Criminal Law - Justia Case Law Summaries

People v. Fuller

2026-11-06T13:31:39-08:00

The defendant was convicted of arson in January 2022 and sentenced to two years in prison. In February 2025, a petition was filed alleging that the defendant had violated Vehicle Code section 14601.2, subdivision (a), but the petition did not specify what was being revoked. At a hearing, the court described the matter as a parole issue, summarily revoked the defendant’s parole supervision, and declined to release him from custody. The defendant was later allowed to represent himself and denied the parole violation, though he admitted to the underlying misdemeanor. At a subsequent hearing, after the defendant’s conviction for the misdemeanor, the court found him in violation of parole “by operation of law,” revoked and reinstated parole, and imposed a jail sentence. The Superior Court of Sonoma County presided over these proceedings. The defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that he was on parole at the time of the alleged violation. The prosecution did not introduce evidence at the hearing to show that the defendant was actually on parole when the alleged violation occurred. The prosecution argued on appeal that references to the proceedings as parole revocation proceedings, and the defendant’s acknowledgment of the hearing, were sufficient. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the matter. It held that to establish a parole violation, the prosecution must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant was on parole at the time of the alleged violation, even if the defendant does not specifically raise the issue before the hearing. Because the prosecution failed to present any evidence of parole status at the time of the violation, the Court of Appeal reversed the order revoking and reinstating parole and imposing jail time. View "People v. Fuller" on Justia Law

United States v. Cook

2026-11-06T10:30:11-08:00

Police observed Gerald Cook commit multiple drug transactions outside his residence after receiving information from an informant who had previously purchased heroin from him. Officers corroborated the informant’s account by seeing Cook’s vehicle at his home and conducting two controlled buys, during which officers observed Cook exit his house, complete drug sales, and return inside. After obtaining a warrant, a search of Cook’s home uncovered drugs, firearms, and evidence of drug trafficking. Cook was indicted on drug and gun charges. He later sought to suppress the evidence, alleging that the warrant affidavit was based on false statements, but withdrew his initial motion. Subsequent motions based on similar grounds were denied. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio considered and denied Cook’s motion to suppress evidence from his home, finding the warrant affidavit provided probable cause and that Cook’s Franks v. Delaware claim was untimely and unsupported. The court also denied a later Franks motion, finding no substantial preliminary showing of intentional or reckless falsehoods in the affidavit, and determined the motion was an unjustified attempt to reopen the suppression hearing. After his motions failed, Cook pleaded guilty and received a sentence of 248 months, which was significantly below the applicable Guidelines range. He appealed, challenging the suppression rulings and his sentence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. It held Cook did not meet the high threshold for a Franks hearing because the record did not show intentional or reckless falsehoods in the warrant affidavit. The court also rejected Cook’s procedural and substantive challenges to his sentence, concluding the district court did not err in its Guidelines calculations or in declining a further reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and that the sentence was reasonable given the § 3553(a) factors. View "United States v. Cook" on Justia Law

USA V. RIDLEY-THOMAS

2026-11-06T10:00:30-08:00

A former member of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors was convicted for conspiracy, federal program bribery, and honest services mail and wire fraud. The case centered on a scheme where the then-Dean of the University of Southern California’s School of Social Work helped channel a $100,000 donation of university funds to a nonprofit employing the supervisor’s son. In exchange, the supervisor voted in favor of a county contract for telehealth services with USC. The evidence showed the supervisor valued the indirect transfer of funds for his son’s benefit, especially after previous attempts to provide direct funding raised concerns about nepotism. The United States District Court for the Central District of California presided over a sixteen-day trial. The jury convicted the supervisor on counts specifically related to the funneling of the $100,000 payment, while acquitting him on other counts tied to his son’s admission, scholarship, or professorship at USC. Following conviction, the supervisor appealed, challenging the Government’s theory of fraud and bribery, the legal validity of the “thing of value,” and the sufficiency of evidence for materiality and intent. He also contested the jury instructions and raised Batson challenges regarding the exclusion of Black female jurors. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court held that the funneling of $100,000 through USC for the son’s benefit was a “thing of value” sufficient to support convictions for honest services fraud and federal program bribery. The court found the evidence of intent and materiality sufficient, determined there was no error in the jury instructions, and rejected the extension of Batson to intersectional challenges. The convictions for conspiracy, federal program bribery, and honest services fraud were affirmed. View "USA V. RIDLEY-THOMAS" on Justia Law

USA V. ABDUL KAREEM

2026-11-06T09:30:31-08:00

The defendant was accused of participating in a plan to attack a public event in Garland, Texas, which was targeted for its association with controversial depictions of the Prophet Muhammad. The attack was carried out by two individuals, Simpson and Soofi, who were killed during the incident. Investigators uncovered evidence of the defendant’s close association with the attackers, his consumption of extremist propaganda, and his involvement in firearms training and procurement. The government argued that the defendant, along with Simpson and Soofi, conspired to provide material support to ISIS, specifically as “personnel” or by providing “services” in the form of the attack. After a trial in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, a jury convicted the defendant on all counts, including conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (Count 5). The district court sentenced him to 360 months’ imprisonment. Post-trial, the defendant filed motions for acquittal and new trials, including arguments based on Brady violations, but relief was denied for Count 5. The government dismissed another count, and the district court resentenced him to the same term. The defendant timely appealed his conviction on Count 5, arguing insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence under the Jackson v. Virginia standard, regardless of whether the claim was preserved below. The court held that the government failed to present sufficient evidence that the defendant intended to join a conspiracy in which material support would be provided to ISIS, either as “personnel” acting under ISIS’s direction or as “services” beyond independent advocacy. The court reversed the conviction on Count 5, remanded for entry of acquittal and resentencing, and affirmed the district court’s rulings on all other issues. View "USA V. ABDUL KAREEM" on Justia Law

State v. Defoe

2026-11-06T07:38:20-08:00

In December 2024, Colton Kenneth Defoe was stopped by a McKenzie County Sheriff’s officer due to an outstanding warrant. The officer cleared Defoe’s vehicle of other passengers and used a K-9 unit to inspect the car, which resulted in an alert for narcotics. A search revealed a plastic baggie and a bindle, both containing methamphetamine residue, and a plastic tube with burn marks. Although Defoe and his passengers denied possession, lab tests confirmed methamphetamine in both the baggie and the bindle, while the tube yielded inconclusive results. No gabapentin was detected, contrary to initial suspicions. Defoe was charged in the District Court of McKenzie County, Northwest Judicial District, with possession of methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving under suspension. Two additional charges were dismissed before trial. The jury found Defoe guilty on all counts, and the district court entered judgment. Defoe appealed, arguing improper jury instructions deprived him of due process and that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. He did not object to the jury instructions at trial but argued the issue in his Rule 29 motion for acquittal, which was denied. The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the appeal. It held that Defoe had not preserved any challenge to the jury instructions for appellate review, as he failed to object distinctly and specifically as required under N.D.R.Crim.P. 30(c). The Court also found no plain error in the instructions, concluding they accurately stated the law and did not mislead the jury. Additionally, the Court determined that substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdicts. The criminal judgment was affirmed. View "State v. Defoe" on Justia Law

State v. Rhodes

2026-11-06T07:33:37-08:00

In 1981, a murder occurred in Wichita, Kansas, and physical evidence, including fingernail scrapings and a hair strand, was collected from the victim. The State charged an individual with the murder, largely based on eyewitness testimony. The defendant argued that the physical evidence could exculpate him, but the jury convicted him of first-degree premeditated murder, and he was sentenced to life in prison. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Years later, the defendant filed successive petitions in Sedgwick District Court—first in 2008, then in 2010, and again in 2025—seeking postconviction DNA testing of the fingernail scrapings and hair strand under K.S.A. 21-2512. In each instance, the district court summarily denied the petitions, finding that the State no longer possessed the items. The court’s denials of the 2008 and 2010 petitions were not appealed. When the third petition was filed in 2025, the Sedgwick District Court again denied relief, this time also ruling that issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) barred the claim because the same issue—the availability of the evidence—had already been decided on the merits in the earlier, unappealed decisions. The defendant appealed this third denial directly to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas. The Supreme Court of Kansas held that issue preclusion barred the third DNA-testing petition because the requirements for the doctrine were met: the same issue had previously been litigated, was necessary to the prior judgments, and involved the same parties. The court further found no abuse of discretion by the district court in applying issue preclusion, even though the defendant argued he was not advised of his right to appeal earlier denials. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "State v. Rhodes " on Justia Law

State v. Byers

2026-11-06T07:33:36-08:00

The defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree premeditated murder and several related offenses. Jury selection began, but before the jury was sworn, the defendant entered into a plea agreement to plead guilty to two counts of first-degree felony murder. At the plea hearing, the district court, prosecutor, defense counsel, and the written plea agreement all stated that the defendant would be eligible for parole after 25 years. However, due to the defendant’s criminal history, the applicable statute required a mandatory minimum sentence based on sentencing guidelines, resulting in a much longer period before parole eligibility. The defendant later learned of this discrepancy and moved to withdraw his pleas, arguing he had been misinformed about the parole eligibility date and would not have pleaded guilty had he known the true consequences. The Wyandotte District Court reviewed the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas before sentencing. The court found that the defendant had been adequately advised and entered his pleas freely, knowingly, and voluntarily. It denied the motion, imposed concurrent life sentences with parole eligibility after 620 months, and did not address the issue of the incorrect parole eligibility information. The defendant timely appealed, raising both the plea withdrawal issue and a challenge to the classification of a prior conviction. The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas held that the district court abused its discretion by denying the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. The Court concluded that a plea cannot be considered fairly and understandingly made when the plea agreement and colloquy materially misstate parole eligibility, the misinformation is not corrected before the plea, and the record shows this mistake directly influenced the decision to plead guilty. The Court reversed the convictions, vacated the sentences, and remanded the case with directions to allow the defendant to withdraw his pleas. View "State v. Byers " on Justia Law

State v. Finley

2026-11-06T07:33:36-08:00

On the afternoon of July 31, 2022, a shooting occurred at a BP gas station in Overland Park, Kansas. Surveillance video captured Zarrell Semaj Finley retrieving an AK-47 from a backpack and shooting Shaquille Jackson multiple times following a brief physical struggle over the backpack. Finley then fled the scene with others, leaving Jackson, who later died from his wounds. During a subsequent police interview, Finley admitted to drinking heavily before the incident and claimed he acted in self-defense, believing Jackson was armed and posed a threat. Finley's sister testified that the firearm belonged to her, and Finley had been drinking on the day of the shooting. In Johnson District Court, Finley was charged with first-degree premeditated murder and criminal possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, to which he pleaded guilty to the weapons charge. The murder charge proceeded to trial, where the jury found Finley guilty, and the court imposed a life sentence. At trial, the court denied Finley’s requests for jury instructions on voluntary intoxication and heat of passion voluntary manslaughter. The court also declined to instruct on voluntary manslaughter based on defense of an occupied vehicle, but did instruct on imperfect self-defense voluntary manslaughter and other lesser included offenses. The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed Finley’s direct appeal. The court held that the district court properly refused Finley’s requested jury instructions because the evidence did not support a finding of impairment sufficient for voluntary intoxication, nor was there legally sufficient provocation for heat of passion manslaughter or factual basis for a defense of an occupied vehicle instruction. The court found that any prosecutorial errors during closing argument were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, it concluded that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding of premeditation. The court affirmed Finley’s conviction. View "State v. Finley " on Justia Law

State v. Mildfelt

2026-11-06T07:33:35-08:00

The defendant was convicted by a jury of six child-sex crimes involving two minor victims. At sentencing, the district court imposed life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 100 years and ordered the defendant to pay a $2,400 Children's Advocacy Center fee, calculating $400 for each conviction as required by the relevant Kansas statute. Following sentencing, the defendant appealed to the Kansas Court of Appeals, arguing that the statute, K.S.A. 20-370(a), only permitted the imposition of a single $400 fee regardless of the number of convictions. The Kansas Court of Appeals disagreed and held that the statute’s plain language required a $400 fee for each conviction where a minor was a victim. The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas granted review to resolve the statutory interpretation question. Upon examining the statutory text, the Supreme Court determined that K.S.A. 20-370(a) is ambiguous because it supports both a per-defendant and a per-conviction reading. Applying ordinary rules of grammar, the Court concluded that the statute imposes a single $400 fee per qualifying defendant, not per conviction. The Court found that other interpretive canons and legislative history did not provide convincing evidence to contradict this grammatical reading. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas held that K.S.A. 20-370(a) requires courts to order any defendant convicted of a crime involving a minor to pay only one $400 assessment fee, regardless of the number of convictions in that case. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacated the district court’s fee order, and remanded the case with directions to impose just a single $400 fee. View "State v. Mildfelt " on Justia Law

State v. Rockefeller

2026-11-06T07:13:38-08:00

The defendant was charged with aggravated assault after an incident in downtown Fargo, where the victim sustained serious injuries, including facial fractures and lacerations. Security footage captured the assault, and the defendant was later found wearing clothing matching the assailant in the video. The victim did not testify, but had signed a medical authorization allowing disclosure of certain health information to the police. At trial, the State called a physician to testify about the victim’s injuries. The defense did not object to the introduction of medical testimony or records, and explicitly agreed that such evidence would be admissible, provided it did not identify the defendant as the assailant. During opening statements, the prosecutor made remarks inviting jurors to imagine themselves in the victim’s position. The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, admitted the physician’s testimony regarding the victim’s injuries, over no objection from the defense, and allowed the medical authorization into evidence. The jury found the defendant guilty of aggravated assault. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota, the defendant argued that the district court erred by compelling the physician’s testimony in violation of the physician-patient privilege, and that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by making a “golden rule” argument during opening statements. The Supreme Court held that the physician-patient privilege belongs exclusively to the patient, not the defendant, so the defendant could not assert it to exclude the physician’s testimony. The court also concluded that, although the prosecutor’s remarks were improper, the lack of a timely objection and the context of the case meant there was no obvious error requiring reversal. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the conviction. View "State v. Rockefeller" on Justia Law

Archambault v. State

2026-11-06T07:12:55-08:00

The petitioner was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a child, involving at least twenty acts against a minor between November 2019 and August 2020. Sentenced in March 2022, he appealed his conviction, which was affirmed by the North Dakota Supreme Court in November 2022. In March 2023, he filed his first postconviction relief petition, which was denied by the District Court of Ward County and affirmed on appeal in March 2024. On April 29, 2025, the petitioner filed a second postconviction relief petition, alleging constitutional violations based on alleged withholding of evidence and false testimony by the State, citing Glossip v. Oklahoma, 604 U.S. 226 (2025). After the State answered the petition—raising the statute of limitations, res judicata, and misuse of process as affirmative defenses—it moved for summary disposition on the basis of misuse of process but omitted the statute of limitations in its motion. The district court, however, ordered briefing on the statute of limitations and the impact of Glossip. Neither party scheduled a hearing, and the court ultimately granted summary disposition and dismissed the petition as untimely. The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the appeal. It held that the State preserved the statute of limitations defense by raising it in its answer, and the district court could properly consider that defense even though it was not included in the State’s summary disposition motion. The Court determined that the petitioner forfeited his hearing request by failing to schedule it, and that the district court provided adequate notice and opportunity to respond regarding the statute of limitations issue. The Court found the petitioner failed to show that his claim fell within an exception to the statute of limitations for a new interpretation of law. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the petition. View "Archambault v. State" on Justia Law

State v. Carpenter

2026-11-06T06:39:57-08:00

The defendant, a sergeant in the North Dakota National Guard, was charged with gross sexual imposition and sexual assault after allegations that he had sexual contact with two subordinate soldiers during a hotel party following a unit training. The prosecution alleged that he touched one woman’s breasts and vagina without consent and had sexual intercourse with another woman who was so intoxicated that she was unaware of her surroundings. The incidents were said to have occurred while the two women were in a vulnerable state due to alcohol consumption. In the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, the case proceeded to a jury trial. During jury selection, the State used seven peremptory challenges, all against male potential jurors. The defense objected, claiming gender discrimination. The prosecution provided non-gender-based reasons for each challenge, citing jurors’ attitudes toward feminism, the MeToo movement, prior criminal history, profession, and willingness to serve. The court found no purposeful discrimination and denied the objection. During opening statements, the defense objected to a statement by the prosecutor as alleged misconduct, arguing it referenced inadmissible prior bad acts; the court found no violation of its pretrial order and denied a motion for mistrial. After the prosecution rested, the defense moved for acquittal for insufficient evidence, which the court denied. The jury ultimately found the defendant guilty on both counts. On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed whether the State’s peremptory challenges were discriminatory, whether the prosecutor’s opening statement constituted misconduct, and whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. The Court held that the State’s explanations for peremptory challenges were gender-neutral and credible, the prosecutor’s comment did not amount to misconduct, and the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "State v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

