Criminal Law - Justia Case Law Summaries

People v. Hawthorn

2026-09-04T15:01:31-08:00

The case involves a defendant who pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted murder along with other charges in 2018, following an incident in which she kidnapped a victim, threatened to kill her, and, while another person intervened, accelerated her car, resulting in a crash. The defendant’s plea included an admission of unlawfully attempting to murder the victims. Following legislative changes to California’s homicide laws that retroactively permitted those convicted under now-invalid theories of homicide to seek resentencing, the defendant petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The Superior Court of San Diego County issued an order to show cause and set an evidentiary hearing. However, the trial court, relying on People v. Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451, treated the defendant’s guilty plea as issue preclusive, limiting the hearing to whether she acted alone. After finding beyond a reasonable doubt that she was the sole actor, the court denied her petition for resentencing. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed whether the trial court erred by treating the guilty plea as issue preclusive and restricting the evidentiary hearing accordingly. The appellate court held that a guilty plea is not issue preclusive in a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing, disagreeing with Rodriguez. Thus, the trial court erred in narrowing the scope of the hearing. However, the appellate court concluded that the defendant did not demonstrate a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome had the error not occurred, so the error was harmless. The appellate court also found no merit in other appellate arguments, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the order denying resentencing was affirmed. View "People v. Hawthorn" on Justia Law

USA v Pennington

2026-09-04T13:00:09-08:00

After being stopped by Illinois State Police for speeding, a driver was questioned about his criminal history and denied a request to search his vehicle. The officer issued only a warning and allowed the driver to leave. However, the officer notified a nearby canine unit about his suspicions. Less than two hours later, the canine officer observed the driver commit another traffic infraction, pulled him over, and conducted a dog sniff that led to the discovery of drugs in the vehicle. The driver was subsequently indicted for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. Reviewing the case, the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois denied the driver’s motion to suppress the drug evidence, finding the second traffic stop was independently justified by a new traffic violation and that the dog sniff did not unreasonably prolong the stop. The district court also denied the driver’s motion to dismiss the indictment for vindictive prosecution and selective enforcement, concluding that there was no evidence of impermissible motives or that similarly situated individuals were treated differently. The driver entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal these rulings. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the initial traffic stop was unreasonably prolonged but that the evidence from the second stop was attenuated from this violation, as the second stop was based on an independent traffic infraction. The court also found the second stop was not unlawfully prolonged and that the dog sniff occurred during the normal course of the traffic warning process. Regarding the motion to dismiss, the court held the driver failed to raise a reasonable doubt that enforcement was selectively or vindictively motivated and upheld the denial of an evidentiary hearing. View "USA v Pennington" on Justia Law

People v. Stammers

2026-09-04T12:31:46-08:00

The case concerns a defendant who was convicted by a jury of forcible digital penetration after a sexual encounter with the complaining witness, Doe. The two had met on a dating website and had several dates before the incident at the defendant’s home, where they drank alcohol, used the hot tub, and engaged in consensual sexual activity before the alleged assault. During the encounter, Doe claimed the defendant forcibly penetrated her anus, causing pain and injury, despite her resistance and lack of consent. Security camera footage captured parts of the evening, but not the full incident. The defendant denied the assault, and character witnesses testified to his nonviolent nature. The Santa Cruz County Superior Court allowed the prosecution to introduce numerous crude, sexist, and racist electronic communications the defendant had sent to friends in the months before the offense. These messages were used to impeach defense character witnesses and, according to the defense, were irrelevant and highly prejudicial. The jury acquitted the defendant of forcible sodomy but convicted him of forcible digital penetration, and he was sentenced to three years in prison. The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It found that most of the electronic communications admitted at trial were irrelevant to the issues of truthfulness, use of force, or intent, and their prejudicial impact substantially outweighed any probative value. The court concluded that the admission of this evidence, combined with the prosecutor’s focus on it, deprived the defendant of a fair trial and due process. Because the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for possible retrial. View "People v. Stammers" on Justia Law

US v. Gonzalez

2026-09-04T10:00:03-08:00

The appellant participated in a drug smuggling operation, originating from Venezuela and intending to transfer cocaine to another vessel at a prearranged location off the coast of Puerto Rico. When the rendezvous failed, the vessel, carrying three individuals and over 600 kilograms of cocaine, headed toward Puerto Rico, where it was intercepted by local and federal authorities. The appellant, who admitted to being the vessel's captain, was arrested along with the others. A federal grand jury in the District of Puerto Rico indicted the appellant on four drug trafficking counts. He pleaded guilty to all charges without a plea agreement. The United States Probation Office prepared a presentence report, applying a sentencing enhancement for his role as captain and recommending other adjustments. The government and the appellant filed sentencing memoranda, with the government supporting a sentence of 135 months and the appellant requesting 84 months and raising objections to the captain enhancement and the lack of a minor participant reduction. The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico imposed a 135-month sentence and five years of supervised release, accepting the government’s recommendations. The appellant appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. It upheld the application of the captain enhancement, finding no error in the district court’s interpretation of the relevant guidelines. However, the government conceded, and the court agreed, that the district court should reconsider the denial of a minor participant role adjustment in light of recent First Circuit decisions. The court also rejected the appellant’s claims regarding sentencing disparities and failure to consider mitigating factors. The First Circuit affirmed the sentence in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings on the minor participant issue. View "US v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

United States v. Dubray

2026-09-04T07:30:12-08:00

Three men, including Dubray, went to a woman’s home in South Dakota intending to confront another individual about an alleged assault earlier that day. One of Dubray’s companions kicked open the locked door, and two entered the house while Dubray remained outside. After an altercation inside, Dubray allegedly kicked the homeowner in the face as she tried to close the door. Dubray, along with the others, was charged with first degree burglary, two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon, and witness tampering. At trial, Dubray was convicted on the burglary and assault counts but acquitted of witness tampering. The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota presided over Dubray’s trial, where he challenged various evidentiary rulings and jury instructions. The district court excluded testimony about 911 calls made from the home, denied Dubray’s proposed jury instruction regarding the “open to the public” status of the home, admitted photographs of the crime scene, and denied motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial. Dubray appealed these decisions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in excluding the sheriff’s testimony about 911 calls, as it was not probative of the home’s public status and risked confusing the jury. The district court properly refused Dubray’s proposed jury instruction, given the lack of evidentiary support and reliance on inapplicable law. The appellate court concluded that the photographs and related testimony were properly admitted, and any speculative testimony was prompted by Dubray’s own questioning. The court found sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict and affirmed the district court’s denial of Dubray’s motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial. The Eighth Circuit affirmed Dubray’s conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Dubray" on Justia Law

Jimenez v. City of New York

2026-09-04T07:00:17-08:00

In 1989, Sean Worrell was murdered in a Bronx movie theater. The police investigation initially focused on Ricardo Jimenez after he was identified by teenager Esco Blaylock, allegedly through a suggestive photo procedure. The official reports linked Jimenez to the nickname “Leon,” though evidence later suggested this identification process was flawed and possibly fabricated. The case remained dormant for a decade. Around 1999, Detective Wendell Stradford reopened the investigation, securing incriminating testimony from witnesses, including Andrew O’Brien, a federal inmate, and Blaylock, who had ceased cooperating years earlier. O’Brien’s cooperation was allegedly induced by the promise of a sentence reduction, and additional testimony came from a jailhouse informant with a history of unreliability. In 2007, Jimenez was convicted of murder based solely on these witnesses’ testimony and was sentenced to 22 years to life. Jimenez appealed his conviction through the New York State courts without success. He then sought federal habeas relief. In 2022, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York vacated his conviction, finding that the prosecutor had committed Brady violations by suppressing exculpatory and impeachment evidence regarding the key witnesses. The charges were dismissed in 2023. Jimenez then sued for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, alleging malicious prosecution, denial of fair trial rights, failure to intervene by the officers, and Monell liability against the City and the District Attorney’s Office. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed all claims, finding, among other reasons, that Jimenez failed to overcome the presumption of probable cause from the grand jury indictment and that the pleadings were insufficient. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the malicious prosecution claims, the fair trial claims against the original investigating officers, the failure to intervene claims, and the Monell claim against the District Attorney’s Office. However, it vacated the dismissal of the fair trial claim against Detective Stradford, the Monell claim against the City of New York, and the negligence claim against the City, remanding those issues for further proceedings. The court held that Jimenez plausibly alleged fabrication and forwarding of false evidence by Detective Stradford and that the Monell and negligence claims warranted further consideration. View "Jimenez v. City of New York" on Justia Law

State v. Barnes

2026-09-04T06:34:11-08:00

Police officers conducted a nighttime traffic stop of a car because its license plate lights were out. As they approached, one officer observed what he believed, based on his training and experience, to be a smoked-down marijuana “blunt” on the front passenger seat. The officers asked the driver, Barnes, about the object, and he handed it to them. Upon further inspection, the officers could not confirm it contained marijuana, and the item was never tested; Barnes was not charged with marijuana possession. The officers then asked Barnes to exit the vehicle and, after obtaining his verbal consent, conducted a full search of his person, finding methamphetamine in his zipped pocket. A subsequent search of his car revealed a scale with white residue. In the Johnson District Court, Barnes moved to suppress the drug evidence, arguing that his consent to the search was coerced, that the search exceeded any consent given, and that the plain view exception did not justify the seizure of the object from his car. The district court denied the motion, finding the officers had reasonable suspicion upon seeing what appeared to be a marijuana blunt and that Barnes’ consent was valid. After a bench trial on stipulated facts, Barnes was found guilty of possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. On appeal, the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, concluding both the search of Barnes’ person and the seizure from the vehicle were justified under the consent and plain view exceptions. The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case and held that the officers had probable cause to seize the object under the plain view exception, as its incriminating character was immediately apparent. The court also found that Barnes’ consent to search was voluntary and that the search did not exceed its scope. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and the district court. View "State v. Barnes " on Justia Law

State v. Cook

2026-09-04T05:06:38-08:00

A woman brought her nearly two-year-old son to a hospital in Lincoln, Nebraska, where he was found with multiple injuries, including bruises, swelling, and a fractured leg. Subsequent medical examinations revealed further injuries, such as broken ribs, a lung contusion, brain swelling, and ultimately, the child died from his injuries. The mother, who had left the child in the care of her boyfriend and others, admitted to noticing symptoms and injuries over a period of weeks but did not seek medical care, citing reasons such as believing the injury was minor and fear of involvement with Child Protective Services. Evidence at trial included interviews, witness testimony, text messages, and internet searches indicating the mother was aware of the child’s worsening condition. The District Court for Lancaster County reviewed the case and presided over a jury trial. The jury found the mother guilty of intentional child abuse resulting in death, intentional child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury, and possession with intent to deliver or delivery of a controlled substance near a school. The court denied pretrial motions to exclude certain photographic evidence and sentenced her to consecutive prison terms totaling 70 years to life for the most serious charges, and additional years for the drug offense. The Nebraska Supreme Court examined claims of insufficient evidence, improper admission of photographs, ineffective assistance of counsel, and excessive sentencing. Applying the appropriate standards of review, the court held that there was sufficient evidence for the convictions, the photographs were relevant and not unduly prejudicial, and the sentences were within statutory limits and not an abuse of discretion. Claims of ineffective assistance were rejected as either unsupported or not prejudicial. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "State v. Cook" on Justia Law

US v. Arevalo Arias

2026-09-03T10:30:10-08:00

In the summer of 2019, a series of violent crimes occurred in Woodbridge, Virginia, involving multiple murders linked to members of the Sitios Locos Salvatrucha (STLS) clique of MS-13. After investigations, a group of defendants was indicted on charges including racketeering, violent crimes in aid of racketeering (VICAR), murder, witness tampering, and drug-related offenses. Several defendants pled guilty and cooperated with authorities, while others, including three individuals central to this appeal, proceeded to trial. The prosecution relied heavily on testimony from a cooperating witness who described the structure of the gang and detailed the defendants’ involvement in four murders. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia severed the trial due to complexity, ultimately trying three defendants together. After closing arguments, the district court found one defendant’s closing argument improper and instructed the jury to disregard it entirely. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts for two defendants and on most counts for the third. The convicted defendants raised various challenges, including claims of improper jury instructions, limitations on cross-examination, alleged due process violations related to evidence preservation and witness deportation, and the propriety of certain special jury findings. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the district court’s instruction to the jury to disregard the entire closing argument of one defendant was a prejudicial abuse of discretion, vacated the conviction as to that defendant, and remanded for further proceedings. However, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions of the other two defendants, finding that the curative instruction was sufficient to cure any possible prejudice and rejecting the remaining challenges to the trial court’s rulings. View "US v. Arevalo Arias" on Justia Law

Sealed Appellee v. Sealed Juvenile

2026-09-03T09:30:10-08:00

A juvenile was charged with two counts of possession or transfer of machinegun conversion devices, known as Glock switches, which enable semiautomatic pistols to fire automatically. The charges were brought under federal statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(o) and 924(a)(2), after the government certified that the State of Mississippi lacked jurisdiction over the alleged conduct because, at the time, Mississippi did not have a law regulating possession or transfer of machineguns. The juvenile moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the certification was inadequate and that the statute violated the Second Amendment, but both motions were denied. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi reviewed the case. After the motions were denied, the juvenile admitted to the charges, waiving appeal rights for all non-jurisdictional issues except his Second Amendment challenge. The district court adjudicated him delinquent and imposed a 19-month term of detention followed by supervised release until age 21. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered whether the district court had jurisdiction, whether the statute violated the Second Amendment, and whether the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms exceeded its authority in classifying Glock switches as machineguns. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court had jurisdiction because Mississippi lacked applicable law at the relevant time, the Second Amendment challenge was foreclosed by United States v. Wilson, 164 F.4th 380 (5th Cir. 2026), which upheld § 922(o) as constitutional, and the statutory challenge regarding ATF’s authority was waived under the terms of the appeal waiver. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Sealed Appellee v. Sealed Juvenile" on Justia Law

USA V. VALENCIA

2026-09-03T08:30:40-08:00

During a robbery at La Milpa Market in Yakima, Washington, two masked individuals stole approximately $16,000. In the course of the crime, one robber dropped an envelope and the other lost his left glove. Both items were later linked to Eduardo Valencia: the envelope was addressed to his parents’ home and the glove produced a DNA match. Valencia, who has tattoos on the backs of his hands, was arrested months later while driving a car matching the one seen near the crime scene. At trial, Valencia’s defense centered on surveillance footage that did not clearly show tattoos on the left hand of the robber who lost his glove. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington presided over Valencia’s trial. Valencia’s attorney sought to have him display his hands to the jury without testifying, arguing that this act was not testimonial and would not subject him to cross-examination. The district court rejected this, ruling that displaying his hands on the stand constituted testimony and required him to be subjected to cross-examination. Valencia took the stand, testified about his tattoos, and was cross-examined by the government, which then introduced additional evidence—a Facebook photo allegedly contradicting his testimony about the timing of his tattoos. The jury convicted Valencia of Hobbs Act robbery and brandishing a firearm. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that requiring Valencia to take the stand to display his tattoos violated his Fifth Amendment right not to testify, because displaying identifying physical characteristics is not testimonial evidence. This constitutional error was not harmless, as the government emphasized Valencia’s testimony and the jury focused on his hand tattoos. The court reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial. View "USA V. VALENCIA" on Justia Law

State v. Sarria

2026-09-03T07:39:17-08:00

The case concerns a defendant who was charged with unlawfully purchasing a firearm. The district attorney’s office prepared an affidavit and requested that the trial court issue a criminal citation for the defendant to appear in court. The trial court signed the citation, which was then served to the defendant by a sheriff’s deputy. The defendant failed to appear, and a warrant for his arrest was subsequently issued. Later, the state charged him with failure to appear on a criminal citation. The defendant moved to dismiss this charge, arguing the citation was invalid because it was issued by the court rather than a peace officer, as required by statute. The Union County Circuit Court denied the defendant’s motion, concluding the citation was lawful in both form and content. The defendant entered conditional guilty pleas in both the unlawful purchase and failure-to-appear cases, reserving his right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his dismissal motions. On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals did not address the merits of the defendant’s argument. Instead, it affirmed on procedural grounds, holding that the defendant’s challenge was not properly made by a pretrial motion to dismiss, as it was essentially a challenge to the sufficiency of the state’s evidence—a matter for trial, not pretrial disposition. The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred by not reaching the merits of the defendant’s challenge. The Supreme Court held that, given the record and the parties’ consent to a conditional plea, the appellate court was required to consider the merits of the legal question reserved. On the merits, the Supreme Court concluded that the criminal citation was not lawfully issued under the relevant statutes because it was issued by the court rather than a peace officer. The Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, upholding the conviction for unlawful purchase but reversing the failure-to-appear conviction and remanding that case. View "State v. Sarria" on Justia Law

