Election Law - Justia Case Law Summaries

Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Secord

2026-07-07T05:17:18-08:00

A group sought access to certain court forms used to notify election officials when a person under guardianship has been found incompetent to vote. These forms, known as Notice of Voting Eligibility (NVE) forms, contain personal information about the individual and details about the court’s finding of incompetency. The group submitted public records requests for completed NVE forms held by the Walworth County register in probate, seeking to identify individuals found incompetent to vote. The requests were denied, and the group filed a mandamus action to compel disclosure. The Walworth County Circuit Court denied the request, holding that NVE forms were confidential under Wisconsin law. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals initially reversed, but because of a prior, conflicting published appellate decision (Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Reynolds), the Wisconsin Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration. On remand, the Court of Appeals held it was bound by the Reynolds precedent and affirmed the circuit court’s denial. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case. It clarified the standard for mandamus actions in public records cases, holding that courts should focus solely on whether the requester has a legal right to the records, and not on other traditional mandamus elements. The court concluded that NVE forms are “court records pertinent to the finding of incompetency” and are therefore “closed” under Wisconsin Statute § 54.75, which protects the privacy of individuals in guardianship proceedings. As a result, the forms are exempt from disclosure under the public records law, the group has no legal right to access them, and the writ of mandamus must be denied. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Secord" on Justia Law

Colorado Montana Wyoming State Area Conference of the NAACP v. Smith

2026-07-06T10:31:41-08:00

Following the 2020 presidential election, three individuals—Shawn Smith, Ashley Epp, and Holly Kasun—formed an unincorporated association called the United States Election Integrity Plan (USEIP) to investigate what they believed was widespread election fraud in Colorado. In 2021, USEIP organized volunteers to go door-to-door canvassing, asking voters questions about their voting history and, in some instances, about whom they voted for. The Colorado Montana Wyoming State Area Conference of the NAACP, the League of Women Voters of Colorado, and Mi Familia Vota (collectively, the Voter Organizations) filed suit against USEIP and its founders, alleging that these canvassing activities constituted voter intimidation. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted summary judgment for USEIP, holding that unincorporated associations could not be sued under the statutes invoked: Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. The district court then held a bench trial against the individual defendants. After the plaintiffs presented their case, the district court granted judgment on partial findings for the individuals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c), finding insufficient evidence that any defendant engaged in voter intimidation. The court denied the defendants’ subsequent motion for attorney’s fees. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of USEIP, holding that unincorporated associations can be sued under both Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act and § 1985. The appellate court found that the district court’s exclusion of USEIP significantly narrowed the scope of relevant evidence at trial, affecting the plaintiffs’ substantial rights. The Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for a new trial against all defendants. The related appeal regarding attorney’s fees was dismissed as moot. View "Colorado Montana Wyoming State Area Conference of the NAACP v. Smith" on Justia Law

City of Hammond v Lake County Board of Elections

2026-07-02T12:00:46-08:00

In this case, the City of Hammond and three individual voters challenged Indiana’s use of the “Missouri Plan”—a system in which the governor appoints superior court judges from a list of nominees vetted by a nonpartisan commission, followed by periodic retention elections—in Lake County. They argued that, unlike most other Indiana counties where superior court judges are chosen in open elections, the Missouri Plan in Lake County gives minority voters, who make up over 40% of the voting-age population there, less opportunity than white voters elsewhere in the state to select judges of their choice. Plaintiffs relied on demographic disparities and asserted that the system violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division, entered summary judgment for the defendants. The district court found that Seventh Circuit precedent, specifically Quinn v. Illinois, foreclosed the plaintiffs’ claim, holding that Section 2 does not require any particular office to be filled by election rather than appointment. The district judge also noted contrary circuit precedent in Bradley v. Work, which addressed similar facts, but concluded that Quinn was controlling. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court concluded that, under the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Louisiana v. Callais, Section 2 liability attaches only where circumstances strongly suggest intentional discrimination. The appellate court found no evidence that Indiana’s use of the Missouri Plan in Lake County was motivated by racial discrimination, as the change was prompted by concerns over partisanship and inefficiency in the courts rather than race. The court thus held that Section 2 could not impose liability under these facts and affirmed the summary judgment for the defendants. View "City of Hammond v Lake County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission

2026-06-30T07:15:07-08:00

A group of candidates and political party committees, including then-Senate candidate JD Vance and various Republican campaign committees, challenged federal limits on coordinated campaign expenditures by political parties under the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). These limits restrict the amount a party can spend in direct coordination with a candidate’s campaign. Plaintiffs argued that the restrictions violate the First Amendment, especially given modern developments in campaign finance law and enforcement tools such as earmarking and disclosure requirements. JD Vance maintained standing to challenge the law, as he had an active Statement of Candidacy and a campaign committee, despite later becoming Vice President. The case was first reviewed by the en banc United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which upheld FECA’s coordinated-expenditure limits. The Sixth Circuit relied primarily on the Supreme Court’s 2001 precedent, Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado II), which had previously sustained these limits against First Amendment challenges. However, several Sixth Circuit judges questioned whether Colorado II remained good law in light of more recent Supreme Court decisions, including McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission and Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and ultimately reversed the Sixth Circuit. The Court held that FECA’s limits on political-party coordinated expenditures violate the First Amendment. Applying rigorous scrutiny, the Court determined that the limits are not necessary, narrowly tailored, or proportionate to the government’s interest in preventing circumvention of candidate contribution limits, especially given the effectiveness of existing earmarking rules and disclosure laws. The Court explicitly overruled Colorado II, concluding that subsequent precedents have rendered it obsolete. The judgment of the Sixth Circuit was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission" on Justia Law

Unite for Colo. v. Colo. Dep't of State

2026-06-30T06:32:55-08:00

During the 2020 election cycle, an organization formed with the stated mission of advocating for certain economic and governmental policies in Colorado. The group, overseen by a sole board member and a contractor, spent over $17 million that year, with around $4 million (about 23.4% of its expenditures) directed at supporting or opposing three statewide ballot initiatives. Its activities included funding signature-gathering efforts and contributing to other issue committees involved in those propositions. Members of the public filed a complaint alleging the organization was required to register and disclose as an “issue committee” under Colorado’s campaign finance laws, which apply to groups with a major purpose of supporting or opposing ballot issues. The Elections Division initially dismissed the complaint, interpreting the law to require a major purpose focused on a specific ballot measure, not ballot initiatives generally. The Deputy Secretary of State disagreed, reinstated the proceedings, and, after an administrative hearing, the Administrative Law Judge found the organization had a major purpose of ballot issue advocacy. A Final Agency Order imposed a fine and mandated disclosure. On appeal, the district court reversed, finding the law did not support aggregating the organization’s activities across multiple initiatives. The Colorado Court of Appeals then reversed again, holding that the law permitted aggregation and that the organization’s activities met the major purpose standard, also rejecting the organization’s First Amendment arguments. The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case, interpreting the constitutional definition of “issue committee.” The court held that determining whether an organization has a major purpose of ballot issue advocacy requires a holistic, fact-specific evaluation of its creation, spending, and activities, considering aggregate activity across multiple ballot issues. Applying this standard, the court found that, although the organization was active in ballot issue advocacy, its spending on such activities (less than a quarter of its overall expenditures) did not rise to the level of a major purpose. The Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Unite for Colo. v. Colo. Dep't of State" on Justia Law

Williams v. Nathan

2026-06-30T05:31:39-08:00

Two proposed statewide initiatives in Colorado sought to alter the process and timing of congressional redistricting and to replace the existing congressional district map for the 2028 and 2030 election cycles. Both initiatives were similar in structure and aimed to temporarily allow mid-decade redistricting by amending the state constitution to enable new congressional maps for two election cycles, with authority returning to the independent redistricting commission after the 2030 federal census. The initiatives also included detailed statutory language setting forth the new temporary map to be used, with one initiative designed to favor Democratic candidates and the other designed to favor Republican candidates, according to the briefing. After the proponents submitted final versions of their initiatives, the Title Board, a state body responsible for setting the ballot title and submission clause, held hearings and set titles for each measure. Motions for rehearing alleging violations of the single subject and clear title requirements were denied by the Title Board. Petitioners then appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court, invoking its jurisdiction to review Title Board determinations under state law. The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the actions of the Title Board under a deferential standard, overturning its findings only in a clear case. Upon examining the initiatives, the court concluded that both measures violated the single subject requirement of the Colorado Constitution and applicable statutes. The court held that temporarily allowing mid-decade redistricting and adopting specific new congressional maps for two election cycles were distinct and separate subjects, not necessarily or properly connected. Because the initiatives combined these separate subjects, they were susceptible to log rolling and could mislead voters. The court reversed the actions of the Title Board, ordered the titles stricken, and directed that the measures be returned to their proponents. View "Williams v. Nathan" on Justia Law

CENTER FOR AZ v AZ SECRETARY OF STATE

2026-06-29T09:02:35-08:00

Arizona voters adopted a statute requiring organizations engaging in independent election-related media spending to disclose the identities of major donors and the original sources of funds used for such communications. The law includes an opt-out provision allowing donors to prevent their contributions from being used for campaign media spending, and imposes thresholds for disclosure and reporting. Plaintiffs, consisting of two nonprofit organizations and two anonymous individuals who donate to such organizations, challenged the law’s constitutionality, alleging it violated their rights to free speech and privacy under the Arizona Constitution. The Superior Court for Maricopa County dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a legally valid claim, but permitted an amended complaint to add an as-applied challenge. After defendants again moved to dismiss, the court granted the motion, and the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, finding plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged that the statute was unconstitutional on its face or as applied. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege that the statute is facially unconstitutional under either the Speak Freely Clause or the Private Affairs Clause of the Arizona Constitution. The court developed an Arizona-specific standard for evaluating compelled disclosure laws, requiring that such laws meaningfully further election integrity or transparency and not unreasonably burden protected expression. The court found that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that the statute burdens protected expression in a substantial number of its applications. However, the Supreme Court of Arizona determined that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged an as-applied challenge under the Speak Freely Clause, based on specific allegations of threats and harassment related to campaign media spending. The court affirmed the lower courts’ dismissal of all facial and privacy claims, reversed the dismissal of the as-applied free speech claim, and remanded that claim for further proceedings. View "CENTER FOR AZ v AZ SECRETARY OF STATE" on Justia Law

Watson v. Republican National Committee

2026-06-29T07:15:05-08:00

Mississippi allows certain residents, including college students away from home and senior citizens, to vote in federal elections by absentee ballot. These absentee ballots must be postmarked on or before election day and received by the registrar no more than five business days after the election. In 2024, several Republican-affiliated organizations and individuals, as well as the Libertarian Party of Mississippi, sued the Mississippi Secretary of State and other election officials. They argued that federal election-day statutes require both the casting and receipt of ballots to occur by election day, thereby preempting Mississippi’s law that permits counting absentee ballots received after election day. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi consolidated the cases and granted summary judgment in favor of Mississippi, finding no conflict between federal statute and state law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the federal election-day statutes preempt Mississippi’s law, and required ballots to be received by election day. The Fifth Circuit denied rehearing and rehearing en banc, prompting the defendants to seek review by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the federal election-day statutes do not prevent Mississippi from counting absentee ballots postmarked by election day but received up to five days later. The Court clarified that the federal statutes set the deadline for when votes must be cast, not when they must be received, and that state law governs ballot receipt deadlines. The Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, emphasizing that the statutes do not preempt Mississippi’s practice of counting properly postmarked but late-arriving absentee ballots. View "Watson v. Republican National Committee" on Justia Law

Morin v. City of Burlington

2026-06-26T12:35:29-08:00

Two U.S. citizens who reside and vote in Burlington challenged a city charter amendment that allows noncitizens to vote in school board and school budget elections. The amendment, approved by the Legislature, permits noncitizens who are legal residents of the United States, live in Burlington, and take the Voter’s Oath to participate in these elections, but does not grant them the right to vote in state or federal elections. The plaintiffs argued that, although school elections appear local, they are actually statewide in nature because Burlington’s education budget is funded through the State Education Fund and these votes impact state finances and the interests of Vermonters statewide. The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim. The court found that school elections are local in nature, focusing on issues such as selecting school board members and approving the school budget, and concluded that the noncitizen-voting provision did not implicate the Vermont Constitution’s voter-eligibility requirements for statewide elections. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Court held that the distinction between local and statewide elections depends on which level of government has authority over the election matter. If a question has been lawfully delegated to local government, the election is local; if not, it is statewide. The Court found that Vermont law delegates authority over school board and budget elections to localities. Although education is a matter of statewide concern, the State may constitutionally delegate decision-making over local school budgets to local voters. The plaintiffs did not demonstrate that the delegation was unlawful or that school elections are statewide under the Vermont Constitution. Accordingly, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal of the complaint. The Court held that Burlington school elections are local and the charter amendment allowing noncitizen voting in those elections does not violate the Constitution’s voter-eligibility requirements for statewide elections. View "Morin v. City of Burlington" on Justia Law

Common Cause v. Evnen

2026-06-26T05:08:06-08:00

The case concerned a request from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) for Nebraska’s statewide voter registration list, including sensitive personal information. Before the Secretary of State released the list, a membership organization and a registered voter filed suit, seeking to block or limit the disclosure, alleging that such release would violate Nebraska statutes restricting the dissemination and use of voter information. They argued that the DOJ was not entitled to all the requested data under federal law and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. In the District Court for Lancaster County, the Secretary moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing and had failed to join the DOJ as an indispensable party. The court agreed that the plaintiffs did not have standing, finding that they had not alleged a concrete injury and that concerns over possible future public disclosure or misuse were speculative. The court also found that Common Cause had not adequately pleaded associational standing. However, the court rejected the Secretary’s argument that the DOJ (or the U.S. Attorney General) was an indispensable party. The case was dismissed without prejudice on standing grounds, and the plaintiffs’ motions for a temporary injunction and summary judgment were denied. On appeal, while the matter was pending before the Nebraska Supreme Court, the Secretary released the voter list to the DOJ. The Nebraska Supreme Court determined that the case was moot because the list had already been disclosed, eliminating any live controversy or possibility of meaningful relief. The court declined to apply the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine and dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal. The main holding is that, due to the completed disclosure, the action no longer presented a justiciable issue. View "Common Cause v. Evnen" on Justia Law

United States v. Benson

2026-06-24T11:00:48-08:00

The United States government, acting through the Attorney General, demanded that the Michigan Secretary of State provide an unredacted copy of Michigan’s statewide voter registration list, which includes sensitive personal information like dates of birth, driver’s license numbers, and partial social security numbers. The Secretary of State provided only a version with personal information redacted, citing concerns about the lack of statutory authority for the federal government’s request. The government then filed suit, seeking to compel production of the unredacted list. In the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, the Secretary of State, the State of Michigan, and certain intervenors moved to dismiss the complaint. The district court granted the motions, concluding that Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 did not authorize the federal government’s demand for the unredacted voter file. The government appealed, contesting only the dismissal of its claim under Title III. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The court held that Michigan’s qualified voter file is not a “record” that “comes into the possession” of the Secretary of State within the meaning of Title III, as it is an internally generated database rather than a record acquired from a third party. The court also determined that the government failed to comply with Title III’s procedural requirements for making such a demand, as its letters did not contain both the basis and the purpose for the request as required by statute. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that the Secretary of State did not violate Title III by refusing to provide the unredacted voter file. View "United States v. Benson" on Justia Law

Jackson v. Attorney General

2026-06-23T04:07:41-08:00

Two registered voters in Massachusetts challenged the Attorney General’s certification of an initiative petition designed to overhaul the state’s election system. The petition proposed replacing the existing partisan primaries and separate nomination process for nonparty candidates with a single, all-party primary. In this new system, all candidates, regardless of party affiliation, would appear on one ballot in September, and all voters could vote for any candidate. The two highest vote-getters would advance to the general election, with the option for voters to write in alternative candidates. After the petition was certified by the Attorney General, and sufficient signatures were collected, the measure was transmitted to the House of Representatives by the Secretary of the Commonwealth. As the Legislature did not enact the petition by the required deadline, it became eligible for placement on the statewide ballot, pending the collection of additional signatures. The plaintiffs filed their complaint directly in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, seeking to invalidate the Attorney General’s certification on the grounds that the petition contained “excluded matters” under Article 48 of the Massachusetts Constitution, specifically that it was inconsistent with the “freedom of elections” guaranteed by Article 9 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. A single justice reserved and reported the case to the full Supreme Judicial Court. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the proposed initiative does not significantly interfere with the constitutional rights of voters or candidates, as all candidates still have equal access to the ballot and all voters retain the right to participate fully, including through write-ins. Applying rational basis review, the court found the petition reasonably related to legitimate state interests and affirmed the Attorney General’s certification, remanding for entry of judgment in accordance with its decision. View "Jackson v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Finfer v. Attorney General

2026-06-22T04:11:46-08:00

Eight Massachusetts voters challenged the Attorney General’s summary of an initiative petition proposing a reduction of the state personal income tax rate from 5% to 4%. The summary stated that the proposed law would lower the tax rates on (1) personal taxable income consisting of interest and dividends, and (2) personal taxable income “other than interest, dividends or capital gain income, such as wages and salaries.” The plaintiffs argued that this language incorrectly informed voters that the long-term capital gains tax rate would remain unchanged, when in fact the petition would also lower that rate due to the way current law links the tax rate for most long-term capital gains to the rate for other income. After the Attorney General certified the petition and issued the summary, proponents collected over 85,000 signatures. The Secretary of the Commonwealth confirmed the required signatures and transmitted the petition to the House of Representatives. The plaintiffs then filed this action in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, seeking a declaration that the summary was unfair under Article 48 of the Massachusetts Constitution, and to enjoin the Secretary from placing the petition on the ballot. The proponents intervened, and the case was reserved and reported to the full Supreme Judicial Court on stipulated facts. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the Attorney General’s summary was not “fair” as required by Article 48 because it materially misstated the effect of the proposed law by excluding the reduction in the long-term capital gains tax rate, which would occur under current law. The Court concluded that this was not a minor omission but a significantly misleading statement likely to affect voters’ understanding. The Court ordered that the petition could not appear on the 2026 Statewide election ballot and remanded for entry of judgment enjoining the Secretary from placing the measure on the ballot. View "Finfer v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

State v. Meta Platforms, Inc.

