Civil Procedure - Justia Case Law Summaries

Damak v. Super. Ct.

2026-07-08T13:32:44-08:00

In this case, an individual sued several defendants over employment issues at a motel, including wage and hour violations, improper meal and rest breaks, retaliation, and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff, acting without an attorney and having received a fee waiver, served extensive discovery requests on the defendants. Despite confirming receipt of the discovery documents, the defendants and their counsel failed to respond or communicate over a period of months. The plaintiff repeatedly attempted to follow up and warned that he would seek sanctions if no response was forthcoming. Ultimately, after more than five months without any discovery responses or communication, the plaintiff filed motions to compel compliance and requested monetary sanctions of at least $1,000 for each motion. The Superior Court of Orange County granted the motions to compel, ordering defendants to comply with discovery. However, it denied the requests for monetary sanctions, reasoning that the relevant statutes only permitted sanctions for "reasonable expenses actually incurred," and since the plaintiff was self-represented and had a fee waiver, he had not shown any actual expenses. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case through a writ of mandate. The court held that the trial court was correct to focus on whether expenses were incurred under certain Discovery Act provisions, consistent with longstanding statutory language and case law. However, it found the lower court erred by failing to consider section 2023.050 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which requires a mandatory $1,000 sanction for certain discovery abuses related to document production, regardless of whether the opposing party incurred expenses. The appellate court granted the petition in part, directing the trial court to reconsider the monetary sanctions requests in light of section 2023.050, and denied the petition in other respects. View "Damak v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

SHAW v. SHAW

2026-07-08T10:04:13-08:00

A dispute arose over ownership of a lakeside property in Sandpoint, Idaho, after Rhoda Shaw quitclaimed her interest in the property to her son, Bobby Shaw, in September 2021. Rhoda, elderly and experiencing cognitive issues, lived part-time in Arizona and Idaho. Her daughter, Cynthia Shaw Beck, later learned of the transfer and, concerned about Rhoda’s capacity, petitioned for and was appointed Rhoda’s guardian and conservator in Arizona in March 2022. Acting in that capacity, Cynthia filed a quiet title action and related claims in Bonner County, Idaho, seeking to invalidate the transfer to Bobby, alleging Rhoda lacked capacity and asserting fraud, and later attempted to add claims for undue influence and tortious interference. The Superior Court of Arizona, Cochise County, had already established Cynthia as Rhoda’s guardian and conservator, and subsequently issued orders retroactively determining Rhoda’s incapacity as predating the property transfer. Cynthia repeatedly sought to have the Idaho District Court either stay its proceedings or accept the Arizona court’s retroactive findings regarding Rhoda’s capacity as controlling. The District Court of the First Judicial District of Idaho denied these motions, finding that the Idaho litigation directly concerned the conveyance of Idaho property and that the Arizona guardianship proceeding did not address this specific issue. The Idaho court also denied Cynthia’s late motion to amend her complaint to add new claims and parties, citing undue delay and prejudice to defendants. The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the appeal and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the Arizona guardianship court’s jurisdiction did not preclude Idaho courts from adjudicating the quiet title action concerning Idaho real property. The Idaho district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to stay the case or enforce the Arizona court’s retroactive order, nor in denying Cynthia’s untimely motion to amend her complaint. No attorney fees were awarded on appeal, but costs were granted to respondents. View "SHAW v. SHAW" on Justia Law

Abdulla v. Progressive Southeastern Insurance Company

2026-07-08T05:00:03-08:00

A commercial truck driver was injured in an accident while operating a tractor-trailer in Missouri. The tractor was registered in Michigan and titled to a limited liability company (LLC) solely owned by the plaintiff, while the trailer was owned by a different LLC. Under a lease agreement, the plaintiff’s LLC leased the tractor to the other LLC, and the plaintiff exclusively operated the tractor. Insurance coverage for the tractor was provided by a policy that excluded personal protection insurance (PIP) when the vehicle was used to transport cargo, and the other LLC’s insurance did not cover PIP for the tractor. The plaintiff, who lived with his parents in Michigan, was not a named insured on his father’s auto policy, nor was the tractor listed as a covered vehicle. After the accident, the plaintiff sued several insurers, arguing that one of them should provide PIP benefits under Michigan’s no-fault act. The Wayne Circuit Court denied summary disposition to one insurer and dismissed others from the case. On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, finding insufficient evidence to classify the plaintiff as the tractor’s owner or registrant. It ruled that the plaintiff’s claim for PIP benefits was not barred and that his father’s insurer was the highest priority insurer. The Michigan Supreme Court, in reviewing the case, held that the plaintiff was an “owner” of the tractor under MCL 500.3101(3)(l)(i) because he had the right to use the vehicle in a manner consistent with ownership for more than 30 days. The Court found that his exclusive, regular use and control of the tractor, as the sole member and agent of the LLC, satisfied the statutory definition of ownership. Because he failed to maintain the required insurance, the plaintiff was excluded from recovering PIP benefits under MCL 500.3113. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court. View "Abdulla v. Progressive Southeastern Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Center for Bio Diversity v. TRAN

2026-07-07T15:30:30-08:00

Delfin LNG sought approval to construct and operate a deepwater liquefied natural gas export facility in the Gulf of America, consisting of onshore infrastructure in Louisiana and floating offshore vessels. The Maritime Administration (MARAD), after extensive environmental review and public comment, initially approved the project in 2017. Over subsequent years, Delfin altered key aspects of the project, including its design and financing. MARAD determined these changes required further review and asked Delfin to submit an amended application, which Delfin did not do. In 2025, following a presidential executive order, MARAD concluded that the modifications would not cause significantly different environmental impacts and issued the license. Three environmental organizations challenged MARAD’s decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. They argued MARAD violated the Deepwater Port Act by not requiring an amended application and additional public comment, the National Environmental Policy Act by not preparing a supplemental environmental impact statement, and the Administrative Procedure Act by issuing a license after finding the prior approval was insufficient. They requested the court vacate MARAD’s licensing decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that none of the petitioners demonstrated Article III standing. The court held that the organizations failed to identify a member who suffered a concrete and particularized injury fairly traceable to MARAD’s licensing decision. The declarations submitted did not show a personal and project-specific harm, nor did they establish a sufficient geographic nexus to the affected area. As a result, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits and denied the petition for review. The main holding is that, in the absence of standing, the court cannot reach the substantive environmental or procedural claims. View "Center for Bio Diversity v. TRAN" on Justia Law

Hernandez v. Blanche

2026-07-07T13:30:03-08:00

The plaintiff worked for over twenty years in various administrative roles for the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in Puerto Rico, eventually becoming Secretary to the Assistant Special Agent in Charge. In 2016, after suffering a foot injury, she requested workplace accommodations, some of which were denied. She filed an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging discrimination based on disability and national origin. Subsequently, other DEA agents filed an EEO complaint against her, and she filed a retaliation complaint with the Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General. A series of workplace conflicts followed, including a verbal altercation, revocation of outside work permission, and eventual suspension. After further absence and issues with communication with supervisors, she was reassigned to another office. An internal investigation led to her termination for insubordination and alleged lack of candor. She appealed her termination to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), arguing it was retaliatory and unsupported by evidence. The MSPB found no lack of candor, but upheld the insubordination charge and her termination. She then sought judicial review in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, which denied her discovery motions and granted summary judgment to the government, finding no prima facie case of retaliation and holding that the MSPB’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s rulings. The court held that the denial of the plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) motion for additional discovery was not an abuse of discretion, as she did not show good cause for her delay. On the merits, the court concluded that the MSPB’s finding of insubordination was supported by substantial evidence and that the plaintiff failed to show the employer’s stated reasons for termination were pretext for retaliation under Title VII. View "Hernandez v. Blanche" on Justia Law

Barrier v. USA

2026-07-07T09:30:38-08:00

A federal employee, Robert Duran, who held a full-time union leadership position with the National Border Patrol Council (NBPC), struck Tami Barrier with his vehicle while exiting a United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) station in Del Rio, Texas. Duran was leaving the station to collect pandemic-related supplies donated for CBP agents, a task requested by another union leader. The supplies were intended for distribution among multiple Border Patrol stations. Duran’s work entailed both union responsibilities and CBP overtime hours, and there was ambiguity regarding whether he was on duty at the time of the incident. Video evidence and timesheets provided conflicting accounts of his work hours, and there was dispute over whether collecting the supplies was a personal favor or part of his union duties. The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judgment to the Government, finding that Duran was not acting within the course and scope of his employment when the incident occurred. The court concluded that the errand was not a CBP task and was not performed under CBP’s authority, so the United States could not be held vicariously liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that genuine disputes of material fact existed regarding whether Duran was acting within the scope of his employment under Texas law, including whether he was performing a “special mission” for CBP at the time. The court determined that a reasonable jury could find Duran’s actions benefited CBP and were performed with its implied approval. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Barrier v. USA" on Justia Law

Reagan Marine Construction, LLC v. Costa

2026-07-07T08:17:35-08:00

A general contractor hired a subcontractor to perform electrical work on a marina expansion project in Bristol, Rhode Island. The subcontract specified that time was critical and required timely written notice of delays, as well as an indemnification clause. After the parties negotiated an expanded scope of work and the general contractor paid a deposit, the subcontractor failed to meet the estimated completion schedule and did not provide required delay notices. As a result, the town threatened to terminate the general contract. The general contractor then terminated the subcontract and hired a replacement. The contractor sued the subcontractor and its CEO in Providence County Superior Court, alleging breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and conversion, and sought damages and attorney’s fees. The defendants answered and asserted affirmative defenses. After repeated failures to comply with discovery orders and to retain new counsel following their attorney’s withdrawal, the Superior Court issued conditional orders of default, giving the defendants multiple opportunities to comply. When they did not, the court entered a default judgment for the contractor, including damages, costs, prejudgment interest, and attorney’s fees. The CEO appeared at some hearings but not others, raising concerns about notice and service, which were addressed by the trial justice, who instructed him to file a Rule 60 motion to vacate the default if he wished to contest notice. No such motion was filed. Both sides subsequently filed motions with the Rhode Island Supreme Court relating to remand and post-judgment relief. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed whether the trial justice abused discretion in entering the default judgment. It held that the defendants’ failure to file a Rule 60 motion or properly raise notice issues in the lower court precluded appellate review of those issues. The Court found no abuse of discretion in the entry of default and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The imposition of a cash bond as a condition for remand did not violate due process. View "Reagan Marine Construction, LLC v. Costa" on Justia Law