Gauna v. State

2026-09-03T07:18:03-08:00

After being arrested during a traffic stop in April 2024, the defendant faced multiple criminal charges in Laramie County, Wyoming. At the time, he was already on probation for prior misdemeanor offenses and had an outstanding warrant in a separate felony case. Following the arrest, he was charged with new felonies and misdemeanors, and his probation was eventually revoked, resulting in the imposition of the underlying misdemeanor sentence. Over the subsequent months, he remained in custody at various points for reasons including probation violations and failure to appear, and he ultimately entered guilty pleas to select charges in two felony cases pursuant to a plea agreement. The District Court of Laramie County, after accepting the plea agreement, sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of imprisonment on the felony charges. At sentencing, the parties disputed the amount of credit for presentence confinement to be applied to his sentences. The State argued that he was entitled only to credit for days spent in custody after completion of his misdemeanor sentence, while the defendant sought credit for nearly all days spent in custody between his arrest and sentencing. The district court initially awarded 56 days of credit, later increasing this to 64 days after further argument, but declined to grant additional credit for periods during which the defendant was serving his misdemeanor sentence. The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the legality of the sentence, specifically the award of credit for presentence confinement. The court held that, under Wyoming precedent, a defendant is only entitled to credit against concurrent sentences in separate cases for time spent in custody if that confinement was due solely to a financial inability to post bond. Because the defendant was in custody for probation revocation and serving a sentence in another case, rather than solely due to an inability to post bond, he was not entitled to additional credit. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Gauna v. State" on Justia Law

Conahan v. State

2026-09-03T07:09:23-08:00

A man was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder and kidnapping of another individual, whose body was found in a remote wooded area after he went out to earn money by posing for nude photographs. The victim suffered strangulation and other trauma, and investigators found evidence linking the defendant to the scene, including paint chips matching his father’s car and records of purchases made shortly before the murder. Prior to this incident, the defendant had assaulted another victim in a similar manner. The evidence presented at trial included testimony from medical experts, forensic analysis, and corroboration from law enforcement investigations. After his conviction, the defendant pursued multiple collateral challenges in state and federal courts, including motions for post-conviction relief and DNA testing under Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and 3.853. The Circuit Court in and for Charlotte County summarily denied his third and fourth successive motions for post-conviction relief, as well as his motion for DNA testing. The defendant appealed these denials, requested a stay of execution, and filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of Florida. The appeals and petition were consolidated for review. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the trial court’s summary denials, finding that the defendant’s claims of newly discovered evidence were based on information that could have been obtained earlier through due diligence and did not meet procedural requirements. The Court also held that advances in DNA testing did not create a reasonable probability of a different outcome, and that expedited post-warrant proceedings did not violate due process. The habeas petition was found to be procedurally barred and lacking in merit. Accordingly, the Court denied all relief, including the request for a stay of execution. View "Conahan v. State" on Justia Law

Sedillo v. State

2026-09-03T06:32:39-08:00

The case arose from a single incident in which the petitioner forcibly took a 2000 BMW from its owner at gunpoint during a high-speed chase through Idaho County. He was charged with multiple offenses, including grand theft of an automobile and armed robbery, both relating to the same act of taking the BMW. The petitioner pleaded guilty to several charges pursuant to a plea agreement, and the district court sentenced him to consecutive terms, including for both grand theft and armed robbery. After his conviction was affirmed by the Idaho Court of Appeals on direct appeal (where he did not raise a double jeopardy argument), the petitioner filed for post-conviction relief in the District Court of the Second Judicial District. He argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for not raising a double jeopardy objection to being convicted and sentenced for both offenses stemming from the same conduct. The district court summarily dismissed his petition, concluding that the double jeopardy claim was both procedurally barred and, on the merits, that grand theft was not a lesser included offense of armed robbery under either the Blockburger test or Idaho’s pleading theory. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case and held that, under the Idaho Constitution’s double jeopardy provision and Idaho’s pleading theory, grand theft as charged was a lesser included offense of the armed robbery charge because both counts were based on the same act of taking the same car from the same victim. The Court clarified that the pleading theory, not the strict elements (Blockburger) test, governs such double jeopardy claims under Idaho law. As a result, the Court vacated the judgment, reversed the district court’s order granting summary disposition, and remanded the case for further proceedings, concluding that the petitioner established a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Sedillo v. State" on Justia Law

Johnson v. United States

2026-09-03T06:31:44-08:00

Police officers in the District of Columbia stopped a man on the street after receiving a tip from a confidential informant that a man with a gun was in a particular area, wearing specific clothing and carrying a bag. The tip was relayed between officers, and one officer sent another a screenshot taken from a surveillance camera. The officer who received the tip from the informant did not testify at the suppression hearing. The only testifying officer could not provide details about the informant's reliability or how the tip was obtained, and the description from the informant was generic, lacking specifics such as physical attributes. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied the defendant’s motion to suppress, reasoning that the officer’s knowledge of the informant’s reliability could be imputed to the officer who made the stop, and that the informant’s tip was corroborated by finding the defendant at the described location wearing the described clothing. The government argued that the police had reasonable articulable suspicion, and the trial court agreed, endorsing the government’s argument and allowing the evidence recovered after the stop to be used at trial. A jury subsequently convicted the defendant of several firearm-related offenses. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the suppression ruling de novo, finding that the government failed to provide the court with sufficient facts to independently assess the reliability of the informant’s tip. The court held that conclusory assertions about the informant’s reliability were inadequate, that corroboration of innocent details alone was insufficient, and that the government had not established reasonable articulable suspicion for the stop. The court reversed the defendant’s convictions and remanded for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. United States" on Justia Law

Brown v. United States

2026-09-03T06:31:44-08:00

The case involves an altercation between Calvon Reginald Brown and Johnny Paul inside a corner store in Southeast D.C. Video footage showed Brown apparently selling pills to another man just before Paul entered. Paul arrived playing music on a speaker, leading to an argument between Brown and Paul. The pair left the store and continued their confrontation in a nearby alley, where Paul testified that Brown fired a gun at him three times, striking his hip. Paul managed to wrestle the gun away, after which Brown fled. Police recovered shell casings and a bullet fragment from the alley but did not find the gun. Brown was arrested and charged with aggravated assault and related offenses. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia presided over Brown's trial. The government moved to admit video evidence showing Brown seemingly dealing drugs before the encounter with Paul. Brown objected, arguing it was inadmissible and unfairly prejudicial. The court admitted the video without directly addressing the prejudice argument. During trial, the government referenced Brown’s “business” in the store, implying drug activity. The jury convicted Brown on all counts. Before sentencing, Brown’s counsel sought to withdraw due to a conflict of interest stemming from Brown's intent to claim ineffective assistance. The court denied her motion, reasoning that such claims could be raised after sentencing. Brown was sentenced to thirteen years’ imprisonment. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It held that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting prejudicial video evidence without properly weighing its probative value and by allowing prejudicial references during trial, but found these errors harmless given the strong evidence supporting conviction. The appellate court also held that the trial court erred by denying counsel’s motion to withdraw before sentencing due to an actual conflict of interest, warranting resentencing before a different judge. The convictions were affirmed, but the case was remanded for resentencing. View "Brown v. United States" on Justia Law

Quarles v. United States

2026-09-03T06:31:42-08:00

Police officers observed an individual walking past their cruiser and believed, based on the shape protruding from his waistband, that he was carrying a handgun. The individual entered a carry-out restaurant, and when he exited, the officers followed him, repeatedly calling out to get his attention. The individual did not respond and eventually fled, at which point the officers chased and tackled him, recovering a handgun from his person. The officers had no prior information about him, were not responding to a reported crime, and did not know if he had a permit or license to carry the firearm. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied the individual’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the stop, concluding that there was reasonable, articulable suspicion for the officers to believe he was engaged in criminal activity. The court credited the officer’s testimony that he recognized the outline of a firearm and relied on the individual’s flight as suggestive of consciousness of guilt. Following trial, the individual was convicted of multiple weapon offenses. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and analyzed whether the stop was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion as required by the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that, in light of recent constitutional and statutory changes—including Supreme Court decisions affirming a right to carry firearms—the mere possession of a handgun does not, without additional evidence, provide reasonable suspicion for a stop. The court also determined that the circumstances surrounding the individual’s flight reduced its value as an indicator of criminal wrongdoing. The court therefore held that the officers lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the stop, vacated the convictions, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Quarles v. United States" on Justia Law

White v. United States

2026-09-03T06:31:41-08:00

The appellant was released into a home confinement program with GPS monitoring after pleading guilty to a firearm offense, though he had not yet been sentenced. The following morning, a police officer saw a live social media video showing the appellant holding a handgun. The police contacted the agency supervising his release to confirm his location via GPS, then surveilled his residence. After observing the appellant exit the residence and approach a vehicle, officers arrested him and recovered a firearm consistent with the one seen in the video. The appellant was convicted of carrying a pistol without a license and other related firearm offenses. Previously, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia reviewed two main issues. First, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the appellant’s motion to suppress evidence, finding that the police’s access to GPS location data from the supervising agency did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights, given his diminished privacy expectations as a releasee and his knowledge of GPS monitoring conditions. Second, the court denied, without a hearing, the appellant’s motion to vacate his convictions for ineffective assistance of counsel, concluding that counsel’s performance was not deficient and that the appellant did not show prejudice, as there was no reasonable probability he would have accepted a plea offer. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the suppression motion, holding that the limited sharing of GPS data by the supervising agency with police did not intrude upon the appellant’s reasonable expectation of privacy, due to his status and prior consent. However, the court vacated the denial of the ineffective assistance motion, finding error in the trial court’s prejudice analysis and in the failure to hold a hearing to resolve factual disputes. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "White v. United States" on Justia Law

United States of America v. Rivera

2026-09-03T06:30:09-08:00

Miguel Rivera, a convicted felon, was apprehended by police following a report of gunshots in Waterbury, Connecticut. Upon his arrest, officers found a semiautomatic rifle, thirty rounds of ammunition for the rifle, and a single bullet of a different caliber in Rivera’s possession. The rifle was located nearby and appeared recently discarded. Rivera confessed to dropping the firearm while fleeing from police. He was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut denied Rivera’s motion to dismiss the indictment, which he argued was duplicitous for combining possession of different items in a single count. The District Court also instructed the jury that unanimity was required only as to whether Rivera possessed a firearm or ammunition, not which specific item. Rivera was convicted by a jury and sentenced to sixty months in prison and three years of supervised release. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Rivera challenged his conviction on two grounds: the alleged duplicity of the indictment and the sufficiency of the evidence. The Second Circuit reviewed these claims de novo and concluded that the identity of the specific firearm or ammunition is not an element of a § 922(g)(1) offense, but rather a “brute fact.” The jury needed only to unanimously agree that Rivera possessed a firearm or ammunition, not which specific item. The court also found the evidence sufficient to support the conviction. The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court. View "United States of America v. Rivera" on Justia Law

United States v. Stuart

2026-09-03T06:30:04-08:00

Jessica Stuart was convicted of health care fraud and using false identification after she falsely claimed to be a Board-Certified Behavioral Analyst, rendering services to children with autism and causing significant financial losses to her employer and Medicaid. Her criminal history included multiple instances of fraud and larceny, such as issuing bad checks, stealing from individuals with whom she resided, and manipulating payments for personal gain. After serving her sentence, Stuart’s supervised release was marked by additional violations, including failing to make restitution payments, moving without approval, committing new frauds involving food stamps and unemployment benefits, and failing to report police contact. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut initially sentenced Stuart to incarceration and supervised release. When she violated conditions of her supervised release, the court, now presided over by Judge Nagala, imposed a new special condition authorizing the Probation Office to notify third parties—including employers, potential employers, and others to whom Stuart might pose a risk—of her criminal history and past conduct. Stuart objected, arguing the condition improperly delegated judicial authority to the Probation Office by granting it sole discretion to determine who qualifies as a third party at risk. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the challenge. Applying an abuse of discretion standard and reviewing legal questions de novo, the court held that the district court had sufficiently limited the Probation Office’s discretion. The condition was found permissible because it was rooted in Stuart’s varied and opportunistic risk profile, and the court had provided enough guidance to constrain arbitrary use of delegated authority. The Probation Office’s role was determined to be execution, not imposition, of the condition. Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Stuart" on Justia Law

In re J.C.

2026-09-02T13:31:29-08:00

The case involves a defendant who, at age 15, allegedly committed two murders and an attempted shooting as part of gang activity in 2009. After an investigation, he was indicted at age 19, which meant he was still eligible for juvenile court jurisdiction. Over the following years, legislative changes—including Proposition 57, Senate Bill No. 1391, and Assembly Bill No. 2361—affected how minors accused of serious crimes could be prosecuted. The defendant’s case shifted repeatedly between juvenile and criminal courts while legal standards for transfer were clarified. The Ventura County Superior Court (criminal division) first remanded the case to juvenile court in 2017, following Proposition 57, which required juvenile court authorization for transfer to criminal court. The juvenile court transferred the defendant back to criminal court, but he continued to argue that, under Welfare and Institutions Code § 707(a)(2), as he was apprehended before the end of juvenile jurisdiction, his case should remain in juvenile court. In December 2022, the criminal court found jurisdiction ended at age 18, denying his request for remand. A later remand in April 2023 occurred after Assembly Bill No. 2361, requiring transfer decisions to be supported by clear and convincing evidence. An informal settlement allowed the juvenile court to base its transfer on probation reports, after which he pled guilty in criminal court. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six reviewed the transfer order. It held that under Senate Bill No. 1391, the juvenile court erred in transferring the defendant to criminal court because he was apprehended before the end of juvenile court jurisdiction. The order granting transfer was reversed, and the matter was remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings. View "In re J.C." on Justia Law

USA v Frazier

2026-09-02T13:00:09-08:00

Matthew Frazier was convicted in federal court for possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A and sentenced to 120 months' imprisonment and seven years of supervised release. Frazier had a prior history involving a state court conviction for similar offenses, during which he was initially found incompetent to stand trial but later restored to competency following mental health treatment. After his release on probation, authorities discovered that he was again accessing prohibited materials, leading to a federal search that uncovered additional incriminating evidence. Prior to his federal trial, Frazier underwent a psychological evaluation, revealing ongoing hallucinations but ultimately concluding he was competent to stand trial. Following Frazier's waiver of a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, he made statements about experiencing hallucinations. However, neither his attorney nor the prosecutor questioned his competency at that time, and the district judge conducted a thorough inquiry into his understanding of the proceedings. Defense counsel confirmed that Frazier’s decision-making abilities were consistent with the earlier finding of competency. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Frazier challenged the district court’s failure to order a second competency hearing and contested the supervised release condition requiring full-time employment. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by not ordering a second competency hearing, given the evidence and the deferential standard of review. Regarding supervised release, the court concluded that the employment condition was not plain error because it included alternatives like community service or job training, and Frazier had not shown he was incapable of meeting those requirements. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v Frazier" on Justia Law

United States v. Boyd

2026-09-02T12:30:06-08:00

While serving a sentence for manslaughter and assault in a South Carolina prison, the defendant used a contraband cell phone to pose as an underage girl on a dating app. He initiated contact with a 22-year-old Michigan man, referred to as B.G., and exchanged sexually explicit messages and images. After revealing (falsely) that the girl was underage, the defendant, posing as the girl’s grandparent, threatened to expose B.G. to his family and law enforcement unless B.G. sent money. The defendant then sent explicit messages to B.G.’s ex-fiancée and her mother and publicly posted accusations of pedophilia on social media. Shortly after these threats and exposures, B.G. died by suicide. A federal grand jury indicted the defendant on charges including attempted extortion under the Hobbs Act, stalking with intent to harass and intimidate, and multiple counts of wire fraud. A jury in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan found him guilty on all counts. At sentencing, the district court applied the Sentencing Guideline for extortion by force or threat of injury or serious damage (U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2), and added enhancements for discharge of a firearm and for the victim sustaining life-threatening injury, resulting in a total sentence of 272 months’ imprisonment. The defendant objected to the choice of Guideline, the enhancements, and the consecutive nature of the sentences, but the district court overruled these objections. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the district court correctly used the extortion Guideline rather than the blackmail Guideline. However, the appellate court concluded that the enhancements for firearm discharge and life-threatening injury were procedurally unreasonable, as there was no evidence the defendant willfully caused B.G.’s suicide. The court affirmed the application of the correct Guideline but reversed the application of the enhancements, remanding for resentencing without them. View "United States v. Boyd" on Justia Law

State v. Mooney

2026-09-02T06:33:10-08:00

The case involves a defendant who, while under the influence of alcohol and oxycodone, intentionally crashed his vehicle into a minivan carrying a family of six, causing bodily harm to each member. The State charged the defendant with six counts of aggravated battery, four counts of injury to a child, and one count of misdemeanor driving under the influence. After a mental health evaluation and a period of commitment, the defendant was found fit to proceed and pleaded guilty to all charges. The Third Judicial District Court of Idaho sentenced the defendant to consecutive and concurrent terms for the various counts and orally pronounced that he would receive credit for 477 days of time served. However, the written judgment of conviction ambiguously applied the 477 days of credit to each count, potentially multiplying the credit. The State filed a motion to clarify the sentence, and the district court, at a hearing held without the defendant's presence, clarified its intent that the credit for time served should total 477 days across all counts, not per count. The district court rescinded the original written judgment and issued a superseding judgment of conviction reflecting this intent. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s amended judgment. The defendant sought review, arguing the district court lacked jurisdiction and authority to issue the amended judgment after the original sentence had been imposed. The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho held that the district court had jurisdiction and authority under Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) to amend the judgment to resolve the ambiguity between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment. However, the Supreme Court determined that the error was in conducting the resentencing hearing without the defendant’s presence. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the amended judgment and remanded the case for resentencing in the defendant’s presence. View "State v. Mooney" on Justia Law

