Class Action - Justia Case Law Summaries

Chianne D. v. Secretary, Florida Agency for Health Care Administ

2026-11-04T14:02:46-08:00

Several Medicaid enrollees in Florida, whose benefits were terminated due to income-based eligibility determinations, challenged the adequacy of the notices they received from the state. These notices, generated by Florida’s Department of Children and Families (DCF), typically stated that Medicaid benefits would end because “household income is too high,” but did not include essential individualized information such as the household size used, the countable income figure, the income threshold applied, or the specific Medicaid eligibility category considered. In some cases, the notices also included contradictory or confusing information about which household members were affected. Many recipients later learned that their coverage had been terminated or restored in error, but the notices did not provide enough detail for them to understand or contest the agency’s decisions. The case was brought as a class action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, focusing on whether the notices met the requirements of due process. After a bench trial, the district court found that the written notices were confusing, lacked sufficient individualized detail to explain the state’s decisions, and failed to enable recipients to understand or meaningfully challenge their benefit terminations. The court also found that other sources of information available to recipients, such as call centers or online resources, did not cure these deficiencies. The district court issued a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction, requiring Florida to provide clear and case-specific information in future notices before terminating Medicaid benefits for income ineligibility. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Florida’s notice system, considered as a whole, did not satisfy due process because it was not reasonably calculated to adequately inform recipients of the reasons for benefit termination or enable them to decide whether to contest the action. View "Chianne D. v. Secretary, Florida Agency for Health Care Administ" on Justia Law

CROOKS VS. STATE

2026-10-30T09:34:33-08:00

The dispute arose after the United States constructed navigation structures in the Catahoula Basin, raising water levels and affecting property in the area. Landowners in the basin, divided into Lake Plaintiffs and Swamp Plaintiffs, brought a class action against the State of Louisiana, alleging unlawful expropriation of their land and seeking damages, a declaration of ownership, and recovery of mineral royalties. The central factual issue was how to classify the Catahoula Basin: the Lake Plaintiffs argued it was part of the Little River’s banks, entitling them to ownership, while the State argued it was a lake owned by the state. After a bench trial in the Ninth Judicial District Court, the court found in favor of the plaintiffs, recognizing the Lake and Swamp Plaintiffs as owners of the disputed lands, awarding damages for inverse condemnation, and granting attorney fees. The Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, affirmed most of the judgment but shifted the attorney fee burden entirely to the plaintiffs’ common fund. The Louisiana Supreme Court then held that plaintiffs’ compensation claims had prescribed, reversing the damages awards but leaving the attorney fee issue unresolved. When the trial court subsequently recalculated attorney fees using the lodestar method, the appellate court increased the award by applying a fourfold multiplier, finding the initial fee too low given the case’s complexity and duration. The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the attorney fee award and found that while a multiplier was warranted due to the exceptional duration, risk, and complexity of the litigation, the appellate court’s fourfold multiplier was excessive given the high hourly rate used in the lodestar calculation. The court reduced the multiplier to three, setting the attorney fee at $16,713,656.20, and affirmed the appellate court’s judgment as amended. The matter was remanded for the trial court to determine appropriate reserves and payment arrangements. View "CROOKS VS. STATE" on Justia Law

NINTH INNING INC. V. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, INC.

2026-10-30T08:30:48-08:00

A group of DirecTV subscribers, both residential and commercial, brought a class action lawsuit alleging that the National Football League (NFL) and its member teams engaged in anticompetitive conduct. The subscribers claimed that the NFL’s interlocking agreements—including pooling telecast rights, exclusive distribution through DirecTV, and arrangements with networks—suppressed competition for out-of-market NFL games. These agreements allegedly forced subscribers to pay inflated prices for the “Sunday Ticket” package, which bundled NFL games not otherwise available in their local markets. The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially allowed the case to proceed, certifying classes and admitting expert testimony by the plaintiffs’ economists. After trial, a jury found the NFL liable on antitrust grounds and awarded substantial damages to the subscribers. However, the district court later excluded the plaintiffs’ expert testimony, finding it unreliable under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of the NFL. In the alternative, the district court conditionally ordered a new trial on damages, concluding the jury’s damages calculation was not supported by the evidence and was improperly derived. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court abused its discretion by excluding the plaintiffs’ expert testimony, ruling that while experts’ methods and opinions may be impeachable, such disputes are for the jury to resolve unless the methods are fundamentally unreliable or speculative. However, the appellate court agreed that a new trial on damages was warranted because the jury’s award was based on an improper calculation method. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment as a matter of law, affirmed the order granting a new trial on damages, remanded with instructions to reinstate the jury’s liability verdict, and directed a new trial limited to the issue of damages. View "NINTH INNING INC. V. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, INC." on Justia Law

Dufour v. BP Exploration & Production

2026-10-27T15:30:07-08:00

The plaintiff worked as a cleanup worker in Pascagoula, Mississippi, following the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, allegedly exposed to crude oil and chemical dispersants through inhalation and direct contact. He claimed this exposure caused a chronic worsening of his preexisting asthma. The plaintiff sued BP Exploration & Production, Inc. and BP America Production Company under the Back-End Litigation Option (BELO) of the Medical Settlement Agreement related to the Deepwater Horizon class-action litigation. The parties stipulated to venue in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The litigation required the plaintiff to prove that his injuries were legally caused by exposure to oil spill-related substances. He proffered two experts, Dr. Michael Freeman and Dr. Shawn French, to establish causation. BP moved to exclude their testimony and for summary judgment. The district court denied the plaintiff’s request for an evidentiary hearing, excluded the expert testimony, and granted summary judgment in favor of BP, finding that the expert evidence was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to causation. The plaintiff timely appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that toxic tort causation standards, requiring expert testimony to establish both general and specific causation, apply under maritime law for BELO claims involving non-readily observable injuries with multiple possible etiologies. The Fifth Circuit found the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the plaintiff’s experts, both for lack of reliability and relevance under Rule 702 and Daubert, and for deficiencies in qualifications and methodology. The district court’s grant of summary judgment was affirmed. View "Dufour v. BP Exploration & Production" on Justia Law

Bien v. Union Pacific

2026-10-26T15:30:05-08:00

James Bien worked as a conductor for Union Pacific Railroad Company. In 2013, he failed two vision tests required for his job and was subsequently removed from his conductor position, receiving a work restriction that prevented him from performing duties requiring color signal recognition. After several months, he was employed by Union Pacific in a different, lower-paying role. In 2015, following a notification from the company, Bien took another vision test, which he passed. He then requested a follow-up test to potentially remove his work restriction and be reinstated as a conductor. Union Pacific denied this request, determining that his prior test failures were dispositive and that the new test had been administered in error. Bien filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC in April 2020 and later brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in January 2025. Prior to Bien's lawsuit, a class action had been filed in the District of Nebraska, Harris v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, challenging similar employment actions by Union Pacific. The initial class definition was broad, but the court later certified a narrower class. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas concluded that Bien fell within the original class definition but not the certified, narrower one, reasoning that his 2015 testing and related correspondence did not constitute a “fitness-for-duty examination” under the certified class. As a result, the district court held that the statute of limitations barred Bien’s claim and dismissed his case. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo and reversed the district court’s decision. The Fifth Circuit held that, under American Pipe tolling, a plaintiff must be unambiguously excluded from a class definition to terminate tolling of the statute of limitations. Because Bien was not unambiguously excluded from the certified class, he was entitled to tolling, and his suit was not time-barred. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Bien v. Union Pacific" on Justia Law

Molina v. Triumph Residential Services, Inc.

2026-10-22T13:01:01-08:00

A property management company in Los Angeles employed an individual from April 2023 to September 2024. As part of the hiring and onboarding process, the employee was required to sign an arbitration agreement that mandated all employment-related claims be resolved through binding arbitration and included a waiver of class and representative actions. The employee later filed a class action lawsuit against the employer, alleging wage-and-hour violations and unfair business practices. The employer responded by filing a motion in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to compel arbitration of the employee's individual claims, dismiss the class claims, and stay the action. The employer made clear that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) did not apply and relied on California law. The employee opposed, arguing that under California Labor Code section 432.6, it is illegal for an employer to require an employee to sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of employment unless the agreement is enforceable under the FAA. The Superior Court denied the employer’s motion, finding that the arbitration agreement was required as a condition of employment, thus violating section 432.6, and that, since the FAA did not apply, the agreement was unenforceable under California law. On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that, under California law, an arbitration agreement required as a condition of employment in violation of section 432.6 is unenforceable unless it is otherwise enforceable under the FAA. Because the parties agreed the FAA did not apply and the agreement was required as a condition of employment, the employer could not enforce it. The court affirmed the denial of the motion to compel arbitration. View "Molina v. Triumph Residential Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Hilton v. Lorain

2026-10-22T05:30:06-08:00

Three individuals brought suit against the City of Lorain and related entities, alleging that the city charged unlawful rates and fees for water and wastewater services. They moved to certify a class consisting of all ratepayers charged these fees by the city since May 7, 2012. The class action was brought only against the City of Lorain, not the other named defendants. The Lorain County Court of Common Pleas considered whether the plaintiffs met the seven requirements for class certification under Ohio law. The court found that the proposed class was not identifiable or unambiguously defined and that the plaintiffs had not met the “predominance and superiority” requirement under Civ.R. 23(B)(3). However, it determined that the other five requirements were satisfied. Based on the two unmet requirements, the trial court denied the motion for class certification. On appeal, the Ninth District Court of Appeals found the trial court’s analysis to be confusing and seemingly contradictory, as it could not reconcile findings that the class was not identifiable with findings that other requirements were satisfied. The appellate court held that the trial court had failed to conduct the rigorous analysis required and remanded the case for further consideration of the class certification motion. The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that a trial court properly conducts a rigorous analysis of a class certification motion when it addresses each of the seven requirements, even if one or more are not met. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court’s approach did not render its analysis insufficient or contradictory. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals and remanded the case to that court to consider the remaining assignments of error. View "Hilton v. Lorain" on Justia Law

Chiaro v Methodist Hospitals, Inc.

2026-10-20T08:00:08-08:00

Several patients brought class action lawsuits against Indiana health care providers, alleging that their medical information was improperly shared with Facebook through the use of the Meta Pixel embedded in online patient portals. The plaintiffs asserted state law claims including breach of implied contract, unjust enrichment, and violations of the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act and Indiana Wiretapping Act. The health care providers had established these online portals to comply with federal regulations encouraging electronic health records, which offered incentive payments and imposed penalties for non-compliance. The health care providers removed the cases from Indiana state court to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, arguing that federal jurisdiction was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). They claimed they were “acting under” the Department of Health and Human Services when creating and maintaining their portals. District courts in multiple consolidated cases rejected this argument, finding that the providers did not meet the statutory requirements for removal under § 1442(a)(1). The courts concluded that while the providers were highly regulated and incentivized by federal policies, their actions did not amount to performing basic governmental tasks or operating under the direction of a federal officer. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the consolidated appeals de novo. It held that compliance with federal regulations and incentives for patient portals did not constitute “acting under” a federal officer. The court found that the health care providers’ relationship to the federal government lacked the unusually close supervision and delegation required for federal officer removal. The court affirmed the district courts’ remand orders, holding that federal subject matter jurisdiction was not established under § 1442(a)(1). View "Chiaro v Methodist Hospitals, Inc." on Justia Law

McCain v. Mary Mahoney's

2026-10-16T09:30:08-08:00

A customer dined at a Mississippi restaurant specializing in local seafood, ordering premium snapper on three occasions between 2013 and 2018. The restaurant, along with its supplier and several managers, was later criminally charged for a long-running scheme to mislabel imported frozen fish as locally caught premium fish. All parties pled guilty, admitting to substituting and fraudulently selling over 29 tons of imported fish as local species during a multi-year period. The customer alleged that he paid high prices for what he believed to be premium Gulf snapper, but was instead served inferior imported fish, and he brought a class action seeking damages under federal and state law. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(1), finding no cognizable Article III injury. The court reasoned that since the plaintiff consumed his meals without complaint, paying for fish he would not have otherwise purchased was not a concrete injury. It also found the allegations insufficiently particularized, as the plaintiff did not specifically allege that imported fish was served on the dates he dined or that all snapper sold on those dates was misbranded. The court denied motions to amend the judgment and complaint, concluding any amendments would be futile. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff plausibly suffered a concrete and particularized injury in fact under Article III, either by being fraudulently induced to purchase inferior fish or by overpaying due to fraud. The court concluded that the allegations of widespread and routine fish substitution at the restaurant plausibly affected the plaintiff’s meals, particularly his August 21, 2018, visit. The denial of leave to amend was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "McCain v. Mary Mahoney's" on Justia Law

CHATHAM COUNTY v. SMITH

2026-10-14T04:04:10-08:00

Chatham County established a fire protection service fee, assessed either as a flat charge per parcel or based on the square footage of structures, on all real property in a special district comprising unincorporated areas of the county. Initially, fire services were provided by Chatham Emergency Services, Inc. (CES), funded by direct payments from property owners. When payment rates fell and CES could no longer provide services as before, the county contracted with CES and adopted a fire service protection tax, later replaced by the Fire Protection Service Fee Ordinance in 2022 and revised in 2023. The fee was collected from property owners in the designated area, with enforcement measures including penalties, collection costs, and potential liens. Property owners Damon L. and Sebrell E. Smith, subject to the fee, filed a class action in the Superior Court of Chatham County, seeking refunds. They contended the fee was actually an illegal tax because it was not ad valorem, as required by Georgia law. The county moved to dismiss and for summary judgment, while the plaintiffs sought class certification and summary judgment. After discovery and hearings, the superior court certified the class and granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, holding the fire fee was a tax on real property and invalid because it was not assessed ad valorem. The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case de novo. The Court agreed with the lower court that the fire protection service fee was, in substance, a tax rather than a fee or assessment. It further held that, under Georgia constitutional and statutory law, taxes on real property—including those levied in special districts—must be ad valorem. Because the county’s ordinance imposed a non-ad-valorem tax, it was unauthorized and illegal. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the superior court’s judgment in favor of the property owners. View "CHATHAM COUNTY v. SMITH" on Justia Law

Phillip v. Baass

2026-10-09T10:32:08-08:00

A Medi-Cal recipient resided in a nursing care facility from 2010 until her death in 2015. During her enrollment, the Department of Health Care Services paid $261,957.40 in capitation payments to her managed care plan, while the plan paid $106,672.71 to health care providers for services she actually received. The Department sought estate recovery totaling $407,774.41, which included the full amount of capitation payments, Medicare Part B premiums, and accrued interest. Her trustee and beneficiaries challenged the Department’s claim, contending that only payments for health care services actually received should be recovered. The Superior Court of San Luis Obispo County certified a class of Medi-Cal recipients and estates subject to similar estate recovery claims. After hearings on stipulated issues, the trial court determined that seeking recovery for capitation payments exceeding the actual cost of health care services received violated Welfare and Institutions Code section 14009.5 and federal law. The trial court entered judgment for the Department for the portion attributable to services actually received, and issued a declaratory judgment and writ of mandate in favor of the beneficiaries and the class, requiring the Department to reform its estate recovery practices and reprocess certain claims. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case de novo. It held that Welfare and Institutions Code section 14009.5 does not permit recovery of capitation payments in excess of the amounts paid for actual health care services received. The court also ruled that the Department’s regulation permitting recovery of excess capitation is void for conflict with the statute. The judgment by the trial court was affirmed. The Department cannot recover excess capitation from estates under section 14009.5. View "Phillip v. Baass" on Justia Law

BLACK V. IEC GROUP, INC.

2026-10-09T09:00:23-08:00

Two individuals who were enrolled in a health insurance plan administered by a company alleged that their sensitive health information was disclosed without their authorization. In August 2023, the company sent each of them a letter explaining that an associate had mistakenly emailed a spreadsheet containing their private health information—including names, provider details, dates of service, and amounts billed or paid—to one or more other plan members. The plaintiffs asserted that they had entrusted this information to the company based on explicit and implicit promises of confidentiality and that the company’s privacy policy reinforced those expectations. They claimed the company’s unauthorized disclosure deprived them of the benefit of their bargain and diminished the value of the contracted services. Reviewing the case, the United States District Court for the District of Idaho dismissed the plaintiffs’ class action lawsuit on the grounds that they had not suffered an “injury in fact” necessary for Article III standing. The district court reasoned that disclosure of private information, without more, did not constitute a concrete injury and that the plaintiffs had not shown a substantial likelihood of future harm. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the plaintiffs’ alleged harm—the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive health information entrusted on the basis of confidentiality—was analogous to the common law actions for breach of confidence and breach of contract, both of which were historically recognized as sufficient to support lawsuits. The court further noted that congressional judgment, as reflected in federal statutes like HIPAA, underscored the sensitivity of such information. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged an injury sufficient for Article III standing, reversed the district court’s dismissal, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "BLACK V. IEC GROUP, INC." on Justia Law

Baker v. Seattle Child.'s Hosp.

