Class Action - Justia Case Law Summaries

Davis v. DC

2026-09-04T07:01:14-08:00

The case arose after the District of Columbia’s Child and Family Services Agency, facing a large budget shortfall in 2010, laid off 115 employees as part of a reduction in force. This included eliminating two support positions and creating a new, hybrid role with fewer positions and different qualification requirements. The agency also terminated additional employees across various divisions based on management assessments. A group of former employees, disproportionately Black, filed a class action lawsuit, alleging that these employment practices had a disparate racial impact in violation of Title VII and D.C. law. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially granted summary judgment to the District, finding that the plaintiffs failed to identify specific employment practices as required for a disparate impact claim. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit revived the disparate impact claims, concluding that the plaintiffs had sufficiently challenged two discrete employment practices. On remand, the district court found the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of disparate impact but again granted summary judgment to the District. The court found the agency’s employment practices were consistent with business necessity and that the plaintiffs failed to propose an adequate alternative practice with less disparate impact. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The court held that, under Title VII, an employer satisfies the business necessity defense if the challenged employment practice reasonably fits with its legitimate interests. Applying this standard, the court found both disputed practices fit legitimate governmental interests in reducing costs while maintaining services. Because the plaintiffs did not identify an equally effective alternative practice with less disparate impact, the appellate court affirmed summary judgment for the District. View "Davis v. DC" on Justia Law

Joyner v. Frontier Airlines

2026-09-01T08:00:59-08:00

Three individuals employed as customer service agents for a ground services provider and an airline at Denver International Airport brought a class action lawsuit asserting violations of Colorado’s wage laws. Their complaint alleged that the employers improperly deducted time for lunch breaks not taken, forced work during rest breaks, failed to pay overtime, and withheld commissions. Each employee’s contract contained a mandatory arbitration clause, which the employers sought to enforce under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and Colorado law. The employees responded that, as transportation workers, their contracts were exempt from the FAA, and further argued that Colorado law voided such arbitration agreements for wage claims. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied the motions to compel arbitration. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court focused narrowly on the specific duties of the three employees, rather than considering the work typically performed by the broader class of customer service agents. It found that the employees “actually and routinely” handled passenger luggage and played a “gatekeeping” role with respect to cargo. On this basis, the court concluded they were transportation workers exempt from the FAA. The district court did not address the request to compel arbitration under Colorado law. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred by defining the relevant class of workers too narrowly—focusing only on the specific employees, rather than the typical duties of the class as a whole, as required by Supreme Court precedent (including Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon). The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order denying the motions to compel arbitration and remanded for further proceedings to properly determine the attributes of the class of workers under the correct legal standard. View "Joyner v. Frontier Airlines" on Justia Law

In re: Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints

2026-08-31T09:00:57-08:00

Plaintiffs, who had donated funds to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, alleged that the Church and its investment subsidiary, Ensign Peak Advisors, Inc., fraudulently induced donations by concealing the true use and accumulation of donated funds. They claimed that the Church misrepresented that tithing would be used for charitable and religious purposes, when instead large portions were invested and used for commercial ventures, such as the development of the City Creek Mall. A key event in the case was the publication of a whistleblower report in December 2019, which was widely reported in national and local media and described how the Church managed and concealed a large investment portfolio. The Church publicly responded, and three other lawsuits were filed by different donors based on similar allegations. After actions were filed in several federal district courts, the cases were consolidated in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. Plaintiffs brought claims for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment, seeking to represent a nationwide class of post-1997 donors. The district court dismissed the consolidated complaint with prejudice, ruling that the claims were untimely under Utah’s three-year statute of limitations for fraud. The court found that the widespread news coverage of the whistleblower report meant that plaintiffs, exercising reasonable diligence, should have discovered the alleged fraud more than three years before filing suit. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred because the whistleblower report and related media coverage provided sufficient public notice to trigger the statute of limitations, and that reasonable diligence would have led to earlier discovery. The court also found no error in the district court’s procedural rulings and denied the request for leave to amend. View "In re: Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints" on Justia Law

Santoro v. Tower Health

2026-08-28T09:00:05-08:00

Two individuals, who were patients of a regional healthcare provider, filed a class action lawsuit alleging that the provider’s website used tracking software to intercept and share users’ personally identifiable health information with a third-party technology company. This software, known as Meta Pixel, collected data such as IP addresses, device identifiers, and details about users’ interactions with the website, transmitting this information to the technology company, which then used it for commercial purposes, including targeted advertising. The healthcare provider also received data analysis from the technology company and was paid for allowing access to this information. The plaintiffs claimed they did not consent to this sharing of their health information. After the claims against the technology company were transferred to another district, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania reviewed several amended complaints against the healthcare provider. The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint with prejudice, concluding that the allegations did not sufficiently specify what personal health information was actually shared and that further amendment would be futile. When the plaintiffs sought reconsideration and submitted a proposed third amended complaint, the District Court denied the motion, citing undue delay because the plaintiffs could have included the new details earlier and had been clearly informed of the deficiencies. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed both orders of the District Court. The Third Circuit held that, although plaintiffs had Article III standing, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the second amended complaint with prejudice or in denying the motion for reconsideration. The appellate court concluded that plaintiffs had sufficient notice of the complaint’s deficiencies after oral argument and did not act promptly to address them, justifying denial of further amendment. View "Santoro v. Tower Health" on Justia Law

Fischer v. XTO Energy

2026-08-28T08:00:46-08:00

A family group brought claims in Oklahoma state court against an energy company, alleging underpayment of oil and gas royalties over several decades. These claims overlapped with those in a separate class action brought by another party against the company and its related entities, also concerning underpayment of royalties. The class action was removed to federal court, where a settlement was reached and approved by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma. The settlement covered claims for a defined period, and included a permanent injunction barring class members from pursuing similar claims. The family did not opt out of the settlement and received compensation under its terms. Later, the energy company sought summary judgment in the family’s original state case, arguing that the federal settlement released the company from liability for claims during the covered period. When summary judgment was denied, the company returned to the federal district court, seeking enforcement of the settlement’s injunction against further pursuit of those claims by the family in state court. The federal court declined to issue a new injunction but found that the family’s ongoing litigation of released claims violated the original injunction. The court ordered the family to either show cause for their violation or agree to abide by the injunction and dismiss the released claims. The family appealed this order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit determined that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over the order. The court held that a post-judgment civil contempt or enforcement order is not final and appealable unless the district court both finds contempt and imposes a specific, unavoidable sanction. Because the district court’s order did neither, and because no alternative grounds for appellate jurisdiction applied, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal. View "Fischer v. XTO Energy" on Justia Law

Lowell v. Lyft, Inc.

2026-08-27T06:00:04-08:00

Two plaintiffs, one individual and one advocacy organization, filed suit against a ridesharing company, alleging discrimination against persons with mobility-related disabilities. They claimed the company violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) by failing to make wheelchair accessible vehicles (WAVs)—that accommodate fixed-frame wheelchairs—available in all regions it operates, instead of only nine cities. The plaintiffs proposed several modifications to the company’s policies and practices to increase WAV availability in Westchester County, New York, and sought class certification for affected residents and visitors. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held a bench trial. After reviewing the evidence, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate either that the rideshare platform’s limited menu constituted a barrier to WAV access or that their proposed modifications would effectively or reasonably achieve WAV transportation in the relevant regions. The court also determined that the evidence did not show the proposed modifications were likely to be effective, and that the defendant’s proof established the modifications would not be reasonable. As a result, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s findings for clear error and considered plaintiffs’ arguments regarding evidentiary burdens and the effectiveness of proposed modifications. The Second Circuit concluded that plaintiffs bore the burden of persuasion as to effectiveness, and only a light burden of production as to reasonableness. The appellate court found no error in the district court’s application of these standards and affirmed the judgment, holding that the plaintiffs failed to show their proposed modifications would effectively provide WAV service in Westchester County. View "Lowell v. Lyft, Inc." on Justia Law

Hickenbottom v. Medical Solutions

2026-08-26T12:01:06-08:00

A healthcare staffing company hired an employee as a travel nurse, requiring him to sign multiple agreements containing arbitration provisions with varying language. When the employee later accepted a temporary assignment at a hospital, he signed an additional agreement incorporating the employer’s most recent arbitration policy. After his assignment ended, the employee filed a class action lawsuit alleging wage and hour violations against the company. The company responded by filing a motion in the Superior Court of San Diego County to compel arbitration, relying on the arbitration provision from the employee handbook. The employee opposed, arguing that the handbook’s provision was superseded by the newer arbitration agreement incorporated into his most recent assignment. The court denied the motion, finding that the company had relied on the wrong agreement. The company then filed a second motion to compel arbitration, this time based on the updated agreement, but failed to provide the affidavit or explanation required by California Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 for renewed motions. The employee objected, contending that the second motion sought the same relief as the first and was subject to section 1008(b), which the company had not satisfied. The Superior Court agreed, ruled it lacked jurisdiction to consider the renewed motion, and denied it. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed whether the trial court properly applied section 1008(b) and whether the second motion was a renewed motion for the same relief. The appellate court held that the company’s second motion sought identical relief as the first—compelling arbitration of the same claims—regardless of which agreement formed the basis. Because the company failed to comply with section 1008(b), the trial court lacked jurisdiction, and the order denying the renewed motion was not appealable. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. View "Hickenbottom v. Medical Solutions" on Justia Law

Dodiya v. Franklin

2026-08-26T11:34:43-08:00

A publicly traded Delaware company specializing in plant-based sweeteners became the subject of a merger transaction led by the controlling stockholder of a major suitor, who was also the father of the company’s CEO. Shortly after becoming interim CEO, the son secretly provided his father’s investment firm with confidential and material nonpublic financial information, including a key valuation report. Over the next several months, the CEO continued to share sensitive company data with his father’s entities. The father’s investment firm then accumulated a significant ownership stake in the company and submitted an offer to acquire it. The board responded by forming a Special Committee and attempting to restrict the CEO’s involvement, but after he refused to sign a confidentiality agreement, he was placed on leave. Despite this, he was later given access to confidential board materials and attended meetings regarding the sale process. The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware reviewed the case after the plaintiff, a stockholder, brought a class action challenging the merger and related conduct. The plaintiff alleged breaches of fiduciary duty, statutory violations under 8 Del. C. § 203, and conversion. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). The court found that the plaintiff had adequately alleged that the board’s process was grossly negligent, noting the board’s failure to adequately wall off the conflicted CEO and its misleading proxy statement to stockholders. As a result, the statutory safe harbors under 8 Del. C. § 144(a)(1) and (a)(2) were unavailable at the pleading stage. The court held that claims could proceed against the CEO and the executive chairman, who had negotiated a lucrative consulting agreement in connection with the merger. It dismissed the remaining directors, finding them disinterested and not alleged to have acted in bad faith. The court also dismissed the statutory and conversion claims, holding that the challenged stockholder vote satisfied Section 203’s requirements and that deficiencies in the proxy statement did not render the merger invalid. View "Dodiya v. Franklin" on Justia Law

PATACSIL V. GOOGLE LLC

2026-08-26T09:00:33-08:00

Google was accused of violating the privacy rights of users in the United States by continuing to track and store their location data even after users had disabled the “Location History” feature on their devices. The lawsuit, brought as a class action on behalf of approximately 247.7 million individuals, consolidated multiple complaints. The parties ultimately negotiated a settlement that included both injunctive relief—requiring Google to alter its practices—and a $62 million fund. This settlement fund was to cover attorneys’ fees, litigation costs, service awards for class representatives, and administrative expenses. The remaining funds were to be distributed to selected nonprofit organizations with a focus on internet privacy, rather than directly to class members. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California, after conducting a fairness hearing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2), overruled objections from certain class members. These objectors argued that it was improper to distribute the settlement fund exclusively through the cy pres doctrine without first attempting a direct distribution to class members. The district court found that a direct distribution was infeasible because the pro rata share for each class member would be minimal (less than 25 cents) and administrative costs would further reduce any recovery. It approved the cy pres distribution, finding the selected nonprofit recipients had a substantial nexus to the class’s privacy interests. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The appellate court held that the district court properly considered the relevant factors under amended Rule 23(e), did not improperly presume the fairness of the settlement, and acted within its discretion in approving a cy pres-only monetary distribution where direct payments were deemed infeasible and not verifiable. The court also found the selection of cy pres recipients appropriate and declined to address new constitutional arguments not presented below. The holding is that cy pres-only distributions are permissible in class settlements when direct distribution is infeasible and the selected recipients have a substantial nexus to the interests of the class. View "PATACSIL V. GOOGLE LLC" on Justia Law

Doe v. Adventist Health System/West

2026-08-24T14:32:20-08:00

Four individuals who were or are patients of a health care system brought a proposed class action against the system, alleging violations of the California Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA) and the California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA). They claimed the health care provider installed web tracking technologies, specifically Meta Pixel and Google Analytics, on its various websites, including a public health risk assessment (HRA) site and a password-protected patient portal. According to the plaintiffs, these tools tracked users’ activities, collected their data—including personally identifiable information, health-related communications, and protected health information—and transmitted it to Meta and Google, who then used the data for advertising purposes. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification in its entirety. The court found that the proposed subclasses—patients who logged into the patient portal and those who submitted HRA forms—were not ascertainable, that individual issues predominated over common ones, and that a class action was not the superior or manageable method. It reasoned that determining whether the tracking technologies’ transmissions constituted “contents” under CIPA or “medical information” under CMIA would require individualized inquiries into each user’s data. The court also concluded plaintiffs had abandoned their CIPA claim under section 632. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appellate court held that the HRA form subclass and the CIPA claim for the patient portal subclass met the requirements for class certification, as key liability questions could be resolved with common proof. However, it affirmed the denial of class certification for the CMIA claim for the patient portal subclass and agreed that plaintiffs forfeited their CIPA section 632 claim. The court found class action treatment was superior and manageable for the certified subclasses. View "Doe v. Adventist Health System/West" on Justia Law

Salvatora v. XTO Energy Inc

2026-08-24T09:00:04-08:00

Six landowners in Western Pennsylvania, believing that XTO Energy, Inc. was underpaying royalties owed under oil and gas leases, brought a class action in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. None of the named plaintiffs’ leases included arbitration clauses, but the proposed class definitions were broad enough to cover leaseholders whose leases did contain arbitration clauses. The plaintiffs sought damages on behalf of themselves and similarly situated landowners. After the suit was filed, the District Court oversaw extensive class discovery and certified classes that included some members whose leases had arbitration clauses. XTO did not assert arbitration as a defense in its answers or move to compel arbitration before class certification or before the expiration of the class opt-out period. It only moved to compel arbitration against those unnamed class members with arbitration clauses after the opt-out period closed. Relying in part on the then-controlling district court decision in Valli v. Avis Budget Rental Car Group, LLC, a Magistrate Judge found that XTO had waived its right to arbitrate by demonstrating a preference for litigation over arbitration, and the District Court adopted that ruling. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s waiver determination de novo as to legal conclusions and for clear error as to factual findings. The Third Circuit held that, under its intervening precedential decision in Valli v. Avis Budget Group, Inc., a defendant does not waive its right to compel arbitration against unnamed class members with arbitration clauses in their leases merely by litigating prior to class certification, where none of the named plaintiffs are subject to arbitration. The court found XTO’s conduct did not constitute an implied waiver. The Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s order denying XTO’s motion to compel arbitration and remanded for further proceedings. View "Salvatora v. XTO Energy Inc" on Justia Law

OPERS v. FHLMC

2026-08-21T11:31:22-08:00

A large public pension fund alleged that a government-sponsored enterprise and three of its senior officers made false and misleading statements regarding the company’s exposure to subprime and Alt-A mortgages during a period preceding the 2008 financial crisis. The pension fund claimed that the company’s public statements and disclosures understated its exposure to high-risk loans, while internal documents and risk assessments suggested a much greater level of risk. It further argued that, when the company’s actual exposure came to light, its stock price fell, resulting in significant losses to shareholders. Previously, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio denied class certification, excluded the pension fund’s expert, and granted summary judgment to the defendants. The court concluded that the pension fund failed to establish reliance due to an inability to show that the company’s stock traded in an efficient market, improperly rejected the fund’s price-maintenance theory of fraud, found insufficient evidence to support loss causation and damages, and determined the defendants did not act with scienter. The court also found no actionable misstatements regarding credit-risk and underwriting standards, and dismissed control-person liability claims after finding no underlying securities violation. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The appellate court held that the pension fund presented sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the company made materially false or misleading statements regarding its subprime and Alt-A exposure, and that issues of scienter and reliance were present. The court determined that the lower court erred in rejecting the price-maintenance theory and improperly excluded the plaintiff’s expert. It also concluded that the fund should be allowed another opportunity to seek class certification and to present evidence of loss causation and damages. The court reinstated the underlying securities fraud and control-person liability claims for further proceedings. View "OPERS v. FHLMC" on Justia Law

Vick v. Vertical Enterprise, LLC

2026-08-20T09:31:38-08:00

After Missouri legalized recreational marijuana in 2022, local governments were permitted to impose an additional sales tax on dispensaries selling recreational marijuana. Dispensaries passed this tax on to their customers. However, the Missouri Supreme Court later ruled that counties could not levy this additional tax on dispensaries located within incorporated areas such as cities or towns. Following this ruling, a class of customers sued several dispensaries, alleging that the dispensaries unlawfully retained the collected county tax and sought restitution. The dispensaries removed the action to the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). The plaintiffs then amended their complaint to limit the class to Missouri citizens and moved to remand the case to state court, arguing that the Local Controversy Exception to CAFA applied. The district court initially found that three of the four required elements for the exception were met but that the class had not sufficiently shown that more than two-thirds of its members were Missouri citizens. After a second amendment explicitly limited the class to Missouri citizens, the district court found all requirements met and remanded the case to state court. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered whether the operative pleading for determining CAFA jurisdiction was the first or second amended complaint. The court, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, held that the most recent amended complaint governs jurisdiction. The Eighth Circuit also agreed that the Local Controversy Exception was satisfied and affirmed the district court’s remand order, holding that federal jurisdiction no longer existed once the class was limited to Missouri citizens. View "Vick v. Vertical Enterprise, LLC" on Justia Law

Toy v. City & County of S.F.