Rice v. Lee

2026-11-06T06:39:11-08:00

Dallas William Rice was charged with two class A felonies relating to theft of property valued over $50,000. He was initially released on an unsecured appearance bond. Rice and the State negotiated a plea agreement under North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), which provides for a binding sentence, and Rice entered a guilty plea to conspiracy to commit theft. However, the district court rejected the proposed plea agreement without clarifying whether it was accepted, and immediately exonerated Rice’s bond, ordering him held in custody pending further proceedings. The court did not follow the required procedures for rejecting a binding plea agreement, nor did it provide Rice with the opportunity to withdraw his plea, as mandated by Rule 11. Prior to this, a request was made to the Supreme Court of North Dakota to reassign Rice’s case to a judge outside the North Central Judicial District to avoid an appearance of impropriety, which was denied. After the district court’s actions regarding the plea and bond, Rice petitioned the Supreme Court of North Dakota for a supervisory writ to reinstate his bond and to reassign his case to a judge from outside the district. The Supreme Court of North Dakota found that the district court erred in exonerating Rice’s bond and ordering him held without properly accepting the guilty plea or providing the required advisements under Rule 11(c)(5). The court held that the district court must promptly determine Rice’s release conditions in accordance with the state constitution and Rule 46. However, the Supreme Court denied Rice’s request for reassignment to an out-of-district judge, concluding that Rice had not shown actual bias or filed a proper motion for disqualification in the district court. The petition for supervisory writ was therefore granted in part and denied in part. View "Rice v. Lee" on Justia Law

State v. Robinson

2026-11-06T06:05:24-08:00

The case involves a defendant who was convicted of first degree murder and related weapons offenses. After his conviction and sentencing were affirmed on direct appeal—with a modification to his life sentence—he pursued postconviction relief in the District Court for Douglas County. The court denied some of his claims without a hearing and others after an evidentiary hearing. The defendant later claimed he was denied his right to appeal the denial of postconviction relief due to the clerk’s negligence. The district court initially dismissed this claim for lack of jurisdiction, but the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Upon remand, the district court found official negligence had caused the lost appeal and reinstated the appeal, which was ultimately affirmed by the Nebraska Supreme Court. The defendant’s subsequent federal habeas petition was denied. In April 2025, the defendant filed another motion for postconviction relief and a motion for a new trial, which were denied by the District Court for Douglas County on May 5, 2025. The order was sent to his former attorneys, not directly to him. Unaware of the order, he filed duplicate motions, which were again denied. The district court later recognized he had not been notified of the earlier orders and mailed them directly to him. He then filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming it was timely due to delayed notice, and the district court accepted it as being within the ten-day period for a motion to alter or amend. The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed whether the appeal was timely. The court held that the district court lacked authority to extend the statutory time for appeal based on delayed notice, absent evidence supporting official negligence. Because the motion for reconsideration was not filed within ten days of the relevant order and no proper motion to vacate was filed with supporting evidence, the notice of appeal was untimely. The Nebraska Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "State v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Cherry v USA

2026-11-05T14:30:08-08:00

Federal agents arrested a man after a sting operation involving a confidential informant. The informant identified the defendant as someone involved in drug transactions and arranged a meeting where agents observed the defendant accepting sham cocaine. Upon arrest, agents found heroin, crack cocaine, and cash in the defendant’s vehicle. The defendant admitted to prior drug dealings with the informant. He was charged with possession of heroin with intent to distribute and went to trial, where a jury convicted him. Before the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the defendant’s sentencing included two enhancements: one under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) for a prior felony drug conviction and another under § 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines for being a career offender. Defense counsel did not challenge these enhancements. The defendant was sentenced to 20 years in prison and 8 years of supervised release. On direct appeal, his conviction was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. He subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object to the sentencing enhancements and to certain testimony at trial. The district court denied relief, finding the enhancements valid and counsel’s performance reasonable. On collateral review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that counsel’s failure to challenge the § 841(b)(1)(B) statutory enhancement was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial, as it affected both the advisory Guidelines range and mandatory minimums. However, the court rejected claims regarding the career-offender enhancement and admission of the agent’s testimony, finding no prejudice or legal error. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, while affirming the conviction. View "Cherry v USA" on Justia Law

State ex rel. State v. Wilson

2026-11-05T12:19:44-08:00

Jeremy Michael Weekley was indicted by the Tyler County Grand Jury for sex crimes allegedly committed against a minor, A.M., in February 2018. The indictment did not specify the exact date, and A.M. did not disclose the alleged assault until 2023. At trial in January 2026, A.M. testified that the incident occurred on February 24, 2018. The defense argued that the specific date had not been disclosed prior to trial and moved to dismiss the charges, but the Circuit Court of Tyler County denied the motion and granted a mistrial. The defense then sought to disqualify the Tyler County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office, asserting that Assistant Prosecutor Kyle Elliot was a necessary witness regarding the timing of the date’s disclosure by A.M.’s mother. The Circuit Court of Tyler County found no prosecutorial misconduct and concluded that Assistant Prosecutor Elliot’s testimony was immaterial to the elements of the charged offenses or the credibility of the witness. Nevertheless, the court disqualified the prosecutor’s office and appointed a special prosecutor as a preemptive measure to avoid further motions from the defense related to evidence disclosure and to expedite proceedings. The State petitioned the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia for a writ of prohibition, arguing that the disqualification lacked valid legal or factual justification and infringed upon the prosecuting attorney’s constitutional duties. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that disqualifying an elected prosecuting attorney and his office without valid reasons was clearly erroneous and exceeded the circuit court’s legitimate authority. The court granted the writ of prohibition, modified precedent to clarify that the State may challenge such disqualifications, and ordered the circuit court to permit the Tyler County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office to remain as counsel for the State. View "State ex rel. State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

USA v. Adams

2026-11-05T12:03:22-08:00

Police in Manatee County, Florida, began investigating an individual known as “Dre” following a tip that he was selling drugs and collecting payments through Cash App. Surveillance linked “Dre” to a residence in Bradenton, which was then associated with Andre Adams Jr. Officers observed frequent, brief visits to the home and witnessed Adams hand items to visitors. Trash recovered from the property contained evidence of drugs, and Cash App records revealed Adams received over $67,000 in small payments, with some transactions referencing drug slang. Adams had no reported employment during this period. A search warrant was obtained for the residence, where officers found substantial evidence of drug trafficking, including narcotics, cash, firearms, and paraphernalia. A subsequent search of a storage unit rented by Adams uncovered more drugs, cash, and firearms. A federal grand jury indicted Adams on charges of possessing drugs with intent to distribute, possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. Adams moved to suppress evidence, arguing the search warrant affidavit omitted material information, and sought a hearing under Franks v. Delaware. A magistrate judge recommended denying his motions, finding Adams failed to submit a sworn statement as required, and the district court adopted this recommendation. Adams’s evidentiary objections to the introduction of his financial records and employment history were also denied, as was his request for a specific jury instruction on “mere presence.” At trial, the jury convicted Adams on all counts. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that Adams was not entitled to a Franks hearing, the evidentiary rulings were proper or harmless, the jury instructions were adequate, the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, and the 228-month sentence was substantively reasonable. View "USA v. Adams" on Justia Law

United States v. Morgan

2026-11-05T11:02:39-08:00

The defendant was responsible for the care of five minor girls, including his former stepdaughter, and used his access to sexually abuse and surreptitiously record them, often while they were nude. The abuse came to light when one of the victims, a seven-year-old, disclosed inappropriate conduct to her parents, prompting a law enforcement investigation. Officers obtained search warrants and discovered secret videos and images of the minors, some recorded in the defendant’s home bathroom using a hidden camera. A grand jury indicted the defendant on multiple counts for production, attempted production, and possession of child pornography based on these depictions. In the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, the defendant was tried before a jury. The evidence included testimony from law enforcement, parents, and one of the victims, as well as review of the illicit images and videos. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, and the district judge sentenced him to eighty years in prison. On appeal, the defendant raised several arguments, including challenges to evidentiary sufficiency, jury instructions, the admission of uncharged sexual abuse evidence, multiplicity of counts, and cumulative error. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that, under its precedent, a depiction of a minor can be considered a “lascivious exhibition” based on how the depiction is created by the defendant, regardless of the minor’s awareness or intent. The court found sufficient evidence for all convictions, determined the jury instructions were not erroneous, and upheld the use of the Dost factors as a jury aid. The court also found no reversible error in the admission of evidence, held that the counts were not plainly multiplicitous, and rejected the cumulative error argument. The convictions and sentence were affirmed. View "United States v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Guzman v. State of Florida

2026-11-05T08:08:44-08:00

The case concerns James Guzman, who was convicted of the murder of David Colvin. Guzman has been tried three times for Colvin's murder, with the most recent conviction occurring in 2016. Following this conviction, Guzman has undergone four penalty-phase proceedings, each resulting in a death sentence. The current appeal focuses on the fourth penalty phase and the resulting death sentence, which followed a unanimous jury recommendation. During that penalty phase, Guzman moved to disqualify the judge based on her prior employment at the law firm (Rice and Rose) that represented him in his first appeal, though she did not work on his case or any criminal matters at the firm. Previously, the Circuit Court for the Seventh Judicial Circuit conducted the penalty phase, presided over jury selection, and ruled on Guzman's motion to disqualify the judge, finding it legally insufficient. The jury found four aggravating factors and recommended death, and the judge imposed the sentence after considering both aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Guzman appealed, raising issues regarding the judge’s disqualification, the jury instructions on victim impact testimony, and the constitutionality of the death penalty. The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decisions. The Court held that Guzman’s motion to disqualify the judge was legally insufficient, as the allegations did not establish an objectively reasonable fear of bias or prejudice. The Court also found Guzman’s challenge to the jury instructions regarding victim impact testimony was unpreserved and, even if preserved, meritless, since the instructions given were adequate. Finally, the Court rejected Guzman’s argument that the death penalty is inherently cruel and unusual, citing longstanding precedent. The disposition by the Supreme Court of Florida was to affirm Guzman’s sentence of death. View "Guzman v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

WRIGHT v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

2026-11-05T08:01:39-08:00

A masked individual entered Plato’s Closet in Jonesboro, Arkansas, threatened employees with what appeared to be a handgun, and stole $598 before fleeing in a gray Mercury sedan. Shortly after, law enforcement stopped Pierre Wright, who was driving a vehicle matching the description. Officers found clothing matching the suspect’s, an imitation firearm, and a Plato’s Closet bag containing $598 in the car. Additional evidence, including GPS and cell-phone data, further linked Wright to the crime. The State charged Wright with aggravated robbery and theft of property and sought to classify him as a habitual offender based on prior Tennessee convictions. At trial in the Craighead County Circuit Court, Wright moved for directed verdicts, arguing insufficient evidence of his identity as the robber. The circuit court denied these motions, and the jury found Wright guilty. During sentencing, the State introduced certified records of Wright’s prior Tennessee convictions—one for aggravated robbery and two for aggravated burglary—and argued that the Tennessee aggravated-burglary offenses were comparable to Arkansas’s aggravated residential burglary, making Wright eligible for a mandatory life sentence under Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-501(d). The circuit court agreed and imposed the life sentence. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, Wright raised three arguments: the sufficiency of the evidence, the comparability of his Tennessee convictions to Arkansas offenses for sentencing enhancement, and the propriety of his mandatory life sentence. The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding the Tennessee aggravated-burglary convictions comparable to the Arkansas statute, and that the mandatory life sentence was proper. The Court affirmed the judgment and sentence. View "WRIGHT v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

MCCOY v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

2026-11-05T08:01:38-08:00

On October 18, 2022, a fatal shooting occurred in the parking lot of The Ridge apartment complex in Little Rock, Arkansas. The evidence at trial established that Ferrad McCoy traveled with Mason Abraham from Memphis to Little Rock, where Abraham, as the passenger in a white Infiniti, shot and killed Broderick Blueford. Law enforcement later pursued the same vehicle on Interstate 40, resulting in a high-speed chase and crash. Both McCoy and Abraham fled on foot but were apprehended nearby. Physical evidence, including firearms, shell casings, a cell phone, and a hoodie matching McCoy’s attire, as well as video footage and cell phone records, linked both men to the crime and location. The Pulaski County Circuit Court presided over a jury trial in which McCoy was convicted of capital murder, first-degree unlawful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, and firearm enhancements. He received life imprisonment plus additional years for the enhancements. McCoy challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and objected to the admission of several items, including photographs, firearms, video footage, and a “BOLO” flyer. He also raised issues regarding jury instructions and the Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case, applying the substantial evidence standard and broad discretion for evidentiary rulings. The Court held that there was substantial evidence to support the convictions, properly admitted the contested evidence, and found no reversible error in the circuit court’s rulings. The Court also determined that McCoy’s jury instruction and Confrontation Clause arguments were either waived or without merit. The convictions and sentences imposed by the Pulaski County Circuit Court were affirmed. View "MCCOY v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

BROWN v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

2026-11-05T08:01:38-08:00

The case centers on a man who shot and killed his wife in their Little Rock home. In the days leading up to the incident, he sent her a series of threatening and incoherent text messages, suggesting jealousy and intent to cause harm. On the day of the shooting, a family friend visited the home and left his .40-caliber Glock handgun on the couch. After an argument between the husband and wife, the friend heard gunshots as he was leaving. He returned to find the wife dead and the husband present but the handgun missing. The husband fled the scene and was later apprehended in Texas, having changed his appearance. During his time in jail, he instructed his daughter to lie to investigators about the nature of his relationship with his wife and whether there had been any conflict. The Pulaski County Circuit Court presided over the trial. During the proceedings, the defendant requested to dismiss his retained counsel midtrial, expressing dissatisfaction with his representation, but had not arranged for another attorney and did not wish to represent himself. The circuit court denied the request, citing the length of time the case had been pending and the absence of substitute counsel. At trial’s conclusion, the jury found him guilty of first-degree murder, a lesser-included offense of the original capital murder charge, and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment plus fifteen years for a firearm enhancement. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed whether the circuit court erred in denying the motion to change counsel and whether there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction. The Supreme Court held that substantial evidence supported the verdict and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the last-minute motion to change counsel. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "BROWN v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

DAVIS V. STATE OF ARKANSAS

2026-11-05T08:01:37-08:00

The appellant was charged as a habitual offender with kidnapping, rape, and aggravated assault following an incident where he forcibly assaulted and raped a fifteen-year-old girl in Columbia County, Arkansas. The State agreed to a plea deal, which would dismiss the kidnapping charge and recommend concurrent sentences of thirty years for rape, twenty years suspended, and six years for aggravated assault. During the plea hearing, the appellant acknowledged the terms and facts of the case, as well as his prior felony convictions. The circuit court found the plea voluntary and knowing, but ultimately imposed a life sentence for rape and six years for aggravated assault, deviating from the recommended plea agreement terms. After the court accepted the plea but before entry of judgment, the appellant moved to withdraw his guilty plea under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.1, arguing that he had not been given notice that the court would reject the recommended sentence and had not been given an opportunity to withdraw his plea. The Columbia County Circuit Court held a hearing on the motion and found that the plea had been entered voluntarily, with effective assistance of counsel, and with knowledge of the nature of the charges and possible sentences. The court determined that it had not indicated concurrence with the plea agreement and that no manifest injustice warranting withdrawal of the plea had been shown. The sentencing order was entered, and the appellant filed a timely appeal. The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the circuit court’s denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea for abuse of discretion. It held that, because the circuit court had not indicated concurrence with the plea agreement, Rule 26.1(b)(v) did not apply, and the appellant did not prove manifest injustice. Arguments regarding lack of notice under Rule 25.3 and involuntariness under Rule 26.1(b)(iii) were not preserved for appellate review. The court affirmed the circuit court’s decision. View "DAVIS V. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

People v. Clark

2026-11-05T06:30:12-08:00

The defendant was convicted in 2012 of first degree murder for a crime allegedly committed in 1994 and sentenced to life in prison without parole. After an appeal affirmed the conviction, he sought postconviction relief, which was partly granted, leading to an evidentiary hearing. While awaiting retrial following a stipulation to vacate his conviction, he learned of alleged misconduct by the DNA analyst involved in his case. He supplemented his motion, claiming entitlement to a new trial based on this new information. Subsequently, he served the Colorado Bureau of Investigation (CBI) with a subpoena requesting documents from cases handled by the analyst, seeking to support claims for a motion to dismiss based on alleged outrageous governmental conduct. The Boulder County District Court initially denied CBI’s motion to quash, finding that the requested materials "may have relevance" to the defendant's anticipated motion. The court clarified the scope of the subpoena after a motion to reconsider but maintained its order for production. The district court’s reasoning relied on both the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Colorado Forensic Science Integrity Act (FSIA), suggesting the materials could be relevant to the defendant’s claims, but did not address all required legal factors or procedural prerequisites under the governing rules and statute. The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the district court’s orders under its original jurisdiction, applying both abuse of discretion and de novo standards of review. The court held that the district court erred by denying CBI's motion to quash because the subpoena exceeded the allowable scope under both Crim. P. 17 and the FSIA. The defendant had not satisfied the procedural requirements for discovery under the FSIA, nor all five factors of the Spykstra test. The order to show cause was made absolute, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "People v. Clark" on Justia Law

PHILPOT v. STATE OF TEXAS

2026-11-05T06:13:52-08:00

The appellant was convicted of forgery for presenting a cashier’s check allegedly issued by “PacPhil Bank” in the amount of $1,028,000.00 to the Dallas County Jail in an attempt to post bond for another individual. Investigation revealed that the check lacked essential banking features such as a routing number, account number, and check number, and that PacPhil Bank was a fictitious entity. The appellant admitted to creating the check himself and claimed that PacPhil Bank was a trust company for which he served as trustee and treasurer. Evidence was also introduced of a similar incident in which the appellant presented another fraudulent cashier’s check at a car dealership. The case was tried in the 194th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas, where the appellant represented himself. The jury found him guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to two years’ confinement, suspended in favor of five years’ community supervision. On appeal, the Fifth Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. The appellate court held that the evidence was sufficient to show the check purported to be the act of another who did not authorize it, and that any error in the jury charge concerning statutory definitions did not egregiously harm the appellant. A dissenting opinion argued the evidence was insufficient because the appellant signed his own name and the check was void on its face. Upon review, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed the appellate court’s judgment. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for forgery, even though the cashier’s check purported to be the act of a fictitious entity, and that the statute encompasses such circumstances. Additionally, the court found no egregious harm from the omission of certain statutory definitions in the jury charge. View "PHILPOT v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