Chishti v. Spottiswoode

2026-07-07T07:32:04-08:00

Zia Chishti, formerly CEO of a technology company, and his wife brought claims against Tatiana Spottiswoode, her attorneys, and related parties. Chishti and Spottiswoode had a prior romantic relationship, and Spottiswoode was later employed by Chishti’s company under an arbitration agreement. In 2017, Spottiswoode accused Chishti of harassment and assault, leading to confidential arbitration, which resulted in an arbitral award in her favor. Years later, Spottiswoode was subpoenaed to testify before Congress about forced arbitration in sexual assault cases, where she recounted her experiences involving Chishti. After her testimony, Spottiswoode and her attorney made public statements to the media and on social media regarding the matter. Chishti alleged these statements were defamatory and part of a campaign to damage his reputation, causing him to resign from his executive roles. His wife also claimed loss of consortium. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court found that Spottiswoode’s statements before Congress were protected by legislative privilege under District of Columbia law, and that the post-hearing public statements were protected opinions or shielded by the fair reporting privilege and the First Amendment. The court also concluded that the other tort claims were duplicative of defamation, that the conspiracy and loss of consortium claims failed without a viable underlying tort, and that the breach of contract claims were barred by privilege or insufficiently pleaded. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The appellate court held that witness statements to Congress and related communications were absolutely privileged under District of Columbia law. It further held that post-hearing statements were protected as opinion or by fair reporting, and that related tort and contract claims failed for lack of an actionable underlying claim. The dismissal with prejudice was affirmed. View "Chishti v. Spottiswoode" on Justia Law

Angelo v. DC

2026-07-07T07:32:03-08:00

Several individuals who hold concealed-carry pistol licenses issued by the District of Columbia challenged a local law prohibiting licensed carriers from possessing firearms on public transportation, including the Metro system. Fearing prosecution if they carried their pistols on the Metro, these plaintiffs avoided using public transit and instead paid for more expensive private transportation. They alleged that this criminal statute violated their Second and Fifth Amendment rights and sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief against the District and several officials in both their official and personal capacities. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially denied the plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief, citing circuit precedent that required them to demonstrate a special law enforcement priority or heightened risk of prosecution. When the plaintiffs amended their complaint to include allegations of increased transportation costs and added defendants, the District Court dismissed the case for lack of standing. Specifically, it found the plaintiffs had not alleged facts indicating a credible and imminent threat of prosecution, and it rejected their economic injury as insufficient for standing. The court also dismissed damages claims against individual defendants, which plaintiffs abandoned. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the plaintiffs had standing for their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against all defendants (except one official capacity claim not appealed), as well as for damages against the District, because their ongoing economic injury—incurred by complying with the Metro Ban—constituted a concrete, imminent, and traceable harm. The Court affirmed the dismissal of damages claims against individual defendants, reversed the dismissal of the remaining claims, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Angelo v. DC" on Justia Law

Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund v. M & K Employee Solutions

2026-07-07T07:32:02-08:00

A group of affiliated truck dealerships in the Midwest operated through a complex structure of multiple limited liability companies. Each dealership location had a “Sales” company that owned assets and an “Employee Solutions” (ES) company that hired employees and leased them to the Sales company. The ES companies entered collective-bargaining agreements requiring pension contributions to a union fund. Over time, the ES companies stopped contributing and employing workers, transferring employees to newly created entities. One of the companies, ES Alsip, incurred withdrawal liability for ceasing contributions. The pension fund assessed over $6 million in liability, which was disputed and partially paid following an arbitration that substantially reduced the amount. Ultimately, higher courts reinstated the original liability. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to the pension fund, holding that ES Summit was liable for delinquent contributions for work performed at another dealership, ES Alsip’s withdrawal liability was properly calculated and subject to an increased interest rate, and that multiple affiliated entities and individuals were jointly and severally liable for the obligations. The court also imposed liability on successors and individual owners, the Bouchers, based on their house-flipping activities. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the delinquent-contribution claim against ES Summit was not adequately pleaded and reversed summary judgment on that issue. It affirmed the allocation of a partial payment to interest rather than principal, but reversed the application of an increased interest rate retroactively. The court affirmed the finding that each Sales entity was a single employer with its corresponding ES entity and upheld successor liability against Laborforce and ESI. However, it found genuine disputes of fact regarding the personal liability of the Bouchers and remanded that issue. View "Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund v. M & K Employee Solutions" on Justia Law

Wilbur-Ellis Company v. Gompert

2026-07-07T07:01:21-08:00

Four former employees of an agricultural products and services company resigned and soon after began working for a competitor. The company alleged that these employees breached their duty of loyalty, misappropriated trade secrets in violation of federal and state law, and tortiously interfered with its business relationships. The employees were paid by both companies for a two-week period during the transition. In total, at least eleven employees moved from the plaintiff company to the competitor during the same period. After the company filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska, several discovery disputes arose. The magistrate judge and the district court denied the company’s attempts to obtain discovery from the competitor before seeking discovery from the employees and found the company’s identification of trade secrets to be overly broad and nonspecific. The company’s subsequent motion to compel discovery from the employees was denied on procedural grounds for failing to follow court-ordered procedures, and the district court affirmed this decision. The company also unsuccessfully requested a stay of summary judgment, which the district court denied as untimely. On summary judgment, the district court dismissed most of the company’s claims, finding insufficient evidence to support the trade secrets, tortious interference, and most duty of loyalty claims, but allowed a limited claim regarding dual employment during the two-week period to proceed. The parties later stipulated to dismiss this remaining claim without prejudice. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s orders in full. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its discovery rulings or in denying a stay. It further held that summary judgment was properly granted for the employees on all claims due to the company’s failure to identify specific trade secrets, provide admissible evidence of breach, or substantiate tortious interference. View "Wilbur-Ellis Company v. Gompert" on Justia Law

Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Secord

2026-07-07T05:17:18-08:00

A group sought access to certain court forms used to notify election officials when a person under guardianship has been found incompetent to vote. These forms, known as Notice of Voting Eligibility (NVE) forms, contain personal information about the individual and details about the court’s finding of incompetency. The group submitted public records requests for completed NVE forms held by the Walworth County register in probate, seeking to identify individuals found incompetent to vote. The requests were denied, and the group filed a mandamus action to compel disclosure. The Walworth County Circuit Court denied the request, holding that NVE forms were confidential under Wisconsin law. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals initially reversed, but because of a prior, conflicting published appellate decision (Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Reynolds), the Wisconsin Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration. On remand, the Court of Appeals held it was bound by the Reynolds precedent and affirmed the circuit court’s denial. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case. It clarified the standard for mandamus actions in public records cases, holding that courts should focus solely on whether the requester has a legal right to the records, and not on other traditional mandamus elements. The court concluded that NVE forms are “court records pertinent to the finding of incompetency” and are therefore “closed” under Wisconsin Statute § 54.75, which protects the privacy of individuals in guardianship proceedings. As a result, the forms are exempt from disclosure under the public records law, the group has no legal right to access them, and the writ of mandamus must be denied. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Secord" on Justia Law

State ex rel. Mobley v. Banks

2026-07-07T05:00:57-08:00

An inmate submitted a written request to the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction for four specific records: emails between corrections officers about him, a “Certificate of Disposal,” an “Authorization for Crisis Precaution” form, and a “Mental Health Protocol I-8.” The institution’s public-information officer responded by informing the inmate that the emails and protocol could be provided if he paid the copying costs, the certificate of disposal did not exist, and the authorization-for-crisis-precaution form was not a public record. The inmate did not pay for the copies or inquire about the cost, but instead initiated a mandamus action seeking to compel production of all four records and requesting statutory damages. Prior to review by the Supreme Court of Ohio, the director moved to dismiss the suit. The court denied the motion, ordered an answer from the director, and required submission of the contested authorization-for-crisis-precaution form under seal for in camera review. The parties proceeded to submit evidence and briefs as scheduled. The Supreme Court of Ohio determined that the director had not proven the authorization-for-crisis-precaution form was exempt as a medical record under Ohio law, so the inmate was entitled to that record. However, the court denied the writ as to the emails and protocol, finding the records custodian had complied with the Public Records Act by agreeing to provide them upon advance payment of copying costs; the Act does not require proactive statements of cost. The writ was also denied for the certificate of disposal because the inmate did not prove it existed. The court further denied statutory damages, finding the director’s assertion of the medical-record exemption reasonable and consistent with public policy. The disposition was a grant of the writ in part and denial in part. View "State ex rel. Mobley v. Banks" on Justia Law

Adelanto Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Krause

2026-07-06T11:03:28-08:00

A former superintendent of a California school district, who later became an elected member of the district’s Board of Trustees, was subject to a workplace violence restraining order (WVRO) requested by the district on behalf of three employees. These employees, who worked closely with the superintendent, reported that he engaged in a persistent course of conduct that included angry outbursts, threats of termination, intrusive and inappropriate text messages, stalking behaviors, and unsolicited photographs. The conduct caused substantial emotional distress and fear among the employees, leading them to seek mental health treatment and report his actions to the police. After his termination, the superintendent continued to interact with the employees in ways they perceived as intimidating, including the placement of campaign signs near their homes and the publication of internal documents on social media. The Superior Court of San Bernardino County granted a temporary restraining order and, after a multi-day hearing, issued a WVRO prohibiting the superintendent from harassing, disturbing the peace of, or contacting the three employees. The WVRO imposed restrictions on his proximity to the employees and their workplace, allowed his attendance at board meetings only under specific conditions, and included a provision barring him from commenting on the WVRO at board meetings. The order was set to last four years, subject to early termination if he was no longer associated with the district. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that an employer’s right to seek a WVRO on behalf of employees is unwaivable under Civil Code section 3513, rejected arguments concerning insufficient evidence and violation of parental rights, and found sufficient evidence of a future threat of harassment. However, it determined that the WVRO’s prohibition on comments at board meetings was overbroad and violated First Amendment rights, and that the order’s four-year duration exceeded the statutory maximum. The court modified the order to remove the speech restriction and limit its duration to three years, then affirmed the WVRO as modified. View "Adelanto Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Krause" on Justia Law

