Contracts - Justia Case Law Summaries

Fox v DuPage Township

2026-07-31T12:00:46-08:00

Two long-term employees of a township senior center lost their jobs when a newly elected board, led by a candidate from the opposing political party, reorganized the center's leadership structure. The plaintiffs, both Republicans, had campaigned for the losing Republican candidate in the local election. After the incoming Democratic supervisor and board took office, they voted to eliminate the plaintiffs' positions as part of a broader reorganization, creating new roles and appointing others, including one individual who had also supported the Republican candidate. After their terminations, the plaintiffs filed suit in Illinois state court, naming the township and certain officials as defendants. They alleged, among other claims, that their First Amendment rights had been violated because their political activity was a motivating factor in their dismissals. The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Following partial dismissal of claims, only the First Amendment retaliation and breach of implied contract claims against the township remained. After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for the township, finding plaintiffs had not shown that their political activity was a motivating factor in the terminations, nor had they rebutted the township's evidence of legitimate reasons for the reorganization. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs had not produced sufficient evidence that their political activity motivated their terminations. The court found that the undisputed evidence showed neither the new supervisor nor the trustees knew of the plaintiffs' political involvement, and there were valid, non-retaliatory reasons for the personnel changes. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the township. View "Fox v DuPage Township" on Justia Law

Big Iron Auction Co. v. Harder Capital

2026-07-31T05:07:33-08:00

A Nebraska auction company and its former independent sales representative (ISR) entered into a written agreement containing restrictive covenants, including a noncompete clause, and an arbitration provision governed by the Federal Arbitration Act. The ISR terminated the relationship and began working for a competitor, allegedly violating the noncompete clause. The auction company sued for breach of contract, injunctive relief, and tortious interference, seeking a temporary injunction to prevent the ISR’s competitive activities. The District Court for Hall County compelled arbitration for the breach of contract and tortious interference claims but retained jurisdiction to decide the request for injunctive relief, ultimately granting a temporary injunction against the ISR. While the arbitration was pending, the ISR sought to dissolve the injunction and later moved for damages, costs, and attorney fees under Nebraska’s injunction undertaking statute after the arbitrator ruled the restrictive covenants unenforceable and awarded certain damages to the ISR. The arbitrator also found that additional damages based on the invalidation of the restrictive covenants were speculative and not recoverable. The District Court confirmed the arbitral award and denied the ISR’s subsequent motion for additional damages, reasoning that the arbitral award was preclusive as to all damages except attorney fees and expenses. The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that, due to the scope of the arbitration and the confirmation of the arbitrator’s award, the ISR could not recover further damages for the wrongful injunction that overlapped with claims already addressed in arbitration. However, the Court held that attorney fees and expenses related to resisting the issuance and seeking dissolution of the wrongful injunction were not foreclosed by the arbitration and should be awarded. The Supreme Court modified the lower court’s judgment to include $11,000 in such fees and otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "Big Iron Auction Co. v. Harder Capital" on Justia Law

Arkeyo LLC v Saggezza, Inc.

2026-07-30T12:00:46-08:00

Two software development companies became involved in a dispute after a UK bank, Metro Bank PLC, hired one company, Arkeyo LLC, to create software for its coin-counting machines. Years later, as Arkeyo’s product became outdated, Metro Bank engaged Saggezza UK (a subsidiary of Saggezza, Inc.) to build replacement software. During development, Metro Bank provided Saggezza with an Arkeyo-operated touchscreen computer for reference. Arkeyo later alleged that Saggezza, Inc. infringed its copyrights and trade secrets, interfered with its contract and business relationship with Metro Bank, and converted Arkeyo’s property. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment for Saggezza, Inc. on all claims, ruling that Arkeyo did not show Saggezza, Inc. was responsible for the alleged infringement or tortious acts—these, if they occurred, were committed by Saggezza UK, which was not a defendant. The district court also denied Arkeyo’s motions for sanctions and for reconsideration based on purportedly new evidence, and it awarded attorney’s fees to Saggezza, Inc. under federal statutes. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that Arkeyo’s copyright claims failed because there was no evidence of copying. The trade secret claims failed due to Arkeyo’s public disclosure of its software and the generic nature of the alleged secrets. The tortious interference claims were rejected because Saggezza’s competitive conduct was not “wrongful” under Illinois law, and the conversion claim failed since Arkeyo did not own or demand the property. The appellate court also affirmed the denial of sanctions, the denial of reconsideration, and the award of attorney’s fees. View "Arkeyo LLC v Saggezza, Inc." on Justia Law

Rolfsrud v. Continental Resources, Inc.

2026-07-30T07:31:05-08:00

The dispute centers on mineral rights to a property in McKenzie County, North Dakota. In 1938, the county acquired the property from Ellen Stole through foreclosure. In 1948, the county leased mineral rights—the “County Lease”—to Thomas Dorough, granting extraction rights in exchange for royalties. Hans Stole, Ellen’s son, redeemed the property in 1951, terminating the county’s ownership, and in 1954 ratified the County Lease as it pertained to his interest. There has been continuous mineral production since 1957. The Rolfsruds acquired the property in 2002 and entered new leases in 2007 and 2019—the latter (“Rolfsrud Lease”) granting higher royalties and naming Davis Exploration as lessee. Continental Resources operated under both leases, ultimately paying royalties at the lower County Lease rate. The Rolfsruds, joined by Davis Exploration, sued Continental and Petro-Hunt, asserting the Rolfsrud Lease controlled the property and raising several claims, including breach, quiet title, and declaratory relief. The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota granted summary judgment to the defendants. The court relied on Ulrich v. Amerada Petroleum Corporation and Holbeck v. Hull from the North Dakota Supreme Court, finding the County Lease had priority. The court determined the Rolfsrud Lease was a “top lease” and quieted title in favor of Petro-Hunt’s interest under the County Lease. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. It held the County Lease became voidable—not void—upon redemption, and Hans’s ratification was valid as to the property he owned. The court further held continuous production under the County Lease sustained its force, despite no Pugh clause or lack of production on the specific property. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding the County Lease controls the subject property and the Rolfsrud Lease is a top lease. View "Rolfsrud v. Continental Resources, Inc." on Justia Law

Pinnacle Flooring Solutions v. Premier Homes Group

2026-07-30T04:37:44-08:00

Premier contracted Pinnacle to provide labor and materials for flooring in three homes, with each subcontract containing a clause allowing Premier to recover attorney fees in the event of Pinnacle’s default. Pinnacle sued Premier, alleging breach of contract for unpaid work, attaching the relevant subcontracts as exhibits. Premier counterclaimed, asserting that Pinnacle breached the subcontracts due to defective work, and requested attorney fees. Premier’s counterclaim referenced paragraphs from Pinnacle’s complaint, which incorporated the contracts, but did not explicitly state the basis for its attorney fees request. Pre-trial, Premier’s counsel informed Pinnacle’s counsel by email that the attorney fees request was based on Section 8(b) of the subcontracts, and the parties agreed to bifurcate the fees issue. The Circuit Court of Virginia found for Premier on its counterclaim regarding the breach, but denied Premier’s request for attorney fees, holding that Premier had not sufficiently identified the basis for its fee request in the counterclaim as required by Rule 3:25(b) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia. Premier appealed, and the Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed, concluding that the incorporation of the subcontracts and the attached exhibits were sufficient to put Pinnacle on notice of the contractual basis for the attorney fees claim. The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case de novo and held that Rule 3:25(b) is a pleading requirement, not merely a notice requirement. The court determined that Premier failed to affirmatively identify the basis for its attorney fees request in its counterclaim, and that mere incorporation by reference of the contracts was insufficient. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s denial of attorney fees to Premier, entering final judgment for Pinnacle on the attorney fees issue. View "Pinnacle Flooring Solutions v. Premier Homes Group" on Justia Law

Joliet Avionics, Inc. v City of Aurora

2026-07-29T12:30:58-08:00

A company that operated as a fixed-base operator at a municipal airport sued the city that owns and operates the airport. The company alleged that the city provided more favorable lease terms and selectively excused certain regulatory requirements for a competing operator, thereby disadvantaging the plaintiff. The city’s leases with the plaintiff and with its competitor differed in several respects, including rent abatement periods, required capital investments, and compliance with fuel storage and insurance requirements. The plaintiff argued that these differences, along with the city’s alleged failure to strictly enforce its own policies and federal grant assurances, constituted both an equal protection violation under a “class-of-one” theory and a breach of contract. The lawsuit was originally filed in Illinois state court, but the city removed it to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiff amended its complaint to drop claims against the competitor and proceeded against the city for breach of contract and equal protection violations. After discovery, both sides moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for the city on both claims, finding that the class-of-one theory did not apply in the context of government contracting and that the contractual documents did not incorporate the policies or grant assurances as enforceable obligations. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that a class-of-one claim under the Equal Protection Clause is not available where a company challenges the terms of its lease or its competitor’s treatment under a different lease, absent any class-based discrimination. The court also held that the city’s policy and grant assurances were not incorporated into the plaintiff’s lease as enforceable contract terms, nor did the law provide a private right to enforce them in this context. The court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the city. View "Joliet Avionics, Inc. v City of Aurora" on Justia Law

Bonfiglioli USA, Inc. v. Midwest Engineered Components, Inc.

2026-07-29T12:30:40-08:00

A Kentucky-based manufacturer entered into a sales representative agreement with a Minnesota-based company to facilitate sales of industrial parts in several Midwestern states. The contract included a choice of law clause specifying Kentucky law would govern disputes and permitted the manufacturer to terminate the relationship at its discretion. However, a pre-contract email from Minnesota’s representatives revealed their intent to disregard the Kentucky choice of law, planning instead to invoke the Minnesota Termination of Sales Representatives Act (MTSRA), which restricts termination and invalidates conflicting contract terms. After several years, the manufacturer issued a termination notice in line with the contract. The Minnesota company, shortly before the contract’s automatic renewal, claimed protection under the MTSRA and demanded $165,000, threatening litigation. The manufacturer responded by filing suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, seeking declaratory judgment that Kentucky law governed and asserting fraudulent inducement based on the Minnesota company’s misrepresentation of its intent to abide by the choice of law provision. The district court held that Kentucky law applied, rendering the MTSRA inapplicable, and granted declaratory judgment for the manufacturer. It permitted the fraudulent inducement claim to proceed to a jury, which found the Minnesota company liable, awarding nominal actual damages and $280,000 in punitive damages. The court denied post-trial motions challenging the verdict, jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, and the punitive damages award. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Sixth Circuit held that Kentucky’s choice of law rules applied and that Kentucky had the most significant relationship to the contract, making the MTSRA inapplicable. The court upheld the jury’s finding of fraudulent inducement and found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s management of trial issues. The punitive damages award was found not to violate due process. View "Bonfiglioli USA, Inc. v. Midwest Engineered Components, Inc." on Justia Law

SERENITY INVESTMENTS, LLC, ET AL. V. SUN HUNG KAI STRATEGIC CAPITAL, LTD.

2026-07-29T08:01:15-08:00

Two investment entities entered into an agreement to sell a significant number of shares of a company to a purchaser. The seller was represented by a law firm as administrative agent and a broker as placement agent. Before the purchaser paid for the shares, it placed the transaction on hold. Despite this, the shares were mistakenly transferred to the purchaser. Multiple parties, including the administrative agent and broker, communicated about the error, and assurances were made that the transfer would be reversed. However, the reversal did not occur, and years later, the purchaser executed documents asserting ownership of the shares, which had notably increased in value. After demands for the return of the shares went unmet, the sellers filed suit. The shares were eventually returned, but their value had dropped. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California addressed claims brought by the sellers against the purchaser for conversion, among other causes of action. The purchaser, in turn, filed a third-party complaint seeking equitable indemnity and statutory contribution from the administrative agent and broker, alleging negligence in their handling of the transaction. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the third-party defendants on the equitable indemnity claim, reasoning that conversion is an intentional tort for which equitable indemnity is unavailable. The sellers and purchaser settled their claims, but the purchaser appealed the indemnity ruling. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. It held that, under California law, conversion is a strict liability tort, not an intentional tort requiring wrongful intent. Accordingly, a party liable for conversion may seek partial equitable indemnity from negligent joint tortfeasors. The panel reversed the district court’s summary judgment for the third-party defendants and remanded for further proceedings. View "SERENITY INVESTMENTS, LLC, ET AL. V. SUN HUNG KAI STRATEGIC CAPITAL, LTD." on Justia Law

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburg

2026-07-28T08:02:04-08:00

Between 2007 and 2011, Michael Jensen sexually abused multiple children in Martinsburg, West Virginia. Jensen’s parents and grandfather held significant positions within the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. Several of Jensen’s victims later sued the Church in West Virginia state court, alleging that the Church failed to take reasonable precautions to prevent Jensen’s abuse, including failing to report suspected abuse and failing to supervise or warn families about Jensen’s prior conduct. Before a verdict was reached, the Church settled with the remaining minor plaintiffs and their families. Following settlement, the Church sought coverage from two of its insurers, National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA, and ACE Property and Casualty Insurance Company, for defense and settlement costs. Both insurers refused to pay, prompting the Church to file suit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, claiming breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith. The central issue became whether the underlying events constituted a single “occurrence” or multiple “occurrences” under the insurance policies, which would determine if the Church’s settlements met the policies’ retained limits required for coverage. The district court granted summary judgment to the insurers, holding that each instance of abuse was a separate occurrence and, therefore, the retained limits were not met for any single occurrence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The Tenth Circuit held that the insurance policies’ definitions of “occurrence” were ambiguous and that the Church’s interpretation—that its alleged negligence constituted a single occurrence—was reasonable. Under Utah law, ambiguities in insurance contracts must be construed in favor of coverage. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburg" on Justia Law

Wildcat Coal v. Pacific Minerals

2026-07-28T08:02:04-08:00

The dispute centers on a coal mining lease in Wyoming originally executed in 1986 between Rock Springs Royalty Company and Bridger Coal Company. Under this lease, Bridger gained exclusive rights to mine coal from a specified area (the “Nine Mile Lease”) and was required to mine at least forty-five percent of the total coal from both the leased lands and “Adjoining Lands” every five years. Bridger was obligated to pay production royalties based on actual coal mined or, if it failed to meet the threshold, advance royalties based on projected production. For nearly thirty years, payments proceeded without issue. In 2020, Bridger, anticipating it would not meet the production threshold, paid an advance royalty, but Wildcat Coal LLC, which had succeeded as lessor, objected to the calculation, particularly the definition of “Adjoining Lands.” Bridger then withheld future royalties to recover what it claimed was an overpayment, prompting Wildcat to sue for breach of contract. The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming granted summary judgment for Wildcat, finding Bridger’s definition of “Adjoining Lands” was incorrect and that the term included both public and private lands as well as surface and underground mining. In a footnote, the district court sua sponte required Bridger to recalculate all royalties paid since 1986, although neither party had requested this. Bridger subsequently moved to correct the order, arguing that a thirty-six-month protest provision in the lease barred recalculation for earlier years, but the district court denied the motion. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Tenth Circuit held that the lease’s protest provision precluded recalculation of royalties for payments made before 2016, reversed the district court’s order requiring recalculation from 1986, affirmed the district court’s interpretation of “Adjoining Lands,” and remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Wildcat Coal v. Pacific Minerals" on Justia Law

Constance L. Beane v. Village on Great Brook, LLC

2026-07-28T07:08:50-08:00

A condominium resident entered into an agreement with the developer, the unit owners’ association, and other unit owners after concerns were raised about infrastructure and proposed changes to the condominium plan. The agreement required the developer to complete infrastructure work, pay a sum to the association, and convey a vacant lot to the association in exchange for the unit owners withdrawing their opposition to a planning board application. The agreement included a provision requiring planning board approval of the developer’s application by March 1, 2023, as a condition for the parties’ obligations. The planning board, however, did not approve the application until March 28, 2023. After learning that the lot was to be sold to a third party, the resident sued for specific performance of the agreement. The Superior Court (York County) granted the developer’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the failure to obtain planning board approval by the specified date was an unmet condition precedent, discharging all parties from their obligations under the agreement. The court also dismissed the resident’s claims for quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and declaratory relief on independent grounds. On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed whether the timing requirement for planning board approval was necessarily a material condition precedent as a matter of law. The Court held that, in actions seeking equitable relief such as specific performance, whether time is of the essence is a factual question dependent on the intent of the parties and the circumstances. The Court concluded that the materiality of the March 1 deadline could not be determined solely from the pleadings, and that the complaint alleged facts which, if proven, could entitle the resident to relief. The Court vacated the dismissal of the breach of contract claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Constance L. Beane v. Village on Great Brook, LLC" on Justia Law

Neils Point, LLC v. Grady

2026-07-28T07:08:50-08:00

Neils Point, LLC owns a farm property in Harpswell, Maine, which it leased to Joseph and Laura Grady for agricultural use. The Gradys resided on the property and operated the farm under successive lease agreements, culminating in a 2017 extension titled “Commercial Agricultural Lease Agreement.” This lease specified that it was not a residential rental, set rent as a percentage of the farm’s net proceeds, and required arbitration for disputes. Neils Point alleged that the Gradys breached the lease by miscalculating rent, failing to pay on time, and not using the land as productive cropland. After Neils Point initiated arbitration in 2024, the Gradys responded by admitting the dispute was subject to arbitration and made their own arbitration demand under the lease. The arbitration hearing was held in July 2025, with both parties participating fully and without objection to either the process or the arbitrability of the dispute. The arbitrator found in favor of Neils Point, concluding that the Gradys breached the lease by improperly deducting expenses, failing to pay rent, and not maintaining the farm’s productivity. Damages were awarded, and the Gradys were ordered to vacate the property. The Cumberland County Superior Court confirmed the arbitration award and denied the Gradys’ subsequent motion to vacate, in which they argued for the first time that the arbitration provision was void because the lease was residential and the arbitrator exceeded his authority. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the Gradys’ participation in arbitration without objection waived their right to challenge the validity of the arbitration clause or the arbitrator’s authority. The Court further held that the arbitrator’s construction of the lease was rational, and thus confirmation of the award was proper. View "Neils Point, LLC v. Grady" on Justia Law

Goforth v. Transform Holdco, LLC

2026-07-28T07:01:08-08:00

Matthew Goforth, through MG Management Co., LLC, entered a dealer agreement with Sears Authorized Home Stores that included a broad non-compete provision, extending restrictions to his spouse, Malinda Goforth. After Matt decided not to renew the agreement, Sears suspected the Goforths would open a competing business and initiated arbitration, seeking to enforce the non-compete. The Goforths opposed enforcement, asserting the provision was unreasonable. The arbitrator initially denied emergency injunctive relief but later, upon learning that Matt and Malinda were opening Goforth Home & Lawn, granted interim relief enforcing the non-compete and added Malinda and her company as parties. A final arbitration award enforced the non-compete, but an appellate arbitrator later held the provision unenforceable while affirming attorneys’ fees to Sears. Subsequently, the Goforths initiated a second arbitration alleging antitrust violations, but the arbitrator determined their antitrust claims were compulsory counterclaims that should have been brought in the first arbitration. Following Sears’s bankruptcy, the Goforths brought an action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri against Sears’s owners, Transform Holdco, LLC and affiliates, asserting the same antitrust claims. Transform moved for summary judgment, arguing the claims were compulsory counterclaims barred by their failure to raise them in the initial arbitration. The district court agreed, holding the claims accrued upon Sears’s initiation of the first arbitration and were thus subject to compulsory counterclaim rules. The court granted summary judgment for Transform and did not address alternative grounds or the Goforths’ partial summary judgment motion. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Eighth Circuit held that the Goforths’ antitrust claims accrued when Sears initiated the first arbitration, making them compulsory counterclaims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13. The court also held that Malinda and her company were bound by the agreement’s arbitration provision. View "Goforth v. Transform Holdco, LLC" on Justia Law

Rossetti v. Bare, Ltd.