2026-06-18T08:20:42-08:00

Several members of the public submitted requests to a large social media company seeking information about political advertisements displayed on its platforms to users in Washington State. The company did not dispute that its responses to these requests failed to comply with Washington’s Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA) and the law’s implementing regulations, as it did not provide all the required information. The State of Washington, through the Attorney General’s Office, filed suit against the company, alleging multiple violations of the FCPA’s disclosure requirements. The case was heard in King County Superior Court, where both sides moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment for the State, holding the company liable for violating the FCPA, and imposed maximum statutory penalties for each advertisement for which the required information was not disclosed. The court found the violations to be intentional, trebled both the civil penalties and attorney fees, and granted an injunction. On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s rulings on liability, statutory interpretation regarding penalty calculation, and the constitutionality of the penalty assessed. Before the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, the company argued that the FCPA’s disclosure requirements violate the First Amendment as applied, that the penalty was improperly calculated, and that the penalty violated the Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause. The Supreme Court, with no single majority opinion, affirmed the company’s liability under the FCPA, holding that the law as applied does not violate the First Amendment. The court also let the penalty judgment stand, as no majority view existed to reverse or modify it, and further held by a majority that the penalty does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Thus, the judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed, upholding both the liability finding and the civil penalty. View "State v. Meta Platforms, Inc." on Justia Law

Jackson v. Jones

2026-06-12T11:31:33-08:00

A candidate for the Republican nomination for Governor of Georgia, who was not the incumbent, challenged a unique provision of Georgia’s campaign finance law. This law allows only the incumbent Governor and Lieutenant Governor to establish and control so-called “leadership committees” with the ability to receive unlimited contributions and coordinate spending directly with their campaigns, advantages not available to challengers or other candidates. The challenger entered the 2026 gubernatorial primary and quickly discovered that his opponent, the sitting Lieutenant Governor, had amassed substantial campaign resources through such a leadership committee, while the challenger remained subject to standard contribution limits. After filing suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, the challenger sought a preliminary injunction to stop the Lieutenant Governor’s leadership committee from raising or spending further funds in support of his campaign. The district court initially issued a temporary restraining order, then, after further proceedings, granted a preliminary injunction, holding that the challenger was likely to succeed on his claim that the law violated the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech and that the leadership committee’s actions could be fairly attributed to state action. The district court determined that the law’s favoritism toward select officials could not be justified and that the harm to the challenger was irreparable. However, the injunction was stayed pending appeal. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction. The court held that the selective fundraising advantage granted to certain incumbents by the leadership committee statute was unconstitutional under the First Amendment, as it imposed different contribution limits on candidates for the same office without sufficient justification. The court also found that the leadership committee’s conduct constituted state action, making it subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "Jackson v. Jones" on Justia Law

Transparent Election Initiative v. Knudsen

2026-06-09T13:37:07-08:00

A group seeking to advance a constitutional initiative in Montana proposed an amendment that would restrict the powers of “artificial persons”—such as corporations, nonprofits, and similar entities—by excluding the authority to engage in political spending to influence voters. The initiative also specified that violations would result in loss of state-conferred privileges, subject to possible reinstatement by the legislature. The proponents submitted a proposed ballot statement summarizing the measure for voters. The Montana Attorney General rejected the proponents’ statement, citing concerns that it misleadingly focused only on corporations, did not fully explain the scope of affected entities, and failed to adequately define key terms. The Attorney General then issued a revised summary. The proponents challenged this revised statement in the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, arguing that the Attorney General exceeded his statutory authority and that his statement was inaccurate, argumentative, or prejudicial. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana found that the Attorney General acted within his authority in rejecting and revising the ballot statement, as long as he identified statutory deficiencies and the new statement complied with requirements of clarity, neutrality, and accuracy. The Court held that most of the Attorney General’s revised statement met statutory requirements, except for one sentence that could mislead voters regarding the revocation of constitutional rights. The Court ordered that this sentence be removed and certified the amended statement to the Secretary of State. The main holding is that, after removing the noncompliant sentence, the Attorney General’s revised ballot statement sufficiently satisfied statutory requirements for impartiality and clarity as required by Montana law. View "Transparent Election Initiative v. Knudsen" on Justia Law

Walker v. Taylor

2026-06-05T01:20:26-08:00

A dispute arose following the April 22, 2025 Democratic primary runoff election for mayor of the City of Canton, Mississippi. The contest centered on whether residents of recently annexed areas—Kingston Subdivision, Westside Trailer Park, and the Trails of Madison—were appropriately allowed to vote. Although these areas had been annexed and their inclusion in municipal elections was upheld in Peco Foods, Inc. v. City of Canton (In re Enlarging City of Canton), concerns were raised that updates to the Statewide Elections Management System (SEMS) were incomplete, potentially disenfranchising voters. On the day before the election, a petition sought to delay certification and allow regular ballots for residents of the affected areas. The Madison County Circuit Court instead permitted eligible voters from those areas to cast affidavit ballots. After the election, in which Tim Scott Taylor won by forty-three votes, Comelia Walker requested a ballot-box examination and subsequently filed several petitions for judicial review and election contest in the Circuit Court. Walker alleged that failures in SEMS updates, lack of notification, and various ballot irregularities materially affected the election’s integrity. The circuit court, after hearing evidence, found that Walker failed to prove any eligible voters had been denied the right to vote, nor could she demonstrate that irregularities affected the election outcome. The circuit court denied and dismissed Walker's petitions with prejudice. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed Walker’s claims of disenfranchisement, equal protection violations, and ballot irregularities. The Court concluded that affidavit voting did not disenfranchise voters, that no evidence supported equal protection violations, and that the alleged irregularities were either minor or unsupported by evidence. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, holding that no statutory departures occurred sufficient to destroy the election’s integrity or make the will of the voters impossible to ascertain. View "Walker v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Allen v. Milligan

2026-06-03T06:45:05-08:00

In this matter, Alabama enacted a congressional district map in 2023 that included only one district in which Black voters constituted a majority. Plaintiffs challenged the map, arguing that it diluted Black voting strength in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment. The essential factual dispute centered on whether Alabama’s map failed to provide an additional district offering Black voters an opportunity to elect their preferred candidates, and whether the State had intentionally avoided implementing a remedial map previously ordered by the court. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama first enjoined the use of Alabama’s 2023 congressional map, finding it violated Section 2 because it did not include an additional Black-opportunity district and concluding that the State’s actions also violated the Fourteenth Amendment as a deliberate refusal to comply with prior remedial requirements. After the Supreme Court vacated this injunction in light of its decision in Louisiana v. Callais, the District Court issued a new injunction on similar grounds. State officials then applied to the Supreme Court for a stay of the District Court’s order. The Supreme Court of the United States granted Alabama’s application for a stay, holding that the State is likely to succeed on the merits. The Court concluded that the District Court failed to apply the updated standards for Section 2 liability announced in Callais, particularly the requirement that a plaintiff’s alternative map must perform “just as well” with respect to all constitutionally permissible districting criteria, and erred in its evaluation of alleged discriminatory intent. The Supreme Court stayed the District Court’s order pending further proceedings, emphasizing the importance of not altering election rules close to an election. View "Allen v. Milligan" on Justia Law

Healey vs. State

2026-05-12T12:30:05-08:00

After the Missouri legislature enacted a new congressional redistricting map in 2025, two groups of residents challenged its constitutionality. The residents argued that the map violated article III, section 45 of the Missouri Constitution, which requires congressional districts to be comprised of contiguous territory, to be as compact as possible, and to have nearly equal populations. Their claims focused particularly on districts 4, 5, and 6, alleging lack of compactness, improper splitting of Kansas City communities, and that a voting tabulation district (KC 811) was assigned to two congressional districts, violating contiguity and equal population requirements. The Circuit Court of Jackson County consolidated the two cases and held a bench trial. After reviewing extensive expert and lay testimony, statistical measures of compactness, and evidence regarding county and municipal splits, the circuit court found that the 2025 Map was more compact than prior maps, satisfied contiguity and equal population requirements, and did not violate the constitutional standards. The circuit court rejected claims regarding community splits and alternative maps, emphasizing its role was not to weigh policy preferences but to apply constitutional directives. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the circuit court’s factual findings with deference and applied de novo review to legal questions. The Court held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the 2025 Map clearly and undoubtedly violated article III, section 45. The Court emphasized that statistical and historical comparisons supported the circuit court’s findings, and that departures from compactness, if any, were minimal and justified by recognized factors. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, upholding the constitutionality of the 2025 Map. View "Healey vs. State" on Justia Law

Quinn v. Secretary of State, State of Georgia

2026-05-11T06:02:38-08:00

Two Georgia voters, William T. Quinn and David Cross, independently analyzed Georgia’s voter registration list by comparing it with the United States Postal Service’s National Change of Address database. Believing they had found evidence that the Secretary of State was not properly maintaining the voter rolls as required by the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) and state law, they notified the Secretary, requesting that potentially ineligible voters be flagged and notified. When the Secretary did not respond, the plaintiffs filed suit, asserting that this alleged failure undermined their confidence in the election process and risked diluting their votes. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed the case for lack of Article III standing. The district court found that the plaintiffs’ claimed injuries—undermined confidence in elections and risk of vote dilution—were generalized grievances common to all Georgia voters, not injuries particularized to the plaintiffs themselves. The court reasoned that any voter could express similar concerns based on the state’s alleged noncompliance with the NVRA, and that such concerns were too speculative to confer standing. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries were not particularized, as the supposed harm—loss of confidence in the electoral process—equally affected all Georgia voters. The court concluded that merely discovering or believing in government error, even after personal investigation, does not transform a generalized grievance into a particularized injury sufficient for federal court standing. Thus, the plaintiffs lacked standing, and the dismissal was affirmed. View "Quinn v. Secretary of State, State of Georgia" on Justia Law

Scott v. McDougle

2026-05-08T06:19:10-08:00

The case concerns the process by which a proposed constitutional amendment, authorizing partisan gerrymandering of congressional districts in Virginia, was submitted to the voters. The General Assembly approved the proposed amendment during a disputed special session in October 2025, after voting in the general election for the House of Delegates had already begun. Approximately 1.3 million votes had been cast before the General Assembly’s first vote on the amendment. The General Assembly then approved the proposal again in the 2026 regular session, and the amendment was put to a popular vote, ultimately passing by a narrow margin. The new map, contingent on the amendment’s approval, would have significantly shifted the partisan balance of Virginia’s congressional delegation. The Circuit Court of Tazewell County reviewed challenges to the constitutional amendment process, focusing on whether the requirements of Article XII, Section 1 of the Virginia Constitution, which governs the procedure for amending the state constitution, were properly followed. The central issue was whether the intervening general election required by the Constitution occurred after the General Assembly’s first vote on the amendment but before the second, thus giving voters the intended opportunity to influence the process. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the legislative process used to advance the proposed amendment violated Article XII, Section 1 of the Virginia Constitution because the first legislative vote occurred after voting in the general election had already begun. The court concluded that the “general election” includes the entire period when votes are cast, not just Election Day, and strict compliance with the constitutionally mandated procedure is required. As a result, the referendum and the amendment were declared null and void. The court affirmed that the existing, nonpartisan congressional maps remain in effect for the upcoming elections. View "Scott v. McDougle" on Justia Law

Paden v. Rayfield

2026-05-07T07:48:06-08:00

This case involves challenges to the ballot title certified by the Oregon Attorney General for Initiative Petition 64 (2026), which proposes to add a provision to the Oregon Constitution. Under current law, individuals charged with crimes who are found unfit to aid and assist in their defense cannot proceed to trial and may be committed for restoration of fitness, but such commitment is limited to a maximum period based on the seriousness of the charge. The proposed measure would require these individuals, if found to require a hospital level of care due to public safety concerns, to be committed to a secure state-funded facility until a court determines they are fit or no longer require such care—removing the current statutory limit on the duration of their commitment. After the Attorney General certified the ballot title, petitioners—both as Oregon electors and as the chief petitioner for IP 64—filed timely challenges. They argued that the caption and the “yes” result statement of the certified ballot title were inaccurate and misleading. Specifically, they contended that the language incorrectly stated that such defendants “cannot be prosecuted,” when, in reality, prosecution is merely paused during the restoration process, and that the ballot title failed to inform voters that the measure would eliminate statutory time limits on commitment, allowing for potentially indefinite detention. The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon agreed with the petitioners. The court found that the caption and the “yes” result statement did not substantially comply with the requirements of ORS 250.035(2), as they mischaracterized the status of prosecution and failed to identify a major effect of the measure. The court referred the ballot title back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Paden v. Rayfield" on Justia Law

Amadasun v. Armstrong

2026-05-01T14:41:48-08:00

A candidate for the South Windsor town council in the November 2025 municipal election challenged the town clerk’s decision regarding the application of revisions to the town charter. During the same election in which council members were chosen, voters also approved, by referendum, changes to the charter that altered the party composition rules for the council, reducing the maximum number of members who could be from the same political party from six to five. The town clerk determined that these new limits applied immediately to the 2025 election, even though meeting minutes from the Charter Revision Commission indicated the changes would not take effect until 2027. As a result, the clerk declared a Republican candidate, rather than the plaintiff (a Democrat who otherwise would have won under the prior rules), as the winner of the final council seat. A lawsuit was filed in the Superior Court for the judicial district of Hartford under statutes providing expedited review for those aggrieved by rulings of election officials in municipal elections. The plaintiff argued that the clerk’s decision to apply the new charter revisions to the 2025 election was erroneous. The trial court dismissed the action, concluding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the clerk’s decision was not a “ruling of an election official” within the meaning of the relevant statutes. On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court addressed whether the clerk’s determination constituted a “ruling of an election official” for the purposes of the statutes governing election disputes. The court held that the town clerk’s decision to apply the newly adopted charter provisions to the current election was indeed a ruling of an election official. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. The decision clarified that applying or interpreting laws affecting the determination of election outcomes falls within the statutory jurisdiction for expedited election challenges. View "Amadasun v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

In re: Election Contest of Highland School Bond Referendum

2026-05-01T06:03:42-08:00

A bond measure election was conducted by a school district to fund improvements, requiring 60% approval to pass. On election day, due to a ballot distribution mistake at one precinct, ballots including the bond measure were given to all voters, including those residing outside the district. Later, officials corrected the error, but evidence indicated that up to 70 ballots with the measure were cast by unqualified voters. The measure ultimately passed with 61.3% approval. Following the election, the contest was brought before the Washington County Election Contest Board (“contest court”) based on the allegation of “illegal votes.” The contest court rejected the challenge, reasoning that even if all votes from the affected precinct were excluded, the bond measure would still pass by the required majority. The contestants appealed to the Iowa District Court for Washington County, where the district court found that the contest was not based on misconduct by precinct officials but on illegal votes, and concluded the contestants failed to comply with Iowa Code section 62.5(2)(e), which requires a statement naming the persons alleged to have voted illegally. The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s interpretation of the statutory requirements for election contests. The court held that under Iowa law, the right to contest an election is strictly statutory, and contestants must strictly comply with the statutory provisions necessary to confer jurisdiction. Because the appellants did not provide the names of the persons alleged to have voted illegally as required by Iowa Code section 62.5(2)(e), their election contest could not proceed. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling. View "In re: Election Contest of Highland School Bond Referendum" on Justia Law

Louisiana v. Callais

2026-04-29T22:15:05-08:00

After the 2020 census, Louisiana redrew its congressional districts, enacting a map (HB1) with only one majority-black district. Plaintiffs challenged this map in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, arguing that it diluted black voting power in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The court agreed, finding a likely Section 2 violation and ordering the state to add a second majority-black district. To avoid a court-imposed map, the legislature enacted a new map (SB8) with a second majority-black district, which connected distant black populations across the state. The new SB8 map was then challenged as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana (a three-judge court). The court found that race predominated in the drawing of SB8’s District 6 and that the state could not justify its actions under the Equal Protection Clause. The court concluded that the state had failed to show that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act required the creation of an additional majority-black district or that compliance with the Act was a compelling interest. The court therefore held SB8 unconstitutional. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States addressed whether compliance with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act can ever justify intentional race-based districting. The Court held that Section 2, properly interpreted, requires liability only when there is a strong inference of intentional discrimination, not merely disparate impact. The Court also clarified that a plaintiff’s illustrative maps must satisfy all the state’s legitimate districting goals without using race as a predominant factor and that evidence of racially polarized voting must be disentangled from partisan affiliation. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that Louisiana’s SB8 map was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander because Section 2 did not require a second majority-black district, and no compelling interest justified the use of race. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Callais" on Justia Law

Honey v. Lycoming Co. Offices of Voter Svcs.