Colorado Montana Wyoming State Area Conference of the NAACP v. Smith

2026-07-06T10:31:41-08:00

Following the 2020 presidential election, three individuals—Shawn Smith, Ashley Epp, and Holly Kasun—formed an unincorporated association called the United States Election Integrity Plan (USEIP) to investigate what they believed was widespread election fraud in Colorado. In 2021, USEIP organized volunteers to go door-to-door canvassing, asking voters questions about their voting history and, in some instances, about whom they voted for. The Colorado Montana Wyoming State Area Conference of the NAACP, the League of Women Voters of Colorado, and Mi Familia Vota (collectively, the Voter Organizations) filed suit against USEIP and its founders, alleging that these canvassing activities constituted voter intimidation. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted summary judgment for USEIP, holding that unincorporated associations could not be sued under the statutes invoked: Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. The district court then held a bench trial against the individual defendants. After the plaintiffs presented their case, the district court granted judgment on partial findings for the individuals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c), finding insufficient evidence that any defendant engaged in voter intimidation. The court denied the defendants’ subsequent motion for attorney’s fees. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of USEIP, holding that unincorporated associations can be sued under both Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act and § 1985. The appellate court found that the district court’s exclusion of USEIP significantly narrowed the scope of relevant evidence at trial, affecting the plaintiffs’ substantial rights. The Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for a new trial against all defendants. The related appeal regarding attorney’s fees was dismissed as moot. View "Colorado Montana Wyoming State Area Conference of the NAACP v. Smith" on Justia Law

Compeer Financial, ACA v. Corp. Amer. Lending, Inc.

2026-07-06T07:30:57-08:00

Compeer, a group of federally chartered farm credit associations, entered into a master participation agreement with Corporate America Lending, Inc. (CAL), under which Compeer paid CAL $58 million in exchange for the right to receive all payments due on a set of agricultural loans CAL had originated to Famoso Hills Ranch in California. Under the agreement, CAL was to promptly remit any payments or proceeds received on these loans to Compeer. When Famoso refinanced its loans and paid off the balance to CAL, CAL failed to notify Compeer or transfer the payoff proceeds as required and instead concealed receipt of the funds and withheld them as a negotiation tactic, eventually claiming a right to offset based on alleged damages suffered. Arbitration proceedings commenced, resulting in an award in favor of Compeer, finding it was unconditionally entitled to the payoff proceeds and that CAL had no legal basis to withhold them. The arbitration panel found for Compeer on its claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment. Compeer moved in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota to confirm the award and appoint a receiver to secure the funds. The district court confirmed the arbitration award, finding it final and enforceable, and appointed a receiver due to CAL’s repeated noncompliance and attempts to dissipate the funds. CAL appealed, arguing the award was nonfinal, violated public policy, and the receivership was improper due to a forum-selection clause and lack of necessity. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The court held that the arbitration award was final and confirmable, the public policy exception to vacatur under the Federal Arbitration Act did not require setting aside the award given the alternative equitable bases for Compeer’s recovery, and the district court acted within its discretion in appointing a receiver due to CAL’s conduct and the inadequacy of alternative remedies. View "Compeer Financial, ACA v. Corp. Amer. Lending, Inc." on Justia Law

Idler v. Idler

2026-07-06T07:18:36-08:00

A married couple with ten minor children separated, and the mother filed for divorce. During the marriage, the father engaged in a pattern of severe and chronic domestic violence, which was witnessed and at times experienced by the children. The father pled guilty to several criminal charges, including felony child abuse and domestic violence-related offenses, resulting in incarceration at the time of the divorce proceedings. The mother sought and was awarded sole legal and physical custody of the children. The divorce decree denied the father immediate visitation but established conditions for potential future contact. In dividing the marital property, the mother was awarded the marital home, while the father received the family business and was assigned nearly all marital debt, except for the home’s mortgage and related utilities. The District Court of Crook County held a bench trial and issued a divorce decree reflecting these terms. The father appealed, challenging, among other things, the division of property and debts, the restricted visitation, and aspects of the trial process. In his briefs, the father raised numerous issues but failed to provide developed legal arguments or cite authorities connecting the issues to the facts of his case. The mother responded that the appeal lacked cogent legal argument and requested attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case. Applying longstanding Wyoming law, the court found the father’s briefs did not comply with the requirement to present cogent arguments and pertinent authority. The court summarily affirmed the district court’s decree of divorce, declining to award attorney fees but granting costs to the mother. The main holding is that an appeal may be summarily affirmed when the appellant fails to present cogent argument or relevant authority, as required by the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure. View "Idler v. Idler" on Justia Law

LYTLE VS. SEPTEMBER TRUST, DATED MARCH 23, 1972

2026-07-02T10:07:43-08:00

Several trusts, including the Lytle Trust and September Trust, own homes in a subdivision governed by a property owners association. After the Lytle Trust secured judgments against the association, it attempted to collect from other property owners by recording abstracts of judgment against their homes. September Trust and other property owners sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, resulting in the court striking the abstracts and enjoining the Lytles from enforcing their judgments against the homes. The Lytles later sought to collect through a receivership, prompting September Trust to seek contempt sanctions. The court found the Lytles violated the injunction and held them in contempt, awarding attorney fees to September Trust for defending the contempt judgment. The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County awarded September Trust attorney fees for the contempt proceedings and for defending those awards on appeal. September Trust’s attorneys initially billed at rates of $260-$265 per hour, which the district court used in its first two fee awards. For the third fee award, September Trust requested fees at higher “market” rates, resulting in a substantial markup over the actual fees billed. The district court granted this request, awarding fees calculated at the higher rates. The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the appeal. The court held that, under Nevada’s contempt statute (NRS 22.100(3)), attorney fees awarded as compensation for civil contempt must be both reasonable and actually incurred. For parties with private counsel working at an agreed-upon hourly rate, the actual billing arrangement is a significant, though not necessarily controlling, factor in determining the reasonable fee. Because September Trust did not demonstrate its attorneys charged discounted rates for public-spirited or noneconomic reasons, the court found the higher-than-billed rates unjustified. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s third fee award, remanding for recalculation at the rates actually billed, and affirmed the remainder of the order. View "LYTLE VS. SEPTEMBER TRUST, DATED MARCH 23, 1972" on Justia Law

Doe v. Marysville Joint Unified School Dist.

2026-07-02T09:02:45-08:00

Several individuals who were former students at an elementary school within a California school district alleged that a school counselor sexually assaulted them between 1993 and 2001. These plaintiffs initially filed lawsuits regarding the alleged abuse in California state court, then voluntarily dismissed those actions without prejudice. On the same day as those state court dismissals, they filed a similar action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, alleging both state and federal claims. Before the federal court ruled on the defendant school district’s motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs again voluntarily dismissed the case, this time under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i), designating the dismissal as without prejudice. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a new action in California state court based on the same underlying facts. The school district demurred, arguing that the so-called two-dismissal rule in Federal Rule 41(a)(1)(B)—which states that a plaintiff who twice voluntarily dismisses claims is subject to an adjudication on the merits—operated as a bar to the new state court action. The Yuba County Superior Court agreed, sustaining the district’s demurrer without leave to amend, and entered a judgment of dismissal. The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed in a split decision, holding that the federal procedural rule precluded the state court claims. The Supreme Court of California reversed. The court held that Federal Rule 41(a)(1)(B) is a procedural rule that limits a plaintiff’s ability to refile the same claim in federal court but does not itself create a rule of claim preclusion applicable in state courts. Therefore, a second voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(B) does not bar a subsequent suit on the same state law claims in California state court. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Doe v. Marysville Joint Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

Gibson v. Gibson

2026-07-02T07:11:48-08:00

Delores Gibson created the Gibson Family Limited Partnership (GFLP) to distribute farmland to her children, with herself as general partner and her sons, Michael and Greg Gibson, as equal limited partners. Michael initiated multiple lawsuits regarding GFLP, including claims of breach of fiduciary duty and undue influence. In this third action, Michael alleged that Delores was unduly influenced by Greg and Joan Gibson, challenging a land transaction favoring Greg and implicating Robert Ronayne, an attorney involved in the sale. Michael’s central claim was that Delores lacked capacity, with Greg acting as de facto general partner and violating fiduciary duties. The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, Codington County, reviewed repeated discovery abuses by Michael’s counsel, including improper subpoenas for Delores’s medical records while a motion to quash was pending. The subpoenas failed to comply with the requirements of SDCL 15-6-45 (Rule 45). Michael’s counsel advanced an unsustainable interpretation of Rule 45(b), arguing that unless the court ruled on a motion to quash before the subpoena’s compliance date, he was entitled to the records. The court found that Michael’s counsel disregarded the rules, failed to accept responsibility, and obtained privileged medical records improperly. The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed whether the circuit court erred in dismissing the case as a sanction under Rule 41(b) for failure to comply with the rules of civil procedure. The Court held that Rule 45(b) requires forestalling compliance with subpoenas until the court has acted on a timely motion to quash, and that Michael’s counsel’s conduct constituted an egregious violation justifying dismissal. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal with prejudice and denial of the motion to reconsider. View "Gibson v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Trace Elements, Inc. v. Mackensen

2026-07-02T07:04:28-08:00

A married couple contracted with a design company to oversee renovations to their vacation rental property. After the company ended its work prematurely, the couple sued for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, and the company countersued for breach of contract and tortious interference with a business relationship. Before trial, the couple submitted a proposal for settlement to the company, offering to resolve all claims for a single lump sum. The company rejected this proposal, and after trial, the jury awarded the couple damages on their breach of contract claim. The company received nothing on its counterclaims. Following the verdict, the couple moved for attorney’s fees under section 768.79, Florida Statutes, which allows fees when a plaintiff’s settlement proposal is rejected and the plaintiff prevails by a sufficient margin. The Circuit Court denied their motion, finding the proposal for settlement invalid because it did not allocate the settlement amount separately to each plaintiff, as required by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(c)(3). On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that apportionment was not required for a joint proposal involving a unified, single claim. The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case because the Fourth District’s decision conflicted with the Second District Court of Appeal’s decision in Cobb v. Durando. The Supreme Court held that Rule 1.442(c)(3) requires apportionment for all joint proposals, even those involving a single, unified claim. The Court quashed the Fourth District's decision, approved the Second District’s approach in Cobb, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The holding requires strict compliance with the apportionment requirement in joint proposals for settlement under Florida law. View "Trace Elements, Inc. v. Mackensen" on Justia Law