2026-07-28T01:47:00-08:00

A physician assistant was employed at a medical spa operated by a corporation in Vermont, with the president as a co-defendant. The plaintiff worked part-time initially, then full-time beginning in 2018. Her employment agreement was amended that year to provide an annual salary, a bonus formula based on the employer’s gross sales for each calendar year, and paid vacation. She received bonuses in 2018 and 2019 but was terminated in December 2020 without receiving a bonus or payment for unused paid time off for that year. The plaintiff sued in the Vermont Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, alleging breach of contract for underpaid bonuses in 2018 and 2019, failure to pay the 2020 bonus and unused PTO, and statutory wage violations. The trial was split, with contractual claims presented to a jury and wage claims to the court. After the plaintiff’s case, the court granted judgment as a matter of law to the defendants on the 2020 claims, finding insufficient evidence for breach or violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The jury found for the plaintiff on her bonus claims for 2018 and 2019, awarding damages, which the court doubled under Vermont’s wage statutes. Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law post-trial, arguing insufficient evidence of gross sales, and the trial court ultimately granted their motion after reconsideration, entering judgment for defendants on all counts. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the trial court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law de novo. The Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding the plaintiff presented insufficient evidence that the employer’s gross sales exceeded the thresholds required for higher bonuses in 2018 and 2019. The Court also affirmed judgment for defendants on the 2020 bonus and PTO claims, holding there was no evidence of bad faith or intent to deprive the plaintiff of accrued benefits. The Court reversed the denial of attorney’s fees for defendants and remanded for reconsideration of that request. View "Rossetti v. Bare, Ltd." on Justia Law

Inouye v. Estate of McHugo

2026-07-28T01:46:52-08:00

The case concerns a dispute among siblings arising from mutual wills executed by their parents, John and Patricia, after their divorce. The parents structured their assets as joint tenancies with rights of survivorship, intending that the survivor would use the property during their lifetime and then have it pass equally to their three children upon death. In 1997, both parents executed mutual wills in Arizona, agreeing not to alter or revoke them without mutual consent, and expressing a clear intention that all property owned at death would be divided equally among their children. After John’s death in 2010, all jointly titled assets passed to Patricia outside probate. Patricia later executed a new will in 2006, disinheriting her daughter Susan except for small bequests to Susan’s children and transferring major properties to her other two children, Gregory and Nancy, before she died in 2016. A Vermont probate court allowed Patricia’s 2006 will, rejecting Susan’s attempt to admit the earlier will. The Vermont Supreme Court, in a prior appeal, affirmed the admission of the 2006 will but noted Susan might have other remedies. Susan subsequently brought civil claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment in the Vermont Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Civil Division. The trial court found for Susan on her unjust enrichment claims against Gregory and Nancy, holding that the mutual wills formed a binding contract to divide all property equally among the siblings and that Patricia breached it by transferring properties and disinheriting Susan. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The Court held that the mutual wills were a binding contract requiring equal distribution of all property owned by the survivor at death, regardless of how it was acquired. The Court found that Patricia’s actions unjustly enriched Gregory and Nancy and upheld the remedies awarded, including a monetary judgment and a constructive trust. The Court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of prejudgment interest on the monetary portion of the judgment. View "Inouye v. Estate of McHugo" on Justia Law

The Law Firm of Fox & Fox v. Arteaga

2026-07-24T08:32:54-08:00

A law firm, represented by its own attorney, sued a former client to recover unpaid fees for legal services rendered during divorce and restraining order proceedings. A jury found in favor of the law firm, awarding it over $21,000. After prevailing, the firm sought to recover additional attorney fees under a provision in its retainer agreement that specifically stated the firm could collect such fees—even if it represented itself—without limitation by California Civil Code section 1717 or the California Supreme Court’s decision in Trope v. Katz. Following the jury verdict, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the law firm's motion for attorney fees. The court found that the retainer provision attempting to waive the limitations set by Trope v. Katz and section 1717 was contrary to public policy, oppressive, and unenforceable. The law firm appealed this denial, arguing that the express waiver in its agreement should entitle it to collect attorney fees even as a self-represented attorney. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The appellate court conducted a de novo review, focusing on whether the retainer agreement’s waiver provision could circumvent the statutory and public policy restrictions established by Trope v. Katz and Civil Code section 1717. The court held that parties cannot contract around section 1717’s requirement that attorney fees be “incurred,” nor override public policy by allowing self-represented attorneys to recover such fees. The court further ruled that section 1021 did not provide a separate basis for recovery in this context. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s order denying the law firm's motion for attorney fees. View "The Law Firm of Fox & Fox v. Arteaga" on Justia Law

8451 Melrose Property, LLC v. Akhtarzad

2026-07-24T08:32:54-08:00

A commercial landlord leased a property to an individual, Sina, who stopped paying rent soon after the lease began, causing significant unpaid rent and property damage. The landlord regained possession of the property and found it had been gutted. The landlord sued Sina for breach of contract and prevailed at trial, but the initial judgment was reversed on appeal due to a change in parol evidence law. On retrial before a referee, the landlord again prevailed, with the referee finding substantial damages and the trial court adopting the referee’s decision, entering judgment for the landlord. This judgment was affirmed on appeal. After the second judgment, Sina and his wife filed for bankruptcy. During related bankruptcy proceedings, the landlord discovered new evidence revealing that Sina, his brothers, their wives, and a family-owned corporation, Amey, were all part of a longstanding “one-for-all” family partnership. The landlord moved in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to amend the judgment to add these family members and Amey as judgment debtors, arguing that they were the true parties in interest and had been virtually represented in the litigation by Sina. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the trial court's decision to amend the judgment. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order, holding that substantial evidence supported the findings that the family members and Amey were part of a partnership that controlled the litigation and benefited from it. The court held that under Code of Civil Procedure section 187, a court may amend a judgment to add parties who had sufficient control of the litigation and unity of interest with the original judgment debtor, even if traditional alter ego requirements are not strictly met. The court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the addition of the individual partners and Amey as judgment debtors. View "8451 Melrose Property, LLC v. Akhtarzad" on Justia Law

Fairholme Funds, Inc v. FHFA

2026-07-24T08:02:47-08:00

In the aftermath of the 2008 housing crisis, Congress created the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and authorized it to place Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship. The FHFA and the U.S. Treasury entered into agreements whereby the Treasury would provide capital to these companies, initially in exchange for fixed-rate dividends. In 2012, these agreements were amended so that Fannie and Freddie were required to pay the Treasury dividends equal to their net worth above a specified reserve, a change known as the “Net Worth Sweep.” The announcement of this amendment caused the value of Fannie and Freddie shares to drop significantly, and shareholders, including those holding both common and junior preferred shares, filed suit alleging various statutory and contract violations. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially dismissed most claims, but after appellate review and remand, permitted the shareholders’ implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim to proceed to trial. The jury found the FHFA had violated this implied covenant by adopting the Net Worth Sweep, awarding over $612 million in damages, which the district court increased to $812 million with prejudgment interest. The district court denied the FHFA’s post-trial motions and rejected shareholders’ attempts to seek restitution or reliance damages beyond expectation damages. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Court of Appeals held that the implied covenant claim was not foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent or by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act, that the claim was available against the FHFA as conservator, and that the Net Worth Sweep violated the reasonable expectations of shareholders. The court also determined that post-Net Worth Sweep purchasers of shares could pursue the claim, and that the denial of restitution and reliance damages was proper. Accordingly, the award of expectation damages was affirmed. View "Fairholme Funds, Inc v. FHFA" on Justia Law

Dressen v. AstraZeneca AB

2026-07-23T10:31:45-08:00

The plaintiff participated in a clinical trial for an experimental COVID-19 vaccine manufactured by AstraZeneca in November 2020. Before receiving the vaccine, she signed an informed-consent form stating that AstraZeneca would compensate her for injuries caused by the vaccine, including providing medical care and reimbursement, and that the company had an insurance policy to cover such costs. The form also disclosed that federal law may limit her right to sue for vaccine-related injuries, referencing the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act), which provides broad immunity to vaccine manufacturers during a public health emergency. After suffering debilitating medical injuries from the vaccine, the plaintiff requested compensation and care from AstraZeneca, which was denied. She then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, alleging breach of contract and breach of the contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing. AstraZeneca moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the PREP Act immunized it from liability. The district court denied the motion, holding that the PREP Act’s immunity provision applies only to tort claims, not to contract-based claims. The court further reserved judgment on whether AstraZeneca had waived its statutory immunity in the informed-consent form. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s ruling. The appellate court held that the PREP Act’s immunity provision applies to “all claims for loss,” including those arising from breach of contract, provided they bear a causal relationship to the administration or use of a covered countermeasure like a vaccine. The court remanded the case for the district court to consider whether AstraZeneca waived immunity in the informed-consent form. View "Dressen v. AstraZeneca AB" on Justia Law

RMS v. Commerce Bank

2026-07-23T07:31:02-08:00

A technology company developed a healthcare revenue management software platform and, in 2014, licensed a white-labeled version to a bank. The bank branded this software as its own and used it to provide services to its customers. The licensing agreement gave the bank access to confidential software and data, while prohibiting reverse engineering, copying, or creating derivative works. In 2018, the bank began developing its own software that performed similar functions. The technology company later noticed a decline in users of its platform and suspected the bank had breached the contract by reverse engineering and copying its software. The company then sought a preliminary injunction to stop the bank from using its new platform and from misusing the information gained through the contract. The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri reviewed the request for a preliminary injunction. The district court found that the technology company failed to show that it would suffer irreparable harm absent injunctive relief, ruling that any potential financial losses could be compensated with money damages and that claims of reputational harm were too speculative. The court also determined that the contract’s clause permitting injunctive relief was not, by itself, sufficient to require an injunction. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding the alleged harms compensable with money damages or too speculative, nor did it abuse its discretion by giving limited weight to the contract’s injunctive relief provision. The court emphasized that failure to demonstrate likely irreparable harm is, by itself, a sufficient ground to deny a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the denial of the preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "RMS v. Commerce Bank" on Justia Law

La Belle Dairy, LLC v. Sharpe Holdings, Inc.

2026-07-23T07:31:00-08:00

A dairy operator in Northeast Missouri leased thousands of acres of adjacent forage land from a landowner to grow feed for its cattle and manage waste under regulatory requirements. The lease included provisions for renewal at a market rental rate and an agreement for the eventual sale of the leased and surrounding acreage to the dairy, with fair market value to be established by appraisal if necessary. The dairy alleged that the landowner breached the lease by unilaterally raising rent, demanding an unfavorable addendum, and refusing to complete the agreed land sales, while the landowner asserted that the dairy breached by not signing the addendum and threatened eviction. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted the dairy’s request for injunctive relief, enjoining the landowner from evicting or otherwise interfering with the dairy’s possession of the leased land. The landowner appealed, arguing lack of adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, as well as contesting the enforceability of the lease and the propriety of the injunction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit first determined it had jurisdiction, treating the lower court order as a preliminary injunction rather than a temporary restraining order, based on its duration and effect. The appellate court held that the landowner waived or forfeited its due process objections by not raising them below. On the merits, the court found the dairy had a fair chance of prevailing on its contract claims, including the enforceability of the land-sale provision and compliance with notice requirements. The court further concluded that the dairy faced irreparable harm due to threatened loss of unique land, that the balance of harms favored the dairy, and that the public interest did not weigh against the injunction. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s issuance of the preliminary injunction. View "La Belle Dairy, LLC v. Sharpe Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Maine Human Rights Commission v. Larkin

2026-07-23T07:09:09-08:00

The Maine Human Rights Commission filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court alleging that a landlord discriminated against his tenant based on sex, asserting claims under both the Maine Human Rights Act and the Fair Housing Act. After litigation began, the tenant requested a judicial settlement conference. The landlord did not attend the conference, but his attorney and daughter attended, allegedly with his authority to settle. After the conference, a record form stated that the parties had agreed to a full and final settlement, but disagreements arose during subsequent exchanges of draft settlement agreements, particularly over provisions related to an acknowledgment of antidiscrimination laws and certain “public-relief terms” such as fair-housing training and property management oversight. The Kennebec County Superior Court reviewed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the court found that the parties intended to be bound by an agreement reached at the settlement conference, as reflected in the settlement conference record form. The court identified five basic terms as the substance of the agreement, including a payment to the tenant and specific non-monetary provisions. The court ordered the parties to execute an agreement consistent with these terms, except for the acknowledgment provision, which it found was not part of the agreement. On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court found that the record was insufficient to support the Superior Court’s finding that the parties mutually assented to all material terms of a binding settlement agreement. The Supreme Judicial Court held that, in the absence of an evidentiary hearing or a sufficiently detailed record, the lower court erred in enforcing the settlement. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Superior Court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the parties actually reached a binding agreement and, if so, its precise terms. View "Maine Human Rights Commission v. Larkin" on Justia Law

American Family Insurance Company vs. NB Electric, Inc.

2026-07-23T05:07:14-08:00

A homeowner hired a general contractor to perform a remodeling project, which included electrical work provided by a subcontractor. During construction, a fire occurred at the home, allegedly due to improper electrical work by both the general contractor and the subcontractor. The homeowner’s insurer paid for the fire damage and, acting as subrogee, brought a negligence and breach of contract action against both contractors. After the fire, the homeowner discontinued the services of both contractors and later hired a new general contractor to complete the project. The Minnesota District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the contractors, dismissing the insurer’s claims as time-barred under the two-year statute of limitations for defective construction claims involving improvements to real property, as set out in Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1. The district court found that the statute of limitations began to run when the homeowner terminated the contract with the original general contractor, concluding that the action was not timely filed. On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court interpreted the statute to mean that the statute of limitations does not begin until the entire construction project is terminated, substantially completed, or abandoned, not merely upon termination of the contract with the general contractor. The Supreme Court of Minnesota reviewed the case to resolve the statutory interpretation issue. The court held that, for purposes of the statute of limitations under Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1, the termination of the contract with the general contractor constitutes “termination … of the construction or the improvement to real property.” As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the district court’s dismissal of the insurer’s claims as time-barred. View "American Family Insurance Company vs. NB Electric, Inc." on Justia Law

One Church v. Bhd. Mut. Ins. Co.

2026-07-23T05:04:35-08:00

A church with property insurance sustained windstorm damage and submitted a claim to its insurer. When the parties could not agree on the amount of loss, the church invoked the insurance policy’s binding appraisal process. Each party selected an appraiser, and the appraisers agreed on an award, which the insurer paid and the church accepted. Afterward, the church alleged it discovered additional, previously hidden damages, and the insurer refused to pay more than the appraisal award. The church then sued, claiming breach of contract and seeking to set aside the binding appraisal based on the later-discovered damage. The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granted judgment on the pleadings to the insurer, finding that the appraisal award was binding and there was no evidence of fraud, misfeasance, or mistake to justify reopening the award. The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the church’s complaint pleaded mistake with sufficient particularity to satisfy Ohio’s Civil Rule 9(B), which requires that mistake be pled with particularity. The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that a binding appraisal award may only be set aside for fraud or manifest mistake, defined as an egregious error undermining the intent of the agreement, not a mere error in judgment. The court further concluded that, to plead mistake with particularity under Civil Rule 9(B), the facts alleged must satisfy the elements of mistake. Since the church only alleged that additional, hidden damages were discovered after the appraisal, and did not plead facts constituting a manifest mistake by the appraisers, the complaint did not state a claim for mistake. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Tenth District’s judgment and reinstated the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint. View "One Church v. Bhd. Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Doe v. Princeton University Trustees

2026-07-21T09:00:20-08:00

A male sophomore at a private university was accused by two female students of physically assaulting them in separate incidents involving alleged choking. Both incidents occurred during the 2023 academic year and involved evolving accounts from the complainants, contradictory witness testimony, and a lack of immediate reporting. The accused, John, denied the accusations and provided evidence and witnesses in his defense, including text messages and accounts from a sole eyewitness supporting his version of events. Despite this, the university’s internal investigation and disciplinary hearing were alleged to have been conducted in an imbalanced way, favoring the complainants, limiting the accused’s ability to present witnesses, and subjecting him and his witness to more rigorous questioning. The hearing concluded with John being found responsible and suspended for two years, which he appealed internally without success. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey reviewed John’s subsequent lawsuit against the university, which asserted claims under Title IX for sex discrimination as well as state law claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that John’s allegations were insufficient to plausibly state a claim under federal or state law. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the District Court’s dismissal. The Third Circuit held that, taking the allegations as true, John had plausibly alleged that the university’s disciplinary process was influenced by both external and internal pressure to favor female complainants over male respondents, and that procedural irregularities and evidence of biased treatment supported an inference of sex discrimination under Title IX. The court also found that John plausibly alleged breaches of contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on the university’s failure to follow its own procedures and to provide a fundamentally fair process. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Doe v. Princeton University Trustees" on Justia Law

Byers v. Finishing Systems Inc.

