Election Law - Justia Case Law Summaries

Idahoans United v. McGrane

2026-09-04T14:32:19-08:00

A citizens’ group challenged the official ballot statements prepared by the Idaho Secretary of State and Attorney General for the 2026 general election, which would accompany Proposition One, the Reproductive Freedom and Privacy Act. The group argued that the statements describing the effect of a “yes” or “no” vote were unclear, misleading, and exceeded the statutory authority given to the officials, as they characterized both the proposed law and existing Idaho law rather than simply stating the effect of each vote. Previously, the Idaho Supreme Court had considered similar issues regarding other ballot materials for the same initiative in Idahoans United for Women & Families v. Labrador, 175 Idaho 708, 570 P.3d 1137 (2025), where it directed revisions to the short ballot title and the fiscal impact statement to ensure substantial compliance with statutory requirements. After the initiative qualified for the ballot, the officials prepared the contested Yes/No Effect Statements and distributed them to county clerks. The group’s objections were not resolved through negotiation, leading to the current original action before the Idaho Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho concluded that the group had standing under its relaxed standing doctrine, found it had original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus and prohibition, and applied the standard of substantial compliance to the ballot statements. The court held that both the “yes” and “no” statements failed to clearly and concisely communicate the effect of a vote, as required by Idaho Code section 34-1810(1)(b). The court granted writs of prohibition and mandamus, prohibited use of the challenged statements, and ordered the officials to prepare new, compliant statements by a set deadline. The request for a writ of certiorari was denied as duplicative, and no attorney fees were awarded. View "Idahoans United v. McGrane" on Justia Law

Giffords v. FEC

2026-09-04T07:01:15-08:00

A nonprofit organization dedicated to gun violence prevention filed several administrative complaints with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) in 2018, alleging violations of the Federal Election Campaign Act by two entities associated with a national advocacy group. After the FEC failed to act within the statutory 120-day period, the nonprofit filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking an order compelling the FEC to act. Due to a lack of quorum, the FEC remained inactive for an extended period. Eventually, the District Court granted summary judgment to the nonprofit, ordered the FEC to act within 30 days, and later determined the FEC had not complied, thereby allowing the nonprofit to file a citizen suit against the NRA-associated entities. The national advocacy group sought to dismiss the citizen suit, arguing the District Court lacked jurisdiction. It also moved to intervene in the original action, but only for the limited purpose of unsealing the judicial record. Subsequently, after the District Court’s final judgment, the advocacy group filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(4) seeking relief from the orders and judgment, contending that the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction due to mootness and lack of adversity. The District Court denied this motion, holding that the group, as a nonparty, lacked standing to seek relief under Rule 60(b). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the appeal from the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion. The Court held that only parties to a lawsuit, or those who properly become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment. Since the advocacy group had not used any procedural mechanism to become a party to the underlying suit, it lacked the procedural ability to appeal. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal as impermissible under binding precedent. View "Giffords v. FEC" on Justia Law

Kuehn v. Evnen

2026-09-04T05:06:39-08:00

In 2024, a Nebraska resident challenged the legal sufficiency of two initiative petitions submitted for the November general election. One petition sought to legalize medical cannabis; the other proposed regulatory measures. The challenge alleged that numerous signatures were invalid due to circulator fraud and improper notarization, contending that after excluding these signatures, the petitions lacked the minimum number required by the Nebraska Constitution. The Secretary of State, having initially certified the petitions, also filed a cross-claim seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the sufficiency of the signatures and the validity of the measures. The District Court for Lancaster County reviewed the claims. It found that while some signatures should lose their presumption of validity due to proven circulator fraud or improper notarization, the challengers had not shown that enough signatures were invalid to render the petitions legally insufficient. The court rejected the argument that improper notarization by a notary on some pages should invalidate all pages notarized by that individual, distinguishing circulator fraud from notarial errors. It also declined to draw adverse inferences from witnesses who had invoked the Fifth Amendment, citing Nebraska statutory law and the circumstances of ongoing criminal investigations. On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order. The Court held that Barkley v. Pool, a precedent concerning circulator fraud, does not require blanket invalidation of signatures based on notary impropriety. It further held that the trial court did not err in declining to draw adverse inferences from Fifth Amendment invocations. Ultimately, the Court found no legal or factual error in the district court’s determinations regarding the validity of the petitions, the sufficiency of signatures, or the denial of a motion to amend pleadings. The district court’s order was affirmed. View "Kuehn v. Evnen" on Justia Law

von Glahn vs. Hoskins

2026-09-03T17:30:24-08:00

The dispute arose when the Missouri General Assembly passed House Bill 1 (HB 1) in September 2025, which would repeal the 2022 congressional districts and establish new ones. Organizers opposed to HB 1 submitted a referendum petition to the Secretary of State, meeting both the signature and timing requirements set by the Missouri Constitution. The Secretary of State, however, issued a Certificate of Insufficiency, asserting that the Missouri Constitution does not authorize a referendum on congressional redistricting acts passed by the General Assembly, and directed that the petition not be placed on the November 2026 ballot. After this, Richard von Glahn, a proponent of the referendum, filed suit in the Cole County Circuit Court seeking to overturn the Secretary’s decision and prevent implementation of HB 1. The circuit court upheld the Secretary’s determination. Von Glahn appealed, and the Supreme Court of Missouri en banc granted discretionary transfer to address the important legal issue presented. The Supreme Court of Missouri en banc held that the Missouri Constitution’s article III, section 49, plainly authorizes the people to approve or reject by referendum “any act of the general assembly,” including congressional redistricting legislation. The Court found that none of the exceptions in article III, section 52(a) applied to HB 1 and rejected arguments that redistricting laws are exempt from referendum. The Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment, ordered the Secretary to certify the petition as sufficient, place it on the November 2026 ballot, and enjoined use of the HB 1 districts unless and until approved by voters. The congressional districts established in 2022 remain in effect for the 2026 election unless HB 1 is approved and takes effect thereafter. View "von Glahn vs. Hoskins" on Justia Law

Harris vs. Hoskins

2026-09-03T17:30:20-08:00

Petition supporters submitted an initiative petition proposing to amend the Missouri Constitution, having followed the statutory process for approval and certification of the ballot title by the Secretary of State. After signature gathering and timely submission, the Secretary of State was required to determine the petition’s compliance with the Missouri Constitution and Missouri statutes and to issue a certificate of sufficiency or insufficiency. Instead, shortly before the deadline, the Secretary issued a certificate declaring the petition insufficient without specifying any constitutional defects, vacated the original ballot title, and issued a new ballot title. The petition supporters, all qualified Missouri voters, challenged the Secretary’s actions in the Cole County Circuit Court, seeking reversal of the insufficiency certification and reinstatement of the original ballot title. The circuit court upheld the Secretary’s decision. The petition supporters appealed, and due to the importance of the legal issues, the Supreme Court of Missouri en banc took discretionary jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Missouri en banc found that the Secretary failed to comply with statutory requirements by not stating any reasons for insufficiency in his certificate, thus preserving nothing for appellate review. The Court further held that hypothetical constitutional violations, which might arise only if the amendment were adopted, are not ripe for pre-election review. The Court rejected the Secretary’s claims regarding single-article and single-subject violations as meritless and determined he lacked authority to vacate the certified ballot title and issue a new one. The Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment, ordered the Secretary to issue a certificate of sufficiency for the initiative petition, to place it on the November 2026 ballot with the original ballot title, and to take all necessary steps to ensure its inclusion before September 8, 2026. View "Harris vs. Hoskins" on Justia Law

State ex rel. Turner v. Barhorst

2026-09-03T09:30:46-08:00

A group of qualified electors and residents of Sidney sought to amend the city charter to establish a procedure for recalling elected officials. They filed a petition with the city clerk containing 561 signatures, which they believed met the threshold for submission to the voters. Their proposal was submitted under a provision in the Sidney Charter allowing amendments as provided by the Ohio Constitution. However, the city clerk rejected the petition, citing noncompliance with Ohio Revised Code section 731.32, which she interpreted as requiring a certified copy of the proposed amendment to be filed before circulating the petition. Following this rejection, the electors initiated a mandamus action in the Supreme Court of Ohio. They requested an order compelling the city council to certify the petition to the county board of elections and further sought to have the board verify the signatures and place the amendment on the ballot if sufficient. They also sought attorney fees and court costs. The respondents argued that the petition was invalid for procedural reasons, including the application of R.C. 731.32. The board of elections had not yet reviewed the petition, as it had not been transmitted by the city clerk. The Supreme Court of Ohio found that R.C. 731.32 does not apply to proposed amendments to a city charter unless the municipal charter incorporates that statute into its amendment process; the Sidney Charter does not do so. Thus, the city clerk erred in rejecting the petition on this basis. The court granted a limited writ of mandamus, ordering the city clerk to transmit the petition to the county board of elections for a determination of sufficiency. If the petition is found sufficient, the city council must provide by ordinance for submission of the proposed amendment to the voters within the constitutional timeframe. The requests for attorney fees and court costs, and relief against the law director and board of elections, were denied. View "State ex rel. Turner v. Barhorst" on Justia Law

State ex rel. Blankenship v. Trenton City Council

2026-09-01T09:00:16-08:00

A group of residents and electors from the city of Trenton proposed an amendment to the city charter that would prohibit the construction of data centers within the city. They submitted a petition with 336 valid signatures to the city council to have this amendment placed on the ballot. The Butler County Board of Elections confirmed the number of valid signatures and reported that 1,277 voters participated in the most recent general municipal election, while 8,197 individuals were registered to vote at that time. The Trenton City Council convened and concluded that the petition did not contain a sufficient number of signatures, reasoning that the requirement was ten percent of all registered voters, not ten percent of votes cast. Accordingly, the council refused to certify the petition to the board of elections for inclusion on the ballot. The residents then filed an action for a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court of Ohio, seeking to compel the council to place the amendment before the voters and to recover court costs and attorney fees. The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the relevant constitutional provisions and its prior decisions. The court held that, consistent with Article XVIII, Sections 8, 9, and 14 of the Ohio Constitution and its decision in State ex rel. Huebner v. W. Jefferson Village Council, the required number of signatures for a charter amendment petition is ten percent of the votes cast in the last preceding general municipal election, not ten percent of all registered voters. The court found that the petitioners had exceeded the required number of signatures and ordered the city council to pass an ordinance certifying the petition to the board of elections for submission to the electors at a special election within the constitutionally specified timeframe. The court denied the request for court costs and attorney fees. View "State ex rel. Blankenship v. Trenton City Council" on Justia Law

Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Albence

2026-08-31T09:00:04-08:00

Two nonprofit organizations that engage in nationwide issue advocacy challenged Delaware’s Elections Disclosure Act, which requires groups spending over $500 on electioneering communications near an election to publicly disclose donors giving more than $100 during the relevant cycle. The law’s disclosure obligations are broad: they are not limited to donors earmarking funds for political ads, nor can donors avoid disclosure by restricting the use of their contributions. The law also looks back several years for purposes of disclosure. The organizations, which have not previously run such communications in Delaware but claim they intend to do so in the upcoming election, argue that the law violates the First Amendment. After the organizations filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, they sought a preliminary injunction to halt enforcement of the Act. The District Court denied the request, finding no likelihood of success on the facial challenge because prior Third Circuit precedent, Delaware Strong Families v. Attorney General of Delaware, had upheld the Act and the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta did not clearly abrogate that ruling. The court also doubted the as-applied challenge, citing the plaintiffs’ failure to offer specific evidence of harm to donors. The District Court emphasized the law’s decade-long enforcement and the lack of urgent need to change the status quo. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the denial. Applying a deferential standard, the court found that the plaintiffs had not made a clear showing of entitlement to a preliminary injunction. It held that even with some likelihood of success and possible irreparable injury, the balance of equities and the public interest favored preserving the longstanding status quo. The court affirmed the District Court’s order denying the preliminary injunction. View "Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Albence" on Justia Law

Iwasa v. Nago

2026-08-28T13:03:00-08:00

A dispute arose from the City and County of Honolulu’s first special election for the District IV councilmember seat, held August 8, 2026. The controversy centered on whether the term limit provision in the Revised Charter—which prohibits anyone from being “elected to the office of councilmember for more than two consecutive four-year terms”—barred the incumbent, who had been elected in both 2019 (in a special election following the invalidation of the 2018 results) and 2022, from running again for the 2027–2031 term. The 2019 election had followed a court-ordered re-run between the same two candidates after irregularities invalidated the 2018 contest. After the Acting City Clerk rejected objections to the incumbent’s eligibility, a candidate filed a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, which ruled the incumbent ineligible. Because ballots had already been printed, election officials notified voters that votes for the incumbent would not count toward determining an eligible candidate for the next round. As no candidate received a majority in the August election, officials prepared to advance the top two eligible candidates, excluding the incumbent, to the second special election. The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed both the procedural and substantive issues. The court held that the Circuit Court should have dismissed the declaratory judgment action as procedurally improper, because Hawai‘i Revised Statutes § 12-8 provided the exclusive remedy for pre-election eligibility challenges. However, the Supreme Court determined it could address the merits under the statutes governing election contests. On the merits, the court concluded the incumbent was “elected to” two consecutive four-year terms and was thus ineligible to run for a third consecutive term under the Revised Charter. The court ordered that only the two eligible candidates be placed on the ballot for the second special election. Judgment was entered for the defendants. View "Iwasa v. Nago" on Justia Law

Public Interest Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Simon

2026-08-28T08:00:11-08:00

An organization based in Virginia requested access to Minnesota’s Registered Voter List under a federal statute, asserting it was entitled to the records despite Minnesota’s exemption from the law. Minnesota denied the request, citing its exemption as a state with continuous election-day registration since August 1, 1994. The organization also sought the information under a Minnesota statute, but was again denied because no Minnesota-registered voter joined the request. The organization acknowledged it could obtain the information by recruiting a Minnesota voter but did not do so. It then filed suit, claiming Minnesota’s exemption from the federal disclosure requirement was unconstitutional, alleging informational injury and other adverse consequences. The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota reviewed the case. Minnesota moved to dismiss, and the United States intervened to defend the statute’s constitutionality. The district court dismissed the organization’s claim on the merits, concluding that the “equal sovereignty” principle does not apply to Congress’s authority under the Elections Clause. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered whether the organization had Article III standing. The court reviewed standing de novo and focused on whether the plaintiff had suffered a concrete injury in fact. The court held that a purely informational injury does not satisfy Article III’s requirements and found the plaintiff’s alleged downstream consequences insufficient, as they lacked a nexus to the interests Congress sought to protect. The court concluded the plaintiff failed to allege a concrete injury and therefore lacked standing. The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. View "Public Interest Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Simon" on Justia Law

Nebraska Republican Party v. Evnen

2026-08-26T12:09:37-08:00

Two groups sought to establish new political parties in Nebraska: one named the “Nebraska Working People Party” and another named the “America First Party.” Both sponsors submitted the required affidavits and sample petitions to the Secretary of State, circulated petitions, and filed the necessary signatures by the statutory deadlines for inclusion on the 2026 general election ballot. The Secretary of State did not initially raise any objections to the party names and announced both groups met the signature threshold, pending submission of party constitutions and bylaws. After these filings, the Nebraska Republican Party and the Nebraska Democratic Party (along with the Working Families Party) submitted written objections to the Secretary of State, contesting the use of the respective party names. The Republican Party’s objection was timely, but the Democratic Parties’ objection was filed after the statutory 7-day deadline. Both groups argued that the proposed names would confuse voters or overlap with existing party names or messaging. The Secretary of State rejected both objections, stating neither name violated the relevant statutes, and did not disqualify either party. The District Court for Lancaster County denied relief to both objecting parties. For the Democratic Parties, the court found their objection untimely under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-624, which requires written objections to party names within seven days of the new party petition filing deadline. For the Republican Party, the court held that “America First Party” did not violate Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-716(2), as the statute only prohibits names identical to, or containing words from, existing party names, as well as “independent” or “nonpartisan.” The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s orders. The main holdings were: (1) § 32-624 imposes a strict seven-day deadline for objections to new party names, running from the petition filing deadline; late objections are barred. (2) § 32-716(2) does not authorize rejection of a party name based on overlap with slogans or ideals or potential voter confusion unless the name includes prohibited words or names. View "Nebraska Republican Party v. Evnen" on Justia Law

Brown v. Federal Communications Commission

2026-08-25T12:00:07-08:00

Four candidates for federal office challenged a Public Notice issued by the Media Bureau of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) that interpreted federal law to require broadcasters to offer the lowest unit charge (LUC) advertising rates not only to candidates for public office but also to political parties and joint fundraising committees with non-candidate members during pre-election periods. The candidates argued that this expanded interpretation unlawfully diluted their statutory right to LUC rates by extending it to entities whose spending cannot be considered spending by or on behalf of a candidate under campaign finance law. Prior to seeking judicial review, the candidates filed an Application for Review with the FCC, urging the Commission to set aside the Media Bureau’s Public Notice as a novel and unlawful interpretation of the LUC requirement. The Commission took no action on the application for several months, even as the relevant election period approached. The candidates then filed a Petition for Review with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, seeking expedited consideration. While the case was pending, the FCC Chairman circulated a proposed order to the other commissioners to dismiss the candidates’ application as an improper vehicle for review, and the Media Bureau denied a similar reconsideration petition from another party, maintaining that the Public Notice merely reiterated existing guidance. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined it had jurisdiction, finding that the Public Notice was a final order of the Commission and that the Commission had constructively denied the candidates’ application by failing to act. On the merits, the court concluded that the LUC statute unambiguously limits the lowest unit charge to legally qualified candidates for public office and does not extend this benefit to political parties or joint fundraising committees with non-candidate members. The court granted the Petition for Review and set aside the FCC’s Public Notice as unlawful. View "Brown v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