Miller v. State

2026-11-05T06:01:46-08:00

On July 17, 2012, Jeremiah McDonald was fatally shot in Newark, Delaware. Witnesses described the shooter as wearing a wolf mask and a hoodie. The police investigation initially failed to identify a suspect, but in 2016, after a renewed inquiry, Kevin Miller was arrested based largely on witness statements, including testimony from Warner Wheeler and James Watson, both of whom identified Miller as the shooter. Other witnesses contradicted Wheeler’s account, and trial testimony included evidence of a tense relationship between Miller and McDonald, as well as alleged witness tampering by Miller. The Superior Court of Delaware conducted a jury trial, resulting in Miller’s conviction for first-degree murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, possession of a firearm by a person prohibited, and witness tampering. After a bench trial, Miller was also found guilty of the severed firearm possession charge. The court declared Miller an habitual offender and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus thirty-five years. Miller’s convictions were affirmed on direct appeal by the Supreme Court of Delaware. Subsequently, Miller filed a motion for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, a Brady violation, cumulative error, and a claim under Erlinger v. United States. The Superior Court denied the motion. The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed Miller’s appeal from the denial of postconviction relief. The court held that Miller’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to call impeachment witnesses or an identification expert, and for not objecting to certain hearsay testimony. It found no Brady violation because the prosecution had no duty to search records of a government agency uninvolved in the prosecution. The court concluded that Miller’s cumulative error and Erlinger claims lacked merit or were unripe, as his sentence enhancement had no practical effect given his life sentence. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "Miller v. State" on Justia Law

State v. Rogers

2026-11-04T15:37:00-08:00

A Montana Highway Patrol officer stopped the defendant for a vehicle malfunction and observed signs of marijuana use. After the defendant admitted to smoking marijuana and submitted to field sobriety tests, he was arrested for driving under the influence. The officer transported him to a hospital, where a certified phlebotomist drew his blood. The State charged the defendant with felony operation of a vehicle with a THC concentration of 5 ng/ml or more, based on the blood toxicology report, and related misdemeanors. The defendant contested the foundational requirements for admitting the blood test, specifically the statutory requirement that the phlebotomist be supervised by a physician or registered nurse, and challenged the use of his certified driving record to establish prior DUI convictions for felony sentencing. The District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District, Ravalli County, admitted the blood test evidence, overruling the defense’s objection and finding hospital employment sufficient to imply supervision. The court also relied on the defendant’s certified driving record to find at least three prior DUI convictions, sentencing him as a fourth or subsequent DUI offender. The defense appealed, arguing both the blood test admission and the sentencing enhancement lacked proper foundation. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the District Court abused its discretion by treating hospital employment as sufficient to establish the statutory supervision requirement for blood draws. However, the Supreme Court found the defendant waived his objection by failing to make it in a timely manner before the evidence was introduced. Regarding sentencing, the Supreme Court held that the certified driving record constituted competent evidence of at least three prior DUI convictions and affirmed the sentencing enhancement. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. View "State v. Rogers" on Justia Law

State v. Notafraid

2026-11-04T15:36:52-08:00

The defendant was charged with deliberate homicide following an arrest in March 2021. Initially released on bond, he was later taken into custody after missing a required hearing. At a pretrial release revocation hearing, the State was represented by then-Deputy County Attorney Brett Linneweber. Over time, the defendant changed attorneys multiple times, displaying distrust toward counsel and initially refusing to accept any plea agreement. Ultimately, after negotiations, he agreed to plead guilty to mitigated deliberate homicide in exchange for a binding sentencing recommendation and dismissal of other charges. Before the plea hearing, Judge Linneweber, who had since been appointed to the bench, was assigned to the case. Although he had previously appeared for the State in a related proceeding, he determined his involvement was minimal and did not recuse himself, accepting the defendant’s guilty plea. After his plea, the defendant filed a motion for Judge Linneweber’s disqualification, which was referred to the Montana Supreme Court. Judge Linneweber then recused himself, and the motion was denied as moot. The defendant later sought to withdraw his guilty plea, citing involuntariness, ineffective assistance of counsel, newly discovered evidence, and pressure to accept the plea, but did not explicitly raise the disqualification issue as a basis for withdrawal. The Thirteenth Judicial District Court denied the motion, finding no evidence that the plea was not knowing or voluntary and that the new evidence could have been discovered earlier. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the failure to recuse constituted good cause for plea withdrawal. The Court held that Judge Linneweber’s prior involvement as counsel required disqualification by statute and rule. The failure to recuse was a due process violation and constituted good cause to withdraw the guilty plea. The Court reversed the District Court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Notafraid" on Justia Law

State v. Savage

2026-11-04T15:36:51-08:00

The defendant sent a series of text messages to the Lincoln County Dispatch using the text-to-911 feature on three separate dates in January and February 2024. He repeatedly contacted dispatch to complain about a cell phone he claimed was not returned by law enforcement a decade earlier. Despite being told that his complaint was not an emergency and being directed to appropriate reporting avenues, he continued to send numerous messages, including profanity and statements perceived as threatening. Over these incidents, dispatchers testified that the frequent alerts from his texts interfered with their work. A criminal complaint was filed in Lincoln County Justice Court, initially alleging multiple counts of obstructing a peace officer based on these communications. The State later amended the complaint to include additional offenses after further investigation. The District Court ultimately charged the defendant with ten counts, including intimidation, obstructing a peace officer, false reports to peace officers, and privacy in communications, with offenses tied to each date of conduct. At trial, the jury acquitted the defendant of intimidation but convicted him on the remaining nine counts. The District Court imposed suspended jail terms and a partially suspended Department of Corrections sentence, with some sentences running concurrently and one consecutively. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the defendant’s counsel was ineffective for not objecting to multiple convictions under Montana’s multiple charges statute, and whether there was sufficient evidence to support one privacy in communications conviction. The court held that the offenses occurred on distinct dates and were not part of the same transaction. It found no deficiency in counsel’s performance and concluded that sufficient evidence supported the privacy in communications conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed all convictions. View "State v. Savage" on Justia Law

State v. Rogers

2026-11-04T15:36:48-08:00

A Montana Highway Patrol trooper stopped the defendant for speeding and discovered signs of intoxication, including the smell of alcohol and slurred speech. The defendant admitted to drinking, and after refusing a blood sample, a search warrant was obtained. A certified phlebotomist, supervised by a registered nurse in a “distant” manner, drew the defendant’s blood at the county detention center. The blood test showed a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.136. The defendant was charged with operation of a vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more, fourth or subsequent offense, and related misdemeanors. The Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, presided over the trial. The defendant moved to exclude the blood-test evidence, arguing improper supervision under Montana Code Annotated § 61-8-1019(1). The District Court denied the motion, finding both the phlebotomist’s qualifications and the supervisory relationship sufficient. At sentencing, the defendant disputed a 1995 DUI conviction listed in the PSI. The District Court relied on a certified driving record and other documents, finding competent proof of the 1995 conviction and sentencing the defendant under § 61-8-1008(2), MCA, as a fifth offense, imposing prison time, credit for time served, fines, statutory surcharges, and an audit-hearing provision. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the blood-test evidence was properly admitted, as the statutory requirements for supervision were satisfied. The Court affirmed that the certified driving record constituted competent proof of the disputed 1995 DUI conviction. It also held that the defendant was properly sentenced under § 61-8-1008(2), MCA, as the predicate conviction remained valid. However, the Court reversed the sentence in part, remanding for resentencing to correct jail credit, reduce surcharges, and strike the audit-hearing provision due to lack of statutory authority. View "State v. Rogers" on Justia Law

State v. Knotts

2026-11-04T12:14:53-08:00

The defendant was charged with multiple counts of sexual abuse, including first-degree sexual assault and sexual abuse by a parent or guardian, based on allegations that he abused his step-daughter when she was between eleven and fourteen years old. Prior to trial, the State notified the defense of its intent to use evidence of prior bad acts related to the victim, but did not provide notice of the defendant’s decades-old misdemeanor domestic battery and assault convictions. At trial, the defendant testified, denying all acts alleged by the victim and any uncharged but related conduct. During cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned the defendant about whether he was a violent man. Upon his denial, the prosecutor confronted him with his prior convictions for domestic battery and assault from 1997, 1998, and 2002. After a jury convicted the defendant on all counts, the Circuit Court of Preston County denied his motion for a new trial. The court found that the prior convictions were properly admitted to rebut the defendant’s claim to a nonviolent character, reasoning that the defendant had put his character at issue by denying both the charged and uncharged conduct. The circuit court alternatively held that, even if the convictions were improperly admitted, any error was harmless in light of the other evidence presented. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed and remanded. The court held that the circuit court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior misdemeanor convictions, as such convictions were inadmissible under Rules 404(a)(2)(A) and 609 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence. The court further determined that the erroneous admission of these convictions was prejudicial and not harmless, especially given the credibility-focused nature of the case. Accordingly, the court ordered a new trial. View "State v. Knotts" on Justia Law

State v. Crawford

2026-11-04T12:14:51-08:00

A man and a female companion were suspected of shoplifting at a Walmart in White Hall, West Virginia. After the store employee alerted law enforcement, officers stopped and searched the vehicle the pair had used. The man, sitting in the passenger seat, was arrested, and officers found a black fanny pack under his seat, which contained a loaded firearm, baggies of white powder suspected to be cocaine, and pills believed to be oxycontin. He was indicted on six counts, including possession with intent to deliver cocaine and fentanyl, use or presentation of a firearm during the commission of a felony, possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, and prohibited person carrying a concealed firearm. The Circuit Court of Marion County presided over a one-day jury trial, after which the jury found the man guilty of five counts and not guilty of conspiracy. He filed a post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal or, alternatively, a new trial, arguing that the evidence was insufficient for the firearm charge and that his Sixth Amendment right to confront the forensic analyst was violated when the analyst who performed drug testing was not called to testify. The circuit court denied the motion, ruling that the sufficiency of evidence was a question for the jury and that the testimony of a substitute expert satisfied the confrontation requirement. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and applied a de novo standard to the sufficiency and confrontation issues. The court held that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for use or presentation of a firearm during a felony because there was no proof the defendant actively employed the firearm. The court further held that admitting the forensic laboratory report through a surrogate expert violated the Confrontation Clause. Accordingly, the court reversed the firearm conviction, vacated the drug convictions, and remanded for a new trial on the drug charges. View "State v. Crawford" on Justia Law

United States v. Dixon

2026-11-04T08:30:12-08:00

The defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and multiple counts of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine after a series of controlled buys, traffic stops, and search warrants linked him to large quantities of drugs. Evidence at trial included testimony from cooperating witnesses who described purchasing or selling methamphetamine with the defendant or his associates. Police seized drugs, firearms, and personal items belonging to the defendant from residences connected to him. Additional evidence, such as coded text messages and testimony about the defendant’s role in directing drug sales, further connected him to the offenses. Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, the defendant was found guilty of conspiracy and two counts of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, but not guilty on other charges, including firearm offenses. The jury determined by special interrogatory that the drug quantity involved was at least 50 but less than 500 grams. At sentencing, the district court attributed a larger drug quantity to the defendant based on additional evidence, applied a manager role enhancement, and used the career offender guideline, resulting in an advisory guidelines range of 360 months to life. Due to mitigating factors, the court imposed a downward-variant sentence of 240 months. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions under Rule 404(b), nor did it clearly err in applying the manager enhancement. It further found that any alleged errors in drug quantity findings did not affect the defendant’s guidelines range, as the career offender guideline controlled. Therefore, any procedural error was harmless. The Eighth Circuit affirmed both the convictions and the sentence. View "United States v. Dixon" on Justia Law

Madden v. Herbert

2026-11-04T07:30:05-08:00

The petitioner, Edwin Madden, was convicted in New York state court in 1994. He first challenged his conviction by filing a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. §2254 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York in 1998, which was dismissed without prejudice. In 2001, he filed another habeas petition in the same district court, which was dismissed as time-barred in 2003. Madden’s subsequent requests to file successive habeas petitions were denied by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 2006 and 2007. In 2021, Madden moved to reopen his 2001 case, claiming new constitutional violations based on evidence discovered in 2015. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York construed Madden’s 2021 motion as a successive habeas petition and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction, holding that Madden had not obtained the required authorization from the Second Circuit to file a successive application. The district court also denied Madden’s motion for reconsideration. Madden appealed, arguing that his claims raised debatable constitutional questions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in dismissing Madden’s successive habeas petition rather than transferring it to the Second Circuit, as required by established procedure. The appellate court vacated the district court’s judgment, construed Madden’s appeal as a motion for authorization to file a successive habeas petition, and denied that motion. The court held that Madden did not make the required prima facie showing that his claims relied on a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive by the Supreme Court, or that he presented newly discovered facts that, if proven, would establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty. Madden’s other motions were denied as moot. View "Madden v. Herbert" on Justia Law

State v. Cherbonneau

2026-11-04T06:06:43-08:00

The defendant was part of a group at a Manchester restaurant when an altercation broke out involving another patron, C.M. After a brief “skirmish” inside the restaurant, both groups went outside and eventually ended up in a nearby pharmacy parking lot. The defendant stayed away from the main confrontation at first, but after gunfire erupted between individuals near a car, he moved forward and fired his weapon toward C.M. and C.G., striking a restaurant window. C.G. was found wounded by police, but it was not alleged that the defendant’s shot caused her injury. Surveillance footage captured portions of the events, but its quality limited clear determination of all actions. The Superior Court (Anderson, J.) conducted a jury trial in which the defendant was convicted of one count of attempted first degree assault with a firearm and two counts of riot. The jury acquitted him of seven other assault counts. After trial, the defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), arguing the State failed to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. The court denied this motion, finding sufficient evidence that the defendant had a duty to retreat or was the initial aggressor and that he could have retreated with complete safety. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and held that the State did not provide sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting in self-defense. The court determined that no rational trier of fact could find the defendant was required to retreat or was the initial aggressor, nor that he lacked a reasonable belief of imminent deadly force against him or others. The court reversed the defendant’s convictions and declined to address the issue of sentencing on both riot charges. View "State v. Cherbonneau" on Justia Law

People v. Savoy

2026-11-03T14:01:07-08:00

The defendant was convicted in 2011 of first degree murder, multiple sexual offenses, and related crimes stemming from incidents in July 2008. A jury found him guilty and determined that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death. Additional findings included three prior prison terms. He was originally sentenced to 78 years to life in prison. Following a change in the law eliminating one-year sentence enhancements for prior prison terms, the defendant petitioned for resentencing. The trial court resentenced him to 77 years to life, removing the prior prison term enhancements but retaining all other aspects of the sentence, including the gun enhancement. After the resentencing, the defendant argued that the trial court should have dismissed the gun enhancement under Penal Code section 1385(c), specifically referencing the Racial Justice Act (RJA). He contended that applying the enhancement would result in a discriminatory racial impact. In the Alameda County Superior Court, the trial judge found that dismissing the enhancement would endanger public safety and that none of the mitigating factors, including those based on racial bias, were established. The defendant’s evidence of racial bias was based on a statistical report and a claim of bias by the original sentencing judge, but the trial court found these claims insufficient under the RJA. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, held that the defendant failed to present evidence meeting the RJA’s requirements. Specifically, he did not show that he received a longer sentence than similarly situated individuals of other races in the same county, nor did he provide comparator cases or adequate statistical evidence. The appellate court affirmed that to trigger section 1385(c)(2)(A), a defendant must satisfy the RJA’s standard, which the defendant did not. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "People v. Savoy" on Justia Law

United States v. Sow

2026-11-03T07:30:13-08:00

The defendant participated in a scheme to traffic counterfeit luxury goods, using a Manhattan storage facility to store and distribute items such as clothing, shoes, and accessories marked with counterfeit trademarks. Law enforcement executed search warrants and seized over 50,000 counterfeit items from units rented by the defendant. She was charged with one count of trafficking in counterfeit goods and pleaded guilty without a plea agreement. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held a Fatico hearing to resolve disputed facts relevant to sentencing, including the value of the counterfeit goods and whether the defendant played a supervisory role. The court found the defendant had an aggravating role, applied a two-level enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines, and determined the value of the goods justified a twenty-level enhancement. The court calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 87 to 108 months’ imprisonment but imposed a downward-variant sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment, three years’ supervised release, and restitution of $189,626.60 to the victim brands for investigative fees. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the defendant raised three arguments: that the district court misapplied 28 U.S.C. § 994(j) regarding non-custodial sentences for first offenders, that the court’s enhancements were not supported by the evidence, and that the restitution order was improper. The Second Circuit rejected each argument. It held that Section 994(j) directs the Sentencing Commission, not sentencing courts, and does not require a non-custodial sentence. The court found no clear error in the application of the aggravating role and value enhancements, and concluded the restitution award was proper under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Sow" on Justia Law