2026-07-20T09:00:20-08:00

At a U.S. Army depot in Pennsylvania, workers used pumps to transfer flammable paint thinner in a paint-mixing room. The depot hired a contractor, Finishing Systems, to upgrade these pumps and provide brief operational training. The pump manufacturer, Carlisle Fluid Technologies, installed the pumps and, per contract, agreed to assist and train personnel in their use, care, and maintenance. Carlisle’s employee provided limited training focused on operation, not safety procedures. Two months after installation, a worker, wearing ordinary clothing rather than required anti-static gear, released vapors while swapping drums. A static discharge sparked a fire, killing two employees and severely injuring another. The survivors and estates of the deceased sued several parties, including Carlisle, alleging negligence for failure to provide adequate safety training. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment in favor of Carlisle, concluding that it owed no duty of care to train workers on safety beyond its limited contract to provide operational instruction. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s summary judgment de novo. The Third Circuit held that, under Pennsylvania law and Section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Carlisle’s duty was no broader than its contractual undertaking to sell, install, and provide basic operational training for the pumps. Carlisle did not increase the risk of harm, assume the depot’s safety training duties, or induce reliance for comprehensive safety training. The court found no legal basis to impose a broader duty. Accordingly, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s summary judgment for Carlisle. View "Byers v. Finishing Systems Inc." on Justia Law

Tennenbaum Living Tr. v. GCDI S.A.

2026-07-20T06:00:03-08:00

In this dispute, an Argentine construction company issued dollar-denominated convertible debt notes to two trusts as part of a capital-raising effort. The parties entered into an indenture agreement, later amended in December 2019, which authorized the company’s Board of Directors to convert the notes into equity if certain financial thresholds were met. Section 1301 of the indenture vested the Board with authority to determine if these conditions were satisfied, provided their determination was free from “manifest error.” In 2020, the Board concluded that the threshold for conversion had been reached, relying on the company’s increased net equity following the issuance of new preferred shares. The trusts disagreed, contending the Board’s calculation was manifestly erroneous and that the actual value of equity sold did not meet the $100 million threshold required by the indenture. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presided over a bench trial. The court dismissed the trusts’ claims regarding improper amendment and bad faith, focusing solely on the manifest error claim. After reviewing the evidence, the District Court concluded that the Board had manifestly erred by using metrics not contemplated by the indenture—specifically, shareholder equity changes and liquidation preferences—rather than the actual value of shares sold. The court found that the threshold for mandatory conversion had not been met, and GCDI breached the agreement by ceasing interest payments on the notes. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the District Court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment, holding that the Board’s determination constituted a manifest error under New York law because it failed to value the equity sold as required by the indenture’s plain terms. The judgment awarding damages to the trusts was affirmed. View "Tennenbaum Living Tr. v. GCDI S.A." on Justia Law

City of Chester v. PHCC LLC

2026-07-17T09:00:12-08:00

The city at the center of this case, after decades of financial distress and unsuccessful efforts to revitalize its economy through projects like a waste facility and a casino, declared bankruptcy in 2022. Prior to the bankruptcy filing, the city had pledged certain revenue streams—including payments from a casino, a waste facility, and agreements with the county—to secure debt issued through complex arrangements. These pledges were established through city ordinances and related contracts with creditors, including a trust indenture and a contribution agreement. The revenue streams and contractual rights to payment became the focal point of disputes in the bankruptcy proceedings. Bankruptcy Judge Ashely M. Chan of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania heard adversary claims from the city against its creditors. The creditors asserted that their liens on the pledged revenues survived the bankruptcy, arguing that their interests were statutory liens or arose from special revenues or proceeds exempt from discharge. The Bankruptcy Court held that the creditors had properly perfected their interests but determined that their liens were consensual, not statutory, and thus cut off by 11 U.S.C. § 552(a). The court also found that the pledged revenues were not "special revenues" under bankruptcy law and ordered that certain excess funds be transferred to the city. The creditors appealed these determinations. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's rulings on three key issues: the liens were not statutory and thus did not survive the bankruptcy; the pledged revenues were not special revenues; and the Trust Indenture required excess funds to be transferred to the city. However, the appellate court remanded for further proceedings on whether certain contract language conveyed a right to payment from which post-petition proceeds could be derived, and whether the creditors’ interests extended to pre-petition accrued amounts not yet paid to the city. View "City of Chester v. PHCC LLC" on Justia Law

Rhode Island Truck Ctr., LLC v. Daimler Trucks North America, LLC

2026-07-17T08:30:02-08:00

A truck dealership and a manufacturer entered into a contract permitting the dealership to sell and service the manufacturer’s trucks in specified regions, with the manufacturer holding the right to appoint additional dealers in those regions at its sole discretion when it determined such appointments were warranted. The manufacturer appointed a new dealer within the dealership’s area, citing customer support needs and concerns about the dealership’s performance. Internal documents revealed the manufacturer had a plan to consolidate its dealer network for efficiency and improved sales, and had previously denied the dealership’s request to expand its franchise. Despite the appointment of the new dealer, the original dealership retained its nonexclusive right to sell trucks in its area. Prior to the current suit, the dealership protested before the Rhode Island Dealer Board, alleging statutory notice failures and bad faith denial of expansion, but the Board dismissed the protest as extraterritorial application of Rhode Island law. The dealership sought reversal in Rhode Island Superior Court, and the case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, which granted summary judgment to the manufacturer. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed summary judgment on certain claims and certified a question to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, which clarified statutory interpretation. Based on that, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment on the statutory-notice claim. Upon de novo review, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the manufacturer acted within its contractual discretion in appointing a new dealer, as the contract only required the manufacturer to have a reason related to its business objectives, not to market conditions. The court also held there was no breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as the manufacturer’s actions were consistent with the contract’s objectives. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer. View "Rhode Island Truck Ctr., LLC v. Daimler Trucks North America, LLC" on Justia Law

Asinga v. Gatorade Co.

2026-07-17T06:30:07-08:00

A professional track and field athlete received a bottle of Gatorade Recovery Gummies at an award ceremony hosted by Gatorade, which were labeled as “NSF Certified for Sport,” indicating independent testing for banned substances. After consuming the gummies, the athlete submitted a routine drug test that later returned positive for cardarine, a banned performance-enhancing drug, resulting in immediate suspension from elite competition. Subsequent investigation revealed that the gummies lot the athlete received had never been NSF certified, and Gatorade was aware of the mislabeling before distributing the product. The athlete suffered significant consequences, including loss of eligibility to compete, loss of a scholarship, and forfeiture of endorsement opportunities. The athlete initiated legal action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging strict products liability, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, violation of Texas’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, tortious interference with contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed all claims. It found no “cognizable injury outside of purely economic damages” for the strict liability, negligence, and misrepresentation claims, applying New York’s economic loss doctrine. Additional claims were dismissed based on statutory definitions and insufficient allegations of extreme conduct or distress. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. It affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the tortious interference, consumer protection, and emotional distress claims. However, the court recognized uncertainty in New York law regarding tort recovery for nonconsensual bodily changes detectable only by laboratory testing and the boundaries of the economic loss doctrine. Accordingly, the Second Circuit deferred decision and certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals concerning the scope of the economic loss doctrine and whether the athlete’s injury is cognizable in tort under New York law. View "Asinga v. Gatorade Co." on Justia Law

Lacher v. Case

2026-07-16T07:17:11-08:00

The case concerns a dispute arising from an oral agreement between a homeowner and a contractor regarding the construction of a wheelchair ramp and a covered addition at the homeowner’s residence. The parties did not sign a written contract or agree to a specific price, instead communicating the project’s scope via text messages. The homeowner paid the contractor $73,000, including $30,000 for siding, but the project was plagued by construction delays, quality concerns, and code violations. Work ceased before completion, and the contractor did not deliver or install the siding. The homeowner and his wife continued living in the property, though it did not receive a final certificate of compliance. The homeowner sued in the District Court of Sweetwater County, asserting claims including breach of contract, negligence, and breach of warranty. During discovery, the homeowner failed to provide a specific calculation of damages, only indicating he would supplement disclosures later. Before trial, the contractor moved to exclude any evidence of damages not previously disclosed. The district court partially granted this motion, limiting the homeowner’s evidence to what had been disclosed. At a bench trial, the homeowner did not call his retained expert and offered only the total amount paid as the measure of damages. The district court concluded the oral contract was unenforceable due to indefinite terms and found insufficient evidence to support a damages award. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Supreme Court held that, because the homeowner failed to make an offer of proof regarding excluded damages evidence, there was no basis to review the trial court’s exclusionary ruling. The court further held that the district court’s finding—that the homeowner did not prove damages by a preponderance of the evidence—was not clearly erroneous. As the damages element was not satisfied, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the claims. View "Lacher v. Case" on Justia Law

4DD HOLDINGS, LLC v. US

2026-07-16T07:02:00-08:00

The dispute centers on the government’s use of TETRA® software, developed by 4DD Holdings, LLC. The Department of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs sought to improve data interoperability for healthcare records and decided to purchase commercial software. After a competitive process, Systems Made Simple (SMS), the government’s contractor, selected TETRA. The government acquired licenses for specific numbers of TETRA’s components through an authorized reseller, Immix Technology, Inc., with explicit restrictions on copying. However, SMS exceeded license limits by making thousands of unauthorized copies during development and testing. 4DD discovered these excess copies and initiated negotiations, ultimately settling for payment for additional cores at the previously agreed license rate. The government later ended its use of TETRA. The United States Court of Federal Claims reviewed the case after 4DD filed suit for copyright infringement. During discovery, evidence destruction by the government led to sanctions. Following a bench trial, the court found the government had significantly exceeded its licenses and assessed damages using a hypothetical negotiation approach, considering factors like the existence of alternative software and the nature of the use, instead of defaulting to the rates in the licensing agreements. The court awarded $12,683,065.86 in damages, including compensatory and non-compensatory (statutory) damages. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit examined whether damages should be calculated by reference to the license rates or through a hypothetical negotiation. The court held that neither statute nor precedent compels using the license agreement rates for damages; courts may use hypothetical negotiations when material differences exist between licensed and infringing uses. However, the trial court erred by considering unforeseeable future events (like TETRA’s cancellation) in its damages analysis and by awarding non-compensatory statutory damages against the government. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "4DD HOLDINGS, LLC v. US " on Justia Law

Golden Corral Corp. v. Illinois Union Insurance Co.

2026-07-15T10:30:39-08:00

Golden Corral, a buffet restaurant chain, held a commercial property insurance policy issued by Illinois Union Insurance Company, covering losses from physical damage to its property. When state and local governments, including North Carolina, mandated closure of indoor dining facilities in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Golden Corral suspended its restaurant operations, resulting in significant lost revenue and reduced income from franchisees. Golden Corral submitted a claim to Illinois Union for coverage of these losses, which Illinois Union denied. After the denial, Golden Corral filed suit in North Carolina state court, seeking a declaration that its pandemic-related losses were covered under the policy. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, where Golden Corral amended its complaint to add claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Illinois Union moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that COVID-19 did not cause physical loss or damage as required for coverage. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the case with prejudice, a decision affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Over three years later, Golden Corral sought relief from final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), citing a subsequent North Carolina Supreme Court decision in North State Deli v. Cincinnati Insurance Co. that found similar losses covered. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the Rule 60(b)(6) motion for abuse of discretion. The court held that a change in state decisional law alone does not constitute "extraordinary circumstances" warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(6), especially when the later case involved different parties, policies, and injuries. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to deny relief. View "Golden Corral Corp. v. Illinois Union Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Northwell Health, Inc. v. Group Hospitalization and Medical Services, Inc.

2026-07-15T07:00:09-08:00

A large New York healthcare provider participated for decades in the Blue Cross Blue Shield insurance network through contracts with the New York Blue Cross licensee, Empire. Under this arrangement, the provider offered negotiated pricing and direct billing for Blue Cross patients. The Blue Cross network comprises thirty-four independent companies, each licensed to operate in a specific region. The provider’s current dispute concerns claims for care provided to patients insured by Blue Cross entities based in Washington, D.C., Maryland, and Virginia. These out-of-state insurers, although not directly contracted with the provider and not operating in New York, used the BlueCard Program to facilitate claims processing in New York and relied on Empire’s network to obtain discounted rates. The provider alleged that these insurers underpaid over $5.5 million in claims. After unsuccessful resolution attempts under the Provider Agreement, the provider brought suit in New York state court. The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, which dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The district court also denied leave to amend the complaint. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It found diversity jurisdiction proper, holding that the D.C.-based insurer’s federal charter made it a D.C. citizen for jurisdictional purposes. The court held that the out-of-state insurers’ purposeful business dealings with Empire and exploitation of New York’s healthcare market established personal jurisdiction under both New York’s long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause. On the merits, the Second Circuit held that the provider adequately stated claims for contract liability based on ratification and for quasi-contract, but affirmed dismissal of the provider’s third-party beneficiary claims. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Northwell Health, Inc. v. Group Hospitalization and Medical Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Nicholls v. Veolia Water Contract Operations USA, Inc.

2026-07-14T04:09:42-08:00

A group of employees working for a private contractor, which operated and maintained a municipal wastewater treatment facility under a long-term contract with the local water and sewer commission, claimed they were entitled to be paid prevailing wages for their work. The contract, authorized under a special legislative act, included both initial capital improvements (which were subcontracted out and paid at prevailing wage rates) and ongoing operations, maintenance, repair, and replacement work, which was paid according to collective bargaining agreements. The employees performed work in the latter category and argued that the prevailing wage requirements should apply to their activities. After the employees brought suit in Massachusetts Superior Court, the case was removed to the United States District Court. Both sides filed for summary judgment. The District Court judge ruled for the contractor, finding that the employees' work was not covered by the phrase "construction and design of improvements" in the special act, and therefore was not subject to the prevailing wage law. The employees appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit certified two questions of Massachusetts law to the Supreme Judicial Court. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the phrase "construction and design of improvements" in the special act is not synonymous with the broader definition of "construction" in the prevailing wage law and does not include ordinary repairs, routine inspections, day-to-day operations and maintenance, or ordinary replacements. The Court further concluded that its previous decision in Metcalf v. BSC Group, Inc., 492 Mass. 676 (2023), which addressed different statutory provisions relating to professional services contracts, does not control or render the special act incompatible with the prevailing wage law. View "Nicholls v. Veolia Water Contract Operations USA, Inc." on Justia Law

DiChiara v. Summit Medical Group, Inc.

2026-07-13T11:00:38-08:00

A physician was employed by a medical group and its affiliated healthcare organization when they implemented a COVID-19 vaccination policy requiring employees to either be vaccinated or obtain a medical or religious exemption. The physician objected to the policy on scientific and religious grounds and engaged in internal advocacy, including meetings with leadership and organizing a petition among medical staff. She also communicated with a disbarred attorney who was promoting litigation against the vaccine mandate, forwarding confidential internal emails and documents to him to build his case. Although she was granted a religious exemption, she was subsequently terminated for cause, with the employer citing misappropriation of company property, policy violations, disruptive conduct, and breach of loyalty. After exhausting administrative remedies, the physician filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, asserting federal claims for retaliation under Title VII and the ADA, and state claims for retaliation, discharge against public policy, breach of contract, tortious interference, and declaratory relief from her non-compete clause. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims, finding no violation of state or federal law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The court held that the physician did not engage in protected activity under Title VII or the ADA, as her conduct did not qualify under either the participation or opposition clauses. Her state retaliation claims failed for the same reasons. The court also ruled that Kentucky’s wrongful discharge tort applies only to at-will employees, and her contract employment precluded such a claim. Finally, it found no breach of contract, as her conduct violated company policies and justified termination for cause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "DiChiara v. Summit Medical Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Lackie v. Noe

2026-07-13T07:31:35-08:00

Jackie Lackie owned property adjacent to Greers Ferry Lake, a federally managed lake in Arkansas. In January 2022, park rangers discovered sixty-nine trees had been cut down on government land between Lackie’s property and the lake. The Army Corps of Engineers identified Lackie as responsible, filed a notice of trespass, and sent Lackie a letter offering to settle the violation if he paid for the tree damage. The letter also indicated the Corps was recommending revocation of his shoreline use permit for a boat dock. Enclosed was a settlement agreement stating the parties intended to settle “all known disputes” regarding the public lands. Lackie signed the agreement and paid the requested sum, but the Corps subsequently revoked his shoreline use permit. Lackie challenged the revocation in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, seeking judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act. He argued the Corps’s action breached the settlement agreement, which he contended had resolved all disputes, including the permit issue. The district court affirmed the Corps’s decision, reasoning that the letter accompanying the settlement made clear that the permit revocation was not resolved by the agreement, so the Corps did not violate the agreement by revoking the permit. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The court held that under the applicable federal common law, guided by Arkansas law, the unambiguous language of the settlement agreement encompassed “all known disputes,” including the dispute over Lackie’s permit. The Eighth Circuit concluded that the Corps’s revocation of Lackie’s permit contravened the settlement agreement and constituted unlawful agency action. The court reversed the district court’s judgment, remanding with instructions to set aside the Corps’s permit revocation. View "Lackie v. Noe" on Justia Law

Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v Eli Lilly and Company

2026-07-13T07:31:15-08:00

A generic drug manufacturer and a brand-name drug company previously settled a patent infringement lawsuit concerning a medication used to treat osteoporosis. As part of their 2018 settlement, the generic manufacturer agreed not to sell its version of the drug until a specified “Entry Date,” and in return, the brand-name company covenanted not to take any action to prevent or delay the approval, launch, or marketing of the generic drug. The agreement did not specify a fixed expiration date for these obligations. Later, after the relevant patents expired in August 2019, the brand-name company submitted a supplemental application to the FDA, obtaining additional regulatory exclusivity that temporarily kept generics—including the plaintiff’s product—off the market. After being unable to enter the market due to this additional exclusivity, the generic manufacturer sued for breach of contract, arguing that the covenants in the settlement agreement required the brand-name company both to waive any exclusivity and not to interfere with its market entry. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana dismissed the case, holding that the agreement and its obligations expired with the patents and therefore could not have been breached after that date. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. It held that the generic manufacturer plausibly alleged breaches of contract terms that may have survived the expiration of the patents, as the settlement agreement did not clearly define its own duration. The court found that, under Indiana law, a contract without a fixed term remains effective for a “reasonable time,” which is a factual question not suitable for resolution on the pleadings. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v Eli Lilly and Company" on Justia Law

Del Biaggio v. Bansen

2026-07-10T11:34:27-08:00

A contract between two parties provided for a succession plan at a dairy farm, outlining salary, livestock transfers, and an option to lease the farm. After four years, the party working at the dairy claimed not to have received all payments and livestock owed, resulting in a lawsuit for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion. A jury awarded damages to the plaintiff but did not specify which claims were the basis for the award. The plaintiff then sought to recover attorney fees and paralegal fees under a contractual provision. The Superior Court of Humboldt County found the plaintiff to be the prevailing party and awarded attorney fees but significantly reduced the compensable hours and, on its own initiative, excluded all paralegal fees, finding the contract did not authorize their recovery. When the plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the paralegal fee exclusion, the court denied the motion and ordered the plaintiff’s attorney to pay the defendants’ fees for opposing it, treating the motion as procedurally improper. The defendants also sought appellate sanctions, arguing the appeal was frivolous and that the plaintiff’s opening brief contained misrepresentations, including fabricated case law quotations. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, affirmed the trial court’s reduction of attorney hours, finding no abuse of discretion. However, it reversed the categorical exclusion of paralegal fees, holding that the contractual language allowing recovery of “attorneys’ fees” encompasses reasonable paralegal fees. The appellate court also vacated the sanctions imposed for the reconsideration motion, finding that the motion was procedurally permitted and not frivolous. While the court declined to sanction the appeal as frivolous, it ordered the plaintiff’s attorney to pay sanctions to the court for submitting a brief with fabricated legal quotations. The case was remanded for the trial court to determine reasonable paralegal fees. View "Del Biaggio v. Bansen" on Justia Law

Lee v. West Virginia University Medical Corp.

