Criminal Law - Justia Case Law Summaries

USA v. Jones

2026-07-31T09:01:42-08:00

Federal agents obtained a warrant to search the defendant’s mobile home in Moline, Illinois, for evidence of drug trafficking. The warrant was based on an affidavit describing a lengthy investigation into a drug organization operating between Arizona and the Quad Cities area. Key facts included intercepted packages containing money and drugs, suspicious phone calls linked to the defendant, phone records connecting him to individuals involved in the drug operation, and utility records showing a person of interest lived with him. In addition, agents conducted two searches of trash outside his residence, finding small amounts of discarded marijuana, mail addressed to the defendant and his housemate, vacuum-seal bags, and a shipping box. When agents executed the warrant, they discovered marijuana and over eight hundred grams of methamphetamine. In the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, the defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained during the search, arguing the warrant lacked probable cause. The district court acknowledged that the information connecting the defendant’s address to the drug organization was somewhat stale and attenuated, but ultimately found that the marijuana recovered from the trash alone supplied probable cause for the search under United States v. Leonard. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress. The court applied a standard giving great deference to the issuing magistrate judge but reviewed legal conclusions de novo. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that officers reasonably relied on the warrant in good faith because the affidavit’s information, taken as a whole, came close enough to establishing probable cause for drug trafficking. The court did not rely solely on the marijuana found in the trash but emphasized the broader context of the ongoing investigation and ties to the defendant’s residence. View "USA v. Jones" on Justia Law

USA v. Turbe

2026-07-31T09:00:11-08:00

A defendant was arrested in November 2024 at the Cyril E. King Airport in the Virgin Islands after law enforcement discovered nearly 12 kilograms of marijuana in his luggage. He subsequently pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute marijuana. The presentence report calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 12 to 18 months’ imprisonment and two to three years of supervised release, taking into account two prior convictions and three earlier arrests, although only two of these arrests had factual descriptions; the circumstances of the third were unknown. The District Court for the Virgin Islands sentenced the defendant to six months’ imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release, with the first six months served under home detention. The defendant requested probation, while the government sought a 12-month prison sentence. The District Court denied the defendant’s objection to the inclusion of the arrest records in the PSR, explaining that while it did not place much weight on arrests not leading to convictions, they could be relevant for other purposes. The District Court imposed a within-Guidelines sentence and addressed arguments regarding the defendant’s criminal history, deterrence, and sentencing disparities. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case on appeal. The main holding is that the District Court did not violate the defendant’s due process rights by impermissibly relying on his bare arrest record when determining his sentence. The Third Circuit found that the District Court did not actually rely on the defendant’s arrests not leading to conviction, but only referenced them in passing, and the record showed reliance on prior convictions alone. The Court also held that the District Court adequately explained its sentence and that the sentence was substantively reasonable. The judgment and sentence of the District Court were affirmed. View "USA v. Turbe" on Justia Law

USA v. Payne

2026-07-31T07:32:07-08:00

After a drive-by shooting targeted Antonio Payne’s home in Washington, D.C., police responded to the scene. Surveillance footage from neighbors captured Payne confronting an unidentified man, during which Payne was seen holding a gun, frisking the man, and making threatening statements. Payne was observed stepping off his driveway onto the alley while armed. Officers, invited into the home by Payne’s mother, saw ammunition in plain view. Detective interviews and a review of the footage led to a search warrant application for the home for evidence of carrying a pistol without a license. The warrant, which contained a typographical error in the cited statute but correctly described the offense, was granted. Upon execution, multiple firearms, drugs, and related materials were found. DNA testing linked Payne to several firearms. Before trial, Payne moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the warrant lacked probable cause. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied the motion, finding probable cause based on Payne’s matching clothing, video evidence of him with a gun, and the shooting incident. At trial, Payne conceded he was filmed carrying a gun and stipulated he lacked a license. The jury found him guilty on all counts, including carrying a pistol without a license. Payne was sentenced to 235 months’ imprisonment and 60 months’ supervised release, and he appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court’s rulings. The appellate court held that, even assuming the warrant lacked probable cause, the officers’ objectively reasonable reliance on the warrant triggered the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The court also found sufficient evidence supported Payne’s conviction for carrying a pistol without a license, as video footage and trial concessions established the offense’s elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The court rejected Payne’s new arguments regarding the statute’s typographical error and self-defense. View "USA v. Payne" on Justia Law

USA v. Johnson

2026-07-31T07:32:07-08:00

The defendant in this case used an encrypted filesharing site to acquire hundreds of videos containing child sexual abuse material (CSAM), which he then uploaded to his Google Drive account and stored on his computer. In October 2020, Google’s automated software identified some of these files as likely CSAM and, following federal law, sent so-called “CyberTip” reports to the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC). NCMEC’s automated system, in turn, forwarded the reports and files to law enforcement, specifically a detective in the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, D.C. The detective initially viewed some of the CSAM files without a warrant, then consulted a federal prosecutor and sought a warrant to review the files. A magistrate judge, however, advised that no warrant was needed, citing the “private search” doctrine, and the detective proceeded accordingly. Subsequent searches led to further evidence and ultimately to the defendant’s arrest and indictment for possession and transportation of CSAM. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied the defendant’s motions to suppress the evidence, reasoning that even if there was a Fourth Amendment violation when the detective first viewed the files without a warrant, suppression was unwarranted under the good-faith exception and independent-source doctrine. The court also rejected the argument that the residential search warrant only permitted seizure, not search, of digital devices. After an eight-day trial, a jury convicted the defendant on multiple counts related to possession and transportation of CSAM. The court further declined to reduce the sentencing offense level as requested by the defendant. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that, even assuming a Fourth Amendment violation occurred when the detective viewed the files without a warrant, suppression was not warranted because the government later obtained lawful authority from a magistrate judge and the detective acted in good faith. The court also found the residential search warrant authorized both seizure and search of digital devices and upheld the sentencing determination. View "USA v. Johnson" on Justia Law

United States v. Ketcher

2026-07-31T07:30:56-08:00

Shelly Ketcher was employed as a bookkeeper for South Delta Aviation (SDA) and also managed the personal affairs of the owner, D.R. Over a five-year period, she embezzled about $2.7 million from SDA and D.R. by forging more than a thousand checks, making them payable to herself, family, and friends. Ketcher concealed her extensive criminal history of prior fraud and embezzlement convictions when she was hired. The embezzlement was discovered after D.R. found he was delinquent on property taxes and confronted Ketcher, who attempted to cover up her actions with forged documents. The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas handled Ketcher’s guilty plea to one count of money laundering and one count of filing a false federal income tax return. The Presentence Investigation Report calculated an advisory guidelines range of 92 to 115 months. At sentencing, after hearing victim impact statements and arguments from both sides, the court imposed an upward variance, sentencing Ketcher to a total of 156 months in prison—120 months for money laundering and a consecutive 36 months for the tax offense. The court cited the egregiousness of the offense and Ketcher’s repeated similar crimes as aggravating factors, outweighing her mitigating circumstances. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Ketcher argued that her sentence was substantively unreasonable, asserting that the district court gave insufficient weight to mitigating factors, imposed a harsher sentence than similarly situated defendants, and was motivated by personal animosity. The Eighth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the upward variance, found the court’s reasoning and weighing of factors appropriate, and affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Ketcher" on Justia Law

State v. Walker

2026-07-31T05:07:35-08:00

The State originally charged the defendant with two counts of first-degree murder in 2004 in the district court for Douglas County. The defendant filed a discovery motion shortly after the charges were brought. The case was dismissed in 2005 at the State’s request, and then, in 2025, the State refiled the same charges, commencing proceedings in county court before moving to the district court. The defendant filed several pretrial motions, including motions for discovery and depositions, and ultimately moved for discharge on the grounds that his statutory speedy trial rights had been violated. Following the refiling, the district court for Douglas County reviewed the timeline for both the original 2004 information and the 2025 information. The court applied the tacking-and-tolling approach, counting nonexcludable days from the 2004 case and excludable periods arising from the defendant’s pretrial motions in the 2025 case. The district court found that only three nonexcludable days had accrued before the discovery motion in 2004, and determined that the 2025 information generated 108 excludable days due to various motions. The court concluded that the defendant’s speedy trial deadline had not expired at the time he filed his motion for discharge. The Nebraska Supreme Court independently reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and conducted a de novo review of the legal questions. The Court held that the district court did not err in finding the 2004 discovery motion was never formally disposed of, and that the defendant’s speedy trial rights had not been violated when he moved for discharge. The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion for discharge and held that the defendant permanently waived his statutory speedy trial rights by filing an unsuccessful motion for discharge that resulted in a continuance beyond the statutory period. View "State v. Walker" on Justia Law

Commonwealth v. Dorsey

2026-07-31T04:07:28-08:00

The defendant was convicted by a jury of murder in the first degree, resisting arrest, and possession of a class B substance after fatally stabbing his live-in girlfriend in their apartment. The incident occurred after a dispute, and the victim was found dead in the building’s entryway. The scene contained significant blood evidence, and the defendant was found in the apartment with both himself and the couch covered in blood. At trial, the defendant admitted to killing the victim but claimed he acted in self-defense while under the influence of PCP, arguing he only used excessive force and lacked premeditated intent. The medical examiner determined the victim suffered multiple sharp-force injuries, some consistent with defensive wounds. Following a mistrial in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, a second trial in 2021 resulted in the defendant’s conviction in the Hampden Superior Court. The court sentenced him to life imprisonment without parole for murder and concurrent sentences for the other offenses. The defendant later moved for a new trial, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel based on four grounds: failure to investigate his PTSD, failure to investigate the victim’s violent history, failure to introduce evidence of the victim’s recent drug use, and failure to introduce expert testimony corroborating his defensive injury. The motion was denied after a nonevidentiary hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed both the direct appeal and the denial of the motion for a new trial. The court held that there was no reversible error and that counsel’s performance did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. The court also declined to reduce the murder conviction to a lesser degree under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. The convictions and the denial of a new trial were affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Dorsey" on Justia Law

US v. Gonzalez

2026-07-30T14:00:03-08:00

An individual, born in 1937, assumed the identity of his younger brother, who died in infancy, to fraudulently obtain a second Social Security number and collect retirement benefits under both his own and his brother’s identities. Over the course of nearly two decades, he received Social Security payments in both names and also procured and used U.S. passports issued under his deceased brother’s identity. His scheme unraveled after a state motor vehicle official noticed similarities between two identification cards with different names but similar photos and addresses. Subsequent investigation revealed the use of both identities for benefits and travel, as well as submission of multiple passport applications with false information. A grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of Maine indicted the defendant on six counts, including identity theft, passport fraud, Social Security fraud, and mail fraud. At trial, the defendant contested the propriety of venue in Maine for two passport fraud counts and challenged the calculation of restitution. The district court submitted the venue question to the jury, which found venue proper for both passport counts and convicted him on all charges. He was sentenced to probation and ordered to pay $175,757 in restitution. Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the jury’s venue determinations and the restitution order. The court held that sufficient circumstantial evidence supported venue in Maine for both the false statement in the passport application and the use of a fraudulently obtained passport, applying the appropriate legal standards for each count. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s method for calculating restitution, concluding that the government met its burden of proof regarding the loss amount. The First Circuit affirmed both the convictions and the restitution order. View "US v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

People v. Kazarian

2026-07-30T10:02:56-08:00

Late one night in January 2023, a San Bernardino County sheriff’s deputy responded to a medical call at a gas station, where he found the defendant unresponsive in his truck. After being awakened, the defendant drove away from the scene, nearly hitting emergency vehicles and prompting the deputy to pursue him with lights and sirens. During the pursuit, the defendant traveled at speeds exceeding 100 miles per hour, failed to stop at two stop signs, and went airborne over railroad tracks. After a lengthy chase, the defendant crashed the truck and was apprehended after hiding nearby. The defendant testified that he did not realize he was being pursued by police, disputed the deputy’s account of the events, and denied driving as dangerously as described. The Superior Court of San Bernardino County conducted a jury trial, during which the jury found the defendant guilty of felony evasion of a police officer under Vehicle Code section 2800.2, subdivision (a). In a separate proceeding, the court found a prior strike conviction and one sentencing factor to be true. The defendant was sentenced to a midterm of two years, doubled to four due to the strike. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court committed reversible instructional error by failing to define for the jury the specific Vehicle Code violations (such as what constitutes “speeding” or “failing to stop at a stop sign”) that are necessary to establish felony evasion. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that although the trial court did not provide detailed definitions of the Vehicle Code violations to the jury, any instructional omission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the evidence and the issues actually disputed at trial. The court affirmed the judgment and conviction. View "People v. Kazarian" on Justia Law

Thompson v. Superior Ct.

2026-07-30T10:02:55-08:00

A defendant was charged with felony burglary after surveillance and investigative evidence linked him to a theft at a medical office. The defendant had a long history of similar offenses. He sought mental health diversion, arguing eligibility due to diagnoses of depression and posttraumatic stress disorder and provided evidence of ongoing treatment and compliance with therapy. The trial court expressed initial reservations due to the lack of a comprehensive treatment plan and the defendant’s extensive criminal record, but ultimately granted diversion for a one-year period, imposing conditions including regular therapy, progress reports, medication compliance, and a search clause requiring submission to search and seizure without probable cause or a warrant. Previously, the Superior Court of Marin County reviewed the case at several hearings, continuing proceedings to allow the defendant to supplement his treatment plan. After receiving sufficient documentation of ongoing mental health treatment, the court granted diversion but imposed the contested search condition. The defendant objected and later moved to vacate the search condition, arguing it was unauthorized under Penal Code section 1001.36. The People opposed, and the trial court denied reconsideration, finding such a condition within its discretion given the defendant’s criminal history and the need to ensure compliance and protect public safety. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the defendant’s petition for writ of mandate challenging the search condition. The court held that trial courts have discretion to impose reasonable rehabilitative probationary conditions—including search clauses—on defendants granted mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36. The court found this consistent with statutory language, legislative history, and the purpose of mental health diversion. The petition for writ of mandate was denied. View "Thompson v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

People v. Sanmiguel

2026-07-30T09:02:29-08:00

The defendant was tried for attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon. During jury selection, the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to excuse a prospective juror identified as Latino, prompting the defense to object under California Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, which prohibits discrimination based on race or other protected status. The prosecutor gave multiple reasons for the strike, including that the juror was less attentive and engaged than others. The trial court confirmed the prosecutor’s observations and overruled the defense’s objection, without requiring a further explanation of why the juror’s behavior mattered to the case. The Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s decision. The majority held that the prosecutor’s and court’s observations about the juror’s attentiveness were sufficient to overcome the statutory presumption that behavior-based reasons for a peremptory challenge are invalid, and independently sufficient to justify the strike. A dissenting justice argued that the prosecutor failed to explain why the juror’s behavior was relevant to the case, and thus the presumption of invalidity was not overcome. The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case. It clarified that section 231.7 requires both confirmation of the observed behavior and an explanation of its relevance to rebut the presumption of invalidity for behavior-based reasons. The court held that failing to rebut this presumption means the reason cannot justify the strike, but does not necessarily establish that the strike was unlawful; courts must still consider all reasons and circumstances to determine if there is a substantial likelihood that an objective observer would view race or other protected status as a factor. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remanded for further proceedings. View "People v. Sanmiguel" on Justia Law

State v. Trevizo

2026-07-30T08:38:27-08:00

A nineteen-year-old woman sought emergency treatment at a hospital for severe lower back pain. She denied being pregnant, reporting vaginal bleeding and describing herself as being on her period. The hospital performed a pregnancy test, which came back positive, but staff continued administering pain medications, including morphine. The patient was not told of her pregnancy. After experiencing an urgent need to use the restroom, she gave birth alone in a locked hospital bathroom. The newborn was later found deceased in a trashcan, with an autopsy revealing morphine in the newborn’s heart blood. The patient was subsequently confronted in her hospital room by her doctor, two uniformed police officers, and a nurse, and made incriminating statements in their presence. The District Court of Eddy County suppressed all statements made by the defendant to her healthcare providers and to police, finding that they were protected by the physician-patient privilege under Rule 11-504 NMRA, and that the privilege had not been waived, despite the presence of officers and the defendant’s mother. The court also found that the defendant’s rights under Miranda v. Arizona were violated. The State appealed, arguing that the privilege did not apply due to mandatory reporting laws and that any privilege was waived. The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico reviewed the case de novo. It held that the physician-patient privilege was not waived. The Court clarified that the statutory exception to the privilege for material that must be reported by law is narrow and only applies to the reporting of suspected child abuse or neglect, not to all communications with medical staff. Furthermore, the Court found that, under the totality of circumstances—including the defendant’s compromised physical and mental state—there was no voluntary waiver of the privilege. The suppression order was affirmed. View "State v. Trevizo" on Justia Law