2026-08-19T13:02:43-08:00

Three individuals filed a class action lawsuit against San Francisco, challenging new water rates adopted by the city’s Public Utility Commission in May 2023. The plaintiffs alleged that the new rates violated Proposition 218 of the California Constitution by including costs unrelated to the actual provision of water service, resulting in charges that exceeded the cost of service. Before adopting the new rates, the city provided required notice to ratepayers, including information about a 120-day period for legal challenges under the applicable validation statutes. The plaintiffs sought a refund, declaratory and equitable relief, and a writ of mandate. After the class action was filed, the City litigated the case for over a year. It participated in discovery, case management, and even moved for summary judgment, without initially arguing that the suit was procedurally improper. Eventually, the City moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that plaintiffs’ action was subject to the validation statutes, specifically Government Code section 53759 and Code of Civil Procedure sections 860 et seq., which require reverse validation actions attacking agency matters like water rates to be brought within 120 days and with specific notice by publication to all interested parties. The trial court (San Francisco County Superior Court) agreed with the City, finding the statutes mandatory and jurisdictional, and dismissed the case for failure to comply with the procedural requirements, including timely filing and appropriate notice. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the judgment de novo. The court held that compliance with the validation statutes was mandatory and jurisdictional. Plaintiffs’ failure to file a proper reverse validation action and to provide notice by publication deprived the court of jurisdiction. The court rejected arguments that the City had waived these requirements or that good cause existed for noncompliance. The judgment in favor of the City was affirmed. View "Toy v. City & County of S.F." on Justia Law

In Re: Apellis Pharm., Inc. Securities Litigation

2026-08-19T12:30:04-08:00

Plaintiffs, who were investors in a pharmaceutical company, brought a putative class action alleging securities fraud. The company had developed a drug to treat geographic atrophy, a form of age-related macular degeneration, and conducted two large clinical trials (OAKS and DERBY) before the drug's approval by the FDA. During the class period, company representatives publicly stated that there were no observed cases of retinal vasculitis, a serious eye condition, among trial participants. After the drug's commercialization, new reports emerged of retinal vasculitis in patients treated with the drug, leading to a decline in the company’s stock price and the addition of a warning to the drug’s label. The action was initially filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware and later transferred to the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs argued that the company's statements were misleading half-truths because the clinical trials were not specifically designed to detect retinal vasculitis, and this limitation was not disclosed to investors. The defendants moved to dismiss, contending that the statements were not materially misleading and that there was no sufficient allegation of scienter (intent to defraud). The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted the motion, holding that the omissions were not actionable because the relevant trial protocols and methodologies had been publicly disclosed and disagreements over scientific methodology do not support securities fraud claims. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The court held that the company’s statements were not materially misleading because the information regarding the trial protocols, including when and how retinal vasculitis could be detected, was publicly available. The court concluded that no material misrepresentation or actionable omission had occurred, and thus affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "In Re: Apellis Pharm., Inc. Securities Litigation" on Justia Law

5-Star General Store v. American Express Company

2026-08-19T12:30:03-08:00

A group of small merchants, including a store in Rhode Island, entered into arbitration agreements with a credit card company, which required arbitration of disputes before the American Arbitration Association (AAA). In August 2023, these merchants initiated thousands of arbitration proceedings against the company, challenging certain “swipe-fee” policies that they argued harmed small businesses. A dispute arose over the filing fees that the credit card company owed to the AAA. The AAA administrator determined the applicable fees and repeatedly warned both parties that the arbitrations would be administratively closed if the fees were not paid. The merchants paid their share of the fees, but the credit card company refused to pay, contesting the fee amount. As a result, in late February 2024, the AAA administratively closed the arbitrations. Subsequently, the merchants filed a class action in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, arguing that the company’s refusal to pay arbitration fees constituted a default and waiver of its right to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The credit card company moved to stay the litigation and compel arbitration. The District Court denied the motion, finding that the company had defaulted and waived its arbitration rights by failing to pay the required fees, and rejected the company’s argument that the merchants had acted with unclean hands. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court had the authority to decide whether the company’s conduct amounted to waiver or default under the FAA, and that the company’s deliberate refusal to pay arbitration fees, despite repeated warnings, constituted waiver and default. The First Circuit also found no error in the district court’s rejection of the unclean hands defense. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to stay and compel arbitration. View "5-Star General Store v. American Express Company" on Justia Law

Hamm v. Ochsner-Acadia

2026-08-19T09:30:54-08:00

Support staff who worked at a psychiatric hospital in Louisiana operated by Acadia-affiliated entities allege that, while they were provided with nominal meal breaks, they were functionally required to remain on call due to company policies and ethical obligations. As a result, they claim they were not properly compensated for this time. The plaintiffs, a former nurse supervisor and a former mental health technician, brought suit on behalf of themselves and similarly situated employees. Their claims included violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Louisiana state-law torts, specifically unjust enrichment and conversion. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana certified both an FLSA collective action and a Rule 23(b)(3) class action for the state-law claims. Acadia sought interlocutory review of the class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was presented with Acadia’s appeal challenging both the collective and class certification decisions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the FLSA collective action certification at this stage, as Rule 23(f) provides for interlocutory review only of class certification orders, not collective actions. The court declined Acadia’s request to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction because the legal standards and issues between the FLSA collective and the Rule 23 class were not sufficiently intertwined. Turning to class certification, the Fifth Circuit found no abuse of discretion by the district court. It held that the Rule 23 requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority were satisfied based on the plaintiffs’ “on-call” theory, which presented common questions suitable for classwide adjudication. The court therefore affirmed the district court’s certification of the Rule 23 class, dismissed the appeal regarding the collective action, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hamm v. Ochsner-Acadia" on Justia Law

VERTHELYI V. PENNYMAC MORTGAGE INVESTMENT TRUST

2026-08-19T08:01:25-08:00

A real estate investment trust issued shares governed by corporate charter documents that initially paid fixed dividends but were set to convert to floating rates tied to the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR). The charter provided three fallback options if LIBOR became unavailable. When LIBOR was discontinued, the company determined that the third fallback provision—a fixed rate based on the most recent dividend period—would apply. This decision was announced before the shares were set to convert to floating rates, leading to a decrease in the shares' market value. A shareholder filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, alleging that the company’s failure to convert to SOFR-based floating rates, as selected by the Federal Reserve under the Adjustable Interest Rate (LIBOR) Act, violated California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL). The shareholder claimed that a fixed rate could not serve as a valid “benchmark replacement” under the LIBOR Act. The company moved to dismiss, arguing that the fallback provision was a valid benchmark replacement, thus precluding a UCL claim. The district court denied the motion, finding ambiguity in the statute and relying on legislative history suggesting concern over fixed-rate conversions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order. The Ninth Circuit held that, under the plain text of the LIBOR Act, a “benchmark replacement” may include a fixed dividend rate as provided in the fallback provision, and there is no requirement that it be a floating rate. The court found the fallback provision to be a valid benchmark replacement and concluded that the company’s actions were not “unlawful” or “unfair” under the UCL. The case was remanded for further proceedings on any remaining issues. View "VERTHELYI V. PENNYMAC MORTGAGE INVESTMENT TRUST" on Justia Law

Burnett v. Spring Way Center, LLC

2026-08-19T07:30:59-08:00

A group of Missouri home sellers brought a class action lawsuit in federal court, alleging that the National Association of Realtors (NAR) and several large real estate brokerage firms conspired to inflate buyer-broker commissions through a rule requiring sellers to offer compensation to buyers’ brokers via Multiple Listing Services (MLSs). The plaintiffs claimed this arrangement artificially increased transaction costs for sellers and buyers nationwide due to NAR’s market dominance. The class was initially limited to Missouri, Illinois, and Kansas home sellers using certain MLSs. After a trial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, a jury found the defendants liable for violating antitrust laws and awarded significant damages. While post-trial motions were pending, similar lawsuits emerged across the country. The parties began global settlement negotiations addressing claims from related cases, including those involving different MLSs and trade associations, such as the Real Estate Board of New York (REBNY). The settlement required NAR and others to pay over $1 billion and implement practice changes, including eliminating the contested rule. The settlement class expanded to nearly all U.S. home sellers using any MLS from 2014 to 2024. Following extensive notice and a fairness hearing, the district court certified the nationwide class, approved the settlement as fair under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and addressed all objections, including those from non-appearing objectors. On appeal, several objectors and interested parties challenged the settlement, raising issues about class scope, adequacy, fairness, the inclusion of unrelated claims, attorneys’ fees, due process, and the fairness hearing procedures. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed for abuse of discretion and found that the district court properly applied the relevant legal standards, including Rule 23(e). The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s approval of the nationwide class-action settlement, holding that it was fair, reasonable, and adequate, and that the process satisfied constitutional and procedural requirements. View "Burnett v. Spring Way Center, LLC" on Justia Law

Moore v Club Exploria, LLC

2026-08-18T12:30:47-08:00

The plaintiff received two pre-recorded telemarketing calls from a vacation property company, which he alleged were made without his consent in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. The company had used third-party vendors to conduct a large-scale telemarketing campaign, targeting individuals whose phone numbers had been obtained from opt-in websites. The plaintiff, on behalf of himself and a proposed class, filed suit against the company in April 2019, asserting that these calls violated federal law. In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the defendant engaged in extensive litigation over the course of four years. It filed answers with affirmative defenses, participated in class-related discovery, and litigated several motions, including opposing class certification and filing for summary judgment. Notably, the defendant did not assert arbitration as a defense until after the class was certified and significant litigation had occurred. When it finally raised arbitration—claiming that many class members had agreed to arbitrate through opt-in websites—the district court refused to allow the late amendment to add this defense, finding that it was too late and that the right to arbitrate had been waived. The district court later denied the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, granted summary judgment to the plaintiff and the class, and ordered further settlement negotiations. Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit clarified the appropriate standard of review for orders denying motions to compel arbitration, holding that legal rulings with precedential effect are reviewed de novo, while the ultimate waiver determination is reviewed for clear error. The court further held that a defendant’s conduct prior to class certification is relevant in assessing waiver of the right to arbitrate. Finding no clear error in the district court’s conclusion that the defendant waived its arbitration rights by failing to timely assert them, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment. View "Moore v Club Exploria, LLC" on Justia Law

BIO-LAB, INC. v. TARTT

2026-08-18T04:05:57-08:00

In September 2024, a major fire at the Bio-Lab chemical facility in Rockdale County, Georgia, caused the release of a toxic chemical plume, resulting in an evacuation order for over 17,000 nearby residents. Many local residents subsequently sought medical attention for symptoms related to exposure to hazardous substances, including hydrogen cyanide. A group of affected residents and businesses filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against Bio-Lab and related entities, alleging negligence, trespass, nuisance, and strict liability. However, the plaintiffs did not claim present physical injury; instead, they asserted an increased risk of future disease and sought, among other remedies, an injunction requiring the creation of a defendant-funded medical monitoring program. The defendants moved to dismiss the request for equitable relief, arguing that Georgia law does not permit medical monitoring as a remedy absent allegations of present physical injury. The federal district court, finding Georgia law unclear on this issue, certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Georgia: whether a plaintiff exposed to toxic substances without present physical injury may obtain equitable relief in the form of medical monitoring, and if so, what standard applies. The Supreme Court of Georgia responded that, under Georgia law, the availability of equitable relief depends on whether the plaintiff has suffered a legally cognizable injury and whether that injury meets the established criteria for equitable relief, including the absence of an adequate remedy at law and the imminence of harm. The court declined to decide whether the specific facts of this case warranted such relief, leaving that determination to the district court. Additionally, the court concluded that the precise form and scope of equitable relief in a federal diversity case is likely governed by federal law, not state law. The certified questions were thus answered only in part. View "BIO-LAB, INC. v. TARTT" on Justia Law

Johnson v. Russell Investments Trust Company

2026-08-17T10:02:04-08:00

An employee of Royal Caribbean participated in the company’s retirement plan and invested in a series of target date funds managed by Russell. She, on behalf of a class, alleged that Royal Caribbean, as plan sponsor and fiduciary under ERISA, breached its duty of prudence by selecting and retaining the Russell Target Date Funds (TDFs) instead of alternatives like those from Vanguard or American Funds. The complaint highlighted that the Russell TDFs underperformed their peers and benchmarks, charged higher fees, and had features—such as a particular glidepath and asset allocation—that allegedly made them a poor fit for plan participants. Internal communications from Russell and Royal Caribbean raised concerns about the performance and cost of the Russell TDFs. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment to Royal Caribbean. It reasoned that, in order to prove the investment was objectively imprudent, the plaintiff was required to present “apples-to-apples” comparator evidence—showing the Russell TDFs were worse than another fund with the same investment strategy and risk profile. The district court found that the plaintiff’s comparators, such as the Vanguard and American Funds TDFs, were not proper because they differed in strategy and structure from the Russell funds. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that an ERISA plaintiff is not always required to provide an “apples-to-apples” comparator to establish that an investment was objectively imprudent. The court explained that evidence of objective imprudence can be qualitative or quantitative, and the inquiry is context-specific, depending on all relevant facts and circumstances. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. Russell Investments Trust Company" on Justia Law

RUSOFF V. THE HAPPY GROUP, INC.

2026-08-17T08:01:23-08:00

Two consumers filed a lawsuit against a company that produces and sells eggs, challenging the company’s marketing claims that its hens are “free range” and “pasture raised on over 8 acres.” The plaintiffs alleged that these statements were deceptive because, in their view, the terms “pasture raised” and “free range” have objective meanings set by specific animal welfare certification organizations, and that consumers would expect the eggs to meet those standards. The plaintiffs sought to certify classes of California and New York consumers who purchased the eggs, arguing that the company’s advertising led consumers to pay a premium under false pretenses. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California considered the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. During this process, the court excluded the plaintiffs’ expert’s opinion on the meaning of “pasture raised,” finding the expert’s methodology unreliable under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Without this expert opinion, the district court concluded that the plaintiffs could not show that deception was a common issue capable of classwide resolution, as required for predominance under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). Nonetheless, the court certified the classes, reasoning that common questions remained regarding the materiality of the statements and the calculation of damages. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting class certification. The Ninth Circuit held that, in the absence of admissible expert evidence regarding what consumers understand “pasture raised” to mean, the plaintiffs failed to show that common issues of deception predominated. The court further held that common questions of materiality and damages could not, by themselves, justify class certification when the element of deception was not established on a classwide basis. View "RUSOFF V. THE HAPPY GROUP, INC." on Justia Law

Kaiser v Alcoa USA Corp.