2026-04-28T10:46:52-08:00

A resident of Lebanon County submitted a request under Pennsylvania’s Right-to-Know Law (RTKL) to obtain the cast vote records (CVRs) for each precinct and the central tabulator used in the 2020 General Election in Lycoming County. The Lycoming County Office of Voter Services denied the request, asserting that CVRs constituted the “contents of ballot boxes and voting machines,” which are exempt from public disclosure under Section 308 of the Election Code. Following administrative appeal, the Office of Open Records upheld the denial based on affidavits that characterized CVRs as the digital equivalent of individual ballots. The case was then appealed to the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas. The trial court determined that the original requester lacked standing but allowed three Lycoming County voters to intervene. The court found that “contents of ballot boxes and voting machines” referred only to physical ballots and the mechanical workings of voting machines, not to digital data or CVRs. It ordered disclosure of the CVRs, finding no violation of ballot secrecy, especially given data randomization. The Department of State and Voter Services appealed, and the Commonwealth Court reversed. The Commonwealth Court concluded that CVRs fell within the meaning of “contents” and that voting machines, as used in the Election Code, included electronic systems like those in Lycoming County. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and reversed the Commonwealth Court. It held that CVRs are not the “contents of ballot boxes and voting machines” as those terms are used in Section 308 of the Election Code. Therefore, CVRs are not exempt from disclosure and are required to be made public under the Election Code’s provisions for public access to election records. The Court clarified that disclosure of CVRs, as randomized in Lycoming County, does not violate the constitutional requirement of ballot secrecy. View "Honey v. Lycoming Co. Offices of Voter Svcs." on Justia Law

PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC. V. NAGO

2026-04-28T08:02:19-08:00

A nonprofit organization focused on election integrity requested that Hawaii’s State Elections Office provide a statewide list of registered voters, citing a provision in the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) that allows for public inspection of certain election records. Hawaii’s State Elections Office declined to provide the statewide list and recommended that the organization seek separate county-level lists from each of the four County Clerks, as the Office does not maintain or distribute such a combined list. After receiving this response, the organization sought injunctive and declaratory relief in federal court, arguing that the NVRA entitled it to the statewide voter list. The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii dismissed the action, holding that the organization’s claim was not ripe because it had not first requested the information from the counties. The court found there was no Article III jurisdiction, as the organization had not suffered a concrete injury and could still pursue county-level records. The district court allowed time for the organization to amend its complaint if its claims became ripe, but the organization declined, maintaining that the NVRA required disclosure by the State. Final judgment was entered, and the organization appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the organization did have standing, as the denial of information requested under the NVRA constitutes a sufficient injury for Article III purposes. The appellate court also found the claim to be ripe, as the State had made clear it would not provide the requested information. However, on the merits, the Ninth Circuit held that the NVRA does not require disclosure of a statewide voter list, as such a list is not a record “concerning the implementation” of list-maintenance programs under the statute. The court therefore affirmed dismissal, but on the merits, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the claim with prejudice. View "PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC. V. NAGO" on Justia Law

Moore v. State of Alabama ex rel. Mayor Sims

2026-04-24T05:30:50-08:00

Three individuals, Barbara Moore, Vanessa Reed, and Christine Burrell, served as members of the Lipscomb City Council, each representing a different district. After a city council meeting in May 2025, the council rejected a proposed redistricting plan and resolved to keep district boundaries unchanged. However, in the August 2025 municipal election, the election was conducted using the rejected redistricting map. Despite this, the three council members were sworn into office for their respective districts under the original boundaries. Mayor Robin Sims, claiming the council members no longer met residency requirements due to the district lines used in the election, filed for a temporary restraining order (TRO), a permanent injunction, and a writ of quo warranto, seeking their removal from office. The Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division, issued the TRO, then granted the writ of quo warranto and the permanent injunction, finding that the council members did not meet the statutory residency requirements and declaring their seats vacant. The court denied the council members’ motion to dismiss and their subsequent postjudgment motion, holding that they were unlawfully occupying their seats. The court also denied their request to stay enforcement of its judgment pending appeal. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed whether the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the statutory requirement that an informant provide security for costs at the commencement of a quo warranto action was not satisfied. The bond posted was solely for the injunction, not for the quo warranto proceeding. Because this requirement is jurisdictional, the trial court’s judgment was void. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the judgment and remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to vacate its judgment. View "Moore v. State of Alabama ex rel. Mayor Sims" on Justia Law

MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. LOPEZ

2026-04-22T08:31:11-08:00

A nonprofit political advocacy organization challenged a set of municipal campaign finance rules adopted by a California city after a history of local government scandals involving city officials and local business interests. The ballot measure, approved by 82% of city voters, imposed per candidate contribution limits for individuals and political action committees, as well as aggregate contribution limits, for city elections. The measure was adopted in response to a series of incidents where city officials accepted valuable gifts or travel from local business figures and subsequently took official actions arguably benefiting those providers. A district attorney’s investigation and report, media coverage, and a resident survey indicating strong public demand for accountability preceded the measure. After the measure took effect, the advocacy organization sued in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, arguing that the per candidate and aggregate contribution limits violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Both sides filed for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for the city, holding that the per candidate limits were justified by a sufficiently important governmental interest and closely drawn to that interest, and that the aggregate limits did not impermissibly discriminate against candidates who also supported ballot measures. The court also upheld a related gift ban, but the plaintiffs did not appeal that aspect. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the city established an important governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, and that the contribution limits were closely drawn, not unconstitutionally low, and comparable to other cities’ limits. The court further found that the aggregate limits were constitutional, as they did not apply to ballot measure committees. Thus, the city’s campaign finance limits were upheld. View "MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. LOPEZ" on Justia Law

State ex rel. Hicks v. Adams Cty. Bd. of Elections

2026-04-10T05:08:44-08:00

An Adams County elector challenged the voter registration of the county prosecuting attorney, alleging that the prosecutor did not actually reside at his registered address in Adams County but instead lived with his family in Hamilton County. The challenger, a qualified elector from Clermont County, submitted evidence including property records, water usage data, and vehicle registrations to support his claim that the prosecutor’s declared residence was not legitimate. The Adams County Board of Elections denied the challenge on two occasions, each time relying solely on its own records and declining to hold a hearing. After the initial challenge was denied, the challenger sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court of Ohio to cancel the prosecutor’s voter registration. The court denied the writ, finding that the relief had not been properly pleaded and declining to address the alternative request for a hearing. In response, the challenger filed a new challenge with the board and, after a second denial without a hearing, again sought mandamus relief from the Supreme Court of Ohio, this time explicitly requesting an order compelling the board to conduct a hearing on his challenge. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that neither claim preclusion nor issue preclusion barred the action, as the new challenge and denial were distinct from the earlier proceeding and the factual question of residency had never been adjudicated in a quasi-judicial hearing. The court found that the challenger had standing under the statute and that the board abused its discretion by denying the challenge without a hearing when its own records were insufficient to resolve the dispute. The court granted a writ of mandamus ordering the Adams County Board of Elections to hold a hearing within ten days on the challenge. The court also denied the board’s request for sanctions against the challenger. View "State ex rel. Hicks v. Adams Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

State v. Rosen

2026-04-09T05:08:43-08:00

The defendant was convicted of voting in more than one state during the 2016 general election. He maintained residences in both New Hampshire and Massachusetts and was alleged to have voted in Holderness, New Hampshire by absentee ballot and in Belmont, Massachusetts in person. The State introduced evidence of his voting history in both states from 1996 to 2018 and sought to exclude statements by an acquaintance, William Botelho, who had previously admitted to voting in the defendant's name in Massachusetts. The Grafton County Superior Court allowed the State to admit the defendant’s prior voting records under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 404(b) and excluded Botelho’s statements as inadmissible propensity evidence, also denying the defendant’s request for a Richards hearing regarding Botelho’s potential testimony. After a jury found the defendant guilty, the Superior Court denied his post-trial motions for dismissal based on territorial jurisdiction, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and to set aside the verdict. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire found that the Superior Court erred in admitting the defendant’s prior voting history because the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value, especially since the prior alleged acts were nearly identical to the charged crime. The court also held that evidence of Botelho’s confession to voting in the defendant’s name in the 2016 election was not evidence of other bad acts under Rule 404(b) and should not have been categorically excluded. The Supreme Court further ruled that, if Botelho asserts his Fifth Amendment rights on remand, the trial court must hold a Richards hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s denial of the defendant’s motions regarding territorial jurisdiction, sufficiency, and weight of the evidence, but reversed the conviction due to the evidentiary errors and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Rosen" on Justia Law

Ocasio v. Comision Estatal de Elecciones

2026-04-01T12:30:04-08:00

Two individuals challenged the Puerto Rican electoral commission and its acting president, arguing that restrictions on early and absentee voting during the 2020 general election unlawfully burdened the right to vote for citizens over sixty, especially considering the COVID-19 pandemic. In August 2020, they brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking relief on constitutional grounds. The district court promptly issued a preliminary injunction, then a permanent injunction, allowing voters over sixty to vote early by mail. After judgment, the plaintiffs were awarded nearly $65,000 in attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. While the fee motion was pending, Puerto Rico’s government was in the process of debt restructuring under Title III of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA). The restructuring plan, confirmed in January 2022, discharged claims against Puerto Rico arising before the plan’s effective date unless creditors filed proof of claim by a set deadline. Defendants argued in the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico that the attorneys’ fees award was subject to the plan’s discharge and enjoined from collection, because the plaintiffs had not filed a timely administrative expense claim. The district court rejected this, finding the fee award unrelated to the bankruptcy case. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded that the claim for attorneys’ fees, though arising from post-petition litigation, related to events before the plan’s effective date. The court held that because the plaintiffs had actual knowledge of the restructuring proceedings but did not file a timely proof of claim, their fee claim was discharged under the confirmed plan and enjoined from collection. The First Circuit reversed the district court’s order, holding that the discharge injunction applied to the attorneys’ fee award. View "Ocasio v. Comision Estatal de Elecciones" on Justia Law

Montana Mining Assn. v. Knudsen

2026-03-31T14:34:41-08:00

A group of business and industry associations challenged the Montana Attorney General’s March 6, 2026 determination that Proposed Ballot Measure No. 10 was legally sufficient to proceed in the initiative process. Ballot Measure No. 10 sought to amend state law by defining “artificial persons” and excluding “political spending power” from the rights granted to such entities. The challengers argued that the measure was facially unconstitutional because it restricted political speech, was vague, and improperly conditioned benefits on the waiver of constitutional rights. The challenge was brought directly to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana under its original jurisdiction. The Attorney General had performed only a procedural review, declining to address the measure’s substantive constitutionality due to a prior order by the First Judicial District Court in Ellingson v. State, which had enjoined the statutory provision that would have allowed such substantive review. The petitioners requested the Supreme Court to require the Attorney General to review the measure’s constitutionality and to reverse his finding of legal sufficiency. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the Attorney General does not have authority to consider the substantive constitutionality of proposed ballot initiatives during legal sufficiency review under current law and precedent. The Court reaffirmed that pre-election constitutional challenges to initiatives are generally disfavored, as the people have a constitutional right to use the initiative process. Because Ballot Measure No. 10 had not yet qualified for the ballot, the Court declined to address the merits of the constitutional arguments, finding such review would be advisory. The Court denied and dismissed the petition, and also denied as moot motions to intervene and to file amicus briefs. View "Montana Mining Assn. v. Knudsen" on Justia Law

Get Loud Arkansas v. Jester

2026-03-31T07:31:21-08:00

Get Loud Arkansas and other plaintiffs challenged an Arkansas State Board of Election Commissioners rule that required all voter registration applications to have a handwritten or “wet” signature, excluding digital or electronic signatures. The controversy arose after Get Loud developed an online voter registration tool, which allowed applicants to sign digitally and resulted in a significant increase in voter registrations, particularly among young voters. Following publicity about the tool’s success, the Arkansas Secretary of State instructed county clerks to reject electronically signed applications. Despite an opinion by the Arkansas Attorney General affirming the legality of electronic signatures, the Board adopted a rule requiring wet signatures, which forced Get Loud to modify its operations, reduce the effectiveness of its registration efforts, and expend additional resources. The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas, arguing that the rule violated the Materiality Provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 52 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(B), which prohibits denying the right to vote based on immaterial errors or omissions on voter registration applications. The district court found that the rule likely violated federal law and granted a preliminary injunction, preventing enforcement of the wet signature requirement. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that Get Loud had standing due to direct interference with its core activities. The court concluded that Arkansas’s rule was not material in determining voter qualifications, as election officials did not use signature type to assess eligibility and had previously accepted both wet and digital signatures without issue. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s injunction, holding that enforcing the rule violated the Materiality Provision and that the balance of equities favored the plaintiffs. View "Get Loud Arkansas v. Jester" on Justia Law

Simmons v. Dove

2026-03-30T13:18:29-08:00

A candidate, John Calvin Dove, Jr., submitted a certificate of candidacy to run for the Democratic Party nomination for the Maryland House of Delegates in Legislative District 12B for the 2026 gubernatorial election. Gary Simmons challenged Dove’s qualifications, asserting that Dove was not a resident and did not maintain a place of abode in Legislative District 12B at the time he filed his candidacy certificate. Simmons further alleged that Dove had misrepresented his residency on his voter registration and his certificate of candidacy, arguing that these actions rendered Dove ineligible and his candidacy certificate invalid. The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County scheduled a hearing on Simmons’s petition, but Dove moved to dismiss, arguing that the constitutional residency requirement only needed to be met six months before the general election, a date which had not yet arrived. The circuit court agreed with Dove, finding the challenge premature and dismissing Simmons’s petition with prejudice, without taking evidence on Dove’s residency or place of abode. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case. The court held that Simmons’s petition was not premature as to his claims under the Election Law Article, which require that a candidate be lawfully registered to vote and reside in the legislative district at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. The court found that such a challenge is ripe for adjudication at the time of filing. The Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing and a decision on the merits of Simmons’s challenge before set deadlines. The costs were assessed against Dove. View "Simmons v. Dove" on Justia Law

Missouri State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People vs. State

2026-03-24T12:30:09-08:00

Several individuals and two organizations challenged a Missouri law enacted in 2022, House Bill No. 1878 (HB 1878), which amended the state’s voting requirements by mandating that voters present specific forms of photo identification or cast a provisional ballot under certain conditions. The organizations—the Missouri State Conference of the NAACP and the League of Women Voters of Missouri—along with the individuals, claimed that these provisions unconstitutionally burdened the right to vote and violated equal protection guarantees. Their petition for declaratory and injunctive relief was filed in the Circuit Court of Cole County. After a bench trial, the circuit court found that none of the individual plaintiffs had shown an actual or threatened injury, as each had either successfully voted since the law’s enactment or their alleged difficulties were speculative. The court also determined that the organizations had not established standing, either through a diversion of resources or by identifying any specific member adversely affected by the law. Despite these findings, the circuit court proceeded to rule on the merits, concluding the law was constitutional. The Supreme Court of Missouri, which has exclusive jurisdiction in cases involving the validity of state statutes, reviewed the matter. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s determination that the appellants lacked standing—meaning none of the plaintiffs demonstrated a concrete, personal stake in the outcome. The Supreme Court held that, because there was no justiciable controversy before the court, the circuit court erred by reaching and deciding the merits of the constitutional claims. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed that portion of the judgment addressing the merits of the constitutional challenge. The case was thus resolved solely on the issue of standing. View "Missouri State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People vs. State" on Justia Law

State vs. League of Women Voters

2026-03-24T12:30:07-08:00

In 2022, Missouri enacted new legislation that imposed several restrictions on activities related to voter registration and absentee ballot applications. The law prohibited the payment or compensation of individuals for soliciting voter registration applications unless they were government employees, required anyone who solicited more than ten voter registration applications to register with the state, and mandated that solicitors be at least eighteen years old and registered Missouri voters. Additionally, the law completely banned the solicitation of voters to obtain absentee ballot applications. These provisions affected organizations whose work involves encouraging and assisting individuals in registering to vote and informing them about absentee voting. The Circuit Court of Cole County reviewed a lawsuit brought by two civic organizations challenging these provisions as unconstitutional. The organizations argued the restrictions violated rights to free speech, association, and due process under the Missouri Constitution. The court issued a preliminary injunction, and after trial, permanently enjoined enforcement of the provisions, finding them to be facially unconstitutional restrictions on core political speech, overbroad, content- and viewpoint-based, and unconstitutionally vague. The court concluded the state had not shown the provisions were narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the statutory provisions imposed facially unconstitutional restrictions on core political speech protected by article I, section 8 of the Missouri Constitution. The Court found the provisions neither served a compelling state interest nor were narrowly tailored, and instead captured substantial amounts of protected speech unrelated to any compelling interest. The judgment declaring the provisions unconstitutional was affirmed. View "State vs. League of Women Voters" on Justia Law