State of Maine v. Witham

2026-07-30T07:38:14-08:00

The case concerns a defendant who was convicted in two separate matters in Hancock County, Maine. In the first, he was found guilty by a jury of several offenses, including domestic violence aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon, after an incident in June 2020 in which he assaulted his romantic partner in his home, engaged in multiple acts of violence, and threatened both her and her child. In the second, he entered a conditional guilty plea to tampering with a witness. The court sentenced him to concurrent terms totaling twenty-four years, with all but twenty-two years suspended, and six years of probation. After the trial, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in three main ways: (1) by denying him an evidentiary hearing regarding funds seized in an unrelated drug case, which he claimed violated his rights to counsel and due process; (2) by failing to provide a specific-unanimity jury instruction and denying his post-judgment request for a mental-condition examination; and (3) by increasing his sentence based on findings about firearms, his age, and his lack of acceptance of responsibility. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court found it lacked jurisdiction to review the issues related to the seized funds, as they were tied to a separate case. The Court held that no specific-unanimity instruction was required for the counts at issue, the trial court did not err in denying the request for a mental-condition examination, and the sentencing court properly considered the presence of firearms, the defendant’s age, and his lack of acceptance of responsibility. However, the Court concluded that certain counts should have been merged to avoid double jeopardy. The judgment was affirmed, but the sentence was vacated in part and the matter remanded for resentencing consistent with the required mergers. View "State of Maine v. Witham" on Justia Law

Rennenger v. Aquawood, LLC

2026-07-30T07:31:01-08:00

Five individuals obtained over $1.8 million in workplace sexual harassment judgments against various related business entities and individuals. When these judgments went unpaid, they brought a civil suit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against fifteen defendants, alleging a scheme to evade collection of the judgments. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants orchestrated fraudulent asset transfers and used a sham consignment scheme involving false customs forms to prevent the plaintiffs from seizing assets to satisfy their judgments. Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa dismissed the plaintiffs’ RICO claims based on predicate acts of bankruptcy crimes, money laundering, and obstruction of justice, as well as their claim for declaratory relief regarding alter ego liability. However, the court allowed the RICO claims predicated on wire fraud related to the consignment scheme to proceed. After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the plaintiffs failed to show proximate causation between the alleged wire fraud and their inability to collect on their judgments, and that they were not entitled to adverse inference sanctions for alleged discovery misconduct. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the consignment scheme was a but-for cause of their injury, as they did not show that any assets subject to seizure belonged to the judgment debtors. The court further concluded that claims based on other predicate offenses failed due to insufficient evidence and lack of particularity. The appellate court also found no error in the district court’s refusal to draw adverse inferences or to allow amendment of the complaints at this stage. The court affirmed summary judgment for all defendants on all claims. View "Rennenger v. Aquawood, LLC" on Justia Law

United States v. Owl

2026-07-30T07:31:01-08:00

The case concerns a defendant who was originally charged with felony murder and arson after a fatal fire in a cabin in Mandaree, North Dakota, which resulted in the death of one individual. The incident occurred after a bonfire gathering attended by the defendant, his wife, and two others. There was evidence of a dispute between the defendant and his wife, who hid in a vehicle to avoid him. The cabin burned down shortly thereafter. Forensic evidence linked gasoline to the fire, and reports included statements from the defendant’s wife that he had accused her of infidelity and intended to harm her. After an initial mistrial due to an evidentiary dispute, the defendant pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter as part of a plea agreement; the more severe charges were dismissed. Following the guilty plea, the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota conducted sentencing. The court declined to grant a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under the sentencing guidelines, finding that the defendant had not genuinely accepted responsibility, as evidenced by his statements to the probation office denying involvement in the offense. The court adopted the advisory guideline range but determined it was inadequate, and imposed an upward variance to the statutory maximum sentence of fifteen years. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the sentence. The appellate court held that the district court did not clearly err in denying the reduction for acceptance of responsibility, nor did it abuse its discretion in considering reliable evidence outside the guilty plea for sentencing purposes. The Eighth Circuit further found no plain error or constitutional violation by the district court in basing the upward variance on facts not admitted in the plea, nor was the sentence substantively unreasonable. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Owl" on Justia Law

United States v. Dominquez

2026-07-30T07:30:59-08:00

Victor Dominquez was indicted on multiple charges, including aggravated sexual abuse of a minor in Indian country. The indictment specifically alleged that, between March 2006 and March 2012, Dominquez knowingly engaged in acts involving the penetration of the genital opening of a child under twelve years old, with an intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire. At trial, the minor victim, M.D., testified that Dominquez, while bathing her as a child, used his fingers to clean her vagina, describing sensations and experiences that the jury found credible and sufficient for conviction. Following the jury’s guilty verdict on all counts, the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota granted Dominquez’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the aggravated sexual abuse charge. The district court reasoned that, even when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, M.D.’s testimony was too ambiguous and nonspecific to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Dominquez penetrated her genital opening, as required by statute. The court noted that clarifying questions might have elicited more explicit testimony but concluded it could not sustain a conviction based on suspicion or possibility. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s order de novo. The appellate court held that a rational jury could infer that M.D. used the ordinary anatomical meaning of “vagina” in her testimony, and that Dominquez’s actions described by M.D. necessarily involved penetration of the vaginal orifice. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficiently specific to support the verdict. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting judgment of acquittal, reinstating the jury’s finding of guilt. View "United States v. Dominquez" on Justia Law

State v. Federico

2026-07-30T07:27:01-08:00

A former high school teacher was charged with sexual offenses arising from an alleged relationship with a 17-year-old student. Prior to trial, the defendant successfully moved to suppress most of the evidence seized from his office, house, and vehicle, as the trial court found the search warrant overbroad and lacking proper nexus. At trial, the student testified to sexual encounters at various locations, including the defendant’s office. The defense argued the accusations were fabricated for extortion, and the defendant did not testify. During trial in the Marion County Circuit Court, the prosecutor, while objecting during the cross-examination of the student, referenced facts not in evidence, including the existence of a search warrant and statements by the student to law enforcement. The prosecutor also accused defense counsel of making false statements. The jury was excused for a period, and after their return, the court issued a curative instruction to disregard the incident. Later, in closing rebuttal, the prosecutor told jurors to consider how they would explain a not guilty verdict to their loved ones. There was no contemporaneous objection to these closing remarks. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, finding no abuse of discretion in denying a mistrial and determining that the prosecutor’s comments did not clearly deny the defendant a fair trial. On review, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the prosecutor’s comments during cross-examination were highly improper, prejudicial, and could not be cured by the court’s instruction. Additionally, the prosecutor’s closing remarks were found to be independently prejudicial in urging the jury to consider outside influences. The Supreme Court reversed both the Court of Appeals and circuit court judgments and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the defendant was denied a fair trial. View "State v. Federico" on Justia Law

Duncan v. The State of Wyoming

2026-07-30T07:15:27-08:00

The case concerns a man who was convicted by a jury of six counts of sexual exploitation of a child, one count of endangering a child, and one count of unlawful contact. The offenses involved his stepdaughter (later adopted), two friends of the stepdaughter, and his son. The defendant encouraged his stepdaughter, beginning when she was 12, to engage in sexual acts with her friends—including digital penetration and the use of sexual devices—and with her stepbrother, whom she began having sexual relations with at age 12. The defendant sent text messages instructing and encouraging such conduct, supplied sexual devices, and sent pornographic material to the minor. Law enforcement became involved after an anonymous report, and following an investigation, charges were filed. After a three-day trial in the District Court of Sweetwater County, the jury convicted the defendant on all counts. The district court imposed an aggregate sentence of 21 to 30 years in prison for the sexual exploitation convictions, followed by five years of supervised probation, and concurrent 180-day jail sentences for endangering a child and unlawful contact, to run consecutively to the exploitation sentences. The defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of evidence for three of the sexual exploitation counts, arguing the conduct did not meet the statutory definition of “explicit sexual conduct,” and claiming his aggregate sentence was cruelly disproportionate. The Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, finding that digital penetration and penetration with a sexual device constituted “explicit sexual conduct” under the relevant statute. The court also determined the jury instructions were adequate to ensure unanimity for each count. Finally, the court found the sentence was not grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offenses and did not violate the Wyoming Constitution. The convictions and sentences were affirmed. View "Duncan v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

State v. Perrin

2026-07-30T07:15:09-08:00

The respondent left threatening messages for a woman, destroyed another person’s bicycle, and assaulted that person with a sword. He was charged with several crimes, including first degree assault, malicious mischief, felony harassment, and theft. At trial, the jury found him guilty of second degree assault with a deadly weapon, felony harassment, and third degree theft. The respondent then requested a mental health sentencing alternative, asserting he had a serious mental illness and proposing an appropriate treatment plan. The sentencing judge granted this request, imposing 36 months of community custody and declining to order any confinement time on the deadly weapon sentencing enhancement. The State appealed this aspect of the sentence, arguing that the trial court was required to impose confinement time for the deadly weapon enhancement. The Washington Court of Appeals found that the relevant sentencing statutes were ambiguous. Applying the rule of lenity, the court affirmed the decision not to impose confinement time on the deadly weapon enhancement. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed whether the sentencing court was obligated to impose confinement time on the deadly weapon enhancement when a mental health sentencing alternative is imposed. The court held that, under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, a deadly weapon enhancement, once determined, is part of the standard range sentence. When a court imposes a mental health sentencing alternative, the entire standard range sentence, including the deadly weapon enhancement, must be waived. The court rejected the argument that the deadly weapon enhancement must always be imposed regardless of other statutes, and found that legislative intent and statutory context support waiving confinement in such circumstances. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "State v. Perrin" on Justia Law

Adams v. Hon. Robison

2026-07-30T06:14:04-08:00

A man was cited and charged in the Salt Lake City Justice Court after allegedly causing a car accident while driving under the influence of alcohol. The charges included a class B misdemeanor for DUI, as well as other related offenses. Several months after the charges were filed, the defendant attempted to plead guilty, but the City refused to consent, invoking a state law requiring prosecutorial approval for guilty pleas in DUI cases. The justice court declined to accept his plea without the City’s consent. The defendant then moved the justice court to declare the prosecutorial consent law unconstitutional, arguing it violated Utah’s separation of powers doctrine and his due process rights. While this motion was pending, the Salt Lake County District Attorney filed enhanced, felony-level charges against him in the district court. The City moved to dismiss the justice court case without prejudice, and the justice court denied the defendant’s constitutional challenge, finding no violation of the separation of powers and concluding the due process argument was inadequately briefed. The case in the justice court was dismissed without prejudice. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the defendant’s petition for extraordinary relief. The court found that the defendant had properly invoked its authority for relief under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 19 regarding the separation of powers claim, since no direct appeal was available. However, the court declined to reach the merits or grant relief, holding that the defendant had not shown he was likely to benefit from a favorable ruling because felony charges were already pending in district court and it was speculative that the justice court would accept his guilty plea. The court also rejected the due process challenge, finding the defendant had not addressed the justice court’s basis for rejection. The petition for extraordinary relief was denied. View "Adams v. Hon. Robison" on Justia Law

Allen v. United States

2026-07-30T06:03:30-08:00

After being convicted in 2003 of first-degree murder and related offenses, the defendant was sentenced to forty-five years in prison. After serving over twenty years, he filed a motion for compassionate release under the District of Columbia’s statute, D.C. Code § 24-403.04(a). He did not meet the statute’s categorical eligibility criteria—he was not yet sixty years old and did not have a terminal illness—but argued that his age, length of incarceration, medical conditions, vulnerability to COVID-19, and extraordinary rehabilitation collectively constituted “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for release. He submitted extensive evidence of rehabilitation, including letters from fellow inmates and a supervisor at a community organization, and offered plans for future employment and community mentorship if released. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia reviewed the motion, held a hearing, and found the defendant was no longer dangerous. However, it denied the motion, finding insufficient evidence of acute vulnerability to COVID-19 and reasoning that the statutory age limit was explicit. The court also declined to consider rehabilitation as part of the eligibility analysis, concluding it was relevant only to dangerousness. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals addressed whether rehabilitation could be considered in evaluating eligibility for compassionate release and whether all relevant factors should be assessed collectively. The court held that trial courts may consider rehabilitation as part of the eligibility analysis under the catch-all provision for “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” It also held that courts must assess the movant’s circumstances in their totality, not individually or piecemeal. The court vacated the Superior Court’s order and remanded for reconsideration consistent with these holdings. View "Allen v. United States" on Justia Law

Lopez v. United States

2026-07-30T06:03:29-08:00

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and a related firearm offense after the death of his former girlfriend, following a history of domestic violence and threats. The evidence included witness testimony about their tumultuous relationship, messages in which the appellant threatened the victim, and his actions around the time of the murder, including fleeing the country. He was eventually apprehended in El Salvador and extradited to the United States to stand trial. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia presided over the trial. During trial, the government’s expert on intimate partner violence exceeded the court’s limitation on her testimony by referencing a study linking post-breakup periods to increased risk of lethal violence. Defense counsel objected, and the court struck the statement and gave a curative instruction, but did not declare a mistrial. The jury convicted the appellant. At sentencing, the court denied credit for time served in El Salvador while awaiting extradition and imposed a fifty-year sentence. Defense counsel raised issues regarding sentencing credit and the possible impact of the extradition order, but the court did not give credit for the time spent in El Salvador and indicated that no evidence had been presented regarding the extradition order’s terms. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not plainly err in failing to declare a mistrial sua sponte, since the improper expert testimony, while prejudicial, was not so extreme as to make a mistrial the only appropriate remedy, especially given the strong evidence against the appellant. The court affirmed the convictions but remanded the case for the trial court to reconsider or explain its decision regarding sentencing credit for time served in El Salvador. The court declined to remand on the extradition order issue for lack of a developed argument. View "Lopez v. United States" on Justia Law

Nunez v. State

2026-07-30T05:45:17-08:00

The appellant was convicted by a jury of multiple child sexual abuse offenses. After his convictions were affirmed on direct appeal by the Utah Court of Appeals, and after the Utah Supreme Court denied certiorari, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Fourth District Court. His initial petition raised claims that had already been addressed on direct appeal, leading the district court to dismiss it as procedurally barred. Subsequently, new counsel moved to set aside the dismissal, arguing he had been deprived of notice and a hearing. The district court granted the motion and reinstated the petition. The appellant then sought and received leave to amend his petition, but the amended version included new claims and was filed after the one-year statute of limitations imposed by the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA). The State moved to dismiss the amended petition as untimely, contending that the new claims did not relate back to the original petition under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). The district court agreed, finding that the new claims were entirely different from the original claims and did not satisfy the relation-back requirements. The court rejected the appellant’s argument that Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C(h)(3) independently allowed the amendment regardless of timeliness, and also dismissed his assertions that the application of Rule 15(c) was discretionary or that the PCRA’s time bar was unconstitutional. The appellant timely appealed; the case was briefly transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals before being recalled by the Supreme Court of Utah. The Supreme Court of Utah affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that Rule 15(c) applies to post-conviction petitions and that Rule 65C(h)(3) does not override the relation-back requirement. It clarified that neither its precedent nor the Utah Constitution invalidates the PCRA’s one-year time bar or requires an “interests of justice” exception. Accordingly, the dismissal of the amended petition as untimely was upheld. View "Nunez v. State" on Justia Law

State v. Castillo

2026-07-30T05:45:16-08:00

A man was accused of sexually abusing and raping his niece when she was a child. The alleged abuse occurred over several years, beginning when the niece was approximately nine or ten years old and continuing until she was about twelve. The niece did not disclose the abuse at the time, but years later, after becoming an adult, she reported the incidents to law enforcement. The prosecution relied heavily on her testimony, as well as testimony from an expert witness who described general patterns in child sexual abuse disclosures, and evidence regarding text messages sent by the accused to the niece. At trial in the Third District Court, a jury convicted the defendant on four counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child and one count of rape of a child. The defense raised several objections and arguments, including challenges to the admissibility of the expert witness testimony under Utah Rule of Evidence 702, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting to the use of the term "victim" at trial, and assertions that the niece’s testimony was inherently improbable and therefore insufficient to support a conviction. The trial court denied a motion for directed verdict and allowed the challenged evidence and arguments over defense objections. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case on direct appeal. The court held that the defendant had waived much of his challenge to the expert testimony by abandoning those arguments in the trial court, and he failed to establish that his counsel was ineffective in handling the expert’s statements or the use of the word “victim.” The court also found that counsel’s decision not to object to testimony about the niece’s self-harm or to raise a challenge based on inherent improbability did not constitute deficient performance. The court affirmed the convictions, finding no reversible error or cumulative prejudice. View "State v. Castillo" on Justia Law

People of Michigan v. Armogeda

2026-07-30T05:00:03-08:00

The defendant was convicted by a jury of assault with intent to commit murder, carrying a dangerous weapon with unlawful intent, and third-degree fleeing and eluding. At sentencing, the trial court calculated his guidelines minimum sentence range as 270 to 450 months for the assault conviction and imposed a sentence of 360 to 600 months. The defendant moved to correct his sentence, arguing that Prior Record Variable 2 and Offense Variable 12 were scored incorrectly, which would lower his guidelines range. The prosecution agreed with some of the scoring errors, but the trial court declined to resolve the precise range, stating it would impose the same sentence regardless of the corrected guidelines. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s sentence, holding that resentencing was unnecessary because the trial court had clearly indicated it would have imposed the same sentence even with the corrected guideline scores. However, the Court of Appeals remanded for the presentence investigation report to be amended to reflect the correct guideline scoring and range. On remand, the parties stipulated to a corrected range of 171 to 285 months, and the trial court amended the report but did not resentence the defendant. The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed whether resentencing is required when a sentence is based on inaccurate guidelines scoring and falls outside the corrected range, even if the trial court would have imposed the same sentence. The Court held that a defendant is entitled to resentencing in such circumstances, reaffirming that reliance on an incorrect guidelines range requires resentencing, regardless of the trial court’s stated intentions. The Court of Appeals’ judgment was reversed in part, and the case was remanded for resentencing, requiring the trial court to rescore the guidelines and consider the correct range, while allowing the same sentence if found to be reasonable and proportionate. View "People of Michigan v. Armogeda" on Justia Law