United States v. DeFelice

2026-09-02T06:30:09-08:00

Federal agents began investigating the defendant in early 2021 after receiving information that he was operating a firearms manufacturing and dealing business from his home without the required federal license. Undercover agents arranged the purchase of a semi-automatic firearm and a high-capacity magazine from him, during which he described the magazine as “highly illegal.” Following a year-long investigation, law enforcement executed a search warrant and recovered two unregistered short-barreled rifles and an unregistered suppressor from his residence. A grand jury indicted the defendant on two counts: dealing and manufacturing firearms without a license under federal law, and possession of unregistered National Firearms Act (NFA) firearms (the rifles and suppressor). He moved to dismiss both counts, alleging the NFA violated his Second Amendment rights. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut denied his motion, holding that the Second Amendment did not cover possession of unregistered rifles and suppressors. The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea to the NFA count, preserving his right to appeal the denial and his sentence. He was sentenced to twelve months and one day in prison. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the defendant lacked standing to challenge the NFA as amended after his offense because the amendment was not retroactive. The court applied the Bruen framework, assumed without deciding that short-barreled rifles and suppressors are “arms,” but concluded the NFA’s registration and taxation requirements did not meaningfully constrain the defendant’s Second Amendment rights. The court also found no procedural or substantive error in the district court’s sentencing determination. The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. DeFelice" on Justia Law

Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction

2026-09-02T04:02:56-08:00

The petitioner was convicted of murder and conspiracy to commit murder in connection with the shooting death of a woman who was pregnant with his child. After unsuccessfully convincing the victim to have an abortion, he conspired with a close friend to kill her. The friend ultimately fired the fatal shot. Weeks later, the friend confessed to a mutual acquaintance, who later served as a key prosecution witness. That witness also participated in a subsequent robbery with the friend, using the same firearm as in the murder. Information from the robbery investigation helped implicate both the friend and the petitioner in the murder. At trial, the witness testified that he had not been promised any deals or consideration for his testimony, although he later alluded to unspecified “considerations.” His defense attorney also testified, indicating there would be some consideration for truthful testimony but denying any formal agreement. The habeas court, Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland, denied the petitioner’s request for a writ of habeas corpus. The court found that the witness’s testimony about the scope of any agreement was truthful and that the jury had been made aware that something would be done in exchange for his testimony. It further concluded that any ambiguity was clarified by testimony from the witness’s defense attorney, who explained that consideration would be given but no specific deal existed. The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and held that the prosecutor violated Napue v. Illinois by eliciting false or substantially misleading testimony regarding the existence and nature of an agreement with the witness, failing to correct those misimpressions, and relying on the misleading testimony in closing argument. The court found these violations were material, as there was a reasonable likelihood they affected the jury’s verdict. The judgment of the habeas court was reversed, and the case remanded with instructions to grant the habeas petition, vacate the conviction, and order a new trial. View "Bryan v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

USA v. Tampico

2026-09-01T15:30:07-08:00

Jonathan M. Tampico was convicted in 1999 of possession, receipt, and distribution of child pornography, receiving concurrent sentences totaling 360 months in prison, five years of supervised release, and a $5,000 fine. After beginning his supervised release in March 2024, the district court modified the conditions of his release in October 2024 to include home detention for six months, with the possibility of continuation until he completed a sex offender treatment program. The court also found that $1,992.86 in interest had accrued on his fine and ordered monthly payments of $200. Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas had not included home detention as a condition of supervised release when Tampico was originally sentenced or resentenced. In 2024, after evidentiary hearings, the district court modified the conditions in response to concerns about Tampico’s progress in treatment. Tampico objected to the location monitoring and home detention but did not appeal the initial March 2024 order. He also contested the October 2024 findings regarding interest on his fine, arguing that no interest was required and that the fine had been fully paid, relying on Bureau of Prisons records showing a zero balance. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. The court held that the district court did not impose an illegal sentence by modifying supervised release conditions to include home detention, finding that the statutory maximums applicable to imprisonment were not implicated because home detention was added as a modification during supervised release, not at sentencing or after revocation. The Fifth Circuit also affirmed the district court’s finding that interest on the fine was due and that the Government was not estopped from collecting it. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA v. Tampico" on Justia Law

Adams v. Guerrero

2026-09-01T15:30:06-08:00

Michael Kevin Adams was convicted of capital murder after evidence showed he drugged, sexually assaulted, and repeatedly threatened his former fiancée, N.L. Following the assault, Adams violated a protective order and continued to harass N.L., prompting her and her son to relocate for safety. Six months after the assault, N.L. was found shot to death in her home, with evidence at the scene including DNA, condom wrappers, and cartridge casings. Investigators found circumstantial evidence, such as Adams’s DNA at the scene, photographs of firearms similar to the murder weapon, and a screw possibly from a gun in his vehicle. Adams denied involvement and provided an uncorroborated alibi. At trial in Texas state court, the prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence and witness testimony to establish Adams’s guilt. The jury convicted him of capital murder, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Adams appealed to the Texas Fifth Court of Appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient under the standard set by Jackson v. Virginia. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding the evidence sufficient, though one judge dissented. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals declined discretionary review, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Adams’s subsequent state habeas petition was also denied. Adams then filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, arguing the state court unreasonably applied Jackson’s sufficiency standard. The district court denied relief and a certificate of appealability. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Adams failed to show that every reasonable jurist would find the state court’s sufficiency determination unreasonable under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and Jackson. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and denied habeas relief. View "Adams v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

State v. Laroque

2026-09-01T13:07:28-08:00

A pickup truck driven by Lilly Laroque collided head-on with another vehicle on a Montana highway, resulting in serious injuries to Laroque and the death of the other driver, Delaney Doherty. At the crash scene, law enforcement found marijuana-related items in Laroque’s vehicle, and evidence suggested Laroque had been texting and using marijuana while driving shortly before the crash. While hospitalized after the accident, Sergeant Stoner of the Montana Highway Patrol requested a blood sample from Laroque to test for intoxicants, reading her the Montana Implied Consent Advisory. Laroque did not respond verbally to repeated requests for consent, and the officer directed medical staff to draw her blood, which later tested above the legal limit for THC. The Eighteenth Judicial District Court of Montana reviewed Laroque's motion to suppress the blood sample and toxicology report, considering arguments that the warrantless blood draw violated her constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. The State argued that Montana’s Implied Consent statute authorized the blood draw, relying on precedent from City of Great Falls v. Allderdice. The District Court found Laroque did not exhibit understanding or consent required by the Implied Consent Advisory, distinguishing her case from Allderdice. The court suppressed the evidence, finding no exception to the warrant requirement applied and declined to apply the good faith exception. The State appealed this suppression order. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court’s finding that Laroque did not consent was clearly erroneous. Applying the clear error standard, the Supreme Court found substantial evidence supported the District Court’s conclusion that Laroque did not consent to the warrantless blood draw. The Supreme Court affirmed the suppression of the blood sample and toxicology report, holding the District Court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous and declining to address the State’s good faith doctrine argument, as it was not raised below. View "State v. Laroque" on Justia Law

State v. Miller

2026-09-01T13:07:26-08:00

A man was charged with multiple felonies following a high-speed pursuit in Lincoln County, Montana. Law enforcement attempted to arrest him on an outstanding warrant, but he fled in a truck, initiating a chase that involved several officers. During the pursuit, the man lost control on a snowy forest road, then accelerated and struck a highway patrol trooper with his vehicle. The passenger in his truck exited as the chase continued, and the man was ultimately apprehended after colliding with a Fish, Wildlife & Parks vehicle. A search of the truck revealed methamphetamine, testosterone enanthate, and a pistol. He was charged with attempted deliberate homicide, criminal endangerment, criminal mischief, criminal possession of dangerous drugs, and aggravated kidnapping. The Nineteenth Judicial District Court held a jury trial. The defendant objected to the presence of a “large” number of uniformed law enforcement officers in the gallery, arguing their presence could intimidate the jury. He requested the officers wear civilian clothes or, alternatively, that the jury be instructed not to let the officers’ presence influence their decision. The court denied the request for civilian clothes but was open to a curative instruction, which the defense did not pursue. The defendant also objected to the admission of a particular photograph from the crime scene and later argued ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not request a specific jury instruction. The jury found him guilty of all charges. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing uniformed officers to attend the trial, as their presence was not inherently prejudicial and there was no evidence of improper influence. The court declined to consider the ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal, leaving it for possible postconviction proceedings. Finally, even if admitting the contested photograph was error, it was harmless given the other evidence. The convictions and judgment were affirmed. View "State v. Miller" on Justia Law

People v. Castillo

2026-09-01T12:03:13-08:00

The defendant was convicted by a jury of several sexual offenses involving two minors, including lewd or lascivious acts with a child aged 14 or 15, sexual penetration by force or fear, and annoying or molesting a child. The defendant had a prior conviction for a similar offense, which was found true in a separate proceeding and factored into sentencing enhancements under California’s “One Strike” and “Three Strikes” laws. At a resentencing hearing, the court imposed an aggregate sentence of 13 years determinate, followed by a consecutive indeterminate term of 50 years to life. Following the conviction, restitution hearings were held in the Superior Court of Kern County, where the primary victim, her mother, and family members testified about the psychological and emotional harm suffered. The trial court awarded noneconomic restitution: $1.8 million to the primary victim, $250,000 to her mother, $25,000 to her brother, and $10,000 to her sister. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to articulate a method for calculating noneconomic restitution and that the amounts awarded were unsupported by the evidence. The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the restitution order. The court held that no specific method or formula is required for calculating noneconomic restitution, given its inherently subjective nature. The appellate court found that the evidence supported the restitution awards to the primary victim, her mother, and her brother, and that the amounts were not so excessive as to constitute an abuse of discretion. However, the court determined there was insufficient evidence of specific noneconomic harm to the sister and vacated the restitution award to her. In all other respects, the trial court’s restitution order was affirmed. View "People v. Castillo" on Justia Law

United States v. Hilton

2026-09-01T11:30:07-08:00

The defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Both offenses carried statutory mandatory minimum sentences of 60 months, with the firearm sentence required to run consecutively. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee calculated the defendant’s Guidelines range as 120 to 131 months and imposed a 120-month sentence. Later, after the defendant provided substantial assistance to the government, the court granted a Rule 35(b) motion and reduced the sentence to 100 months. Following her resentencing, the United States Sentencing Commission adopted Amendment 821, which changed how criminal-history points are calculated and was made retroactive. Under the new calculation, the defendant’s criminal-history category would have been lower, resulting in a reduced Guidelines range. The defendant moved pro se for a further sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), arguing that Amendment 821 lowered her sentencing range. The district court denied the motion, finding her sentence was not “based on” a Guidelines range but on statutory minimums, and denied a subsequent motion for reconsideration. The defendant appealed both orders, resulting in two consolidated appeals. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s eligibility determination de novo. It held that the defendant’s sentence was indeed “based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered” by the Sentencing Commission, specifically Amendment 821. The court found that the relevant Guidelines range, excluding mandatory minimums due to the prior substantial-assistance reduction, had been lowered. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying the initial motion and remanded for further proceedings to consider other eligibility requirements. The second appeal was dismissed as moot. View "United States v. Hilton" on Justia Law

State v. Valdez

2026-09-01T10:47:06-08:00

The defendant was convicted after a jury trial of first-degree willful and deliberate murder of a woman with whom he had a history of domestic violence, aggravated battery and assault with a deadly weapon against another victim, and aggravated fleeing from a law enforcement officer. On the morning of the crime, the defendant assaulted both women at a friend’s house, struck one with a gun, and ultimately shot and killed his domestic partner. The defendant then attempted to flee the scene, leading police on a high-speed chase before crashing and being arrested. He was indicted, tried before a jury, and sentenced to life in prison plus thirteen years. Reviewing the case, the District Court of Doña Ana County excluded some evidence of prior sexual assaults but admitted testimony about the defendant’s other prior bad acts against the murder victim, including physical abuse and threats. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts except tampering with evidence, for which the court directed a verdict of acquittal. The defendant subsequently filed multiple motions to substitute his appointed counsel, arguing a breakdown in communication and lack of trust, but the district court denied these motions after holding hearings and facilitating additional meetings between defendant and counsel. The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico reviewed the appeal, considering whether the district court erred by admitting evidence of prior bad acts and by denying motions to substitute counsel. The Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence, as it appropriately considered Rule 11-403 and excluded unduly prejudicial evidence. The Court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions to substitute counsel, as the defendant failed to show ineffective representation or prejudice to his defense. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions. View "State v. Valdez" on Justia Law

State v. Skeets

2026-09-01T10:47:06-08:00

The defendant was charged with an open count of murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder after a fatal stabbing at a gas station in Gallup, New Mexico. Following a preliminary hearing, the district court found that the charges were not supported by probable cause and ordered the defendant discharged from both counts. After this determination, the State appealed the district court’s finding to the New Mexico Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals transferred the case to the Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico, referencing caselaw that directs life-imprisonment or death-eligible appeals to the state’s highest court. The transfer was accepted. The State argued that appellate jurisdiction existed under NMSA 1978, Section 39-3-3(B)(1), which allows the state to appeal certain district court orders in criminal cases, contending that the district court’s order was a dismissal as contemplated by the statute. The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the State’s appeal. The Court explained that, under its precedent, Section 39-3-3(B)(1) only authorizes state appeals from final orders, and the district court’s order was not final because the State could refile the charges or seek a grand jury indictment. The Court further found that the doctrine of practical finality did not apply because the probable cause issue was not unreviewable; the State retained avenues to pursue prosecution. As a result, the Supreme Court dismissed the State’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction and abrogated contrary precedent from the Court of Appeals. View "State v. Skeets" on Justia Law

State v. Valencia

2026-09-01T10:47:05-08:00

The defendant attended a social gathering at a relative’s house in Pecos, New Mexico, along with his girlfriend and two other individuals. All present consumed significant amounts of alcohol, including vodka and beer. As the evening progressed, the defendant became upset about a haircut, argued with one of the others, and left the house to retrieve a firearm from his vehicle. He proceeded to shoot multiple times at the front door, ultimately forcing entry. Upon entering, he shot and killed two individuals and threatened a third, who hid and called 911. When law enforcement arrived, they found the defendant unresponsive in a vehicle, exhibiting signs of intoxication. He later confessed to the shootings during police questioning but asserted he was highly intoxicated and unable to recall parts of the incident. The case was tried before the District Court of San Miguel County, where the defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, aggravated assault, shooting at a dwelling or occupied building, and negligent use of a deadly weapon. The defendant’s main argument at trial was that his intoxication prevented him from forming the specific intent required for first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder. He requested jury instructions on voluntary intoxication, which the district court denied, finding insufficient evidence that his intoxication interfered with his ability to form the requisite intent. The defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms, including life without parole, and appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico. The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico held that the district court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication as it pertained to the specific intent crimes. The Court found sufficient evidence existed to support such an instruction and reversed the convictions for first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder, remanding those charges for a new trial. The Court affirmed the convictions for shooting at a dwelling or occupied building and for negligent use of a deadly weapon, finding no double jeopardy violation. View "State v. Valencia" on Justia Law

State v. Benavidez

2026-09-01T10:47:05-08:00

A seventeen-year-old defendant shot and killed his mother’s boyfriend following a confrontation outside the victim’s apartment, which was recorded on a security camera. The defendant admitted to the killing but claimed he acted in response to provocation rather than with deliberate intent. He later concealed both the firearm and clothing used in the crime. Testimony at trial included evidence of past abuse by the victim toward the defendant and his mother, as well as the defendant’s prior threat against the victim. The District Court of Bernalillo County tried the case. The jury convicted the defendant of first-degree murder and two counts of tampering with evidence. The court sentenced him to thirty years of incarceration, with eight years suspended, and imposed a five-year parole term. The defendant appealed, arguing the parole term was illegal for a serious youthful offender not sentenced to life imprisonment, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for deliberate intent, alleging instructional error regarding provocation, asserting prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments, and contending that his tampering convictions violated double jeopardy. The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico reviewed the appeal. It held that the five-year parole term was lawful for a serious youthful offender convicted of first-degree murder, regardless of mitigation in the prison sentence. The Court found sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of deliberate intent, determined the jury instructions on provocation were correct, and found no fundamental error in the prosecutor’s statements. However, it concluded that the two tampering convictions lacked sufficient distinctness to justify separate punishments under the statute, violating double jeopardy. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence except for one tampering conviction, which it reversed and remanded with instructions to vacate. View "State v. Benavidez" on Justia Law

