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	<title>Copyright - Justia Case Law Summaries</title>
	<link rel="self" href="https://law.justia.com/summaryfeed/copyright/"/>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://copyrightopinions.justia.com/"/>
	<id>https://law.justia.com/summaryfeed/copyright/</id>
	<updated>2026-06-11T02:58:12-08:00</updated>
	<author>
		<name>Justia Inc</name>
		<uri>https://www.justia.com/</uri>
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	<generator uri="https://law.justia.com/" version="3.0">Justia Law</generator>
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	<rights>Copyright 2026 Justia Inc</rights>
	        <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/25-1534/25-1534-2026-06-05.html</id>
        	<title>Deque Systems Inc. v. Browserstack, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-05T10:30:42-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-05T10:30:42-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/25-1534/25-1534-2026-06-05.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Deque Systems Inc., a company specializing in web accessibility software, developed and registered multiple versions of its DevTools and Rules Help Pages products. To access these, users agreed not to copy, reverse-engineer, or otherwise misuse the software or its documentation. In 2021, BrowserStack, a competing firm, sought to develop its own accessibility testing tools. More than 100 BrowserStack employees created accounts with Deque—agreeing to Deque’s terms—and later, BrowserStack released an Accessibility Toolkit, which Deque alleged was developed by unlawfully copying and reverse-engineering DevTools and the Rules Help Pages.

Deque filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, claiming copyright infringement, false advertising, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment, and sought injunctive relief, damages, and other remedies. During discovery, Deque repeatedly failed to properly disclose its damages calculations and supporting evidence by the deadlines set in the court’s scheduling order. Despite several opportunities to supplement its disclosures and a late attempt to introduce expert testimony, Deque did not timely provide the required information. BrowserStack moved to exclude Deque’s damages evidence and for summary judgment. The district court granted these motions, finding that Deque’s noncompliance with disclosure rules was neither substantially justified nor harmless, and that Deque presented no evidence supporting injunctive or other relief.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding all evidence of Deque’s damages under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) due to repeated and unjustified failures to comply with disclosure requirements. The court also held that summary judgment for BrowserStack was warranted because Deque could not establish entitlement to injunctive, declaratory, or monetary relief. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/25-1534/25-1534-2026-06-05.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Deque Systems Inc. v. Browserstack, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Deque Systems Inc., a company specializing in web accessibility software, developed and registered multiple versions of its DevTools and Rules Help Pages products. To access these, users agreed not to copy, reverse-engineer, or otherwise misuse the software or its documentation. In 2021, BrowserStack, a competing firm, sought to develop its own accessibility testing tools. More than 100 BrowserStack employees created accounts with Deque—agreeing to Deque’s terms—and later, BrowserStack released an Accessibility Toolkit, which Deque alleged was developed by unlawfully copying and reverse-engineering DevTools and the Rules Help Pages.

Deque filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, claiming copyright infringement, false advertising, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment, and sought injunctive relief, damages, and other remedies. During discovery, Deque repeatedly failed to properly disclose its damages calculations and supporting evidence by the deadlines set in the court’s scheduling order. Despite several opportunities to supplement its disclosures and a late attempt to introduce expert testimony, Deque did not timely provide the required information. BrowserStack moved to exclude Deque’s damages evidence and for summary judgment. The district court granted these motions, finding that Deque’s noncompliance with disclosure rules was neither substantially justified nor harmless, and that Deque presented no evidence supporting injunctive or other relief.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding all evidence of Deque’s damages under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) due to repeated and unjustified failures to comply with disclosure requirements. The court also held that summary judgment for BrowserStack was warranted because Deque could not establish entitlement to injunctive, declaratory, or monetary relief.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Steven Agee</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Consumer Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/24-13978/24-13978-2026-06-02.html</id>
        	<title>Lil&#039; Joe Records, Inc. v. Won</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-02T08:31:45-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-02T08:31:45-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/24-13978/24-13978-2026-06-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Members of the rap group 2 Live Crew, including Mark Ross, created five albums between 1986 and 1989. Through a written agreement, the group assigned the sound recording copyrights to Luke Records, a company owned by one of the group’s members. In 1995, following Luke Records’ bankruptcy, these copyrights were sold to Lil’ Joe Records. In 2000, Mark Ross filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy; his termination interests in these copyrights were never listed or addressed in his bankruptcy proceedings. Years later, within the statutory window, Ross, another group member, and heirs of a third served a notice attempting to terminate the copyright grants to Luke Records, as permitted by the Copyright Act.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially concluded that Ross’s termination interests did not enter his bankruptcy estate, interpreting the Copyright Act and Bankruptcy Code to exclude them. The court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment on the effectiveness of the termination notice, and the case proceeded to trial. After the jury’s factual findings, the district court concluded the termination notice was valid. Lil’ Joe Records appealed the district court’s final judgment, the denial of its motion for summary judgment, and the denial of its motion for reconsideration.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Ross’s termination interests were property of his bankruptcy estate under the Bankruptcy Code, notwithstanding the Copyright Act’s inalienability restriction. Because these interests were never scheduled or administered by the bankruptcy court, they remained with the bankruptcy estate when Ross attempted to exercise them. As a result, Ross could not validly sign the termination notice, and the group did not have the required majority to terminate the copyright grants. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/24-13978/24-13978-2026-06-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Lil&#039; Joe Records, Inc. v. Won" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Members of the rap group 2 Live Crew, including Mark Ross, created five albums between 1986 and 1989. Through a written agreement, the group assigned the sound recording copyrights to Luke Records, a company owned by one of the group’s members. In 1995, following Luke Records’ bankruptcy, these copyrights were sold to Lil’ Joe Records. In 2000, Mark Ross filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy; his termination interests in these copyrights were never listed or addressed in his bankruptcy proceedings. Years later, within the statutory window, Ross, another group member, and heirs of a third served a notice attempting to terminate the copyright grants to Luke Records, as permitted by the Copyright Act.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially concluded that Ross’s termination interests did not enter his bankruptcy estate, interpreting the Copyright Act and Bankruptcy Code to exclude them. The court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment on the effectiveness of the termination notice, and the case proceeded to trial. After the jury’s factual findings, the district court concluded the termination notice was valid. Lil’ Joe Records appealed the district court’s final judgment, the denial of its motion for summary judgment, and the denial of its motion for reconsideration.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Ross’s termination interests were property of his bankruptcy estate under the Bankruptcy Code, notwithstanding the Copyright Act’s inalienability restriction. Because these interests were never scheduled or administered by the bankruptcy court, they remained with the bankruptcy estate when Ross attempted to exercise them. As a result, Ross could not validly sign the termination notice, and the group did not have the required majority to terminate the copyright grants. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Andrew Brasher</case:judge>
													<category term="Bankruptcy"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/25-1863/25-1863-2026-05-27.html</id>
        	<title>Estate of Worrell v. Thang, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-27T13:00:37-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-27T13:00:37-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/25-1863/25-1863-2026-05-27.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		George Bernard Worrell, Jr., a foundational member and arranger for the musical group Parliament-Funkadelic, collaborated with George Clinton and Thang, Inc. from 1969 to 1981. In 1976, Worrell was presented with a contract (the “1976 Agreement”) by Thang, Inc., which purported to grant Thang full ownership of sound recordings Worrell contributed to, in exchange for royalties. Over the years, Worrell and his estate asserted that Thang and Clinton failed to pay royalties due under this agreement. Worrell died in 2016, and his estate became the plaintiff in subsequent litigation.

After Worrell’s estate sued Thang and Clinton in New York state court for breach of contract related to the 1976 Agreement, the New York Supreme Court dismissed the suit. The court found that the agreement was not enforceable because it had not been signed by Thang, and the estate did not refute this. Subsequently, the estate filed a new action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, seeking a declaration of joint copyright ownership in the sound recordings and an accounting of royalties. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on statute of limitations grounds, holding that the estate’s copyright claims were untimely.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment. The court held that, given the unique circumstances—including the parties’ decades-long conduct in apparent reliance on the 1976 Agreement—there was a factual question as to whether Clinton and Thang had “plainly and expressly repudiated” Worrell’s copyright co-ownership before 2020. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding that part of the estate’s copyright-ownership claim is timely. The court also found genuine disputes of material fact as to Worrell’s status as a co-author of the recordings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/25-1863/25-1863-2026-05-27.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Estate of Worrell v. Thang, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                George Bernard Worrell, Jr., a foundational member and arranger for the musical group Parliament-Funkadelic, collaborated with George Clinton and Thang, Inc. from 1969 to 1981. In 1976, Worrell was presented with a contract (the “1976 Agreement”) by Thang, Inc., which purported to grant Thang full ownership of sound recordings Worrell contributed to, in exchange for royalties. Over the years, Worrell and his estate asserted that Thang and Clinton failed to pay royalties due under this agreement. Worrell died in 2016, and his estate became the plaintiff in subsequent litigation.

After Worrell’s estate sued Thang and Clinton in New York state court for breach of contract related to the 1976 Agreement, the New York Supreme Court dismissed the suit. The court found that the agreement was not enforceable because it had not been signed by Thang, and the estate did not refute this. Subsequently, the estate filed a new action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, seeking a declaration of joint copyright ownership in the sound recordings and an accounting of royalties. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on statute of limitations grounds, holding that the estate’s copyright claims were untimely.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment. The court held that, given the unique circumstances—including the parties’ decades-long conduct in apparent reliance on the 1976 Agreement—there was a factual question as to whether Clinton and Thang had “plainly and expressly repudiated” Worrell’s copyright co-ownership before 2020. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding that part of the estate’s copyright-ownership claim is timely. The court also found genuine disputes of material fact as to Worrell’s status as a co-author of the recordings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Karen Moore</case:judge>
													<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/24-12482/24-12482-2026-05-05.html</id>
        	<title>Great Bowery Inc. v. Consequence Sound LLC</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-05T10:04:13-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-05T10:04:13-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/24-12482/24-12482-2026-05-05.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A renowned photographer entered into a 2014 agreement with a licensing agency, granting it the exclusive worldwide right to license, market, and promote certain of her images. However, she reserved for herself the right to collaborate with or deliver these images to specific individuals or entities for special projects or other endeavors she deemed of interest. In subsequent years, the photographer took photographs for a magazine under agreements that reserved rights to her studio. The agency discovered that some of these photographs appeared on websites operated by the defendants and sued them for copyright infringement, supplying an authorization letter from the photographer permitting it to act on her behalf in matters relating to copyright infringement.

In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, the defendants argued that the agency lacked statutory standing under the Copyright Act because it was not the legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under the copyright. The district court agreed, finding that the photographer’s retention of certain rights in the agreement meant the agency did not have an exclusive license, and therefore lacked standing. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants. It also denied the agency’s late motion to amend the complaint to add the photographer as a co-plaintiff.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court’s analysis was mistaken: the reservation of certain rights by the photographer did not automatically eliminate the agency’s ability to hold other exclusive rights. The appellate court vacated the summary judgment, affirmed the denial of the motion to amend, and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the district court to reconsider the standing issue and the effect of the authorization letter in light of its opinion. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/24-12482/24-12482-2026-05-05.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Great Bowery Inc. v. Consequence Sound LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A renowned photographer entered into a 2014 agreement with a licensing agency, granting it the exclusive worldwide right to license, market, and promote certain of her images. However, she reserved for herself the right to collaborate with or deliver these images to specific individuals or entities for special projects or other endeavors she deemed of interest. In subsequent years, the photographer took photographs for a magazine under agreements that reserved rights to her studio. The agency discovered that some of these photographs appeared on websites operated by the defendants and sued them for copyright infringement, supplying an authorization letter from the photographer permitting it to act on her behalf in matters relating to copyright infringement.

In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, the defendants argued that the agency lacked statutory standing under the Copyright Act because it was not the legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under the copyright. The district court agreed, finding that the photographer’s retention of certain rights in the agreement meant the agency did not have an exclusive license, and therefore lacked standing. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants. It also denied the agency’s late motion to amend the complaint to add the photographer as a co-plaintiff.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court’s analysis was mistaken: the reservation of certain rights by the photographer did not automatically eliminate the agency’s ability to hold other exclusive rights. The appellate court vacated the summary judgment, affirmed the denial of the motion to amend, and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the district court to reconsider the standing issue and the effect of the authorization letter in light of its opinion.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Adalberto Jordan</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/25-291/25-291-2026-04-23.html</id>
        	<title>Richardson v. Townsquare Media, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-23T06:30:04-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-23T06:30:04-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/25-291/25-291-2026-04-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A professional videographer recorded a video in 2015 showing Michael Jordan breaking up a fight. Years later, a hip-hop news website operated by a media company republished the entire video, embedding it from a social media post, and used a screenshot from the video as the background of the article’s headline. The same website also published two articles embedding a separate interview video that the videographer had recorded with rapper Melle Mel, which had been posted on YouTube. Both articles included screenshots from the interview as part of their headlines.

The videographer sued the media company for copyright infringement in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings for the defendant, finding that the use of the Jordan Video was fair use, the screenshots were de minimis and not actionable, and the embedding of the Melle Mel Video was permitted under YouTube’s Terms of Service.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court found that the district court erred in determining, at the pleading stage, that the media company’s use of the entire Jordan Video was fair use, since it could substitute for the original and potentially harm the market for the video. The appellate court also found that the screenshots’ use was not de minimis because they were clearly recognizable and prominently displayed. However, the appellate court agreed with the district court that embedding the Melle Mel Video from YouTube was permitted by the license granted under YouTube’s Terms of Service.

The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment as to the Jordan Video and both sets of screenshots, affirmed as to the Melle Mel Video, and remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/25-291/25-291-2026-04-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Richardson v. Townsquare Media, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A professional videographer recorded a video in 2015 showing Michael Jordan breaking up a fight. Years later, a hip-hop news website operated by a media company republished the entire video, embedding it from a social media post, and used a screenshot from the video as the background of the article’s headline. The same website also published two articles embedding a separate interview video that the videographer had recorded with rapper Melle Mel, which had been posted on YouTube. Both articles included screenshots from the interview as part of their headlines.

The videographer sued the media company for copyright infringement in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings for the defendant, finding that the use of the Jordan Video was fair use, the screenshots were de minimis and not actionable, and the embedding of the Melle Mel Video was permitted under YouTube’s Terms of Service.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court found that the district court erred in determining, at the pleading stage, that the media company’s use of the entire Jordan Video was fair use, since it could substitute for the original and potentially harm the market for the video. The appellate court also found that the screenshots’ use was not de minimis because they were clearly recognizable and prominently displayed. However, the appellate court agreed with the district court that embedding the Melle Mel Video from YouTube was permitted by the license granted under YouTube’s Terms of Service.

The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment as to the Jordan Video and both sets of screenshots, affirmed as to the Melle Mel Video, and remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Gerard Lynch</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/24-10223/24-10223-2026-04-09.html</id>
        	<title>Dish Network L.L.C. v. Fraifer</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-09T08:33:22-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-09T08:33:22-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/24-10223/24-10223-2026-04-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		DISH Network L.L.C. held exclusive rights to broadcast certain Arabic-language television channels in the United States, secured through written agreements with foreign content producers. The defendants operated businesses that provided U.S. customers with unauthorized access to these channels through internet streaming devices and services, bypassing DISH’s authorization and payments. The defendants’ services relied on content delivery networks and encoders to capture, transcode, and transmit live broadcasts of the protected channels to their customers in the U.S.

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida first considered cross-motions for summary judgment. It granted summary judgment for DISH regarding its ownership of valid copyrights but found factual disputes about infringement, leading to a bench trial. After trial, the district court ruled in favor of DISH, finding that the defendants&#039; use of both content delivery networks and encoders constituted direct copyright infringement. The court awarded DISH a permanent injunction, $600,000 in statutory damages, attorney fees, and costs.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. The appellate court rejected all arguments by the defendants, including challenges to DISH’s ownership, the validity and transfer of the copyrights, and several evidentiary rulings. The court specifically found that the audiovisual works at issue were “Collective Works” under UAE law, supporting MBC’s initial ownership, and that the transfer of rights to DISH was uncontested by the original owner. The Eleventh Circuit held that sufficient evidence showed the defendants directly infringed DISH’s exclusive rights by operating encoders, and affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/24-10223/24-10223-2026-04-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Dish Network L.L.C. v. Fraifer" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                DISH Network L.L.C. held exclusive rights to broadcast certain Arabic-language television channels in the United States, secured through written agreements with foreign content producers. The defendants operated businesses that provided U.S. customers with unauthorized access to these channels through internet streaming devices and services, bypassing DISH’s authorization and payments. The defendants’ services relied on content delivery networks and encoders to capture, transcode, and transmit live broadcasts of the protected channels to their customers in the U.S.

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida first considered cross-motions for summary judgment. It granted summary judgment for DISH regarding its ownership of valid copyrights but found factual disputes about infringement, leading to a bench trial. After trial, the district court ruled in favor of DISH, finding that the defendants&#039; use of both content delivery networks and encoders constituted direct copyright infringement. The court awarded DISH a permanent injunction, $600,000 in statutory damages, attorney fees, and costs.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. The appellate court rejected all arguments by the defendants, including challenges to DISH’s ownership, the validity and transfer of the copyrights, and several evidentiary rulings. The court specifically found that the audiovisual works at issue were “Collective Works” under UAE law, supporting MBC’s initial ownership, and that the transfer of rights to DISH was uncontested by the original owner. The Eleventh Circuit held that sufficient evidence showed the defendants directly infringed DISH’s exclusive rights by operating encoders, and affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Embry J. Kidd</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-2965/24-2965-2026-04-07.html</id>
        	<title>American Society for Testing &amp; Materials v. UPCODES Inc</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-07T10:00:57-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-07T10:00:57-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-2965/24-2965-2026-04-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A non-profit organization that develops and sells technical standards for use in industry brought suit against a for-profit company that operates an online library of building codes. The for-profit company published on its website the full text of several copyrighted standards developed by the non-profit, which had been incorporated by reference into the International Building Code. This building code, in turn, was adopted as law by the City of Philadelphia and other jurisdictions. The for-profit company made these incorporated standards freely available, though it also sold premium subscriptions for enhanced features. The non-profit derived significant revenue from licensing and selling its standards, including those incorporated into law, and did not authorize the copying.

The case was first heard in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. After limited discovery and a hearing, the District Court denied the non-profit’s motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the for-profit company was likely to succeed on its fair use defense. The District Court found that the company’s publication of the standards for the purpose of public access to the law was transformative, even though the use was commercial in part, and that the standards, as incorporated into law, were primarily factual in nature. The District Court also found that copying the entire standards was reasonable because the law incorporated those standards in full, and that the effect on the market for the standards was at best equivocal.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. The Third Circuit held that the for-profit company is likely to succeed on the merits of its fair use defense, as three of the four statutory fair use factors favored fair use and the fourth was equivocal. The order denying the preliminary injunction was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-2965/24-2965-2026-04-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "American Society for Testing &amp; Materials v. UPCODES Inc" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A non-profit organization that develops and sells technical standards for use in industry brought suit against a for-profit company that operates an online library of building codes. The for-profit company published on its website the full text of several copyrighted standards developed by the non-profit, which had been incorporated by reference into the International Building Code. This building code, in turn, was adopted as law by the City of Philadelphia and other jurisdictions. The for-profit company made these incorporated standards freely available, though it also sold premium subscriptions for enhanced features. The non-profit derived significant revenue from licensing and selling its standards, including those incorporated into law, and did not authorize the copying.

The case was first heard in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. After limited discovery and a hearing, the District Court denied the non-profit’s motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the for-profit company was likely to succeed on its fair use defense. The District Court found that the company’s publication of the standards for the purpose of public access to the law was transformative, even though the use was commercial in part, and that the standards, as incorporated into law, were primarily factual in nature. The District Court also found that copying the entire standards was reasonable because the law incorporated those standards in full, and that the effect on the market for the standards was at best equivocal.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. The Third Circuit held that the for-profit company is likely to succeed on the merits of its fair use defense, as three of the four statutory fair use factors favored fair use and the fourth was equivocal. The order denying the preliminary injunction was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Luis Felipe Restrepo</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/607/24-171/</id>
        	<title>Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-25T06:45:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-25T06:45:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/607/24-171/"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several major music copyright owners, including a leading entertainment company, sought to hold an Internet service provider responsible for copyright infringement committed by its subscribers. The service provider, which serves millions of customers, was notified by a monitoring company of over 160,000 instances where its subscribers’ IP addresses were linked to alleged copyright violations such as illegal music file sharing. Although the provider had policies prohibiting infringement and took steps such as issuing warnings and suspending service, the copyright holders argued these measures were inadequate and brought suit seeking to impose liability on the provider for continuing to serve known infringers.

The case was tried in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. There, the jury found in favor of the copyright owners on both contributory and vicarious liability, and determined the provider’s infringement was willful, awarding $1 billion in statutory damages. After the District Court denied the provider’s post-trial motion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the finding of contributory liability, reasoning that supplying a service with knowledge it would be used for infringement was sufficient. The Fourth Circuit, however, reversed as to vicarious liability and remanded for a new determination of damages.

The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case concerning contributory liability. The Court held that a service provider is contributorily liable for a user’s infringement only if it either induced the infringement or provided a service tailored for infringement. Because the provider neither encouraged infringement nor offered a service primarily designed for infringement—since Internet access has substantial lawful uses—the provider was not contributorily liable. The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit’s judgment on contributory liability and remanded the case for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/607/24-171/" target="_blank"&gt;View "Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several major music copyright owners, including a leading entertainment company, sought to hold an Internet service provider responsible for copyright infringement committed by its subscribers. The service provider, which serves millions of customers, was notified by a monitoring company of over 160,000 instances where its subscribers’ IP addresses were linked to alleged copyright violations such as illegal music file sharing. Although the provider had policies prohibiting infringement and took steps such as issuing warnings and suspending service, the copyright holders argued these measures were inadequate and brought suit seeking to impose liability on the provider for continuing to serve known infringers.

The case was tried in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. There, the jury found in favor of the copyright owners on both contributory and vicarious liability, and determined the provider’s infringement was willful, awarding $1 billion in statutory damages. After the District Court denied the provider’s post-trial motion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the finding of contributory liability, reasoning that supplying a service with knowledge it would be used for infringement was sufficient. The Fourth Circuit, however, reversed as to vicarious liability and remanded for a new determination of damages.

The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case concerning contributory liability. The Court held that a service provider is contributorily liable for a user’s infringement only if it either induced the infringement or provided a service tailored for infringement. Because the provider neither encouraged infringement nor offered a service primarily designed for infringement—since Internet access has substantial lawful uses—the provider was not contributorily liable. The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit’s judgment on contributory liability and remanded the case for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                A company is not liable as a copyright infringer for merely providing a service to the general public with knowledge that it will be used by some to infringe copyrights.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-25</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Clarence Thomas</case:judge>
													<category term="Communications Law"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Internet Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Supreme Court"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-935/23-935-2026-02-24.html</id>
        	<title>Broadcast Music, Inc. v. North American Concert Promoters Association</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-24T08:00:05-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-24T08:00:05-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-935/23-935-2026-02-24.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A major music performing rights organization, which licenses the public performance of musical works to concert promoters, was unable to reach agreement with a national association of concert promoters on the rates and revenue base for blanket licenses covering live performances. For the first time in their relationship, the rights organization petitioned the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to set the licensing terms, as permitted under an antitrust consent decree applicable to the organization due to its significant market share. The promoters’ association, whose members include the two largest concert promoters in the United States, has historically secured blanket licenses from multiple performing rights organizations to avoid copyright infringement.

The district court accepted the organization’s proposed rates for a retroactive period and set a new, higher rate for a more recent period. It also broadened the definition of “gross revenues” for calculating royalties, including new categories such as revenues from ticket service fees, VIP packages, and box suites, which had not traditionally been included. The promoters’ association appealed these decisions, arguing that both the rates and the expanded revenue base were unreasonable. The rights organization cross-appealed the denial of prejudgment interest on retroactive payments.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions. It held that the district court imposed unreasonable rates, in part because it adopted an unprecedented and administratively burdensome revenue base without justification and relied too heavily on benchmark agreements that were not sufficiently comparable to prior agreements with the association. The court also found no economic changes justifying a significant rate increase. While it found no abuse of discretion in denying prejudgment interest, it vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-935/23-935-2026-02-24.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Broadcast Music, Inc. v. North American Concert Promoters Association" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A major music performing rights organization, which licenses the public performance of musical works to concert promoters, was unable to reach agreement with a national association of concert promoters on the rates and revenue base for blanket licenses covering live performances. For the first time in their relationship, the rights organization petitioned the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to set the licensing terms, as permitted under an antitrust consent decree applicable to the organization due to its significant market share. The promoters’ association, whose members include the two largest concert promoters in the United States, has historically secured blanket licenses from multiple performing rights organizations to avoid copyright infringement.

The district court accepted the organization’s proposed rates for a retroactive period and set a new, higher rate for a more recent period. It also broadened the definition of “gross revenues” for calculating royalties, including new categories such as revenues from ticket service fees, VIP packages, and box suites, which had not traditionally been included. The promoters’ association appealed these decisions, arguing that both the rates and the expanded revenue base were unreasonable. The rights organization cross-appealed the denial of prejudgment interest on retroactive payments.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions. It held that the district court imposed unreasonable rates, in part because it adopted an unprecedented and administratively burdensome revenue base without justification and relied too heavily on benchmark agreements that were not sufficiently comparable to prior agreements with the association. The court also found no economic changes justifying a significant rate increase. While it found no abuse of discretion in denying prejudgment interest, it vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-24</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Steven Menashi</case:judge>
													<category term="Antitrust &amp; Trade Regulation"/>
							<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-7652/23-7652-2026-02-10.html</id>
        	<title>McGucken v. Shutterstock, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-10T07:30:05-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-10T07:30:05-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-7652/23-7652-2026-02-10.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A professional photographer discovered that between 2018 and 2022, hundreds of his photographs were uploaded to an online stock photo platform operated by a large digital content marketplace, without his permission. Three contributors to the platform were responsible for uploading these images, and the platform subsequently licensed many of them to customers, generating revenue shared with the uploaders. After being notified by the photographer’s attorney, the platform removed the images and terminated the contributor accounts, but the photographer filed suit alleging both copyright infringement and violations related to the removal and alteration of copyright management information (CMI).

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment to the platform on all claims. The court concluded that the platform qualified for safe harbor immunity under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) for the copyright infringement claims. For the CMI claims, the court found that the photographer failed to present evidence of the platform&#039;s required scienter (knowledge or intent) to sustain a violation under 17 U.S.C. § 1202.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision regarding the CMI claims, agreeing that there was no evidence the platform acted with the necessary scienter under § 1202(a) or (b). However, the appellate court vacated the grant of summary judgment on the copyright infringement claims. It held that factual disputes remained as to whether the infringing activity occurred “by reason of the storage at the direction of a user” and whether the platform had the “right and ability to control” the infringing activity, both critical to safe harbor eligibility under the DMCA. The case was remanded for further proceedings on these factual questions. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-7652/23-7652-2026-02-10.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "McGucken v. Shutterstock, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A professional photographer discovered that between 2018 and 2022, hundreds of his photographs were uploaded to an online stock photo platform operated by a large digital content marketplace, without his permission. Three contributors to the platform were responsible for uploading these images, and the platform subsequently licensed many of them to customers, generating revenue shared with the uploaders. After being notified by the photographer’s attorney, the platform removed the images and terminated the contributor accounts, but the photographer filed suit alleging both copyright infringement and violations related to the removal and alteration of copyright management information (CMI).

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment to the platform on all claims. The court concluded that the platform qualified for safe harbor immunity under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) for the copyright infringement claims. For the CMI claims, the court found that the photographer failed to present evidence of the platform&#039;s required scienter (knowledge or intent) to sustain a violation under 17 U.S.C. § 1202.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision regarding the CMI claims, agreeing that there was no evidence the platform acted with the necessary scienter under § 1202(a) or (b). However, the appellate court vacated the grant of summary judgment on the copyright infringement claims. It held that factual disputes remained as to whether the infringing activity occurred “by reason of the storage at the direction of a user” and whether the platform had the “right and ability to control” the infringing activity, both critical to safe harbor eligibility under the DMCA. The case was remanded for further proceedings on these factual questions.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-10</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Myrna Pérez</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-1954/24-1954-2026-01-23.html</id>
        	<title>Allen v. Stein</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-23T13:00:14-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-23T13:00:14-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-1954/24-1954-2026-01-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case concerns Frederick Allen, a videographer, and his company, Nautilus Productions, who documented the excavation of the Queen Anne’s Revenge, the sunken pirate ship of Blackbeard, off the North Carolina coast. Allen registered copyrights for many years of video footage he recorded during the recovery project. The State of North Carolina and its Department of Natural and Cultural Resources entered into agreements related to the salvage operation. Allen alleged that state officials infringed his copyrights by using his footage online and in state publications without permission, and that the state passed a law, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 121-25(b), which Allen argued authorized this infringement.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina initially dismissed some claims but allowed Allen’s claims for declaratory judgment and copyright infringement to proceed, finding Congress had validly abrogated state sovereign immunity under the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act (CRCA). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the CRCA did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Allen then voluntarily dismissed his remaining claims against the only non-governmental defendant, closing the case.

Despite these rulings, the district court in 2021 allowed Allen to reopen the case, permitting him to amend his complaint based on a new constitutional theory stemming from United States v. Georgia, seeking as-applied, case-by-case abrogation of state sovereign immunity. In 2024, the district court denied sovereign immunity on this new claim, allowing it to proceed. The North Carolina defendants appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in reopening the litigation under Rule 54(b) rather than Rule 60(b), where no extraordinary circumstances justified such relief. The appellate court reversed the order reopening the case, vacated the subsequent 2024 ruling as moot, and remanded with instructions to close the litigation and dismiss all claims against the North Carolina defendants with prejudice. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-1954/24-1954-2026-01-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Allen v. Stein" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case concerns Frederick Allen, a videographer, and his company, Nautilus Productions, who documented the excavation of the Queen Anne’s Revenge, the sunken pirate ship of Blackbeard, off the North Carolina coast. Allen registered copyrights for many years of video footage he recorded during the recovery project. The State of North Carolina and its Department of Natural and Cultural Resources entered into agreements related to the salvage operation. Allen alleged that state officials infringed his copyrights by using his footage online and in state publications without permission, and that the state passed a law, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 121-25(b), which Allen argued authorized this infringement.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina initially dismissed some claims but allowed Allen’s claims for declaratory judgment and copyright infringement to proceed, finding Congress had validly abrogated state sovereign immunity under the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act (CRCA). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the CRCA did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Allen then voluntarily dismissed his remaining claims against the only non-governmental defendant, closing the case.

Despite these rulings, the district court in 2021 allowed Allen to reopen the case, permitting him to amend his complaint based on a new constitutional theory stemming from United States v. Georgia, seeking as-applied, case-by-case abrogation of state sovereign immunity. In 2024, the district court denied sovereign immunity on this new claim, allowing it to proceed. The North Carolina defendants appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in reopening the litigation under Rule 54(b) rather than Rule 60(b), where no extraordinary circumstances justified such relief. The appellate court reversed the order reopening the case, vacated the subsequent 2024 ruling as moot, and remanded with instructions to close the litigation and dismiss all claims against the North Carolina defendants with prejudice.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Robert King</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/25-5357/25-5357-2026-01-14.html</id>
        	<title>Stovall v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Education</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-14T14:30:14-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-14T14:30:14-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/25-5357/25-5357-2026-01-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A Kentucky high school intended to administer a mental-health survey to its students. Concerned about the survey’s contents, a parent requested a copy under the Kentucky Open Records Act, aiming to share it with other parents and reporters. The school denied her request, citing a provision of the state law that excludes records “prohibited by federal law or regulation” from disclosure, and argued that the survey was copyrighted by its publisher, NCS Pearson. The school did allow her to inspect the survey in person, but would not provide a copy.

The parent, Miranda Stovall, did not pursue available state remedies, such as review by the Kentucky Attorney General or a state court appeal. Instead, she filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, seeking a declaratory judgment that releasing the survey would fall under the fair-use exception in federal copyright law. NCS Pearson moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and the district court dismissed the case, finding that Stovall’s claim did not arise under federal law.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that federal jurisdiction was lacking because Stovall’s claim arose under state law, not the Copyright Act, and did not “necessarily raise” a substantial federal question. The court found that copyright law entered the dispute only as a defense to the state-law claim, and that potential future infringement actions did not establish Article III standing. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/25-5357/25-5357-2026-01-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Stovall v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Education" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A Kentucky high school intended to administer a mental-health survey to its students. Concerned about the survey’s contents, a parent requested a copy under the Kentucky Open Records Act, aiming to share it with other parents and reporters. The school denied her request, citing a provision of the state law that excludes records “prohibited by federal law or regulation” from disclosure, and argued that the survey was copyrighted by its publisher, NCS Pearson. The school did allow her to inspect the survey in person, but would not provide a copy.

The parent, Miranda Stovall, did not pursue available state remedies, such as review by the Kentucky Attorney General or a state court appeal. Instead, she filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, seeking a declaratory judgment that releasing the survey would fall under the fair-use exception in federal copyright law. NCS Pearson moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and the district court dismissed the case, finding that Stovall’s claim did not arise under federal law.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that federal jurisdiction was lacking because Stovall’s claim arose under state law, not the Copyright Act, and did not “necessarily raise” a substantial federal question. The court found that copyright law entered the dispute only as a defense to the state-law claim, and that potential future infringement actions did not establish Article III standing. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jeffrey Sutton</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30108/25-30108-2026-01-12.html</id>
        	<title>Vetter v. Resnik</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-12T16:30:12-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-12T16:30:12-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30108/25-30108-2026-01-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Two individuals, Vetter and Smith, co-wrote the song “Double Shot (Of My Baby’s Love)” in 1962 and assigned all copyright interests to Windsong Music Publishers in 1963, including a contingent assignment of renewal rights. After Smith died in 1972, his heirs and Vetter renewed the copyright when the original term ended in 1994. Windsong’s ownership of renewal rights depended on the authors’ survival; thus, Windsong received Vetter’s renewal rights because he survived, while Smith’s heirs received his share. Vetter Communications Corporation later purchased Smith’s heirs’ renewal rights. In 2019, Vetter terminated his earlier assignment under 17 U.S.C. § 304(c), aiming to recapture his rights. The publisher’s ownership interests were subsequently sold to Resnik Music Group. When licensing negotiations arose for international use, conflicting ownership claims led Vetter and his corporation to seek a declaratory judgment establishing their sole copyright ownership worldwide.

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana denied Resnik’s motion to dismiss and granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The court declared that Vetter was the sole owner of the recaptured copyright interest globally, and Vetter Communications Corporation was the sole owner of the renewal copyright interest globally, establishing their exclusive ownership.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that termination of copyright assignments under 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) and the renewal provisions of the Copyright Act of 1909 confer worldwide ownership rights to the terminating author or their heirs, not limited to domestic rights. The court found that statutory text, context, and purpose support this interpretation, and that the judgment does not conflict with international treaty obligations or relevant legal principles. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30108/25-30108-2026-01-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Vetter v. Resnik" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Two individuals, Vetter and Smith, co-wrote the song “Double Shot (Of My Baby’s Love)” in 1962 and assigned all copyright interests to Windsong Music Publishers in 1963, including a contingent assignment of renewal rights. After Smith died in 1972, his heirs and Vetter renewed the copyright when the original term ended in 1994. Windsong’s ownership of renewal rights depended on the authors’ survival; thus, Windsong received Vetter’s renewal rights because he survived, while Smith’s heirs received his share. Vetter Communications Corporation later purchased Smith’s heirs’ renewal rights. In 2019, Vetter terminated his earlier assignment under 17 U.S.C. § 304(c), aiming to recapture his rights. The publisher’s ownership interests were subsequently sold to Resnik Music Group. When licensing negotiations arose for international use, conflicting ownership claims led Vetter and his corporation to seek a declaratory judgment establishing their sole copyright ownership worldwide.