Commonwealth v. Shaw

2026-07-30T04:07:03-08:00

The defendant was convicted of several firearm-related offenses, including carrying a firearm without a license and possession of ammunition without a firearm identification card. At sentencing, the Commonwealth sought to enhance the defendant’s sentence based on prior convictions, including a 2002 drug conviction. To prove the prior conviction, the Commonwealth introduced a nine-page copy of a District Court docket sheet. The copy bore the court’s seal and a stamped signature, but lacked a written certification attesting it was a true and accurate copy of the original. The defense did not object to the docket sheet’s admission at trial. After the jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of the underlying firearm charges in the Superior Court Department, and following a jury-waived trial on the sentencing enhancements, the judge found him guilty of the enhancement under G. L. c. 269, § 10G (a). The defendant was sentenced to five to seven years in State prison under this enhancement. The Appeals Court affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts then granted further appellate review to consider whether the docket sheet was properly authenticated and, if not, whether its admission created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the copy of the District Court docket sheet was not properly authenticated, as it did not meet the requirements for attestation set forth in the relevant rules and statutes. However, the Court concluded that the error did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. The Court reasoned that the document had many indicia of reliability, the defendant did not dispute the conviction, and the Commonwealth could have remedied the error if it had been identified at trial. The defendant's conviction under G. L. c. 269, § 10G (a) was therefore affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Shaw" on Justia Law

State of Minnesota vs. Ahmed

2026-07-30T01:22:25-08:00

Police officers investigated suspected fentanyl sales at an apartment in East Grand Forks, Minnesota, in 2022. After surveillance and a search warrant, they found Mohamed Abdulgani Ahmed at the apartment, arrested him, and discovered 775 fentanyl pills, cash, and Ahmed’s wallet in the bedroom closet. Forensic analysis confirmed the pills contained fentanyl weighing approximately 77.5 grams. Ahmed admitted to selling some fentanyl pills but denied knowledge of the large bag of pills. Text messages from Ahmed’s phone indicated involvement in fentanyl sales with his roommate, A.F., and others. Ahmed was charged with conspiracy to commit first-degree sale of controlled substances, first-degree sale, and second-degree possession of controlled substances. The District Court for Polk County entered convictions for all three counts after a jury trial. Ahmed appealed, arguing errors in the prosecution’s closing argument and other issues. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions for conspiracy and sale but reversed and remanded for the district court to vacate the conviction for second-degree possession, as it was a lesser-included offense under Minnesota law. The Supreme Court of Minnesota reviewed whether the prosecutor’s statement—that the State need not prove Ahmed knew the conspiracy involved more than fifty grams of fentanyl—was plain error. The court held that, under Minnesota Statutes section 152.096 and its prior decision in State v. Kuhnau, the State must prove the defendant intended the commission of every element of the underlying offense, including the statutory weight threshold. The prosecutor’s misstatement was plain error affecting Ahmed’s substantial rights and was prejudicial. The Supreme Court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for a new trial on all three challenged counts. View "State of Minnesota vs. Ahmed" on Justia Law

USA v. Hunter

2026-07-29T15:30:30-08:00

The defendant, Munson Hunter, was indicted on multiple counts of bank and wire fraud for his role in a scheme that caused significant financial losses. After raising concerns about his mental health and undergoing a competency evaluation, Hunter pleaded guilty to one count in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charges. His plea agreement included a waiver of the right to appeal his conviction and sentence, except for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. At sentencing, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas imposed a term of supervised release with a special condition requiring Hunter to participate in a mental health program and take any medication prescribed by his physician. Hunter objected to being compelled to take medication. Despite the appellate waiver, Hunter appealed the medication condition, arguing it infringed on his due process rights. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit initially dismissed his appeal, relying on circuit precedent that recognized only limited exceptions to appeal waivers. The Supreme Court of the United States subsequently granted certiorari and announced a new rule: appeal waivers are unenforceable if their enforcement would result in a "miscarriage of justice"—that is, if they would leave in place an obvious and egregious error undermining the integrity of the judicial system. On remand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s new standard. The court determined that the record supported the imposition of the medication condition, finding no "blatant" constitutional error or egregious statutory violation. The court concluded that requiring Hunter to take prescribed medication as part of supervised release did not constitute the kind of obvious judicial error that would render the waiver unenforceable. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that Hunter’s appeal waiver remained effective and dismissed the appeal. View "USA v. Hunter" on Justia Law

United States v. Smith

2026-07-29T12:30:39-08:00

Three individuals—Khari, Logan, and Saruba—became involved in a drug distribution scheme. While incarcerated, Khari connected his cellmate (who was cooperating with law enforcement) with Logan, a drug dealer based in Detroit but residing in Lexington, Kentucky. Logan, guided by Khari, communicated with an undercover officer and arranged to sell fentanyl and methamphetamine. Saruba, Logan’s girlfriend, accompanied Logan to a drug deal and participated in the exchange. Law enforcement recorded and monitored the transactions, conducted controlled buys, and eventually arrested the trio after seizing large quantities of drugs and drug paraphernalia. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky presided over the proceedings. Logan pleaded guilty to conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute, receiving a 360-month sentence. Khari and Saruba proceeded to trial. The jury convicted both of aiding and abetting drug distribution; Khari was also convicted of using a telephone to facilitate a drug offense, while Saruba was acquitted of conspiracy. The district court sentenced Khari to 150 months, consecutive to a prior sentence, and Saruba to 92 months. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed multiple challenges. The court rejected Logan’s claims of procedural and substantive sentencing error and affirmed her conviction and sentence. Khari’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence and sentencing arguments were also rejected, with the court upholding his conviction and sentence. For Saruba, the court affirmed her conviction, finding no reversible error in her trial or in the sufficiency of evidence. However, the appellate court determined that the district court erred by failing to apply a two-level reduction to her offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines. As a result, the Sixth Circuit vacated Saruba’s sentence and remanded her case for resentencing. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

USA v Randle

2026-07-29T11:31:03-08:00

Police in Illinois used a confidential informant to arrange a controlled purchase of methamphetamine involving the defendant at a hotel near Chicago. The informant met the defendant, facilitated the transaction, and provided police with a sample of the drugs. The following day, officers observed the defendant leave the hotel, place a suitcase in his car, and drive away. Shortly thereafter, state troopers conducted a traffic stop of the vehicle. During the stop, a canine unit alerted to the presence of drugs, and a subsequent search uncovered nearly three pounds of methamphetamine in the trunk. The defendant was indicted for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. In the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, the defendant moved to suppress the drug evidence, arguing the stop and search violated the Fourth Amendment. He also sought disclosure of the confidential informant’s identity and production of the grand jury transcript, claiming both were necessary for his defense. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied all three motions. The court held that the search was justified under the automobile exception based on probable cause from the controlled buy, and that the stop and search did not violate constitutional standards. It further concluded that the defendant had not sufficiently demonstrated a need for the informant’s identity or the grand jury transcript. The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal these rulings. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that police had probable cause to search the defendant’s car under the automobile exception, independent of the validity of the traffic stop and dog sniff. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in denying the motions for disclosure of the informant’s identity and the grand jury transcript, as the defendant failed to show a particularized need for either. View "USA v Randle" on Justia Law

USA V. YATES

2026-07-29T08:01:16-08:00

A man who had recently been released on parole was stopped by police in San Pablo, California, while driving with his young niece and nephew. After a brief delay in pulling over, the officer learned of his parole status and asked the occupants to exit the car. The officer found a loaded, modified Glock pistol on the nephew, and text messages showed the man had instructed his mother to retrieve the child because he was carrying the gun. The gun and ammunition were manufactured outside California, and the gun was modified to fire automatically. A federal grand jury indicted the defendant for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. He sought to dismiss the indictment on constitutional grounds and to suppress the evidence, but while the United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted the suppression motion, the Ninth Circuit summarily reversed and remanded after a related case clarified that asking about parole status during a stop was permissible. The defendant then requested a stipulated-facts bench trial, after his request for a conditional plea was refused by the government. The district court found him guilty following the bench trial. At sentencing, the district court applied a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility but, over its stated disagreement, did not apply a third point because the government declined to move for it, citing resources expended preparing for trial. The court also applied an enhancement for possessing the firearm in connection with child endangerment, a “wobbler” offense under California law, finding the conduct was felonious. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the government has broad discretion to withhold the motion for the third acceptance point under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b), and the district court properly exercised its discretion in treating the child endangerment offense as a felony for sentencing purposes. View "USA V. YATES" on Justia Law

United States v. Greebel

2026-07-29T07:00:13-08:00

The defendant, convicted by a jury of conspiracies to commit wire and securities fraud in connection with a scheme to defraud investors, was ordered to pay over $10 million in restitution to the victim company. To enforce this restitution order, the government sought to garnish the defendant’s 401(k) retirement accounts. The defendant objected, arguing that various legal provisions, including plan terms and federal statutes, either prohibited or limited garnishment of his accounts. The victim, the financial institutions holding the accounts, and the government ultimately reached a settlement on how the garnishment and tax consequences would be handled. After the conviction and sentence were affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York considered the government’s application for writs of garnishment. The district court rejected the parties’ proposed stipulated orders of garnishment, reasoning that the proposal exceeded the scope of the Second Circuit’s prior mandate by not resolving specific tax issues, and ordered its own procedure for liquidation and distribution of the funds. The district court also denied a stay of distribution, holding that the defendant lacked standing because the funds had been liquidated. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the controversy remained live despite the liquidation of the accounts, and that its previous mandate did not bar the district court from approving the parties’ stipulated orders of garnishment. The court found that the district court erred in its application of the mandate rule and in concluding that the defendant lacked standing. Accordingly, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case with instructions to approve the parties’ proposed stipulated orders of garnishment. View "United States v. Greebel" on Justia Law

State v. Allen

2026-07-29T06:08:52-08:00

The defendant was convicted of the murder of Lannie Silver, Jr., based primarily on the testimony of Ruby Waller, who identified the defendant as the shooter and recounted the events leading up to Silver’s death. Waller, who had a history of drug convictions, initially provided her statement to police before she faced any pending charges, but by the time of trial, she had an unresolved shoplifting charge. During trial, she testified she was not expecting any benefit for her testimony. Years after conviction, the defendant alleged that the prosecution failed to disclose Waller’s 1991 plea agreement, in which she had received a reduced sentence in exchange for testifying against a co-defendant in an unrelated case, arguing that this could have been used to impeach her credibility. Following his conviction and unsuccessful direct appeal in the Superior Court, Appellate Division, and after a failed habeas petition in federal court, the defendant filed a motion in state court for a new trial based on the newly discovered plea agreement. The trial court denied the motion, concluding the evidence was not material. On appeal, the Appellate Division agreed with the trial court’s result but found it had used the wrong legal standard, ultimately holding that the standards for materiality under Brady v. Maryland and State v. Carter were essentially the same, and that the error was harmless. The Supreme Court of New Jersey clarified that the Brady standard for materiality—whether there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different—is less demanding than Carter’s requirement that new evidence would probably change the verdict. The Court held these standards are not the same. Nonetheless, the Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s result, finding that the undisclosed plea agreement did not create a reasonable probability of a different outcome, and thus the defendant did not meet the Brady materiality standard. View "State v. Allen" on Justia Law

People Of Michigan v. Langston

2026-07-29T05:00:02-08:00

In 1976, the defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree felony murder for aiding and abetting an armed robbery in which another individual committed a fatal shooting at a grocery store. The defendant was not present during the actual shooting but had provided information about the store’s occupants to the principal. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The trial court’s instructions to the jury did not require a finding of malice as later defined by Michigan law. On direct appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the conviction due to improper jury instructions regarding the mens rea for felony murder. However, the Michigan Supreme Court reinstated the conviction after its decision in People v Aaron, which redefined malice for felony murder but applied only to trials in progress or later. The case returned to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the conviction, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied further review. In 2020, the defendant filed for post-judgment relief, arguing that his sentence was unconstitutional because the jury did not make a finding of malice as required by Aaron, and that mandatory life without parole was cruel or unusual punishment. The trial court denied his motion, stating it was bound by precedent, and the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. The Michigan Supreme Court held that mandatory life without parole for pre-Aaron felony murder constitutes cruel or unusual punishment under the Michigan Constitution if the jury was not instructed on malice as defined by Aaron, unless the prosecution can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found malice based on the trial evidence. If the prosecution fails to meet this burden, the no-parole aspect of the sentence must be struck, making the defendant eligible for parole. The trial court’s order was vacated in part, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "People Of Michigan v. Langston" on Justia Law

Commonwealth v. Pina

2026-07-29T04:09:08-08:00

The defendant was convicted by a jury in the Superior Court of murder in the first degree and unlawful possession of a firearm related to the shooting death of Keith Robinson in Boston in 1993. The prosecution’s case relied almost entirely on the testimony of two eyewitnesses, Debra Annas and Timothy Hall, both of whom identified the defendant as the shooter. There was no physical or forensic evidence directly linking the defendant to the crime scene. The defense theory throughout was misidentification. After the convictions were affirmed on direct appeal by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1999, the defendant filed three motions for a new trial. The first two were denied without hearings. The third motion, filed in 2020, was based on newly discovered and previously undisclosed evidence, including the fact that Annas was psychiatrically hospitalized at the time of her testimony, new police reports suggesting a third-party culprit, and DNA evidence excluding the defendant as a contributor to key items. After a four-day evidentiary hearing, a Superior Court judge granted the motion, finding that the combined weight of the new evidence justified a new trial. The Commonwealth was permitted to appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s decision to grant a new trial. The Court held that the newly discovered evidence—including Annas’s mental health records, the third-party culprit evidence, and the DNA testing—either individually or in concert, cast real doubt on the justice of the convictions. The Court concluded that the motion judge did not commit a significant error of law or abuse of discretion. The order allowing the defendant’s motion for a new trial was affirmed, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Commonwealth v. Pina" on Justia Law

State v. Keaton

2026-07-29T04:03:13-08:00

The case involved a fatal shooting that took place during a nighttime street vigil in Hartford, where the defendant was identified as the shooter through surveillance video footage and subsequent police investigation. The police obtained and compiled footage from multiple street cameras using a software program called Milestone, which synchronized the various video feeds. During a police interview, the defendant identified himself in the video footage and admitted to being in the vicinity of the shooting. At trial, both the video compilation and the recording of the defendant’s interview were admitted into evidence. The case was tried before the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the jury found the defendant guilty of murder and criminal possession of a firearm. During the trial, the defense did not object to the admission of either the video compilation or the recorded police interview and related waiver forms. The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict and sentenced the defendant to fifty-five years of imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant argued before the Connecticut Supreme Court that his confrontation rights were violated by the admission of the video compilation, claiming he was entitled to cross-examine the developer of the Milestone software. He also contended that his right to counsel was violated during the police interview. The Supreme Court held that the defendant’s confrontation clause claim was affirmatively waived because his counsel expressly stated “[n]o objection” to the admission of the evidence at trial. The court further found the record inadequate to review the confrontation claim and determined that the right-to-counsel claim was unreviewable under established standards due to waiver. The court declined to exercise its supervisory authority to adopt new rules or reverse the conviction. Accordingly, the conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Keaton" on Justia Law

State v. Kim

2026-07-29T04:03:11-08:00

The case concerns a criminal prosecution in which the defendant, a man in his late fifties, was convicted of sexual assault in the third degree and assault of an elderly person in the third degree against a coworker. The incident occurred when the victim, a sixty-year-old woman, invited the defendant to her condominium to assess window repairs. During the visit, the defendant assaulted her physically and sexually. The victim reported the incident to her employer and later to the police. Physical evidence, including DNA found on the victim’s clothing, corroborated her account. The defendant initially denied being at the victim’s residence in a workplace interview but later admitted his presence, offering an alternative, exculpatory explanation at trial. After the charges were filed, the Superior Court for the Judicial District of Danbury conducted a jury trial. The court gave a consciousness of guilt instruction, over the defendant’s objection, based on his inconsistent statements regarding his presence at the victim’s home. The jury found him guilty of two charges but acquitted him on others. He was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment, suspended after twenty-seven months, with probation. The defendant appealed, arguing that the consciousness of guilt instruction was improper and that such instructions should be categorically abolished. The Supreme Court of Connecticut found that the trial court abused its discretion by delivering the consciousness of guilt instruction, as the evidence of inconsistent statements was ambiguous and its probative value was minimal. Nevertheless, the Court held the error was harmless, given the strong independent evidence of guilt and the jury’s mixed verdict. The Supreme Court declined to abolish consciousness of guilt instructions but used its supervisory authority to clarify the narrow circumstances in which such instructions are appropriate and provided guidance on their proper, neutral formulation. The judgment was affirmed. View "State v. Kim" on Justia Law