2026-07-10T10:30:54-08:00

Dr. Mark Lee, age 59 at hiring, was appointed Chair of the Department of Neurosurgery at West Virginia University’s School of Medicine and also employed as a pediatric neurosurgeon by University Health Associates. By spring 2020, senior administrators raised concerns about Lee’s performance, including absenteeism and lack of engagement. In March 2021, Lee was offered a new position requiring him to step down as Chair, which he ultimately declined. Discussions about his removal continued, during which Lee was allegedly told the university sought a younger Chair. After Lee’s attorney raised age discrimination concerns in July and August 2021, Lee was informed he would be removed as Chair effective September 1, 2021, rather than the previously discussed later date. Lee subsequently resigned in January 2022 and pursued claims for age discrimination, retaliation, and breach of contract. The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia dismissed claims against WVU defendants on sovereign immunity grounds and granted summary judgment to University Health Associates on all remaining claims. The district court found Lee’s age discrimination claim lacked direct and circumstantial evidence, noting Lee’s replacement and the decisionmaker were of similar age. Lee’s retaliation claims failed because the removal process began before his complaints, and the decision to accelerate his removal was attributed to his conduct at a July meeting rather than his protected activity. The breach-of-contract claims were rejected based on the employment agreement’s terms and integration clause. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo. The Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for University Health Associates on Lee’s age discrimination, retaliation (removal and constructive discharge), and breach-of-contract claims. However, it vacated the judgment on Lee’s claim that the acceleration of his removal constituted unlawful retaliation, finding genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings on that claim. View "Lee v. West Virginia University Medical Corp." on Justia Law

Leo Investments Hong Kong Limited v. Tomales Bay Capital Anduril III, L.P.

2026-07-10T07:03:02-08:00

A China-based company sought to invest indirectly in SpaceX by becoming a limited partner in a Delaware fund, despite SpaceX’s preferences against China-based investors and public disclosure. The fund’s principal allowed the company’s investment and negotiated disclosure terms, which the company followed. The disclosure, accompanied by a press release, attracted significant media attention. When SpaceX learned of the investment through the media, it objected and refused to allow the fund to purchase its shares with the company as a partner. To appease SpaceX, the fund’s principal initially asked the company to withdraw voluntarily, but ultimately removed it unilaterally. The company’s investment was returned, and the fund later purchased SpaceX shares at a higher price. The company sued the fund, its general partner, and the principal in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty and the partnership agreement. At summary judgment, the court held that the company’s disclosure was permitted. After trial, it found that the company had not proved breach of loyalty or care, applying the business judgment rule. However, it found a breach of the “duty of candor” in communications surrounding the forced withdrawal, awarding nominal damages and nearly $16 million in attorneys’ fees. Both sides appealed some rulings. The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware affirmed the Court of Chancery’s application of the business judgment rule and its finding of no breach of loyalty or care, as well as its interpretation of the forum-selection clause. It also affirmed the nominal damages award for the breach of the duty to communicate honestly. However, it reversed the award of attorneys’ fees, holding that fee-shifting was not warranted under the circumstances where the plaintiff prevailed only on a minor issue and failed to prove causation or damages. View "Leo Investments Hong Kong Limited v. Tomales Bay Capital Anduril III, L.P." on Justia Law

Juneau Group v. Vendera Management

2026-07-09T15:30:33-08:00

A Louisiana limited liability company (LLC) with a sole member voluntarily dissolved in April 2024 and subsequently had its Texas registration terminated in May 2024. Prior to dissolution, the LLC had developed a bid strategy for certain oilfield assets and shared confidential information with a bank to seek financing. The assets were ultimately acquired by a different bidder, also financed by the same bank, and the LLC alleged that its confidential information was improperly conveyed to the winning bidder. After dissolution, the LLC initiated a lawsuit in July 2024 against the bank and the winning bidder, asserting trade secret misappropriation and breach of contract. In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, the defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing the LLC lacked capacity to sue due to its prior dissolution. The LLC did not contest its lack of capacity but requested a stay while it sought reinstatement in Louisiana state court. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings for lack of capacity, denied the LLC’s request for a stay, and denied the defendants’ request to seek attorneys’ fees. The court also sealed various filings relating to the mental health of the LLC’s sole member. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s judgment on the pleadings, holding that under Texas law, an entity dissolved prior to suit lacks capacity to file suit, and that Louisiana law does not permit retroactive reinstatement of an LLC dissolved by affidavit to pursue claims known before dissolution but filed after. The Fifth Circuit denied the LLC’s request to certify a question to the Louisiana Supreme Court and affirmed the denial of attorneys’ fees. However, it vacated the district court’s sealing order, remanding for proper balancing of the public’s right of access to court records, as required by precedent. View "Juneau Group v. Vendera Management" on Justia Law

Nautilus Insurance Company v Bee Quality Inc.

2026-07-09T14:00:46-08:00

A roofing contractor was sued in Illinois state court by the estates of two individuals who died when a building façade collapsed. The estates alleged that the contractor had negligently performed repairs on the building after it was damaged by a windstorm in August 2020. The repairs were completed by December 2020, and the fatal collapse occurred in April 2022. The contractor sought defense and indemnification from its commercial general liability insurer under a policy that began on February 8, 2022. The insurance policy included a “Prior Work Exclusion” that barred coverage for claims arising from work completed before the policy’s inception date. The insurer filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the contractor in the underlying state lawsuit. The contractor counterclaimed for breach of contract and argued that the exclusion rendered coverage illusory. Both parties moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted judgment to the insurer, holding that the exclusion applied because the work at issue was completed before the policy period and that the exclusion did not render the coverage illusory, as some coverage for completed operations remained. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that, under Illinois law, the Prior Work Exclusion clearly barred coverage for claims arising from work completed prior to February 8, 2022. The court further held that the exclusion did not make completed-operations coverage illusory because the policy still provided coverage for work completed during the policy period. The judgment in favor of the insurer was affirmed. View "Nautilus Insurance Company v Bee Quality Inc." on Justia Law

RV Holdings 4 v. Standard Fiber

2026-07-09T06:58:15-08:00

The underlying dispute arose from a business relationship between Standard Fiber, LLC and entities associated with Ridgeview, involving management fee arrangements over several years. In 2006, Standard Fiber and Ridgeview Capital, LLC entered a Management Services Agreement (2006 MSA) with a set fee structure. While payments continued after the 2006 MSA expired, the parties disagreed on what terms governed post-2008 payments. Standard Fiber asserted that subsequent agreements, including a 2014 agreement to pay $25,000 per month, controlled. Ridgeview denied the existence or effect of any later agreements, instead claiming entitlement to fees under the original MSA or an alleged oral 50/50 fee-splitting agreement. Ridgeview sued in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, seeking unpaid management fees under the 50/50 oral agreement. The court compelled arbitration pursuant to the parties’ operating agreement, and the arbitration proceeded before a JAMS arbitrator. Ridgeview’s arbitration demand asserted claims for fees under the 2006 MSA and the 50/50 Agreement, but did not seek relief for breach of the 2014 fee agreement. During the arbitration, Standard Fiber referenced the 2014 Agreement as a defense, but Ridgeview did not advance it as a basis for affirmative recovery. The arbitrator ultimately found against Ridgeview on its submitted claims but awarded damages to Ridgeview based on breach of the 2014 Agreement. Standard Fiber moved the district court to modify or vacate the arbitration award, arguing the arbitrator exceeded her authority by granting relief on an unsubmitted claim. The district court confirmed the award, concluding it was rationally related to the parties’ submissions. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah held that an arbitrator may only award relief on claims actually submitted for decision. Because Ridgeview did not submit a claim for breach of the 2014 Agreement, the arbitrator exceeded her authority. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s confirmation of the award and remanded for modification to exclude any amount based on the 2014 Agreement. View "RV Holdings 4 v. Standard Fiber" on Justia Law

Hanson v. Dabbert Custom Homes

2026-07-09T05:40:38-08:00

The case concerns a dispute between a homeowner and the builder of his residence. The homeowner entered into a purchase agreement in 2014 for a newly constructed home, which included a one-year residential warranty. Shortly after moving in, he noticed significant cold drafts, frost buildup, and temperature differences in the northwest corner of the home. He raised these concerns with the builder and a local home builders association within the first year, and specifically requested an insulation check before the warranty expired. The builder coordinated multiple inspections and minor repairs with a subcontractor and later, after a period of inactivity, continued to address the issues through additional inspections and proposed repairs. Nevertheless, the homeowner did not commence legal action until July 2022, after an independent inspection revealed ongoing insulation defects. The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, dismissed the homeowner’s claims for breach of warranty, breach of contract, and negligence on summary judgment. The court found the claims were time-barred under North Dakota’s six-year statute of limitations, ruling that the homeowner was on inquiry notice of potential claims as early as December 28, 2015, when he specifically identified insulation concerns. The court also rejected arguments that the builder had waived or forfeited the statute of limitations defense due to litigation conduct, or that equitable estoppel should apply based on ongoing repair efforts. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that the homeowner was on inquiry notice of his claims by December 28, 2015, making his 2022 action untimely under N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(1). The Court further held that the builder neither waived nor forfeited its limitations defense, that ongoing repair and settlement discussions did not equitably estop the builder from asserting the defense, and that no duty-to-disclose exception applied. The summary judgment dismissal was affirmed. View "Hanson v. Dabbert Custom Homes" on Justia Law

Needham v. Needham

2026-07-08T08:03:36-08:00

A married couple, Shane and Janet Needham, divorced after a long marriage during which Mr. Needham co-founded a closely held corporation, Alturas Analytics, Inc., holding 50% of its shares. The parties stipulated to a divorce decree, but the magistrate court reserved jurisdiction to determine the division of their community shares in Alturas. The corporation’s Buy-Sell Agreement, which restricted share transfers, had been signed by both spouses. Following Mr. Needham’s termination from Alturas and ongoing disputes among shareholders, Ms. Needham sought an in-kind division of the shares, while Mr. Needham argued for a monetary award reflecting the shares’ value at the date of divorce. After a two-day trial, the Magistrate Court awarded Ms. Needham 50% of Mr. Needham’s Alturas shares, compelling him to execute a waiver to facilitate the transfer. Mr. Needham appealed to the District Court of the Second Judicial District, arguing the division was inequitable, diminished his share value, and violated precedent requiring equal value in community property division. The district court affirmed the magistrate court’s disposition and awarded attorney fees against Mr. Needham, concluding the in-kind share award was permissible and the court had discretion regarding the valuation date. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho found that the magistrate court abused its discretion by awarding shares in kind and by compelling Mr. Needham to execute the waiver without considering whether that action required him to act in a corporate fiduciary capacity, which the court lacked authority to compel. The Supreme Court also clarified that the proper valuation date for community property is the date of dissolution, not a later date, and reversed the district court’s award of attorney fees. The Court reversed the district court’s affirmance and remanded with instructions for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Needham v. Needham" on Justia Law

Boldt Company v Black & Veatch Construction, Inc.

2026-07-08T07:30:46-08:00

Black & Veatch Construction, Inc. contracted The Boldt Company as a subcontractor for the assembly of a windfarm in Illinois. The project quickly encountered delays due to late delivery of turbine parts, unsuitable site conditions, and issues with equipment, for which Boldt provided several written notices to Black & Veatch. Despite these notices, Black & Veatch issued multiple default warnings and ultimately terminated Boldt for cause, taking over the remaining work. Boldt sued, claiming wrongful termination and seeking payment for completed work, while Black & Veatch counterclaimed that Boldt breached by failing to perform on time. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of Black & Veatch, ruling that Boldt defaulted by failing to perform on schedule and that Black & Veatch properly terminated the subcontract. At trial, the jury was tasked only with determining damages and awarded Black & Veatch nominal damages of $1. Both parties filed post-trial motions, which the district court denied. Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the jury’s nominal damages verdict, finding no reversible error in the district court’s evidentiary rulings or jury instructions. The appellate court also affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Boldt’s claims for payment for completed work and for Black & Veatch’s alleged failure to provide adequate construction works. However, the Seventh Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment on the wrongful termination claim, finding the subcontract ambiguous about whether Boldt was responsible for delays absent specific notice and that material factual disputes remained. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the wrongful termination claim. View "Boldt Company v Black & Veatch Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Cross v. Albright

2026-07-08T07:19:50-08:00

Two neighboring landowners, who are related by marriage, became involved in multiple property disputes, including disagreements over joint ownership and access to ditches and land. To resolve these disputes, one party filed two complaints in the District Court of Fremont County: one seeking an easement for ditch access and another seeking partition of jointly owned land. The parties also had related petitions pending before the Board of Control. During litigation, they participated in mediation and signed an email outlining terms of a purported global settlement agreement, which included provisions for access to ditches, maintenance rights, restrictions on visible storage, and the drafting of a formal settlement by one party’s attorney. After mediation, as the parties attempted to formalize the agreement, new disagreements arose regarding how to implement the access and storage restriction provisions. Each party filed a motion to enforce their interpretation of the settlement; one sought a recordable easement and restrictive covenant, while the other argued those terms exceeded the agreement. The District Court of Fremont County held a hearing to consider the motions, reviewed the parties’ filings and affidavits, and ultimately found that the agreement lacked essential terms, particularly regarding implementation of ditch access and the visual storage restriction. The court determined there was no meeting of the minds and denied both motions to enforce, as well as a request for sanctions. The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the appeal. It held that the district court did not violate due process, as the issue of contract formation was properly considered and the parties had notice and opportunity to argue their positions. The Supreme Court agreed with the district court’s finding that no enforceable settlement agreement existed due to lack of mutual assent on material terms. It further held that Cross was not entitled to attorney’s fees, as there was no enforceable contract providing for such fees. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order. View "Cross v. Albright" on Justia Law

Reagan Marine Construction, LLC v. Costa

2026-07-07T08:17:35-08:00

A general contractor hired a subcontractor to perform electrical work on a marina expansion project in Bristol, Rhode Island. The subcontract specified that time was critical and required timely written notice of delays, as well as an indemnification clause. After the parties negotiated an expanded scope of work and the general contractor paid a deposit, the subcontractor failed to meet the estimated completion schedule and did not provide required delay notices. As a result, the town threatened to terminate the general contract. The general contractor then terminated the subcontract and hired a replacement. The contractor sued the subcontractor and its CEO in Providence County Superior Court, alleging breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and conversion, and sought damages and attorney’s fees. The defendants answered and asserted affirmative defenses. After repeated failures to comply with discovery orders and to retain new counsel following their attorney’s withdrawal, the Superior Court issued conditional orders of default, giving the defendants multiple opportunities to comply. When they did not, the court entered a default judgment for the contractor, including damages, costs, prejudgment interest, and attorney’s fees. The CEO appeared at some hearings but not others, raising concerns about notice and service, which were addressed by the trial justice, who instructed him to file a Rule 60 motion to vacate the default if he wished to contest notice. No such motion was filed. Both sides subsequently filed motions with the Rhode Island Supreme Court relating to remand and post-judgment relief. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed whether the trial justice abused discretion in entering the default judgment. It held that the defendants’ failure to file a Rule 60 motion or properly raise notice issues in the lower court precluded appellate review of those issues. The Court found no abuse of discretion in the entry of default and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The imposition of a cash bond as a condition for remand did not violate due process. View "Reagan Marine Construction, LLC v. Costa" on Justia Law

Chishti v. Spottiswoode

2026-07-07T07:32:04-08:00

Zia Chishti, formerly CEO of a technology company, and his wife brought claims against Tatiana Spottiswoode, her attorneys, and related parties. Chishti and Spottiswoode had a prior romantic relationship, and Spottiswoode was later employed by Chishti’s company under an arbitration agreement. In 2017, Spottiswoode accused Chishti of harassment and assault, leading to confidential arbitration, which resulted in an arbitral award in her favor. Years later, Spottiswoode was subpoenaed to testify before Congress about forced arbitration in sexual assault cases, where she recounted her experiences involving Chishti. After her testimony, Spottiswoode and her attorney made public statements to the media and on social media regarding the matter. Chishti alleged these statements were defamatory and part of a campaign to damage his reputation, causing him to resign from his executive roles. His wife also claimed loss of consortium. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court found that Spottiswoode’s statements before Congress were protected by legislative privilege under District of Columbia law, and that the post-hearing public statements were protected opinions or shielded by the fair reporting privilege and the First Amendment. The court also concluded that the other tort claims were duplicative of defamation, that the conspiracy and loss of consortium claims failed without a viable underlying tort, and that the breach of contract claims were barred by privilege or insufficiently pleaded. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The appellate court held that witness statements to Congress and related communications were absolutely privileged under District of Columbia law. It further held that post-hearing statements were protected as opinion or by fair reporting, and that related tort and contract claims failed for lack of an actionable underlying claim. The dismissal with prejudice was affirmed. View "Chishti v. Spottiswoode" on Justia Law

20100 Eastex v. Saltgrass

2026-07-06T15:30:32-08:00

A dispute arose over a property contract concerning two adjacent restaurant parcels in Humble, Texas, formerly owned by affiliates of Landry’s, Inc. After Landry’s sold one parcel, a Reciprocal Easement Agreement was created to regulate construction and modifications on each parcel. Years later, 20100 Eastex, L.L.C. purchased the parcel previously occupied by Joe’s Crab Shack and leased it to BJ’s Brewery, which planned to demolish the existing building and construct a new one. BJ’s requested Saltgrass’s consent for the project, but Saltgrass denied approval, leading Eastex to claim that consent was deemed granted under the contract due to alleged procedural defects. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment to Saltgrass, finding that the Agreement required Eastex to obtain Saltgrass’s express written consent before demolition or new construction, and Eastex failed to properly request approval. Eastex appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit initially found Section 3.3 of the Agreement ambiguous and remanded for further factfinding. On remand, the district court considered extrinsic evidence, particularly the uncontested testimony of the drafter, and again granted summary judgment for Saltgrass. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that undisputed extrinsic evidence clarified Section 3.3, establishing that Saltgrass’s consent was required for any demolition or new construction. The court affirmed summary judgment for Saltgrass, dismissed Eastex’s appeal regarding attorney fees for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded for determination of Saltgrass’s appellate attorney fees. The main holdings were: Saltgrass’s interpretation of the contract was correct; summary judgment was proper due to lack of genuine factual dispute; and Saltgrass is entitled to appellate attorney fees. View "20100 Eastex v. Saltgrass" on Justia Law

Compeer Financial, ACA v. Corp. Amer. Lending, Inc.