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana denied Resnik’s motion to dismiss and granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The court declared that Vetter was the sole owner of the recaptured copyright interest globally, and Vetter Communications Corporation was the sole owner of the renewal copyright interest globally, establishing their exclusive ownership.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that termination of copyright assignments under 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) and the renewal provisions of the Copyright Act of 1909 confer worldwide ownership rights to the terminating author or their heirs, not limited to domestic rights. The court found that statutory text, context, and purpose support this interpretation, and that the judgment does not conflict with international treaty obligations or relevant legal principles.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Carl Stewart</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/23-13156/23-13156-2026-01-07.html</id>
        	<title>Athos Overseas Limited Corp. v. YouTube, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-07T12:01:38-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-07T12:01:38-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/23-13156/23-13156-2026-01-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Athos Overseas Limited owns copyrights to numerous classic Mexican and Latin American films. The company discovered that its copyrighted films were posted on YouTube without authorization. Athos sent multiple takedown notices to YouTube, which removed the specific videos identified in those notices. However, Athos argued that YouTube’s technology—particularly its video-hashing and content management tools—gave it actual or “red flag” knowledge of additional infringing material beyond what was specifically identified, and thus YouTube should have removed all such matches automatically.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, denied Athos’s motion for partial summary judgment, and granted summary judgment in favor of YouTube. The court found that YouTube qualified for safe-harbor protection under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), as it expeditiously removed infringing material identified by valid takedown notices and did not have actual or red flag knowledge of other specific infringements.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Eleventh Circuit held that YouTube’s copyright management technologies do not, in themselves, give YouTube actual or red flag knowledge of specific infringing material unless a valid DMCA notice is received. The court also found that YouTube’s moderation and curation features did not constitute the right and ability to control infringing activity for purposes of the DMCA safe harbor. Therefore, YouTube was entitled to safe-harbor protection under § 512(c), and summary judgment in its favor was proper. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/23-13156/23-13156-2026-01-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Athos Overseas Limited Corp. v. YouTube, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Athos Overseas Limited owns copyrights to numerous classic Mexican and Latin American films. The company discovered that its copyrighted films were posted on YouTube without authorization. Athos sent multiple takedown notices to YouTube, which removed the specific videos identified in those notices. However, Athos argued that YouTube’s technology—particularly its video-hashing and content management tools—gave it actual or “red flag” knowledge of additional infringing material beyond what was specifically identified, and thus YouTube should have removed all such matches automatically.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, denied Athos’s motion for partial summary judgment, and granted summary judgment in favor of YouTube. The court found that YouTube qualified for safe-harbor protection under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), as it expeditiously removed infringing material identified by valid takedown notices and did not have actual or red flag knowledge of other specific infringements.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Eleventh Circuit held that YouTube’s copyright management technologies do not, in themselves, give YouTube actual or red flag knowledge of specific infringing material unless a valid DMCA notice is received. The court also found that YouTube’s moderation and curation features did not constitute the right and ability to control infringing activity for purposes of the DMCA safe harbor. Therefore, YouTube was entitled to safe-harbor protection under § 512(c), and summary judgment in its favor was proper.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Adalberto Jordan</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-2897/24-2897-2026-01-02.html</id>
        	<title>YONAY V. PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORPORATION</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-02T09:01:01-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-02T09:01:01-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-2897/24-2897-2026-01-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Two individuals who are heirs to the author of a 1983 magazine article about the United States Navy Fighter Weapons School, known as “Top Gun,” brought suit against a film studio. They alleged that a 2022 film, which is a sequel to an earlier movie inspired by the article, unlawfully copied their copyrighted work and breached a contractual obligation to credit the original author.

After the 1983 article was published, the author assigned all rights to the studio in exchange for compensation and a promise that he would be credited in any movie “substantially based upon or adapted from” the article. The studio produced an initial film in 1986, which acknowledged the article. Decades later, the heirs terminated the copyright grant under 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3)—a statutory right for authors’ heirs. The studio released the sequel without crediting or compensating the heirs. The heirs filed claims for copyright infringement and breach of contract in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The district court granted summary judgment for the studio, finding that the new film did not share substantial amounts of the article’s original expression and excluded the plaintiffs’ expert’s opinion for failing to filter out unprotectable elements.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the sequel did not share substantial similarity in protectable expression with the article, as required for copyright infringement. It also found no original and protectable selection and arrangement of elements, and concluded that the district court properly excluded the plaintiffs’ expert and admitted the studio’s expert. The court further held that the studio did not breach the 1983 agreement, because the new film was not produced under the rights conferred by that agreement. The judgment for the studio was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-2897/24-2897-2026-01-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "YONAY V. PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORPORATION" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Two individuals who are heirs to the author of a 1983 magazine article about the United States Navy Fighter Weapons School, known as “Top Gun,” brought suit against a film studio. They alleged that a 2022 film, which is a sequel to an earlier movie inspired by the article, unlawfully copied their copyrighted work and breached a contractual obligation to credit the original author.

After the 1983 article was published, the author assigned all rights to the studio in exchange for compensation and a promise that he would be credited in any movie “substantially based upon or adapted from” the article. The studio produced an initial film in 1986, which acknowledged the article. Decades later, the heirs terminated the copyright grant under 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3)—a statutory right for authors’ heirs. The studio released the sequel without crediting or compensating the heirs. The heirs filed claims for copyright infringement and breach of contract in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The district court granted summary judgment for the studio, finding that the new film did not share substantial amounts of the article’s original expression and excluded the plaintiffs’ expert’s opinion for failing to filter out unprotectable elements.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the sequel did not share substantial similarity in protectable expression with the article, as required for copyright infringement. It also found no original and protectable selection and arrangement of elements, and concluded that the district court properly excluded the plaintiffs’ expert and admitted the studio’s expert. The court further held that the studio did not breach the 1983 agreement, because the new film was not produced under the rights conferred by that agreement. The judgment for the studio was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Eric D. Miller</case:judge>
													<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-313/24-313-2025-12-18.html</id>
        	<title>Smart Study Co., LTD v. Shenzhenshixindajixieyouxiangongsi</title>
        	<updated>2025-12-18T07:30:05-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-18T07:30:05-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-313/24-313-2025-12-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A South Korean entertainment company that owns trademarks for the popular “Baby Shark” song and related products brought a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against dozens of China-based businesses. The company alleged these businesses manufactured or sold counterfeit Baby Shark merchandise, violating trademark, copyright, and unfair competition laws. Seeking to stop the alleged counterfeiting, the company obtained temporary and preliminary injunctions and moved to serve the defendants by email, arguing that this method was appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3).

After the plaintiff served process by email, most defendants did not respond, leading to default judgments against many of them. However, two defendants appeared and challenged the court’s jurisdiction, arguing that service by email violated the Hague Service Convention, to which both the United States and China are parties. The district court agreed, finding that the Convention did not permit service by email on parties in China, and dismissed the claims against these defendants without prejudice for improper service. The plaintiff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the Hague Service Convention does not allow email service on defendants located in China, as China has expressly objected to alternative methods such as those in Article 10 of the Convention. The court further held that neither Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(2) nor any purported emergency exception permitted email service in these circumstances. The court also upheld the denial of a default judgment, finding no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the dismissal of the claims against the two China-based defendants for lack of proper service was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-313/24-313-2025-12-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Smart Study Co., LTD v. Shenzhenshixindajixieyouxiangongsi" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A South Korean entertainment company that owns trademarks for the popular “Baby Shark” song and related products brought a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against dozens of China-based businesses. The company alleged these businesses manufactured or sold counterfeit Baby Shark merchandise, violating trademark, copyright, and unfair competition laws. Seeking to stop the alleged counterfeiting, the company obtained temporary and preliminary injunctions and moved to serve the defendants by email, arguing that this method was appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3).

After the plaintiff served process by email, most defendants did not respond, leading to default judgments against many of them. However, two defendants appeared and challenged the court’s jurisdiction, arguing that service by email violated the Hague Service Convention, to which both the United States and China are parties. The district court agreed, finding that the Convention did not permit service by email on parties in China, and dismissed the claims against these defendants without prejudice for improper service. The plaintiff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the Hague Service Convention does not allow email service on defendants located in China, as China has expressly objected to alternative methods such as those in Article 10 of the Convention. The court further held that neither Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(2) nor any purported emergency exception permitted email service in these circumstances. The court also upheld the denial of a default judgment, finding no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the dismissal of the claims against the two China-based defendants for lack of proper service was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Sullivan</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="Trademark"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-1860/24-1860-2025-12-05.html</id>
        	<title>Design Gaps, Inc. v. Distinctive Design &amp; Construction LLC</title>
        	<updated>2025-12-05T12:00:15-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-05T12:00:15-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-1860/24-1860-2025-12-05.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A dispute arose from the design and installation of cabinetry in a luxury home in Charleston, South Carolina. Design Gaps, Inc., owned by David and Eva Glover, had a longstanding business relationship with Shelter, LLC, a general contractor operated by Ryan and Jenny Butler. After being dissatisfied with Design Gaps’ performance, the homeowners, Dr. Jason and Kacie Highsmith, and Shelter terminated their contract with Design Gaps and hired Distinctive Design &amp; Construction LLC, owned by Bryan and Wendy Reiss, to complete the work. The Highsmiths and Shelter initiated arbitration against Design Gaps, which led to the arbitrator ruling in favor of the homeowners and Shelter on their claims, and against Design Gaps on its counterclaims, including those for copyright infringement, tortious interference, and unfair trade practices.

After the arbitration, Design Gaps sought to vacate the arbitration award in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, but the court instead confirmed the award. Concurrently, Design Gaps filed a separate federal lawsuit against several parties, including some who were not part of the arbitration. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that res judicata and collateral estoppel barred the new claims, or alternatively, that the claims failed on other grounds such as the statute of limitations and laches. The district court agreed, dismissing most claims based on preclusion or other legal bars, and granted summary judgment on the remaining claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions. The court held that res judicata and collateral estoppel applied to bar most of Design Gaps’ claims, even against parties not directly involved in the arbitration but in privity with those who were. For the remaining claims, the court found they were properly dismissed on grounds such as the statute of limitations, waiver, or laches. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in full. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-1860/24-1860-2025-12-05.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Design Gaps, Inc. v. Distinctive Design &amp; Construction LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A dispute arose from the design and installation of cabinetry in a luxury home in Charleston, South Carolina. Design Gaps, Inc., owned by David and Eva Glover, had a longstanding business relationship with Shelter, LLC, a general contractor operated by Ryan and Jenny Butler. After being dissatisfied with Design Gaps’ performance, the homeowners, Dr. Jason and Kacie Highsmith, and Shelter terminated their contract with Design Gaps and hired Distinctive Design &amp; Construction LLC, owned by Bryan and Wendy Reiss, to complete the work. The Highsmiths and Shelter initiated arbitration against Design Gaps, which led to the arbitrator ruling in favor of the homeowners and Shelter on their claims, and against Design Gaps on its counterclaims, including those for copyright infringement, tortious interference, and unfair trade practices.

After the arbitration, Design Gaps sought to vacate the arbitration award in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, but the court instead confirmed the award. Concurrently, Design Gaps filed a separate federal lawsuit against several parties, including some who were not part of the arbitration. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that res judicata and collateral estoppel barred the new claims, or alternatively, that the claims failed on other grounds such as the statute of limitations and laches. The district court agreed, dismissing most claims based on preclusion or other legal bars, and granted summary judgment on the remaining claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions. The court held that res judicata and collateral estoppel applied to bar most of Design Gaps’ claims, even against parties not directly involved in the arbitration but in privity with those who were. For the remaining claims, the court found they were properly dismissed on grounds such as the statute of limitations, waiver, or laches. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in full.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>A. Marvin Quattlebaum Jr.</case:judge>
													<category term="Arbitration &amp; Mediation"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Construction Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Real Estate &amp; Property Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2025/b345843.html</id>
        	<title>In re Marriage of Strong</title>
        	<updated>2025-11-24T15:01:12-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-11-24T15:01:12-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2025/b345843.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		After separating from his wife Monique in 2016, Brett, a sculptor, was ordered in a dissolution proceeding to pay spousal and child support. Brett accumulated approximately $2 million in unpaid support obligations and, according to his own testimony, held no assets apart from a copyright in certain works associated with Michael Jackson. Monique moved to have a receiver appointed and to compel Brett to assign the copyright to the receiver for purposes of monetization to satisfy the outstanding support debt.

The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Monique’s request, appointing a receiver and ordering Brett to assign his copyright to that receiver. Brett did not dispute his debt or the fact that his copyright was his only asset but argued that existing law did not authorize courts to compel the assignment of a copyright, contending that such authority existed only for patents. He timely appealed from this order.

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that, under Code of Civil Procedure section 695.010, subdivision (a), all property of a judgment debtor, including copyrights, is subject to enforcement of a money judgment unless a specific exception applies. The court found no exception for copyrights. It further reasoned that although no published California case had previously addressed forced assignment of copyrights, statutes and past cases regarding other intellectual property, such as patents, supported the trial court’s authority. The court also found persuasive support in analogous federal and out-of-state decisions. Consequently, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order compelling Brett to assign his copyright to the receiver and denied Monique’s request for appellate sanctions. Respondent was awarded costs on appeal. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2025/b345843.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re Marriage of Strong" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                After separating from his wife Monique in 2016, Brett, a sculptor, was ordered in a dissolution proceeding to pay spousal and child support. Brett accumulated approximately $2 million in unpaid support obligations and, according to his own testimony, held no assets apart from a copyright in certain works associated with Michael Jackson. Monique moved to have a receiver appointed and to compel Brett to assign the copyright to the receiver for purposes of monetization to satisfy the outstanding support debt.

The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Monique’s request, appointing a receiver and ordering Brett to assign his copyright to that receiver. Brett did not dispute his debt or the fact that his copyright was his only asset but argued that existing law did not authorize courts to compel the assignment of a copyright, contending that such authority existed only for patents. He timely appealed from this order.

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that, under Code of Civil Procedure section 695.010, subdivision (a), all property of a judgment debtor, including copyrights, is subject to enforcement of a money judgment unless a specific exception applies. The court found no exception for copyrights. It further reasoned that although no published California case had previously addressed forced assignment of copyrights, statutes and past cases regarding other intellectual property, such as patents, supported the trial court’s authority. The court also found persuasive support in analogous federal and out-of-state decisions. Consequently, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order compelling Brett to assign his copyright to the receiver and denied Monique’s request for appellate sanctions. Respondent was awarded costs on appeal.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-11-24</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>California</case:state>
						<case:court>California Courts of Appeal</case:court>
							<case:judge>Frances Rothschild</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Family Law"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="California Courts of Appeal"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/24-1119/24-1119-2025-10-16.html</id>
        	<title>Richardson v. Kharbouch</title>
        	<updated>2025-10-16T12:30:21-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-10-16T12:30:21-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/24-1119/24-1119-2025-10-16.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A young music producer created an instrumental hip-hop beat and uploaded it online without first obtaining a copyright. After hearing a similar beat in a popular song by a well-known rapper, he registered a sound recording copyright for his track and later sued the rapper for copyright infringement, seeking damages and an injunction. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had copied his digital recording, but did not obtain a musical composition copyright, which would have protected the underlying musical elements.

In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, both parties failed to comply with local rules regarding summary judgment filings. The district court, exercising its discretion, chose not to penalize either side for these procedural lapses. On the merits, the court found that the plaintiff had not provided sufficient evidence to show that the defendant had duplicated the actual digital sound recording, as opposed to merely imitating the musical composition. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The court also awarded costs to the defendant but denied his request for attorney’s fees, finding the plaintiff’s claims were not frivolous or objectively unreasonable.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s decisions on all issues. The appellate court held that, for a sound recording copyright infringement claim, a plaintiff must present evidence of actual duplication of the digital recording, not just imitation of the musical composition. Because the plaintiff failed to provide such evidence, summary judgment for the defendant was proper. The appellate court also affirmed the district court’s discretionary decisions regarding enforcement of local rules and denial of attorney’s fees. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/24-1119/24-1119-2025-10-16.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Richardson v. Kharbouch" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A young music producer created an instrumental hip-hop beat and uploaded it online without first obtaining a copyright. After hearing a similar beat in a popular song by a well-known rapper, he registered a sound recording copyright for his track and later sued the rapper for copyright infringement, seeking damages and an injunction. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had copied his digital recording, but did not obtain a musical composition copyright, which would have protected the underlying musical elements.

In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, both parties failed to comply with local rules regarding summary judgment filings. The district court, exercising its discretion, chose not to penalize either side for these procedural lapses. On the merits, the court found that the plaintiff had not provided sufficient evidence to show that the defendant had duplicated the actual digital sound recording, as opposed to merely imitating the musical composition. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The court also awarded costs to the defendant but denied his request for attorney’s fees, finding the plaintiff’s claims were not frivolous or objectively unreasonable.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s decisions on all issues. The appellate court held that, for a sound recording copyright infringement claim, a plaintiff must present evidence of actual duplication of the digital recording, not just imitation of the musical composition. Because the plaintiff failed to provide such evidence, summary judgment for the defendant was proper. The appellate court also affirmed the district court’s discretionary decisions regarding enforcement of local rules and denial of attorney’s fees.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-10-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Candace Jackson-Akiwumi</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-2196/24-2196-2025-09-15.html</id>
        	<title>Santos v. Kimmel</title>
        	<updated>2025-09-15T06:30:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-09-15T06:30:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-2196/24-2196-2025-09-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A former congressman created personalized videos for paying customers through the Cameo platform. A late-night television host, using fictitious names, requested and purchased several of these videos. The host then broadcast some of the videos on his show as part of a recurring segment that mocked the congressman by highlighting his willingness to say unusual things for money. The congressman claimed that this use of his videos infringed his copyrights and also violated state law through breach of contract and fraudulent inducement.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed the case and dismissed the complaint. The court found that the copyright claims were barred by the fair use doctrine, reasoning that the television host’s use was transformative and did not harm the market for the original videos. The court also held that the state law claims were either preempted by the Copyright Act or failed to state a claim under applicable state law. Specifically, the court determined that the congressman was not a party to the relevant contract, failed to allege the essential terms of any implied contract, and did not plead any actual out-of-pocket loss for the fraudulent inducement claim.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The appellate court agreed that the copyright claims were barred by the fair use doctrine, emphasizing the transformative nature of the use and the lack of market harm. The court also concluded that the state law claims failed to state a claim for relief, either because the congressman was not a party to the contract, did not allege an implied contract, or failed to allege actual damages. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed in full. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-2196/24-2196-2025-09-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Santos v. Kimmel" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A former congressman created personalized videos for paying customers through the Cameo platform. A late-night television host, using fictitious names, requested and purchased several of these videos. The host then broadcast some of the videos on his show as part of a recurring segment that mocked the congressman by highlighting his willingness to say unusual things for money. The congressman claimed that this use of his videos infringed his copyrights and also violated state law through breach of contract and fraudulent inducement.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed the case and dismissed the complaint. The court found that the copyright claims were barred by the fair use doctrine, reasoning that the television host’s use was transformative and did not harm the market for the original videos. The court also held that the state law claims were either preempted by the Copyright Act or failed to state a claim under applicable state law. Specifically, the court determined that the congressman was not a party to the relevant contract, failed to allege the essential terms of any implied contract, and did not plead any actual out-of-pocket loss for the fraudulent inducement claim.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The appellate court agreed that the copyright claims were barred by the fair use doctrine, emphasizing the transformative nature of the use and the lack of market harm. The court also concluded that the state law claims failed to state a claim for relief, either because the congressman was not a party to the contract, did not allege an implied contract, or failed to allege actual damages. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed in full.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-09-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Raymond Lohier</case:judge>
													<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-3970/24-3970-2025-09-11.html</id>
        	<title>REARDEN, LLC V. WALT DISNEY PICTURES</title>
        	<updated>2025-09-11T08:30:43-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-09-11T08:30:43-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-3970/24-3970-2025-09-11.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A technology company developed and copyrighted a facial motion capture software system used in film production. The company’s assets, including the software, were transferred among several affiliated entities, leading to a disputed sale to a visual effects contractor. The contractor, after acquiring the assets under contested circumstances, used the software in the production of a major motion picture for a film studio. The studio’s contract with the contractor gave it broad rights to supervise the contractor’s work, including the right to terminate the contract for copyright infringement. During production, representatives of the studio were present at all relevant sessions where the software was used, and evidence was presented that copyright notices appeared during these sessions.

After the film’s release, the technology company sued the studio in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging vicarious and contributory copyright infringement. The district court granted summary judgment to the studio on the contributory infringement claim, finding insufficient evidence of the studio’s knowledge of infringement, but allowed the vicarious liability claim to proceed to trial. At trial, the jury found the studio vicariously liable, awarded actual damages, and returned an advisory verdict on profits. The district court later granted judgment as a matter of law for the studio, concluding there was insufficient evidence that the studio had the practical ability to supervise or control the contractor’s infringing conduct. The court also struck the plaintiff’s jury demand on the issue of disgorgement of profits, holding there was no statutory right to a jury trial for that remedy, and excluded certain expert testimony and evidence of an indemnification agreement.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law, holding that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find the studio had the practical ability to supervise or control the contractor’s infringing conduct. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings striking the jury demand on disgorgement of profits, excluding the damages expert’s testimony, and excluding the indemnification agreement. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-3970/24-3970-2025-09-11.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "REARDEN, LLC V. WALT DISNEY PICTURES" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A technology company developed and copyrighted a facial motion capture software system used in film production. The company’s assets, including the software, were transferred among several affiliated entities, leading to a disputed sale to a visual effects contractor. The contractor, after acquiring the assets under contested circumstances, used the software in the production of a major motion picture for a film studio. The studio’s contract with the contractor gave it broad rights to supervise the contractor’s work, including the right to terminate the contract for copyright infringement. During production, representatives of the studio were present at all relevant sessions where the software was used, and evidence was presented that copyright notices appeared during these sessions.

After the film’s release, the technology company sued the studio in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging vicarious and contributory copyright infringement. The district court granted summary judgment to the studio on the contributory infringement claim, finding insufficient evidence of the studio’s knowledge of infringement, but allowed the vicarious liability claim to proceed to trial. At trial, the jury found the studio vicariously liable, awarded actual damages, and returned an advisory verdict on profits. The district court later granted judgment as a matter of law for the studio, concluding there was insufficient evidence that the studio had the practical ability to supervise or control the contractor’s infringing conduct. The court also struck the plaintiff’s jury demand on the issue of disgorgement of profits, holding there was no statutory right to a jury trial for that remedy, and excluded certain expert testimony and evidence of an indemnification agreement.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law, holding that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find the studio had the practical ability to supervise or control the contractor’s infringing conduct. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings striking the jury demand on disgorgement of profits, excluding the damages expert’s testimony, and excluding the indemnification agreement. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-09-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Lucy H. Koh</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-3949/24-3949-2025-09-08.html</id>
        	<title>BIANI V. SHOWTIME NETWORKS, INC.</title>
        	<updated>2025-09-08T08:31:50-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-09-08T08:31:50-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-3949/24-3949-2025-09-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Anna Biani participated in an online role-playing forum themed around Victorian London, where she created three original characters: Charlotte Émilie Benoit, Frederick FitzClarence, and Landon Otis Lloyd. She registered copyrights for these characters and her forum posts. Biani alleged that the television series Penny Dreadful, which aired on Showtime, infringed her copyrights by incorporating aspects of her characters into the show’s characters, particularly Vanessa Malcolm and Sir Malcolm Murray. She pointed to similarities in character traits, backgrounds, and the casting of Eva Green, whom she had identified as resembling one of her characters.

The United States District Court for the Central District of California reviewed Biani’s complaint. The court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim, finding that Biani had not plausibly alleged that the defendants had access to her work or that the similarities between the characters were so striking as to preclude independent creation. The district court applied the extrinsic test for substantial similarity, filtering out unprotectable elements such as stock features of the Victorian-era genre, and concluded that any remaining similarities were insufficient. Biani was given leave to amend but chose not to do so, resulting in dismissal with prejudice.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that, to state a claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must plausibly allege ownership of a valid copyright and that the defendant copied protected aspects of the work. The court found that Biani failed to plausibly allege copying, as the similarities were not so extensive as to preclude coincidence or independent creation. Additionally, the court agreed that Biani did not allege substantial similarity in protectable expression under the extrinsic test. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-3949/24-3949-2025-09-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "BIANI V. SHOWTIME NETWORKS, INC." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Anna Biani participated in an online role-playing forum themed around Victorian London, where she created three original characters: Charlotte Émilie Benoit, Frederick FitzClarence, and Landon Otis Lloyd. She registered copyrights for these characters and her forum posts. Biani alleged that the television series Penny Dreadful, which aired on Showtime, infringed her copyrights by incorporating aspects of her characters into the show’s characters, particularly Vanessa Malcolm and Sir Malcolm Murray. She pointed to similarities in character traits, backgrounds, and the casting of Eva Green, whom she had identified as resembling one of her characters.

The United States District Court for the Central District of California reviewed Biani’s complaint. The court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim, finding that Biani had not plausibly alleged that the defendants had access to her work or that the similarities between the characters were so striking as to preclude independent creation. The district court applied the extrinsic test for substantial similarity, filtering out unprotectable elements such as stock features of the Victorian-era genre, and concluded that any remaining similarities were insufficient. Biani was given leave to amend but chose not to do so, resulting in dismissal with prejudice.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that, to state a claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must plausibly allege ownership of a valid copyright and that the defendant copied protected aspects of the work. The court found that Biani failed to plausibly allege copying, as the similarities were not so extensive as to preclude coincidence or independent creation. Additionally, the court agreed that Biani did not allege substantial similarity in protectable expression under the extrinsic test. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-09-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jacqueline Nguyen</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/24-1289/24-1289-2025-09-08.html</id>
        	<title>Hoffmann Bros. Heating &amp; Air v. Hoffmann Air &amp; Heating</title>
        	<updated>2025-09-08T07:30:27-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-09-08T07:30:27-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/24-1289/24-1289-2025-09-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Two brothers, Tom and Robert Hoffmann, were formerly partners in a family heating and air conditioning business. After Robert bought out Tom’s interest, they settled their disputes in state court with an agreement that included a four-year prohibition on Tom’s use of the “Hoffmann” name in any HVAC business, as well as non-disparagement and non-solicitation clauses. After the four-year period, Tom started a new company, Hoffmann Air Conditioning &amp; Heating, LLC, using the family name. Robert and his company, Hoffmann Brothers Heating and Air Conditioning, Inc., objected and filed suit in federal court, alleging copyright infringement, trademark infringement, unfair competition, and breach of contract.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment to Tom and his company on the copyright claim, finding insufficient evidence of damages or a causal link between the alleged infringement and any profits. The remaining claims proceeded to a jury trial, which resulted in a mixed verdict largely favoring Tom and his company on the trademark and unfair competition claims. Both sides sought attorney fees, but the district court denied all requests.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings. The appellate court affirmed the summary judgment on the copyright claim, holding that the evidence of damages and profits was too speculative. It also upheld the jury instructions and verdict on the trademark claims, finding the instructions properly reflected the law regarding customer sophistication and initial-interest confusion. The court agreed that ambiguity in the settlement agreement’s language about post-four-year use of the Hoffmann name was a factual question for the jury. Finally, the court affirmed the denial of attorney fees to Robert, as he had not personally incurred any fees. The judgment of the district court was affirmed in all respects. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/24-1289/24-1289-2025-09-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Hoffmann Bros. Heating &amp; Air v. Hoffmann Air &amp; Heating" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Two brothers, Tom and Robert Hoffmann, were formerly partners in a family heating and air conditioning business. After Robert bought out Tom’s interest, they settled their disputes in state court with an agreement that included a four-year prohibition on Tom’s use of the “Hoffmann” name in any HVAC business, as well as non-disparagement and non-solicitation clauses. After the four-year period, Tom started a new company, Hoffmann Air Conditioning &amp; Heating, LLC, using the family name. Robert and his company, Hoffmann Brothers Heating and Air Conditioning, Inc., objected and filed suit in federal court, alleging copyright infringement, trademark infringement, unfair competition, and breach of contract.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment to Tom and his company on the copyright claim, finding insufficient evidence of damages or a causal link between the alleged infringement and any profits. The remaining claims proceeded to a jury trial, which resulted in a mixed verdict largely favoring Tom and his company on the trademark and unfair competition claims. Both sides sought attorney fees, but the district court denied all requests.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings. The appellate court affirmed the summary judgment on the copyright claim, holding that the evidence of damages and profits was too speculative. It also upheld the jury instructions and verdict on the trademark claims, finding the instructions properly reflected the law regarding customer sophistication and initial-interest confusion. The court agreed that ambiguity in the settlement agreement’s language about post-four-year use of the Hoffmann name was a factual question for the jury. Finally, the court affirmed the denial of attorney fees to Robert, as he had not personally incurred any fees. The judgment of the district court was affirmed in all respects.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-09-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>David Stras</case:judge>
													<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Trademark"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-2270/24-2270-2025-08-27.html</id>
        	<title>AMBROSETTI V. OREGON CATHOLIC PRESS</title>
        	<updated>2025-08-27T08:31:17-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-08-27T08:31:17-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-2270/24-2270-2025-08-27.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A musician and songwriter alleged that another composer copied his liturgical song, “Emmanuel,” in creating her own work, “Christ Be Our Light.” The plaintiff had published and performed “Emmanuel” widely in the 1980s and early 1990s, including at conventions attended by both the defendant and her publisher. The defendant, a British musician, composed “Christ Be Our Light” in 1993, and her publisher had received copies of “Emmanuel” from the plaintiff in the mid-1980s. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had access to his work through these conventions, widespread dissemination, and her relationship with her publisher.

The plaintiff initially filed suit in the Northern District of Indiana, but after a procedural dismissal and re-filing, the case was transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. During discovery, the plaintiff disclosed, after the deadline, letters from the publisher acknowledging receipt of “Emmanuel.” The district court, adopting a magistrate judge’s recommendation, excluded these letters and the related access theory as a sanction for late disclosure, finding the failure to disclose was neither substantially justified nor harmless. The court then granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that, without the excluded evidence, the plaintiff could not show access or striking similarity, and thus could not proceed with his copyright claim.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the exclusion of the late-disclosed evidence and the related access theory, holding that the discovery sanction was not claim-dispositive and was within the district court’s discretion. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding that, even without the excluded evidence, there were triable issues of fact as to whether the defendant had access to “Emmanuel” and whether the two works were substantially or strikingly similar. The case was remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-2270/24-2270-2025-08-27.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "AMBROSETTI V. OREGON CATHOLIC PRESS" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A musician and songwriter alleged that another composer copied his liturgical song, “Emmanuel,” in creating her own work, “Christ Be Our Light.” The plaintiff had published and performed “Emmanuel” widely in the 1980s and early 1990s, including at conventions attended by both the defendant and her publisher. The defendant, a British musician, composed “Christ Be Our Light” in 1993, and her publisher had received copies of “Emmanuel” from the plaintiff in the mid-1980s. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had access to his work through these conventions, widespread dissemination, and her relationship with her publisher.

The plaintiff initially filed suit in the Northern District of Indiana, but after a procedural dismissal and re-filing, the case was transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. During discovery, the plaintiff disclosed, after the deadline, letters from the publisher acknowledging receipt of “Emmanuel.” The district court, adopting a magistrate judge’s recommendation, excluded these letters and the related access theory as a sanction for late disclosure, finding the failure to disclose was neither substantially justified nor harmless. The court then granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that, without the excluded evidence, the plaintiff could not show access or striking similarity, and thus could not proceed with his copyright claim.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the exclusion of the late-disclosed evidence and the related access theory, holding that the discovery sanction was not claim-dispositive and was within the district court’s discretion. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding that, even without the excluded evidence, there were triable issues of fact as to whether the defendant had access to “Emmanuel” and whether the two works were substantially or strikingly similar. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-08-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Milan Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1360/24-1360-2025-08-21.html</id>
        	<title>Foss v. Eastern States Exposition</title>
        	<updated>2025-08-21T13:00:03-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-08-21T13:00:03-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1360/24-1360-2025-08-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A graphic designer was commissioned in 2016 to create a room-sized artwork for a brewery’s exhibition at an annual fair produced by the defendant. The agreement specified that the designer would retain copyright ownership and that the installation could only be shown in person to paying patrons at the 2016 event. During the fair, the defendant created and widely disseminated marketing videos online featuring the designer’s work without attribution, despite the designer’s requests for credit. The designer applied for copyright registration in April 2017, and the work was eventually registered, though the exact date of registration is not in the record.

The designer first filed a pro se copyright infringement suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts in early 2018, but the court dismissed it without prejudice for failure to allege copyright registration. Instead of amending, the designer filed a second action in state court, which was removed to federal court. After amending her complaint, the district court again dismissed the copyright claims, this time with prejudice, for failure to state a plausible claim and failure to allege registration. The designer did not respond to the motion to dismiss. In December 2020, now represented by counsel, she filed the present suit in federal court, which was dismissed with prejudice on claim preclusion grounds. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and remanded for further consideration.

On remand, the district court again dismissed the case, this time on both claim preclusion and statute of limitations grounds. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal, holding that the copyright infringement claims were untimely under the three-year statute of limitations, as the plaintiff knew or should have known of the alleged infringement by early 2017. The court also found no basis for equitable tolling. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1360/24-1360-2025-08-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Foss v. Eastern States Exposition" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A graphic designer was commissioned in 2016 to create a room-sized artwork for a brewery’s exhibition at an annual fair produced by the defendant. The agreement specified that the designer would retain copyright ownership and that the installation could only be shown in person to paying patrons at the 2016 event. During the fair, the defendant created and widely disseminated marketing videos online featuring the designer’s work without attribution, despite the designer’s requests for credit. The designer applied for copyright registration in April 2017, and the work was eventually registered, though the exact date of registration is not in the record.

The designer first filed a pro se copyright infringement suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts in early 2018, but the court dismissed it without prejudice for failure to allege copyright registration. Instead of amending, the designer filed a second action in state court, which was removed to federal court. After amending her complaint, the district court again dismissed the copyright claims, this time with prejudice, for failure to state a plausible claim and failure to allege registration. The designer did not respond to the motion to dismiss. In December 2020, now represented by counsel, she filed the present suit in federal court, which was dismissed with prejudice on claim preclusion grounds. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and remanded for further consideration.

On remand, the district court again dismissed the case, this time on both claim preclusion and statute of limitations grounds. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal, holding that the copyright infringement claims were untimely under the three-year statute of limitations, as the plaintiff knew or should have known of the alleged infringement by early 2017. The court also found no basis for equitable tolling.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-08-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Lara Montecalvo</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-2858/24-2858-2025-08-20.html</id>
        	<title>Thompson v. Hodgson</title>
        	<updated>2025-08-20T08:30:46-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-08-20T08:30:46-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-2858/24-2858-2025-08-20.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several former members of the rock band Supertramp entered into a 1977 publishing agreement with their bandmates and manager, allocating specific percentages of songwriting royalties among themselves. These royalties were distributed according to the agreement for decades. In 2018, two of the principal songwriters and their publishing company stopped paying royalties to the plaintiffs, prompting the plaintiffs to file a breach of contract action. The dispute centered on whether the agreement could be unilaterally terminated or whether the obligation to pay royalties continued as long as the songs generated income.

