior Court, seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, asserting both as-applied and facial challenges to the OWTS regulations under the Takings, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The state moved to dismiss, arguing failure to exhaust administrative remedies and the lack of constitutional violations. The Superior Court granted the state’s motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies and the futility exception did not apply. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court held that the plaintiff was required to exhaust administrative remedies for his as-applied challenges and that the futility exception did not apply because the AAD had independent authority to grant variances. For the facial constitutional challenge, the Court determined that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The judgment dismissing the complaint was affirmed and the matter remanded. View "DiBiccari v. State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law

Lucas Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Environmental Protection Agency

2026-03-09T11:30:36-08:00

This case concerns the approval of Ohio’s Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) for phosphorus in the Maumee River watershed, a key regulatory effort to combat harmful algal blooms in Lake Erie. The United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) approved the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency’s (Ohio EPA) TMDL for this region. Plaintiffs, including Lucas County, the City of Toledo, and the Environmental Law & Policy Center, challenged this approval under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), alleging that it was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law. During the litigation in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, several parties sought to intervene. The court allowed environmental groups and the Ohio EPA to intervene but denied intervention to two sets of proposed defendant-intervenors: various agricultural associations (“Associations”) and the Maumee Coalition II Association (“Coalition”). The district court found that neither the Associations nor the Coalition satisfied the criteria for intervention of right because it presumed the U.S. EPA would adequately represent their interests and that neither group overcame this presumption. The court also denied permissive intervention, concluding that their participation would unnecessarily complicate and delay the proceedings. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denials. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of intervention for the Coalition, finding it had not shown its interests were inadequately represented by existing parties. However, the appellate court reversed the denial for the Associations, holding that they intended to make specific legal arguments distinct from U.S. EPA’s, thereby overcoming the presumption of adequate representation. The court remanded with instructions to allow the Associations to intervene as of right, while affirming the denial of both intervention of right and permissive intervention to the Coalition. View "Lucas Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

WYOMING TRUST CO. v. US

2026-03-06T07:02:52-08:00

The appellants, including trustees of several trusts and Hall Atlas, LLC, held coal mining rights to the Hall Ranch in Wyoming, containing significant coal reserves. In 1985, the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality (WDEQ) determined that a portion of the Hall Ranch was located on an alluvial valley floor (AVF), which limited mining under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA). For decades, neither the appellants nor Exxon Coal Resources, the lessee at the time, pursued a coal exchange. In 2010, Hall Atlas applied to the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) for a coal exchange. BLM initially rejected WDEQ’s 1985 determination but changed position in 2014, and Hall Atlas submitted a mine plan. In 2016, BLM determined the Hall Ranch AVF coal had a value of $0. In 2017, BLM reiterated its $0 valuation and rejected the appellants’ proposed exchange tract, instead proposing alternatives based on the same valuation. The United States Court of Federal Claims dismissed the appellants’ takings claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the claim was time-barred because it was filed more than six years after the claim accrued. The appellants argued that their claim did not accrue until BLM’s 2017 letter, but the court found that the relevant accrual date was in 2016, when BLM finalized its $0 valuation. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision. The Federal Circuit held that any takings claim accrued no later than 2016, making the 2023 filing untimely under the Tucker Act’s six-year statute of limitations. The court rejected arguments for equitable tolling and the application of the continuing claim or stabilization doctrines, and concluded the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was correct. The judgment was affirmed and costs were awarded to the appellee. View "WYOMING TRUST CO. v. US " on Justia Law