State v. Veltkamp

2026-07-28T14:38:53-08:00

A father was accused of sexually abusing his minor daughter over a period of years, with a specific incident occurring on April 15, 2020, when the daughter, J.V., was 14 years old. The next day, J.V. disclosed the abuse to her mother via text message, and a sexual assault examination was performed at a hospital, where J.V. provided a narrative statement detailing the incident. Physical evidence, including J.V.’s blood on the father’s penile swab and the father’s semen on J.V.’s bedding, was collected. The father was charged with multiple counts of incest, and at trial, both J.V. and her mother testified about the events and the disclosure. The State introduced J.V.’s narrative from the Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) Report and the text messages as evidence. In the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, the defendant objected to the admission of J.V.’s statements in the SANE Report and the text messages, arguing they were inadmissible hearsay. The District Court overruled these objections, admitting both as evidence, and allowed the jury to review the SANE Report during deliberations. The jury convicted the defendant on two counts of incest and acquitted him on a third. He was sentenced to two consecutive 100-year prison terms. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the admission of the SANE Report and text messages, and allowing the jury to examine the SANE Report during deliberations, constituted reversible error. The Court held that it was error to admit the SANE Report under the medical diagnosis exception and to provide it to the jury during deliberations, but these errors were harmless because other properly admitted evidence proved the same facts. The Court also found the text messages were properly admitted as relevant evidence. The conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Veltkamp" on Justia Law

State v. Martinez

2026-07-28T14:38:52-08:00

The case concerns a man who, after drinking alcohol at a public lake with his family, drove away with his wife and children, attracting the attention of other beachgoers who reported his behavior to law enforcement. When an officer found the vehicle on the roadside, the defendant was outside, agitated and armed, and engaged in a heated argument with his wife. The officer attempted to intervene, deploying a TASER, but the defendant remained combative until backup arrived and detained him. While in the back of the patrol car, the defendant spat throughout the vehicle. He was charged with several offenses, including three counts of felony criminal child endangerment, one felony count of criminal endangerment, one misdemeanor count of criminal mischief for spitting in the patrol car, and one misdemeanor count of disorderly conduct. The Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, presided over a jury trial where the jury convicted the defendant of all counts except the felony criminal endangerment. At sentencing, the court imposed prison terms and fines, including a fine for the misdemeanor criminal mischief. The defendant requested suspension of fines and fees, citing his incarceration and lack of future earning ability. The district court nonetheless found the defendant able to pay and imposed the financial obligations. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether sufficient evidence supported the misdemeanor criminal mischief conviction and whether the lower court properly inquired into the defendant’s ability to pay fines and fees. The Supreme Court held that there was insufficient evidence to support the criminal mischief conviction, as no evidence showed that the spitting caused damage or pecuniary loss to the vehicle. The Court also determined that the district court had not conducted an adequate inquiry into the defendant’s ability to pay. The Supreme Court reversed the criminal mischief conviction and remanded for further proceedings regarding the imposition of fines and fees. View "State v. Martinez" on Justia Law

State v. Morrissey

2026-07-28T14:38:46-08:00

The case involves a defendant who was charged with three counts of felony sexual assault based on allegations made by his niece, S.M. The incidents occurred at the defendant’s mother’s house in Laurel, Montana, between 2015 and 2017, during the defendant’s annual summer visits. S.M. disclosed the assaults in 2020 after a school assembly on sexual assault, leading to a police investigation. At trial, S.M. described three incidents, including one where she was standing and the defendant’s hand touched the same area as during a previous assault. The State presented expert testimony on the delayed disclosure and memory issues common among child victims. No physical evidence was collected. The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, presided over the jury trial. After the State’s case-in-chief, the defense moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on Count I, arguing the evidence was insufficient to prove knowing or purposeful sexual contact for that incident. The District Court denied the motion, concluding that a rational juror could find the essential elements of the offense, and submitted all three counts to the jury. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court erred in denying the motion to dismiss Count I. Applying a de novo standard, the Court held that, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on Count I. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s ruling and the defendant’s conviction on all three counts. View "State v. Morrissey" on Justia Law

United States v. King

2026-07-28T13:00:37-08:00

The defendant was arrested in 2023 after police discovered evidence linking him to significant drug trafficking, including large quantities of fentanyl and methamphetamine, as well as a firearm. He confessed to both personal use and substantial sales of fentanyl. Previously, he had two state felony convictions for possessing meth for resale, served five years in prison, and was paroled before committing the new offense. A federal grand jury charged him with several offenses, but he ultimately pleaded guilty to possessing with intent to distribute at least 40 grams of a fentanyl mixture. The government dismissed other charges and did not pursue enhanced penalties. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee sentenced the defendant as a career offender, calculating a Guidelines range of 188 to 235 months and imposing a sentence at the lower end. The defendant moved for a downward variance, arguing that his prior state convictions should not qualify him as a career offender under the guidelines, citing his upbringing and the time gap between convictions as mitigating factors. He also challenged the inclusion of state-law convictions as career-offender predicates, suggesting the Sentencing Commission exceeded its statutory authority. The district court considered his mitigating arguments but denied the variance and applied the guideline. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the sentence. It held that the career-offender guideline validly includes state-law convictions, interpreting the statute to cover offenses “described in” federal drug statutes, regardless of whether the convictions were under federal or state law. The court found no procedural error, as the district court adequately considered the relevant factors and explained its reasoning. The court also found the sentence substantively reasonable, especially as it was within the Guidelines range, and rejected the defendant’s challenges. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. King" on Justia Law

United States v. Meier

2026-07-28T10:33:53-08:00

The defendant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute child pornography and five counts of distribution, all stemming from his posting of images and video links on a child pornography website. The investigation revealed that the defendant used online personas, often pretending to be a young female and sometimes using prerecorded videos, to entice minor boys into sexually explicit acts over webcam, which he then recorded and distributed. The presentence report and victim accounts detailed his consistent method of operation, although no videos of the so-called "bait girls" were recovered by law enforcement. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado calculated the defendant’s offense level under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Ordinarily, distribution offenses are calculated under § 2G2.2, but the court applied the "Production Cross Reference," shifting to § 2G2.1, the guideline for production, because it found the defendant had produced the videos and that § 2G2.1 yielded a higher offense level for each count. The court’s findings relied on the presentence report and government briefing. The defendant did not dispute the higher offense level under § 2G2.1 at sentencing but later argued that the district court should have applied a different enhancement under § 2G2.2, which, if applied, would have resulted in a lower guideline range. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the application of the guidelines for plain error. The defendant argued the district court should have applied a seven-level enhancement for distribution to entice a minor, which would have prevented use of the more punitive production guideline. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not clearly or obviously err, because it had not made the factual findings necessary to trigger that enhancement—specifically, that the distributed material depicted underage girls engaged in prohibited sexual conduct. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment and sentence. View "United States v. Meier" on Justia Law

Spicuzza v. State

2026-07-28T09:35:56-08:00

The case involved allegations that a father sexually abused his minor daughter, H., over a period of years, and that he also abused her friends and provided them with intoxicating substances when they visited his apartment. The evidence included testimony from H., two of her friends (A.L. and A.B.), and a social worker, describing sexual misconduct and the provision of alcohol, marijuana, and vapes to the minors. The prosecution also introduced evidence that the father showed pornographic material to the girls. The defense denied all allegations and sought to present character witnesses to attest to his honesty. In the Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County, the defendant was convicted by a jury of sexual abuse of a minor, second-degree rape, and third-degree sexual offense. The court admitted the testimony of H.’s friends regarding other alleged abuses and denied the defendant’s motion to exclude this evidence under Maryland Rule 5-404(b). The court also refused to allow the defendant’s character witnesses to testify as to his honesty. Additionally, during cross-examination, the prosecutor asked the defendant why his daughter would lie about the allegations, to which the defense objected. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the convictions, holding that the evidence of other bad acts was admissible to explain the victim’s delayed reporting and to corroborate her testimony, and that the exclusion of character witnesses was proper. The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the judgment. It held that the trial court did not err in admitting the other bad acts evidence under the “common scheme or plan” exception to Rule 5-404(b), as the acts were sufficiently connected to show a general plan of abuse involving the daughter and her friends. The Court further held that the prosecutor’s “why-would-she-lie” question was improper but found the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, it concluded that the trial court properly excluded the defendant’s character evidence for honesty, as the charges were not veracity-impeaching offenses and the defense’s proffers lacked specificity. View "Spicuzza v. State" on Justia Law

United States v. Campbell

2026-07-28T09:32:18-08:00

Deputy U.S. Marshals sought to arrest an individual on outstanding warrants at a Dollar General store in Mannford, Oklahoma. The deputies approached a white sedan where the suspect had been lying in the backseat. When the deputies initiated the arrest, the individual quickly exited the vehicle, brushing past one deputy. The deputy attempted to restrain the individual, who broke free and fled into a wooded area. Video evidence later revealed that the individual had been holding a knife during the encounter. During the pursuit, a deputy was injured by barbed wire, and the suspect was apprehended several weeks later. A grand jury indicted the defendant for using a deadly or dangerous weapon to assault a federal officer engaged in official duties, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1), (b). Prior to trial, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma issued a preliminary ruling allowing the government to use five of the defendant’s prior felony convictions to impeach his testimony, depending on trial evidence. At trial, the defendant chose not to testify, and the jury convicted him, specifically finding the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon. The district court imposed a sentence within the Sentencing Guidelines. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that because the defendant did not testify, he waived any review of the district court’s preliminary ruling regarding impeachment with prior convictions. The court also found that while it was error to admit testimony about a police dog’s injury during the search, this error was harmless. The court concluded there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction, found no plain prosecutorial error during closing arguments, and determined that cumulative error did not warrant reversal. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law

United States v. Mims

2026-07-28T09:02:43-08:00

The case involves a defendant who broke into a pickup truck and stole various items, including a pistol. The day after the burglary, police stopped and searched the defendant’s vehicle, discovering the stolen firearm and another weapon. The defendant had prior felony convictions and was prosecuted in federal court for unlawfully possessing firearms as a felon and for possessing a stolen firearm. He was also charged by the State of Oklahoma with third-degree burglary, though that charge was later dismissed. In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, the defendant pled guilty to the federal firearms charges. At sentencing, the court adopted two enhancements recommended by the Presentence Investigation Report: one for possessing stolen firearms and another for possessing a firearm “in connection with another felony offense,” specifically the burglary. The defendant objected to the latter enhancement, arguing that it should not apply because he did not commit a separate felony beyond the burglary through which he acquired the firearm, and because Oklahoma’s third-degree burglary did not meet the generic definition of burglary. The district court overruled his objection and imposed a sentence at the low end of the enhanced guideline range. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(7)(B) applies when a firearm obtained during the commission of a felony, such as burglary, has the potential to facilitate that felony—even if the firearm is the object of the offense and there is no additional felonious conduct. The court concluded that the defendant’s possession of the stolen firearm during the burglary met this standard and affirmed the district court’s application of the enhancement and resulting sentence. View "United States v. Mims" on Justia Law

USA V. LOPEZ

2026-07-28T08:01:15-08:00

Jonathan Lopez was charged with possessing a firearm as a prohibited person after previously being convicted of two felony offenses under California Penal Code § 273.5, which penalizes willfully inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition on certain victims such as spouses or cohabitants. Lopez pleaded guilty to the federal firearm charge but reserved the right to challenge whether his prior state convictions qualified as “crimes of violence” for the purpose of sentencing enhancements under the federal Sentencing Guidelines. In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, the probation office and the government recommended, and the court applied, an enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2), which raises the base offense level if the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence. The district court found that Lopez’s two prior convictions under § 273.5 met this criterion, following then-binding Ninth Circuit precedent. The court overruled Lopez’s objection to this classification and sentenced him to a term of 67 months, which was below the guideline range due to a downward variance. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered intervening Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit en banc decisions—Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021), and United States v. Gomez, 165 F.4th 1199 (9th Cir. 2026) (en banc)—which clarified that, to be a categorical crime of violence, an offense must require a mens rea greater than recklessness as to the use of force directed at another. The Ninth Circuit held that § 273.5 does not categorically qualify because it requires only the intent to commit the act, not intent or knowledge that force will be directed at another. The court vacated Lopez’s sentence and remanded for resentencing without the enhancement. View "USA V. LOPEZ" on Justia Law

United States v. Bogan

2026-07-28T07:01:09-08:00

The defendant, after joining a gang at age 14, participated in a drive-by shooting in Iowa that resulted in the death of a bystander. He was convicted by a state jury of first-degree murder, but the conviction was reversed on appeal. He subsequently pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and related charges and was sentenced to up to 25 years in state prison. Following his release in 2014, he was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and later, after further criminal activity including high-speed chases and renewed gang involvement, conspired to distribute cocaine and participated in a shooting incident in 2020. Surveillance footage captured him firing a weapon, and he was later charged federally with RICO conspiracy and felon-in-possession offenses. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa denied the defendant’s pretrial motions to dismiss the indictment. He had argued that the inclusion of his juvenile conduct in the RICO charge violated the Juvenile Delinquency Act (JDA), and challenged the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). The district court rejected both arguments, and the defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings de novo. It held that post-majority ratification of a conspiracy allows pre-majority conduct to be considered as part of a federal RICO prosecution, making the JDA inapplicable in this context. The court also held that circuit precedent foreclosed the defendant’s Bruen-based challenge to the felon-in-possession statute. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motions to dismiss. View "United States v. Bogan" on Justia Law

United States v. Longie

2026-07-28T07:01:07-08:00

In this case, the defendant had previously pleaded guilty in Minnesota state court to a serious sexual offense, which required him to register as a sex offender under both state law and the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). After his release in 2022, he indicated in Minnesota that he would reside at a local shelter, but was homeless when the shelter had no space for him. He expressed interest in moving to another state for employment, and was advised that he must provide specific information and obtain approval before relocating. He registered as living in Moorhead, Minnesota at the end of June 2022, but soon after left the state without proper authorization, spent time in North Dakota, and eventually resided in South Dakota with his mother without registering in either state. For over 600 days, he failed to comply with SORNA’s registration requirements. The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota presided over his criminal trial after he was discovered living in South Dakota. The defendant sought to introduce an affirmative defense based on “uncontrollable circumstances” under 18 U.S.C. § 2250(c), claiming that threats and harassment prevented him from registering. The district court excluded some testimony from the defendant and his mother concerning alleged threats and mistreatment, and refused to instruct the jury on the uncontrollable circumstances defense, concluding there was insufficient evidence to support it. The jury convicted the defendant, who was then sentenced to 45 months’ imprisonment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that there was no abuse of discretion in excluding the testimony and that, even when viewed favorably to the defendant, the evidence did not establish the statutory elements of the uncontrollable circumstances defense. Therefore, the district court’s refusal to instruct the jury on this defense was proper. View "United States v. Longie" on Justia Law

United States v. Striplin

2026-07-28T07:01:06-08:00

Benjamin Striplin was apprehended after leading police on a high-speed chase that ended with his arrest. During a search of his vehicle, officers found a loaded pistol and a makeshift device used for smoking methamphetamine. Striplin admitted to regularly using methamphetamine and to owning the firearm at the time of his arrest. Based on these admissions, a grand jury charged him with possessing a firearm as an unlawful user of a controlled substance, in violation of federal law. Before trial, Striplin moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute under which he was charged violated the Second Amendment and was unconstitutionally vague, both on its face and as applied to him. A magistrate judge recommended denial of the motion, reasoning that historical firearm regulations supported restrictions on possession by certain categories of persons, and concluded that vagueness challenges could not be resolved until trial. The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri adopted these recommendations, denied the motion to dismiss, and later found Striplin guilty at a bench trial based on stipulated facts. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. The appellate court rejected Striplin’s vagueness challenge, finding the statute clear as applied to someone who admitted to regular drug use contemporaneous with firearm possession. However, regarding the Second Amendment claim, the Eighth Circuit noted that recent case law requires a fact-specific analysis to determine whether the application of the statute aligns with historical firearm regulation traditions. Because the district court did not conduct this analysis, the appellate court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with current legal standards. View "United States v. Striplin" on Justia Law

State v. Chamberlin

2026-07-28T01:46:56-08:00

A child disclosed to their pediatrician at age seventeen that their father had sexually abused them multiple times during childhood. This led to a police investigation and criminal charges against the father for multiple counts of aggravated sexual assault and lewd or lascivious conduct, with incidents alleged to have occurred in various Vermont locations and one count referencing acts in Massachusetts. At trial, the child recounted specific memories of being sexually assaulted in Vermont and Massachusetts, along with related inappropriate conduct, while an expert for the prosecution testified about the effects of trauma on memory and reasons for delayed reporting in child sexual abuse cases. Before trial, the defendant moved to exclude evidence of uncharged acts in Massachusetts and to bar the expert’s testimony as unqualified, but the Vermont Superior Court, Windham Unit, Criminal Division, denied both motions, finding the evidence relevant and the expert qualified. The defendant was convicted by a jury on four counts (aggravated sexual assault and lewd or lascivious conduct) and acquitted on one; the court sentenced him to multiple concurrent terms. Post-trial, the defendant sought acquittal on one count due to insufficient evidence and a new trial based on evidentiary claims, but the trial court denied these motions. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the sufficiency of evidence for one count, the admission of prior bad acts, the qualifications of the expert witness, and alleged improper prosecutorial statements. The court held that circumstantial evidence and expert testimony sufficed to support the conviction, the evidence of uncharged acts was properly admitted for context and to explain delayed reporting, the expert was suitably qualified, and no plain error occurred in the prosecutor’s comments. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Chamberlin" on Justia Law