2026-10-08T07:12:47-08:00

Several individuals alleged that a hospital violated Washington’s privacy statute by using Meta Pixel technology on its public website. When these individuals searched for information or clicked links on the hospital’s website, Meta Pixel tracked their activity and sent the data to Meta Platforms, which then used the information for targeted advertising. The plaintiffs argued that this tracking amounted to intercepting or recording “private communications” under the Washington Privacy Act (WPA), and asserted their searches on the hospital’s website were protected communications. A putative class action was filed in the King County Superior Court. The hospital moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the plaintiffs' activities on its public website did not constitute “private communication[s]” under the WPA, and that Meta Pixel was not installed on the hospital’s patient portal. The trial court granted the hospital's motion to dismiss with prejudice. On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, concluding that the plaintiffs’ website searches were unilateral actions and not “private communication[s]” between two or more individuals as required by the WPA. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. The court held that the WPA provision at issue applies only to communications “between two or more individuals,” and excludes interactions between an individual and an automated system operated by a corporation. Because the plaintiffs’ activities involved only a single individual and an automated corporate server, the court concluded the WPA did not apply. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaint. View "Baker v. Seattle Child.'s Hosp." on Justia Law

Skolarus v. Bloomberg, L.P.

2026-10-07T06:30:03-08:00

A group of utility customers in Texas and California paid interest on bonds issued by their utility companies, which were intended to finance recovery after winter storms and wildfires. These bonds, known as recovery bonds, were subject to approval by state public utility commissions in Texas and California. Plaintiffs alleged that Bloomberg, L.P. and Bloomberg Index Services, Ltd. unlawfully reclassified these bonds from corporate bonds to asset-backed securities, resulting in higher interest rates that were ultimately paid by the utility customers. After the utilities submitted applications and detailed bond terms, including interest rates, to the state public utility commissions, the commissions retained authority to approve or reject the bonds. The commissions received notice of Bloomberg’s reclassification and the associated interest rates, but permitted the issuance of the bonds. Plaintiffs filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming that Bloomberg’s actions led to inflated rates. The district court dismissed the case, finding that the filed rate doctrine barred the claims, since the challenged rates were filed with and approved by the relevant state regulators. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that the filed rate doctrine barred the plaintiffs’ claims. It explained that the regulatory process provided sufficient safeguards, as the state commissions had notice of the reclassification and still allowed the bonds to be issued. The court found that plaintiffs had forfeited any argument that the federal filed rate doctrine could not bar state-law claims and further concluded that, under controlling circuit precedent, the doctrine applied. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the action with prejudice. View "Skolarus v. Bloomberg, L.P." on Justia Law

ROE V. PETERSEN

2026-10-06T09:00:26-08:00

Three transgender children in Arizona, representing a class of all transgender individuals born in Arizona who wish to amend the sex marker on their birth certificates without undergoing a sex change operation, challenged the requirements for amending birth certificates. Arizona law, specifically A.R.S. § 36-337(A)(3), requires the registrar to amend a person’s birth certificate upon receiving a written request and a physician’s statement verifying a sex change operation. The plaintiffs argued that this “surgical requirement” violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, finding that the statute discriminated based on transgender status and burdened fundamental rights, thus applying heightened and strict scrutiny. The district court concluded the statute failed these standards and entered a permanent injunction, striking the word “operation” from the statute and its implementing regulation to allow amendments without proof of surgery. Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit clarified that Arizona’s statute provides two avenues for amending the sex marker on a birth certificate: through a physician’s verification of a sex change operation or by obtaining a court order. The court found that the law does not classify based on transgender status, but rather on whether an individual has undergone surgery, and that all individuals—including transgender people who have not had surgery—can seek a court order for amendment. Applying rational basis review, the court concluded the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest in ensuring adequate evidentiary support for amendments. The court also held that the statute does not violate due process, as it does not burden fundamental rights in all its applications. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment for the plaintiffs, vacated the permanent injunction, and remanded for further proceedings. View "ROE V. PETERSEN" on Justia Law

Frankfort v. Metropolis Technologies

2026-10-02T15:30:08-08:00

Two individuals received fines after failing to pay parking charges at garages operated by a company that uses automated technology, such as cameras and QR codes, to manage parking payments. When the plaintiffs did not pay the required parking fees, the company mailed them notices demanding the original fee plus a significantly larger fine. The plaintiffs alleged that the company’s business model intentionally made it difficult for drivers to pay, thereby increasing the likelihood of nonpayment and enabling the company to collect higher fines. The plaintiffs brought a putative class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, asserting claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), as well as related Texas statutes. They argued that the company qualified as a “debt collector” under the FDCPA because it mailed notices demanding payment. The company moved to dismiss, and a magistrate judge recommended dismissal, finding that the company’s principal business was operating parking lots, not debt collection, and that it did not collect debts on behalf of others. The district court dismissed the FDCPA claim with prejudice, concluding the company was not a debt collector since it originated the debt and thus fell within a statutory exception. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims and denied leave to amend, finding any amendment would be futile. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district court misapplied the statutory exception for debt originators. The Fifth Circuit clarified that to invoke this exception, a party must both collect debts on behalf of others and have originated the debt. However, the court affirmed the dismissal on alternative grounds, holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a plausible claim that the company was a debt collector under the FDCPA because they did not sufficiently allege either that debt collection was the company's principal purpose or that it regularly collected debts for others. The Fifth Circuit also affirmed the denial of leave to amend. View "Frankfort v. Metropolis Technologies" on Justia Law

Beig v. Ocugen Inc

2026-09-30T09:00:04-08:00

Investors in a small publicly traded pharmaceutical company claimed that the company and its CEO made false statements regarding finances and accounting controls over several years. These statements allegedly included manipulated financial forecasts, misleading quarterly reports, and improper accounting for revenues from a major collaboration agreement. The company later restated its financial statements for fifteen quarters, admitting they were materially misstated due to weaknesses in internal controls, and several key finance personnel either resigned or were terminated. After the company’s stock price dropped following the restatement disclosure, the investors filed a class action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. The District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, focusing solely on two corrective disclosures—the August 2023 report and the April 2024 restatement—and concluded that these were not materially false or actionable. For materiality, the District Court relied on Third Circuit precedents establishing a categorical rule that immateriality could be proven if the stock price rebounded quickly after disclosure. Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s dismissal de novo, taking all facts in the complaint as true. The Third Circuit held that categorical rules based on post-disclosure stock price movements are inappropriate for materiality analysis under the securities laws, in light of Supreme Court precedent. The proper standard is a fact-specific inquiry focusing on whether a reasonable investor would consider the omitted or misstated information significant at the time of investment. The Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings using the correct standard. View "Beig v. Ocugen Inc" on Justia Law

Edwards v. Randolph County Sheriff

2026-09-28T12:31:00-08:00

A woman was arrested in Randolph County, Alabama, under a system that required arrestees to pay a predetermined bail amount based on the charged offense for immediate release. Those unable to pay had to wait until an initial appearance, which could take up to three days, and frequently did not result in a release determination. Instead, release decisions were often deferred until a preliminary hearing up to four weeks later. The plaintiff, unable to afford bail, filed a class action alleging that the county’s bail practices discriminated against indigent individuals and violated their constitutional rights. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama initially granted a temporary restraining order, releasing the plaintiff. While the case was pending, Randolph County adopted a new, more permissive bail policy. Defendants moved to dismiss the case as moot, arguing the new policy ended the challenged conduct. The district court certified a class of arrestees unable to pay secured bail, but after the Supreme Court denied certiorari in a similar case, Schultz v. Alabama, the district court dismissed most claims as moot, limiting plaintiffs to facial challenges against the new policy, and concluded those remaining claims failed to state a plausible claim for relief. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the voluntary cessation doctrine precludes defendants from mooting the case simply by changing the bail policy during litigation. The class may proceed with facial and as-applied challenges to the prior bail practices, as well as as-applied challenges to the current bail practices. However, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of facial challenges to the current bail policy. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "Edwards v. Randolph County Sheriff" on Justia Law

NOLEN V. PEOPLECONNECT, INC.

2026-09-24T08:00:36-08:00

A company that operates a website hosting digitized yearbooks, allowing users to search for names and view yearbook pages, was sued by a California resident whose name and photo appeared in a yearbook on the site. The plaintiff alleged that the company violated California’s right-of-publicity statute by using individuals’ names without consent to advertise paid subscriptions. The plaintiff advanced a theory that simply making individuals’ names searchable on the site, even if no one actually searched for them, constituted a commercial use requiring consent under the statute. Previously, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the company’s motion to dismiss, finding the plaintiff plausibly alleged a direct commercial use. The court then conditionally certified both damages and injunctive classes consisting of California residents whose names were searchable on the site, had never registered as users, and had not donated yearbooks. The company challenged class certification, arguing that individual issues predominated and that the lead plaintiff would not adequately represent the classes. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that, for class certification purposes, whether being “searchable” is sufficient for liability under the statute is a merits question not to be resolved at the certification stage. The court further found that injury could be shown by common evidence of economic harm, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in managing potential individualized issues regarding class membership. The appellate court also rejected the company’s adequacy challenges, noting that the lead plaintiff could represent both classes. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order certifying the classes. View "NOLEN V. PEOPLECONNECT, INC." on Justia Law

D.V.D. v. Department of Homeland Security

2026-09-18T13:30:03-08:00

A class of noncitizens with final removal orders challenged new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) policies issued in March and July 2025, which authorized their removal to “third countries”—countries neither designated in their removal orders nor identified in writing during prior proceedings. The plaintiffs alleged that DHS’s policy failed to provide effective notice or a meaningful opportunity to contest removal to these third countries based on reasonable fear of persecution or torture. The policies also relied on diplomatic assurances from receiving countries, sometimes removing individuals without further protective procedures. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts issued a temporary restraining order, granted class certification, and later a preliminary injunction requiring DHS to provide written notice and an opportunity for class members to assert fear-based claims before any third-country removal. After DHS appealed, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a stay pending appellate review. On remand, the district court dissolved the preliminary injunction and issued a final judgment, concluding that DHS’s guidance violated statutory requirements for sequencing removal destinations, and failed to provide notice and hearing for fear-based claims, including those under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court ordered declaratory relief and vacated the guidance as unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing on the “sequencing” claim and vacated the related declarations. However, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment that DHS must provide effective notice and a meaningful opportunity to contest removal to a third country based on fear-based claims, and upheld the vacatur of DHS guidance as unlawful under the APA. The court rejected DHS’s jurisdictional and remedy arguments, clarifying that declaratory and vacatur relief were permissible and not barred by statute. View "D.V.D. v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Scott v. Ulta Beauty, Inc.

2026-09-18T10:01:13-08:00

Several individuals filed a putative class action against two related corporate defendants, alleging that the defendants’ website terms and conditions violated a California statute known as section 1670.8, or the “Yelp Law.” The plaintiffs argued that certain provisions in the website’s terms—specifically, language related to trademark use and website access—prohibited or penalized negative statements about the defendants, their employees, or their goods and services. The plaintiffs claimed these provisions constituted unlawful non-disparagement clauses in consumer contracts. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case and sustained the defendants’ demurrer to the consolidated class action complaint, first with leave to amend and then, after an amended complaint was filed, without leave to amend. The court found that the challenged terms were limited to intellectual property protections and did not restrict consumer speech. It also determined that the statute did not create a private right of action for merely including a violative provision unless there was a threat to enforce that provision or penalize speech. The court concluded that neither the trademark nor the termination provisions in the defendants’ terms constituted actionable violations of section 1670.8 and entered judgment dismissing the case. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Five, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the website’s trademark language did not waive consumers’ rights to make critical statements about the defendants, and the website access termination clause was not a restriction on consumer speech. The court concluded that plaintiffs had not stated a cause of action under section 1670.8 and confirmed that the inclusion of these provisions, without a threat or attempt to enforce against protected speech, does not violate the statute. View "Scott v. Ulta Beauty, Inc." on Justia Law

S.D. V. REESE

2026-09-17T09:00:44-08:00

Two inmates who identify as transgender women brought a class action against the Oregon Department of Corrections and related officials, alleging Eighth Amendment violations for purportedly exposing transgender women inmates to substantial risk of harm by housing them in men’s prisons. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary mandatory injunction on behalf of a class of all current and future transgender women in Oregon prison facilities, requesting that they be presumptively assigned to the state’s women’s prison and given additional protections. A magistrate judge in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon granted the motion for a preliminary injunction and provisionally certified the class. The injunction required Oregon to presumptively assign transgender women inmates to the women’s prison unless a specific security justification was documented, along with other measures for safety and privacy. Defendants moved for reconsideration, and the district court amended but largely maintained the injunction. Defendants appealed and obtained a stay of the injunction pending appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s order, applying an abuse-of-discretion standard to the injunction and de novo review to underlying legal issues. The Ninth Circuit found the district court committed clear error by basing its injunction on an unsupported finding that the defendants employed a default presumption of housing transgender women in men’s prisons. The appellate court determined that the record showed individualized assessments for inmate placement and that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, or commonality for class certification. The Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction, ordered the class to be decertified, and remanded the case. The mandate was issued forthwith. View "S.D. V. REESE" on Justia Law

Wisconsin Laborers' Pension Fund v. Joshi

2026-09-16T10:09:26-08:00

A Delaware corporation specializing in data analytics software was acquired in December 2023 through a merger valued at $48.25 per share, totaling approximately $4.4 billion. The merger was orchestrated by funds affiliated with Insight Venture Management, LLC and Clearlake Capital Group, L.P. Prior to the merger, the company’s controlling stockholder held significant voting power through legacy Class B shares. The board formed a special committee to oversee the sales process, which involved multiple bidders and was influenced by disappointing financial results and market conditions. Ultimately, the merger was approved by a significant majority of stockholders, with the controlling stockholder not receiving any special consideration. The plaintiffs, representing a putative class, initiated litigation in the Delaware Court of Chancery, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty against the board, the controlling stockholder, the chief legal officer, and a claim for aiding and abetting against Insight Venture Management, LLC. The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that the merger was approved by a fully informed, uncoerced stockholder vote, invoking the protections of Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015). The Court of Chancery granted the motion to dismiss. It held that none of the alleged disclosure deficiencies raised by the plaintiffs were material, and the stockholder vote was both fully informed and uncoerced. Under Corwin, this vote cleansed the transaction, and the business judgment rule insulated the merger from attacks other than waste, which was not claimed. As a result, all counts—including breach of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting—were dismissed. View "Wisconsin Laborers' Pension Fund v. Joshi" on Justia Law

IN RE: KIA HYUNDAI VEHICLE THEFT MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION

2026-09-14T08:30:46-08:00

Insurance companies paid claims to policyholders whose Hyundai or Kia vehicles were stolen or damaged due to a vulnerability stemming from the lack of an engine immobilizer in certain models from 2011 to 2022. These companies, as subrogees, filed a nationwide class action alleging that the Korean manufacturers, Hyundai Motor Company and Kia Corporation, defectively designed these vehicles, making them prone to theft. The complaint also asserted claims for breach of warranties, violations of consumer protection statutes, fraud, unjust enrichment, and negligent failure to warn. Multiple lawsuits arising from this issue were consolidated into multidistrict litigation before the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The district court dismissed the claims against the Korean entities for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that the evidence did not establish intentional targeting of California by the manufacturers and that the claims did not arise from California-related conduct. The district court also denied leave to amend and jurisdictional discovery, entering final judgment under Rule 54(b) dismissing the Korean entities from the subrogation track. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that the Korean manufacturers were subject to specific personal jurisdiction in California. The panel found that the manufacturers purposefully directed their activities toward California by sending thousands of shipments of vehicles through California ports and designing vehicles specifically for the U.S. market. The court further held that the claims arose out of these California contacts, as the injuries were caused by vehicles shipped to California. The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, leaving the question of reasonableness of jurisdiction for the district court to resolve. View "IN RE: KIA HYUNDAI VEHICLE THEFT MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION" on Justia Law

Davis v. DC

2026-09-04T07:01:14-08:00

The case arose after the District of Columbia’s Child and Family Services Agency, facing a large budget shortfall in 2010, laid off 115 employees as part of a reduction in force. This included eliminating two support positions and creating a new, hybrid role with fewer positions and different qualification requirements. The agency also terminated additional employees across various divisions based on management assessments. A group of former employees, disproportionately Black, filed a class action lawsuit, alleging that these employment practices had a disparate racial impact in violation of Title VII and D.C. law. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially granted summary judgment to the District, finding that the plaintiffs failed to identify specific employment practices as required for a disparate impact claim. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit revived the disparate impact claims, concluding that the plaintiffs had sufficiently challenged two discrete employment practices. On remand, the district court found the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of disparate impact but again granted summary judgment to the District. The court found the agency’s employment practices were consistent with business necessity and that the plaintiffs failed to propose an adequate alternative practice with less disparate impact. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The court held that, under Title VII, an employer satisfies the business necessity defense if the challenged employment practice reasonably fits with its legitimate interests. Applying this standard, the court found both disputed practices fit legitimate governmental interests in reducing costs while maintaining services. Because the plaintiffs did not identify an equally effective alternative practice with less disparate impact, the appellate court affirmed summary judgment for the District. View "Davis v. DC" on Justia Law

Joyner v. Frontier Airlines

2026-09-01T08:00:59-08:00

Three individuals employed as customer service agents for a ground services provider and an airline at Denver International Airport brought a class action lawsuit asserting violations of Colorado’s wage laws. Their complaint alleged that the employers improperly deducted time for lunch breaks not taken, forced work during rest breaks, failed to pay overtime, and withheld commissions. Each employee’s contract contained a mandatory arbitration clause, which the employers sought to enforce under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and Colorado law. The employees responded that, as transportation workers, their contracts were exempt from the FAA, and further argued that Colorado law voided such arbitration agreements for wage claims. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied the motions to compel arbitration. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court focused narrowly on the specific duties of the three employees, rather than considering the work typically performed by the broader class of customer service agents. It found that the employees “actually and routinely” handled passenger luggage and played a “gatekeeping” role with respect to cargo. On this basis, the court concluded they were transportation workers exempt from the FAA. The district court did not address the request to compel arbitration under Colorado law. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred by defining the relevant class of workers too narrowly—focusing only on the specific employees, rather than the typical duties of the class as a whole, as required by Supreme Court precedent (including Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon). The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order denying the motions to compel arbitration and remanded for further proceedings to properly determine the attributes of the class of workers under the correct legal standard. View "Joyner v. Frontier Airlines" on Justia Law