2026-07-06T07:30:57-08:00

Compeer, a group of federally chartered farm credit associations, entered into a master participation agreement with Corporate America Lending, Inc. (CAL), under which Compeer paid CAL $58 million in exchange for the right to receive all payments due on a set of agricultural loans CAL had originated to Famoso Hills Ranch in California. Under the agreement, CAL was to promptly remit any payments or proceeds received on these loans to Compeer. When Famoso refinanced its loans and paid off the balance to CAL, CAL failed to notify Compeer or transfer the payoff proceeds as required and instead concealed receipt of the funds and withheld them as a negotiation tactic, eventually claiming a right to offset based on alleged damages suffered. Arbitration proceedings commenced, resulting in an award in favor of Compeer, finding it was unconditionally entitled to the payoff proceeds and that CAL had no legal basis to withhold them. The arbitration panel found for Compeer on its claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment. Compeer moved in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota to confirm the award and appoint a receiver to secure the funds. The district court confirmed the arbitration award, finding it final and enforceable, and appointed a receiver due to CAL’s repeated noncompliance and attempts to dissipate the funds. CAL appealed, arguing the award was nonfinal, violated public policy, and the receivership was improper due to a forum-selection clause and lack of necessity. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The court held that the arbitration award was final and confirmable, the public policy exception to vacatur under the Federal Arbitration Act did not require setting aside the award given the alternative equitable bases for Compeer’s recovery, and the district court acted within its discretion in appointing a receiver due to CAL’s conduct and the inadequacy of alternative remedies. View "Compeer Financial, ACA v. Corp. Amer. Lending, Inc." on Justia Law

Alta v. General Electric

2026-07-01T09:30:53-08:00

Alta Power, L.L.C. sought to build peaker plants in Texas using refurbished turbines, ultimately contracting with WattStock, which collaborated with General Electric International, Inc. (GE) as a subcontractor. Alta and WattStock’s Master Agreement included a mutual waiver of consequential damages for claims “arising out of or connected in any way to” the agreement, covering both parties and their subcontractors. The turbine arrangement failed in 2020, leading to litigation among Alta, WattStock, and later GE. WattStock filed for bankruptcy and removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Alta sought consequential damages from GE, alleging tortious conduct, fraudulent inducement, and arguing the waiver did not apply to intentional torts. The district court for the Northern District of Texas granted summary judgment to GE, holding that GE, as WattStock’s subcontractor, was an intended third-party beneficiary of the consequential-damages waiver. The court found the waiver enforceable under Texas law, even in the face of alleged fraudulent inducement, referencing Bombardier Aerospace Corp. v. SPEP Aircraft Holdings, LLC, 572 S.W.3d 213 (Tex. 2019), and concluded that the waiver applied to all causes of action, including intentional torts. The district court dismissed all claims by Alta with prejudice, except for GE’s breach of contract claim, which was also dismissed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the summary judgment de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Fifth Circuit held that GE was an intended third-party beneficiary eligible to enforce the waiver, that alleged fraudulent inducement did not render the waiver unenforceable under Texas law, and that the waiver applied to intentional tort claims. The court affirmed the dismissal of Alta’s claims against GE. View "Alta v. General Electric" on Justia Law

Menge v. GEICO General Insurance Company

2026-07-01T08:23:02-08:00

A carpenter who managed his own construction business was involved in a multi-vehicle accident in September 2013, while driving a car owned by another individual. The accident, caused by another driver, resulted in significant injuries and financial losses for the plaintiff, who claimed over $75,000 in medical expenses and more than $250,000 in lost income. The plaintiff had a business insurance policy with Main Street America Assurance Company (MSAA) during the relevant period. The driver and owner of the vehicle that struck the plaintiff were insured by GEICO General Insurance Company. Previously, the plaintiff sued the at-fault driver and owner (the Mathieus) in Kent County Superior Court and later settled that case. In the present suit, the plaintiff brought claims against both GEICO and MSAA for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and statutory bad faith refusal to settle. Both defendants moved to sever the bad faith and implied covenant claims and to stay discovery on those claims, which the Superior Court granted. The court also denied the plaintiff’s motion to compel additional document production from GEICO, pending resolution of summary judgment motions. Ultimately, the Superior Court granted summary judgment for both defendants. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court’s judgments. The Court held that MSAA’s business insurance policy expressly excluded coverage for injuries arising from automobile use, so the plaintiff’s contract and related claims failed as a matter of law. As to GEICO, the Court found that Rhode Island law prohibits direct actions against an insurer under these circumstances, and the plaintiff had no contractual or third-party rights under the GEICO policy. The Court also concluded that the issues related to severance and discovery were moot given the disposition of the contract claims. View "Menge v. GEICO General Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Patterson v. Cannon,

2026-07-01T06:03:27-08:00

A founder of a Delaware start-up, after personally paying a consultant for services due to lack of company funds, negotiated with the consultant to resolve claims for unpaid fees. The consultant agreed to accept a reduced cash payment and a warrant entitling her to purchase one percent of the company's common stock, with the percentage measured at the time of exercise. The founder, acting as CEO, executed this warrant, though he had not fully read the revised terms provided by the consultant’s lawyer. Later, when the consultant needed funds for a personal legal issue, the founder loaned her $20,000, secured by her only company warrant. The security agreement described the collateral as "a warrant to purchase Common Stock...for one million shares," even though the warrant was in fact for a percentage, not a fixed number of shares. When the loan matured and the consultant defaulted, the founder caused the warrant to be transferred into his name without the consultant’s notice, and later partially exercised it. Following a merger, the founder converted some of the resulting shares and retained the rest, selling them after a lock-up period for significant proceeds. The consultant disputed the validity of the transfer and exercise, arguing that the collateral description in the pledge agreement was insufficient and that the founder’s actions constituted conversion. The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware held the warrant was valid and enforceable as a contract for one percent of the company’s stock at exercise, but found the collateral description insufficient under the Delaware UCC, ruling that no security interest attached and the founder’s actions constituted conversion, resulting in a large damages award. The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware affirmed that the warrant was valid and enforceable, but reversed the finding that no security interest attached. The Court held that, despite the inaccurate description of "one million shares," the security agreement reasonably identified the collateral because the consultant had only one such warrant, satisfying the UCC’s requirements. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Patterson v. Cannon," on Justia Law

HAMP'S CONSTRUCTION LLC v. SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

2026-06-30T06:32:30-08:00

This case centers on a contractor’s claim for a Type I differing site condition relating to a flood control project in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana. The United States Army Corps of Engineers issued a solicitation for work on the Trapp Canal, which included boring logs and cross-sections of the canal but lacked specific information about the southwest bank. Hamp’s Construction LLC, after being awarded the contract, encountered unexpected bank failures in the southwest quadrant, resulting in unsafe conditions for land-based equipment and significant delays. Hamp’s Construction submitted a request for equitable adjustment and later a formal claim, asserting that the conditions encountered were materially different from those indicated in the contract documents. The contracting officer denied Hamp’s Construction’s request and subsequent claim, concluding there was insufficient proof of a differing site condition under the relevant Federal Acquisition Regulation clause. Hamp’s Construction appealed to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals. After a hearing, the Board found that although Hamp’s Construction had faced unforeseen difficulties and increased costs, the contract documents did not provide representations or indications about the subsurface conditions of the southwest bank. The Board emphasized the absence of boring logs or explicit information for the area where the failures occurred and denied the appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence. The court held that, for a Type I differing site condition claim, the contract must affirmatively indicate conditions at the disputed site. The court determined that Hamp’s Construction could not reasonably rely on contract documents as indications for the southwest bank. The court affirmed the Board’s decision, holding that Hamp’s Construction failed to establish a threshold element of a Type I differing site condition claim. View "HAMP'S CONSTRUCTION LLC v. SECRETARY OF THE ARMY" on Justia Law

Bridges v. Maxum Indemnity Company

2026-06-29T12:00:47-08:00

The case centers on a legal-malpractice insurance dispute arising from a failed medical-malpractice lawsuit. Lauren Bridges, acting as guardian for her minor daughter, initially filed suit in Alaska state court, alleging negligence by healthcare providers that resulted in her child’s disabilities. The case was dismissed when Bridges’s attorney, McKeen & Associates, failed to respond to summary judgment motions. Bridges subsequently brought a legal-malpractice claim against McKeen. At the relevant times, McKeen held legal-malpractice policies from Maxum Indemnity Company, StarStone Specialty Insurance Company, and Landmark American Insurance Company. All insurers declined to defend or indemnify McKeen. McKeen settled with Bridges, assigning her its rights under the policies. Bridges filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against all three insurers, seeking a declaratory judgment and damages for breach of contract. Maxum and Landmark moved to dismiss, and the district court granted their motions, finding the policies unambiguously excluded coverage. The district court also denied Bridges’s motion to amend her complaint to add bad-faith claims and, after Bridges and StarStone stipulated to dismissal, entered final judgment regarding Maxum and Landmark. Bridges appealed only the dismissal of her claims against Maxum and Landmark. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The court held that Maxum’s policy unambiguously required notification of potential malpractice claims during the policy period, which McKeen failed to do, precluding coverage. As to Landmark, the court found that the relevant “wrongful act” occurred before the retroactive date specified in the follow-form policy, excluding coverage. Bridges’s arguments regarding policy ambiguity and procedural fairness were rejected. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Bridges’s claims against both Maxum and Landmark. View "Bridges v. Maxum Indemnity Company" on Justia Law

IN RE: MMA LAW FIRM, PLLC

2026-06-29T08:36:37-08:00

After Hurricane Ida and other storms struck Louisiana, thousands of residents hired a Houston-based law firm under contingent fee contracts to pursue damage claims. Concerns emerged regarding the firm’s handling of these cases, leading to disciplinary and sanction actions by multiple courts. The Louisiana Supreme Court suspended the firm’s lead attorney’s license and stayed the firm’s cases in state courts. Subsequently, the firm withdrew or was discharged from virtually all remaining cases, and successor law firms resolved many claims. The firm filed for bankruptcy and asserted claims against successor law firms for attorney fees and costs from settlements, sparking disputes over the validity of its contracts in light of alleged misconduct. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, after a jury demand by a successor firm, withdrew the case from bankruptcy court and certified several questions to the Supreme Court of Louisiana. The parties agreed that Louisiana substantive law governs the fee dispute. No factual findings were made about the misconduct allegations; the federal court and Louisiana Supreme Court addressed questions hypothetically. The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that a contingent fee contract formed as a result of unethical or illegal conduct by an attorney is absolutely null, and the attorney cannot recover fees or costs, even on a quasi-contract or quantum meruit basis. If an attorney engages in misconduct after a valid contract is formed, recovery of fees and costs is governed by the Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Products, Inc. and O’Rourke v. Cairns framework, which allows for fee allocation based on the nature and gravity of the misconduct. The Court clarified that any person, including successor law firms, may assert absolute nullity of such contracts. The Court also declined to address procedural questions governed by federal law, such as whether a judge or jury should determine fee reductions in federal court. View "IN RE: MMA LAW FIRM, PLLC" on Justia Law

J.C. Cannistraro, LLC v. Columbia Construction Co.

2026-06-29T04:09:06-08:00

A general contractor and a subcontractor entered into agreements for the construction and renovation of a facility. The subcontracts required disputes to be resolved by arbitration pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration Association. The subcontractor performed work and submitted invoices, but the general contractor, while timely rejecting the invoices and providing reasons, failed to include the good faith certification required by the Massachusetts prompt pay act. The contractor later paid the invoices after an arbitrator determined that the invoices were deemed approved due to the lack of timely certification. Subsequently, the contractor filed a counterclaim in arbitration seeking recoupment of those payments, arguing the invoices were not fair and reasonable. The subcontractor initially brought suit in the Massachusetts Superior Court, which was then compelled to arbitration per the contract. During arbitration, the arbitrator found that the contractor’s failure to timely certify its rejection of the invoices resulted in the invoices being deemed approved and ordered payment to the subcontractor. After payment, the arbitrator allowed the contractor’s counterclaim for recoupment. Following evidentiary proceedings, the arbitrator ruled in favor of the contractor, awarding partial recoupment. The subcontractor moved in the Superior Court to vacate this award, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his authority. Relying on J.C. Cannistraro, LLC v. Columbia Construction Co., the Superior Court judge vacated the recoupment portion of the arbitration award, finding that the contractor had asserted defenses before paying the invoices, contrary to precedent. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the matter on direct appellate review. It held that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority because the award was not prohibited by law nor did it violate public policy. The court determined that the prompt pay act did not expressly prohibit recoupment in these circumstances and that the arbitrator’s actions were within the broad scope granted by the parties’ agreement and the arbitration rules. The judgment vacating the arbitration award was reversed and the matter remanded for confirmation of the arbitration award. View "J.C. Cannistraro, LLC v. Columbia Construction Co." on Justia Law

CARDEN v. MINTON, BASSETT, FLORES & CARSEY, P.C.

2026-06-26T06:22:16-08:00

A man was charged with several serious crimes and, at trial, was represented by attorneys from a law firm. His mother paid $300,000 in legal fees to the firm, based on representations made by his defense counsel about the services to be provided. The man was convicted of some charges and sentenced to prison. After an unsuccessful appeal, he and his mother sued the defense attorneys and their firm for professional negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud. They claimed that the attorneys had provided ineffective representation, failed to deliver on promises related to legal services and use of retainer funds, overcharged, failed to account for fees, and did not return unearned funds. The trial court dismissed all claims with prejudice under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, finding that the mother had no standing to sue because she was not a client, and that the Peeler doctrine barred all of the son’s claims because he had not been exonerated. The Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas affirmed, holding that the mother lacked standing and that the Peeler doctrine categorically barred all of the son’s claims, including those about excessive fees and failure to account. The Supreme Court of Texas clarified that Peeler v. Hughes & Luce bars a convicted criminal defendant from suing defense counsel for legal malpractice unless exonerated, but does not categorically bar contract or fraud claims unrelated to the conviction. The court held that the mother had standing to bring claims for her own direct economic losses, such as overpayment or failure to return unearned fees, but could not bring claims based on an attorney-client relationship. The court affirmed the dismissal of some claims, reversed as to others, and remanded to the court of appeals to consider additional issues, including whether some claims are really fractured malpractice claims and statute of limitations defenses. View "CARDEN v. MINTON, BASSETT, FLORES & CARSEY, P.C." on Justia Law

MAYA WALNUT LLC v. LY

2026-06-26T06:22:14-08:00

A grocery store operated by the petitioner leased space in a shopping center owned by the respondent. As the lease’s expiration approached, the store attempted to renew but was unsuccessful in reaching terms. During negotiations, a representative of the store became suspicious that a competitor, El Rancho, might be taking over the location after hearing about a possible “big surprise” involving El Rancho. Despite these suspicions, the store did not ask the landlord if other negotiations were underway. The landlord had in fact already agreed to lease the space to the competitor, but continued to negotiate with the store. When the store eventually discovered the new lease, it was unable to secure an alternate location and ultimately ceased operations. A jury found for the store on its fraud claims, and the trial court awarded substantial damages. The trial court also found for the landlord on a counterclaim for breach of contract. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas reversed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the store, holding that the store’s reliance on the landlord’s representations was not justified as a matter of law because the existence of “red flags” negated justifiable reliance. The appellate court also held there was sufficient evidence to support the landlord’s counterclaim and remanded for a new judgment in the landlord’s favor. The Supreme Court of Texas granted review and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. The Supreme Court held that the store’s reliance on the landlord’s representations was unjustifiable as a matter of law because, despite being a sophisticated party and having reason to be suspicious, the store failed to exercise reasonable diligence by not inquiring further when it suspected the property might not be available. The case was remanded for entry of judgment favoring the landlord on its counterclaim. View "MAYA WALNUT LLC v. LY" on Justia Law

FS Medical Supplies, LLC v. Tanner Pharma UK Limited

2026-06-25T10:30:26-08:00

During the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, a limited liability company (LLC), FS Medical Supplies, entered into a contract to supply personal protective equipment and related products to TannerGAP, Inc. and Tanner Pharma UK Limited for distribution. FS Medical later discovered that the Tanner entities had contracted directly with one of its suppliers, prompting FS Medical to sue for breach of contract. Initially, FS Medical brought suit in California state court, but the defendants removed the case to federal court, where it was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. FS Medical then filed two actions in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, asserting diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3). FS Medical alleged that its members were citizens of Texas and California, and later acknowledged that one member was a citizen of China. The defendants included both U.S. citizens domiciled in North Carolina and a United Kingdom corporation. After limited discovery and amendment of the complaint, the district court, following a magistrate judge’s recommendation, dismissed the actions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the presence of both domestic and foreign members in the plaintiff LLC destroyed diversity jurisdiction. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that, under § 1332(a)(3), complete diversity requires at least one U.S. citizen on each side of the action. Because FS Medical, as an LLC, had both domestic and foreign members at the time the complaints were filed, and because there were foreign defendants as well, the suit was not between “citizens of different States.” The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal and declined to grant relief under North Carolina’s savings statute, finding it lacked jurisdiction to do so. View "FS Medical Supplies, LLC v. Tanner Pharma UK Limited" on Justia Law

T&T Management, Inc. v. Choice Hotels Int'l

2026-06-25T07:31:00-08:00

T&T Management, Inc. operated a Country Inn & Suites hotel in Port Orange, Florida, under a 15-year license agreement that restricted the franchisor and others from operating hotels using the Country Inn & Suites marks within a defined area. In 2016, Radisson acquired the Country brand, and in 2022, Choice Hotels International purchased the brand from Radisson, assuming all obligations under the license agreement. Prior to acquiring the Country brand, Choice had licensed Sunshine Fund Port Orange, LLC to operate a WoodSpring Suites hotel within the protected area. T&T argued that this violated its license agreement, which it claimed protected it from all competing branded hotels operated or licensed by Choice in the area, and that the agreement’s definition of “Marks” included the WoodSpring mark. T&T initially brought suit in Florida, but after procedural rulings, the case was transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. After amending its complaint multiple times—including to reflect its sale of the Country-branded hotel—T&T alleged breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and tortious interference. The district court dismissed the third amended complaint for failure to state a claim and denied further leave to amend, finding no good cause for additional amendments. Before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, T&T contended that the district court erred in interpreting the contract, dismissing its claims, and denying further amendment. The Eighth Circuit held that, under Florida law, the agreement unambiguously permitted Choice to license non-Country-branded hotels, such as WoodSpring Suites, within the protected area. It affirmed the dismissal of T&T’s breach of contract and good faith claims, and also found the tortious interference claims insufficient because T&T failed to allege a breach or a non-speculative business expectancy. The appellate court also upheld the denial of further leave to amend due to lack of diligence. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "T&T Management, Inc. v. Choice Hotels Int'l" on Justia Law