Trump v. California

2026-08-25T05:15:05-08:00

The President issued an Executive Order that directed certain federal agencies to take actions related to election integrity, including creating and distributing lists of eligible voters, prioritizing prosecution of officials issuing ballots to ineligible voters, and initiating a rulemaking related to ballot tracking. The Order did not impose any requirements on states or parties outside the Executive Branch, and all actions were subject to feasibility and compliance with existing law. Shortly after the Order was issued, several states and the District of Columbia sued, arguing that the Order unconstitutionally infringed on their authority to administer elections. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts agreed with the states and entered a final judgment enjoining the federal government from implementing the challenged provisions of the Order as to the plaintiff states for the upcoming midterm elections. The government sought a stay of this injunction from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which was denied, prompting an emergency application to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of the United States granted the stay, holding that the government is likely to succeed on its argument that the District Court lacked jurisdiction because the states lacked standing and their claims were not ripe for adjudication. The Court reasoned that the Order was an internal directive that did not cause concrete or imminent harm to the states, and any alleged injury was speculative and dependent on uncertain future events. The Court also found that the government would likely suffer irreparable harm from the injunction, which interfered with the internal workings of the Executive Branch. As a result, the Supreme Court stayed the District Court’s injunction pending further appellate review. View "Trump v. California" on Justia Law

Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Ellison

2026-08-20T07:31:14-08:00

Several individuals and a nonprofit organization in Minnesota, focused on election integrity, wished to publicly advocate their interpretation that certain felons—specifically those still on supervised release—are constitutionally ineligible to vote in Minnesota. State law, however, allows felons to vote once released from incarceration, regardless of whether they are on parole or probation. Concerned about possible prosecution under a Minnesota statute that criminalizes knowingly false statements about voter eligibility made within 60 days of an election, the plaintiffs sought to continue their advocacy without facing criminal or civil penalties. After the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the group lacked standing to challenge the felon voting law in state court, the plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the election disinformation statute, arguing it violated the First Amendment. In response, the Anoka County Attorney filed a counterclaim, seeking to restrain the plaintiffs from violating the law and to obtain damages. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint and denied a preliminary injunction, concluding that the law could constitutionally restrict their speech. The plaintiffs appealed the denial of a preliminary injunction while the counterclaim remained pending. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the denial of preliminary injunctive relief and found that the plaintiffs had standing due to both actual and imminent injuries. The court held that the statute at issue regulated protected political speech based on its content and was therefore subject to strict scrutiny. The court determined that Minnesota’s law was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, as it both overreached and underreached in its restriction of speech, and also authorized unconstitutional prior restraints. The Eighth Circuit reversed the denial of a preliminary injunction in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for entry of a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiffs. View "Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Ellison" on Justia Law

Public Interest Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Wolfe

2026-08-19T11:00:56-08:00

A nonprofit organization dedicated to election integrity requested a copy of Wisconsin’s voter registration list, seeking access under the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA). Wisconsin, however, is exempt from the NVRA because it has permitted same-day polling-place registration since before August 1, 1994. The state processed the request under its public-records law, which required redaction of birth dates and imposed a fee of $12,500 due to the size of the list. The organization objected to both the fee and the redactions, arguing that Wisconsin’s exemption from the NVRA was unconstitutional. The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin dismissed the case. The district judge held that the plaintiff’s claims—asserting violations of the “equal state sovereignty” principle from Shelby County v. Holder and the “congruence and proportionality” requirement from City of Boerne v. Flores—were not supported by law. While the judge found that the plaintiff had Article III standing due to the alleged financial injury, he expressed doubt about prudential standing but decided the case on the merits, concluding that neither cited Supreme Court decision undermined the validity of Wisconsin’s exemption. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court agreed that the plaintiff had Article III standing but questioned prudential standing, as the legal theories invoked state, rather than individual, rights. Nonetheless, the court bypassed this issue, holding that the NVRA’s exemption for states like Wisconsin does not violate equal state sovereignty or the congruence and proportionality standard. The court emphasized that the exemption relieves, rather than imposes, federal regulatory burdens and that Congress acted under its Elections Clause authority, making City of Boerne inapplicable. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Public Interest Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

Grant v. Belangia

2026-08-18T10:30:31-08:00

A group of registered voters in South Carolina, all under the age of sixty-five, challenged a provision of state law that restricts “no excuse” absentee-by-mail voting to voters sixty-five years of age or older. These plaintiffs argued that the statute unconstitutionally discriminates against them on account of age, in violation of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, and also violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The law at issue allows voters sixty-five and older to vote absentee by mail for any reason, while voters under sixty-five can only do so if they meet specific, narrow criteria such as disability, military service, or certain employment conflicts. The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, where the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants—the South Carolina State Election Commission and related officials—on both constitutional claims. The district court found that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a violation of either the Twenty-Sixth Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause. The plaintiffs appealed this decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the appeal. This court held that the plaintiffs have standing and that South Carolina’s age-based absentee-by-mail voting scheme violates the Twenty-Sixth Amendment because it abridges the right to vote on account of age by providing greater ballot access to older voters. However, the court affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss the Equal Protection claim, as age is not a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause and the plaintiffs did not challenge the law under rational basis or Anderson-Burdick scrutiny. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment on the Twenty-Sixth Amendment claim, affirmed the Equal Protection ruling, and remanded the case for appropriate remedy. View "Grant v. Belangia" on Justia Law

In Re: Petition to Disqualify Adams

2026-08-14T01:23:31-08:00

A former county court judge in Leflore County, Mississippi, sought to run for county court judge in the general election scheduled for November 3, 2026. After filing his qualifying statement of intent, the current judge filed a petition with the Leflore County Election Commission, asserting that the former judge did not meet the residency requirements for candidacy because he had sold his Leflore County home and moved to Grenada County in 2023. The petition argued that the candidate had not resided in Leflore County for the required two years before the qualifying date or before the election date. The Leflore County Election Commission held a hearing, during which the candidate challenged the commission’s jurisdiction to decide candidate qualifications for county court judge. The commission consulted the secretary of state’s office, which indicated the commission had authority to review qualifications under relevant statutes. The commission then voted to disqualify the candidate, removing his name from the ballot. The candidate appealed to the Circuit Court of Leflore County. The circuit court ruled that the election commission did not have jurisdiction to determine the qualifications of a county court judge candidate and ordered the candidate’s name be placed back on the ballot. In the alternative, the circuit court found that the commission had applied the wrong residency standard. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the circuit court’s judgment that the election commission lacked statutory authority to rule on the qualifications of candidates for county court judge, as the relevant statutes specifically excluded such offices from the commission’s jurisdiction. The court vacated as moot the remaining parts of the circuit court’s judgment, found the commission’s exclusion of the candidate improper, and directed that the candidate’s name be returned to the ballot. View "In Re: Petition to Disqualify Adams" on Justia Law

Cathey v. Tanksley

2026-08-14T01:23:22-08:00

The case concerns a closely contested Democratic primary election for alderman of Ward 3 in Senatobia, Mississippi, in which Allen Tanksley defeated Michael Cathey by a single vote. Cathey alleged several irregularities in the handling of absentee ballots, including that some were improperly counted or excluded, that absentee ballots were not properly distinguished from regular ballots, that the ballot box was not properly secured, and that he was denied timely access to examine the ballot box and related materials. Following the election, the Tate County Democratic Executive Committee initially determined that irregularities warranted a new election, but the Chancery Court of Tate County set aside this determination and issued an injunction. Cathey then filed a formal election contest in the Circuit Court of Tate County, alleging procedural and substantive errors affecting the election’s outcome. After a hearing, the circuit court found that Cathey had not met his burden of proof on any claim. The court upheld the validity of a written agreement giving authority over the ballot box to the city clerk, found Cathey was not denied access to relevant materials, and concluded that there was no evidence of fraud or improper ballot tampering. The circuit court declared Tanksley the winner. Cathey appealed to the Supreme Court of Mississippi. The Supreme Court found that the city clerk’s breaking of the ballot box seal, in violation of Mississippi Code Section 23-15-911, constituted a “gross violation” of mandatory election law, creating a loss of confidence in the election’s integrity, especially given the unexplained counting of a contested absentee ballot. The Court held that, even absent proof of fraud, the breach of ballot box security warranted a special election. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the circuit court’s judgment and ordered a new special election for the office. View "Cathey v. Tanksley" on Justia Law

Minnesota Alliance for Retired Americans Educational Fund vs. Simon

2026-08-13T01:23:22-08:00

A nonprofit organization and two registered Minnesota voters challenged the state’s requirement that absentee voters obtain a witness certification in order to cast an absentee ballot. The organization assists its members with the absentee voting process. The plaintiffs argued that the requirement violates two federal laws: the Voting Rights Act, by conditioning the right to vote on a “voucher” from a witness, and the Civil Rights Act’s Materiality Provision, by potentially denying the right to vote based on errors or omissions in witness certifications that are not material to determining voter eligibility. The case began in district court, where the Secretary of State moved to dismiss, arguing the plaintiffs lacked standing and failed to state claims. The district court denied the motion, finding the organization had standing. It ruled that the plaintiffs stated a claim under the Voting Rights Act for unregistered voters and under the Civil Rights Act for registered voters. The Secretary then sought discretionary review. The Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded the organization had standing but held that the witness certification requirement did not violate either federal law, reversing the district court and remanding with instructions to dismiss the case. The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the appeal. It held that the witness certification does not violate the Voting Rights Act for unregistered voters because it does not require proving eligibility by the voucher of another; the witness merely attests to the presentation of residency documentation, not personal knowledge of the voter’s qualifications. The court also held that, as to registered voters, the witness certification is not a paper relating to an “act requisite to voting” under the Civil Rights Act’s Materiality Provision, as it does not pertain to a determination of voter eligibility. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to state claims under either federal law. View "Minnesota Alliance for Retired Americans Educational Fund vs. Simon" on Justia Law

La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott

2026-08-12T15:30:40-08:00

Several organizations and individuals challenged provisions of a 2021 Texas law known as Senate Bill 1, which imposed new requirements on mail-in voting, regulated voter assistance, and restricted compensation for certain election-related activities. The plaintiffs, including advocacy groups and individuals with disabilities, argued that these provisions discriminated against voters with disabilities in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Key facts included reports of rejected mail-in ballots due to missing identification numbers and claims that the law’s requirements created barriers for disabled voters. The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas held a bench trial and found that nine provisions of Senate Bill 1 were inconsistent with the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court permanently enjoined the Texas Secretary of State and various local officials from enforcing these provisions. The defendants, including the Governor of Texas and other state and county officials, appealed the injunction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision in its entirety. The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the identification provisions, as they could not show a substantial risk of future injury to any specific member or demonstrate organizational standing under Supreme Court precedent. The court also found that the plaintiffs’ challenges to voter assistance and compensation provisions were foreclosed by prior Fifth Circuit decisions and failed for lack of standing or on the merits. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court’s grant of permanent injunctive relief was improper and reversed the injunction, declining to interfere with the Texas Legislature’s election regulations. View "La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott" on Justia Law

Ortiz y Pino v. Oliver

2026-08-11T08:02:24-08:00

The plaintiff, a former New Mexico state senator, used leftover campaign funds to make charitable donations, including a $200 contribution to assist a high school student with attending a pre-law program. These donations were made to individuals and organizations that did not qualify as tax-exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. New Mexico’s Campaign Reporting Act (CRA) prohibits most campaign expenditures, but lists certain permitted uses, including donations to 501(c)(3) organizations. After the Secretary of State discovered the $200 donation during a random audit, she determined it violated the CRA and requested the plaintiff to reimburse his campaign fund. The plaintiff refused, arguing that enforcing the CRA in this way violated his First Amendment rights, and the matter was referred to the State Ethics Commission and Attorney General. In the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, the plaintiff sought a declaration that the restriction was facially unconstitutional, and injunctive relief. The district court initially granted a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the CRA for such donations, viewing the plaintiff’s claim as a facial overbreadth challenge and finding it likely to succeed. However, after further proceedings and in light of an affidavit from the Secretary of State, the district court concluded the CRA did not prohibit protected speech, granted summary judgment for the defendant, and denied a permanent injunction. The district court allowed the plaintiff’s as-applied challenge to proceed separately; the plaintiff appealed only the denial of his facial challenge. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the CRA’s prohibition on donations to non-501(c)(3) organizations and individuals facially regulates activity protected by the First Amendment. The court vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings, directing the lower court to determine the appropriate constitutional test and apply it to the CRA’s challenged prohibitions. View "Ortiz y Pino v. Oliver" on Justia Law

ARIZONA ALLIANCE FOR RETIRED AMERICANS V. MAYES

2026-08-07T08:01:29-08:00

Arizona amended its election laws in 2022, introducing two provisions: one requires county recorders to cancel a voter’s registration in their county if the voter registers in a new county (“Cancellation Provision”), and the other criminalizes knowingly providing a “mechanism for voting” to someone registered in another state (“Felony Provision”). Three organizations engaged in voter registration and education activities claimed these provisions would interfere with their efforts, and sought to enjoin enforcement. They argued that the Cancellation Provision would lead to improper removal of voters and that the Felony Provision was vague and could chill their constitutionally protected activities. The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted a preliminary injunction, barring enforcement of both provisions. The Arizona Attorney General appealed. A three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the injunction, finding that the organizations lacked standing for the Cancellation Provision and were unlikely to succeed on the merits regarding the Felony Provision. The case was then reheard en banc after the prior panel’s opinion was vacated. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the organizations lacked standing to challenge the Cancellation Provision because they did not clearly show that it directly affected or interfered with their core activities, as required by FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine. The court further held that the organizations had standing to challenge the Felony Provision due to a credible threat of prosecution, but were unlikely to succeed on the merits, as the statutory context indicated that “mechanism for voting” likely refers only to a ballot or ballot envelope, not to voter registration or education activities. The court vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case. View "ARIZONA ALLIANCE FOR RETIRED AMERICANS V. MAYES" on Justia Law

Osborne v. Logan

2026-07-24T11:33:54-08:00

Two registered voters challenged the language of a school district bond measure prior to the November 2024 election. The Los Angeles Unified School District sought voter approval to issue $9 billion in bonds, repaid by property taxes. The district’s board adopted a ballot label stating the tax rate as “2.5¢ per $100 of assessed valuation,” while the voter information materials described the tax rate as "$25.04 per $100,000." The challengers argued that the ballot label should have used the same unit as the voter information materials, and filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking four specific amendments to the ballot label. Los Angeles County Superior Court denied the petition, holding that the statutory requirement to state the tax rate per $100,000 applied only to voter information materials, not the ballot itself. The court found that the ballot label substantially complied with legal requirements since the tax rate denominator was correctly stated elsewhere. The election proceeded, and the bond measure was approved by voters. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. Although the election had already occurred and the appeal was technically moot, the court exercised its discretion to decide the issue because it was of public interest and likely to recur. The court held that the ballot for a school bond measure must state the tax rate in the same terms as the corresponding tax rate statement mailed to voters, specifically per $100,000 of assessed valuation as required by Elections Code section 9401(c). The judgment denying the petition was reversed, and the trial court was directed to dismiss the petition as moot. The motion to dismiss the appeal was denied, and parties were ordered to bear their own costs. View "Osborne v. Logan" on Justia Law

Landers v. Secretary of State

2026-07-22T12:09:12-08:00

A candidate for Knox County Sheriff submitted the required election petition and consent form, swearing to meet statutory qualifications for the office, including at least two years of supervisory employment experience in law enforcement or corrections. He provided documentation and testimony from his previous employer, the Chattanooga Housing Authority Police Department, confirming his supervisory role over contract officers. A registered voter and deputy sheriff challenged the candidate’s qualifications, particularly contesting the sufficiency of his supervisory experience. At the hearing, the candidate declined to testify, but his former supervisor and a contract officer testified about his supervisory duties. A presiding officer appointed by the Secretary of State heard the challenge and found that the candidate’s position did not constitute sufficient supervisory employment experience under the relevant statute, reasoning that his supervisory authority was limited and primarily over independent contractors rather than employees. The officer recommended that the candidate’s consent form be invalidated. The candidate objected to this recommendation. The Secretary of State issued a final decision, adopting the presiding officer’s findings regarding certification but concluding that the candidate’s supervisory experience as a Criminal Investigator satisfied the statutory requirement. The Secretary of State interpreted supervisory employment experience to mean supervision of personnel as a job responsibility, regardless of whether the supervised individuals were direct employees or contractors. On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the interpretation of the statute de novo and the Secretary of State’s factual findings for substantial evidence. The Court held that the Secretary of State’s interpretation and application of the statute were correct and supported by substantial evidence, and affirmed the decision allowing the candidate to appear on the ballot. View "Landers v. Secretary of State" on Justia Law

REPUBLICAN NATL COMMITTEE v. FONTES

2026-07-17T11:03:25-08:00

The case revolves around whether Arizona’s Secretary of State was required to follow the state’s Administrative Procedure Act (APA) when publishing the Election Procedures Manual (EPM), a comprehensive set of rules governing election procedures. In 2023, the Secretary published a draft EPM, allowed a fifteen-day public comment period, and then submitted a revised version for approval to the Governor and Attorney General, who approved it. The final EPM was issued on December 30, 2023. The Republican National Committee (RNC) challenged the process, arguing that the Secretary had not complied with APA rulemaking requirements, specifically citing the abbreviated comment period and seeking to invalidate the EPM or several of its provisions. Maricopa County Superior Court reviewed the RNC’s claims and granted the Secretary’s motion to dismiss, finding that the EPM was not subject to the APA due to a distinct statutory process outlined in A.R.S. § 16-452. The court also rejected the RNC’s claims that specific EPM provisions conflicted with state and federal law. The RNC appealed, and the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the EPM was subject to the APA and that the Secretary had not substantially complied with its requirements, especially regarding the notice-and-comment period. The Arizona Supreme Court, reviewing the case de novo, vacated the appellate court’s opinion and reinstated the superior court’s dismissal. The Court held that A.R.S. § 16-452 constitutes a comprehensive, self-contained rulemaking process “otherwise provided by law,” exempting the EPM from the APA’s procedures. The EPM’s validity is not contingent on APA compliance. The Supreme Court remanded for consideration of the RNC’s alternative claims, but the main holding was that the EPM is not subject to APA rulemaking requirements. View "REPUBLICAN NATL COMMITTEE v. FONTES" on Justia Law