Luther vs. Hoskins

2026-03-24T12:30:05-08:00

After the results of the 2020 United States census were certified to the governor of Missouri in August 2021, the Missouri General Assembly established new congressional districts in 2022, as required by the state constitution. In September 2025, the General Assembly passed House Bill 1 (“HB 1”), which repealed the 2022 congressional districts and established new ones, even though no new census had been certified. The governor signed HB 1 into law. A group of plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of HB 1, arguing that article III, section 45 of the Missouri Constitution restricts the General Assembly to one redistricting following each decennial census certification. The Circuit Court of Cole County heard the case on stipulated facts and rejected the plaintiffs’ claim, finding that HB 1 was a valid exercise of the General Assembly’s legislative authority. The circuit court declared that article III, section 45 does not prevent the General Assembly from redistricting more frequently than once per decade. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the constitutional question de novo. The Court held that article III, section 45 obligates the General Assembly to redistrict upon certification of the decennial census but does not expressly prohibit mid-decade or more frequent congressional redistricting. The Court explained that, absent express constitutional restraint, the General Assembly’s legislative power remains plenary. The Court also found that the word “when” in section 45 acts as a trigger for mandatory redistricting but does not serve as a limitation on the legislature’s authority to redistrict at other times. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, upholding HB 1 as constitutional and concluding that article III, section 45 does not restrict the General Assembly’s power to conduct mid-decade congressional redistricting. View "Luther vs. Hoskins" on Justia Law

State ex rel. Hicks v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections

2026-03-24T06:30:45-08:00

An individual submitted a written objection to a county board of elections, challenging a candidate’s petition to appear on the primary-election ballot for county commissioner. The objection claimed that one part-petition supporting the candidate’s declaration of candidacy contained elector signatures not properly witnessed by the circulator, as required by law. The individual provided a photograph as evidence and referenced relevant election statutes. The part-petition in question, however, accounted for only 17 signatures, and the candidate’s overall petition still contained more than the 50 valid signatures required for ballot qualification, regardless of the challenged signatures. After receiving the objection, the Clermont County Board of Elections did not schedule or conduct a protest hearing. At a special meeting, the board determined that the objection did not meet the statutory requirements for a valid protest under Ohio Revised Code sections 3501.39 and 3513.05. The board reasoned that even if all signatures on the challenged part-petition were invalidated, the candidate would still qualify for the ballot. The board informed the objector that a hearing was not warranted. The objector then filed a mandamus action in the Supreme Court of Ohio, seeking to compel the board to hold a protest hearing. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the objector failed to establish a clear legal right to a mandatory hearing or a corresponding legal duty for the board because the protest, on its face, could not have resulted in the candidate’s removal from the ballot. The court further concluded that granting mandamus would compel a vain act. The court denied the writ of mandamus, denied the board’s request for sanctions, and granted the board’s motion for leave to file amended evidence. View "State ex rel. Hicks v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

State ex rel. Spencer v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Elections

2026-03-20T13:00:45-08:00

A candidate seeking the Republican Party nomination for U.S. Representative from the Sixth Ohio Congressional District submitted a petition with signatures from several counties, including Stark and Carroll. The Stark County Board of Elections, after reviewing the signatures and receiving certified determinations from other relevant county boards, initially validated one additional signature beyond those accepted by the Carroll County Board, enabling the candidate to meet the minimum requirement for ballot access. A protest was filed arguing the board lacked authority to revisit other counties’ signature determinations and that not enough valid signatures existed. At a protest hearing, both parties presented evidence about specific disputed signatures. The Stark County Board of Elections held a hearing on the protest, as required by Ohio law. At this stage, the board considered evidence regarding the validity of disputed signatures, including some that had previously been declared invalid by the Carroll County Board. The board found three additional signatures valid (including two from Carroll County), bringing the total valid signatures above the threshold. The board accordingly denied the protest and certified the candidate for the primary ballot. The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. The court held that while the Stark County Board could not, during the initial precertification review, override other counties’ signature determinations, the board did have authority during a formal protest hearing to consider evidence and make its own determinations regarding the validity of any signatures, including those from other counties. The court found that the board did not abuse its discretion or clearly disregard applicable law in denying the protest and certifying the candidate. The Supreme Court of Ohio denied the requested writ of prohibition. View "State ex rel. Spencer v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Martinez v. Jensen

2026-03-18T12:05:33-08:00

An individual submitted a candidate filing form to appear on the ballot for Douglas County sheriff in the May 2026 primary election. Alongside his filing, he provided a letter from the director of the Nebraska Law Enforcement Training Center certifying that he possessed an “inactive” Nebraska law enforcement officer certificate. His certificate had been active from 1984 to 2009 but was inactive at the time of filing. The Douglas County Republican Party objected to his candidacy, arguing that Nebraska law required a candidate to hold an “active” certificate. The objection was supported by a memorandum and legislative materials suggesting legislative intent to require active certification. The Douglas County election commissioner reviewed the objection and determined that the candidate did not meet the requirements to run for sheriff, based on the inactive status of his law enforcement certificate. The candidate then filed an emergency application for special proceedings with the Nebraska Supreme Court, seeking to overturn the commissioner’s decision and compel his placement on the ballot. The Republican Party intervened, asserting that legislative history and statutory context supported the requirement of an active certificate. The Supreme Court of Nebraska heard the case as a special, summary proceeding under state election law. The court held that the relevant statute required only that a candidate “possess a law enforcement officer certificate,” and made no distinction between active and inactive status. The court found the statutory text to be unambiguous and declined to consider legislative history or administrative regulations. Accordingly, the court concluded that possession of an inactive certificate satisfied the statutory qualifications for candidacy. The judgment ordered that the candidate’s name appear on the ballot for the sheriff’s office. View "Martinez v. Jensen" on Justia Law

Randle v. Ivy

2026-03-13T01:17:01-08:00

A candidate filed to run in the Democratic primary for city marshal in Okolona, Mississippi, listing an in-city address. His opponent contended that the candidate did not truly reside within the city limits for the two years required before the election. Evidence was presented suggesting the candidate held homestead exemptions outside the city and had not lived at the addresses he claimed. The candidate argued he met the residency requirement, providing some documentation and his own testimony. Additional testimony from a city official cast doubt on whether the candidate had actually lived at the in-city address before the qualifying deadline. The Okolona Democratic Executive Committee initially found the candidate qualified. The opponent then petitioned the Chickasaw County Circuit Court for review. A special judge presided and, after a hearing, found the candidate failed to prove two years’ residency in the city as required by law, giving weight to evidence of out-of-city homestead properties and the lack of credible proof of in-city residence. The judge disqualified the candidate from the primary ballot. The candidate appealed the disqualification order to the Supreme Court of Mississippi. Meanwhile, both the primary and general elections took place, and the candidate was not on either ballot. The candidate also attempted a post-primary challenge, but did not pursue an appeal in time. The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the candidate’s appeal under the preprimary-qualification statute was moot since the elections had already occurred and the statute provides no remedy after the fact. The Court also found that substantial evidence supported the judge’s finding that the candidate did not meet the two-year residency requirement. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the lower court’s decision. View "Randle v. Ivy" on Justia Law

Kendrick v. Knudsen

2026-02-27T13:35:56-08:00

A group of petitioners proposed a constitutional amendment, designated as Ballot Issue 8 (BI-8), which would add a new section to the Montana Constitution. This amendment would explicitly recognize a fundamental right to initiative and referendum and set forth procedural protections to ensure the timely, impartial, and unburdened exercise of those rights. BI-8 also contains limits on governmental interference, including a prohibition on the use of government resources to support or oppose ballot measures. The Attorney General determined that BI-8 was legally insufficient, arguing it violated the Montana Constitution’s separate-vote requirement by effecting multiple, unrelated constitutional changes. The Attorney General also appended a fiscal statement to BI-8, based on speculative litigation costs, despite the fiscal note indicating zero fiscal impact. The Montana Attorney General’s legal-sufficiency determination was challenged in the Supreme Court of the State of Montana under its original jurisdiction. The main arguments centered on whether BI-8 improperly combined multiple unrelated constitutional subjects and whether the Attorney General had statutory authority to append a fiscal statement when the fiscal note showed no fiscal impact. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that BI-8 constituted a single constitutional amendment because its provisions were closely related and collectively served to define and protect the right to initiative and referendum. The Court explained that procedural protections and government-resource limitations were integral components of the proposed right, not separate constitutional subjects. The Court further held that the Attorney General lacked authority to append a fiscal statement since the fiscal note did not indicate a fiscal impact. As a result, the Court reversed the Attorney General’s determination, struck the fiscal statement, and ordered the Attorney General to prepare ballot statements for submission to the Secretary of State. View "Kendrick v. Knudsen" on Justia Law

Amadasun v. Armstrong

2026-02-25T08:31:49-08:00

A candidate for town council in South Windsor challenged the town clerk’s decision regarding the application of newly approved charter revisions following the November 2025 municipal election. The charter revisions, approved by referendum on election day, reduced the maximum number of town council members from any one party from six to five. During the election, six Democratic candidates received more votes than any Republican candidate. The plaintiff, a Democrat, received the sixth highest total among his party’s candidates. After the election, the town clerk determined that the newly approved “bare majority” rule applied immediately, which resulted in a Republican candidate, who received fewer votes, being seated instead of the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed suit in the Superior Court for the judicial district of Hartford, claiming he was aggrieved by the town clerk’s application of the charter revisions to the 2025 election results. He argued that this constituted a ruling of an election official under Connecticut General Statutes §§ 9-328 and 9-371b. The trial court dismissed the case, holding that the town clerk’s actions did not constitute a “ruling of an election official” as required by the statutes, reasoning that the clerk was merely applying the law after votes were tallied. On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed whether the town clerk’s decision constituted a ruling of an election official for purposes of expedited judicial review under the relevant statutes. The Supreme Court held that the town clerk’s decision to apply the new charter revisions in determining the outcome of the election was indeed a ruling of an election official. The court concluded that this action involved interpreting and applying legal requirements central to the election process. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Amadasun v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

Alaska Policy Forum v. Alaska Public Offices Commission

2026-02-13T11:00:56-08:00

A nonprofit corporation focused on public policy issues published several materials criticizing ranked-choice voting in Alaska ahead of a 2020 statewide election that included a ballot proposition proposing to adopt ranked-choice voting and other election reforms. These materials included a press release announcing an educational campaign, a video posted on the nonprofit’s website and YouTube channel, a press release about a report on the effects of ranked-choice voting, and a blog post. The communications did not explicitly mention the ballot proposition by name but referred to ranked-choice voting and the upcoming election. A complaint was filed with the Alaska Public Offices Commission (the Commission), alleging that the nonprofit failed to comply with Alaska’s campaign finance laws by not registering, not reporting expenditures, and not including “paid for by” disclosures on its communications. The nonprofit acknowledged spending approximately $643 on related activities. The Commission determined that the nonprofit’s communications qualified as regulated “express communications” because, in context, they could only be interpreted as exhortations to vote against the ballot proposition. The Commission found violations but waived any penalty. The nonprofit appealed to the Superior Court for the Third Judicial District, Anchorage, challenging the statutory interpretation, the application of the law, and the constitutionality of the statutes as vague and violative of the First Amendment. The superior court affirmed the Commission’s order, holding that the statutory standards were reasonably applied, were not unconstitutionally vague, and withstood First Amendment scrutiny under exacting review. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska held that the nonprofit’s communications triggered reporting and disclosure requirements. The court ruled that the statutes, as narrowed by agency interpretation, were not unconstitutionally vague and that the disclosure and reporting requirements were substantially related to the government’s interest in an informed electorate. The judgment was affirmed. View "Alaska Policy Forum v. Alaska Public Offices Commission" on Justia Law

Reed v. Yang

2026-02-12T09:31:33-08:00

A candidate for the Arkansas House of Representatives, District 92, was certified to appear on the Republican primary ballot. Another Arkansas citizen, who did not reside in District 92, sued to have the candidate declared ineligible based on a past guilty plea to a felony public trust crime. The plaintiff sought to prevent election officials from counting or certifying any votes cast for the candidate. The Pulaski County Circuit Court considered the statutory framework that allows any Arkansas citizen to bring an action to enforce eligibility requirements for public office if the responsible prosecuting attorney fails to act. The court found that the prosecuting attorney knew of the candidate’s prior conviction and failed to act, and that the plaintiff, as a citizen, had standing. The court ruled the candidate ineligible to run or hold office and ordered that votes for the candidate not be counted. The court denied the plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees and expenses. The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case. It affirmed the circuit court’s findings that the plaintiff had standing, that the prosecuting attorney’s failure to act was sufficient, and that the candidate was ineligible under the plain language of Arkansas’s statutory disqualification provisions for those pleading guilty to public trust crimes, even if records were sealed. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s evidentiary rulings. On cross-appeal, the Supreme Court held that the statute mandates an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses to a prevailing citizen plaintiff. Thus, it reversed the denial of fees and remanded for further proceedings on that issue. The Supreme Court’s disposition was to affirm on the direct appeal and reverse and remand on the cross-appeal. View "Reed v. Yang" on Justia Law

Gibbons v. Gibbs

2026-02-11T11:30:26-08:00

The case concerns the non-reappointment of a local general registrar of elections in Lynchburg, Virginia. The plaintiff, previously appointed unanimously by a bipartisan electoral board, reapplied for her position after her term expired in 2023. By that time, the board’s partisan makeup had shifted to include two Republicans and one Democrat, reflecting state law. The board interviewed four candidates, including the plaintiff, but ultimately appointed a different candidate who was a registered Republican. The plaintiff, describing herself as an independent, alleged her non-reappointment was due to partisan bias rather than job performance. Following the board’s decision, the plaintiff sued the board and its two Republican members, alleging First Amendment violations tied to political animus. The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia dismissed the claim against the board itself on sovereign immunity grounds, but allowed the suit against the individual members to proceed. After a jury trial, the verdict favored the defendants. The plaintiff then appealed, raising concerns about jury selection procedures and the exclusion of certain evidence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the appeal. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in managing voir dire, including its refusal to allow more pointed questioning about potential jurors’ political affiliations and beliefs. The Fourth Circuit also determined that the plaintiff had not preserved most evidentiary challenges for appellate review, as she failed to make sufficient proffers or obtain definitive rulings on excluded evidence. For the limited evidentiary exclusions properly preserved, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion. Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Gibbons v. Gibbs" on Justia Law

DAY V. WARDLAW

2026-02-11T11:02:47-08:00

A candidate for the Arkansas House of Representatives was challenged by his opponent, who argued that she was ineligible to run for office due to a prior disposition in a 2018 hot-check case. The challenger claimed that the opponent had been found guilty of violating the Arkansas Hot Check Law, which, under state constitutional and statutory provisions, would render her ineligible for election. The evidence included a district court docket showing a disposition labeled “GUILTY – BOND FORFEITURE,” as well as payment of fines, fees, and restitution related to the charge. The opponent did not contest the existence of the underlying case but denied that she had been convicted or found guilty. The case was first heard in the Pulaski County Circuit Court. After a hearing that included testimony from court and law enforcement personnel about the court’s procedures, and review of the district court records, the circuit court concluded that the bond forfeiture was not an admission of guilt. The court found that the opponent had neither entered a plea nor been found guilty by the court. The circuit court therefore held that she had not been convicted of an infamous crime or a public trust crime under Arkansas law, and denied the challenger’s petition for declaratory judgment and mandamus. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the record and the circuit court’s findings under a clearly erroneous standard. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that a bond forfeiture, without a plea or factual finding of guilt, does not constitute a conviction or render a candidate ineligible under Article 5, Section 9 of the Arkansas Constitution or the relevant statutes. The Supreme Court rejected the challenger’s remaining arguments and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. View "DAY V. WARDLAW" on Justia Law

Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Millis

2026-02-10T14:30:42-08:00

A nonprofit organization dedicated to election integrity, along with two individual members, filed administrative complaints with the Wisconsin Elections Commission, alleging that the Commissioners themselves had failed to properly enforce certain aspects of federal election law regarding voter-ID requirements and management of voter registration lists. The Commission, citing ethical concerns about adjudicating complaints against itself, declined to review the complaints on their merits but suggested alternative remedies, such as referral to a district attorney or appeal to a state court. Dissatisfied, the organization and its members filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, seeking to compel the Commission to address their complaints under federal law. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that neither the organization nor its members had Article III standing because they failed to show a concrete injury. The plaintiffs were permitted to amend their complaint, but upon doing so, the district court again dismissed the action, finding that their alleged injuries were intangible and insufficient to establish standing under federal law. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that alleged procedural violations of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) did not constitute a concrete injury in fact necessary for Article III standing, as there was no historic or common-law analog for suing the government merely for failing to follow statutory procedures. The court further determined that HAVA did not create a private right of action enforceable through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the plaintiffs’ claims of organizational or associational standing were inadequately supported. The Seventh Circuit thus affirmed the dismissal for lack of standing. View "Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Millis" on Justia Law