TRAMMELL v. THE STATE

2026-11-03T05:04:02-08:00

The defendant was indicted in Floyd County, Georgia, and convicted by a jury of possession of less than one ounce of marijuana and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. His firearm conviction was based on three prior non-violent felonies. Before trial, he filed a general demurrer, arguing that the statute prohibiting felons from possessing firearms was unconstitutional as applied to him because it imposed a permanent ban on non-violent offenders. He was sentenced to twelve months for the marijuana conviction and ten years for the firearm conviction, with four years to be served in prison. After briefs and a hearing, the Superior Court of Floyd County denied his demurrer, citing precedent upholding the constitutionality of the statute and reasoning that felons are presumptively excluded from firearm possession. The trial court reaffirmed this position when denying his motion for new trial. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia, the defendant again argued that the statute, as applied to non-violent felons, violated the Second Amendment. However, the Attorney General, participating as amicus, raised a procedural issue: the defendant had not served the Attorney General with notice of his constitutional challenge, as required by OCGA § 9-4-7(c). The Supreme Court of Georgia determined that the notice requirement applies not only to civil actions but also to criminal prosecutions challenging the constitutionality of a statute. Because the defendant failed to serve the Attorney General, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to decide the constitutional issue. The Supreme Court of Georgia vacated the portion of the trial court’s order addressing the constitutional challenge and remanded the case for compliance with the statutory notice requirement, without reaching the merits of the Second Amendment claim. View "TRAMMELL v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

BLACKWELL v. THE STATE

2026-11-03T05:04:02-08:00

The case centers on the conviction of Alice Blackwell for felony murder and related offenses arising from the death of Carl Phillips, who died in a house fire. Blackwell had a contentious relationship with James Lovelace, who owned the house where Phillips was staying. After an argument between Blackwell and Lovelace, during which Blackwell attempted to run Lovelace over with her van and allegedly threatened to have someone "shoot his house up," Blackwell was recorded by an ankle monitor at the scene of the later fire. Phillips died from smoke inhalation, and Molotov cocktails were found at the site. Investigators determined the fire was intentionally set. No one witnessed the fire being set, and Blackwell denied responsibility when questioned by law enforcement. The Superior Court of Fulton County held a jury trial where Blackwell was found guilty of all counts except malice murder. She was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. After her conviction, Blackwell moved for a new trial, arguing that the trial court's comments during her cross-examination violated Georgia law prohibiting judicial comments on a defendant’s credibility and that her trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to these comments. The trial court denied the motion for new trial. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed whether the trial court’s statements during cross-examination constituted improper judicial comment under OCGA § 17-8-57 and whether trial counsel’s failure to object constituted ineffective assistance. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's remarks were explanations of evidentiary rulings, not expressions of opinion on the evidence or the defendant’s credibility, and therefore did not violate the statute. Because the statements were not improper, counsel’s lack of objection was not deficient. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the convictions. View "BLACKWELL v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

USA v. Herndon

2026-11-02T16:30:06-08:00

The defendant led a prostitution operation involving several girls, some as young as 13, 15, and 16 years old. He did not dispute that he trafficked these minors but claimed he was unaware of their ages. The government charged him under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) for sex trafficking of children and under 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c) for conspiracy, alleging that he acted knowingly or in reckless disregard of the victims’ ages. At trial, the government presented substantial evidence indicating the defendant knew or was reckless as to the minors’ ages, including his statements and his actions toward individual victims. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas conducted the trial. During the trial, the court instructed the jury that it could convict the defendant if it found he either knew or recklessly disregarded the victims’ ages, or if he had a reasonable opportunity to observe them—an alternative theory not included in the indictment. The defendant did not object to this instruction at trial. After conviction on all counts and a life sentence, he appealed, arguing that the jury instructions constructively amended the indictment, warranting reversal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the conviction for plain error, as the defendant had not timely objected to the jury instruction. The court concluded that although the instruction was a plain error, it did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights because he had ample notice of the government’s alternative theory and overwhelming evidence supported a finding of knowledge or reckless disregard. The Fifth Circuit also determined that discretionary reversal was unwarranted in light of the substantial evidence against the defendant and affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "USA v. Herndon" on Justia Law

People v. North River Ins. Co.

2026-11-02T15:01:50-08:00

A bail bond company, acting as surety for a criminal defendant, posted a $90,000 bond to secure the defendant’s release in a felony case. When the defendant failed to appear for arraignment, the court ordered the bail forfeited and notified the surety. The surety requested and was granted an extension of the period in which the defendant could be surrendered. After this period lapsed without surrender, the court entered a summary judgment for the full amount of the bond plus costs and interest against the surety in the same criminal case. The surety moved to set aside the summary judgment, arguing it should have been entered in a new civil case, not in the criminal proceeding. The Superior Court of Stanislaus County denied the surety’s motion, finding no statutory requirement to open a new civil case for entry of summary judgment on a forfeited bail bond. The surety appealed, contending that Penal Code section 1306 impliedly required summary judgment to be entered in a separate civil action, citing prior procedures and various appellate cases as support. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District reviewed the appeal independently, as only legal issues were in dispute. The court held that the relevant bail statutes—particularly Penal Code section 1306—do not expressly require summary judgment to be entered in a new civil case, nor do they prohibit entry in the criminal case. The court concluded that if the Legislature had intended such a requirement, it would have stated so. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that summary judgment on a forfeited bail bond may be entered in either the criminal case or a newly opened civil case, at the court’s discretion. View "People v. North River Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Ortega v. Superior Court

2026-11-02T15:01:49-08:00

A man was charged with implied malice murder, felony child endangerment, and possession of fentanyl for sale after a 19-month-old child died from ingesting fentanyl and methamphetamine in a home shared by the man, the child’s parents, and another adult. The man sold fentanyl to the child’s parents, and all four adults used drugs in the house. The evidence showed that drugs and paraphernalia were accessible throughout the house and that the adults, including the child’s parents, were reckless in their use of drugs around the child. There was no evidence that the man personally left drugs within the child’s reach, but he sometimes smoked drugs in her presence. The child died of acute toxicity, with both fentanyl and methamphetamine present in her system. At the preliminary hearing in Santa Clara County Superior Court, the magistrate held the man to answer on the murder charge, reasoning that by providing fentanyl that ultimately ended up in the child’s system and not protecting her, he aided and abetted her death. The magistrate found no evidence that the man provided the methamphetamine or directly left drugs accessible to the child. The trial court denied the man’s motion to set aside the murder charge, finding sufficient evidence under the applicable probable cause standard. The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the magistrate’s holding order. It concluded that, as a matter of law, the man’s actions in supplying drugs to the parents were too remote from the parents’ life-endangering conduct to support prosecution for implied malice murder. The court held that the evidence did not establish that the man proximately caused the child’s death or aided and abetted the specific life-endangering act. The court granted a writ prohibiting further prosecution of the murder charge but allowed prosecution on the remaining counts. View "Ortega v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

State v. Ward

2026-11-01T10:52:53-08:00

The case involves a defendant who was convicted by a jury of first-degree willful and deliberate murder after fatally striking a church security guard with his pickup truck in a parking lot. The defendant admitted hitting the victim but argued that the incident was accidental and occurred while he was panicking after the victim startled him with a flashlight and fired a gun in his direction. The defendant claimed he instinctively covered his eyes and drove away, not realizing he had struck the victim. The prosecution presented evidence, including two fluid trails and audio recordings, suggesting the defendant circled back and struck the victim a second time, then dragged the victim off the property. Forensic evidence supported the possibility of multiple impacts and dragging, and the defendant's jeans contained the victim’s blood. The District Court of Bernalillo County, after a jury trial, found the defendant guilty of first-degree willful and deliberate murder and sentenced him to life in prison. The defendant appealed, raising issues concerning the sufficiency of the evidence for deliberation, the denial of a jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter, and the admission of specific character evidence about the victim’s peacefulness. The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico reviewed the case. It held that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding of deliberation, based on circumstantial evidence and the audio of the incident. The court affirmed the denial of an involuntary manslaughter instruction, clarifying that the proper mens rea for involuntary manslaughter is recklessness, not criminal negligence, and directed the Uniform Jury Instructions Committee to revise the relevant instruction. The court also found the admission of specific character evidence regarding the victim’s peacefulness to be error but harmless, as it did not affect the verdict. The conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Ward" on Justia Law

State v. Neal

2026-11-01T10:52:53-08:00

A woman traveling through Raton, New Mexico, was approached twice by the defendant, who eventually led her into an abandoned motel. There, the defendant forcibly pulled her through a window, assaulted, strangled, and sexually assaulted her, causing physical and sexual injuries. The key facts are that the defendant's actions resulted in serious harm to the victim, including both physical and sexual violence, and these actions were largely undisputed at trial. The defendant was charged in district court with first-degree kidnapping, second-degree criminal sexual penetration (CSP II), and aggravated battery. The jury convicted him on all three counts, and he received an aggregate sentence of approximately thirty years. On appeal, the New Mexico Court of Appeals vacated both the CSP II and aggravated battery convictions on double jeopardy grounds, applying a novel analytical approach that compared the lesser offenses against each other, rather than against the most serious conviction, which was first-degree kidnapping. The State challenged this approach, arguing that the proper analysis should compare each lesser conviction with the most severe conviction that remained. The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico held that double jeopardy barred the defendant’s conviction for CSP II because the State relied on that single sexual offense both to support the first-degree kidnapping charge and as an independent offense, without introducing another distinct sexual offense. Accordingly, the CSP II conviction was vacated. However, the Court found that aggravated battery and kidnapping were supported by sufficiently distinct factual bases, allowing both convictions to stand. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision vacating aggravated battery and affirmed its decision vacating CSP II, remanding for further proceedings. The Court also declined to change its established double jeopardy analysis. View "State v. Neal" on Justia Law

State v. Villalobos

2026-11-01T10:52:52-08:00

A fifteen-year-old defendant with an intellectual disability was arrested and charged with first-degree murder and tampering with evidence after the death of a younger child. Unable to post a high cash bond, the defendant remained incarcerated pretrial. At arraignment, defense counsel raised concerns about the defendant’s competency to stand trial. Over the next three years and three months, the case was repeatedly delayed due to defense counsel’s failure to schedule and facilitate a competency evaluation. The defendant was ultimately found competent to stand trial after several years in custody. Additional delays occurred, including a fourteen-month period during which the State pursued an interlocutory appeal. The first trial ended in a mistrial, while the second resulted in convictions for second-degree murder and tampering with evidence, leading to an adult prison sentence. After conviction, the defendant argued that his constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated. The District Court for Santa Fe County rejected this claim, attributing much of the delay to defense counsel. The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the delays caused by defense counsel’s neglect should be attributed to the defendant and that the State’s conduct did not warrant relief. The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico reversed. Applying the Barker v. Wingo factors, the court held that the nearly six-year delay was extraordinary and presumptively prejudicial. It concluded that because the delays were caused by defense counsel’s neglect, and the defendant’s intellectual disability prevented him from meaningfully participating or acquiescing, the delays could not be weighed against the defendant. The State also failed to monitor and move the case forward. The court held that the defendant’s speedy trial rights were violated, vacated the convictions, and ordered dismissal of the indictment. View "State v. Villalobos" on Justia Law

State v. Freeman

2026-11-01T10:52:51-08:00

The defendant was charged with second-degree criminal sexual penetration. After a jury trial, the jury was instructed on the elements of the offense. During deliberations, the jury submitted two questions to the trial court: whether the charged crime was comparable to statutory rape under New Mexico law, and the legal definition of “physical force.” The defendant was not present when these questions were discussed or when the trial court, after agreement from both counsel, responded by directing the jury back to the written instructions. Defense counsel purported to waive the defendant’s presence, but there was no clear record that the waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. After conviction, the defendant appealed to the New Mexico Court of Appeals, arguing that his constitutional right to be present at all communications between the court and the jury was violated. The Court of Appeals found that the communications did not fall under exceptions for “ministerial matters” or “conferences or hearings upon a question of law” and therefore were improper, creating a presumption of prejudice. However, the Court of Appeals held that this presumption was rebutted because the trial court’s responses merely referred the jury to the correct instructions already given, and affirmed the conviction. The New Mexico Supreme Court reviewed the matter de novo. It concluded that the communications did not qualify for any exception under the relevant rules and thus the defendant’s right to be present was violated, creating a presumption of prejudice. However, the Court held that the State overcame this presumption by showing the communications simply restated prior instructions in the presence of counsel, after the defendant participated in setting those instructions, and did not affect the jury’s verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction. View "State v. Freeman" on Justia Law

USA v. Lemaine

2026-10-30T12:01:54-08:00

The defendant, previously convicted of serious felonies, was indicted for possessing a firearm as a felon after officers found a firearm in his vehicle during a traffic stop. He initially pleaded not guilty, but later changed his plea to guilty. While released on bond awaiting sentencing—subject to home detention and an ankle monitor—the defendant requested and received removal of the home detention condition. Shortly before sentencing, he was arrested for armed robbery. The incident involved two masked men robbing a victim at gunpoint, stealing cash, jewelry, and a cell phone. Circumstantial evidence, including location data from the defendant’s ankle monitor and a tracking device registered to him, placed him at the scene and linked him to the crime. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida held a bond revocation hearing, found probable cause the defendant violated his release conditions, revoked his bond, and later conducted a sentencing hearing. The presentence report initially recommended a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, but after the robbery charge, a revised report removed the reduction and increased the guideline range. The prosecution sought an upward variance based on the new criminal conduct. At sentencing, the district court considered testimony and evidence from both hearings, denied the reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and imposed a 96-month sentence, citing the defendant’s continued dangerous conduct. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not reversibly err in finding the defendant committed armed robbery by a preponderance of the evidence, did not plainly err in considering the robbery to deny the offense-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and did not impose an unreasonable sentence. The court affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "USA v. Lemaine" on Justia Law

STATE VS. LEE

2026-10-30T09:34:32-08:00

On June 3, 2020, officers responded to a home after Ms. Annie Grace and her daughter saw two individuals on surveillance footage, one carrying a gas can and pouring gasoline around the property. An officer discovered a burnt paper bag near the driveway, but no structural damage occurred. Following an anonymous tip, police interrogated a juvenile who implicated Mardeontae Lee as the individual pouring the gasoline. Lee admitted his involvement, explaining he acted out of fear for his life after being pressured by gang members, specifically Kadrick Thompson, who told him the plan was retaliation for a murder involving Ms. Grace’s son. Lee stated he did not intend to harm anyone, only to feign an attempt to placate threats against him. Lee was charged in the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court with aggravated arson and three counts of attempted first degree murder. A jury found him guilty on all counts. The Court of Appeal, First Circuit, affirmed the convictions, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Louisiana determined whether the evidence supported Lee’s convictions. The Court held that the statutory definition of "movable" for aggravated arson requires a facility or enclosure for fifty or more people, which was not present. The only responsive verdict was not guilty, so the conviction was reversed. For attempted first degree murder, the Court found the State’s circumstantial evidence did not exclude Lee’s reasonable hypothesis of innocence—namely, that he lacked specific intent to kill. Therefore, the convictions for attempted first degree murder were also reversed, and judgments of acquittal entered. The Supreme Court of Louisiana remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to discharge the defendant. View "STATE VS. LEE" on Justia Law

State v. Coleman

2026-10-30T05:06:21-08:00

The case involved a fatal shooting that occurred in Omaha, Nebraska, on November 8, 2023. The defendant was charged with first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon in connection with the death of a 17-year-old victim. Evidence at trial included eyewitness testimony that the defendant shot the victim after a group attack, statements allegedly made by the defendant admitting to the shooting, forensic evidence linking shell casings to a recovered handgun, DNA analysis suggesting the defendant could be a contributor to DNA found on the gun’s magazine and shell casings, and a video found on the defendant’s phone showing him with a similar firearm about a week before the shooting. The case was first tried in the District Court for Douglas County. The defendant filed pretrial motions to exclude the cell phone video and related expert comparison testimony, as well as to exclude DNA evidence analyzed using probabilistic genotyping software, arguing these were irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. The district court overruled these motions, found the evidence relevant and more probative than prejudicial, and admitted both the video and DNA evidence at trial. The jury found the defendant guilty on both counts, and the court imposed consecutive sentences of 80 years to life for murder and 40 to 50 years for the weapon offense. The defendant appealed, challenging the evidentiary rulings, sufficiency of the evidence, and the length of his sentences. The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the cell phone video, the expert’s comparison testimony, or the DNA evidence, finding each relevant and not unfairly prejudicial. The Court found sufficient evidence supported the convictions and ruled that the sentences, while lengthy, were within statutory limits and considered appropriate factors, including the defendant’s age. The convictions and sentences were affirmed. View "State v. Coleman" on Justia Law

US v. Newton

2026-10-29T14:30:03-08:00

The defendant was charged in connection with a large-scale health care fraud scheme involving Arbor Homecare Services LLC, a company she controlled. Over several years, Arbor fraudulently billed Massachusetts’ Medicaid program, MassHealth, for more than $99 million. The government alleged that the defendant orchestrated the scheme, laundered proceeds through domestic and Kenyan financial accounts, and used the funds to acquire properties and businesses. After an initial mistrial, the defendant was retried and convicted by a jury on charges of conspiracy to commit health care fraud, health care fraud, and money laundering. She was sentenced to 144 months in prison, fined $250,000, and ordered to pay restitution. Prior to the retrial, the defendant cycled through numerous attorneys, at times expressing a desire to proceed without counsel and at other times seeking to hire new counsel if her assets were released from civil forfeiture. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts conducted multiple Faretta colloquies, warning her of the risks of self-representation. Ultimately, the court found her waiver of counsel to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and permitted her to proceed pro se with standby counsel. The court also denied her motion to suppress evidence obtained from her cell phone during a border search, finding the search supported by reasonable suspicion. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the defendant argued that her conviction should be reversed due to alleged violations of her right to counsel and due process, and that the cell phone evidence should have been suppressed. She also challenged the calculation of her sentence, disputing the loss amount and the application of a sophisticated-means enhancement. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions, holding that her waiver of counsel was constitutionally valid, her suppression argument was waived, and her sentencing challenges were either waived or without merit. View "US v. Newton" on Justia Law