2026-08-14T13:00:55-08:00

An aluminum company had, through various collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), promised certain healthcare benefits to retirees, their spouses, and dependents. The agreements did not specify the duration of these benefits, but the company had been providing lifetime healthcare coverage to individuals who retired before June 1, 1993. In August 2020, the company announced it would transition these pre-1993 retirees to a new health reimbursement arrangement starting January 1, 2021, under which the company reserved the right to terminate benefits at any time. Over 3,000 affected individuals, including the widow of a former employee, challenged this change, alleging that it breached the CBAs and violated federal labor and benefits laws. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana certified a class of affected retirees and their eligible spouses and dependents. After discovery, the court granted summary judgment as to liability in favor of the plaintiffs, relying on judicial estoppel. The court found that the company was barred from arguing that benefits were not vested for life because it had previously taken the opposite position in earlier litigation. As a result, the district court declared that class members were entitled to lifetime healthcare benefits and issued a permanent injunction requiring reinstatement of the prior plan and allowing claims for expenses incurred since January 1, 2021. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s certification of the class under Rule 23(b)(2), finding no abuse of discretion. However, it reversed the grant of summary judgment as to liability. The appellate court concluded that judicial estoppel did not apply because the company’s prior statements in earlier litigation were not clearly inconsistent with its current position. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the merits. View "Kaiser v Alcoa USA Corp." on Justia Law

Hunter v Elanco Animal Health Incorporated

2026-08-14T06:30:47-08:00

The plaintiffs, who purchased securities issued by an animal health company, brought a proposed class action against the company and certain officers and directors. They alleged that the company misled investors by publicly attributing its sales growth to strong end-user demand, when in reality, the growth was artificially created through “channel stuffing”—the practice of pushing excessive inventory onto distributors, thus inflating reported revenues. The company’s alleged conduct took place around the time of major acquisitions and included public statements and SEC filings that, according to the plaintiffs, failed to disclose the channel stuffing and misrepresented the true basis for revenue increases. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana reviewed the plaintiffs’ first amended complaint and dismissed it without prejudice for failure to state a claim, allowing an opportunity to amend. The plaintiffs sought to file a second amended complaint, asserting claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Act of 1933, as well as related “control person” liability provisions. The district court denied leave to amend, deeming further amendment futile, and dismissed the case with prejudice. The court concluded the plaintiffs had not adequately alleged actionable misstatements, scienter (intent to defraud), or loss causation under the heightened pleading standards required by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that, even assuming the statements at issue could be considered materially misleading, the plaintiffs failed to allege facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter. The court also agreed that the claims under the Securities Act sounded in fraud and therefore required particularized pleading, which the plaintiffs had not met. Consequently, all claims were properly dismissed with prejudice. View "Hunter v Elanco Animal Health Incorporated" on Justia Law

Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz

2026-08-13T17:30:03-08:00

A Salvadoran national entered the United States without inspection in 2013 and lived in Massachusetts. In September 2025, he was arrested by immigration authorities during a vehicle stop and placed in removal proceedings, charged as inadmissible for being present without admission or valid documentation. Under longstanding practice, individuals in his situation could seek release from detention on bond while their removal cases were pending. However, in July 2025, the Department of Homeland Security issued guidance, later adopted by the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, that mandatory detention without bond applied to all noncitizens present in the U.S. without admission, shifting the legal framework and increasing the detained population. After his arrest, the individual challenged his detention without a bond hearing by filing a habeas petition in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The district court issued a preliminary injunction, requiring his release or a bond hearing, and later certified a class action for similarly situated noncitizens. The district court ultimately held that the new DHS policy violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), finding that those present in the United States without admission were entitled to bond hearings under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed whether the INA requires mandatory detention without bond for noncitizens present in the country without admission, or if they are eligible for bond hearings. The First Circuit held that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to noncitizens "seeking admission"—that is, those seeking lawful entry at the border—not those already present after unlawful entry. Accordingly, detention and bond eligibility for class members are governed by § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), and the district court’s order was affirmed. View "Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz" on Justia Law

W.M.M. v. Trump

2026-08-13T15:30:29-08:00

Three Venezuelan nationals, alleged by the government to be members of the Tren de Aragua gang, were detained in Texas following a presidential proclamation under the Alien Enemies Act (AEA). This proclamation, issued in March 2025, authorized immediate removal of Venezuelan citizens aged fourteen or older, residing in the United States, who were not naturalized or lawful permanent residents and were identified as members of the gang. The petitioners challenged the proclamation, arguing that it exceeded the President’s authority under the AEA and violated due process rights. They sought class certification and injunctive relief to prevent removal under the AEA. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied temporary restraining orders and class certification. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit initially dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, in A.A.R.P. v. Trump, vacated that dismissal and remanded, instructing the Fifth Circuit to address two issues: whether the petitioners were entitled to a preliminary injunction against removal under the AEA, and whether the notice provided for due process claims was sufficient for the putative class. The Supreme Court also allowed the government to remove the petitioners under other lawful authorities. After remand, the three named petitioners were removed from the United States under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), not the AEA. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that, because the petitioners were no longer in the country and no class had been certified, it was impossible to grant any effectual relief. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot for lack of jurisdiction, declining to substitute new class representatives on appeal but leaving open the possibility for future proceedings in the district court. View "W.M.M. v. Trump" on Justia Law

TURREY V. VERVENT, INC.

2026-08-12T08:01:30-08:00

A group of former students who attended ITT Technical Institute, a for-profit college, brought suit against companies and individuals involved in servicing and collecting on certain private student loans known as the PEAKS loans. After the 2008 financial crisis, ITT, needing to comply with federal regulations limiting reliance on federal funds, established the PEAKS loan program with the backing of Deutsche Bank to generate non-federal revenue. The loans were internally backed by guarantees from ITT, and as default rates rose, ITT concealed the program’s financial troubles from investors and regulators. The PEAKS loans continued to be serviced by Vervent, Inc. and its affiliates, even after ITT’s collapse and bankruptcy in 2016. Students alleged that they were not aware that their loan payments were induced by fraud until after ITT’s public downfall. In the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, the plaintiffs, as a putative class, alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and various state-law claims. The defendants argued that the RICO claims were untimely, asserting that the statute of limitations began when the students received or began paying the loans, and also challenged proximate causation. The district court denied summary judgment on both grounds, finding fact issues precluded judgment as a matter of law. A jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding damages that were trebled under RICO. The district court denied defendants’ post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It held there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the students neither knew nor reasonably should have known of their fraud-based injuries more than four years before suit was filed, so the claims were timely under RICO’s four-year statute of limitations. The court also concluded that defendants did not preserve their proximate cause argument for appeal because they did not properly raise it after trial. The judgment was affirmed. View "TURREY V. VERVENT, INC." on Justia Law

Trimble v. Entrata, Inc.

2026-08-11T10:30:42-08:00

A software company operated an online payment portal used by residents, including the plaintiff, to pay rent for Maryland apartments. Each time the plaintiff paid rent through the portal, she was charged a convenience fee. To complete a transaction, users were required to check a box agreeing to the portal’s hyperlinked terms and conditions, which included an arbitration provision, a clause allowing unilateral changes to the agreement, and a notice provision stating that notices would be posted on the portal. The plaintiff, on behalf of herself and similarly situated individuals, filed a class action, alleging that the company unlawfully acted as an unlicensed collection agency by collecting these fees. After the action was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, the company moved to compel arbitration based on the terms and conditions. The plaintiff opposed, arguing that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable under Maryland law because the company’s ability to unilaterally change the terms without advance notice rendered its promise to arbitrate illusory. The district court agreed, finding that the contract was a browsewrap agreement and that the modification and notice clauses allowed the company to change terms at will without meaningful notice or an opportunity for users to opt out before changes became binding. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that, under Maryland law, the arbitration agreement was unenforceable for lack of consideration because the company’s promise to arbitrate was illusory. The court reasoned that the change-in-terms clause gave the company unfettered discretion to modify the agreement at any time, without advance notice, thus failing to bind the company meaningfully. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Trimble v. Entrata, Inc." on Justia Law

Glover v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Company

2026-08-11T06:30:03-08:00

A group of life insurance policyholders sued Connecticut General Life Insurance Company and The Lincoln National Life Insurance Company, claiming that the companies wrongfully deducted inflated “cost of insurance” charges from the value of their life insurance policies. The lead plaintiff purchased her policy from Connecticut General, which was later administered by Lincoln following a business acquisition. The litigation in Connecticut overlapped with three similar class actions brought in Pennsylvania and New York against Lincoln and related companies, all alleging similar overcharging schemes. After years of litigation, the plaintiffs in the Connecticut case reached a settlement agreement with the defendants. This settlement aimed to resolve not only the Connecticut action but also the related actions in Pennsylvania and New York. Some class members from the related actions objected, arguing that the proposed settlement class failed to meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, specifically the requirement that the claims of the class representatives be “typical” of those of the class. They pointed out that the named plaintiffs had policies directly issued by Connecticut General or Lincoln and could easily establish privity of contract, while many class members had policies issued by other Lincoln affiliates and would struggle to prove such privity. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut rejected these objections, certified the settlement class, approved the settlement, and entered judgment for the plaintiffs. The objectors appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3) was not met, relying on its prior decision in Mazzei v. Money Store, 829 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2016). The court found that the named plaintiffs’ claims were not typical because their ability to prove privity of contract was not shared by a substantial portion of the class. The Second Circuit reversed the class certification, vacated the judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Glover v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Company" on Justia Law

G.T. v Samsung Electronics America, Inc.

2026-08-07T12:00:45-08:00

Several individuals who purchased and used Samsung smartphones and tablets alleged that the preinstalled Samsung Gallery app created and stored face templates by scanning photographs for facial geometry, thereby capturing biometric data. They claimed that Samsung’s proprietary algorithm measured unique facial features, and the resulting face templates were stored locally on their devices. Plaintiffs argued that Samsung controlled the biometric data, since users had no way to disable the facial recognition features, and Samsung’s privacy policy indicated it “may collect” such information. They further contended that Samsung lacked a written policy for retention and destruction of biometric data and failed to provide required disclosures or obtain releases, in violation of the Illinois Biometric Privacy Information Act (“BIPA”). The plaintiffs initially filed their suit in Illinois state court, seeking class certification for all Illinois residents whose biometric data was collected or stored by Samsung. Samsung removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under the Class Action Fairness Act. After several amended complaints and motions to dismiss, the district court ultimately granted Samsung’s third motion to dismiss with prejudice, finding that the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that Samsung possessed or exerted control over the biometric data stored on users’ devices. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The court held that under both Illinois law and BIPA, “possession,” “collection,” and “capture” require a degree of control by the company over the biometric data. Because the plaintiffs’ allegations did not plausibly show that Samsung itself controlled the facial geometry data generated by the app, the Court affirmed the district court’s judgment dismissing the complaint. View "G.T. v Samsung Electronics America, Inc." on Justia Law

Cortez Gomez v Kohl's Corporation

2026-08-03T13:00:55-08:00

The plaintiff purchased a portable speaker from a Wisconsin-based retailer, believing she was receiving a $30 discount off a regular price of $129.99. However, she later discovered that the retailer almost always sold the speaker at the “sale” price of $99.99 and rarely at the higher “regular” price. She claimed she would not have bought the speaker if she had known this, and brought suit on behalf of a proposed nationwide class, alleging the retailer had violated Wisconsin’s Unfair Trade Practices Act by using misleading price comparison advertising. The suit was filed in federal court, invoking the Class Action Fairness Act as the basis for subject matter jurisdiction. The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the plaintiff had not adequately alleged pecuniary loss under Wisconsin law. The court reasoned that, for damages under Wisconsin’s Unfair Trade Practices Act, the plaintiff must plead that the product was defective or worth less than the price paid, or otherwise did not receive the benefit of the bargain. Because the plaintiff did not make such allegations, the court concluded it was legally impossible for her to meet the required amount-in-controversy for class action jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. It found Wisconsin law unclear on whether a consumer who was misled by false price comparison advertising, but received a product worth the purchase price, suffers a pecuniary loss. Noting a split in authority and uncertainty in Wisconsin precedent, the appellate court certified this question to the Wisconsin Supreme Court and stayed further proceedings pending an answer. View "Cortez Gomez v Kohl's Corporation" on Justia Law

Hartmann v. Chudzik

2026-07-31T09:00:12-08:00

Several individuals arrested in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, were detained pending trial after cash bail was set at their preliminary arraignments. At these arraignments, which were conducted via video without counsel present, the Magisterial District Judges allegedly imposed bail without considering the defendants’ ability to pay or other required factors under state law. Because they could not afford bail, the plaintiffs remained incarcerated. They brought a class action against four Magisterial District Judges (in their official capacities), Lancaster County, and the Warden of the county prison, alleging violations of their rights to equal protection, due process, and counsel. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania first dismissed the plaintiffs’ Sixth Amendment claim, holding that the right to counsel attaches at the preliminary arraignment but does not require counsel’s presence at that proceeding, relying on Supreme Court precedent. The District Court later abstained from hearing the equal protection and due process claims under the doctrine established in Younger v. Harris, reasoning that federal intervention would improperly intrude upon ongoing state criminal proceedings and that state courts could address the plaintiffs’ bail-related claims. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed both rulings. The Third Circuit held that Younger abstention was inappropriate because the plaintiffs did not seek to enjoin ongoing state criminal prosecutions but rather challenged procedures ancillary to those prosecutions—specifically, the process by which bail was set. Therefore, the District Court’s abstention was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings on the equal protection and due process claims. However, the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Sixth Amendment claim, holding that the preliminary arraignment under Pennsylvania law is not a “critical stage” requiring the presence of counsel, even though the right to counsel attaches at that point. View "Hartmann v. Chudzik" on Justia Law

Yousefzadeh v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc.

2026-07-30T06:30:03-08:00

Buyers of over-the-counter nasal decongestants containing oral phenylephrine brought numerous class actions against drug manufacturers and retailers, alleging that for years these companies sold and advertised decongestant products they knew to be ineffective. The plaintiffs claimed that scientific studies, particularly since 2016, had shown oral phenylephrine to be no better than a placebo at relieving congestion, yet the companies continued to market their products as effective decongestants and complied with Food and Drug Administration (FDA) labeling requirements. The FDA, despite mounting evidence, did not remove oral phenylephrine’s designation as an effective decongestant under its regulations. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated nearly one hundred class actions and transferred them to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Plaintiffs filed a complaint asserting New York statutory and common-law claims as well as a federal RICO claim. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) expressly preempted the state law claims because the drugs’ labels complied with FDA requirements, and that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the RICO claim. The court also dismissed a Lanham Act claim brought by one pharmacy plaintiff. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the FDCA expressly preempts most of the state law claims because the federal regime requires manufacturers to follow the FDA-approved labeling, but it vacated the dismissal for claims regarding “Maximum Strength” labeling and brand-name drugs approved via the New Drug Application process, remanding those for further proceedings. The court affirmed dismissal of the RICO claim, adopting the indirect purchaser rule, and upheld denial of the pharmacy’s motion for reconsideration regarding its Lanham Act claim. View "Yousefzadeh v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc." on Justia Law

Arterberry v. Peet's Coffee

2026-07-29T12:03:05-08:00

A group of consumers who purchased products from a coffee company’s website filed a class action lawsuit, claiming that the website’s terms and conditions improperly restricted their right to post negative reviews about the company or its products. The website included clauses stating that users could not submit content intended to cause commercial harm or use the company’s trademarks in a way that would disparage the brand. The plaintiffs did not allege that the company ever threatened to enforce these provisions against them or that they experienced any economic harm as a result. In the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the company responded with a demurrer, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim because merely including such provisions in the terms and conditions does not violate California Civil Code section 1670.8 unless there is an attempt to enforce or threaten enforcement of the provision. The court agreed, finding that section 1670.8 only permits a consumer to seek civil penalties when a business attempts to enforce or otherwise penalizes a consumer under such a clause, not merely for including the clause in a contract. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ related claim under the Unfair Competition Law, as no economic harm was alleged. The court denied leave to amend the Civil Code section 1670.8 claim and entered judgment in favor of the company. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the interpretation of section 1670.8. The appellate court held that while non-disparagement clauses in consumer contracts are void and unenforceable, a business can only be held liable for civil penalties if it threatens to enforce or seeks to enforce such a provision or penalizes a consumer for protected speech. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "Arterberry v. Peet's Coffee" on Justia Law

Onosamba-Ohindo v. Ball

2026-07-29T07:00:09-08:00

A noncitizen from the Democratic Republic of the Congo was detained in New York pending removal proceedings and was ordered released on bond, which he could not pay. He then brought a class action and habeas petition on behalf of similarly situated noncitizens, challenging government bond-hearing procedures as violating due process. Specifically, he argued that the procedures wrongly placed the burden of proof on detainees, failed to consider ability to pay, and did not require consideration of alternatives to detention. The United States District Court for the Western District of New York initially certified the class and issued a preliminary injunction requiring changes to bond-hearing procedures, with the government complying for nearly two years. After the Supreme Court decided Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, which held that lower courts lack jurisdiction to issue class-wide injunctive relief under certain immigration statutes, the district court vacated the injunction. It then decertified the class entirely, concluding that neither class-wide injunctive nor declaratory relief was appropriate, and dismissed the case. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in decertifying the class for injunctive relief, as lower courts lack authority for such relief post-Aleman Gonzalez. However, it found that the district court erred by decertifying the class for declaratory relief based on factors irrelevant to the Rule 23(b)(2) class-certification analysis. The Second Circuit clarified that while injunctive relief is unavailable, district courts retain authority to grant class-wide declaratory relief in these cases. Accordingly, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Onosamba-Ohindo v. Ball" on Justia Law

Lutz v Froedtert Health, Inc.

2026-07-27T12:00:46-08:00

The plaintiff worked as a Sterile Processing Technician for the defendant, a health system, and was compensated with a base hourly wage, shift differentials, weekend differentials, extra pay for additional hours, and bonuses for on-call time. The dispute centered on how overtime and holiday pay were calculated. The defendant included shift and weekend differentials and extra pay in the regular rate calculation, but excluded holiday premiums. The plaintiff, representing a certified class, alleged that the defendant’s method improperly credited regular-rate compensation toward overtime premiums and wrongly excluded holiday pay from the regular rate, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Wisconsin law. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment to the defendant on all class-wide claims. The court found that the defendant’s approach to overtime calculations—using total remuneration (excluding statutory exclusions) divided by total hours worked, and then applying a 0.5 multiplier to the regular rate for overtime hours—was consistent with federal and state law. The court also concluded that statutory exclusions in § 207(e)(6) of the FLSA permitted the exclusion of holiday premiums from the regular rate. The plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and the case was dismissed with prejudice. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the summary judgment de novo. The court held that the defendant’s methodologies for calculating overtime and excluding holiday premiums complied with both the FLSA and Wisconsin law. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment and denied the plaintiff’s request to certify a question to the Wisconsin Supreme Court regarding holiday pay exclusions. The district court’s decisions granting summary judgment and denying reconsideration were affirmed. View "Lutz v Froedtert Health, Inc." on Justia Law

Toy v. City and County of S.F.