Kohls v. Ellison

2026-02-09T08:30:54-08:00

Two individuals, a political commentator and a state legislator, brought suit against Minnesota officials to challenge a state statute that criminalizes the dissemination of “deep fake” content intended to influence elections. The law applies to realistic depictions that could mislead a reasonable person into believing a public figure engaged in speech or conduct they did not. The commentator created an AI-generated video of Vice President Harris, which he labeled as parody with a clear disclaimer. The legislator shared the same video without any disclaimer. Both plaintiffs argued that the statute infringed their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. After the complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, the district court found that the commentator lacked standing because the only videos he posted were labeled as parody and thus not covered by the statute. The court concluded that the legislator did have standing, since she shared content that could plausibly be seen as a deep fake under the law. However, the court denied her motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding she had unreasonably delayed in seeking relief—waiting over sixteen months after the statute’s enactment without sufficient explanation. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the commentator did not demonstrate a credible threat of prosecution or show any evidence of injury, including from third parties. The court also determined that the legislator’s delay in seeking a preliminary injunction undermined her claim of irreparable harm, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying extraordinary relief. The Eighth Circuit left open the possibility of further proceedings on the merits, including a permanent injunction, but affirmed the denial of preliminary relief. View "Kohls v. Ellison" on Justia Law

Public Interest Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Wooten

2026-01-16T11:30:21-08:00

A nonprofit organization based in Virginia, which advocates for election integrity, requested access to South Carolina’s statewide voter registration list from the state’s Election Commission. The request was made under the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), which generally requires states to make certain records about voter list maintenance available for public inspection and copying. South Carolina’s Election Commission denied the request, citing a state law that restricts disclosure of the voter list to individuals registered to vote within the state. The nonprofit responded by notifying the Election Commission that this refusal violated the NVRA and, after receiving a reiteration of the Commission’s position, filed a federal lawsuit seeking disclosure of the list. The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina reviewed the case. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to the nonprofit, concluding that the NVRA requires disclosure of the voter list and preempts the conflicting state law. The district court ordered the Election Commission to disclose the list. The Election Commission then moved for reconsideration, but the district court denied this motion. The Election Commission appealed both the grant of summary judgment and the denial of reconsideration. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. On appeal, the Election Commission argued for the first time that the nonprofit lacked Article III standing to sue under the NVRA. The Fourth Circuit held that standing is a threshold jurisdictional issue and that the record lacked sufficient factual findings on standing, as the issue was not previously addressed in the district court. The Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the nonprofit has standing to bring the suit. The merits of the case were not addressed on appeal. View "Public Interest Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Wooten" on Justia Law

Bost v. Illinois Bd. of Elections

2026-01-14T09:15:05-08:00

Illinois law provides that election officials must count mail-in ballots postmarked or certified no later than election day, as long as those ballots are received within two weeks after election day. Congressman Michael Bost and two other political candidates filed suit against the Illinois State Board of Elections and its executive director, asserting that counting ballots received after election day violates federal statutes that set a single election day for federal offices. The plaintiffs alleged that the challenged law would require them to expend additional campaign resources, potentially harm their reputations, and deprive them of a fair electoral process. Congressman Bost, in particular, claimed he would need to extend campaign activities and monitoring efforts for two additional weeks, incurring costs and risking a reduction in his margin of victory. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the case, concluding that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the injuries alleged—such as increased campaign costs and potential reputational harm—were speculative or voluntarily incurred. The Seventh Circuit emphasized that Congressman Bost had won his prior election with a significant margin and found the plaintiffs’ injuries to be neither concrete nor particularized enough to support standing. The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that Congressman Bost, as a candidate for office, does have standing to challenge the rules governing vote counting in his election. The Court reasoned that candidates possess a concrete and particularized interest in the integrity and legality of the electoral process, which is distinct from the generalized interest of voters. The judgment of the Seventh Circuit was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Bost v. Illinois Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

In re Rogers

2026-01-13T15:14:35-08:00

A candidate for Justice of the Supreme Court sought to participate in the Texas Republican primary by submitting a ballot application to the party chair. The application was rejected as deficient, specifically due to concerns about the validity and sufficiency of the submitted signatures. The candidate disputed the rejection, arguing both that his original application met requirements and that he cured any alleged defects by submitting an amended application after the statutory deadline. The timing of the submissions was central: the original application was filed just hours before the deadline, and the amended materials were submitted several days after the deadline had passed. After the application was rejected, the candidate sought temporary injunctive relief in a state district court. The trial court denied this request, and the candidate did not appeal the denial or seek emergency relief from the court of appeals. Instead, he pursued a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court of Texas, arguing that the party chair had a ministerial duty to accept his amended application and certify him as a candidate. The Supreme Court of Texas denied the petition for writ of mandamus. The court held that mandamus is inappropriate where there are genuinely disputed material facts, and noted that the trial court had ruled against the candidate on the core factual dispute regarding the sufficiency of his signatures. Further, the court concluded that the law does not require election officials to accept amendments to ballot applications after the statutory deadline, especially when initial submissions occur at the very end of the filing period. The court found no violation of a ministerial duty or clear abuse of discretion by the party chair and thus denied the extraordinary relief requested. View "In re Rogers" on Justia Law

Transparent Election Initiative v. Knudsen

2026-01-06T14:19:12-08:00

A petitioner sought a declaratory judgment regarding the legal sufficiency of a proposed constitutional ballot initiative, known as Ballot Issue 4. This initiative aimed to amend the Montana Constitution to limit the powers and privileges of "artificial persons"—including corporations, nonprofit corporations, limited liability companies, unincorporated associations, and certain foreign entities—by expressly restricting their ability to engage in election and ballot issue activities. The initiative would revoke all powers previously granted to artificial persons under Montana law, regrant only those necessary for lawful business or charitable purposes, and specifically prohibit election-related activities except for certain political committees. The petitioner contended that all provisions of the initiative were integral to a unified purpose: preventing artificial persons from participating in political spending. The Montana Attorney General, supported by amici, determined that Ballot Issue 4 was legally insufficient because it violated the separate-vote requirement of Article XIV, Section 11, of the Montana Constitution. According to the Attorney General, the initiative encompassed multiple changes that were not closely related, including broad revocations and regrants of powers to artificial persons, and affected diverse areas of law beyond the stated intent. The petitioner challenged this determination, arguing that the initiative constituted a single, unified scheme and that none of its provisions could sensibly be considered separately. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana exercised original jurisdiction to review the Attorney General’s legal sufficiency determination. The Court held that Ballot Issue 4 violated the separate-vote requirement because it proposed more than one substantive constitutional change—specifically, both limiting artificial persons’ powers to those expressly provided and revoking and regranting powers in a manner that extended beyond election-related activities. The Court affirmed the Attorney General’s rejection of the initiative and denied the petitioner’s request to declare it legally sufficient. View "Transparent Election Initiative v. Knudsen" on Justia Law

Walsh vs. City of Orono

2026-01-01T02:19:39-08:00

A vacancy was created on the Orono City Council in November 2024 when a councilmember resigned with more than two years remaining in his term. At the time, the City of Orono did not have a special-election ordinance. The mayor appointed a replacement to fill the seat. Subsequently, in February 2025, the city council enacted a special-election ordinance and adopted a resolution to hold a special election to fill the remainder of the term. Dennis Walsh, who had appointed the replacement, petitioned the Hennepin County District Court under Minnesota Statutes section 204B.44 to quash the special election. He argued the relevant statute required the appointed councilmember to serve the remainder of the term because no special-election ordinance was in place at the time of the vacancy, and that holding a special election would improperly remove the appointee in violation of the Minnesota Constitution. The City of Orono and its city clerk opposed the petition, asserting statutory authority for their actions. The Hennepin County District Court denied Walsh’s petition, finding that the city was authorized to hold a special election and that passage of the ordinance after the vacancy did not violate the statute or constitution. Walsh sought accelerated review. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that claims challenging the special election were properly raised under section 204B.44. Substantively, the court determined Minnesota Statutes section 412.02, subdivision 2a, permits a statutory city to enact and apply a special-election ordinance after a vacancy is filled by appointment, so long as more than two years remain in the term. Further, holding a special election in these circumstances does not constitute an unconstitutional removal of an inferior officer under article VIII, section 5, of the Minnesota Constitution. View "Walsh vs. City of Orono" on Justia Law

Un del Pueblo Entero v. Nelson

2025-12-31T16:30:12-08:00

After the Texas Legislature passed the Election Protection and Integrity Act of 2021 (“S.B.1”), a sweeping law that amended numerous aspects of the state’s election procedures, multiple groups of plaintiffs—including civil rights and voter advocacy organizations—challenged thirty-eight provisions of the law. They alleged violations of various constitutional amendments, the Voting Rights Act (VRA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act, naming state officials including the Texas Secretary of State and Attorney General as defendants. In the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, the defendants moved to dismiss on grounds of sovereign immunity and lack of standing. The district court addressed the motions on a provision-by-provision basis, concluding that the Secretary and Attorney General were sufficiently connected to the enforcement of most challenged provisions to overcome sovereign immunity under Ex parte Young, and that plaintiffs had standing to sue. It denied the motions to dismiss for the majority of the claims, although it dismissed others as moot, for lack of standing, or for failure to state a claim. The defendants appealed the denials. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held it had appellate jurisdiction over the interlocutory sovereign immunity appeals. On the merits, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. It held that the VRA claims were not barred by sovereign immunity. For the constitutional and other statutory claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court determined that the Secretary of State is a proper defendant only for those provisions she directly enforces—such as those involving the design of forms and sanctioning of registrars—and not for those enforced by other officials. Similarly, it held the Attorney General could be sued only for one provision authorizing civil penalties. The court affirmed standing for claims against provisions enforced by these officials. View "Un del Pueblo Entero v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Wygant v. Lee

2025-12-10T16:14:27-08:00

After the 2020 census, Tennessee’s General Assembly redrew the state House and Senate legislative maps. Two voters, Gary Wygant and Francie Hunt, challenged these new maps. Wygant, a resident of Gibson County, argued the House map violated the state constitution by splitting more counties than necessary to comply with federal law. Hunt, a Davidson County voter, asserted the Senate map violated the state constitution’s requirement that multi-district counties’ Senate districts be consecutively numbered, because Davidson County’s new districts were not. The case was initially heard by a three-judge panel in the Davidson County Chancery Court. At trial, the panel allowed only Wygant’s district-specific challenge (focused on Gibson County) and Hunt’s claim regarding Davidson County’s Senate districts to proceed. The court found Wygant had standing only as to the Gibson County split and dismissed his broader challenge. The court ruled that the House map was constitutional, finding the state’s actions justified given federal requirements. However, the panel found Hunt had standing and declared the Senate map unconstitutional due to the misnumbering of Davidson County’s districts. The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case. It held that Wygant had standing only to challenge the split of Gibson County, not the entire House map. The Court concluded that although Wygant demonstrated it was possible to draw a map that split fewer counties, he did not prove the Gibson County split was unnecessary to comply with federal law or lacked a rational or legitimate basis. The Court further held that Hunt did not suffer an injury in fact from the Senate map’s numbering, and therefore lacked standing. As a result, the Court affirmed the trial court’s rejection of Wygant’s district-specific challenge, reversed the finding that Hunt had standing, vacated the judgment declaring the Senate map unconstitutional, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wygant v. Lee" on Justia Law

In re Recall of Olsen

2025-12-04T11:45:03-08:00

A registered voter in Pacific County, Washington filed a recall petition against an elected county commissioner, alleging two violations of the Open Public Meetings Act (OPMA) in connection with executive sessions held to discuss litigation or potential litigation following two inmate deaths at the county jail. The petition claimed the commissioner attended executive sessions on several dates without legal counsel present, as required by law, and accused her of disregarding public input and misrepresenting the decision-making process leading to the creation of a new jail services department. The Pacific County Superior Court held a sufficiency hearing and found both charges in the recall petition factually and legally sufficient, thus permitting the recall to proceed. The petitioner relied primarily on county meeting minutes and metadata from prepared statements to support the allegations, while the commissioner challenged the accuracy and reliability of the minutes and argued there was no evidence of intent to violate the law. Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington considered the sufficiency of each charge de novo. The court found that the evidence for some meetings contradicted the allegations about the absence of legal counsel, and for others, although legal counsel was not listed in the minutes, there was no evidence of intentional violation. The petitioner’s supporting exhibits only showed the commissioner received OPMA training, not that she intended to violate the Act. Regarding the second charge, the court found the allegations lacked specific facts about the date, location, and nature of the alleged misconduct and did not cite a law or standard making the conduct unlawful. The Supreme Court of Washington held both charges in the recall petition were factually and legally insufficient and reversed the superior court’s decision. View "In re Recall of Olsen" on Justia Law

KNIGHT v FONTES

2025-12-04T09:00:25-08:00

Four Arizona voters, each residing in a different geographic voting district, challenged the constitutionality of the statute governing the retention election process for Arizona Court of Appeals judges. The statute, A.R.S. § 12-120.02, divides the state into four geographic voting districts, limiting which voters may participate in the retention elections for particular appellate judges. The plaintiffs argued that, because Court of Appeals judges have statewide precedential authority, all Arizona voters should be permitted to participate in their retention elections. They alleged that the district-based system violated both the Free and Equal Elections Clause and the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Arizona Constitution. In the Superior Court in Maricopa County, the State moved to dismiss the complaint, raising arguments including lack of standing and the constitutionality of the statute. The superior court granted the motion to dismiss. It found that § 12-120.02 did not violate the Free and Equal Elections Clause because there was no complete denial of the right to vote, and that the Constitution’s design did not require statewide participation in all judicial retention elections. The court also rejected the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause claim, holding that the statute treated all similarly situated voters within each district equally, and no class was treated differently from another similarly situated class. On direct review, the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona affirmed the superior court’s dismissal. The court held that the Free and Equal Elections Clause is only implicated where there is a complete denial of the right to vote or unequal weighting of votes, neither of which were present here. It also held that the one-person, one-vote principle does not apply to judicial retention elections. Regarding the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause, the court found that all voters within each geographic district are treated equally, so the statute did not violate the state constitution. View "KNIGHT v FONTES" on Justia Law

Voter Reference Foundation v. Torrez

2025-11-25T12:03:25-08:00

A nonprofit organization dedicated to promoting electoral transparency operates a website that republishes voter registration data collected from state agencies. The group obtained New Mexico’s voter data through a third party and published it online, including information such as names, addresses, party affiliation, and voting history. After the website highlighted discrepancies in the state’s voter rolls, New Mexico’s Secretary of State publicly questioned the group’s motives and the lawfulness of its actions. The Secretary referred the group to the Attorney General for criminal investigation under state statutes that restrict the use and sharing of voter data. The group’s subsequent requests for updated voter data were denied. After the state’s refusal, the organization filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that New Mexico’s restrictions were preempted by the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) and violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court issued a preliminary injunction preventing prosecution, which was later stayed by the Tenth Circuit. After cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court found that the NVRA preempted New Mexico’s restrictions and enjoined criminal prosecution. The court rejected most of the group’s remaining constitutional claims but, following a bench trial, held that the state engaged in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination by refusing further data requests. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the NVRA preempts New Mexico’s restrictions on the use and sharing of voter data, holding that state laws that prevent broad public disclosure of voter data conflict with the NVRA’s requirements. The Tenth Circuit did not reach the First Amendment claims, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Voter Reference Foundation v. Torrez" on Justia Law

DeLanis v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville

2025-11-24T13:30:16-08:00

An attorney who chaired the Davidson County Election Commission was also employed at a law firm that represented the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County. The Election Commission became involved in a dispute over whether a citizen-initiated tax-repeal referendum should be placed on the ballot, a measure opposed by the city government and certain city council members. The attorney, acting as commission chair, supported certifying the referendum. Following pressure from city officials, including a council member who threatened to withdraw city business from the law firm if the attorney continued supporting the referendum, the law firm terminated the attorney’s employment after he refused to change his position. The attorney filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, asserting violations of his First Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, among other claims. The district court denied motions to dismiss based on qualified immunity filed by both the council member and the law firm. The court concluded that the council member’s alleged conduct violated clearly established First Amendment law and that the law firm, as a private entity, was not entitled to qualified immunity. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that both the council member and the law firm were eligible to assert qualified immunity due to their public functions in this context. The court held that the council member was not entitled to qualified immunity because the complaint plausibly alleged he violated clearly established First Amendment rights by causing the attorney’s firing due to protected speech. However, the court found that the law firm was entitled to qualified immunity, as there was no clearly established law prohibiting a law firm from firing an employee in response to client pressure under these circumstances. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity for the council member, reversed as to the law firm, and remanded for further proceedings. View "DeLanis v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville" on Justia Law

Clarke v Town of Newburgh

2025-11-20T07:07:30-08:00

Six residents of the Town of Newburgh sued the Town and its Town Board, alleging that the Board’s at-large electoral system unlawfully diluted the votes of Black and Hispanic residents, in violation of Section 17-206 of the New York Voting Rights Act (NYVRA). The plaintiffs argued that the method of electing all five Town Board members at-large prevented Black and Hispanic voters, who together made up about 40% of the population, from electing their preferred candidates or influencing election outcomes. They sought a court declaration that the at-large system violated the NYVRA and an injunction requiring the Town to implement a different electoral system. The Town of Newburgh moved for summary judgment, arguing that Section 17-206 was facially unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. and New York Constitutions, and that its current election system complied with the NYVRA. The Supreme Court, Orange County, granted the Town’s motion, holding that the Town could challenge the statute because it allegedly could not comply with the NYVRA without violating equal protection, and declared the provision—and the entire NYVRA—unconstitutional. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the Town lacked capacity to bring this challenge since it had not shown that compliance with the NYVRA would force it to violate equal protection, and that the Supreme Court erred in invalidating the statute. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the Town of Newburgh, as a political subdivision created by the State, could not bring a facial constitutional challenge to the NYVRA's vote-dilution provision. The court reaffirmed the longstanding rule that political subdivisions generally lack authority to challenge state laws unless a narrow exception applies, and found that no such exception was met here. The Appellate Division’s order was affirmed. View "Clarke v Town of Newburgh" on Justia Law