In re: Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints

2026-08-31T09:00:57-08:00

Plaintiffs, who had donated funds to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, alleged that the Church and its investment subsidiary, Ensign Peak Advisors, Inc., fraudulently induced donations by concealing the true use and accumulation of donated funds. They claimed that the Church misrepresented that tithing would be used for charitable and religious purposes, when instead large portions were invested and used for commercial ventures, such as the development of the City Creek Mall. A key event in the case was the publication of a whistleblower report in December 2019, which was widely reported in national and local media and described how the Church managed and concealed a large investment portfolio. The Church publicly responded, and three other lawsuits were filed by different donors based on similar allegations. After actions were filed in several federal district courts, the cases were consolidated in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. Plaintiffs brought claims for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment, seeking to represent a nationwide class of post-1997 donors. The district court dismissed the consolidated complaint with prejudice, ruling that the claims were untimely under Utah’s three-year statute of limitations for fraud. The court found that the widespread news coverage of the whistleblower report meant that plaintiffs, exercising reasonable diligence, should have discovered the alleged fraud more than three years before filing suit. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred because the whistleblower report and related media coverage provided sufficient public notice to trigger the statute of limitations, and that reasonable diligence would have led to earlier discovery. The court also found no error in the district court’s procedural rulings and denied the request for leave to amend. View "In re: Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints" on Justia Law

Santoro v. Tower Health

2026-08-28T09:00:05-08:00

Two individuals, who were patients of a regional healthcare provider, filed a class action lawsuit alleging that the provider’s website used tracking software to intercept and share users’ personally identifiable health information with a third-party technology company. This software, known as Meta Pixel, collected data such as IP addresses, device identifiers, and details about users’ interactions with the website, transmitting this information to the technology company, which then used it for commercial purposes, including targeted advertising. The healthcare provider also received data analysis from the technology company and was paid for allowing access to this information. The plaintiffs claimed they did not consent to this sharing of their health information. After the claims against the technology company were transferred to another district, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania reviewed several amended complaints against the healthcare provider. The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint with prejudice, concluding that the allegations did not sufficiently specify what personal health information was actually shared and that further amendment would be futile. When the plaintiffs sought reconsideration and submitted a proposed third amended complaint, the District Court denied the motion, citing undue delay because the plaintiffs could have included the new details earlier and had been clearly informed of the deficiencies. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed both orders of the District Court. The Third Circuit held that, although plaintiffs had Article III standing, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the second amended complaint with prejudice or in denying the motion for reconsideration. The appellate court concluded that plaintiffs had sufficient notice of the complaint’s deficiencies after oral argument and did not act promptly to address them, justifying denial of further amendment. View "Santoro v. Tower Health" on Justia Law

Fischer v. XTO Energy

2026-08-28T08:00:46-08:00

A family group brought claims in Oklahoma state court against an energy company, alleging underpayment of oil and gas royalties over several decades. These claims overlapped with those in a separate class action brought by another party against the company and its related entities, also concerning underpayment of royalties. The class action was removed to federal court, where a settlement was reached and approved by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma. The settlement covered claims for a defined period, and included a permanent injunction barring class members from pursuing similar claims. The family did not opt out of the settlement and received compensation under its terms. Later, the energy company sought summary judgment in the family’s original state case, arguing that the federal settlement released the company from liability for claims during the covered period. When summary judgment was denied, the company returned to the federal district court, seeking enforcement of the settlement’s injunction against further pursuit of those claims by the family in state court. The federal court declined to issue a new injunction but found that the family’s ongoing litigation of released claims violated the original injunction. The court ordered the family to either show cause for their violation or agree to abide by the injunction and dismiss the released claims. The family appealed this order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit determined that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over the order. The court held that a post-judgment civil contempt or enforcement order is not final and appealable unless the district court both finds contempt and imposes a specific, unavoidable sanction. Because the district court’s order did neither, and because no alternative grounds for appellate jurisdiction applied, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal. View "Fischer v. XTO Energy" on Justia Law

Lowell v. Lyft, Inc.

2026-08-27T06:00:04-08:00

Two plaintiffs, one individual and one advocacy organization, filed suit against a ridesharing company, alleging discrimination against persons with mobility-related disabilities. They claimed the company violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) by failing to make wheelchair accessible vehicles (WAVs)—that accommodate fixed-frame wheelchairs—available in all regions it operates, instead of only nine cities. The plaintiffs proposed several modifications to the company’s policies and practices to increase WAV availability in Westchester County, New York, and sought class certification for affected residents and visitors. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held a bench trial. After reviewing the evidence, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate either that the rideshare platform’s limited menu constituted a barrier to WAV access or that their proposed modifications would effectively or reasonably achieve WAV transportation in the relevant regions. The court also determined that the evidence did not show the proposed modifications were likely to be effective, and that the defendant’s proof established the modifications would not be reasonable. As a result, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s findings for clear error and considered plaintiffs’ arguments regarding evidentiary burdens and the effectiveness of proposed modifications. The Second Circuit concluded that plaintiffs bore the burden of persuasion as to effectiveness, and only a light burden of production as to reasonableness. The appellate court found no error in the district court’s application of these standards and affirmed the judgment, holding that the plaintiffs failed to show their proposed modifications would effectively provide WAV service in Westchester County. View "Lowell v. Lyft, Inc." on Justia Law

Hickenbottom v. Medical Solutions

2026-08-26T12:01:06-08:00

A healthcare staffing company hired an employee as a travel nurse, requiring him to sign multiple agreements containing arbitration provisions with varying language. When the employee later accepted a temporary assignment at a hospital, he signed an additional agreement incorporating the employer’s most recent arbitration policy. After his assignment ended, the employee filed a class action lawsuit alleging wage and hour violations against the company. The company responded by filing a motion in the Superior Court of San Diego County to compel arbitration, relying on the arbitration provision from the employee handbook. The employee opposed, arguing that the handbook’s provision was superseded by the newer arbitration agreement incorporated into his most recent assignment. The court denied the motion, finding that the company had relied on the wrong agreement. The company then filed a second motion to compel arbitration, this time based on the updated agreement, but failed to provide the affidavit or explanation required by California Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 for renewed motions. The employee objected, contending that the second motion sought the same relief as the first and was subject to section 1008(b), which the company had not satisfied. The Superior Court agreed, ruled it lacked jurisdiction to consider the renewed motion, and denied it. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed whether the trial court properly applied section 1008(b) and whether the second motion was a renewed motion for the same relief. The appellate court held that the company’s second motion sought identical relief as the first—compelling arbitration of the same claims—regardless of which agreement formed the basis. Because the company failed to comply with section 1008(b), the trial court lacked jurisdiction, and the order denying the renewed motion was not appealable. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. View "Hickenbottom v. Medical Solutions" on Justia Law

Dodiya v. Franklin

2026-08-26T11:34:43-08:00

A publicly traded Delaware company specializing in plant-based sweeteners became the subject of a merger transaction led by the controlling stockholder of a major suitor, who was also the father of the company’s CEO. Shortly after becoming interim CEO, the son secretly provided his father’s investment firm with confidential and material nonpublic financial information, including a key valuation report. Over the next several months, the CEO continued to share sensitive company data with his father’s entities. The father’s investment firm then accumulated a significant ownership stake in the company and submitted an offer to acquire it. The board responded by forming a Special Committee and attempting to restrict the CEO’s involvement, but after he refused to sign a confidentiality agreement, he was placed on leave. Despite this, he was later given access to confidential board materials and attended meetings regarding the sale process. The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware reviewed the case after the plaintiff, a stockholder, brought a class action challenging the merger and related conduct. The plaintiff alleged breaches of fiduciary duty, statutory violations under 8 Del. C. § 203, and conversion. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). The court found that the plaintiff had adequately alleged that the board’s process was grossly negligent, noting the board’s failure to adequately wall off the conflicted CEO and its misleading proxy statement to stockholders. As a result, the statutory safe harbors under 8 Del. C. § 144(a)(1) and (a)(2) were unavailable at the pleading stage. The court held that claims could proceed against the CEO and the executive chairman, who had negotiated a lucrative consulting agreement in connection with the merger. It dismissed the remaining directors, finding them disinterested and not alleged to have acted in bad faith. The court also dismissed the statutory and conversion claims, holding that the challenged stockholder vote satisfied Section 203’s requirements and that deficiencies in the proxy statement did not render the merger invalid. View "Dodiya v. Franklin" on Justia Law

PATACSIL V. GOOGLE LLC

2026-08-26T09:00:33-08:00

Google was accused of violating the privacy rights of users in the United States by continuing to track and store their location data even after users had disabled the “Location History” feature on their devices. The lawsuit, brought as a class action on behalf of approximately 247.7 million individuals, consolidated multiple complaints. The parties ultimately negotiated a settlement that included both injunctive relief—requiring Google to alter its practices—and a $62 million fund. This settlement fund was to cover attorneys’ fees, litigation costs, service awards for class representatives, and administrative expenses. The remaining funds were to be distributed to selected nonprofit organizations with a focus on internet privacy, rather than directly to class members. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California, after conducting a fairness hearing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2), overruled objections from certain class members. These objectors argued that it was improper to distribute the settlement fund exclusively through the cy pres doctrine without first attempting a direct distribution to class members. The district court found that a direct distribution was infeasible because the pro rata share for each class member would be minimal (less than 25 cents) and administrative costs would further reduce any recovery. It approved the cy pres distribution, finding the selected nonprofit recipients had a substantial nexus to the class’s privacy interests. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The appellate court held that the district court properly considered the relevant factors under amended Rule 23(e), did not improperly presume the fairness of the settlement, and acted within its discretion in approving a cy pres-only monetary distribution where direct payments were deemed infeasible and not verifiable. The court also found the selection of cy pres recipients appropriate and declined to address new constitutional arguments not presented below. The holding is that cy pres-only distributions are permissible in class settlements when direct distribution is infeasible and the selected recipients have a substantial nexus to the interests of the class. View "PATACSIL V. GOOGLE LLC" on Justia Law

Doe v. Adventist Health System/West

2026-08-24T14:32:20-08:00

Four individuals who were or are patients of a health care system brought a proposed class action against the system, alleging violations of the California Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA) and the California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA). They claimed the health care provider installed web tracking technologies, specifically Meta Pixel and Google Analytics, on its various websites, including a public health risk assessment (HRA) site and a password-protected patient portal. According to the plaintiffs, these tools tracked users’ activities, collected their data—including personally identifiable information, health-related communications, and protected health information—and transmitted it to Meta and Google, who then used the data for advertising purposes. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification in its entirety. The court found that the proposed subclasses—patients who logged into the patient portal and those who submitted HRA forms—were not ascertainable, that individual issues predominated over common ones, and that a class action was not the superior or manageable method. It reasoned that determining whether the tracking technologies’ transmissions constituted “contents” under CIPA or “medical information” under CMIA would require individualized inquiries into each user’s data. The court also concluded plaintiffs had abandoned their CIPA claim under section 632. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appellate court held that the HRA form subclass and the CIPA claim for the patient portal subclass met the requirements for class certification, as key liability questions could be resolved with common proof. However, it affirmed the denial of class certification for the CMIA claim for the patient portal subclass and agreed that plaintiffs forfeited their CIPA section 632 claim. The court found class action treatment was superior and manageable for the certified subclasses. View "Doe v. Adventist Health System/West" on Justia Law

Salvatora v. XTO Energy Inc

2026-08-24T09:00:04-08:00

Six landowners in Western Pennsylvania, believing that XTO Energy, Inc. was underpaying royalties owed under oil and gas leases, brought a class action in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. None of the named plaintiffs’ leases included arbitration clauses, but the proposed class definitions were broad enough to cover leaseholders whose leases did contain arbitration clauses. The plaintiffs sought damages on behalf of themselves and similarly situated landowners. After the suit was filed, the District Court oversaw extensive class discovery and certified classes that included some members whose leases had arbitration clauses. XTO did not assert arbitration as a defense in its answers or move to compel arbitration before class certification or before the expiration of the class opt-out period. It only moved to compel arbitration against those unnamed class members with arbitration clauses after the opt-out period closed. Relying in part on the then-controlling district court decision in Valli v. Avis Budget Rental Car Group, LLC, a Magistrate Judge found that XTO had waived its right to arbitrate by demonstrating a preference for litigation over arbitration, and the District Court adopted that ruling. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s waiver determination de novo as to legal conclusions and for clear error as to factual findings. The Third Circuit held that, under its intervening precedential decision in Valli v. Avis Budget Group, Inc., a defendant does not waive its right to compel arbitration against unnamed class members with arbitration clauses in their leases merely by litigating prior to class certification, where none of the named plaintiffs are subject to arbitration. The court found XTO’s conduct did not constitute an implied waiver. The Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s order denying XTO’s motion to compel arbitration and remanded for further proceedings. View "Salvatora v. XTO Energy Inc" on Justia Law

OPERS v. FHLMC

2026-08-21T11:31:22-08:00

A large public pension fund alleged that a government-sponsored enterprise and three of its senior officers made false and misleading statements regarding the company’s exposure to subprime and Alt-A mortgages during a period preceding the 2008 financial crisis. The pension fund claimed that the company’s public statements and disclosures understated its exposure to high-risk loans, while internal documents and risk assessments suggested a much greater level of risk. It further argued that, when the company’s actual exposure came to light, its stock price fell, resulting in significant losses to shareholders. Previously, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio denied class certification, excluded the pension fund’s expert, and granted summary judgment to the defendants. The court concluded that the pension fund failed to establish reliance due to an inability to show that the company’s stock traded in an efficient market, improperly rejected the fund’s price-maintenance theory of fraud, found insufficient evidence to support loss causation and damages, and determined the defendants did not act with scienter. The court also found no actionable misstatements regarding credit-risk and underwriting standards, and dismissed control-person liability claims after finding no underlying securities violation. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The appellate court held that the pension fund presented sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the company made materially false or misleading statements regarding its subprime and Alt-A exposure, and that issues of scienter and reliance were present. The court determined that the lower court erred in rejecting the price-maintenance theory and improperly excluded the plaintiff’s expert. It also concluded that the fund should be allowed another opportunity to seek class certification and to present evidence of loss causation and damages. The court reinstated the underlying securities fraud and control-person liability claims for further proceedings. View "OPERS v. FHLMC" on Justia Law

Vick v. Vertical Enterprise, LLC

2026-08-20T09:31:38-08:00

After Missouri legalized recreational marijuana in 2022, local governments were permitted to impose an additional sales tax on dispensaries selling recreational marijuana. Dispensaries passed this tax on to their customers. However, the Missouri Supreme Court later ruled that counties could not levy this additional tax on dispensaries located within incorporated areas such as cities or towns. Following this ruling, a class of customers sued several dispensaries, alleging that the dispensaries unlawfully retained the collected county tax and sought restitution. The dispensaries removed the action to the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). The plaintiffs then amended their complaint to limit the class to Missouri citizens and moved to remand the case to state court, arguing that the Local Controversy Exception to CAFA applied. The district court initially found that three of the four required elements for the exception were met but that the class had not sufficiently shown that more than two-thirds of its members were Missouri citizens. After a second amendment explicitly limited the class to Missouri citizens, the district court found all requirements met and remanded the case to state court. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered whether the operative pleading for determining CAFA jurisdiction was the first or second amended complaint. The court, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, held that the most recent amended complaint governs jurisdiction. The Eighth Circuit also agreed that the Local Controversy Exception was satisfied and affirmed the district court’s remand order, holding that federal jurisdiction no longer existed once the class was limited to Missouri citizens. View "Vick v. Vertical Enterprise, LLC" on Justia Law

Toy v. City & County of S.F.