After the case was removed to the United States District Court for the Central District of California, the court ruled as a matter of law that the defendants could terminate the agreement after a “reasonable time,” finding no express or implied duration in the contract. The case proceeded to a jury trial, which found in favor of the defendants, concluding that the contract had been terminated after a reasonable time. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and applied California contract law, which requires courts to first look for an express duration in the contract, then to determine if a duration can be implied from the contract’s nature and circumstances, and only if neither is found, to construe the duration as a reasonable time. The Ninth Circuit agreed there was no express duration but held that the contract’s nature implied a duration: the obligation to pay royalties continues as long as the songs generate publishing income, ending only when the copyrights expire and the works enter the public domain. The court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the plaintiffs on liability. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-2858/24-2858-2025-08-20.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Thompson v. Hodgson" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several former members of the rock band Supertramp entered into a 1977 publishing agreement with their bandmates and manager, allocating specific percentages of songwriting royalties among themselves. These royalties were distributed according to the agreement for decades. In 2018, two of the principal songwriters and their publishing company stopped paying royalties to the plaintiffs, prompting the plaintiffs to file a breach of contract action. The dispute centered on whether the agreement could be unilaterally terminated or whether the obligation to pay royalties continued as long as the songs generated income.

After the case was removed to the United States District Court for the Central District of California, the court ruled as a matter of law that the defendants could terminate the agreement after a “reasonable time,” finding no express or implied duration in the contract. The case proceeded to a jury trial, which found in favor of the defendants, concluding that the contract had been terminated after a reasonable time. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and applied California contract law, which requires courts to first look for an express duration in the contract, then to determine if a duration can be implied from the contract’s nature and circumstances, and only if neither is found, to construe the duration as a reasonable time. The Ninth Circuit agreed there was no express duration but held that the contract’s nature implied a duration: the obligation to pay royalties continues as long as the songs generate publishing income, ending only when the copyrights expire and the works enter the public domain. The court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the plaintiffs on liability.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-08-20</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kim McLane Wardlaw</case:judge>
													<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-3978/24-3978-2025-08-15.html</id>
        	<title>In re Subpoena Internet Subscribers of Cox Communications, LLC</title>
        	<updated>2025-08-15T08:31:15-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-08-15T08:31:15-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-3978/24-3978-2025-08-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Capstone Studios Corp., a copyright holder, sought to identify 29 subscribers of CoxCom LLC, an Internet service provider, whose IP addresses were allegedly used to share pirated copies of Capstone’s movie via the BitTorrent peer-to-peer protocol. Capstone petitioned the clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii to issue a subpoena under § 512(h) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) to compel Cox to disclose the subscribers’ identities. Cox notified its subscribers, and one, identified as “John Doe,” objected, claiming he had not downloaded the movie and that his Wi-Fi had been unsecured.

A magistrate judge treated John Doe’s letter as a motion to quash the subpoena. The magistrate judge found that Cox’s involvement was limited to providing Internet access, qualifying it for the safe harbor under 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), which covers service providers acting solely as conduits for data transmission. The magistrate judge concluded that, as a matter of law, a § 512(h) subpoena cannot issue to a § 512(a) service provider. The district court adopted these findings and quashed the subpoena. Capstone’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and Capstone appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the DMCA does not permit a § 512(h) subpoena to issue to a service provider whose role is limited to that described in § 512(a), because such providers cannot remove or disable access to infringing content and thus cannot receive a valid notification under § 512(c)(3)(A), which is a prerequisite for a § 512(h) subpoena. The court also found no clear error in the district court’s factual finding that Cox acted only as a § 512(a) service provider. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order quashing the subpoena. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-3978/24-3978-2025-08-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re Subpoena Internet Subscribers of Cox Communications, LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Capstone Studios Corp., a copyright holder, sought to identify 29 subscribers of CoxCom LLC, an Internet service provider, whose IP addresses were allegedly used to share pirated copies of Capstone’s movie via the BitTorrent peer-to-peer protocol. Capstone petitioned the clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii to issue a subpoena under § 512(h) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) to compel Cox to disclose the subscribers’ identities. Cox notified its subscribers, and one, identified as “John Doe,” objected, claiming he had not downloaded the movie and that his Wi-Fi had been unsecured.

A magistrate judge treated John Doe’s letter as a motion to quash the subpoena. The magistrate judge found that Cox’s involvement was limited to providing Internet access, qualifying it for the safe harbor under 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), which covers service providers acting solely as conduits for data transmission. The magistrate judge concluded that, as a matter of law, a § 512(h) subpoena cannot issue to a § 512(a) service provider. The district court adopted these findings and quashed the subpoena. Capstone’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and Capstone appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the DMCA does not permit a § 512(h) subpoena to issue to a service provider whose role is limited to that described in § 512(a), because such providers cannot remove or disable access to infringing content and thus cannot receive a valid notification under § 512(c)(3)(A), which is a prerequisite for a § 512(h) subpoena. The court also found no clear error in the district court’s factual finding that Cox acted only as a § 512(a) service provider. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order quashing the subpoena.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-08-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Morgan Christen</case:judge>
													<category term="Communications Law"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Internet Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-1226/23-1226-2025-07-29.html</id>
        	<title>Atticus Ltd. Liab. Co. v. The Dramatic Publ&#039;g Co.</title>
        	<updated>2025-07-29T06:30:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-07-29T06:30:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-1226/23-1226-2025-07-29.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves a dispute over the rights to stage adaptations of Harper Lee&#039;s novel &quot;To Kill a Mockingbird.&quot; In 1969, Lee granted The Dramatic Publishing Company (Dramatic) the exclusive rights to develop and license a stage adaptation of the novel for non-first-class productions. Decades later, Lee terminated this grant and authorized a new stage adaptation, with Atticus Limited Liability Company (Atticus) holding the rights to produce this second adaptation. Atticus sought a declaration from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York that its performances did not infringe on any copyright interest held by Dramatic. Dramatic argued that it retained exclusive rights under the Copyright Act&#039;s derivative works exception and that Atticus&#039;s acquisition of rights was invalid.

The district court rejected Dramatic&#039;s arguments, ruling in favor of Atticus and awarding it attorney&#039;s fees. Dramatic appealed the judgment on the merits and both parties cross-appealed the award of attorney&#039;s fees.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court&#039;s judgment granting declaratory relief to Atticus, holding that Dramatic&#039;s exclusive rights did not survive Lee&#039;s termination of the 1969 grant. The court found that the derivative works exception did not preserve Dramatic&#039;s exclusive license to stage non-first-class productions after the termination. The court also rejected Dramatic&#039;s arguments regarding the invalidity of the 2015 grant to Atticus and the timeliness of Atticus&#039;s claim.

Regarding attorney&#039;s fees, the Second Circuit vacated the district court&#039;s award and remanded for further consideration. The court agreed that Dramatic&#039;s statute of limitations and res judicata arguments were objectively unreasonable but found that the district court erred in concluding that Dramatic had forfeited its statute of limitations defense and that its discovery requests unnecessarily prolonged the litigation. The court affirmed the district court&#039;s decision to deny fees incurred before April 27, 2023, and declined to award Atticus its fees on appeal. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-1226/23-1226-2025-07-29.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Atticus Ltd. Liab. Co. v. The Dramatic Publ&#039;g Co." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves a dispute over the rights to stage adaptations of Harper Lee&#039;s novel &quot;To Kill a Mockingbird.&quot; In 1969, Lee granted The Dramatic Publishing Company (Dramatic) the exclusive rights to develop and license a stage adaptation of the novel for non-first-class productions. Decades later, Lee terminated this grant and authorized a new stage adaptation, with Atticus Limited Liability Company (Atticus) holding the rights to produce this second adaptation. Atticus sought a declaration from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York that its performances did not infringe on any copyright interest held by Dramatic. Dramatic argued that it retained exclusive rights under the Copyright Act&#039;s derivative works exception and that Atticus&#039;s acquisition of rights was invalid.

The district court rejected Dramatic&#039;s arguments, ruling in favor of Atticus and awarding it attorney&#039;s fees. Dramatic appealed the judgment on the merits and both parties cross-appealed the award of attorney&#039;s fees.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court&#039;s judgment granting declaratory relief to Atticus, holding that Dramatic&#039;s exclusive rights did not survive Lee&#039;s termination of the 1969 grant. The court found that the derivative works exception did not preserve Dramatic&#039;s exclusive license to stage non-first-class productions after the termination. The court also rejected Dramatic&#039;s arguments regarding the invalidity of the 2015 grant to Atticus and the timeliness of Atticus&#039;s claim.

Regarding attorney&#039;s fees, the Second Circuit vacated the district court&#039;s award and remanded for further consideration. The court agreed that Dramatic&#039;s statute of limitations and res judicata arguments were objectively unreasonable but found that the district court erred in concluding that Dramatic had forfeited its statute of limitations defense and that its discovery requests unnecessarily prolonged the litigation. The court affirmed the district court&#039;s decision to deny fees incurred before April 27, 2023, and declined to award Atticus its fees on appeal.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-07-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Wesley</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Legal Ethics"/>
							<category term="Professional Malpractice &amp; Ethics"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-879/24-879-2025-07-23.html</id>
        	<title>Yuga Labs, Inc. v. Ripps</title>
        	<updated>2025-07-23T08:30:36-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-07-23T08:30:36-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-879/24-879-2025-07-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Yuga Labs, Inc. created the Bored Ape Yacht Club (BAYC) NFT collection, which became highly popular and valuable. Defendants Ryder Ripps and Jeremy Cahen created a nearly identical NFT collection called Ryder Ripps Bored Ape Yacht Club (RR/BAYC), using the same images and identifiers as Yuga&#039;s BAYC NFTs. Yuga sued for trademark infringement and cybersquatting, while Defendants countersued under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and sought declaratory relief that Yuga had no copyright protection over the Bored Apes.

The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed Defendants&#039; declaratory-judgment counterclaims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and granted summary judgment for Yuga on its trademark infringement and cybersquatting claims, as well as on Defendants&#039; DMCA counterclaim. The court then held a bench trial on remedies, enjoining Defendants from using the BAYC marks and awarding Yuga over $8 million in disgorgement of profits, statutory damages, attorney fees, and costs.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that NFTs can be trademarked under the Lanham Act as they are considered &quot;goods.&quot; However, the court reversed the district court&#039;s grant of summary judgment for Yuga on its trademark infringement and cybersquatting claims, concluding that Yuga did not prove as a matter of law that Defendants&#039; actions were likely to cause consumer confusion. The court found that Defendants&#039; use of Yuga&#039;s marks did not constitute nominative fair use and was not protected by the First Amendment. The court affirmed the district court&#039;s rejection of Defendants&#039; DMCA counterclaim and the dismissal of their declaratory-judgment claims with prejudice. The case was remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-879/24-879-2025-07-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Yuga Labs, Inc. v. Ripps" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Yuga Labs, Inc. created the Bored Ape Yacht Club (BAYC) NFT collection, which became highly popular and valuable. Defendants Ryder Ripps and Jeremy Cahen created a nearly identical NFT collection called Ryder Ripps Bored Ape Yacht Club (RR/BAYC), using the same images and identifiers as Yuga&#039;s BAYC NFTs. Yuga sued for trademark infringement and cybersquatting, while Defendants countersued under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and sought declaratory relief that Yuga had no copyright protection over the Bored Apes.

The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed Defendants&#039; declaratory-judgment counterclaims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and granted summary judgment for Yuga on its trademark infringement and cybersquatting claims, as well as on Defendants&#039; DMCA counterclaim. The court then held a bench trial on remedies, enjoining Defendants from using the BAYC marks and awarding Yuga over $8 million in disgorgement of profits, statutory damages, attorney fees, and costs.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that NFTs can be trademarked under the Lanham Act as they are considered &quot;goods.&quot; However, the court reversed the district court&#039;s grant of summary judgment for Yuga on its trademark infringement and cybersquatting claims, concluding that Yuga did not prove as a matter of law that Defendants&#039; actions were likely to cause consumer confusion. The court found that Defendants&#039; use of Yuga&#039;s marks did not constitute nominative fair use and was not protected by the First Amendment. The court affirmed the district court&#039;s rejection of Defendants&#039; DMCA counterclaim and the dismissal of their declaratory-judgment claims with prejudice. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-07-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Danielle Forrest</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Trademark"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/24-5263/24-5263-2025-07-07.html</id>
        	<title>Livingston v. Jay Livingston Music, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2025-07-07T11:30:15-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-07-07T11:30:15-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/24-5263/24-5263-2025-07-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Tammy Livingston, individually and as a beneficiary and co-trustee of the Livingston Music Interest Trust, sued her mother, Travilyn Livingston, over the termination of copyright assignments and associated royalties for songs authored by Jay Livingston. Jay had assigned his copyright interests in several songs to a music publishing company owned by Travilyn. Travilyn later invoked her statutory right to terminate these copyright grants and filed termination notices with the U.S. Copyright Office. Tammy challenged these terminations, claiming her rights as a beneficiary were affected.

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee dismissed Tammy&#039;s complaint, holding that it failed to state a claim. Tammy appealed the decision, arguing that the termination notices were ineffective, defective, or invalid, and that she retained a state law right to receive royalties from the songs covered by the terminated agreements.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court&#039;s dismissal. The court held that the 2003 California probate court order, which declared that the Family Trust held no ownership interests in Jay&#039;s copyrights, precluded Tammy&#039;s claims. The court also found that Jay had validly executed the copyright grants as an individual, not as a trustee, and that Travilyn owned Jay Livingston Music at the time of the assignments. Additionally, the court rejected Tammy&#039;s arguments regarding the termination notices&#039; compliance with federal requirements, noting that she failed to plead specific factual allegations for most of the notices. Finally, the court held that Tammy did not identify a state law basis for her claim to royalties, thus failing to meet the pleading standards under Civil Rule 12(b)(6). &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/24-5263/24-5263-2025-07-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Livingston v. Jay Livingston Music, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Tammy Livingston, individually and as a beneficiary and co-trustee of the Livingston Music Interest Trust, sued her mother, Travilyn Livingston, over the termination of copyright assignments and associated royalties for songs authored by Jay Livingston. Jay had assigned his copyright interests in several songs to a music publishing company owned by Travilyn. Travilyn later invoked her statutory right to terminate these copyright grants and filed termination notices with the U.S. Copyright Office. Tammy challenged these terminations, claiming her rights as a beneficiary were affected.

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee dismissed Tammy&#039;s complaint, holding that it failed to state a claim. Tammy appealed the decision, arguing that the termination notices were ineffective, defective, or invalid, and that she retained a state law right to receive royalties from the songs covered by the terminated agreements.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court&#039;s dismissal. The court held that the 2003 California probate court order, which declared that the Family Trust held no ownership interests in Jay&#039;s copyrights, precluded Tammy&#039;s claims. The court also found that Jay had validly executed the copyright grants as an individual, not as a trustee, and that Travilyn owned Jay Livingston Music at the time of the assignments. Additionally, the court rejected Tammy&#039;s arguments regarding the termination notices&#039; compliance with federal requirements, noting that she failed to plead specific factual allegations for most of the notices. Finally, the court held that Tammy did not identify a state law basis for her claim to royalties, thus failing to meet the pleading standards under Civil Rule 12(b)(6).
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-07-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Chad Readler</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Trusts &amp; Estates"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-55662/23-55662-2025-06-23.html</id>
        	<title>COSTAR GROUP, INC. V. COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE EXCHANGE, INC.</title>
        	<updated>2025-06-23T08:30:49-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-06-23T08:30:49-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-55662/23-55662-2025-06-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		CoStar Group, Inc. and CoStar Realty Information, Inc. (collectively, “CoStar”) and Commercial Real Estate Exchange, Inc. (“CREXi”) are online platforms competing in the commercial real estate listing, information, and auction markets. CoStar sued CREXi for copyright infringement, alleging that CREXi listed images and information hosted by CoStar without permission. CREXi counterclaimed on antitrust grounds, asserting that CoStar engaged in monopolistic practices to exclude competition.

The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed CREXi’s antitrust counterclaims and directed entry of final judgment on those claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The district court held that CREXi failed to show CoStar had monopoly power and that the agreements at issue were not exclusive. CREXi appealed the dismissal of its antitrust counterclaims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal of the antitrust counterclaims. The Ninth Circuit held that CREXi successfully stated claims under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, California’s Cartwright Act, and the Unfair Competition Law. The court found that CREXi plausibly alleged CoStar had monopoly power in the relevant markets and engaged in anticompetitive conduct by entering into de facto exclusive deals with brokers and imposing technological barriers to entry. The court concluded that a monopolist using its power to exclude competitors and maintain monopoly power violates § 2 of the Sherman Act, and using exclusive deals to do so violates § 1 of the Sherman Act and the Cartwright Act. The court also held that CREXi stated claims under the “unfair” and “unlawful” prongs of the Unfair Competition Law. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of CREXi’s tortious interference claims as they were improperly raised. The case was remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-55662/23-55662-2025-06-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "COSTAR GROUP, INC. V. COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE EXCHANGE, INC." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                CoStar Group, Inc. and CoStar Realty Information, Inc. (collectively, “CoStar”) and Commercial Real Estate Exchange, Inc. (“CREXi”) are online platforms competing in the commercial real estate listing, information, and auction markets. CoStar sued CREXi for copyright infringement, alleging that CREXi listed images and information hosted by CoStar without permission. CREXi counterclaimed on antitrust grounds, asserting that CoStar engaged in monopolistic practices to exclude competition.

The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed CREXi’s antitrust counterclaims and directed entry of final judgment on those claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The district court held that CREXi failed to show CoStar had monopoly power and that the agreements at issue were not exclusive. CREXi appealed the dismissal of its antitrust counterclaims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal of the antitrust counterclaims. The Ninth Circuit held that CREXi successfully stated claims under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, California’s Cartwright Act, and the Unfair Competition Law. The court found that CREXi plausibly alleged CoStar had monopoly power in the relevant markets and engaged in anticompetitive conduct by entering into de facto exclusive deals with brokers and imposing technological barriers to entry. The court concluded that a monopolist using its power to exclude competitors and maintain monopoly power violates § 2 of the Sherman Act, and using exclusive deals to do so violates § 1 of the Sherman Act and the Cartwright Act. The court also held that CREXi stated claims under the “unfair” and “unlawful” prongs of the Unfair Competition Law. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of CREXi’s tortious interference claims as they were improperly raised. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-06-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Anthony Johnstone</case:judge>
													<category term="Antitrust &amp; Trade Regulation"/>
							<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/23-3267/23-3267-2025-05-28.html</id>
        	<title>LADS Network Solutions, Inc. v. Agilis Systems, LLC</title>
        	<updated>2025-05-28T07:30:24-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-05-28T07:30:24-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/23-3267/23-3267-2025-05-28.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		LADS Network Solutions, Inc. sued Agilis Systems, LLC and its subsidiaries for copyright infringement of LADS’s courier management software, GPStrac. LADS licensed GPStrac to Agilis from 2004 to 2009 and sought copyright protection in 2014. LADS’s application claimed the first publication date was May 1, 2000, but the Copyright Office found a 2004 copyright notice within the source code. LADS resubmitted the correct code, and the Copyright Office approved the copyright. LADS alleged Agilis continued using GPStrac after the license expired.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment to Agilis, invalidating LADS’s copyright under 17 U.S.C. § 411(b). The court found that LADS had knowledge of inaccuracies in the application due to references to APIs that did not exist on the claimed publication date. The district court rejected LADS’s argument that § 411(b)(1) requires intent to defraud the Copyright Office.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether LADS had actual knowledge of the inaccuracies in the application. The court noted that the API references alone did not necessarily provide actual knowledge of the code’s creation date. Agilis failed to show that LADS knew the API’s creation date from any source. The court held that this factual dispute precluded summary judgment and reversed the district court’s decision, remanding the case for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/23-3267/23-3267-2025-05-28.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "LADS Network Solutions, Inc. v. Agilis Systems, LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                LADS Network Solutions, Inc. sued Agilis Systems, LLC and its subsidiaries for copyright infringement of LADS’s courier management software, GPStrac. LADS licensed GPStrac to Agilis from 2004 to 2009 and sought copyright protection in 2014. LADS’s application claimed the first publication date was May 1, 2000, but the Copyright Office found a 2004 copyright notice within the source code. LADS resubmitted the correct code, and the Copyright Office approved the copyright. LADS alleged Agilis continued using GPStrac after the license expired.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment to Agilis, invalidating LADS’s copyright under 17 U.S.C. § 411(b). The court found that LADS had knowledge of inaccuracies in the application due to references to APIs that did not exist on the claimed publication date. The district court rejected LADS’s argument that § 411(b)(1) requires intent to defraud the Copyright Office.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether LADS had actual knowledge of the inaccuracies in the application. The court noted that the API references alone did not necessarily provide actual knowledge of the code’s creation date. Agilis failed to show that LADS knew the API’s creation date from any source. The court held that this factual dispute precluded summary judgment and reversed the district court’s decision, remanding the case for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-05-28</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jonathan Kobes</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-3731/23-3731-2025-05-27.html</id>
        	<title>CARROLL SHELBY LICENSING, INC. V. HALICKI</title>
        	<updated>2025-05-27T08:31:56-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-05-27T08:31:56-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-3731/23-3731-2025-05-27.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Carroll Shelby Licensing, Inc. and Carroll Hall Shelby Trust filed a lawsuit against Denice Halicki and her associated entities, alleging that Halicki&#039;s copyright claims over the &quot;Eleanor&quot; Ford Mustangs were invalid. Halicki counterclaimed, asserting that Shelby&#039;s &quot;GT-500CR&quot; Mustangs infringed her copyright in Eleanor, a collection of Mustangs featured in four films. The dispute also involved claims of breach of a prior settlement agreement between the parties.

The United States District Court for the Central District of California held that Eleanor was not entitled to character copyright protection and dismissed Halicki’s breach of contract claim based on the settlement agreement. The court also denied Shelby’s request for a declaration that the GT-500CR did not infringe any of Halicki’s rights.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s summary judgment that Eleanor was not entitled to character copyright protection. The Ninth Circuit applied the Towle test and concluded that Eleanor did not have conceptual qualities, consistent traits, or distinctive elements necessary for character copyright protection. The court also affirmed the district court’s judgment that Shelby did not violate the settlement agreement, which prohibited Shelby from copying only Eleanor’s distinctive hood and inset lights.

However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of declaratory relief and remanded the case for the purpose of issuing the appropriate declaration. The appellate court held that a declaration would clarify and settle the legal relations between Shelby and Halicki and provide Shelby relief from the uncertainty that led to the proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-3731/23-3731-2025-05-27.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "CARROLL SHELBY LICENSING, INC. V. HALICKI" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Carroll Shelby Licensing, Inc. and Carroll Hall Shelby Trust filed a lawsuit against Denice Halicki and her associated entities, alleging that Halicki&#039;s copyright claims over the &quot;Eleanor&quot; Ford Mustangs were invalid. Halicki counterclaimed, asserting that Shelby&#039;s &quot;GT-500CR&quot; Mustangs infringed her copyright in Eleanor, a collection of Mustangs featured in four films. The dispute also involved claims of breach of a prior settlement agreement between the parties.

The United States District Court for the Central District of California held that Eleanor was not entitled to character copyright protection and dismissed Halicki’s breach of contract claim based on the settlement agreement. The court also denied Shelby’s request for a declaration that the GT-500CR did not infringe any of Halicki’s rights.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s summary judgment that Eleanor was not entitled to character copyright protection. The Ninth Circuit applied the Towle test and concluded that Eleanor did not have conceptual qualities, consistent traits, or distinctive elements necessary for character copyright protection. The court also affirmed the district court’s judgment that Shelby did not violate the settlement agreement, which prohibited Shelby from copying only Eleanor’s distinctive hood and inset lights.

However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of declaratory relief and remanded the case for the purpose of issuing the appropriate declaration. The appellate court held that a declaration would clarify and settle the legal relations between Shelby and Halicki and provide Shelby relief from the uncertainty that led to the proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-05-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jeremy Kernodle</case:judge>
													<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-828/23-828-2025-05-23.html</id>
        	<title>Romanova v. Amilus Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2025-05-23T07:00:09-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-05-23T07:00:09-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-828/23-828-2025-05-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Plaintiff Jana Romanova, a professional photographer, filed a lawsuit against Defendant Amilus Inc. for willful copyright infringement. Romanova alleged that Amilus published her photograph on its website without authorization. Despite being served, Amilus did not respond or appear in court. Romanova moved for a default judgment, but the district court ordered Amilus to show cause why the motion should not be granted. After receiving no response from Amilus, the court then ordered Romanova to show cause why the use of her photograph did not constitute fair use. The district court ultimately dismissed Romanova’s complaint with prejudice, concluding that Amilus’s use of the photograph was fair use.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Romanova’s claim, finding that the fair use defense was clearly established on the face of the complaint. The court reasoned that Amilus’s publication of the photograph communicated a different message than the original, which justified the fair use defense. Romanova appealed the decision, arguing that the court erred in its substantive finding of fair use and in raising the defense sua sponte for a non-appearing defendant.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court found that the district court misunderstood the fair use doctrine, particularly the requirement for a transformative purpose and justification for copying. The appellate court held that Amilus’s use of the photograph did not communicate a different message and lacked any valid justification for copying. Consequently, the appellate court remanded the case with instructions to enter a default judgment in favor of Romanova. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-828/23-828-2025-05-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Romanova v. Amilus Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Plaintiff Jana Romanova, a professional photographer, filed a lawsuit against Defendant Amilus Inc. for willful copyright infringement. Romanova alleged that Amilus published her photograph on its website without authorization. Despite being served, Amilus did not respond or appear in court. Romanova moved for a default judgment, but the district court ordered Amilus to show cause why the motion should not be granted. After receiving no response from Amilus, the court then ordered Romanova to show cause why the use of her photograph did not constitute fair use. The district court ultimately dismissed Romanova’s complaint with prejudice, concluding that Amilus’s use of the photograph was fair use.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Romanova’s claim, finding that the fair use defense was clearly established on the face of the complaint. The court reasoned that Amilus’s publication of the photograph communicated a different message than the original, which justified the fair use defense. Romanova appealed the decision, arguing that the court erred in its substantive finding of fair use and in raising the defense sua sponte for a non-appearing defendant.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court found that the district court misunderstood the fair use doctrine, particularly the requirement for a transformative purpose and justification for copying. The appellate court held that Amilus’s use of the photograph did not communicate a different message and lacked any valid justification for copying. Consequently, the appellate court remanded the case with instructions to enter a default judgment in favor of Romanova.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-05-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Pierre Leval</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-55418/23-55418-2025-05-16.html</id>
        	<title>Woodland v. Hill</title>
        	<updated>2025-05-16T08:00:38-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-05-16T08:00:38-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-55418/23-55418-2025-05-16.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Rodney Woodland, a freelance artist and model, sued Montero Lamar Hill, also known as Lil Nas X, for copyright infringement. Woodland claimed that Hill posted photos on his Instagram page that were too similar to photos Woodland had posted on his own Instagram account. Woodland&#039;s photos, posted between August 2018 and July 2021, received between eight and seventy-five &quot;likes.&quot; Hill&#039;s allegedly infringing photos were posted between March and October 2021 and received hundreds of thousands to millions of &quot;likes.&quot;

The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed Woodland&#039;s claims, including copyright infringement, declaratory relief, accounting, and unjust enrichment. The court found that Woodland failed to allege facts showing a reasonable possibility that Hill viewed Woodland&#039;s photos on Instagram and that Hill&#039;s photos were not substantially similar to Woodland&#039;s. Woodland was granted leave to amend his complaint but ultimately failed to state a claim for copyright infringement.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court&#039;s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Woodland did not plausibly allege that Hill had &quot;access&quot; to Woodland&#039;s photos, as the mere fact that Woodland posted his photos on Instagram was insufficient to show that Hill had viewed them. Additionally, the court found that Woodland failed to show that Hill unlawfully appropriated his photos. The court explained that the Copyright Act protects only the &quot;selection&quot; and &quot;arrangement&quot; of individual elements in a photo, and the photos in question were not substantially similar in their selection and arrangement of elements. Thus, Woodland&#039;s copyright infringement claim was dismissed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-55418/23-55418-2025-05-16.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Woodland v. Hill" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Rodney Woodland, a freelance artist and model, sued Montero Lamar Hill, also known as Lil Nas X, for copyright infringement. Woodland claimed that Hill posted photos on his Instagram page that were too similar to photos Woodland had posted on his own Instagram account. Woodland&#039;s photos, posted between August 2018 and July 2021, received between eight and seventy-five &quot;likes.&quot; Hill&#039;s allegedly infringing photos were posted between March and October 2021 and received hundreds of thousands to millions of &quot;likes.&quot;

The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed Woodland&#039;s claims, including copyright infringement, declaratory relief, accounting, and unjust enrichment. The court found that Woodland failed to allege facts showing a reasonable possibility that Hill viewed Woodland&#039;s photos on Instagram and that Hill&#039;s photos were not substantially similar to Woodland&#039;s. Woodland was granted leave to amend his complaint but ultimately failed to state a claim for copyright infringement.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court&#039;s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Woodland did not plausibly allege that Hill had &quot;access&quot; to Woodland&#039;s photos, as the mere fact that Woodland posted his photos on Instagram was insufficient to show that Hill had viewed them. Additionally, the court found that Woodland failed to show that Hill unlawfully appropriated his photos. The court explained that the Copyright Act protects only the &quot;selection&quot; and &quot;arrangement&quot; of individual elements in a photo, and the photos in question were not substantially similar in their selection and arrangement of elements. Thus, Woodland&#039;s copyright infringement claim was dismissed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-05-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kenneth Kiyul Lee</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/20-2146/20-2146-2025-05-05.html</id>
        	<title>InfoDeli, LLC v. Western Robidoux, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2025-05-05T07:30:38-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-05-05T07:30:38-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/20-2146/20-2146-2025-05-05.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		InfoDeli, LLC and Breht C. Burri (collectively, InfoDeli) brought a lawsuit against Western Robidoux, Inc. (WRI), Engage Mobile Solutions, LLC, and other defendants, including members of the Burri family and several companies. InfoDeli alleged copyright infringement, tortious interference, and violations of the Missouri Computer Tampering Act (MCTA). The dispute arose from a joint venture between InfoDeli and WRI, where InfoDeli created webstores for clients, and WRI provided printing and fulfillment services. The relationship deteriorated when WRI hired Engage to replace InfoDeli&#039;s webstores, leading to the lawsuit.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri granted summary judgment to the defendants on the copyright infringement claim, dismissed or tried the remaining claims before a jury, which found in favor of the defendants. The district court also granted in part and denied in part InfoDeli&#039;s sanctions motion and awarded attorney’s fees and costs to the defendants. InfoDeli appealed these decisions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court&#039;s grant of summary judgment on the copyright infringement claim, finding that InfoDeli failed to show that the nonliteral elements of its webstores were protected by copyright. The court also upheld the district court&#039;s denial of InfoDeli&#039;s motion for summary judgment on CEVA&#039;s conversion counterclaim, finding it was timely under Missouri law. Additionally, the court affirmed the district court&#039;s denial of InfoDeli&#039;s posttrial motions for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial as untimely.

The Eighth Circuit also reviewed the sanctions imposed by the district court and found no abuse of discretion in the amount awarded or the decision not to impose additional sanctions under Rule 37(e). Finally, the court upheld the award of attorney’s fees and costs to the defendants, finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its assessment. The court affirmed the district court&#039;s decisions in all respects. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/20-2146/20-2146-2025-05-05.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "InfoDeli, LLC v. Western Robidoux, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                InfoDeli, LLC and Breht C. Burri (collectively, InfoDeli) brought a lawsuit against Western Robidoux, Inc. (WRI), Engage Mobile Solutions, LLC, and other defendants, including members of the Burri family and several companies. InfoDeli alleged copyright infringement, tortious interference, and violations of the Missouri Computer Tampering Act (MCTA). The dispute arose from a joint venture between InfoDeli and WRI, where InfoDeli created webstores for clients, and WRI provided printing and fulfillment services. The relationship deteriorated when WRI hired Engage to replace InfoDeli&#039;s webstores, leading to the lawsuit.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri granted summary judgment to the defendants on the copyright infringement claim, dismissed or tried the remaining claims before a jury, which found in favor of the defendants. The district court also granted in part and denied in part InfoDeli&#039;s sanctions motion and awarded attorney’s fees and costs to the defendants. InfoDeli appealed these decisions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court&#039;s grant of summary judgment on the copyright infringement claim, finding that InfoDeli failed to show that the nonliteral elements of its webstores were protected by copyright. The court also upheld the district court&#039;s denial of InfoDeli&#039;s motion for summary judgment on CEVA&#039;s conversion counterclaim, finding it was timely under Missouri law. Additionally, the court affirmed the district court&#039;s denial of InfoDeli&#039;s posttrial motions for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial as untimely.

The Eighth Circuit also reviewed the sanctions imposed by the district court and found no abuse of discretion in the amount awarded or the decision not to impose additional sanctions under Rule 37(e). Finally, the court upheld the award of attorney’s fees and costs to the defendants, finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its assessment. The court affirmed the district court&#039;s decisions in all respects.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-05-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jane Kelly</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Commercial Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Legal Ethics"/>
							<category term="Professional Malpractice &amp; Ethics"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/23-5233/23-5233-2025-03-18.html</id>
        	<title>Thaler v. Perlmutter</title>
        	<updated>2025-03-18T08:01:41-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-03-18T08:01:41-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/23-5233/23-5233-2025-03-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A computer scientist, Dr. Stephen Thaler, created an artificial intelligence system called the &quot;Creativity Machine,&quot; which autonomously generated an artwork titled &quot;A Recent Entrance to Paradise.&quot; Dr. Thaler submitted a copyright registration application to the United States Copyright Office, listing the Creativity Machine as the sole author and himself as the owner. The Copyright Office denied the application, citing its policy that only works authored by humans are eligible for copyright protection.

Dr. Thaler sought review of the Copyright Office&#039;s decision in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The district court affirmed the Copyright Office&#039;s denial, holding that human authorship is a fundamental requirement under the Copyright Act of 1976. The court also rejected Dr. Thaler&#039;s argument that he should own the copyright under the work-made-for-hire doctrine, as the work was never eligible for copyright protection in the first place. Additionally, the court found that Dr. Thaler had waived his argument that he should be considered the author because he created and used the Creativity Machine.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court&#039;s decision. The court held that the Copyright Act requires all eligible works to be authored by a human being. Since Dr. Thaler listed the Creativity Machine, a non-human entity, as the sole author, the application was correctly denied. The court did not address the argument that the Constitution requires human authorship, nor did it consider Dr. Thaler&#039;s claim that he is the author by virtue of creating and using the Creativity Machine, as this argument was waived before the agency. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/23-5233/23-5233-2025-03-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Thaler v. Perlmutter" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A computer scientist, Dr. Stephen Thaler, created an artificial intelligence system called the &quot;Creativity Machine,&quot; which autonomously generated an artwork titled &quot;A Recent Entrance to Paradise.&quot; Dr. Thaler submitted a copyright registration application to the United States Copyright Office, listing the Creativity Machine as the sole author and himself as the owner. The Copyright Office denied the application, citing its policy that only works authored by humans are eligible for copyright protection.