State v. Eaker

2026-09-01T10:47:05-08:00

The defendant was convicted in 2012 of criminal sexual penetration and incest (Case One) and later paroled. In 2019, while on parole, he was found in possession of child sexual abuse material, which led to his arrest for parole violations and subsequent custody. The following day, he was charged with sexual exploitation of children (Case Two) and released on bond in that case, yet remained confined due to the parole revocation in Case One. He ultimately pleaded guilty in Case Two and received a twelve-year sentence with part suspended, and indeterminate parole and probation terms. After sentencing, the defendant moved to receive presentence confinement credit in Case Two for the time spent incarcerated due to the parole violation, arguing the underlying facts overlapped. The District Court denied this motion. On appeal, the New Mexico Court of Appeals requested transfer to the New Mexico Supreme Court, recognizing the defendant’s motion was untimely and should be treated as a habeas petition. The Supreme Court accepted the case for review and ordered supplemental briefing on issues concerning presentence confinement credit and the effect of the state’s pretrial release reforms. The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico held that the established three-factor test for presentence confinement credit in dual credit cases remains controlling. The Court rejected arguments to eliminate the third factor, abrogated State v. French to the extent it conflicted, and clarified that the defendant is entitled to only one day of presentence confinement credit for the single day he was confined in part on Case Two. Additionally, the Court found the defendant’s parole and probation sentences illegal under the statutes governing fourth-degree felonies and remanded for resentencing consistent with these holdings. View "State v. Eaker" on Justia Law

State v. Aragon

2026-09-01T10:47:04-08:00

The defendant was convicted of the first-degree murder of his wife and three counts of tampering with evidence. The couple had been married for eleven months when the victim was found dead by the side of a road near Roswell, New Mexico, having suffered blunt force head trauma, strangulation, and stabbing. Physical evidence, including the victim’s blood found in their shared home, in her vehicle, and at another property owned by the defendant, implicated him. Digital forensic evidence placed the defendant’s phone at various locations consistent with moving the body. The defendant, representing himself at trial, maintained his innocence and offered alternative explanations, including implicating another man and asserting the victim had left with another lover. The District Court of Chaves County presided over the jury trial, during which the defendant raised multiple evidentiary objections and claims of constitutional violations. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. On direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico, the defendant challenged the admission of lay and expert testimony, alleged violations of his right to confront witnesses, argued that the evidence was insufficient, raised double jeopardy concerns regarding the tampering counts, and claimed prosecutorial misconduct. The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico affirmed the convictions for first-degree murder and two counts of tampering with evidence. The Court held that the admission of lay and expert testimony was not erroneous and that any potential Confrontation Clause errors were harmless. The Court found sufficient evidence to support the convictions. However, it determined that one tampering with evidence conviction (count three) violated double jeopardy principles because the conduct underlying two counts was unitary. The case was remanded for dismissal of that conviction and for resentencing. All other claims for relief were rejected. View "State v. Aragon" on Justia Law

State v. Eaker

2026-09-01T10:47:03-08:00

The case centers on a defendant who pleaded no contest to criminal sexual penetration in the third degree and incest. At sentencing, the court granted a conditional discharge and placed the defendant on supervised probation, consistent with the victim’s wishes and without opposition from the State. The court also warned the defendant that a violation of probation could result in incarceration and the imposition of a five- to twenty-year term of sex offender parole. The defendant later violated probation after several incidents, including being reported for suspicious and inappropriate behavior. Following revocation proceedings, the court adjudicated him guilty on both charges, revoked his conditional discharge, and sentenced him to consecutive prison terms with corresponding parole, including an indeterminate sex offender parole term. After serving his prison sentence, the defendant filed a habeas petition in the District Court of Otero County, arguing that because his prison sentence for the sex offense had expired before he was transferred to prison, he could not lawfully be required to serve the sex offender parole term. The district court agreed, concluding that under New Mexico law, sex offender parole could only be imposed if the defendant actually served prison time for the relevant conviction. It therefore discharged the defendant from his sex offender parole term. The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico reviewed the case on direct appeal. The Court held that under the plain language of NMSA 1978, Section 31-21-10.1, sex offender parole is imposed at sentencing when a defendant is sentenced to a term of incarceration for an enumerated sex offense, regardless of whether the defendant actually serves time in prison. The Court concluded that the district court erred in discharging the defendant from his parole term and reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Eaker" on Justia Law

People v. Campbell

2026-09-01T09:31:46-08:00

Sidney Campbell was convicted by a jury of second degree murder in 2003 after he and his brother shot and killed a 15-year-old boy following a confrontation related to a damaged bicycle rim. Witnesses testified that Campbell was one of the shooters, and the jury found he personally used and discharged a firearm during the offense. The jury was not instructed on felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine, but was instructed on implied malice. Following his conviction, Campbell was sentenced to 35 years to life. The California Court of Appeal previously affirmed his conviction. In 2022, Campbell filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that recent statutory amendments and relevant case law might render him eligible for relief because his conviction could have rested on an imputed malice theory, particularly given ambiguities in the aiding and abetting instructions. The Los Angeles County Superior Court summarily denied the petition at the prima facie stage, finding Campbell ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the trial court’s denial after the California Supreme Court directed reconsideration in light of People v. Lopez (2026) 19 Cal.5th 639, which clarified that the ability to raise instructional error on direct appeal does not categorically bar relief under section 1172.6. The appellate court independently reviewed the record and concluded that the jury instructions did not allow for conviction based on imputed malice and that it was not reasonably likely the jury relied on such a theory. Therefore, Campbell was found ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. The order denying Campbell’s section 1172.6 petition was affirmed. View "People v. Campbell" on Justia Law

United States v. Bayne

2026-09-01T09:01:04-08:00

Mark Bayne was charged in July 2024 with multiple federal offenses, including making threats in interstate commerce and stalking, after allegedly sending numerous hostile messages through a Department of Veterans Affairs system. Bayne has a history of similar offenses and mental health issues: in 2010, after being indicted for threats, he was found incompetent to stand trial, later restored to competence, and ultimately found not guilty by reason of insanity following further psychiatric evaluations. He was conditionally released with psychiatric treatment requirements but violated those terms, resulting in re-arrest and subsequent releases. After his most recent discharge in February 2024, the current offenses allegedly occurred. Following his indictment, Bayne was detained pretrial because he refused release conditions. He missed several status conferences, citing chronic pain and transportation discomfort. Although his attorneys stated he was competent, the government requested a psychiatric evaluation under 18 U.S.C. § 4241, and the United States District Court for the District of Utah found reasonable cause to question Bayne’s competence, ordering the evaluation. Bayne challenged this order, asserting it was an abuse of discretion and that the reasonable cause determination was unsupported. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the interlocutory appeal. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s order because it did not fall within the collateral-order doctrine’s narrow exception to the final judgment rule. Specifically, the interests at stake for a detained defendant subject to a competency evaluation were outweighed by the public interest in prompt criminal proceedings. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and the court did not address the merits of Bayne’s challenge to the evaluation order. View "United States v. Bayne" on Justia Law

USA v. Berger

2026-09-01T09:00:06-08:00

Federal agents intercepted a package containing three silencers shipped from China to Joseph Berger’s residence in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. Upon searching the home with a warrant, agents discovered more than sixty firearms, including thirteen fully automatic guns (mostly AK-47 variants), a dozen silencers, and parts for converting semi-automatic weapons into machine guns. Berger was indicted for possession of machine guns and unregistered silencers, violations of federal law. He is a Navy veteran who lived with his father, and evidence suggested both were involved in acquiring conversion parts. In the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Berger raised an as-applied Second Amendment challenge. The court denied his challenge, finding that machine guns were “dangerous and unusual weapons” not commonly used for self-defense, and that silencers were not “bearable arms” under the Second Amendment. Berger then pleaded guilty to possessing a machine gun and an unregistered silencer, reserving his right to appeal the Second Amendment issue. The government dismissed the charge of possessing an unregistered machine gun as part of the plea agreement. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed Berger’s appeal de novo, focusing on pure issues of law. The court held that the Second Amendment does not protect possession of machine guns because they are not commonly used for lawful purposes and are classified as “dangerous and unusual.” Furthermore, the registration requirement for silencers under the National Firearms Act imposes only a minimal, objective burden and does not infringe upon Second Amendment rights. The court affirmed Berger’s conviction and sentence, holding that both the machine-gun ban and the silencer registration requirement are constitutional as applied to Berger. View "USA v. Berger" on Justia Law

USA v. Walker

2026-09-01T09:00:05-08:00

Police investigating a suspicious package at a UPS facility in Pennsylvania discovered it contained methamphetamine after a drug-sniffing dog alerted and a search warrant was obtained for the box. Officers planned to track the package with a GPS device and sought judicial authorization for a “hit-and-hold” procedure: if the package was brought into any location other than the listed delivery address (Apartment 2), they would secure the package there and then apply for a search warrant for the new location. The judge issued a tracker order and a search warrant for Apartment 2 but did not explicitly authorize entry into any other apartment. When the package was instead brought into Apartment 1 by Davone Walker, officers entered Apartment 1 to secure the package, then obtained a search warrant for that apartment and found substantial quantities of drugs. Walker was charged with drug offenses in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. He moved to suppress the evidence found in Apartment 1, arguing that the officers’ warrant did not authorize entry into his apartment. The District Court found that Trooper Montz unreasonably believed he was permitted to enter Apartment 1 based on the tracker order but concluded this mistake was at most isolated negligence rather than gross negligence or deliberate misconduct, and thus denied the suppression motion. Walker then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The Third Circuit held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained through an officer’s isolated or negligent mistake unless the conduct is deliberate, reckless, grossly negligent, or part of systemic misconduct. Because Trooper Montz’s mistake was not grossly negligent, the court affirmed the denial of the suppression motion and Walker’s conviction. View "USA v. Walker" on Justia Law

USA v. Aleman-Lozano

2026-09-01T09:00:05-08:00

The case concerns a noncitizen from El Salvador who lawfully entered the United States on a nonimmigrant temporary visa with work authorization. While residing in the United States, he was stopped by a Pennsylvania state trooper for a traffic violation. During the stop, the officer observed a rifle cartridge in the vehicle, leading to a search warrant and the discovery of a loaded pistol without a serial number. The individual admitted to purchasing the pistol in Maryland. He was indicted by a grand jury for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(B), a statute prohibiting nonimmigrant visa holders from possessing firearms. He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute violated the Second Amendment. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denied his motion, holding the statute constitutional. After entering a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the constitutional issue, he was sentenced to twenty-four months’ imprisonment and one year of supervised release. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(B) is facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. The Court, following the framework from New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, assumed without deciding that some noncitizens may be included among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment. The Court then considered whether the statute is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. It found that there is a longstanding historical practice of disarming individuals considered disloyal to the sovereign, including noncitizens with allegiance to another country. Concluding that § 922(g)(5)(B) is relevantly similar to these historical analogues, the Court held that the statute does not violate the Second Amendment and affirmed the conviction. View "USA v. Aleman-Lozano" on Justia Law

Brown v. The State of Wyoming

2026-09-01T07:18:31-08:00

Law enforcement agents in Rawlins, Wyoming, surveilled suspects believed to be involved in drug distribution. During this operation, officers observed two known drug users at the residence of an individual who was not originally a target. After one of these individuals left, she was stopped for a traffic violation, and a drug detection dog conducted a search but found no contraband. Subsequently, officers followed the resident, observed him commit a traffic violation, and conducted a traffic stop. During the stop, a drug detection dog alerted to the presence of drugs in the vehicle, leading to a search that recovered significant quantities of methamphetamine, marijuana, and a firearm. Additional evidence was found at the individual's home and on his person. He was charged with multiple drug and firearm offenses and misdemeanors. The District Court of Carbon County conducted pretrial hearings on the admissibility of evidence, including evidence under Wyoming Rule of Evidence 404(b) and the validity of the traffic stop. The district court admitted text and Facebook messages between the defendant and various individuals, which referenced drug activity using coded language, concluding they were relevant to the charges and their probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence from the traffic stop, finding reasonable suspicion existed, and later denied a request to file a late motion to suppress related to the drug dog’s alert. At trial, the jury convicted the defendant on most charges, and the district court imposed sentences accordingly. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming considered whether the defendant had waived his right to challenge the dog sniff and whether the district court erred in admitting the 404(b) evidence. The court held that the defendant waived his challenge to the dog sniff by failing to raise it in a timely manner and did not demonstrate good cause for this failure. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in admitting the messages, concluding the district court properly applied the required evidentiary framework. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the convictions. View "Brown v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

State of Idaho v. Orr

2026-09-01T07:03:52-08:00

After being arrested for domestic battery against S.O., Nicholas James Orr was subject to a criminal no contact order prohibiting communication with S.O. Despite this order, Orr repeatedly called S.O. from jail and made statements that included urging her to alter her testimony, suggesting she say the incident “didn’t happen,” and implying that her actions could “fix” his legal troubles. The State charged Orr with intimidating a witness under Idaho Code section 18-2604(3), as well as multiple violations of the no contact order. The District Court of the Sixth Judicial District denied Orr’s motion to dismiss the witness intimidation charge. Orr had argued that the statute was facially overbroad under the First Amendment and unconstitutional as applied to his conduct, asserting that the “by any manner” language of the statute criminalized protected speech, including his attempts to persuade S.O. to provide more information or clarify her statements. The district court concluded that the statute did not infringe on protected speech, as it targeted attempts to influence or prevent truthful testimony, and that Orr’s conduct could be interpreted as seeking perjury. Orr entered a conditional guilty plea to the intimidation charge, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Idaho Supreme Court held that Idaho Code section 18-2604(3) is not unconstitutionally overbroad because it prohibits speech integral to criminal conduct, such as suborning perjury, which is not protected by the First Amendment. The court also held that, as applied to Orr, the statute was constitutional because his statements could reasonably be interpreted as attempts to convince S.O. to testify untruthfully. The court affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss. View "State of Idaho v. Orr" on Justia Law

USA v. Ortega-Hernandez

2026-09-01T07:01:04-08:00

In 2011, Oscar Ortega-Hernandez fired multiple rounds from an assault rifle at the White House, causing significant property damage. He believed then-President Obama was the anti-Christ and intended to harm him, but the President and First Lady were not present; two other members of the First Family were inside. No one was injured, but the shots struck areas near Secret Service officers and damaged the Truman Balcony. Ortega-Hernandez fled the scene and was arrested in Pennsylvania after a multi-state search. A federal grand jury indicted Ortega-Hernandez on nineteen counts, including attempting to assassinate the President. In 2013, he pled guilty to two counts: injuring a dwelling or placing lives in jeopardy within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States (18 U.S.C. § 1363), and using a firearm during and in relation to a “crime of violence” (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). The predicate crime for the § 924(c) charge was his § 1363 conviction. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia sentenced him to 25 years in prison. After subsequent Supreme Court decisions invalidated § 924(c)’s residual clause, Ortega-Hernandez moved to vacate his firearm conviction, arguing that § 1363 did not qualify as a crime of violence under the force clause. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed whether Ortega-Hernandez’s § 1363 conviction categorically constitutes a crime of violence under § 924(c)’s force clause. The court held that willfully and maliciously injuring a dwelling necessarily involves the use of physical force against the property of another and that § 1363 targets injury to another’s property, not one’s own. Therefore, Ortega-Hernandez’s conviction under § 924(c) stands, and the district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "USA v. Ortega-Hernandez" on Justia Law

Commonwealth v. Hood

2026-09-01T04:05:38-08:00

The defendant pleaded guilty in 1995 to two counts of second-degree murder and several related charges after confessing to the shooting deaths of Tracy Brown and Celine Kirk in Boston. Evidence included ballistics matching a weapon used in a prior shooting, witness identification, and a confession detailing facts only the perpetrator would know. The plea resulted in two consecutive life sentences with parole eligibility and concurrent sentences for other charges. Prior to this appeal, the defendant filed multiple motions in the Massachusetts Superior Court to withdraw his guilty pleas, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel and issues with discovery. These motions were denied, and the Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed the denials. In 2020, the defendant filed another motion for a new trial, asserting that undisclosed exculpatory evidence and newly discovered evidence from the investigation into Detective John Mulligan's murder, as well as alleged police misconduct and a protective order restricting access to certain materials, undermined the voluntariness of his plea and counsel’s effectiveness. After an evidentiary hearing, the Superior Court judge denied the motion, finding no material prejudice and that the defendant’s decision to plead guilty was rational given the strong evidence against him. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case on direct appellate review. It held that the defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would have rejected the plea offer had he known of the undisclosed or newly discovered evidence, and did not show that rejecting the plea would have been rational. The court found no nexus between alleged police misconduct and the investigation of the defendant’s case, and concluded the confession was voluntary. The order denying the motion to vacate the guilty pleas and for a new trial was affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Hood" on Justia Law

People v. Espinosa

2026-08-31T13:01:27-08:00

A 75-year-old defendant was convicted in 2010 of serious sexual offenses against children and sentenced to a determinate term of 10 years plus a consecutive indeterminate term of 25 years to life in prison. In January 2023, he was released from custody on medical parole due to his permanent inability to perform basic daily activities, and he began residing in a privately owned long-term care facility. Despite statutory requirements, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the Department) continued to fund his care because it failed to apply for federal benefits on his behalf. In November 2024, the Department recommended that the trial court consider compassionate release for the defendant, citing his advanced age and severe medical incapacitation, including dementia and the aftermath of a stroke. The Superior Court of Riverside County considered the Department’s recommendation, overruled the prosecution’s objections to hearsay evidence regarding the defendant’s medical condition, and admitted records from the care facility. The court determined the defendant was medically incapacitated, granted the recall of his sentence, and ordered his release without imposing parole or resentencing him. The prosecution objected, arguing errors in admitting hearsay, allowing remote testimony, failing to resentence, a clerical error in the court’s minute order, and the lack of mandatory parole conditions. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. It held that while the trial court erred in considering certain unreliable hearsay, the error was harmless because sufficient reliable evidence supported the finding of medical incapacitation. The court found no prejudice in permitting remote testimony and affirmed the trial court’s discretion to allow it. However, it determined the trial court was required to resentence the defendant and correct the clerical error in the minute order. The Court of Appeal also held that imposing parole conditions is the responsibility of the parole board, not the trial court. The order was affirmed with directions to resentence and correct the record. View "People v. Espinosa" on Justia Law