In re: Stoudmire v. City of Birmingham

2026-07-02T05:30:46-08:00

A motorcyclist suffered severe injuries after crashing on Avenue V in Birmingham due to a defect in the road. He submitted a notice of claim to the City of Birmingham within six months as required by state law and later filed a negligence lawsuit, alleging the City failed to repair the defect after being notified. The key factual dispute involved whether the City had actual or constructive knowledge of the defect prior to the accident. The Jefferson Circuit Court reviewed the case and, after discovery, denied the City’s initial motion for summary judgment. The City later renewed its motion, attaching new evidence and seeking to strike some of the plaintiff’s evidence. The trial court struck several items, including an affidavit, an unsworn witness statement, and a patient-care report, but again denied summary judgment. The City’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting it to petition for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the petition, focusing on whether the City was entitled to municipal immunity. Applying a de novo standard, the court found that the admissible evidence did not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the City had actual or constructive knowledge of the defect. The court held that the plaintiff’s remaining evidence was speculative and insufficient to overcome the City’s prima facie case for immunity. The court granted the City’s petition, issued the writ of mandamus, and directed the trial court to vacate its order denying summary judgment and instead grant summary judgment in favor of the City. View "In re: Stoudmire v. City of Birmingham" on Justia Law

In re: Busby v. City of Tuskegee

2026-07-02T05:30:44-08:00

A group of individuals who had received traffic citations under a local ordinance enacted by the City of Tuskegee permitting automated photographic enforcement of traffic laws brought suit against the City, certain city officials, and JENOPTIK, the company involved in the installation and operation of the enforcement devices. The plaintiffs challenged the validity of the ordinance, raised constitutional concerns, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as damages, including tort claims for negligence, invasion of privacy, and fraud. The City later enacted resolutions cancelling outstanding citations, refunding fines, and ultimately suspending enforcement of the ordinance. The case was initially filed in the Macon Circuit Court. The City and JENOPTIK moved to dismiss, arguing lack of a justiciable controversy, mootness, lack of standing, and other grounds, including lack of personal jurisdiction over JENOPTIK. The trial court denied these motions to dismiss, treating them as motions under Rule 12 and excluding extraneous materials, but did not provide detailed reasoning. On review, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that because the plaintiffs either paid the fines or failed to contest the citations under the administrative procedures provided in the ordinance, and because the City subsequently nullified the citations and provided for reimbursement, their claims challenging the legality of the ordinance were moot. The Court directed the trial court to dismiss those claims. However, the Supreme Court denied the petitions insofar as they sought dismissal of the plaintiffs’ tort claims, holding that the City and JENOPTIK did not demonstrate a clear right to mandamus relief on those claims at this stage. The Court likewise declined to dismiss the tort claims against JENOPTIK for lack of personal jurisdiction based on the current record. View "In re: Busby v. City of Tuskegee" on Justia Law

Spencer v. Vapor Technology Association

2026-07-02T05:30:43-08:00

The plaintiffs, a trade association and a vape shop operator, filed suit challenging an Alabama law regulating electronic nicotine delivery systems (ENDS), which includes e-cigarettes and vapes. The law, effective June 1, 2025, established strict requirements for the sale of ENDS, including a product directory listing only approved products, mandates that products be manufactured in the United States or have federal FDA marketing authorization, and imposed significant penalties for violations. The plaintiffs claimed these regulations would cause them immediate and irreparable harm, including loss of profits, employees, and potential closure of their businesses due to prohibitions and penalties outlined in the law. The Montgomery Circuit Court initially granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) in favor of the plaintiffs, finding they would suffer irreparable harm and had no adequate remedy at law because the State defendants were protected by sovereign immunity. After a hearing, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction but extended the TRO pending appeal. The State defendants appealed, challenging the plaintiffs’ standing, while the plaintiffs cross-appealed the denial of the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed both appeals. It held that the plaintiffs had standing, as they faced concrete, particularized, and actual harm directly resulting from the enforcement of the Alabama law. However, the Court found the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of their constitutional claims, including implied preemption and dormant Commerce Clause challenges. The Court determined that the Alabama Act was not preempted by federal law and served legitimate state interests related to health and safety. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court's denial of the preliminary injunction. View "Spencer v. Vapor Technology Association" on Justia Law

1 Cono Contracting v. Lopez

2026-07-02T05:08:03-08:00

After the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court entered an award against Mauro Rubio and Cono Contracting, LLC in favor of Catarino Lopez, Rubio alleged the award was procured by fraud, irregularity, and was inequitable. Rubio’s attorney withdrew unexpectedly at trial, leaving Rubio unrepresented. Rubio claimed Lopez exaggerated his injuries and sought to vacate the award, citing Nebraska statutory and equitable grounds. The award had been filed in the District Court for Douglas County. Lopez moved to dismiss Rubio’s independent action in the district court, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to vacate the Workers’ Compensation Court’s award, asserting the district court’s authority was limited to enforcement. The district court agreed, finding it had no authority to vacate or modify the compensation court award and that Rubio’s complaint failed to state a claim for relief under § 25-2001. Rubio appealed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals. Prior to briefing, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, reasoning that the district court lacked jurisdiction to vacate the award and, consequently, the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. Rubio’s motion for rehearing was denied. The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the district court had equitable jurisdiction to vacate the compensation court’s award once it had been filed as a judgment in the district court, pursuant to § 48-188. The Court held that the district court’s jurisdiction was not limited to enforcement and that it could entertain an independent action to vacate such an award. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ dismissal and retained the case for further proceedings, allowing briefing on whether Rubio had stated a claim for relief. View "1 Cono Contracting v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Hernandez-Castrodad v. Steidel-Figueroa

2026-07-01T13:00:03-08:00

Plaintiffs had their property taken by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico through eminent domain. They received over two million dollars in compensation, including interest accrued up to the time of payment. However, they alleged a second violation occurred when the court-administered disbursement process failed to notify them of further accrued interest and deducted a 15% administrative fee from that interest. They challenged these practices as unconstitutional takings and violations of due process, seeking declaratory and equitable relief against the Administrator of the Administration of Tribunals. The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico initially dismissed most claims, finding plaintiffs lacked standing because they had not alleged an attempt to withdraw the accrued interest, making their injury speculative. After reconsideration, the court revived the claim challenging the deduction of administrative fees, but limited relief to prospective injunctive relief due to Eleventh Amendment constraints. The court ultimately granted summary judgment to the defendant, finding the administrative fee reasonable and not an unconstitutional taking, as plaintiffs provided no evidence to the contrary. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and confronted jurisdictional issues arising from Puerto Rico’s Title III bankruptcy under PROMESA. The court held that the administrative fee claim was void for violating the automatic stay provisions, as it amounted to a demand for property of the debtor (the Commonwealth), and dismissed that portion of the appeal. Regarding the interest claim, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, ruling plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to allege they sought disbursement or challenged existing procedures. The First Circuit thus dismissed the appeal from summary judgment and affirmed the district court's dismissal. View "Hernandez-Castrodad v. Steidel-Figueroa" on Justia Law

United States v. I-44 Truck Cntr & Wrecker Svc

2026-07-01T07:31:07-08:00

The defendant operated a trucking and towing business with a facility in Rolla, Missouri, where the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) conducted inspections and issued two citations for safety violations in June and October 2017. The first citation imposed a penalty of $5,541 and the second a penalty of $65,184 for failure to abate a prior violation. The defendant did not respond or pay either penalty, causing both citations to become final orders. After the penalties remained unpaid for more than 180 days, OSHA referred the debts to the Department of Treasury, which then referred them to private collection agencies and ultimately to the Department of Justice. Two demand letters were sent to the defendant in March 2022 seeking payment. In January 2023, the government filed suit under the Debt Collection Improvement Act (DCIA) to collect the debts, which had accrued to $124,567.78. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that the statute of limitations found in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 did not apply to collection actions under the DCIA. The court struck the defendant’s notice defense and granted summary judgment to the government. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss de novo. The appellate court held that § 2462’s five-year statute of limitations does apply to government actions seeking to collect civil penalties, even when proceeding under the DCIA. Because the penalties were punitive in nature and the government’s collection action was filed more than five years after the penalties became final orders, the action was time-barred. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the government’s collection action. View "United States v. I-44 Truck Cntr & Wrecker Svc" on Justia Law

Texas Tobacco Barn v. HHS

2026-06-30T15:30:30-08:00

Texas Tobacco Barn operated a laboratory and retail shop in Lubbock, Texas, manufacturing and selling e-liquids and vape products. After applying for authorization to sell over 2,200 vape products, including Barn Brewed Beetle Juice e-liquids, the FDA denied approval and warned that these products were considered “adulterated” and “misbranded.” Despite assurances from Texas Tobacco Barn that it would cease sales, a subsequent FDA inspection revealed continued sale of unauthorized products. The FDA initiated proceedings seeking a civil penalty of $19,192 for violations. The enforcement action began with an administrative hearing before an HHS administrative law judge (ALJ), who reviewed evidence including inspection photos and testimony from an FDA inspector. Texas Tobacco Barn admitted that the e-liquids lacked FDA authorization but disputed the inspector’s findings and challenged the FDA’s regulatory authority. The ALJ concluded that the FDA proved its case by a preponderance of the evidence and imposed the civil penalty. On appeal, the HHS Departmental Appeals Board affirmed the ALJ’s ruling, agreeing the ALJ lacked jurisdiction to address constitutional challenges but offering advisory comments on those defenses. Reviewing the agency’s final decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered Texas Tobacco Barn’s statutory and constitutional arguments. The court rejected the nondelegation challenge, citing its own precedent and Supreme Court guidance clarifying FDA’s explicit authority to regulate vape products. However, the Fifth Circuit held that the administrative process violated Texas Tobacco Barn’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The court determined that civil penalties for FDCA violations are legal in nature and do not fall under the public-rights exception that would permit agency adjudication without a jury. As a result, the Fifth Circuit granted the petition and vacated the agency’s decision. View "Texas Tobacco Barn v. HHS" on Justia Law