United States v. Taylor

2025-11-17T08:30:25-08:00

A woman who immigrated from Vietnam to the United States and became active in the Vietnamese community in Sioux City, Iowa, organized a campaign in 2020 to assist Vietnamese Americans—many of whom had limited English proficiency and were unfamiliar with the U.S. election system—in registering to vote and casting absentee ballots. Her efforts were not solely for civic engagement; she hoped these voters would support her husband, who was a candidate in the election. She facilitated the process by providing forms, translating, and returning completed documents to the county auditor. However, she also engaged in fraudulent conduct by instructing family members to complete and submit voting documents for absent adult children, and in some cases, she filled out and signed the forms herself. In total, she submitted 26 documents with forged signatures. The county auditor became suspicious and contacted the FBI, leading to her arrest and indictment on 52 counts of voter fraud under two federal statutes. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa presided over her trial. The court used model jury instructions that did not require the jury to find that she knew her conduct was illegal or that the children did not consent to her actions, despite her request for such an instruction. The jury found her guilty on all counts, and her motion for judgment of acquittal was denied. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed whether the jury instructions accurately reflected the law and whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. The court held that the instructions properly conveyed the required mental states—knowledge and willfulness—and did not need to require knowledge of the specific law violated. The court also found the evidence sufficient for conviction, including for counts involving equivocal testimony, based on the defendant’s pattern of conduct. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

State v. DeGraffenreid

2025-11-13T16:05:27-08:00

Several individuals were nominated by the Nevada Republican Party to serve as potential electors for the 2020 presidential election. After the Democratic candidates won the Nevada popular vote, these individuals challenged the results in state court, seeking to be declared the legitimate electors. Their challenge was denied by the district court, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed that decision. Despite this, the individuals held a ceremony in Carson City, signed documents purporting to cast Nevada’s electoral votes for the Republican candidates, and mailed these documents to various officials, including the Chief Judge of the United States District Court in Las Vegas, Nevada. Based on these actions, the State charged the individuals with crimes under NRS 205.110 (uttering or offering forged instruments) and NRS 239.330 (offering a false or forged instrument to be filed in a public office). The indictment was filed in Clark County, where the federal courthouse is located. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the alleged offenses were complete upon mailing the documents from Douglas County, and thus venue was improper in Clark County. The Eighth Judicial District Court agreed, finding that the crimes were completed upon mailing and dismissed the indictment for improper venue. The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the offenses charged were not complete upon mailing, but rather required the delivery and receipt of the documents at the intended location in Clark County. The court concluded that venue was proper in Clark County because the alleged crimes involved the delivery of false documents to a recipient in that county. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. DeGraffenreid" on Justia Law

Benda for Common-sense vs. Anderson

2025-11-13T02:18:55-08:00

In August 2022, the appellants filed a complaint and petition in Rice County District Court, seeking to prevent the use of electronic voting machines with embedded modems in the upcoming November 2022 general election. They alleged that these machines were not properly certified or secure, in violation of Minnesota law, and requested an order restraining the county from using the modem functions during the election. The complaint named the Director of Rice County Property Tax and Elections as a defendant, and the Minnesota Secretary of State intervened as a party. The Rice County District Court dismissed the section 204B.44 claim in January 2023, citing several jurisdictional defects, including mootness because the 2022 election had already occurred, and insufficient service of process on all candidates as required by statute. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, focusing on the lack of service to all candidates as the basis for its decision and did not address the other grounds identified by the district court. The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the appellants’ claim under Minnesota Statutes section 204B.44 was moot because the relief sought pertained solely to the 2022 general election, which had already taken place. The court rejected the argument that the claim could be redirected to future elections and clarified that section 204B.44 challenges must be specific to a single election. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, but did so on the alternative ground of mootness, without reaching the issue of service of process on all candidates. View "Benda for Common-sense vs. Anderson" on Justia Law

Anderson v. Bates

2025-11-06T07:56:11-08:00

A group of landowners in Summit County, Utah, challenged a proposed ballot measure to incorporate a new municipality called West Hills. The sponsor of the incorporation, Derek Anderson, had modified the proposed boundaries after the statutory deadline for landowners to request exclusion from the new municipality had passed. As a result, certain landowners whose properties were added late were unable to seek exclusion, even though similarly situated landowners had previously been allowed to do so. The landowners filed suit in the Third District Court, Silver Summit, arguing that the Municipal Incorporation Code, as applied, violated the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause of the Utah Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment for the landowners, finding the code unconstitutional as applied and invalidating the certification of the West Hills ballot measure. The court determined that the plaintiffs were “specified landowners” who would have been entitled to exclusion if their properties had been added earlier, and that the legislature’s interest in certainty did not justify the disparate treatment. The sponsor then filed an emergency petition for extraordinary relief with the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, seeking to overturn the district court’s order before the upcoming election. The Utah Supreme Court, after expedited briefing and oral argument, denied the petition for extraordinary relief. The court held that, under the unique circumstances, it would not exercise its discretion to issue a writ due to the potential disruption and confusion in the election process, including the risk of voter suppression and interference with electioneering efforts. The denial was without prejudice to the sponsor’s ability to pursue an appeal or interlocutory review of the district court’s order. View "Anderson v. Bates" on Justia Law

P. ex rel. Bonta v. City of Huntington Beach

2025-11-03T13:01:49-08:00

Huntington Beach, a charter city in Orange County, amended its city charter through Measure A, which authorized the city to require voter identification for municipal elections beginning in 2026. This measure was passed by local voters. In response, the California Legislature enacted Elections Code section 10005, effective January 1, 2025, which prohibits any local government from requiring voter identification for voting unless mandated by state or federal law. The statute was specifically intended to address Huntington Beach’s Measure A. Following the passage of Measure A, the State of California, through the Attorney General and Secretary of State, filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Orange County, seeking to invalidate the voter identification provision in the city charter. The City of Huntington Beach demurred, arguing the issue was not ripe since the provision had not yet been implemented. The trial court sustained the demurrer, but after procedural developments and further hearings, ultimately denied the state’s petition, finding that the charter provision did not violate the right to vote or implicate the integrity of the electoral process. The state timely appealed. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. Applying the four-part “home rule” test, the court held that Elections Code section 10005 addresses a matter of statewide concern—integrity of the electoral process—and is narrowly tailored to prevent discriminatory barriers to voting. The court concluded that section 10005 preempts the Huntington Beach charter provision. The judgment of the trial court was reversed and remanded with directions to issue a writ of mandate invalidating the charter provision, enter a permanent injunction against its enforcement, and declare it preempted by state law. View "P. ex rel. Bonta v. City of Huntington Beach" on Justia Law

EVANS v. HARRISON

2025-10-30T07:02:17-08:00

A citizen of Cleburne County submitted a petition for a local ballot initiative, titled the “Hand Marked, Hand Counted Paper Ballot Ordinance of 2024,” to the county clerk for inclusion in the 2024 general election. The county clerk rejected the petition, determining that there were insufficient valid signatures because some paid canvassers were not Arkansas residents as required by law. The canvassers later submitted supplemental affidavits listing Arkansas addresses, but the clerk still refused to count those signatures. The petitioner then filed suit in the Cleburne County Circuit Court, seeking a writ of mandamus and an injunction to compel the clerk to count the disputed signatures and certify the petition if it met the signature requirements. After an expedited hearing, the circuit court granted both the writ and the injunction, ordering the clerk to count all signatures, including those “cured” by the supplemental affidavits, and to certify the petition if it was sufficient. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed whether the circuit court could require the county clerk to certify a local ballot initiative that was not timely filed under the Arkansas Constitution. The Supreme Court held that Article 5, section 1 of the Arkansas Constitution sets the exclusive timeline for filing local initiative petitions—no sooner than ninety days and no later than sixty days before the election. The petition in question was filed too early for the 2024 election and, by operation of statute, would have been certified for the 2026 election, but it was also untimely for that election under the constitutional timeline. The Supreme Court held that the relevant statutory provisions were unconstitutional to the extent they conflicted with the constitutional timeline. The court reversed the circuit court’s order and dismissed the case, holding that a circuit court cannot require certification of an untimely initiative. View "EVANS v. HARRISON" on Justia Law

Jackson v. Tarrant County

2025-10-29T09:30:15-08:00

A group of voters in Tarrant County, Texas, challenged the county’s decision to redraw the boundaries of its four commissioners precincts in 2025, a process that occurred outside the usual post-census redistricting cycle. The new map, adopted by a narrow 3–2 vote, shifted a significant number of voters—disproportionately Black, Latino, and Democratic—into precincts that would not hold commissioner elections until 2028, effectively postponing their opportunity to vote for a county commissioner by two years. The plaintiffs, who are racially diverse, argued that the redistricting was intended to harm racial minorities and Democratic voters, and that the mid-cycle timing unlawfully disenfranchised certain residents. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction to block the use of the new map in the 2026 election. The district court dismissed the First Amendment claims as nonjusticiable under Supreme Court precedent, but allowed the race discrimination and vote postponement claims to proceed, ultimately finding that the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The Fifth Circuit held that claims of partisan gerrymandering are nonjusticiable in federal court, even when staggered elections result in some voters’ ballots being postponed. The court further held that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that race was a motivating factor in the adoption of the new map, applying the Arlington Heights framework and finding no clear error in the district court’s assessment of the evidence. Finally, the court concluded that postponement of voting opportunities due to redistricting in a staggered election system does not violate the Constitution, as there is no right to vote on a particular schedule. View "Jackson v. Tarrant County" on Justia Law

Johnson v. Wilkerson

2025-10-27T06:08:50-08:00

In this case, Denise Wilkerson won the Democratic primary for a council seat in Roselle, New Jersey, by a narrow margin of three votes over Cynthia Johnson. Johnson requested a recount and a recheck, which ultimately reduced Wilkerson’s margin to two votes. Johnson then filed an amended petition contesting the election, arguing that three voters had been improperly denied the right to vote. The trial court initially ordered a new election but, after reconsideration prompted by the Attorney General, removed the requirement for a new election and directed that the Democratic County Committee select the nominee pursuant to N.J.S.A. 19:13-20. Wilkerson appealed the trial court’s September 12 order to the Appellate Division, seeking either a special primary and general election after Election Day or, alternatively, placement of both Democratic candidates on the general election ballot. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s order, upholding the use of the statutory process that allowed the county committee to select the nominee. Wilkerson then filed an emergent application with the Supreme Court of New Jersey, reiterating her requests for extraordinary remedies. The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that neither of Wilkerson’s proposed remedies—holding a special primary and general election after Election Day or placing both Democratic candidates on the general election ballot—finds support in the statutory scheme. The Court determined that the relevant statutes, N.J.S.A. 19:13-18 and N.J.S.A. 19:13-20, govern the situation, and that the county committee’s selection of the nominee was proper, even though the statutory deadline was relaxed due to litigation delays. The judgment of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "Johnson v. Wilkerson" on Justia Law

County of Onondaga v State of New York

2025-10-16T07:10:23-08:00

In 2023, the New York Legislature enacted the Even Year Election Law (EYEL), which consolidated certain county and town elections with even-year state and federal elections. The law amended various statutes to move local elections to even-numbered years and adjusted the terms of office for officials elected in odd-numbered years. Several counties and towns with charter provisions setting local elections in odd years, along with individual voters, challenged the EYEL, arguing that it violated the home rule provisions of article IX of the New York State Constitution and other constitutional rights. The Supreme Court, Onondaga County, consolidated the complaints and denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss. It declared the EYEL unconstitutional, holding that counties have a constitutional right to set their own terms of office and that the EYEL was neither a valid general law nor a valid special law under article IX. The court enjoined enforcement of the EYEL. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, finding that the EYEL did not violate the New York or United States Constitutions. The Appellate Division held that the EYEL was a general law, applied rationally to similarly situated counties, and served the legitimate state interest of increasing voter turnout. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court held that article IX does not expressly or implicitly limit the Legislature’s authority to mandate the timing of local elections. The EYEL was found to be a valid general law, and the constitutional “bill of rights” for local governments did not bar the Legislature from enacting such a statute. The Court also dismissed the individual voter plaintiffs’ claims, finding any alleged injury minor compared to the State’s substantial interest. The order was affirmed without costs. View "County of Onondaga v State of New York" on Justia Law

Republican Governors Association v. Hebdon

2025-10-10T09:00:19-08:00

Several months before an election, complaints were filed with the Alaska Public Offices Commission alleging that two political groups, A Stronger Alaska and the Republican Governors Association, had violated Alaska’s campaign finance laws by coordinating with a gubernatorial campaign and failing to comply with disclosure requirements. The Commission initiated expedited proceedings, held hearings where officials from the groups testified, and then chose not to make a final determination on the alleged violations. Instead, the Commission remanded the matters to its staff for further investigation on a regular, non-expedited basis. The Commission’s staff subsequently issued administrative subpoenas seeking documents and communications from the groups, but the groups refused to comply. The Commission sought judicial enforcement of its subpoenas in the Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District. The groups opposed enforcement, arguing that the subpoenas were unnecessary because the Commission already had relevant testimony, that further investigation was barred by res judicata, and that the process violated their due process rights. They also challenged the constitutionality of the statutory scheme authorizing the expedited process. The superior court rejected all of these arguments, granted summary judgment in favor of the Commission, and ordered enforcement of the subpoenas. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s decision. The court held that the subpoenas were not unreasonable or oppressive simply because prior testimony had been given, as documentary evidence could still be relevant. The court also held that res judicata did not apply because the Commission had not issued a final decision on the merits, and that the process did not violate substantive due process or result in an absurd or unconstitutional statutory scheme. The court affirmed the order granting summary judgment to the Commission. View "Republican Governors Association v. Hebdon" on Justia Law

Center for Coalfield Justice v. Washington County Board of Elections

2025-09-26T11:43:13-08:00

Several voters in Washington County, Pennsylvania, submitted mail-in ballots for the 2024 Primary Election that contained obvious errors, such as missing signatures or dates on the declaration envelope, or missing secrecy envelopes. Under a previous policy, the county board of elections notified voters of such defects and allowed them to correct the errors or vote provisionally. However, in April 2024, the board adopted a new policy eliminating notice and cure procedures. Instead, all returned mail-in ballots, including those with disqualifying errors, were coded identically in the state’s SURE system, which triggered an email to voters stating their ballot had been received and that they could not vote at the polls, regardless of whether their ballot was valid. As a result, voters whose ballots were set aside for errors were not informed of the disqualification and did not attempt to vote provisionally. The Washington County Court of Common Pleas found that the board’s policy violated voters’ procedural due process rights under the Pennsylvania Constitution by failing to provide notice that their ballots would not be counted, thus depriving them of the opportunity to challenge the decision or vote provisionally. The court issued an injunction requiring the board to notify affected voters, accurately code ballots in the SURE system, and ensure poll books reflected that such voters had not “voted,” allowing them to cast provisional ballots. The Commonwealth Court affirmed, holding that the right to vote and the statutory right to cast a provisional ballot are protected liberty interests, and that the board’s policy risked erroneous deprivation of those rights. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed in large part, holding that the right to vote and the statutory right to cast a provisional ballot when a mail-in ballot is void are protected liberty interests under the Pennsylvania Constitution. The court held that due process requires county boards to provide accurate notice—via correct SURE system coding—when a mail-in ballot is segregated for a disqualifying error, so affected voters have the opportunity to vote provisionally. The court vacated the requirement for additional notice beyond accurate SURE coding and clarified that the right to challenge under 25 P.S. §3157 does not require pre-canvass challenges. The injunction otherwise remains in effect. View "Center for Coalfield Justice v. Washington County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

League of Women Voters of South Carolina v. Alexander

2025-09-17T06:43:31-08:00

Following the 2020 census, South Carolina was required to redraw its congressional districts to ensure population equality among the seven districts. The most significant changes involved Districts 1 and 6, with District 1 being overpopulated and District 6 underpopulated. The redistricting process, led by Senator Chip Campsen, resulted in a plan that increased the Republican advantage in District 1 by unifying certain counties and shifting precincts with high Democratic vote shares into District 6. The plan was enacted in 2022 and used in subsequent elections. Previously, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the plan in Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, 602 U.S. 1 (2024), focusing on claims of racial gerrymandering. The Supreme Court found that the legislature’s primary intent was partisan advantage, not racial discrimination, and held that claims of partisan gerrymandering are nonjusticiable under the U.S. Constitution. After the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their remaining federal claims, the League of Women Voters of South Carolina filed a petition in the Supreme Court of South Carolina, arguing that the plan constituted an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander under several provisions of the South Carolina Constitution. The Supreme Court of South Carolina, exercising its original jurisdiction, held that claims of partisan gerrymandering present a nonjusticiable political question under the state constitution. The court found that South Carolina’s constitution and statutes do not contain provisions that prohibit or limit partisan gerrymandering, nor do they provide judicially manageable standards for adjudicating such claims. The court concluded that the authority to draw congressional districts is textually committed to the legislature and denied the League’s request for relief, dismissing the claims with prejudice. View "League of Women Voters of South Carolina v. Alexander" on Justia Law