United States v. Laykovich

2026-10-29T11:30:10-08:00

The defendant was stopped by police in Kentucky while driving erratically. He was found wearing body armor and carrying eight firearms, knives, ammunition, drugs, and a gasoline can. He claimed he was headed to Fort Knox to discuss a security clearance. Investigation revealed that he was prohibited from possessing firearms due to a prior Missouri court adjudication of mental illness, which had resulted from an incident in St. Louis where he exhibited erratic behavior and his girlfriend reported suicidal tendencies. The Missouri court had committed him for treatment and barred him from firearm possession, and he never petitioned to restore his rights. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky reviewed the case after Laykovich was indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (prohibiting firearm possession by persons adjudicated as mentally defective). Laykovich moved to dismiss the charge on Second Amendment grounds, but the district court denied the motion, reasoning that the government could disarm individuals whose mental illness posed a risk of harm. Laykovich then entered a plea agreement, reserving his right to appeal both the constitutional issue and sentencing. At sentencing, the district court found, based on circumstantial evidence, that Laykovich had induced his girlfriend to act as a straw purchaser for some firearms, and applied a sentencing enhancement. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the appeal de novo. It held that § 922(g)(4) is constitutional as applied to persons adjudicated as mentally defective and dangerous, because it is “relevantly similar” to longstanding laws allowing civil detention of dangerous mentally ill persons and serves the same public safety purpose. The court affirmed the district court’s application of the sentencing enhancement and its within-guidelines sentence, finding no procedural or substantive error. The judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Laykovich" on Justia Law

State v. Pinkerman

2026-10-29T11:14:40-08:00

After the petitioner’s adult son was terminated from a local fire department, shots were fired at the fire station, leading to an investigation by the Cabell County Sheriff's Department. Officers suspected the son due to recent statements and visited the petitioner’s property, where the son exited holding a 9mm pistol. The officers handled and photographed the firearm for safety reasons. Later, a mistaken report led officers to believe the pistol was stolen, prompting a search warrant and an arrest warrant for the son. When officers returned to execute the warrants, a confrontation ensued, resulting in injuries to officers and the petitioner, and the son’s death. It was later determined the firearm was lawfully owned by the petitioner. The Cabell County grand jury indicted the petitioner on several charges, including attempted murder and obstructing an officer. During the grand jury proceedings, officers referred to the 9mm Beretta as “stolen,” but did not disclose its lawful ownership, which had been discovered weeks after the incident. The petitioner moved to suppress evidence relating to the firearm, to dismiss the indictment due to alleged misleading grand jury testimony, and to strike two jurors for cause. The Circuit Court of Cabell County denied these motions, finding that any mistakes regarding the firearm’s status were innocent, that no prima facie showing of willful fraud by officers was made, and that the challenged jurors affirmed their impartiality. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the appeal and affirmed the circuit court’s order. The Court held that any error regarding the search and seizure of the firearm was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the conviction for obstructing an officer was based on the petitioner’s own conduct. The Court also concluded there was no basis to go behind the indictment, as no willful fraud was shown, and found no prejudice in jury selection since the petitioner removed the challenged jurors using peremptory strikes. View "State v. Pinkerman" on Justia Law

People v. Flint

2026-10-29T11:01:18-08:00

In 2006, the defendant acted as a lookout during an attempted robbery in which his associate shot and killed an off-duty Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department deputy, Maria Cecilia Rosa. The defendant and his associate were charged with first degree murder and attempted robbery. The jury convicted the defendant on both counts, finding the felony-murder special circumstance allegation not true. The defendant was sentenced to 29 years to life, later reduced to 26 years to life after the sentence on attempted robbery was stayed. Years later, following legislative changes by Senate Bill No. 1437, which restricted the felony-murder rule and created a mechanism for retroactive relief under Penal Code section 1172.6, the defendant filed a petition seeking resentencing. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the petition after an evidentiary hearing, finding that Rosa was killed in the course of her duties as a peace officer, making the defendant ineligible for relief under section 189, subdivision (f). On two prior appeals, the California Court of Appeal reviewed aspects of the evidentiary process and remanded for further hearings to determine whether Rosa was acting in the course of her peace officer duties and whether her authority extended while off duty. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the appeal. The court interpreted Penal Code section 830.1, subdivision (c), concluding it applies only to deputies hired, trained, and used for the limited purpose of working exclusively or initially in custodial assignments with modified training. The court found substantial evidence that Rosa was a fully trained deputy under section 830.1, subdivision (a), not a modified deputy, and thus had off-duty peace officer authority. Therefore, Rosa was killed in the course of her peace officer duties, and the defendant is not eligible for resentencing relief under section 1172.6. The court affirmed the denial of the petition. View "People v. Flint" on Justia Law

USA v. Harris

2026-10-29T09:30:06-08:00

The defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute under federal law. He ultimately pled guilty and, as part of his plea agreement, he waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence, except for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. During the plea process, the defendant confirmed in open court that he had read, discussed, and understood the terms of the plea agreement, including the appeal waiver. He was sentenced to 240 months in prison. The conduct underlying the sentencing enhancements involved the defendant fleeing law enforcement by driving through residential property, which led to the district court applying certain enhancements to his sentence. Following sentencing, the defendant appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, challenging the application of sentencing enhancements and arguing his appeal waiver was not knowing and voluntary. The government argued that the appeal should be dismissed based on the waiver. The Fifth Circuit initially dismissed the appeal, enforcing the waiver. The Supreme Court of the United States then decided Hunter v. United States, establishing that appeal waivers are unenforceable if enforcing them would result in a miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration under the Hunter standard. On remand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that the defendant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary. The court further found that, under the Hunter standard, the alleged sentencing errors were not the type of egregious errors that would constitute a miscarriage of justice. As a result, the Fifth Circuit enforced the appeal waiver and dismissed the appeal. The court’s holding was that no miscarriage of justice occurred, and the appeal waiver remained enforceable. View "USA v. Harris" on Justia Law

Barrett v. Board of Parole

2026-10-29T07:26:03-08:00

In 1994, the petitioner was convicted of aggravated murder and first-degree robbery following a fatal shooting during a robbery. He received a life sentence with a mandatory minimum of 30 years for aggravated murder and a consecutive 72-month sentence for robbery, with additional consecutive sentences for later in-prison offenses. After nearly 27 years, he became eligible to seek release from his aggravated murder sentence under Oregon’s three-step process: a murder-review hearing, a determination of a projected release date, and an exit interview. The petitioner successfully completed these steps; the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision affirmed his release date following the exit interview. The Oregon Board of Parole first set the petitioner’s projected release date as January 5, 2022, but after applying some earned-time credits, adjusted it to November 18, 2021, the date of the exit interview. The petitioner argued that the Board should have adjusted his release date further back, to September 23, 2017, based on all available earned-time credits calculated by the Department of Corrections. The Board believed it could not set a release date before the exit interview, relying on prior Oregon Supreme Court cases. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the Board’s approach, holding that earned-time credits could not be applied to adjust the release date to a time before the exit interview, reasoning that the term of incarceration is not set until after the Board schedules and affirms the release date. The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reversed the Court of Appeals and the Board’s final order. The court held that, for inmates serving consecutive sentences, once the Board affirms release after the statutory three-step process, the Board must fully apply all available earned-time credits under ORS 421.121, even if that results in a release date before the exit interview. The case was remanded to the Board for further proceedings. View "Barrett v. Board of Parole" on Justia Law

Christensen v. State

2026-10-29T07:13:05-08:00

A 15-year-old girl, CZ, who has cerebral palsy and learning difficulties, accused Timothy R. Christensen, a family friend, of sexually assaulting her during a visit to his home. The incident allegedly occurred when CZ was left upstairs with Mr. Christensen while other adults and children were elsewhere in the house. CZ later reported the assault to her mother, underwent a sexual assault examination, and DNA evidence consistent with Mr. Christensen was found. The police investigated, including reviewing text messages between CZ and Mr. Christensen and conducting controlled communication with him through CZ’s phone. The District Court of Sheridan County charged Mr. Christensen with two counts of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor. During trial, the court admitted prior consistent statements made by CZ to her mother, a nurse, and a detective, overruling the defense’s hearsay objections. The defense argued that these admissions were improper because there was no express or implied charge of fabrication at that stage. The court also excluded evidence about a text message CZ sent Mr. Christensen containing a pregnancy test photo, finding it inadmissible under Wyoming’s rape shield statute and lacking relevance. The jury found Mr. Christensen guilty on one count and acquitted him on the other. He was sentenced to five to eight years in prison. The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting CZ’s prior consistent statements and in excluding the pregnancy test text message. The Supreme Court held that the prior consistent statements were properly admitted under W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) because the defense’s theory implied fabrication, and that the pregnancy test message was properly excluded due to lack of relevance, regardless of the rape shield statute. The conviction and rulings of the district court were affirmed. View "Christensen v. State" on Justia Law

People v. Nantan

2026-10-29T07:07:17-08:00

The defendant was charged with misdemeanor assault and related offenses. Under New York’s speedy trial statute (CPL 30.30), the prosecution was required to declare readiness for trial within 90 days. More than a year after the charges were filed—following multiple court appearances in which the prosecution was not ready due to a key witness’s unavailability—the defendant moved to dismiss the case on speedy trial grounds. The Criminal Court denied both the motion to dismiss and a subsequent motion to reargue. The defendant then pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of harassment in the second degree and was sentenced to a one-year conditional discharge, with orders of protection imposed. While the defendant’s appeal was pending, CPL 30.30 (6) took effect, providing that speedy trial claims are reviewable on appeal, even after guilty pleas. The defendant perfected her appeal, challenging only the denial of her speedy trial motion. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant had forfeited her speedy trial claim by pleading guilty and that the new statute did not apply retroactively to cases with convictions entered before its effective date. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It held that the plain language of CPL 30.30 (6) unambiguously expands appellate review to all cases, including those pending at the time of its enactment, regardless of whether the conviction resulted from a guilty plea or a trial. The Court concluded that the provision is procedural, applies to pending appeals, and contains no express limitation to future convictions. The Court reversed the Appellate Term’s order and remitted the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "People v. Nantan" on Justia Law

Guardado v. State of Florida

2026-10-29T07:02:27-08:00

The appellant was convicted of the murder of a seventy-five-year-old woman, whom he knew personally and had previously lived with. In 2004, after an unsuccessful attempt to rob a grocery store, he decided to rob the victim at her secluded home. Armed with a metal bar and a knife, he entered her residence, violently assaulted her, and stole various items. He pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and robbery with a weapon. At sentencing, the court found multiple aggravating factors and, despite acknowledging nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, imposed a death sentence. Following the conviction and sentencing in the Eighth Judicial Circuit Court, the appellant pursued multiple avenues of relief. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Subsequent postconviction motions, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and challenges under Hurst v. Florida, were denied by the circuit court and affirmed by the Supreme Court of Florida. Federal habeas petitions were also unsuccessful. After the Governor signed a death warrant, the appellant filed another successive postconviction motion, raising claims about the constitutionality of Florida’s clemency and warrant process, and the reliability of his death sentence due to counsel’s performance. The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the circuit court’s summary denial of the successive postconviction motion de novo. The court held that the appellant was not entitled to relief. It held that Florida’s clemency process does not violate due process, as the appellant received clemency review and there is no requirement for specific procedures. Claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel and the reliability of the death sentence were found untimely and procedurally barred. Challenges to the expedited warrant process were also rejected based on settled precedent. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the circuit court’s denial and denied the appellant’s request for a stay of execution. View "Guardado v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

WESLEY v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

2026-10-29T07:01:32-08:00

Wesley Cooper fatally shot his neighbor, Donald Lewis, and his uncle, Terry Brasuell in Crawford County in 2023. Cooper, under the influence of drugs, mistakenly believed that Lewis and Brasuell had killed his family after he was unable to contact them, not realizing they were merely camping in a location without cell service. He purchased black clothing for his intended actions, stole two handguns from his father's safe, and proceeded to carry out both killings. After the second shooting, a neighbor, Melinda Ball, witnessed the event and relayed her account to police officers, which was subsequently documented by another neighbor, Helene Plonski, at the direction of law enforcement. Cooper was arrested and confessed to both murders. The Crawford County Circuit Court presided over Cooper's trial. Prior to trial, Melinda Ball passed away. Cooper moved to exclude Ball’s written statement on hearsay and confrontation grounds, arguing he had no opportunity to cross-examine her. The circuit court denied his motion, finding the statement admissible as a present sense impression and excited utterance, but did not rule specifically on the confrontation issue. The statement was introduced at trial, and Cooper renewed his objections, which were denied without explicit consideration of the confrontation argument. The jury convicted Cooper on both counts of capital murder, imposing two life sentences without parole. The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case, focusing solely on Cooper’s appeal regarding the conviction for Brasuell’s murder. The court held that the admission of Ball’s statement did violate Cooper’s right to confront witnesses against him, as the statement was testimonial and Cooper had no prior opportunity for cross-examination. However, the court found the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, given Cooper’s confession and corroborating eyewitness evidence. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "WESLEY v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

Commonwealth v. Outlaw

2026-10-29T06:11:17-08:00

During a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence in a Philadelphia County criminal case, an acquaintance of the defendant, Basile Outlaw, attended as a spectator. After the judge denied the suppression motion, Outlaw stood up and loudly insulted the judge with vulgar language before leaving the courtroom. The judge paused the proceedings to question what Outlaw had said, to which Outlaw responded dismissively and exited. Outlaw later returned to the courtroom, where he was detained and charged with direct criminal contempt. He did not dispute the facts and expressed remorse, but was sentenced to fifteen to thirty days of incarceration. Outlaw appealed his conviction to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, arguing the evidence was insufficient because his conduct did not obstruct the administration of justice. The prosecution, represented by the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office, agreed that the outburst, while inappropriate, did not delay or impede the proceedings. Nonetheless, the Superior Court affirmed the conviction, finding that Outlaw’s conduct significantly disrupted the hearing or, alternatively, prejudiced the court’s authority and orderly procedure. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case to determine whether Outlaw’s remark constituted an obstruction of the administration of justice under 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132(3). The Court held that a conviction under this provision requires a significant disruption of judicial proceedings. It compared the facts to prior cases and found that Outlaw’s conduct caused only a momentary interruption, not a significant disruption. The Court rejected the argument that disrespectful or profane remarks alone, without substantial interference, suffice for criminal contempt. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the decisions below and vacated Outlaw’s judgment of sentence. View "Commonwealth v. Outlaw" on Justia Law

People v. Post

2026-10-29T06:02:48-08:00

The defendant was charged with three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of children under 13, based on allegations from multiple minors, some of whom first disclosed abuse years after the alleged incidents. The State presented a petition to deny pretrial release, citing the severity of the charges and arguing that the defendant posed a real and present threat to safety, supported by specific facts such as his proximity to the victims and prior disregard for court orders. The defendant testified about his willingness to comply with court-imposed conditions, including electronic monitoring and no contact with the alleged victims. The Circuit Court of Fulton County initially denied pretrial release, citing concerns about the defendant’s compliance with court orders and the vulnerability of the victims. On the defendant’s motion, the court reconsidered but denied relief, finding no substantial change in circumstances. The Appellate Court, Fourth District, vacated the initial detention order and remanded for a new hearing due to insufficient findings. After a new hearing, where additional allegations and live testimony were considered, the circuit court again denied release, expressing ongoing concern for community safety. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the circuit court’s decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and that no significant change in circumstances or new information justified altering the detention order. The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case. It held that to alter an existing continued detention order, a defendant must present new information or demonstrate a change in circumstances. The court further held that when live testimony is presented at a continued detention hearing, the appropriate standard of appellate review is whether the circuit court’s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence, not abuse of discretion. Applying this standard, the court found no error in the continued denial of pretrial release and affirmed the lower courts’ judgments. View "People v. Post" on Justia Law

State v. Holliman

2026-10-29T05:30:07-08:00

The case concerns an incident in which an individual confronted a former friend outside the friend’s home, became angry, and fired three shots from a revolver—two into the air and one into the house. As a result, a jury found the individual guilty of discharging a firearm on or near prohibited premises, a third-degree felony. The jury also found him guilty of two separate firearm specifications: one carrying a one-year mandatory prison term for possessing a firearm during the commission of the offense, and another carrying a three-year mandatory prison term for using a firearm to facilitate the offense. At sentencing, the parties disputed which firearm specification should apply. Defense counsel argued for the one-year specification, while the State insisted it should select the three-year specification. The trial court determined that it had discretion to choose which specification to impose and opted for the one-year specification, sentencing the defendant to nine months in prison for the felony plus the one-year mandatory term. The State appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, arguing it was entitled to choose the specification for sentencing. The Eighth District disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding the statutory language did not restrict the trial court’s discretion or grant the prosecution authority to select the specification. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the matter. The court held that, under R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a), when an offender is found guilty of multiple firearm specifications for a single felony offense, the trial court—not the prosecution—has the discretion to select which specification to impose. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals, upholding the trial court’s exercise of discretion in imposing the one-year specification. View "State v. Holliman" on Justia Law