2026-08-19T13:02:43-08:00

Three individuals filed a class action lawsuit against San Francisco, challenging new water rates adopted by the city’s Public Utility Commission in May 2023. The plaintiffs alleged that the new rates violated Proposition 218 of the California Constitution by including costs unrelated to the actual provision of water service, resulting in charges that exceeded the cost of service. Before adopting the new rates, the city provided required notice to ratepayers, including information about a 120-day period for legal challenges under the applicable validation statutes. The plaintiffs sought a refund, declaratory and equitable relief, and a writ of mandate. After the class action was filed, the City litigated the case for over a year. It participated in discovery, case management, and even moved for summary judgment, without initially arguing that the suit was procedurally improper. Eventually, the City moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that plaintiffs’ action was subject to the validation statutes, specifically Government Code section 53759 and Code of Civil Procedure sections 860 et seq., which require reverse validation actions attacking agency matters like water rates to be brought within 120 days and with specific notice by publication to all interested parties. The trial court (San Francisco County Superior Court) agreed with the City, finding the statutes mandatory and jurisdictional, and dismissed the case for failure to comply with the procedural requirements, including timely filing and appropriate notice. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the judgment de novo. The court held that compliance with the validation statutes was mandatory and jurisdictional. Plaintiffs’ failure to file a proper reverse validation action and to provide notice by publication deprived the court of jurisdiction. The court rejected arguments that the City had waived these requirements or that good cause existed for noncompliance. The judgment in favor of the City was affirmed. View "Toy v. City & County of S.F." on Justia Law

In Re: Apellis Pharm., Inc. Securities Litigation

2026-08-19T12:30:04-08:00

Plaintiffs, who were investors in a pharmaceutical company, brought a putative class action alleging securities fraud. The company had developed a drug to treat geographic atrophy, a form of age-related macular degeneration, and conducted two large clinical trials (OAKS and DERBY) before the drug's approval by the FDA. During the class period, company representatives publicly stated that there were no observed cases of retinal vasculitis, a serious eye condition, among trial participants. After the drug's commercialization, new reports emerged of retinal vasculitis in patients treated with the drug, leading to a decline in the company’s stock price and the addition of a warning to the drug’s label. The action was initially filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware and later transferred to the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs argued that the company's statements were misleading half-truths because the clinical trials were not specifically designed to detect retinal vasculitis, and this limitation was not disclosed to investors. The defendants moved to dismiss, contending that the statements were not materially misleading and that there was no sufficient allegation of scienter (intent to defraud). The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted the motion, holding that the omissions were not actionable because the relevant trial protocols and methodologies had been publicly disclosed and disagreements over scientific methodology do not support securities fraud claims. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The court held that the company’s statements were not materially misleading because the information regarding the trial protocols, including when and how retinal vasculitis could be detected, was publicly available. The court concluded that no material misrepresentation or actionable omission had occurred, and thus affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "In Re: Apellis Pharm., Inc. Securities Litigation" on Justia Law

5-Star General Store v. American Express Company

2026-08-19T12:30:03-08:00

A group of small merchants, including a store in Rhode Island, entered into arbitration agreements with a credit card company, which required arbitration of disputes before the American Arbitration Association (AAA). In August 2023, these merchants initiated thousands of arbitration proceedings against the company, challenging certain “swipe-fee” policies that they argued harmed small businesses. A dispute arose over the filing fees that the credit card company owed to the AAA. The AAA administrator determined the applicable fees and repeatedly warned both parties that the arbitrations would be administratively closed if the fees were not paid. The merchants paid their share of the fees, but the credit card company refused to pay, contesting the fee amount. As a result, in late February 2024, the AAA administratively closed the arbitrations. Subsequently, the merchants filed a class action in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, arguing that the company’s refusal to pay arbitration fees constituted a default and waiver of its right to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The credit card company moved to stay the litigation and compel arbitration. The District Court denied the motion, finding that the company had defaulted and waived its arbitration rights by failing to pay the required fees, and rejected the company’s argument that the merchants had acted with unclean hands. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court had the authority to decide whether the company’s conduct amounted to waiver or default under the FAA, and that the company’s deliberate refusal to pay arbitration fees, despite repeated warnings, constituted waiver and default. The First Circuit also found no error in the district court’s rejection of the unclean hands defense. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to stay and compel arbitration. View "5-Star General Store v. American Express Company" on Justia Law

Hamm v. Ochsner-Acadia

2026-08-19T09:30:54-08:00

Support staff who worked at a psychiatric hospital in Louisiana operated by Acadia-affiliated entities allege that, while they were provided with nominal meal breaks, they were functionally required to remain on call due to company policies and ethical obligations. As a result, they claim they were not properly compensated for this time. The plaintiffs, a former nurse supervisor and a former mental health technician, brought suit on behalf of themselves and similarly situated employees. Their claims included violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Louisiana state-law torts, specifically unjust enrichment and conversion. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana certified both an FLSA collective action and a Rule 23(b)(3) class action for the state-law claims. Acadia sought interlocutory review of the class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was presented with Acadia’s appeal challenging both the collective and class certification decisions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the FLSA collective action certification at this stage, as Rule 23(f) provides for interlocutory review only of class certification orders, not collective actions. The court declined Acadia’s request to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction because the legal standards and issues between the FLSA collective and the Rule 23 class were not sufficiently intertwined. Turning to class certification, the Fifth Circuit found no abuse of discretion by the district court. It held that the Rule 23 requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority were satisfied based on the plaintiffs’ “on-call” theory, which presented common questions suitable for classwide adjudication. The court therefore affirmed the district court’s certification of the Rule 23 class, dismissed the appeal regarding the collective action, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hamm v. Ochsner-Acadia" on Justia Law

VERTHELYI V. PENNYMAC MORTGAGE INVESTMENT TRUST

2026-08-19T08:01:25-08:00

A real estate investment trust issued shares governed by corporate charter documents that initially paid fixed dividends but were set to convert to floating rates tied to the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR). The charter provided three fallback options if LIBOR became unavailable. When LIBOR was discontinued, the company determined that the third fallback provision—a fixed rate based on the most recent dividend period—would apply. This decision was announced before the shares were set to convert to floating rates, leading to a decrease in the shares' market value. A shareholder filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, alleging that the company’s failure to convert to SOFR-based floating rates, as selected by the Federal Reserve under the Adjustable Interest Rate (LIBOR) Act, violated California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL). The shareholder claimed that a fixed rate could not serve as a valid “benchmark replacement” under the LIBOR Act. The company moved to dismiss, arguing that the fallback provision was a valid benchmark replacement, thus precluding a UCL claim. The district court denied the motion, finding ambiguity in the statute and relying on legislative history suggesting concern over fixed-rate conversions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order. The Ninth Circuit held that, under the plain text of the LIBOR Act, a “benchmark replacement” may include a fixed dividend rate as provided in the fallback provision, and there is no requirement that it be a floating rate. The court found the fallback provision to be a valid benchmark replacement and concluded that the company’s actions were not “unlawful” or “unfair” under the UCL. The case was remanded for further proceedings on any remaining issues. View "VERTHELYI V. PENNYMAC MORTGAGE INVESTMENT TRUST" on Justia Law

Burnett v. Spring Way Center, LLC

2026-08-19T07:30:59-08:00

A group of Missouri home sellers brought a class action lawsuit in federal court, alleging that the National Association of Realtors (NAR) and several large real estate brokerage firms conspired to inflate buyer-broker commissions through a rule requiring sellers to offer compensation to buyers’ brokers via Multiple Listing Services (MLSs). The plaintiffs claimed this arrangement artificially increased transaction costs for sellers and buyers nationwide due to NAR’s market dominance. The class was initially limited to Missouri, Illinois, and Kansas home sellers using certain MLSs. After a trial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, a jury found the defendants liable for violating antitrust laws and awarded significant damages. While post-trial motions were pending, similar lawsuits emerged across the country. The parties began global settlement negotiations addressing claims from related cases, including those involving different MLSs and trade associations, such as the Real Estate Board of New York (REBNY). The settlement required NAR and others to pay over $1 billion and implement practice changes, including eliminating the contested rule. The settlement class expanded to nearly all U.S. home sellers using any MLS from 2014 to 2024. Following extensive notice and a fairness hearing, the district court certified the nationwide class, approved the settlement as fair under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and addressed all objections, including those from non-appearing objectors. On appeal, several objectors and interested parties challenged the settlement, raising issues about class scope, adequacy, fairness, the inclusion of unrelated claims, attorneys’ fees, due process, and the fairness hearing procedures. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed for abuse of discretion and found that the district court properly applied the relevant legal standards, including Rule 23(e). The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s approval of the nationwide class-action settlement, holding that it was fair, reasonable, and adequate, and that the process satisfied constitutional and procedural requirements. View "Burnett v. Spring Way Center, LLC" on Justia Law

Moore v Club Exploria, LLC

2026-08-18T12:30:47-08:00

The plaintiff received two pre-recorded telemarketing calls from a vacation property company, which he alleged were made without his consent in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. The company had used third-party vendors to conduct a large-scale telemarketing campaign, targeting individuals whose phone numbers had been obtained from opt-in websites. The plaintiff, on behalf of himself and a proposed class, filed suit against the company in April 2019, asserting that these calls violated federal law. In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the defendant engaged in extensive litigation over the course of four years. It filed answers with affirmative defenses, participated in class-related discovery, and litigated several motions, including opposing class certification and filing for summary judgment. Notably, the defendant did not assert arbitration as a defense until after the class was certified and significant litigation had occurred. When it finally raised arbitration—claiming that many class members had agreed to arbitrate through opt-in websites—the district court refused to allow the late amendment to add this defense, finding that it was too late and that the right to arbitrate had been waived. The district court later denied the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, granted summary judgment to the plaintiff and the class, and ordered further settlement negotiations. Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit clarified the appropriate standard of review for orders denying motions to compel arbitration, holding that legal rulings with precedential effect are reviewed de novo, while the ultimate waiver determination is reviewed for clear error. The court further held that a defendant’s conduct prior to class certification is relevant in assessing waiver of the right to arbitrate. Finding no clear error in the district court’s conclusion that the defendant waived its arbitration rights by failing to timely assert them, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment. View "Moore v Club Exploria, LLC" on Justia Law

BIO-LAB, INC. v. TARTT

2026-08-18T04:05:57-08:00

In September 2024, a major fire at the Bio-Lab chemical facility in Rockdale County, Georgia, caused the release of a toxic chemical plume, resulting in an evacuation order for over 17,000 nearby residents. Many local residents subsequently sought medical attention for symptoms related to exposure to hazardous substances, including hydrogen cyanide. A group of affected residents and businesses filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against Bio-Lab and related entities, alleging negligence, trespass, nuisance, and strict liability. However, the plaintiffs did not claim present physical injury; instead, they asserted an increased risk of future disease and sought, among other remedies, an injunction requiring the creation of a defendant-funded medical monitoring program. The defendants moved to dismiss the request for equitable relief, arguing that Georgia law does not permit medical monitoring as a remedy absent allegations of present physical injury. The federal district court, finding Georgia law unclear on this issue, certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Georgia: whether a plaintiff exposed to toxic substances without present physical injury may obtain equitable relief in the form of medical monitoring, and if so, what standard applies. The Supreme Court of Georgia responded that, under Georgia law, the availability of equitable relief depends on whether the plaintiff has suffered a legally cognizable injury and whether that injury meets the established criteria for equitable relief, including the absence of an adequate remedy at law and the imminence of harm. The court declined to decide whether the specific facts of this case warranted such relief, leaving that determination to the district court. Additionally, the court concluded that the precise form and scope of equitable relief in a federal diversity case is likely governed by federal law, not state law. The certified questions were thus answered only in part. View "BIO-LAB, INC. v. TARTT" on Justia Law

Johnson v. Russell Investments Trust Company

2026-08-17T10:02:04-08:00

An employee of Royal Caribbean participated in the company’s retirement plan and invested in a series of target date funds managed by Russell. She, on behalf of a class, alleged that Royal Caribbean, as plan sponsor and fiduciary under ERISA, breached its duty of prudence by selecting and retaining the Russell Target Date Funds (TDFs) instead of alternatives like those from Vanguard or American Funds. The complaint highlighted that the Russell TDFs underperformed their peers and benchmarks, charged higher fees, and had features—such as a particular glidepath and asset allocation—that allegedly made them a poor fit for plan participants. Internal communications from Russell and Royal Caribbean raised concerns about the performance and cost of the Russell TDFs. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment to Royal Caribbean. It reasoned that, in order to prove the investment was objectively imprudent, the plaintiff was required to present “apples-to-apples” comparator evidence—showing the Russell TDFs were worse than another fund with the same investment strategy and risk profile. The district court found that the plaintiff’s comparators, such as the Vanguard and American Funds TDFs, were not proper because they differed in strategy and structure from the Russell funds. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that an ERISA plaintiff is not always required to provide an “apples-to-apples” comparator to establish that an investment was objectively imprudent. The court explained that evidence of objective imprudence can be qualitative or quantitative, and the inquiry is context-specific, depending on all relevant facts and circumstances. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. Russell Investments Trust Company" on Justia Law

RUSOFF V. THE HAPPY GROUP, INC.

2026-08-17T08:01:23-08:00

Two consumers filed a lawsuit against a company that produces and sells eggs, challenging the company’s marketing claims that its hens are “free range” and “pasture raised on over 8 acres.” The plaintiffs alleged that these statements were deceptive because, in their view, the terms “pasture raised” and “free range” have objective meanings set by specific animal welfare certification organizations, and that consumers would expect the eggs to meet those standards. The plaintiffs sought to certify classes of California and New York consumers who purchased the eggs, arguing that the company’s advertising led consumers to pay a premium under false pretenses. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California considered the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. During this process, the court excluded the plaintiffs’ expert’s opinion on the meaning of “pasture raised,” finding the expert’s methodology unreliable under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Without this expert opinion, the district court concluded that the plaintiffs could not show that deception was a common issue capable of classwide resolution, as required for predominance under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). Nonetheless, the court certified the classes, reasoning that common questions remained regarding the materiality of the statements and the calculation of damages. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting class certification. The Ninth Circuit held that, in the absence of admissible expert evidence regarding what consumers understand “pasture raised” to mean, the plaintiffs failed to show that common issues of deception predominated. The court further held that common questions of materiality and damages could not, by themselves, justify class certification when the element of deception was not established on a classwide basis. View "RUSOFF V. THE HAPPY GROUP, INC." on Justia Law

Kaiser v Alcoa USA Corp.

2026-08-14T13:00:55-08:00

An aluminum company had, through various collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), promised certain healthcare benefits to retirees, their spouses, and dependents. The agreements did not specify the duration of these benefits, but the company had been providing lifetime healthcare coverage to individuals who retired before June 1, 1993. In August 2020, the company announced it would transition these pre-1993 retirees to a new health reimbursement arrangement starting January 1, 2021, under which the company reserved the right to terminate benefits at any time. Over 3,000 affected individuals, including the widow of a former employee, challenged this change, alleging that it breached the CBAs and violated federal labor and benefits laws. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana certified a class of affected retirees and their eligible spouses and dependents. After discovery, the court granted summary judgment as to liability in favor of the plaintiffs, relying on judicial estoppel. The court found that the company was barred from arguing that benefits were not vested for life because it had previously taken the opposite position in earlier litigation. As a result, the district court declared that class members were entitled to lifetime healthcare benefits and issued a permanent injunction requiring reinstatement of the prior plan and allowing claims for expenses incurred since January 1, 2021. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s certification of the class under Rule 23(b)(2), finding no abuse of discretion. However, it reversed the grant of summary judgment as to liability. The appellate court concluded that judicial estoppel did not apply because the company’s prior statements in earlier litigation were not clearly inconsistent with its current position. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the merits. View "Kaiser v Alcoa USA Corp." on Justia Law

Hunter v Elanco Animal Health Incorporated

2026-08-14T06:30:47-08:00

The plaintiffs, who purchased securities issued by an animal health company, brought a proposed class action against the company and certain officers and directors. They alleged that the company misled investors by publicly attributing its sales growth to strong end-user demand, when in reality, the growth was artificially created through “channel stuffing”—the practice of pushing excessive inventory onto distributors, thus inflating reported revenues. The company’s alleged conduct took place around the time of major acquisitions and included public statements and SEC filings that, according to the plaintiffs, failed to disclose the channel stuffing and misrepresented the true basis for revenue increases. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana reviewed the plaintiffs’ first amended complaint and dismissed it without prejudice for failure to state a claim, allowing an opportunity to amend. The plaintiffs sought to file a second amended complaint, asserting claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Act of 1933, as well as related “control person” liability provisions. The district court denied leave to amend, deeming further amendment futile, and dismissed the case with prejudice. The court concluded the plaintiffs had not adequately alleged actionable misstatements, scienter (intent to defraud), or loss causation under the heightened pleading standards required by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that, even assuming the statements at issue could be considered materially misleading, the plaintiffs failed to allege facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter. The court also agreed that the claims under the Securities Act sounded in fraud and therefore required particularized pleading, which the plaintiffs had not met. Consequently, all claims were properly dismissed with prejudice. View "Hunter v Elanco Animal Health Incorporated" on Justia Law

Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz

2026-08-13T17:30:03-08:00

A Salvadoran national entered the United States without inspection in 2013 and lived in Massachusetts. In September 2025, he was arrested by immigration authorities during a vehicle stop and placed in removal proceedings, charged as inadmissible for being present without admission or valid documentation. Under longstanding practice, individuals in his situation could seek release from detention on bond while their removal cases were pending. However, in July 2025, the Department of Homeland Security issued guidance, later adopted by the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, that mandatory detention without bond applied to all noncitizens present in the U.S. without admission, shifting the legal framework and increasing the detained population. After his arrest, the individual challenged his detention without a bond hearing by filing a habeas petition in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The district court issued a preliminary injunction, requiring his release or a bond hearing, and later certified a class action for similarly situated noncitizens. The district court ultimately held that the new DHS policy violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), finding that those present in the United States without admission were entitled to bond hearings under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed whether the INA requires mandatory detention without bond for noncitizens present in the country without admission, or if they are eligible for bond hearings. The First Circuit held that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to noncitizens "seeking admission"—that is, those seeking lawful entry at the border—not those already present after unlawful entry. Accordingly, detention and bond eligibility for class members are governed by § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), and the district court’s order was affirmed. View "Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz" on Justia Law

W.M.M. v. Trump

2026-08-13T15:30:29-08:00

Three Venezuelan nationals, alleged by the government to be members of the Tren de Aragua gang, were detained in Texas following a presidential proclamation under the Alien Enemies Act (AEA). This proclamation, issued in March 2025, authorized immediate removal of Venezuelan citizens aged fourteen or older, residing in the United States, who were not naturalized or lawful permanent residents and were identified as members of the gang. The petitioners challenged the proclamation, arguing that it exceeded the President’s authority under the AEA and violated due process rights. They sought class certification and injunctive relief to prevent removal under the AEA. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied temporary restraining orders and class certification. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit initially dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, in A.A.R.P. v. Trump, vacated that dismissal and remanded, instructing the Fifth Circuit to address two issues: whether the petitioners were entitled to a preliminary injunction against removal under the AEA, and whether the notice provided for due process claims was sufficient for the putative class. The Supreme Court also allowed the government to remove the petitioners under other lawful authorities. After remand, the three named petitioners were removed from the United States under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), not the AEA. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that, because the petitioners were no longer in the country and no class had been certified, it was impossible to grant any effectual relief. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot for lack of jurisdiction, declining to substitute new class representatives on appeal but leaving open the possibility for future proceedings in the district court. View "W.M.M. v. Trump" on Justia Law

TURREY V. VERVENT, INC.