AMERICAN ENCORE V. FONTES

2025-09-16T09:02:56-08:00

Two nonprofit organizations and an individual challenged two provisions of Arizona’s 2023 Election Procedures Manual (EPM). The first provision, known as the Speech Provision, purported to summarize Arizona’s voter intimidation laws and included examples of prohibited conduct, such as using offensive language or engaging in behavior that could be seen as intimidating or harassing voters. The second, the Canvass Provision, described the Secretary of State’s duty to certify statewide election results by a statutory deadline, specifying that if a county failed to submit its official results on time, the Secretary must proceed without including that county’s votes. The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging that the Speech Provision violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by chilling protected political speech, and that the Canvass Provision unconstitutionally burdened the right to vote by threatening disenfranchisement if a county missed the certification deadline. The district court found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge both provisions, denied a request to stay the case under Pullman abstention, and granted a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of both the Speech and Canvass Provisions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction as to the Speech Provision, holding that the plaintiffs had standing because they intended to engage in political speech arguably covered by the provision and faced a credible risk of enforcement. The court found a likelihood of success on the merits, as the state did not contest the district court’s conclusion that the Speech Provision likely violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding of standing regarding the Canvass Provision, concluding that plaintiffs had not shown a substantial risk that any county would fail to certify its results and thus vacated the injunction as to that provision. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "AMERICAN ENCORE V. FONTES" on Justia Law

IN RE INITIATIVE PETITION NO. 448, STATE QUESTION NO. 836: THE OKLAHOMA REPUBLICAN PARTY v. SETTER

2025-09-16T08:11:27-08:00

A group of proponents filed an initiative petition seeking to repeal the existing constitutional provision governing Oklahoma’s primary elections and replace it with a new system. The proposed amendment would establish an “open primary” for certain state and federal offices, where all candidates appear on the same ballot regardless of party, and any qualified voter may vote for any candidate. The two candidates with the most votes would advance to the general election, regardless of party affiliation or endorsement. The ballot would display each candidate’s party registration or independent status, with a disclaimer clarifying that such registration does not imply party nomination or endorsement. The measure would not affect elections for presidential electors, municipal, judicial, or school board offices. After the petition was filed with the Secretary of State, the Oklahoma Republican Party and another petitioner protested its legal sufficiency before the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma. They argued that the initiative was facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment, claiming it infringed on the right of political association and failed strict scrutiny. They also asserted that the gist and ballot title were misleading, particularly in their use of the term “open primary” and in the explanation of changes to general elections. The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the petition. Applying its standard of review, the court found no clear or manifest facial constitutional infirmity, holding that the proposed system did not impose a severe burden on associational rights under relevant U.S. Supreme Court precedents. The court determined that the gist was not misleading, as it adequately described the practical effect of the measure. The challenge to the ballot title was deemed premature, as statutory procedure requires such review after the signature-gathering phase. The court held that the initiative petition was legally sufficient for circulation and signature gathering. View "IN RE INITIATIVE PETITION NO. 448, STATE QUESTION NO. 836: THE OKLAHOMA REPUBLICAN PARTY v. SETTER" on Justia Law

State Legislature v. League of Women Voters

2025-09-15T15:22:37-08:00

In this case, Utah voters passed Proposition 4 in 2018, a citizen initiative designed to reform the state’s redistricting process and address partisan gerrymandering. Before the next redistricting cycle, the Utah Legislature repealed Proposition 4 and replaced it with Senate Bill 200 (S.B. 200), which eliminated the key reforms established by the initiative. Several organizations and individuals challenged this legislative action, arguing that the repeal violated Utahns’ constitutional right to alter or reform their government through the initiative process. The Third District Court initially dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim that the Legislature’s repeal of Proposition 4 was unconstitutional. On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of Utah held that the people’s right to reform their government via initiative is constitutionally protected and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding that S.B. 200 unconstitutionally impaired the reforms enacted by Proposition 4 and was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. The court declared Proposition 4 to be the law, enjoined the use of the 2021 Congressional Map enacted under S.B. 200, and established a remedial process for creating a compliant map. The Legislature’s request to stay the injunction on the 2021 map during the remedial process and any appeals was denied by the district court. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the Legislature’s emergency petition for extraordinary relief, which challenged only the district court’s denial of the stay. The Supreme Court held that the Legislature had not shown the district court abused its discretion in denying the stay, as their arguments focused on the remedial process rather than the legal standard for granting a stay. The petition for extraordinary relief was therefore denied. View "State Legislature v. League of Women Voters" on Justia Law

A. Philip Randolph Institute v. North Carolina State Board of Elections

2025-09-12T10:30:24-08:00

Two nonprofit organizations challenged the constitutionality of a North Carolina statute that made it a felony for individuals with felony convictions to vote before their rights were restored, regardless of whether those individuals mistakenly believed they were eligible. The statute, originally enacted in the late 19th century, was shown to have been motivated by racial animus and to have a disproportionate impact on Black North Carolinians. In 2023, the North Carolina General Assembly amended the statute to add a requirement that a person must “know” their rights had not been restored to be prosecuted, effective January 1, 2024. The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina considered the plaintiffs’ claims under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. After the statute was amended, a magistrate judge recommended dismissal for lack of standing, but the district court found the case was not moot because prosecutions under the old statute for pre-2024 conduct could still occur, potentially chilling voter participation and requiring the plaintiffs to divert resources. The district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, holding the statute unconstitutional and enjoining its enforcement. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the case was not moot because prosecutions under the prior version of the statute could still proceed, and the plaintiffs retained a concrete interest in the outcome. On the merits, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the challenged statute violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court found that the statute’s original enactment and reenactment were motivated by racial discrimination, and that subsequent legislative changes did not “cleanse” the statute of its discriminatory origins, as the statute itself had not been substantively reenacted or amended in a way that would warrant a presumption of legislative good faith. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "A. Philip Randolph Institute v. North Carolina State Board of Elections" on Justia Law

Rio Grande Foundation v. Oliver

2025-09-09T08:32:08-08:00

A nonprofit advocacy organization challenged an amendment to New Mexico’s Campaign Reporting Act (CRA), which requires certain political committees to disclose the names and addresses of donors who contribute above specified thresholds when the committee makes independent expenditures on advertisements referring to candidates or ballot questions shortly before an election. The organization argued that these disclosure requirements burdened its First Amendment rights and would chill potential donors from contributing, citing concerns about possible harassment or retaliation. The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico granted summary judgment to the Secretary of State, finding that the disclosure requirements were substantially related and narrowly tailored to the state’s interest in informing the public about the sources of funding for large, election-related advertisements. The district court concluded that advertisements covered by the law—those referring to candidates or ballot questions and disseminated shortly before elections—were made for a political purpose, and that the law’s temporal, monetary, and geographic limitations, as well as an opt-out provision for donors, ensured the requirements were not overly broad. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the summary judgment decision de novo. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that the challenged disclosure provision withstands exacting scrutiny. The court determined that the law is substantially related to the important governmental interest of transparency in election-related advocacy and is narrowly tailored through its thresholds and opt-out mechanism. The court also found that the evidence presented by the organization did not establish a reasonable probability of threats, harassment, or reprisals sufficient to invalidate the law on its face. The judgment for the Secretary of State was affirmed. View "Rio Grande Foundation v. Oliver" on Justia Law

La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott

2025-08-29T15:30:22-08:00

Texas enacted Senate Bill 1, which included several provisions regulating how individuals may assist voters, particularly those who are blind, disabled, or illiterate. The challenged provisions required assistors to disclose personal information, amended the oath assistors must take, and prohibited compensated assistance or paid ballot harvesting. Various organizations with members who require or provide voting assistance argued that these provisions were preempted by Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act, which allows eligible voters to receive assistance from a person of their choice, with certain exceptions. The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas found that at least one plaintiff organization had standing to challenge each provision. The court held that Section 208 preempted all the challenged provisions, reasoning that the federal law did not permit states to impose additional limitations or exceptions beyond those stated in Section 208. As a result, the district court permanently enjoined state officials and certain district attorneys from enforcing the relevant sections of Senate Bill 1. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The Fifth Circuit concluded that none of the plaintiff organizations had standing to challenge the disclosure and oath provisions, as their fears of prosecution were speculative and did not constitute an actual or imminent injury. However, the court agreed that two organizations had standing to challenge the compensation provisions, as there was a credible threat of prosecution for their ongoing activities. Addressing the merits, the Fifth Circuit held that Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act does not preempt Texas’s compensation-related restrictions. The court found no clear and manifest congressional intent to preempt such state regulations and rejected the district court’s broader reading of Section 208. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, vacated the permanent injunction, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott" on Justia Law

PALMER V. TREVINO

2025-08-27T08:00:41-08:00

A group of Latino voters from Washington State’s Yakima Valley challenged the state’s legislative district map, arguing that the configuration of one district diluted their votes and denied them an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice, in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The state’s bipartisan redistricting commission had drawn the map following the 2020 Census, but the plaintiffs contended that the map “cracked” their community, undermining their voting power. After a bench trial, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington agreed with the plaintiffs, enjoined the enacted map, and, when the commission declined to draw a new map, imposed its own remedial map. Three Yakima Valley voters, who had intervened in the district court, appealed. They challenged both the district court’s finding of a Section 2 violation and the remedial map, arguing that the new map violated the Equal Protection Clause and Section 2, and that the district court lacked jurisdiction because a three-judge panel was not convened. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court had jurisdiction, ruling that 28 U.S.C. § 2284 requires a three-judge court only for constitutional, not statutory, challenges to legislative apportionment. The court found that the intervenors lacked standing to appeal the Section 2 liability finding and to challenge the remedial map under Section 2, as they failed to show traceable or redressable injuries or vote dilution. However, one intervenor had standing to bring an equal protection challenge to the remedial map. On the merits, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the remedial map did not constitute an unconstitutional racial gerrymander, as race was not the predominant factor in its design. The court dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction except for the equal protection claim, which it affirmed, upholding the district court’s remedial map. View "PALMER V. TREVINO" on Justia Law

Eakin v. Adams County Board of Elections

2025-08-26T09:00:52-08:00

A Pennsylvania resident, along with several organizations, challenged the state’s requirement that mail-in ballots be discarded if the return envelope is missing a handwritten date or contains an incorrect date. The plaintiffs argued that this “date requirement” led to thousands of otherwise valid ballots being rejected in recent elections, often without notice to the affected voters or an opportunity to cure the error. The date field on the return envelope does not determine whether a ballot is timely or whether the voter is eligible, and the state’s election system already records the actual receipt date of each ballot. The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania reviewed the case after extensive discovery. Only two county election boards defended the date requirement, while most did not. The District Court found that the date requirement was not justified by the state’s interests in election efficiency, solemnity, or fraud prevention. The court noted that the requirement imposed a minimal but real burden on voters, as it led to the rejection of thousands of ballots, and that the state had not shown the requirement meaningfully advanced its asserted interests. The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs and enjoined enforcement of the date requirement, but did not prohibit the inclusion of a date field on return envelopes. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The Third Circuit held that, under the Anderson-Burdick framework, the date requirement imposed a minimal burden on the right to vote, but that burden was not justified by the state’s interests. The court found no meaningful connection between the date requirement and election administration, solemnity, or fraud prevention, and concluded that discarding ballots for minor date errors was unconstitutional. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "Eakin v. Adams County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

Walden v. Kosinski

2025-08-21T06:00:09-08:00

A prospective candidate for the 2025 New York City mayoral election, who had not been affiliated with any political party since 2006, sought to run as the nominee of an independent body named the “Independence Party.” New York election law prohibits both political parties and independent bodies from using certain words, including “Independence” and “Independent,” in their names. The candidate argued that these naming restrictions, as applied to him, violated his First Amendment rights to free speech and association. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York reviewed the candidate’s request for a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the naming restrictions. The district court found that the candidate had standing to sue but denied the injunction. The court concluded that the naming provisions did not impose a severe burden on the candidate’s First Amendment rights, as they did not prevent him from communicating his political message or engaging in petitioning activity. Applying the Anderson-Burdick balancing test, the court determined that the restrictions were reasonable, nondiscriminatory, and justified by the state’s interest in preventing voter confusion. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Second Circuit held that the naming restrictions apply to independent bodies, that the candidate had standing, and that the state officials were not entitled to sovereign immunity. The court further held that the naming provisions did not impose a severe burden on the candidate’s First Amendment rights and were reasonable and viewpoint-neutral regulations justified by the state’s interest in avoiding voter confusion. The denial of the preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "Walden v. Kosinski" on Justia Law

Hawkins v. Youngkin

2025-08-20T11:00:32-08:00

A man who was previously convicted of a felony in Virginia sought to have his voting rights restored after his release from prison. Under Virginia’s Constitution, individuals convicted of felonies lose the right to vote, but the Governor has the sole discretion to restore those rights. The restoration process requires applicants to submit a form, after which the Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth reviews the application and makes a recommendation to the Governor, who then decides whether to grant restoration. The applicant in this case, who had never voted due to his conviction as a minor, submitted at least one application for restoration, but the Governor declined to restore his rights. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia reviewed the applicant’s claims, which were brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The applicant argued that the Governor’s unfettered discretion in restoring voting rights, and the lack of a definite time limit for the process, violated the First Amendment’s unfettered-discretion doctrine. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Governor and Secretary, finding that the doctrine did not apply because the restoration process determines eligibility to reenter the franchise, rather than regulating the exercise of an existing right. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Fourth Circuit held that Virginia’s discretionary system for restoring voting rights, which is rooted in the executive clemency power, does not facially violate the First Amendment’s unfettered-discretion doctrine. The court reasoned that the clemency power is fundamentally different from a licensing scheme subject to First Amendment prior restraint analysis, and that judicial review of such executive discretion is limited to narrow circumstances not present here. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Hawkins v. Youngkin" on Justia Law

SMITH v FONTES

2025-08-06T09:01:12-08:00

A political committee sought to place a constitutional initiative on the Arizona general election ballot that would have replaced partisan primaries with an open primary system. To qualify, the committee needed to submit signatures from at least 15% of qualified electors, as required by the Arizona Constitution. The committee submitted more than the required number of signatures, but opponents challenged the initiative, alleging violations of the separate amendment rule, misleading petition summaries, and various deficiencies in the signature collection process, including claims of duplicate signatures. The Superior Court in Maricopa County consolidated the challenges and set an expedited schedule due to the impending ballot printing deadline. The court first rejected the legal challenges regarding the separate amendment rule and petition summary, a decision affirmed on appeal. After a hearing on the signature challenges, the trial court initially overruled the objections to alleged duplicate signatures, finding the evidence inadmissible, and determined the initiative had enough valid signatures. On further review, the Arizona Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration of the duplicate signature evidence. After further proceedings, including review by a special master, the trial court ultimately dismissed the challenge, finding the statutory method for signature validation unconstitutional as applied, and holding it lacked authority to grant the requested injunction. The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case and held that the statutory formula in A.R.S. § 19-121.04(A), which required double counting of some invalid signatures, was unconstitutional as applied to this initiative. The court found that this method effectively raised the constitutionally mandated 15% signature threshold for constitutional initiatives, contrary to the framers’ intent. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment dismissing the challenge, holding that the initiative would have qualified for the ballot absent the unconstitutional double counting. View "SMITH v FONTES" on Justia Law

USA v. Paxton

2025-08-04T17:00:16-08:00

Texas enacted a law in 2021 requiring voters who wish to vote by mail to provide an identification number—such as a driver’s license or the last four digits of their Social Security number—on both their mail-in ballot applications and the ballots themselves. This number must match the one provided during voter registration. If the numbers do not match or are missing, the application or ballot is rejected. The law was challenged by the United States and several private plaintiffs, who argued that these requirements violate the materiality provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits denying the right to vote due to errors or omissions on paperwork if those errors are not material to determining voter qualification. The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas consolidated the lawsuits and denied Texas’s motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiffs had standing and that sovereign immunity did not bar the private plaintiffs’ claims. After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, holding that the identification number requirement was not material to voter eligibility and enjoined Texas from enforcing the number-matching provisions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit first determined that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the private plaintiffs’ claims against the Secretary of State due to a pending appeal on sovereign immunity, but found no jurisdictional bar to reviewing the United States’ claims. The Fifth Circuit held that the identification number requirement is material to determining whether an individual is qualified to vote under Texas law, as it serves to confirm the voter’s identity and prevent fraud. The court concluded that the law complies with the materiality provision of the Civil Rights Act and reversed the district court’s judgment, rendering judgment for the defendants. View "USA v. Paxton" on Justia Law