Dr. Thaler sought review of the Copyright Office&#039;s decision in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The district court affirmed the Copyright Office&#039;s denial, holding that human authorship is a fundamental requirement under the Copyright Act of 1976. The court also rejected Dr. Thaler&#039;s argument that he should own the copyright under the work-made-for-hire doctrine, as the work was never eligible for copyright protection in the first place. Additionally, the court found that Dr. Thaler had waived his argument that he should be considered the author because he created and used the Creativity Machine.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court&#039;s decision. The court held that the Copyright Act requires all eligible works to be authored by a human being. Since Dr. Thaler listed the Creativity Machine, a non-human entity, as the sole author, the application was correctly denied. The court did not address the argument that the Constitution requires human authorship, nor did it consider Dr. Thaler&#039;s claim that he is the author by virtue of creating and using the Creativity Machine, as this argument was waived before the agency.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-03-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Patricia Ann Millett</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/23-1729/23-1729-2025-03-03.html</id>
        	<title>Design Gaps, Inc. v. Shelter, LLC</title>
        	<updated>2025-03-03T11:31:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-03-03T11:31:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/23-1729/23-1729-2025-03-03.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Jason and Kacie Highsmith hired Shelter, LLC to manage a home renovation project and later contracted with Design Gaps, Inc. to design and install cabinets and closets. The contracts required arbitration for disputes but did not specify completion dates. Design Gaps failed to meet multiple promised deadlines, leading the Highsmiths to terminate the contracts and hire another company. The Highsmiths shared Design Gaps&#039; copyrighted drawings with the new contractor. They then filed for arbitration, alleging breach of contract and other claims, while Design Gaps counterclaimed for various issues, including copyright infringement.

The arbitrator held a three-day hearing, during which the Highsmiths presented multiple witnesses, while Design Gaps only presented David Glover. The arbitrator found in favor of the Highsmiths, awarding them damages and attorney’s fees, and denied Design Gaps&#039; counterclaims, including the copyright claim, citing fair use and lack of evidence for copyright registration.

Design Gaps petitioned the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina to vacate the arbitration award, arguing the arbitrator disregarded the law and failed to issue a reasoned award. The district court denied the petition and confirmed the arbitration award, also granting the Highsmiths&#039; motion for attorney’s fees.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed the appeal, citing lack of federal jurisdiction based on the precedent set in Friedler v. Stifel, Nicolaus, &amp; Co., which held that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over motions to vacate arbitration awards unless there is an independent basis for federal jurisdiction beyond the Federal Arbitration Act. The court concluded that the petition did not meet this requirement. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/23-1729/23-1729-2025-03-03.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Design Gaps, Inc. v. Shelter, LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Jason and Kacie Highsmith hired Shelter, LLC to manage a home renovation project and later contracted with Design Gaps, Inc. to design and install cabinets and closets. The contracts required arbitration for disputes but did not specify completion dates. Design Gaps failed to meet multiple promised deadlines, leading the Highsmiths to terminate the contracts and hire another company. The Highsmiths shared Design Gaps&#039; copyrighted drawings with the new contractor. They then filed for arbitration, alleging breach of contract and other claims, while Design Gaps counterclaimed for various issues, including copyright infringement.

The arbitrator held a three-day hearing, during which the Highsmiths presented multiple witnesses, while Design Gaps only presented David Glover. The arbitrator found in favor of the Highsmiths, awarding them damages and attorney’s fees, and denied Design Gaps&#039; counterclaims, including the copyright claim, citing fair use and lack of evidence for copyright registration.

Design Gaps petitioned the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina to vacate the arbitration award, arguing the arbitrator disregarded the law and failed to issue a reasoned award. The district court denied the petition and confirmed the arbitration award, also granting the Highsmiths&#039; motion for attorney’s fees.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed the appeal, citing lack of federal jurisdiction based on the precedent set in Friedler v. Stifel, Nicolaus, &amp; Co., which held that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over motions to vacate arbitration awards unless there is an independent basis for federal jurisdiction beyond the Federal Arbitration Act. The court concluded that the petition did not meet this requirement.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-03-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>A. Marvin Quattlebaum Jr.</case:judge>
													<category term="Arbitration &amp; Mediation"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-35704/22-35704-2025-02-03.html</id>
        	<title>AQUARIAN FOUNDATION, INC. V. LOWNDES</title>
        	<updated>2025-02-03T09:00:22-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-02-03T09:00:22-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-35704/22-35704-2025-02-03.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Aquarian Foundation, Inc., a non-profit religious organization, alleged that Bruce Lowndes infringed on its copyrights by uploading spiritual teachings of its late founder, Keith Milton Rhinehart, to various websites. Lowndes claimed he had a license from Rhinehart, granted in 1985, to use the materials. Rhinehart passed away in 1999, bequeathing his estate, including the copyrights, to Aquarian.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted partial summary judgment, confirming that Rhinehart&#039;s copyrights were properly transferred to Aquarian via his will. After a bench trial, the court ruled against Aquarian on its claims of copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and false designation of origin. The court found that Rhinehart created the works as his own, not as works for hire, and that he had validly licensed them to Lowndes. The court also determined that Lowndes did not breach the licensing agreement and that Aquarian could not terminate the license under 17 U.S.C. § 203(a). The court denied attorneys’ fees to both parties.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s findings that Rhinehart’s works were not created as works for hire, that he validly licensed the works to Lowndes, and that Lowndes did not breach the licensing agreement. The court also affirmed the decision not to award Lowndes attorneys’ fees under the Lanham Act. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s determination regarding the termination of the license, holding that Aquarian’s termination letter in May 2021 was effective. The case was remanded for further proceedings to address any infringement that may have occurred after the license termination, as well as the denial of injunctive relief and attorneys’ fees under the Copyright Act. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-35704/22-35704-2025-02-03.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "AQUARIAN FOUNDATION, INC. V. LOWNDES" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Aquarian Foundation, Inc., a non-profit religious organization, alleged that Bruce Lowndes infringed on its copyrights by uploading spiritual teachings of its late founder, Keith Milton Rhinehart, to various websites. Lowndes claimed he had a license from Rhinehart, granted in 1985, to use the materials. Rhinehart passed away in 1999, bequeathing his estate, including the copyrights, to Aquarian.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted partial summary judgment, confirming that Rhinehart&#039;s copyrights were properly transferred to Aquarian via his will. After a bench trial, the court ruled against Aquarian on its claims of copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and false designation of origin. The court found that Rhinehart created the works as his own, not as works for hire, and that he had validly licensed them to Lowndes. The court also determined that Lowndes did not breach the licensing agreement and that Aquarian could not terminate the license under 17 U.S.C. § 203(a). The court denied attorneys’ fees to both parties.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s findings that Rhinehart’s works were not created as works for hire, that he validly licensed the works to Lowndes, and that Lowndes did not breach the licensing agreement. The court also affirmed the decision not to award Lowndes attorneys’ fees under the Lanham Act. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s determination regarding the termination of the license, holding that Aquarian’s termination letter in May 2021 was effective. The case was remanded for further proceedings to address any infringement that may have occurred after the license termination, as well as the denial of injunctive relief and attorneys’ fees under the Copyright Act.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-02-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Margaret McKeown</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Non-Profit Corporations"/>
							<category term="Trademark"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-3707/23-3707-2025-01-14.html</id>
        	<title>TANGLE, INC. V. ARITZIA, INC.</title>
        	<updated>2025-01-14T11:00:39-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-01-14T11:00:39-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-3707/23-3707-2025-01-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Tangle, Inc. holds copyright registrations for seven kinetic and manipulable sculptures made from 17 or 18 identical, connected, 90-degree curved tubular segments that can be twisted or turned 360 degrees. Aritzia, Inc. owns and operates retail stores and used similar sculptures in their store windows. Tangle alleged that Aritzia&#039;s sculptures infringed on their copyrighted works and also claimed trade dress infringement under the Lanham Act.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Tangle&#039;s initial copyright infringement claim for failure to state a claim but allowed Tangle to amend its complaint. Tangle filed an amended complaint, which was again dismissed. Tangle then filed a Second Amended Complaint, adding a trade dress infringement claim. The district court dismissed both claims, giving Tangle leave to amend. Tangle chose not to amend further and instead appealed the dismissal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Tangle’s copyright claim, holding that Tangle adequately alleged valid copyrights in its kinetic and manipulable sculptures. The court found that the sculptures were sufficiently &quot;fixed&quot; in a tangible medium for copyright purposes, despite their ability to move into various poses. The court also held that Tangle plausibly alleged that Aritzia&#039;s sculptures were substantially similar to Tangle&#039;s protected works under the &quot;extrinsic test.&quot;

However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Tangle’s trade dress infringement claim. The court agreed that Tangle failed to provide a complete recitation of the concrete elements of its alleged trade dress, which is necessary to give adequate notice of the asserted trade dress.

The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Ninth Circuit&#039;s opinion. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-3707/23-3707-2025-01-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "TANGLE, INC. V. ARITZIA, INC." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Tangle, Inc. holds copyright registrations for seven kinetic and manipulable sculptures made from 17 or 18 identical, connected, 90-degree curved tubular segments that can be twisted or turned 360 degrees. Aritzia, Inc. owns and operates retail stores and used similar sculptures in their store windows. Tangle alleged that Aritzia&#039;s sculptures infringed on their copyrighted works and also claimed trade dress infringement under the Lanham Act.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Tangle&#039;s initial copyright infringement claim for failure to state a claim but allowed Tangle to amend its complaint. Tangle filed an amended complaint, which was again dismissed. Tangle then filed a Second Amended Complaint, adding a trade dress infringement claim. The district court dismissed both claims, giving Tangle leave to amend. Tangle chose not to amend further and instead appealed the dismissal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Tangle’s copyright claim, holding that Tangle adequately alleged valid copyrights in its kinetic and manipulable sculptures. The court found that the sculptures were sufficiently &quot;fixed&quot; in a tangible medium for copyright purposes, despite their ability to move into various poses. The court also held that Tangle plausibly alleged that Aritzia&#039;s sculptures were substantially similar to Tangle&#039;s protected works under the &quot;extrinsic test.&quot;

However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Tangle’s trade dress infringement claim. The court agreed that Tangle failed to provide a complete recitation of the concrete elements of its alleged trade dress, which is necessary to give adequate notice of the asserted trade dress.

The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Ninth Circuit&#039;s opinion.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-01-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Michael Simon</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Trademark"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/23-3402/23-3402-2025-01-14.html</id>
        	<title>Designworks Homes, Inc. v. Columbia House of Brokers Realty, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2025-01-14T08:30:20-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-01-14T08:30:20-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/23-3402/23-3402-2025-01-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Charles James, a home designer, claimed that real estate agents infringed his copyrights by including floorplans of his homes in resale listings. James designed a home with a triangular atrium and stairs, built six homes using the design, and registered copyrights for the designs. In 2010, agent Susan Horak listed one of these homes for resale, creating a floorplan by hand for the listing. In 2017, agent Jackie Bulgin listed another of James&#039;s homes, using a similar floorplan. James discovered these listings in 2017 and alleged that the floorplans could be used to build homes, potentially infringing his copyrights.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri granted summary judgment to the real estate agents, concluding that their use of the floorplans was fair use. The court also initially ruled in favor of the agents under § 120(a) of the Copyright Act, but this decision was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which remanded the case for further consideration of the fair use defense.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court&#039;s summary judgment in favor of the agents. The court held that the agents&#039; use of the floorplans was fair use, considering the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the portion used, and the effect on the market for the original work. The court found that the agents&#039; use was transformative, had an informational purpose, and did not harm the market for James&#039;s designs. The court also rejected Designworks&#039;s request for further discovery on the fair use issue, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. The court affirmed the district court&#039;s judgments. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/23-3402/23-3402-2025-01-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Designworks Homes, Inc. v. Columbia House of Brokers Realty, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Charles James, a home designer, claimed that real estate agents infringed his copyrights by including floorplans of his homes in resale listings. James designed a home with a triangular atrium and stairs, built six homes using the design, and registered copyrights for the designs. In 2010, agent Susan Horak listed one of these homes for resale, creating a floorplan by hand for the listing. In 2017, agent Jackie Bulgin listed another of James&#039;s homes, using a similar floorplan. James discovered these listings in 2017 and alleged that the floorplans could be used to build homes, potentially infringing his copyrights.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri granted summary judgment to the real estate agents, concluding that their use of the floorplans was fair use. The court also initially ruled in favor of the agents under § 120(a) of the Copyright Act, but this decision was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which remanded the case for further consideration of the fair use defense.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court&#039;s summary judgment in favor of the agents. The court held that the agents&#039; use of the floorplans was fair use, considering the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the portion used, and the effect on the market for the original work. The court found that the agents&#039; use was transformative, had an informational purpose, and did not harm the market for James&#039;s designs. The court also rejected Designworks&#039;s request for further discovery on the fair use issue, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. The court affirmed the district court&#039;s judgments.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-01-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Morris Arnold</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/21-2949/21-2949-2025-01-13.html</id>
        	<title>Capitol Records v. Vimeo</title>
        	<updated>2025-01-13T08:00:13-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-01-13T08:00:13-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/21-2949/21-2949-2025-01-13.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Plaintiffs, rightsholders of musical recordings affiliated with EMI, sued Vimeo, Inc. and Connected Ventures, LLC for copyright infringement, alleging that Vimeo users uploaded videos containing their copyrighted music without authorization. Vimeo claimed protection under the safe harbor provision of Section 512(c) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which shields service providers from liability for user-uploaded infringing content under certain conditions.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of Vimeo, finding that Vimeo was entitled to the DMCA safe harbor. The court concluded that Vimeo did not have actual or red flag knowledge of the infringing content and did not have the right and ability to control the infringing activity in a manner that would disqualify it from the safe harbor.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Vimeo employees did not have red flag knowledge of the infringing content because it was not obvious to an ordinary person without specialized knowledge of music or copyright law that the videos were infringing. The court also found that Vimeo did not exercise substantial influence over user activities to the extent required to lose the safe harbor protection. The court noted that Vimeo&#039;s actions, such as promoting certain videos and banning specific types of content, did not amount to the level of control that would disqualify it from the safe harbor.

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s judgment, holding that Vimeo was entitled to the DMCA safe harbor and dismissing Plaintiffs&#039; claims of copyright infringement. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/21-2949/21-2949-2025-01-13.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Capitol Records v. Vimeo" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Plaintiffs, rightsholders of musical recordings affiliated with EMI, sued Vimeo, Inc. and Connected Ventures, LLC for copyright infringement, alleging that Vimeo users uploaded videos containing their copyrighted music without authorization. Vimeo claimed protection under the safe harbor provision of Section 512(c) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which shields service providers from liability for user-uploaded infringing content under certain conditions.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of Vimeo, finding that Vimeo was entitled to the DMCA safe harbor. The court concluded that Vimeo did not have actual or red flag knowledge of the infringing content and did not have the right and ability to control the infringing activity in a manner that would disqualify it from the safe harbor.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Vimeo employees did not have red flag knowledge of the infringing content because it was not obvious to an ordinary person without specialized knowledge of music or copyright law that the videos were infringing. The court also found that Vimeo did not exercise substantial influence over user activities to the extent required to lose the safe harbor protection. The court noted that Vimeo&#039;s actions, such as promoting certain videos and banning specific types of content, did not amount to the level of control that would disqualify it from the safe harbor.

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s judgment, holding that Vimeo was entitled to the DMCA safe harbor and dismissing Plaintiffs&#039; claims of copyright infringement.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-01-13</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Pierre Leval</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1506/23-1506-2025-01-07.html</id>
        	<title>BITMANAGEMENT SOFTWARE GMBH v. US </title>
        	<updated>2025-01-07T07:01:11-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-01-07T07:01:11-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1506/23-1506-2025-01-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Bitmanagement Software GmBH (&quot;Bitmanagement&quot;) developed software for rendering three-dimensional graphics, specifically &quot;BS Contact Geo,&quot; which was used by the United States Navy (&quot;Navy&quot;) in conjunction with its SPIDERS 3D platform. Initially, Bitmanagement provided the Navy with 100 seat licenses, allowing installation on 100 computers. In 2012, the Navy switched to a floating license, permitting installation on multiple computers but limiting simultaneous users to 20, monitored by a tracking application called Flexera. However, Flexera failed to limit usage, and the software was installed on over 429,000 Navy computers.

The United States Court of Federal Claims initially found no liability for copyright infringement. Bitmanagement appealed, and the Federal Circuit held that the Navy&#039;s failure to use Flexera breached a material condition of the implied license, constituting copyright infringement. The case was remanded to the Court of Federal Claims to calculate damages. On remand, the court awarded Bitmanagement $154,400, based on a hypothetical negotiation for a combination of seat and floating licenses, rather than per-copy damages.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court&#039;s decision. The Federal Circuit held that the Court of Federal Claims did not abuse its discretion in awarding damages based on the Navy&#039;s actual usage of the software rather than the number of copies made. The court found that the hypothetical negotiation would have resulted in a primarily usage-based licensing scheme, supported by the parties&#039; past licensing practices and the evidence presented. The court also upheld the admission of the government&#039;s damages expert&#039;s testimony and found no error in the burden of proof allocation. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1506/23-1506-2025-01-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "BITMANAGEMENT SOFTWARE GMBH v. US " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Bitmanagement Software GmBH (&quot;Bitmanagement&quot;) developed software for rendering three-dimensional graphics, specifically &quot;BS Contact Geo,&quot; which was used by the United States Navy (&quot;Navy&quot;) in conjunction with its SPIDERS 3D platform. Initially, Bitmanagement provided the Navy with 100 seat licenses, allowing installation on 100 computers. In 2012, the Navy switched to a floating license, permitting installation on multiple computers but limiting simultaneous users to 20, monitored by a tracking application called Flexera. However, Flexera failed to limit usage, and the software was installed on over 429,000 Navy computers.

The United States Court of Federal Claims initially found no liability for copyright infringement. Bitmanagement appealed, and the Federal Circuit held that the Navy&#039;s failure to use Flexera breached a material condition of the implied license, constituting copyright infringement. The case was remanded to the Court of Federal Claims to calculate damages. On remand, the court awarded Bitmanagement $154,400, based on a hypothetical negotiation for a combination of seat and floating licenses, rather than per-copy damages.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court&#039;s decision. The Federal Circuit held that the Court of Federal Claims did not abuse its discretion in awarding damages based on the Navy&#039;s actual usage of the software rather than the number of copies made. The court found that the hypothetical negotiation would have resulted in a primarily usage-based licensing scheme, supported by the parties&#039; past licensing practices and the evidence presented. The court also upheld the admission of the government&#039;s damages expert&#039;s testimony and found no error in the burden of proof allocation.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-01-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leonard Stark</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/23-1738/23-1738-2024-12-20.html</id>
        	<title>Sysco Machinery Corp. v. Cymtek Solutions, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2024-12-20T14:00:04-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-12-20T14:00:04-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/23-1738/23-1738-2024-12-20.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Sysco Machinery Corp. (&quot;Sysco&quot;), a Taiwanese company, sued two other Taiwanese companies, Cymtek Solutions, Inc. (&quot;Cymtek&quot;) and Cymmetrik Enterprise Co. Ltd. (&quot;Cymmetrik&quot;), in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Sysco alleged that Cymtek and Cymmetrik infringed its copyrights and misappropriated its trade secrets related to a rotary die-cutting machine developed in Taiwan. The alleged infringing activities occurred in Taiwan, but Sysco claimed that the effects of these activities extended to the United States.

Sysco initially pursued legal action in Taiwan&#039;s Intellectual Property and Commercial Court (IPCC) and obtained a preliminary injunction against Cymtek and its employees. However, the proceedings in Taiwan are ongoing. Sysco then filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, which it voluntarily dismissed. Subsequently, Sysco filed the current lawsuit in the District of Massachusetts, asserting claims of trade secret misappropriation, copyright infringement, unfair and deceptive acts, and tortious interference.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, concluding that Taiwan was a more appropriate forum for the dispute. Sysco appealed the dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

The First Circuit reviewed the district court&#039;s decision for abuse of discretion and affirmed the dismissal. The court held that Taiwan was an adequate alternative forum, as it could exercise jurisdiction over the parties and provide sufficient remedies for the alleged intellectual property violations. The court also found that the private and public interest factors favored litigation in Taiwan, given that the majority of evidence and witnesses were located there, and the alleged infringing activities primarily occurred in Taiwan. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/23-1738/23-1738-2024-12-20.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Sysco Machinery Corp. v. Cymtek Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Sysco Machinery Corp. (&quot;Sysco&quot;), a Taiwanese company, sued two other Taiwanese companies, Cymtek Solutions, Inc. (&quot;Cymtek&quot;) and Cymmetrik Enterprise Co. Ltd. (&quot;Cymmetrik&quot;), in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Sysco alleged that Cymtek and Cymmetrik infringed its copyrights and misappropriated its trade secrets related to a rotary die-cutting machine developed in Taiwan. The alleged infringing activities occurred in Taiwan, but Sysco claimed that the effects of these activities extended to the United States.

Sysco initially pursued legal action in Taiwan&#039;s Intellectual Property and Commercial Court (IPCC) and obtained a preliminary injunction against Cymtek and its employees. However, the proceedings in Taiwan are ongoing. Sysco then filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, which it voluntarily dismissed. Subsequently, Sysco filed the current lawsuit in the District of Massachusetts, asserting claims of trade secret misappropriation, copyright infringement, unfair and deceptive acts, and tortious interference.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, concluding that Taiwan was a more appropriate forum for the dispute. Sysco appealed the dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

The First Circuit reviewed the district court&#039;s decision for abuse of discretion and affirmed the dismissal. The court held that Taiwan was an adequate alternative forum, as it could exercise jurisdiction over the parties and provide sufficient remedies for the alleged intellectual property violations. The court also found that the private and public interest factors favored litigation in Taiwan, given that the majority of evidence and witnesses were located there, and the alleged infringing activities primarily occurred in Taiwan. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-12-20</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>William Kayatta</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-16038/23-16038-2024-12-16.html</id>
        	<title>ORACLE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION V. RIMINI STREET, INC.</title>
        	<updated>2024-12-16T09:00:25-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-12-16T09:00:25-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-16038/23-16038-2024-12-16.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Oracle International Corporation sued Rimini Street, Inc. for copyright infringement and violations of the Lanham Act. Oracle alleged that Rimini, a third-party provider of software support services, infringed on its copyrights by using Oracle&#039;s software in unauthorized ways. Rimini had previously been found to infringe Oracle&#039;s copyrights and had changed its business model, seeking a declaratory judgment that its new processes did not infringe Oracle&#039;s copyrights. Oracle counterclaimed, leading to a bench trial.

The United States District Court for the District of Nevada found that Rimini&#039;s new processes still infringed Oracle&#039;s copyrights and issued a permanent injunction against Rimini. The court ordered Rimini to delete various software files and issue a press release correcting alleged misstatements. Rimini appealed the decision, challenging several aspects of the district court&#039;s rulings.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court&#039;s holding that Rimini created infringing derivative works based solely on interoperability with Oracle&#039;s programs. The court explained that a derivative work must incorporate Oracle&#039;s copyrighted work, either literally or nonliterally. The court also vacated the district court&#039;s ruling striking Rimini&#039;s affirmative defense under 17 U.S.C. § 117(a), which allows the owner of a copy of a computer program to make another copy for certain purposes.

Additionally, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court&#039;s ruling that Rimini&#039;s creation of &quot;gap customer&quot; environments and use of automated tools to deliver PeopleSoft updates constituted copyright infringement. The court also reversed the district court&#039;s ruling that Rimini&#039;s security-related statements, except for one about &quot;holistic security,&quot; constituted false advertising under the Lanham Act. The court vacated the portions of the injunction appealed by Rimini and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-16038/23-16038-2024-12-16.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "ORACLE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION V. RIMINI STREET, INC." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Oracle International Corporation sued Rimini Street, Inc. for copyright infringement and violations of the Lanham Act. Oracle alleged that Rimini, a third-party provider of software support services, infringed on its copyrights by using Oracle&#039;s software in unauthorized ways. Rimini had previously been found to infringe Oracle&#039;s copyrights and had changed its business model, seeking a declaratory judgment that its new processes did not infringe Oracle&#039;s copyrights. Oracle counterclaimed, leading to a bench trial.

The United States District Court for the District of Nevada found that Rimini&#039;s new processes still infringed Oracle&#039;s copyrights and issued a permanent injunction against Rimini. The court ordered Rimini to delete various software files and issue a press release correcting alleged misstatements. Rimini appealed the decision, challenging several aspects of the district court&#039;s rulings.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court&#039;s holding that Rimini created infringing derivative works based solely on interoperability with Oracle&#039;s programs. The court explained that a derivative work must incorporate Oracle&#039;s copyrighted work, either literally or nonliterally. The court also vacated the district court&#039;s ruling striking Rimini&#039;s affirmative defense under 17 U.S.C. § 117(a), which allows the owner of a copy of a computer program to make another copy for certain purposes.

Additionally, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court&#039;s ruling that Rimini&#039;s creation of &quot;gap customer&quot; environments and use of automated tools to deliver PeopleSoft updates constituted copyright infringement. The court also reversed the district court&#039;s ruling that Rimini&#039;s security-related statements, except for one about &quot;holistic security,&quot; constituted false advertising under the Lanham Act. The court vacated the portions of the injunction appealed by Rimini and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-12-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Patrick J. Bumatay</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Trademark"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-905/23-905-2024-11-01.html</id>
        	<title>Structured Asset Sales, LLC v. Sheeran</title>
        	<updated>2024-11-01T06:30:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-11-01T06:30:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-905/23-905-2024-11-01.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In 2014, Ed Sheeran and Amy Wadge wrote the song &quot;Thinking Out Loud,&quot; which became a global hit. Structured Asset Sales, LLC (SAS), which owns a portion of the royalties for Marvin Gaye&#039;s 1973 song &quot;Let’s Get It On,&quot; alleged that Sheeran&#039;s song infringed on the copyright of Gaye&#039;s song. SAS claimed that the chord progression and syncopated harmonic rhythm in &quot;Thinking Out Loud&quot; were copied from &quot;Let’s Get It On.&quot;

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York initially denied Sheeran&#039;s motion for summary judgment but later granted it upon reconsideration. The court concluded that the combination of the chord progression and harmonic rhythm in &quot;Let’s Get It On&quot; was too commonplace to warrant copyright protection. The court also excluded evidence and expert testimony related to musical elements not present in the sheet music deposited with the Copyright Office in 1973, which defined the scope of the copyright under the Copyright Act of 1909.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court&#039;s judgment. The appellate court agreed that the scope of the copyright was limited to the elements in the deposited sheet music and that the combination of the chord progression and harmonic rhythm was not original enough to be protectable. The court also found that no reasonable jury could find the two songs substantially similar as a whole, given their different melodies and lyrics. Thus, the court held that Sheeran did not infringe on the copyright of &quot;Let’s Get It On&quot; and affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Sheeran. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-905/23-905-2024-11-01.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Structured Asset Sales, LLC v. Sheeran" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In 2014, Ed Sheeran and Amy Wadge wrote the song &quot;Thinking Out Loud,&quot; which became a global hit. Structured Asset Sales, LLC (SAS), which owns a portion of the royalties for Marvin Gaye&#039;s 1973 song &quot;Let’s Get It On,&quot; alleged that Sheeran&#039;s song infringed on the copyright of Gaye&#039;s song. SAS claimed that the chord progression and syncopated harmonic rhythm in &quot;Thinking Out Loud&quot; were copied from &quot;Let’s Get It On.&quot;

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York initially denied Sheeran&#039;s motion for summary judgment but later granted it upon reconsideration. The court concluded that the combination of the chord progression and harmonic rhythm in &quot;Let’s Get It On&quot; was too commonplace to warrant copyright protection. The court also excluded evidence and expert testimony related to musical elements not present in the sheet music deposited with the Copyright Office in 1973, which defined the scope of the copyright under the Copyright Act of 1909.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court&#039;s judgment. The appellate court agreed that the scope of the copyright was limited to the elements in the deposited sheet music and that the combination of the chord progression and harmonic rhythm was not original enough to be protectable. The court also found that no reasonable jury could find the two songs substantially similar as a whole, given their different melodies and lyrics. Thus, the court held that Sheeran did not infringe on the copyright of &quot;Let’s Get It On&quot; and affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Sheeran.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-11-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>PARK</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-50162/23-50162-2024-10-09.html</id>
        	<title>UMG Recordings v. Grande Communications Networks, LLC</title>
        	<updated>2024-10-09T15:30:19-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-10-09T15:30:19-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-50162/23-50162-2024-10-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A group of major record labels sued Grande Communications Networks, LLC, an internet service provider, for contributory copyright infringement. The plaintiffs alleged that Grande knowingly provided internet services to subscribers who used them to infringe on the plaintiffs&#039; copyrighted works. The plaintiffs presented evidence that Grande received over 1.3 million infringement notices from Rightscorp, a company that identifies infringing activity on peer-to-peer networks, but Grande did not terminate or take action against repeat infringers. Instead, Grande continued to provide internet services to these subscribers, despite knowing about their infringing activities.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas held a three-week jury trial. The jury found Grande liable for willful contributory copyright infringement and awarded the plaintiffs $46,766,200 in statutory damages. Grande moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on the issue of liability and for a new trial on damages, but the district court denied these motions. Grande then appealed, challenging the district court&#039;s rulings on its JMOL motion, the jury instructions, and the final judgment. The plaintiffs filed a conditional cross-appeal regarding a jury instruction.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the jury&#039;s verdict, finding that the plaintiffs had provided sufficient evidence to support the jury&#039;s finding of contributory copyright infringement. The court concluded that Grande had knowledge of its subscribers&#039; infringing activities and materially contributed to the infringement by continuing to provide internet services without taking basic measures to prevent further damage. However, the court found that the district court erred in awarding statutory damages for each individual song rather than for each album, as the Copyright Act treats all parts of a compilation as one work for statutory damages purposes. Consequently, the court vacated the damages award and remanded the case for a new trial on damages. The plaintiffs&#039; conditional cross-appeal was dismissed as moot. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-50162/23-50162-2024-10-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "UMG Recordings v. Grande Communications Networks, LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A group of major record labels sued Grande Communications Networks, LLC, an internet service provider, for contributory copyright infringement. The plaintiffs alleged that Grande knowingly provided internet services to subscribers who used them to infringe on the plaintiffs&#039; copyrighted works. The plaintiffs presented evidence that Grande received over 1.3 million infringement notices from Rightscorp, a company that identifies infringing activity on peer-to-peer networks, but Grande did not terminate or take action against repeat infringers. Instead, Grande continued to provide internet services to these subscribers, despite knowing about their infringing activities.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas held a three-week jury trial. The jury found Grande liable for willful contributory copyright infringement and awarded the plaintiffs $46,766,200 in statutory damages. Grande moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on the issue of liability and for a new trial on damages, but the district court denied these motions. Grande then appealed, challenging the district court&#039;s rulings on its JMOL motion, the jury instructions, and the final judgment. The plaintiffs filed a conditional cross-appeal regarding a jury instruction.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the jury&#039;s verdict, finding that the plaintiffs had provided sufficient evidence to support the jury&#039;s finding of contributory copyright infringement. The court concluded that Grande had knowledge of its subscribers&#039; infringing activities and materially contributed to the infringement by continuing to provide internet services without taking basic measures to prevent further damage. However, the court found that the district court erred in awarding statutory damages for each individual song rather than for each album, as the Copyright Act treats all parts of a compilation as one work for statutory damages purposes. Consequently, the court vacated the damages award and remanded the case for a new trial on damages. The plaintiffs&#039; conditional cross-appeal was dismissed as moot.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-10-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Andrew Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Communications Law"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Internet Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-20188/23-20188-2024-09-18.html</id>
        	<title>Keck v. Mix Creative Learning Center</title>
        	<updated>2024-09-18T15:30:14-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-09-18T15:30:14-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-20188/23-20188-2024-09-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In 2020, Mix Creative Learning Center, an art studio offering children&#039;s art lessons, began selling online art kits during the pandemic. These kits included reproductions of artworks from Michel Keck&#039;s Dog Art series. Keck sued Mix Creative and its proprietor for copyright and trademark infringement, seeking enhanced statutory damages for willful infringement.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas found that the fair use defense applied to the copyright claim and granted summary judgment to Mix Creative. The court also granted summary judgment on the trademark claim, even though Mix Creative had not sought it. Following this, the district court awarded fees and costs to Mix Creative under 17 U.S.C. § 505 but declined to hold Keck’s trial counsel jointly and severally liable for the fee award under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court&#039;s judgment. The appellate court held that the fair use defense applied because Mix Creative’s use was transformative and unlikely to harm the market for Keck’s works. The court also found that any error in the district court’s sua sponte grant of summary judgment on the trademark claim was harmless, given the parties&#039; concession that the arguments for the copyright claim applied to the trademark claim. Lastly, the appellate court ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees to Mix Creative or in refusing to hold Keck’s attorneys jointly and severally liable for the fee award. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-20188/23-20188-2024-09-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Keck v. Mix Creative Learning Center" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In 2020, Mix Creative Learning Center, an art studio offering children&#039;s art lessons, began selling online art kits during the pandemic. These kits included reproductions of artworks from Michel Keck&#039;s Dog Art series. Keck sued Mix Creative and its proprietor for copyright and trademark infringement, seeking enhanced statutory damages for willful infringement.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas found that the fair use defense applied to the copyright claim and granted summary judgment to Mix Creative. The court also granted summary judgment on the trademark claim, even though Mix Creative had not sought it. Following this, the district court awarded fees and costs to Mix Creative under 17 U.S.C. § 505 but declined to hold Keck’s trial counsel jointly and severally liable for the fee award under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court&#039;s judgment. The appellate court held that the fair use defense applied because Mix Creative’s use was transformative and unlikely to harm the market for Keck’s works. The court also found that any error in the district court’s sua sponte grant of summary judgment on the trademark claim was harmless, given the parties&#039; concession that the arguments for the copyright claim applied to the trademark claim. Lastly, the appellate court ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees to Mix Creative or in refusing to hold Keck’s attorneys jointly and severally liable for the fee award.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-09-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Edith H. Jones</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Legal Ethics"/>
							<category term="Professional Malpractice &amp; Ethics"/>
							<category term="Trademark"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-1260/23-1260-2024-09-04.html</id>
        	<title>Hachette Book Group, Inc. v. Internet Archive</title>
        	<updated>2024-09-04T07:00:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-09-04T07:00:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-1260/23-1260-2024-09-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves Internet Archive (IA), a nonprofit organization that creates digital copies of print books and makes them available online for free through its &quot;Free Digital Library.&quot; IA maintains a one-to-one owned-to-loaned ratio, meaning it only allows as many digital checkouts as it has physical copies. In 2020, four major book publishers sued IA, alleging that its practices infringed their copyrights on 127 books. IA claimed its actions were protected under the fair use doctrine of the Copyright Act.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the publishers, rejecting IA&#039;s fair use defense. The court found that IA&#039;s use of the books was non-transformative, commercial in nature, and that it usurped the market for the publishers&#039; eBooks, causing market harm.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that IA&#039;s use of the books was not transformative because it did not add new expression, meaning, or message to the original works. Instead, it served the same purpose as the originals, making them available to read. The court also found that IA&#039;s use was commercial, as it solicited donations and had a partnership with Better World Books, which provided some financial benefit. The court concluded that IA&#039;s practices harmed the publishers&#039; market for eBooks and print books, as IA&#039;s free digital copies served as a substitute for the originals.