In re Estate of Pfeifer-Murphy

2026-06-30T13:38:36-08:00

The dispute centered on farmland in Chouteau County, Montana, inherited by Linda Reynolds and Gerald Cook, who formed the Cook-Reynolds Partnership to lease and operate the land. Gerald and his wife, Karin Cook, became involved in probate proceedings in Idaho, where Karin, as personal representative of the Estate of Ann Lafferty Pfeifer-Murphy, misappropriated funds to benefit herself, Gerald, and their company. Gerald executed promissory notes pledging land in Chouteau County as collateral, but these actions did not reference the Partnership. In Idaho, the Estate and its beneficiaries sought restraining orders against Gerald, Karin, their company Pneumex, Inc., and the Partnership, but only Gerald was served regarding the Partnership. Subsequently, Gerald and Karin entered into a settlement agreement confessing to a judgment exceeding $1 million, with Gerald purporting to bind the Partnership as a debtor. The Idaho court entered judgment against the Partnership and others. The Estate domesticated this judgment in Montana’s Twelfth Judicial District Court and sought to execute it against the Partnership. Linda, the managing partner, challenged the Idaho judgment, arguing lack of personal jurisdiction and that she had no knowledge or authorization of Gerald’s actions on behalf of the Partnership. The District Court held a hearing but ultimately the Partnership’s motion for relief was deemed denied by operation of rule due to the court’s inaction. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the District Court’s denial de novo. It held that the Idaho court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Partnership because Gerald did not have authority to bind the Partnership in the proceedings, and Linda neither authorized nor ratified Gerald’s actions. The Montana Supreme Court also found the Partnership’s motion was made within a reasonable time. The Court reversed the District Court’s denial and vacated the Idaho judgment as to the Partnership, while leaving the judgment intact as to other debtors. View "In re Estate of Pfeifer-Murphy" on Justia Law

Smith v. Super. Ct.

2026-06-30T12:03:26-08:00

A large group of former employees alleged that they suffered racial discrimination and harassment while working at a Tesla manufacturing facility. These individuals were initially part of a class action lawsuit seeking relief under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, claiming Tesla maintained a factory-wide policy of ignoring and failing to address pervasive racial harassment. After the trial court in that class action certified only certain common issues and ordered that each worker seeking damages must file a separate lawsuit, Tesla’s former employees filed five new lawsuits, each joining between 54 and 98 plaintiffs, all making similar allegations regarding their experiences at the same facility. In response to the five new actions, the Superior Court of Alameda County issued an order to show cause regarding whether the plaintiffs were improperly joined. After briefing and argument, the trial court found misjoinder, dismissed all plaintiffs except the first-named in each suit, and ordered the remaining plaintiffs to file separate, single-plaintiff lawsuits. The court justified its decision by citing the impracticality of managing such large, multi-plaintiff cases and the anticipated differences in each plaintiff’s experiences. The plaintiffs then filed petitions for writ of mandate challenging the misjoinder rulings. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that the trial court erred in finding misjoinder under California’s permissive joinder statute (Code of Civil Procedure section 378). The Court of Appeal clarified that plaintiffs alleging harm from a common policy or practice, as in this case, could join their claims in a single action. The appellate court further held that the trial court lacked authority under section 379.5 to dismiss properly joined plaintiffs solely due to concerns about case management or judicial efficiency. The Court of Appeal granted the petitions and directed the trial court to allow the multi-plaintiff complaints to proceed. View "Smith v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Osorio-Calderon v. Sandstone

2026-06-30T11:01:22-08:00

Jose Osorio-Calderon, a federal inmate sentenced for coercion and enticement of a minor, participated in recidivism reduction programs while incarcerated and earned significant time credits under the First Step Act (FSA). These credits advanced his projected release date and made him eligible for prerelease custody starting July 3, 2024. Osorio-Calderon initially sought placement in New York, but the United States Probation Office found his sister’s residence unsuitable. The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) then explored options in Puerto Rico but determined, due to local ordinances and proximity to schools and daycare centers, that residential reentry center placement was not feasible. Despite eligibility, Osorio-Calderon remains incarcerated after exhausting administrative remedies. The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota reviewed Osorio-Calderon's habeas petition, which sought to compel the BOP to transfer him to prerelease custody based on his earned time credits. A magistrate judge recommended granting the petition, reasoning that the FSA’s language required the transfer. However, the district court rejected that recommendation and dismissed the petition, holding that, despite the FSA’s mandatory language, it lacked jurisdiction to review BOP’s placement decisions due to statutory preclusion in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. It held that, although the FSA directs the BOP to transfer eligible prisoners to prerelease custody, Congress preserved the BOP’s broad discretion under § 3621(b) and expressly barred judicial review of placement decisions. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, concluding that Osorio-Calderon's petition sought relief that is not reviewable by any court, regardless of the FSA’s mandatory language. View "Osorio-Calderon v. Sandstone" on Justia Law

Bedell v. Parsons

2026-06-30T09:05:02-08:00

Two unmarried individuals were in a long-term romantic relationship and jointly purchased real property in Idaho, with both names appearing on the purchase and sale agreement and the warranty deed. During their relationship, they lived together in California, and Bedell contributed to household expenses but not to rent or mortgage. After their relationship ended, Parsons attempted to quitclaim her interest in the Idaho property to a nonprofit, which then transferred it back to her. Bedell made the property his primary residence and filed suit seeking to quiet title in his name or, alternatively, to partition the property entirely to himself. Parsons counterclaimed, asserting she had a 50% interest and sought to quiet title in both names. The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District reviewed a series of summary judgment motions. It determined that Parsons had a 50% ownership interest in the property, relying on the presumption of equal shares when both parties’ names are on a deed without specified percentages, as set forth in Demoney-Hendrickson v. Larsen. The court found Bedell had not rebutted this presumption, ordered partition by sale, and awarded Parsons attorney fees. On reconsideration, the court maintained its conclusions, and later held that Bedell had waived any claim for contribution by not pleading it. The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case. It held that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to Parsons because genuine disputes of material fact existed regarding the parties’ intent about their respective ownership interests. The Supreme Court clarified that Idaho law does not preclude a co-tenant from having a 0% ownership interest, and the presumption of equal shares can be rebutted by evidence of the parties’ intent. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s rulings on summary judgment, reconsideration, and attorney fees, but affirmed the finding that Bedell had waived any contribution claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Bedell v. Parsons" on Justia Law

Utah Political Watch v. Musselman

2026-06-30T08:32:44-08:00

A journalist with over twenty-five years of experience covering the Utah Legislature previously received media credentials while working for established news organizations. After founding an independent news outlet, he applied for a media credential under a new policy that categorically excluded bloggers, independent media, and freelance journalists from receiving credentials. This exclusion prevented him from accessing restricted areas and events within the Capitol that were available only to credentialed journalists, limiting his ability to gather news directly from legislative press conferences and availabilities. The plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah against legislative officials, alleging that the credentialing policy was unconstitutional as both facial and as-applied viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment, along with claims of retaliation, prior restraint, and vagueness. The district court dismissed all claims, including denying a preliminary injunction as moot. The court reasoned, in part, that there was no protected speech implicated by the policy and that the plaintiff’s continued reporting without a credential undercut the retaliation claim. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that the district court erred in dismissing both the facial and as-applied viewpoint discrimination claims. The appellate court found that the plaintiff plausibly alleged denial of access based on his viewpoint and that the exclusion from a government-created forum for journalists implicated protected speech. The court remanded those claims for further proceedings. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the retaliation, prior restraint, and vagueness claims, finding no plausible allegation of chilling effect and determining the policy did not regulate expression sufficiently to support a prior restraint or vagueness challenge. View "Utah Political Watch v. Musselman" on Justia Law

City of Grand Junction & Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Nicola

2026-06-30T06:32:55-08:00

Danielle Nicola suffered severe brain trauma after being struck by a car while crossing a street at night in Grand Junction, Colorado. She remained unconscious and died nineteen days after the accident. No conservator or guardian was appointed for her during the period between the accident and her death. Nearly two years after Danielle’s death, her father, John Nicola, acting as the personal representative of her estate, filed survival claims against the City of Grand Junction and Public Service Company of Colorado, alleging negligence and premises liability due to faulty street lighting and inadequate signage at the accident site. The District Court for Mesa County dismissed Nicola’s claims, determining they were untimely under section 13-81-103(1)(b), which requires survival claims for persons under disability to be brought within one year of their death. Nicola appealed, and the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, holding that subsection (1)(b) applied only when a person under disability had a legal representative and died after the expiration of the statute of limitations but less than two years after the representative was appointed. The Court of Appeals concluded that, since Danielle had no legal representative, the one-year limitation did not apply, and Nicola’s claims were timely under the general limitations provision for survival actions. The Supreme Court of Colorado granted certiorari and reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Supreme Court held that section 13-81-103(1)(b) applies regardless of whether a legal representative was appointed, and that the phrase “the expiration of the period of limitation in [subsection (1)(a)]” refers to the applicable statute of limitations or any extended period if a legal representative was appointed. Because Nicola filed the claims almost two years after Danielle’s death, the claims were barred by the one-year limitation in subsection (1)(b). The Supreme Court remanded the case for reinstatement of the district court’s dismissal and determination of attorney fees. View "City of Grand Junction & Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Nicola" on Justia Law

Waukesha County v. R. D. T.