People v. Vasquez

2026-07-27T12:03:38-08:00

The case involves a man who was investigated for illegal possession of firearms based on social media activity and prior criminal history. Law enforcement officers observed a photograph on his public social media profile depicting him holding a handgun, and further background checks revealed he was prohibited from possessing firearms due to a prior felony conviction. After an initial search warrant could not be executed because he had moved, investigators eventually learned of his new residence from a confidential informant. Surveillance confirmed his presence at the new location, and a warrant was obtained—supported in part by informant statements, which were sealed for confidentiality. The search of his home uncovered multiple firearms, ammunition, cash, and marijuana, and he was charged with several counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, among other offenses. Prior to entering a guilty plea, the defendant filed several motions in the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. He sought to unseal the confidential informant portion of the search warrant affidavit, traverse and quash the warrant, and suppress evidence obtained during the search. The trial court held in camera hearings, reviewed both public and sealed portions of the affidavit, and denied all motions, finding the sealing justified, no material misrepresentations or omissions in the affidavit, and probable cause for the warrant. The defendant pled guilty but preserved his right to appeal the denial of these motions. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s decisions, holding that the confidential informant’s identity was properly protected, the affidavit supported probable cause, no material falsehoods or omissions were found, and the search was not tainted by any alleged unlawful detention. The denial of the motions to unseal, traverse, quash, and suppress was affirmed, and the judgment was upheld. View "People v. Vasquez" on Justia Law

USA v Dorfman

2026-07-27T11:30:47-08:00

The case concerns the owner and CEO of a telemarketing company that sold limited indemnity healthcare insurance plans, which provided fewer benefits than traditional health insurance. The CEO, along with other executives, instructed sales employees to use deceptive and misleading scripts to sell these plans, resulting in customers being misled about the scope of coverage. The government alleged that these practices were designed to create the false impression that customers were purchasing more comprehensive health insurance than they actually received. The case was first tried in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. One executive pleaded guilty and testified against the CEO and another defendant, who were tried before a jury. After an eleven-day trial, the jury convicted both remaining defendants on all counts, including conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud, and mail fraud. The CEO moved for acquittal or a new trial, but the district court denied those motions and sentenced him to 300 months imprisonment on the conspiracy count and 240 months on the other counts, with all terms to be served concurrently. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed several challenges to the conviction. The court held that the jury instructions on “scheme to defraud” accurately reflected the law, clarifying that actual falsity is not required and that misleading or deceptive statements, including omissions or half-truths, can support a conviction under the relevant statutes. The court also found no plain error in the admission and use of a training video exhibit during jury deliberations, and rejected claims of constructive amendment and the need for a specific unanimity instruction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v Dorfman" on Justia Law

State v. King

2026-07-27T11:07:13-08:00

The case involves the conviction of an individual for two counts of second-degree murder and related firearms offenses following a shooting incident in Prince George’s County, Maryland. The State’s evidence included testimony from a firearms identification expert who opined that bullets and cartridges recovered from the scene were fired from a specific handgun linked to the defendant. The defense initially raised discovery objections concerning the expert’s bench notes and signaled an intent to challenge the reliability of the ballistics methodology but ultimately limited its objection to procedural discrepancies in how the expert conducted the examination, rather than the reliability of the underlying science. Following trial and conviction in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court of Maryland. While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court of Maryland decided Abruquah v. State, 483 Md. 637 (2023), which limited the admissibility of unqualified firearms identification testimony based on the evidentiary record in that case. The defendant raised an Abruquah claim for the first time in his reply brief, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the expert’s testimony. The Appellate Court reversed the conviction, finding abuse of discretion and concluding the error was not harmless, as the firearms testimony was the primary evidence linking the defendant to the crime. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Maryland addressed whether the Appellate Court erred in applying Abruquah retroactively when the issue was not preserved and no Daubert-Rochkind hearing was held. The Supreme Court held that the defense had expressly waived any challenge to the reliability of firearms identification methodology and failed to file a timely motion as required by Maryland Rule 4-252. Even if treated as unpreserved, the admission of the expert testimony was not plain error, as Abruquah was a case-specific ruling rather than a categorical prohibition. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. King" on Justia Law

US v. Melvin

2026-07-27T11:01:34-08:00

The defendant pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The Probation Office prepared a presentence report that identified four prior convictions as potential predicates for a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which imposes a mandatory minimum sentence if a defendant has at least three qualifying convictions. The defendant timely objected to three of the four proposed predicates. At sentencing, the district court sustained two of the defendant’s objections, leaving only two qualifying convictions. In response, the government, for the first time at the sentencing hearing, proposed a new predicate conviction that had not been raised earlier. Over defense counsel’s objection, the district court allowed a continuance for consideration of the new predicate, ultimately agreed with the government, and applied the ACCA enhancement, resulting in a 188-month sentence. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina ruled in favor of the government’s late proposal for a new predicate offense, despite the defendant’s objections that the government had not complied with procedural rules. The defendant appealed the sentence. During the appeal, the government initially responded to the merits of the defendant’s claims rather than invoking an appeal waiver. Only after new briefing did the government attempt to assert the appeal waiver, but the appellate court found this procedural argument had been forfeited due to the government’s earlier actions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred by allowing the government to introduce a new ACCA predicate after the deadline for objections in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(f) without a showing of good cause. The court found the procedural error was not harmless because it resulted in a substantially longer sentence. The Fourth Circuit vacated the defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing without the ACCA enhancement. View "US v. Melvin" on Justia Law

US v. Jaqu

2026-07-27T11:01:34-08:00

The defendant was convicted by a jury of multiple drug-trafficking and firearm offenses following a three-day trial, during which he was represented by court-appointed counsel. After the trial and before sentencing, the defendant filed a notice expressing his desire to remove his counsel and represent himself at sentencing. At a subsequent hearing, despite being advised against self-representation, the defendant maintained his wish to proceed pro se for sentencing. The sentencing hearing had not yet been scheduled at the time of his request. The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina denied the defendant’s request to represent himself at sentencing, finding it untimely because it was made several months after the jury verdict and after objections to the presentence report had been filed. The court relied on precedent that allows for denial of self-representation requests made after the commencement of trial and appointed new counsel to represent the defendant at sentencing. The defendant was ultimately sentenced with an enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act, and he appealed, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation was violated. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in denying the defendant’s request to represent himself at sentencing on the basis of untimeliness. The appellate court clarified that a request to proceed pro se at sentencing, made after trial but before sentencing, is not untimely if sentencing has not yet been scheduled and the request does not disrupt proceedings. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for resentencing, instructing the district court to conduct a proper Faretta hearing to determine whether the waiver of counsel is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The court did not address arguments related to the Armed Career Criminal Act enhancement. View "US v. Jaqu" on Justia Law

USA V. PATTERSON

2026-07-27T08:01:19-08:00

The case concerns a defendant who pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, after police discovered a loaded pistol on his person during a traffic stop. The prosecution sought an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), based on the defendant’s prior Oregon state felony convictions: two for third-degree assault and one for strangulation. The defendant challenged the use of these convictions as ACCA predicate offenses, arguing they did not meet the definition of “violent felonies.” He also argued that his constitutional rights were violated because the judge, rather than a jury, determined that his prior offenses occurred on different occasions, a necessary finding to trigger the ACCA enhancement. The United States District Court for the District of Oregon found that the prior convictions were for violent felonies and had been committed on different occasions, and imposed the ACCA’s mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years. The defendant appealed, raising the same constitutional and statutory objections. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It concluded that, in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Erlinger v. United States, the district court had erred under Apprendi v. New Jersey by making the separate-occasions finding itself, rather than submitting it to a jury. However, the Ninth Circuit held that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, because the record contained overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence that the offenses occurred on different occasions. The court also held that the defendant’s Oregon convictions for third-degree assault and strangulation qualified as violent felonies under the ACCA. The court therefore affirmed the sentence imposed by the district court. View "USA V. PATTERSON" on Justia Law

USA V. ANTEN

2026-07-27T08:01:19-08:00

The case centers on Mark William Anten, who, after previously serving as a confidential informant for the FBI, began sending a series of increasingly disturbing emails to former FBI handlers and other agents. These communications included self-identification as the “Unabomber,” explicit threats to bomb the Los Angeles FBI headquarters, and attachments referencing mass violence and bomb-making. The messages, sent in 2023, alarmed the agents involved, leading them to notify security and initiate threat assessments. Anten’s emails persisted despite warnings, culminating in his arrest in December 2023. A search of his residence uncovered no weapons or bomb-making materials. The United States District Court for the Central District of California presided over Anten’s trial. The jury convicted him on two counts of transmitting threats to injure others via interstate communications, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). During trial, Anten contested the jury instructions, arguing they failed to include an objective element for what constitutes a “threat,” and challenged the court’s response to a jury note about which exhibits were referenced in the indictment. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit examined whether the statute requires both an objective “threat” element and a subjective mental state element. The appellate court held that 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) indeed requires: (1) an objective element—meaning the communication must be viewed as a threat by a reasonable person—and (2) a subjective element—requiring at least recklessness as to whether the statement would be perceived as a threat. The court found that, while the jury instructions could have been clearer, they sufficiently included both elements. It also concluded that the district court’s response to the jury’s note was not improper. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction. View "USA V. ANTEN" on Justia Law

United States v. Gendron

2026-07-27T07:00:03-08:00

In May 2022, Payton Gendron carried out a mass shooting at a supermarket in Buffalo, New York, killing ten Black individuals and injuring three others. He meticulously planned the attack to target Black victims, documenting his intentions and motives in a manifesto and online journal. Following the attack, a grand jury indicted Gendron on multiple federal charges, including hate crimes resulting in death and firearm offenses. The government sought the death penalty on certain counts and provided notice of both statutory and non-statutory aggravating factors, including the impact on surviving victims, Gendron’s racist motive, and his intent to incite further violence. The United States District Court for the Western District of New York struck the three contested non-statutory aggravating factors from the government’s notice. The court reasoned that the surviving victims’ injuries were irrelevant to the capital charges, that federal law precluded the government from presenting Gendron’s racist motive as an aggravator, and that citing his intent to incite further violence would violate his First Amendment rights by punishing protected speech. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed these rulings de novo. The Second Circuit held that all three non-statutory aggravating factors were permissible. It concluded that evidence of injury to surviving victims is relevant to the circumstances of the crime in a capital sentencing proceeding. The court determined that presenting Gendron’s racist motive does not violate statutory restrictions, as the motive itself, not the race of the victims, is at issue. Finally, the court held that referencing Gendron’s intent to incite further violence does not infringe upon his First Amendment rights when used to establish motive for the crime. The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Gendron" on Justia Law

State v. King

2026-07-27T06:36:28-08:00

After two individuals were found shot to death in a car in Prince George’s County, Maryland, the police recovered a semi-automatic handgun and spent cartridges at the scene. The defendant’s cellphone, containing a picture of the same gun and messages referencing a debt owed by one of the victims, was also found in the car. Surveillance footage and witness testimony placed the defendant at the scene. The defendant was indicted on multiple charges, including second-degree murder and firearms offenses. During pretrial proceedings in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, the defense raised discovery issues related to the State’s firearms expert but did not file a motion for a Daubert hearing to challenge the reliability of the firearms identification methodology. At trial, the defense limited its objection to “as-applied” issues—alleging the examiner had not followed proper procedures—rather than contesting the scientific reliability of the methodology. The defense explicitly told the court its concern was “not with the science.” The circuit court allowed the expert’s testimony, and the jury convicted the defendant. On appeal, the Appellate Court of Maryland reversed, relying on the Supreme Court of Maryland’s decision in Abruquah v. State, which restricted unqualified firearms identification testimony. The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case. It held that Abruquah was a case-specific determination under Daubert and Rochkind, not a categorical rule barring all unqualified firearms identification testimony. The Court found the defense had waived any challenge to the methodology’s reliability by expressly disclaiming such an objection and failing to file a proper motion. Even if the claim were merely unpreserved, admission of the testimony was not plain error. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment and remanded for consideration of remaining appellate issues. View "State v. King" on Justia Law

State v. Kearney

2026-07-27T06:09:08-08:00

In this case, the defendant was charged and convicted of murder and related offenses following the stabbing death of Christopher Sharp. The incident occurred during a late-night altercation at Boone’s home, where Boone, the defendant’s girlfriend, was present along with other individuals. Boone later hired an attorney to represent the defendant and paid his legal fees, subsequently serving as a key State witness at trial. Her testimony regarding the defendant’s statements about the victim’s injuries was central to the prosecution, and defense counsel cross-examined her extensively, questioning her credibility and motives. After his conviction by a jury, the defendant appealed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel based on a conflict of interest arising from Boone’s payment of legal fees. The Superior Court, Appellate Division, reviewed the post-conviction relief (PCR) petition, concluding that the defendant failed to establish a per se or actual conflict and that the attorney’s performance demonstrated loyalty to the client. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s denial of relief, finding no evidence of divided loyalties or impaired advocacy, and deemed an evidentiary hearing unnecessary given the lack of specific factual allegations. Upon granting certification, the Supreme Court of New Jersey addressed whether payment of legal fees by a State witness creates a conflict of interest. The Court held that such arrangements do not constitute a per se conflict and, under the facts presented, no actual conflict was established. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment and recommended best practices for documenting third-party payment arrangements, but clarified that failure to adopt these practices does not alone warrant relief for ineffective assistance of counsel. View "State v. Kearney" on Justia Law

People Of Michigan v. Jennings

2026-07-25T05:00:02-08:00

A man was stopped by police while driving a car matching the description of a vehicle seen leaving the scene of a shooting. Police found a loaded handgun in the glovebox. During questioning, the driver admitted to being at the scene and driving the car, but when asked for a DNA sample to compare with the handgun, he refused and ended the interview. At trial, the prosecutor argued that the defendant’s decision to stop cooperating was evidence of a “guilty conscience,” displaying a board with that phrase to the jury and contrasting his actions with those of other occupants who continued their interviews. After closing arguments, the Macomb Circuit Court judge raised concerns that the prosecutor’s comments improperly used the defendant’s invocation of his right to silence against him. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, which the court granted. The defendant argued that a retrial would violate double jeopardy, but the trial court denied this, finding no evidence that the prosecutor specifically intended to provoke a mistrial. At the second trial, the prosecution shifted its theory, and the defendant was convicted. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that retrial was not barred under the standard from Oregon v Kennedy, 456 US 667 (1982), because the prosecutor’s misconduct was not intended to goad the defense into requesting a mistrial but was instead reckless or negligent. On further appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the Kennedy standard does not properly protect the double-jeopardy rights guaranteed by the Michigan Constitution. The Court rejected Kennedy and adopted the broader standard from Pool v Superior Court, 139 Ariz 98 (1984), holding that retrial is barred if a mistrial is granted due to intentional, prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct pursued for an improper purpose with indifference to the risk of mistrial, and the resulting prejudice cannot be cured short of a mistrial. The Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded for application of the new standard. View "People Of Michigan v. Jennings" on Justia Law

US v. Irizarry-Irizarry

2026-07-24T13:30:04-08:00

A lawyer who served as a legal advisor to a Puerto Rican municipality and its mayor became involved in a scheme related to funds awarded to the municipality for trauma center renovations. The municipal legislature had created a for-profit corporation to promote economic development. Following the deposit of $9 million—traceable to the trauma center renovation funds—financial consultants persuaded the mayor to invest the money, promising it would benefit the municipality and be returned after generating interest. However, the consultants and associates, including the defendant, orchestrated a fraudulent transfer of the funds through multiple accounts and corporate entities. The defendant’s company received significant payments from these transactions, for which he fabricated invoices and provided no actual services. He used some of the money for personal expenses. When auditors later questioned the $9 million transfer, the defendant and others falsely asserted that the transaction was lawful and the funds were appropriately invested. A federal grand jury in Puerto Rico indicted the defendant and several others on charges including wire fraud conspiracy, substantive wire fraud, and money laundering. At trial in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, the defendant moved for judgment of acquittal based on insufficient evidence, but the court denied the motions. The jury found him guilty on all counts. The district court sentenced him to thirty-seven months’ imprisonment and denied his subsequent pro se motion for a sentence reduction. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s convictions, as a reasonable jury could find he knowingly participated in a single overarching conspiracy to defraud the municipality. The court also held it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of his sentence reduction motion because no notice of appeal was filed for that order. The court affirmed the convictions and dismissed the sentencing challenge. View "US v. Irizarry-Irizarry" on Justia Law

USA v Fung

2026-07-24T11:30:46-08:00

A licensed podiatrist in Illinois, holding a DEA registration, was investigated for his opioid prescription practices. After an undercover operation involving agents posing as patients, he was indicted on 74 counts for unlawfully prescribing controlled substances. The indictment included prescriptions written for undercover agents and several patients, with each count corresponding to a specific prescription. At trial, the evidence focused on a single undercover visit where the agent explicitly stated she was not in pain but only had discomfort from work. Despite this, the doctor prescribed her 90 hydrocodone pills without any medical examination, diagnosis, or documentation. A jury in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, found the doctor not guilty on 73 counts but convicted him on the count related to prescribing opioids to the undercover agent who reported only discomfort. The district court sentenced him to six months’ incarceration, three years of supervised release, and imposed a $50,000 fine. The defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, certain evidentiary rulings, the denial of his motion for a mistrial, and the imposition of the fine. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting lay testimony from a pharmacist, as it was limited to personal observations and did not constitute expert opinion. The court also held there was no error in denying a mistrial based on a stray witness remark, as it was isolated and unrelated to the count of conviction. The Seventh Circuit found the evidence sufficient to support the conviction and concluded that the district court properly considered the relevant factors in imposing the fine. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "USA v Fung" on Justia Law