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s decision, holding that IA&#039;s Free Digital Library did not qualify as fair use under the Copyright Act. The court emphasized that allowing such widespread copying and distribution without compensation would undermine the incentives for authors to create new works. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-1260/23-1260-2024-09-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Hachette Book Group, Inc. v. Internet Archive" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves Internet Archive (IA), a nonprofit organization that creates digital copies of print books and makes them available online for free through its &quot;Free Digital Library.&quot; IA maintains a one-to-one owned-to-loaned ratio, meaning it only allows as many digital checkouts as it has physical copies. In 2020, four major book publishers sued IA, alleging that its practices infringed their copyrights on 127 books. IA claimed its actions were protected under the fair use doctrine of the Copyright Act.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the publishers, rejecting IA&#039;s fair use defense. The court found that IA&#039;s use of the books was non-transformative, commercial in nature, and that it usurped the market for the publishers&#039; eBooks, causing market harm.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that IA&#039;s use of the books was not transformative because it did not add new expression, meaning, or message to the original works. Instead, it served the same purpose as the originals, making them available to read. The court also found that IA&#039;s use was commercial, as it solicited donations and had a partnership with Better World Books, which provided some financial benefit. The court concluded that IA&#039;s practices harmed the publishers&#039; market for eBooks and print books, as IA&#039;s free digital copies served as a substitute for the originals.

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s decision, holding that IA&#039;s Free Digital Library did not qualify as fair use under the Copyright Act. The court emphasized that allowing such widespread copying and distribution without compensation would undermine the incentives for authors to create new works.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-09-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Robinson</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/21-1571/21-1571-2024-08-29.html</id>
        	<title>American Board of Internal Medicine v. Salas-Rushford</title>
        	<updated>2024-08-29T12:00:03-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-08-29T12:00:03-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/21-1571/21-1571-2024-08-29.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A physician in Puerto Rico, Dr. Jaime Salas Rushford, had his board certification suspended by the American Board of Internal Medicine (ABIM) after ABIM concluded that he had improperly shared board exam questions with his test prep instructor. ABIM sued Salas Rushford for copyright infringement in New Jersey. Salas Rushford counterclaimed against ABIM and several ABIM-affiliated individuals, alleging that the process leading to his suspension was a &quot;sham.&quot;

The counterclaims were transferred to the District of Puerto Rico, where the district court granted ABIM&#039;s motion for judgment on the pleadings and denied Salas Rushford leave to amend his pleading. The court found that Salas Rushford failed to state a claim for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and tort claims against the ABIM Individuals. The court also dismissed his Lanham Act claim for commercial disparagement.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court&#039;s dismissal of Salas Rushford&#039;s claims. It held that ABIM had broad discretion under its policies to revoke certification if a diplomate failed to maintain satisfactory ethical and professional behavior. The court found that Salas Rushford did not plausibly allege that ABIM acted with bad motive or ill intention, which is necessary to state a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under New Jersey law.

The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Lanham Act claim, noting that Salas Rushford failed to allege actual consumer deception or intentional deception, which is required to state a claim for false advertising. Finally, the court upheld the district court&#039;s denial of leave to amend the complaint, citing undue delay and lack of a concrete argument for why justice required an amendment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/21-1571/21-1571-2024-08-29.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "American Board of Internal Medicine v. Salas-Rushford" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A physician in Puerto Rico, Dr. Jaime Salas Rushford, had his board certification suspended by the American Board of Internal Medicine (ABIM) after ABIM concluded that he had improperly shared board exam questions with his test prep instructor. ABIM sued Salas Rushford for copyright infringement in New Jersey. Salas Rushford counterclaimed against ABIM and several ABIM-affiliated individuals, alleging that the process leading to his suspension was a &quot;sham.&quot;

The counterclaims were transferred to the District of Puerto Rico, where the district court granted ABIM&#039;s motion for judgment on the pleadings and denied Salas Rushford leave to amend his pleading. The court found that Salas Rushford failed to state a claim for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and tort claims against the ABIM Individuals. The court also dismissed his Lanham Act claim for commercial disparagement.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court&#039;s dismissal of Salas Rushford&#039;s claims. It held that ABIM had broad discretion under its policies to revoke certification if a diplomate failed to maintain satisfactory ethical and professional behavior. The court found that Salas Rushford did not plausibly allege that ABIM acted with bad motive or ill intention, which is necessary to state a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under New Jersey law.

The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Lanham Act claim, noting that Salas Rushford failed to allege actual consumer deception or intentional deception, which is required to state a claim for false advertising. Finally, the court upheld the district court&#039;s denial of leave to amend the complaint, citing undue delay and lack of a concrete argument for why justice required an amendment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-08-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kermit Victor Lipez</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Trademark"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/23-3200/23-3200-2024-08-28.html</id>
        	<title>Yash Venture Holdings, LLC v. Moca Financial, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2024-08-28T10:00:20-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-08-28T10:00:20-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/23-3200/23-3200-2024-08-28.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In 2018, John Burns and Rajeev Arora, representing Moca Financial Inc., engaged in discussions with Manoj Baheti, represented by Yash Venture Holdings, LLC, about a potential investment. The alleged agreement was that Yash would provide $600,000 worth of software development in exchange for a 15% non-dilutable ownership interest in Moca. However, subsequent documents and communications indicated ongoing negotiations and changes in terms, including a reduction of Yash&#039;s proposed stake and a shift from software development to a cash investment. Yash eventually refused to sign the final documents, leading to the current litigation.

The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois dismissed most of Yash&#039;s claims, including breach of contract, fraud, and securities fraud, but allowed the equitable estoppel and copyright infringement claims to proceed. Yash later voluntarily dismissed the remaining claims, and the district court entered final judgment, prompting Yash to appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found that Yash did not adequately allege the existence of an enforceable contract, as there was no meeting of the minds on the material term of whether the ownership interest was non-dilutable. Consequently, the breach of contract claim failed. Similarly, the promissory estoppel claim failed due to the lack of an unambiguous promise. The fraud and securities fraud claims were also dismissed because they relied on the existence of a non-dilutable ownership interest, which was not sufficiently alleged. Lastly, the breach of fiduciary duty claims failed as there was no enforceable stock subscription agreement to establish a fiduciary duty. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/23-3200/23-3200-2024-08-28.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Yash Venture Holdings, LLC v. Moca Financial, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In 2018, John Burns and Rajeev Arora, representing Moca Financial Inc., engaged in discussions with Manoj Baheti, represented by Yash Venture Holdings, LLC, about a potential investment. The alleged agreement was that Yash would provide $600,000 worth of software development in exchange for a 15% non-dilutable ownership interest in Moca. However, subsequent documents and communications indicated ongoing negotiations and changes in terms, including a reduction of Yash&#039;s proposed stake and a shift from software development to a cash investment. Yash eventually refused to sign the final documents, leading to the current litigation.

The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois dismissed most of Yash&#039;s claims, including breach of contract, fraud, and securities fraud, but allowed the equitable estoppel and copyright infringement claims to proceed. Yash later voluntarily dismissed the remaining claims, and the district court entered final judgment, prompting Yash to appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found that Yash did not adequately allege the existence of an enforceable contract, as there was no meeting of the minds on the material term of whether the ownership interest was non-dilutable. Consequently, the breach of contract claim failed. Similarly, the promissory estoppel claim failed due to the lack of an unambiguous promise. The fraud and securities fraud claims were also dismissed because they relied on the existence of a non-dilutable ownership interest, which was not sufficiently alleged. Lastly, the breach of fiduciary duty claims failed as there was no enforceable stock subscription agreement to establish a fiduciary duty. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-08-28</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>KOLAR</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-1078/23-1078-2024-08-16.html</id>
        	<title>Michael Grecco Prods., Inc. v. RADesign, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2024-08-16T06:30:10-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-08-16T06:30:10-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-1078/23-1078-2024-08-16.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Michael Grecco Productions, Inc. (MGP) sued Ruthie Allyn Davis and associated entities for copyright infringement, alleging that Davis used Michael Grecco’s copyrighted photos without a license. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed MGP’s complaint, reasoning that MGP, being a sophisticated plaintiff in detecting and litigating infringements, should have discovered the alleged infringement within three years of its occurrence. The district court concluded that MGP’s claims were time-barred by the Copyright Act’s three-year limitations provision.

The district court’s decision was based on the premise that sophisticated plaintiffs cannot benefit from the discovery rule, which determines when a claim accrues. The court held that MGP’s sophistication in detecting infringements meant it should have discovered the alleged infringement within three years of its occurrence. Consequently, the court dismissed the complaint as time-barred, offering MGP the opportunity to amend the complaint to allege a separately occurring act of infringement within the limitations period, which MGP declined.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court’s application of the discovery rule. The appellate court held that the discovery rule, not the injury rule, determines when a copyright infringement claim accrues, regardless of the plaintiff’s sophistication. The court emphasized that there is no “sophisticated plaintiff” exception to the discovery rule or to a defendant’s burden to plead and prove a statute-of-limitations defense. The appellate court found that it was not clear from the face of the complaint that MGP’s claims were time-barred and vacated the district court’s dismissal, remanding the case for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-1078/23-1078-2024-08-16.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Michael Grecco Prods., Inc. v. RADesign, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Michael Grecco Productions, Inc. (MGP) sued Ruthie Allyn Davis and associated entities for copyright infringement, alleging that Davis used Michael Grecco’s copyrighted photos without a license. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed MGP’s complaint, reasoning that MGP, being a sophisticated plaintiff in detecting and litigating infringements, should have discovered the alleged infringement within three years of its occurrence. The district court concluded that MGP’s claims were time-barred by the Copyright Act’s three-year limitations provision.

The district court’s decision was based on the premise that sophisticated plaintiffs cannot benefit from the discovery rule, which determines when a claim accrues. The court held that MGP’s sophistication in detecting infringements meant it should have discovered the alleged infringement within three years of its occurrence. Consequently, the court dismissed the complaint as time-barred, offering MGP the opportunity to amend the complaint to allege a separately occurring act of infringement within the limitations period, which MGP declined.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court’s application of the discovery rule. The appellate court held that the discovery rule, not the injury rule, determines when a copyright infringement claim accrues, regardless of the plaintiff’s sophistication. The court emphasized that there is no “sophisticated plaintiff” exception to the discovery rule or to a defendant’s burden to plead and prove a statute-of-limitations defense. The appellate court found that it was not clear from the face of the complaint that MGP’s claims were time-barred and vacated the district court’s dismissal, remanding the case for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-08-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard C. Wesley</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/23-5159/23-5159-2024-08-02.html</id>
        	<title>Matthew Green v. DOJ</title>
        	<updated>2024-08-02T06:31:49-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-08-02T06:31:49-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/23-5159/23-5159-2024-08-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A computer science professor and a tech inventor challenged the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), arguing that its provisions against circumventing technological protections on copyrighted works and distributing circumvention tools violate the First Amendment. They claimed these provisions unduly stifle fair use of copyrighted works, which they argued is protected speech. The plaintiffs sought to invalidate these provisions as facially overbroad and a prior restraint on speech.

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the plaintiffs&#039; facial First Amendment challenges and their Administrative Procedure Act claims but allowed their as-applied First Amendment claims to proceed. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to show that the DMCA&#039;s impact on third-party free speech interests was different from its impact on their own. The court also held that the triennial rulemaking process for exemptions did not constitute content-based censorship. The plaintiffs&#039; as-applied claims were later dismissed after the Librarian of Congress granted an exemption for the professor&#039;s security research, and the court found that the tech inventor&#039;s proposed device would likely lead to widespread piracy.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s dismissal of the facial challenges. The court held that the DMCA&#039;s anticircumvention and antitrafficking provisions are not facially overbroad because they regulate conduct, not speech, and their legitimate applications, such as preventing digital piracy, far outweigh any potential unconstitutional applications. The court also rejected the argument that the triennial rulemaking process constitutes a prior restraint on speech, noting that the DMCA does not target expression and that alternative avenues for lawful access to copyrighted works remain available. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/23-5159/23-5159-2024-08-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Matthew Green v. DOJ" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A computer science professor and a tech inventor challenged the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), arguing that its provisions against circumventing technological protections on copyrighted works and distributing circumvention tools violate the First Amendment. They claimed these provisions unduly stifle fair use of copyrighted works, which they argued is protected speech. The plaintiffs sought to invalidate these provisions as facially overbroad and a prior restraint on speech.

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the plaintiffs&#039; facial First Amendment challenges and their Administrative Procedure Act claims but allowed their as-applied First Amendment claims to proceed. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to show that the DMCA&#039;s impact on third-party free speech interests was different from its impact on their own. The court also held that the triennial rulemaking process for exemptions did not constitute content-based censorship. The plaintiffs&#039; as-applied claims were later dismissed after the Librarian of Congress granted an exemption for the professor&#039;s security research, and the court found that the tech inventor&#039;s proposed device would likely lead to widespread piracy.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s dismissal of the facial challenges. The court held that the DMCA&#039;s anticircumvention and antitrafficking provisions are not facially overbroad because they regulate conduct, not speech, and their legitimate applications, such as preventing digital piracy, far outweigh any potential unconstitutional applications. The court also rejected the argument that the triennial rulemaking process constitutes a prior restraint on speech, noting that the DMCA does not target expression and that alternative avenues for lawful access to copyrighted works remain available.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-08-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>PILLARD</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/21-14071/21-14071-2024-08-01.html</id>
        	<title>Compulife Software Inc. v. Moses Newman</title>
        	<updated>2024-08-01T06:00:48-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-08-01T06:00:48-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/21-14071/21-14071-2024-08-01.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Compulife Software, Inc. created software to generate life insurance quotes using a proprietary database of insurance rates. The defendants, Moses Newman, Aaron Levy, Binyomin Rutstein, and David Rutstein, were accused of copying Compulife’s software code and misappropriating its trade secret by scraping its database to use on their own websites. Compulife alleged that this led to a decline in its sales and revenue.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially ruled against Compulife on the copyright infringement claim but in favor of Compulife on the trade secret misappropriation claim. The court found that the defendants had not infringed on Compulife’s copyright because the copied elements were not protectable. However, it concluded that the defendants had misappropriated Compulife’s trade secret by acquiring the database through improper means, specifically scraping. The court awarded Compulife compensatory and punitive damages and held the defendants jointly and severally liable.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It found that the district court erred by not considering the arrangement of Compulife’s code as a potentially protectable element under copyright law. The appellate court reversed the district court’s ruling on the copyright claim and remanded for further fact-finding on whether the arrangement of the code was protectable. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s ruling on the trade secret misappropriation claim, agreeing that the defendants had used improper means to acquire the trade secret. It also upheld the joint and several liability for the defendants, noting that this is standard for trade secret claims under Florida law. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/21-14071/21-14071-2024-08-01.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Compulife Software Inc. v. Moses Newman" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Compulife Software, Inc. created software to generate life insurance quotes using a proprietary database of insurance rates. The defendants, Moses Newman, Aaron Levy, Binyomin Rutstein, and David Rutstein, were accused of copying Compulife’s software code and misappropriating its trade secret by scraping its database to use on their own websites. Compulife alleged that this led to a decline in its sales and revenue.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially ruled against Compulife on the copyright infringement claim but in favor of Compulife on the trade secret misappropriation claim. The court found that the defendants had not infringed on Compulife’s copyright because the copied elements were not protectable. However, it concluded that the defendants had misappropriated Compulife’s trade secret by acquiring the database through improper means, specifically scraping. The court awarded Compulife compensatory and punitive damages and held the defendants jointly and severally liable.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It found that the district court erred by not considering the arrangement of Compulife’s code as a potentially protectable element under copyright law. The appellate court reversed the district court’s ruling on the copyright claim and remanded for further fact-finding on whether the arrangement of the code was protectable. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s ruling on the trade secret misappropriation claim, agreeing that the defendants had used improper means to acquire the trade secret. It also upheld the joint and several liability for the defendants, noting that this is standard for trade secret claims under Florida law. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-08-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Brasher</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/21-1645/21-1645-2024-07-30.html</id>
        	<title>D&#039;Pergo Custom Guitars, Inc. v. Sweetwater Sound, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2024-07-30T14:00:03-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-07-30T14:00:03-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/21-1645/21-1645-2024-07-30.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		D&#039;Pergo Custom Guitars, Inc. sued Sweetwater Sound, Inc. for using a photo of D&#039;Pergo&#039;s guitar necks on Sweetwater&#039;s website. D&#039;Pergo claimed copyright infringement under the Copyright Act, trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, and a violation of the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act (CPA). The district court granted summary judgment to Sweetwater on the trademark claim and to D&#039;Pergo on the copyright claim. A bench trial found in favor of Sweetwater on the CPA claim, and a jury awarded D&#039;Pergo approximately $75,000 in compensatory damages for the copyright claim but did not award any of Sweetwater&#039;s profits.

D&#039;Pergo appealed the district court&#039;s summary judgment on the trademark claim and the bench trial ruling on the CPA claim. D&#039;Pergo also argued that erroneous jury instructions warranted a reversal of the jury&#039;s finding that it was not entitled to recover any of Sweetwater&#039;s profits. Sweetwater cross-appealed, challenging the copyright damages based on what it claimed was inadmissible expert testimony.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s ruling in favor of Sweetwater on the CPA claim, finding that Sweetwater did not act with the intent required for a CPA violation. However, the court reversed the district court&#039;s grant of summary judgment to Sweetwater on the trademark claim, concluding that D&#039;Pergo&#039;s evidence created a genuine issue of fact regarding the trademark&#039;s secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion.

The court also remanded for a new jury trial on the issue of infringing profits for the copyright claim, finding that the district court&#039;s jury instruction on the burden of proof for infringing profits overstated D&#039;Pergo&#039;s burden. The court affirmed the district court&#039;s refusal to give D&#039;Pergo&#039;s proposed &quot;commingling&quot; instruction and upheld the actual damages awarded to D&#039;Pergo, rejecting Sweetwater&#039;s challenge to the admissibility of the expert testimony. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/21-1645/21-1645-2024-07-30.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "D&#039;Pergo Custom Guitars, Inc. v. Sweetwater Sound, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                D&#039;Pergo Custom Guitars, Inc. sued Sweetwater Sound, Inc. for using a photo of D&#039;Pergo&#039;s guitar necks on Sweetwater&#039;s website. D&#039;Pergo claimed copyright infringement under the Copyright Act, trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, and a violation of the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act (CPA). The district court granted summary judgment to Sweetwater on the trademark claim and to D&#039;Pergo on the copyright claim. A bench trial found in favor of Sweetwater on the CPA claim, and a jury awarded D&#039;Pergo approximately $75,000 in compensatory damages for the copyright claim but did not award any of Sweetwater&#039;s profits.

D&#039;Pergo appealed the district court&#039;s summary judgment on the trademark claim and the bench trial ruling on the CPA claim. D&#039;Pergo also argued that erroneous jury instructions warranted a reversal of the jury&#039;s finding that it was not entitled to recover any of Sweetwater&#039;s profits. Sweetwater cross-appealed, challenging the copyright damages based on what it claimed was inadmissible expert testimony.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s ruling in favor of Sweetwater on the CPA claim, finding that Sweetwater did not act with the intent required for a CPA violation. However, the court reversed the district court&#039;s grant of summary judgment to Sweetwater on the trademark claim, concluding that D&#039;Pergo&#039;s evidence created a genuine issue of fact regarding the trademark&#039;s secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion.

The court also remanded for a new jury trial on the issue of infringing profits for the copyright claim, finding that the district court&#039;s jury instruction on the burden of proof for infringing profits overstated D&#039;Pergo&#039;s burden. The court affirmed the district court&#039;s refusal to give D&#039;Pergo&#039;s proposed &quot;commingling&quot; instruction and upheld the actual damages awarded to D&#039;Pergo, rejecting Sweetwater&#039;s challenge to the admissibility of the expert testimony.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-07-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>HOWARD</case:judge>
													<category term="Consumer Law"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Trademark"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/23-12563/23-12563-2024-07-30.html</id>
        	<title>Affordable Aerial Photography, Inc. v. Property Matters USA, LLC</title>
        	<updated>2024-07-30T06:00:51-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-07-30T06:00:51-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/23-12563/23-12563-2024-07-30.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Affordable Aerial Photography, Inc. (AAP) filed a copyright infringement lawsuit against Property Matters USA, LLC (Property Matters) and Home Junction Inc. (Home Junction) in the Southern District of Florida. AAP alleged that Property Matters used a copyrighted aerial photograph on its website without permission. The photograph, created by AAP in 2010, was registered with the Register of Copyrights in 2018. Property Matters moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the statute of limitations had expired. Before the court ruled on the motion, AAP voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i).

The district court denied Property Matters&#039; motion for attorney’s fees under 17 U.S.C. § 505, concluding that Property Matters was not the prevailing party because the voluntary dismissal did not materially alter the legal relationship between the parties. The court applied the discovery rule, determining that AAP discovered the alleged infringement in February 2022, making the claim timely.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that a defendant is not the prevailing party under § 505 when a plaintiff’s action is voluntarily dismissed without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i). The court emphasized that prevailing-party status requires a judicial rejection of the plaintiff’s claim, which did not occur in this case. Therefore, Property Matters was not entitled to attorney’s fees. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/23-12563/23-12563-2024-07-30.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Affordable Aerial Photography, Inc. v. Property Matters USA, LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Affordable Aerial Photography, Inc. (AAP) filed a copyright infringement lawsuit against Property Matters USA, LLC (Property Matters) and Home Junction Inc. (Home Junction) in the Southern District of Florida. AAP alleged that Property Matters used a copyrighted aerial photograph on its website without permission. The photograph, created by AAP in 2010, was registered with the Register of Copyrights in 2018. Property Matters moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the statute of limitations had expired. Before the court ruled on the motion, AAP voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i).

The district court denied Property Matters&#039; motion for attorney’s fees under 17 U.S.C. § 505, concluding that Property Matters was not the prevailing party because the voluntary dismissal did not materially alter the legal relationship between the parties. The court applied the discovery rule, determining that AAP discovered the alleged infringement in February 2022, making the claim timely.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that a defendant is not the prevailing party under § 505 when a plaintiff’s action is voluntarily dismissed without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i). The court emphasized that prevailing-party status requires a judicial rejection of the plaintiff’s claim, which did not occur in this case. Therefore, Property Matters was not entitled to attorney’s fees.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-07-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Lagoa</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-50081/23-50081-2024-07-16.html</id>
        	<title>Canadian Standards Association v. P.S. Knight Company Limited</title>
        	<updated>2024-07-16T09:30:43-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-07-16T09:30:43-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-50081/23-50081-2024-07-16.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves the Canadian Standards Association (CSA), a Canadian not-for-profit corporation that holds Canadian copyrights for various model codes. CSA alleged that P.S. Knight Company, Limited, PS Knight Americas, Incorporated, and Gordon Knight (collectively, Knight) infringed its copyrights by selling competing versions of CSA’s codes. These codes had been incorporated by reference into Canadian statutes and regulations. Knight argued that his actions were permissible under U.S. copyright law, as the codes had become &quot;the law&quot; of Canada.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas found in favor of CSA, granting its motion for summary judgment and issuing a permanent injunction against Knight. The district court held that Knight&#039;s copying of CSA’s codes constituted copyright infringement and declared Knight’s U.S. copyright registration invalid. Knight appealed the decision, arguing that the district court improperly applied the law.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found that the district court had improperly applied the holding of Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc., which states that once model codes are enacted into law, they become &quot;the law&quot; and may be reproduced or distributed as such. The Fifth Circuit held that because CSA’s model codes had been incorporated into Canadian law, Knight’s copying of those codes did not constitute copyright infringement under U.S. law.

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment decisions, vacated the grant of injunctive relief, and remanded the case with instructions to grant summary judgment in favor of Knight and to dismiss CSA’s copyright infringement claim. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-50081/23-50081-2024-07-16.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Canadian Standards Association v. P.S. Knight Company Limited" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves the Canadian Standards Association (CSA), a Canadian not-for-profit corporation that holds Canadian copyrights for various model codes. CSA alleged that P.S. Knight Company, Limited, PS Knight Americas, Incorporated, and Gordon Knight (collectively, Knight) infringed its copyrights by selling competing versions of CSA’s codes. These codes had been incorporated by reference into Canadian statutes and regulations. Knight argued that his actions were permissible under U.S. copyright law, as the codes had become &quot;the law&quot; of Canada.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas found in favor of CSA, granting its motion for summary judgment and issuing a permanent injunction against Knight. The district court held that Knight&#039;s copying of CSA’s codes constituted copyright infringement and declared Knight’s U.S. copyright registration invalid. Knight appealed the decision, arguing that the district court improperly applied the law.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found that the district court had improperly applied the holding of Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc., which states that once model codes are enacted into law, they become &quot;the law&quot; and may be reproduced or distributed as such. The Fifth Circuit held that because CSA’s model codes had been incorporated into Canadian law, Knight’s copying of those codes did not constitute copyright infringement under U.S. law.

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment decisions, vacated the grant of injunctive relief, and remanded the case with instructions to grant summary judgment in favor of Knight and to dismiss CSA’s copyright infringement claim.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-07-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>King</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/22-2413/22-2413-2024-07-02.html</id>
        	<title>Motorola Solutions, Inc. v. Hytera Communications Corporation Ltd.</title>
        	<updated>2024-07-02T11:00:48-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-07-02T11:00:48-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/22-2413/22-2413-2024-07-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		This case involves a dispute between Motorola Solutions, Inc. and Hytera Communications Corporation Ltd., two global competitors in the market for two-way radio systems. After struggling to develop its own competing products, Hytera poached three engineers from Motorola, who, before leaving Motorola, downloaded thousands of documents and files containing Motorola&#039;s trade secrets and copyrighted source code. Using this stolen material, Hytera launched a line of radios that were functionally indistinguishable from Motorola&#039;s radios. In 2017, Motorola sued Hytera for copyright infringement and trade secret misappropriation. 

The jury found that Hytera had violated both the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA) and the Copyright Act, awarding compensatory and punitive damages totaling $764.6 million. The district court later reduced the award to $543.7 million and denied Motorola’s request for a permanent injunction. Both parties appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the district court must recalculate copyright damages, which will need to be reduced substantially from the original award of $136.3 million. The court affirmed the district court’s award of $135.8 million in compensatory damages and $271.6 million in punitive damages under the DTSA. The court also found that the district court erred in denying Motorola’s motion for reconsideration of the denial of permanent injunctive relief. The case was remanded for the district court to reconsider the issue of permanent injunctive relief. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/22-2413/22-2413-2024-07-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Motorola Solutions, Inc. v. Hytera Communications Corporation Ltd." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                This case involves a dispute between Motorola Solutions, Inc. and Hytera Communications Corporation Ltd., two global competitors in the market for two-way radio systems. After struggling to develop its own competing products, Hytera poached three engineers from Motorola, who, before leaving Motorola, downloaded thousands of documents and files containing Motorola&#039;s trade secrets and copyrighted source code. Using this stolen material, Hytera launched a line of radios that were functionally indistinguishable from Motorola&#039;s radios. In 2017, Motorola sued Hytera for copyright infringement and trade secret misappropriation. 

The jury found that Hytera had violated both the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA) and the Copyright Act, awarding compensatory and punitive damages totaling $764.6 million. The district court later reduced the award to $543.7 million and denied Motorola’s request for a permanent injunction. Both parties appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the district court must recalculate copyright damages, which will need to be reduced substantially from the original award of $136.3 million. The court affirmed the district court’s award of $135.8 million in compensatory damages and $271.6 million in punitive damages under the DTSA. The court also found that the district court erred in denying Motorola’s motion for reconsideration of the denial of permanent injunctive relief. The case was remanded for the district court to reconsider the issue of permanent injunctive relief.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-07-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>HAMILTON</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Corporate Compliance"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/22-7057/22-7057-2024-06-21.html</id>
        	<title>Apprio, Inc. v. Zaccari</title>
        	<updated>2024-06-21T07:31:58-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-06-21T07:31:58-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/22-7057/22-7057-2024-06-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case revolves around a dispute between Apprio, Inc., a government contractor, and its former employee, Neil Zaccari. Zaccari, a Senior Technical Manager at Apprio, had developed a regulatory compliance software prior to his employment. During his tenure, he updated the software, demonstrated it at work, and handed it over to Apprio upon request. Apprio then sent Zaccari a document titled “Proprietary Information and Assignment of Inventions Agreement,” which Zaccari acknowledged through Apprio’s human resources portal. After his termination, Zaccari copyrighted the updated software and sued Apprio for breaching the agreement when it allegedly forced him to turn over a copy of the software to an Apprio client. In response, Apprio countersued Zaccari for breaching the agreement when he refused to assign his rights in the updated software to Apprio.

The District Court combined the cases, dismissed Zaccari’s case for failure to state a claim, and granted partial and full summary judgment for Apprio with respect to contractual assignment of rights in the updated software and its breach of contract claim. Zaccari appealed, arguing that the agreement is not an enforceable contract and, alternatively, that the agreement neither supports the assignment of his rights in the updated software to Apprio nor a finding that he breached the agreement.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed with Zaccari&#039;s arguments. The court held that Zaccari’s “acknowledgment” of the agreement created an enforceable contract that requires Zaccari to assign his rights in the updated software to Apprio. Accordingly, Zaccari breached the binding agreement by failing to assign those rights to Apprio and disclosing the updated software’s underlying code to the U.S. Copyright Office in order to obtain the copyright. The court affirmed the District Court&#039;s decision. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/22-7057/22-7057-2024-06-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Apprio, Inc. v. Zaccari" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case revolves around a dispute between Apprio, Inc., a government contractor, and its former employee, Neil Zaccari. Zaccari, a Senior Technical Manager at Apprio, had developed a regulatory compliance software prior to his employment. During his tenure, he updated the software, demonstrated it at work, and handed it over to Apprio upon request. Apprio then sent Zaccari a document titled “Proprietary Information and Assignment of Inventions Agreement,” which Zaccari acknowledged through Apprio’s human resources portal. After his termination, Zaccari copyrighted the updated software and sued Apprio for breaching the agreement when it allegedly forced him to turn over a copy of the software to an Apprio client. In response, Apprio countersued Zaccari for breaching the agreement when he refused to assign his rights in the updated software to Apprio.

The District Court combined the cases, dismissed Zaccari’s case for failure to state a claim, and granted partial and full summary judgment for Apprio with respect to contractual assignment of rights in the updated software and its breach of contract claim. Zaccari appealed, arguing that the agreement is not an enforceable contract and, alternatively, that the agreement neither supports the assignment of his rights in the updated software to Apprio nor a finding that he breached the agreement.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed with Zaccari&#039;s arguments. The court held that Zaccari’s “acknowledgment” of the agreement created an enforceable contract that requires Zaccari to assign his rights in the updated software to Apprio. Accordingly, Zaccari breached the binding agreement by failing to assign those rights to Apprio and disclosing the updated software’s underlying code to the U.S. Copyright Office in order to obtain the copyright. The court affirmed the District Court&#039;s decision.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-06-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Wilkins</case:judge>
													<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/23-2833/23-2833-2024-06-12.html</id>
        	<title>Sumrall v. LeSEA, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2024-06-12T07:30:19-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-06-12T07:30:19-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/23-2833/23-2833-2024-06-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case revolves around a dispute over the estate of Dr. Lester Frank Sumrall, who founded a church that grew into a global evangelical empire, LeSEA, Inc. After his death, his son and grandson, Lester Sumrall, claimed they should have inherited part of his estate, including copyrights to his works and his right of publicity. They alleged that LeSEA, now controlled by other family members, had wrongfully taken ownership of these assets.

The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. The district court dismissed the claims brought by Lester Sumrall and the Lester Sumrall Family Trust against LeSEA and its affiliates, ruling in favor of LeSEA on all counts. The court found that the copyright claims were untimely and that LeSEA owned the copyright to a particular photograph, the &quot;Traveler Photo,&quot; taken by Lester Sumrall. The court also dismissed various state law claims for damages under the doctrine of laches, citing inexcusable delay in asserting rights and prejudice to the adverse party.

Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s decision. The appellate court agreed that the copyright claims were untimely and that LeSEA owned the copyright to the Traveler Photo. The court also upheld the application of laches to the state law claims, noting that laches is equally applicable in suits at law in Indiana. Finally, the court dismissed the claim for LeSEA&#039;s alleged use of Dr. Sumrall&#039;s right of publicity, as the Trust failed to plead the required half-ownership. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/23-2833/23-2833-2024-06-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Sumrall v. LeSEA, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case revolves around a dispute over the estate of Dr. Lester Frank Sumrall, who founded a church that grew into a global evangelical empire, LeSEA, Inc. After his death, his son and grandson, Lester Sumrall, claimed they should have inherited part of his estate, including copyrights to his works and his right of publicity. They alleged that LeSEA, now controlled by other family members, had wrongfully taken ownership of these assets.

The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. The district court dismissed the claims brought by Lester Sumrall and the Lester Sumrall Family Trust against LeSEA and its affiliates, ruling in favor of LeSEA on all counts. The court found that the copyright claims were untimely and that LeSEA owned the copyright to a particular photograph, the &quot;Traveler Photo,&quot; taken by Lester Sumrall. The court also dismissed various state law claims for damages under the doctrine of laches, citing inexcusable delay in asserting rights and prejudice to the adverse party.

Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s decision. The appellate court agreed that the copyright claims were untimely and that LeSEA owned the copyright to the Traveler Photo. The court also upheld the application of laches to the state law claims, noting that laches is equally applicable in suits at law in Indiana. Finally, the court dismissed the claim for LeSEA&#039;s alleged use of Dr. Sumrall&#039;s right of publicity, as the Trust failed to plead the required half-ownership.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-06-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>ST.EVE</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Trusts &amp; Estates"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/23-1214/23-1214-2024-06-10.html</id>
        	<title>Foss v. Marvic</title>
        	<updated>2024-06-10T13:30:03-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-06-10T13:30:03-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/23-1214/23-1214-2024-06-10.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A graphic designer, Cynthia Foss, filed a lawsuit against Marvic, Inc., Brady-Built, Inc., and Charter Communications, alleging copyright infringement. Foss claimed that Marvic and Brady-Built used a marketing brochure she created without her permission. She also sought a declaratory judgment that Charter Communications was not eligible for the Digital Millennium Copyright Act&#039;s safe-harbor defense. 

Previously, Foss had filed a similar lawsuit against Marvic alone, which was dismissed because she had not registered her copyright before filing the suit. This dismissal was affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals. In the current case, the District Court dismissed Foss&#039;s copyright infringement claim against Marvic and Brady-Built on the grounds of claim preclusion, citing the dismissal of her earlier lawsuit. The court also dismissed her claim against Charter Communications for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a plausible claim.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the dismissal of the copyright infringement claim against Marvic and Brady-Built. The court found that the dismissal of Foss&#039;s earlier lawsuit was not a &quot;final judgment on the merits&quot; for claim preclusion purposes. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Foss&#039;s claim against Charter Communications for lack of jurisdiction. The court also vacated the District Court&#039;s alternative merits-based dismissal of Foss&#039;s claim against Charter Communications. The case was remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/23-1214/23-1214-2024-06-10.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Foss v. Marvic" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A graphic designer, Cynthia Foss, filed a lawsuit against Marvic, Inc., Brady-Built, Inc., and Charter Communications, alleging copyright infringement. Foss claimed that Marvic and Brady-Built used a marketing brochure she created without her permission. She also sought a declaratory judgment that Charter Communications was not eligible for the Digital Millennium Copyright Act&#039;s safe-harbor defense. 