TAYLOR v. STATE OF TEXAS

2026-10-29T04:26:24-08:00

A man was arrested outside his ex-girlfriend’s house, where he was found illegally parked. He had two outstanding warrants for stalking and making a terroristic threat, both related to his prior conduct toward the same woman. After arresting him, police officers decided to have his vehicle towed and conducted an inventory search prior to impoundment. During this search, the officers found a handgun in the center console. The inventory search was not conducted in perfect conformity with the police department’s written policy; for example, the officers did not obtain the arrestee’s signature on the inventory report and did not itemize every object in the vehicle. The trial court in Hays County denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the handgun, finding that the search was reasonable under the circumstances. The case proceeded to a jury trial, which resulted in a conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. On appeal, the Seventh Court of Appeals determined that the inventory search deviated from departmental policy and that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. Relying on its interpretation of earlier Texas precedent, the appellate court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case on discretionary review. It held that minor deviations from departmental policy during an inventory search do not render the search unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, as long as the deviations are not used as a pretext for criminal investigation and do not undermine the purposes of an inventory search. The Court found that the inventory search here was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Accordingly, it reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny suppression. View "TAYLOR v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

STATE OF TEXAS v. SUAREZ

2026-10-29T04:26:23-08:00

Police officers investigating a shooting incident tracked a wounded suspect, Anthony Lopez, to an apartment in Bryan, Texas. The apartment was leased by Sylvia Sanchez, mother of Saul Suarez, who also lived there. Officers found Lopez and Suarez inside, with Lopez needing medical attention. Sanchez and other family members were present and cooperated with police. Sanchez consented both verbally and in writing to a search of the apartment, including Suarez’s bedroom, where police found weapons and other evidence. Suarez was later charged with felony murder, possession of a prohibited weapon, and aggravated robbery. Suarez filed a motion to suppress the evidence found during the search, arguing that Sanchez lacked authority to consent to a search of his bedroom under the Fourth Amendment and Texas Constitution. At the suppression hearing in the 272nd District Court of Brazos County, Sanchez testified that, although she leased the apartment, she did not have access to Suarez’s room due to his right to privacy as an adult. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, finding Sanchez lacked actual or apparent authority to consent. The Tenth Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding the officers were not reasonable in believing Sanchez had authority to consent to a search of Suarez’s bedroom. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case. It held that, under the totality of the circumstances and the apparent authority doctrine, the officers acted reasonably in believing Sanchez, as the matriarch and leaseholder, had authority to consent to a search of Suarez’s bedroom. The court determined the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded to the trial court for proceedings on the merits. View "STATE OF TEXAS v. SUAREZ" on Justia Law

Bahtuoh vs. State of Minnesota

2026-10-29T01:15:20-08:00

On April 28, 2009, Kyle Parker was killed in a drive-by shooting in North Minneapolis. The State alleged that Christopher Dineaa Bahtuoh, affiliated with the 1–9 gang, aided and abetted another gang member, Lamont McGee, in committing the murder. The evidence presented at trial showed Bahtuoh repeatedly drove near Parker’s location, made numerous calls to gang associates, and, upon seeing Parker, positioned his car so McGee could shoot Parker from the passenger seat. Bahtuoh sped away immediately after the shooting without rendering aid. The State did not accuse Bahtuoh of being the shooter but claimed he intended to assist in Parker’s killing. A Hennepin County grand jury indicted Bahtuoh on several murder-related charges, including first-degree felony murder for the benefit of a gang. At trial, the district court instructed the jury that to convict Bahtuoh of first-degree felony murder, it had to find he “acted with the intent to kill Kyle Parker.” The jury acquitted Bahtuoh of premeditated murder but convicted him of first-degree felony murder for the benefit of a gang and other related offenses. The Hennepin County District Court entered judgment and sentenced him to life imprisonment. On direct appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed Bahtuoh’s conviction, finding sufficient evidence of intent and that any error in jury instructions did not affect his substantial rights. Bahtuoh later filed a preliminary application for relief under a 2023 law allowing certain defendants convicted of first-degree felony murder under an aiding-and-abetting theory to challenge their convictions. The Hennepin County District Court summarily denied the application, finding no reasonable probability that Bahtuoh was entitled to relief. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed this denial, holding that because the jury instructions required finding Bahtuoh intended to kill, and the jury made that finding, Bahtuoh cannot demonstrate a reasonable probability of entitlement to relief under the Act. View "Bahtuoh vs. State of Minnesota" on Justia Law

State v. Jarrett

2026-10-28T11:19:02-08:00

Jeremy Jarrett was charged and convicted in Kanawha County of two counts of first-degree sexual abuse involving a minor. After serving his prison sentence, Jarrett began a fifty-year term of supervised release, subject to conditions imposed by the circuit court in 2011. These included restrictions on contact with minors and requirements to comply with directives from his supervising probation officer. Following his release, his probation officer provided additional, more restrictive conditions regarding proximity and contact with minors. Jarrett violated these conditions on several occasions, resulting in revocations and imprisonment. In 2023, Jarrett sought to modify his supervised release terms to allow contact with his newborn daughter, which was denied. He was subsequently arrested for violating supplemental conditions after accompanying his wife to a hospital where children were present. The Circuit Court of Kanawha County found Jarrett had violated the conditions imposed by his probation officer and revoked his supervised release, sentencing him to four years of imprisonment. The court also denied his motion to modify supervised release terms for contact with his daughter but permitted him to seek supervised visitation with appropriate safeguards. Jarrett appealed, arguing that the supplemental conditions were imposed without a hearing or counsel and constituted improper enlargement of court-ordered conditions. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that the circuit court erred in revoking Jarrett’s supervised release based on conditions unilaterally imposed by the probation officer without a hearing or assistance of counsel, rendering those conditions void and unenforceable. However, the court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Jarrett’s motion to modify supervised release to allow contact with his child, finding no abuse of discretion. The disposition was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Jarrett" on Justia Law

Tucker v. State of Idaho

2026-10-28T08:33:07-08:00

Several indigent criminal defendants in Idaho brought a lawsuit against the State, alleging that the longstanding county-based public defense system failed to provide constitutionally adequate legal representation. The plaintiffs asserted that the State’s system resulted in excessive caseloads, insufficient support staff, inadequate funding, lack of independence for defense attorneys, and other systemic deficiencies that jeopardized defendants’ rights under both the Sixth Amendment and the Idaho Constitution. Initially, the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims based on justiciability grounds. After an appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho allowed certain claims to proceed against the State, setting a standard that plaintiffs must prove widespread, persistent structural deficiencies likely to result in actual or constructive denial of counsel at critical stages. Subsequent legislative reforms shifted funding responsibility for indigent defense from counties to the state and created a centralized Office of the State Public Defender. Following these changes, the district court partially granted plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion, enjoining the State from returning to the prior county-based system, but dismissed the rest of the case, declining to impose a remedial plan on the new system. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Idaho, plaintiffs argued that the district court erred in determining the new system was unlikely to perpetuate constitutional violations and in refusing to devise and enforce its own remedial plan. The Supreme Court of Idaho held that a district court may properly exercise remedial discretion by declining to issue injunctive relief when doing so would conflict with ongoing legislative reforms and efforts of a coordinate branch of government. The Court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the district court’s order. The plaintiffs were not awarded attorney fees, as they were not prevailing parties under relevant legal standards. View "Tucker v. State of Idaho" on Justia Law

State v. Erickson

2026-10-27T14:04:54-08:00

The defendant was charged with Criminal Mischief and Threats and Other Improper Influence in Official and Political Matters after damaging property and threatening officers during and after a court proceeding in Lake County, Montana. Following these events, he was arrested and charged. Attempting to resolve the charges, the defendant and the State negotiated plea agreements, but the District Court rejected them due to insufficient factual basis and misrepresentation of the defendant’s status as a repeat Persistent Felony Offender. After further attempts, the defendant ultimately entered an open guilty plea, meaning there was no plea agreement and no promises regarding sentencing. The Twentieth Judicial District Court sentenced the defendant to two consecutive thirty-year terms at the Montana State Prison, with parole restrictions. However, after the defendant filed a notice of appeal, it was discovered that audio recordings from several hearings—including the sentencing hearing—were missing or indiscernible. The partial and unofficial transcript attached to the presentence investigation report was not recognized as an official record. The defendant argued on appeal that he was entitled to enforcement of an amended plea agreement and that the lack of a sentencing transcript deprived him of due process. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the defendant waived his right to appeal adverse pre-plea rulings by entering an open guilty plea without reserving any such rights. However, the Court determined that the absence of a certified transcript or suitable alternative from the sentencing hearing constituted a substantial and significant omission, denying the defendant due process and preventing effective appellate review. The Court affirmed the acceptance of the guilty plea but remanded the case for resentencing before a new District Court judge. View "State v. Erickson" on Justia Law

City of Missoula v. Mugondozi

2026-10-27T13:35:49-08:00

A witness in Missoula, Montana, observed Bagendabanga Mugondozi physically assaulting a woman in a parked vehicle and reported the incident to law enforcement. Officers arrived on scene, observed injuries on the woman, and received statements from both individuals. Mugondozi admitted to slapping the woman, who was identified as his pregnant girlfriend. He was arrested and charged with misdemeanor Partner or Family Member Assault (PFMA). Mugondozi later moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that potential deportation as a collateral consequence outweighed the statutory interests in prosecuting the misdemeanor. The Missoula Municipal Court granted the motion to dismiss, focusing on the potential negative impact of Mugondozi's deportation on the victim and their child, and emphasizing the victim's wishes not to proceed with prosecution. The City of Missoula appealed, and the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District reversed the Municipal Court’s dismissal, finding that the lower court had abused its discretion by basing its decision solely on speculative collateral consequences and failing to consider societal interests. An initial appeal to the Supreme Court of Montana was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because there was no conviction or final judgment at that time. After Mugondozi pleaded guilty, the District Court reaffirmed its ruling. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case as if the appeal were originally before it. The Court held that the Municipal Court abused its discretion by dismissing the case in furtherance of justice without considering the interests of society, the nature of the crime, the weight of the evidence, and other relevant factors. The Court emphasized that unknown potential collateral consequences and the victim’s wishes, absent a violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights, do not justify dismissal. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s reversal of the Municipal Court’s dismissal. View "City of Missoula v. Mugondozi" on Justia Law

O'Kelley v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic Prison

2026-10-27T12:31:08-08:00

A Georgia inmate was sentenced to death after being convicted by a jury of two counts of malice murder, along with other crimes, based on evidence that he and an accomplice burglarized a residence, set fire to another nearby home, and killed two victims. The inmate confessed to the crimes and was linked by physical evidence. After exhausting his appeals in the Georgia Supreme Court and being denied certiorari by the United States Supreme Court, he filed a state habeas petition, which was denied, and the Georgia Supreme Court denied his application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal. Following these state proceedings, the inmate filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, raising nine claims with approximately sixty subclaims. The Warden argued that most claims were procedurally defaulted, unexhausted, or insufficiently pleaded under Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. The district court dismissed six subclaims as insufficiently pleaded, some on its own motion (sua sponte), and denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and for leave to amend the petition, reasoning that the petitioner had long been aware of the pleading requirements and had delayed seeking leave to amend. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed the narrow question of whether the Constitution required the district court to give the petitioner notice and an opportunity to amend before dismissing subclaims sua sponte for insufficient pleading. The Eleventh Circuit held that the petitioner had adequate notice of the pleading requirements and the possibility of dismissal under the applicable rules and case law, and that he had sufficient opportunity to be heard, including through his original petition and motion for reconsideration. The court therefore affirmed the district court’s denial of the habeas petition. View "O'Kelley v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic Prison" on Justia Law

United States v. Johnson

2026-10-27T11:30:08-08:00

The defendant was stopped by Columbus police for driving with a broken headlight and found to be driving on a suspended license related to a prior OVI offense. After arresting him, police conducted an inventory search of his car, which revealed heroin, cocaine, and ammunition. Subsequent searches of his residence and his grandmother’s home, both conducted pursuant to warrants, uncovered additional drugs, cash, and firearms. The defendant was implicated in a long-running drug-trafficking organization operated by his uncle and another individual, and was charged in a federal indictment with conspiracy and various drug and firearm offenses. Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress evidence from all three searches, arguing, among other things, that the impoundment and search of his car were improper and that the warrants for the residences lacked probable cause. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio denied all suppression motions. During trial, the government discovered that most of the cocaine from the car was powder, not crack, and successfully moved to amend Count Two of the indictment to reflect this. The jury convicted the defendant of conspiracy and several drug offenses, acquitting him on firearm counts. The district court denied post-verdict motions and sentenced him to concurrent terms of imprisonment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions. It affirmed the denial of all suppression motions, finding the searches lawful and either properly supported by probable cause or covered by the good-faith exception. The appellate court also affirmed the admission of alleged hearsay, ruling it fell within the co-conspirator exception. The court upheld the conviction for conspiracy, determining that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict. However, the court held that the mid-trial amendment to Count Two of the indictment constituted an actual amendment in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Presentment Clause and vacated the conviction on that count, remanding for further proceedings. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

People v Mears

2026-10-27T10:36:29-08:00

The defendant was involved in a physical altercation with his girlfriend’s fifteen-year-old son, resulting in the son being rendered unconscious. The prosecution charged the defendant with endangering the welfare of a child and strangulation in the second degree, relying on the defendant’s use of force as evidence for both counts. At trial, witnesses including the victim, his mother, and the defendant testified about the incident, and forensic evidence was presented to support the prosecution’s case. The defendant requested a justification instruction under Penal Law § 35.15 for both charges, arguing self-defense, but the trial court granted it only for the strangulation charge and denied it for endangerment. The jury acquitted the defendant of strangulation but convicted him of endangering the welfare of a child. The Supreme Court, Kings County, denied the justification charge for endangerment. The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed this decision, relying on prior appellate cases that generally held justification is not applicable to the offense of endangering the welfare of a child. The Appellate Division further concluded that no reasonable view of the trial evidence supported the justification defense for the endangerment charge. Leave to appeal was granted by a Judge of the Court of Appeals. The New York State Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court held that a justification instruction under Penal Law § 35.15 is available for endangering the welfare of a child when the prosecution’s theory is based on the defendant’s use of force, provided a reasonable view of the evidence supports the defense. The Court also found that the trial evidence reasonably supported a justification defense and that the failure to instruct the jury on justification was not harmless error. Consequently, the Court ordered a new trial. View "People v Mears" on Justia Law

United States v. Hess

2026-10-27T10:01:08-08:00

Two individuals operated a funeral home and nonprofit organization in Colorado, offering low-cost cremation services to families and marketing body donation for medical research. Over several years, they fraudulently obtained, sold, and shipped bodies and body parts without proper consent, often misrepresenting services and forging documents. They targeted particularly vulnerable victims, including those experiencing financial hardship or dealing with terminal illness and hospice care. Many families were misled, charged for services never rendered, and provided false cremains, while the defendants profited from unauthorized sales. After indictment, both defendants pleaded guilty to mail fraud charges involving the shipment of remains; other counts were dismissed pursuant to plea agreements. Their initial Presentence Investigation Reports recommended sentencing enhancements for targeting vulnerable victims and substantial upward variances. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado imposed significant sentences—240 months for one defendant and 180 months for the other—after finding the offenses involved a large number of vulnerable victims. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit vacated the sentences, holding the district court had not made sufficient particularized findings of vulnerability as required under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(2). On remand, the district court received new evidence and identified twenty-one specific victims whose vulnerabilities were directly exploited by the defendants, including those with financial hardship and families referred by hospice. The court found a sufficient nexus between each victim’s vulnerability and the fraud, applied the two-level enhancement for offenses involving a large number of vulnerable victims, and resentenced the defendants to the same terms as before. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court correctly applied the enhancement, rejected arguments relating to post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts and substantive reasonableness, and upheld both sentences. View "United States v. Hess" on Justia Law

United States v. Barrera

2026-10-27T09:31:12-08:00

The defendant was arrested in Wyoming for possession of and conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. When police apprehended him, they found a baseball bat, a police-style baton, and drug paraphernalia in his car. The defendant admitted to having used the bat and baton days earlier to retake his car after it had been stolen with methamphetamine stored inside. Evidence showed that he believed meth might still be in the car when he recovered it by force, though there was no proof that meth was actually present at that time. Five days later, police tracked his movements, observed what appeared to be a drug transaction, and ultimately arrested him after a brief chase, finding methamphetamine and the same bat and baton in his vehicle. The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming accepted the defendant’s guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The presentence report recommended a two-level sentencing enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines for possession of dangerous weapons. At sentencing, the defendant objected to this enhancement. The district court, after hearing testimony and arguments, found that the totality of the circumstances linked the bat and baton to his drug offense and imposed the enhancement, resulting in a 151-month sentence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s application of the sentencing enhancement for clear error and legal questions de novo. The court held that the enhancement was properly imposed because the defendant failed to demonstrate that a connection between the weapons and his drug activity was “clearly improbable.” The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that the facts—including the defendant’s use of the weapons to retake his car associated with drug trafficking—supported the enhancement. View "United States v. Barrera" on Justia Law