Airey v. Feliciano

2025-07-30T04:22:37-08:00

The case involves a dispute between two competing slates of candidates, the Airey slate and the Green slate, who sought to appear on the ballot for the Democratic Town Committee primary election for Hartford's seventh district. Hartford election officials initially certified both slates for the primary. However, the Airey slate filed a complaint to disqualify the Green slate, and the Green slate counterclaimed to disqualify the Airey slate. The trial court ruled that only the Airey slate qualified, leading to the cancellation of the primary. On appeal, the higher court determined that neither slate qualified for the primary. The trial court, on remand, denied the Green slate's motion for a new primary election, reasoning that it lacked the authority to order a new primary under General Statutes § 9-329a (b) (3) because neither slate had qualified for the primary. The court noted that the statute contemplates a contested primary election that either was held or will be held, but in this case, no primary was held, and no candidates qualified. The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the trial court correctly concluded it lacked authority under § 9-329a (b) (3) to order a new primary. The court reasoned that the statute does not authorize a new primary when no candidates qualified for the original primary, and any vacancies should be filled according to local party rules. The court also rejected the Green slate's claim that the trial court's decision violated the fundamental rights of Democratic voters, as the candidates' failure to qualify for the primary was the cause of the canceled primary, not the court's decision. Lastly, the court declined to overrule or narrow the imputed knowledge doctrine, which grants standing to candidates aggrieved by election officials' decisions. View "Airey v. Feliciano" on Justia Law

Institute for Free Speech v. Johnson

2025-07-28T16:00:14-08:00

The Institute for Free Speech (IFS), a nonprofit organization that provides pro bono legal services for First Amendment litigation, sought to represent a Texas politician and a political committee in challenging a Texas election law. This law requires political advertising signs to include a government-prescribed notice. IFS refrained from entering into representation agreements due to fear of prosecution under the Texas Election Code, which prohibits corporations from making political contributions, including in-kind contributions such as pro bono legal services. The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed IFS's complaint for lack of Article III standing, concluding that IFS's claims were not ripe and that qualified immunity barred the individual-capacity claims. The district court assumed IFS had standing but found that the claims were not ripe because the prospective clients did not yet qualify as a candidate and a political committee. The court also concluded that sovereign immunity did not bar the official-capacity claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that IFS had standing to pursue its claims. The court found that IFS had demonstrated a serious intent to engage in constitutionally protected conduct, that its proposed conduct would violate Texas law, and that there was a substantial threat of enforcement. The court also concluded that IFS's claims were ripe for adjudication, as the prospective clients qualified as a candidate and a political committee under Texas law. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing the case for lack of standing and ripeness. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the individual-capacity claims based on qualified immunity, as the right to provide pro bono legal services in this context was not clearly established. The court also affirmed that the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity applied, allowing the official-capacity claims to proceed. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Institute for Free Speech v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Arkansas United v. Thurston

2025-07-28T07:30:56-08:00

In 2009, Arkansas enacted a law limiting the number of voters one person could assist to six, with violations classified as misdemeanors. Arkansas United, a non-profit organization, and its founder, L. Mireya Reith, challenged this law, arguing it conflicted with Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), which allows voters needing assistance to choose anyone to help them, except their employer or union representative. The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas denied an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order but later granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs, enjoining the enforcement of the six-voter limit. The court also awarded attorney fees and costs to the plaintiffs. The State sought and obtained a stay of the injunction from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, allowing the six-voter limit to remain in effect for the 2022 General Election. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and held that Section 208 of the VRA does not create a private right of action. The court found that enforcement of Section 208 is intended to be carried out by the Attorney General, not private parties. The court also rejected the argument that the Supremacy Clause provided a basis for a private right of action. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the plaintiffs, vacated the permanent injunction and the award of attorney fees and costs, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Arkansas United v. Thurston" on Justia Law

Alaska Democratic Party v. Beecher

2025-07-25T09:00:19-08:00

A challenge was brought against the Alaska Division of Elections for including Eric Hafner, a federal prisoner, as one of the four candidates on the 2024 general election ballot for the U.S. House of Representatives. Hafner, who finished sixth in the primary, was elevated to the general election ballot after two of the top-four candidates withdrew. The Alaska Democratic Party and Anita Thorne argued that Alaska law only allows the fifth-place candidate to replace a withdrawn candidate, not the sixth-place candidate. The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, rejected the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. The court found that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate irreparable harm and sided with the Division's interpretation of the law, which required successive replacements for withdrawn candidates. The court also concluded that Hafner was not constitutionally disqualified and that he was an indispensable party to the litigation. The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court's decision. The court held that AS 15.25.100(c) requires the Division to replace successive withdrawn candidates on the general election ballot if additional primary candidates are available. The court found that the statute's language and the purpose of Ballot Measure 2, which aimed to increase voter choice, supported this interpretation. The court also noted that its precedent favors resolving ambiguities in election laws in favor of greater ballot access. Thus, the judgment of the superior court was affirmed. View "Alaska Democratic Party v. Beecher" on Justia Law

State ex rel. Elmore v. Franklin County Board of Elections

2025-07-23T13:07:18-08:00

Lori Elmore and the City of Whitehall filed a protest against the candidacy of Holly Stein for the Ward 4 seat on the Whitehall City Council, arguing that Stein did not meet the two-year residency requirement specified in Section 3(a) of the Whitehall Charter. Stein had filed her declaration of candidacy in January 2025, but Elmore contended that Stein had not lived in Ward 4 for the two years immediately preceding the election, as required by the charter. Stein admitted to living outside Ward 4 in 2023 but argued that the charter only required her to have lived in Ward 4 for any two-year period before the election. The Franklin County Board of Elections held a hearing on Elmore’s protest in March 2025 and ultimately denied the protest, allowing Stein’s name to remain on the ballot. Elmore and the City of Whitehall then sought a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court of Ohio to prevent the board from placing Stein’s name on the ballot. The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and determined that the phrase “next preceding” in Section 3(a) of the Whitehall Charter means “immediately preceding.” The court concluded that the two-year residency requirement applies to both ward and at-large candidates for the Whitehall City Council. Since Stein did not meet this requirement, the court held that the board’s denial of Elmore’s protest was unauthorized by law. Consequently, the court granted the writ of prohibition, preventing the board from placing Stein’s name on the November 4, 2025 general-election ballot. View "State ex rel. Elmore v. Franklin County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

State ex rel. Maumee v. Lucas County Board of Elections

2025-07-17T12:07:18-08:00

Seven petitions were filed with the Lucas County Board of Elections to recall the mayor and six members of the Maumee city council under R.C. 705.92. The board found the petitions valid and certified the recall questions for a special primary election. The City of Maumee and a citizen, Glenn Rambo, protested, arguing that the city’s charter does not provide for recall, R.C. 705.92 does not apply to the city, and the petitions did not comply with the statute. The board denied the protests. The relators sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the board from placing the recall questions on the ballot and a writ of mandamus to order the board to grant their protests. The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. The court found that Maumee’s charter allows for the removal of elected officials as provided by the Constitution or laws of Ohio, but R.C. 705.92 does not apply to Maumee because it was not adopted under R.C. 705.03. The court held that the board erred in deeming R.C. 705.92 applicable to Maumee. The Supreme Court of Ohio granted the writ of prohibition, preventing the board from placing the recall questions on the ballot, and denied the writ of mandamus as moot. The court concluded that the recall procedure in R.C. 705.92 is not generally applicable to municipalities and can only be adopted as part of a statutory plan of government under R.C. 705.03, which Maumee did not do. View "State ex rel. Maumee v. Lucas County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

Black Voters Matter Capacity Building Institute, Inc. v. Secretary, Florida Department of State

2025-07-17T07:02:44-08:00

The case involves a challenge to Florida’s 2022 congressional districting plan. The plaintiffs, consisting of civic organizations and individual voters, argue that the plan violates the Florida Constitution's Fair Districts Amendment (FDA) by failing to retain a two-hundred-mile-long congressional district that previously enabled black voters in North Florida to elect representatives of their choice. The plaintiffs claim that the new plan diminishes this ability, contrary to the FDA's Non-Diminishment Clause. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring the Enacted Plan unconstitutional under the FDA, enjoining its use, and ordering the Legislature to adopt a remedial map. The First District Court of Appeal reversed this decision, holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove the existence of a sufficiently compact minority community in North Florida to merit protection under the FDA. The appellate court also questioned the binding nature of the Florida Supreme Court’s precedents on the Non-Diminishment Clause. The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case and upheld the Enacted Plan. The court concluded that the plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proving the possibility of drawing a North Florida district that complies with both the Non-Diminishment Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. The court emphasized that compliance with the Equal Protection Clause is a superior obligation and that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that a non-diminishing district could be drawn without subordinating traditional race-neutral districting principles to racial considerations. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment of the First District Court of Appeal, though not its reasoning. View "Black Voters Matter Capacity Building Institute, Inc. v. Secretary, Florida Department of State" on Justia Law

United States v. Town of Thornapple

2025-07-14T10:30:41-08:00

In June 2023, the Town Board of Thornapple, Wisconsin decided to stop using electronic voting machines and switched to paper ballots for elections. This change was implemented in the 2024 federal primary elections. The United States sued the Town and certain officials, alleging that they failed to provide at least one accessible voting system for individuals with disabilities, as required by section 301 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). The United States also sought and obtained a preliminary injunction from the district court, requiring the Town to provide a HAVA-compliant system in the November 2024 federal election. The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin granted the preliminary injunction, rejecting the Town's arguments that paper ballots did not fall under HAVA's purview and that the government failed to show a likelihood of irreparable harm. The court found that the Town's actions would likely deprive individuals with disabilities of the opportunity to vote independently and privately, as required by HAVA. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the Town's use of paper ballots constitutes a "voting system" under HAVA. The court found that the government demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits and a likelihood of irreparable harm. The court concluded that the Town's actions would likely deprive individuals with disabilities of the opportunity to vote independently and privately, thus violating HAVA's requirements. The preliminary injunction was upheld, requiring the Town to provide an accessible voting system in the upcoming election. View "United States v. Town of Thornapple" on Justia Law

Central Maine Power Co. v. Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices

2025-07-11T13:00:07-08:00

In 2023, Maine voters passed "An Act to Prohibit Campaign Spending by Foreign Governments" to prevent foreign governments and entities influenced by them from contributing to or influencing elections. The Act also requires media platforms to ensure they do not distribute communications that violate this prohibition, with violators facing civil and criminal penalties. Several companies and individuals, including Central Maine Power (CMP) and Versant Power, challenged the Act, claiming it violated the First Amendment. The district court granted a preliminary injunction against the Act, and Maine appealed. The United States District Court for the District of Maine granted the preliminary injunction, finding that the Act was likely unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The court held that the Act's prohibition on spending by entities with at least 5% foreign ownership was not narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. It also found that the definition of "foreign government-influenced entity" was overly broad and likely to stifle domestic speech regardless of actual foreign influence. The court declined to sever the unconstitutional provisions from the rest of the Act, reserving the issue for later consideration. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the Act's 5% foreign ownership threshold was not narrowly tailored and that the definition of "foreign government-influenced entity" was overly broad. The court also found that the Act's restrictions on contributions and expenditures were likely unconstitutional. The court did not address the issue of severability, leaving it for the district court to decide. The court also did not find it necessary to discuss the preemption determination in affirming the injunction. View "Central Maine Power Co. v. Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices" on Justia Law

Titcomb v. Secretary of State

2025-07-11T12:05:12-08:00

Alex Titcomb and four other registered Maine voters challenged the wording of a ballot question for citizen-initiated legislation that would amend Maine voting laws. They argued that the question did not meet statutory requirements to be understandable and not misleading to a reasonable voter. The proposed legislation included various changes to election laws, such as requiring photo ID for voting, ending ongoing absentee voting for seniors and people with disabilities, and other modifications. The Superior Court (Cumberland County) affirmed the Secretary of State’s decision on the wording of the ballot question. The court found that the language used in the question was understandable and not misleading. Titcomb appealed this decision, arguing that the question improperly singled out the effect on seniors and people with disabilities and used confusing terms. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and upheld the Superior Court’s judgment. The court concluded that the ballot question was not misleading and was understandable to a reasonable voter. The court noted that the language used in the question accurately reflected the proposed legislation and that the terms used were clear to an informed voter. The court also found that the length of the question, while longer than usual, was necessary to convey the various changes proposed in the legislation. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "Titcomb v. Secretary of State" on Justia Law

No Labels Party of Arizona v. Fontes

2025-07-11T08:30:31-08:00

No Labels Party of Arizona (No Labels) is a political party that only seeks to run candidates for the offices of President and Vice President of the United States. During the 2024 election, five No Labels party members filed statements of interest to run for down-ballot positions. No Labels requested that the Arizona Secretary of State (the Secretary) disregard these filings, but the Secretary refused, citing Arizona law that mandates acceptance of candidate filings by eligible persons. The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted No Labels a permanent injunction, finding that the Arizona law substantially burdened No Labels's First Amendment rights by forcing it to associate with candidates for offices it did not wish to pursue. The court concluded that Arizona's interests were minimal and did not outweigh the burden on No Labels's rights. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the Secretary's enforcement of Arizona's election law, which allowed eligible No Labels party members to be placed on the primary ballot, imposed at most a minimal burden on No Labels's associational rights. The court found that Arizona's interests in ensuring voter and candidate participation, avoiding voter confusion, and limiting opportunities for fraud and corruption outweighed any burden on No Labels. The court concluded that the Secretary's actions were narrowly tailored to advance these compelling state interests. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit vacated the permanent injunction issued by the district court. View "No Labels Party of Arizona v. Fontes" on Justia Law

United States v. Mackey

2025-07-09T06:30:13-08:00

In this case, the defendant, Douglass Mackey, was convicted of conspiring to injure citizens in the exercise of their right to vote in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241. The conviction was based on three memes he posted or reposted on Twitter shortly before the 2016 presidential election, which falsely suggested that supporters of then-candidate Hillary Clinton could vote by text message. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Donnelly, J.) oversaw the trial, where a jury found Mackey guilty. Mackey appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he knowingly agreed to join the charged conspiracy. The government presented evidence of Mackey's participation in several private Twitter message groups where members discussed strategies to influence the election, including the creation and distribution of misleading memes. However, Mackey was not a member of these groups during the critical period when the conspiracy was allegedly formed and discussed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the government failed to provide sufficient evidence that Mackey knowingly agreed to join the conspiracy. The court noted that while Mackey posted the misleading memes, there was no direct evidence that he viewed or participated in the relevant discussions within the private message groups. The court emphasized that mere association with individuals involved in an unlawful undertaking is not enough to prove knowing involvement in a conspiracy. The Second Circuit concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support Mackey's conviction and reversed the judgment of the district court. The case was remanded with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal for Mackey. View "United States v. Mackey" on Justia Law

Frederick v. Balt. City Bd. of Elections

2025-07-01T07:08:11-08:00

Appellants Benedict J. Frederick, III, Matthew W. Wyskiel, III, and Stacie Teal-Locust challenged the Baltimore City Board of Elections' decision to reject a proposed charter amendment petition sponsored by Renew Baltimore. The proposed amendment sought to cap Baltimore City's real property tax rate, decreasing it incrementally over seven years. The current tax rate is $2.248 per $100 of assessed value, and the amendment aimed to reduce it to $1.20 per $100 by fiscal year 2032. The Election Director for the City Board approved the petition format but did not assess its legality. Renew Baltimore submitted the petition with 23,542 signatures, exceeding the required 10,000. However, the Election Director later deemed the amendment deficient, citing a conflict with section 6-302(a) of the Tax-Property Article, which grants the Mayor and City Council the authority to set property tax rates. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City upheld this decision, ruling that the amendment was not proper charter material and violated section 6-302(a). The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and affirmed the Circuit Court's decision. The Court held that the proposed charter amendment was impermissible because it violated section 6-302(a) of the Tax-Property Article by allowing citizens to establish the tax rate, which is a power vested in the Mayor and City Council. Additionally, the Court noted that section 49 of Article II of the Baltimore City Charter prohibits voters from initiating legislation related to property taxation. Therefore, the proposed amendment could not be presented on the November 2024 general election ballot. View "Frederick v. Balt. City Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Crow v. Beecher

2025-06-27T09:00:29-08:00

Three Alaska residents challenged the Division of Elections' process for certifying a ballot initiative for the November 2024 election. They claimed the Division violated regulations and statutes by allowing corrections to circulators’ certifications of petition booklets used to gather signatures. The superior court granted summary judgment to the Division and the initiative’s sponsors on this issue. After a trial on other issues, the court ordered the Division to reject some signatures and booklets but found enough valid signatures remained to keep the initiative on the ballot. The challengers appealed the summary judgment decision. The superior court ruled that Alaska Statute 15.45.130 allows corrections to circulators’ certifications after the petition is filed, as long as the corrections are made before the Division completes its signature-counting process. The court found that the statute’s language, legislative history, and intent support this interpretation, aiming to facilitate the initiative process and avoid disenfranchising voters due to technical errors. The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court’s decision. The court held that AS 15.45.130 permits corrections to certifications during the Division’s 60-day review period, even after the one-year signature-gathering deadline and the start of the legislative session. The court found that the statute’s plain language, legislative history, and purpose support allowing corrections to ensure voters’ signatures are counted. The court also determined that the Division’s regulations do not prohibit post-filing corrections and that the Division’s interpretation of its regulations was reasonable. Thus, the initiative remained on the ballot. View "Crow v. Beecher" on Justia Law