Previously, Foss had filed a similar lawsuit against Marvic alone, which was dismissed because she had not registered her copyright before filing the suit. This dismissal was affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals. In the current case, the District Court dismissed Foss&#039;s copyright infringement claim against Marvic and Brady-Built on the grounds of claim preclusion, citing the dismissal of her earlier lawsuit. The court also dismissed her claim against Charter Communications for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a plausible claim.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the dismissal of the copyright infringement claim against Marvic and Brady-Built. The court found that the dismissal of Foss&#039;s earlier lawsuit was not a &quot;final judgment on the merits&quot; for claim preclusion purposes. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Foss&#039;s claim against Charter Communications for lack of jurisdiction. The court also vacated the District Court&#039;s alternative merits-based dismissal of Foss&#039;s claim against Charter Communications. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-06-10</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>BARRON</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Communications Law"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/23-2117/23-2117-2024-06-07.html</id>
        	<title>Griner v. King for Congress</title>
        	<updated>2024-06-07T07:31:05-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-06-07T07:31:05-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/23-2117/23-2117-2024-06-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case revolves around a copyright infringement claim brought by Laney Griner, the owner of the copyright to a popular internet meme template known as &quot;Success Kid.&quot; The meme was used by the King for Congress Committee, a political campaign committee, to solicit donations. Griner sued the Congressman and the Committee for copyright infringement. The jury found the Committee, but not the Congressman, liable for copyright infringement and awarded Griner $750, the statutory minimum. Both parties moved for costs and attorney’s fees, which the district court partially granted and denied to both parties, but denied all attorney’s fees.

The Committee appealed the decision, arguing that it had an implied license to use the meme and that its use constituted fair use. The Committee also contested the district court&#039;s evidentiary rulings and the jury&#039;s instruction regarding damages. The Defendants appealed the denial of attorney’s fees and some costs.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s decision. The court found that the Committee had waived its implied license defense and that the jury correctly concluded that the Committee&#039;s use of the meme did not constitute fair use. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court&#039;s evidentiary rulings and held that the Committee&#039;s challenge to the jury instruction regarding damages was waived. The court affirmed the district court&#039;s decision not to award attorney’s fees and its denial of additional costs. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/23-2117/23-2117-2024-06-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Griner v. King for Congress" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case revolves around a copyright infringement claim brought by Laney Griner, the owner of the copyright to a popular internet meme template known as &quot;Success Kid.&quot; The meme was used by the King for Congress Committee, a political campaign committee, to solicit donations. Griner sued the Congressman and the Committee for copyright infringement. The jury found the Committee, but not the Congressman, liable for copyright infringement and awarded Griner $750, the statutory minimum. Both parties moved for costs and attorney’s fees, which the district court partially granted and denied to both parties, but denied all attorney’s fees.

The Committee appealed the decision, arguing that it had an implied license to use the meme and that its use constituted fair use. The Committee also contested the district court&#039;s evidentiary rulings and the jury&#039;s instruction regarding damages. The Defendants appealed the denial of attorney’s fees and some costs.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s decision. The court found that the Committee had waived its implied license defense and that the jury correctly concluded that the Committee&#039;s use of the meme did not constitute fair use. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court&#039;s evidentiary rulings and held that the Committee&#039;s challenge to the jury instruction regarding damages was waived. The court affirmed the district court&#039;s decision not to award attorney’s fees and its denial of additional costs.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-06-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Benton</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/23-5067/23-5067-2024-06-07.html</id>
        	<title>Medical Imaging &amp; Technology Alliance v. Library of Congress</title>
        	<updated>2024-06-07T07:01:37-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-06-07T07:01:37-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/23-5067/23-5067-2024-06-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves the Medical Imaging &amp; Technology Alliance and the Advanced Medical Technology Association, two trade associations representing medical device manufacturers, who sued the Library of Congress and the Librarian of Congress. The dispute arose from an exemption to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) that allowed some access to the software of advanced medical devices. The trade associations claimed that the exemption violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court dismissed the case, ruling that the APA claims were barred by sovereign immunity because the Library of Congress is part of “the Congress” and therefore not an “agency” within the meaning of the APA’s judicial review provision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court&#039;s decision. The court held that irrespective of whether the Library is an “agency,” Congress has specified that copyright regulations under Title 17 of the U.S. Code are subject to the APA. The court concluded that DMCA rules are subject to the APA just like other copyright rules, and therefore, the APA provides the necessary waiver of sovereign immunity for this suit. The court remanded the case back to the district court to assess the APA claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/23-5067/23-5067-2024-06-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Medical Imaging &amp; Technology Alliance v. Library of Congress" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves the Medical Imaging &amp; Technology Alliance and the Advanced Medical Technology Association, two trade associations representing medical device manufacturers, who sued the Library of Congress and the Librarian of Congress. The dispute arose from an exemption to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) that allowed some access to the software of advanced medical devices. The trade associations claimed that the exemption violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court dismissed the case, ruling that the APA claims were barred by sovereign immunity because the Library of Congress is part of “the Congress” and therefore not an “agency” within the meaning of the APA’s judicial review provision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court&#039;s decision. The court held that irrespective of whether the Library is an “agency,” Congress has specified that copyright regulations under Title 17 of the U.S. Code are subject to the APA. The court concluded that DMCA rules are subject to the APA just like other copyright rules, and therefore, the APA provides the necessary waiver of sovereign immunity for this suit. The court remanded the case back to the district court to assess the APA claims.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-06-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Rao</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/601/22-1078/</id>
        	<title>Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy</title>
        	<updated>2024-05-09T07:35:11-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-05-09T07:35:11-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/601/22-1078/"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case revolves around a dispute between Sherman Nealy and Warner Chappell Music, Inc. Nealy, who co-founded Music Specialist, Inc. in 1983, alleged that he held the copyrights to the company&#039;s songs and that Warner Chappell&#039;s licensing activities infringed his rights. The infringing activity, according to Nealy, dated back to 2008, ten years before he brought suit. Nealy sought damages and profits for the alleged misconduct, as authorized by the Copyright Act. To proceed with his claims, Nealy had to show they were timely under the Copyright Act, which requires a plaintiff to file suit &quot;within three years after the claim accrued.&quot; Nealy argued that all his claims were timely under the discovery rule because he did not learn of Warner Chappell’s infringing conduct until 2016, less than three years before he sued.

In the District Court, Warner Chappell accepted that the discovery rule governed the timeliness of Nealy’s claims. However, it argued that even if Nealy could sue under that rule for infringements going back ten years, he could recover damages or profits for only those occurring in the last three. The District Court agreed, and Nealy appealed. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision, rejecting the notion of a three-year damages bar on a timely claim.

The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the Eleventh Circuit&#039;s decision. The Court held that the Copyright Act entitles a copyright owner to obtain monetary relief for any timely infringement claim, no matter when the infringement occurred. The Act’s statute of limitations establishes a three-year period for filing suit, which begins to run when a claim accrues. That provision establishes no separate three-year limit on recovering damages. If any time limit on damages exists, it must come from the Act’s remedial sections. But those provisions merely state that an infringer is liable either for statutory damages or for the owner’s actual damages and the infringer’s profits. There is no time limit on monetary recovery. So a copyright owner possessing a timely claim is entitled to damages for infringement, no matter when the infringement occurred. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/601/22-1078/" target="_blank"&gt;View "Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case revolves around a dispute between Sherman Nealy and Warner Chappell Music, Inc. Nealy, who co-founded Music Specialist, Inc. in 1983, alleged that he held the copyrights to the company&#039;s songs and that Warner Chappell&#039;s licensing activities infringed his rights. The infringing activity, according to Nealy, dated back to 2008, ten years before he brought suit. Nealy sought damages and profits for the alleged misconduct, as authorized by the Copyright Act. To proceed with his claims, Nealy had to show they were timely under the Copyright Act, which requires a plaintiff to file suit &quot;within three years after the claim accrued.&quot; Nealy argued that all his claims were timely under the discovery rule because he did not learn of Warner Chappell’s infringing conduct until 2016, less than three years before he sued.

In the District Court, Warner Chappell accepted that the discovery rule governed the timeliness of Nealy’s claims. However, it argued that even if Nealy could sue under that rule for infringements going back ten years, he could recover damages or profits for only those occurring in the last three. The District Court agreed, and Nealy appealed. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision, rejecting the notion of a three-year damages bar on a timely claim.

The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the Eleventh Circuit&#039;s decision. The Court held that the Copyright Act entitles a copyright owner to obtain monetary relief for any timely infringement claim, no matter when the infringement occurred. The Act’s statute of limitations establishes a three-year period for filing suit, which begins to run when a claim accrues. That provision establishes no separate three-year limit on recovering damages. If any time limit on damages exists, it must come from the Act’s remedial sections. But those provisions merely state that an infringer is liable either for statutory damages or for the owner’s actual damages and the infringer’s profits. There is no time limit on monetary recovery. So a copyright owner possessing a timely claim is entitled to damages for infringement, no matter when the infringement occurred.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                A copyright owner possessing a timely claim for infringement is entitled to damages, no matter when the infringement occurred.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-05-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Elena Kagan</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Supreme Court"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-5046/23-5046-2024-04-12.html</id>
        	<title>I Dig Texas v. Creager</title>
        	<updated>2024-04-12T08:03:03-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-04-12T08:03:03-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-5046/23-5046-2024-04-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case revolves around a dispute between two competitors in the construction equipment market, I Dig Texas, LLC, and Kerry Creager, along with Creager Services, LLC. I Dig Texas used copyrighted photographs of Creager&#039;s products, which were made in China, in its advertisements to emphasize its own products&#039; American-made status. This led to claims under the Copyright Act and the Lanham Act. 

Previously, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma granted summary judgment to I Dig Texas on Creager&#039;s federal claims and remanded all of the state-law claims to state court. Creager had claimed that the use of its photographs constituted copyright infringement and that the accompanying text misrepresented the origin of I Dig Texas&#039;s products. 

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court&#039;s decision. The court found that Creager failed to present evidence of any profit from the use of its photographs, which was necessary to establish a claim for copyright infringement. The court also found that I Dig Texas&#039;s advertisements were not literally false under the Lanham Act. The advertisements were ambiguous as to whether a product is considered American-made when it is assembled in the United States but uses some foreign components. The court concluded that such a claim is not literally false because the claim itself is ambiguous. The court also affirmed the lower court&#039;s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims and remand these claims to state court. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-5046/23-5046-2024-04-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "I Dig Texas v. Creager" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case revolves around a dispute between two competitors in the construction equipment market, I Dig Texas, LLC, and Kerry Creager, along with Creager Services, LLC. I Dig Texas used copyrighted photographs of Creager&#039;s products, which were made in China, in its advertisements to emphasize its own products&#039; American-made status. This led to claims under the Copyright Act and the Lanham Act. 

Previously, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma granted summary judgment to I Dig Texas on Creager&#039;s federal claims and remanded all of the state-law claims to state court. Creager had claimed that the use of its photographs constituted copyright infringement and that the accompanying text misrepresented the origin of I Dig Texas&#039;s products. 

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court&#039;s decision. The court found that Creager failed to present evidence of any profit from the use of its photographs, which was necessary to establish a claim for copyright infringement. The court also found that I Dig Texas&#039;s advertisements were not literally false under the Lanham Act. The advertisements were ambiguous as to whether a product is considered American-made when it is assembled in the United States but uses some foreign components. The court concluded that such a claim is not literally false because the claim itself is ambiguous. The court also affirmed the lower court&#039;s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims and remand these claims to state court.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-04-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>BACHARACH</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/23-1591/23-1591-2024-04-03.html</id>
        	<title>R.J. Control Consultants, Inc. v. Multiject, LLC</title>
        	<updated>2024-04-03T11:30:17-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-04-03T11:30:17-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/23-1591/23-1591-2024-04-03.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		This case pertains to an alleged copyright infringement involving software code used in an industrial control system. The plaintiffs, RJ Control Consultants, Inc. and its sole shareholder, Paul Rogers, appealed the district court’s exclusion of their proposed expert and the granting of summary judgment to the defendants, Multiject, LLC; its sole owner, Jack Elder; and RSW Technologies, LLC. The U.S Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the plaintiffs’ proposed expert or in granting summary judgment to the defendants. The plaintiffs had failed to properly disclose their expert as required and did not produce an expert report. Consequently, they could not offer expert evidence to rebut the defendants&#039; evidence. Furthermore, they could not create a genuine dispute of fact about the protectability of the software code, a crucial factor in their copyright infringement claim. Therefore, the district court&#039;s judgment was affirmed. The court also vacated its prior decision in RJ Control Consultants, Inc. v. Multiject, LLC, 981 F.3d 446 (2020), due to lack of appellate jurisdiction at the time of that decision. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/23-1591/23-1591-2024-04-03.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "R.J. Control Consultants, Inc. v. Multiject, LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                This case pertains to an alleged copyright infringement involving software code used in an industrial control system. The plaintiffs, RJ Control Consultants, Inc. and its sole shareholder, Paul Rogers, appealed the district court’s exclusion of their proposed expert and the granting of summary judgment to the defendants, Multiject, LLC; its sole owner, Jack Elder; and RSW Technologies, LLC. The U.S Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the plaintiffs’ proposed expert or in granting summary judgment to the defendants. The plaintiffs had failed to properly disclose their expert as required and did not produce an expert report. Consequently, they could not offer expert evidence to rebut the defendants&#039; evidence. Furthermore, they could not create a genuine dispute of fact about the protectability of the software code, a crucial factor in their copyright infringement claim. Therefore, the district court&#039;s judgment was affirmed. The court also vacated its prior decision in RJ Control Consultants, Inc. v. Multiject, LLC, 981 F.3d 446 (2020), due to lack of appellate jurisdiction at the time of that decision.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-04-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Mathis</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/22-6086/22-6086-2024-03-27.html</id>
        	<title>Whyte Monkee Productions v. Netflix</title>
        	<updated>2024-03-27T08:32:22-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-03-27T08:32:22-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/22-6086/22-6086-2024-03-27.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		This case revolves around a copyright dispute between Whyte Monkee Productions, LLC and Timothy Sepi (Plaintiffs) and Netflix, Inc. and Royal Goode Productions, LLC (Defendants). Plaintiffs sued Defendants for copyright infringement, alleging that Defendants had used clips from eight videos filmed by Mr. Sepi without permission in the documentary series &quot;Tiger King: Murder, Mayhem and Madness&quot;. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, concluding that seven of the videos were works made for hire and thus Mr. Sepi did not own the copyrights. The court also found that the use of the eighth video constituted fair use and did not infringe on Mr. Sepi’s copyright. 

On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Plaintiffs waived their argument regarding the first seven videos as they presented a new theory not raised in the lower court. Accordingly, the appellate court upheld the district court&#039;s judgment regarding these videos. However, regarding the eighth video, the appellate court ruled that the district court erred in determining that Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on their fair use defense. The court concluded that the first factor of the fair use analysis favored the Plaintiffs instead of the Defendants, and that the Defendants failed to provide any evidence demonstrating the absence of a market impact, which is necessary to apply the fourth fair use factor. Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s judgment as to the first seven videos, reversed the judgment as to the eighth video, and remanded the case for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/22-6086/22-6086-2024-03-27.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Whyte Monkee Productions v. Netflix" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                This case revolves around a copyright dispute between Whyte Monkee Productions, LLC and Timothy Sepi (Plaintiffs) and Netflix, Inc. and Royal Goode Productions, LLC (Defendants). Plaintiffs sued Defendants for copyright infringement, alleging that Defendants had used clips from eight videos filmed by Mr. Sepi without permission in the documentary series &quot;Tiger King: Murder, Mayhem and Madness&quot;. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, concluding that seven of the videos were works made for hire and thus Mr. Sepi did not own the copyrights. The court also found that the use of the eighth video constituted fair use and did not infringe on Mr. Sepi’s copyright. 

On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Plaintiffs waived their argument regarding the first seven videos as they presented a new theory not raised in the lower court. Accordingly, the appellate court upheld the district court&#039;s judgment regarding these videos. However, regarding the eighth video, the appellate court ruled that the district court erred in determining that Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on their fair use defense. The court concluded that the first factor of the fair use analysis favored the Plaintiffs instead of the Defendants, and that the Defendants failed to provide any evidence demonstrating the absence of a market impact, which is necessary to apply the fourth fair use factor. Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s judgment as to the first seven videos, reversed the judgment as to the eighth video, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-03-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>HOLMES</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1630/22-1630-2024-03-27.html</id>
        	<title>Brumfield v. IBG LLC</title>
        	<updated>2024-03-27T07:31:48-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-03-27T07:31:48-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1630/22-1630-2024-03-27.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		This case concerns a patent dispute between Harris Brumfield, Trustee for Ascent Trust (Plaintiff-Appellant) and IBG LLC and Interactive Brokers LLC (Defendants-Appellees). The plaintiff alleged that the defendants infringed several patents owned by Trading Technologies International, Inc., the plaintiff&#039;s predecessor. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s challenges and affirmed the district court&#039;s rulings. 

The district court had invalidated the asserted claims of two of the plaintiff&#039;s patents under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The court also excluded one basis for recovering &quot;foreign damages&quot; proposed by the plaintiff&#039;s damages expert, and denied the plaintiff&#039;s post-verdict motion for a new trial on damages. 

On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the district court correctly applied the law in determining that the asserted claims of the patents were ineligible for patenting under § 101. The court also affirmed the district court’s decision to exclude certain damages evidence, and it upheld the denial of the plaintiff&#039;s request for a new trial on damages. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1630/22-1630-2024-03-27.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Brumfield v. IBG LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                This case concerns a patent dispute between Harris Brumfield, Trustee for Ascent Trust (Plaintiff-Appellant) and IBG LLC and Interactive Brokers LLC (Defendants-Appellees). The plaintiff alleged that the defendants infringed several patents owned by Trading Technologies International, Inc., the plaintiff&#039;s predecessor. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s challenges and affirmed the district court&#039;s rulings. 

The district court had invalidated the asserted claims of two of the plaintiff&#039;s patents under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The court also excluded one basis for recovering &quot;foreign damages&quot; proposed by the plaintiff&#039;s damages expert, and denied the plaintiff&#039;s post-verdict motion for a new trial on damages. 

On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the district court correctly applied the law in determining that the asserted claims of the patents were ineligible for patenting under § 101. The court also affirmed the district court’s decision to exclude certain damages evidence, and it upheld the denial of the plaintiff&#039;s request for a new trial on damages.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-03-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>TARANTO</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/23-3394/23-3394-2024-02-26.html</id>
        	<title>Premier Dealer Services, Inc. v. Allegiance Administrators, LLC</title>
        	<updated>2024-02-26T13:30:19-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-02-26T13:30:19-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/23-3394/23-3394-2024-02-26.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Premier Dealer Services, a developer and administrator of automobile dealers’ aftermarket products, sued Allegiance Administrators for infringing its copyright. The issue stemmed from Premier&#039;s creation of a Lifetime Powertrain Loyalty Program, which included a loyalty certificate that set out the program&#039;s terms and conditions. Premier had registered this certificate for copyright protection. When Allegiance started working with a former Premier client, it used Premier’s Lifetime Powertrain Loyalty Program certificates in its own plan, with minor modifications in the contact information. 

In the lawsuit, the district court ruled that Allegiance had infringed Premier’s copyright, ordered Allegiance to give up any profits from using the certificates, and awarded Premier attorney’s fees. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court. 

The appellate court held that Premier&#039;s certificate was &quot;original&quot; and thus protected by copyright. The court clarified that originality in copyright law has a low threshold, requiring only that the author independently created a work with some minimal degree of creativity. The court rejected Allegiance&#039;s argument that the certificates were scenes a faire—stock or standard phrases that necessarily follow from a common theme or setting, which are not protectable by copyright. The court found that Allegiance had not provided sufficient evidence that industry standards or other external constraints dictated the content of the certificates. 

Regarding the disgorgement of profits, the court agreed with the lower court&#039;s calculations. It noted that Premier had successfully shown a reasonable relationship between Allegiance’s infringement and its gross revenues. The burden then shifted to Allegiance to demonstrate which part of its gross revenues did not result from the infringement, but Allegiance failed to fulfill this burden. 

Finally, the court upheld the award of attorney’s fees to Premier, finding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in characterizing Allegiance&#039;s arguments as unreasonable and contrary to settled law. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/23-3394/23-3394-2024-02-26.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Premier Dealer Services, Inc. v. Allegiance Administrators, LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Premier Dealer Services, a developer and administrator of automobile dealers’ aftermarket products, sued Allegiance Administrators for infringing its copyright. The issue stemmed from Premier&#039;s creation of a Lifetime Powertrain Loyalty Program, which included a loyalty certificate that set out the program&#039;s terms and conditions. Premier had registered this certificate for copyright protection. When Allegiance started working with a former Premier client, it used Premier’s Lifetime Powertrain Loyalty Program certificates in its own plan, with minor modifications in the contact information. 

In the lawsuit, the district court ruled that Allegiance had infringed Premier’s copyright, ordered Allegiance to give up any profits from using the certificates, and awarded Premier attorney’s fees. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court. 

The appellate court held that Premier&#039;s certificate was &quot;original&quot; and thus protected by copyright. The court clarified that originality in copyright law has a low threshold, requiring only that the author independently created a work with some minimal degree of creativity. The court rejected Allegiance&#039;s argument that the certificates were scenes a faire—stock or standard phrases that necessarily follow from a common theme or setting, which are not protectable by copyright. The court found that Allegiance had not provided sufficient evidence that industry standards or other external constraints dictated the content of the certificates. 

Regarding the disgorgement of profits, the court agreed with the lower court&#039;s calculations. It noted that Premier had successfully shown a reasonable relationship between Allegiance’s infringement and its gross revenues. The burden then shifted to Allegiance to demonstrate which part of its gross revenues did not result from the infringement, but Allegiance failed to fulfill this burden. 

Finally, the court upheld the award of attorney’s fees to Premier, finding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in characterizing Allegiance&#039;s arguments as unreasonable and contrary to settled law.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-02-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>SUTTON</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/21-1168/21-1168-2024-02-20.html</id>
        	<title>Sony Music Entertainment v. Cox Communications, Incorporated</title>
        	<updated>2024-02-20T11:30:38-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-02-20T11:30:38-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/21-1168/21-1168-2024-02-20.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In this case, Sony Music Entertainment and numerous other record companies and music publishers sued Cox Communications, alleging that Cox&#039;s customers used its internet service to infringe their copyrights. The plaintiffs argued that Cox should be held accountable for its customers&#039; copyright infringement. A jury found Cox liable for both willful contributory and vicarious infringement of over 10,000 copyrighted works owned by the plaintiffs and awarded $1 billion in statutory damages. 

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Cox was not vicariously liable for its customers&#039; copyright infringement because Cox did not profit from its subscribers’ acts of infringement, a legal prerequisite for vicarious liability. However, the court affirmed the jury’s finding of willful contributory infringement because Cox knew of the infringing activity and materially contributed to it. 

The court vacated the $1 billion damages award and remanded the case for a new trial on damages, holding that the jury’s finding of vicarious liability could have influenced its assessment of statutory damages. The court did not vacate the contributory infringement verdict. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/21-1168/21-1168-2024-02-20.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Sony Music Entertainment v. Cox Communications, Incorporated" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In this case, Sony Music Entertainment and numerous other record companies and music publishers sued Cox Communications, alleging that Cox&#039;s customers used its internet service to infringe their copyrights. The plaintiffs argued that Cox should be held accountable for its customers&#039; copyright infringement. A jury found Cox liable for both willful contributory and vicarious infringement of over 10,000 copyrighted works owned by the plaintiffs and awarded $1 billion in statutory damages. 

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Cox was not vicariously liable for its customers&#039; copyright infringement because Cox did not profit from its subscribers’ acts of infringement, a legal prerequisite for vicarious liability. However, the court affirmed the jury’s finding of willful contributory infringement because Cox knew of the infringing activity and materially contributed to it. 

The court vacated the $1 billion damages award and remanded the case for a new trial on damages, holding that the jury’s finding of vicarious liability could have influenced its assessment of statutory damages. The court did not vacate the contributory infringement verdict.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-02-20</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Rushing</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/21-2021/21-2021-2024-02-06.html</id>
        	<title>Philpot v. Independent Journal Review</title>
        	<updated>2024-02-06T12:02:15-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-02-06T12:02:15-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/21-2021/21-2021-2024-02-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In this case, professional concert photographer Larry Philpot brought a copyright-infringement claim against news website Independent Journal Review (IJR) after IJR used his photograph of musician Ted Nugent in an online article. IJR sought summary judgment, arguing that its use of the photo constituted fair use under the Copyright Act and alternatively arguing that Philpot&#039;s copyright registration was invalid. Philpot also sought summary judgment, contending that his registration was valid and that IJR&#039;s use was not fair use. The district court granted summary judgment to IJR on fair use grounds and denied Philpot&#039;s motion. 

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the decision. The court held that IJR&#039;s use of the photograph did not constitute fair use because it was non-transformative and commercial, and it adversely affected the potential market for the photograph. It also found that Philpot&#039;s copyright registration was valid because the photograph was not published before Philpot registered it as an unpublished work. The court concluded that IJR was not entitled to summary judgment on its fair use defense and that Philpot was entitled to summary judgment on the validity of the copyright registration. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/21-2021/21-2021-2024-02-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Philpot v. Independent Journal Review" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In this case, professional concert photographer Larry Philpot brought a copyright-infringement claim against news website Independent Journal Review (IJR) after IJR used his photograph of musician Ted Nugent in an online article. IJR sought summary judgment, arguing that its use of the photo constituted fair use under the Copyright Act and alternatively arguing that Philpot&#039;s copyright registration was invalid. Philpot also sought summary judgment, contending that his registration was valid and that IJR&#039;s use was not fair use. The district court granted summary judgment to IJR on fair use grounds and denied Philpot&#039;s motion. 

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the decision. The court held that IJR&#039;s use of the photograph did not constitute fair use because it was non-transformative and commercial, and it adversely affected the potential market for the photograph. It also found that Philpot&#039;s copyright registration was valid because the photograph was not published before Philpot registered it as an unpublished work. The court concluded that IJR was not entitled to summary judgment on its fair use defense and that Philpot was entitled to summary judgment on the validity of the copyright registration.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-02-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Wynn</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/22-3355/22-3355-2024-02-02.html</id>
        	<title>Ragan v. Berkshire Hathaway Auto, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2024-02-02T08:06:23-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-02-02T08:06:23-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/22-3355/22-3355-2024-02-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Ronald Ragan, Jr. brought a suit against Berkshire Hathaway Automotive, Inc. (BHA) alleging that the company had copied his car dealership customer intake form (&quot;Guest Sheet&quot;) without his permission, constituting copyright infringement. The case was brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Ragan held a certificate of registration for the Guest Sheet issued by the United States Copyright Office and asserted that BHA continued to use the form after acquiring a company that had previously copied and used the Guest Sheet. BHA argued that the Guest Sheet was not copyrightable. The district court agreed with BHA and ruled in its favor. On appeal, Ragan argued that the district court erred in finding the Guest Sheet uncopyrightable. The appeals court, however, upheld the district court&#039;s decision, ruling that the Guest Sheet lacked the requisite originality to be protected under copyright law. The court found that the Guest Sheet, which contained basic questions and prompts, did not exhibit sufficient creativity, and was designed to record, not convey, information. The court also dismissed Ragan&#039;s claim that the district court ignored the statutory presumption of copyright validity granted to the Guest Sheet by the certificate of registration, stating that the copyrightability of the Guest Sheet could be determined by an examination of the Guest Sheet alone. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/22-3355/22-3355-2024-02-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Ragan v. Berkshire Hathaway Auto, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Ronald Ragan, Jr. brought a suit against Berkshire Hathaway Automotive, Inc. (BHA) alleging that the company had copied his car dealership customer intake form (&quot;Guest Sheet&quot;) without his permission, constituting copyright infringement. The case was brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Ragan held a certificate of registration for the Guest Sheet issued by the United States Copyright Office and asserted that BHA continued to use the form after acquiring a company that had previously copied and used the Guest Sheet. BHA argued that the Guest Sheet was not copyrightable. The district court agreed with BHA and ruled in its favor. On appeal, Ragan argued that the district court erred in finding the Guest Sheet uncopyrightable. The appeals court, however, upheld the district court&#039;s decision, ruling that the Guest Sheet lacked the requisite originality to be protected under copyright law. The court found that the Guest Sheet, which contained basic questions and prompts, did not exhibit sufficient creativity, and was designed to record, not convey, information. The court also dismissed Ragan&#039;s claim that the district court ignored the statutory presumption of copyright validity granted to the Guest Sheet by the certificate of registration, stating that the copyrightability of the Guest Sheet could be determined by an examination of the Guest Sheet alone.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-02-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>GRASZ</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-15899/22-15899-2024-01-11.html</id>
        	<title>Best Carpet Values, Inc. v. Google LLC</title>
        	<updated>2024-01-11T09:30:52-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-01-11T09:30:52-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-15899/22-15899-2024-01-11.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Best Carpet Values, Inc. and Thomas D. Rutledge initiated a class action lawsuit against Google, LLC. The plaintiffs argued that Google, through its Search App on Android phones, displayed their websites in a way that occupied valuable space for which Google should have paid. They contended that Google received all the benefits of advertising from the use of that space. The plaintiffs made state-law claims for trespass to chattels, implied-in-law contract and unjust enrichment, and violation of California&#039;s Unfair Competition Law.

The court reviewed questions certified by the district court for interlocutory review. In response to the first question, the court ruled that the website copies displayed on a user&#039;s screen should not be protected as chattel, concluding that a cognizable property right did not exist in a website copy. As a result, the plaintiffs’ trespass to chattels claim was dismissed.

Addressing the third question, the court held that website owners cannot invoke state law to control how their websites are displayed on a user&#039;s screen without being preempted by federal copyright law. The court determined that the manner in which the plaintiffs’ websites were displayed fell within the subject matter of federal copyright law. It also found that the rights asserted by the plaintiffs’ implied-in-law contract and unjust enrichment claim were equivalent to the rights provided by federal copyright law. Thus, the plaintiffs’ state-law claim was preempted by federal copyright law.

Given these findings, the court did not address the other certified questions. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in denying Google’s motion to dismiss and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-15899/22-15899-2024-01-11.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Best Carpet Values, Inc. v. Google LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Best Carpet Values, Inc. and Thomas D. Rutledge initiated a class action lawsuit against Google, LLC. The plaintiffs argued that Google, through its Search App on Android phones, displayed their websites in a way that occupied valuable space for which Google should have paid. They contended that Google received all the benefits of advertising from the use of that space. The plaintiffs made state-law claims for trespass to chattels, implied-in-law contract and unjust enrichment, and violation of California&#039;s Unfair Competition Law.

The court reviewed questions certified by the district court for interlocutory review. In response to the first question, the court ruled that the website copies displayed on a user&#039;s screen should not be protected as chattel, concluding that a cognizable property right did not exist in a website copy. As a result, the plaintiffs’ trespass to chattels claim was dismissed.

Addressing the third question, the court held that website owners cannot invoke state law to control how their websites are displayed on a user&#039;s screen without being preempted by federal copyright law. The court determined that the manner in which the plaintiffs’ websites were displayed fell within the subject matter of federal copyright law. It also found that the rights asserted by the plaintiffs’ implied-in-law contract and unjust enrichment claim were equivalent to the rights provided by federal copyright law. Thus, the plaintiffs’ state-law claim was preempted by federal copyright law.

Given these findings, the court did not address the other certified questions. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in denying Google’s motion to dismiss and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-01-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Wallace</case:judge>
													<category term="Communications Law"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Internet Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-55890/22-55890-2023-11-01.html</id>
        	<title>KYLE HANAGAMI V. EPIC GAMES, INC., ET AL</title>
        	<updated>2023-11-01T08:31:40-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-11-01T08:31:40-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-55890/22-55890-2023-11-01.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Choreographer Kyle Hanagami claimed that Epic Games, Inc., the creator of the videogame Fortnite, infringed the copyright of a choreographic work when the company created and sold a virtual animation, known as an “emote,” depicting portions of the registered choreography. The district court dismissed his action under the Copyright Act and remanded for further proceedings on claims of direct and contributory infringement of a choreographic work.
 
The Ninth Circuit reversed. The panel held that, under the “extrinsic test” for assessing substantial similarity, Hanagami plausibly alleged that his choreography and Epic’s emote shared substantial similarities. The panel held that, like other forms of copyrightable material such as music, choreography is composed of various elements that are unprotectable when viewed in isolation. What is protectable is the choreographer’s selection and arrangement of the work’s otherwise unprotectable elements. The panel held that “poses” are not the only relevant element, and a choreographic work also may include body position, body shape, body actions, transitions, use of space, timing, pauses, energy, canon, motif, contrast, and repetition. The panel concluded that Hanagami plausibly alleged that the creative choices he made in selecting and arranging elements of the choreography—the movement of the limbs, movement of the hands and fingers, head and shoulder movement, and tempo—were substantially similar to the choices Epic made in creating the emote. The panel held that the district court also erred in dismissing Hanagami’s claim on the ground that the allegedly copied choreography was “short” and a “small component” of Hanagami’s overall work. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-55890/22-55890-2023-11-01.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "KYLE HANAGAMI V. EPIC GAMES, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Choreographer Kyle Hanagami claimed that Epic Games, Inc., the creator of the videogame Fortnite, infringed the copyright of a choreographic work when the company created and sold a virtual animation, known as an “emote,” depicting portions of the registered choreography. The district court dismissed his action under the Copyright Act and remanded for further proceedings on claims of direct and contributory infringement of a choreographic work.
 
The Ninth Circuit reversed. The panel held that, under the “extrinsic test” for assessing substantial similarity, Hanagami plausibly alleged that his choreography and Epic’s emote shared substantial similarities. The panel held that, like other forms of copyrightable material such as music, choreography is composed of various elements that are unprotectable when viewed in isolation. What is protectable is the choreographer’s selection and arrangement of the work’s otherwise unprotectable elements. The panel held that “poses” are not the only relevant element, and a choreographic work also may include body position, body shape, body actions, transitions, use of space, timing, pauses, energy, canon, motif, contrast, and repetition. The panel concluded that Hanagami plausibly alleged that the creative choices he made in selecting and arranging elements of the choreography—the movement of the limbs, movement of the hands and fingers, head and shoulder movement, and tempo—were substantially similar to the choices Epic made in creating the emote. The panel held that the district court also erred in dismissing Hanagami’s claim on the ground that the allegedly copied choreography was “short” and a “small component” of Hanagami’s overall work.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of an action under the Copyright Act and remanded for further proceedings on claims of direct and contributory infringement of a choreographic work.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-11-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Paez</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-55890</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/22-255/22-255-2023-10-17.html</id>
        	<title>Elliott v. Cartagena, et al.</title>
        	<updated>2023-10-17T06:30:45-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-10-17T06:30:45-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/22-255/22-255-2023-10-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Plaintiff alleged that he co-created the song “All the Way Up,” but that he has not been properly credited or compensated for his contribution. He filed this action in the district court asserting claims under the Copyright Act, as well as various tort claims. Defendants maintain that Plaintiff assigned away any rights he may have had in the song, but the agreement has never been produced, and the parties disagree about its content and effect. The district court admitted a draft version of the missing agreement as a duplicate, and then granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment without allowing Plaintiff to conduct discovery.
 
The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in finding the draft admissible as a duplicate original under Federal Rule of Evidence 1003, but properly admitted the draft as “other evidence of the content” of the original under Rule 1004. The court further held that the district court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s request to conduct discovery prior to the entry of summary judgment and erred in concluding that no genuine dispute of material fact existed based on the current record. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/22-255/22-255-2023-10-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Elliott v. Cartagena, et al." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Plaintiff alleged that he co-created the song “All the Way Up,” but that he has not been properly credited or compensated for his contribution. He filed this action in the district court asserting claims under the Copyright Act, as well as various tort claims. Defendants maintain that Plaintiff assigned away any rights he may have had in the song, but the agreement has never been produced, and the parties disagree about its content and effect. The district court admitted a draft version of the missing agreement as a duplicate, and then granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment without allowing Plaintiff to conduct discovery.
 