State v. Mallozzi

2026-07-15T04:03:42-08:00

During the 2015 municipal election in Stamford, a local political committee chairman engaged in submitting fraudulent absentee ballot applications and ballots on behalf of residents who neither completed applications nor voted by absentee ballot. The town clerk, despite knowing it was unlawful, provided voting sets to the chairman and his associates. Investigations revealed that the signatures on several applications did not match the genuine signatures of the supposed applicants, leading to the discovery that multiple fraudulent applications and ballots had been submitted. The case was initially tried in the Superior Court for the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, where the defendant was found guilty on fourteen counts each of false statement in absentee balloting and forgery in the second degree. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request during trial to call an expert witness to rebut the prosecution's handwriting expert. The Appellate Court affirmed the conviction, finding no abuse of discretion, given that the defense failed to timely disclose its intention to call an expert and did not provide meaningful information about the expert's expected testimony. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, the defendant focused on whether denial of his late request to present expert testimony constituted an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court held that the trial court acted within its discretion, as the defense had not demonstrated good cause for the late disclosure and failed to identify the expert or substantiate the expert's proposed testimony. The Court also noted that any alleged surprise regarding the prosecution’s expert testimony was avoidable, since the expert’s overall conclusion was disclosed in the arrest warrant affidavit long before trial. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment. View "State v. Mallozzi" on Justia Law

Dove v. Simmons

2026-07-13T06:08:16-08:00

An individual sought the Democratic Party nomination for a Maryland House of Delegates seat in District 12B for the 2026 primary election. Shortly before filing his candidacy certificate, he changed his voter registration to reflect a residential address within District 12B, although he had long resided at a different address in District 31. The certificate of candidacy listed the District 12B address as his residence. The incumbent delegate and a registered voter of District 12B challenged the candidacy, alleging the candidate was not a resident of District 12B when he filed and made false statements about his address on official documents. The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County initially dismissed the challenge as premature, reasoning that the constitutional residency requirement for delegates applied only six months before the general election, not at the time of filing. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Maryland reversed and remanded, holding the challenge was ripe for adjudication. After an evidentiary hearing on remand, the circuit court found the candidate’s true residence and domicile remained at his longtime District 31 address at the time of filing. The court concluded he had not abandoned that domicile, did not reside at the District 12B address, and had made a material misrepresentation on his certificate of candidacy. The court disqualified him from the ballot. On further direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed. It held that, pursuant to Maryland law, a candidate who materially misrepresents their residential address on a certificate of candidacy invalidates that certificate. The Court clarified that the candidate must provide either a current address or a voter registration address, but only if it is current, and that a false statement about residence warrants disqualification. The Supreme Court also ruled that an attorney from the General Assembly who enters an appearance after the legislative session begins waives the statutory right to postponement under such circumstances. View "Dove v. Simmons" on Justia Law

Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Secord

2026-07-07T05:17:18-08:00

A group sought access to certain court forms used to notify election officials when a person under guardianship has been found incompetent to vote. These forms, known as Notice of Voting Eligibility (NVE) forms, contain personal information about the individual and details about the court’s finding of incompetency. The group submitted public records requests for completed NVE forms held by the Walworth County register in probate, seeking to identify individuals found incompetent to vote. The requests were denied, and the group filed a mandamus action to compel disclosure. The Walworth County Circuit Court denied the request, holding that NVE forms were confidential under Wisconsin law. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals initially reversed, but because of a prior, conflicting published appellate decision (Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Reynolds), the Wisconsin Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration. On remand, the Court of Appeals held it was bound by the Reynolds precedent and affirmed the circuit court’s denial. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case. It clarified the standard for mandamus actions in public records cases, holding that courts should focus solely on whether the requester has a legal right to the records, and not on other traditional mandamus elements. The court concluded that NVE forms are “court records pertinent to the finding of incompetency” and are therefore “closed” under Wisconsin Statute § 54.75, which protects the privacy of individuals in guardianship proceedings. As a result, the forms are exempt from disclosure under the public records law, the group has no legal right to access them, and the writ of mandamus must be denied. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Secord" on Justia Law

Colorado Montana Wyoming State Area Conference of the NAACP v. Smith

2026-07-06T10:31:41-08:00

Following the 2020 presidential election, three individuals—Shawn Smith, Ashley Epp, and Holly Kasun—formed an unincorporated association called the United States Election Integrity Plan (USEIP) to investigate what they believed was widespread election fraud in Colorado. In 2021, USEIP organized volunteers to go door-to-door canvassing, asking voters questions about their voting history and, in some instances, about whom they voted for. The Colorado Montana Wyoming State Area Conference of the NAACP, the League of Women Voters of Colorado, and Mi Familia Vota (collectively, the Voter Organizations) filed suit against USEIP and its founders, alleging that these canvassing activities constituted voter intimidation. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted summary judgment for USEIP, holding that unincorporated associations could not be sued under the statutes invoked: Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. The district court then held a bench trial against the individual defendants. After the plaintiffs presented their case, the district court granted judgment on partial findings for the individuals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c), finding insufficient evidence that any defendant engaged in voter intimidation. The court denied the defendants’ subsequent motion for attorney’s fees. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of USEIP, holding that unincorporated associations can be sued under both Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act and § 1985. The appellate court found that the district court’s exclusion of USEIP significantly narrowed the scope of relevant evidence at trial, affecting the plaintiffs’ substantial rights. The Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for a new trial against all defendants. The related appeal regarding attorney’s fees was dismissed as moot. View "Colorado Montana Wyoming State Area Conference of the NAACP v. Smith" on Justia Law

City of Hammond v Lake County Board of Elections

2026-07-02T12:00:46-08:00

In this case, the City of Hammond and three individual voters challenged Indiana’s use of the “Missouri Plan”—a system in which the governor appoints superior court judges from a list of nominees vetted by a nonpartisan commission, followed by periodic retention elections—in Lake County. They argued that, unlike most other Indiana counties where superior court judges are chosen in open elections, the Missouri Plan in Lake County gives minority voters, who make up over 40% of the voting-age population there, less opportunity than white voters elsewhere in the state to select judges of their choice. Plaintiffs relied on demographic disparities and asserted that the system violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division, entered summary judgment for the defendants. The district court found that Seventh Circuit precedent, specifically Quinn v. Illinois, foreclosed the plaintiffs’ claim, holding that Section 2 does not require any particular office to be filled by election rather than appointment. The district judge also noted contrary circuit precedent in Bradley v. Work, which addressed similar facts, but concluded that Quinn was controlling. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court concluded that, under the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Louisiana v. Callais, Section 2 liability attaches only where circumstances strongly suggest intentional discrimination. The appellate court found no evidence that Indiana’s use of the Missouri Plan in Lake County was motivated by racial discrimination, as the change was prompted by concerns over partisanship and inefficiency in the courts rather than race. The court thus held that Section 2 could not impose liability under these facts and affirmed the summary judgment for the defendants. View "City of Hammond v Lake County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission

2026-06-30T07:15:07-08:00

A group of candidates and political party committees, including then-Senate candidate JD Vance and various Republican campaign committees, challenged federal limits on coordinated campaign expenditures by political parties under the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). These limits restrict the amount a party can spend in direct coordination with a candidate’s campaign. Plaintiffs argued that the restrictions violate the First Amendment, especially given modern developments in campaign finance law and enforcement tools such as earmarking and disclosure requirements. JD Vance maintained standing to challenge the law, as he had an active Statement of Candidacy and a campaign committee, despite later becoming Vice President. The case was first reviewed by the en banc United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which upheld FECA’s coordinated-expenditure limits. The Sixth Circuit relied primarily on the Supreme Court’s 2001 precedent, Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado II), which had previously sustained these limits against First Amendment challenges. However, several Sixth Circuit judges questioned whether Colorado II remained good law in light of more recent Supreme Court decisions, including McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission and Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and ultimately reversed the Sixth Circuit. The Court held that FECA’s limits on political-party coordinated expenditures violate the First Amendment. Applying rigorous scrutiny, the Court determined that the limits are not necessary, narrowly tailored, or proportionate to the government’s interest in preventing circumvention of candidate contribution limits, especially given the effectiveness of existing earmarking rules and disclosure laws. The Court explicitly overruled Colorado II, concluding that subsequent precedents have rendered it obsolete. The judgment of the Sixth Circuit was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission" on Justia Law

Unite for Colo. v. Colo. Dep't of State

2026-06-30T06:32:55-08:00

During the 2020 election cycle, an organization formed with the stated mission of advocating for certain economic and governmental policies in Colorado. The group, overseen by a sole board member and a contractor, spent over $17 million that year, with around $4 million (about 23.4% of its expenditures) directed at supporting or opposing three statewide ballot initiatives. Its activities included funding signature-gathering efforts and contributing to other issue committees involved in those propositions. Members of the public filed a complaint alleging the organization was required to register and disclose as an “issue committee” under Colorado’s campaign finance laws, which apply to groups with a major purpose of supporting or opposing ballot issues. The Elections Division initially dismissed the complaint, interpreting the law to require a major purpose focused on a specific ballot measure, not ballot initiatives generally. The Deputy Secretary of State disagreed, reinstated the proceedings, and, after an administrative hearing, the Administrative Law Judge found the organization had a major purpose of ballot issue advocacy. A Final Agency Order imposed a fine and mandated disclosure. On appeal, the district court reversed, finding the law did not support aggregating the organization’s activities across multiple initiatives. The Colorado Court of Appeals then reversed again, holding that the law permitted aggregation and that the organization’s activities met the major purpose standard, also rejecting the organization’s First Amendment arguments. The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case, interpreting the constitutional definition of “issue committee.” The court held that determining whether an organization has a major purpose of ballot issue advocacy requires a holistic, fact-specific evaluation of its creation, spending, and activities, considering aggregate activity across multiple ballot issues. Applying this standard, the court found that, although the organization was active in ballot issue advocacy, its spending on such activities (less than a quarter of its overall expenditures) did not rise to the level of a major purpose. The Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Unite for Colo. v. Colo. Dep't of State" on Justia Law

Williams v. Nathan

2026-06-30T05:31:39-08:00

Two proposed statewide initiatives in Colorado sought to alter the process and timing of congressional redistricting and to replace the existing congressional district map for the 2028 and 2030 election cycles. Both initiatives were similar in structure and aimed to temporarily allow mid-decade redistricting by amending the state constitution to enable new congressional maps for two election cycles, with authority returning to the independent redistricting commission after the 2030 federal census. The initiatives also included detailed statutory language setting forth the new temporary map to be used, with one initiative designed to favor Democratic candidates and the other designed to favor Republican candidates, according to the briefing. After the proponents submitted final versions of their initiatives, the Title Board, a state body responsible for setting the ballot title and submission clause, held hearings and set titles for each measure. Motions for rehearing alleging violations of the single subject and clear title requirements were denied by the Title Board. Petitioners then appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court, invoking its jurisdiction to review Title Board determinations under state law. The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the actions of the Title Board under a deferential standard, overturning its findings only in a clear case. Upon examining the initiatives, the court concluded that both measures violated the single subject requirement of the Colorado Constitution and applicable statutes. The court held that temporarily allowing mid-decade redistricting and adopting specific new congressional maps for two election cycles were distinct and separate subjects, not necessarily or properly connected. Because the initiatives combined these separate subjects, they were susceptible to log rolling and could mislead voters. The court reversed the actions of the Title Board, ordered the titles stricken, and directed that the measures be returned to their proponents. View "Williams v. Nathan" on Justia Law

CENTER FOR AZ v AZ SECRETARY OF STATE

2026-06-29T09:02:35-08:00

Arizona voters adopted a statute requiring organizations engaging in independent election-related media spending to disclose the identities of major donors and the original sources of funds used for such communications. The law includes an opt-out provision allowing donors to prevent their contributions from being used for campaign media spending, and imposes thresholds for disclosure and reporting. Plaintiffs, consisting of two nonprofit organizations and two anonymous individuals who donate to such organizations, challenged the law’s constitutionality, alleging it violated their rights to free speech and privacy under the Arizona Constitution. The Superior Court for Maricopa County dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a legally valid claim, but permitted an amended complaint to add an as-applied challenge. After defendants again moved to dismiss, the court granted the motion, and the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, finding plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged that the statute was unconstitutional on its face or as applied. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege that the statute is facially unconstitutional under either the Speak Freely Clause or the Private Affairs Clause of the Arizona Constitution. The court developed an Arizona-specific standard for evaluating compelled disclosure laws, requiring that such laws meaningfully further election integrity or transparency and not unreasonably burden protected expression. The court found that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that the statute burdens protected expression in a substantial number of its applications. However, the Supreme Court of Arizona determined that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged an as-applied challenge under the Speak Freely Clause, based on specific allegations of threats and harassment related to campaign media spending. The court affirmed the lower courts’ dismissal of all facial and privacy claims, reversed the dismissal of the as-applied free speech claim, and remanded that claim for further proceedings. View "CENTER FOR AZ v AZ SECRETARY OF STATE" on Justia Law

Watson v. Republican National Committee

2026-06-29T07:15:05-08:00

Mississippi allows certain residents, including college students away from home and senior citizens, to vote in federal elections by absentee ballot. These absentee ballots must be postmarked on or before election day and received by the registrar no more than five business days after the election. In 2024, several Republican-affiliated organizations and individuals, as well as the Libertarian Party of Mississippi, sued the Mississippi Secretary of State and other election officials. They argued that federal election-day statutes require both the casting and receipt of ballots to occur by election day, thereby preempting Mississippi’s law that permits counting absentee ballots received after election day. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi consolidated the cases and granted summary judgment in favor of Mississippi, finding no conflict between federal statute and state law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the federal election-day statutes preempt Mississippi’s law, and required ballots to be received by election day. The Fifth Circuit denied rehearing and rehearing en banc, prompting the defendants to seek review by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the federal election-day statutes do not prevent Mississippi from counting absentee ballots postmarked by election day but received up to five days later. The Court clarified that the federal statutes set the deadline for when votes must be cast, not when they must be received, and that state law governs ballot receipt deadlines. The Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, emphasizing that the statutes do not preempt Mississippi’s practice of counting properly postmarked but late-arriving absentee ballots. View "Watson v. Republican National Committee" on Justia Law

Morin v. City of Burlington

2026-06-26T12:35:29-08:00

Two U.S. citizens who reside and vote in Burlington challenged a city charter amendment that allows noncitizens to vote in school board and school budget elections. The amendment, approved by the Legislature, permits noncitizens who are legal residents of the United States, live in Burlington, and take the Voter’s Oath to participate in these elections, but does not grant them the right to vote in state or federal elections. The plaintiffs argued that, although school elections appear local, they are actually statewide in nature because Burlington’s education budget is funded through the State Education Fund and these votes impact state finances and the interests of Vermonters statewide. The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim. The court found that school elections are local in nature, focusing on issues such as selecting school board members and approving the school budget, and concluded that the noncitizen-voting provision did not implicate the Vermont Constitution’s voter-eligibility requirements for statewide elections. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Court held that the distinction between local and statewide elections depends on which level of government has authority over the election matter. If a question has been lawfully delegated to local government, the election is local; if not, it is statewide. The Court found that Vermont law delegates authority over school board and budget elections to localities. Although education is a matter of statewide concern, the State may constitutionally delegate decision-making over local school budgets to local voters. The plaintiffs did not demonstrate that the delegation was unlawful or that school elections are statewide under the Vermont Constitution. Accordingly, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal of the complaint. The Court held that Burlington school elections are local and the charter amendment allowing noncitizen voting in those elections does not violate the Constitution’s voter-eligibility requirements for statewide elections. View "Morin v. City of Burlington" on Justia Law

Common Cause v. Evnen

2026-06-26T05:08:06-08:00

The case concerned a request from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) for Nebraska’s statewide voter registration list, including sensitive personal information. Before the Secretary of State released the list, a membership organization and a registered voter filed suit, seeking to block or limit the disclosure, alleging that such release would violate Nebraska statutes restricting the dissemination and use of voter information. They argued that the DOJ was not entitled to all the requested data under federal law and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. In the District Court for Lancaster County, the Secretary moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing and had failed to join the DOJ as an indispensable party. The court agreed that the plaintiffs did not have standing, finding that they had not alleged a concrete injury and that concerns over possible future public disclosure or misuse were speculative. The court also found that Common Cause had not adequately pleaded associational standing. However, the court rejected the Secretary’s argument that the DOJ (or the U.S. Attorney General) was an indispensable party. The case was dismissed without prejudice on standing grounds, and the plaintiffs’ motions for a temporary injunction and summary judgment were denied. On appeal, while the matter was pending before the Nebraska Supreme Court, the Secretary released the voter list to the DOJ. The Nebraska Supreme Court determined that the case was moot because the list had already been disclosed, eliminating any live controversy or possibility of meaningful relief. The court declined to apply the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine and dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal. The main holding is that, due to the completed disclosure, the action no longer presented a justiciable issue. View "Common Cause v. Evnen" on Justia Law