2026-07-24T09:33:01-08:00

Several plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit against a city, challenging the validity of recently adopted water rates. They alleged that the city’s new rates, implemented by a resolution passed in May 2023, violated Proposition 218 by including costs for public fire service, resulting in charges exceeding the actual cost of water service. Prior to filing suit, the plaintiffs submitted claims under the Government Claims Act, which were denied. The plaintiffs sought refunds, declaratory relief, equitable relief, and a writ of mandate. After the city litigated the case for more than a year, including discovery and other pretrial activities, it moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that plaintiffs failed to bring a reverse validation action as required by Government Code section 53759 and Code of Civil Procedure sections 860 et seq. The San Francisco County Superior Court granted the city’s motion, holding that the validation statutes applied, were both mandatory and jurisdictional, and that plaintiffs had not complied with them in two ways: their suit was time-barred and they failed to follow proper notice procedures, including service by publication. On appeal to the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, plaintiffs argued that the city had waived the validation requirements by litigating the case and that their action was timely. The appellate court reviewed the matter de novo and held that the validation statutes were mandatory and jurisdictional for challenges to water rates, and plaintiffs’ failure to comply with statutory procedures—including timely filing and notice by publication—was fatal to their claims. The court rejected arguments regarding waiver, good cause, and belated publication, ultimately affirming the trial court’s order and concluding that the procedural requirements for reverse validation actions must be strictly followed. View "Toy v. City and County of S.F." on Justia Law

Henson v. SCDC

2026-07-22T06:15:53-08:00

Several inmates who were in the custody of either the South Carolina Department of Corrections or the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice filed a lawsuit alleging that prison officials were negligent in failing to implement proper policies, procedures, and staffing, resulting in their being sexually assaulted. The plaintiffs sought to represent a class of all inmates who were victims of nonconsensual sexual battery while in custody from 2012 to the present. They argued that common issues of law and fact predominated, justifying class treatment. The Circuit Court for Dorchester County certified two plaintiff classes—one for each department—based on alleged failures in protection and policy, finding that the requirements for class certification under Rule 23(a) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure were met. The departments appealed the certification order, but the South Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that class certification orders are not immediately appealable. The Supreme Court of South Carolina granted a common-law writ of certiorari to review the circuit court’s class certification. The Supreme Court held that the proposed classes failed to meet the requirements of Rule 23(a), particularly the commonality requirement, because the factual and legal issues, including whether an individual was assaulted, whether negligence occurred, proximate causation, and damages, would require individualized determinations for each claimant. The Court clarified that interlocutory class certification orders are never immediately appealable to the court of appeals and reiterated that class certification requires a qualitative predominance of common issues. The Supreme Court reversed the class certification and remanded the case for discovery and trial solely on the individual claims of the named plaintiffs. View "Henson v. SCDC" on Justia Law

In re Avandia Marketing

2026-07-21T09:00:20-08:00

Several third-party payors who covered prescriptions for Avandia, a diabetes medication manufactured by GlaxoSmithKline LLC, brought a putative class action alleging that the company misrepresented Avandia’s cardiovascular risks and benefits. They claimed these misrepresentations led health care providers to prescribe Avandia more frequently than less expensive alternatives, causing the payors to reimburse for prescriptions that otherwise would not have been issued. The plaintiffs sought class certification on behalf of entities that paid for Avandia prescriptions during a specified period. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania previously reviewed this case. It denied GlaxoSmithKline’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, and the Third Circuit affirmed that denial. Later, the District Court granted summary judgment to GlaxoSmithKline on certain claims, but the Third Circuit reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. Most recently, the District Court granted class certification, finding the class ascertainable and concluding that common issues would predominate regarding causation. It relied on evidence of a common scheme to deceive and statistical analyses showing marketing campaigns increased prescriptions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s class certification. The Third Circuit held that while the class is ascertainable, the record does not yet demonstrate that common questions predominate on causation. The court clarified that plaintiffs in pharmaceutical fraud RICO class actions may use statistical evidence to prove causation, but such evidence must establish causation, not merely correlation. Because the plaintiffs’ statistical evidence failed to satisfy this standard, the Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s class certification and remanded for further fact-finding on predominance under the clarified standard. View "In re Avandia Marketing" on Justia Law

Mata v. Digital Recognition Network, Inc.

2026-07-20T11:32:32-08:00

A private company operating an automated license plate recognition (ALPR) system collected and stored images of license plates and related data, including date, time, and location, from vehicles in public areas in California. The company maintained a written usage and privacy policy, posted on its website, which set out authorized uses of the ALPR information and procedures for access and security. A California resident whose license plate information was collected by this system filed a class action lawsuit, alleging that the company violated the ALPR statute by failing to meaningfully implement or publicly disclose a compliant usage and privacy policy, by failing to enact adequate security measures, and by improperly allowing customers to use the data for unauthorized purposes. The plaintiff claimed harm based on an asserted invasion of privacy due to the collection and storage of his information, but did not allege any unauthorized access, disclosure, or tangible injury. The Superior Court of San Diego County granted summary judgment to the company, finding that the plaintiff lacked standing because he had not suffered actual harm as required by the ALPR statute. The court also denied another class member’s ex parte application to intervene as a substitute plaintiff, partly because the application was untimely and partly because he too failed to demonstrate actual harm resulting from a statutory violation. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed both rulings. The appellate court held that standing to sue under the ALPR statute requires a showing of actual harm arising from a violation of the statute, not merely a statutory violation or a subjective sense of privacy invasion. The court concluded the plaintiff had not suffered actual harm, and therefore lacked standing. The appellate court also found no reversible error in the denial of the motion to intervene, as the movant failed to address all grounds for the trial court’s decision. View "Mata v. Digital Recognition Network, Inc." on Justia Law

In re: The Boeing Company

2026-07-20T10:31:39-08:00

A group of shareholders alleged that a major aerospace manufacturer and several of its former executives made repeated misrepresentations regarding the company’s commitment to safety following two fatal airplane crashes involving one of its aircraft models. The shareholders claimed that these false and misleading statements artificially inflated or maintained the company’s stock price. When a subsequent in-flight safety incident and other disclosures revealed ongoing safety and quality issues, the company’s stock price declined, causing significant losses for the shareholders. The lead plaintiffs, representing a proposed class, sought to recover these losses through a class action lawsuit. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia oversaw the initial proceedings. It denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding the allegations sufficiently detailed, and subsequently certified a class. The district court concluded that the plaintiffs’ proposed damages methodology, which was based on an “out-of-pocket” measure, satisfied the requirements established by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend. The court found that this methodology fit the plaintiffs’ theory of liability and that class-wide issues predominated over individual questions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed whether class certification was proper. The Fourth Circuit found that the plaintiffs did not provide a sufficiently specific damages methodology at the class certification stage, as required by Comcast. The court held that simply describing a general measure of damages was inadequate, and that the plaintiffs needed to commit to a particular methodology and demonstrate its consistency with their liability theory. Because the district court did not conduct the rigorous analysis required and relied on inadequate proof, the Fourth Circuit reversed the class certification order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re: The Boeing Company" on Justia Law

Steidinger v Blackstone Medical Services

2026-07-14T09:31:07-08:00

The plaintiffs in this case are individuals who received marketing text messages and phone calls from a medical services company, promoting its home sleep tests. Despite their efforts to stop the communications—such as replying “STOP” to text messages and registering on the National Do-Not-Call Registry—they continued to receive unwanted texts and calls. They filed a consolidated class action complaint seeking monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief for alleged violations of both the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. § 227, and the Florida Telephone Solicitation Act. The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois reviewed the complaint after the defendant moved to dismiss the TCPA claims. The defendant argued that the relevant TCPA provision, § 227(c)(5), only provides a private right of action for unwanted telephone calls, not text messages. The plaintiffs did not argue that their suit could proceed based on calls alone. The district court agreed with the defendant, found that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the TCPA because their complaint focused on text messages, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim, ultimately dismissing the entire suit. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The main issue was whether § 227(c)(5)’s reference to “telephone calls” includes text messages. The court held that, based on the statute’s text, context, and the ordinary public meaning at the time of enactment, “telephone call” does not encompass text messages. The court also concluded that neither FCC interpretations nor prior decisions involving other TCPA provisions required a different outcome. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Steidinger v Blackstone Medical Services" on Justia Law

KetoNatural Pet Foods v. Hill's Pet Nutrition

2026-07-14T08:02:00-08:00

A startup company that produces grain-free pet food filed a class action lawsuit against a major competitor, a traditional pet food company, alleging violations of the Lanham Act for false advertising. The plaintiff claimed that the larger company, whose products contain grain, conspired with veterinarians and two non-profit organizations to falsely associate grain-free pet food with an increased risk of canine heart disease. The complaint described a coordinated marketing campaign, including statements on the defendant’s website, educational materials for veterinarians, and dissemination of information through blogs, media appearances, and social media. The plaintiff asserted these actions were intended to disparage grain-free products and damage its business. The United States District Court for the District of Kansas dismissed the plaintiff’s claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court found that the plaintiff failed to plausibly allege two required elements for a Lanham Act claim: first, that the challenged statements constituted commercial speech; and second, that the statements were literally false. The court concluded that academic articles and the other challenged statements were not commercial speech, and that the plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged literal falsity. The court also dismissed the related Kansas civil conspiracy claim, as it depended on the Lanham Act violation. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that the district court erred in part. It found that the plaintiff plausibly alleged that some of the traditional pet food company’s website statements and veterinary educational materials were commercial speech and could be literally false under the establishment claim doctrine. However, it affirmed dismissal regarding statements made by veterinarians and non-profits, finding these were not commercial speech. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "KetoNatural Pet Foods v. Hill's Pet Nutrition" on Justia Law

Weissman v Clearview AI, Inc.

2026-07-13T10:00:47-08:00

Clearview AI, Inc. developed technology that collects and analyzes photographs from public websites to create facial recognition profiles, which can reveal personal details about individuals. After a media exposé in January 2020, multiple putative class-action lawsuits were filed against Clearview and related defendants, alleging misuse of biometric data. The cases were consolidated in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, and plaintiffs asserted claims on behalf of a nationwide class and state-specific subclasses (Illinois, California, New York, and Virginia), each based on differing statutory and common law rights. The litigation was extensive, involving motions to dismiss and discovery, before settlement negotiations began. The initial settlement talks failed due to Clearview’s limited financial resources. A second round resulted in a proposed settlement that offered class members a share in Clearview’s future equity, with a larger stake for members of certain state subclasses compared to the nationwide class. No original class representatives endorsed the settlement, prompting lead counsel to appoint new representatives, all from the favored subclasses. The district court, after considering objections, including from members of the nationwide class, approved the settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the objections of nationwide class members. The court found no inherent flaw in the lack of injunctive relief or in the structure of monetary relief (an equity stake in the defendant). However, it held that the settlement was procedurally deficient because no representative of only the nationwide class participated in or approved the allocation of benefits, raising concerns about fair and adequate representation. The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s approval of the settlement and remanded for further proceedings. View "Weissman v Clearview AI, Inc." on Justia Law

Millrace Condo. v. Shapiro Sher etc., PA

2026-07-13T06:08:27-08:00

A group of homeowners and their associations opposed amendments to a planned unit development in Baltimore City, actively communicating their disapproval to the Planning Commission. After the Commission approved the amendments, the developer filed suit against the homeowners and associations, seeking damages and alleging breach of contract and tortious interference. The homeowners and associations, believing the suit to be a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP), moved to dismiss under Maryland’s anti-SLAPP statute, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-807. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City found the lawsuit was a SLAPP and dismissed it, and the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the dismissal, citing evidence that the suit was intended to deter the homeowners from exercising their rights. Two years after the Appellate Court affirmed the SLAPP dismissal, the homeowners and associations filed a class action for malicious use of process against the developer, its law firm, and its attorney. They alleged unique injuries, including emotional distress, intimidation, diminished property values, and burdensome discovery demands. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City dismissed the suit, concluding that the plaintiffs had not pleaded the “special injury” required for malicious use of process. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed, holding that the alleged injuries were typical of litigation and not “special” as required by Maryland law. The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for malicious use of process because they did not plead a special injury. The Court clarified that litigation expenses, temporary property value diminution, emotional distress, and chilling of constitutional rights are not special injuries under Maryland law. The Court also declined to adopt a rule that victims of a SLAPP inherently satisfy the special-injury requirement. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court. View "Millrace Condo. v. Shapiro Sher etc., PA" on Justia Law

Morse v. State

2026-07-10T07:22:00-08:00

A residential subdivision in Black Hawk, South Dakota, known as Hideaway Hills, was constructed atop land with a history of both underground and surface gypsum mining. The State of South Dakota, through the South Dakota Cement Plant Commission, purchased the property, conducted surface mining, and reclaimed the land to pasture before selling it at public auction, while retaining subsurface mineral rights. Subsequent private owners and developers, aware of prior mining activity, developed the land into residential lots. Years later, residents began experiencing foundational problems and sinkholes, which culminated in a significant sinkhole event in 2020, leading to evacuation and property devaluation. After previous lawsuits against various parties were dismissed, a class action was brought in the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Meade County, against the State and related entities. The plaintiffs alleged inverse condemnation, asserting that the State’s reclamation and retention of subsurface rights amounted to a taking or damaging of private property for public use under the South Dakota Constitution. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the State, holding that the plaintiffs’ claims were, in essence, tort claims barred by sovereign immunity. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish a viable inverse condemnation claim because the alleged governmental actions occurred while the State owned the property, and thus did not implicate “private property.” The Court further found that the State’s activities were not for “public use” within the meaning of the state constitution, as the retained mineral rights did not confer a public right of use. The Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for the State. View "Morse v. State" on Justia Law

In Re Axsome Therapeutics, Inc. Stockholder Derivative Litigation

2026-07-09T06:03:34-08:00

Axsome Therapeutics, Inc., a biopharmaceutical company, developed AXS-07, an experimental migraine treatment. Beginning in late 2019, Axsome and its officers made public statements about AXS-07’s regulatory prospects and estimated filing dates for FDA approval, which plaintiffs allege were false and misleading because they omitted significant manufacturing and control deficiencies. Throughout 2020 and 2021, Axsome repeatedly delayed the expected FDA filing date for AXS-07. In April 2022, Axsome disclosed that the FDA had identified unresolved issues, causing its stock price to drop. After these disclosures, Axsome faced related litigation in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, including a securities class action and derivative lawsuits. The Securities Action was ultimately settled in 2026. The federal derivative suits were consolidated and stayed during the securities litigation. Meanwhile, in April and May 2025, plaintiffs in this Delaware action sent Section 220 books and records demands to Axsome, seeking company documents before filing suit. Axsome produced documents in September 2025, and the plaintiffs then filed this derivative lawsuit in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware. The Court of Chancery ruled that the plaintiffs’ claims were untimely under the doctrine of laches, applying Delaware’s three-year statute of limitations by analogy. The court held that the claims accrued by April 22, 2022, at the latest, and that neither the late and informally served Section 220 demands nor the existence of federal litigation tolled or excused the delay. The Court of Chancery concluded that the mere transmission of books and records demands did not suspend the limitations period, found no extraordinary circumstances to rebut the presumption of prejudice, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice as time-barred. View "In Re Axsome Therapeutics, Inc. Stockholder Derivative Litigation" on Justia Law

Diana v. LVNV Funding LLC

2026-07-08T06:07:44-08:00

After defaulting on his credit card debt, the plaintiff’s outstanding balance was sold by the issuing bank to a series of institutional debt buyers. None of these entities were licensed in New Jersey as consumer lenders or sales finance companies at the time they acquired the debt. The last entity in the chain, LVNV Funding LLC, obtained a default judgment against the plaintiff to collect the debt. Subsequently, the plaintiff initiated a separate class action against LVNV and the other assignees, seeking a declaration that the debt purchase was void under the New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act (CFLA) because the buyers lacked the required licenses, and requesting an injunction against further collection efforts. The Superior Court, Law Division, dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice, holding that the CFLA does not provide a private right of action for borrowers to void loan contracts based on alleged licensing violations. While the plaintiff’s appeal was pending, the Appellate Division decided Francavilla v. Absolute Resolutions VI, LLC, which held that the CFLA confers no such private right. Relying on that precedent, the Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal and denied the plaintiff’s cross-motion to vacate the underlying default judgment. The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case to determine whether a borrower may bring a private action under the CFLA to void a loan contract. The Court held that the CFLA does not contain an implied private right of action for borrowers to void loan contracts. The Court reasoned that the legislative history and statutory structure show no intent to permit such private suits, noting that prior statutes expressly granted a private remedy, which was omitted from the CFLA. The voiding provision in the CFLA operates within a penal framework, and absent clear legislative direction, the Court will not infer a private right of action. The judgment of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "Diana v. LVNV Funding LLC" on Justia Law

Mehl v. BP Energy Company

2026-07-06T08:01:58-08:00

A group of Kansas residential natural gas consumers, who purchase gas from local distributors, sued several interstate wholesalers. They alleged that during Winter Storm Uri, the wholesalers manipulated the market and sold natural gas to local distributors at exorbitant prices, leading to unprecedented increases in retail gas prices. The plaintiffs claimed these actions violated the Kansas Consumer Protection Act (KCPA) by forcing local distributors into the high-priced spot market and passing the excessive costs on to consumers. The plaintiffs contended that even though the alleged misconduct occurred in the wholesale market, it had a direct and significant impact on retail customers. The United States District Court for the District of Kansas consolidated five class actions and reviewed the claims. The district court granted the defendants’ joint motion to dismiss, finding that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has exclusive jurisdiction over interstate wholesale natural gas rates under the Natural Gas Act (NGA), and that the plaintiffs’ state-law claims were preempted. The court concluded that the challenged conduct concerned wholesale transactions, which are subject to comprehensive federal regulation. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the NGA field-preempts the plaintiffs’ KCPA claims because the claims are aimed directly at, and challenge, transactions and practices in the interstate wholesale natural gas market, an area reserved for federal oversight. The Tenth Circuit distinguished this case from Supreme Court precedent where state-law claims were not preempted, emphasizing that these plaintiffs’ claims targeted wholesale sales rather than background marketplace conditions. The court concluded that the exclusive jurisdiction of FERC over wholesale sales foreclosed state-law consumer protection claims based on those transactions. View "Mehl v. BP Energy Company" on Justia Law

Phan v. Knight Sacramento SU Inc.