Duckett v. State

2026-07-24T08:33:40-08:00

Nearly forty years ago, the defendant was convicted of the sexual battery and first-degree murder of an eleven-year-old child. After the Governor signed a warrant for execution in February 2026, the defendant filed several postconviction motions. These included a motion for DNA testing of a sample from the victim's underwear and a fifth successive motion for postconviction relief. The circuit court granted the DNA testing request but denied the postconviction relief motion. DNA testing did not exonerate the defendant, and the stay of execution was lifted. Following those events, the defendant filed a second post-warrant motion for DNA testing, seeking analysis of additional items, as well as a sixth successive motion for postconviction relief. The Circuit Court for Lake County summarily denied both motions, finding the DNA testing request was procedurally barred because the defendant could have sought testing of those items earlier. The court also determined there was no testable genetic material on the items requested for testing. Regarding the postconviction motion, the court rejected the defendant’s claim that the State violated due process by not sending a sample to a Texas laboratory for a different DNA testing method, finding no evidence of bad faith by the State in consuming the sample during testing. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the circuit court’s summary denial of both motions. The Court held that the DNA testing motion was procedurally barred and meritless, as no DNA existed on the items sought to be tested. The Court also held that the defendant failed to demonstrate bad faith by the State under Arizona v. Youngblood in the destruction of evidence during DNA testing. The Court denied the motion for stay of execution and stated that no motion for rehearing would be considered. View "Duckett v. State" on Justia Law

Hemwall v. Douglas

2026-07-24T07:30:38-08:00

Christopher Hemwall was convicted by a jury in Michigan of multiple counts of criminal sexual conduct involving his twin half-sisters, with the incidents occurring when the victims were between four and six years old. The offenses took place from 2005 to 2008 and were reported to authorities roughly a decade later. Following his conviction, Hemwall received a lengthy prison sentence. He exhausted his appellate rights, with the Michigan Court of Appeals affirming his conviction and the Michigan Supreme Court denying leave to appeal. Hemwall did not pursue review by the U.S. Supreme Court, and his convictions became final in August 2021. Hemwall sought post-conviction relief in Michigan courts, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The Monroe County Circuit Court denied his motion, the Michigan Court of Appeals declined leave to appeal, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave in January 2024. Hemwall then filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, but it was filed nearly three months after the statutory deadline. Hemwall requested equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations, citing his attorney’s health issues and those of the attorney’s child, as well as COVID-19-related disruptions. The district court dismissed the petition, finding Hemwall failed to establish that these circumstances caused the late filing, but granted a certificate of appealability due to unsettled precedent. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. It assumed for argument’s sake that the attorney’s health difficulties could qualify as extraordinary circumstances but held that Hemwall did not prove these difficulties caused the late filing. The Sixth Circuit found no clear error in the district court’s factual finding that the attorney’s personal issues did not prevent timely filing, especially given evidence that the attorney was able to continue practicing law and that the federal petition was largely copied from prior state filings. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Hemwall’s habeas petition. View "Hemwall v. Douglas" on Justia Law

United States v. Williams

2026-07-24T07:30:38-08:00

The case concerns a defendant who was arrested after his girlfriend reported to police that he had struck her, taken her handgun, chambered a round, and threatened her with it. Forensic evidence later confirmed his DNA on the weapon. The defendant gave conflicting accounts, initially denying knowledge of the gun, then claiming he took it from his girlfriend to protect himself. Officers arrested him, and he was charged in state court with domestic violence and illegal firearm possession. While out on bond, federal prosecutors indicted him for being a felon in possession of a firearm after an earlier felony conviction. During execution of a federal arrest warrant, officers found a stolen rifle in the home. The government offered a plea deal involving a single count, which the defendant declined, resulting in a superseding indictment on two counts. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the rifle and his motion to dismiss on Second Amendment grounds. The defendant ultimately pleaded guilty to both counts without a written plea agreement. At sentencing, the district court applied an enhancement for possessing a firearm in connection with a felony offense, based on evidence that he had threatened his girlfriend with the handgun, and imposed a 100-month prison sentence. The defendant appealed, raising constitutional arguments and challenging the sentencing enhancement. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that, because the defendant pleaded guilty unconditionally and did not comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2), he waived his right to appeal pre-plea constitutional issues. The court declined to address his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal, finding the record undeveloped. Reviewing the sentencing enhancement for clear error, the court found ample evidence to support the district court’s application of the enhancement and affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Beedy v. The State of Wyoming

2026-07-24T07:21:04-08:00

An elderly man, Harold Anderson, was removed from his home in Glenrock, Converse County, Wyoming, and hospitalized in Casper, Natrona County, due to mental health issues. While hospitalized and unable to make decisions for himself, Mr. Anderson transferred title of his vehicle and mobile home to Goldie Beedy, who took possession of both items. The transfer documents reflected values significantly below the property’s actual worth. Around the same time, local law enforcement found Ms. Beedy at Mr. Anderson’s Glenrock home, where she claimed she would become his guardian, presenting incomplete guardianship paperwork. Shortly thereafter, the Wyoming Guardianship Corporation was appointed as Mr. Anderson’s guardian. The State charged Ms. Beedy in Converse County with exploitation of a vulnerable adult. She moved to dismiss the charge, contending that the alleged conduct occurred in Natrona County, as Mr. Anderson was hospitalized there during the relevant period. The District Court of Converse County denied the motion, and a jury convicted her. The district court sentenced Ms. Beedy to a suspended prison term with supervised probation and ordered restitution for the mobile home, vehicle, and clothing purchased for Mr. Anderson by his guardian, finding Ms. Beedy’s control of the mobile home prevented access to his clothing. Restitution for other items was denied. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming held that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that the exploitation occurred in Converse County, as Ms. Beedy’s acts to complete the crime—including taking possession of the property and filing title documents—occurred there. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the restitution order for clothing, as Ms. Beedy’s conduct necessitated the purchases. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "Beedy v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

Glenn v. The State of Wyoming

2026-07-24T07:21:03-08:00

A police sergeant stopped an individual riding a bicycle at night because he believed the bicycle did not have a light on the front, as required by Wyoming law. Upon approaching, the officer discovered the bicycle had a light, but it was very dim. The officer explained the stop, stating the light did not appear to meet statutory requirements. The individual was arrested on an outstanding warrant, and during a search, drug paraphernalia with methamphetamine residue was found. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the stop was invalid because the officer misinterpreted the statutory requirement and made a mistake regarding the presence of a light. The District Court of Natrona County held a hearing, at which only the initial justification for the stop was contested. The court found the officer’s mistake of fact—believing there was no light—was reasonable under the circumstances, even though the statute required the light to be visible from a certain distance, not to project light. The court denied the suppression motion. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of the suppression motion. He was sentenced to probation. On appeal, the defendant raised issues about the extension of the stop and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case, adopting the district court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous and reviewing legal questions de novo. The Court held that the officer’s initial stop was supported by reasonable suspicion based on an objectively reasonable mistake of fact. The Court further held the defendant waived issues relating to the extension of the stop and ineffective assistance of counsel because they were not reserved in his conditional plea agreement and were not tied to the voluntariness of his plea. The judgment was affirmed. View "Glenn v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

State v. Dotson

2026-07-24T06:36:36-08:00

The case concerns a defendant convicted by a jury of first-degree premeditated murder and aggravated battery, arising from a shooting incident in which he killed his friend and injured another person. The defendant claimed at trial that he acted in self-defense after an attempted armed robbery by the victims, but the prosecution presented a different narrative, arguing the shooting was deliberate. The jury rejected the self-defense claim, and the court imposed a life sentence. The Kansas Supreme Court previously affirmed these convictions. Subsequently, the defendant filed a pro se motion under Kansas’s postconviction DNA testing statute, seeking forensic testing on various items, including a rifle, clothing, and biological samples. The State responded that few, if any, relevant biological materials were in its possession and argued that even if DNA evidence existed, testing would not yield exculpatory results because the defendant admitted handling the weapon. The Wyandotte District Court appointed counsel and held an evidentiary hearing, at which the defendant focused his request on DNA from the murder weapon. Ultimately, the district court denied the motion, finding that the defendant failed to identify specific biological material in the State’s possession and that, regardless, such testing would not produce exculpatory evidence relevant to his claim of innocence. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the district court’s factual findings for substantial competent evidence and its legal conclusions de novo. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not err in denying the postconviction DNA testing request. It concluded that, even if DNA from the rifle or other items were available for testing, the results would not produce exculpatory evidence as required by statute, because such evidence would not prove a disputed material fact relevant to the defendant’s claim of wrongful conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion. View "State v. Dotson " on Justia Law

State v. Manczuk

2026-07-24T06:36:35-08:00

In this case, law enforcement initiated an investigation after receiving a tip about online activity linked to incriminating material involving child sexual exploitation. The investigation led to the arrest and prosecution of the defendant for rape, aggravated criminal sodomy, and sexual exploitation of a child based on alleged conduct years prior, as well as an additional charge of solicitation to commit capital murder after the defendant allegedly attempted to have his accusers killed to prevent their testimony. The alleged offenses involved two victims who were minors at the time. The Leavenworth District Court initially denied the defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss the sex offense charges as time-barred under the statute of limitations and later permitted consolidation of the solicitation charge. The defendant was convicted by a jury on all counts and received consecutive life sentences for the sex offenses and a separate sentence for the solicitation charge. The defendant renewed his statute of limitations defense post-trial, relying on a different legal theory than had been presented before trial. The district court rejected the post-trial motion. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, determining that the statute of limitations defense was not preserved for the rape and sodomy charges but was preserved for the sexual exploitation charge, and rejected other claims of trial error. The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed whether the statute of limitations defense and related sufficiency claims were properly preserved for appeal, as well as challenges to the solicitation conviction and a claim of cumulative error. The court held that preservation requires the same legal theory be presented in the district court and on appeal and that a statute of limitations defense is a waivable affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional issue. Because the defendant’s post-trial theory was not preserved, the court declined to reach the merits and affirmed the lower courts’ rulings, upholding all convictions. View "State v. Manczuk " on Justia Law

State v. West

2026-07-24T06:36:35-08:00

A man was involved in two separate incidents in Wichita, Kansas, in early 2021. In March, he was accused of aggravated assault and criminal possession of a weapon after a confrontation with a restaurant owner and his stepson, during which he allegedly displayed a firearm. In May, he was involved in a fatal altercation with a security guard outside a convenience store, resulting in the guard’s death by gunshot. Surveillance footage and eyewitness accounts connected him to both events, and he was identified and arrested. He was charged in a single complaint with six crimes stemming from these incidents. In the Sedgwick District Court, the defendant moved to sever the charges from the two incidents, arguing they should not be tried together. The district court denied this motion, finding the crimes were of the same or similar character and could be joined under Kansas law. At trial, the defendant testified in support of self-defense, but the jury convicted him of first-degree premeditated murder and other related offenses, acquitting him on one aggravated assault charge. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and appealed directly to the Kansas Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed several claims: improper joinder of charges, erroneous jury instructions (including those on self-defense and lesser included offenses), exclusion of evidence related to self-defense, and cumulative error. The court held that the charges were properly joined as they were of the same or similar character, the jury instructions given were both legally and factually appropriate, and the exclusion of certain evidence did not violate the defendant’s right to present a defense. Finding no reversible errors, the court affirmed the convictions. View "State v. West " on Justia Law

State v. Scott

2026-07-24T06:36:34-08:00

The case concerns a defendant who was convicted by a jury of rape and aggravated indecent liberties with a child. The offenses involved a three-year-old girl who was cared for in the defendant’s home daycare. The defendant’s wife was the primary caregiver and was absent from the home at the time of the crimes. The victim disclosed the abuse shortly after the incidents occurred. At sentencing, the defendant’s counsel requested a downward departure from the mandatory minimum sentences, pointing to the defendant’s lack of prior criminal history as a mitigating factor. The Shawnee District Court denied the motion for a departure sentence, merging the aggravated indecent liberties convictions and imposing concurrent lifetime sentences with a minimum of 25 years before parole eligibility. The court found only one mitigating circumstance—that the defendant was amenable to treatment—and explicitly discounted the defendant’s lack of prior criminal history as a valid mitigating factor. On appeal, the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed both the convictions and the denial of the departure motion, concluding the district court’s decision was reasonable, but it did not expressly address the argument regarding the failure to recognize lack of criminal history as a statutory mitigating factor. The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed only the issue of the denial of the departure sentence. The court held that the district court erred as a matter of law by refusing to consider the statutorily enumerated mitigating circumstance of no prior criminal history under K.S.A. 21-6627(d). However, the Supreme Court concluded that this error was harmless because, on the record as a whole, there was no reasonable probability it affected the outcome. As a result, the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of both the Court of Appeals and the Shawnee District Court. View "State v. Scott " on Justia Law

State v. McLemore

2026-07-24T05:11:05-08:00

After being convicted in 1999 of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, an individual was sentenced to life imprisonment and an additional term for the weapon offense. The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. In subsequent years, the individual filed multiple motions for postconviction relief, including a third motion in 2020 alleging that a key trial witness had recanted. That motion was dismissed as untimely, a decision summarily affirmed by the Nebraska Supreme Court. In June 2025, the individual filed a fourth motion for postconviction relief, challenging the constitutionality of the time limit for such motions under the Nebraska Postconviction Act, arguing that because his convictions predated the enactment of the time bar, it should not apply to him. He also sought an evidentiary hearing and later claimed the district court issued fictitious orders regarding his prior motions. The District Court for Douglas County dismissed the fourth postconviction motion without an evidentiary hearing, finding it time barred under the statutory amendments, and noted that the relief sought was not authorized by the Nebraska Postconviction Act. The court also found that any new claims, such as challenges to alleged fictitious orders, had not been properly raised in the latest motion. On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the dismissal and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the relief sought was not available under the Nebraska Postconviction Act, and that claims about fictitious orders were not properly before the court because they were not included in the verified postconviction motion. The Court also reiterated that new issues not raised in the verified motion cannot be considered for the first time on appeal, and that the procedural bars in the Act applied to this case. View "State v. McLemore" on Justia Law

State v. Evans

2026-07-24T05:11:03-08:00

A man was accused of killing his girlfriend in Omaha, Nebraska, in November 2023. Evidence at trial indicated they had been dating for approximately a year, and he moved into her apartment several months before the incident. The victim was last seen after a supervised visit with her child, and her body was later found wrapped in bedding and plastic bags in a field outside Lincoln. Forensic evidence, GPS data from the victim’s vehicle, and testimony about blood stains and cleaning in the apartment connected the accused to the crime. The autopsy showed extensive blunt force injuries, and expert testimony suggested a claw-type hammer was likely used, although the specific weapon was never recovered. The District Court for Douglas County presided over the jury trial. The defendant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon (not a firearm) to commit a felony, and sentenced to life imprisonment plus 40 to 50 years, consecutively. Post-trial, the defendant argued that the court erred by denying a mistrial after a police officer’s statement about his truthfulness was inadvertently played for the jury, that the evidence was insufficient to support the deadly weapon conviction, that improper bad acts evidence was admitted, and that counsel was ineffective in investigating and cross-examining the victim’s ex-husband. The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial, finding the limiting instructions were sufficient to mitigate any prejudice from the officer’s statement. The court found sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the deadly weapon conviction, even without the weapon’s recovery. It ruled that most relationship evidence was inextricably intertwined with the murder and not inadmissible as “other acts,” and any error regarding evidence about the defendant’s behavior toward a third party was harmless. The record also showed no ineffective assistance of counsel. The convictions and sentences were affirmed. View "State v. Evans" on Justia Law

Rencher v. State of Mississippi

2026-07-24T01:24:25-08:00

A defendant was indicted as a habitual offender for one count of child exploitation after he sent sexually explicit messages via Facebook to a fourteen-year-old girl, I.R., in June 2023. The defendant, who was the father of I.R.’s cousin, had previously encountered I.R. at his daughter’s apartment complex and subsequently sent her a Facebook friend request. Messages from the defendant’s account included solicitations for sexual acts and offers of money. After receiving the messages, I.R. reported the incident to her mother and law enforcement. Investigators linked the defendant’s cell phone and Facebook activity to the time and place of the incident, and he made subsequent attempts to have the charges dropped in exchange for money. The case was tried in the Kemper County Circuit Court. During the trial, the prosecution introduced Facebook messages and cell phone records, including location data, all supported by certificates of authenticity. The defendant did not object to this evidence at trial. The jury found the defendant guilty, and the court sentenced him to life imprisonment as a habitual offender, based on prior convictions for aggravated assault and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The defendant’s motions for post-trial relief were denied. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case. The Court held that the defendant’s objections to the admissibility of evidence were procedurally barred due to failure to object at trial or pretrial, and the records were properly admitted as self-authenticating business records under Mississippi Rules of Evidence. The Court also found that the investigator’s testimony was permissible as lay opinion and did not require expert qualification. Additional claims—including mistake of fact, cruel and unusual punishment, and ineffective assistance of counsel—were found to be without merit or better suited for post-conviction proceedings. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "Rencher v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law