United States v. Barrett

2026-10-27T08:01:07-08:00

In 1999, a warrant was issued for the arrest of a man involved in methamphetamine distribution in eastern Oklahoma after he failed to appear for trial on drug charges. For months, law enforcement sought his capture, eventually locating him at his residence where they executed a no-knock search warrant. During the early morning raid, the defendant opened fire with a rifle, killing one state trooper and wounding another. Following his arrest, authorities found weapons, drug paraphernalia, and cash in the residence and on his person. The defendant was initially tried in Oklahoma state court, where his first trial ended with a hung jury. At a second trial, he was acquitted of murder but convicted of first-degree manslaughter and assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, resulting in a 30-year state sentence. Subsequently, federal authorities charged him with three counts, including using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (with the killing of a law enforcement officer as the predicate offense) under federal statutes. He was convicted on all counts, receiving life sentences for the firearm offenses and a death sentence for the killing. His convictions and death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, but post-conviction proceedings led to the death sentence being vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel during sentencing. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma later denied his second or successive motion to vacate his conviction for using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that causing the intentional killing of a law enforcement officer during a drug crime under 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(B) categorically qualifies as a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)’s elements clause. Therefore, any error regarding the use of the now-invalid “residual clause” was harmless. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of relief. View "United States v. Barrett" on Justia Law

P. v. Bray

2026-10-27T07:07:43-08:00

In 1996, the defendant, shortly after turning 18, conspired with her boyfriend to kill her mother for financial gain, making detailed plans and facilitating access to their home. On January 16, 1996, her boyfriend entered the house and killed her mother by shooting, beating, and stabbing her. The defendant’s younger sister witnessed the attack and attempted to call for help but was impeded by the defendant. The victim died from her injuries. At trial in 1998, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder, with special circumstance findings for intentional murder for financial gain and murder committed while lying in wait. She was sentenced to life without parole for murder and 25 years to life for conspiracy, the latter stayed. In November 2024, the defendant petitioned the Superior Court of Los Angeles County for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.1, arguing that changes in sentencing laws since her conviction would allow for a lesser sentence. After a hearing, the court found it had discretion to recall the sentence, reduced the murder conviction to second degree, and resentenced her to 15 years to life; the conspiracy conviction was similarly reduced, with sentence stayed. The People appealed, asserting the trial court lacked authority to resentence because there was no change in "applicable sentencing laws" as required by section 1172.1(a). The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case and held that the trial court did not have statutory authority to resentence the defendant on its own motion. The court concluded that since there had been no change in sentencing laws applicable to the defendant’s offenses, the original sentences for first degree murder with special circumstances and conspiracy to commit murder remained mandatory. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s resentencing order and directed that the original judgment and sentence remain in effect. View "P. v. Bray" on Justia Law

State of Maine v. Stewart

2026-10-27T07:04:57-08:00

A sixteen-year-old victim was walking from Waterville to Fairfield when she encountered Devon M. Stewart, a former schoolmate. After walking together, Stewart made inappropriate remarks, then, at a railroad trestle, unexpectedly hugged, kissed, and groped the victim. He pushed her against a railing, pulled down her pants and underwear, and subjected her to penile penetration despite her saying “no” and screaming “stop.” The victim, frightened and frozen, did not physically resist. After the assault, they continued walking until the victim separated from Stewart and called 9-1-1, later undergoing a sexual assault examination where Stewart’s DNA was found. Following the incident, Stewart was indicted in the Somerset County Unified Criminal Docket for one count of gross sexual assault (Class A). At trial, the jury heard testimony from the victim, law enforcement, and Stewart. The court admitted the 9-1-1 call, forensic evidence, and police interviews. The jury found Stewart guilty. At sentencing, the trial court imposed twenty years’ imprisonment, with all but eleven years suspended, and six years of probation, referencing aggravating and mitigating factors. Stewart appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, admission of certain evidence, and the legality of the probation period. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court found sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding of compulsion, as required for gross sexual assault, and held that Stewart had waived his objection to admission of the 9-1-1 call. The court also determined that there was no obvious error in admitting the victim’s testimony about Stewart’s prior statement regarding minors. However, the court concluded that the imposed six-year probation exceeded the statutory maximum for a Class A crime. The Court affirmed Stewart’s conviction, vacated his sentence, and remanded for resentencing in accordance with statutory limits. View "State of Maine v. Stewart" on Justia Law

USA v. Rizo

2026-10-27T06:31:14-08:00

The defendant was convicted in 1997 of participating in a conspiracy to rob drug dealers at gunpoint, resulting in the theft of large amounts of money and drugs. He received a total sentence of 468 months, which included consecutive sentences for two convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) related to firearm use during crimes of violence and drug trafficking. At the time, sentencing law required a 20-year consecutive sentence for a “second or subsequent” § 924(c) conviction, even if both convictions arose from the same prosecution. Following a 2018 amendment to § 924(c), which eliminated the “stacking” requirement for first-time offenders with multiple convictions in a single prosecution, the defendant moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. He argued that the change in law, though not retroactive, constituted an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for a reduction under a 2023 Sentencing Commission policy statement (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6)). The district court granted the motion, reduced the defendant’s second § 924(c) sentence from 20 to 5 years, and ordered his release. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held it had jurisdiction over the government’s appeal. On the merits, the court concluded that the district court erred because, under Rutherford v. United States, 608 U.S. 454 (2026), the 2018 non-retroactive amendment to § 924(c) cannot, as a matter of law, constitute an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s order and directed reinstatement of the original sentence. View "USA v. Rizo" on Justia Law

ANDERSON v. THE STATE

2026-10-27T04:31:55-08:00

The defendant was convicted of malice murder and aggravated assault after striking and killing a man, Marshall, with his truck. The incident occurred following a physical altercation at the Browning residence, after which Marshall left the house on foot and Anderson departed shortly thereafter in his truck. Evidence presented at trial included security footage and eyewitness testimony establishing that Anderson rounded a blind curve at a high speed and collided with Marshall, who was in the roadway. Anderson claimed to have attempted to avoid hitting Marshall but was unable to do so in time. After the collision, Anderson fled the scene, abandoned his vehicle, and traveled out of state. After a jury found Anderson guilty of malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault in the Superior Court of Newton County, the trial court sentenced him to life with the possibility of parole for malice murder and five years for aggravated assault. The felony murder count was vacated by operation of law. Anderson filed a motion for new trial, which was amended several times. The trial court later vacated the sentence for aggravated assault and merged that count for sentencing purposes, but denied the motion for new trial as amended. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia, Anderson argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to retain an accident reconstruction expert and for not objecting to the absence of a jury instruction on the law of accident. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that Anderson did not demonstrate deficient performance regarding the expert witness, as counsel reasonably chose to support the defense theory through other evidence. The claim regarding the jury instruction was procedurally barred. The court further held that Anderson failed to establish cumulative prejudice, as no deficient performance was shown. The conviction was affirmed. View "ANDERSON v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

MORELAND v. THE STATE

2026-10-27T04:31:54-08:00

On the night of January 28, 2023, a man was shot and killed while sitting in his car outside a motel in Troup County, Georgia. The shooting was captured by surveillance cameras, and eyewitnesses described the shooters as wearing face coverings. One shooter wore a distinctive black hoodie with a white Nike emblem, ripped blue jeans, and white Air Jordan sneakers with blue accents. Earlier that day, similar clothing was seen on a man at a gas station, captured in a still photo by store surveillance. The individual in the photo was later identified as the defendant, who was also linked to the crime through social media posts and forensic evidence connecting a firearm to the shooting. Additional evidence suggested a gang-related motive, as both the victim and the accused were members of rival factions. After a trial in the Superior Court of Troup County, a jury found the defendant guilty of malice murder, violations of the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, aggravated assault, and weapons offenses. He was sentenced to life in prison without parole plus additional consecutive terms. The defendant’s motion for a new trial was denied, and he appealed, raising several evidentiary challenges including the admissibility of lay identification testimony, exclusion of an investigative report containing anonymous tips, and testimony regarding the circumstances of his arrest. The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the appeal and affirmed the trial court’s rulings. The court held there was no plain error in allowing a witness who had sustained contact with the defendant to identify him in a surveillance photo. The court also found no clear or obvious error in excluding the investigative report with anonymous tips, as there was no controlling authority supporting the defendant’s arguments for admissibility. Finally, the court concluded that the brief reference to a threat made during the defendant’s arrest did not affect his substantial rights given the compelling evidence of guilt. The conviction and sentences were affirmed. View "MORELAND v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

THE STATE v. MCGRIFF

2026-10-27T04:31:54-08:00

A 16-year-old defendant was questioned by Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) agents following the death of his infant daughter in March 2020. The interviews occurred at a Florida hospital on March 5 and 6, and at the Clinch County Sheriff’s Office in Georgia on March 11. During these interviews, the defendant made statements about the events leading to the child’s injuries, including an admission of hitting her during the March 11 interview. At the time of the interviews, he was not living with his parents and no parent or guardian was present during questioning. The March 11 interview included Miranda warnings, which the defendant verbally acknowledged and waived in writing. The Superior Court of Clinch County held a hearing on the defendant’s omnibus motion to suppress his statements. After hearing testimony and reviewing audio and video evidence, the trial court granted the motion to suppress all three statements. The court found that the defendant was in custody during each interview and that Miranda warnings should have been provided for the March 5 and 6 interviews. For the March 11 interview, the trial court concluded that the defendant did not voluntarily, knowingly, or intelligently waive his Miranda rights based on his age, education, lack of guardian presence, and the brief explanation of his rights. The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the trial court’s decision. It held that the trial court’s findings regarding custody for the March 5 and 6 statements were insufficient for appellate review and remanded for further factual findings. However, the Court determined that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights during the March 11 interview under the totality of the circumstances. The Court reversed the suppression of the March 11 statement, vacated the suppression of the March 5 and 6 statements, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "THE STATE v. MCGRIFF" on Justia Law

HOWARD v. THE STATE

2026-10-27T04:31:53-08:00

The defendant admitted to shooting and killing another individual but claimed she acted in self-defense. Prior to the incident, there was evidence that the defendant had repeatedly voiced intentions to harm the victim if he came near her, including statements to acquaintances and the property manager of her apartment complex. On the night of the shooting, a confrontation occurred after an argument between the victim and another individual. The defendant intervened, pushed the victim, and ultimately shot him after a physical exchange. Surveillance footage captured the incident, and eyewitnesses testified about the events leading up to and following the shooting. The defendant testified that she shot the victim out of fear after seeing a gun on him, although no witness observed the victim brandishing a weapon during the altercation. The Fulton County Superior Court indicted the defendant for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted on all counts. The trial court sentenced her to life in prison with the possibility of parole for malice murder and additional suspended time for the firearm charge, with the other counts merged or vacated for sentencing. The defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied, and subsequently appealed. The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the appeal. It held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, as direct evidence and eyewitness testimony substantiated the jury's verdict. The court also found no abuse of discretion in excluding certain evidence, no plain error in the corrective jury instruction given, and no error regarding the voluntary manslaughter charge, as the relevant instruction was properly given. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were also rejected. The judgment was affirmed. View "HOWARD v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

WRIGHT v. THE STATE

2026-10-27T04:31:53-08:00

Two individuals were convicted in connection with the shooting death of a marijuana dealer during an attempted drug transaction in Atlanta. Surveillance footage and witness testimony established that the defendants met the victim at a gas station, relocated to a nearby street to complete the purchase, and that the shooting occurred during the transaction. One defendant was identified by the victim’s girlfriend as the person who pointed a gun at her immediately after the shooting, and both defendants were linked to the scene by cell phone data and video evidence. After the incident, one defendant’s cell phone was found at the scene and later remotely wiped. The Superior Court of Fulton County held a jury trial where both defendants were charged with multiple counts, including malice murder, felony murder, armed robbery, and attempted purchase of marijuana. The jury convicted them of felony murder predicated on attempted purchase of marijuana and attempted purchase of marijuana, acquitted them of some counts, and deadlocked on others, resulting in a mistrial for those counts. The court granted the State’s motion to dismiss the unresolved counts and sentenced the defendants to life in prison with the possibility of parole. Both defendants filed motions for new trial, which were denied. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia, the defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the consistency of the jury’s verdicts, the admission of identification evidence, and alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the convictions, holding that attempted purchase of marijuana is an inherently dangerous felony supporting felony murder, the evidence was sufficient to establish proximate cause, the jury’s verdicts were not mutually exclusive or repugnant, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting identification evidence. The Court also rejected all ineffective assistance of counsel claims, finding no deficient performance or resulting prejudice. View "WRIGHT v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

COLLIER v. THE STATE

2026-10-27T04:31:52-08:00

A college student was charged with felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony after the shooting death of another individual during a dispute over a cell phone sale arranged through an app. Surveillance footage and witness testimony established that after the victim allegedly took the phone without paying, the defendant searched for him, chased him through a fast-food restaurant parking lot and adjacent pharmacy area, and ultimately shot him from a distance. The victim died from a single gunshot wound to his back, and no firearm was found on or near the victim. The defendant later turned himself in and testified that he fired in self-defense, claiming the victim shot at him first. The Superior Court of Fulton County held a jury trial where the defendant was found guilty of felony murder, aggravated assault, and firearm possession but acquitted of malice murder. The aggravated assault conviction was merged into the felony murder conviction. The defendant was sentenced to life in prison with an additional suspended term for the firearm charge. After the verdict, the defendant moved for a new trial, which was denied following a hearing. The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's rulings. The Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying two motions for mistrial—one related to a prosecutor's reference to the Georgia Crime Information Center during opening statements, and another concerning statements made during the State’s closing argument. The Supreme Court also upheld the admission of two jail call recordings as impeachment evidence, finding their probative value was not substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice under Rule 403. Thus, the defendant’s convictions and the trial court's decisions were affirmed. View "COLLIER v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

MARDELL v. THE STATE

2026-10-27T04:31:51-08:00

The case involves Alexzandria Mardell, who killed her husband, John Mardell, on December 23, 2019, after a violent altercation at their shared home. Earlier that day, John had obtained a temporary protective order (TPO) against Alexzandria and requested law enforcement to serve her with the TPO and a divorce petition. After the attempted service, Alexzandria attacked John with a broken golf club, a glass jar, and stabbed him 20 times, resulting in his death. The incident was followed by Alexzandria calling 911 and interactions with responding officers, which were documented and presented at trial. Alexzandria claimed self-defense, testifying about alleged abuse and control exerted by John during their marriage. A Fayette County grand jury indicted Alexzandria for malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. After a jury trial in the Superior Court of Fayette County, she was found guilty on all counts. The court sentenced her to life in prison without parole for malice murder, vacated the felony murder conviction, and merged the aggravated assault charge. Her motion for a new trial was denied following a hearing. The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed Alexzandria’s appeal, in which she argued that admitting John’s written statements from his ex-parte TPO petition violated her confrontation rights and that her counsel was ineffective. The Court held that the admission of John’s statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause because they were not hearsay—the statements were not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted but for other purposes. The Court also rejected her ineffective assistance claims, finding no deficient performance or prejudice resulting from counsel’s actions. Additionally, the Court concluded that no cumulative prejudice resulted from the alleged errors. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "MARDELL v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

RUCKER v. THE STATE

2026-10-27T04:31:51-08:00

A man was convicted following a fatal shooting at a motel where he had been staying with several acquaintances. Tensions arose when one member of the group refused to contribute funds for the room, leading to an argument. Witnesses testified that the defendant threatened the victim and ultimately shot him at close range. Some witnesses stated the victim was unarmed and did not attack or threaten the defendant. The defendant claimed he acted out of fear and that the gun discharged accidentally during a struggle, but his account varied during his testimony. After the incident, the defendant left the scene and was later apprehended at another motel after a SWAT team forced entry. The Superior Court of Hall County conducted a jury trial, resulting in guilty verdicts for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The defendant was acquitted of theft by taking, and a charge for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was not pursued. He was sentenced to life without parole plus a consecutive five-year term. Following denial of his motion for a new trial, the defendant appealed. The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the appeal. The court held that the defendant failed to establish a violation of due process under Napue v. Illinois, as the trial court’s finding that no offer was made to a key witness in exchange for testimony was not clearly erroneous. The court also found no plain error in the omission of an accident instruction, no error in the self-defense instruction, and no abuse of discretion regarding evidence of the victim’s habits, as the defense withdrew the relevant question. Finally, the court held that the defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel and affirmed the convictions and sentences. View "RUCKER v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

People v. Thompson

2026-10-26T15:01:04-08:00

A detective observed the defendant in a parking lot handing an item to another man, who then appeared to use narcotics. The detective detained the defendant and found drugs and paraphernalia during a search. The defendant was charged with felony drug offenses and remanded into custody. After arraignment, the court scheduled a preliminary hearing, which was continued several times at the defense’s request. Before the preliminary hearing, the defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, to be heard concurrently with the preliminary hearing. As the rescheduled preliminary hearing approached, the prosecution requested a continuance because the detective who witnessed the events was unavailable due to medical leave. The defense opposed any further delay, and the defendant declined to waive the statutory time limit for holding the preliminary hearing under California Penal Code section 859b. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the motion for a continuance, granted the motion to suppress, and dismissed the complaint, finding the prosecution could not proceed without the suppressed evidence. The prosecution then moved to reinstate the complaint under Penal Code section 871.5, arguing the suppression motion could be bifurcated from the preliminary hearing. The Superior Court denied this motion as well. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the order denying reinstatement. It held that a defendant who brings a motion to suppress evidence at the preliminary hearing has a statutory and substantial right to have the motion litigated within the statutory timeframe for the preliminary hearing. The prosecution cannot bifurcate the suppression motion or extend the preliminary hearing beyond the statutory time limit without the defendant’s waiver. The appellate court affirmed the Superior Court’s order denying reinstatement of the complaint. View "People v. Thompson" on Justia Law