2026-07-02T10:03:11-08:00

The plaintiff was intermittently employed by two car dealerships operated by the defendant corporations from 2022 to 2024. During her employment, she signed several arbitration agreements, including standalone agreements, with both dealerships. These agreements required binding arbitration of “any claims” arising from not only employment but also any other interaction or relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants or their defined third-party beneficiaries. The agreements precluded class actions and included a severance clause for invalid terms. In 2024, the plaintiff filed wage and hour claims both individually and on behalf of a class of current and former employees, seeking a jury trial. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on the agreements, or alternatively, to sever any invalid terms and enforce the remainder. The Superior Court of Sacramento County denied the motion, relying on Cook v. University of Southern California, and found the agreements procedurally and substantively unconscionable, with unconscionable terms permeating the agreements. The court declined to sever the terms and refused to enforce the agreements. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District reviewed the appeal. The court affirmed the trial court’s order, holding that the arbitration agreements were substantively unconscionable due to their overly broad scope extending beyond employment-related claims and lack of mutuality, as they required the plaintiff to arbitrate all claims against third parties without reciprocal obligation from those parties. The court found no sufficient justification for the breadth or the nonmutual terms. It also concluded that the unconscionable terms tainted the central purpose of the agreements, so severance was not appropriate. The judgment was affirmed. View "Phan v. Knight Sacramento SU Inc." on Justia Law

Trump v. Barbara

2026-06-30T07:15:10-08:00

Several parents, some acting on behalf of their children, challenged a presidential executive order issued in January 2025. The order declared that children born in the United States to parents who were unlawfully or temporarily present would not be considered “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States, and therefore would not be entitled to citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment or the Immigration and Nationality Act. The plaintiffs argued that this order violated both the Constitution and the INA, as it denied citizenship to children based solely on the immigration status of their parents at the time of birth. The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire reviewed the case and agreed with the plaintiffs. It provisionally certified a nationwide class of children affected by the order and issued a preliminary injunction, blocking enforcement of the executive order. The government appealed, and the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari before judgment from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The Supreme Court held that children born in the United States to parents who are unlawfully or temporarily present are “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States, and are entitled to citizenship at birth under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause. The Court based its holding on the historical understanding of citizenship rooted in the English common law, the repudiation of Dred Scott v. Sandford, and the precedent established in United States v. Wong Kim Ark. The Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court, upholding birthright citizenship for these children. View "Trump v. Barbara" on Justia Law

Creason v Elanco US Inc.

2026-06-29T10:00:53-08:00

Clayton Creason worked as an engineer for Elanco US from November 2017 to November 2021. During his employment, Elanco offered a standard paid vacation benefit and an optional “vacation buy” program that allowed employees to purchase an extra week of paid leave by accepting a reduction in weekly salary. Creason participated in this program, reducing his pay by approximately $84 per week for the additional vacation week. After resigning, he filed suit under the Indiana Wage Payment Statute, claiming Elanco owed him the amount of the salary reduction, arguing the program required a written assignment of wages with notice of the right to rescind, as specified by Indiana law. The suit was initially filed in Indiana state court, with Creason seeking class certification for similarly situated employees. Elanco removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana under the Class Action Fairness Act. The district court denied Creason’s belated motion to remand, finding his delay in seeking remand unreasonable after substantial progress in federal court. The court then dismissed some claims on the pleadings and granted summary judgment to Elanco on the remaining issues, concluding the vacation buy program did not constitute an assignment of wages and that Elanco’s policies concerning unused pandemic-related vacation hours did not violate Indiana law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court acted within its discretion in denying the remand request due to Creason’s unreasonable delay. On the merits, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that the vacation buy program was not an assignment of wages under Indiana law and that Elanco was not obligated to pay out unused COVID-related vacation hours. The district court’s decision was affirmed. View "Creason v Elanco US Inc." on Justia Law

Huey v. Anavex Life Sciences Corporation

2026-06-26T06:30:03-08:00

An investor in a publicly traded biopharmaceutical company filed a proposed class action against the company and its CEO, alleging securities fraud. The plaintiff claimed that the company misled investors by suggesting that the FDA had approved their methodology for measuring a drug’s efficacy in clinical trials. The alleged misrepresentation was made in a press release that communicated the FDA’s input on the study’s endpoints, but, according to the plaintiff, failed to disclose that the FDA found the methodology unacceptable. When the company later announced it would not use the disputed methodology, the share price initially increased. A decline in the share price occurred over the next two days, during which the stock moved in line with the general market. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the complaint with prejudice, holding that the plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead loss causation, an essential element of a securities fraud claim. The court noted that the share price rose on the day of the corrective disclosure and only declined later, in tandem with the broader market. The district court also denied the plaintiff’s request to amend the complaint, reasoning that amendment would be futile. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court's dismissal de novo. The appellate court agreed that the plaintiff did not plausibly allege loss causation. It explained that when a stock price does not fall immediately after a corrective disclosure, and a later decline coincides with general market losses, a plaintiff must provide a plausible explanation linking the loss to the alleged fraud. Because the plaintiff failed to do so, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and denial of leave to amend. View "Huey v. Anavex Life Sciences Corporation" on Justia Law

Betanco v. Living Spaces Furniture, LLC

2026-06-25T12:32:55-08:00

The plaintiff worked as a delivery driver for a furniture distribution company, transporting goods from California warehouses to customers. The furniture was sourced both within and outside California, including from Mexico, and arrived at the distribution centers before being delivered to customers. The plaintiff signed an independent contractor agreement with a delivery-service provider that included an arbitration clause, and subsequently filed two lawsuits against the furniture company and the delivery company: a class action alleging wage and hour violations, and a separate action under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) for civil penalties. The Alameda County Superior Court reviewed the defendants’ omnibus motion to compel arbitration of all claims and to dismiss the plaintiff’s representative PAGA claims. The trial court found that, although the arbitration agreement was valid and enforceable and the defendants had not waived their right to arbitrate, the plaintiff qualified as a “transportation worker” under section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and was thus exempt from FAA coverage. As a result, state law governed the enforcement of the arbitration agreement. The court ordered certain claims (reimbursement of expenses, wage statement claims, and unfair competition) to arbitration, but allowed wage claims to proceed in court under Labor Code section 229. It denied the motion to dismiss the representative PAGA claims, citing California Supreme Court precedent, and stayed both actions pending arbitration of individual claims. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed these consolidated appeals. The court held that the plaintiff is a transportation worker exempt from the FAA because he played a direct and active role in the interstate movement of goods, even though his deliveries were intrastate and retail in nature. The court affirmed that the plaintiff has standing to pursue non-individual PAGA claims in court, following Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. The order by the trial court was affirmed. View "Betanco v. Living Spaces Furniture, LLC" on Justia Law

Mullin v. Al Otro Lado

2026-06-25T06:45:12-08:00

In 2016, U.S. Customs and Border Protection faced a surge of individuals seeking admission at ports along the U.S.-Mexico border, often exceeding the capacity for safe processing. To manage this, the Department of Homeland Security instituted a “metering” policy that limited the number of people allowed to cross each day, with CBP officials stationed on the U.S. side of the border to prevent entry beyond daily capacity. The policy’s enforcement meant that some asylum seekers remained in Mexico, unable to present themselves for inspection or apply for asylum immediately. A group of asylum seekers and the advocacy organization Al Otro Lado filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, challenging the legality of metering. The District Court certified a class and granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, declaring the government’s denial of inspection and asylum processing to those “in the process of arriving in the United States” to be unlawful. After the government rescinded the metering policy, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, holding that an individual standing in Mexico who encounters a U.S. official at the border “arrives in the United States” for purposes of inspection and asylum eligibility. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision. It held that under the Immigration and Nationality Act, an alien “arrives in the United States” only upon physically crossing the border. The statutory language does not entitle someone standing in Mexico to inspection or to apply for asylum, nor does it require U.S. officials to inspect such individuals. The Court concluded that the statutory provisions at issue do not have extraterritorial effect and that the metering policy, as applied, was not unlawful under the INA. The judgment was reversed and remanded. View "Mullin v. Al Otro Lado" on Justia Law

Hossfeld v Allstate Insurance Co.

2026-06-24T13:00:47-08:00

Robert Hossfeld received twelve telemarketing calls advertising Allstate Insurance products, despite having previously requested that Allstate not contact him. The calls were made by Atlantic Telemarketing Center, which had been subcontracted by Transfer Kings, a company retained by Allstate’s insurance agents, Fleming and Gilmond. Allstate’s internal do-not-call list included Hossfeld’s number months before the calls occurred. Neither Allstate nor its agents were aware that Atlantic was involved in marketing Allstate insurance until after Hossfeld initiated his lawsuit. Hossfeld sued Allstate in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) because Allstate failed to maintain an adequate do-not-call policy and permitted calls to be made to him after his request. He also sought class certification for other similarly affected individuals. The district court denied class certification, finding Hossfeld had not demonstrated that the proposed class was sufficiently numerous. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled in Hossfeld’s favor, holding Allstate vicariously liable for Atlantic’s calls under agency law and awarding treble damages for willful violations. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court affirmed the denial of class certification, agreeing that Hossfeld failed to prove numerosity and impracticability of joinder. However, it reversed the district court’s summary judgment on liability, concluding that Hossfeld failed to show Allstate was liable for Atlantic’s calls under any theory of agency law, including subagency, apparent authority, or ratification. The Seventh Circuit clarified that the willfulness standard under the TCPA requires reckless or knowing conduct, not merely volitional acts. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part, directing judgment for Allstate. View "Hossfeld v Allstate Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Braggs v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections

2026-06-24T10:32:51-08:00

A group of inmates incarcerated within Alabama’s state prison system filed a class action challenging the adequacy of mental health care provided by the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC). The plaintiffs, who suffer from serious mental illnesses, alleged that overcrowding, understaffing, and a series of systemic failures resulted in constitutionally deficient mental health services, contributing to a suicide rate far above the national average. Key alleged deficiencies included improper identification and classification of mental health needs, inadequate treatment plans, insufficient psychotherapy, lack of proper suicide risk management, improper use of segregation for mentally ill inmates, and the imposition of disciplinary sanctions for manifestations of mental illness. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama managed the litigation in multiple phases. After a seven-week bench trial, the court found the ADOC liable under the Eighth Amendment for deliberate indifference to inmates’ serious mental health needs. The court then held extensive remedial proceedings, including further hearings and negotiations, and entered a comprehensive, system-wide remedial injunction. The court made detailed factual findings and, to comply with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), issued particularized findings that the relief ordered was necessary, narrowly drawn, and the least intrusive means to remedy the constitutional violations. The court also adopted a monitoring plan to ensure compliance, involving external experts and a transition to internal oversight. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s liability findings and most aspects of the remedial and monitoring orders, holding that system-wide relief was appropriate given the systemic nature of the violations. However, the appellate court reversed certain remedial provisions where it found the relief exceeded what was necessary to correct the constitutional violations, particularly with respect to suicide-proofing cells and some staffing requirements, and as applied to a women’s facility where violations were not established. The case was remanded for modification in those limited respects. View "Braggs v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

State ex rel. City of St. Louis vs. Whyte

2026-06-23T12:30:06-08:00

A resident of St. Louis brought a class action lawsuit against the city, seeking a refund of fees paid for solid waste services. The plaintiff alleged that these fees were collected under the mistaken belief that the city was providing separate recycling and yard waste collection, which the city either failed to provide or did not provide consistently. The city had implemented a monthly solid waste services fee in 2010, increased it in 2017, and included the fee in residents’ water bills. Although the city at times collected recyclables and yard waste separately, it often did not, and ultimately terminated the program in 2025. The plaintiff argued that the city unjustly retained fees for services it did not render, seeking damages for herself and other residents. The Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis denied the city’s motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff’s claim for “money had and received” could proceed. The city then sought a writ of prohibition from the Missouri Court of Appeals, which was denied. The city subsequently sought relief from the Supreme Court of Missouri. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the city is protected by sovereign immunity and that section 432.070 of the Missouri Revised Statutes bars the claim. The court found that the plaintiff’s allegations did not plead facts that would establish an exception to sovereign immunity for her claim and that no statutory or recognized common law exception applied. The court also concluded that the proprietary function exception did not apply, as solid waste collection is a governmental function. The court made its preliminary writ of prohibition permanent, directing that the plaintiff’s claim be dismissed. View "State ex rel. City of St. Louis vs. Whyte" on Justia Law

Walton v Comfort Sys. USA (Syracuse), Inc.

2026-06-23T10:25:49-08:00

Technicians employed by the defendant performed installation, maintenance, inspection, testing, repair, and replacement of fire alarms, fire sprinklers, and security system equipment under contracts with public entities in New York. These contracts varied in their language regarding the payment of prevailing wages: some disclaimed any obligation to pay prevailing wages, some were silent, and a few expressly based payment on prevailing wage rates. All contracts included a clause providing that any action against the defendant had to be brought within one year of accrual. The plaintiffs brought a proposed class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, alleging, among other claims, that they were owed prevailing wages as third-party beneficiaries of the contracts. The District Court granted the defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment, finding that the breach of contract claims were time-barred by the contractual limitation period, that the contracts did not expressly entitle plaintiffs to prevailing wages, and, in the alternative, that plaintiffs were not covered by the prevailing wage law. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that plaintiffs were covered by Labor Law § 220 but certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the implicit inclusion of prevailing wage promises in public works contracts and the enforceability of shortened contractual limitation periods. The New York Court of Appeals held that the promise to pay prevailing wages is implicit in every public works contract covered by Labor Law § 220, regardless of whether that promise appears in the contract’s text. As a result, employees may bring third-party beneficiary breach of contract claims to enforce the prevailing wage requirement. The Court further held that contractual agreements to shorten the statute of limitations for such claims are unenforceable. The Court answered the first certified question in the affirmative and the second in the negative. View "Walton v Comfort Sys. USA (Syracuse), Inc." on Justia Law

COCOM V. ABM AVIATION, INC.

2026-06-23T08:01:19-08:00

Robert Cocom, a former airport janitor, brought a putative class action against his previous employer, ABM Aviation, Inc., alleging wage and hour violations. When he was hired, Cocom signed a Mutual Arbitration Agreement (MAA) requiring employment-related disputes to be resolved through arbitration. The MAA included waivers of class, collective, and representative actions, as well as a provision stating that arbitration awards would not have preclusive or precedential effect in other proceedings. Cocom’s lawsuit was originally filed in state court but was removed to federal court by ABM, which then moved to compel arbitration and strike the class claims. The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied ABM’s motion, finding the arbitration agreement both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The court relied heavily on the California Court of Appeal’s decision in Cook v. University of Southern California, interpreting the MAA as having an overly broad scope, indefinite duration, and lack of mutuality, and concluding that certain waivers violated California law. Finding multiple provisions unconscionable, the district court declined to sever them and refused to enforce the MAA. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the MAA’s provisions were distinguishable from those in Cook, noting that the MAA was limited to employment-related disputes, thereby avoiding the overbreadth, indefinite duration, and mutuality issues identified in Cook. The Ninth Circuit also found that any potentially unconscionable waivers (such as those related to representative actions or public injunctive relief) were severable. The main holding was that the MAA was not substantively unconscionable and should be enforced, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "COCOM V. ABM AVIATION, INC." on Justia Law

Nguyen v. City of L.A.

2026-06-22T11:03:30-08:00

A utility company, Southern California Gas (SoCalGas), entered into a 2022 franchise agreement with the City of Los Angeles, allowing it to install, maintain, and operate its natural gas system under city streets. In exchange, SoCalGas agreed to pay the City a franchise fee equal to 5.5% of its gross receipts from natural gas sales within the City. Of this, 3.5% was passed to SoCalGas customers as a surcharge, which was later approved by the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC). The franchise agreement was adopted after extensive, arm’s-length negotiations and CPUC review. A putative class action was filed by a customer, alleging that the surcharge component of the franchise fee constituted an unlawful tax under article XIII C of the California Constitution because it was not submitted for voter approval. The plaintiff argued the fee should have been apportioned between charges for physical use of city property and charges for the general business privilege, with the latter portion requiring voter approval. The Superior Court for Los Angeles County granted summary judgment for the City, finding the franchise fee, including the surcharge, exempt from voter approval as a charge for the use of local government property under section 1, subdivision (e)(4) of article XIII C. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The Court held that the franchise fee, including the portion passed through as a surcharge, was not a tax within the meaning of article XIII C, section 1, subdivision (e)(4), because it was compensation for the use of city property and not subject to voter approval. The Court further held that the fee did not need to be apportioned or shown to be reasonably related to the value of the franchise, but found that, even if such a requirement existed, the City met it through bona fide negotiations. View "Nguyen v. City of L.A." on Justia Law

Guthrie v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co.