Las Posas Valley Water v. Ventura County Waterworks

2026-03-05T14:09:53-08:00

A group of landowners and mutual water companies in Ventura County, California, claimed rights to groundwater from the Las Posas Valley Groundwater Basin, which supplies water for agricultural, commercial, and domestic purposes. The groundwater basin had been subject to restrictions and management by the Fox Canyon Groundwater Management Agency (Fox Canyon), especially in light of overdraft conditions and the requirements of the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA). Disputes arose over groundwater pumping allocations, historical use, and the proper method for determining and allocating water rights among various landowners, mutual water companies, and public agencies. The case was brought as a comprehensive groundwater adjudication in the Superior Court of Santa Barbara County, proceeding in three phases. First, the court established the initial “Total Safe Yield” of the basin and allocated a portion to certain public water suppliers. In the second phase, the court, after a trial and a settlement agreed to by a large majority of parties, allocated the remaining rights among landowners, prioritizing overlying landowners and finding no surplus for appropriators. The third phase established a “physical solution” for basin management, appointing Fox Canyon as watermaster and integrating the settlement into a final judgment. Several parties, including Mahan Ranch and two mutual water companies, objected to aspects of the allocations and the final judgment, raising issues about the treatment of mutual water companies, the handling of dormant rights, and the legality of the court's actions. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court properly allocated water rights based on overlying landowners’ rights, not directly to mutual water companies, and that there was no surplus for appropriators. The court found the physical solution and allocations consistent with California law, the Constitution, and SGMA, and that non-stipulating parties were treated equitably. The judgment was affirmed. View "Las Posas Valley Water v. Ventura County Waterworks" on Justia Law

Physicians for Social Responsibility - Los Angeles v. Dept. of Toxic Substances Control

2026-03-04T12:31:56-08:00

For many years, the federal government and private entities engaged in activities at the Santa Susana Field Laboratory in Ventura County, resulting in significant environmental contamination. The Boeing Company, which owns much of the site, planned to demolish several buildings within a specific area known as Area IV. California’s Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) is authorized to regulate chemical contamination cleanup at the site, and its actions are subject to environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). In 2013, after Boeing notified DTSC of its demolition intent, the plaintiffs raised concerns about environmental impacts and filed a writ petition alleging DTSC failed to comply with CEQA. The Superior Court of Sacramento County denied the plaintiffs’ petition, finding that demolition activities were private actions not subject to CEQA’s discretionary approval requirements, and thus not subject to CEQA review. The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed this decision, and the California Supreme Court declined review. During subsequent events, DTSC voluntarily included an environmental analysis of the building demolition in its final Environmental Impact Report (EIR), released after the litigation had concluded. The plaintiffs then sought attorney fees under California’s private attorney general statute (Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5), arguing that their litigation was the catalyst for DTSC’s changed conduct. The superior court denied the fee request, finding the plaintiffs were not a “successful party” under the catalyst theory because their lawsuit had been resolved on the merits against them, and thus there was no “threat of victory” that motivated DTSC’s actions. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the denial. The court held that attorney fees under the catalyst theory are not warranted where the moving party lost on the merits, and there was no causal connection between the litigation and the agency’s subsequent voluntary actions. DTSC was awarded its costs on appeal. View "Physicians for Social Responsibility - Los Angeles v. Dept. of Toxic Substances Control" on Justia Law

Anadarko v. Alternative Environmental Solutions

2026-03-03T11:02:51-08:00

An environmental remediation company and an oil corporation entered into a Master Services Contract in 2008, which included a Texas choice-of-law and venue provision and an indemnification clause requiring the remediation company to defend and indemnify the oil corporation for claims arising from violations of applicable laws. In 2012, it was discovered that the remediation company’s then-president, along with subcontractors, had engaged in fraudulent overbilling for work performed for the oil corporation. Upon discovery, ownership of the remediation company changed hands, and litigation ensued in Louisiana state court. The remediation company’s new owner alleged that the oil corporation’s employee was complicit in the fraud, making the corporation vicariously liable. The oil corporation then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas seeking a declaratory judgment that the remediation company had a duty to defend and indemnify it in the Louisiana litigation, and also sought attorney’s fees as damages for breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment for the oil corporation, holding that Texas law applied, the remediation company owed both a duty to defend and to indemnify, and awarding attorney’s fees for both the Texas and Louisiana lawsuits. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings de novo regarding summary judgment and attorney’s fees. The appellate court held that Texas law governed under the contract’s choice-of-law clause since Louisiana did not have a more significant relationship or materially greater interest, and applying Texas law did not contravene Louisiana public policy. The indemnity provision was not void as against public policy or for illegality. The court affirmed the duty to defend and to indemnify, but vacated the judgment to the extent it would require indemnification for punitive and exemplary damages, and remanded for modification. It also vacated attorney’s fees awarded for the underlying Louisiana litigation, affirming only those fees related to the declaratory judgment action. View "Anadarko v. Alternative Environmental Solutions" on Justia Law