USA V. MORGOVSKY

2026-08-31T08:00:30-08:00

The defendant engaged in a long-running scheme to illegally export components for night-vision and thermal-vision rifle scopes, which are classified as “defense articles” under federal law, from California to Russia. He did so without obtaining the required export license from the U.S. State Department and concealed his activities through offshore banking. Over nearly a decade, his illicit exports generated over $9 million in international wire transfers. After federal investigators uncovered the operation, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California charged him with conspiracy to export defense articles without a license under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and its implementing regulations, as well as two counts of money laundering. The defendant pleaded guilty to all three counts without a plea agreement and was sentenced to nine years in prison. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. He claimed his lawyer failed to challenge the validity of the conspiracy regulation under which he was convicted and did not properly inform him about the money-laundering charges. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of this motion de novo. The court held that the AECA authorized the State Department to promulgate regulations criminalizing conspiracies to violate export restrictions, so counsel’s failure to challenge the regulation was not deficient. The factual record also foreclosed the defendant’s claim regarding the money-laundering pleas. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the § 2255 motion and declined to expand the certificate of appealability to include additional claims. View "USA V. MORGOVSKY" on Justia Law

United States v. Smith

2026-08-31T07:30:13-08:00

In May 2023, law enforcement officers in North Dakota responded to a report of gunshots fired into electrical equipment at a substation owned by two power cooperatives. Near the scene, officers searched a car and found a gun case and medication labeled with Cameron Smith’s name. A tow truck employee identified Smith as the driver and indicated he had dropped Smith off at a nearby hotel. Officers located Smith at the hotel, detained him, and obtained surveillance footage showing him with duffel bags later found in a dumpster. The bags contained firearms and ammunition matching shell casings at the substation. Officers obtained warrants to test the bags for DNA and to search Smith’s residence and devices. Smith was charged with destruction of an energy facility in North Dakota and later in South Dakota for a similar incident. The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota denied Smith’s motion to suppress evidence, ruling that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered even absent the challenged searches. Smith then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling. At sentencing, the district court applied a 12-level upward departure under the sentencing guidelines and imposed consecutive sentences totaling 300 months, plus over $2 million in restitution. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of Smith’s motion to suppress, finding that the modified warrant affidavit supported probable cause and that the evidence was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. The court also concluded that Smith’s appeal waiver barred his challenge to the restitution order. However, the appellate court found procedural error in the calculation of the sentencing guideline range, holding that the evidence did not support a finding that Smith’s motive was to intimidate or coerce a civilian population as required for the sentencing departure. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Dziedziach v. Blanche

2026-08-31T06:30:11-08:00

A native and citizen of Poland entered the United States without inspection in 1999 and adjusted to lawful permanent resident status in 2006. Between 2006 and 2008, he participated in a conspiracy to retaliate against employees who had sued his employer for wage violations, including hiring individuals to commit violent acts and intimidation. He pleaded guilty in 2012 to conspiracy to retaliate against witnesses and parties to an official proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b) and (f), and was sentenced to 364 days’ imprisonment. Removal proceedings were initiated by the Department of Homeland Security. Before an Immigration Judge, he argued that his conviction was not for a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) and that the offense was not committed within five years of his admission. The Immigration Judge denied his motion to terminate removal, finding the conviction was categorically a CIMT and met the timing requirement. He sought relief under the Convention Against Torture and a hardship waiver, but was denied by a second Immigration Judge. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal. On a previous petition for review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded for the BIA to reconsider the CIMT determination. The BIA again concluded the conviction was categorically a CIMT. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision. It held that conspiracy to retaliate against witnesses in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b) is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, and that the CIMT ground for removability is not unconstitutionally vague as applied. The court also declined to reconsider arguments already rejected in the earlier petition. The petition for review was denied. View "Dziedziach v. Blanche" on Justia Law

United States v. Seals

2026-08-28T11:31:00-08:00

An individual pleaded guilty to twelve felony counts, including threatening members of Congress and their families and transmitting those threats via interstate communication. The sentencing guidelines recommended a prison term of 33 to 41 months based on the offense level and criminal history. Although the guidelines did not permit probation, the court imposed a five-year probation term, as urged by all parties, with special conditions, including monitored communications and a prohibition on making further threats. Within days, the defendant violated probation by sending another threatening message to a former federal official, prompting the probation office to seek revocation. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado held a revocation hearing, revoked probation, and resentenced the defendant. The court referenced both Chapter 5 and Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines, ultimately imposing a 36-month prison sentence based on the Chapter 5 range. The defendant appealed, arguing that the court erred by not starting with Chapter 7’s recommended range for probation violations. Initially, the appellate panel affirmed the sentence, interpreting prior circuit precedent, United States v. Moore (Moore I), as not requiring the district court to identify an alternative sentence at the original sentencing. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, reviewed whether Moore I’s two-step sentencing process—first considering the underlying offense under Chapter 5 and then the probation violation under Chapter 7—was correct. The court held that after revoking probation, the sentencing court must take Chapter 7’s recommended range as its starting point, and only consider Chapter 5’s range when deciding whether to vary from Chapter 7’s recommendation. Because the district court did not follow this process, the Tenth Circuit reversed the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Seals" on Justia Law

US v. Velez-Ramirez

2026-08-28T11:30:04-08:00

A police officer in Puerto Rico was convicted after accepting a bribe from a woman he had arrested for marijuana possession. The officer promised to help the woman avoid a criminal conviction in exchange for sex. The woman, a young assistant nurse studying to become a full-time nurse, feared that a conviction would jeopardize her career. After her arrest, she met with the officer, who suggested that he could get her case dismissed if she provided sexual favors. She agreed, and they had sex, but the officer did not deliver on his promise. The woman subsequently faced multiple court appearances, hired a private attorney, and ultimately pleaded guilty, incurring various costs and emotional distress. The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico presided over the trial, during which the jury convicted the officer of violating 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B), which prohibits government officials from accepting bribes in connection with business or transactions involving $5,000 or more. The defendant moved for acquittal, arguing that the government failed to prove the value of the "business" or "transaction" exceeded $5,000. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, the defendant challenged both the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the $5,000 threshold and an alleged violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination due to statements by the prosecution during closing argument. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the conviction. The court held that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the value of avoiding a criminal conviction—considering the woman’s career prospects, legal expenses, fines, and her own testimony—exceeded $5,000. The court also found no clear or obvious error in the prosecution’s closing argument regarding the defendant’s decision not to testify. The conviction was affirmed. View "US v. Velez-Ramirez" on Justia Law

McDonald v. US

2026-08-28T11:30:03-08:00

The appellant was convicted in the 1990s for bank and armored car robberies committed with a group that included Anthony Shea. These crimes involved frequent use of firearms, and in one particularly violent incident, two armored car guards were killed execution-style. The convictions included armed bank robbery, carjacking, Hobbs Act robbery and conspiracy, gun possession by a felon or drug user, and aiding and abetting the use of a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The trial judge instructed the jury that several offenses were “crimes of violence” for the gun-use charge, but the verdict form did not specify which predicate offense the jury relied upon. Following his conviction, the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire sentenced him to life imprisonment, applying enhancements under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on prior convictions. After the Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States struck down ACCA’s residual clause, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit allowed the appellant to file a successive habeas petition. The district court subsequently vacated the ACCA-enhanced sentence and imposed a lower term, but declined to grant a full resentencing or to vacate the § 924(c) conviction, reasoning that the jury instruction error was harmless because valid predicate offenses remained. Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the denial of § 2255 relief de novo and for harmless error. It held that the district court's reliance on the harmless-error standard was correct and that the error in instructing on an invalid predicate offense did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict, given the interrelated and coextensive nature of the valid and invalid predicates. The court further held that the appellant was not entitled to a certificate of appealability or to a full resentencing, as no substantial constitutional claim was raised regarding the district court’s choice of remedy. The judgment was affirmed and the request for a certificate of appealability denied. View "McDonald v. US" on Justia Law

United States v. Hoffpowier

2026-08-28T11:00:07-08:00

The case concerns Michael C. Hoffpowier, who was investigated after his estranged wife, B.H., reported to law enforcement that he had scheduled an appointment at her workplace under a false name and had a history of harassing her across multiple states. Officers responding to the scene located Hoffpowier’s vehicle in a nearby parking lot. Upon approaching, they observed behavior they interpreted as a potential flight risk, including the vehicle being put in reverse. Hoffpowier was handcuffed after failing to comply with commands to approach an officer. While detained, officers reviewed text messages between Hoffpowier and B.H. and, with his consent, observed binoculars and a gun magazine in his vehicle. A search of the vehicle revealed firearms and a silencer. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee denied Hoffpowier’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search, concluding that the handcuffing did not constitute an arrest and that there was a reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contained evidence related to stalking. The magistrate judge’s report and recommendation to deny suppression was adopted after Hoffpowier’s objections were overruled, in part because he did not update his arguments in light of the report’s analysis. Hoffpowier subsequently pleaded guilty to possession of an unregistered silencer. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the officers’ use of handcuffs during the investigatory stop was reasonable given the circumstances and did not convert the stop into an arrest. It further held that the presence of binoculars visible in the vehicle provided a reasonable basis to believe that the vehicle contained evidence pertinent to the stalking offense, justifying the warrantless search under the search-incident-to-arrest exception. View "United States v. Hoffpowier" on Justia Law

USA v. Smith

2026-08-28T10:00:54-08:00

Reginald Smith, previously convicted of multiple cocaine-related felonies in Florida state court, was arrested in December 2019 after officers investigating illegal hunting found him holding a loaded shotgun. During a search, officers discovered additional ammunition, a hunting knife, and MDMA pills. An agent determined that Smith’s shotgun had traveled in interstate commerce, having been manufactured outside Florida. Smith, as a result, was indicted for possession of a firearm as a felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and possession of MDMA under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). He pleaded guilty to both counts. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida reviewed Smith’s prior convictions to determine whether they triggered the mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The court considered evolving precedent—including United States v. Conage and United States v. Jackson—regarding whether certain Florida drug crimes qualified as “serious drug offenses” under ACCA. After law developments clarified that Smith’s two 1993 convictions for selling cocaine and his 2001 conviction for trafficking cocaine were ACCA predicates under Eleventh Circuit precedent, the court applied the ACCA enhancement. Smith was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment for the firearm count and 12 months for MDMA possession, to run concurrently. Smith objected to the ACCA enhancement but acknowledged its applicability under current circuit law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Smith’s conviction and sentence. The court held that § 922(g)(1) did not violate the Second Amendment or Commerce Clause, Smith invited any error regarding ACCA classification of his convictions, the district court’s error under Erlinger v. United States did not affect Smith’s substantial rights, and any error in calculating his base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines was harmless. View "USA v. Smith" on Justia Law

United States v. Gladney

2026-08-28T07:30:14-08:00

Federal law enforcement intercepted thousands of phone calls between April and June 2021, some of which involved the defendant discussing marijuana and firearm transactions. In April 2022, following a traffic stop, officers detected a strong marijuana odor and, after a brief struggle, arrested the defendant. A search of his vehicle uncovered firearms, large quantities of marijuana, codeine, and cash. The next day, a Glock switch was found in the patrol car where the defendant had been held. He was initially charged in May 2022 by indictment for offenses relating to this incident and later indicted again with 34 codefendants in a broader drug conspiracy case in November 2022. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment on Speedy Trial Act and Sixth Amendment grounds. The trial jury convicted him on several counts, including conspiracy to distribute marijuana, possession with intent to distribute marijuana, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and use of a communications facility in furtherance of a drug crime. He was acquitted on others, including possession of a machinegun. The district court sentenced him to a total of 150 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed challenges to the indictment’s timeliness, evidentiary rulings admitting certain rap lyrics, and the reasonableness of the sentence. The court held that there was no violation of the Speedy Trial Act or the Sixth Amendment, finding that necessary continuances were justified and adequately explained. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting limited rap lyric evidence, nor did it err in its application of sentencing enhancements or in declining a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The court affirmed the convictions and the sentence imposed by the district court. View "United States v. Gladney" on Justia Law

USA v. Almonte

2026-08-28T07:01:05-08:00

The case concerns Cesar Gomez Almonte, who was convicted for his role in an international drug-smuggling conspiracy. Beginning in 2016, conspirators based in the Dominican Republic transported large quantities of cocaine into the United States using boats with secret compartments. Almonte was responsible for procuring and outfitting these vessels. After U.S. officials became aware of the operation, Almonte was indicted under seal in Washington, D.C., and later arrested during a layover at Miami International Airport. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia oversaw Almonte’s trial, during which a jury found him guilty of conspiracy to import cocaine and sentenced him to 184 months in prison. Almonte raised several constitutional claims on appeal: he argued that the 18-month delay between his indictment and arrest violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, that venue in D.C. was improper under Article III and 18 U.S.C. § 3238, and that the district court’s refusal to grant a new trial after certain jurors expressed concerns about his counsel denied him an impartial jury. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed these claims. The court held that the delay between indictment and arrest did not violate Almonte’s right to a speedy trial, given the government’s good-faith investigative reasons and his failure to show specific prejudice. On venue, the court found that Almonte waived his only meritorious venue argument regarding the Eastern District of Virginia by not raising it when invited, and his other arguments about venue in Florida were either without merit or forfeited. Regarding juror impartiality, the court concluded that the district court handled the matter appropriately through voir dire and did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial or new trial. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA v. Almonte" on Justia Law

State v. Shields

2026-08-28T06:34:15-08:00

In this case, the defendant was convicted in 2019 of two counts of premeditated first-degree murder for the 1988 killings of two victims, after a cold case investigation identified him through DNA and fingerprint evidence. The prosecution’s case relied primarily on DNA and fingerprint matches, as well as eyewitness testimony placing him with the victims near the time of their deaths. The defendant was sentenced to two consecutive life terms. Before sentencing, the defendant filed a petition in the Wyandotte District Court seeking postconviction DNA testing of evidence under K.S.A. 21-2512, which the district court denied, finding he had not alleged that new or more accurate testing techniques were available. The defendant did not appeal this denial. In 2021, he filed a second petition, this time requesting retesting of previously tested items using “touch DNA” methods and testing several additional items. The district court summarily denied this petition as well, concluding he had not shown that touch DNA techniques would yield more accurate or probative results, and that even if retesting were possible, it would not produce noncumulative, exculpatory evidence indicating wrongful conviction. The court’s decision predated the Kansas Supreme Court’s guidance in State v. Angelo. The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the appeal. The court held that the second petition was not barred by res judicata because it raised new claims regarding new testing technology and previously untested items. However, the court affirmed the district court’s denial. It ruled that the defendant failed to sufficiently allege that new DNA testing techniques would likely yield more accurate or probative results for previously tested items. For the newly identified items, the court found that testing could not produce exculpatory evidence relevant to the defendant’s claim of wrongful conviction. The judgment was affirmed. View "State v. Shields " on Justia Law

State v. Banks

2026-08-28T06:34:14-08:00

A woman fired multiple shots at vehicles after being involved in two separate fistfights outside a nightclub in Wichita, Kansas. During the incident, a nineteen-year-old was shot and killed. The shooter claimed self-defense, stating she believed the other group intended to harm her following the altercations. Several witnesses testified regarding the events preceding the shooting, including video evidence and accounts of the physical confrontations and the moments when the shots were fired. The Sedgwick District Court oversaw the trial, where the defendant was convicted by a jury of felony murder, attempted first-degree murder, four counts of aggravated assault, and two counts of criminal discharge of a firearm. The trial court admitted certain hearsay statements under the excited utterance exception and excluded a defense exhibit comparing the defendant’s actions to police use of force in another case. The court also denied requests for jury instructions on imperfect self-defense and lesser included offenses related to the attempted murder charge, finding them legally inappropriate or unrequested. The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the appeal. It held that factual findings supporting the admission of a hearsay statement are reviewed for substantial evidence. The court affirmed that when the underlying felony for felony murder is criminal discharge of a firearm, only pure self-defense—not imperfect self-defense—is available as a defense and must be instructed upon. Imperfect self-defense is not legally appropriate. Additionally, it clarified that, when considering the factual appropriateness of a jury instruction, facts are construed in the light most favorable to the requesting party, even if the instruction was not requested at trial. The court found no reversible error and affirmed the convictions. View "State v. Banks " on Justia Law

State v. Cavitt

2026-08-28T06:34:13-08:00

Three individuals—Shannon Berry Cavitt Jr., Caviontay Conway, and Robert “Nice” White—conspired to rob Dennis Haynes, a known drug dealer in Wichita, Kansas. Cavitt provided information about Haynes and acted as a decoy to facilitate entry into Haynes’ apartment. On the night in question, Cavitt gained access to the apartment, followed closely by Conway and White, who were armed. During the attempted robbery, White shot and killed Haynes. Multiple individuals present in the apartment were confined and threatened during the incident. After the incident, the Sedgwick District Court jury found Cavitt guilty of felony murder based on aggravated robbery, four counts of kidnapping (involving four individuals), and one count of aggravated burglary. However, the jury acquitted him on a separate count of aggravated robbery and a second count of felony murder based on aggravated burglary. Cavitt appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, especially given the jury’s acquittals on some related charges. The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case. It held that sufficiency of the evidence for a felony murder conviction remains the same even if the jury acquits on the underlying felony, as the verdict could be based on an attempt rather than a completed crime. The court also clarified that kidnapping under Kansas law only requires taking or confining by force, threat, or deception with the requisite intent, and expressly overruled State v. Buggs, which had imposed additional requirements for kidnapping associated with another crime. The court found that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, supported all convictions and affirmed the judgment of the Sedgwick District Court. View "State v. Cavitt " on Justia Law

United States v. Amerisource Bergen Corp.