2026-06-22T10:03:33-08:00

Two individuals filed a lawsuit on behalf of themselves and a proposed class, alleging that a life insurance company’s “Trendsetter LB” term life insurance policy misrepresented its premium structure. The plaintiffs argued that policy language stating the annual premium was “excluding riders” and that additional accelerated death benefit riders were included at “no charge” was misleading. They claimed consumers were led to believe these extra benefits were free, when in fact the premium included undisclosed charges for these riders. The plaintiffs did not allege they were denied any promised benefits, but contended the policy failed to break down the cost of its bundled components, allegedly causing consumers to misunderstand their options and overpay compared to a more basic policy. The case began in Alameda County Superior Court. Plaintiffs sought class certification for claims under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL), focusing only on alleged misrepresentations in the policy’s standardized language. The trial court initially found ascertainability and numerosity met, but denied class certification for most claims, ruling that determining liability would require individualized inquiries into what information each customer received from agents or marketing materials. The court certified only a narrow claim regarding compliance with a statutory notice requirement, but later, at plaintiffs’ request, denied certification entirely when they clarified they did not intend to pursue that claim. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court’s denial of class certification. The court held that the policy language was, at best, ambiguous and that resolving liability would depend not just on the form policy language but also on individualized evidence about communications with each purchaser. The court determined that common issues did not predominate and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying certification. The judgment was affirmed. View "Guthrie v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Johnson v. Quest Diagnostics Inc

2026-06-22T09:00:11-08:00

Employees participating in a 401(k) plan offered by their employer, a clinical laboratory company, brought a class action alleging that the plan’s fiduciaries breached their duties under ERISA by retaining two particular investment options: the Fidelity Freedom Funds and the Invesco Global Real Estate Fund. The plaintiffs argued that these funds underperformed compared to alternatives, were riskier, and that the plan’s managers failed to remove them despite subpar performance. They also claimed that internal policy statements required the funds’ removal and that the plan’s managers failed in their duty to monitor investments and breached trust obligations. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey initially denied a motion to dismiss the case, allowing discovery to proceed. After discovery, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that the plan’s fiduciaries had fulfilled their obligations by hiring investment advisors, regularly reviewing investment performance, seeking relevant training, and following up on concerns regarding the challenged funds. The court concluded there was no breach of fiduciary duty or related failures. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, considering all facts and inferences in favor of the plaintiffs. The Third Circuit held that ERISA’s fiduciary standard is process-oriented, not outcome-based. The Court found that the fiduciaries had used a prudent process—hiring advisors, critically assessing their recommendations, meeting with fund managers, and maintaining regular oversight—even if the investments did not always outperform alternatives. The Court further held that internal policy statements were nonbinding and that the fiduciaries did not abuse their discretion. Consequently, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims. View "Johnson v. Quest Diagnostics Inc" on Justia Law

Hall v. Trivest Partners L.P.

2026-06-16T13:00:40-08:00

Several Michigan residents purchased expensive solar-panel systems from a company that promised substantial reductions in their electricity bills. The company’s advertising, prepared in part by entities connected to Trivest Partners, promoted significant savings and government payments, but the plaintiffs experienced little to no reduction in their bills and, in some cases, saw increases. The company, which operated in both Michigan and Florida, later went bankrupt. Alleging fraud and racketeering violations, the plaintiffs brought a civil RICO action and a Michigan Consumer Protection Act claim against Trivest Partners, its affiliates (all Florida entities), and the company founder. In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, the two Florida-based Trivest defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that the civil RICO statute did not allow them to be sued in Michigan, as a court in Florida could exercise jurisdiction over all defendants. The district court denied the motion, holding that several practical factors—including the pending status of the case in Michigan, local counsel, and comparative convenience—favored retaining jurisdiction. The plaintiffs later added additional Trivest-related defendants, also Florida citizens, with the court again finding personal jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b) de novo. The appellate court held that the district court’s reasons, grounded in convenience and practical considerations, were insufficient as a matter of law to satisfy the “ends of justice require” standard under § 1965(b). The Sixth Circuit concluded that interests of convenience alone cannot justify asserting personal jurisdiction over defendants with no minimum contacts to the forum. The court reversed the district court’s order denying dismissal and vacated the order denying the Trivest defendants’ motions to compel arbitration. View "Hall v. Trivest Partners L.P." on Justia Law

Zurbriggen v Twin Hill Acquisition, Inc.

2026-06-16T10:01:02-08:00

American Airlines contracted with a uniform manufacturer to provide new apparel for its employees. After distribution, many employees reported health issues, including skin and respiratory symptoms, allegedly connected to wearing or being near the uniforms. The airline allowed employees to stop wearing the uniforms, ultimately replacing them. Laboratory and government testing found low levels of chemicals in the uniforms but concluded these were unlikely to cause the reported symptoms. Multiple alternative causes were identified, and the scientific evidence did not support the employees' claims. A group of employees sued American Airlines, the manufacturer, and others in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, initially seeking class certification under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). After several amended complaints and significant discovery disputes, the plaintiffs dropped their request for class certification, briefly raising questions about the court’s subject matter jurisdiction under CAFA. They later re-pled their class allegations in a fourth amended complaint, and the district court determined it retained jurisdiction. The defendants moved for summary judgment and to exclude the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses, arguing these experts were essential to prove defect and causation. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court properly retained jurisdiction under CAFA after plaintiffs reasserted class claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the exclusion of the plaintiffs’ experts due to unreliable methodologies. It further held that, without expert evidence, the plaintiffs could not establish a defect or causation under strict or negligent products liability. The court also held that neither the Tweedy doctrine nor res ipsa loquitur provided an evidentiary shortcut under the case facts, since the alleged injuries did not inherently indicate a product defect or negligence. The judgment for the defendants was affirmed. View "Zurbriggen v Twin Hill Acquisition, Inc." on Justia Law

Overby v. Anheuser-Busch, LLC

2026-06-15T11:00:26-08:00

Hourly workers at a brewing company’s Williamsburg, Virginia facility alleged that the company failed to pay them for various pre- and post-shift activities, including donning and doffing personal protective equipment, complying with COVID-19 protocols, attending shift-handoff meetings, and handling tools. The company used an electronic badge system for entry but compensated employees based on scheduled shift hours, not actual time on site. Different employees performed these tasks at different times and locations, with some tasks done at home, some during shift hours, and some on the premises outside shift hours. The company committed to pay for all hours actually worked, provided employees notified management about extra time worked. The plaintiffs filed suit under the Virginia Wage Payment Act, the Virginia Overtime Wage Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act, seeking class certification for wage and hour claims. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia certified the class, finding that common questions predominated, such as whether the company’s policy resulted in uncompensated mandatory work. The district court’s class definition included all hourly employees at the facility within the relevant timeframe, and it denied the company’s motion to decertify the FLSA collective action. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court erred by certifying the class without adequately considering significant variations among employees regarding their pre- and post-shift activities, the timing and location of those activities, and the applicable legal standards over time. The appellate court found that the class definition was overly broad and failed to account for differences among employees. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit vacated the class certification order and remanded for further proceedings, allowing the district court to consider narrower subclasses or to deny certification entirely. The appeal regarding the FLSA collective action was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Overby v. Anheuser-Busch, LLC" on Justia Law

Quinteros v. Harbor Distributing

2026-06-11T12:01:54-08:00

A law firm filed a class action complaint in San Francisco Superior Court on behalf of an employee and similarly situated individuals, alleging wage and hour violations against several beverage distribution companies. This followed the same firm’s earlier, nearly identical class action complaint in Los Angeles County Superior Court, with overlapping claims and parties. The San Francisco action was amended to add claims under the Private Attorneys General Act. After the defense raised concerns about duplicative litigation, the defendants moved to stay the San Francisco case, arguing that the later-filed action was duplicative and should be stayed under the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction. The San Francisco Superior Court found substantial overlap between the two cases and granted the stay. In its tentative ruling, the court identified significant misconduct by the plaintiff’s attorneys, including fabricated legal citations and misrepresentations in their opposition to the motion to stay. The court issued an order to show cause regarding sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 and the attorneys’ ethical duties. The firm’s attorneys and a contract attorney responded, denying intentional misconduct and attributing errors to reliance on the contract attorney’s work and alleged citation-checking issues with legal research software. However, the court found their explanations lacking credibility, emphasized their responsibility as counsel of record, and imposed monetary sanctions jointly and severally against the firm and three attorneys, payable to both the defendants and the court. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the attorneys’ appeal of the sanctions order. The court held that the attorneys had forfeited their procedural challenges by not raising them in the trial court and found no abuse of discretion in imposing sanctions for filing a pleading with fabricated authority and failing to meet ethical and professional obligations. The appellate court affirmed the sanctions order. View "Quinteros v. Harbor Distributing" on Justia Law

Gelis v. BMW of North America LLC

2026-06-11T09:00:11-08:00

Several plaintiffs brought a class action against BMW of North America, alleging the company sold vehicles with defective timing chains. After partial dismissal of initial claims and additional discovery totaling approximately 12,000 pages, the parties reached a settlement resolving the merits of the dispute. However, they could not agree on attorneys’ fees, so a settlement agreement stipulated that class counsel would apply to the court for “reasonable attorneys’ fees” to be paid separately from class relief, with BMW not opposing fees up to $1.5 million and class counsel requesting up to $3.7 million. The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey used the lodestar method to calculate fees, finding the hours and rates reasonable and applying a lodestar multiplier that resulted in a $3.7 million award. BMW appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit previously vacated the fee award, finding the record insufficient to support it and remanding for further proceedings. On remand, class counsel supplemented their billing records and again sought $3.7 million. The district court approved the hours and rates, applied a reduced multiplier, and awarded the same amount. BMW appealed again, challenging the use and calculation of the multiplier and the reasonableness of the hours. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that constraints imposed by the Supreme Court on lodestar multipliers in statutory fee-shifting cases, particularly Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, also apply to contractual fee-shifting arrangements governed by federal law. The court found the district court erred by applying a multiplier without considering Perdue’s “strong presumption” that the unenhanced lodestar is reasonable and by approving excessive hours without sufficient justification. The Third Circuit vacated the fee award and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gelis v. BMW of North America LLC" on Justia Law

Revolinsky v Bayer Corporation

2026-06-10T12:31:15-08:00

This appeal concerns attorney fee allocation following the settlement of multidistrict litigation related to alleged injuries caused by Seresto flea and tick collars. Plaintiffs across the country, including Laura Revolinsky, brought class actions against Bayer and Elanco, claiming the products harmed their pets. Revolinsky’s attorneys sought to have these cases consolidated in New Jersey, while other plaintiffs’ counsel advocated for centralization in Missouri. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ultimately transferred the cases to the Northern District of Illinois, where the district court appointed lead and liaison counsel, but did not appoint Revolinsky’s attorneys to leadership positions. The court entered a case management order requiring counsel to seek advance approval for compensable work and to submit monthly reports; it generally limited compensation to work performed after leadership was appointed, though it allowed lead counsel some discretion to compensate earlier work if it benefited the class. After settlement was reached and a fund established, lead counsel applied for attorney fees, excluding pre-transfer and untimely work by Revolinsky’s attorneys. The district court approved the settlement and fee allocation, and Revolinsky’s attorneys later discovered their compensation was much less than anticipated. They did not timely object to the allocation or procedures. Instead, months after the deadline, they filed a separate motion seeking additional compensation for pre-transfer and untimely work. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed only the denial of this later motion. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the untimely motion because the procedures and deadlines for fee submissions were clear and had been reasonably enforced. The court affirmed the district court’s order, emphasizing that objections to fee allocations must be raised in a timely manner under court-established protocols. View "Revolinsky v Bayer Corporation" on Justia Law

Johnson v Amazon.com Services LLC

2026-06-09T09:03:51-08:00

Two hourly warehouse employees for a large national retailer, on behalf of a putative class, sought compensation for overtime hours spent undergoing mandatory pre-shift COVID-19 health screenings at their workplace during the pandemic. These screenings, lasting roughly 10 to 15 minutes per shift, were required before employees could clock in and begin paid work. The employees asserted that, over time, these unpaid screenings amounted to significant uncompensated overtime in violation of the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (IMWL). The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed their claim, agreeing with the employer’s argument that the IMWL incorporated the federal Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, which excludes preliminary activities, such as pre-shift screenings, from compensable work. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit certified to the Illinois Supreme Court the question of whether the IMWL in fact incorporates these federal exclusions. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the IMWL does not incorporate the Portal-to-Portal Act’s preliminary activities exclusion and that the relevant state regulations define compensable “hours worked” more broadly, including all time an employee is required to be on the employer’s premises. Upon receiving this answer, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the IMWL does not adopt either the preliminary activities exclusion of the Portal-to-Portal Act or the “benefit of the employer” test derived from federal law, except in two specific contexts outlined in state regulations (meal periods and travel). The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these interpretations. View "Johnson v Amazon.com Services LLC" on Justia Law

Premca Extra Income Fund LP v. Angle

2026-06-05T13:30:03-08:00

A robotics company, whose primary product is a well-known robot vacuum, agreed in August 2022 to be acquired by a major online retailer. Over the next eighteen months, the companies sought approval for the merger from regulatory authorities in the United States and Europe. In January 2024, facing significant regulatory obstacles, the parties abandoned the merger. Following this, shareholders of the robotics company, led by an investment fund, brought a securities fraud class action against the company’s CEO and CFO. They alleged that during the merger’s review period, company statements misrepresented or omitted material information regarding the likelihood of regulatory approval, particularly concerning the company’s expectation of approval and the acquirer’s cooperation with regulators. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to identify any actionable material misrepresentation or omission and did not adequately allege scienter (the intent or knowledge of wrongdoing). During the appeal, the robotics company entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy, resulting in its dismissal from the appeal, which continued as to the individual defendants. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It agreed with the district court that the complaint failed to state a claim for most of the statements challenged by the plaintiffs, affirming dismissal as to those. However, the court found that the amended complaint plausibly alleged that an August 24, 2023, proxy statement expressed an opinion about expected regulatory approval while omitting important contrary information regarding European regulatory concerns and the acquirer’s refusal to cooperate. This omission, in the circumstances, was sufficient to state a claim as to that statement. The dismissal was reversed in part and affirmed in part, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Premca Extra Income Fund LP v. Angle" on Justia Law

COFFEY V. FAST EASY OFFER, LLC

2026-06-04T15:01:11-08:00

The plaintiff, an Arizona resident, registered her personal cell phone on the national “do not call” registry in 2004. She alleged that a real estate company, Fast Easy Offer, LLC, and related entities, contacted her through at least six phone calls and two text messages in the fall of 2024. The messages asked if she had given up on selling her property. According to the plaintiff, Fast Easy Offer’s business model involves purchasing homes below market value and remarketing them, and if a home is not purchased, the lead is given to a real estate brokerage, Keller Williams Realty Phoenix, with revenues shared. The plaintiff claimed that the purpose of these communications was to solicit the purchase of real estate brokerage services. The plaintiff filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the communications did not qualify as “telephone solicitations” under the Act and that Keller Williams Realty, Inc. was not vicariously liable. The district court granted the motion, dismissing the complaint with prejudice. The court held that the calls and texts were not telephone solicitations because they did not expressly encourage the purchase of services. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that under the TCPA’s definition, and consistent with Chesbro v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 705 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2012), the plaintiff had adequately pleaded that the messages qualified as telephone solicitations. The court concluded that the purpose of initiation of the calls or messages is determinative, and the plaintiff’s allegations about defendants’ intent sufficed. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "COFFEY V. FAST EASY OFFER, LLC" on Justia Law

Askins v. CRST Expedited, Inc.

2026-06-04T14:03:10-08:00

A trucking company conducted background checks on a job applicant, both before and during his employment, using disclosure and authorization forms. The applicant alleged these forms did not comply with the requirements of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), and initiated a class action on behalf of similarly situated job seekers and employees. He asserted that the company obtained background checks without proper, legally compliant disclosures and authorizations, in violation of federal law. The San Mateo County Superior Court initially certified the class for claims under the FCRA. After the Fifth District Court of Appeal decided *Limon v. Circle K Stores Inc.*, which interpreted the FCRA as requiring plaintiffs to show concrete injury for standing in California courts, the defendant moved to decertify the class, arguing the applicant had not identified any actual harm. The Superior Court agreed, finding that the applicant’s confusion and lack of awareness about the background checks did not amount to concrete injury, and decertified the class. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that California courts are not bound by Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which requires concrete injury in federal courts. The Court interpreted the FCRA’s language and legislative history to mean that statutory damages are available for willful violations, even absent proof of actual harm. It found that a statutory violation alone is sufficient to confer standing in California courts for FCRA claims, and that the applicant’s interest in his statutory rights was adequate. The Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court’s order decertifying the class, holding that proof of actual injury is not required to maintain a class action under the FCRA in California state court. View "Askins v. CRST Expedited, Inc." on Justia Law

Jonathan R. v. Morrisey

2026-06-04T11:00:32-08:00

A group of children in West Virginia’s foster care system filed a class action lawsuit against state officials, alleging systemic failures by the state agencies responsible for their care. The plaintiffs claimed the state’s practices resulted in widespread abuses, neglect, inadequate placements, understaffing, and failure to provide necessary physical and mental health services. They alleged violations of their constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as statutory violations under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. The class action encompassed approximately 6,800 foster children, with additional subclasses for kinship placements, children with disabilities, and those aging out of the system. The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia initially dismissed the case on abstention and mootness grounds, but that decision was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Jonathan R. ex rel. Dixon v. Justice. Upon remand, the district court certified the General Class and ADA Subclass, denied certification of other subclasses, and proceeded with discovery. In February 2025, the district court, acting sua sponte and without notice or briefing, dismissed the case with prejudice for lack of standing, finding that it lacked power under Article III to grant the requested injunctive and declaratory relief and concluding the plaintiffs’ injuries were not redressable. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. It held that federal courts have the authority and duty to remedy systemic constitutional violations, including through comprehensive injunctive relief and declaratory judgments in institutional reform cases. The court found that the plaintiffs’ injuries were sufficiently concrete and ongoing, and that the requested relief was likely to redress those injuries. The district court’s dismissal was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. The Fourth Circuit declined to reassign the case to a new judge and found West Virginia’s cross-appeal on class decertification unreviewable at this stage. View "Jonathan R. v. Morrisey" on Justia Law

Hiller v. Marin Municipal Water Dist.