Fischer v. Fischer-Olson

2026-06-25T07:17:57-08:00

A South Dakota general partnership, along with two individual partners, claimed they had made a series of loans exceeding $1 million to a corporation run by family members during a period when that corporation was engaged in costly litigation. The loans, according to the partnership, were informally made and not fully documented by promissory notes. After the corporation prevailed in its lawsuit and collected on a judgment, the partnership brought action to recover the loaned amounts. The defendants acknowledged receiving some funds but argued those had been repaid and contended that other claimed loan balances were fictitious. The Second Judicial Circuit Court in Lincoln County, South Dakota, oversaw the trial. The jury found in favor of the partnership, awarding $849,550 in damages. The court refused to instruct the jury on the statute of frauds, as requested by the defendants, and also declined their proposed instruction regarding the requirement to prove contract damages with reasonable certainty. After trial, the court denied the partnership’s request for prejudgment interest, citing the absence of a jury finding on the date of loss. The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. It held that whether a writing satisfies the statute of frauds is a question of law, not fact, and that the emails and testimony presented were sufficient to satisfy the evidentiary requirements of the statute. Moreover, the court determined that judicial estoppel precluded the defendants from denying the indebtedness after previously acknowledging the same loans as part of their damages claim in earlier litigation. The court found no abuse of discretion in the damages instruction given and concluded that any error was non-prejudicial. Finally, it held that the plaintiffs had waived their right to prejudgment interest by not securing a jury finding on the date of loss. The judgment was affirmed. View "Fischer v. Fischer-Olson" on Justia Law

Veolia Water Techs. v. Antero Treatment LLC

2026-06-24T07:32:05-08:00

An energy company, seeking to address disposal challenges associated with wastewater from its hydraulic fracturing operations, engaged a water technology firm to design and construct a specialized treatment facility. The two sides entered into a series of agreements, culminating in a comprehensive contract for the facility’s construction. Before this final contract was executed, the water technology firm discovered that its design would not meet the energy consumption requirements critical to the energy company, but did not disclose this information. The firm also failed to reveal risks associated with a proposed design change that could affect the quality of the facility’s waste byproduct. Relying on the firm’s representations, the energy company signed the contract and later approved the design change. When the facility failed to meet contractual specifications—producing unusable waste and exceeding power limits—the energy company terminated the contract and sued for breach and fraud. The case was tried in the Denver District Court, which found that the water technology firm had fraudulently induced the energy company into signing the contract by concealing and failing to disclose material facts. The trial court held that the economic loss rule did not bar the fraud claim because the misconduct occurred prior to contract formation. The court awarded the energy company substantial damages and attorney fees. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, though it reasoned that the contracts were interrelated but found an independent tort duty still existed. The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed whether the economic loss rule barred the fraud claim. The Court held that the interrelated contracts doctrine does not apply when each contract is a stand-alone transaction and that the fraudulent conduct occurred before the governing contract was executed, inducing its formation. Therefore, the economic loss rule does not bar the fraud claim. The judgment was affirmed, and the case was remanded for a determination of reasonable attorney fees. View "Veolia Water Techs. v. Antero Treatment LLC" on Justia Law

Euphoric, LLC v. 4128 Broadway, LLC

2026-06-24T07:31:15-08:00

A business entity, through its principal, attempted to lease a commercial property in Kansas City, Missouri, from the property owner’s company. Both parties signed a lease document; however, the space for the “Commencement Date” was left blank. After negotiations soured—particularly following concerns from neighboring business owners about the potential use and branding of the property—the landlord refused to provide the tenant with keys or possession. The tenant did not provide a requested business plan and, shortly thereafter, the landlord leased the property to a different tenant. The would-be tenant had already paid a security deposit and incurred expenses in anticipation of opening its business. The tenant company filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, raising claims including breach of contract and racial discrimination. Several months later, after the property was re-leased, the tenant moved for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order to compel the landlord to grant possession. At the hearing, the tenant conceded its request for injunctive relief was based solely on the breach of contract claim. The district court denied both the motion for a preliminary injunction and a motion for reconsideration, finding the lease failed to satisfy Missouri’s statute of frauds because the commencement date—an essential term—was not included in the writing, and further finding the tenant failed to show irreparable harm. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of both motions. The Eighth Circuit held that, under Missouri law, a lease for longer than one year must include all essential terms, including the commencement date, in a signed writing, and that parol evidence cannot supply missing essential terms. Because the lease lacked the commencement date, the tenant failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits, and failed to demonstrate irreparable harm. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying reconsideration. View "Euphoric, LLC v. 4128 Broadway, LLC" on Justia Law

Fazel v. Pete Fowler Construction Services

2026-06-23T12:03:09-08:00

After her property experienced water intrusion, a homeowner sued her neighbor, whose property was the source of the problem. The neighbor, in defending the lawsuit, hired a construction consulting firm to inspect both properties and to create an expert report recommending repairs. The recommendations from this report formed the basis of a settlement between the homeowner and her neighbor, and repairs were performed accordingly. After the settlement and repairs, the water intrusion problem recurred, leading the homeowner to file a new lawsuit against the consulting firm, alleging that its recommendations were negligent and defective. In the Superior Court of Orange County, the consulting firm filed an anti-SLAPP motion, asserting that its actions were protected as statements made in the course of litigation. The trial court granted the motion concerning certain claims, but denied it for claims of negligence and breach of contract as a third-party beneficiary, reasoning these arose from conduct rather than protected statements. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal previously affirmed the trial court’s partial denial, finding that the remaining claims were not based on protected activity, and remanded for further proceedings on those claims. Upon remand, the consulting firm moved for judgment on the pleadings, contending that the litigation privilege under California Civil Code section 47(b) barred the remaining claims. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the consulting firm. The court held that the litigation privilege applied because the firm’s formulation of repair recommendations was necessarily related to a communicative act (the expert report) prepared in the course of litigation, and thus barred the homeowner’s negligence and third-party beneficiary claims. The judgment in favor of the consulting firm was affirmed. View "Fazel v. Pete Fowler Construction Services" on Justia Law

Walton v Comfort Sys. USA (Syracuse), Inc.

2026-06-23T10:25:49-08:00

Technicians employed by the defendant performed installation, maintenance, inspection, testing, repair, and replacement of fire alarms, fire sprinklers, and security system equipment under contracts with public entities in New York. These contracts varied in their language regarding the payment of prevailing wages: some disclaimed any obligation to pay prevailing wages, some were silent, and a few expressly based payment on prevailing wage rates. All contracts included a clause providing that any action against the defendant had to be brought within one year of accrual. The plaintiffs brought a proposed class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, alleging, among other claims, that they were owed prevailing wages as third-party beneficiaries of the contracts. The District Court granted the defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment, finding that the breach of contract claims were time-barred by the contractual limitation period, that the contracts did not expressly entitle plaintiffs to prevailing wages, and, in the alternative, that plaintiffs were not covered by the prevailing wage law. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that plaintiffs were covered by Labor Law § 220 but certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the implicit inclusion of prevailing wage promises in public works contracts and the enforceability of shortened contractual limitation periods. The New York Court of Appeals held that the promise to pay prevailing wages is implicit in every public works contract covered by Labor Law § 220, regardless of whether that promise appears in the contract’s text. As a result, employees may bring third-party beneficiary breach of contract claims to enforce the prevailing wage requirement. The Court further held that contractual agreements to shorten the statute of limitations for such claims are unenforceable. The Court answered the first certified question in the affirmative and the second in the negative. View "Walton v Comfort Sys. USA (Syracuse), Inc." on Justia Law

CHAMPION FOOD SERVICE, INC. v. PROALAMO FOODS, L.L.C.

2026-06-19T06:17:11-08:00

A commercial meat supplier delivered frozen meat products to a distributor over a series of transactions, each accompanied by an invoice. The distributor did not pay all of the invoices, claiming that some of the meat was spoiled, while the supplier insisted that the distributor simply failed to pay what was owed and invented the spoiled-meat justification later. The supplier sued for breach of contract and, alternatively, for quantum meruit (an equitable claim for the value of goods or services provided), seeking payment for the unpaid invoices. The distributor counterclaimed for breach of contract, alleging damages from the spoiled meat. At trial in a Texas district court, the jury was asked whether the distributor failed to comply with the agreements to pay for the meat and answered no. However, the jury found in favor of the supplier on its quantum meruit claim and awarded damages. The jury found that a reasonable attorney’s fee for the supplier’s attorneys was $0. The trial court entered judgment for the supplier on the quantum meruit claim and awarded the supplier its requested attorney’s fees, disregarding the jury’s finding. The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment on both quantum meruit and attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court of Texas concluded that the supplier’s provision of meat was covered by express agreements between the parties and, as a matter of law, quantum meruit recovery is barred when a valid contract governs the subject matter. Because the supplier was not entitled to recover in quantum meruit, it also could not recover attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the relevant portions of the court of appeals’ judgment and rendered a take-nothing judgment in favor of the distributor. View "CHAMPION FOOD SERVICE, INC. v. PROALAMO FOODS, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Office of the Special Deputy Receiver v Hartford Fire Insurance Company

2026-06-18T12:30:47-08:00

The Office of the Special Deputy Receiver (OSD), an Illinois non-profit that manages receiverships for insolvent insurance companies, purchased a Financial Institution Bond from Hartford Fire Insurance Company. The bond included coverage for computer systems fraud and for electronic mail initiated transfer fraud, subject to certain exclusions. Hackers infiltrated OSD’s Chief Financial Officer’s email account via a spear phishing attack, impersonated the CFO, and sent fraudulent instructions to other OSD employees, resulting in unauthorized wire transfers and a loss of nearly $4 million. OSD filed claims with both Hartford and another insurer. Hartford denied coverage, asserting that an exclusion in the bond applied to the loss. OSD sued both insurers in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking declaratory relief and alleging breach of contract. The district court granted Hartford’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), finding that the policy’s exclusion for losses resulting from fraudulent instructions sent to OSD by email applied, and denied the other insurer’s motion. OSD later voluntarily dismissed its claims against the second company, and judgment was entered. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the exclusion in Rider 17 of the Hartford bond unambiguously barred coverage for losses resulting from fraudulent email instructions sent to OSD—even if the sender was impersonating an internal employee—because the exclusion focused on the recipient, not the sender. The court found no ambiguity or conflict between the exclusion and other coverage provisions, and concluded that OSD’s losses fell outside the scope of coverage. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of OSD’s claims against Hartford. View "Office of the Special Deputy Receiver v Hartford Fire Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Incorporated Vil. of Freeport v Freeport Plaza W., LLC

2026-06-18T08:11:53-08:00

The Incorporated Village of Freeport and Freeport Plaza West, LLC entered into a contract for the purchase and development of several parcels of land. The agreement stipulated that the closing would occur within 30 days after Freeport Plaza West received all required approvals. The Village alleged that Freeport Plaza West obtained the necessary approvals but failed to close on the property within the contractual timeframe. In response, Freeport Plaza West filed a counterclaim, alleging that the Village had effectively breached the contract by forcing a premature closing and refusing to accept necessary development documentation. Importantly, Freeport Plaza West did not file a notice of claim with the Village regarding its counterclaim. After the Village brought suit for breach of contract, Freeport Plaza West answered and asserted its counterclaim. The Village, in turn, raised as a defense that Freeport Plaza West had failed to satisfy all conditions precedent, including the statutory notice of claim requirement under CPLR 9802. Nearly a year and a half into the litigation and shortly before the scheduled trial, the Village moved to dismiss the counterclaim for the lack of a timely notice of claim. Supreme Court denied the motion, applying equitable estoppel against the Village due to its litigation conduct and finding no prejudice from the absence of formal notice. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the Village’s actions did not amount to misleading conduct warranting equitable estoppel and dismissed the counterclaim. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court held that CPLR 9802’s notice of claim requirement applies strictly to contract actions against villages, including counterclaims, and that equitable estoppel against a municipality is only warranted in rare and unusual circumstances involving misconduct or misleading behavior, which were not present here. The failure to file a notice of claim barred Freeport Plaza West’s counterclaim. View "Incorporated Vil. of Freeport v Freeport Plaza W., LLC" on Justia Law

ZHANG VS. ZHANG

2026-06-18T08:08:55-08:00

Two sisters became involved in a business dispute after one sister contributed $200,000 to the other for the purchase of four residential properties, expecting an equal share of profits from their rental or sale. The properties were titled solely in the recipient sister’s name, who later sold one and kept all proceeds. After attempts to secure her ownership interest failed, the contributing sister filed suit, asserting claims including breach of contract and unjust enrichment, seeking return of her investment and her share of profits. The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County initially entered a default against the defendant for failing to timely answer, but this was later set aside. As the trial approached, the defendant moved to exclude evidence of damages, arguing that the plaintiff had not provided an adequate computation of damages as required by NRCP 16.1. The court gave the plaintiff another chance to supplement her computation but she failed to comply in time. The court granted the motion to exclude all evidence of damages, then dismissed the complaint with prejudice, reasoning that without damages there was nothing left to litigate. The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the case. The court held that the district court correctly required a computation of damages because the claims sought tangible, quantifiable losses. However, it found that by granting the motion to exclude all damages evidence—which resulted in dismissal with prejudice—the district court imposed a case-terminating sanction. Under Nevada law, before issuing such a sanction, the court must analyze the factors set out in Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Building, Inc. Because the district court failed to conduct this analysis, the Supreme Court vacated the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the required standards. View "ZHANG VS. ZHANG" on Justia Law

Construction Services, LLC v. RAM-Robertsdale Subdivision Partners, LLC

2026-06-18T05:30:34-08:00

A Mississippi construction company, operating under the name MCA Construction, Inc., entered into a contract with an Alabama property owner to perform site development work on a residential subdivision in Baldwin County. The contract was executed on February 11, 2021, and at that time, the company held an Alabama general contractor’s license with a “Building Construction” (BC) classification and an unlimited bid limit. Shortly before executing the contract, the city engineer raised questions regarding whether the BC classification was adequate for the planned utility work (such as water and sewer installation) and indicated that an additional “Municipal and Utility” (MU) classification might be required before such work began. MCA sought clarification from the state licensing board and subsequently obtained the MU classification in May 2021, before starting the utility work. The property owner, RAM-Robertsdale Subdivision Partners, LLC, along with related parties, later alleged that MCA had performed defective work and failed to pay subcontractors, and they brought suit in Baldwin Circuit Court. MCA filed counterclaims for breach of contract and fraud, asserting that it had not been fully paid for its work. The RAM parties moved for summary judgment, arguing that the contract was void because MCA was not properly licensed with the MU classification at the time the contract was executed. The Baldwin Circuit Court granted summary judgment for the RAM parties, holding that the contract was void because MCA was not “duly licensed” for all aspects of the work at the time of contracting. MCA appealed. The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the statutory and regulatory framework, noting that MCA had a valid BC license, acted in good faith, and obtained the MU classification before performing utility work. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that substantial compliance with the licensing statute was sufficient in these circumstances and that voiding the contract was not warranted. The court reversed the summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Construction Services, LLC v. RAM-Robertsdale Subdivision Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

Bar at the Yard v. Friends Family

2026-06-18T05:08:38-08:00

A business operating a restaurant and bar near Memorial Stadium in Lincoln, Nebraska, leased its space from a landlord and claimed an exclusive right, under its lease, to sell alcohol in a specific outdoor area called the Common Area. Another business, which also operated a restaurant nearby, entered into agreements with the same landlord to sell alcohol from a space adjacent to the Common Area during Nebraska football home games. The new competitor sold alcohol through windows to customers standing in the Common Area, which the first business claimed violated its exclusive rights and harmed its sales. After learning of the competitor’s plans, the original bar sent a cease-and-desist letter, which was ignored. The bar then sued the competitor, alleging tortious interference with contract and with a business expectancy, seeking both damages and injunctive relief. Both sides submitted affidavits and evidence during discovery. The District Court for Lancaster County granted summary judgment in favor of the competitor, finding no evidence that the competitor’s actions went beyond valid competition or that it induced the landlord to breach the lease’s exclusivity provision. The court also struck certain portions of the plaintiff’s affidavit on evidentiary grounds. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that to prevail on claims for tortious interference with contract or business expectancy, a plaintiff must show intentional and unjustified interference beyond valid competition. The Court found no evidence that the competitor induced the landlord to breach the lease or engaged in improper means; mere knowledge that entering a new agreement would conflict with an existing contract was insufficient. The Court also agreed that the competitor’s conduct constituted valid competition, not actionable interference, and that any evidentiary rulings by the district court did not affect the outcome. View "Bar at the Yard v. Friends Family" on Justia Law

Peters Broadcast Engineering, Inc. v PEM Consulting Group, LLC

2026-06-17T11:30:47-08:00

A small Indiana telecommunications engineering company entered into a master services agreement with a larger firm, Crown Castle, for potential construction work on cell tower sites. The agreement did not guarantee specific work or payment, and required approval of any subcontractors. Before the agreement was signed, the company began discussions with a group including the defendants about subcontracting the construction work because it lacked sufficient resources. Communications between the parties included a draft proposal but no finalized agreement. Nevertheless, work commenced, with the defendants providing crews, equipment, and funding, and the plaintiff company also supplying resources and covering expenses. Throughout the project, both parties disputed their responsibilities, and payments were made and later charged back. Eventually, the defendants contacted Crown Castle directly seeking payment, and the project ended with Crown Castle terminating its contract with the plaintiff due to poor work quality. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana granted summary judgment for all defendants. The court found there was no enforceable contract, as both sides admitted no final agreement was reached and essential terms were missing. The court also rejected the plaintiff’s claims for fraudulent inducement, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation, finding no actionable reliance or advisory relationship. The claim for unjust enrichment failed because no benefit was conferred that would make retention unjust. The claim of tortious interference with business relations was dismissed because the defendants’ actions were justified by their legitimate interest in payment. The district court accordingly granted summary judgment to the insurers as well. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held there was no enforceable contract, no actionable fraud or misrepresentation, no unjust enrichment, and no tortious interference, and upheld summary judgment for all defendants. View "Peters Broadcast Engineering, Inc. v PEM Consulting Group, LLC" on Justia Law