2026-08-12T08:01:30-08:00

A group of former students who attended ITT Technical Institute, a for-profit college, brought suit against companies and individuals involved in servicing and collecting on certain private student loans known as the PEAKS loans. After the 2008 financial crisis, ITT, needing to comply with federal regulations limiting reliance on federal funds, established the PEAKS loan program with the backing of Deutsche Bank to generate non-federal revenue. The loans were internally backed by guarantees from ITT, and as default rates rose, ITT concealed the program’s financial troubles from investors and regulators. The PEAKS loans continued to be serviced by Vervent, Inc. and its affiliates, even after ITT’s collapse and bankruptcy in 2016. Students alleged that they were not aware that their loan payments were induced by fraud until after ITT’s public downfall. In the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, the plaintiffs, as a putative class, alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and various state-law claims. The defendants argued that the RICO claims were untimely, asserting that the statute of limitations began when the students received or began paying the loans, and also challenged proximate causation. The district court denied summary judgment on both grounds, finding fact issues precluded judgment as a matter of law. A jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding damages that were trebled under RICO. The district court denied defendants’ post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It held there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the students neither knew nor reasonably should have known of their fraud-based injuries more than four years before suit was filed, so the claims were timely under RICO’s four-year statute of limitations. The court also concluded that defendants did not preserve their proximate cause argument for appeal because they did not properly raise it after trial. The judgment was affirmed. View "TURREY V. VERVENT, INC." on Justia Law

Trimble v. Entrata, Inc.

2026-08-11T10:30:42-08:00

A software company operated an online payment portal used by residents, including the plaintiff, to pay rent for Maryland apartments. Each time the plaintiff paid rent through the portal, she was charged a convenience fee. To complete a transaction, users were required to check a box agreeing to the portal’s hyperlinked terms and conditions, which included an arbitration provision, a clause allowing unilateral changes to the agreement, and a notice provision stating that notices would be posted on the portal. The plaintiff, on behalf of herself and similarly situated individuals, filed a class action, alleging that the company unlawfully acted as an unlicensed collection agency by collecting these fees. After the action was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, the company moved to compel arbitration based on the terms and conditions. The plaintiff opposed, arguing that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable under Maryland law because the company’s ability to unilaterally change the terms without advance notice rendered its promise to arbitrate illusory. The district court agreed, finding that the contract was a browsewrap agreement and that the modification and notice clauses allowed the company to change terms at will without meaningful notice or an opportunity for users to opt out before changes became binding. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that, under Maryland law, the arbitration agreement was unenforceable for lack of consideration because the company’s promise to arbitrate was illusory. The court reasoned that the change-in-terms clause gave the company unfettered discretion to modify the agreement at any time, without advance notice, thus failing to bind the company meaningfully. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Trimble v. Entrata, Inc." on Justia Law

Glover v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Company

2026-08-11T06:30:03-08:00

A group of life insurance policyholders sued Connecticut General Life Insurance Company and The Lincoln National Life Insurance Company, claiming that the companies wrongfully deducted inflated “cost of insurance” charges from the value of their life insurance policies. The lead plaintiff purchased her policy from Connecticut General, which was later administered by Lincoln following a business acquisition. The litigation in Connecticut overlapped with three similar class actions brought in Pennsylvania and New York against Lincoln and related companies, all alleging similar overcharging schemes. After years of litigation, the plaintiffs in the Connecticut case reached a settlement agreement with the defendants. This settlement aimed to resolve not only the Connecticut action but also the related actions in Pennsylvania and New York. Some class members from the related actions objected, arguing that the proposed settlement class failed to meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, specifically the requirement that the claims of the class representatives be “typical” of those of the class. They pointed out that the named plaintiffs had policies directly issued by Connecticut General or Lincoln and could easily establish privity of contract, while many class members had policies issued by other Lincoln affiliates and would struggle to prove such privity. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut rejected these objections, certified the settlement class, approved the settlement, and entered judgment for the plaintiffs. The objectors appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3) was not met, relying on its prior decision in Mazzei v. Money Store, 829 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2016). The court found that the named plaintiffs’ claims were not typical because their ability to prove privity of contract was not shared by a substantial portion of the class. The Second Circuit reversed the class certification, vacated the judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Glover v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Company" on Justia Law

G.T. v Samsung Electronics America, Inc.

2026-08-07T12:00:45-08:00

Several individuals who purchased and used Samsung smartphones and tablets alleged that the preinstalled Samsung Gallery app created and stored face templates by scanning photographs for facial geometry, thereby capturing biometric data. They claimed that Samsung’s proprietary algorithm measured unique facial features, and the resulting face templates were stored locally on their devices. Plaintiffs argued that Samsung controlled the biometric data, since users had no way to disable the facial recognition features, and Samsung’s privacy policy indicated it “may collect” such information. They further contended that Samsung lacked a written policy for retention and destruction of biometric data and failed to provide required disclosures or obtain releases, in violation of the Illinois Biometric Privacy Information Act (“BIPA”). The plaintiffs initially filed their suit in Illinois state court, seeking class certification for all Illinois residents whose biometric data was collected or stored by Samsung. Samsung removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under the Class Action Fairness Act. After several amended complaints and motions to dismiss, the district court ultimately granted Samsung’s third motion to dismiss with prejudice, finding that the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that Samsung possessed or exerted control over the biometric data stored on users’ devices. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The court held that under both Illinois law and BIPA, “possession,” “collection,” and “capture” require a degree of control by the company over the biometric data. Because the plaintiffs’ allegations did not plausibly show that Samsung itself controlled the facial geometry data generated by the app, the Court affirmed the district court’s judgment dismissing the complaint. View "G.T. v Samsung Electronics America, Inc." on Justia Law

Cortez Gomez v Kohl's Corporation

2026-08-03T13:00:55-08:00

The plaintiff purchased a portable speaker from a Wisconsin-based retailer, believing she was receiving a $30 discount off a regular price of $129.99. However, she later discovered that the retailer almost always sold the speaker at the “sale” price of $99.99 and rarely at the higher “regular” price. She claimed she would not have bought the speaker if she had known this, and brought suit on behalf of a proposed nationwide class, alleging the retailer had violated Wisconsin’s Unfair Trade Practices Act by using misleading price comparison advertising. The suit was filed in federal court, invoking the Class Action Fairness Act as the basis for subject matter jurisdiction. The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the plaintiff had not adequately alleged pecuniary loss under Wisconsin law. The court reasoned that, for damages under Wisconsin’s Unfair Trade Practices Act, the plaintiff must plead that the product was defective or worth less than the price paid, or otherwise did not receive the benefit of the bargain. Because the plaintiff did not make such allegations, the court concluded it was legally impossible for her to meet the required amount-in-controversy for class action jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. It found Wisconsin law unclear on whether a consumer who was misled by false price comparison advertising, but received a product worth the purchase price, suffers a pecuniary loss. Noting a split in authority and uncertainty in Wisconsin precedent, the appellate court certified this question to the Wisconsin Supreme Court and stayed further proceedings pending an answer. View "Cortez Gomez v Kohl's Corporation" on Justia Law

Hartmann v. Chudzik

2026-07-31T09:00:12-08:00

Several individuals arrested in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, were detained pending trial after cash bail was set at their preliminary arraignments. At these arraignments, which were conducted via video without counsel present, the Magisterial District Judges allegedly imposed bail without considering the defendants’ ability to pay or other required factors under state law. Because they could not afford bail, the plaintiffs remained incarcerated. They brought a class action against four Magisterial District Judges (in their official capacities), Lancaster County, and the Warden of the county prison, alleging violations of their rights to equal protection, due process, and counsel. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania first dismissed the plaintiffs’ Sixth Amendment claim, holding that the right to counsel attaches at the preliminary arraignment but does not require counsel’s presence at that proceeding, relying on Supreme Court precedent. The District Court later abstained from hearing the equal protection and due process claims under the doctrine established in Younger v. Harris, reasoning that federal intervention would improperly intrude upon ongoing state criminal proceedings and that state courts could address the plaintiffs’ bail-related claims. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed both rulings. The Third Circuit held that Younger abstention was inappropriate because the plaintiffs did not seek to enjoin ongoing state criminal prosecutions but rather challenged procedures ancillary to those prosecutions—specifically, the process by which bail was set. Therefore, the District Court’s abstention was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings on the equal protection and due process claims. However, the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Sixth Amendment claim, holding that the preliminary arraignment under Pennsylvania law is not a “critical stage” requiring the presence of counsel, even though the right to counsel attaches at that point. View "Hartmann v. Chudzik" on Justia Law

Yousefzadeh v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc.

2026-07-30T06:30:03-08:00

Buyers of over-the-counter nasal decongestants containing oral phenylephrine brought numerous class actions against drug manufacturers and retailers, alleging that for years these companies sold and advertised decongestant products they knew to be ineffective. The plaintiffs claimed that scientific studies, particularly since 2016, had shown oral phenylephrine to be no better than a placebo at relieving congestion, yet the companies continued to market their products as effective decongestants and complied with Food and Drug Administration (FDA) labeling requirements. The FDA, despite mounting evidence, did not remove oral phenylephrine’s designation as an effective decongestant under its regulations. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated nearly one hundred class actions and transferred them to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Plaintiffs filed a complaint asserting New York statutory and common-law claims as well as a federal RICO claim. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) expressly preempted the state law claims because the drugs’ labels complied with FDA requirements, and that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the RICO claim. The court also dismissed a Lanham Act claim brought by one pharmacy plaintiff. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the FDCA expressly preempts most of the state law claims because the federal regime requires manufacturers to follow the FDA-approved labeling, but it vacated the dismissal for claims regarding “Maximum Strength” labeling and brand-name drugs approved via the New Drug Application process, remanding those for further proceedings. The court affirmed dismissal of the RICO claim, adopting the indirect purchaser rule, and upheld denial of the pharmacy’s motion for reconsideration regarding its Lanham Act claim. View "Yousefzadeh v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc." on Justia Law

Arterberry v. Peet's Coffee

2026-07-29T12:03:05-08:00

A group of consumers who purchased products from a coffee company’s website filed a class action lawsuit, claiming that the website’s terms and conditions improperly restricted their right to post negative reviews about the company or its products. The website included clauses stating that users could not submit content intended to cause commercial harm or use the company’s trademarks in a way that would disparage the brand. The plaintiffs did not allege that the company ever threatened to enforce these provisions against them or that they experienced any economic harm as a result. In the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the company responded with a demurrer, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim because merely including such provisions in the terms and conditions does not violate California Civil Code section 1670.8 unless there is an attempt to enforce or threaten enforcement of the provision. The court agreed, finding that section 1670.8 only permits a consumer to seek civil penalties when a business attempts to enforce or otherwise penalizes a consumer under such a clause, not merely for including the clause in a contract. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ related claim under the Unfair Competition Law, as no economic harm was alleged. The court denied leave to amend the Civil Code section 1670.8 claim and entered judgment in favor of the company. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the interpretation of section 1670.8. The appellate court held that while non-disparagement clauses in consumer contracts are void and unenforceable, a business can only be held liable for civil penalties if it threatens to enforce or seeks to enforce such a provision or penalizes a consumer for protected speech. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "Arterberry v. Peet's Coffee" on Justia Law

Onosamba-Ohindo v. Ball

2026-07-29T07:00:09-08:00

A noncitizen from the Democratic Republic of the Congo was detained in New York pending removal proceedings and was ordered released on bond, which he could not pay. He then brought a class action and habeas petition on behalf of similarly situated noncitizens, challenging government bond-hearing procedures as violating due process. Specifically, he argued that the procedures wrongly placed the burden of proof on detainees, failed to consider ability to pay, and did not require consideration of alternatives to detention. The United States District Court for the Western District of New York initially certified the class and issued a preliminary injunction requiring changes to bond-hearing procedures, with the government complying for nearly two years. After the Supreme Court decided Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, which held that lower courts lack jurisdiction to issue class-wide injunctive relief under certain immigration statutes, the district court vacated the injunction. It then decertified the class entirely, concluding that neither class-wide injunctive nor declaratory relief was appropriate, and dismissed the case. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in decertifying the class for injunctive relief, as lower courts lack authority for such relief post-Aleman Gonzalez. However, it found that the district court erred by decertifying the class for declaratory relief based on factors irrelevant to the Rule 23(b)(2) class-certification analysis. The Second Circuit clarified that while injunctive relief is unavailable, district courts retain authority to grant class-wide declaratory relief in these cases. Accordingly, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Onosamba-Ohindo v. Ball" on Justia Law

Lutz v Froedtert Health, Inc.

2026-07-27T12:00:46-08:00

The plaintiff worked as a Sterile Processing Technician for the defendant, a health system, and was compensated with a base hourly wage, shift differentials, weekend differentials, extra pay for additional hours, and bonuses for on-call time. The dispute centered on how overtime and holiday pay were calculated. The defendant included shift and weekend differentials and extra pay in the regular rate calculation, but excluded holiday premiums. The plaintiff, representing a certified class, alleged that the defendant’s method improperly credited regular-rate compensation toward overtime premiums and wrongly excluded holiday pay from the regular rate, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Wisconsin law. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment to the defendant on all class-wide claims. The court found that the defendant’s approach to overtime calculations—using total remuneration (excluding statutory exclusions) divided by total hours worked, and then applying a 0.5 multiplier to the regular rate for overtime hours—was consistent with federal and state law. The court also concluded that statutory exclusions in § 207(e)(6) of the FLSA permitted the exclusion of holiday premiums from the regular rate. The plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and the case was dismissed with prejudice. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the summary judgment de novo. The court held that the defendant’s methodologies for calculating overtime and excluding holiday premiums complied with both the FLSA and Wisconsin law. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment and denied the plaintiff’s request to certify a question to the Wisconsin Supreme Court regarding holiday pay exclusions. The district court’s decisions granting summary judgment and denying reconsideration were affirmed. View "Lutz v Froedtert Health, Inc." on Justia Law

Toy v. City and County of S.F.

2026-07-24T09:33:01-08:00

Several plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit against a city, challenging the validity of recently adopted water rates. They alleged that the city’s new rates, implemented by a resolution passed in May 2023, violated Proposition 218 by including costs for public fire service, resulting in charges exceeding the actual cost of water service. Prior to filing suit, the plaintiffs submitted claims under the Government Claims Act, which were denied. The plaintiffs sought refunds, declaratory relief, equitable relief, and a writ of mandate. After the city litigated the case for more than a year, including discovery and other pretrial activities, it moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that plaintiffs failed to bring a reverse validation action as required by Government Code section 53759 and Code of Civil Procedure sections 860 et seq. The San Francisco County Superior Court granted the city’s motion, holding that the validation statutes applied, were both mandatory and jurisdictional, and that plaintiffs had not complied with them in two ways: their suit was time-barred and they failed to follow proper notice procedures, including service by publication. On appeal to the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, plaintiffs argued that the city had waived the validation requirements by litigating the case and that their action was timely. The appellate court reviewed the matter de novo and held that the validation statutes were mandatory and jurisdictional for challenges to water rates, and plaintiffs’ failure to comply with statutory procedures—including timely filing and notice by publication—was fatal to their claims. The court rejected arguments regarding waiver, good cause, and belated publication, ultimately affirming the trial court’s order and concluding that the procedural requirements for reverse validation actions must be strictly followed. View "Toy v. City and County of S.F." on Justia Law

Henson v. SCDC

2026-07-22T06:15:53-08:00

Several inmates who were in the custody of either the South Carolina Department of Corrections or the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice filed a lawsuit alleging that prison officials were negligent in failing to implement proper policies, procedures, and staffing, resulting in their being sexually assaulted. The plaintiffs sought to represent a class of all inmates who were victims of nonconsensual sexual battery while in custody from 2012 to the present. They argued that common issues of law and fact predominated, justifying class treatment. The Circuit Court for Dorchester County certified two plaintiff classes—one for each department—based on alleged failures in protection and policy, finding that the requirements for class certification under Rule 23(a) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure were met. The departments appealed the certification order, but the South Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that class certification orders are not immediately appealable. The Supreme Court of South Carolina granted a common-law writ of certiorari to review the circuit court’s class certification. The Supreme Court held that the proposed classes failed to meet the requirements of Rule 23(a), particularly the commonality requirement, because the factual and legal issues, including whether an individual was assaulted, whether negligence occurred, proximate causation, and damages, would require individualized determinations for each claimant. The Court clarified that interlocutory class certification orders are never immediately appealable to the court of appeals and reiterated that class certification requires a qualitative predominance of common issues. The Supreme Court reversed the class certification and remanded the case for discovery and trial solely on the individual claims of the named plaintiffs. View "Henson v. SCDC" on Justia Law

In re Avandia Marketing

2026-07-21T09:00:20-08:00

Several third-party payors who covered prescriptions for Avandia, a diabetes medication manufactured by GlaxoSmithKline LLC, brought a putative class action alleging that the company misrepresented Avandia’s cardiovascular risks and benefits. They claimed these misrepresentations led health care providers to prescribe Avandia more frequently than less expensive alternatives, causing the payors to reimburse for prescriptions that otherwise would not have been issued. The plaintiffs sought class certification on behalf of entities that paid for Avandia prescriptions during a specified period. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania previously reviewed this case. It denied GlaxoSmithKline’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, and the Third Circuit affirmed that denial. Later, the District Court granted summary judgment to GlaxoSmithKline on certain claims, but the Third Circuit reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. Most recently, the District Court granted class certification, finding the class ascertainable and concluding that common issues would predominate regarding causation. It relied on evidence of a common scheme to deceive and statistical analyses showing marketing campaigns increased prescriptions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s class certification. The Third Circuit held that while the class is ascertainable, the record does not yet demonstrate that common questions predominate on causation. The court clarified that plaintiffs in pharmaceutical fraud RICO class actions may use statistical evidence to prove causation, but such evidence must establish causation, not merely correlation. Because the plaintiffs’ statistical evidence failed to satisfy this standard, the Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s class certification and remanded for further fact-finding on predominance under the clarified standard. View "In re Avandia Marketing" on Justia Law

Mata v. Digital Recognition Network, Inc.