2026-08-28T06:30:03-08:00

The plaintiff, a former Senior Reimbursement Manager at a national pharmacy provider, alleged that her employer engaged in a scheme to overcharge government healthcare programs such as Medicare and Medicaid. She claimed the company exploited billing system discrepancies and other tactics to cause overpayments, including billing for deceased patients and miscoding pharmacy types for higher reimbursements. The company allegedly concealed these overpayments in its internal accounting and, after a period, transferred the unreturned funds into its own revenues. The plaintiff reported these practices to management and internal audit, but the issues persisted. After filing a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, the plaintiff amended her allegations. The District Court dismissed all federal claims with prejudice, finding that the plaintiff did not meet the heightened pleading standards for fraud required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) for “direct” False Claims Act (FCA) claims (those based on submitting fraudulent invoices or statements to the government). The court also denied leave to further amend the complaint, and denied reconsideration. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s direct FCA claims, holding that she did not identify any specific fraudulent submissions to the government, nor adequately allege that such information was solely within the defendants’ control. However, the Second Circuit vacated the dismissal of the “reverse” FCA claim, which is based on knowingly retaining government overpayments. The court found the plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the company had an obligation to return identified overpayments and knowingly concealed or improperly avoided that obligation. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the reverse FCA claim. View "United States v. Amerisource Bergen Corp." on Justia Law

White v. State of Mississippi

2026-08-28T01:23:58-08:00

Police in Jackson, Mississippi, responded to reports of gunshots and hostages at the Rainbow Inn Motel, where they encountered Jermaine White in the lobby with blood on his hands and behaving erratically. Officers found two women, Kiara Poole and Samantha Cannon, dead from multiple gunshot wounds in Room 123. White, who was identified as Poole’s boyfriend, was the only individual seen leaving the room alive according to both eyewitness accounts and surveillance footage. Investigators found significant evidence in the motel room, including a firearm, ammunition magazines, spent shell casings, and cocaine. Autopsies confirmed both victims died from multiple gunshot wounds, with evidence suggesting some shots were fired at close range and while the victims were on the ground. The case was tried in the Hinds County Circuit Court, where White moved for a directed verdict at the close of the State’s case, arguing that the State failed to prove identity, deliberate design, and possession of a firearm. The court denied his motion. The jury found White guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He was sentenced to two life terms and ten years, all to run consecutively. White’s post-trial motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial was denied, and he appealed. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case, applying a de novo standard to the sufficiency of the evidence and an abuse-of-discretion standard to the denial of a new trial. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find deliberate design and affirm the first-degree murder convictions. The court also found no error in the omission of a lesser-included-offense instruction, as White had objected to its inclusion. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the convictions and sentences. View "White v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law

United States v. Forrester

2026-08-27T11:30:19-08:00

Several individuals affiliated with the Clarksville, Tennessee chapter of the Mongols Motorcycle Club were indicted by a federal grand jury on charges including racketeering conspiracy (RICO), murder, kidnapping, drug trafficking, and related crimes. The Mongols, a national motorcycle gang with a history of violence and drug distribution, established a chapter in Clarksville around 2015. The group engaged in violent acts to assert dominance, including two murders: one of a woman believed to have stolen drugs and another of a former member following an internal dispute. They also participated in extensive methamphetamine and prescription pill trafficking, multiple assaults, kidnappings, and other crimes. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee presided over a joint trial of the seven remaining defendants after others pleaded guilty or died. The jury convicted the defendants on various counts, ranging from racketeering and drug conspiracy to violent crimes in aid of racketeering, money laundering, and accessory after the fact. Sentences ranged from approximately 18 years to mandatory life imprisonment, with some consecutive terms. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed numerous arguments, including challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, the use of a semi-anonymous jury, admission of expert and other evidence, and trial delays caused by COVID-19. The court also considered claims regarding jury instructions, denial of severance and mistrial motions, sentencing errors, and substantive unreasonableness of sentences. The Sixth Circuit found no reversible error. It held that sufficient evidence supported all convictions, the jury and trial procedures were within the district court’s discretion, and any instructional or sentencing issues did not warrant reversal or resentencing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions and sentences of all appellants. View "United States v. Forrester" on Justia Law

Stafford v. State

2026-08-27T10:08:21-08:00

A defendant pleaded guilty to attempted battery with substantial bodily harm, an offense that can be classified as either a gross misdemeanor or a felony. In exchange for the guilty plea, the State agreed to recommend the lesser gross misdemeanor classification and a sentence of 225 days in county detention. The plea agreement included a clause stating that if the defendant failed to appear at any subsequent hearing, the State would be released from its promises under the agreement and could argue for any legal sentence. After pleading guilty, the defendant remained in custody but failed to appear at a continued sentencing hearing because he refused transport from jail, for nonmedical reasons. The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County determined that the defendant’s failure to appear constituted a breach of the plea agreement. As a result, the court released the State from its obligations under the agreement, permitting the State to recommend a felony sentence. The State then argued for, and the court imposed, a sentence of 19 to 48 months in prison. The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the case and considered whether a failure-to-appear clause in a guilty plea agreement can be enforced against a defendant who remains in custody. The court held that such a clause cannot be enforced against in-custody defendants because they lack control over their appearance in court, and the State retains the means to produce them for hearings. The court vacated the defendant’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing before a new judge, instructing the State to abide by its original sentencing recommendation. The sentencing judge remains free to determine the appropriate sentence. View "Stafford v. State" on Justia Law

P. v. Hazlett

2026-08-27T09:02:52-08:00

In October 1978, a woman named Tana Woolley was found dead in her apartment in Rosamond, California. She had been strangled with a sock, and her body was partially undressed. Initial investigation yielded no arrests, although DNA and other forensic evidence were collected. Decades later, with advances in DNA technology, semen stains found on Woolley’s bedspread were tested and matched the defendant, who lived in the same apartment complex at the time. The defendant denied knowing Woolley or ever being in her apartment. Further investigation revealed he had previously committed multiple sexual assaults, and evidence of these prior offenses was admitted at trial. The case was first tried in the Kern County Superior Court. The jury convicted the defendant of first degree murder and found true two special circumstances: that the murder was committed during the commission or attempted commission of rape and burglary, both requiring a finding of willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder under the then-applicable 1977 death penalty law. At the penalty phase, the jury returned a verdict of death, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. The defense raised several issues, including challenges to jury selection, the admission of prior sexual offenses, and various constitutional and evidentiary claims. The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case on automatic appeal. It addressed whether the defendant established a prima facie case of racial discrimination in jury selection, the admissibility and instructions regarding other sexual offenses, the sufficiency of the evidence for the murder and special circumstance findings, and challenges under the California Racial Justice Act. The court held that the defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in jury selection, that the evidence and instructions regarding prior sexual offenses were properly admitted, and that sufficient evidence supported the convictions and special circumstance findings. It further determined that no prejudicial error occurred under the Racial Justice Act. The court affirmed the judgment of death. View "P. v. Hazlett" on Justia Law

United States v. Valdez

2026-08-27T08:31:28-08:00

The case involves a defendant who was observed in a high-crime area of Albuquerque, New Mexico, acting suspiciously by loitering near a house, retrieving a duffel bag he had left overnight, and peering into the window of a car for sale. After the homeowner reported his behavior to the police, deputies responding to the call found the defendant matching the caller’s description. During their interaction, the defendant acted nervously, repeatedly reached into his duffel bag, and did not comply with officers’ commands. The deputies conducted a pat-down, discovering a pistol, a magazine, and cash on his person. After running his information, they learned of outstanding felony warrants, arrested him, and searched the duffel bag, uncovering methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. In the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence from his person and the duffel bag, arguing the stop, frisk, and search were unlawful. Initially, the district court indicated the stop and frisk were lawful but suppressed the contents of the duffel bag, finding no valid inventory search or basis for inevitable discovery. After the government submitted additional evidence regarding inventory procedures, the district court reconsidered and denied the motion to suppress, holding that the items would have been inevitably discovered during a lawful inventory search prior to booking. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court concluded that the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion given the defendant's suspicious behavior in a high-crime area. The court further held that, even if the frisk or bag search had been unlawful, the items would have been inevitably discovered either during a search incident to arrest or a proper inventory search. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress, upholding the convictions. View "United States v. Valdez" on Justia Law

United States v. Parrott

2026-08-27T07:30:17-08:00

The case involves a defendant who was indicted for participating in a drug conspiracy involving methamphetamine and marijuana. Three witnesses testified that they purchased or sold methamphetamine with the defendant at his residence, and that he was involved in distributing significant quantities of narcotics. Text messages and other evidence corroborated these accounts. Law enforcement also established connections between the defendant and his alleged drug suppliers, including evidence from a GPS tracker and observations of meetings. Additional evidence showed that the defendant possessed firearms in the same location where he stored and distributed drugs. A jury in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska found the defendant guilty of conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. At sentencing, the district court found the defendant responsible for over 11,000 grams of methamphetamine, applied enhancements for firearm possession and for maintaining a premises for drug distribution, and imposed a 300-month sentence after varying downward from the advisory guideline range. The defendant challenged multiple aspects of his trial and sentencing, including evidentiary rulings, the admission of expert and co-conspirator testimony, denial of motions in limine, and sentencing enhancements. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion or commit clear error in its evidentiary rulings, the admission of expert and co-conspirator testimony, or the application of sentencing enhancements. The court also found that the evidence was sufficient for the jury’s verdict and that any trial errors were either nonexistent or harmless. The sentence imposed was found to be substantively reasonable. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Parrott" on Justia Law

USA v. Musselman

2026-08-27T07:30:08-08:00

Carrie Musselman, a chiropractor in Illinois, expanded her practice to include non-chiropractic medical services and subsequently engaged in fraudulent billing practices targeting Medicare. She directed staff to bill services performed by nurse practitioners and physician assistants under physicians’ names, circumventing Medicare’s “Incident To” requirements, which resulted in higher reimbursements. Additionally, she billed a non-surgically implanted pain-relief device using a code for surgically implanted devices and billed sublingual allergy drops under a code intended for injectable allergy treatments. Despite repeated internal and external warnings about these improper practices, Musselman persisted, primarily seeking advice from sources with vested financial interests. A federal grand jury indicted Musselman on charges of healthcare fraud, wire fraud, and obstruction of a federal audit. Following a 13-day trial in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, a jury found her guilty of healthcare fraud and five counts of wire fraud, acquitting her on other charges. Post-verdict, the district court discovered that the jury foreperson had created a deliberation guide based on online articles, which included references to non-unanimous verdicts. Musselman moved for a new trial on this basis and challenged the court’s use of an “ostrich” instruction regarding deliberate ignorance. The district court denied both motions, reasoning that the outside research was harmless and the ostrich instruction was justified by the evidence. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court properly found no reasonable possibility that the jury’s verdict was affected by the foreperson’s outside research and that Musselman had waived a further evidentiary hearing. The appellate court also concluded that the evidence supported the ostrich instruction, given Musselman’s repeated disregard of obvious red flags and her heightened duty to inquire about her practice’s billing practices. View "USA v. Musselman" on Justia Law

State of Maine v. Welsh

2026-08-27T07:06:31-08:00

James Welsh resided in a Bangor apartment building in which multiple tenants accessed their residences through a shared hallway. On January 20, 2024, Welsh’s neighbor saw him standing naked in the shared hallway outside her apartment. Disturbed by the incident, she contacted the police. When a responding officer arrived, he observed Welsh naked inside his own apartment, with the door to the hallway open. Welsh was given a summons for indecent conduct, and it was established that he had two prior convictions for the same offense. The case proceeded to a bench trial in the Penobscot County Unified Criminal Docket, where the prosecution presented testimony from the neighbor and the police officer, as well as documentary evidence of Welsh’s prior convictions. Welsh argued that the State failed to prove that his conduct occurred in a “public place,” as required by the Maine indecent conduct statute. The trial court denied Welsh’s motion for acquittal, reasoning that the shared hallway was a public place. However, at the conclusion of the trial, the court based its finding of guilt not on Welsh’s conduct in the hallway, but on his exposure while standing naked inside his apartment with the door open, specifically during the interaction with the police officer. Upon review, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court determined that the trial court erred in treating Welsh’s apartment as a public place under the statute. The Law Court clarified that a “public place” for the purposes of Maine’s indecent conduct statute includes shared hallways accessible to others, but not an individual’s private apartment. Although there was evidence Welsh was naked in the public hallway, the trial court had not made findings on that basis. The Law Court vacated Welsh’s conviction and remanded the case for the trial court to make appropriate findings regarding his conduct in the shared hallway and to apply the correct statutory interpretation. View "State of Maine v. Welsh" on Justia Law

Quarles v. United States

2026-08-27T06:31:38-08:00

Police officers observed an African-American man walking past their parked cruiser and believed they saw the imprint of a handgun magazine under his clothing at his waistband. The officer, with extensive firearms experience, was not certain whether the object could have been a wallet or a bag. The officers followed the man after he left a restaurant, calling out to him. When he did not respond and instead ran, the officers chased and tackled him, recovering a handgun from his hip. The officers were not responding to any report of crime and had no prior information about the man. They did not know whether he was lawfully carrying the firearm. After a hearing, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the firearm, finding that the officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal conduct based on the officer’s testimony and the defendant’s flight, which was interpreted as consciousness of guilt. The defendant was subsequently convicted of several weapon offenses. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court’s factual findings for clear error and considered de novo whether reasonable, articulable suspicion existed. The appellate court held that, in light of recent constitutional and statutory developments, mere possession of a handgun, without more, does not provide reasonable, articulable suspicion for a stop in the District of Columbia. The court also found that the circumstances of the defendant’s flight did not significantly increase suspicion, given the context of the police approach. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the appellate court concluded that the officers lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion and that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment. The court vacated the convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Quarles v. United States" on Justia Law

Brooks v. United States

2026-08-27T06:31:37-08:00

Late at night, Luis Garcia was assaulted by two men in Adams Morgan after purchasing cigarettes at a 7-Eleven. The assailants punched, kicked, and tased Garcia, taking cash and cigarettes from his pockets. Surveillance footage showed the attackers arriving and leaving in a blue Ford Fusion with duct tape on the driver’s side mirror. Garcia and another witness, Salvador Leyva, could not identify the attackers beyond noting their dark clothing. The police later stopped Charles Brooks driving the same car, and GPS data placed him at the scene during the relevant time. Brooks was interviewed and denied involvement, claiming he was picking up food orders nearby. No taser was recovered during police stops. Brooks was charged in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia with robbery while armed, assault with a dangerous weapon, and possession of a prohibited weapon (PPW). At trial, the jury acquitted him of robbery while armed but convicted him of the lesser-included offense of simple assault, assault with a dangerous weapon, and PPW. Brooks appealed his PPW conviction, arguing there was insufficient evidence to prove he possessed the taser or aided and abetted his accomplice’s possession of it. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. The court found no evidence from which a rational jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Brooks was the assailant who possessed the taser or that he aided and abetted his accomplice’s possession. The evidence left equal possibility that Brooks was the unarmed accomplice. The court reversed Brooks’s PPW conviction and remanded with instructions to vacate his simple assault conviction, as it merged with the assault with a dangerous weapon conviction, while affirming the latter. View "Brooks v. United States" on Justia Law

Thomas v. United States

2026-08-27T06:02:28-08:00

A woman left a 7-Eleven carrying cash in her back pocket and was followed by a man, James Thomas, who had been watching her. After she walked away from the store, Thomas pursued her across the street, approached her from behind, and reached into her back pocket. According to the woman, Thomas grabbed both her buttocks and the money from her pocket before walking away. Thomas was later arrested, and a search revealed that he also possessed PCP. The woman consistently described the incident as a robbery, stating that Thomas’s touch was not otherwise inappropriate. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia presided over Thomas’s jury trial. The jury acquitted Thomas of robbery but found him guilty of misdemeanor sexual abuse and unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Thomas appealed his conviction for misdemeanor sexual abuse, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to show he acted with the intent required for that charge—namely, the intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify sexual desire. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and determined that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Thomas acted with the requisite intent for misdemeanor sexual abuse. The court found that while Thomas did grab the woman’s buttocks while taking the money, there was no evidence his actions were motivated by sexual intent rather than a desire to steal. The evidence was at best in equipoise regarding whether Thomas acted with a nonsexual or sexual intent. The main holding by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals was to reverse Thomas’s conviction for misdemeanor sexual abuse. View "Thomas v. United States" on Justia Law