Eacholes v. State of Mississippi

2026-07-24T01:24:21-08:00

Police officers arrested an individual after learning that two arrest warrants had been issued for him—one for shooting into a dwelling and another for possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. Upon arrest, officers conducted a pat-down search and discovered over two grams of methamphetamine in his pocket. Laboratory analysis confirmed the substance was methamphetamine. The defendant was indicted as a habitual offender for possession of methamphetamine. The Calhoun County Circuit Court presided over the jury trial in December 2024. Both officers involved testified about the circumstances of the arrest and the discovery of the drugs. The defense objected to the introduction of the warrant and later moved to dismiss the charge, arguing the defendant was not afforded a preliminary hearing after requesting one in justice court. The circuit court found no evidence of such a request and denied the motion. The defense also moved to suppress the warrants for lack of probable cause, but the court determined there was a substantial basis for probable cause, relying on the indictment and the justice court judge’s issuance of the warrants. The jury convicted the defendant of possession of methamphetamine and found him to be a habitual offender, resulting in an eight-year sentence. Post-trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial were denied. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the appeal. Applying a mixed standard of review to the Fourth Amendment issues, the Court held that the circuit court had a substantial basis for determining probable cause existed when the warrants were issued. It found the warrants met procedural requirements and that officers verified their existence. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "Eacholes v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law

Sims v. State of Mississippi

2026-07-24T01:24:16-08:00

In 2019, a man was indicted in Coahoma County, Mississippi, on three charges: sexual battery of a child under fourteen, felonious child abuse, and exposing another to HIV. The case involved his eight-year-old daughter, who moved to live with him that year. After the child disclosed abuse to her older sister, she was taken to the hospital, where injuries consistent with sexual abuse were observed. Medical professionals and law enforcement became involved, and the child underwent further examinations and interviews. During the investigation, the defendant admitted to law enforcement that he was HIV positive. A jury in the Coahoma County Circuit Court found the defendant guilty on all three counts. The trial court sentenced him to twenty years for sexual battery, and five years each for child abuse and exposing another to HIV, all to be served concurrently. The defendant’s motion for a new trial was denied. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Mississippi, the defendant challenged only his conviction for exposing another to HIV, arguing the trial court violated his Confrontation Clause rights by admitting Mississippi Department of Health records without the opportunity to cross-examine their custodian and that the State presented insufficient evidence of knowing exposure. The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the Confrontation Clause argument was procedurally barred because it was not raised at trial and, alternatively, the admitted records were non-testimonial business records not subject to the Confrontation Clause. The court also determined that the State had presented sufficient evidence for a rational juror to convict under the plain language of the statute, which required proof that the defendant was HIV positive and knowingly exposed the child. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "Sims v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law

Sanders v. State of Mississippi

2026-07-24T01:24:12-08:00

A child named Rachel disclosed during a forensic interview at a Children’s Advocacy Center that Elza Charles Sanders had sexually abused her when she was twelve years old. Rachel’s family had lived with Sanders, and she testified that one night while her mother was away, Sanders dragged her into his room, touched her breasts, and raped her. Rachel did not reveal the incident until years later, sharing it only with a former boyfriend and with the forensic interviewer. Law enforcement was notified, and Rachel identified Sanders from a photograph. At trial, experts testified regarding the common delays in reporting abuse and the lack of physical evidence, given Rachel’s young age at the time. The Warren County Circuit Court conducted a jury trial at which Sanders was convicted of sexual battery and molestation. He was sentenced to life in prison for sexual battery and fifteen years for molestation, with the sentences to run consecutively. Sanders filed post-trial motions challenging the verdict as against the weight of the evidence, which were denied. He then filed an appeal, raising issues regarding an alleged discovery violation, the sufficiency and weight of the evidence, and several pro se arguments, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, errors in sentencing, and the cumulative-error doctrine. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed Sanders’s appeal. The Court held that Sanders had waived his discovery violation argument because he did not properly object or request a continuance. The Court further determined that the jury’s verdict was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, as Rachel’s testimony was consistent and not contradicted by other credible evidence, and the timing discrepancies were not material. All pro se arguments were found to be either waived or without merit. The Court affirmed Sanders’s convictions and sentences. View "Sanders v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law

USA v. Debrow

2026-07-23T15:30:30-08:00

The defendant, after previously pleading guilty to aggravated criminal damage to property under Louisiana law, was found in possession of a firearm. His earlier offense involved intentionally damaging vehicles during a police traffic stop, endangering human life, which led to a three-year sentence. After serving his sentence, he was again found with a firearm, resulting in an indictment for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana reviewed the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment, in which he argued that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to him. The district court denied the motion. The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial, and was sentenced to 56 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as applied to the defendant, considering whether the government's justification for permanent disarmament was supported by a historical tradition consistent with the Second Amendment, as outlined in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). The Fifth Circuit found that the government had not met its burden to demonstrate a relevant historical analogue for disarming individuals with a property crime predicate like the defendant’s. The court declined to expand precedent by treating aggravated property damage as sufficiently violent for permanent disarmament under historical going-armed laws. The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying the motion to dismiss and remanded the case for reconsideration. The main holding was that, absent sufficient evidence of a historical tradition supporting disarmament for this type of predicate felony, the government had not justified the application of § 922(g)(1) to the defendant. View "USA v. Debrow" on Justia Law

USA v Doss

2026-07-23T12:31:08-08:00

The defendant was convicted after pleading guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of federal law. His prior criminal history included a 2017 Indiana felony conviction for sexual battery under Indiana Code § 35-42-4-8(a)(2), which criminalizes nonconsensual sexual touching when the victim is unaware that the touching is occurring. At his federal sentencing, the Presentence Investigation Report classified this conviction as a “crime of violence” under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, leading to an enhanced base offense level. The defendant did not object to this classification at the time of sentencing. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division, adopted the recommendations in the Presentence Investigation Report, applied the “crime of violence” enhancement, and imposed a sentence of 41 months’ imprisonment followed by two years of supervised release. The defendant appealed, arguing for the first time that his prior sexual battery conviction did not qualify as a “crime of violence” under the relevant Guideline and requested resentencing. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred in classifying the Indiana sexual battery conviction as a “crime of violence.” Applying the categorical and modified categorical approaches, the appellate court determined that the statute of conviction is a “forcible sex offense” as defined by the Guidelines, because it criminalizes nonconsensual sexual contact and the absence of valid consent is sufficient. The court held that such an offense qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines. Finding no error in the district court’s application of the enhancement, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence. View "USA v Doss" on Justia Law

State v. Palmer

2026-07-23T12:06:44-08:00

The case involved an incident in which the respondent was found at the scene of a single-vehicle accident late at night, standing near a crashed vehicle that had veered off a dry roadway and struck a speed limit sign. Law enforcement arriving at the scene observed that the respondent exhibited multiple signs of intoxication, including bloodshot eyes, slurred and lethargic speech, repeated confusion, and inconsistent statements about his actions. The only key to the vehicle was found in his possession, and there was circumstantial evidence linking him to the vehicle’s operation. The owner of the vehicle confirmed that she was not present and that there was only one key. After being charged with several traffic offenses, including driving under the influence and driving while impaired, the respondent was tried by jury in the Circuit Court for Somerset County and convicted on the relevant counts. He appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove he was intoxicated at the time he was driving. The Appellate Court of Maryland agreed, reversing the convictions for the alcohol-related offenses on the grounds that the State did not present “specific evidence” directly linking his intoxication to the period of driving, especially given the time gap between when he was last seen and when law enforcement arrived. On review, the Supreme Court of Maryland clarified that the standard for sufficiency of the evidence in all criminal cases is the “no reasonable trier of fact” standard, as set forth in Jackson v. Virginia and reaffirmed in Smith v. State. Applying this standard, the Court held that the State’s evidence—both direct and circumstantial—was sufficient for a rational jury to infer that the respondent drove the vehicle while intoxicated. The Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court and reinstated the convictions. View "State v. Palmer" on Justia Law

USA v. Murphy

2026-07-23T09:30:52-08:00

The defendant was charged with multiple counts including conspiracy to possess and brandish firearms during crimes of violence and drug trafficking, conspiracy to distribute cocaine and heroin, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, and Hobbs Act robbery. He pleaded guilty to all charges without a plea agreement. The factual basis submitted in support of the plea indicated that he was associated with a street gang, communicated about drug sales and firearms, participated in the use and possession of firearms for drug trafficking, and attempted to rob a rival drug dealer. The presentence report attributed to him the provision of a rifle used in a murder, and found him responsible for specific drug quantities. It recommended applying a cross-reference for first-degree murder under the Sentencing Guidelines, resulting in a significantly higher advisory sentencing range. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held an evidentiary hearing to consider the defendant’s objections to the presentence report, including the factual findings, drug quantity calculations, omission of a mitigating role adjustment, application of the cross-reference, and the standard of proof. The court overruled the objections, found sufficient evidence for the factual findings, adopted the presentence report, denied the mitigating role adjustment, applied the first-degree murder cross-reference, and sentenced the defendant to 360 months’ imprisonment. The defendant timely appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings, affirming its credibility determinations, evidentiary findings, drug quantity calculations, denial of a mitigating role adjustment, and use of the preponderance of the evidence standard. However, the appellate court reversed the district court’s application of the cross-reference for first-degree murder, holding that the firearm used in another offense must be cited in the offense of conviction for the cross-reference to apply. As a result, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "USA v. Murphy" on Justia Law

USA V. PEREDA

2026-07-23T08:31:31-08:00

The defendant, a state supervisee subject to warrantless search conditions, was found by police in a trailer located near his girlfriend’s parents’ home. Officers searched both the trailer and a nearby Ford F-150 pickup truck believed to be used by the defendant. The trailer yielded ammunition, while the truck contained drugs. The defendant had reported his parents’ home as his residence, but GPS monitoring indicated he frequently stayed at the Goleta address, near the trailer. Officers had also previously conducted home visits at the Goleta address, and Pereda’s supervising officer had admonished him for not updating his reported residence. The United States District Court for the Central District of California reviewed the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence discovered in both the trailer and the pickup truck. The district court found that the officers lacked probable cause to believe either that the trailer was the defendant’s residence or that the truck was property under his control. Consequently, the district court granted the motion to suppress and excluded all evidence recovered from the searches. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether the searches were consistent with Fourth Amendment requirements, specifically the parolee exception to the warrant requirement. The Ninth Circuit concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had probable cause to believe the defendant resided in or controlled the trailer and owned or controlled the pickup truck. Accordingly, the panel held that both searches were valid under the defendant’s supervised release conditions and the Fourth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting the motion to suppress and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "USA V. PEREDA" on Justia Law

DIAZ-BOYZO V. BLANCHE

2026-07-23T08:01:16-08:00

A lawful permanent resident from Mexico pleaded guilty in Oregon state court to two counts of felony fourth-degree assault for physically assaulting his wife in the immediate presence of their minor children. The events occurred in 2013, and the charges were brought under Oregon Revised Statutes § 163.160(1)(a), (3)(c), which enhances misdemeanor assault to a felony when committed in the presence of a minor child. He was sentenced to two years in prison, followed by probation. After his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security charged him with removability from the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), arguing his conviction constituted a “crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment.” An Immigration Judge found him removable on this ground, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed that decision. The individual then petitioned for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the Oregon statute was overbroad and indivisible, and thus not a categorical match to the federal offense. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that, although the Oregon statute covered conduct unrelated to children and was therefore overbroad, it was divisible into alternative elements. Applying the modified categorical approach, the court determined that the petitioner’s conviction was specifically for assault in the presence of his minor children. The court held that this offense matched the definition of a “crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment” under federal law, as interpreted in Leon-Briviesca v. Blanche, because committing assault in a child’s presence places the child at real risk of bodily or mental harm and requires at least criminal negligence. The Ninth Circuit therefore denied the petition for review. View "DIAZ-BOYZO V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

United States v. Berry

2026-07-23T07:31:01-08:00

Authorities began investigating after receiving a Suspicious Activity Report concerning the defendant’s large-scale firearm purchases. Between 2018 and 2024, he acquired over 180 firearms from licensed dealers in Arkansas, and thirteen of those weapons were later found at crime scenes. A search of his home and vehicle uncovered more than 100 firearms, price tags totaling over $30,000, and evidence suggesting auction sales, including checks indicating proceeds of nearly $54,000 from a gun auction. The defendant was indicted on allegations of unlicensed dealing, but ultimately pled guilty to making a false statement in acquiring a firearm by denying marijuana use. The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas accepted the plea, adopted the Presentence Investigation Report, and calculated a Sentencing Guidelines range of 57 to 71 months’ imprisonment. The court imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 48 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. The defendant appealed, arguing that the court relied on clearly erroneous facts by treating him as a commercial firearms dealer rather than a hobbyist, and that it gave improper weight to this finding, resulting in a procedurally and substantively unreasonable sentence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case for both procedural error and substantive reasonableness. It determined that the district court had not made any clearly erroneous factual findings, noting that the evidence supported the conclusion that the defendant was engaged in the business of dealing firearms. The appellate court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing sentencing factors, particularly given the below-Guidelines sentence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Berry" on Justia Law

State of Maine v. Marin

2026-07-23T07:09:09-08:00

The defendant was charged with multiple offenses, including three counts of gross sexual assault, two counts of unlawful sexual contact, two counts of unlawful sexual touching, and one count of tampering with a witness or informant. The offenses involved sexual abuse spanning several years against a young girl, who had a close, grandfather-granddaughter-like relationship with the defendant. The abuse primarily occurred at the defendant’s home, where he lived with his grandson. Law enforcement began investigating after the victim disclosed the abuse in 2018. Initially, the defendant’s grandson denied witnessing any abuse but later recanted and confirmed having seen inappropriate conduct and being coached by the defendant on what to say. Following the investigation, the State indicted the defendant on several charges, later expanded by a superseding indictment. Prior to trial, the State sought to admit a noncriminal pornographic photograph found on the defendant’s computer, depicting a sexual act between a young female and an older male, captioned “Oh, Grandpa!” The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to sever certain counts, excluding some images but admitting the specific photograph as evidence of motive and intent. The court also allowed testimony about alleged uncharged conduct occurring outside Maine, after the defendant’s counsel affirmatively stated there was no objection. A jury found the defendant guilty on the charges tried, and he was sentenced accordingly. On appeal to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, the defendant challenged the admission of the photograph and the testimony about uncharged conduct. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photograph, as it was relevant to prove motive and intent for the charges requiring intent, and was not unduly prejudicial. The Court also concluded that the argument regarding uncharged conduct was waived by the defendant’s lack of objection. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State of Maine v. Marin" on Justia Law

Tang v. State

2026-07-23T07:03:42-08:00

A police officer in Lewes, Delaware observed a vehicle driving at night without headlights and subsequently weaving within its lane and onto a bike trail. The officer followed the vehicle, which then left the city limits and committed additional traffic violations, including tailgating and swerving into oncoming traffic. Upon initiating a traffic stop, the officer found the driver, Henry Tang, exhibited signs of intoxication and failed field sobriety and breath tests. Tang was charged with driving under the influence and failing to use headlights. Prior to trial in the Superior Court of the State of Delaware, Tang moved to suppress evidence, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion for the stop and that the court should not consider the initial violations in Lewes due to the absence of mobile video recorder (MVR) footage. Tang also moved to exclude blood alcohol content (BAC) results, asserting that the State failed to produce an Intoxilyzer 9000 manual and did not lay a proper foundation for the evidence. The Superior Court denied both motions, found reasonable suspicion existed based on the officer’s testimony, and admitted the BAC results after finding the evidentiary foundation sufficient. Following a bench trial, Tang was found guilty on all charges. Tang appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. The Supreme Court held that Delaware law does not require officers to activate their MVRs when initially observing traffic violations, and the absence of such video did not bar the court from considering the officer’s testimony. The Court affirmed that multiple observed traffic violations established reasonable articulable suspicion for the stop. It also concluded that the Superior Court properly admitted the BAC results, finding that the State provided an adequate evidentiary foundation and that no manual existed to be produced. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "Tang v. State" on Justia Law

State v. Jaramillo

2026-07-23T06:50:59-08:00

Police stopped a man for a traffic violation late at night. During the stop, officers smelled marijuana, searched the car, and found drugs and a gun. The man’s brother, who was in the car, told police that there might be evidence of drug possession and use at their home. The police officer then applied for two search warrants: one to search the home for evidence of drug dealing, and another to collect the man’s blood and DNA. The officer intended to request permission for nighttime searches but failed to do so due to a technical omission—he did not check the box in the electronic application system that would have prompted him to justify nighttime execution. As a result, both warrants were issued for daytime only. Despite this, officers executed both warrants during nighttime hours. The Second District Court reviewed the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from the nighttime execution of the daytime-only warrants. After an evidentiary hearing, the court found that the officer’s failure to request nighttime authorization was inadvertent, not malicious or in bad faith. The court also acknowledged that the magistrate would likely have granted nighttime authorization if it had been requested. Nevertheless, the court suppressed the evidence, concluding that the plain language of rule 40(e)(1) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure required magistrate authorization for nighttime searches and that non-compliance with this requirement warranted suppression, regardless of the absence of prejudice or bad faith. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case on certification from the Utah Court of Appeals. It held that, under prior precedent, suppression is not required for a violation of rule 40(e)(1) unless the violation also infringes constitutional rights, is committed in bad faith, or prejudices the defendant. Because the district court found neither bad faith nor prejudice and did not determine there was a constitutional violation, the Supreme Court reversed the suppression order and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Jaramillo" on Justia Law