United States v. Benson

2026-06-24T11:00:48-08:00

The United States government, acting through the Attorney General, demanded that the Michigan Secretary of State provide an unredacted copy of Michigan’s statewide voter registration list, which includes sensitive personal information like dates of birth, driver’s license numbers, and partial social security numbers. The Secretary of State provided only a version with personal information redacted, citing concerns about the lack of statutory authority for the federal government’s request. The government then filed suit, seeking to compel production of the unredacted list. In the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, the Secretary of State, the State of Michigan, and certain intervenors moved to dismiss the complaint. The district court granted the motions, concluding that Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 did not authorize the federal government’s demand for the unredacted voter file. The government appealed, contesting only the dismissal of its claim under Title III. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The court held that Michigan’s qualified voter file is not a “record” that “comes into the possession” of the Secretary of State within the meaning of Title III, as it is an internally generated database rather than a record acquired from a third party. The court also determined that the government failed to comply with Title III’s procedural requirements for making such a demand, as its letters did not contain both the basis and the purpose for the request as required by statute. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that the Secretary of State did not violate Title III by refusing to provide the unredacted voter file. View "United States v. Benson" on Justia Law

Jackson v. Attorney General

2026-06-23T04:07:41-08:00

Two registered voters in Massachusetts challenged the Attorney General’s certification of an initiative petition designed to overhaul the state’s election system. The petition proposed replacing the existing partisan primaries and separate nomination process for nonparty candidates with a single, all-party primary. In this new system, all candidates, regardless of party affiliation, would appear on one ballot in September, and all voters could vote for any candidate. The two highest vote-getters would advance to the general election, with the option for voters to write in alternative candidates. After the petition was certified by the Attorney General, and sufficient signatures were collected, the measure was transmitted to the House of Representatives by the Secretary of the Commonwealth. As the Legislature did not enact the petition by the required deadline, it became eligible for placement on the statewide ballot, pending the collection of additional signatures. The plaintiffs filed their complaint directly in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, seeking to invalidate the Attorney General’s certification on the grounds that the petition contained “excluded matters” under Article 48 of the Massachusetts Constitution, specifically that it was inconsistent with the “freedom of elections” guaranteed by Article 9 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. A single justice reserved and reported the case to the full Supreme Judicial Court. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the proposed initiative does not significantly interfere with the constitutional rights of voters or candidates, as all candidates still have equal access to the ballot and all voters retain the right to participate fully, including through write-ins. Applying rational basis review, the court found the petition reasonably related to legitimate state interests and affirmed the Attorney General’s certification, remanding for entry of judgment in accordance with its decision. View "Jackson v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Finfer v. Attorney General

2026-06-22T04:11:46-08:00

Eight Massachusetts voters challenged the Attorney General’s summary of an initiative petition proposing a reduction of the state personal income tax rate from 5% to 4%. The summary stated that the proposed law would lower the tax rates on (1) personal taxable income consisting of interest and dividends, and (2) personal taxable income “other than interest, dividends or capital gain income, such as wages and salaries.” The plaintiffs argued that this language incorrectly informed voters that the long-term capital gains tax rate would remain unchanged, when in fact the petition would also lower that rate due to the way current law links the tax rate for most long-term capital gains to the rate for other income. After the Attorney General certified the petition and issued the summary, proponents collected over 85,000 signatures. The Secretary of the Commonwealth confirmed the required signatures and transmitted the petition to the House of Representatives. The plaintiffs then filed this action in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, seeking a declaration that the summary was unfair under Article 48 of the Massachusetts Constitution, and to enjoin the Secretary from placing the petition on the ballot. The proponents intervened, and the case was reserved and reported to the full Supreme Judicial Court on stipulated facts. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the Attorney General’s summary was not “fair” as required by Article 48 because it materially misstated the effect of the proposed law by excluding the reduction in the long-term capital gains tax rate, which would occur under current law. The Court concluded that this was not a minor omission but a significantly misleading statement likely to affect voters’ understanding. The Court ordered that the petition could not appear on the 2026 Statewide election ballot and remanded for entry of judgment enjoining the Secretary from placing the measure on the ballot. View "Finfer v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

State v. Meta Platforms, Inc.

2026-06-18T08:20:42-08:00

Several members of the public submitted requests to a large social media company seeking information about political advertisements displayed on its platforms to users in Washington State. The company did not dispute that its responses to these requests failed to comply with Washington’s Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA) and the law’s implementing regulations, as it did not provide all the required information. The State of Washington, through the Attorney General’s Office, filed suit against the company, alleging multiple violations of the FCPA’s disclosure requirements. The case was heard in King County Superior Court, where both sides moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment for the State, holding the company liable for violating the FCPA, and imposed maximum statutory penalties for each advertisement for which the required information was not disclosed. The court found the violations to be intentional, trebled both the civil penalties and attorney fees, and granted an injunction. On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s rulings on liability, statutory interpretation regarding penalty calculation, and the constitutionality of the penalty assessed. Before the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, the company argued that the FCPA’s disclosure requirements violate the First Amendment as applied, that the penalty was improperly calculated, and that the penalty violated the Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause. The Supreme Court, with no single majority opinion, affirmed the company’s liability under the FCPA, holding that the law as applied does not violate the First Amendment. The court also let the penalty judgment stand, as no majority view existed to reverse or modify it, and further held by a majority that the penalty does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Thus, the judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed, upholding both the liability finding and the civil penalty. View "State v. Meta Platforms, Inc." on Justia Law

Jackson v. Jones

2026-06-12T11:31:33-08:00

A candidate for the Republican nomination for Governor of Georgia, who was not the incumbent, challenged a unique provision of Georgia’s campaign finance law. This law allows only the incumbent Governor and Lieutenant Governor to establish and control so-called “leadership committees” with the ability to receive unlimited contributions and coordinate spending directly with their campaigns, advantages not available to challengers or other candidates. The challenger entered the 2026 gubernatorial primary and quickly discovered that his opponent, the sitting Lieutenant Governor, had amassed substantial campaign resources through such a leadership committee, while the challenger remained subject to standard contribution limits. After filing suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, the challenger sought a preliminary injunction to stop the Lieutenant Governor’s leadership committee from raising or spending further funds in support of his campaign. The district court initially issued a temporary restraining order, then, after further proceedings, granted a preliminary injunction, holding that the challenger was likely to succeed on his claim that the law violated the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech and that the leadership committee’s actions could be fairly attributed to state action. The district court determined that the law’s favoritism toward select officials could not be justified and that the harm to the challenger was irreparable. However, the injunction was stayed pending appeal. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction. The court held that the selective fundraising advantage granted to certain incumbents by the leadership committee statute was unconstitutional under the First Amendment, as it imposed different contribution limits on candidates for the same office without sufficient justification. The court also found that the leadership committee’s conduct constituted state action, making it subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "Jackson v. Jones" on Justia Law

Transparent Election Initiative v. Knudsen

2026-06-09T13:37:07-08:00

A group seeking to advance a constitutional initiative in Montana proposed an amendment that would restrict the powers of “artificial persons”—such as corporations, nonprofits, and similar entities—by excluding the authority to engage in political spending to influence voters. The initiative also specified that violations would result in loss of state-conferred privileges, subject to possible reinstatement by the legislature. The proponents submitted a proposed ballot statement summarizing the measure for voters. The Montana Attorney General rejected the proponents’ statement, citing concerns that it misleadingly focused only on corporations, did not fully explain the scope of affected entities, and failed to adequately define key terms. The Attorney General then issued a revised summary. The proponents challenged this revised statement in the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, arguing that the Attorney General exceeded his statutory authority and that his statement was inaccurate, argumentative, or prejudicial. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana found that the Attorney General acted within his authority in rejecting and revising the ballot statement, as long as he identified statutory deficiencies and the new statement complied with requirements of clarity, neutrality, and accuracy. The Court held that most of the Attorney General’s revised statement met statutory requirements, except for one sentence that could mislead voters regarding the revocation of constitutional rights. The Court ordered that this sentence be removed and certified the amended statement to the Secretary of State. The main holding is that, after removing the noncompliant sentence, the Attorney General’s revised ballot statement sufficiently satisfied statutory requirements for impartiality and clarity as required by Montana law. View "Transparent Election Initiative v. Knudsen" on Justia Law

Walker v. Taylor

2026-06-05T01:20:26-08:00

A dispute arose following the April 22, 2025 Democratic primary runoff election for mayor of the City of Canton, Mississippi. The contest centered on whether residents of recently annexed areas—Kingston Subdivision, Westside Trailer Park, and the Trails of Madison—were appropriately allowed to vote. Although these areas had been annexed and their inclusion in municipal elections was upheld in Peco Foods, Inc. v. City of Canton (In re Enlarging City of Canton), concerns were raised that updates to the Statewide Elections Management System (SEMS) were incomplete, potentially disenfranchising voters. On the day before the election, a petition sought to delay certification and allow regular ballots for residents of the affected areas. The Madison County Circuit Court instead permitted eligible voters from those areas to cast affidavit ballots. After the election, in which Tim Scott Taylor won by forty-three votes, Comelia Walker requested a ballot-box examination and subsequently filed several petitions for judicial review and election contest in the Circuit Court. Walker alleged that failures in SEMS updates, lack of notification, and various ballot irregularities materially affected the election’s integrity. The circuit court, after hearing evidence, found that Walker failed to prove any eligible voters had been denied the right to vote, nor could she demonstrate that irregularities affected the election outcome. The circuit court denied and dismissed Walker's petitions with prejudice. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed Walker’s claims of disenfranchisement, equal protection violations, and ballot irregularities. The Court concluded that affidavit voting did not disenfranchise voters, that no evidence supported equal protection violations, and that the alleged irregularities were either minor or unsupported by evidence. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, holding that no statutory departures occurred sufficient to destroy the election’s integrity or make the will of the voters impossible to ascertain. View "Walker v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Allen v. Milligan

2026-06-03T06:45:05-08:00

In this matter, Alabama enacted a congressional district map in 2023 that included only one district in which Black voters constituted a majority. Plaintiffs challenged the map, arguing that it diluted Black voting strength in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment. The essential factual dispute centered on whether Alabama’s map failed to provide an additional district offering Black voters an opportunity to elect their preferred candidates, and whether the State had intentionally avoided implementing a remedial map previously ordered by the court. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama first enjoined the use of Alabama’s 2023 congressional map, finding it violated Section 2 because it did not include an additional Black-opportunity district and concluding that the State’s actions also violated the Fourteenth Amendment as a deliberate refusal to comply with prior remedial requirements. After the Supreme Court vacated this injunction in light of its decision in Louisiana v. Callais, the District Court issued a new injunction on similar grounds. State officials then applied to the Supreme Court for a stay of the District Court’s order. The Supreme Court of the United States granted Alabama’s application for a stay, holding that the State is likely to succeed on the merits. The Court concluded that the District Court failed to apply the updated standards for Section 2 liability announced in Callais, particularly the requirement that a plaintiff’s alternative map must perform “just as well” with respect to all constitutionally permissible districting criteria, and erred in its evaluation of alleged discriminatory intent. The Supreme Court stayed the District Court’s order pending further proceedings, emphasizing the importance of not altering election rules close to an election. View "Allen v. Milligan" on Justia Law

Healey vs. State

2026-05-12T12:30:05-08:00

After the Missouri legislature enacted a new congressional redistricting map in 2025, two groups of residents challenged its constitutionality. The residents argued that the map violated article III, section 45 of the Missouri Constitution, which requires congressional districts to be comprised of contiguous territory, to be as compact as possible, and to have nearly equal populations. Their claims focused particularly on districts 4, 5, and 6, alleging lack of compactness, improper splitting of Kansas City communities, and that a voting tabulation district (KC 811) was assigned to two congressional districts, violating contiguity and equal population requirements. The Circuit Court of Jackson County consolidated the two cases and held a bench trial. After reviewing extensive expert and lay testimony, statistical measures of compactness, and evidence regarding county and municipal splits, the circuit court found that the 2025 Map was more compact than prior maps, satisfied contiguity and equal population requirements, and did not violate the constitutional standards. The circuit court rejected claims regarding community splits and alternative maps, emphasizing its role was not to weigh policy preferences but to apply constitutional directives. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the circuit court’s factual findings with deference and applied de novo review to legal questions. The Court held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the 2025 Map clearly and undoubtedly violated article III, section 45. The Court emphasized that statistical and historical comparisons supported the circuit court’s findings, and that departures from compactness, if any, were minimal and justified by recognized factors. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, upholding the constitutionality of the 2025 Map. View "Healey vs. State" on Justia Law

Quinn v. Secretary of State, State of Georgia

2026-05-11T06:02:38-08:00

Two Georgia voters, William T. Quinn and David Cross, independently analyzed Georgia’s voter registration list by comparing it with the United States Postal Service’s National Change of Address database. Believing they had found evidence that the Secretary of State was not properly maintaining the voter rolls as required by the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) and state law, they notified the Secretary, requesting that potentially ineligible voters be flagged and notified. When the Secretary did not respond, the plaintiffs filed suit, asserting that this alleged failure undermined their confidence in the election process and risked diluting their votes. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed the case for lack of Article III standing. The district court found that the plaintiffs’ claimed injuries—undermined confidence in elections and risk of vote dilution—were generalized grievances common to all Georgia voters, not injuries particularized to the plaintiffs themselves. The court reasoned that any voter could express similar concerns based on the state’s alleged noncompliance with the NVRA, and that such concerns were too speculative to confer standing. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries were not particularized, as the supposed harm—loss of confidence in the electoral process—equally affected all Georgia voters. The court concluded that merely discovering or believing in government error, even after personal investigation, does not transform a generalized grievance into a particularized injury sufficient for federal court standing. Thus, the plaintiffs lacked standing, and the dismissal was affirmed. View "Quinn v. Secretary of State, State of Georgia" on Justia Law

Scott v. McDougle

2026-05-08T06:19:10-08:00

The case concerns the process by which a proposed constitutional amendment, authorizing partisan gerrymandering of congressional districts in Virginia, was submitted to the voters. The General Assembly approved the proposed amendment during a disputed special session in October 2025, after voting in the general election for the House of Delegates had already begun. Approximately 1.3 million votes had been cast before the General Assembly’s first vote on the amendment. The General Assembly then approved the proposal again in the 2026 regular session, and the amendment was put to a popular vote, ultimately passing by a narrow margin. The new map, contingent on the amendment’s approval, would have significantly shifted the partisan balance of Virginia’s congressional delegation. The Circuit Court of Tazewell County reviewed challenges to the constitutional amendment process, focusing on whether the requirements of Article XII, Section 1 of the Virginia Constitution, which governs the procedure for amending the state constitution, were properly followed. The central issue was whether the intervening general election required by the Constitution occurred after the General Assembly’s first vote on the amendment but before the second, thus giving voters the intended opportunity to influence the process. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the legislative process used to advance the proposed amendment violated Article XII, Section 1 of the Virginia Constitution because the first legislative vote occurred after voting in the general election had already begun. The court concluded that the “general election” includes the entire period when votes are cast, not just Election Day, and strict compliance with the constitutionally mandated procedure is required. As a result, the referendum and the amendment were declared null and void. The court affirmed that the existing, nonpartisan congressional maps remain in effect for the upcoming elections. View "Scott v. McDougle" on Justia Law

Paden v. Rayfield

2026-05-07T07:48:06-08:00

This case involves challenges to the ballot title certified by the Oregon Attorney General for Initiative Petition 64 (2026), which proposes to add a provision to the Oregon Constitution. Under current law, individuals charged with crimes who are found unfit to aid and assist in their defense cannot proceed to trial and may be committed for restoration of fitness, but such commitment is limited to a maximum period based on the seriousness of the charge. The proposed measure would require these individuals, if found to require a hospital level of care due to public safety concerns, to be committed to a secure state-funded facility until a court determines they are fit or no longer require such care—removing the current statutory limit on the duration of their commitment. After the Attorney General certified the ballot title, petitioners—both as Oregon electors and as the chief petitioner for IP 64—filed timely challenges. They argued that the caption and the “yes” result statement of the certified ballot title were inaccurate and misleading. Specifically, they contended that the language incorrectly stated that such defendants “cannot be prosecuted,” when, in reality, prosecution is merely paused during the restoration process, and that the ballot title failed to inform voters that the measure would eliminate statutory time limits on commitment, allowing for potentially indefinite detention. The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon agreed with the petitioners. The court found that the caption and the “yes” result statement did not substantially comply with the requirements of ORS 250.035(2), as they mischaracterized the status of prosecution and failed to identify a major effect of the measure. The court referred the ballot title back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Paden v. Rayfield" on Justia Law

Amadasun v. Armstrong

2026-05-01T14:41:48-08:00

A candidate for the South Windsor town council in the November 2025 municipal election challenged the town clerk’s decision regarding the application of revisions to the town charter. During the same election in which council members were chosen, voters also approved, by referendum, changes to the charter that altered the party composition rules for the council, reducing the maximum number of members who could be from the same political party from six to five. The town clerk determined that these new limits applied immediately to the 2025 election, even though meeting minutes from the Charter Revision Commission indicated the changes would not take effect until 2027. As a result, the clerk declared a Republican candidate, rather than the plaintiff (a Democrat who otherwise would have won under the prior rules), as the winner of the final council seat. A lawsuit was filed in the Superior Court for the judicial district of Hartford under statutes providing expedited review for those aggrieved by rulings of election officials in municipal elections. The plaintiff argued that the clerk’s decision to apply the new charter revisions to the 2025 election was erroneous. The trial court dismissed the action, concluding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the clerk’s decision was not a “ruling of an election official” within the meaning of the relevant statutes. On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court addressed whether the clerk’s determination constituted a “ruling of an election official” for the purposes of the statutes governing election disputes. The court held that the town clerk’s decision to apply the newly adopted charter provisions to the current election was indeed a ruling of an election official. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. The decision clarified that applying or interpreting laws affecting the determination of election outcomes falls within the statutory jurisdiction for expedited election challenges. View "Amadasun v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