2026-06-30T05:24:22-08:00

An individual was subject to involuntary civil commitment under Wisconsin law due to findings that he was mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and dangerous. After several recommitments, his case was transferred to a new county when he moved. As his most recent recommitment period approached its end, the county petitioned for another recommitment. At the hearing, the county presented testimony from a social worker and a forensic psychiatrist, both of whom described the individual's mental health history and risks associated with discontinuing medication. The social worker and psychiatrist also submitted written reports containing information based on records and statements from others; the individual's attorney objected to admission of these reports on hearsay grounds, but did not object to the witnesses’ testimony. The Waukesha County Circuit Court found the individual dangerous under relevant statutory standards and granted the recommitment petition, entering an order for a one-year recommitment. The individual appealed, arguing that the circuit court improperly relied on inadmissible hearsay and that non-hearsay evidence was insufficient. While the appeal was pending, another recommitment order was entered. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as moot, reasoning that vacating the previous order would have no practical effect, but also opined any errors at the hearing were harmless. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case. It held that the appeal was not moot because vacating the expired recommitment order could affect collateral consequences, including the individual’s liability for the cost of care and his ability to restore firearm rights. On the merits, the Supreme Court concluded that any error in admitting the objected-to reports was harmless, as the unobjected-to testimony alone strongly supported the circuit court’s finding of dangerousness. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ dismissal but affirmed the circuit court’s recommitment order. View "Waukesha County v. R. D. T." on Justia Law

Creason v Elanco US Inc.

2026-06-29T10:00:53-08:00

Clayton Creason worked as an engineer for Elanco US from November 2017 to November 2021. During his employment, Elanco offered a standard paid vacation benefit and an optional “vacation buy” program that allowed employees to purchase an extra week of paid leave by accepting a reduction in weekly salary. Creason participated in this program, reducing his pay by approximately $84 per week for the additional vacation week. After resigning, he filed suit under the Indiana Wage Payment Statute, claiming Elanco owed him the amount of the salary reduction, arguing the program required a written assignment of wages with notice of the right to rescind, as specified by Indiana law. The suit was initially filed in Indiana state court, with Creason seeking class certification for similarly situated employees. Elanco removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana under the Class Action Fairness Act. The district court denied Creason’s belated motion to remand, finding his delay in seeking remand unreasonable after substantial progress in federal court. The court then dismissed some claims on the pleadings and granted summary judgment to Elanco on the remaining issues, concluding the vacation buy program did not constitute an assignment of wages and that Elanco’s policies concerning unused pandemic-related vacation hours did not violate Indiana law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court acted within its discretion in denying the remand request due to Creason’s unreasonable delay. On the merits, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that the vacation buy program was not an assignment of wages under Indiana law and that Elanco was not obligated to pay out unused COVID-related vacation hours. The district court’s decision was affirmed. View "Creason v Elanco US Inc." on Justia Law

Pavlovich v. Gaiman

2026-06-29T08:30:54-08:00

The plaintiff, a New Zealand citizen who currently resides in Scotland, alleged that the defendant, a United Kingdom citizen and lawful permanent resident of Wisconsin, repeatedly sexually assaulted her while she was employed as a live-in nanny for the defendant’s family in New Zealand. The plaintiff claimed she was economically distressed and intermittently unhoused at the time, and accepted the job for secure employment and housing. She brought federal claims under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act and Wisconsin common law claims, seeking damages for the alleged assaults and related harms. After the plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, the defendant moved to dismiss the case on two grounds: forum non conveniens, arguing that New Zealand was a more appropriate forum, and failure to state a federal claim, contending the civil-remedy provision of the Act does not apply extraterritorially. The district court granted the motion to dismiss under forum non conveniens, finding that New Zealand was an available, adequate, and more convenient forum with a stronger connection to the dispute. The district court did not address the extraterritoriality issue. The plaintiff appealed the dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal under forum non conveniens. The appellate court concluded there was no abuse of discretion in the district court’s findings that New Zealand was both an available and adequate forum, and it properly balanced public and private interest factors. The Seventh Circuit held that New Zealand’s connection to the dispute was stronger than that of the United States and that international comity concerns supported dismissal. The judgment was affirmed and the action dismissed without prejudice. View "Pavlovich v. Gaiman" on Justia Law

Stabosz v. Friedman

2026-06-26T10:34:10-08:00

A county attorney sued the county auditor for defamation after the auditor made statements about the attorney’s professional conduct in emails and social media posts. After a five-day jury trial, the jury returned a verdict for the auditor, finding in his favor. The plaintiff then filed a motion to correct error, raising several arguments for a new trial, including that the jury was incorrectly instructed and that the court improperly excluded certain evidence. The trial court did not rule on the motion within thirty days, so under Indiana Trial Rule 53.3(A), the motion was deemed denied. However, the trial court subsequently belatedly granted the motion and ordered a new trial based on the jury instruction issue, then vacillated between rescinding and reinstating its order. Following these developments, the auditor appealed, arguing that the trial court’s belated order was void because the motion had already been deemed denied, and that the motion lacked merit. The attorney, still within his time to appeal the deemed denial, cross-appealed, raising not only the issues in his motion to correct error but also two additional evidentiary arguments. The Indiana Court of Appeals vacated the belated order, reinstated the jury verdict, and held that the attorney’s cross-appeal was limited to the issues raised in his motion to correct error. The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that when a nonmovant appeals after a belated grant of a motion to correct error, and the movant’s deadline to appeal the deemed denial has not yet expired, the movant may cross-appeal any issues preserved in the trial court—not just those in the motion to correct error. The court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to consider the additional cross-appeal issues, and otherwise affirmed the appellate court’s decision. View "Stabosz v. Friedman" on Justia Law

FAMILY DOLLAR STORES OF TEXAS, LLC v. JLMH INVESTMENTS, LLC

2026-06-26T06:22:15-08:00

The dispute involved neighboring commercial properties in Fort Worth, Texas. After a store was constructed on one property, the adjacent property began to experience flooding during rainfall, which led to silt and trash accumulation and eventually damaged the building and parking lot. The owner of the flooded property documented the issue over several years and sought remedies from the city, but received no resolution. Engineering reports concluded that the store’s drainage system caused increased groundwater and stormwater runoff onto the neighbor’s land. The owner of the flooded property sued the store owner and related parties for nuisance, trespass, negligent and intentional diversion of water, and violations of the Texas Water Code, seeking damages and permanent injunctive relief. Two groups of defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that all claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The District Court for Tarrant County granted both motions for summary judgment in separate orders, one of which explicitly stated it was final and disposed of all parties and claims. The trial court subsequently issued a clarifying order allowing for a permissive interlocutory appeal but did not clarify whether the summary judgment orders’ finality was undone. The Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas determined that the trial court’s summary judgment was final and accepted appellate jurisdiction. It held that while the two-year statute of limitations barred claims for damages, it did not bar injunctive relief to abate a nuisance. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Texas held that appellate jurisdiction was proper because the summary judgment order was expressly final and was not undone by the subsequent clarifying order. On the merits, the Supreme Court determined that injunctive relief cannot be granted without an underlying cause of action, and that the two-year statute of limitations applies to all claims for damages and injunctions in this case. The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the trial court’s judgment was reinstated. View "FAMILY DOLLAR STORES OF TEXAS, LLC v. JLMH INVESTMENTS, LLC" on Justia Law

Outagamie County v. M.J.B.

2026-06-26T05:53:52-08:00

In this case, an individual referred to as Mark was detained following property damage allegations and later underwent an inpatient psychiatric evaluation to assess his competency for trial. As his mental health concerns continued, Outagamie County initiated involuntary civil commitment proceedings under Wisconsin law. After his emergency detention, two examiners were appointed to assess Mark and submit written reports. One examiner’s report was not made accessible to Mark’s counsel until less than 48 hours before the final hearing, because the filing was delayed due to a holiday. The Outagamie County Circuit Court determined that, despite the delayed access to the report by Mark’s counsel, the court retained competency to proceed. Neither party intended to rely on the late report, and Mark’s counsel declined to seek a postponement. The court found the statutory violation did not affect Mark’s substantial rights and entered orders for involuntary commitment and involuntary medication and treatment. Mark appealed, and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the failure to provide timely access to the examiner’s report deprived the circuit court of competency. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case. It held that the statutory requirement for counsel to have access to the examiners’ reports at least 48 hours before the final hearing is not central to Chapter 51’s statutory scheme governing involuntary commitment, and thus, noncompliance does not strip the circuit court of competency. The court further held that any error in failing to meet the 48-hour requirement was subject to harmless error review. Because the delay in access did not affect Mark’s substantial rights or the outcome, the error was harmless. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the circuit court’s orders. View "Outagamie County v. M.J.B." on Justia Law

Moore v. Capesius

2026-06-26T05:30:53-08:00

After suffering personal injuries in a motor-vehicle accident, a plaintiff obtained a default judgment in 2005 against the defendant for $1,500,000. More than a decade later, the plaintiff revived the judgment and secured a writ of garnishment against the defendant’s wages through her employer, a property management company. Wage garnishment payments were made for nearly eight years. In 2024, the employer sold most of its assets to another company, and the defendant’s employment with the original employer ended. Following this, the employer (now renamed) moved to be released from its garnishment obligations, arguing that, since the defendant was no longer employed, it held no further wages subject to garnishment. The motion was signed by the employer’s attorney but did not include a separate affidavit as typically required by statute. The Madison Circuit Court granted the motion the next day, releasing the employer from the garnishment. On that same day, the plaintiff requested the court to set aside the release, citing the lack of affidavit and seeking the right to orally examine the employer under state law. The plaintiff also moved to substitute the successor employer as garnishee. The trial court did not rule on these motions within the required period, so they were deemed denied by operation of law. The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. The court held that the employer’s amended answer, though lacking a formal affidavit, substantially complied with statutory requirements due to the attorney’s certification. However, the trial court erred by not granting the plaintiff’s timely request to orally examine the employer under the applicable statute. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and instructed it to permit the oral examination as required by law. View "Moore v. Capesius" on Justia Law

Common Cause v. Evnen

2026-06-26T05:08:06-08:00

The case concerned a request from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) for Nebraska’s statewide voter registration list, including sensitive personal information. Before the Secretary of State released the list, a membership organization and a registered voter filed suit, seeking to block or limit the disclosure, alleging that such release would violate Nebraska statutes restricting the dissemination and use of voter information. They argued that the DOJ was not entitled to all the requested data under federal law and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. In the District Court for Lancaster County, the Secretary moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing and had failed to join the DOJ as an indispensable party. The court agreed that the plaintiffs did not have standing, finding that they had not alleged a concrete injury and that concerns over possible future public disclosure or misuse were speculative. The court also found that Common Cause had not adequately pleaded associational standing. However, the court rejected the Secretary’s argument that the DOJ (or the U.S. Attorney General) was an indispensable party. The case was dismissed without prejudice on standing grounds, and the plaintiffs’ motions for a temporary injunction and summary judgment were denied. On appeal, while the matter was pending before the Nebraska Supreme Court, the Secretary released the voter list to the DOJ. The Nebraska Supreme Court determined that the case was moot because the list had already been disclosed, eliminating any live controversy or possibility of meaningful relief. The court declined to apply the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine and dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal. The main holding is that, due to the completed disclosure, the action no longer presented a justiciable issue. View "Common Cause v. Evnen" on Justia Law