The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in finding the draft admissible as a duplicate original under Federal Rule of Evidence 1003, but properly admitted the draft as “other evidence of the content” of the original under Rule 1004. The court further held that the district court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s request to conduct discovery prior to the entry of summary judgment and erred in concluding that no genuine dispute of material fact existed based on the current record.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment granting Defendants&#039; motion for summary judgment without allowing Plaintiff to conduct discovery. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in finding the draft admissible as a duplicate original under Federal Rule of Evidence 1003.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-10-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>SARAH A. L. MERRIAM</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-255</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Personal Injury"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/21-4128/21-4128-2023-10-16.html</id>
        	<title>Greer v. Moon, et al.</title>
        	<updated>2023-10-16T09:06:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-10-16T09:06:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/21-4128/21-4128-2023-10-16.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		When he discovered his copyrighted book and song online, Plaintiff Russell Greer sent a “takedown notice” to Defendants Joshua Moon and his website Kiwi Farms, requesting the material be removed from the Kiwi Farms site. When Moon refused, Greer sued Defendants for copyright infringement. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding Greer failed to state a claim. On appeal, Greer argued his pro se complaint, construed liberally, adequately “alleged facts demonstrating [Moon and Kiwi Farms] had knowingly induced, encouraged, and materially contributed to direct infringements,” and so “stated a claim for contributory copyright infringement” sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. The Tenth Circuit agreed, reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/21-4128/21-4128-2023-10-16.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Greer v. Moon, et al." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                When he discovered his copyrighted book and song online, Plaintiff Russell Greer sent a “takedown notice” to Defendants Joshua Moon and his website Kiwi Farms, requesting the material be removed from the Kiwi Farms site. When Moon refused, Greer sued Defendants for copyright infringement. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding Greer failed to state a claim. On appeal, Greer argued his pro se complaint, construed liberally, adequately “alleged facts demonstrating [Moon and Kiwi Farms] had knowingly induced, encouraged, and materially contributed to direct infringements,” and so “stated a claim for contributory copyright infringement” sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. The Tenth Circuit agreed, reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                &quot;Rather, we conclude a reasonable inference from the facts alleged is that the reposting of the takedown notice, combined with the refusal to take down the infringing material, amounted to encouragement of Kiwi Farms users’ direct copyright infringement.&quot;
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-10-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Rossman</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-4128</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/22-30772/22-30772-2023-09-29.html</id>
        	<title>Carbon Six Barrels v. Proof Research</title>
        	<updated>2023-09-29T15:30:17-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-09-29T15:30:17-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/22-30772/22-30772-2023-09-29.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Proof Research, Inc. and Carbon Six Barrels, LLC both manufacture carbon-fiber gun barrels. Proof entered the market first and obtained a trademark for the unique appearance of its barrels. When Proof found out that Carbon Six intended to begin manufacturing and selling similar-looking carbon-fiber gun barrels of its own, Proof responded with litigation. However, Proof did not file suit against Carbon Six but rather against McGowen Precision Barrels, LLC, Carbon Six’s sister company. McGowen then initiated separate proceedings to have Proof’s trademark canceled. McGowen was ultimately successful, and Proof’s trademark for its carbon-fiber gun barrels was canceled in 2021. On February 9, 2022, Carbon Six filed this lawsuit against Proof for defamation and violation of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act stemming from Proof’s efforts to register, renew, enforce, and defend its previously valid trademark. However, Carbon Six brought its claims after the one-year prescriptive period imposed by Louisiana law had run. On Proof’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Carbon Six failed to convince the district court that any of its claims were timely. The district court also held that Carbon Six’s LUTPA claim was legally deficient.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that all actions Carbon Six alleged Proof took were discrete rather than ongoing, and each began and ended more than a year before this lawsuit was filed. Carbon Six’s LUTPA claim is therefore prescribed. The court explained even if Carbon Six could do so, Proof’s attempt to enforce a later-invalidated trademark does not violate LUTPA. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/22-30772/22-30772-2023-09-29.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Carbon Six Barrels v. Proof Research" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Proof Research, Inc. and Carbon Six Barrels, LLC both manufacture carbon-fiber gun barrels. Proof entered the market first and obtained a trademark for the unique appearance of its barrels. When Proof found out that Carbon Six intended to begin manufacturing and selling similar-looking carbon-fiber gun barrels of its own, Proof responded with litigation. However, Proof did not file suit against Carbon Six but rather against McGowen Precision Barrels, LLC, Carbon Six’s sister company. McGowen then initiated separate proceedings to have Proof’s trademark canceled. McGowen was ultimately successful, and Proof’s trademark for its carbon-fiber gun barrels was canceled in 2021. On February 9, 2022, Carbon Six filed this lawsuit against Proof for defamation and violation of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act stemming from Proof’s efforts to register, renew, enforce, and defend its previously valid trademark. However, Carbon Six brought its claims after the one-year prescriptive period imposed by Louisiana law had run. On Proof’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Carbon Six failed to convince the district court that any of its claims were timely. The district court also held that Carbon Six’s LUTPA claim was legally deficient.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that all actions Carbon Six alleged Proof took were discrete rather than ongoing, and each began and ended more than a year before this lawsuit was filed. Carbon Six’s LUTPA claim is therefore prescribed. The court explained even if Carbon Six could do so, Proof’s attempt to enforce a later-invalidated trademark does not violate LUTPA.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s granting Defendant Proof Research, Inc.’s motion to dismiss Carbon Six Barrels, LLC’s lawsuit against Proof for defamation and violation of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act stemming from Proof’s efforts to register, renew, enforce, and defend its previously valid trademark.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-09-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jennifer Walker Elrod</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-30772</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Trademark"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/22-5361/22-5361-2023-09-21.html</id>
        	<title>Bliss Collection, LLC v. Latham Companies, LLC</title>
        	<updated>2023-09-21T12:31:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-09-21T12:31:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/22-5361/22-5361-2023-09-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In 1999, Latham, McLean, and Vernooy formed Bliss to sell children’s clothing under the name “bella bliss.” In 2003, Shannon left Bliss and started Latham to sell her own children’s clothing under the name “little english.” Bliss’s logo is a lowercase “b” drawn out as if stitched in thread. Bliss has registered trademarks for this logo. Bliss has several designs that it claims as signature looks of the bella bliss brand that have “become famous and widely known and recognized as symbols of unique and high-quality garments.”  There has been previous litigation between the parties.  

In 2020, Bliss filed federal claims for copyright, trademark, and trade dress infringement; false designation of origin and misappropriation of source; and unfair competition. The district court dismissed Bliss’s claims and granted Latham attorney’s fees for defending the copyright claim but found that Bliss filed its action in good faith and that the trademark and trade dress claims were not so “exceptionally meritless” that Latham merited a rare attorney’s fees award under 15 U.S.C. 1117.  The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part.   Bliss stated claims for federal and state trademark infringement but has not stated a claim for trade dress infringement. The district court did not err in denying attorney’s fees to Latham for defending the trademark and trade dress infringement claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/22-5361/22-5361-2023-09-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Bliss Collection, LLC v. Latham Companies, LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In 1999, Latham, McLean, and Vernooy formed Bliss to sell children’s clothing under the name “bella bliss.” In 2003, Shannon left Bliss and started Latham to sell her own children’s clothing under the name “little english.” Bliss’s logo is a lowercase “b” drawn out as if stitched in thread. Bliss has registered trademarks for this logo. Bliss has several designs that it claims as signature looks of the bella bliss brand that have “become famous and widely known and recognized as symbols of unique and high-quality garments.”  There has been previous litigation between the parties.  

In 2020, Bliss filed federal claims for copyright, trademark, and trade dress infringement; false designation of origin and misappropriation of source; and unfair competition. The district court dismissed Bliss’s claims and granted Latham attorney’s fees for defending the copyright claim but found that Bliss filed its action in good faith and that the trademark and trade dress claims were not so “exceptionally meritless” that Latham merited a rare attorney’s fees award under 15 U.S.C. 1117.  The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part.   Bliss stated claims for federal and state trademark infringement but has not stated a claim for trade dress infringement. The district court did not err in denying attorney’s fees to Latham for defending the trademark and trade dress infringement claims.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Sixth Circuit holds that a plaintiff stated a claim for trademark infringement but affirms the denial of attorneys&#039; fees in that case.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-09-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Mathis</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-5361</case:docket_number>
																<case:docket_number>21-5723</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Legal Ethics"/>
							<category term="Trademark"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/21-16977/21-16977-2023-09-12.html</id>
        	<title>IMPOSSIBLE FOODS INC. V. IMPOSSIBLE X LLC</title>
        	<updated>2023-09-12T08:31:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-09-12T08:31:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/21-16977/21-16977-2023-09-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Impossible X, now a Texas LLC, is a one-person company run by Joel Runyon, a self-described “digital nomad” who for two years operated his business from San Diego. Impossible X sells apparel, nutritional supplements, diet guides, and a consulting service through its website and various social media channels. Impossible Foods sued Impossible X in federal court in California, seeking a declaration that Impossible Foods’ use of the IMPOSSIBLE mark did not infringe on Impossible X’s trademark rights. The district court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that Impossible X was subject to specific personal jurisdiction in California because it previously operated out of California and built its brand and trademarks there, and its activities in California were sufficiently affiliated with the underlying trademark dispute to satisfy the requirements of due process. First, Impossible X purposefully directed its activities toward California and availed itself of the privileges of conducting activities there by building its brand and working to establish trademark rights there. Second, Impossible Foods’ declaratory judgment action arose out of or related to Impossible X’s conduct in California. The panel did not confine its analysis to Impossible X’s trademark enforcement activities, but rather concluded that, to the extent the Federal Circuit follows such an approach for patent declaratory judgments, that approach is not justified in the trademark context. Third, the panel concluded that there was nothing unreasonable about requiring Impossible X to defend a lawsuit based on its trademark building activities in the state that was its headquarters and Runyon’s home base. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/21-16977/21-16977-2023-09-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "IMPOSSIBLE FOODS INC. V. IMPOSSIBLE X LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Impossible X, now a Texas LLC, is a one-person company run by Joel Runyon, a self-described “digital nomad” who for two years operated his business from San Diego. Impossible X sells apparel, nutritional supplements, diet guides, and a consulting service through its website and various social media channels. Impossible Foods sued Impossible X in federal court in California, seeking a declaration that Impossible Foods’ use of the IMPOSSIBLE mark did not infringe on Impossible X’s trademark rights. The district court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that Impossible X was subject to specific personal jurisdiction in California because it previously operated out of California and built its brand and trademarks there, and its activities in California were sufficiently affiliated with the underlying trademark dispute to satisfy the requirements of due process. First, Impossible X purposefully directed its activities toward California and availed itself of the privileges of conducting activities there by building its brand and working to establish trademark rights there. Second, Impossible Foods’ declaratory judgment action arose out of or related to Impossible X’s conduct in California. The panel did not confine its analysis to Impossible X’s trademark enforcement activities, but rather concluded that, to the extent the Federal Circuit follows such an approach for patent declaratory judgments, that approach is not justified in the trademark context. Third, the panel concluded that there was nothing unreasonable about requiring Impossible X to defend a lawsuit based on its trademark building activities in the state that was its headquarters and Runyon’s home base.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal, for lack of personal jurisdiction, of a trademark declaratory judgment action brought against Impossible X, LLC, by Impossible Foods, Inc., a corporation that manufactures and markets plant-based meat substitutes, and remanded for the district court to consider the merits of Impossible Foods’ claims.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-09-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Bress</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-16977</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Trademark"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/22-7063/22-7063-2023-09-12.html</id>
        	<title>American Society for Testing and Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2023-09-12T06:31:41-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-09-12T06:31:41-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/22-7063/22-7063-2023-09-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Plaintiffs in this case are three standard-developing organizations: the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE), and the NFPA. Defendant, Public.Resource.Org, is a non-profit group that disseminates legal and other materials. It has posted on its website copies of hundreds of incorporated standards. Plaintiffs sued Public Resource for copyright infringement. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on their claims as to nine of the disputed standards. The district court granted the motion and enjoined Public Resource from posting these standards. The DC Circuit reversed and remanded for further factual development. On remand, the district court held that the non-commercial posting of standards incorporated by reference into law is fair use.
 
The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s reasonable exercise of discretion in declining to award injunctive relief. The court explained that the first three factors under section 107 strongly favor fair use, and the fourth is equivocal. The court concluded that Public Resource’s non-commercial posting of incorporated standards is fair use. Further, the court found that the district court reasonably declined to enter an injunction. Public Resource promptly removed from its website the 32 standards found not to have been incorporated into law. The court explained that Plaintiffs give the court no reason to think that Public Resource will post unincorporated standards again absent an injunction &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/22-7063/22-7063-2023-09-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "American Society for Testing and Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Plaintiffs in this case are three standard-developing organizations: the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE), and the NFPA. Defendant, Public.Resource.Org, is a non-profit group that disseminates legal and other materials. It has posted on its website copies of hundreds of incorporated standards. Plaintiffs sued Public Resource for copyright infringement. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on their claims as to nine of the disputed standards. The district court granted the motion and enjoined Public Resource from posting these standards. The DC Circuit reversed and remanded for further factual development. On remand, the district court held that the non-commercial posting of standards incorporated by reference into law is fair use.
 
The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s reasonable exercise of discretion in declining to award injunctive relief. The court explained that the first three factors under section 107 strongly favor fair use, and the fourth is equivocal. The court concluded that Public Resource’s non-commercial posting of incorporated standards is fair use. Further, the court found that the district court reasonably declined to enter an injunction. Public Resource promptly removed from its website the 32 standards found not to have been incorporated into law. The court explained that Plaintiffs give the court no reason to think that Public Resource will post unincorporated standards again absent an injunction
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment declining to award injunctive relief to three standard-developing organizations raising copyright infringement claims against Defendant for posting online their copyrighted standards, as incorporated into law.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-09-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>KATSAS</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-7063</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/21-5203/21-5203-2023-08-29.html</id>
        	<title>Valancourt Books, LLC v. Merrick Garland</title>
        	<updated>2023-08-29T06:34:50-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-08-29T06:34:50-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/21-5203/21-5203-2023-08-29.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Copyright Office sent a letter to Valancourt Books, LLC, an independent press based in Richmond, Virginia, demanding physical copies of Valancourt’s published books on the pain of fines. Valancourt protested that it could not afford to deposit physical copies and that much of what it published was in the public domain. In response, the Office narrowed the list of demanded works but continued to demand that Valancourt deposit copies of its books with the Library of Congress or otherwise face a fine. Valancourt then brought this action against the Register of Copyrights and the Attorney General. Valancourt challenged the application of Section 407’s deposit requirement against it as an unconstitutional taking of its property in violation of the Fifth Amendment and an invalid burden on its speech in violation of the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to the government on both claims.
 
The DC Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in the government’s favor and remanded for the entry of judgment to Valancourt and the award of relief. The court concluded that Section 407, as applied by the Copyright Office in this case, worked an unconstitutional taking of Valancourt’s property. The court explained that the Office demanded that Valancourt relinquish property (physical copies of copyrighted books) on the pain of fines. And because the requirement to turn over copies of the works is not a condition of attaining (or retaining) copyright protection in them, the demand to forfeit property cannot be justified as the conferral of a benefit in exchange for property. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/21-5203/21-5203-2023-08-29.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Valancourt Books, LLC v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Copyright Office sent a letter to Valancourt Books, LLC, an independent press based in Richmond, Virginia, demanding physical copies of Valancourt’s published books on the pain of fines. Valancourt protested that it could not afford to deposit physical copies and that much of what it published was in the public domain. In response, the Office narrowed the list of demanded works but continued to demand that Valancourt deposit copies of its books with the Library of Congress or otherwise face a fine. Valancourt then brought this action against the Register of Copyrights and the Attorney General. Valancourt challenged the application of Section 407’s deposit requirement against it as an unconstitutional taking of its property in violation of the Fifth Amendment and an invalid burden on its speech in violation of the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to the government on both claims.
 
The DC Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in the government’s favor and remanded for the entry of judgment to Valancourt and the award of relief. The court concluded that Section 407, as applied by the Copyright Office in this case, worked an unconstitutional taking of Valancourt’s property. The court explained that the Office demanded that Valancourt relinquish property (physical copies of copyrighted books) on the pain of fines. And because the requirement to turn over copies of the works is not a condition of attaining (or retaining) copyright protection in them, the demand to forfeit property cannot be justified as the conferral of a benefit in exchange for property.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The DC Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the government on Valancourt’s actions against the Register of Copyrights and the Attorney General. The court concluded that Section 407, as applied by the Copyright Office in this case, worked an unconstitutional taking of Valancourt’s property.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-08-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>SRINIVASAN</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-5203</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Trademark"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-15188/22-15188-2023-08-24.html</id>
        	<title>ORACLE USA, INC., ET AL V. RIMINI STREET, INC.</title>
        	<updated>2023-08-24T08:31:17-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-08-24T08:31:17-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-15188/22-15188-2023-08-24.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		This civil contempt dispute is the fallout from the protracted copyright infringement litigation between Oracle USA, Inc. and Rimini Street, Inc.—now in its thirteenth year. In the underlying case, the district court entered a permanent injunction that enjoined Rimini from various infringing practices. Years later, the district court identified ten potential violations of the permanent injunction (“Issues 1– 10”), and ultimately held Rimini in contempt on five. Rimini was ordered to pay $630,000 in statutory sanctions plus attorneys’ fees. On appeal, Rimini argued that the contempt order should be reversed and that the sanctions should be vacated.
 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part the district court’s order. The permanent injunction generally prohibited Rimini from reproducing, preparing derivative works from, or distributing certain Oracle software. The district court identified ten potential violations of the permanent injunction (Issues 1–10) and held Rimini in contempt on five (Issues 1-4, 8). The panel affirmed the district court’s finding of contempt on Issues 1-4. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding Rimini in contempt for hosting Oracle files on its computer systems (Issue 1). The panel also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding Rimini in contempt for violating the injunction against the “cross use” of development environments (Issues 2, 3, and 4). Reversing the finding of contempt on Issue 8, the panel held that the district court abused its discretion in holding Rimini in contempt for creating copies of an Oracle Database file on its systems. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-15188/22-15188-2023-08-24.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "ORACLE USA, INC., ET AL V. RIMINI STREET, INC." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                This civil contempt dispute is the fallout from the protracted copyright infringement litigation between Oracle USA, Inc. and Rimini Street, Inc.—now in its thirteenth year. In the underlying case, the district court entered a permanent injunction that enjoined Rimini from various infringing practices. Years later, the district court identified ten potential violations of the permanent injunction (“Issues 1– 10”), and ultimately held Rimini in contempt on five. Rimini was ordered to pay $630,000 in statutory sanctions plus attorneys’ fees. On appeal, Rimini argued that the contempt order should be reversed and that the sanctions should be vacated.
 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part the district court’s order. The permanent injunction generally prohibited Rimini from reproducing, preparing derivative works from, or distributing certain Oracle software. The district court identified ten potential violations of the permanent injunction (Issues 1–10) and held Rimini in contempt on five (Issues 1-4, 8). The panel affirmed the district court’s finding of contempt on Issues 1-4. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding Rimini in contempt for hosting Oracle files on its computer systems (Issue 1). The panel also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding Rimini in contempt for violating the injunction against the “cross use” of development environments (Issues 2, 3, and 4). Reversing the finding of contempt on Issue 8, the panel held that the district court abused its discretion in holding Rimini in contempt for creating copies of an Oracle Database file on its systems.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part the district court’s order holding Rimini Street, Inc., in civil contempt and imposing sanctions for violations of a permanent injunction in copyright infringement litigation between Rimini and Oracle USA, Inc.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-08-24</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Bumatay</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-15188</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Trademark"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/22-1641/22-1641-2023-08-11.html</id>
        	<title>Live Face on Web, LLC v. Cremation Society of Illinois, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2023-08-11T08:00:25-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-08-11T08:00:25-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/22-1641/22-1641-2023-08-11.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendants each licensed computer code from Live Face for $328. Live Face then sued them for copyright infringement, seeking about $483,000 in damages. Live Face has roughly 200 copyright suits pending. After more than five years, with summary judgment pending, Live Face successfully moved to dismiss its suit with prejudice. It argued that a 2021 Supreme Court case (Google) made the defendants’ fair-use defense insurmountable. The defendants sought fees; the district court denied the motion, finding that the defendants did not prevail because of their defenses but rather due to a fortuitous, unforeseen change in the law. 

The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The Copyright Act authorizes prevailing parties to recover costs and fees, 17 U.S.C. 505. Four nonexclusive factors are relevant: the frivolousness of the suit; the losing party’s motivation for bringing or defending against a suit; the objective unreasonableness of the claims advanced by the losing party; and the need to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.  The defendants did prevail because of their defenses, including their fair-use defense. No matter which side prevailed in Google, the law would favor one of these parties. It is unclear whether Google changed anything relevant here, without a proper analysis of how Google affected Live Face’s claims. Even if Google did change something fundamental, the defendants raised defenses apart from fair use, which might have defeated Live Face’s claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/22-1641/22-1641-2023-08-11.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Live Face on Web, LLC v. Cremation Society of Illinois, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendants each licensed computer code from Live Face for $328. Live Face then sued them for copyright infringement, seeking about $483,000 in damages. Live Face has roughly 200 copyright suits pending. After more than five years, with summary judgment pending, Live Face successfully moved to dismiss its suit with prejudice. It argued that a 2021 Supreme Court case (Google) made the defendants’ fair-use defense insurmountable. The defendants sought fees; the district court denied the motion, finding that the defendants did not prevail because of their defenses but rather due to a fortuitous, unforeseen change in the law. 

The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The Copyright Act authorizes prevailing parties to recover costs and fees, 17 U.S.C. 505. Four nonexclusive factors are relevant: the frivolousness of the suit; the losing party’s motivation for bringing or defending against a suit; the objective unreasonableness of the claims advanced by the losing party; and the need to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.  The defendants did prevail because of their defenses, including their fair-use defense. No matter which side prevailed in Google, the law would favor one of these parties. It is unclear whether Google changed anything relevant here, without a proper analysis of how Google affected Live Face’s claims. Even if Google did change something fundamental, the defendants raised defenses apart from fair use, which might have defeated Live Face’s claims.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Seventh Circuit vacates the denial of a motion for fees in a copyright case; an intervening Supreme Court did not necessarily negate the petitioners&#039; status as prevailing parties.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-08-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kirsch</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-1641</case:docket_number>
																<case:docket_number>22-1641</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Legal Ethics"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/22-1976/22-1976-2023-08-11.html</id>
        	<title>Cornice &amp; Rose International, LLC v. Four Keys</title>
        	<updated>2023-08-11T07:30:34-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-08-11T07:30:34-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/22-1976/22-1976-2023-08-11.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990 (AWCPA)1 extended copyright protection to “architectural works,” defined in 17 U.S.C. Section 101 as “the design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including a building, architectural plans, or drawings.” The principal question raised by this appeal is whether First Security Bank &amp; Trust Company (the “Bank”), which purchased an uncompleted building in a sale approved by the bankruptcy court in the property owner’s Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding, infringed the architect’s copyright in the building by completing the building without the permission of the building’s architect, Cornice &amp; Rose (“C&amp;R”).
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with the district court there was no actionable infringement because C&amp;R’s infringement claims are precluded by the bankruptcy court’s order approving the sale. The court explained that C&amp;R makes no showing on appeal that the district court would have reached a different result (i.e., denied summary judgment) had it been allowed to file a sur-reply. In other words, the argument is entirely procedural. Further, it ignores that sur-replies are viewed with disfavor and that a party appealing the denial of leave to file a discretionary pleading has a heavy burden to prove that the adverse procedural ruling mattered. Here, even if C&amp;R’s contention that DSC and WWA raised new or additional arguments in the supplemental affidavit is fairly debatable. Thus, the court concluded that the denial of permission to file the requested sur-reply in a thoroughly litigated case was a textbook example of harmless error. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/22-1976/22-1976-2023-08-11.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Cornice &amp; Rose International, LLC v. Four Keys" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990 (AWCPA)1 extended copyright protection to “architectural works,” defined in 17 U.S.C. Section 101 as “the design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including a building, architectural plans, or drawings.” The principal question raised by this appeal is whether First Security Bank &amp; Trust Company (the “Bank”), which purchased an uncompleted building in a sale approved by the bankruptcy court in the property owner’s Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding, infringed the architect’s copyright in the building by completing the building without the permission of the building’s architect, Cornice &amp; Rose (“C&amp;R”).
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with the district court there was no actionable infringement because C&amp;R’s infringement claims are precluded by the bankruptcy court’s order approving the sale. The court explained that C&amp;R makes no showing on appeal that the district court would have reached a different result (i.e., denied summary judgment) had it been allowed to file a sur-reply. In other words, the argument is entirely procedural. Further, it ignores that sur-replies are viewed with disfavor and that a party appealing the denial of leave to file a discretionary pleading has a heavy burden to prove that the adverse procedural ruling mattered. Here, even if C&amp;R’s contention that DSC and WWA raised new or additional arguments in the supplemental affidavit is fairly debatable. Thus, the court concluded that the denial of permission to file the requested sur-reply in a thoroughly litigated case was a textbook example of harmless error.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment finding that there was no actionable infringement because C&amp;R’s infringement claims are precluded by the bankruptcy court’s order approving the sale.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-08-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Per Curiam</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-1976</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Bankruptcy"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/21-1243/21-1243-2023-07-28.html</id>
        	<title>National Religious Broadcasters Noncommercial Music License Committee v. CRB</title>
        	<updated>2023-07-28T07:03:15-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-07-28T07:03:15-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/21-1243/21-1243-2023-07-28.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Every five years, the Copyright Royalty Board (the “Board”) issues a statutory license that establishes the terms and rates under which certain entities that stream copyrighted songs over the internet make royalty payments to the songs’ copyright owners. The “webcasters” that are subject to the license are “noninteractive” — i.e., they stream music without letting their listeners choose songs on demand. This appeal challenges on various grounds the Board’s most recent noninteractive webcaster license Final Determination, covering calendar years 2021 through 2025.
 
The DC Circuit sustained Board’s Final Determination in all respects. The court held that the Board’s decision to set a royalty rate that was slightly below the Willig model’s flawed opportunity-cost measure is neither here nor there. And thus, the court explained, it has no occasion to decide, as SoundExchange urges, whether it would, as a matter of law, violate the willing buyer/willing seller standard for the Board to set a royalty rate below some definitive measure of opportunity cost. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/21-1243/21-1243-2023-07-28.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "National Religious Broadcasters Noncommercial Music License Committee v. CRB" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Every five years, the Copyright Royalty Board (the “Board”) issues a statutory license that establishes the terms and rates under which certain entities that stream copyrighted songs over the internet make royalty payments to the songs’ copyright owners. The “webcasters” that are subject to the license are “noninteractive” — i.e., they stream music without letting their listeners choose songs on demand. This appeal challenges on various grounds the Board’s most recent noninteractive webcaster license Final Determination, covering calendar years 2021 through 2025.
 
The DC Circuit sustained Board’s Final Determination in all respects. The court held that the Board’s decision to set a royalty rate that was slightly below the Willig model’s flawed opportunity-cost measure is neither here nor there. And thus, the court explained, it has no occasion to decide, as SoundExchange urges, whether it would, as a matter of law, violate the willing buyer/willing seller standard for the Board to set a royalty rate below some definitive measure of opportunity cost.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The DC Circuit sustained the Copyright Royalty Board’s Final Determination setting the rates and terms of the statutory license for calendar years 2021 through 2025.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-07-28</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Per Curiam</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-1243</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-35345/22-35345-2023-07-17.html</id>
        	<title>ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT LIMITED, INC., ET AL V. CONSTRUX SOFTWARE BUILDERS, INC., ET AL</title>
        	<updated>2023-07-17T09:03:24-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-07-17T09:03:24-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-35345/22-35345-2023-07-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Plaintiff claimed Defendant infringed her copyrights in two charts depicting organizational change. The key question is whether the copyright in one of those charts was registered with the Copyright Office such that it will support a suit for copyright infringement. 

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s partial grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants, vacated a jury verdict, vacated an award of attorneys’ fees, and remanded an action alleging infringement of copyrights in two charts depicting organizational change. The court held that Plaintiff created a genuine issue of material fact on that question. The panel held that Plaintiff raised a genuine dispute about whether she registered the chart directly or whether she registered elements of that chart by later registering an “Aligning for Success” chart. Agreeing with other circuits on a matter of first impression, the panel held that by registering a derivative work, an author registers all of the material included in the derivative work, including that which previously appeared in an unregistered, original work created by the author. The panel, therefore, reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and also vacated the jury verdict because, as a result of the grant of summary judgment, the district court prevented Plaintiff from introducing any evidence and making any argument as to the Managinwg Complex Change chart at trial. The panel further held that the district court erred in instructing the jury that if it found that Defendant accessed and copied other work but did not copy the registered Aligning for Success chart, then Dfendant’s challenged work was an independent creation. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-35345/22-35345-2023-07-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT LIMITED, INC., ET AL V. CONSTRUX SOFTWARE BUILDERS, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Plaintiff claimed Defendant infringed her copyrights in two charts depicting organizational change. The key question is whether the copyright in one of those charts was registered with the Copyright Office such that it will support a suit for copyright infringement. 

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s partial grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants, vacated a jury verdict, vacated an award of attorneys’ fees, and remanded an action alleging infringement of copyrights in two charts depicting organizational change. The court held that Plaintiff created a genuine issue of material fact on that question. The panel held that Plaintiff raised a genuine dispute about whether she registered the chart directly or whether she registered elements of that chart by later registering an “Aligning for Success” chart. Agreeing with other circuits on a matter of first impression, the panel held that by registering a derivative work, an author registers all of the material included in the derivative work, including that which previously appeared in an unregistered, original work created by the author. The panel, therefore, reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and also vacated the jury verdict because, as a result of the grant of summary judgment, the district court prevented Plaintiff from introducing any evidence and making any argument as to the Managinwg Complex Change chart at trial. The panel further held that the district court erred in instructing the jury that if it found that Defendant accessed and copied other work but did not copy the registered Aligning for Success chart, then Dfendant’s challenged work was an independent creation.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s partial grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants, vacated a jury verdict, vacated an award of attorneys’ fees, and remanded an action alleging infringement of copyrights in two charts depicting organizational change.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-07-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Ikuta</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-35345</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-15293/22-15293-2023-07-17.html</id>
        	<title>ALEXIS HUNLEY, ET AL V. INSTAGRAM, LLC</title>
        	<updated>2023-07-17T08:32:40-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-07-17T08:32:40-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-15293/22-15293-2023-07-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Plaintiffs are photographers who sued Defendant Instagram for copyright infringement. Plaintiff alleged that Instagram violates their exclusive display right by permitting third-party sites to embed the photographers’ Instagram content. The district court held that Instagram could not be liable for secondary infringement because embedding a photo does not “display a copy” of the underlying images under Perfect 10.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of an action brought by two photographers under the Copyright Act alleging that Instagram, LLC, violated their exclusive display right by permitting third-party sites to embed the photographers’ Instagram content. The panel held that, under Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007), Instagram could not be liable for secondary infringement because embedding a photo does not &quot;display a copy&quot; of the underlying image. Perfect 10 set forth the “Server Test,” which provides that a copy of a photographic image is not displayed when it is not fixed in a computer’s memory. The panel held that Perfect 10 did not restrict the application of the Server Test to a specific type of website, such as search engine. Arguments that Perfect10 is inconsistent with the Copyright Act are foreclosed by Perfect 10 outside of an en banc proceeding. And Perfect 10 was not effectively overturned by American Broadcasting Co. v. Aereo, 573 U.S. 431 (2014), which held that a streaming provider infringed broadcasters’ exclusive right to public performance. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-15293/22-15293-2023-07-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "ALEXIS HUNLEY, ET AL V. INSTAGRAM, LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Plaintiffs are photographers who sued Defendant Instagram for copyright infringement. Plaintiff alleged that Instagram violates their exclusive display right by permitting third-party sites to embed the photographers’ Instagram content. The district court held that Instagram could not be liable for secondary infringement because embedding a photo does not “display a copy” of the underlying images under Perfect 10.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of an action brought by two photographers under the Copyright Act alleging that Instagram, LLC, violated their exclusive display right by permitting third-party sites to embed the photographers’ Instagram content. The panel held that, under Perfect 10 v. Amazon, 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007), Instagram could not be liable for secondary infringement because embedding a photo does not &quot;display a copy&quot; of the underlying image. Perfect 10 set forth the “Server Test,” which provides that a copy of a photographic image is not displayed when it is not fixed in a computer’s memory. The panel held that Perfect 10 did not restrict the application of the Server Test to a specific type of website, such as search engine. Arguments that Perfect10 is inconsistent with the Copyright Act are foreclosed by Perfect 10 outside of an en banc proceeding. And Perfect 10 was not effectively overturned by American Broadcasting Co. v. Aereo, 573 U.S. 431 (2014), which held that a streaming provider infringed broadcasters’ exclusive right to public performance.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of an action brought by two photographers under the Copyright Act alleging that Instagram, LLC, violated their exclusive display right by permitting third-party sites to embed the photographers’ Instagram content.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-07-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Bybee</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-15293</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/19-1927/19-1927-2023-06-22.html</id>
        	<title>Markham Concepts, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2023-06-22T13:00:28-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-06-22T13:00:28-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/19-1927/19-1927-2023-06-22.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In this copyright action involving ownership rights to the board game, &quot;The Game of Life,&quot; the First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court denying attorney&#039;s fees sought from the unsuccessful plaintiffs, holding that the district court did not err in denying fees and that this Court declines to award fees for the appeal.

This case stemmed from a dispute between Rueben Klamer, a toy developer who came up with the initial concept of the game before it was introduced in 1960 by the Milton Bradley Company, and Bill Markham, a game designer that Klamer recruited to design and create the actual game prototype. Markham&#039;s successors-in-interest sued Klamer and other defendants seeking a declaration that they possessed &quot;termination rights&quot; under the 1976 Copyright Act. The district court granted judgment for Defendants but denied fees. Defendants appealed and moved for appellate attorney&#039;s fees. The First Circuit denied relief, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying fees; and (2) this Court declines to award fees for the appeal. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/19-1927/19-1927-2023-06-22.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Markham Concepts, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In this copyright action involving ownership rights to the board game, &quot;The Game of Life,&quot; the First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court denying attorney&#039;s fees sought from the unsuccessful plaintiffs, holding that the district court did not err in denying fees and that this Court declines to award fees for the appeal.