Wallace & Layne v. United States

2026-08-27T06:02:28-08:00

During a traffic stop in Washington, D.C., police officers pulled over a BMW for equipment violations. Elliott Wallace was driving, Jowan Plummer was in the front passenger seat, and Antoine Layne was in the back. Officers observed suspicious movements by Plummer and Layne, leading them to search the vehicle and its occupants. Police found an open liquor bottle, a firearm under a seat, and various drugs and cash on both Wallace and Layne. Both were charged with multiple drug and firearm offenses. The case proceeded to trial in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. The government presented expert testimony from an MPD narcotics officer, who had general experience with narcotics and some recent exposure to N,N-dimethylpentylone (“boot”). Over defense objections, the court allowed this expert testimony. The jury convicted Wallace and Layne of the charged offenses. Wallace was found guilty of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and related charges; Layne was convicted of possession with intent to distribute N,N-dimethylpentylone while armed, as well as several firearm offenses. On appeal, Wallace and Layne argued that the trial court erred in admitting the government’s expert testimony regarding “boot,” that the evidence was insufficient to support Wallace’s conviction for possession with intent to distribute, and that the trial judge improperly questioned witnesses, affecting Layne’s right to an impartial trial. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed these claims. Applying the appropriate standards of review, the court held that the trial judge did not abuse discretion in admitting the expert testimony, that the judge’s witness questioning was neither improper nor prejudicial under plain-error review, and that there was sufficient evidence to support Wallace’s conviction. The court affirmed the convictions on all counts. View "Wallace & Layne v. United States" on Justia Law

Walker v. United States

2026-08-27T06:02:27-08:00

Early one morning, a man entered Trojan Labor, a temporary employment agency, armed with a handgun and dressed in a distinctive tracksuit, mask, and glove. He shot two individuals, killing one and wounding another, then fled westbound on Hamlin Street. Surveillance footage captured the shooter discarding items in a recycling bin, where police later found clothing matching the shooter’s outfit, a mask, and a note with Matthew Isiah Walker’s phone number. DNA analysis linked Walker to the recovered items and a pistol found nearby three days later, which was strongly associated with the casings found at the crime scene. Walker lived and frequented the area surrounding Trojan Labor. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia conducted a bench trial and found Walker guilty of first-degree murder while armed and related offenses. The court considered collective evidence, including Walker’s proximity to the scene, the physical and forensic connections to the shooter’s clothing and weapon, and the note bearing Walker’s phone number. The court’s verdict did not depend on the firearms expert’s testimony about ballistic matching. The trial court convicted Walker beyond a reasonable doubt based on the totality of the evidence. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Walker’s convictions, rejecting his arguments regarding the mixed-source DNA profiles, the possibility of being set up, and the absence of motive. The court affirmed the trial court’s factual findings as supported by the record and concluded that motive evidence was not required. However, the court granted an unopposed motion to vacate Walker’s conviction for possession of a large-capacity ammunition feeding device, finding no need for resentencing due to concurrent sentences. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects, with a remand for entry of a new judgment. View "Walker v. United States" on Justia Law

USA v. Palencia-Berrum

2026-08-26T15:30:08-08:00

The defendant pled guilty to a single count of illegal reentry after removal from the United States. His presentence report detailed a criminal history that included prior convictions for driving under the influence, obstruction of justice, unlawful possession or consumption of alcohol by a minor, domestic battery, drug trafficking, and a previous illegal reentry. After being deported for his earlier illegal reentry, the defendant returned to the United States, purportedly to assist his wife, who was recovering from a significant injury and mental health issues. About ten months after his return, he was arrested for assaulting his wife, but the charges were later dismissed. The presentence report indicated the incident involved the defendant throwing water bottles at his wife, causing minor injuries, but made no mention of direct physical contact or biting. The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas conducted a brief sentencing hearing, during which it adopted the presentence report but made several factual errors. The court incorrectly referenced a 2020 illegal reentry conviction that did not exist and mistakenly asserted that the defendant had bitten his wife during the alleged assault. The district court treated these purported facts as aggravating factors and sentenced the defendant to 46 months, at the top of the Guidelines range, without stating whether the same sentence would have been imposed absent these errors. No contemporaneous objections were raised by the parties. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case under the plain error standard. The court found that the district court relied on clearly erroneous facts, that the errors were clear under established law, and that they affected the defendant’s substantial rights by likely increasing his sentence. The Fifth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding that sentencing based on unfounded facts violates due process and undermines the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings. View "USA v. Palencia-Berrum" on Justia Law

State v. Sellers

2026-08-26T10:33:00-08:00

The case involved the fatal shooting of a victim in Stamford, Connecticut. Following the incident, police investigation placed the defendant near the crime scene through surveillance footage. A search of the defendant’s home yielded clothing matching what he was seen wearing on the night of the murder. Although no firearm was recovered, the state tested the clothing for primer gunshot residue (pGSR). At trial, a forensic science examiner testified that particles “commonly associated with” pGSR were found on the clothing, and her report was admitted into evidence. Other evidence included cell phone records and witness testimony placing the defendant near the scene but did not directly tie him to possessing a firearm. Prior to trial in the Superior Court for the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, the defendant moved to preclude the pGSR evidence and requested a hearing under State v. Porter to determine the reliability of the scientific methodology behind the pGSR analysis. The trial court denied the request, ruling that pGSR analysis was a well-established area of forensic science and therefore did not require a Porter hearing. The defendant was convicted by a jury of murder, and he appealed directly to the Connecticut Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to conduct a Porter hearing solely because it viewed pGSR analysis as well established, without considering new evidence and advancements in the field that could affect its reliability. The Court emphasized that trial judges must exercise their gatekeeping function by considering whether new scientific developments cast doubt on previously accepted methodologies. Finding that this error was harmful—since the pGSR evidence was central to the state’s case and could have influenced the verdict—the Supreme Court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial. View "State v. Sellers" on Justia Law

State v. Toste

2026-08-26T10:33:00-08:00

The defendant was convicted of murder following a retrial in 1981 and sentenced to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life, with a mandatory minimum of 25 years. The underlying facts involved the killing of a friend’s mother during a burglary and a subsequent fatal car crash. The defendant’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal and collateral review. While incarcerated, the defendant applied for parole in 2013 and 2019, and for a commutation of his sentence in 2021; all applications were denied. He then filed a motion for sentence modification, citing his intellectual disability, youth at the time of the offense, remorse, age, physical incapacity, and low risk of recidivism as grounds for good cause. The trial court denied the motion, finding the defendant had not established good cause. On appeal, the Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that it was proper to consider the Board of Pardons and Paroles’ prior denials of parole and commutation as part of the sentence modification inquiry. The Appellate Court also noted that the trial court had considered other relevant factors, such as the seriousness of the offense, the impact on the victims, and the defendant’s disciplinary record while incarcerated. The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case on certification. It held that a trial court may consider prior decisions of the Board of Pardons and Paroles in ruling on a motion for sentence modification, as such information falls within the broad scope of relevant sentencing information. The Court found no abuse of discretion or due process violation, as the trial court’s reliance on the board’s denials was not impermissibly speculative and was only one factor among several considered. The judgment of the Appellate Court was affirmed. View "State v. Toste" on Justia Law

State v. Amasiu

2026-08-26T10:15:02-08:00

A man was accused of intentionally or knowingly causing serious bodily injury to his infant son in November 2014. Five days before the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations for first-degree assault, the State filed a felony information in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, charging him with the offense. About a month later, the State filed a second felony information for the same offense in the Family Court of the Second Circuit. After filing the second information, the State moved to dismiss the first one, which the Circuit Court granted. The defendant was served with an arrest warrant issued in connection with the second information. Trial in Family Court was scheduled and continued several times over the next three years. The defendant moved to dismiss the second information in Family Court, arguing that the statute of limitations was not tolled by the first information because the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction and he was not served with the first arrest warrant. The Family Court denied his motion but allowed an interlocutory appeal. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed, concluding that the prosecution commenced when the first information was filed and that the statute of limitations was tolled. On review, the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i held that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction when the first information was filed and was authorized to make the probable cause determination. The Court clarified that prosecution by information commences, for statute of limitations purposes, when the applicable court makes a finding of probable cause, not merely upon filing the information. The Court further held that a district court judge was properly authorized to make the probable cause determination under a standing order by the chief justice. The Court affirmed the ICA’s judgment, which upheld the Family Court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The case was remanded to the Family Court for further proceedings. View "State v. Amasiu" on Justia Law

USA v. Mitchell

2026-08-26T09:30:09-08:00

Officers responding to a reported burglary encountered Maurice Mitchell near a storage facility, leading to his flight, capture, and discovery of a loaded revolver in a bag on his bicycle. Mitchell has a history of felony convictions, including drug possession and attempting to disarm a peace officer, the latter involving an attempt to grab pepper spray from an officer during an arrest. Based on the January 2023 incident, Mitchell was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana denied Mitchell’s pretrial motions to dismiss the indictment, which asserted Second Amendment protections against prosecution. The court focused on Mitchell’s drug convictions as predicates, not addressing the attempted disarmament conviction. At trial, the court issued a flight instruction over Mitchell’s objection, directing the jury to consider his flight as evidence of consciousness of guilt. The jury ultimately returned a guilty verdict, and Mitchell was sentenced to prison and supervised release. He timely appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Mitchell’s Second Amendment challenge de novo. The court held that Mitchell’s conviction for attempting to disarm a police officer is analogous to robbery, historically a crime for which individuals could be disarmed under firearm regulations. Thus, the application of § 922(g)(1) to Mitchell was constitutional. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the flight instruction, and the evidence was sufficient to support Mitchell’s conviction under the stringent “manifest miscarriage of justice” standard. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

USA v. McIver

2026-08-26T09:00:04-08:00

A member of Congress from New Jersey was charged with three counts of violating federal law after allegedly physically interfering with federal officials during an oversight visit to a federal immigration detention facility in Newark. During the visit, the Congresswoman and other Representatives encountered Newark’s Mayor, who was ordered to leave the premises by federal agents. When federal agents attempted to arrest the Mayor, the Congresswoman allegedly placed herself between the Mayor and an agent, forcibly made contact with the agent, and later pushed past another federal officer to reenter the facility. The charges stem from these physical altercations and the Congresswoman’s efforts to impede the Mayor’s arrest. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied the Congresswoman’s motions to dismiss the indictment. The court found that her conduct was not protected by legislative immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause, concluding it was non-legislative in nature. The court also rejected her arguments based on the separation of powers doctrine, distinguishing between Presidential and legislative immunities. Additionally, the court ruled against her selective and vindictive prosecution claims, finding she failed to demonstrate discriminatory effect or personal animus by the prosecution. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s decisions. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of legislative immunity for Counts One and Two, holding that prosecution of those charges would not require the Congresswoman to answer for any legislative acts. The court vacated and remanded with respect to Count Three for further consideration as to whether legislative immunity might apply. The court dismissed the remainder of her appeal, including claims of selective and vindictive prosecution, for lack of jurisdiction. View "USA v. McIver" on Justia Law

State v. Fontanez

2026-08-26T05:30:40-08:00

The case concerns a defendant who was indicted in five separate cases in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, for a series of offenses including felonious assault, aggravated robbery, theft, and failure to comply with police. The alleged conduct included assaulting individuals with a vehicle and a baseball bat, shooting at a car, stealing property, and leading police on a high-speed chase. The defendant ultimately entered into a plea agreement with the prosecution, reducing the number and severity of charges in exchange for pleading guilty to nine offenses. During the plea colloquy, the trial court reviewed the charges, the plea agreement, and the defendant's rights, but did not explicitly state that a guilty plea was a complete admission of guilt. After sentencing, the defendant sought to withdraw his plea, expressing disagreement with some victims’ characterizations of the events, but did not assert actual innocence. The Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas denied the motion and imposed a ten-year sentence. On appeal, the Eighth District Court of Appeals found that, considering the common understanding of “guilty” and the context of the plea colloquy, the defendant understood the effect of his plea. The court held that the trial court’s failure to explicitly state that a guilty plea is a complete admission of guilt did not render the plea invalid, especially where the defendant did not claim actual innocence. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Eighth District’s decision. The main holding is that, absent an assertion of actual innocence, a trial court does not completely fail to comply with Ohio Criminal Rule 11(C)(2) merely by omitting an explicit statement that a guilty plea constitutes a complete admission of guilt, provided the plea colloquy otherwise demonstrates the defendant’s understanding. The court also reaffirmed that State v. Griggs remains good law within the clarified framework of State v. Dangler. View "State v. Fontanez" on Justia Law

USA v. Luna

2026-08-25T15:30:05-08:00

Raymond Luna was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The only felony conviction supporting this indictment was Luna’s prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance. The district court found that applying § 922(g)(1) to Luna violated the Second Amendment as applied to him and dismissed the indictment. After the dismissal, the Government moved for reconsideration, providing new evidence from Luna’s prior conviction that suggested he was involved in drug trafficking, rather than mere possession. The district court denied the motion for reconsideration, reasoning that the Government could have, but did not, present this evidence earlier. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion, as the district court declined to consider the new evidence presented by the Government after the original dismissal. The Fifth Circuit observed that the Government did not argue in its opening appellate brief that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to consider the late-submitted evidence, thereby forfeiting that argument. The appellate court further declined to revisit the district court’s ruling based on the late-submitted evidence. The Fifth Circuit held that, with only the fact of Luna’s conviction for simple possession before it, binding precedent established that such a conviction cannot support a § 922(g)(1) prosecution post-Hembree. The court also rejected the Government’s alternative arguments, including the assertion that historical regulations on illicit marketplaces justified disarmament, and found that Luna’s indictment status for a separate firearm offense was irrelevant under circuit precedent. As a result, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the indictment. View "USA v. Luna" on Justia Law

State v. Mitchell

2026-08-25T15:11:35-08:00

The defendant was charged with multiple counts of Sexual Intercourse Without Consent (SIWOC) and Sexual Assault involving two underaged victims. One victim reported ongoing abuse from age six to thirteen, and a second reported being assaulted by the defendant while intoxicated at his residence. After charges were filed, the defendant was released on bail. The court later severed the charges, and a plea agreement was reached: the defendant pled guilty to one SIWOC count involving the second victim in exchange for dismissal of the other charges. He was sentenced to twenty years with the Montana Department of Corrections (DOC), with fifteen years suspended and five years to be served under community supervision. Following his release to community supervision, the defendant was arrested on new SIWOC charges involving another underage victim. His parole officer filed a violation report, and a petition to revoke his suspended sentence was filed. Throughout 2021 and 2022, the defendant was intermittently detained and released on bond related to the new charges and revocation proceedings. At the revocation hearing, the Fifth Judicial District Court found he had violated the conditions of his community supervision and revoked the suspended sentence, imposing a new fifteen-year DOC sentence with no time suspended. The court awarded the defendant thirty-four days of credit for time served but declined to credit an additional 112 days, stating that period had already been applied to the earlier five-year sentence. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court erred in calculating credit for time served. The Court held that the defendant was entitled to credit for the 112 days only toward the initial five-year sentence, not the revoked fifteen-year sentence. The Court affirmed the District Court’s judgment, concluding the thirty-four days of credit awarded was appropriate and that the defendant was not entitled to additional credit on the revocation sentence. View "State v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

State v. Garding

2026-08-25T15:11:29-08:00

The appellant was convicted by a jury in 2011 of vehicular homicide while under the influence, failure to stop immediately at an accident scene involving an injured person, and driving without a valid driver’s license, and received a forty-year prison sentence. Over the years, she challenged her conviction through direct appeal and postconviction relief in the Montana Supreme Court, raising issues such as the limitation of cross-examination, undisclosed witnesses, ineffective assistance of counsel, and alleged Brady violations. Each of her challenges was rejected by the Montana Supreme Court, which found no reversible error or constitutional violation. After exhausting state remedies, the appellant petitioned for federal habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the District of Montana, which partially granted relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The federal district court ordered the State to either retry the appellant or release her. In response, the State reinstated criminal proceedings in the state District Court, and the appellant filed a motion to substitute the presiding judge. However, while those state proceedings were pending, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the federal district court’s grant of habeas relief, upholding the Montana Supreme Court’s findings and nullifying the order that had set aside the conviction. Following the Ninth Circuit’s reversal, the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, reinstated the appellant’s convictions and custody. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the appellant was not entitled to judicial substitution because no new criminal action or proceeding had commenced following the federal habeas reversal. The Court affirmed the District Court’s reinstatement of the convictions, concluding that the statutory requirements for judicial substitution had not been triggered. View "State v. Garding" on Justia Law