MARKHAM v. CAHAVA

2026-06-17T09:05:50-08:00

A developer owned all property in a residential community and petitioned a town to create a public improvement district to finance and construct infrastructure improvements, such as roads and water lines. The district’s board, composed of representatives of the developer, was authorized to levy assessments and issue bonds to fund construction. The developer and the district entered a development agreement requiring the developer to fund the improvements, and the district contracted with a construction company to perform the work. After most of the work was done, a payment dispute arose. The construction company obtained an arbitration award against the district but was not fully paid. The construction company then sued the developer and related entities for unjust enrichment, asserting that the developer received the benefit of infrastructure improvements without paying for them. The Superior Court in Maricopa County granted the developer’s motion to dismiss, concluding that, under Arizona law as interpreted in Wang Electric, Inc. v. Smoke Tree Resort, a plaintiff in an unjust enrichment claim must allege improper conduct by the property owner, and the construction company had not done so. The court also denied the construction company’s request to file an amended complaint. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the improper conduct requirement applied only in landlord-tenant-contractor cases, and allowed the construction company to amend its complaint. The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case to clarify when the improper conduct requirement applies to unjust enrichment claims. The court held that the requirement only applies when the owner is a landlord and the improvements are made at the tenant’s direction. It does not extend to situations where the owner directly arranges for improvements and pays no one for them. The court concluded that the construction company’s allegations were sufficient to state a claim for unjust enrichment against the developer. The court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, reversed the superior court’s dismissal, and remanded for further proceedings. View "MARKHAM v. CAHAVA" on Justia Law

Pinto v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n

2026-06-17T05:35:14-08:00

Samantha Pinto was involved in a car accident in December 2020, after which she claimed to have suffered various physical and cognitive injuries, including a concussion and related mental health issues. At the time, she was employed by United Services Automobile Association (USAA), her insurer, and asserted a claim for uninsured motorist (UM) benefits. Pinto alleged significant lost wages and benefits following her termination from USAA, which she attributed to her accident-related health issues. She received $500,000 from the other driver’s insurer but claimed that her damages exceeded that amount, seeking additional recovery from USAA under her UM policy. After USAA denied her UM claim, valuing it at less than what she had already recovered, Pinto filed a breach of contract lawsuit against the company. During discovery in the El Paso County District Court, USAA requested Pinto’s unredacted medical records, documents relating to a subsequent 2022 accident, and required her to submit to an independent medical examination (IME). Pinto objected, arguing that under Schultz v. GEICO Casualty Co., USAA should be limited to the evidence available at the time of its coverage decision. The district court distinguished Schultz, finding the requested information relevant and discoverable for the contract claim, and ordered Pinto to comply. The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the district court’s order under its original jurisdiction. It held that the rule from Schultz, which limits review to evidence available when the insurer made its decision, applies only to bad faith claims, not to breach of contract claims. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in compelling production of Pinto’s medical records and insurance documents, and in ordering her to undergo an IME. The order to show cause was discharged. View "Pinto v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n" on Justia Law

Wightman v. Ameritas Life Ins

2026-06-12T09:30:38-08:00

Mark and Courtney Wightman, who own a dental clinic in Louisiana, entered into an agreement with DenteMax, a preferred provider organization (PPO), allowing DenteMax to offer their services at discounted rates to its network subscribers in exchange for access to more patients. Unbeknownst to the Wightmans, DenteMax also entered into a separate agreement with Ameritas Life Insurance Corporation, which permitted Ameritas to pay DenteMax’s network providers, including the Wightmans, at the same discounted rates. The Wightmans only became aware of this arrangement when Ameritas reimbursed them at the discounted rates rather than their standard rates for services rendered to Ameritas-insured patients. The Wightmans filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against Ameritas and DenteMax, alleging breach of contract, violations of Louisiana’s Preferred Provider Organization Act (PPO Act), and unjust enrichment. The district court initially dismissed several claims, partly on the ground that the suit was prescribed (time-barred). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified a question to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which held that PPO Act claims are contractual for prescriptive purposes, making the claims timely. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s prior dismissal. DenteMax settled, and on remand, the district court granted summary judgment to Ameritas, concluding that dental services are not “healthcare services” under the PPO Act, and that the Wightmans had abandoned their non-PPO Act claims. On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that dental services are “healthcare” under the PPO Act, reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment on those claims. The court also found error in the district court’s treatment of the abandonment of non-PPO Act claims and remanded for further proceedings. The denial of leave to amend was affirmed. View "Wightman v. Ameritas Life Ins" on Justia Law

RIVER CREEK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. PRESTON HOLLOW CAPITAL, LLC

2026-06-12T06:16:24-08:00

A Texas city created a local government corporation to finance public improvements in a designated district. The corporation borrowed $17.4 million from a Wisconsin bond issuer, which funded the construction of improvements, with the city agreeing to purchase those improvements over time using assessments levied within the district. The financing structure involved a promissory note and other contracts, but the corporation did not submit these documents to the Texas Attorney General for required examination and approval. After a change in city leadership and financial difficulties, the city and corporation sued the bondholder and related parties, arguing that the failure to obtain Attorney General approval rendered the transaction void and that the financing arrangement violated provisions of the Public Improvement District (PID) Act. The trial court (District Court of Williamson County) granted summary judgment for the bondholder and other defendants, holding that while submission to the Attorney General was required, failure to do so did not void the transaction. The court also determined that the PID Act had not been violated, and it rejected challenges to certain evidence and to the award of attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas affirmed, agreeing that the note and contracts were not void and that statutory requirements regarding bond issuance did not apply to the transaction. The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that failing to submit the promissory note and supporting contracts to the Attorney General removes the statutory defense of incontestability but does not render the transaction void or unenforceable. It further held that the transaction did not violate the PID Act because the relevant restrictions applied only to bonds issued by the city or its corporation, which was not the case here. The court also found no reversible error regarding evidentiary rulings or the award of attorney’s fees. View "RIVER CREEK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. PRESTON HOLLOW CAPITAL, LLC" on Justia Law

5th and Walnut Parking, LLC v. City of Des Moines

2026-06-12T06:04:03-08:00

A group of developers and the City of Des Moines entered into a development agreement for a multi-use project in downtown Des Moines, including a parking garage, a residential tower, and a theater. The project was delayed multiple times due to issues with property title, design changes, and the COVID-19 pandemic. The developers notified the City of enforced delays under the agreement’s force majeure clause. Despite ongoing negotiations for contract amendments, the City issued default notices in June 2020 for failure to meet construction deadlines, which caused the project's lender to initiate foreclosure. The City later purchased the garage at foreclosure, extinguishing the developers’ debt but preventing them from completing the project and realizing contractual gains. The Iowa District Court for Polk County found the City breached the development agreement by issuing default notices without providing the required opportunity to cure and during an enforceable pandemic-related delay. The court awarded the developers over $4.3 million in damages for lost contractual benefits. The court also found the City liable for tortious interference with the developers’ loan agreement but denied other claims by both sides, including additional damages sought by the developers and fraud and unjust enrichment claims by the City. The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed the case for errors at law. It affirmed the district court’s finding that the City, not the developers, breached the agreement, upholding the damages award for breach of contract. However, it reversed the judgment against the City for tortious interference with contract, holding that a breach of contract alone, without additional improper conduct, does not support such a tort claim. The court affirmed the denial of all additional damages sought by the developers and rejected the City’s arguments for immunity, damages limitations, and reclaiming property titles. The developers’ cross-appeal was denied. View "5th and Walnut Parking, LLC v. City of Des Moines" on Justia Law

Vaughn Boyd v. Deadwood Tobacco Co.

2026-06-08T07:31:04-08:00

Two businesses and their principals were involved in the sale of a cigar company. The sale was governed by a written agreement which expressly reserved three registered trademarks for the sellers, and did not mention other closely related marks. After the sale, the buyers’ company launched new cigar products and marketing campaigns referencing the history and reputation of the reserved marks and associated product lines. The sellers objected, claiming infringement of their reserved trademark interests and associated goodwill. When attempts to resolve the dispute failed, the sellers filed a federal trademark infringement lawsuit. The first lawsuit was brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. That court did not address the merits of the trademark claims. Instead, it found that the claims arose out of the sales agreement, which contained a forum selection clause requiring venue in state court in Lawrence County, South Dakota. On that basis, the Florida district court dismissed the case on forum non conveniens grounds. Subsequently, the buyers initiated a related contract lawsuit in South Dakota state court. The sellers then filed the present lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota, asserting only federal Lanham Act claims and omitting the sales agreement from their initial filings. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the federal trademark claims arose out of the sales agreement, because resolving them would require analyzing the parties’ contractual allocation of trademark rights and goodwill. The court further held that the forum selection clause in the agreement was valid, mandatory, and enforceable under South Dakota law and federal law, and that it required litigation to proceed in state court in Lawrence County, South Dakota. The Eighth Circuit also concluded that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over federal Lanham Act claims. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Vaughn Boyd v. Deadwood Tobacco Co." on Justia Law

Deque Systems Inc. v. Browserstack, Inc.

2026-06-05T10:30:42-08:00

Deque Systems Inc., a company specializing in web accessibility software, developed and registered multiple versions of its DevTools and Rules Help Pages products. To access these, users agreed not to copy, reverse-engineer, or otherwise misuse the software or its documentation. In 2021, BrowserStack, a competing firm, sought to develop its own accessibility testing tools. More than 100 BrowserStack employees created accounts with Deque—agreeing to Deque’s terms—and later, BrowserStack released an Accessibility Toolkit, which Deque alleged was developed by unlawfully copying and reverse-engineering DevTools and the Rules Help Pages. Deque filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, claiming copyright infringement, false advertising, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment, and sought injunctive relief, damages, and other remedies. During discovery, Deque repeatedly failed to properly disclose its damages calculations and supporting evidence by the deadlines set in the court’s scheduling order. Despite several opportunities to supplement its disclosures and a late attempt to introduce expert testimony, Deque did not timely provide the required information. BrowserStack moved to exclude Deque’s damages evidence and for summary judgment. The district court granted these motions, finding that Deque’s noncompliance with disclosure rules was neither substantially justified nor harmless, and that Deque presented no evidence supporting injunctive or other relief. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding all evidence of Deque’s damages under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) due to repeated and unjustified failures to comply with disclosure requirements. The court also held that summary judgment for BrowserStack was warranted because Deque could not establish entitlement to injunctive, declaratory, or monetary relief. View "Deque Systems Inc. v. Browserstack, Inc." on Justia Law

Gombako-Amos v. Amos

2026-06-05T01:21:07-08:00

After divorcing by mutual agreement, the parties executed a property settlement agreement incorporated into their judgment of divorce. The agreement required one party, Louise, to be responsible for a Trustmark National Bank judgment and to hold the other party, Corey, harmless from liability. Subsequently, Trustmark National Bank began garnishing Louise’s wages to satisfy the judgment. Later, Corey discovered a lien from the Trustmark judgment on property he received in the divorce. To complete a sale of that property, Corey paid the remaining balance of the judgment in a lump sum, without notifying Louise of the lien or his payment. Louise learned the judgment had been released but did not know Corey had paid it. Corey then filed a contempt action in Pike County Chancery Court, alleging that Louise willfully violated the property settlement agreement by failing to fully satisfy the debt and reimburse him. After a hearing, the chancellor held Louise in willful contempt, ordering her to pay Corey the amount he had paid to release the lien, plus interest, in a lump sum within ninety days, and to pay $4,000 in attorneys’ fees within sixty days. Louise appealed to the Mississippi Court of Appeals, which affirmed the chancellor’s decision, concluding the agreement required Louise to reimburse Corey and that the chancellor did not clearly err in finding contempt. The Supreme Court of Mississippi granted certiorari. It held that there was no clear and convincing evidence that Louise willfully or deliberately violated the court’s order, as she was paying the debt through wage garnishment and was unaware of Corey’s payment. The court also found the agreement was vague regarding the manner and timing of reimbursement. The Supreme Court reversed and rendered the contempt and attorneys’ fee awards, and remanded to the chancery court to determine the timing and manner of reimbursement. View "Gombako-Amos v. Amos" on Justia Law

Hofer v. Paulson

2026-06-04T06:10:22-08:00

The dispute centers on two business partners, Hofer and Paulson, who jointly owned multiple entities, including Imaging Solutions, Inc. (ISI). After several ventures failed, both partners assumed significant individual debts to ISI. In 2016, as Paulson sought to separate his interests, the parties negotiated a "Takeout" through their chief financial officer, Heier. Hofer agreed to assume Paulson’s $1.9 million debt to ISI. Multiple agreements were executed, including an oral assumption agreement, a Master Redemption Agreement, and an ISI Redemption Agreement. Hofer later claimed he was unaware of assuming the debt, citing written assumption agreements with stamped signatures that he alleged were unauthorized. The District Court of Cass County held a bench trial in November 2024. It found the oral assumption agreement valid and enforceable, concluding Hofer had indeed assumed Paulson’s debt as part of the Takeout. The court declared the written assumption agreements invalid, dismissed Hofer’s claims for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, rescission, and other causes of action, and awarded statutory costs to Paulson and Heier. Paulson’s counterclaims, other than the request for declaratory judgment, were also dismissed. The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the appeal and applied a clearly erroneous standard to factual findings. It held the oral assumption agreement was not subject to the statute of frauds under N.D.C.C. § 9-06-04(2) or (5), because the agreement constituted an assumption rather than a guaranty and did not alter terms of repayment. The court found sufficient evidence of mutual consent and affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the validity and enforceability of the oral assumption agreement. View "Hofer v. Paulson" on Justia Law

Hurd v. H & H Real Estate, LLC

2026-06-03T08:49:44-08:00

The case centers on an owner of a waterfront condominium in Newport, Rhode Island, who hired a real estate agency and its agent to find a suitable tenant for his property. The agency presented a candidate, Cynthia Dziurgot, who passed credit and criminal background checks, and the owner entered into a lease with her. After several months, Dziurgot stopped paying rent and refused to vacate the property at the end of the lease, leading to an extended eviction process during the COVID-19 eviction moratorium. The owner later discovered that an internet search would have revealed a history of misconduct and legal issues involving the tenant. The plaintiff filed suit in Newport County Superior Court, alleging breach of contract and negligence by the agency and its agent for allegedly failing to adequately vet the tenant. The plaintiff intended to call a real estate expert to testify that a reasonable real estate professional would have conducted an internet search of the prospective tenant. However, after failing to produce the expert for deposition as agreed in a consent order, the court precluded the plaintiff from offering any expert testimony. The defendants then moved for summary judgment, arguing that without expert testimony, the plaintiff could not establish the applicable standard of care for real estate professionals. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that the standard of care was not within common knowledge and required expert testimony. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The Court held that establishing the standard of care for real estate professionals regarding background searches is not within the common knowledge of laypersons and requires expert testimony. Because the plaintiff was precluded from offering such testimony, summary judgment for the defendants was affirmed. View "Hurd v. H & H Real Estate, LLC" on Justia Law

Melby v. Doering

2026-06-02T14:36:51-08:00

A couple owned a large property in Missoula County, Montana, known as Marshall Mountain, and agreed to sell it to buyers for $2,150,000. The original purchase agreement called for conventional financing, but the parties later amended their agreement to provide for seller financing through a contract for deed, specifying essential terms such as the down payment, interest rate, amortization period, and payment responsibilities. The agreement contained a title contingency, among others, and the buyers approved the preliminary title commitment, which did not include any public access easements. After negotiating drafts of the contract for deed, the sellers’ attorney added numerous new provisions, including a public access easement that would allow various groups to use the property, which was not present in the original agreement or amendment. The buyers objected to this new term, arguing that it changed the character of the property. The sellers refused to accept the buyers’ proposed revisions and terminated the agreement. The buyers filed suit in the Montana Fourth Judicial District Court, alleging breach of contract, among other claims. The District Court found that the executed buy-sell agreement and its amendment constituted an enforceable contract, that the sellers breached its express terms by refusing to close, and that the buyers were damaged, but left other issues for trial. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed de novo whether the parties’ failure to agree to the final terms of the contract for deed rendered the agreement unenforceable. The Court held that the buy-sell agreement and amendment contained all material terms necessary for the enforceable sale of real property, and that the parties did not clearly condition contract formation on later agreement to the contract for deed’s terms. The Court affirmed the District Court’s order granting partial summary judgment to the buyers. View "Melby v. Doering" on Justia Law

Progressive Direct Ins. Co. v. Ortiz

2026-06-02T05:02:11-08:00

This case centers on a car accident between an insured driver, Ortiz, and an uninsured motorist, Camacho, in Colorado. At the time of the collision, Camacho lacked insurance, drove with only a learner’s permit, and was unsupervised. Ortiz, insured by Progressive Direct Insurance Company, sought uninsured motorist (UM) benefits from Progressive after the accident. Progressive denied the claim, asserting Ortiz was more than 50% at fault. Ortiz then sued both Camacho for negligence and Progressive for breach of contract, insurance bad faith, and unreasonable delay and denial of benefits. Camacho did not respond to the lawsuit, leading the District Court for Garfield County to enter a clerk’s default against her. Progressive had been served but did not object at that time. Progressive’s answer to Ortiz’s complaint included general affirmative defenses but did not specifically assert comparative fault. After Ortiz moved for partial summary judgment, Progressive, for the first time, sought to participate in the liability and damages components of the default judgment hearing. The district court permitted Progressive to contest damages but barred it from contesting liability, finding Progressive had not timely or specifically pleaded its legitimate defenses as required under State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Brekke, 105 P.3d 177 (Colo. 2004). Progressive paid the damages awarded in the default judgment and then proceeded to trial on Ortiz’s bad faith claims, where Ortiz prevailed. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision, holding Progressive failed to meet the Brekke standards for timely and particularized pleading of its legitimate defenses. The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed whether Brekke’s requirements should be reconsidered. The Court clarified that pleading with particularity under Rule 9(b) is only necessary if fraud or mistake is asserted, and otherwise, insurers must plead legitimate defenses specifically and as soon as practicable. The Court affirmed the appellate judgment, reaffirming Brekke and declining to overrule it. View "Progressive Direct Ins. Co. v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

STATE OF GEORGIA v. FEDERAL DEFENDER PROGRAM, INC.