In re: Election Contest of Highland School Bond Referendum

2026-05-01T06:03:42-08:00

A bond measure election was conducted by a school district to fund improvements, requiring 60% approval to pass. On election day, due to a ballot distribution mistake at one precinct, ballots including the bond measure were given to all voters, including those residing outside the district. Later, officials corrected the error, but evidence indicated that up to 70 ballots with the measure were cast by unqualified voters. The measure ultimately passed with 61.3% approval. Following the election, the contest was brought before the Washington County Election Contest Board (“contest court”) based on the allegation of “illegal votes.” The contest court rejected the challenge, reasoning that even if all votes from the affected precinct were excluded, the bond measure would still pass by the required majority. The contestants appealed to the Iowa District Court for Washington County, where the district court found that the contest was not based on misconduct by precinct officials but on illegal votes, and concluded the contestants failed to comply with Iowa Code section 62.5(2)(e), which requires a statement naming the persons alleged to have voted illegally. The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s interpretation of the statutory requirements for election contests. The court held that under Iowa law, the right to contest an election is strictly statutory, and contestants must strictly comply with the statutory provisions necessary to confer jurisdiction. Because the appellants did not provide the names of the persons alleged to have voted illegally as required by Iowa Code section 62.5(2)(e), their election contest could not proceed. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling. View "In re: Election Contest of Highland School Bond Referendum" on Justia Law

Louisiana v. Callais

2026-04-29T22:15:05-08:00

After the 2020 census, Louisiana redrew its congressional districts, enacting a map (HB1) with only one majority-black district. Plaintiffs challenged this map in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, arguing that it diluted black voting power in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The court agreed, finding a likely Section 2 violation and ordering the state to add a second majority-black district. To avoid a court-imposed map, the legislature enacted a new map (SB8) with a second majority-black district, which connected distant black populations across the state. The new SB8 map was then challenged as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana (a three-judge court). The court found that race predominated in the drawing of SB8’s District 6 and that the state could not justify its actions under the Equal Protection Clause. The court concluded that the state had failed to show that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act required the creation of an additional majority-black district or that compliance with the Act was a compelling interest. The court therefore held SB8 unconstitutional. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States addressed whether compliance with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act can ever justify intentional race-based districting. The Court held that Section 2, properly interpreted, requires liability only when there is a strong inference of intentional discrimination, not merely disparate impact. The Court also clarified that a plaintiff’s illustrative maps must satisfy all the state’s legitimate districting goals without using race as a predominant factor and that evidence of racially polarized voting must be disentangled from partisan affiliation. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that Louisiana’s SB8 map was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander because Section 2 did not require a second majority-black district, and no compelling interest justified the use of race. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Callais" on Justia Law

Honey v. Lycoming Co. Offices of Voter Svcs.

2026-04-28T10:46:52-08:00

A resident of Lebanon County submitted a request under Pennsylvania’s Right-to-Know Law (RTKL) to obtain the cast vote records (CVRs) for each precinct and the central tabulator used in the 2020 General Election in Lycoming County. The Lycoming County Office of Voter Services denied the request, asserting that CVRs constituted the “contents of ballot boxes and voting machines,” which are exempt from public disclosure under Section 308 of the Election Code. Following administrative appeal, the Office of Open Records upheld the denial based on affidavits that characterized CVRs as the digital equivalent of individual ballots. The case was then appealed to the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas. The trial court determined that the original requester lacked standing but allowed three Lycoming County voters to intervene. The court found that “contents of ballot boxes and voting machines” referred only to physical ballots and the mechanical workings of voting machines, not to digital data or CVRs. It ordered disclosure of the CVRs, finding no violation of ballot secrecy, especially given data randomization. The Department of State and Voter Services appealed, and the Commonwealth Court reversed. The Commonwealth Court concluded that CVRs fell within the meaning of “contents” and that voting machines, as used in the Election Code, included electronic systems like those in Lycoming County. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and reversed the Commonwealth Court. It held that CVRs are not the “contents of ballot boxes and voting machines” as those terms are used in Section 308 of the Election Code. Therefore, CVRs are not exempt from disclosure and are required to be made public under the Election Code’s provisions for public access to election records. The Court clarified that disclosure of CVRs, as randomized in Lycoming County, does not violate the constitutional requirement of ballot secrecy. View "Honey v. Lycoming Co. Offices of Voter Svcs." on Justia Law

PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC. V. NAGO

2026-04-28T08:02:19-08:00

A nonprofit organization focused on election integrity requested that Hawaii’s State Elections Office provide a statewide list of registered voters, citing a provision in the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) that allows for public inspection of certain election records. Hawaii’s State Elections Office declined to provide the statewide list and recommended that the organization seek separate county-level lists from each of the four County Clerks, as the Office does not maintain or distribute such a combined list. After receiving this response, the organization sought injunctive and declaratory relief in federal court, arguing that the NVRA entitled it to the statewide voter list. The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii dismissed the action, holding that the organization’s claim was not ripe because it had not first requested the information from the counties. The court found there was no Article III jurisdiction, as the organization had not suffered a concrete injury and could still pursue county-level records. The district court allowed time for the organization to amend its complaint if its claims became ripe, but the organization declined, maintaining that the NVRA required disclosure by the State. Final judgment was entered, and the organization appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the organization did have standing, as the denial of information requested under the NVRA constitutes a sufficient injury for Article III purposes. The appellate court also found the claim to be ripe, as the State had made clear it would not provide the requested information. However, on the merits, the Ninth Circuit held that the NVRA does not require disclosure of a statewide voter list, as such a list is not a record “concerning the implementation” of list-maintenance programs under the statute. The court therefore affirmed dismissal, but on the merits, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the claim with prejudice. View "PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC. V. NAGO" on Justia Law

Moore v. State of Alabama ex rel. Mayor Sims

2026-04-24T05:30:50-08:00

Three individuals, Barbara Moore, Vanessa Reed, and Christine Burrell, served as members of the Lipscomb City Council, each representing a different district. After a city council meeting in May 2025, the council rejected a proposed redistricting plan and resolved to keep district boundaries unchanged. However, in the August 2025 municipal election, the election was conducted using the rejected redistricting map. Despite this, the three council members were sworn into office for their respective districts under the original boundaries. Mayor Robin Sims, claiming the council members no longer met residency requirements due to the district lines used in the election, filed for a temporary restraining order (TRO), a permanent injunction, and a writ of quo warranto, seeking their removal from office. The Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division, issued the TRO, then granted the writ of quo warranto and the permanent injunction, finding that the council members did not meet the statutory residency requirements and declaring their seats vacant. The court denied the council members’ motion to dismiss and their subsequent postjudgment motion, holding that they were unlawfully occupying their seats. The court also denied their request to stay enforcement of its judgment pending appeal. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed whether the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the statutory requirement that an informant provide security for costs at the commencement of a quo warranto action was not satisfied. The bond posted was solely for the injunction, not for the quo warranto proceeding. Because this requirement is jurisdictional, the trial court’s judgment was void. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the judgment and remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to vacate its judgment. View "Moore v. State of Alabama ex rel. Mayor Sims" on Justia Law

MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. LOPEZ

2026-04-22T08:31:11-08:00

A nonprofit political advocacy organization challenged a set of municipal campaign finance rules adopted by a California city after a history of local government scandals involving city officials and local business interests. The ballot measure, approved by 82% of city voters, imposed per candidate contribution limits for individuals and political action committees, as well as aggregate contribution limits, for city elections. The measure was adopted in response to a series of incidents where city officials accepted valuable gifts or travel from local business figures and subsequently took official actions arguably benefiting those providers. A district attorney’s investigation and report, media coverage, and a resident survey indicating strong public demand for accountability preceded the measure. After the measure took effect, the advocacy organization sued in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, arguing that the per candidate and aggregate contribution limits violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Both sides filed for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for the city, holding that the per candidate limits were justified by a sufficiently important governmental interest and closely drawn to that interest, and that the aggregate limits did not impermissibly discriminate against candidates who also supported ballot measures. The court also upheld a related gift ban, but the plaintiffs did not appeal that aspect. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the city established an important governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, and that the contribution limits were closely drawn, not unconstitutionally low, and comparable to other cities’ limits. The court further found that the aggregate limits were constitutional, as they did not apply to ballot measure committees. Thus, the city’s campaign finance limits were upheld. View "MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. LOPEZ" on Justia Law

State ex rel. Hicks v. Adams Cty. Bd. of Elections

2026-04-10T05:08:44-08:00

An Adams County elector challenged the voter registration of the county prosecuting attorney, alleging that the prosecutor did not actually reside at his registered address in Adams County but instead lived with his family in Hamilton County. The challenger, a qualified elector from Clermont County, submitted evidence including property records, water usage data, and vehicle registrations to support his claim that the prosecutor’s declared residence was not legitimate. The Adams County Board of Elections denied the challenge on two occasions, each time relying solely on its own records and declining to hold a hearing. After the initial challenge was denied, the challenger sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court of Ohio to cancel the prosecutor’s voter registration. The court denied the writ, finding that the relief had not been properly pleaded and declining to address the alternative request for a hearing. In response, the challenger filed a new challenge with the board and, after a second denial without a hearing, again sought mandamus relief from the Supreme Court of Ohio, this time explicitly requesting an order compelling the board to conduct a hearing on his challenge. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that neither claim preclusion nor issue preclusion barred the action, as the new challenge and denial were distinct from the earlier proceeding and the factual question of residency had never been adjudicated in a quasi-judicial hearing. The court found that the challenger had standing under the statute and that the board abused its discretion by denying the challenge without a hearing when its own records were insufficient to resolve the dispute. The court granted a writ of mandamus ordering the Adams County Board of Elections to hold a hearing within ten days on the challenge. The court also denied the board’s request for sanctions against the challenger. View "State ex rel. Hicks v. Adams Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

State v. Rosen

2026-04-09T05:08:43-08:00

The defendant was convicted of voting in more than one state during the 2016 general election. He maintained residences in both New Hampshire and Massachusetts and was alleged to have voted in Holderness, New Hampshire by absentee ballot and in Belmont, Massachusetts in person. The State introduced evidence of his voting history in both states from 1996 to 2018 and sought to exclude statements by an acquaintance, William Botelho, who had previously admitted to voting in the defendant's name in Massachusetts. The Grafton County Superior Court allowed the State to admit the defendant’s prior voting records under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 404(b) and excluded Botelho’s statements as inadmissible propensity evidence, also denying the defendant’s request for a Richards hearing regarding Botelho’s potential testimony. After a jury found the defendant guilty, the Superior Court denied his post-trial motions for dismissal based on territorial jurisdiction, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and to set aside the verdict. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire found that the Superior Court erred in admitting the defendant’s prior voting history because the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value, especially since the prior alleged acts were nearly identical to the charged crime. The court also held that evidence of Botelho’s confession to voting in the defendant’s name in the 2016 election was not evidence of other bad acts under Rule 404(b) and should not have been categorically excluded. The Supreme Court further ruled that, if Botelho asserts his Fifth Amendment rights on remand, the trial court must hold a Richards hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s denial of the defendant’s motions regarding territorial jurisdiction, sufficiency, and weight of the evidence, but reversed the conviction due to the evidentiary errors and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Rosen" on Justia Law

Ocasio v. Comision Estatal de Elecciones

2026-04-01T12:30:04-08:00

Two individuals challenged the Puerto Rican electoral commission and its acting president, arguing that restrictions on early and absentee voting during the 2020 general election unlawfully burdened the right to vote for citizens over sixty, especially considering the COVID-19 pandemic. In August 2020, they brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking relief on constitutional grounds. The district court promptly issued a preliminary injunction, then a permanent injunction, allowing voters over sixty to vote early by mail. After judgment, the plaintiffs were awarded nearly $65,000 in attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. While the fee motion was pending, Puerto Rico’s government was in the process of debt restructuring under Title III of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA). The restructuring plan, confirmed in January 2022, discharged claims against Puerto Rico arising before the plan’s effective date unless creditors filed proof of claim by a set deadline. Defendants argued in the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico that the attorneys’ fees award was subject to the plan’s discharge and enjoined from collection, because the plaintiffs had not filed a timely administrative expense claim. The district court rejected this, finding the fee award unrelated to the bankruptcy case. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded that the claim for attorneys’ fees, though arising from post-petition litigation, related to events before the plan’s effective date. The court held that because the plaintiffs had actual knowledge of the restructuring proceedings but did not file a timely proof of claim, their fee claim was discharged under the confirmed plan and enjoined from collection. The First Circuit reversed the district court’s order, holding that the discharge injunction applied to the attorneys’ fee award. View "Ocasio v. Comision Estatal de Elecciones" on Justia Law

Montana Mining Assn. v. Knudsen

2026-03-31T14:34:41-08:00

A group of business and industry associations challenged the Montana Attorney General’s March 6, 2026 determination that Proposed Ballot Measure No. 10 was legally sufficient to proceed in the initiative process. Ballot Measure No. 10 sought to amend state law by defining “artificial persons” and excluding “political spending power” from the rights granted to such entities. The challengers argued that the measure was facially unconstitutional because it restricted political speech, was vague, and improperly conditioned benefits on the waiver of constitutional rights. The challenge was brought directly to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana under its original jurisdiction. The Attorney General had performed only a procedural review, declining to address the measure’s substantive constitutionality due to a prior order by the First Judicial District Court in Ellingson v. State, which had enjoined the statutory provision that would have allowed such substantive review. The petitioners requested the Supreme Court to require the Attorney General to review the measure’s constitutionality and to reverse his finding of legal sufficiency. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the Attorney General does not have authority to consider the substantive constitutionality of proposed ballot initiatives during legal sufficiency review under current law and precedent. The Court reaffirmed that pre-election constitutional challenges to initiatives are generally disfavored, as the people have a constitutional right to use the initiative process. Because Ballot Measure No. 10 had not yet qualified for the ballot, the Court declined to address the merits of the constitutional arguments, finding such review would be advisory. The Court denied and dismissed the petition, and also denied as moot motions to intervene and to file amicus briefs. View "Montana Mining Assn. v. Knudsen" on Justia Law

Get Loud Arkansas v. Jester

2026-03-31T07:31:21-08:00

Get Loud Arkansas and other plaintiffs challenged an Arkansas State Board of Election Commissioners rule that required all voter registration applications to have a handwritten or “wet” signature, excluding digital or electronic signatures. The controversy arose after Get Loud developed an online voter registration tool, which allowed applicants to sign digitally and resulted in a significant increase in voter registrations, particularly among young voters. Following publicity about the tool’s success, the Arkansas Secretary of State instructed county clerks to reject electronically signed applications. Despite an opinion by the Arkansas Attorney General affirming the legality of electronic signatures, the Board adopted a rule requiring wet signatures, which forced Get Loud to modify its operations, reduce the effectiveness of its registration efforts, and expend additional resources. The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas, arguing that the rule violated the Materiality Provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 52 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(B), which prohibits denying the right to vote based on immaterial errors or omissions on voter registration applications. The district court found that the rule likely violated federal law and granted a preliminary injunction, preventing enforcement of the wet signature requirement. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that Get Loud had standing due to direct interference with its core activities. The court concluded that Arkansas’s rule was not material in determining voter qualifications, as election officials did not use signature type to assess eligibility and had previously accepted both wet and digital signatures without issue. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s injunction, holding that enforcing the rule violated the Materiality Provision and that the balance of equities favored the plaintiffs. View "Get Loud Arkansas v. Jester" on Justia Law

Simmons v. Dove

2026-03-30T13:18:29-08:00

A candidate, John Calvin Dove, Jr., submitted a certificate of candidacy to run for the Democratic Party nomination for the Maryland House of Delegates in Legislative District 12B for the 2026 gubernatorial election. Gary Simmons challenged Dove’s qualifications, asserting that Dove was not a resident and did not maintain a place of abode in Legislative District 12B at the time he filed his candidacy certificate. Simmons further alleged that Dove had misrepresented his residency on his voter registration and his certificate of candidacy, arguing that these actions rendered Dove ineligible and his candidacy certificate invalid. The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County scheduled a hearing on Simmons’s petition, but Dove moved to dismiss, arguing that the constitutional residency requirement only needed to be met six months before the general election, a date which had not yet arrived. The circuit court agreed with Dove, finding the challenge premature and dismissing Simmons’s petition with prejudice, without taking evidence on Dove’s residency or place of abode. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case. The court held that Simmons’s petition was not premature as to his claims under the Election Law Article, which require that a candidate be lawfully registered to vote and reside in the legislative district at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. The court found that such a challenge is ripe for adjudication at the time of filing. The Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing and a decision on the merits of Simmons’s challenge before set deadlines. The costs were assessed against Dove. View "Simmons v. Dove" on Justia Law

Missouri State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People vs. State