This case stemmed from a dispute between Rueben Klamer, a toy developer who came up with the initial concept of the game before it was introduced in 1960 by the Milton Bradley Company, and Bill Markham, a game designer that Klamer recruited to design and create the actual game prototype. Markham&#039;s successors-in-interest sued Klamer and other defendants seeking a declaration that they possessed &quot;termination rights&quot; under the 1976 Copyright Act. The district court granted judgment for Defendants but denied fees. Defendants appealed and moved for appellate attorney&#039;s fees. The First Circuit denied relief, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying fees; and (2) this Court declines to award fees for the appeal.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                In this copyright action involving ownership rights to the board game, &quot;The Game of Life,&quot; the First Circuit held that the district court did not err in denying attorney&#039;s fees.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-06-22</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kermit Victor Lipez</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>19-1927</case:docket_number>
																<case:docket_number>21-1958</case:docket_number>
																<case:docket_number>21-1957</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-35147/22-35147-2023-06-07.html</id>
        	<title>VHT, INC. V. ZILLOW GROUP, INC., ET AL</title>
        	<updated>2023-06-07T09:03:40-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-06-07T09:03:40-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-35147/22-35147-2023-06-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Thousands of copyrighted photos on Zillow’s site come from VHT, a professional real estate photography studio. Zillow used VHT’s photos on its real estate “Listing Platform,” which is the primary display of properties, and on a home design section of the website called “Digs.” Following summary judgment rulings, a jury trial, and various post-trial motions, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court in large part in prior appeal Zillow I. Essentially, the panel agreed with the district court that Zillow was not liable for direct, secondary, or contributory infringement.
 
Back on remand, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision in full. The panel held that the district court properly excused VHT’s failure to meet Section 411(a)’s non-jurisdictional exhaustion requirement because copyright registration was wholly collateral to whether Zillow infringed on VHT&#039;s copyright, dismissing VHT’s claim after the statute of limitations had already expired would cause irreparable harm, and excusal would not undermine the purpose of administrative exhaustion. The panel affirmed the district court’s ruling, on remand, that the 2,700 VHT photos remaining at issue were not a compilation, which would entitle VHT to only a single award of statutory damages under 17 U.S.C. Section 504(c), but rather, each individual photo constituted an infringement. The photos were part of VHT’s master photo database, and the VHT group registered its images as a “compilation.” But VHT also registered the underlying individual images and licensed these images on a per-image or per-property basis. The panel held that the photos had independent economic value separate from the database and did not qualify as “one work.” &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-35147/22-35147-2023-06-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "VHT, INC. V. ZILLOW GROUP, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Thousands of copyrighted photos on Zillow’s site come from VHT, a professional real estate photography studio. Zillow used VHT’s photos on its real estate “Listing Platform,” which is the primary display of properties, and on a home design section of the website called “Digs.” Following summary judgment rulings, a jury trial, and various post-trial motions, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court in large part in prior appeal Zillow I. Essentially, the panel agreed with the district court that Zillow was not liable for direct, secondary, or contributory infringement.
 
Back on remand, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision in full. The panel held that the district court properly excused VHT’s failure to meet Section 411(a)’s non-jurisdictional exhaustion requirement because copyright registration was wholly collateral to whether Zillow infringed on VHT&#039;s copyright, dismissing VHT’s claim after the statute of limitations had already expired would cause irreparable harm, and excusal would not undermine the purpose of administrative exhaustion. The panel affirmed the district court’s ruling, on remand, that the 2,700 VHT photos remaining at issue were not a compilation, which would entitle VHT to only a single award of statutory damages under 17 U.S.C. Section 504(c), but rather, each individual photo constituted an infringement. The photos were part of VHT’s master photo database, and the VHT group registered its images as a “compilation.” But VHT also registered the underlying individual images and licensed these images on a per-image or per-property basis. The panel held that the photos had independent economic value separate from the database and did not qualify as “one work.”
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment on remand in a copyright action brought by VHT, Inc., concerning the online display of photos by Zillow Group, Inc., and Zillow Inc., an online real estate marketplace.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-06-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>McKeown</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-35147</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-15162/22-15162-2023-06-07.html</id>
        	<title>DAVID LOWERY, ET AL V. RHAPSODY INTERNATIONAL, INC.</title>
        	<updated>2023-06-07T09:03:38-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-06-07T09:03:38-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-15162/22-15162-2023-06-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Counsel filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of copyright holders of musical compositions and recovered a little over $50,000 for the class members from Defendant Rhapsody International, Inc. (now rebranded as Napster), a music streaming service. The class members obtained no meaningful injunctive or nonmonetary relief in the settlement of their action. The district court nonetheless authorized $1.7 in attorneys’ fees under the “lodestar” method.
 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees to Plaintiffs’ counsel and remanded. The panel held that the touchstone for determining the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees in a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 is the benefit to the class. Here, the benefit was minimal. The panel held that the district court erred in failing to calculate the settlement’s actual benefit to the class members who submitted settlement claims, as opposed to a hypothetical $20 million cap agreed on by the parties. The panel held that district courts awarding attorneys’ fees in class actions under the Copyright Act must still generally consider the proportion between the award and the benefit to the class to ensure that the award is reasonable. The panel recognized that a fee award may exceed the monetary benefit provided to the class in certain copyright cases, such as when a copyright infringement litigation leads to substantial nonmonetary relief or provides a meaningful benefit to society, but this was not such a case. The panel instructed that, on remand, the district court should rigorously evaluate the actual benefit provided to the class and award reasonable attorneys’ fees considering that benefit. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-15162/22-15162-2023-06-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "DAVID LOWERY, ET AL V. RHAPSODY INTERNATIONAL, INC." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Counsel filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of copyright holders of musical compositions and recovered a little over $50,000 for the class members from Defendant Rhapsody International, Inc. (now rebranded as Napster), a music streaming service. The class members obtained no meaningful injunctive or nonmonetary relief in the settlement of their action. The district court nonetheless authorized $1.7 in attorneys’ fees under the “lodestar” method.
 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees to Plaintiffs’ counsel and remanded. The panel held that the touchstone for determining the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees in a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 is the benefit to the class. Here, the benefit was minimal. The panel held that the district court erred in failing to calculate the settlement’s actual benefit to the class members who submitted settlement claims, as opposed to a hypothetical $20 million cap agreed on by the parties. The panel held that district courts awarding attorneys’ fees in class actions under the Copyright Act must still generally consider the proportion between the award and the benefit to the class to ensure that the award is reasonable. The panel recognized that a fee award may exceed the monetary benefit provided to the class in certain copyright cases, such as when a copyright infringement litigation leads to substantial nonmonetary relief or provides a meaningful benefit to society, but this was not such a case. The panel instructed that, on remand, the district court should rigorously evaluate the actual benefit provided to the class and award reasonable attorneys’ fees considering that benefit.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees to Plaintiffs’ counsel in a copyright action and remanded.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-06-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Lee</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-15162</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/21-16978/21-16978-2023-05-30.html</id>
        	<title>JASON SCOTT COLLECTION, INC. V. TRENDILY FURNITURE, LLC, ET AL</title>
        	<updated>2023-05-30T07:31:37-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-05-30T07:31:37-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/21-16978/21-16978-2023-05-30.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Appellee Jason Scott Collection, Inc. (JSC) and Appellants Trendily Furniture, LLC, Trendily Home Collection, LLC and Rahul Malhotra (collectively, “Trendily”) are high-end furniture manufacturers that sell their products in the Texas market. Trendily intentionally copied three unique furniture designs by JSC and sold them to Texas retailers. The district court granted summary judgment to JSC on its copyright claim and then held Trendily liable on the trade dress claim following a bench trial. On appeal, Trendily challenged only the latter ruling, arguing that trade dress liability is precluded here because JSC did not demonstrate either secondary meaning or the likelihood of consumer confusion.
 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The panel held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that JSC did so. The panel wrote that Trendily’s clear intent to copy nonfunctional features of JSC’s pieces supports a strong inference of secondary meaning. Noting that copyright and trademark are not mutually exclusive, the panel rejected Trendily’s argument that it should be held liable only under the Copyright Act. The panel held that the district court properly considered several other factors, including that the JSC pieces were continuously manufactured and sold since 2004, that JSC had a longstanding and well-known presence in the high-end furniture market, and that JSC’s furniture was distinctive in the minds of purchasers. The panel held that the district court did not err in finding that there was a likelihood of confusion between the JSC pieces and the Trendily pieces. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/21-16978/21-16978-2023-05-30.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "JASON SCOTT COLLECTION, INC. V. TRENDILY FURNITURE, LLC, ET AL" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Appellee Jason Scott Collection, Inc. (JSC) and Appellants Trendily Furniture, LLC, Trendily Home Collection, LLC and Rahul Malhotra (collectively, “Trendily”) are high-end furniture manufacturers that sell their products in the Texas market. Trendily intentionally copied three unique furniture designs by JSC and sold them to Texas retailers. The district court granted summary judgment to JSC on its copyright claim and then held Trendily liable on the trade dress claim following a bench trial. On appeal, Trendily challenged only the latter ruling, arguing that trade dress liability is precluded here because JSC did not demonstrate either secondary meaning or the likelihood of consumer confusion.
 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The panel held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that JSC did so. The panel wrote that Trendily’s clear intent to copy nonfunctional features of JSC’s pieces supports a strong inference of secondary meaning. Noting that copyright and trademark are not mutually exclusive, the panel rejected Trendily’s argument that it should be held liable only under the Copyright Act. The panel held that the district court properly considered several other factors, including that the JSC pieces were continuously manufactured and sold since 2004, that JSC had a longstanding and well-known presence in the high-end furniture market, and that JSC’s furniture was distinctive in the minds of purchasers. The panel held that the district court did not err in finding that there was a likelihood of confusion between the JSC pieces and the Trendily pieces.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, following a bench trial, holding Trendily liable on trade dress infringement claims and awarding attorney’s fees.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-05-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Wardlaw</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-16978</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Trademark"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/22-4252/22-4252-2023-05-18.html</id>
        	<title>US v. Bijan Rafiekian</title>
        	<updated>2023-05-18T10:30:35-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-05-18T10:30:35-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/22-4252/22-4252-2023-05-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A jury convicted Defendant of one count of acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign government and one count of criminal conspiracy. The district court granted a judgment of acquittal as to both charges and conditionally granted a new trial in the event the judgment of acquittal was reversed on appeal. On appeal, in Rafiekian I, the Fourth Circuit reversed the judgments of acquittal, vacated and remanded the court’s new-trial order, and noted that the district court “may have additional justifications for its decision” that it failed to explain. On remand, ordered a new trial. The government appealed.
 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because the government’s case relied on the jury’s drawing inferences of guilt, the district court had no choice but to examine those inferences in considering the new trial motion. Barring the district court from granting a new trial based solely on disagreement with the jury’s inferences of guilt would place this class of cases beyond the reach of the new-trial standard. The government is entitled to rely on circumstantial evidence, but it is not entitled to special deference when it does so. 
 
In this case, because the district court determined that a new trial was warranted based on the weight of the evidence, the court’s role is only to ask whether the court abused its discretion in doing so. Exercising “great deference” to the district court’s “discretionary assessments of the balance of the evidence,” the court held that it did not. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/22-4252/22-4252-2023-05-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "US v. Bijan Rafiekian" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A jury convicted Defendant of one count of acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign government and one count of criminal conspiracy. The district court granted a judgment of acquittal as to both charges and conditionally granted a new trial in the event the judgment of acquittal was reversed on appeal. On appeal, in Rafiekian I, the Fourth Circuit reversed the judgments of acquittal, vacated and remanded the court’s new-trial order, and noted that the district court “may have additional justifications for its decision” that it failed to explain. On remand, ordered a new trial. The government appealed.
 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because the government’s case relied on the jury’s drawing inferences of guilt, the district court had no choice but to examine those inferences in considering the new trial motion. Barring the district court from granting a new trial based solely on disagreement with the jury’s inferences of guilt would place this class of cases beyond the reach of the new-trial standard. The government is entitled to rely on circumstantial evidence, but it is not entitled to special deference when it does so. 
 
In this case, because the district court determined that a new trial was warranted based on the weight of the evidence, the court’s role is only to ask whether the court abused its discretion in doing so. Exercising “great deference” to the district court’s “discretionary assessments of the balance of the evidence,” the court held that it did not.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, following Defendant’s appeal of his criminal conviction, and held that it would be “unjust to enter judgment of conviction” and concluded the district court did not abuse its broad discretion in granting a new trial.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-05-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>WYNN</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-4252</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/598/21-869/</id>
        	<title>Andy Warhol Foundation for Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith</title>
        	<updated>2023-05-18T08:35:23-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-05-18T08:35:23-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/598/21-869/"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In 1984, Goldsmith, a portrait artist, granted Vanity Fair a one-time license to use a Prince photograph to illustrate a story about the musician. Vanity Fair hired Andy Warhol, who made a silkscreen using Goldsmith’s photo. Vanity Fair published the resulting image, crediting Goldsmith for the “source photograph,” and paying her $400. Warhol used Goldsmith’s photograph to derive 15 additional works. In 2016, the Andy Warhol Foundation (AWF) licensed one of those works, “Orange Prince,” to Condé Nast to illustrate a magazine story about Prince. AWF received $10,000. Goldsmith received nothing. When Goldsmith asserted copyright infringement, AWF sued her. The district court granted AWF summary judgment on its assertion of “fair use,” 17 U.S.C. 107. The Second Circuit reversed.

The Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing that the first fair use factor, “the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes,” weighs against AWF’s commercial licensing to Condé Nast.  Both the 1984 and the 2016 publications are portraits of Prince used in magazines to illustrate stories about Prince; the “environment[s]” are not “distinct and different.” The 2016 use also is of a commercial nature.
Orange Prince reasonably can be perceived to portray Prince as iconic, whereas Goldsmith’s portrayal is photorealistic but the purpose of that use is still to illustrate a magazine about Prince. The degree of difference is not enough for the first factor to favor AWF. To hold otherwise would potentially authorize a range of commercial copying of photographs, to be used for purposes that are substantially the same as those of the originals. AWF offers no independent justification for copying the photograph. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/598/21-869/" target="_blank"&gt;View "Andy Warhol Foundation for Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In 1984, Goldsmith, a portrait artist, granted Vanity Fair a one-time license to use a Prince photograph to illustrate a story about the musician. Vanity Fair hired Andy Warhol, who made a silkscreen using Goldsmith’s photo. Vanity Fair published the resulting image, crediting Goldsmith for the “source photograph,” and paying her $400. Warhol used Goldsmith’s photograph to derive 15 additional works. In 2016, the Andy Warhol Foundation (AWF) licensed one of those works, “Orange Prince,” to Condé Nast to illustrate a magazine story about Prince. AWF received $10,000. Goldsmith received nothing. When Goldsmith asserted copyright infringement, AWF sued her. The district court granted AWF summary judgment on its assertion of “fair use,” 17 U.S.C. 107. The Second Circuit reversed.

The Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing that the first fair use factor, “the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes,” weighs against AWF’s commercial licensing to Condé Nast.  Both the 1984 and the 2016 publications are portraits of Prince used in magazines to illustrate stories about Prince; the “environment[s]” are not “distinct and different.” The 2016 use also is of a commercial nature.
Orange Prince reasonably can be perceived to portray Prince as iconic, whereas Goldsmith’s portrayal is photorealistic but the purpose of that use is still to illustrate a magazine about Prince. The degree of difference is not enough for the first factor to favor AWF. To hold otherwise would potentially authorize a range of commercial copying of photographs, to be used for purposes that are substantially the same as those of the originals. AWF offers no independent justification for copying the photograph.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Supreme Court rejects a claim of &quot;fair use&quot; arising in a copyright dispute concerning an Andy Warhol silkscreen made from a copyright-protected photograph.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-05-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Sonia Sotomayor</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-869</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Communications Law"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Supreme Court"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/21-40648/21-40648-2023-05-12.html</id>
        	<title>National Oilwell Varco v. Auto-Dril</title>
        	<updated>2023-05-12T15:30:15-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-05-12T15:30:15-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/21-40648/21-40648-2023-05-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Varco, L.P. (“Varco”), an oil and gas drilling company, purchased the assets of another drilling company, including U.S. Patent No. 5,474,142 (the “’142 Patent”). Varco’s parent company, Varco International, Inc., and a competitor, National Oilwell, Inc., completed a merger to form National Oilwell Varco, Inc. It was understood that Varco, as Varco International, Inc.’s operating company, would transfer its assets to the newly formed entity’s operating company: Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant National Oilwell Varco, L.P. (“NOV”).  NOV filed an action in district court alleging that Defendant-Appellant/CrossAppellee Auto-Dril, Inc. (“Auto-Dril”) infringed the ’142 Patent (the “Underlying Action”). Auto-Dril and NOV entered into a confidential settlement agreement that was intended to end their litigation over the ’142 Patent (the “Settlement Agreement”). The parties appealed various holdings that both preceded and followed a trial regarding their 2011 Settlement Agreement.
 
The Fifth Circuit held that it lacks jurisdiction over Auto-Dril’s counterclaim for being fraudulently induced into entering the Settlement Agreement. The court reversed the ruling granting summary judgment for NOV on Auto-Dril’s claim for breach of the Settlement Agreement. The court reversed the dismissal of NOV’s claim for breach of the Settlement Agreement and remanded NOV’s JMOL motion for reconsideration. The court explained that here, NOV’s conduct did not rise to the level of a fraud on the court. Specifically, there is no clear and convincing evidence that NOV was cognizant that it did not own the ’142 Patent while it was litigating the Underlying Action. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/21-40648/21-40648-2023-05-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "National Oilwell Varco v. Auto-Dril" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Varco, L.P. (“Varco”), an oil and gas drilling company, purchased the assets of another drilling company, including U.S. Patent No. 5,474,142 (the “’142 Patent”). Varco’s parent company, Varco International, Inc., and a competitor, National Oilwell, Inc., completed a merger to form National Oilwell Varco, Inc. It was understood that Varco, as Varco International, Inc.’s operating company, would transfer its assets to the newly formed entity’s operating company: Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant National Oilwell Varco, L.P. (“NOV”).  NOV filed an action in district court alleging that Defendant-Appellant/CrossAppellee Auto-Dril, Inc. (“Auto-Dril”) infringed the ’142 Patent (the “Underlying Action”). Auto-Dril and NOV entered into a confidential settlement agreement that was intended to end their litigation over the ’142 Patent (the “Settlement Agreement”). The parties appealed various holdings that both preceded and followed a trial regarding their 2011 Settlement Agreement.
 
The Fifth Circuit held that it lacks jurisdiction over Auto-Dril’s counterclaim for being fraudulently induced into entering the Settlement Agreement. The court reversed the ruling granting summary judgment for NOV on Auto-Dril’s claim for breach of the Settlement Agreement. The court reversed the dismissal of NOV’s claim for breach of the Settlement Agreement and remanded NOV’s JMOL motion for reconsideration. The court explained that here, NOV’s conduct did not rise to the level of a fraud on the court. Specifically, there is no clear and convincing evidence that NOV was cognizant that it did not own the ’142 Patent while it was litigating the Underlying Action.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling granting summary judgment for National Oilwell Varco, Inc. (“NOV”) on Auto-Dril’s claim for breach of the Settlement Agreement. The court reversed the dismissal of NOV’s claim for breach of the Settlement Agreement and remanded NOV’s JMOL motion for reconsideration.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-05-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>King</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-40648</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Trademark"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/22-1313/22-1313-2023-05-10.html</id>
        	<title>Foss v. Eastern States Exposition</title>
        	<updated>2023-05-10T13:01:04-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-05-10T13:01:04-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/22-1313/22-1313-2023-05-10.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The First Circuit vacated the judgment dismissing on claim preclusion grounds Plaintiff&#039;s claims against Eastern States Exposition alleging violations of federal copyright infringement law and the U.S. Visual Artists Rights Act, holding that the district court erred.

On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the claim preclusive order gave claim preclusive effect to the dismissal in a prior action that she brought even where the dismissal rested on several grounds, not all of which would on their own render the dismissal claim preclusive. In support of her claim, Plaintiff argued that federal res judicata law recognizes the &quot;alternative-determinations&quot; doctrine. The First Circuit vacated the judgment dismissing the claims at issue, holding (1) the assertedly preclusive dismissal rested on one ground that, on its own, would not allow the dismissal to be claim preclusive, even though the dismissal also rested on two counts that could have; and (2) federal res judiata law recognizes the alternative-determinations doctrine, which strips a dismissal of claim preclusive effect if the dismissal rests on multiple grounds, not all of which would on their own render the dismissal claim preclusive, and the doctrine applied in this case. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/22-1313/22-1313-2023-05-10.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Foss v. Eastern States Exposition" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The First Circuit vacated the judgment dismissing on claim preclusion grounds Plaintiff&#039;s claims against Eastern States Exposition alleging violations of federal copyright infringement law and the U.S. Visual Artists Rights Act, holding that the district court erred.

On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the claim preclusive order gave claim preclusive effect to the dismissal in a prior action that she brought even where the dismissal rested on several grounds, not all of which would on their own render the dismissal claim preclusive. In support of her claim, Plaintiff argued that federal res judicata law recognizes the &quot;alternative-determinations&quot; doctrine. The First Circuit vacated the judgment dismissing the claims at issue, holding (1) the assertedly preclusive dismissal rested on one ground that, on its own, would not allow the dismissal to be claim preclusive, even though the dismissal also rested on two counts that could have; and (2) federal res judiata law recognizes the alternative-determinations doctrine, which strips a dismissal of claim preclusive effect if the dismissal rests on multiple grounds, not all of which would on their own render the dismissal claim preclusive, and the doctrine applied in this case.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The First Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing on claim preclusion grounds Plaintiff&#039;s claims against Eastern States Exposition alleging violations of federal copyright infringement law and the U.S. Visual Artists Rights Act.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-05-10</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>David J. Barron</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-1313</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/21-55642/21-55642-2023-04-21.html</id>
        	<title>SAN DIEGO COUNTY CREDIT UNION V. CEFCU</title>
        	<updated>2023-04-21T08:31:17-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-04-21T08:31:17-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/21-55642/21-55642-2023-04-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Defendant Citizens Equity First Credit Union (CEFCU) petitioned the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) to cancel a trademark registration belonging to Plaintiff San Diego County Credit Union (SDCCU). SDCCU procured a stay to the TTAB proceedings by filing an action seeking declaratory relief to establish that it was not infringing either of CEFCU’s registered and common-law marks and to establish that those marks were invalid. The district court granted SDCCU’s motion for summary judgment on noninfringement. After a bench trial, the district court also held that CEFCU’s common-law mark was invalid and awarded SDCCU attorneys’ fees.
 
The Ninth Circuit filed (1) an order amending its opinion, denying a petition for panel rehearing, and denying on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc; and (2) an amended opinion affirming in part and vacating in part the district court’s judgment and award of attorneys’ fees. The panel held that SDCCU had no personal stake in seeking to invalidate CEFCU’s common-law mark because the district court had already granted summary judgment in favor of SDCCU, which established that SDCCU was not infringing that mark. The panel held that the district court correctly exercised personal jurisdiction over CEFCU regarding SDCCU’s noninfringement claims, which sought declaratory relief that SDCCU was not infringing CEFCU’s registered mark or common-law mark. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/21-55642/21-55642-2023-04-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "SAN DIEGO COUNTY CREDIT UNION V. CEFCU" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Defendant Citizens Equity First Credit Union (CEFCU) petitioned the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) to cancel a trademark registration belonging to Plaintiff San Diego County Credit Union (SDCCU). SDCCU procured a stay to the TTAB proceedings by filing an action seeking declaratory relief to establish that it was not infringing either of CEFCU’s registered and common-law marks and to establish that those marks were invalid. The district court granted SDCCU’s motion for summary judgment on noninfringement. After a bench trial, the district court also held that CEFCU’s common-law mark was invalid and awarded SDCCU attorneys’ fees.
 
The Ninth Circuit filed (1) an order amending its opinion, denying a petition for panel rehearing, and denying on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc; and (2) an amended opinion affirming in part and vacating in part the district court’s judgment and award of attorneys’ fees. The panel held that SDCCU had no personal stake in seeking to invalidate CEFCU’s common-law mark because the district court had already granted summary judgment in favor of SDCCU, which established that SDCCU was not infringing that mark. The panel held that the district court correctly exercised personal jurisdiction over CEFCU regarding SDCCU’s noninfringement claims, which sought declaratory relief that SDCCU was not infringing CEFCU’s registered mark or common-law mark.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Ninth Circuit filed (1) an order amending its opinion, denying a petition for panel rehearing, and denying on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc; and (2) an amended opinion affirming in part and vacating in part the district court’s judgment and award of attorneys’ fees in favor of Plaintiff and remanding in a trademark case.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-04-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Bea</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-55642</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Trademark"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/22-20333/22-20333-2023-04-13.html</id>
        	<title>Martinelli v. Hearst Newspapers</title>
        	<updated>2023-04-13T15:31:01-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-04-13T15:31:01-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/22-20333/22-20333-2023-04-13.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Sotheby’s International Realty commissioned Plaintiff to photograph Lugalla, an Irish estate owned by the Guinness family. Plaintiff took seven photographs of the property, and Lugalla was subsequently listed for sale. On March 7, 2017, Hearst Newspapers used Plaintiff’s photographs in a web-only article, which Hearst Newspapers published on websites associated with the Houston Chronicle, the San Francisco Chronicle, the Times Union, the Greenwich Time, and The Middletown Press. Plaintiff sued Hearst Newspapers for copyright infringement. On February 11, 2022, Plaintiff amended his complaint to bring a copyright infringement claim against Hearst Magazine Media, Inc. and to allege that his photographs were also used on websites associated with various media sources. Plaintiff brought these claims within three years of discovering the infringements but more than three years after the infringements occurred. The district court followed Graper, granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, and denied Hearst’s motion.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court first explained that Graper is the only precedent binding upon the court to apply the discovery rule with respect to the Section 507(b) limitations period for copyright infringement claims. Further, the court wrote that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Petrella and Rotkiske did not unequivocally overrule Graper. And under Graper, Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claims were timely because he brought them within three years of discovering Hearst’s infringements. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/22-20333/22-20333-2023-04-13.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Martinelli v. Hearst Newspapers" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Sotheby’s International Realty commissioned Plaintiff to photograph Lugalla, an Irish estate owned by the Guinness family. Plaintiff took seven photographs of the property, and Lugalla was subsequently listed for sale. On March 7, 2017, Hearst Newspapers used Plaintiff’s photographs in a web-only article, which Hearst Newspapers published on websites associated with the Houston Chronicle, the San Francisco Chronicle, the Times Union, the Greenwich Time, and The Middletown Press. Plaintiff sued Hearst Newspapers for copyright infringement. On February 11, 2022, Plaintiff amended his complaint to bring a copyright infringement claim against Hearst Magazine Media, Inc. and to allege that his photographs were also used on websites associated with various media sources. Plaintiff brought these claims within three years of discovering the infringements but more than three years after the infringements occurred. The district court followed Graper, granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, and denied Hearst’s motion.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court first explained that Graper is the only precedent binding upon the court to apply the discovery rule with respect to the Section 507(b) limitations period for copyright infringement claims. Further, the court wrote that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Petrella and Rotkiske did not unequivocally overrule Graper. And under Graper, Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claims were timely because he brought them within three years of discovering Hearst’s infringements.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment finding that Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claims were timely because he brought them within three years of discovering Defendant’s infringements.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-04-13</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen A. Higginson</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-20333</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1542/21-1542-2023-04-06.html</id>
        	<title>SAS Institute, Inc. v. World Programming Ltd.</title>
        	<updated>2023-04-06T06:02:16-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-04-06T06:02:16-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1542/21-1542-2023-04-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		SAS creates and sells software used for data access, management, analysis, and presentation. The SAS System allows users to input user-written programs into its graphical user interface to complete analytics tasks. Users write commands in SAS’s programming language.  An earlier version of the SAS System is in the public domain. SAS has copyright registrations that cover various aspects of the SAS System. WPL created a competitor, the WPS System, which uses the SAS Language to allow users to run user-written programs to complete analytics tasks such as data access, management, analysis, and presentation. SAS sued WPL, alleging copyright infringement of the SAS System and SAS user manuals. 

The district court first concluded that SAS possessed valid copyright registrations covering SAS’s asserted software, then determined that WPL provided evidence that showed the software program elements were not within the scope of protection under copyright law.  Applying the abstraction-filtration-comparison test, the district court determined that SAS failed to establish copyrightability. 

The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The court interpreted “copyrightability” as meaning whether the specific elements of a copyrighted work that are asserted in a copyright infringement action fall within the scope of protection extended to that particular work under copyright law.  The district court acted properly in conducting a pretrial “Copyrightability Hearing.” &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1542/21-1542-2023-04-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "SAS Institute, Inc. v. World Programming Ltd." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                SAS creates and sells software used for data access, management, analysis, and presentation. The SAS System allows users to input user-written programs into its graphical user interface to complete analytics tasks. Users write commands in SAS’s programming language.  An earlier version of the SAS System is in the public domain. SAS has copyright registrations that cover various aspects of the SAS System. WPL created a competitor, the WPS System, which uses the SAS Language to allow users to run user-written programs to complete analytics tasks such as data access, management, analysis, and presentation. SAS sued WPL, alleging copyright infringement of the SAS System and SAS user manuals. 

The district court first concluded that SAS possessed valid copyright registrations covering SAS’s asserted software, then determined that WPL provided evidence that showed the software program elements were not within the scope of protection under copyright law.  Applying the abstraction-filtration-comparison test, the district court determined that SAS failed to establish copyrightability. 

The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The court interpreted “copyrightability” as meaning whether the specific elements of a copyrighted work that are asserted in a copyright infringement action fall within the scope of protection extended to that particular work under copyright law.  The district court acted properly in conducting a pretrial “Copyrightability Hearing.”
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit upholds a determination that certain software program elements were not within the scope of protection under copyright law.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-04-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jimmie V. Reyna</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-1542</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/22-2386/22-2386-2023-03-31.html</id>
        	<title>Sullivan v. Flora, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2023-03-31T08:31:14-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-03-31T08:31:14-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/22-2386/22-2386-2023-03-31.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Sullivan registered copyrights for two “illustration collections,” comprising 33 individual illustrations, and sued Flora for infringing those copyrights, 17 U.S.C. 504(c)(1). A jury found that Flora willfully infringed Sullivan’s copyrights and awarded statutory damages for each of the individual illustrations infringed ($3,600,000). The Seventh Circuit rejected the court&#039;s test for calculating statutory damages, which focused exclusively on how the illustrations were copyrighted. The court adopted the “independent economic value test”: “A protected work has standalone value if the evidence shows that work has distinct and discernable value to the copyright holder.”  On remand, the district court denied Flora’s request to reopen discovery; held that Flora had waived arguments challenging the independent economic value of certain illustrations; granted Sullivan summary judgment; and entered the same verdict, finding that the 33 illustrations constitute separate works.  

The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that, in entering summary judgment, the district court violated the remand mandate and improperly weighed the evidence.  The case must proceed to trial on the question of damages. The scope of the remand was narrow and limited to determining whether Sullivan’s illustrations “constitute 33 individual works or instead are parts of two compilations (corresponding with the two advertising campaigns in which Flora used the illustrations).” At trial, Flora is not prohibited from “nitpicking” specific aspects of the 33 illustrations to show that they lack independent economic value.  Flora is not permitted to relitigate the issues of infringement or joint authorship. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/22-2386/22-2386-2023-03-31.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Sullivan v. Flora, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Sullivan registered copyrights for two “illustration collections,” comprising 33 individual illustrations, and sued Flora for infringing those copyrights, 17 U.S.C. 504(c)(1). A jury found that Flora willfully infringed Sullivan’s copyrights and awarded statutory damages for each of the individual illustrations infringed ($3,600,000). The Seventh Circuit rejected the court&#039;s test for calculating statutory damages, which focused exclusively on how the illustrations were copyrighted. The court adopted the “independent economic value test”: “A protected work has standalone value if the evidence shows that work has distinct and discernable value to the copyright holder.”  On remand, the district court denied Flora’s request to reopen discovery; held that Flora had waived arguments challenging the independent economic value of certain illustrations; granted Sullivan summary judgment; and entered the same verdict, finding that the 33 illustrations constitute separate works.  

The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that, in entering summary judgment, the district court violated the remand mandate and improperly weighed the evidence.  The case must proceed to trial on the question of damages. The scope of the remand was narrow and limited to determining whether Sullivan’s illustrations “constitute 33 individual works or instead are parts of two compilations (corresponding with the two advertising campaigns in which Flora used the illustrations).” At trial, Flora is not prohibited from “nitpicking” specific aspects of the 33 illustrations to show that they lack independent economic value.  Flora is not permitted to relitigate the issues of infringement or joint authorship.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Seventh Circuit remands a copyright infringement damages award for a determination of whether individual illustrations in compilations have &quot;standalone value.&quot;
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-03-31</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>St. Eve</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-2386</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/22-1041/22-1041-2023-03-03.html</id>
        	<title>Interprofession du Gruyere v. U.S. Dairy Export Council</title>
        	<updated>2023-03-03T12:00:54-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-03-03T12:00:54-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/22-1041/22-1041-2023-03-03.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Appellants are a Swiss consortium, Interprofession du Gruyère (“IDG”), and a French consortium, Syndicat Interprofessionel du Gruyère (“SIG”) (together, “the Consortiums”), who believe that gruyere should only be used to label cheese that is produced in the Gruyère region of Switzerland and France. Seeking to enforce this limitation in the United States, the Consortiums filed an application with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) to register the word “GRUYERE” as a certification mark. Appellees, the U.S. Dairy Export Council, Atalanta Corporation, and Intercibus, Inc. (together, “the Opposers”), opposed this certification mark because they believe the term is generic and, therefore, ineligible for such protection. The USPTO’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) agreed with the Opposers and held that “GRUYERE” could not be registered as a certification mark because it is generic. The Consortiums filed a complaint challenging the TTAB’s decision in the United States district court. The district court granted summary judgment for the Opposers on the same grounds as articulated in the TTAB’s decision.
 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed and concluded that that the term “GRUYERE” is generic as a matter of law. The court explained that the Consortiums have not brought evidence bearing on whether, at an earlier point in history, the term “GRUYERE” was in common use in the United States. But even assuming that was the case, this argument still fails. In sum, the Consortiums cannot overcome what the record makes clear: cheese consumers in the United States understand “GRUYERE” to refer to a type of cheese, which renders the term generic. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/22-1041/22-1041-2023-03-03.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Interprofession du Gruyere v. U.S. Dairy Export Council" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Appellants are a Swiss consortium, Interprofession du Gruyère (“IDG”), and a French consortium, Syndicat Interprofessionel du Gruyère (“SIG”) (together, “the Consortiums”), who believe that gruyere should only be used to label cheese that is produced in the Gruyère region of Switzerland and France. Seeking to enforce this limitation in the United States, the Consortiums filed an application with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) to register the word “GRUYERE” as a certification mark. Appellees, the U.S. Dairy Export Council, Atalanta Corporation, and Intercibus, Inc. (together, “the Opposers”), opposed this certification mark because they believe the term is generic and, therefore, ineligible for such protection. The USPTO’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) agreed with the Opposers and held that “GRUYERE” could not be registered as a certification mark because it is generic. The Consortiums filed a complaint challenging the TTAB’s decision in the United States district court. The district court granted summary judgment for the Opposers on the same grounds as articulated in the TTAB’s decision.
 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed and concluded that that the term “GRUYERE” is generic as a matter of law. The court explained that the Consortiums have not brought evidence bearing on whether, at an earlier point in history, the term “GRUYERE” was in common use in the United States. But even assuming that was the case, this argument still fails. In sum, the Consortiums cannot overcome what the record makes clear: cheese consumers in the United States understand “GRUYERE” to refer to a type of cheese, which renders the term generic.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling granting summary judgment to the U.S. Dairy Export Council, Atalanta Corporation, and Intercibus, Inc. (together, “the Opposers”), in Appellants complaint challenging the TTAB’s finding that “GRUYERE” could not be registered as a certification mark because it is generic.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-03-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>GREGORY</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-1041</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Trademark"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
    </feed>