2026-07-20T11:32:32-08:00

A private company operating an automated license plate recognition (ALPR) system collected and stored images of license plates and related data, including date, time, and location, from vehicles in public areas in California. The company maintained a written usage and privacy policy, posted on its website, which set out authorized uses of the ALPR information and procedures for access and security. A California resident whose license plate information was collected by this system filed a class action lawsuit, alleging that the company violated the ALPR statute by failing to meaningfully implement or publicly disclose a compliant usage and privacy policy, by failing to enact adequate security measures, and by improperly allowing customers to use the data for unauthorized purposes. The plaintiff claimed harm based on an asserted invasion of privacy due to the collection and storage of his information, but did not allege any unauthorized access, disclosure, or tangible injury. The Superior Court of San Diego County granted summary judgment to the company, finding that the plaintiff lacked standing because he had not suffered actual harm as required by the ALPR statute. The court also denied another class member’s ex parte application to intervene as a substitute plaintiff, partly because the application was untimely and partly because he too failed to demonstrate actual harm resulting from a statutory violation. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed both rulings. The appellate court held that standing to sue under the ALPR statute requires a showing of actual harm arising from a violation of the statute, not merely a statutory violation or a subjective sense of privacy invasion. The court concluded the plaintiff had not suffered actual harm, and therefore lacked standing. The appellate court also found no reversible error in the denial of the motion to intervene, as the movant failed to address all grounds for the trial court’s decision. View "Mata v. Digital Recognition Network, Inc." on Justia Law

In re: The Boeing Company

2026-07-20T10:31:39-08:00

A group of shareholders alleged that a major aerospace manufacturer and several of its former executives made repeated misrepresentations regarding the company’s commitment to safety following two fatal airplane crashes involving one of its aircraft models. The shareholders claimed that these false and misleading statements artificially inflated or maintained the company’s stock price. When a subsequent in-flight safety incident and other disclosures revealed ongoing safety and quality issues, the company’s stock price declined, causing significant losses for the shareholders. The lead plaintiffs, representing a proposed class, sought to recover these losses through a class action lawsuit. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia oversaw the initial proceedings. It denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding the allegations sufficiently detailed, and subsequently certified a class. The district court concluded that the plaintiffs’ proposed damages methodology, which was based on an “out-of-pocket” measure, satisfied the requirements established by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend. The court found that this methodology fit the plaintiffs’ theory of liability and that class-wide issues predominated over individual questions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed whether class certification was proper. The Fourth Circuit found that the plaintiffs did not provide a sufficiently specific damages methodology at the class certification stage, as required by Comcast. The court held that simply describing a general measure of damages was inadequate, and that the plaintiffs needed to commit to a particular methodology and demonstrate its consistency with their liability theory. Because the district court did not conduct the rigorous analysis required and relied on inadequate proof, the Fourth Circuit reversed the class certification order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re: The Boeing Company" on Justia Law

Steidinger v Blackstone Medical Services

2026-07-14T09:31:07-08:00

The plaintiffs in this case are individuals who received marketing text messages and phone calls from a medical services company, promoting its home sleep tests. Despite their efforts to stop the communications—such as replying “STOP” to text messages and registering on the National Do-Not-Call Registry—they continued to receive unwanted texts and calls. They filed a consolidated class action complaint seeking monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief for alleged violations of both the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. § 227, and the Florida Telephone Solicitation Act. The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois reviewed the complaint after the defendant moved to dismiss the TCPA claims. The defendant argued that the relevant TCPA provision, § 227(c)(5), only provides a private right of action for unwanted telephone calls, not text messages. The plaintiffs did not argue that their suit could proceed based on calls alone. The district court agreed with the defendant, found that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the TCPA because their complaint focused on text messages, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim, ultimately dismissing the entire suit. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The main issue was whether § 227(c)(5)’s reference to “telephone calls” includes text messages. The court held that, based on the statute’s text, context, and the ordinary public meaning at the time of enactment, “telephone call” does not encompass text messages. The court also concluded that neither FCC interpretations nor prior decisions involving other TCPA provisions required a different outcome. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Steidinger v Blackstone Medical Services" on Justia Law

KetoNatural Pet Foods v. Hill's Pet Nutrition

2026-07-14T08:02:00-08:00

A startup company that produces grain-free pet food filed a class action lawsuit against a major competitor, a traditional pet food company, alleging violations of the Lanham Act for false advertising. The plaintiff claimed that the larger company, whose products contain grain, conspired with veterinarians and two non-profit organizations to falsely associate grain-free pet food with an increased risk of canine heart disease. The complaint described a coordinated marketing campaign, including statements on the defendant’s website, educational materials for veterinarians, and dissemination of information through blogs, media appearances, and social media. The plaintiff asserted these actions were intended to disparage grain-free products and damage its business. The United States District Court for the District of Kansas dismissed the plaintiff’s claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court found that the plaintiff failed to plausibly allege two required elements for a Lanham Act claim: first, that the challenged statements constituted commercial speech; and second, that the statements were literally false. The court concluded that academic articles and the other challenged statements were not commercial speech, and that the plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged literal falsity. The court also dismissed the related Kansas civil conspiracy claim, as it depended on the Lanham Act violation. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that the district court erred in part. It found that the plaintiff plausibly alleged that some of the traditional pet food company’s website statements and veterinary educational materials were commercial speech and could be literally false under the establishment claim doctrine. However, it affirmed dismissal regarding statements made by veterinarians and non-profits, finding these were not commercial speech. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "KetoNatural Pet Foods v. Hill's Pet Nutrition" on Justia Law

Weissman v Clearview AI, Inc.

2026-07-13T10:00:47-08:00

Clearview AI, Inc. developed technology that collects and analyzes photographs from public websites to create facial recognition profiles, which can reveal personal details about individuals. After a media exposé in January 2020, multiple putative class-action lawsuits were filed against Clearview and related defendants, alleging misuse of biometric data. The cases were consolidated in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, and plaintiffs asserted claims on behalf of a nationwide class and state-specific subclasses (Illinois, California, New York, and Virginia), each based on differing statutory and common law rights. The litigation was extensive, involving motions to dismiss and discovery, before settlement negotiations began. The initial settlement talks failed due to Clearview’s limited financial resources. A second round resulted in a proposed settlement that offered class members a share in Clearview’s future equity, with a larger stake for members of certain state subclasses compared to the nationwide class. No original class representatives endorsed the settlement, prompting lead counsel to appoint new representatives, all from the favored subclasses. The district court, after considering objections, including from members of the nationwide class, approved the settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the objections of nationwide class members. The court found no inherent flaw in the lack of injunctive relief or in the structure of monetary relief (an equity stake in the defendant). However, it held that the settlement was procedurally deficient because no representative of only the nationwide class participated in or approved the allocation of benefits, raising concerns about fair and adequate representation. The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s approval of the settlement and remanded for further proceedings. View "Weissman v Clearview AI, Inc." on Justia Law

Millrace Condo. v. Shapiro Sher etc., PA

2026-07-13T06:08:27-08:00

A group of homeowners and their associations opposed amendments to a planned unit development in Baltimore City, actively communicating their disapproval to the Planning Commission. After the Commission approved the amendments, the developer filed suit against the homeowners and associations, seeking damages and alleging breach of contract and tortious interference. The homeowners and associations, believing the suit to be a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP), moved to dismiss under Maryland’s anti-SLAPP statute, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-807. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City found the lawsuit was a SLAPP and dismissed it, and the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the dismissal, citing evidence that the suit was intended to deter the homeowners from exercising their rights. Two years after the Appellate Court affirmed the SLAPP dismissal, the homeowners and associations filed a class action for malicious use of process against the developer, its law firm, and its attorney. They alleged unique injuries, including emotional distress, intimidation, diminished property values, and burdensome discovery demands. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City dismissed the suit, concluding that the plaintiffs had not pleaded the “special injury” required for malicious use of process. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed, holding that the alleged injuries were typical of litigation and not “special” as required by Maryland law. The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for malicious use of process because they did not plead a special injury. The Court clarified that litigation expenses, temporary property value diminution, emotional distress, and chilling of constitutional rights are not special injuries under Maryland law. The Court also declined to adopt a rule that victims of a SLAPP inherently satisfy the special-injury requirement. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court. View "Millrace Condo. v. Shapiro Sher etc., PA" on Justia Law

Morse v. State

2026-07-10T07:22:00-08:00

A residential subdivision in Black Hawk, South Dakota, known as Hideaway Hills, was constructed atop land with a history of both underground and surface gypsum mining. The State of South Dakota, through the South Dakota Cement Plant Commission, purchased the property, conducted surface mining, and reclaimed the land to pasture before selling it at public auction, while retaining subsurface mineral rights. Subsequent private owners and developers, aware of prior mining activity, developed the land into residential lots. Years later, residents began experiencing foundational problems and sinkholes, which culminated in a significant sinkhole event in 2020, leading to evacuation and property devaluation. After previous lawsuits against various parties were dismissed, a class action was brought in the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Meade County, against the State and related entities. The plaintiffs alleged inverse condemnation, asserting that the State’s reclamation and retention of subsurface rights amounted to a taking or damaging of private property for public use under the South Dakota Constitution. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the State, holding that the plaintiffs’ claims were, in essence, tort claims barred by sovereign immunity. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish a viable inverse condemnation claim because the alleged governmental actions occurred while the State owned the property, and thus did not implicate “private property.” The Court further found that the State’s activities were not for “public use” within the meaning of the state constitution, as the retained mineral rights did not confer a public right of use. The Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for the State. View "Morse v. State" on Justia Law

In Re Axsome Therapeutics, Inc. Stockholder Derivative Litigation

2026-07-09T06:03:34-08:00

Axsome Therapeutics, Inc., a biopharmaceutical company, developed AXS-07, an experimental migraine treatment. Beginning in late 2019, Axsome and its officers made public statements about AXS-07’s regulatory prospects and estimated filing dates for FDA approval, which plaintiffs allege were false and misleading because they omitted significant manufacturing and control deficiencies. Throughout 2020 and 2021, Axsome repeatedly delayed the expected FDA filing date for AXS-07. In April 2022, Axsome disclosed that the FDA had identified unresolved issues, causing its stock price to drop. After these disclosures, Axsome faced related litigation in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, including a securities class action and derivative lawsuits. The Securities Action was ultimately settled in 2026. The federal derivative suits were consolidated and stayed during the securities litigation. Meanwhile, in April and May 2025, plaintiffs in this Delaware action sent Section 220 books and records demands to Axsome, seeking company documents before filing suit. Axsome produced documents in September 2025, and the plaintiffs then filed this derivative lawsuit in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware. The Court of Chancery ruled that the plaintiffs’ claims were untimely under the doctrine of laches, applying Delaware’s three-year statute of limitations by analogy. The court held that the claims accrued by April 22, 2022, at the latest, and that neither the late and informally served Section 220 demands nor the existence of federal litigation tolled or excused the delay. The Court of Chancery concluded that the mere transmission of books and records demands did not suspend the limitations period, found no extraordinary circumstances to rebut the presumption of prejudice, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice as time-barred. View "In Re Axsome Therapeutics, Inc. Stockholder Derivative Litigation" on Justia Law

Diana v. LVNV Funding LLC

2026-07-08T06:07:44-08:00

After defaulting on his credit card debt, the plaintiff’s outstanding balance was sold by the issuing bank to a series of institutional debt buyers. None of these entities were licensed in New Jersey as consumer lenders or sales finance companies at the time they acquired the debt. The last entity in the chain, LVNV Funding LLC, obtained a default judgment against the plaintiff to collect the debt. Subsequently, the plaintiff initiated a separate class action against LVNV and the other assignees, seeking a declaration that the debt purchase was void under the New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act (CFLA) because the buyers lacked the required licenses, and requesting an injunction against further collection efforts. The Superior Court, Law Division, dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice, holding that the CFLA does not provide a private right of action for borrowers to void loan contracts based on alleged licensing violations. While the plaintiff’s appeal was pending, the Appellate Division decided Francavilla v. Absolute Resolutions VI, LLC, which held that the CFLA confers no such private right. Relying on that precedent, the Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal and denied the plaintiff’s cross-motion to vacate the underlying default judgment. The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case to determine whether a borrower may bring a private action under the CFLA to void a loan contract. The Court held that the CFLA does not contain an implied private right of action for borrowers to void loan contracts. The Court reasoned that the legislative history and statutory structure show no intent to permit such private suits, noting that prior statutes expressly granted a private remedy, which was omitted from the CFLA. The voiding provision in the CFLA operates within a penal framework, and absent clear legislative direction, the Court will not infer a private right of action. The judgment of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "Diana v. LVNV Funding LLC" on Justia Law

Mehl v. BP Energy Company

2026-07-06T08:01:58-08:00

A group of Kansas residential natural gas consumers, who purchase gas from local distributors, sued several interstate wholesalers. They alleged that during Winter Storm Uri, the wholesalers manipulated the market and sold natural gas to local distributors at exorbitant prices, leading to unprecedented increases in retail gas prices. The plaintiffs claimed these actions violated the Kansas Consumer Protection Act (KCPA) by forcing local distributors into the high-priced spot market and passing the excessive costs on to consumers. The plaintiffs contended that even though the alleged misconduct occurred in the wholesale market, it had a direct and significant impact on retail customers. The United States District Court for the District of Kansas consolidated five class actions and reviewed the claims. The district court granted the defendants’ joint motion to dismiss, finding that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has exclusive jurisdiction over interstate wholesale natural gas rates under the Natural Gas Act (NGA), and that the plaintiffs’ state-law claims were preempted. The court concluded that the challenged conduct concerned wholesale transactions, which are subject to comprehensive federal regulation. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the NGA field-preempts the plaintiffs’ KCPA claims because the claims are aimed directly at, and challenge, transactions and practices in the interstate wholesale natural gas market, an area reserved for federal oversight. The Tenth Circuit distinguished this case from Supreme Court precedent where state-law claims were not preempted, emphasizing that these plaintiffs’ claims targeted wholesale sales rather than background marketplace conditions. The court concluded that the exclusive jurisdiction of FERC over wholesale sales foreclosed state-law consumer protection claims based on those transactions. View "Mehl v. BP Energy Company" on Justia Law

Phan v. Knight Sacramento SU Inc.

2026-07-02T10:03:11-08:00

The plaintiff was intermittently employed by two car dealerships operated by the defendant corporations from 2022 to 2024. During her employment, she signed several arbitration agreements, including standalone agreements, with both dealerships. These agreements required binding arbitration of “any claims” arising from not only employment but also any other interaction or relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants or their defined third-party beneficiaries. The agreements precluded class actions and included a severance clause for invalid terms. In 2024, the plaintiff filed wage and hour claims both individually and on behalf of a class of current and former employees, seeking a jury trial. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on the agreements, or alternatively, to sever any invalid terms and enforce the remainder. The Superior Court of Sacramento County denied the motion, relying on Cook v. University of Southern California, and found the agreements procedurally and substantively unconscionable, with unconscionable terms permeating the agreements. The court declined to sever the terms and refused to enforce the agreements. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District reviewed the appeal. The court affirmed the trial court’s order, holding that the arbitration agreements were substantively unconscionable due to their overly broad scope extending beyond employment-related claims and lack of mutuality, as they required the plaintiff to arbitrate all claims against third parties without reciprocal obligation from those parties. The court found no sufficient justification for the breadth or the nonmutual terms. It also concluded that the unconscionable terms tainted the central purpose of the agreements, so severance was not appropriate. The judgment was affirmed. View "Phan v. Knight Sacramento SU Inc." on Justia Law

Trump v. Barbara

2026-06-30T07:15:10-08:00

Several parents, some acting on behalf of their children, challenged a presidential executive order issued in January 2025. The order declared that children born in the United States to parents who were unlawfully or temporarily present would not be considered “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States, and therefore would not be entitled to citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment or the Immigration and Nationality Act. The plaintiffs argued that this order violated both the Constitution and the INA, as it denied citizenship to children based solely on the immigration status of their parents at the time of birth. The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire reviewed the case and agreed with the plaintiffs. It provisionally certified a nationwide class of children affected by the order and issued a preliminary injunction, blocking enforcement of the executive order. The government appealed, and the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari before judgment from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The Supreme Court held that children born in the United States to parents who are unlawfully or temporarily present are “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States, and are entitled to citizenship at birth under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause. The Court based its holding on the historical understanding of citizenship rooted in the English common law, the repudiation of Dred Scott v. Sandford, and the precedent established in United States v. Wong Kim Ark. The Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court, upholding birthright citizenship for these children. View "Trump v. Barbara" on Justia Law

Creason v Elanco US Inc.