2026-06-02T04:16:16-08:00

The case concerns a dispute arising from an agreement between the State of Georgia and several organizations representing death row inmates. This agreement, made in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, established certain conditions that had to be met before the State would resume seeking execution orders for specific inmates. One condition required that a COVID-19 vaccine be “readily available to all members of the public.” The Federal Defender Program, Inc., along with intervenors including Virgil Delano Presnell, Jr., alleged the State breached this agreement by seeking execution orders before this condition was fulfilled, specifically arguing that vaccines were not FDA-approved for children under six months old. The Superior Court of Fulton County previously granted an interlocutory injunction halting the executions, finding the agreement enforceable and the vaccine condition unmet. After further litigation focused on whether the vaccine condition was satisfied, the parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment. The Superior Court concluded that because the FDA had not approved COVID-19 vaccines for children under six months old, the condition remained unsatisfied. It granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and issued a permanent injunction preventing the State from resuming executions until all agreement conditions were met. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia first determined it had jurisdiction, holding that intervention by a prisoner in a suit originally filed by a non-prisoner did not transform the case into a “prisoner action” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Addressing the merits, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court’s order. It held that the vaccine condition did not require FDA approval for every age group and that the evidence showed COVID-19 vaccines were “readily available” to all members of the public as required by the agreement. The court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "STATE OF GEORGIA v. FEDERAL DEFENDER PROGRAM, INC." on Justia Law

Cave Bay Community Services v. Lohman

2026-06-01T13:36:02-08:00

Morgan Lohman purchased a 25.8-acre property from Stephen and Melinda Dreher in 2022, knowing that the property was subject to a permanent easement held by Cave Bay Community Services, Inc., and an option agreement allowing Cave Bay to purchase the easement area for one dollar once the Drehers’ loans were paid off. After the purchase, the Drehers paid off their loans, Cave Bay attempted to exercise its option, and Lohman refused to comply. Cave Bay, which had already been using the easement for a wastewater facility, filed suit against Lohman for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and specific performance. The District Court of the First Judicial District, Kootenai County, granted summary judgment to Cave Bay solely on the claim for specific performance and awarded attorney fees and costs. The court’s decision was based on its view that there were no disputed material facts and that Cave Bay was entitled to specific performance under the option agreement. The district court did not issue a detailed written opinion and did not resolve whether there was a breach of contract, focusing instead on the remedy of specific performance. The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case and held that the district court erred by granting summary judgment on specific performance as if it were an independent cause of action. The Supreme Court clarified that specific performance is a remedy, not a stand-alone claim, and that entitlement to such a remedy requires first establishing a breach of contract. Because the district court had not ruled on the underlying breach, the Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment, vacated the award of attorney fees and costs, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Costs on appeal were awarded to Lohman. View "Cave Bay Community Services v. Lohman" on Justia Law

Khalsa v. Ridnour

2026-06-01T13:36:01-08:00

Two neighbors in Bonner County, Idaho, own adjacent properties—one is lakefront and the other sits directly behind it without lake access. After years of disputes over easements relating to beach, lake, and parking access, the parties entered litigation. During trial, the district court mediated a settlement, which was read into the record and later formalized as a Stipulated Agreement and Order. This agreement outlined the parties’ rights to use the properties and set procedures for mediation and arbitration if further disputes arose. After signing the agreement and a minor modification by the district court, further conflicts emerged, especially regarding the construction and location of one party’s patio, use of a parking easement, a maintenance corridor, and a sprinkler system. Pursuant to the agreement, the unresolved issues were submitted to arbitration. The arbitrator ruled in favor of the lakefront property owner on all issues, finding that the other party had not complied with the agreement. The dissatisfied party then moved in the District Court of the First Judicial District to vacate the arbitration award, alleging bias and that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority. The district court denied the motion, finding the arbitrator had acted within the scope of his authority. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the district court’s denial. The Court held that the arbitrator’s decisions were within the authority granted by the parties’ agreement and the Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act. The Court found no evidence of bias and concluded the arbitrator had not rewritten or exceeded the terms of the agreement, but rather interpreted and applied it as authorized. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to vacate the arbitration award and granted attorney fees on appeal to the prevailing party under Idaho Code section 12-121. View "Khalsa v. Ridnour" on Justia Law

Hubbard v. Nexion Health at Clinton, Inc.

2026-05-29T01:21:59-08:00

Benard Hubbard II electronically signed an admissions packet and a stand-alone arbitration agreement for his father’s admission to Woodlands Rehabilitation and Healthcare Center in Clinton, Mississippi. At the time, Hubbard Sr. was competent and able to communicate with staff. Two years later, Hubbard Sr. filed a medical-negligence claim against the facility’s parent company, a physician, and a medical practice. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on the agreement signed by Hubbard II. At the hearing, both parties acknowledged that Hubbard II did not have power of attorney or formal authority and that the arbitration agreement was separate from the admission itself. Hubbard II submitted an affidavit stating he signed without consulting or receiving authority from his father, and no evidence was presented to refute this. The Hinds County Circuit Court granted the motion to compel arbitration, expressing concern about Hubbard II contesting the agreement but failing to specify any factual basis for its decision or address the defendants’ request for additional discovery. The defendants subsequently conceded in the Supreme Court of Mississippi that the factual record was insufficient to affirm the trial court’s order and requested a remand for further findings. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the trial court’s decision de novo and found that the record lacked evidence establishing Hubbard II’s authority to bind his father to arbitration. The court also determined that the defendants had abandoned their motion for additional discovery by failing to secure a trial court ruling. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order compelling arbitration and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Hubbard v. Nexion Health at Clinton, Inc." on Justia Law

111 W. 57th Inv. LLC v 111 W57 Mezz Inv. LLC

2026-05-28T08:08:22-08:00

A major equity investor contributed $65 million to a joint venture formed to acquire and develop a luxury residential tower in New York City. The project was financed with significant loans, including a $325 million mezzanine loan from Apollo entities. After construction cost overruns put the mezzanine loan in default, Apollo and the joint venture entered a forbearance agreement splitting the loan and securing a portion with the joint venture’s equity. Apollo later assigned the junior mezzanine loan to Spruce Capital Partners, which then initiated a strict foreclosure under the Uniform Commercial Code. This process extinguished the joint venture’s equity—including the plaintiff’s investment—while allegedly allowing the project sponsor to retain a role and equity interest. The investor claimed that Apollo, Spruce, and the sponsor colluded to cut it out of the project’s value through assignment and foreclosure. The Supreme Court, New York County, dismissed the investor’s breach of implied covenant claim against Spruce but allowed the claim against Apollo to proceed, while dismissing tortious interference claims. The Appellate Division, First Department, reversed in part by dismissing the implied covenant claim against Apollo, holding that Apollo’s sole discretion to assign the loan foreclosed such a claim, and otherwise affirmed the dismissal of the tortious interference claims. The New York Court of Appeals held that a party’s sole discretion to assign a loan does not exempt it from the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Court concluded that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded that Apollo may have exercised its assignment right as part of a bad faith scheme to deprive the investor of the benefit of its bargain, reviving the implied covenant claim against Apollo. The Court affirmed the dismissal of the tortious interference claims for insufficient pleading. The case was remitted to Supreme Court for further proceedings on the implied covenant claim. View "111 W. 57th Inv. LLC v 111 W57 Mezz Inv. LLC" on Justia Law

Groves v. Goodsell & Oviatt LLP

2026-05-28T07:20:19-08:00

A solo attorney and another law firm entered into contingency fee agreements with three clients for representation in workers’ compensation matters, providing for a 50/50 split of any attorney’s fees. After the solo attorney died, disputes arose over how much his estate was owed for fees from two resolved cases and a third pending case. The settlement for the first client was received shortly before the attorney’s death, while the second client’s case settled months later. The estate sued to recover its share of fees and for a declaratory judgment regarding the third case, which remained unresolved. The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Pennington County, found that the attorney’s contracts with the second and third clients expired at his death, and that the estate had been fully paid for the first two cases. The court also awarded prejudgment interest to the estate for delayed payment on the first client’s case and ordered the estate to pay prejudgment interest to the law firm for the disputed portion of the second client’s fees that had been deposited with the court. The estate and the law firm both appealed aspects of the decision. The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the ruling that the contingency fee agreements for the second and third clients terminated upon the attorney’s death. However, it reversed the finding that the estate had been fully paid for services rendered in the second client’s case, holding that the estate could recover in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of services rendered before death, and remanded for further proceedings on that issue. The Supreme Court also reversed the award of prejudgment interest to the law firm for the deposited funds and directed recalculation of prejudgment interest owed to the estate for the first client’s case based on the timing of unconditional tender and full payment. View "Groves v. Goodsell & Oviatt LLP" on Justia Law

Aberdeen Developers, LLC v Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

2026-05-28T07:01:22-08:00

Aberdeen Developers, LLC obtained a $41 million loan secured by a mixed-use building in Chicago. The loan was governed by two agreements: a Loan Agreement and a Cash Management Agreement (CMA). During the COVID-19 pandemic, a major tenant filed for bankruptcy, which under the CMA allowed the loan servicer, LNR Partners, LLC, to trigger a Cash Sweep Event Period. As a result, building income was redirected to a special account controlled by LNR Partners. The dispute arose over how long LNR Partners could retain the excess revenue (Excess Cash Flow) in this account: Aberdeen Developers argued for monthly disbursement, while LNR Partners asserted that it could hold the funds until a specific cure event occurred, which had not and might never happen. The case was initially filed by Aberdeen Developers in Illinois state court, alleging breach of contract. The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The district court concluded that the relevant agreements unambiguously allowed LNR Partners to retain the Excess Cash Flow until the end of the contract term and dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Seventh Circuit determined that the language in the Loan Agreement and CMA was ambiguous because both parties’ interpretations were reasonable. The court held that ambiguity in the contract meant the case could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss and factual development was required to determine the parties’ intent. The Seventh Circuit therefore reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Aberdeen Developers, LLC v Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Estate of Worrell v. Thang, Inc.

2026-05-27T13:00:37-08:00

George Bernard Worrell, Jr., a foundational member and arranger for the musical group Parliament-Funkadelic, collaborated with George Clinton and Thang, Inc. from 1969 to 1981. In 1976, Worrell was presented with a contract (the “1976 Agreement”) by Thang, Inc., which purported to grant Thang full ownership of sound recordings Worrell contributed to, in exchange for royalties. Over the years, Worrell and his estate asserted that Thang and Clinton failed to pay royalties due under this agreement. Worrell died in 2016, and his estate became the plaintiff in subsequent litigation. After Worrell’s estate sued Thang and Clinton in New York state court for breach of contract related to the 1976 Agreement, the New York Supreme Court dismissed the suit. The court found that the agreement was not enforceable because it had not been signed by Thang, and the estate did not refute this. Subsequently, the estate filed a new action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, seeking a declaration of joint copyright ownership in the sound recordings and an accounting of royalties. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on statute of limitations grounds, holding that the estate’s copyright claims were untimely. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment. The court held that, given the unique circumstances—including the parties’ decades-long conduct in apparent reliance on the 1976 Agreement—there was a factual question as to whether Clinton and Thang had “plainly and expressly repudiated” Worrell’s copyright co-ownership before 2020. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding that part of the estate’s copyright-ownership claim is timely. The court also found genuine disputes of material fact as to Worrell’s status as a co-author of the recordings. View "Estate of Worrell v. Thang, Inc." on Justia Law

Guild Mortgage Company v. CrossCounty Mortgage

2026-05-27T11:31:48-08:00

Guild Mortgage Company LLC and CrossCountry Mortgage LLC are direct competitors in the residential mortgage industry. Over an 18-month period, several Guild employees in the Kirkland, Washington branch, including the branch manager and other high-level staff, were allegedly recruited by CrossCountry while still employed by Guild. According to the complaints, these employees solicited their colleagues to also move to CrossCountry, diverted customers and loan applications, and accessed Guild’s computer systems to take confidential and proprietary information. The employees had signed agreements with Guild prohibiting such conduct, and Guild subsequently lost nearly its entire Kirkland branch workforce to CrossCountry. After Guild initiated arbitration against the former employees and prevailed, it filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of San Diego County against CrossCountry. Guild’s claims included interference with economic advantage, interference with contract, violation of California’s Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act (CCDAFA), unfair competition, and aiding and abetting tortious conduct. The Superior Court sustained CrossCountry’s demurrers, finding that the claims were preempted by the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA) or otherwise failed to state a cause of action, and dismissed the case without leave to amend. The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. It held that Guild had adequately alleged actionable duties of loyalty and, for the branch manager, fiduciary duty, that were breached by the employees and aided by CrossCountry. The court found that the claims for interference and violation of the CCDAFA were not displaced by CUTSA because they arose from conduct beyond trade secret misappropriation. The court also held that the unfair competition claim could proceed since the other claims were viable. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment in favor of CrossCountry and remanded for further proceedings. View "Guild Mortgage Company v. CrossCounty Mortgage" on Justia Law

Jay Patel v. LandingPartners LLC et al.

2026-05-27T08:49:05-08:00

A dispute arose following a failed real estate transaction involving the sale of a hotel property in Warwick, Rhode Island. The property was to be sold by Shiva, LLC, of which Jay Patel was the registered agent, to LandingPartners LLC under a Purchase and Sale and Discounted Pay-Off Agreement. Centreville Bank held a mortgage on the property, which was in default. When Shiva, Airport Hospitality (another entity linked to Patel), and Patel failed to respond to an earlier lawsuit brought by LandingPartners, the Superior Court entered a default judgment against them, ordering specific performance of their obligations under the agreement and appointing a commissioner to facilitate the closing. Afterward, LandingPartners and Centreville Bank reached a consent order with new terms for the sale and discharged the mortgage, and the case was dismissed with prejudice. Shortly after the dismissal of the first case, Patel filed a new lawsuit in the Washington County Superior Court against LandingPartners, Centreville, and a related entity, 1850 Post Road Owner LLC. He alleged violations of the agreement, fraud, misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the claims were barred by res judicata because they arose from the same transaction addressed in the prior litigation. The Superior Court agreed, finding that the parties or their privies were the same, the issues arose from the same transaction, and there was a final judgment in the first action. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court held that res judicata barred Patel’s claims, as all issues now raised were or could have been raised in the initial suit, and the new claims concerned the same transaction. The dismissal of Patel’s complaint with prejudice was therefore upheld. View "Jay Patel v. LandingPartners LLC et al." on Justia Law

Declan Flight, Inc. v. Textron eAviation, Inc.

2026-05-26T10:04:34-08:00

Two American companies, Declan Flight, Inc. and Right Rudder Aviation, LLC (RRA), developed successful sales and distribution relationships with Pipistrel, a Slovenian aircraft manufacturer, through contracts signed in 2020 and 2021. Their contracts contained forum-selection clauses specifying Slovenia as the forum for disputes. In 2022, Textron, Inc., a large U.S. aerospace company, acquired Pipistrel through its subsidiary Textron eAviation, Inc. Shortly after the acquisition, Textron and eAviation orchestrated the termination of Declan’s and RRA’s contracts. RRA also lost a separate sales contract with Mesa Airlines after Textron and eAviation allegedly interfered with that business relationship. Declan and RRA sued Textron and eAviation in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, alleging tortious interference with the Pipistrel contracts and with the Mesa Airlines contract. The district court dismissed the claims related to the Pipistrel contracts (Counts I and II) for forum non conveniens, holding that the forum-selection clauses could be enforced by Textron and eAviation—nonsignatories—under the federal doctrine of equitable estoppel, thus requiring litigation to proceed in Slovenia. The district court also found that personal jurisdiction existed for the Mesa Airlines claim (Count III), but dismissed it for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of Counts I and II. The court held that the applicability of the forum-selection clauses is governed by Slovenian law, not federal common law, and that Slovenian law does not permit nonsignatories to invoke these clauses. Thus, the district court erred in applying the modified forum non conveniens rule from Atlantic Marine. The Eleventh Circuit also reversed the finding of personal jurisdiction over Textron and eAviation as to Count III, remanding all claims for further proceedings. View "Declan Flight, Inc. v. Textron eAviation, Inc." on Justia Law

THAKUR V. TRUMP

2026-05-26T08:01:13-08:00

Several researchers at the University of California received multi-year federal grants from agencies including the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Science Foundation, and the National Endowment for the Humanities. In April 2025, these agencies terminated the research grants by issuing form letters, citing shifts in agency priorities and referencing multiple Executive Orders issued by the President, some of which explicitly aimed to eliminate diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) and related initiatives from the federal government. The affected researchers alleged these terminations resulted in lost funding, harm to their reputations, and disruption to their projects, with no ready alternative sources of support. The researchers filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, asserting constitutional and statutory claims, including violations of the First Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court provisionally certified two classes: one consisting of researchers whose grants were terminated by form letter without grant-specific explanation (the Form Termination Class), and another whose grants were terminated specifically due to the DEI Executive Orders (the DEI Termination Class). The district court granted a preliminary injunction, ordering the reinstatement of the grants for both classes. The government appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs had established Article III standing. It reversed the preliminary injunction for the Form Termination Class, concluding that the district court likely lacked jurisdiction over their APA claim because the claim was essentially contractual and thus barred by the Tucker Act. However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction for the DEI Termination Class, finding that the class was likely to succeed on its First Amendment claim because the grant terminations were based on viewpoint discrimination. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "THAKUR V. TRUMP" on Justia Law

Langley v. Autocraft, Inc

2026-05-22T07:41:31-08:00

An individual who previously worked for a company left his employment in 2015, but in 2016 was invited by the company’s founder and sole owner to consider returning. Before rejoining, the individual drafted a one-page agreement that was signed by both himself and the owner. This document set out employment terms, including salary, vacation, and, crucially, a provision that he would receive a 10% ownership interest in the company after five years of employment, subject to certain conditions. These conditions included the individual’s own decision to accept the ownership, a review of the company’s finances after four years, and an arrangement for the purchase of the remaining ownership interest over a period of five to ten years. The agreement also contained language giving the individual considerable discretion over changes to its terms. The individual resumed employment in 2017 and was terminated in 2022, after more than five years with the company. After his termination, the individual filed suit in Guilford County Superior Court against the company for breach of contract and for a declaratory judgment. During discovery, the owner claimed he had signed the agreement only in his individual capacity, leading the individual to file a separate suit against the owner in Randolph County. Both suits were designated as mandatory complex business cases and were consolidated in the North Carolina Business Court. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the agreement was unenforceable. The Business Court granted summary judgment, finding the agreement was illusory because it gave the individual unlimited discretion over its terms. The individual appealed directly to the Supreme Court of North Carolina. The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the relevant provision of the agreement was void for indefiniteness, not merely illusory. The Court determined that the ownership provision and its sub-provisions were inseparable and lacked essential terms, such as price and payment schedule, rendering enforcement impossible. The Court also rejected the individual's equitable arguments. The decision of the Business Court was modified and affirmed. View "Langley v. Autocraft, Inc" on Justia Law