People v. Hirschfield

2026-10-26T12:03:28-08:00

On June 21, 2020, a Sacramento-based rap artist known as Christopher T. was shot and killed by Moses Alexander Hirschfield. The incident began when Christopher T., his girlfriend, and others visited an AM/PM convenience store where Hirschfield was present. After Christopher T. left the store, Hirschfield followed him at high speed. Christopher T. crashed his car, fled on foot, and was subsequently shot by Hirschfield, who then drove away. Hirschfield was arrested several months later. The Superior Court of Sacramento County presided over the trial. A jury found Hirschfield guilty of first degree murder and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The jury determined that Hirschfield personally discharged a firearm causing death and found several aggravating circumstances to be true, including great violence and cruelty, use of a weapon, and indication of serious danger to society. In a separate proceeding, the trial court found additional aggravating factors related to Hirschfield’s prior convictions and probation status. Hirschfield was sentenced to three years for the firearm possession and two consecutive indeterminate terms of 25 years to life for murder and firearm enhancement. On appeal, Hirschfield challenged the sentencing, arguing that the trial court improperly used aggravating factors associated with the murder charge to enhance the sentence for the firearm possession conviction. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court erred by imposing the upper term for the felon in possession conviction based on aggravating factors that were not proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt for that specific crime. The court concluded that this constituted prejudicial error and vacated Hirschfield’s sentence, remanding the case for a full resentencing and further litigation of aggravating circumstances as they pertain to the firearm possession conviction. View "People v. Hirschfield" on Justia Law

Cormier v. Florida Department of Corrections

2026-10-26T12:00:43-08:00

The petitioner was convicted in Florida state court in 2013 of two counts of first-degree grand theft and one count of second-degree grand theft for taking investments from three individuals and using the funds for personal expenses. He was sentenced to fifteen years in prison and ordered to pay $835,000 in restitution. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal, and his motion for rehearing was denied in January 2016, making his conviction final ninety days later. Shortly before his conviction became final, he filed a motion to reduce his imprisonment, which was denied in April 2016. He later mailed a separate motion, challenging only the restitution part of his sentence, but this motion was never docketed by the state court. In December 2017, he filed a state post-conviction motion, which was eventually denied and became final in December 2022. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed his federal habeas petition as untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), holding that the one-year limitations period was not tolled by his undocketed motion challenging restitution, because it did not challenge the custody-imposing portion of his sentence. The district court also found no basis for equitable tolling and held, in the alternative, that his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel and due process claims were not colorable. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Eleventh Circuit held that a motion challenging only restitution does not toll AEDPA’s statute of limitations, because restitution does not relate to the custody underlying habeas relief. Therefore, his federal habeas petition was untimely, and the court did not reach the merits of his constitutional claims. The district court’s order was affirmed. View "Cormier v. Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

United States v. Dodd

2026-10-26T11:30:07-08:00

The defendant pleaded guilty in federal court to possessing and conspiring to produce child pornography. His convictions followed a significant history of sexual offenses beginning in his early teens, including a juvenile adjudication for molesting two young girls and subsequent adult convictions for offenses related to child sexual abuse material (CSAM). Despite prior incarcerations and court-ordered treatments, the defendant continued to engage in the acquisition and production of CSAM, including while in custody, where he coerced an acquaintance to produce illicit images of infants. Previously, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio calculated the Sentencing Guidelines range for the defendant’s offenses, applying a five-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(5) for engaging in a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor. The defendant objected to this enhancement and requested the mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years, while the government recommended thirty years. The district court, after considering the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), imposed a sentence of fifty years, the statutory maximum, citing the defendant’s persistent criminal conduct, lack of rehabilitation, and the vulnerability of the victims. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. The court held that any procedural error in applying the pattern enhancement was harmless because it did not alter the applicable Guidelines range or affect the sentencing decision. The appellate court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by considering the defendant’s risk to the public or by imposing the statutory maximum, given the seriousness and persistence of the defendant’s conduct. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Dodd" on Justia Law

Hammond v. State

2026-10-26T09:36:06-08:00

A man convicted of sex offenses in the District of Columbia was required to register as a Tier I sex offender in Maryland, reporting every six months to the supervising authority. In February 2023, he registered in Charles County and received written notice that his next required registration was August 1, 2023. He failed to appear for registration on that date, later explaining his omission as a result of forgetfulness due to depression and multiple family deaths. After his missed registration, he attempted to contact the supervising detective and reschedule, but was ultimately charged with knowingly failing to register. The Circuit Court for Charles County held a bench trial, where the defendant argued that he forgot to register because of his mental health and distressing life events, but conceded he knew of the registration requirement and date. The court found him guilty, distinguishing between not knowing and forgetting, and imposed a suspended sentence with probation. He appealed, and the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the conviction, holding that proof of notice of the obligation to register was sufficient to establish that he “knowingly” failed to do so, and that forgetfulness was not a valid defense under the statute. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment. The Court held that under Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 11-721(a), forgetting to register is not a valid defense to a charge of knowingly failing to register. The State need only prove that the individual had notice of the duty to register and failed to comply. However, evidence of a medically diagnosed involuntary condition, such as late-stage Alzheimer’s or dementia, depriving the person of knowledge or awareness of their obligation, or uncontrollable external circumstances, may constitute a defense. The rule of lenity did not apply, as the statute was unambiguous. View "Hammond v. State" on Justia Law

P. v. Ball

2026-10-26T09:01:20-08:00

An off-duty peace officer observed a driver engaging in aggressive conduct on a public roadway, including speeding, tailgating, and cutting off other vehicles. When the officer photographed the vehicle, the driver pulled alongside and pointed a Glock firearm in the officer’s direction before driving away. The officer reported the incident, and law enforcement later confirmed the defendant’s possession of the firearm and vehicle. At the preliminary hearing in the Orange County Superior Court, the defendant was held to answer on two misdemeanor charges and a felony charge under Penal Code section 417.3 for brandishing a firearm in a threatening manner in the presence of a vehicle occupant. The Superior Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the felony charge, reasoning that the statute required proof that the motor vehicle occupant was actually in fear, and there was no evidence presented of such subjective fear. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reversed the dismissal and reinstated the felony charge, holding that section 417.3 sets forth an objective test and does not require the victim to subjectively experience fear. The Supreme Court of California reviewed whether section 417.3 requires proof that a victim subjectively experienced apprehension or fear, or if it is sufficient that the conduct would cause a reasonable person to feel such fear. The Court held that the statute requires only objective fear—proof that brandishing the firearm would cause a reasonable person to experience apprehension or fear of bodily harm, regardless of the actual victim’s subjective experience. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, reinstating the felony charge. View "P. v. Ball" on Justia Law

ROBBINS v STATE OF ARIZONA

2026-10-26T09:01:09-08:00

Two defendants were jointly indicted for money laundering, illegal control of an enterprise, and attempts to commit trafficking in stolen property. During their trial, the State introduced evidence referencing financial records that had previously been excluded as untimely. One defendant’s counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, additionally requesting dismissal with prejudice, arguing the jury had been irreparably exposed to precluded evidence. The co-defendant’s counsel joined in these motions. The trial court excused the jury, heard arguments, and granted a mistrial, but denied dismissal with prejudice, finding the State’s conduct was not intentional nor in bad faith. After the mistrial was granted, both defendants attempted to withdraw their mistrial requests, expressing preference to continue the trial if dismissal with prejudice was unavailable, but the court declined to revisit its decision. The defendants sought special action review from the Arizona Court of Appeals, arguing that a retrial would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court of appeals accepted jurisdiction, granted relief, and vacated the trial court’s order of mistrial, concluding that retrial would violate double jeopardy because the defendants had not consented to a mistrial without prejudice. The appellate court found the trial court abused its discretion in declaring a mistrial without manifest necessity and instructed that the charges be dismissed with prejudice, reasoning the defendants’ requests were ambiguous and their later attempts to clarify indicated they sought only a mistrial with prejudice. The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed the case to address whether a defendant can withdraw or clarify a mistrial motion after the court’s ruling and what framework governs appellate review of a manifest necessity finding. The Court held that defendants cannot withdraw or condition a mistrial motion after the trial court has ruled; consent to a mistrial must be withdrawn or clarified before the ruling. The Court also held that either consent or manifest necessity is independently sufficient to permit retrial under double jeopardy principles, and affirmed the trial court’s finding of manifest necessity. The relief granted by the court of appeals was vacated, and the case was remanded. View "ROBBINS v STATE OF ARIZONA" on Justia Law

US v. Barros Brandao

2026-10-23T14:30:04-08:00

The defendant, an American citizen, applied for a temporary emergency passport at the U.S. Embassy in Senegal after fleeing Cape Verde, where he faced two pending homicide charges and other criminal accusations. The Cape Verdean authorities had confiscated his passports and identification, but shortly after his release from pretrial detention (with instructions not to leave the country), he traveled to Senegal and claimed to have lost his American passport. Based on these events, he was charged in the United States with knowingly making false statements on a passport application, specifically that he had lost his passport in Dakar. Proceedings in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts included the denial of the defendant’s motion to exclude evidence regarding the Cape Verdean homicide charges, on the grounds that such evidence was relevant to motive. The district court also declined to give a missing witness instruction regarding the absence of a Cape Verdean official and did not ask a proposed voir dire question about potential juror bias related to the homicide charges. The jury convicted the defendant, who then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to give a missing witness instruction or by prohibiting argument about the absent Cape Verdean official. However, the appellate court concluded that the district court erred in not questioning potential jurors about bias from the homicide charges and in admitting evidence specifically referencing those charges, which was unduly prejudicial. Nonetheless, because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming, the court held these errors to be harmless and affirmed the conviction. View "US v. Barros Brandao" on Justia Law

USA v. McLaurin

2026-10-23T06:00:38-08:00

The case concerns a defendant who pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute, and possession with intent to distribute, methamphetamine, fentanyl, and cocaine. The defendant was part of a group engaged in distributing these drugs from multiple residences. Law enforcement conducted several search warrants at locations linked to the group, recovering significant quantities of the controlled substances and other evidence. The defendant admitted to being involved in the conspiracy, selling drugs at one of the residences, and participating in music videos promoting the drug operation. After the indictment, the defendant entered a guilty plea to both conspiracy and substantive drug charges without a plea agreement. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida accepted the plea. At sentencing, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, which attributed to the defendant all drugs seized in connection with the group’s activities at various residences. The court also applied a two-level enhancement for maintaining premises for drug distribution, based on co-conspirator conduct. The defendant objected, arguing he should be accountable only for drugs at the location where he sold, and that the enhancement should not apply based on co-conspirator actions. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the defendant contested the drug quantity attributed to him and the application of the sentencing enhancement. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not clearly err in attributing the full drug quantity to the defendant because the relevant conduct included reasonably foreseeable acts of co-conspirators within the scope of the conspiracy. The court also held that the premises-maintaining enhancement could be based on co-conspirator conduct if it was reasonably foreseeable. The court affirmed the sentence. View "USA v. McLaurin" on Justia Law

State v. Prince

2026-10-23T05:05:53-08:00

A man fired a warning shot with his handgun at his neighbor’s occupied mobile home following a dispute. He was arrested and initially charged with unlawful discharge of a firearm and use of a firearm to commit a felony. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State amended the charges, and the man pleaded guilty to attempted unlawful discharge of a firearm, a Class II felony. There was no agreement as to sentencing. The district court reviewed a presentence investigation report detailing the man’s military background, mental health issues, lack of criminal history, and the ongoing conflict with his neighbor. At sentencing, the man requested probation, while the State argued for a prison sentence, citing public safety concerns. The District Court for Sarpy County granted the man’s motion for deferred judgment and imposed a five-year term of probation, with a condition that he participate in veterans treatment court. The State appealed, arguing that the sentence was excessively lenient, that the court lacked authority to order participation in veterans treatment court, and that granting deferred judgment over the State’s objection violated constitutional separation of powers. The Nebraska Supreme Court determined that it had jurisdiction only to review the State’s claim that the sentence was excessively lenient, not the other issues raised. The court held that a term of probation imposed pursuant to deferred judgment statutes is a “sentence” for purposes of appeal under the excessive leniency statutes. The court concluded that the sentence of probation, including participation in veterans treatment court, was legally permissible, within statutory limits, and not an abuse of discretion by the district court. The portion of the appeal challenging the sentence as excessively lenient was affirmed, and all other assignments of error were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "State v. Prince" on Justia Law

State v. Elias

2026-10-23T05:05:52-08:00

The case involved a defendant convicted of second degree murder, unlawful discharge of a firearm, and two counts of use of a weapon to commit a felony related to a drive-by shooting. Key evidence included cell phone location data obtained through a "tower dump" order under Nebraska and federal statutes, which provided law enforcement with phone numbers of all cell phones accessing certain towers during a specified period. This order was sought soon after the crime because carriers retained such data only briefly. After the defendant was identified as a suspect, his number was found among the collected data, and this evidence linked him to the crime scene. On direct appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial court correctly admitted the tower dump data. The court found the data collection did not constitute a "search" under the Fourth Amendment, distinguishing it from broader location tracking at issue in Carpenter v. United States. The court also held that, even if the search were subject to the Fourth Amendment, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied because law enforcement reasonably relied on the court's order. The same attorneys represented the defendant at trial and on direct appeal. Subsequently, with new counsel, the defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief in the District Court for Lancaster County. He argued that his previous counsel was ineffective for failing to raise First Amendment and statutory arguments regarding the cell tower data, and that the state's failure to notify affected subscribers violated statutory and constitutional rights. The district court denied these claims without an evidentiary hearing, concluding the arguments were either procedurally barred, lacked merit, or were precluded by prior appellate rulings. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the claims were procedurally barred or precluded by its prior decision, and that counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise meritless or novel legal theories. The court also found recent Supreme Court precedent did not alter this outcome. View "State v. Elias" on Justia Law

State v. Lotter

2026-10-23T05:05:51-08:00

The case concerns a defendant convicted of three counts of first degree murder and related charges arising from a 1993 triple homicide. The primary evidence against the defendant at trial was the testimony of his codefendant, who had entered into an agreement with the prosecution to testify in exchange for avoiding the death penalty. Over the years, the defendant has pursued numerous challenges to his convictions and sentences, including prior unsuccessful attempts at postconviction relief, claims of newly discovered evidence, and federal habeas petitions. After his previous postconviction motions were denied, the defendant filed a new set of postconviction motions in 2024, asserting that the State had violated its obligations under Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose his codefendant’s prison mental health records. The defendant argued these records would have aided in impeaching the codefendant’s credibility at trial. He claimed he obtained these records only recently, after receiving the codefendant’s consent for their release, and that the information contained within could not have previously been discovered. The District Court for Richardson County dismissed the new postconviction motions without an evidentiary hearing. The court found that the claims were both untimely under Nebraska’s one-year limitations period and procedurally barred because the defendant could have raised them in earlier motions. On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the procedural bar de novo and held that the defendant failed to affirmatively demonstrate that the new claims could not have been raised in prior postconviction motions. Because the motion did not meet the statutory requirement to show that the grounds for relief were previously unavailable, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal on procedural grounds. View "State v. Lotter" on Justia Law

People v. Thomas

2026-10-22T14:00:56-08:00

Police officers observed Anthony Thomas commit two minor traffic violations but did not issue him a ticket. After Thomas parked his car legally in a parking lot and began to walk away, officers approached him, expressing suspicion about his actions and the vehicle. Due to an error in running the license plate, officers received a “no information” result, which increased their suspicion that the vehicle might be stolen. Although Thomas explained the car was his mother’s rental and this proved true, officers decided to impound the vehicle under a provision of the Vehicle Code that was inapplicable, as the car was legally parked with valid plates. Without verifying the vehicle’s status or giving Thomas an opportunity to arrange for someone to move it, officers arrested him on an outstanding misdemeanor warrant and conducted a search that uncovered a gun, leading to firearms charges. In the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Thomas moved to suppress the gun evidence, arguing that the search was not a valid inventory search and lacked a true community caretaking purpose. The court denied the motion without making findings about the officers’ motivation for impoundment. Thomas then pleaded guilty, preserving his right to appeal the suppression issue. Upon review, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, found that the search did not qualify as a valid inventory search because the prosecution failed to show a legitimate community caretaking rationale. Instead, the officers’ actions indicated an investigatory purpose. The court held that the prosecution did not meet its burden to justify the warrantless search, and the inventory search exception could not be used as a pretext for investigating criminal activity. The order denying the suppression motion was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions to grant the suppression motion. View "People v. Thomas" on Justia Law

People v. Baxter

2026-10-22T13:01:01-08:00

The defendant was charged in San Bernardino County with multiple offenses, including felony marijuana cultivation under Health and Safety Code section 11358, subdivision (d)(3), misdemeanor possession of marijuana for sale, and felony receipt of proceeds derived from controlled substances. The prosecution alleged aggravating circumstances for the felony cultivation charges, such as illegal discharge of waste and causing substantial environmental harm. The defendant pled guilty to two counts of felony marijuana cultivation and one count of misdemeanor possession for sale. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence, granted probation for two years, and ordered a period of county jail time to be served by work release. After completing probation, the defendant moved to dismiss the convictions under Penal Code section 1203.4 and to reduce the felony convictions to misdemeanors under Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b). The Superior Court of San Bernardino County granted the dismissal but denied the motion to reduce the felonies, reasoning that the relevant statute did not permit the offenses to be treated as wobblers, but rather as straight felonies. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the statutory language and its amendments following Proposition 64. The court concluded that Health and Safety Code section 11358, subdivision (d), uses permissive language (“may be punished”) indicating that the offense is a wobbler, not a straight felony. Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law in denying the defendant’s motion on the basis that it lacked discretion. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the matter for the lower court to exercise its discretion as to whether to reduce the felony convictions to misdemeanors. View "People v. Baxter" on Justia Law