2026-06-29T10:00:53-08:00

Clayton Creason worked as an engineer for Elanco US from November 2017 to November 2021. During his employment, Elanco offered a standard paid vacation benefit and an optional “vacation buy” program that allowed employees to purchase an extra week of paid leave by accepting a reduction in weekly salary. Creason participated in this program, reducing his pay by approximately $84 per week for the additional vacation week. After resigning, he filed suit under the Indiana Wage Payment Statute, claiming Elanco owed him the amount of the salary reduction, arguing the program required a written assignment of wages with notice of the right to rescind, as specified by Indiana law. The suit was initially filed in Indiana state court, with Creason seeking class certification for similarly situated employees. Elanco removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana under the Class Action Fairness Act. The district court denied Creason’s belated motion to remand, finding his delay in seeking remand unreasonable after substantial progress in federal court. The court then dismissed some claims on the pleadings and granted summary judgment to Elanco on the remaining issues, concluding the vacation buy program did not constitute an assignment of wages and that Elanco’s policies concerning unused pandemic-related vacation hours did not violate Indiana law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court acted within its discretion in denying the remand request due to Creason’s unreasonable delay. On the merits, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that the vacation buy program was not an assignment of wages under Indiana law and that Elanco was not obligated to pay out unused COVID-related vacation hours. The district court’s decision was affirmed. View "Creason v Elanco US Inc." on Justia Law

Huey v. Anavex Life Sciences Corporation

2026-06-26T06:30:03-08:00

An investor in a publicly traded biopharmaceutical company filed a proposed class action against the company and its CEO, alleging securities fraud. The plaintiff claimed that the company misled investors by suggesting that the FDA had approved their methodology for measuring a drug’s efficacy in clinical trials. The alleged misrepresentation was made in a press release that communicated the FDA’s input on the study’s endpoints, but, according to the plaintiff, failed to disclose that the FDA found the methodology unacceptable. When the company later announced it would not use the disputed methodology, the share price initially increased. A decline in the share price occurred over the next two days, during which the stock moved in line with the general market. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the complaint with prejudice, holding that the plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead loss causation, an essential element of a securities fraud claim. The court noted that the share price rose on the day of the corrective disclosure and only declined later, in tandem with the broader market. The district court also denied the plaintiff’s request to amend the complaint, reasoning that amendment would be futile. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court's dismissal de novo. The appellate court agreed that the plaintiff did not plausibly allege loss causation. It explained that when a stock price does not fall immediately after a corrective disclosure, and a later decline coincides with general market losses, a plaintiff must provide a plausible explanation linking the loss to the alleged fraud. Because the plaintiff failed to do so, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and denial of leave to amend. View "Huey v. Anavex Life Sciences Corporation" on Justia Law

Betanco v. Living Spaces Furniture, LLC

2026-06-25T12:32:55-08:00

The plaintiff worked as a delivery driver for a furniture distribution company, transporting goods from California warehouses to customers. The furniture was sourced both within and outside California, including from Mexico, and arrived at the distribution centers before being delivered to customers. The plaintiff signed an independent contractor agreement with a delivery-service provider that included an arbitration clause, and subsequently filed two lawsuits against the furniture company and the delivery company: a class action alleging wage and hour violations, and a separate action under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) for civil penalties. The Alameda County Superior Court reviewed the defendants’ omnibus motion to compel arbitration of all claims and to dismiss the plaintiff’s representative PAGA claims. The trial court found that, although the arbitration agreement was valid and enforceable and the defendants had not waived their right to arbitrate, the plaintiff qualified as a “transportation worker” under section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and was thus exempt from FAA coverage. As a result, state law governed the enforcement of the arbitration agreement. The court ordered certain claims (reimbursement of expenses, wage statement claims, and unfair competition) to arbitration, but allowed wage claims to proceed in court under Labor Code section 229. It denied the motion to dismiss the representative PAGA claims, citing California Supreme Court precedent, and stayed both actions pending arbitration of individual claims. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed these consolidated appeals. The court held that the plaintiff is a transportation worker exempt from the FAA because he played a direct and active role in the interstate movement of goods, even though his deliveries were intrastate and retail in nature. The court affirmed that the plaintiff has standing to pursue non-individual PAGA claims in court, following Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. The order by the trial court was affirmed. View "Betanco v. Living Spaces Furniture, LLC" on Justia Law

Mullin v. Al Otro Lado

2026-06-25T06:45:12-08:00

In 2016, U.S. Customs and Border Protection faced a surge of individuals seeking admission at ports along the U.S.-Mexico border, often exceeding the capacity for safe processing. To manage this, the Department of Homeland Security instituted a “metering” policy that limited the number of people allowed to cross each day, with CBP officials stationed on the U.S. side of the border to prevent entry beyond daily capacity. The policy’s enforcement meant that some asylum seekers remained in Mexico, unable to present themselves for inspection or apply for asylum immediately. A group of asylum seekers and the advocacy organization Al Otro Lado filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, challenging the legality of metering. The District Court certified a class and granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, declaring the government’s denial of inspection and asylum processing to those “in the process of arriving in the United States” to be unlawful. After the government rescinded the metering policy, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, holding that an individual standing in Mexico who encounters a U.S. official at the border “arrives in the United States” for purposes of inspection and asylum eligibility. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision. It held that under the Immigration and Nationality Act, an alien “arrives in the United States” only upon physically crossing the border. The statutory language does not entitle someone standing in Mexico to inspection or to apply for asylum, nor does it require U.S. officials to inspect such individuals. The Court concluded that the statutory provisions at issue do not have extraterritorial effect and that the metering policy, as applied, was not unlawful under the INA. The judgment was reversed and remanded. View "Mullin v. Al Otro Lado" on Justia Law

Hossfeld v Allstate Insurance Co.

2026-06-24T13:00:47-08:00

Robert Hossfeld received twelve telemarketing calls advertising Allstate Insurance products, despite having previously requested that Allstate not contact him. The calls were made by Atlantic Telemarketing Center, which had been subcontracted by Transfer Kings, a company retained by Allstate’s insurance agents, Fleming and Gilmond. Allstate’s internal do-not-call list included Hossfeld’s number months before the calls occurred. Neither Allstate nor its agents were aware that Atlantic was involved in marketing Allstate insurance until after Hossfeld initiated his lawsuit. Hossfeld sued Allstate in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) because Allstate failed to maintain an adequate do-not-call policy and permitted calls to be made to him after his request. He also sought class certification for other similarly affected individuals. The district court denied class certification, finding Hossfeld had not demonstrated that the proposed class was sufficiently numerous. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled in Hossfeld’s favor, holding Allstate vicariously liable for Atlantic’s calls under agency law and awarding treble damages for willful violations. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court affirmed the denial of class certification, agreeing that Hossfeld failed to prove numerosity and impracticability of joinder. However, it reversed the district court’s summary judgment on liability, concluding that Hossfeld failed to show Allstate was liable for Atlantic’s calls under any theory of agency law, including subagency, apparent authority, or ratification. The Seventh Circuit clarified that the willfulness standard under the TCPA requires reckless or knowing conduct, not merely volitional acts. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part, directing judgment for Allstate. View "Hossfeld v Allstate Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Braggs v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections

2026-06-24T10:32:51-08:00

A group of inmates incarcerated within Alabama’s state prison system filed a class action challenging the adequacy of mental health care provided by the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC). The plaintiffs, who suffer from serious mental illnesses, alleged that overcrowding, understaffing, and a series of systemic failures resulted in constitutionally deficient mental health services, contributing to a suicide rate far above the national average. Key alleged deficiencies included improper identification and classification of mental health needs, inadequate treatment plans, insufficient psychotherapy, lack of proper suicide risk management, improper use of segregation for mentally ill inmates, and the imposition of disciplinary sanctions for manifestations of mental illness. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama managed the litigation in multiple phases. After a seven-week bench trial, the court found the ADOC liable under the Eighth Amendment for deliberate indifference to inmates’ serious mental health needs. The court then held extensive remedial proceedings, including further hearings and negotiations, and entered a comprehensive, system-wide remedial injunction. The court made detailed factual findings and, to comply with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), issued particularized findings that the relief ordered was necessary, narrowly drawn, and the least intrusive means to remedy the constitutional violations. The court also adopted a monitoring plan to ensure compliance, involving external experts and a transition to internal oversight. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s liability findings and most aspects of the remedial and monitoring orders, holding that system-wide relief was appropriate given the systemic nature of the violations. However, the appellate court reversed certain remedial provisions where it found the relief exceeded what was necessary to correct the constitutional violations, particularly with respect to suicide-proofing cells and some staffing requirements, and as applied to a women’s facility where violations were not established. The case was remanded for modification in those limited respects. View "Braggs v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

State ex rel. City of St. Louis vs. Whyte

2026-06-23T12:30:06-08:00

A resident of St. Louis brought a class action lawsuit against the city, seeking a refund of fees paid for solid waste services. The plaintiff alleged that these fees were collected under the mistaken belief that the city was providing separate recycling and yard waste collection, which the city either failed to provide or did not provide consistently. The city had implemented a monthly solid waste services fee in 2010, increased it in 2017, and included the fee in residents’ water bills. Although the city at times collected recyclables and yard waste separately, it often did not, and ultimately terminated the program in 2025. The plaintiff argued that the city unjustly retained fees for services it did not render, seeking damages for herself and other residents. The Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis denied the city’s motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff’s claim for “money had and received” could proceed. The city then sought a writ of prohibition from the Missouri Court of Appeals, which was denied. The city subsequently sought relief from the Supreme Court of Missouri. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the city is protected by sovereign immunity and that section 432.070 of the Missouri Revised Statutes bars the claim. The court found that the plaintiff’s allegations did not plead facts that would establish an exception to sovereign immunity for her claim and that no statutory or recognized common law exception applied. The court also concluded that the proprietary function exception did not apply, as solid waste collection is a governmental function. The court made its preliminary writ of prohibition permanent, directing that the plaintiff’s claim be dismissed. View "State ex rel. City of St. Louis vs. Whyte" on Justia Law

Walton v Comfort Sys. USA (Syracuse), Inc.

2026-06-23T10:25:49-08:00

Technicians employed by the defendant performed installation, maintenance, inspection, testing, repair, and replacement of fire alarms, fire sprinklers, and security system equipment under contracts with public entities in New York. These contracts varied in their language regarding the payment of prevailing wages: some disclaimed any obligation to pay prevailing wages, some were silent, and a few expressly based payment on prevailing wage rates. All contracts included a clause providing that any action against the defendant had to be brought within one year of accrual. The plaintiffs brought a proposed class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, alleging, among other claims, that they were owed prevailing wages as third-party beneficiaries of the contracts. The District Court granted the defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment, finding that the breach of contract claims were time-barred by the contractual limitation period, that the contracts did not expressly entitle plaintiffs to prevailing wages, and, in the alternative, that plaintiffs were not covered by the prevailing wage law. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that plaintiffs were covered by Labor Law § 220 but certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the implicit inclusion of prevailing wage promises in public works contracts and the enforceability of shortened contractual limitation periods. The New York Court of Appeals held that the promise to pay prevailing wages is implicit in every public works contract covered by Labor Law § 220, regardless of whether that promise appears in the contract’s text. As a result, employees may bring third-party beneficiary breach of contract claims to enforce the prevailing wage requirement. The Court further held that contractual agreements to shorten the statute of limitations for such claims are unenforceable. The Court answered the first certified question in the affirmative and the second in the negative. View "Walton v Comfort Sys. USA (Syracuse), Inc." on Justia Law

COCOM V. ABM AVIATION, INC.

2026-06-23T08:01:19-08:00

Robert Cocom, a former airport janitor, brought a putative class action against his previous employer, ABM Aviation, Inc., alleging wage and hour violations. When he was hired, Cocom signed a Mutual Arbitration Agreement (MAA) requiring employment-related disputes to be resolved through arbitration. The MAA included waivers of class, collective, and representative actions, as well as a provision stating that arbitration awards would not have preclusive or precedential effect in other proceedings. Cocom’s lawsuit was originally filed in state court but was removed to federal court by ABM, which then moved to compel arbitration and strike the class claims. The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied ABM’s motion, finding the arbitration agreement both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The court relied heavily on the California Court of Appeal’s decision in Cook v. University of Southern California, interpreting the MAA as having an overly broad scope, indefinite duration, and lack of mutuality, and concluding that certain waivers violated California law. Finding multiple provisions unconscionable, the district court declined to sever them and refused to enforce the MAA. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the MAA’s provisions were distinguishable from those in Cook, noting that the MAA was limited to employment-related disputes, thereby avoiding the overbreadth, indefinite duration, and mutuality issues identified in Cook. The Ninth Circuit also found that any potentially unconscionable waivers (such as those related to representative actions or public injunctive relief) were severable. The main holding was that the MAA was not substantively unconscionable and should be enforced, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "COCOM V. ABM AVIATION, INC." on Justia Law

Nguyen v. City of L.A.

2026-06-22T11:03:30-08:00

A utility company, Southern California Gas (SoCalGas), entered into a 2022 franchise agreement with the City of Los Angeles, allowing it to install, maintain, and operate its natural gas system under city streets. In exchange, SoCalGas agreed to pay the City a franchise fee equal to 5.5% of its gross receipts from natural gas sales within the City. Of this, 3.5% was passed to SoCalGas customers as a surcharge, which was later approved by the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC). The franchise agreement was adopted after extensive, arm’s-length negotiations and CPUC review. A putative class action was filed by a customer, alleging that the surcharge component of the franchise fee constituted an unlawful tax under article XIII C of the California Constitution because it was not submitted for voter approval. The plaintiff argued the fee should have been apportioned between charges for physical use of city property and charges for the general business privilege, with the latter portion requiring voter approval. The Superior Court for Los Angeles County granted summary judgment for the City, finding the franchise fee, including the surcharge, exempt from voter approval as a charge for the use of local government property under section 1, subdivision (e)(4) of article XIII C. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The Court held that the franchise fee, including the portion passed through as a surcharge, was not a tax within the meaning of article XIII C, section 1, subdivision (e)(4), because it was compensation for the use of city property and not subject to voter approval. The Court further held that the fee did not need to be apportioned or shown to be reasonably related to the value of the franchise, but found that, even if such a requirement existed, the City met it through bona fide negotiations. View "Nguyen v. City of L.A." on Justia Law

Guthrie v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co.

2026-06-22T10:03:33-08:00

Two individuals filed a lawsuit on behalf of themselves and a proposed class, alleging that a life insurance company’s “Trendsetter LB” term life insurance policy misrepresented its premium structure. The plaintiffs argued that policy language stating the annual premium was “excluding riders” and that additional accelerated death benefit riders were included at “no charge” was misleading. They claimed consumers were led to believe these extra benefits were free, when in fact the premium included undisclosed charges for these riders. The plaintiffs did not allege they were denied any promised benefits, but contended the policy failed to break down the cost of its bundled components, allegedly causing consumers to misunderstand their options and overpay compared to a more basic policy. The case began in Alameda County Superior Court. Plaintiffs sought class certification for claims under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL), focusing only on alleged misrepresentations in the policy’s standardized language. The trial court initially found ascertainability and numerosity met, but denied class certification for most claims, ruling that determining liability would require individualized inquiries into what information each customer received from agents or marketing materials. The court certified only a narrow claim regarding compliance with a statutory notice requirement, but later, at plaintiffs’ request, denied certification entirely when they clarified they did not intend to pursue that claim. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court’s denial of class certification. The court held that the policy language was, at best, ambiguous and that resolving liability would depend not just on the form policy language but also on individualized evidence about communications with each purchaser. The court determined that common issues did not predominate and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying certification. The judgment was affirmed. View "Guthrie v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Johnson v. Quest Diagnostics Inc

2026-06-22T09:00:11-08:00

Employees participating in a 401(k) plan offered by their employer, a clinical laboratory company, brought a class action alleging that the plan’s fiduciaries breached their duties under ERISA by retaining two particular investment options: the Fidelity Freedom Funds and the Invesco Global Real Estate Fund. The plaintiffs argued that these funds underperformed compared to alternatives, were riskier, and that the plan’s managers failed to remove them despite subpar performance. They also claimed that internal policy statements required the funds’ removal and that the plan’s managers failed in their duty to monitor investments and breached trust obligations. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey initially denied a motion to dismiss the case, allowing discovery to proceed. After discovery, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that the plan’s fiduciaries had fulfilled their obligations by hiring investment advisors, regularly reviewing investment performance, seeking relevant training, and following up on concerns regarding the challenged funds. The court concluded there was no breach of fiduciary duty or related failures. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, considering all facts and inferences in favor of the plaintiffs. The Third Circuit held that ERISA’s fiduciary standard is process-oriented, not outcome-based. The Court found that the fiduciaries had used a prudent process—hiring advisors, critically assessing their recommendations, meeting with fund managers, and maintaining regular oversight—even if the investments did not always outperform alternatives. The Court further held that internal policy statements were nonbinding and that the fiduciaries did not abuse their discretion. Consequently, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims. View "Johnson v. Quest Diagnostics Inc" on Justia Law

Hall v. Trivest Partners L.P.