State v. Eastgate

2026-07-23T06:43:46-08:00

Thomas Eastgate was subject to probation revocation proceedings in five consolidated criminal cases. At his initial appearance, he was briefly represented by an attorney making a limited appearance, but for subsequent proceedings, Eastgate did not have counsel. He posted bond and, shortly before the scheduled revocation hearing, requested a continuance to retain or consult counsel and prepare his defense. The court denied his continuance request and his application for indigent defense services, determining Eastgate was ineligible due to his income. Eastgate proceeded to the revocation hearing without counsel, did not cross-examine witnesses or present testimony, and was found to have willfully violated probation in all five cases. He was resentenced to five years on each count, served concurrently. The District Court of Morton County, South Central Judicial District, presided over the revocation hearing. The court denied Eastgate’s requests for a continuance and appointed counsel, then proceeded with the hearing and sentencing without making a determination as to whether Eastgate’s waiver of counsel was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, or advising him of the disadvantages of self-representation. The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the appeal, applying a de novo standard to the interpretation of court rules and an abuse of discretion standard to the denial of continuance. The Supreme Court held that the district court misapplied Rule 32(f)(3)(A), N.D.R.Crim.P., by failing to determine whether Eastgate voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to counsel, and by proceeding with the revocation hearing without the required findings. The Court also found the denial of Eastgate’s continuance motion unreasonable. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the probation revocation orders in all five cases and remanded for a new revocation hearing consistent with its opinion. View "State v. Eastgate" on Justia Law

State v. Quam

2026-07-23T05:43:32-08:00

A Cass County Deputy Sheriff was investigated after an initial tip suggested he had been found viewing illegal sexual material involving minors and had threatened self-harm if reported. The sheriff’s wife and another individual were interviewed as potential sources of this claim, but neither corroborated the tip. During a voluntary interview with law enforcement, the deputy denied viewing such material but admitted to searching for explicit content involving “teen girls” and described results depicting females he estimated to be 15 or 16 years old, though he claimed not to recall if they were nude or involved in sex acts. He also admitted accessing such material at his residence, specifically using his basement television’s internet connection, and acknowledged using the TOR browser to conceal his online activity. Following these admissions, officers sought and obtained a search warrant for the deputy’s residence. They seized several electronic devices, ultimately discovering illegal sexual material on a broken cell phone. The deputy was charged with multiple counts of possessing prohibited materials and moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the warrant lacked probable cause and did not sufficiently connect the alleged conduct to his home. The District Court of Cass County denied the suppression motion, finding probable cause supported the search. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed the case. The court independently assessed the existence of probable cause and the nexus between the alleged criminal activity and the residence. It concluded that the deputy’s own admissions about searching for and viewing material involving underage females at his home, efforts to conceal his actions, and inconsistencies in his explanations provided a substantial basis for the search warrant. The court determined the totality of circumstances established both probable cause and a sufficient nexus to the residence. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the conviction. View "State v. Quam" on Justia Law

State v. Fox

2026-07-23T05:43:07-08:00

The defendant was charged with continuous sexual abuse of his stepdaughter, following her disclosure of alleged abuse. He sought to introduce evidence that the accuser had engaged in an inappropriate online relationship with an adult male, including sexually explicit exchanges, arguing that she fabricated the allegations against him in retaliation for being disciplined after her mother discovered the relationship and terminated it. The defendant believed this evidence would support his theory that the accuser had a motive to lie. The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, held an in camera hearing under North Dakota Rule of Evidence 412 to consider the admissibility of the proposed evidence. The court conditionally denied the defendant’s motion, finding the evidence inadmissible under Rule 412(a) and determining that the defendant had not provided a sufficient offer of proof to invoke the constitutional exception under Rule 412(b)(1)(C). The court identified foundational deficiencies in the proffered evidence and allowed limited questioning about the fact and emotional impact of discipline, but not the explicit sexual content. The jury subsequently convicted the defendant of continuous sexual abuse, and the court entered judgment. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota, the defendant argued that the exclusion of evidence violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and constituted an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court reviewed the constitutional claim de novo and the evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion. It concluded that the District Court’s exclusion of the explicit evidence was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate, given the marginal probative value and the temporal gap between the events. The defendant’s confrontation rights were not violated because he was permitted to question the victim about discipline and emotional impact. The Supreme Court affirmed the criminal judgment. View "State v. Fox" on Justia Law

Paola v. State

2026-07-23T05:41:30-08:00

In this case, the petitioner was charged with multiple serious offenses, including several counts of gross sexual imposition, patronizing a minor for commercial sexual activity, contributing to the deprivation or delinquency of a minor, luring minors by computer, and indecent exposure. The petitioner retained counsel and was offered a plea deal by the State that included substantial but partly suspended sentences and probation. On his counsel’s advice, he rejected the offer and later entered open guilty pleas to all charges. The district court ultimately imposed consecutive and concurrent sentences that were longer than those in the rejected plea offer. After sentencing, the petitioner filed for postconviction relief in the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, seeking withdrawal of his guilty plea and a new trial. He argued that his trial counsel was ineffective, particularly for advising him to reject the plea agreement. At an evidentiary hearing, both the petitioner and his trial counsel testified about the decision-making process. The district court found that counsel’s advice was a reasonable strategic choice, that the petitioner agreed with the strategy at the time, and that there was no evidence the counsel’s performance fell below professional standards. The court denied the application for postconviction relief, and judgment was entered accordingly. On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the denial of postconviction relief. Applying the two-prong Strickland v. Washington test for ineffective assistance of counsel, the court held that the district court’s finding—that counsel’s performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness—was not clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court also declined to consider an argument regarding a waiver of the petitioner’s presence, as it was not properly preserved in the lower court. The judgment denying postconviction relief was affirmed. View "Paola v. State" on Justia Law

State v. Engelking

2026-07-23T05:41:05-08:00

The defendant worked as a controller for two related companies, handling payroll and taxes. During her employment, she was authorized to issue herself one $12,000 loan but later issued a second, unauthorized $12,000 payment. She was terminated when this was discovered. The companies’ president and CEO, as well as several employees and a hired CPA, spent significant time investigating the theft, including reviewing financial records to determine the full extent of losses. The investigation also revealed that the defendant had failed to withhold required insurance premiums from her own paychecks and that the companies had paid her unearned wages after her termination. After the defendant pled guilty to theft, the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, imposed sentence and later determined the amount of restitution. The State sought restitution for the unauthorized loan, the cost of unearned paychecks, insurance premiums not withheld, and investigative expenses. The defendant conceded liability for the unauthorized loan but challenged the inclusion of investigative expenses and insurance premiums. The district court excluded the unearned paychecks from restitution but included the investigative costs and insurance premiums, finding them directly related to the theft and reasonable in amount. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion by including investigative expenses and insurance premiums in the restitution award. The Supreme Court held that investigative expenses could be included in restitution when they are directly related to the criminal offense and are actually incurred as a direct result of that offense. The Court also held that the loss from insurance premiums not withheld from the defendant’s paychecks was directly related to her criminal conduct. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s amended criminal judgment awarding restitution. View "State v. Engelking" on Justia Law

State of Minnesota vs. Yang

2026-07-23T05:07:27-08:00

A 16-year-old girl disclosed to her high school advisor that her stepfather had sexually abused her, prompting a police investigation. The accused was charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct, based on allegations that he committed multiple acts of sexual penetration against his minor stepdaughter over a period of about two years, beginning when she was around nine years old. The complainant described several acts of abuse, including cunnilingus and fellatio, occurring on different occasions and in different locations. Other family members and professionals testified about her disclosures and related observations. The defendant denied the allegations, and his defense emphasized inconsistencies in the complainant’s account and testimony from other relatives. After a jury trial, the Hennepin County District Court found the defendant guilty of both first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct, entering judgment on the first-degree charge and sentencing him to 144 months in prison. The defendant appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, arguing that the district court’s failure to provide a jury instruction requiring specific unanimity—that is, requiring jurors to agree on which specific act constituted the charged offense—constituted plain error. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, relying in part on its prior decision in State v. Rucker, which held that a specific-unanimity instruction was not required under similar circumstances. The Supreme Court of Minnesota reviewed the case and held that, under its recent decision in State v. Keyes, when a single count is charged but the evidence involves multiple distinct acts, each capable of independently satisfying the statutory elements, a specific-unanimity jury instruction is required. The Court concluded that the district court’s failure to provide such an instruction was plain error that affected the defendant’s substantial rights. The Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed the first-degree conviction and remanded for a new trial on that charge. View "State of Minnesota vs. Yang" on Justia Law

Patterson vs. State of Minnesota

2026-07-23T05:07:07-08:00

In 2016, Tyrel Patterson and three accomplices participated in a burglary and robbery that resulted in the death of James Herron. Patterson was indicted on two counts of first-degree felony murder and ultimately pleaded guilty to one count under an aiding and abetting theory. He admitted to planning and executing the robbery, being armed, and robbing a resident, but maintained he was outside the house when Herron was fatally shot. He was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of release after 30 years. Years later, Patterson petitioned the Scott County District Court to vacate his conviction under a new Minnesota law (the Act) that provides relief for certain felony murder convictions based on aiding and abetting, if the defendant did not cause the death or intentionally aid with the intent to cause death. The district court initially found a reasonable probability that Patterson could be entitled to relief, but ultimately denied his petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. The court relied on transcripts and findings from the trial of a co-defendant, concluding that Patterson caused Herron’s death. The Supreme Court of Minnesota reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion. It held that the district court erred by making credibility determinations without first holding an evidentiary hearing, as required by precedent and the Act’s procedural framework. The court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to properly resolve disputed material facts and assess the credibility of the parties. The main holding is that a district court cannot make credibility determinations in proceedings under the Act without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. View "Patterson vs. State of Minnesota" on Justia Law

People of Michigan v. Ellis

2026-07-23T05:00:02-08:00

The defendant pleaded guilty to attempted unarmed robbery in Michigan in 2021, following a prior conviction for attempted rape in Illinois in 1983. As part of the 2022 sentence, the Berrien Circuit Court imposed lifetime registration as a Tier III sex offender under Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), based on the statute’s “recapture” provision. This provision requires individuals with pre-SORA sexual offense convictions to register if they are later convicted of any felony after July 1, 2011. The defendant had not committed another sexual offense in the intervening decades, and his recent conviction involved theft and a disputed assault in a Walmart store. After sentencing, the defendant challenged the registration requirement, arguing it was unconstitutional and not applicable because he was an out-of-state resident. The Berrien Circuit Court denied his motion to correct an invalid sentence. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the registration requirement constitutional but held that the defendant, as a nonresident, did not have to register unless he moved to or worked in Michigan. The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether SORA’s recapture provision constituted cruel or unusual punishment when imposed for nonsexual offenses. The Court held that imposing SORA registration on individuals convicted of nonsexual offenses who had a pre-SORA sexual offense conviction was unconstitutional under the Michigan Constitution. The Court found the registration requirement grossly disproportionate, ineffective for rehabilitation, and harsher than penalties imposed for similar offenses elsewhere. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded to the trial court to remove the registration requirement from the defendant’s sentence. View "People of Michigan v. Ellis" on Justia Law

USA v. Rivera

2026-07-22T12:31:45-08:00

A man became involved with a woman who had a minor daughter. After the woman and her daughter moved in with him, the man’s relationship with the daughter deteriorated, especially after he assaulted her mother. Despite the girl’s reluctance to engage with him, he persistently attempted to discuss her personal and sexual life and offered her gifts. Unbeknownst to her, these gifts—a Bluetooth speaker, a USB charger, and a digital picture frame—each contained hidden recording devices, which he installed in her bedroom. The girl’s mother discovered the hidden cameras after breaking up with the man and notified authorities. Investigators found evidence on the man’s phones linking him to the purchase and use of the devices, as well as sexually explicit images and videos of the girl changing clothes, which were recovered from his devices. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida presided over the trial. The government provided notice of its intent to introduce evidence of prior similar acts, specifically testimony from another woman who alleged that the defendant had sexually abused her as a minor. During trial, this witness’s testimony included a statement that went beyond what was disclosed in the government’s pretrial notice. The defense objected, moved for a mistrial, and requested that all of the witness’s testimony be stricken, arguing it was unreliable and unduly prejudicial. The district court struck only the unexpected portion, issued curative instructions to the jury, and denied the motions for mistrial and to strike all testimony. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts, and he was sentenced to 262 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the prior-act evidence, denying a mistrial, or refusing to strike all of the witness’s testimony. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 2251. The convictions were affirmed. View "USA v. Rivera" on Justia Law

United States v. Fordham

2026-07-22T11:00:58-08:00

Three defendants, who held leadership positions in a nationwide gang operating in Michigan and Chicago, were charged after a lengthy federal investigation uncovered extensive drug distribution, violent acts, and strict internal codes of silence within the organization. Law enforcement used confidential informants, monitored communications, conducted controlled purchases, and executed search warrants on social media and personal devices to gather evidence. The defendants were indicted for racketeering conspiracy, drug conspiracies, and related offenses. While many co-defendants pled guilty, these three proceeded to trial. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan conducted a month-long trial, after which a jury convicted all three defendants on most counts. One defendant was acquitted of certain drug trafficking and firearm possession charges but convicted on racketeering, drug conspiracy, and possession with intent to distribute marijuana. At sentencing, the district court imposed lengthy prison terms for each defendant. The defendants appealed, raising suppression issues concerning wiretap evidence, social media searches, and cell phone searches; Sixth Amendment claims regarding prison mail policies and cross-examination limitations; sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges; and a sentencing dispute. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. It rejected all suppression arguments except for a procedural sentencing challenge raised by one defendant, finding that the district court failed to adequately address his objection to a sentencing enhancement based on acquitted conduct. The Court affirmed the convictions for all three defendants and rejected their constitutional and evidentiary claims, holding that the evidence and trial procedures met legal standards. However, it vacated the sentence for the one defendant on procedural grounds and remanded for resentencing, while affirming all other aspects of the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Fordham" on Justia Law

In re McCowen

2026-07-22T08:32:57-08:00

A man was convicted of first-degree murder in 2001 after fatally shooting another individual during a confrontation at a woman’s apartment. At trial, a paramedic testified that the victim suffered two gunshot wounds—one to the chest and another to the head with brain matter visible—supporting the prosecution’s theory of premeditation. However, the pathologist’s autopsy report, which was not introduced at trial, indicated there was only one gunshot wound, entering through the upper chest or neck and exiting from the upper back, with the victim’s head found intact. After his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal by the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, the defendant unsuccessfully sought relief in the San Bernardino County Superior Court and then again in the Court of Appeal, arguing that his conviction rested on false evidence. He filed a similar petition in the California Supreme Court, which issued an order to show cause, directing the Court of Appeal to consider whether the prosecution had violated due process by allowing false testimony about the number and nature of gunshot wounds. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the pleadings and determined that the paramedic’s testimony was materially false and had been relied upon by the prosecution to argue for premeditation. The court found no procedural bar to the petition and concluded that the discrepancy between the trial testimony and the autopsy report required further factual development. The court granted the habeas corpus petition and remanded the matter to the superior court for an evidentiary hearing to determine the origins and impact of the false testimony, the prosecution’s knowledge of the autopsy report, and whether a new trial should be ordered. View "In re McCowen" on Justia Law

Heatley v. State

2026-07-22T06:15:54-08:00

The case involves a defendant who was convicted of murder and armed robbery based largely on circumstantial evidence. The prosecution’s evidence included instant messages allegedly used to lure the victim, text messages about the defendant’s plan, cell phone location data placing him with the victim at key times, firearm evidence linking the defendant’s gun to the crime, and the defendant’s use of the victim’s credit card after the murder. The trial court instructed the jury using a reasonable doubt charge and a circumstantial evidence instruction recommended in an earlier South Carolina Supreme Court case. After his conviction, the South Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed the defendant’s direct appeal under the procedures outlined in Anders v. California. Subsequently, the defendant filed a post-conviction relief (PCR) application, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a specific circumstantial evidence jury instruction identified in State v. Logan. At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel admitted he had not known of Logan at the time of trial. The PCR court found counsel’s performance was not deficient and, even if it was, there was no prejudice. The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the PCR court’s denial of relief. In its opinion, the court clarified South Carolina law regarding jury charges on circumstantial evidence, overruling in part its prior decision in Logan. The court held that trial courts must not require the jury to find that circumstantial evidence “point conclusively to guilt” or that “all circumstances be consistent,” as Logan had suggested. Instead, a constitutionally sound reasonable doubt charge, along with an explanation of circumstantial and direct evidence (as recommended in State v. Grippon), suffices. Consequently, the court held that counsel was not ineffective for not requesting the Logan charge and affirmed the PCR court’s decision. View "Heatley v. State" on Justia Law