State v Hatfield

2026-08-25T14:38:25-08:00

A 37-year-old paraplegic man communicated online with someone he believed to be a 12-year-old girl, soliciting nude images and arranging a meeting for sexual activity. He sent sexual images and videos and admitted to prior sexual contact with minors. Law enforcement arrested him at a planned meeting. During investigation, he admitted his intentions and possession of child sexual abuse material, including images of young children. Authorities found child pornography and bestiality images on his phone. He was charged with two counts of sexual abuse of children under 12 and one count of possession of child sexual abuse material. He entered a plea agreement, resulting in dismissal of one count and amendment of the other, with a recommended sentence of 30 years and a concurrent 10-year term. The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, held a sentencing hearing, considering mitigating and aggravating factors such as his health, military service, lack of remorse toward victims, and risk of re-offending. The court sentenced him according to the plea agreement and included recommendations from presentence reports in the written judgment. The court labeled his offenses as "crimes of violence" and included statements regarding his criminal history and imposed various fees and surcharges. The defendant filed a motion to amend the judgment, arguing that certain statements were factually incorrect and that the financial obligations were improperly imposed, but the District Court denied the motion. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The Court held that the District Court erred in labeling the offenses as "crimes of violence" and making certain factually erroneous statements, as well as in including recommendations for financial obligations that did not conform to the oral pronouncement of sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment but remanded with instructions to strike the erroneous statements and financial recommendations from the written judgment. View "State v Hatfield" on Justia Law

United States v. Phillips

2026-08-25T13:00:54-08:00

The case concerns a fatal shooting that occurred after an altercation in a bar, where the defendant, after being physically attacked and ejected by several patrons, retrieved a firearm from his vehicle and fired into the bar, killing a patron. There was evidence presented that the defendant suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and possibly a traumatic brain injury as a result of the fight, which could have affected his mental state and perception of danger at the time of the shooting. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma presided over the original trial, where the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder in Indian Country and using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. The district court instructed the jury on imperfect self-defense but did not inform them that the government bore the burden to disprove this defense beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also instructed on diminished capacity, stating it was not a defense to second-degree murder or manslaughter. The defendant raised several challenges on appeal, including errors in jury instructions and prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. The district court also addressed multiplicitous charges under 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 924(j), dismissing the greater-included offense. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that the district court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury that the government must disprove imperfect self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt as to first-degree murder. This error affected the defendant's substantial rights and seriously impacted the fairness of the proceedings, necessitating reversal of the first-degree murder conviction. The Tenth Circuit rejected the defendant’s other challenges, including those related to diminished capacity instructions and prosecutorial statements. The court affirmed the district court’s choice to dismiss the greater-included firearm offense and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "United States v. Phillips" on Justia Law

USA v Anderegg

2026-08-25T12:00:11-08:00

The defendant was charged with producing, distributing, and possessing AI-generated images that depicted minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, as well as transferring such material to a minor. The images were alleged to be created using Stable Diffusion, a text-to-image generative AI program, and did not involve real children. Law enforcement linked the defendant to these images after a report by Meta Platforms, which found the material sent to a minor on Instagram. A search of the defendant’s devices revealed hundreds of similar AI-generated images. In the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, the defendant moved to dismiss the count charging him with knowing possession of obscene virtual child sexual abuse material (CSAM) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(b)(1). The district court granted the motion as to the possession charge, concluding that the statute was unconstitutional as applied in this context. The court reasoned that, under Stanley v. Georgia, individuals have a First Amendment right to possess obscenity in their homes, and that this right extends to virtual CSAM, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, which distinguished virtual CSAM from material involving actual children. The court left the production and distribution charges intact. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Seventh Circuit held that Supreme Court precedent—specifically Stanley v. Georgia and Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition—controls the as-applied challenge. The court found that, because the images did not depict real children, the government’s justifications for banning their possession in the home had been expressly rejected by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(b)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to the defendant’s in-home possession of obscene virtual CSAM. View "USA v Anderegg" on Justia Law

United States v. Barker

2026-08-25T10:31:45-08:00

In this case, the defendant was indicted for murder and related firearm offenses arising from the death of an individual in Indian Country. A key witness, William Lozer, had previously testified at a state preliminary hearing that the defendant confessed to and described details of the crime. Prior to the defendant's federal trial, the government was unable to locate Lozer, who was known to be transient and had not been seen or contacted by his family or attorney for months. The government sought to introduce Lozer's prior testimony, which had been given under oath and subject to cross-examination by defense counsel. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma considered whether the government had made sufficient efforts to locate Lozer and ultimately found that, despite reasonable and good-faith efforts, Lozer was unavailable as a witness. As a result, the court permitted the prior testimony to be read to the jury. At trial, additional evidence against the defendant was introduced, including incriminating statements to other individuals and physical evidence. The defendant was convicted on all counts, and the district court sentenced him to life in prison. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the defendant’s argument that his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was violated by the admission of Lozer’s prior testimony. Applying a de novo standard of review, the Tenth Circuit held that the government’s efforts to locate Lozer were reasonable and made in good faith under the circumstances. Thus, Lozer was properly deemed unavailable, and the admission of his prior, cross-examined testimony did not violate the defendant’s confrontation rights. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the defendant’s convictions. View "United States v. Barker" on Justia Law

US v. Smith

2026-08-25T10:30:48-08:00

After police responded to a theft report at a convenience store in Chesterfield County, Virginia, Markel Trevon Smith and another individual were detained. A search of their vehicle revealed four firearms, including a Glock pistol equipped with a device converting it into a machinegun. This Glock bore three serial numbers: two had been scratched, leaving only partial digits visible, while one serial number remained fully legible. The firearm was traced using the unaltered serial number. Smith was indicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia for possession of a machinegun in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). He moved to dismiss, arguing that § 922(o) violated the Second Amendment, but the district court denied the motion. Smith then pled guilty. At sentencing, the court adopted the Presentence Report’s recommendation to apply a four-level enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B)(i), which increases the offense level if any firearm has a serial number modified so that the original information is illegible or unrecognizable to the unaided eye. The district court reasoned that altering any serial number on the firearm warranted the enhancement, and sentenced Smith to 57 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Smith’s conviction, holding that § 922(o) does not violate the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to Smith, because machineguns are not in common use for lawful purposes. However, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court erred in applying the serial number enhancement. The court held that the enhancement only applies where modifications render the firearm as a whole untraceable, which was not the case since one serial number remained fully legible. The appellate court therefore reversed the application of the enhancement, vacated Smith’s sentence, and remanded for resentencing without the enhancement. View "US v. Smith" on Justia Law

USA v. Figueroa

2026-08-25T09:00:05-08:00

On June 6, 2014, the defendant armed himself and traveled from New York to Pennsylvania, where he attacked his ex-girlfriend (Victim 1), forcibly abducted her, and then drove her across state lines to New Jersey. During this ordeal, he threatened and physically assaulted her, then sexually assaulted her at a rest stop. After Victim 1 managed to escape, the defendant assaulted a National Park Service maintenance worker (Victim 2) and stole his vehicle, then proceeded to commit arson at a business owned by his former partners. He was apprehended after a police chase in New York. A grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey initially indicted the defendant on six counts, including kidnapping, aggravated sexual abuse, firearm offenses, assault of a federal employee, and arson. Over nearly eight years, the case was continued multiple times due to plea negotiations, questions of competency, and the defendant’s own motions and changes in counsel. The defendant entered into a plea agreement, pled guilty to several charges, and waived certain statute of limitations defenses, but later moved to withdraw his plea, claiming innocence and coercion. The District Court accepted the withdrawal. The government subsequently filed superseding indictments, and the defendant continued to challenge the timeliness of certain charges and raised speedy trial concerns, but the District Court denied these motions. At trial, the defendant pled guilty to two counts and was found guilty on the remaining charges by a jury. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed several claims, including whether the statute of limitations waiver in the earlier plea agreement remained enforceable after the plea was withdrawn, whether the District Court erred in its jury instructions regarding the elements of kidnapping and the status of the assaulted federal employee, and whether the lengthy pretrial delay violated the defendant’s speedy trial rights. The Third Circuit held that the statute of limitations waiver survived the plea withdrawal due to the language of the agreement, and that the guilty plea to one count barred a statute of limitations challenge to that conviction. The court found any jury instruction errors harmless in light of overwhelming evidence, and concluded that, under the Barker v. Wingo factors, the delay did not violate the defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Third Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court. View "USA v. Figueroa" on Justia Law

Timofey V v. USA

2026-08-25T09:00:04-08:00

Two individuals associated with a Russian nonprofit registered the domain name waronfakes.com through a Russian registrar in March 2022. This domain hosted content focused on Russian political issues. In August 2024, the United States government seized the domain and others, alleging violations of the international money laundering statute and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The government claimed the domain was used to promote Russian disinformation on behalf of sanctioned individuals and entities, and that the purchase of the domain involved funds transferred for the benefit of a blocked person under U.S. sanctions. Five days after the seizure, the nonprofit and its director were added to the U.S. Treasury’s blocked persons list, which prohibits the transfer or dealing in their U.S.-based property without a license. The applicants, Timofey V and ANO Dialog, moved in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for the return of the domain under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g). The government opposed the motion, arguing that the applicants were not lawfully entitled to possess the property as they were now blocked persons under U.S. sanctions and lacked the required license from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). The District Court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that the applicants could not lawfully receive the domain. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that although the applicants had standing due to a sufficient possessory interest, they failed to establish lawful entitlement to the property because transfer to them was blocked by sanctions and no OFAC license had been obtained. The court further found no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing, as the legal impediment to transfer was undisputed. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "Timofey V v. USA" on Justia Law

United States v. Burton

2026-08-25T07:30:12-08:00

Law enforcement officers responded to a report of a possible drug overdose at a residence in Onamia, Minnesota. Upon arrival, they found Jeremy Burton unconscious with drug paraphernalia present. After being revived with Narcan, officers noticed a handgun magazine protruding from Burton’s shorts. During the encounter, another individual tried to prevent officers from retrieving the firearm, but it was ultimately secured. Burton was transported to a hospital and found to have multiple controlled substances in his system. He was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, with a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act due to prior convictions. The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota presided over Burton’s trial. The court granted the government’s motion in limine to exclude expert testimony from a pharmacologist regarding the effects of drugs on Burton’s mental state, finding voluntary intoxication was not a defense to the charge. At trial, Burton testified that someone had planted the gun on him while he was unconscious, but the jury found him guilty. The district court sentenced him to 240 months of imprisonment, which was a downward variance from the applicable guidelines range. Burton appealed, arguing error in excluding the expert testimony and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion and, where constitutional issues were implicated, de novo. The appellate court held that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to being a felon in possession of a firearm, and thus the exclusion of the expert testimony was proper. The court also found that the sentence was substantively reasonable, given the district court’s consideration of both aggravating and mitigating factors. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Burton" on Justia Law

United States v. Carter

2026-08-25T07:30:11-08:00

Darius Carter, a convicted felon, and his girlfriend, Sarah Mason, sought to obtain firearms but were ineligible to purchase them themselves. They recruited Carter’s mother to serve as a “straw buyer,” who purchased two guns from a pawn shop after Carter and Mason made most of the payments. She falsely certified on federal forms that she was the actual buyer. Months later, Mason was found dead from a gunshot wound to the head, which led investigators to uncover the gun-buying scheme. Carter was subsequently charged with making and conspiring to make false statements in connection with acquiring firearms. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri allowed the government at trial to present evidence that Mason died under suspicious circumstances, over Carter’s objection that this testimony was irrelevant and prejudicial. Carter was convicted on both counts by a jury. At sentencing, the government presented further evidence implicating Carter in Mason’s murder, arguing for a significant sentence enhancement on the basis that he used one of the illegally purchased firearms to commit the killing. The district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Carter had committed first-degree murder with one of the guns, applying a sentencing guideline cross-reference that dramatically increased his advisory sentencing range. Carter was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that although the district court abused its discretion by admitting irrelevant evidence regarding the suspicious nature of Mason’s death, the error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of Carter’s guilt. The court also found no clear error in the district court’s factual findings at sentencing and held that applying the homicide cross-reference under the Sentencing Guidelines was proper. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Carter" on Justia Law

State of Maine v. Hart

2026-08-25T06:38:55-08:00

On November 6, 2022, law enforcement responded to a 9-1-1 call from the former partner of Robert J. Hart, who reported that Hart threatened to kill her and was banging on her hotel room door. Officers located Hart in a nearby parking lot, where he sent messages to the victim encouraging her to downplay the incident. During booking at the county jail, officials discovered a bag containing cocaine base and other drugs hidden on Hart’s person. Hart was initially charged with seven offenses, including tampering with a victim, domestic violence aggravated assault, and various drug possession counts. After Hart entered not guilty pleas, he moved to suppress statements made to law enforcement, evidence from his cellphone, and the drugs found at the jail. At a hearing in the Androscoggin County Unified Criminal Docket, the State agreed to suppress certain statements and all cellphone evidence, and the court denied the remaining suppression requests. Shortly before trial, the State obtained a superseding indictment with revised charges due to jurisdictional issues regarding some offenses. Hart moved to dismiss the superseding indictment, alleging double jeopardy and prosecutorial vindictiveness, and requested discovery and a hearing on the vindictiveness claim. The trial court (Archer, J.) denied these requests. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case following Hart’s conditional guilty plea to three charges, which preserved his right to appeal the suppression and dismissal rulings. The Court held that the circumstances did not establish a reasonable likelihood of prosecutorial vindictiveness, as the State’s actions were prompted by routine pretrial developments and jurisdictional concerns, not retaliation. The Court also found that Hart’s statements to jail officials were properly suppressed and that other claims, including double jeopardy and Miranda violations, lacked merit. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "State of Maine v. Hart" on Justia Law

State v. Garces

2026-08-24T13:11:35-08:00

The case concerns a defendant who was convicted of murdering his girlfriend after a violent altercation in their home. The defendant called 911, expressing both an apparent confession and suicidal intent. He was apprehended after returning home the next day. At the police station, he was advised of his rights using the Maui Police Department’s Miranda waiver form, which, at the time, did not include an explicit warning that he could stop answering questions or request an attorney at any time during interrogation. The defendant subsequently confessed during a custodial interview and did not attempt to invoke his right to silence or counsel. Proceedings in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit were delayed to evaluate the defendant’s mental fitness. After finding him fit, the court denied his motion to suppress statements, concluding he had voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights, despite his claims of mental distress and the absence of the so-called “fifth Miranda warning.” At trial, the jury found him guilty of second-degree murder, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the Miranda warnings given were constitutionally sufficient and the waiver voluntary. The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case. It held that, under the Hawai‘i Constitution, law enforcement must henceforth provide not only the traditional four Miranda warnings but also explicitly inform custodial suspects of their right to cease answering questions and request an attorney at any time. However, because this is a new constitutional rule, the court applied it prospectively only, not to the defendant’s case. The court affirmed both the conviction and sentence, holding that the defendant’s waiver was valid under the previous standard. View "State v. Garces" on Justia Law

USA v. Thompson

2026-08-24T12:30:56-08:00

A former stadium control room engineer for the Jacksonville Jaguars, who had previously been convicted of child sexual abuse, was suspected of interfering with the stadium’s videoboards after his contract was terminated. Investigators traced unauthorized access to the videoboard computer network to him, and a subsequent FBI search uncovered large volumes of child pornography as well as evidence that he had produced exploitive material involving children. When he learned of the investigation, he fled abroad but was eventually returned to the United States. He faced a ten-count indictment including charges related to child pornography, enticement of minors, computer intrusion, sex offender registration violations, and firearm possession as a felon. The case was first reviewed by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The defendant chose to represent himself at trial after a Faretta hearing in which he was informed of the risks of self-representation; standby counsel was appointed. Over the course of the proceedings, he challenged the validity of the search warrant, sought to suppress evidence, and requested certain discovery and a trial continuance, all of which were denied. He also objected to a child victim testifying by closed-circuit television, but the court allowed it after making the necessary findings. The jury convicted him on all counts, and he received a sentence of 2,640 months in prison followed by supervised release. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the appeal. It held that the defendant’s waiver of counsel remained valid after new charges were added, that the district court did not err in allowing the child witness to testify remotely, and that the denial of the defendant’s motions for discovery, continuance, and suppression of evidence was proper. The court also upheld the validity of the search warrant and the denial of subpoenas for a Franks hearing. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentence. View "USA v. Thompson" on Justia Law

USA v. Miller

2026-08-24T11:00:52-08:00

Over a two-week period, the defendant entered four financial institutions in Florida, presenting notes to tellers demanding money. The notes did not explicitly threaten violence and were sometimes phrased politely. In two instances, the defendant succeeded in obtaining cash; in the other two, he left without money. The tellers’ responses varied: some felt intimidated, while others initially perceived the acts as non-threatening but later reconsidered after the defendant’s actions, such as staring and insisting on the return of his note. Law enforcement arrested the defendant the same day as the last incident. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida indicted the defendant on two counts of attempted credit-union robbery, one count of credit-union robbery, and one count of bank robbery, all under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). At trial, the defendant moved for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29, arguing that the government failed to prove intimidation, a required element of the offenses. The district court denied the motion, referencing persuasive authority that a demand for money alone can constitute intimidation, and found sufficient evidence based on trial testimony. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts, and he timely appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that, in the context of a suspected bank robbery, a demand for cash from a teller—whether verbal or written, threatening or polite—provides sufficient evidentiary grounds to affirm a jury’s finding of intimidation under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). The court concluded that the defendant’s actions satisfied the intimidation requirement for both completed and attempted offenses. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions. View "USA v. Miller" on Justia Law