2026-06-16T13:00:40-08:00

Several Michigan residents purchased expensive solar-panel systems from a company that promised substantial reductions in their electricity bills. The company’s advertising, prepared in part by entities connected to Trivest Partners, promoted significant savings and government payments, but the plaintiffs experienced little to no reduction in their bills and, in some cases, saw increases. The company, which operated in both Michigan and Florida, later went bankrupt. Alleging fraud and racketeering violations, the plaintiffs brought a civil RICO action and a Michigan Consumer Protection Act claim against Trivest Partners, its affiliates (all Florida entities), and the company founder. In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, the two Florida-based Trivest defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that the civil RICO statute did not allow them to be sued in Michigan, as a court in Florida could exercise jurisdiction over all defendants. The district court denied the motion, holding that several practical factors—including the pending status of the case in Michigan, local counsel, and comparative convenience—favored retaining jurisdiction. The plaintiffs later added additional Trivest-related defendants, also Florida citizens, with the court again finding personal jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b) de novo. The appellate court held that the district court’s reasons, grounded in convenience and practical considerations, were insufficient as a matter of law to satisfy the “ends of justice require” standard under § 1965(b). The Sixth Circuit concluded that interests of convenience alone cannot justify asserting personal jurisdiction over defendants with no minimum contacts to the forum. The court reversed the district court’s order denying dismissal and vacated the order denying the Trivest defendants’ motions to compel arbitration. View "Hall v. Trivest Partners L.P." on Justia Law

Zurbriggen v Twin Hill Acquisition, Inc.

2026-06-16T10:01:02-08:00

American Airlines contracted with a uniform manufacturer to provide new apparel for its employees. After distribution, many employees reported health issues, including skin and respiratory symptoms, allegedly connected to wearing or being near the uniforms. The airline allowed employees to stop wearing the uniforms, ultimately replacing them. Laboratory and government testing found low levels of chemicals in the uniforms but concluded these were unlikely to cause the reported symptoms. Multiple alternative causes were identified, and the scientific evidence did not support the employees' claims. A group of employees sued American Airlines, the manufacturer, and others in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, initially seeking class certification under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). After several amended complaints and significant discovery disputes, the plaintiffs dropped their request for class certification, briefly raising questions about the court’s subject matter jurisdiction under CAFA. They later re-pled their class allegations in a fourth amended complaint, and the district court determined it retained jurisdiction. The defendants moved for summary judgment and to exclude the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses, arguing these experts were essential to prove defect and causation. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court properly retained jurisdiction under CAFA after plaintiffs reasserted class claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the exclusion of the plaintiffs’ experts due to unreliable methodologies. It further held that, without expert evidence, the plaintiffs could not establish a defect or causation under strict or negligent products liability. The court also held that neither the Tweedy doctrine nor res ipsa loquitur provided an evidentiary shortcut under the case facts, since the alleged injuries did not inherently indicate a product defect or negligence. The judgment for the defendants was affirmed. View "Zurbriggen v Twin Hill Acquisition, Inc." on Justia Law

Overby v. Anheuser-Busch, LLC

2026-06-15T11:00:26-08:00

Hourly workers at a brewing company’s Williamsburg, Virginia facility alleged that the company failed to pay them for various pre- and post-shift activities, including donning and doffing personal protective equipment, complying with COVID-19 protocols, attending shift-handoff meetings, and handling tools. The company used an electronic badge system for entry but compensated employees based on scheduled shift hours, not actual time on site. Different employees performed these tasks at different times and locations, with some tasks done at home, some during shift hours, and some on the premises outside shift hours. The company committed to pay for all hours actually worked, provided employees notified management about extra time worked. The plaintiffs filed suit under the Virginia Wage Payment Act, the Virginia Overtime Wage Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act, seeking class certification for wage and hour claims. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia certified the class, finding that common questions predominated, such as whether the company’s policy resulted in uncompensated mandatory work. The district court’s class definition included all hourly employees at the facility within the relevant timeframe, and it denied the company’s motion to decertify the FLSA collective action. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court erred by certifying the class without adequately considering significant variations among employees regarding their pre- and post-shift activities, the timing and location of those activities, and the applicable legal standards over time. The appellate court found that the class definition was overly broad and failed to account for differences among employees. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit vacated the class certification order and remanded for further proceedings, allowing the district court to consider narrower subclasses or to deny certification entirely. The appeal regarding the FLSA collective action was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Overby v. Anheuser-Busch, LLC" on Justia Law

Quinteros v. Harbor Distributing

2026-06-11T12:01:54-08:00

A law firm filed a class action complaint in San Francisco Superior Court on behalf of an employee and similarly situated individuals, alleging wage and hour violations against several beverage distribution companies. This followed the same firm’s earlier, nearly identical class action complaint in Los Angeles County Superior Court, with overlapping claims and parties. The San Francisco action was amended to add claims under the Private Attorneys General Act. After the defense raised concerns about duplicative litigation, the defendants moved to stay the San Francisco case, arguing that the later-filed action was duplicative and should be stayed under the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction. The San Francisco Superior Court found substantial overlap between the two cases and granted the stay. In its tentative ruling, the court identified significant misconduct by the plaintiff’s attorneys, including fabricated legal citations and misrepresentations in their opposition to the motion to stay. The court issued an order to show cause regarding sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 and the attorneys’ ethical duties. The firm’s attorneys and a contract attorney responded, denying intentional misconduct and attributing errors to reliance on the contract attorney’s work and alleged citation-checking issues with legal research software. However, the court found their explanations lacking credibility, emphasized their responsibility as counsel of record, and imposed monetary sanctions jointly and severally against the firm and three attorneys, payable to both the defendants and the court. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the attorneys’ appeal of the sanctions order. The court held that the attorneys had forfeited their procedural challenges by not raising them in the trial court and found no abuse of discretion in imposing sanctions for filing a pleading with fabricated authority and failing to meet ethical and professional obligations. The appellate court affirmed the sanctions order. View "Quinteros v. Harbor Distributing" on Justia Law

Gelis v. BMW of North America LLC

2026-06-11T09:00:11-08:00

Several plaintiffs brought a class action against BMW of North America, alleging the company sold vehicles with defective timing chains. After partial dismissal of initial claims and additional discovery totaling approximately 12,000 pages, the parties reached a settlement resolving the merits of the dispute. However, they could not agree on attorneys’ fees, so a settlement agreement stipulated that class counsel would apply to the court for “reasonable attorneys’ fees” to be paid separately from class relief, with BMW not opposing fees up to $1.5 million and class counsel requesting up to $3.7 million. The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey used the lodestar method to calculate fees, finding the hours and rates reasonable and applying a lodestar multiplier that resulted in a $3.7 million award. BMW appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit previously vacated the fee award, finding the record insufficient to support it and remanding for further proceedings. On remand, class counsel supplemented their billing records and again sought $3.7 million. The district court approved the hours and rates, applied a reduced multiplier, and awarded the same amount. BMW appealed again, challenging the use and calculation of the multiplier and the reasonableness of the hours. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that constraints imposed by the Supreme Court on lodestar multipliers in statutory fee-shifting cases, particularly Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, also apply to contractual fee-shifting arrangements governed by federal law. The court found the district court erred by applying a multiplier without considering Perdue’s “strong presumption” that the unenhanced lodestar is reasonable and by approving excessive hours without sufficient justification. The Third Circuit vacated the fee award and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gelis v. BMW of North America LLC" on Justia Law

Revolinsky v Bayer Corporation

2026-06-10T12:31:15-08:00

This appeal concerns attorney fee allocation following the settlement of multidistrict litigation related to alleged injuries caused by Seresto flea and tick collars. Plaintiffs across the country, including Laura Revolinsky, brought class actions against Bayer and Elanco, claiming the products harmed their pets. Revolinsky’s attorneys sought to have these cases consolidated in New Jersey, while other plaintiffs’ counsel advocated for centralization in Missouri. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ultimately transferred the cases to the Northern District of Illinois, where the district court appointed lead and liaison counsel, but did not appoint Revolinsky’s attorneys to leadership positions. The court entered a case management order requiring counsel to seek advance approval for compensable work and to submit monthly reports; it generally limited compensation to work performed after leadership was appointed, though it allowed lead counsel some discretion to compensate earlier work if it benefited the class. After settlement was reached and a fund established, lead counsel applied for attorney fees, excluding pre-transfer and untimely work by Revolinsky’s attorneys. The district court approved the settlement and fee allocation, and Revolinsky’s attorneys later discovered their compensation was much less than anticipated. They did not timely object to the allocation or procedures. Instead, months after the deadline, they filed a separate motion seeking additional compensation for pre-transfer and untimely work. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed only the denial of this later motion. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the untimely motion because the procedures and deadlines for fee submissions were clear and had been reasonably enforced. The court affirmed the district court’s order, emphasizing that objections to fee allocations must be raised in a timely manner under court-established protocols. View "Revolinsky v Bayer Corporation" on Justia Law

Johnson v Amazon.com Services LLC

2026-06-09T09:03:51-08:00

Two hourly warehouse employees for a large national retailer, on behalf of a putative class, sought compensation for overtime hours spent undergoing mandatory pre-shift COVID-19 health screenings at their workplace during the pandemic. These screenings, lasting roughly 10 to 15 minutes per shift, were required before employees could clock in and begin paid work. The employees asserted that, over time, these unpaid screenings amounted to significant uncompensated overtime in violation of the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (IMWL). The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed their claim, agreeing with the employer’s argument that the IMWL incorporated the federal Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, which excludes preliminary activities, such as pre-shift screenings, from compensable work. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit certified to the Illinois Supreme Court the question of whether the IMWL in fact incorporates these federal exclusions. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the IMWL does not incorporate the Portal-to-Portal Act’s preliminary activities exclusion and that the relevant state regulations define compensable “hours worked” more broadly, including all time an employee is required to be on the employer’s premises. Upon receiving this answer, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the IMWL does not adopt either the preliminary activities exclusion of the Portal-to-Portal Act or the “benefit of the employer” test derived from federal law, except in two specific contexts outlined in state regulations (meal periods and travel). The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these interpretations. View "Johnson v Amazon.com Services LLC" on Justia Law

Premca Extra Income Fund LP v. Angle

2026-06-05T13:30:03-08:00

A robotics company, whose primary product is a well-known robot vacuum, agreed in August 2022 to be acquired by a major online retailer. Over the next eighteen months, the companies sought approval for the merger from regulatory authorities in the United States and Europe. In January 2024, facing significant regulatory obstacles, the parties abandoned the merger. Following this, shareholders of the robotics company, led by an investment fund, brought a securities fraud class action against the company’s CEO and CFO. They alleged that during the merger’s review period, company statements misrepresented or omitted material information regarding the likelihood of regulatory approval, particularly concerning the company’s expectation of approval and the acquirer’s cooperation with regulators. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to identify any actionable material misrepresentation or omission and did not adequately allege scienter (the intent or knowledge of wrongdoing). During the appeal, the robotics company entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy, resulting in its dismissal from the appeal, which continued as to the individual defendants. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It agreed with the district court that the complaint failed to state a claim for most of the statements challenged by the plaintiffs, affirming dismissal as to those. However, the court found that the amended complaint plausibly alleged that an August 24, 2023, proxy statement expressed an opinion about expected regulatory approval while omitting important contrary information regarding European regulatory concerns and the acquirer’s refusal to cooperate. This omission, in the circumstances, was sufficient to state a claim as to that statement. The dismissal was reversed in part and affirmed in part, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Premca Extra Income Fund LP v. Angle" on Justia Law

COFFEY V. FAST EASY OFFER, LLC

2026-06-04T15:01:11-08:00

The plaintiff, an Arizona resident, registered her personal cell phone on the national “do not call” registry in 2004. She alleged that a real estate company, Fast Easy Offer, LLC, and related entities, contacted her through at least six phone calls and two text messages in the fall of 2024. The messages asked if she had given up on selling her property. According to the plaintiff, Fast Easy Offer’s business model involves purchasing homes below market value and remarketing them, and if a home is not purchased, the lead is given to a real estate brokerage, Keller Williams Realty Phoenix, with revenues shared. The plaintiff claimed that the purpose of these communications was to solicit the purchase of real estate brokerage services. The plaintiff filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the communications did not qualify as “telephone solicitations” under the Act and that Keller Williams Realty, Inc. was not vicariously liable. The district court granted the motion, dismissing the complaint with prejudice. The court held that the calls and texts were not telephone solicitations because they did not expressly encourage the purchase of services. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that under the TCPA’s definition, and consistent with Chesbro v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 705 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2012), the plaintiff had adequately pleaded that the messages qualified as telephone solicitations. The court concluded that the purpose of initiation of the calls or messages is determinative, and the plaintiff’s allegations about defendants’ intent sufficed. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "COFFEY V. FAST EASY OFFER, LLC" on Justia Law

Askins v. CRST Expedited, Inc.

2026-06-04T14:03:10-08:00

A trucking company conducted background checks on a job applicant, both before and during his employment, using disclosure and authorization forms. The applicant alleged these forms did not comply with the requirements of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), and initiated a class action on behalf of similarly situated job seekers and employees. He asserted that the company obtained background checks without proper, legally compliant disclosures and authorizations, in violation of federal law. The San Mateo County Superior Court initially certified the class for claims under the FCRA. After the Fifth District Court of Appeal decided *Limon v. Circle K Stores Inc.*, which interpreted the FCRA as requiring plaintiffs to show concrete injury for standing in California courts, the defendant moved to decertify the class, arguing the applicant had not identified any actual harm. The Superior Court agreed, finding that the applicant’s confusion and lack of awareness about the background checks did not amount to concrete injury, and decertified the class. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that California courts are not bound by Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which requires concrete injury in federal courts. The Court interpreted the FCRA’s language and legislative history to mean that statutory damages are available for willful violations, even absent proof of actual harm. It found that a statutory violation alone is sufficient to confer standing in California courts for FCRA claims, and that the applicant’s interest in his statutory rights was adequate. The Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court’s order decertifying the class, holding that proof of actual injury is not required to maintain a class action under the FCRA in California state court. View "Askins v. CRST Expedited, Inc." on Justia Law

Jonathan R. v. Morrisey

2026-06-04T11:00:32-08:00

A group of children in West Virginia’s foster care system filed a class action lawsuit against state officials, alleging systemic failures by the state agencies responsible for their care. The plaintiffs claimed the state’s practices resulted in widespread abuses, neglect, inadequate placements, understaffing, and failure to provide necessary physical and mental health services. They alleged violations of their constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as statutory violations under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. The class action encompassed approximately 6,800 foster children, with additional subclasses for kinship placements, children with disabilities, and those aging out of the system. The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia initially dismissed the case on abstention and mootness grounds, but that decision was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Jonathan R. ex rel. Dixon v. Justice. Upon remand, the district court certified the General Class and ADA Subclass, denied certification of other subclasses, and proceeded with discovery. In February 2025, the district court, acting sua sponte and without notice or briefing, dismissed the case with prejudice for lack of standing, finding that it lacked power under Article III to grant the requested injunctive and declaratory relief and concluding the plaintiffs’ injuries were not redressable. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. It held that federal courts have the authority and duty to remedy systemic constitutional violations, including through comprehensive injunctive relief and declaratory judgments in institutional reform cases. The court found that the plaintiffs’ injuries were sufficiently concrete and ongoing, and that the requested relief was likely to redress those injuries. The district court’s dismissal was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. The Fourth Circuit declined to reassign the case to a new judge and found West Virginia’s cross-appeal on class decertification unreviewable at this stage. View "Jonathan R. v. Morrisey" on Justia Law

Hiller v. Marin Municipal Water Dist.

2026-06-02T14:02:52-08:00

A public agency adopted an ordinance to increase water service rates after following procedural steps, such as conducting a cost-of-service analysis, notifying the public, and holding hearings as required by Proposition 218 of the California Constitution. After adopting the new rates, the agency initiated a validation action in court to confirm the validity of the ordinance, providing notice to interested parties by publication in a local newspaper, as authorized by statute. No one responded to contest the action within the required time, so the court entered default judgment upholding the ordinance. Subsequently, an individual who had previously submitted administrative claims to the agency challenging the rates filed a class action and mandamus lawsuit seeking refunds and declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging violations of Proposition 218 and constitutional rights. The agency responded with a demurrer, arguing that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the prior validation judgment and the statutory scheme requiring such challenges be brought through validation procedures. The Marin County Superior Court agreed, sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend and finding that the plaintiff's opportunity to challenge the rates had been foreclosed by the unchallenged validation judgment. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that under Government Code section 53759 and the related validation statutes, any legal challenge to ordinances adopting water service fees must be brought through specified validation proceedings, including constitutional claims. Since the plaintiff neither intervened in the agency's validation action nor filed a timely reverse validation action, her claims were barred. The court also found that due process was satisfied by the published notice required by statute, and that mandamus proceedings are not exempt from these requirements. The appellate court affirmed the judgment in favor of the agency. View "Hiller v. Marin Municipal Water Dist." on Justia Law