2026-06-02T14:02:52-08:00

A public agency adopted an ordinance to increase water service rates after following procedural steps, such as conducting a cost-of-service analysis, notifying the public, and holding hearings as required by Proposition 218 of the California Constitution. After adopting the new rates, the agency initiated a validation action in court to confirm the validity of the ordinance, providing notice to interested parties by publication in a local newspaper, as authorized by statute. No one responded to contest the action within the required time, so the court entered default judgment upholding the ordinance. Subsequently, an individual who had previously submitted administrative claims to the agency challenging the rates filed a class action and mandamus lawsuit seeking refunds and declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging violations of Proposition 218 and constitutional rights. The agency responded with a demurrer, arguing that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the prior validation judgment and the statutory scheme requiring such challenges be brought through validation procedures. The Marin County Superior Court agreed, sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend and finding that the plaintiff's opportunity to challenge the rates had been foreclosed by the unchallenged validation judgment. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that under Government Code section 53759 and the related validation statutes, any legal challenge to ordinances adopting water service fees must be brought through specified validation proceedings, including constitutional claims. Since the plaintiff neither intervened in the agency's validation action nor filed a timely reverse validation action, her claims were barred. The court also found that due process was satisfied by the published notice required by statute, and that mandamus proceedings are not exempt from these requirements. The appellate court affirmed the judgment in favor of the agency. View "Hiller v. Marin Municipal Water Dist." on Justia Law

Mebane v. GKN Driveline North America, Inc.

2026-06-02T11:01:23-08:00

A former employee brought a class-action lawsuit against his previous employer, alleging that the company’s practices concerning rounding employees’ time entries and automatically deducting meal breaks resulted in violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act. The employer operated manufacturing facilities in North Carolina and used policies that rounded employee work time and deducted unpaid meal breaks regardless of whether an employee actually took the break. Plaintiffs argued these policies led to unpaid overtime and wages. The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina initially certified two classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and conditionally certified a collective action under the FLSA. However, after further developments and evidence showing that individualized inquiries would be necessary to determine whether employees were harmed by the time-rounding and meal-deduction policies, and that not all employees suffered wage loss, the district court decertified the classes and collective action. Subsequently, the named plaintiffs settled their individual claims with the employer, and the district court dismissed all remaining substantive claims with prejudice. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was asked to review the district court’s order decertifying the classes and collective action. The court held that because the plaintiff voluntarily settled his individual claims before filing the appeal, he lacked standing to challenge the district court’s decertification order. The court reasoned that once the individual claims underlying the request for class certification are settled or dismissed voluntarily, the plaintiff no longer retains a concrete interest sufficient to satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Mebane v. GKN Driveline North America, Inc." on Justia Law

Smith v. The Gap, Inc.

2026-05-28T07:00:08-08:00

Gap, a major clothing retailer, launched an initiative in August 2021 to expand plus-size clothing options in its Old Navy stores. The company overestimated customer demand for these larger sizes, resulting in excess inventory that had to be sold at discounts. By early 2022, Gap reduced its in-store plus-size offerings and eventually limited extended sizing to online sales. In May 2022, Gap disclosed that these missteps negatively affected its financial results for the first quarter of the year. Investors who purchased Gap stock between November 24, 2021, and July 11, 2022, filed a putative securities class action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. They alleged that Gap and two senior executives violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by failing to disclose problems with the initiative in various statements to investors. The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), concluding that the plaintiffs did not identify any false or misleading statements or adequately plead that the defendants acted with scienter (intent or recklessness). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the challenged statements—including risk disclosures, earnings call remarks, and press releases—were not false or misleading in context and did not obligate Gap to disclose the problems with the initiative. The court found that the statements at issue were either generic industry risks, unactionable opinions or puffery, or did not give rise to a duty to disclose additional information. The appellate court also concluded that the plaintiffs failed to allege facts supporting a strong inference of scienter and, accordingly, their control-person liability claims under Section 20(a) were properly dismissed. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Smith v. The Gap, Inc." on Justia Law

THAKUR V. TRUMP

2026-05-26T08:01:13-08:00

Several researchers at the University of California received multi-year federal grants from agencies including the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Science Foundation, and the National Endowment for the Humanities. In April 2025, these agencies terminated the research grants by issuing form letters, citing shifts in agency priorities and referencing multiple Executive Orders issued by the President, some of which explicitly aimed to eliminate diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) and related initiatives from the federal government. The affected researchers alleged these terminations resulted in lost funding, harm to their reputations, and disruption to their projects, with no ready alternative sources of support. The researchers filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, asserting constitutional and statutory claims, including violations of the First Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court provisionally certified two classes: one consisting of researchers whose grants were terminated by form letter without grant-specific explanation (the Form Termination Class), and another whose grants were terminated specifically due to the DEI Executive Orders (the DEI Termination Class). The district court granted a preliminary injunction, ordering the reinstatement of the grants for both classes. The government appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs had established Article III standing. It reversed the preliminary injunction for the Form Termination Class, concluding that the district court likely lacked jurisdiction over their APA claim because the claim was essentially contractual and thus barred by the Tucker Act. However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction for the DEI Termination Class, finding that the class was likely to succeed on its First Amendment claim because the grant terminations were based on viewpoint discrimination. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "THAKUR V. TRUMP" on Justia Law

Ewalt v. GateHouse Media Ohio Holdings II, Inc.

2026-05-22T12:30:59-08:00

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against GateHouse Media in Ohio state court, alleging claims that met the requirements for federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). GateHouse timely removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, where the parties litigated for several years. The district court eventually denied class certification and, based on that denial, remanded the case to state court, concluding it could no longer exercise jurisdiction and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining claims. After the case returned to state court, it remained inactive until plaintiffs renewed their motion for class certification. GateHouse then removed the case to federal court a second time, asserting that this renewed motion provided a new basis for removal under CAFA. Plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing the removal was untimely. The district court denied the remand motion, finding that its earlier remand order had created ambiguity about federal jurisdiction and, under principles of equity, tolled the 30-day removal deadline. Plaintiffs sought and were granted interlocutory review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the 30-day deadline for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) is strict and cannot be equitably tolled, as clarified by the Supreme Court in Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel ex rel. Michigan. The Sixth Circuit concluded that GateHouse’s second removal was untimely because the original complaint had already triggered the removal clock, and subsequent events, including renewed class certification efforts, did not restart it. The appellate court reversed the district court’s order and instructed that the case be remanded to state court. View "Ewalt v. GateHouse Media Ohio Holdings II, Inc." on Justia Law

Surgeon v. TKO Shelby, LLC

2026-05-22T07:41:41-08:00

Plaintiffs received a promotional flyer advertising a car dealership event, which offered a chance to win one of several grand prizes. The flyer instructed recipients whose code matched a winning number to call a hotline and then visit the dealership to claim their prize. Plaintiffs alleged that the scratch-off numbers on all flyers matched the grand prize, misleading recipients, while defendants maintained that a separate activation code determined the actual prize, which was a nominal cash amount for all claimants. Approximately 50,000 flyers were sent, 2,118 people called the hotline, and records indicated 927 people visited the dealership. However, there were no records identifying those 927 individuals. The Superior Court in Gaston County initially certified a class of the 927 people who visited the dealership. Defendants appealed, and the Supreme Court of North Carolina vacated the certification due to inconsistencies between the class definition and the court’s analysis, remanding for clarification. On remand, the trial court again certified a class based on revised criteria: receiving the flyer, calling the hotline, and visiting the dealership. However, the trial court allowed a named plaintiff who had not personally called the hotline to remain as a representative, leading to further conflict in its reasoning. Defendants appealed the renewed certification order. The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that, on the current record, class certification was improper. The Court found that the class was not ascertainable because there was no objective method to identify class members without individualized fact determinations, which would overwhelm common issues. The Court vacated the trial court’s class certification order and remanded for further proceedings, leaving open the possibility of addressing spoliation claims if pursued. View "Surgeon v. TKO Shelby, LLC" on Justia Law

OLSON V. FCA US, LLC

2026-05-21T08:01:11-08:00

Jeffrey Olson leased a Jeep Grand Cherokee from a car dealership under a lease agreement that included an arbitration provision and a delegation clause, which assigned questions about the scope of arbitration to an arbitrator. FCA US, LLC, the manufacturer of the Jeep, was not a signatory to the lease agreement. Olson later became the named plaintiff in a federal class-action lawsuit against FCA, alleging defects in the vehicle’s headrest system. FCA, not being a party to the lease, sought to compel Olson to arbitrate the dispute based on the arbitration agreement between Olson and the dealership. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied FCA’s motion to compel arbitration. The district court found that FCA, as a non-signatory to the lease agreement, could not enforce the arbitration provision or its delegation clause against Olson. The court concluded that the arbitration agreement applied only to Olson and the dealership (including its employees, agents, successors, or assigns), and FCA did not qualify under any of those categories. Additionally, the court rejected FCA’s argument that it could use equitable estoppel to compel arbitration, holding that none of Olson’s claims were sufficiently intertwined with the lease agreement to justify such an exception under California law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that FCA could not compel Olson to arbitrate because FCA was not a party to the arbitration agreement and no applicable exception—such as equitable estoppel—applied. The court clarified that, under both federal and California law, only parties to an arbitration agreement (or those qualifying under specific, limited exceptions) may enforce it. The court also rejected FCA’s reliance on Supreme Court precedent, finding it inapplicable to non-signatories in these circumstances. View "OLSON V. FCA US, LLC" on Justia Law

Boe v. Children's Hosp. Colo.

2026-05-20T05:32:12-08:00

The plaintiffs in this case are minor patients who had been receiving gender-affirming medical care at the TRUE Center for Gender Diversity, a specialized department at a major pediatric hospital serving the Rocky Mountain Region. Following a December 2025 declaration by the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services stating that medical gender-affirming care for minors was unsafe and could result in exclusion from federal health care payment programs, the hospital suspended such care for transgender patients under eighteen. The hospital continued to provide hormone therapy and puberty blockers to cisgender youth for other medical reasons. The plaintiffs, representing a class of similarly situated individuals, experienced immediate and significant emotional and physical harm as a result. The plaintiffs filed a class action in the District Court for the City and County of Denver seeking a preliminary injunction under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) to require the hospital to resume medically necessary gender-affirming care. The trial court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits, faced irreparable harm, and lacked an adequate remedy at law, but denied the injunction. The court reasoned that granting the injunction was contrary to the public interest, the balance of equities favored the hospital, and the injunction was not sufficiently specific to preserve the status quo. The Supreme Court of Colorado, en banc, reviewed the trial court's denial for abuse of discretion. It concluded that the trial court misapplied the legal standards governing preliminary injunctions in discrimination cases, particularly regarding the public interest and balance of equities. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs satisfied all six required factors, including a reasonable probability of success on their CADA claim, and that the injunction would preserve the pre-suspension status quo. The trial court’s order was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions to grant the preliminary injunction. View "Boe v. Children's Hosp. Colo." on Justia Law

Jackson v. Protas, Spivok & Collins LLC

2026-05-18T10:30:34-08:00

Donte Jackson received a $30,000 loan from WebBank, which was later sold to Velocity Investments, LLC. After Jackson defaulted on the loan, Velocity, represented by the law firm Protas, Spivok & Collins LLC (PSC), sued Jackson in Maryland state court to collect the debt. Velocity eventually dismissed the state court suit with prejudice. Subsequently, Jackson brought a class action lawsuit against both Velocity and PSC, alleging that their practice of suing on time-barred debts was unlawful. In the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, both Velocity and PSC moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause in Jackson’s original promissory note. The district court found that Velocity, as a subsequent holder of the note, was a party to the arbitration agreement but had waived its right to arbitrate by filing suit in state court. The court ruled that PSC was not a party to the agreement, as it did not fit the contractual definition of an entity “servicing” the note, which the court interpreted in accordance with Maryland law. Only PSC appealed the denial of its motion to compel arbitration. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s ruling de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that PSC, as the law firm representing Velocity, was not a party to the arbitration agreement because it did not “service” the note in the relevant contractual sense, which involves collecting and maintaining a payment schedule for the loan. The court concluded that the arbitration agreement covered only creditors and loan servicers, not lawyers. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of PSC’s motion to compel arbitration. View "Jackson v. Protas, Spivok & Collins LLC" on Justia Law

Farella v. Anglin

2026-05-18T07:31:28-08:00

Two individuals were arrested by the Bentonville Police Department in Arkansas and appeared before a state district court judge two days and one day after their respective arrests. During these initial hearings, the judge set bail amounts for each individual without providing them with legal representation. Only after setting bail did the judge determine that they were indigent and appoint counsel for future proceedings. Both individuals remained incarcerated for several weeks before ultimately pleading guilty and being sentenced to time served. Following their experiences, these individuals, acting on behalf of a class of similarly situated pretrial detainees, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas. They alleged that the judge’s practice of setting bail without first appointing counsel violated their rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring that indigent defendants be provided with counsel at the start of their initial bail hearings. The district court denied motions to dismiss, certified the class, and ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The district court held that the plaintiffs’ right to counsel attached at the initial hearing and that the bail-setting constituted a critical stage, thus granting declaratory and injunctive relief against the judge. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing because they failed to show an ongoing or imminent injury that could be redressed by the prospective relief sought. The court found that the possibility of facing the same situation again was too speculative and that the requested relief would not redress any past harm already suffered. As a result, the Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of standing. View "Farella v. Anglin" on Justia Law

TRAMMELL V. KLN ENTERPRISES, INC.

2026-05-15T08:31:24-08:00

A consumer purchased a licorice product manufactured by a Minnesota company, relying on packaging that stated the product was “Naturally Flavored,” “Natural Strawberry & Raspberry Flavored Licorice,” and “Free of . . . Artificial Colors & Flavors.” The consumer later learned, through laboratory testing, that the product contained DL malic acid, which is an artificial flavor created from petrochemical sources. The consumer alleged that this ingredient rendered the product’s labeling false or misleading, and filed a putative class action in California, asserting claims for violation of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, unjust enrichment, and breach of express warranty. The United States District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The court found that the complaint failed to plead with sufficient particularity that the malic acid was artificial, thus not meeting the heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The district court also held that the plaintiff did not plausibly allege that a reasonable consumer would be misled by the product’s labeling, reasoning that the labels did not explicitly state the product was “all natural” or “100% natural,” and that the ingredients list disclosed both natural and artificial ingredients. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the complaint satisfied Rule 9(b) because it identified the specifics of the alleged fraud and provided details about the laboratory testing. The court also held that the plaintiff plausibly alleged that a reasonable consumer could be misled by the product’s claim to be free of artificial flavors when it allegedly contained an artificial flavor. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "TRAMMELL V. KLN ENTERPRISES, INC." on Justia Law

J.M. v. Illuminate Education, Inc.