2026-03-24T12:30:09-08:00

Several individuals and two organizations challenged a Missouri law enacted in 2022, House Bill No. 1878 (HB 1878), which amended the state’s voting requirements by mandating that voters present specific forms of photo identification or cast a provisional ballot under certain conditions. The organizations—the Missouri State Conference of the NAACP and the League of Women Voters of Missouri—along with the individuals, claimed that these provisions unconstitutionally burdened the right to vote and violated equal protection guarantees. Their petition for declaratory and injunctive relief was filed in the Circuit Court of Cole County. After a bench trial, the circuit court found that none of the individual plaintiffs had shown an actual or threatened injury, as each had either successfully voted since the law’s enactment or their alleged difficulties were speculative. The court also determined that the organizations had not established standing, either through a diversion of resources or by identifying any specific member adversely affected by the law. Despite these findings, the circuit court proceeded to rule on the merits, concluding the law was constitutional. The Supreme Court of Missouri, which has exclusive jurisdiction in cases involving the validity of state statutes, reviewed the matter. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s determination that the appellants lacked standing—meaning none of the plaintiffs demonstrated a concrete, personal stake in the outcome. The Supreme Court held that, because there was no justiciable controversy before the court, the circuit court erred by reaching and deciding the merits of the constitutional claims. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed that portion of the judgment addressing the merits of the constitutional challenge. The case was thus resolved solely on the issue of standing. View "Missouri State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People vs. State" on Justia Law

State vs. League of Women Voters

2026-03-24T12:30:07-08:00

In 2022, Missouri enacted new legislation that imposed several restrictions on activities related to voter registration and absentee ballot applications. The law prohibited the payment or compensation of individuals for soliciting voter registration applications unless they were government employees, required anyone who solicited more than ten voter registration applications to register with the state, and mandated that solicitors be at least eighteen years old and registered Missouri voters. Additionally, the law completely banned the solicitation of voters to obtain absentee ballot applications. These provisions affected organizations whose work involves encouraging and assisting individuals in registering to vote and informing them about absentee voting. The Circuit Court of Cole County reviewed a lawsuit brought by two civic organizations challenging these provisions as unconstitutional. The organizations argued the restrictions violated rights to free speech, association, and due process under the Missouri Constitution. The court issued a preliminary injunction, and after trial, permanently enjoined enforcement of the provisions, finding them to be facially unconstitutional restrictions on core political speech, overbroad, content- and viewpoint-based, and unconstitutionally vague. The court concluded the state had not shown the provisions were narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the statutory provisions imposed facially unconstitutional restrictions on core political speech protected by article I, section 8 of the Missouri Constitution. The Court found the provisions neither served a compelling state interest nor were narrowly tailored, and instead captured substantial amounts of protected speech unrelated to any compelling interest. The judgment declaring the provisions unconstitutional was affirmed. View "State vs. League of Women Voters" on Justia Law

Luther vs. Hoskins

2026-03-24T12:30:05-08:00

After the results of the 2020 United States census were certified to the governor of Missouri in August 2021, the Missouri General Assembly established new congressional districts in 2022, as required by the state constitution. In September 2025, the General Assembly passed House Bill 1 (“HB 1”), which repealed the 2022 congressional districts and established new ones, even though no new census had been certified. The governor signed HB 1 into law. A group of plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of HB 1, arguing that article III, section 45 of the Missouri Constitution restricts the General Assembly to one redistricting following each decennial census certification. The Circuit Court of Cole County heard the case on stipulated facts and rejected the plaintiffs’ claim, finding that HB 1 was a valid exercise of the General Assembly’s legislative authority. The circuit court declared that article III, section 45 does not prevent the General Assembly from redistricting more frequently than once per decade. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the constitutional question de novo. The Court held that article III, section 45 obligates the General Assembly to redistrict upon certification of the decennial census but does not expressly prohibit mid-decade or more frequent congressional redistricting. The Court explained that, absent express constitutional restraint, the General Assembly’s legislative power remains plenary. The Court also found that the word “when” in section 45 acts as a trigger for mandatory redistricting but does not serve as a limitation on the legislature’s authority to redistrict at other times. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, upholding HB 1 as constitutional and concluding that article III, section 45 does not restrict the General Assembly’s power to conduct mid-decade congressional redistricting. View "Luther vs. Hoskins" on Justia Law

State ex rel. Hicks v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections

2026-03-24T06:30:45-08:00

An individual submitted a written objection to a county board of elections, challenging a candidate’s petition to appear on the primary-election ballot for county commissioner. The objection claimed that one part-petition supporting the candidate’s declaration of candidacy contained elector signatures not properly witnessed by the circulator, as required by law. The individual provided a photograph as evidence and referenced relevant election statutes. The part-petition in question, however, accounted for only 17 signatures, and the candidate’s overall petition still contained more than the 50 valid signatures required for ballot qualification, regardless of the challenged signatures. After receiving the objection, the Clermont County Board of Elections did not schedule or conduct a protest hearing. At a special meeting, the board determined that the objection did not meet the statutory requirements for a valid protest under Ohio Revised Code sections 3501.39 and 3513.05. The board reasoned that even if all signatures on the challenged part-petition were invalidated, the candidate would still qualify for the ballot. The board informed the objector that a hearing was not warranted. The objector then filed a mandamus action in the Supreme Court of Ohio, seeking to compel the board to hold a protest hearing. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the objector failed to establish a clear legal right to a mandatory hearing or a corresponding legal duty for the board because the protest, on its face, could not have resulted in the candidate’s removal from the ballot. The court further concluded that granting mandamus would compel a vain act. The court denied the writ of mandamus, denied the board’s request for sanctions, and granted the board’s motion for leave to file amended evidence. View "State ex rel. Hicks v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

State ex rel. Spencer v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Elections

2026-03-20T13:00:45-08:00

A candidate seeking the Republican Party nomination for U.S. Representative from the Sixth Ohio Congressional District submitted a petition with signatures from several counties, including Stark and Carroll. The Stark County Board of Elections, after reviewing the signatures and receiving certified determinations from other relevant county boards, initially validated one additional signature beyond those accepted by the Carroll County Board, enabling the candidate to meet the minimum requirement for ballot access. A protest was filed arguing the board lacked authority to revisit other counties’ signature determinations and that not enough valid signatures existed. At a protest hearing, both parties presented evidence about specific disputed signatures. The Stark County Board of Elections held a hearing on the protest, as required by Ohio law. At this stage, the board considered evidence regarding the validity of disputed signatures, including some that had previously been declared invalid by the Carroll County Board. The board found three additional signatures valid (including two from Carroll County), bringing the total valid signatures above the threshold. The board accordingly denied the protest and certified the candidate for the primary ballot. The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. The court held that while the Stark County Board could not, during the initial precertification review, override other counties’ signature determinations, the board did have authority during a formal protest hearing to consider evidence and make its own determinations regarding the validity of any signatures, including those from other counties. The court found that the board did not abuse its discretion or clearly disregard applicable law in denying the protest and certifying the candidate. The Supreme Court of Ohio denied the requested writ of prohibition. View "State ex rel. Spencer v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Martinez v. Jensen

2026-03-18T12:05:33-08:00

An individual submitted a candidate filing form to appear on the ballot for Douglas County sheriff in the May 2026 primary election. Alongside his filing, he provided a letter from the director of the Nebraska Law Enforcement Training Center certifying that he possessed an “inactive” Nebraska law enforcement officer certificate. His certificate had been active from 1984 to 2009 but was inactive at the time of filing. The Douglas County Republican Party objected to his candidacy, arguing that Nebraska law required a candidate to hold an “active” certificate. The objection was supported by a memorandum and legislative materials suggesting legislative intent to require active certification. The Douglas County election commissioner reviewed the objection and determined that the candidate did not meet the requirements to run for sheriff, based on the inactive status of his law enforcement certificate. The candidate then filed an emergency application for special proceedings with the Nebraska Supreme Court, seeking to overturn the commissioner’s decision and compel his placement on the ballot. The Republican Party intervened, asserting that legislative history and statutory context supported the requirement of an active certificate. The Supreme Court of Nebraska heard the case as a special, summary proceeding under state election law. The court held that the relevant statute required only that a candidate “possess a law enforcement officer certificate,” and made no distinction between active and inactive status. The court found the statutory text to be unambiguous and declined to consider legislative history or administrative regulations. Accordingly, the court concluded that possession of an inactive certificate satisfied the statutory qualifications for candidacy. The judgment ordered that the candidate’s name appear on the ballot for the sheriff’s office. View "Martinez v. Jensen" on Justia Law

Randle v. Ivy

2026-03-13T01:17:01-08:00

A candidate filed to run in the Democratic primary for city marshal in Okolona, Mississippi, listing an in-city address. His opponent contended that the candidate did not truly reside within the city limits for the two years required before the election. Evidence was presented suggesting the candidate held homestead exemptions outside the city and had not lived at the addresses he claimed. The candidate argued he met the residency requirement, providing some documentation and his own testimony. Additional testimony from a city official cast doubt on whether the candidate had actually lived at the in-city address before the qualifying deadline. The Okolona Democratic Executive Committee initially found the candidate qualified. The opponent then petitioned the Chickasaw County Circuit Court for review. A special judge presided and, after a hearing, found the candidate failed to prove two years’ residency in the city as required by law, giving weight to evidence of out-of-city homestead properties and the lack of credible proof of in-city residence. The judge disqualified the candidate from the primary ballot. The candidate appealed the disqualification order to the Supreme Court of Mississippi. Meanwhile, both the primary and general elections took place, and the candidate was not on either ballot. The candidate also attempted a post-primary challenge, but did not pursue an appeal in time. The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the candidate’s appeal under the preprimary-qualification statute was moot since the elections had already occurred and the statute provides no remedy after the fact. The Court also found that substantial evidence supported the judge’s finding that the candidate did not meet the two-year residency requirement. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the lower court’s decision. View "Randle v. Ivy" on Justia Law

Kendrick v. Knudsen

2026-02-27T13:35:56-08:00

A group of petitioners proposed a constitutional amendment, designated as Ballot Issue 8 (BI-8), which would add a new section to the Montana Constitution. This amendment would explicitly recognize a fundamental right to initiative and referendum and set forth procedural protections to ensure the timely, impartial, and unburdened exercise of those rights. BI-8 also contains limits on governmental interference, including a prohibition on the use of government resources to support or oppose ballot measures. The Attorney General determined that BI-8 was legally insufficient, arguing it violated the Montana Constitution’s separate-vote requirement by effecting multiple, unrelated constitutional changes. The Attorney General also appended a fiscal statement to BI-8, based on speculative litigation costs, despite the fiscal note indicating zero fiscal impact. The Montana Attorney General’s legal-sufficiency determination was challenged in the Supreme Court of the State of Montana under its original jurisdiction. The main arguments centered on whether BI-8 improperly combined multiple unrelated constitutional subjects and whether the Attorney General had statutory authority to append a fiscal statement when the fiscal note showed no fiscal impact. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that BI-8 constituted a single constitutional amendment because its provisions were closely related and collectively served to define and protect the right to initiative and referendum. The Court explained that procedural protections and government-resource limitations were integral components of the proposed right, not separate constitutional subjects. The Court further held that the Attorney General lacked authority to append a fiscal statement since the fiscal note did not indicate a fiscal impact. As a result, the Court reversed the Attorney General’s determination, struck the fiscal statement, and ordered the Attorney General to prepare ballot statements for submission to the Secretary of State. View "Kendrick v. Knudsen" on Justia Law

Amadasun v. Armstrong

2026-02-25T08:31:49-08:00

A candidate for town council in South Windsor challenged the town clerk’s decision regarding the application of newly approved charter revisions following the November 2025 municipal election. The charter revisions, approved by referendum on election day, reduced the maximum number of town council members from any one party from six to five. During the election, six Democratic candidates received more votes than any Republican candidate. The plaintiff, a Democrat, received the sixth highest total among his party’s candidates. After the election, the town clerk determined that the newly approved “bare majority” rule applied immediately, which resulted in a Republican candidate, who received fewer votes, being seated instead of the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed suit in the Superior Court for the judicial district of Hartford, claiming he was aggrieved by the town clerk’s application of the charter revisions to the 2025 election results. He argued that this constituted a ruling of an election official under Connecticut General Statutes §§ 9-328 and 9-371b. The trial court dismissed the case, holding that the town clerk’s actions did not constitute a “ruling of an election official” as required by the statutes, reasoning that the clerk was merely applying the law after votes were tallied. On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed whether the town clerk’s decision constituted a ruling of an election official for purposes of expedited judicial review under the relevant statutes. The Supreme Court held that the town clerk’s decision to apply the new charter revisions in determining the outcome of the election was indeed a ruling of an election official. The court concluded that this action involved interpreting and applying legal requirements central to the election process. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Amadasun v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

Alaska Policy Forum v. Alaska Public Offices Commission

2026-02-13T11:00:56-08:00

A nonprofit corporation focused on public policy issues published several materials criticizing ranked-choice voting in Alaska ahead of a 2020 statewide election that included a ballot proposition proposing to adopt ranked-choice voting and other election reforms. These materials included a press release announcing an educational campaign, a video posted on the nonprofit’s website and YouTube channel, a press release about a report on the effects of ranked-choice voting, and a blog post. The communications did not explicitly mention the ballot proposition by name but referred to ranked-choice voting and the upcoming election. A complaint was filed with the Alaska Public Offices Commission (the Commission), alleging that the nonprofit failed to comply with Alaska’s campaign finance laws by not registering, not reporting expenditures, and not including “paid for by” disclosures on its communications. The nonprofit acknowledged spending approximately $643 on related activities. The Commission determined that the nonprofit’s communications qualified as regulated “express communications” because, in context, they could only be interpreted as exhortations to vote against the ballot proposition. The Commission found violations but waived any penalty. The nonprofit appealed to the Superior Court for the Third Judicial District, Anchorage, challenging the statutory interpretation, the application of the law, and the constitutionality of the statutes as vague and violative of the First Amendment. The superior court affirmed the Commission’s order, holding that the statutory standards were reasonably applied, were not unconstitutionally vague, and withstood First Amendment scrutiny under exacting review. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska held that the nonprofit’s communications triggered reporting and disclosure requirements. The court ruled that the statutes, as narrowed by agency interpretation, were not unconstitutionally vague and that the disclosure and reporting requirements were substantially related to the government’s interest in an informed electorate. The judgment was affirmed. View "Alaska Policy Forum v. Alaska Public Offices Commission" on Justia Law

Reed v. Yang

2026-02-12T09:31:33-08:00

A candidate for the Arkansas House of Representatives, District 92, was certified to appear on the Republican primary ballot. Another Arkansas citizen, who did not reside in District 92, sued to have the candidate declared ineligible based on a past guilty plea to a felony public trust crime. The plaintiff sought to prevent election officials from counting or certifying any votes cast for the candidate. The Pulaski County Circuit Court considered the statutory framework that allows any Arkansas citizen to bring an action to enforce eligibility requirements for public office if the responsible prosecuting attorney fails to act. The court found that the prosecuting attorney knew of the candidate’s prior conviction and failed to act, and that the plaintiff, as a citizen, had standing. The court ruled the candidate ineligible to run or hold office and ordered that votes for the candidate not be counted. The court denied the plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees and expenses. The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case. It affirmed the circuit court’s findings that the plaintiff had standing, that the prosecuting attorney’s failure to act was sufficient, and that the candidate was ineligible under the plain language of Arkansas’s statutory disqualification provisions for those pleading guilty to public trust crimes, even if records were sealed. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s evidentiary rulings. On cross-appeal, the Supreme Court held that the statute mandates an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses to a prevailing citizen plaintiff. Thus, it reversed the denial of fees and remanded for further proceedings on that issue. The Supreme Court’s disposition was to affirm on the direct appeal and reverse and remand on the cross-appeal. View "Reed v. Yang" on Justia Law

Gibbons v. Gibbs

2026-02-11T11:30:26-08:00

The case concerns the non-reappointment of a local general registrar of elections in Lynchburg, Virginia. The plaintiff, previously appointed unanimously by a bipartisan electoral board, reapplied for her position after her term expired in 2023. By that time, the board’s partisan makeup had shifted to include two Republicans and one Democrat, reflecting state law. The board interviewed four candidates, including the plaintiff, but ultimately appointed a different candidate who was a registered Republican. The plaintiff, describing herself as an independent, alleged her non-reappointment was due to partisan bias rather than job performance. Following the board’s decision, the plaintiff sued the board and its two Republican members, alleging First Amendment violations tied to political animus. The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia dismissed the claim against the board itself on sovereign immunity grounds, but allowed the suit against the individual members to proceed. After a jury trial, the verdict favored the defendants. The plaintiff then appealed, raising concerns about jury selection procedures and the exclusion of certain evidence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the appeal. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in managing voir dire, including its refusal to allow more pointed questioning about potential jurors’ political affiliations and beliefs. The Fourth Circuit also determined that the plaintiff had not preserved most evidentiary challenges for appellate review, as she failed to make sufficient proffers or obtain definitive rulings on excluded evidence. For the limited evidentiary exclusions properly preserved, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion. Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Gibbons v. Gibbs" on Justia Law

DAY V. WARDLAW

2026-02-11T11:02:47-08:00

A candidate for the Arkansas House of Representatives was challenged by his opponent, who argued that she was ineligible to run for office due to a prior disposition in a 2018 hot-check case. The challenger claimed that the opponent had been found guilty of violating the Arkansas Hot Check Law, which, under state constitutional and statutory provisions, would render her ineligible for election. The evidence included a district court docket showing a disposition labeled “GUILTY – BOND FORFEITURE,” as well as payment of fines, fees, and restitution related to the charge. The opponent did not contest the existence of the underlying case but denied that she had been convicted or found guilty. The case was first heard in the Pulaski County Circuit Court. After a hearing that included testimony from court and law enforcement personnel about the court’s procedures, and review of the district court records, the circuit court concluded that the bond forfeiture was not an admission of guilt. The court found that the opponent had neither entered a plea nor been found guilty by the court. The circuit court therefore held that she had not been convicted of an infamous crime or a public trust crime under Arkansas law, and denied the challenger’s petition for declaratory judgment and mandamus. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the record and the circuit court’s findings under a clearly erroneous standard. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that a bond forfeiture, without a plea or factual finding of guilt, does not constitute a conviction or render a candidate ineligible under Article 5, Section 9 of the Arkansas Constitution or the relevant statutes. The Supreme Court rejected the challenger’s remaining arguments and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. View "DAY V. WARDLAW" on Justia Law

Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Millis

2026-02-10T14:30:42-08:00

A nonprofit organization dedicated to election integrity, along with two individual members, filed administrative complaints with the Wisconsin Elections Commission, alleging that the Commissioners themselves had failed to properly enforce certain aspects of federal election law regarding voter-ID requirements and management of voter registration lists. The Commission, citing ethical concerns about adjudicating complaints against itself, declined to review the complaints on their merits but suggested alternative remedies, such as referral to a district attorney or appeal to a state court. Dissatisfied, the organization and its members filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, seeking to compel the Commission to address their complaints under federal law. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that neither the organization nor its members had Article III standing because they failed to show a concrete injury. The plaintiffs were permitted to amend their complaint, but upon doing so, the district court again dismissed the action, finding that their alleged injuries were intangible and insufficient to establish standing under federal law. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that alleged procedural violations of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) did not constitute a concrete injury in fact necessary for Article III standing, as there was no historic or common-law analog for suing the government merely for failing to follow statutory procedures. The court further determined that HAVA did not create a private right of action enforceable through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the plaintiffs’ claims of organizational or associational standing were inadequately supported. The Seventh Circuit thus affirmed the dismissal for lack of standing. View "Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Millis" on Justia Law

Kohls v. Ellison

2026-02-09T08:30:54-08:00

Two individuals, a political commentator and a state legislator, brought suit against Minnesota officials to challenge a state statute that criminalizes the dissemination of “deep fake” content intended to influence elections. The law applies to realistic depictions that could mislead a reasonable person into believing a public figure engaged in speech or conduct they did not. The commentator created an AI-generated video of Vice President Harris, which he labeled as parody with a clear disclaimer. The legislator shared the same video without any disclaimer. Both plaintiffs argued that the statute infringed their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. After the complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, the district court found that the commentator lacked standing because the only videos he posted were labeled as parody and thus not covered by the statute. The court concluded that the legislator did have standing, since she shared content that could plausibly be seen as a deep fake under the law. However, the court denied her motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding she had unreasonably delayed in seeking relief—waiting over sixteen months after the statute’s enactment without sufficient explanation. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the commentator did not demonstrate a credible threat of prosecution or show any evidence of injury, including from third parties. The court also determined that the legislator’s delay in seeking a preliminary injunction undermined her claim of irreparable harm, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying extraordinary relief. The Eighth Circuit left open the possibility of further proceedings on the merits, including a permanent injunction, but affirmed the denial of preliminary relief. View "Kohls v. Ellison" on Justia Law

Public Interest Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Wooten

2026-01-16T11:30:21-08:00

A nonprofit organization based in Virginia, which advocates for election integrity, requested access to South Carolina’s statewide voter registration list from the state’s Election Commission. The request was made under the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), which generally requires states to make certain records about voter list maintenance available for public inspection and copying. South Carolina’s Election Commission denied the request, citing a state law that restricts disclosure of the voter list to individuals registered to vote within the state. The nonprofit responded by notifying the Election Commission that this refusal violated the NVRA and, after receiving a reiteration of the Commission’s position, filed a federal lawsuit seeking disclosure of the list. The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina reviewed the case. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to the nonprofit, concluding that the NVRA requires disclosure of the voter list and preempts the conflicting state law. The district court ordered the Election Commission to disclose the list. The Election Commission then moved for reconsideration, but the district court denied this motion. The Election Commission appealed both the grant of summary judgment and the denial of reconsideration. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. On appeal, the Election Commission argued for the first time that the nonprofit lacked Article III standing to sue under the NVRA. The Fourth Circuit held that standing is a threshold jurisdictional issue and that the record lacked sufficient factual findings on standing, as the issue was not previously addressed in the district court. The Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the nonprofit has standing to bring the suit. The merits of the case were not addressed on appeal. View "Public Interest Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Wooten" on Justia Law

Bost v. Illinois Bd. of Elections

2026-01-14T09:15:05-08:00

Illinois law provides that election officials must count mail-in ballots postmarked or certified no later than election day, as long as those ballots are received within two weeks after election day. Congressman Michael Bost and two other political candidates filed suit against the Illinois State Board of Elections and its executive director, asserting that counting ballots received after election day violates federal statutes that set a single election day for federal offices. The plaintiffs alleged that the challenged law would require them to expend additional campaign resources, potentially harm their reputations, and deprive them of a fair electoral process. Congressman Bost, in particular, claimed he would need to extend campaign activities and monitoring efforts for two additional weeks, incurring costs and risking a reduction in his margin of victory. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the case, concluding that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the injuries alleged—such as increased campaign costs and potential reputational harm—were speculative or voluntarily incurred. The Seventh Circuit emphasized that Congressman Bost had won his prior election with a significant margin and found the plaintiffs’ injuries to be neither concrete nor particularized enough to support standing. The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that Congressman Bost, as a candidate for office, does have standing to challenge the rules governing vote counting in his election. The Court reasoned that candidates possess a concrete and particularized interest in the integrity and legality of the electoral process, which is distinct from the generalized interest of voters. The judgment of the Seventh Circuit was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Bost v. Illinois Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

In re Rogers

2026-01-13T15:14:35-08:00

A candidate for Justice of the Supreme Court sought to participate in the Texas Republican primary by submitting a ballot application to the party chair. The application was rejected as deficient, specifically due to concerns about the validity and sufficiency of the submitted signatures. The candidate disputed the rejection, arguing both that his original application met requirements and that he cured any alleged defects by submitting an amended application after the statutory deadline. The timing of the submissions was central: the original application was filed just hours before the deadline, and the amended materials were submitted several days after the deadline had passed. After the application was rejected, the candidate sought temporary injunctive relief in a state district court. The trial court denied this request, and the candidate did not appeal the denial or seek emergency relief from the court of appeals. Instead, he pursued a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court of Texas, arguing that the party chair had a ministerial duty to accept his amended application and certify him as a candidate. The Supreme Court of Texas denied the petition for writ of mandamus. The court held that mandamus is inappropriate where there are genuinely disputed material facts, and noted that the trial court had ruled against the candidate on the core factual dispute regarding the sufficiency of his signatures. Further, the court concluded that the law does not require election officials to accept amendments to ballot applications after the statutory deadline, especially when initial submissions occur at the very end of the filing period. The court found no violation of a ministerial duty or clear abuse of discretion by the party chair and thus denied the extraordinary relief requested. View "In re Rogers" on Justia Law

Transparent Election Initiative v. Knudsen

2026-01-06T14:19:12-08:00

A petitioner sought a declaratory judgment regarding the legal sufficiency of a proposed constitutional ballot initiative, known as Ballot Issue 4. This initiative aimed to amend the Montana Constitution to limit the powers and privileges of "artificial persons"—including corporations, nonprofit corporations, limited liability companies, unincorporated associations, and certain foreign entities—by expressly restricting their ability to engage in election and ballot issue activities. The initiative would revoke all powers previously granted to artificial persons under Montana law, regrant only those necessary for lawful business or charitable purposes, and specifically prohibit election-related activities except for certain political committees. The petitioner contended that all provisions of the initiative were integral to a unified purpose: preventing artificial persons from participating in political spending. The Montana Attorney General, supported by amici, determined that Ballot Issue 4 was legally insufficient because it violated the separate-vote requirement of Article XIV, Section 11, of the Montana Constitution. According to the Attorney General, the initiative encompassed multiple changes that were not closely related, including broad revocations and regrants of powers to artificial persons, and affected diverse areas of law beyond the stated intent. The petitioner challenged this determination, arguing that the initiative constituted a single, unified scheme and that none of its provisions could sensibly be considered separately. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana exercised original jurisdiction to review the Attorney General’s legal sufficiency determination. The Court held that Ballot Issue 4 violated the separate-vote requirement because it proposed more than one substantive constitutional change—specifically, both limiting artificial persons’ powers to those expressly provided and revoking and regranting powers in a manner that extended beyond election-related activities. The Court affirmed the Attorney General’s rejection of the initiative and denied the petitioner’s request to declare it legally sufficient. View "Transparent Election Initiative v. Knudsen" on Justia Law

Walsh vs. City of Orono

2026-01-01T02:19:39-08:00

A vacancy was created on the Orono City Council in November 2024 when a councilmember resigned with more than two years remaining in his term. At the time, the City of Orono did not have a special-election ordinance. The mayor appointed a replacement to fill the seat. Subsequently, in February 2025, the city council enacted a special-election ordinance and adopted a resolution to hold a special election to fill the remainder of the term. Dennis Walsh, who had appointed the replacement, petitioned the Hennepin County District Court under Minnesota Statutes section 204B.44 to quash the special election. He argued the relevant statute required the appointed councilmember to serve the remainder of the term because no special-election ordinance was in place at the time of the vacancy, and that holding a special election would improperly remove the appointee in violation of the Minnesota Constitution. The City of Orono and its city clerk opposed the petition, asserting statutory authority for their actions. The Hennepin County District Court denied Walsh’s petition, finding that the city was authorized to hold a special election and that passage of the ordinance after the vacancy did not violate the statute or constitution. Walsh sought accelerated review. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that claims challenging the special election were properly raised under section 204B.44. Substantively, the court determined Minnesota Statutes section 412.02, subdivision 2a, permits a statutory city to enact and apply a special-election ordinance after a vacancy is filled by appointment, so long as more than two years remain in the term. Further, holding a special election in these circumstances does not constitute an unconstitutional removal of an inferior officer under article VIII, section 5, of the Minnesota Constitution. View "Walsh vs. City of Orono" on Justia Law

Un del Pueblo Entero v. Nelson

2025-12-31T16:30:12-08:00

After the Texas Legislature passed the Election Protection and Integrity Act of 2021 (“S.B.1”), a sweeping law that amended numerous aspects of the state’s election procedures, multiple groups of plaintiffs—including civil rights and voter advocacy organizations—challenged thirty-eight provisions of the law. They alleged violations of various constitutional amendments, the Voting Rights Act (VRA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act, naming state officials including the Texas Secretary of State and Attorney General as defendants. In the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, the defendants moved to dismiss on grounds of sovereign immunity and lack of standing. The district court addressed the motions on a provision-by-provision basis, concluding that the Secretary and Attorney General were sufficiently connected to the enforcement of most challenged provisions to overcome sovereign immunity under Ex parte Young, and that plaintiffs had standing to sue. It denied the motions to dismiss for the majority of the claims, although it dismissed others as moot, for lack of standing, or for failure to state a claim. The defendants appealed the denials. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held it had appellate jurisdiction over the interlocutory sovereign immunity appeals. On the merits, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. It held that the VRA claims were not barred by sovereign immunity. For the constitutional and other statutory claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court determined that the Secretary of State is a proper defendant only for those provisions she directly enforces—such as those involving the design of forms and sanctioning of registrars—and not for those enforced by other officials. Similarly, it held the Attorney General could be sued only for one provision authorizing civil penalties. The court affirmed standing for claims against provisions enforced by these officials. View "Un del Pueblo Entero v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Wygant v. Lee

2025-12-10T16:14:27-08:00

After the 2020 census, Tennessee’s General Assembly redrew the state House and Senate legislative maps. Two voters, Gary Wygant and Francie Hunt, challenged these new maps. Wygant, a resident of Gibson County, argued the House map violated the state constitution by splitting more counties than necessary to comply with federal law. Hunt, a Davidson County voter, asserted the Senate map violated the state constitution’s requirement that multi-district counties’ Senate districts be consecutively numbered, because Davidson County’s new districts were not. The case was initially heard by a three-judge panel in the Davidson County Chancery Court. At trial, the panel allowed only Wygant’s district-specific challenge (focused on Gibson County) and Hunt’s claim regarding Davidson County’s Senate districts to proceed. The court found Wygant had standing only as to the Gibson County split and dismissed his broader challenge. The court ruled that the House map was constitutional, finding the state’s actions justified given federal requirements. However, the panel found Hunt had standing and declared the Senate map unconstitutional due to the misnumbering of Davidson County’s districts. The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case. It held that Wygant had standing only to challenge the split of Gibson County, not the entire House map. The Court concluded that although Wygant demonstrated it was possible to draw a map that split fewer counties, he did not prove the Gibson County split was unnecessary to comply with federal law or lacked a rational or legitimate basis. The Court further held that Hunt did not suffer an injury in fact from the Senate map’s numbering, and therefore lacked standing. As a result, the Court affirmed the trial court’s rejection of Wygant’s district-specific challenge, reversed the finding that Hunt had standing, vacated the judgment declaring the Senate map unconstitutional, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wygant v. Lee" on Justia Law

In re Recall of Olsen

2025-12-04T11:45:03-08:00

A registered voter in Pacific County, Washington filed a recall petition against an elected county commissioner, alleging two violations of the Open Public Meetings Act (OPMA) in connection with executive sessions held to discuss litigation or potential litigation following two inmate deaths at the county jail. The petition claimed the commissioner attended executive sessions on several dates without legal counsel present, as required by law, and accused her of disregarding public input and misrepresenting the decision-making process leading to the creation of a new jail services department. The Pacific County Superior Court held a sufficiency hearing and found both charges in the recall petition factually and legally sufficient, thus permitting the recall to proceed. The petitioner relied primarily on county meeting minutes and metadata from prepared statements to support the allegations, while the commissioner challenged the accuracy and reliability of the minutes and argued there was no evidence of intent to violate the law. Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington considered the sufficiency of each charge de novo. The court found that the evidence for some meetings contradicted the allegations about the absence of legal counsel, and for others, although legal counsel was not listed in the minutes, there was no evidence of intentional violation. The petitioner’s supporting exhibits only showed the commissioner received OPMA training, not that she intended to violate the Act. Regarding the second charge, the court found the allegations lacked specific facts about the date, location, and nature of the alleged misconduct and did not cite a law or standard making the conduct unlawful. The Supreme Court of Washington held both charges in the recall petition were factually and legally insufficient and reversed the superior court’s decision. View "In re Recall of Olsen" on Justia Law

KNIGHT v FONTES

2025-12-04T09:00:25-08:00

Four Arizona voters, each residing in a different geographic voting district, challenged the constitutionality of the statute governing the retention election process for Arizona Court of Appeals judges. The statute, A.R.S. § 12-120.02, divides the state into four geographic voting districts, limiting which voters may participate in the retention elections for particular appellate judges. The plaintiffs argued that, because Court of Appeals judges have statewide precedential authority, all Arizona voters should be permitted to participate in their retention elections. They alleged that the district-based system violated both the Free and Equal Elections Clause and the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Arizona Constitution. In the Superior Court in Maricopa County, the State moved to dismiss the complaint, raising arguments including lack of standing and the constitutionality of the statute. The superior court granted the motion to dismiss. It found that § 12-120.02 did not violate the Free and Equal Elections Clause because there was no complete denial of the right to vote, and that the Constitution’s design did not require statewide participation in all judicial retention elections. The court also rejected the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause claim, holding that the statute treated all similarly situated voters within each district equally, and no class was treated differently from another similarly situated class. On direct review, the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona affirmed the superior court’s dismissal. The court held that the Free and Equal Elections Clause is only implicated where there is a complete denial of the right to vote or unequal weighting of votes, neither of which were present here. It also held that the one-person, one-vote principle does not apply to judicial retention elections. Regarding the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause, the court found that all voters within each geographic district are treated equally, so the statute did not violate the state constitution. View "KNIGHT v FONTES" on Justia Law

Voter Reference Foundation v. Torrez

2025-11-25T12:03:25-08:00

A nonprofit organization dedicated to promoting electoral transparency operates a website that republishes voter registration data collected from state agencies. The group obtained New Mexico’s voter data through a third party and published it online, including information such as names, addresses, party affiliation, and voting history. After the website highlighted discrepancies in the state’s voter rolls, New Mexico’s Secretary of State publicly questioned the group’s motives and the lawfulness of its actions. The Secretary referred the group to the Attorney General for criminal investigation under state statutes that restrict the use and sharing of voter data. The group’s subsequent requests for updated voter data were denied. After the state’s refusal, the organization filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that New Mexico’s restrictions were preempted by the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) and violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court issued a preliminary injunction preventing prosecution, which was later stayed by the Tenth Circuit. After cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court found that the NVRA preempted New Mexico’s restrictions and enjoined criminal prosecution. The court rejected most of the group’s remaining constitutional claims but, following a bench trial, held that the state engaged in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination by refusing further data requests. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the NVRA preempts New Mexico’s restrictions on the use and sharing of voter data, holding that state laws that prevent broad public disclosure of voter data conflict with the NVRA’s requirements. The Tenth Circuit did not reach the First Amendment claims, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Voter Reference Foundation v. Torrez" on Justia Law

DeLanis v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville

2025-11-24T13:30:16-08:00

An attorney who chaired the Davidson County Election Commission was also employed at a law firm that represented the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County. The Election Commission became involved in a dispute over whether a citizen-initiated tax-repeal referendum should be placed on the ballot, a measure opposed by the city government and certain city council members. The attorney, acting as commission chair, supported certifying the referendum. Following pressure from city officials, including a council member who threatened to withdraw city business from the law firm if the attorney continued supporting the referendum, the law firm terminated the attorney’s employment after he refused to change his position. The attorney filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, asserting violations of his First Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, among other claims. The district court denied motions to dismiss based on qualified immunity filed by both the council member and the law firm. The court concluded that the council member’s alleged conduct violated clearly established First Amendment law and that the law firm, as a private entity, was not entitled to qualified immunity. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that both the council member and the law firm were eligible to assert qualified immunity due to their public functions in this context. The court held that the council member was not entitled to qualified immunity because the complaint plausibly alleged he violated clearly established First Amendment rights by causing the attorney’s firing due to protected speech. However, the court found that the law firm was entitled to qualified immunity, as there was no clearly established law prohibiting a law firm from firing an employee in response to client pressure under these circumstances. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity for the council member, reversed as to the law firm, and remanded for further proceedings. View "DeLanis v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville" on Justia Law