Adams v. FAA

2026-03-03T09:02:30-08:00

A commercial air tour operator, who had previously conducted flights over Bandelier National Monument under interim authority, challenged a final order issued by the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Park Service. This order established an Air Tour Management Plan (ATMP) for Bandelier National Monument, prohibiting all commercial air tours over the site. The agencies’ process included public comment, environmental assessment, and extensive consultation with Native American tribes, who strongly objected to air tours due to cultural and privacy concerns. The operator argued that his flights were minimally intrusive, carefully routed, and brief, and that banning them would negatively impact safety and his business. The agencies initially considered various alternatives, including allowing limited air tours or maintaining previous operations, but ultimately concluded that any commercial air tour flights would create unacceptable impacts to Bandelier’s natural and cultural resources and visitor experience. The agencies’ environmental assessment under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) found no significant impacts for NEPA purposes, but their record of decision emphasized significant adverse impacts to tribal cultural resources under the National Parks Air Tour Management Act (NPATMA). Upon petition for review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard and de novo for statutory interpretation, as required by recent Supreme Court precedent. The court held that NPATMA and NEPA use different significance standards, and that the agency’s path to finding significant adverse impacts under NPATMA was reasonably discernible in the record. The court also rejected the petitioner’s additional statutory and constitutional challenges, finding them either unexhausted or inadequately briefed. The Tenth Circuit denied the petition for review. View "Adams v. FAA" on Justia Law

CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

2026-03-03T09:01:07-08:00

The case concerns a challenge brought by an environmental non-profit against the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) relating to the agency’s 2016 national recommendations for allowable cadmium levels in water. The EPA, as required by the Clean Water Act (CWA), periodically issues nonbinding criteria for water pollutants, which states typically adopt as standards for their own waters. In 2016, the EPA updated its cadmium recommendations but did so without consulting the Fish and Wildlife Service or the National Marine Fisheries Service, as mandated under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) for actions that may affect protected species. Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona found that the Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) had standing to challenge the EPA’s failure to consult. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CBD, holding that the EPA’s issuance of the cadmium recommendations constituted “agency action” under the ESA that “may affect” listed species, thus triggering the consultation requirement. The court vacated the less stringent chronic freshwater cadmium recommendation and remanded all four 2016 cadmium recommendations to the EPA for proper consultation. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that CBD had Article III standing, finding a concrete injury to its members’ interests in protected species, that the injury was fairly traceable to EPA’s recommendations due to predictable state adoption, and that the injury could be redressed by stricter recommendations resulting from consultation. On the merits, the court concluded that EPA’s publication of nationwide recommendations was “agency action” under the ESA and that such action “may affect” listed species, thus requiring prior consultation with the Services. The district court’s vacatur and remand were affirmed. View "CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY" on Justia Law

City of Idaho Falls v. Idaho Department of Water Resources

2026-03-02T14:02:59-08:00

Several cities in Idaho that hold junior ground water rights within the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer (ESPA) challenged the methodology used by the Idaho Department of Water Resources (IDWR) to determine whether their groundwater pumping caused material injury to senior surface water right holders. The core factual dispute arose after the Director of IDWR issued a Fifth Amended Methodology Order in April 2023, updating the scientific models and data for evaluating material injury, followed by an order predicting a water shortfall for the senior rights holders. The cities requested a hearing, raising concerns about the methodology and specific factual determinations. After the hearing, the Director issued a Post-Hearing Order that modified and affirmed the Fifth Methodology Order and, simultaneously, a Sixth Methodology Order that expressly superseded all prior methodology orders. The cities then filed a petition for judicial review in the Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA) district court, challenging the Director’s Post-Hearing Order. The district court allowed intervention by senior water right holders and, after review, affirmed the Director’s findings and conclusions regarding the methodology and its application. The court found the agency’s factual determinations were supported by substantial evidence and that the Director’s legal standards were proper. The court’s judgment affirmed only the Post-Hearing Order and did not address the subsequently issued Sixth Methodology Order. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court considered whether it had jurisdiction to address the cities’ claims. The Supreme Court held that because the cities failed to petition for judicial review of the operative, currently effective Sixth Methodology Order in the district court, it lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief sought. The court explained that under Idaho law, only the currently operative order may be challenged, and failure to timely appeal the correct order is jurisdictional. The appeal was therefore dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and costs were awarded to IDWR and the intervenors. View "City of Idaho Falls v. Idaho Department of Water Resources" on Justia Law