2026-05-14T08:32:09-08:00

An educational technology company was contracted by a county office of education to provide software and technology services to school districts, which involved collecting and storing various types of student data, including medical information. In 2022, the company experienced a data breach that resulted in unauthorized access to student medical records, including those of a minor plaintiff. The minor, through a guardian, filed a class action lawsuit alleging violations of both the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA) and the Customer Records Act (CRA), claiming the company was negligent in protecting confidential medical information and failed to provide timely disclosure of the breach. The Superior Court of Ventura County granted the company’s demurrer and dismissed the case, concluding that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under either statute, as the company was not a covered entity under the CMIA or CRA and the plaintiff was not a “customer” under the CRA. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reversed, finding that the company fell within the scope of both statutes and that the plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to support both claims. The appellate court also determined that the trial court erred by denying leave to amend the complaint. The Supreme Court of California reversed the appellate decision. The Court held that the plaintiff did not sufficiently allege the company was a “provider of health care” under the CMIA, nor that he was the company’s “customer” under the CRA, so no claim was stated under either statute. However, the Court clarified that under the CMIA, a breach of confidentiality occurs when medical information is exposed to a significant risk of unauthorized access or use, and actual viewing by an unauthorized party is not required. The judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "J.M. v. Illuminate Education, Inc." on Justia Law

Ibrahim Alzandani v. Hamtramck Public Schools

2026-05-12T13:00:34-08:00

Three Michigan parents alleged that a local public school district systematically denied their children access to special education services required by federal law. One child with autism reportedly received only a few hours of aide support each day, another autistic child was promised speech therapy that was not provided, and a third child with Down syndrome was allegedly denied evaluation and services altogether. In response, two parents filed complaints with the Michigan Department of Education, which found that the school district violated the children’s rights to a free and appropriate public education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and issued corrective action plans. However, none of the parents pursued the IDEA’s due process complaint process. The parents and children instead filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the school district, Wayne County Regional Educational Service Agency, and the Michigan Department of Education. They alleged violations of the IDEA, Americans with Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act, and Michigan law, seeking injunctive relief and damages. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the plaintiffs failed to exhaust IDEA administrative remedies. The district court denied the motion, holding that exhaustion was not required for “systemic” failures, and certified the issue for interlocutory appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the appeal and held that the IDEA does not recognize a “systemic violations” exception to its exhaustion requirement. The court ruled that parents must pursue the IDEA’s due process hearing before filing suit, even in cases alleging district-wide failures related to staffing and funding. The court concluded that none of the recognized exceptions to exhaustion applied and reversed the district court’s decision, foreclosing the lawsuit until administrative remedies are exhausted. View "Ibrahim Alzandani v. Hamtramck Public Schools" on Justia Law

CRAIN WALNUT SHELLING, LP V. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

2026-05-07T09:04:35-08:00

The case concerns the process for selecting a lead plaintiff in a securities fraud class action brought under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). After investors filed federal securities claims against a company and its executives, several parties moved to be appointed as lead plaintiff, including Crain Walnut Shelling, LP. Crain Walnut reported the largest financial losses among the movants and made a prima facie showing of adequacy and typicality, initially making it the presumptive lead plaintiff. However, a competing movant, Universal, challenged Crain Walnut’s adequacy, raising concerns about inaccuracies in Crain Walnut’s filings and inconsistent representations about its ownership and organizational structure. During discovery, further issues arose when Crain Walnut’s representative gave problematic deposition testimony, indicating an unwillingness to comply with potential discovery obligations. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California evaluated these challenges. After initial proceedings and discovery, the district court concluded that the evidence raised doubts about Crain Walnut’s adequacy but initially applied a “genuine and serious doubt” standard. Ultimately, Universal was appointed as lead plaintiff after the district court found that Crain Walnut’s adequacy was rebutted based on the evidence. Crain Walnut then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for a writ of mandamus to vacate the district court’s orders. The Ninth Circuit clarified that the correct standard for rebutting the PSLRA’s presumption of adequacy is the preponderance of the evidence, not a lower standard. The appellate court held that, even under the correct standard, the district court did not commit clear error in finding Crain Walnut inadequate, and thus mandamus relief was not warranted. The court therefore denied the petition for writ of mandamus. View "CRAIN WALNUT SHELLING, LP V. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA" on Justia Law

Toothman v. Redwood Toxicology Laboratory

2026-05-05T12:31:49-08:00

Robert Toothman was initially employed by Apex Life Sciences, LLC, a temporary employment agency, which placed him at Redwood Toxicology Laboratory, Inc. During his employment with Apex, Toothman signed an arbitration agreement that required him to arbitrate employment disputes with Apex and its defined affiliates, subsidiaries, and parent companies. In April 2018, Toothman’s employment with Apex ended, after which he was hired directly by Redwood and worked there until June 2022. Toothman and Redwood did not sign an arbitration agreement. Several months after leaving Redwood, Toothman filed a class action alleging Labor Code violations based solely on his direct employment with Redwood, not his prior period as an Apex employee. The Sonoma County Superior Court reviewed Redwood’s motion to compel arbitration and to dismiss the class claims. Redwood argued that it was either a party to the Apex arbitration agreement as an affiliate, a third-party beneficiary, or entitled to enforce the agreement under equitable estoppel. Redwood also claimed that Toothman’s class claims should be dismissed based on the arbitration agreement. The trial court denied Redwood’s motion, finding that Redwood was not a signatory to the arbitration agreement, was not an affiliate as defined by the agreement, and could not compel arbitration under any alternative theory. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the trial court’s order de novo. It held that Redwood was not a party to the arbitration agreement and did not qualify as an affiliate or third-party beneficiary. The court further determined that Toothman’s claims were not sufficiently intertwined with the arbitration agreement to justify equitable estoppel. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order denying Redwood’s motion to compel arbitration and to dismiss the class claims. View "Toothman v. Redwood Toxicology Laboratory" on Justia Law

Rider v. Oxy USA

2026-05-05T09:07:17-08:00

Several individuals who own royalty interests in the Kansas Hugoton Gas Field brought a putative class action against two energy companies. Their claims are based on an alleged breach of a 2008 class action settlement agreement, which had resolved earlier disputes about underpayment of royalties by one of the companies. The 2008 settlement required limits on certain deductions from royalty payments and specified that its terms would bind successors, assigns, and related entities. In 2014, one defendant acquired assets from the other and continued making royalty payments. Plaintiffs allege the acquiring company violated the settlement by taking improper deductions after the acquisition. The plaintiffs initially sought to enforce the settlement in Kansas state court, but the District Court of Stevens County determined the judgment had become dormant and unenforceable. Plaintiffs appealed that ruling, and while the appeal was pending, they filed this federal class action complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. The district court denied defendants’ motions to dismiss but later denied class certification. The district court found that the proposed class was not ascertainable because identifying class members would require individualized title review and that other Rule 23 requirements were not satisfied. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The appellate court clarified that, under its recent precedent, class ascertainability does not require administrative feasibility—only an objectively and clearly defined class. The court found the proposed class ascertainable, that common questions predominated, and that the plaintiffs satisfied all Rule 23 requirements. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of class certification and remanded with instructions to certify the putative class. View "Rider v. Oxy USA" on Justia Law

Spurlock v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.

2026-05-04T10:30:28-08:00

Three individuals suffering from opioid use disorder (OUD) alleged that while incarcerated in facilities where a private medical contractor provided care, they were denied medically accepted screening and treatment for their condition. They claimed that the medical contractor excluded opioid dependence screening and treatment from its otherwise comprehensive services, forcing affected individuals to undergo withdrawal, even when arriving with a valid prescription for medication-assisted treatment. The plaintiffs asserted that these policies were motivated by cost-saving considerations and persisted even after the contractor was aware of the prevailing medical standards and associated constitutional risks. The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia reviewed the case, which was filed as a class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs sought to certify two classes: one requesting injunctive relief to require the contractor to provide proper screening and treatment, and another seeking damages for past deprivation of such care. The district court certified both classes after narrowing their definitions to ensure ascertainability and found that the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 were met. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., the defendant, challenged the certification, particularly arguing against the validity, typicality, and commonality of the classes, as well as the predominance and superiority requirements for the damages class. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine, in the first instance, whether the named plaintiffs had standing to represent the class seeking injunctive relief, given that standing was first raised on appeal and required fact-specific findings. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s certification of the damages class, finding no abuse of discretion in its conclusions regarding ascertainability, the Rule 23(a) requirements, predominance, and superiority. View "Spurlock v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

In Re: Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation

2026-05-04T07:00:11-08:00

A group of branded gasoline retailers, known as the Old Jericho Plaintiffs, operated gas stations and accepted Visa and Mastercard payment cards during a specified period. Following a long-running federal antitrust class action alleging that Visa and Mastercard imposed unlawfully high interchange fees, a $5.6 billion settlement was reached in 2019 with a class defined as all entities accepting Visa- or Mastercard-branded cards in the United States from January 1, 2004, to January 24, 2019. The Old Jericho Plaintiffs did not opt out of this settlement. However, after the opt-out period ended, they filed a separate class action asserting state-law antitrust claims for damages based on the same alleged conduct, contending that their suppliers were the direct payors of the fees and thus should be the proper class members. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York determined that the Old Jericho Plaintiffs were members of the original settlement class and that the settlement agreement barred their new claims. The district court found the term “accepted” in the settlement ambiguous but, after reviewing extrinsic evidence—such as contracts and how transactions were conducted—concluded that the retailers themselves, not their suppliers, “accepted” payment cards within the meaning of the agreement. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Second Circuit held that its prior decision in Fikes Wholesale, Inc. v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. did not require class membership to be determined solely by identifying the “direct payor.” The court found no clear error in the district court’s factual determination that the Old Jericho Plaintiffs were intended to be class members. Additionally, it held that the claims brought by these plaintiffs were validly released in the settlement because they rested on the same factual predicate as the released claims and the plaintiffs had been adequately represented. View "In Re: Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

Provencher v. Bimbo Foods Bakeries Distribution LLC

2026-05-04T07:00:04-08:00

Two Vermont residents who worked as delivery drivers for a baked goods company sued the company, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) because they were not paid overtime despite regularly working more than 40 hours per week. The company classified them as independent contractors, not employees, and both the drivers and the company are located in different states: the drivers in Vermont, and the company is incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania. The drivers brought the lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, both on their own behalf and on behalf of other similarly situated delivery drivers. After the case was filed, the plaintiffs asked the district court to allow notification of potential collective action members not just in Vermont, but also in Connecticut and New York. The company objected, arguing that the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over claims by out-of-state drivers. The district court disagreed, concluding that it did have personal jurisdiction over the company regarding claims by non-Vermont drivers, and permitted notification to potential plaintiffs in all three states. The district court then certified the personal jurisdiction issue for interlocutory appeal and stayed its decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court. The appellate court held that, unless Congress has provided otherwise (which it has not in the FLSA), a federal district court’s personal jurisdiction over a defendant for out-of-state plaintiffs’ claims is limited by the same rules that bind state courts. Because there was no showing that the claims by Connecticut and New York drivers arose out of the company's contacts with Vermont, the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over those claims. The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Provencher v. Bimbo Foods Bakeries Distribution LLC" on Justia Law

Vela v. Harbor Rail Services of California, Inc.

2026-05-01T11:33:41-08:00

An employee worked as a railcar repairman for a company that performs inspections and repairs on freight cars at a train yard. He was hired with an agreement that required all employment-related disputes to be resolved through arbitration and included a waiver of class and representative actions, except for certain claims that cannot be waived by law. After his employment ended, the employee sued for various wage and hour violations under California law, asserting claims on his own behalf and on behalf of a proposed class of other employees. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case after the employer moved to compel arbitration of the individual claims and to dismiss the class claims. The court ordered further proceedings to clarify whether the arbitration agreement was part of a contract of employment and whether the employee fell within a federal exemption for certain transportation workers. After additional evidence was submitted, the court granted the employer’s motion, compelling arbitration of individual claims and dismissing the class claims, finding the employee was not exempt from arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the order dismissing and striking the class claims. The court held that the FAA applied to the arbitration agreement because the employee was neither a “railroad employee” nor a transportation worker directly involved in the interstate transportation of goods under the FAA’s section 1 exemption. The court found that repairing out-of-service railcars did not constitute direct engagement in interstate commerce. The court also held that, because the FAA applied, the waiver of class claims was enforceable under federal law, thus preempting contrary state law. The appeal as to the order compelling arbitration was treated as a petition for writ of mandate and was denied. View "Vela v. Harbor Rail Services of California, Inc." on Justia Law

Preston v. SB&C, Ltd.

2026-04-30T07:13:06-08:00

A patient received medical care at a hospital and was billed for those services. At the time, the patient’s income allegedly qualified her for financial assistance known as charity care under Washington law, which is designed to help low-income patients pay hospital bills. The hospital did not determine the patient’s eligibility for charity care before billing her and subsequently assigned the debt to a collection agency. The agency sued to collect the debt, obtained a judgment, and did not provide any information about the availability of charity care in its communications. The patient only learned about the program after judgment and was later granted a partial reduction by the hospital, but the collection agency refused to honor it, citing its policy against reductions after court judgment. The patient filed a class action against the collection agency in Skagit County Superior Court, alleging violations of the Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA), the Collection Agency Act (CAA), and the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. The district court dismissed some claims, including those under the CAA, and divided the remaining claims into “failure-to-screen” and “failure-to-notify” theories. The court dismissed the “failure-to-screen” theory, retained the “failure-to-notify” theory, and certified a question of state law to the Washington Supreme Court regarding whether the charity care notice requirements apply to collection agencies. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that the statutory requirement to give notice of charity care under RCW 70.170.060(8)(a) applies to collection agencies collecting hospital debt. The court explained that the policy and plain language of the statute require patients to be notified by all entities engaged in billing or collection, including collection agencies, and that the duty to provide notice passes to assignees of hospital debt. View "Preston v. SB&C, Ltd." on Justia Law

Connex Credit Union v. Madgic

2026-04-29T03:08:49-08:00

The case involves a dispute between a credit union and borrowers who defaulted on a retail installment contract for a vehicle. After the borrowers defaulted, the credit union repossessed and sold the vehicle, then sued the borrowers for the remaining balance. The borrowers responded with a counterclaim alleging that the credit union failed to provide proper notice before and after repossession and sale, in violation of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 9 and the Retail Installment Sales Financing Act (RISFA). The borrowers sought statutory damages under both statutes and also moved to certify their counterclaim as a class action. The Superior Court, Judicial District of Waterbury, granted summary judgment to the credit union on the borrowers’ counterclaim, reasoning that both the UCC and RISFA claims were subject to the one-year statute of limitations for penal statutes found in Connecticut General Statutes § 52-585. The court found the claims time-barred because they were filed more than one year after the alleged violations. Based on this conclusion, the court also denied the borrowers’ motion for class certification. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Connecticut concluded that the trial court applied the wrong statute of limitations. The Supreme Court held that both the UCC Article 9 and RISFA provisions at issue are remedial, not penal, and are thus not governed by the one-year limitation for penal statutes. Instead, it determined that the three-year statute of limitations for tort actions under § 52-577 applies, because the borrowers’ counterclaims arose from statutory violations rather than breach of contract. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to apply the three-year limitation and reconsider class certification. View "Connex Credit Union v. Madgic" on Justia Law

Carefirst Bluechoice v. Skipper

2026-04-27T08:35:49-08:00

Matthew and Jamie Skipper obtained health insurance from CareFirst BlueChoice, Inc. through the Maryland Health Benefit Exchange. After experiencing infertility, they underwent in-vitro fertilization (IVF), which included freezing embryos. When they later sought coverage for the medically necessary procedure of embryo thawing as part of a subsequent IVF cycle, CareFirst denied coverage, citing a policy exclusion. The Skippers paid for the thawing themselves and later sought reimbursement. CareFirst denied their appeal as untimely. The Skippers filed a complaint with the Maryland Insurance Administration and, while that was pending, brought a putative class action in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Shortly after the federal suit was filed, CareFirst reversed its denial and paid the claim. The federal court then dismissed the Skippers’ complaint for lack of jurisdiction due to the amount-in-controversy requirement. The Skippers promptly refiled their class action in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. CareFirst moved to dismiss in the Circuit Court, arguing the case was moot because it had paid the Skippers’ claim and that the policy did not cover embryo thawing. The Circuit Court granted the motion based on mootness. The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed, holding that the payment did not moot the class claims and that the complaint adequately stated a claim. The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment. The Court held that when a putative class action is first filed in another court and the defendant tenders individual relief to the named representative before dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, a substantially similar complaint promptly refiled in state court is not moot until the representative has a reasonable opportunity to seek class certification. Additionally, the Court held that the relevant policy exclusion does not authorize CareFirst to deny coverage for medically necessary expenses arising from IVF procedures, including embryo thawing, and that Maryland law requires such coverage. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Carefirst Bluechoice v. Skipper" on Justia Law

Clippinger v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co.

2026-04-24T11:30:33-08:00

State Farm, an automobile insurer, uses a standard process in Tennessee to determine the “actual cash value” (ACV) of vehicles totaled in accidents. This process involves comparing the insured’s vehicle to similar used vehicles listed for sale and then applying a “typical negotiation” adjustment, which reduces the estimated value based on the assumption that advertised prices are generally higher than actual sales prices. After her own totaled minivan was valued using this process, Jessica Clippinger agreed to the payout but later challenged the fairness of the typical-negotiation adjustment, arguing that it systematically undervalued cars and breached the insurance contract. She brought a putative class action on behalf of similarly situated State Farm customers. The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee initially required Clippinger to use the policy’s appraisal process. After the appraisal resulted in a higher valuation and State Farm paid the difference, the district court found that Clippinger’s claim was not moot, as she had allegedly been harmed by incurring appraisal costs. The court granted class certification, accepting Clippinger’s argument that damages could be determined by simply refunding the amount of the negotiation adjustment for each class member, and found that common questions predominated over individual ones. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the class certification order. The court held that, even if the negotiation adjustment was flawed, determining whether State Farm breached its contract for each class member would require individualized evidence about the actual cash value of each vehicle. The court concluded that these individualized valuation questions would predominate over any common issues, making class certification improper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). The Sixth Circuit further held that the district court’s proposed formula for damages improperly abridged State Farm’s substantive right to present individualized defenses, violating the Rules Enabling Act. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Clippinger v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services v. Mullin

2026-04-24T07:02:56-08:00

Thirteen individuals and three nonprofit organizations challenged executive actions taken after the issuance of a presidential proclamation in January 2025, which responded to increased crossings at the southern border by suspending the entry of certain noncitizens and instituting new summary removal procedures. These new procedures, set out in subsequent agency guidance, barred individuals who crossed between ports of entry—or at ports without proper documentation—from seeking asylum or other statutory protections. The policies also established new, non-statutory removal processes that bypassed existing procedures and protections mandated by federal law. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed these policies in a putative class action. The court certified a class of all individuals subject to the proclamation, declared the agency guidance unlawful, vacated it, and enjoined agency officials from implementing similar actions under the proclamation. The district court found that the challenged policies supplanted the removal procedures and substantive protections Congress had established in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and related regulations, including the right to apply for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for the plaintiffs and affirmed the modified class certification. The D.C. Circuit held that Congress, in granting the President authority to suspend entry under the INA, did not authorize the executive to circumvent or override the statute’s exclusive and mandatory removal procedures or to categorically deny the right to apply for asylum and other protections. The court further held that neither the proclamation nor its guidance could lawfully suspend or replace statutory and regulatory processes for removal or for considering claims to asylum, withholding of removal, or Convention Against Torture protection. The court also upheld the district court’s class-wide relief and its scope under federal law. View "Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services v. Mullin" on Justia Law