Betanco v. Living Spaces Furniture, LLC

2026-06-25T12:32:55-08:00

The plaintiff worked as a delivery driver for a furniture distribution company, transporting goods from California warehouses to customers. The furniture was sourced both within and outside California, including from Mexico, and arrived at the distribution centers before being delivered to customers. The plaintiff signed an independent contractor agreement with a delivery-service provider that included an arbitration clause, and subsequently filed two lawsuits against the furniture company and the delivery company: a class action alleging wage and hour violations, and a separate action under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) for civil penalties. The Alameda County Superior Court reviewed the defendants’ omnibus motion to compel arbitration of all claims and to dismiss the plaintiff’s representative PAGA claims. The trial court found that, although the arbitration agreement was valid and enforceable and the defendants had not waived their right to arbitrate, the plaintiff qualified as a “transportation worker” under section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and was thus exempt from FAA coverage. As a result, state law governed the enforcement of the arbitration agreement. The court ordered certain claims (reimbursement of expenses, wage statement claims, and unfair competition) to arbitration, but allowed wage claims to proceed in court under Labor Code section 229. It denied the motion to dismiss the representative PAGA claims, citing California Supreme Court precedent, and stayed both actions pending arbitration of individual claims. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed these consolidated appeals. The court held that the plaintiff is a transportation worker exempt from the FAA because he played a direct and active role in the interstate movement of goods, even though his deliveries were intrastate and retail in nature. The court affirmed that the plaintiff has standing to pursue non-individual PAGA claims in court, following Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. The order by the trial court was affirmed. View "Betanco v. Living Spaces Furniture, LLC" on Justia Law

Scott v. City of Daytona Beach

2026-06-25T12:31:58-08:00

Four individuals who regularly engage in panhandling in Daytona Beach, Florida, challenged the city’s 2019 ordinance that imposed wide-ranging restrictions on panhandling. They argued that the law, which defined panhandling as in-person requests for immediate donations, and which banned or restricted this conduct in various locations and circumstances, violated their First Amendment rights. Each plaintiff relied on panhandling for basic needs and had faced threats, arrests, or other enforcement actions as a result of the ordinance. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida reviewed the case and granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The court found that the ordinance’s challenged provisions were content-based, failed strict scrutiny, and thus violated the First Amendment. It issued a declaratory judgment, a universal injunction against enforcement of the challenged provisions, and awarded damages as agreed by the parties. The City of Daytona Beach appealed these decisions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the ordinance imposed content-based restrictions on speech by targeting only in-person requests for immediate donations, distinguishing them from other types of solicitation. The court found that several provisions could not withstand strict scrutiny, as the city had less speech-restrictive means to achieve its public health and safety goals. However, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge only some, not all, of the ordinance’s provisions and that the district court’s remedy was overbroad. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s ruling as to the provisions where at least one plaintiff had standing, vacated it in other respects, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The damages award was affirmed because at least one provision was found unconstitutional. View "Scott v. City of Daytona Beach" on Justia Law

Amacher v. City of Tullahoma

2026-06-25T12:30:39-08:00

An elected official in a Tennessee city, after selling her home and residing outside city limits for an extended period, faced a legal challenge to her eligibility to serve based on the city’s residency requirement. The challenge was initiated after a citizen petition, supported by over two hundred signatures, prompted the district attorney to file a quo warranto petition seeking her removal from office. Although she later purchased an unimproved lot in the city and began construction of a new home, questions remained about her intent to return and her actual residency during the contested period. The Tennessee state court found her claims of living on the undeveloped property unconvincing but ultimately determined that her efforts to build a residence demonstrated just enough intent to return, allowing her to retain her office. Following this outcome, the official sued two citizens, the city, the mayor, and the city administrator in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, alleging First Amendment retaliation and conspiracy for their roles in initiating the removal proceedings, along with a state law malicious prosecution claim. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the federal claims, holding that she failed to show a conspiracy or retaliation connected to her protected speech, and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claim. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that, when a claim of First Amendment retaliation is based on the initiation of a civil action such as a quo warranto petition, the plaintiff must show a lack of probable cause for that action. The court concluded that probable cause existed to support the quo warranto petition, as there were reasonable grounds to doubt the official’s residency. Therefore, the court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants and found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s handling of discovery deadlines. View "Amacher v. City of Tullahoma" on Justia Law

Morris v. Blanche

2026-06-25T12:30:38-08:00

A lawful permanent resident who had fled civil war in Liberia and become a U.S. resident in 2016 was convicted twice under Michigan law for possessing a loaded firearm in a vehicle, and later for embezzlement. Following his most recent conviction, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings. At his removal hearing, his attorney conceded removability and applied for cancellation of removal. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied this relief, focusing solely on the discretionary factors, as eligibility was uncontested. The petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing that the IJ should have granted cancellation based on the equitable balance of factors. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision. Subsequently, represented by new counsel, the petitioner filed a motion to reconsider and reopen, alleging ineffective assistance by prior counsel and challenging whether his Michigan firearm conviction qualified as a removable firearms offense under federal law. He included supporting documents for his ineffective assistance claim. The Department of Homeland Security also moved to reopen and dismiss the proceedings, citing changed circumstances. The BIA denied both motions, finding the petitioner had not complied with procedural requirements for ineffective assistance claims—specifically, he failed to provide evidence that notice and a bar complaint had been sent. The BIA also denied the government’s motion, noting it lacked explanation or supporting new facts. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. It dismissed the petitioner’s first petition, holding that his arguments were either unexhausted or jurisdictionally barred. The court denied the second petition, finding the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying relief for ineffective assistance due to lack of procedural compliance, and also properly denied the government’s motion to reopen and dismiss for lack of supporting evidence. View "Morris v. Blanche" on Justia Law

FS Medical Supplies, LLC v. Tanner Pharma UK Limited

2026-06-25T10:30:26-08:00

During the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, a limited liability company (LLC), FS Medical Supplies, entered into a contract to supply personal protective equipment and related products to TannerGAP, Inc. and Tanner Pharma UK Limited for distribution. FS Medical later discovered that the Tanner entities had contracted directly with one of its suppliers, prompting FS Medical to sue for breach of contract. Initially, FS Medical brought suit in California state court, but the defendants removed the case to federal court, where it was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. FS Medical then filed two actions in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, asserting diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3). FS Medical alleged that its members were citizens of Texas and California, and later acknowledged that one member was a citizen of China. The defendants included both U.S. citizens domiciled in North Carolina and a United Kingdom corporation. After limited discovery and amendment of the complaint, the district court, following a magistrate judge’s recommendation, dismissed the actions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the presence of both domestic and foreign members in the plaintiff LLC destroyed diversity jurisdiction. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that, under § 1332(a)(3), complete diversity requires at least one U.S. citizen on each side of the action. Because FS Medical, as an LLC, had both domestic and foreign members at the time the complaints were filed, and because there were foreign defendants as well, the suit was not between “citizens of different States.” The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal and declined to grant relief under North Carolina’s savings statute, finding it lacked jurisdiction to do so. View "FS Medical Supplies, LLC v. Tanner Pharma UK Limited" on Justia Law

Danduran v. Eddy Cty. Zoning Bd.

2026-06-25T09:10:43-08:00

Larry Danduran attended public meetings held by the Eddy County Zoning Board and the Eddy County Commissioners to consider amendments to Eddy County’s wind-energy zoning regulations. He raised concerns about potential conflicts of interest among members of both bodies and alleged that public comment was improperly restricted during the decision-making process. Despite his objections, the Zoning Board recommended, and the County Commission adopted, the proposed amendments. After a grievance hearing failed to change the outcome, Danduran filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to void the zoning amendments, require recusals for conflicted officials, and obtain costs and other relief. The District Court of Eddy County, Southeast Judicial District, reviewed the case. The County moved to dismiss Danduran’s amended complaint, arguing that any challenge to a zoning decision must be brought through the exclusive statutory appeal procedures outlined in North Dakota law. Danduran had initially filed a timely statutory appeal under N.D.C.C. § 28-34-01 but voluntarily dismissed it with prejudice. The district court concluded that his claims, though framed as statutory and constitutional violations, substantively challenged the validity of the rezoning proceedings and decision. The court ruled it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Danduran had failed to properly pursue the exclusive statutory remedy. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Supreme Court held that when a statutory appeal process is available to challenge a local governing body’s zoning decision, that process is the exclusive remedy. Collateral attacks through separate actions for declaratory or injunctive relief are not permitted. The Supreme Court found that Danduran’s claims, despite their characterization, fell within the scope of the exclusive statutory review process, and because he did not pursue that remedy, dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was proper. View "Danduran v. Eddy Cty. Zoning Bd." on Justia Law

Fischer v. Fischer-Olson

2026-06-25T07:17:57-08:00

A South Dakota general partnership, along with two individual partners, claimed they had made a series of loans exceeding $1 million to a corporation run by family members during a period when that corporation was engaged in costly litigation. The loans, according to the partnership, were informally made and not fully documented by promissory notes. After the corporation prevailed in its lawsuit and collected on a judgment, the partnership brought action to recover the loaned amounts. The defendants acknowledged receiving some funds but argued those had been repaid and contended that other claimed loan balances were fictitious. The Second Judicial Circuit Court in Lincoln County, South Dakota, oversaw the trial. The jury found in favor of the partnership, awarding $849,550 in damages. The court refused to instruct the jury on the statute of frauds, as requested by the defendants, and also declined their proposed instruction regarding the requirement to prove contract damages with reasonable certainty. After trial, the court denied the partnership’s request for prejudgment interest, citing the absence of a jury finding on the date of loss. The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. It held that whether a writing satisfies the statute of frauds is a question of law, not fact, and that the emails and testimony presented were sufficient to satisfy the evidentiary requirements of the statute. Moreover, the court determined that judicial estoppel precluded the defendants from denying the indebtedness after previously acknowledging the same loans as part of their damages claim in earlier litigation. The court found no abuse of discretion in the damages instruction given and concluded that any error was non-prejudicial. Finally, it held that the plaintiffs had waived their right to prejudgment interest by not securing a jury finding on the date of loss. The judgment was affirmed. View "Fischer v. Fischer-Olson" on Justia Law