Clarke v Town of Newburgh

2025-11-20T07:07:30-08:00

Six residents of the Town of Newburgh sued the Town and its Town Board, alleging that the Board’s at-large electoral system unlawfully diluted the votes of Black and Hispanic residents, in violation of Section 17-206 of the New York Voting Rights Act (NYVRA). The plaintiffs argued that the method of electing all five Town Board members at-large prevented Black and Hispanic voters, who together made up about 40% of the population, from electing their preferred candidates or influencing election outcomes. They sought a court declaration that the at-large system violated the NYVRA and an injunction requiring the Town to implement a different electoral system. The Town of Newburgh moved for summary judgment, arguing that Section 17-206 was facially unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. and New York Constitutions, and that its current election system complied with the NYVRA. The Supreme Court, Orange County, granted the Town’s motion, holding that the Town could challenge the statute because it allegedly could not comply with the NYVRA without violating equal protection, and declared the provision—and the entire NYVRA—unconstitutional. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the Town lacked capacity to bring this challenge since it had not shown that compliance with the NYVRA would force it to violate equal protection, and that the Supreme Court erred in invalidating the statute. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the Town of Newburgh, as a political subdivision created by the State, could not bring a facial constitutional challenge to the NYVRA's vote-dilution provision. The court reaffirmed the longstanding rule that political subdivisions generally lack authority to challenge state laws unless a narrow exception applies, and found that no such exception was met here. The Appellate Division’s order was affirmed. View "Clarke v Town of Newburgh" on Justia Law

United States v. Taylor

2025-11-17T08:30:25-08:00

A woman who immigrated from Vietnam to the United States and became active in the Vietnamese community in Sioux City, Iowa, organized a campaign in 2020 to assist Vietnamese Americans—many of whom had limited English proficiency and were unfamiliar with the U.S. election system—in registering to vote and casting absentee ballots. Her efforts were not solely for civic engagement; she hoped these voters would support her husband, who was a candidate in the election. She facilitated the process by providing forms, translating, and returning completed documents to the county auditor. However, she also engaged in fraudulent conduct by instructing family members to complete and submit voting documents for absent adult children, and in some cases, she filled out and signed the forms herself. In total, she submitted 26 documents with forged signatures. The county auditor became suspicious and contacted the FBI, leading to her arrest and indictment on 52 counts of voter fraud under two federal statutes. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa presided over her trial. The court used model jury instructions that did not require the jury to find that she knew her conduct was illegal or that the children did not consent to her actions, despite her request for such an instruction. The jury found her guilty on all counts, and her motion for judgment of acquittal was denied. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed whether the jury instructions accurately reflected the law and whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. The court held that the instructions properly conveyed the required mental states—knowledge and willfulness—and did not need to require knowledge of the specific law violated. The court also found the evidence sufficient for conviction, including for counts involving equivocal testimony, based on the defendant’s pattern of conduct. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

State v. DeGraffenreid

2025-11-13T16:05:27-08:00

Several individuals were nominated by the Nevada Republican Party to serve as potential electors for the 2020 presidential election. After the Democratic candidates won the Nevada popular vote, these individuals challenged the results in state court, seeking to be declared the legitimate electors. Their challenge was denied by the district court, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed that decision. Despite this, the individuals held a ceremony in Carson City, signed documents purporting to cast Nevada’s electoral votes for the Republican candidates, and mailed these documents to various officials, including the Chief Judge of the United States District Court in Las Vegas, Nevada. Based on these actions, the State charged the individuals with crimes under NRS 205.110 (uttering or offering forged instruments) and NRS 239.330 (offering a false or forged instrument to be filed in a public office). The indictment was filed in Clark County, where the federal courthouse is located. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the alleged offenses were complete upon mailing the documents from Douglas County, and thus venue was improper in Clark County. The Eighth Judicial District Court agreed, finding that the crimes were completed upon mailing and dismissed the indictment for improper venue. The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the offenses charged were not complete upon mailing, but rather required the delivery and receipt of the documents at the intended location in Clark County. The court concluded that venue was proper in Clark County because the alleged crimes involved the delivery of false documents to a recipient in that county. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. DeGraffenreid" on Justia Law

Benda for Common-sense vs. Anderson

2025-11-13T02:18:55-08:00

In August 2022, the appellants filed a complaint and petition in Rice County District Court, seeking to prevent the use of electronic voting machines with embedded modems in the upcoming November 2022 general election. They alleged that these machines were not properly certified or secure, in violation of Minnesota law, and requested an order restraining the county from using the modem functions during the election. The complaint named the Director of Rice County Property Tax and Elections as a defendant, and the Minnesota Secretary of State intervened as a party. The Rice County District Court dismissed the section 204B.44 claim in January 2023, citing several jurisdictional defects, including mootness because the 2022 election had already occurred, and insufficient service of process on all candidates as required by statute. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, focusing on the lack of service to all candidates as the basis for its decision and did not address the other grounds identified by the district court. The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the appellants’ claim under Minnesota Statutes section 204B.44 was moot because the relief sought pertained solely to the 2022 general election, which had already taken place. The court rejected the argument that the claim could be redirected to future elections and clarified that section 204B.44 challenges must be specific to a single election. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, but did so on the alternative ground of mootness, without reaching the issue of service of process on all candidates. View "Benda for Common-sense vs. Anderson" on Justia Law

Anderson v. Bates

2025-11-06T07:56:11-08:00

A group of landowners in Summit County, Utah, challenged a proposed ballot measure to incorporate a new municipality called West Hills. The sponsor of the incorporation, Derek Anderson, had modified the proposed boundaries after the statutory deadline for landowners to request exclusion from the new municipality had passed. As a result, certain landowners whose properties were added late were unable to seek exclusion, even though similarly situated landowners had previously been allowed to do so. The landowners filed suit in the Third District Court, Silver Summit, arguing that the Municipal Incorporation Code, as applied, violated the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause of the Utah Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment for the landowners, finding the code unconstitutional as applied and invalidating the certification of the West Hills ballot measure. The court determined that the plaintiffs were “specified landowners” who would have been entitled to exclusion if their properties had been added earlier, and that the legislature’s interest in certainty did not justify the disparate treatment. The sponsor then filed an emergency petition for extraordinary relief with the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, seeking to overturn the district court’s order before the upcoming election. The Utah Supreme Court, after expedited briefing and oral argument, denied the petition for extraordinary relief. The court held that, under the unique circumstances, it would not exercise its discretion to issue a writ due to the potential disruption and confusion in the election process, including the risk of voter suppression and interference with electioneering efforts. The denial was without prejudice to the sponsor’s ability to pursue an appeal or interlocutory review of the district court’s order. View "Anderson v. Bates" on Justia Law

P. ex rel. Bonta v. City of Huntington Beach

2025-11-03T13:01:49-08:00

Huntington Beach, a charter city in Orange County, amended its city charter through Measure A, which authorized the city to require voter identification for municipal elections beginning in 2026. This measure was passed by local voters. In response, the California Legislature enacted Elections Code section 10005, effective January 1, 2025, which prohibits any local government from requiring voter identification for voting unless mandated by state or federal law. The statute was specifically intended to address Huntington Beach’s Measure A. Following the passage of Measure A, the State of California, through the Attorney General and Secretary of State, filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Orange County, seeking to invalidate the voter identification provision in the city charter. The City of Huntington Beach demurred, arguing the issue was not ripe since the provision had not yet been implemented. The trial court sustained the demurrer, but after procedural developments and further hearings, ultimately denied the state’s petition, finding that the charter provision did not violate the right to vote or implicate the integrity of the electoral process. The state timely appealed. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. Applying the four-part “home rule” test, the court held that Elections Code section 10005 addresses a matter of statewide concern—integrity of the electoral process—and is narrowly tailored to prevent discriminatory barriers to voting. The court concluded that section 10005 preempts the Huntington Beach charter provision. The judgment of the trial court was reversed and remanded with directions to issue a writ of mandate invalidating the charter provision, enter a permanent injunction against its enforcement, and declare it preempted by state law. View "P. ex rel. Bonta v. City of Huntington Beach" on Justia Law

EVANS v. HARRISON

2025-10-30T07:02:17-08:00

A citizen of Cleburne County submitted a petition for a local ballot initiative, titled the “Hand Marked, Hand Counted Paper Ballot Ordinance of 2024,” to the county clerk for inclusion in the 2024 general election. The county clerk rejected the petition, determining that there were insufficient valid signatures because some paid canvassers were not Arkansas residents as required by law. The canvassers later submitted supplemental affidavits listing Arkansas addresses, but the clerk still refused to count those signatures. The petitioner then filed suit in the Cleburne County Circuit Court, seeking a writ of mandamus and an injunction to compel the clerk to count the disputed signatures and certify the petition if it met the signature requirements. After an expedited hearing, the circuit court granted both the writ and the injunction, ordering the clerk to count all signatures, including those “cured” by the supplemental affidavits, and to certify the petition if it was sufficient. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed whether the circuit court could require the county clerk to certify a local ballot initiative that was not timely filed under the Arkansas Constitution. The Supreme Court held that Article 5, section 1 of the Arkansas Constitution sets the exclusive timeline for filing local initiative petitions—no sooner than ninety days and no later than sixty days before the election. The petition in question was filed too early for the 2024 election and, by operation of statute, would have been certified for the 2026 election, but it was also untimely for that election under the constitutional timeline. The Supreme Court held that the relevant statutory provisions were unconstitutional to the extent they conflicted with the constitutional timeline. The court reversed the circuit court’s order and dismissed the case, holding that a circuit court cannot require certification of an untimely initiative. View "EVANS v. HARRISON" on Justia Law

Jackson v. Tarrant County

2025-10-29T09:30:15-08:00

A group of voters in Tarrant County, Texas, challenged the county’s decision to redraw the boundaries of its four commissioners precincts in 2025, a process that occurred outside the usual post-census redistricting cycle. The new map, adopted by a narrow 3–2 vote, shifted a significant number of voters—disproportionately Black, Latino, and Democratic—into precincts that would not hold commissioner elections until 2028, effectively postponing their opportunity to vote for a county commissioner by two years. The plaintiffs, who are racially diverse, argued that the redistricting was intended to harm racial minorities and Democratic voters, and that the mid-cycle timing unlawfully disenfranchised certain residents. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction to block the use of the new map in the 2026 election. The district court dismissed the First Amendment claims as nonjusticiable under Supreme Court precedent, but allowed the race discrimination and vote postponement claims to proceed, ultimately finding that the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The Fifth Circuit held that claims of partisan gerrymandering are nonjusticiable in federal court, even when staggered elections result in some voters’ ballots being postponed. The court further held that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that race was a motivating factor in the adoption of the new map, applying the Arlington Heights framework and finding no clear error in the district court’s assessment of the evidence. Finally, the court concluded that postponement of voting opportunities due to redistricting in a staggered election system does not violate the Constitution, as there is no right to vote on a particular schedule. View "Jackson v. Tarrant County" on Justia Law

Johnson v. Wilkerson

2025-10-27T06:08:50-08:00

In this case, Denise Wilkerson won the Democratic primary for a council seat in Roselle, New Jersey, by a narrow margin of three votes over Cynthia Johnson. Johnson requested a recount and a recheck, which ultimately reduced Wilkerson’s margin to two votes. Johnson then filed an amended petition contesting the election, arguing that three voters had been improperly denied the right to vote. The trial court initially ordered a new election but, after reconsideration prompted by the Attorney General, removed the requirement for a new election and directed that the Democratic County Committee select the nominee pursuant to N.J.S.A. 19:13-20. Wilkerson appealed the trial court’s September 12 order to the Appellate Division, seeking either a special primary and general election after Election Day or, alternatively, placement of both Democratic candidates on the general election ballot. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s order, upholding the use of the statutory process that allowed the county committee to select the nominee. Wilkerson then filed an emergent application with the Supreme Court of New Jersey, reiterating her requests for extraordinary remedies. The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that neither of Wilkerson’s proposed remedies—holding a special primary and general election after Election Day or placing both Democratic candidates on the general election ballot—finds support in the statutory scheme. The Court determined that the relevant statutes, N.J.S.A. 19:13-18 and N.J.S.A. 19:13-20, govern the situation, and that the county committee’s selection of the nominee was proper, even though the statutory deadline was relaxed due to litigation delays. The judgment of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "Johnson v. Wilkerson" on Justia Law

County of Onondaga v State of New York

2025-10-16T07:10:23-08:00

In 2023, the New York Legislature enacted the Even Year Election Law (EYEL), which consolidated certain county and town elections with even-year state and federal elections. The law amended various statutes to move local elections to even-numbered years and adjusted the terms of office for officials elected in odd-numbered years. Several counties and towns with charter provisions setting local elections in odd years, along with individual voters, challenged the EYEL, arguing that it violated the home rule provisions of article IX of the New York State Constitution and other constitutional rights. The Supreme Court, Onondaga County, consolidated the complaints and denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss. It declared the EYEL unconstitutional, holding that counties have a constitutional right to set their own terms of office and that the EYEL was neither a valid general law nor a valid special law under article IX. The court enjoined enforcement of the EYEL. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, finding that the EYEL did not violate the New York or United States Constitutions. The Appellate Division held that the EYEL was a general law, applied rationally to similarly situated counties, and served the legitimate state interest of increasing voter turnout. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court held that article IX does not expressly or implicitly limit the Legislature’s authority to mandate the timing of local elections. The EYEL was found to be a valid general law, and the constitutional “bill of rights” for local governments did not bar the Legislature from enacting such a statute. The Court also dismissed the individual voter plaintiffs’ claims, finding any alleged injury minor compared to the State’s substantial interest. The order was affirmed without costs. View "County of Onondaga v State of New York" on Justia Law

Republican Governors Association v. Hebdon

2025-10-10T09:00:19-08:00

Several months before an election, complaints were filed with the Alaska Public Offices Commission alleging that two political groups, A Stronger Alaska and the Republican Governors Association, had violated Alaska’s campaign finance laws by coordinating with a gubernatorial campaign and failing to comply with disclosure requirements. The Commission initiated expedited proceedings, held hearings where officials from the groups testified, and then chose not to make a final determination on the alleged violations. Instead, the Commission remanded the matters to its staff for further investigation on a regular, non-expedited basis. The Commission’s staff subsequently issued administrative subpoenas seeking documents and communications from the groups, but the groups refused to comply. The Commission sought judicial enforcement of its subpoenas in the Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District. The groups opposed enforcement, arguing that the subpoenas were unnecessary because the Commission already had relevant testimony, that further investigation was barred by res judicata, and that the process violated their due process rights. They also challenged the constitutionality of the statutory scheme authorizing the expedited process. The superior court rejected all of these arguments, granted summary judgment in favor of the Commission, and ordered enforcement of the subpoenas. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s decision. The court held that the subpoenas were not unreasonable or oppressive simply because prior testimony had been given, as documentary evidence could still be relevant. The court also held that res judicata did not apply because the Commission had not issued a final decision on the merits, and that the process did not violate substantive due process or result in an absurd or unconstitutional statutory scheme. The court affirmed the order granting summary judgment to the Commission. View "Republican Governors Association v. Hebdon" on Justia Law

Center for Coalfield Justice v. Washington County Board of Elections

2025-09-26T11:43:13-08:00

Several voters in Washington County, Pennsylvania, submitted mail-in ballots for the 2024 Primary Election that contained obvious errors, such as missing signatures or dates on the declaration envelope, or missing secrecy envelopes. Under a previous policy, the county board of elections notified voters of such defects and allowed them to correct the errors or vote provisionally. However, in April 2024, the board adopted a new policy eliminating notice and cure procedures. Instead, all returned mail-in ballots, including those with disqualifying errors, were coded identically in the state’s SURE system, which triggered an email to voters stating their ballot had been received and that they could not vote at the polls, regardless of whether their ballot was valid. As a result, voters whose ballots were set aside for errors were not informed of the disqualification and did not attempt to vote provisionally. The Washington County Court of Common Pleas found that the board’s policy violated voters’ procedural due process rights under the Pennsylvania Constitution by failing to provide notice that their ballots would not be counted, thus depriving them of the opportunity to challenge the decision or vote provisionally. The court issued an injunction requiring the board to notify affected voters, accurately code ballots in the SURE system, and ensure poll books reflected that such voters had not “voted,” allowing them to cast provisional ballots. The Commonwealth Court affirmed, holding that the right to vote and the statutory right to cast a provisional ballot are protected liberty interests, and that the board’s policy risked erroneous deprivation of those rights. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed in large part, holding that the right to vote and the statutory right to cast a provisional ballot when a mail-in ballot is void are protected liberty interests under the Pennsylvania Constitution. The court held that due process requires county boards to provide accurate notice—via correct SURE system coding—when a mail-in ballot is segregated for a disqualifying error, so affected voters have the opportunity to vote provisionally. The court vacated the requirement for additional notice beyond accurate SURE coding and clarified that the right to challenge under 25 P.S. §3157 does not require pre-canvass challenges. The injunction otherwise remains in effect. View "Center for Coalfield Justice v. Washington County Board of Elections" on Justia Law