City of Culver City v. Federal Aviation Administration

2026-03-02T11:03:47-08:00

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) introduced new and revised air traffic procedures in the Southern California Metroplex as part of its Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) initiative in 2016, affecting airports including Los Angeles International Airport. These procedures, specifically the HUULL, IRNMN, and RYDRR routes, relied on satellite navigation and were subject to an environmental review, which concluded there would be no significant noise impacts. In 2018, the FAA amended these procedures, making minor changes to altitude and speed restrictions at certain waypoints, with no changes to flight paths, number of flights, or aircraft types. Only one amended waypoint affected Malibu, and none affected Culver City. Previously, Culver City and other parties challenged the FAA’s 2016 approval in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which upheld the FAA’s decision. After the 2018 amendments, the City of Los Angeles and Culver City (as intervenor) challenged the FAA’s actions in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which found violations of environmental statutes but remanded for further review without vacating the procedures. The FAA then conducted additional environmental consultations and issued a Record of Decision, concluding the amendments qualified for a categorical exclusion from further environmental review. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the petitions from Malibu and Culver City regarding the FAA’s 2018 amendments. The court held that only challenges to the 2018 amendments were timely, dismissing any challenge to the original 2016 procedures as untimely. The court determined that neither city demonstrated standing to challenge the 2018 amendments: Malibu’s evidence addressed only the 2016 procedures, and Culver City failed to provide evidence of injury. The petitions were dismissed for lack of standing. View "City of Culver City v. Federal Aviation Administration" on Justia Law

EGGER ENTER., LLC VS. STATE ENGINEER

2026-02-26T11:19:07-08:00

Egger Enterprises, LLC acquired a ranch in Humboldt County, Nevada, which had previously shifted from flood to center pivot irrigation systems. This conversion left portions of water rights unused, and Egger sought to use the leftover water by acquiring adjacent public land through federal Desert Land Entry applications. Administrative delays between the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and Nevada’s Division of Water Resources (NDWR) prolonged this process. Meanwhile, a nonparty challenged Egger’s applications, asserting that Egger had not used portions of its water rights for over 16 years, and thus, those rights were forfeited. The State Engineer found, by clear and convincing evidence, that certain water rights had not been put to beneficial use for five or more consecutive years and declared them forfeited. Egger petitioned for judicial review in the Sixth Judicial District Court, which initially reversed and remanded for lack of proper notice. Once proper notice was sent and Egger requested extensions of time, the State Engineer granted one extension but denied a subsequent request, ultimately issuing a declaration of forfeiture. Egger again sought judicial review, but the district court denied relief, finding the State Engineer’s decision supported by substantial evidence and holding that Egger was not entitled to equitable relief. The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of Egger’s petition. The court held that the State Engineer is not required to make findings on every statutory factor when considering an extension request under NRS 534.090(3)—only those relevant to the case. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the forfeiture decision and that Egger was not entitled to equitable relief, as there was no beneficial use of the water within the statutory period, nor any estoppel or error by the State Engineer. View "EGGER ENTER., LLC VS. STATE ENGINEER" on Justia Law

City of Idaho Falls v. Idaho Department of Water Resources

2026-02-25T08:15:44-08:00

A group of cities in Idaho, each holding junior ground water rights within the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer, became subject to curtailment proceedings initiated by senior surface water users represented by the Surface Water Coalition. The Coalition argued that pumping by junior ground water rights holders diminished water available to senior rights holders drawing from the Snake River. In response, the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources has periodically updated the methodology used to determine whether material injury to the senior rights has occurred, issuing a series of orders—the most recent being a Sixth Methodology Order. Following the issuance of a Fifth Methodology Order and an associated Post-Hearing Order, the cities challenged those orders in the Snake River Basin Adjudication district court, raising several concerns about the Director’s factual determinations and legal standards. During the administrative process, the Director simultaneously issued a Sixth Methodology Order that expressly superseded all prior methodology orders. The cities, however, did not include a direct challenge to the Sixth Methodology Order in their petition for judicial review. The district court affirmed the Director’s Post-Hearing Order, supporting the agency’s methodology and factual findings. The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal because the cities failed to petition for review of the operative Sixth Methodology Order in the district court, as required under Idaho administrative law. As a result, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and declined to address the substantive claims raised by the cities. The court also denied requests for attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-117(1), finding the statute inapplicable, but awarded costs to the prevailing parties. View "City of Idaho Falls v. Idaho Department of Water Resources" on Justia Law