State v. Ogden

2026-06-25T07:17:56-08:00

A man was stopped by South Dakota wildlife conservation officers while boating on the Missouri River between South Dakota and Nebraska in July 2024. The officers noticed possible impairment and, after a field sobriety test, arrested him for boating under the influence and other offenses. The events in question took place near the Nebraska shoreline, beyond the centerline of the river’s designed channel. The defendant moved to dismiss the charges in the Magistrate Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Union County, South Dakota, arguing the state lacked jurisdiction because the incident happened on the Nebraska side of the river. After an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate court found that the arrest occurred on the Nebraska side, and concluded that South Dakota’s statutes giving conservation officers jurisdiction to the furthermost shoreline were preempted by the federally approved 1989 South Dakota-Nebraska Boundary Compact, which fixes the state boundary at the centerline of the Missouri River. The magistrate court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The State of South Dakota sought appellate review. The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota first determined that the State’s petition for intermediate appeal was timely and that it had appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the magistrate court did not abuse its discretion by receiving testimony and evidence to resolve the jurisdictional issue. The Supreme Court further held that, based on federal law and the 1989 Compact, South Dakota does not have concurrent jurisdiction over the Missouri River beyond the centerline of the designed channel unless there is an agreement or reciprocal legislation with Nebraska, which does not exist. As a result, the Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate court’s order dismissing the charges for lack of jurisdiction. View "State v. Ogden" on Justia Law

Anderson v. Smith

2026-06-25T07:06:06-08:00

The dispute arose from a press conference in 2017 regarding approval of a hog farming operation. The plaintiff supported the measure, while the defendant opposed it and held a sign during an interview. After an interaction between the two, the defendant reported to police that she was pushed by the plaintiff, leading to his arrest for assault and subsequent battery charges. He was acquitted in a bench trial. Prior to the criminal trial, the plaintiff filed a defamation suit, later amended to include malicious prosecution, alleging the defendant falsely accused him. The defendant counterclaimed for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Schuyler County circuit court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss under the Citizen Participation Act (the Act) without prejudice and later denied her motion for summary judgment, finding triable issues for a jury. The Appellate Court, Fourth District, reviewed the matter, rejecting the “meritless and retaliatory” standard previously applied by the First District and instead focused on the plaintiff’s intent. The appellate court reversed the circuit court’s ruling and remanded for further proceedings, stating the trial court had used the wrong test and failed to resolve factual issues. The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case, clarifying the framework for evaluating anti-SLAPP motions under the Act for cases filed before January 1, 2026. The court held that the second prong of the test requires a determination of the plaintiff’s subjective intent, rather than a rigid “meritless and retaliatory” standard. The trial court must base its ruling only on pleadings and supporting documents, not through an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s judgment as modified, reversed the circuit court’s judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Anderson v. Smith" on Justia Law

Pitt v. Shefler

2026-06-24T12:02:38-08:00

Two California residents, through their investment companies, jointly acquired a French vineyard business. Years later, after one party filed for divorce, she sold her California company holding a 50% share in the vineyard to a Dutch entity, Tenute del Mondo B.V., ultimately controlled by Yuri Shefler. This transaction made Shefler and Tenute co-owners with the other California resident and his company. The sale contract was governed by California law, included a California forum-selection clause, and required substantial payments to the seller, a California resident. The buyer’s payment obligations were personally guaranteed by Shefler, a Swiss resident. Following the sale, the remaining California co-owner and his company sued Shefler and related entities for, among other claims, tortious interference with contractual relations, alleging that Shefler orchestrated the purchase to breach rights the plaintiffs held. Shefler moved to quash service of summons in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, arguing lack of personal jurisdiction because he resided in Switzerland, had minimal involvement in the negotiations—which largely occurred in Europe—and had only limited contact with California. The Superior Court granted Shefler’s motion, finding insufficient evidence of purposeful availment of California’s jurisdiction by Shefler. Plaintiffs appealed. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reversed. The appellate court held that Shefler had sufficient minimum contacts with California to support specific personal jurisdiction: he played a significant role in structuring and finalizing the acquisition of a California company from a California resident, guaranteed a portion of the purchase price, communicated with California parties, and entered into a contract governed by California law with a California forum-selection clause. The claims arose out of these contacts, and exercising jurisdiction would not be unreasonable. The order quashing service was reversed, allowing the case against Shefler to proceed in California. View "Pitt v. Shefler" on Justia Law

United States v. Benson

2026-06-24T11:00:48-08:00

The United States government, acting through the Attorney General, demanded that the Michigan Secretary of State provide an unredacted copy of Michigan’s statewide voter registration list, which includes sensitive personal information like dates of birth, driver’s license numbers, and partial social security numbers. The Secretary of State provided only a version with personal information redacted, citing concerns about the lack of statutory authority for the federal government’s request. The government then filed suit, seeking to compel production of the unredacted list. In the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, the Secretary of State, the State of Michigan, and certain intervenors moved to dismiss the complaint. The district court granted the motions, concluding that Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 did not authorize the federal government’s demand for the unredacted voter file. The government appealed, contesting only the dismissal of its claim under Title III. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The court held that Michigan’s qualified voter file is not a “record” that “comes into the possession” of the Secretary of State within the meaning of Title III, as it is an internally generated database rather than a record acquired from a third party. The court also determined that the government failed to comply with Title III’s procedural requirements for making such a demand, as its letters did not contain both the basis and the purpose for the request as required by statute. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that the Secretary of State did not violate Title III by refusing to provide the unredacted voter file. View "United States v. Benson" on Justia Law

Braggs v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections

2026-06-24T10:32:51-08:00

A group of inmates incarcerated within Alabama’s state prison system filed a class action challenging the adequacy of mental health care provided by the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC). The plaintiffs, who suffer from serious mental illnesses, alleged that overcrowding, understaffing, and a series of systemic failures resulted in constitutionally deficient mental health services, contributing to a suicide rate far above the national average. Key alleged deficiencies included improper identification and classification of mental health needs, inadequate treatment plans, insufficient psychotherapy, lack of proper suicide risk management, improper use of segregation for mentally ill inmates, and the imposition of disciplinary sanctions for manifestations of mental illness. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama managed the litigation in multiple phases. After a seven-week bench trial, the court found the ADOC liable under the Eighth Amendment for deliberate indifference to inmates’ serious mental health needs. The court then held extensive remedial proceedings, including further hearings and negotiations, and entered a comprehensive, system-wide remedial injunction. The court made detailed factual findings and, to comply with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), issued particularized findings that the relief ordered was necessary, narrowly drawn, and the least intrusive means to remedy the constitutional violations. The court also adopted a monitoring plan to ensure compliance, involving external experts and a transition to internal oversight. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s liability findings and most aspects of the remedial and monitoring orders, holding that system-wide relief was appropriate given the systemic nature of the violations. However, the appellate court reversed certain remedial provisions where it found the relief exceeded what was necessary to correct the constitutional violations, particularly with respect to suicide-proofing cells and some staffing requirements, and as applied to a women’s facility where violations were not established. The case was remanded for modification in those limited respects. View "Braggs v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

McMaster v. Department of Labor

2026-06-24T10:31:20-08:00

South Carolina has administered its own workplace safety program under federal law for decades. In July 2016, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) issued an interim final rule requiring states with their own plans to increase monetary penalties in line with federal levels. South Carolina did not adjust its penalties, and OSHA’s annual monitoring reports repeatedly noted this issue without finding formal noncompliance until 2022. That year, OSHA formally found South Carolina noncompliant and recommended legislative changes to bring the state into alignment with federal standards. Previously, in 2022, South Carolina officials challenged only OSHA’s 2022 inflation adjustment in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. The district court held that the 2022 adjustment was not a final agency action and dismissed the claim. In 2023, South Carolina brought a new suit in the same court, this time challenging the 2016 interim final rule under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The Department of Labor moved to dismiss, arguing the claims were untimely under the APA’s six-year statute of limitations. The district court agreed, finding that any injury occurred when the 2016 rule was promulgated and dismissed the APA claims as time-barred. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed whether the APA claims were timely. The court held that a claim accrues when the plaintiff is injured by a final agency action, which, in this case, was when the 2016 rule was published. The court determined that South Carolina could have filed suit as early as 2016 and was therefore outside the six-year limitations period. The court also noted that South Carolina may still raise its substantive arguments if an enforcement action is initiated. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "McMaster v. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

Roberts v. KJ Win

2026-06-24T09:30:53-08:00

Cheryl Roberts and William Chambers were injured in a multi-vehicle crash on Interstate 20 in Mississippi, which they allege was caused by a tractor-trailer operated by a KJ Win, Inc. employee. According to the plaintiffs, the KJ Win driver improperly parked his truck on the shoulder, forcing another truck to change lanes suddenly and triggering the collision. Roberts suffered a traumatic brain injury and other ongoing problems, while Chambers sustained a fractured sternum and other injuries. They sued KJ Win for negligence and asserted that the company was vicariously liable for its driver’s actions. After filing the suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Roberts and Chambers attempted to serve KJ Win but had difficulty locating its registered agent. Ultimately, they received permission from the court to effect service through the California Secretary of State. KJ Win did not respond, and the district court entered a default judgment against it following an evidentiary hearing, awarding the plaintiffs over $2.8 million in damages. KJ Win later moved to set aside the default judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), arguing lack of notice, excusable neglect, lack of prejudice to plaintiffs, existence of meritorious defenses, and interests of justice. The district court denied the motion, finding the default was willful. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the denial of relief under Rule 60(b). The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding KJ Win’s default was willful, ending the inquiry under Rule 60(b)(1). The Fifth Circuit also ruled that KJ Win forfeited its arguments regarding defective service and damages, as they were not raised before the district court. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Roberts v. KJ Win" on Justia Law

Wike v. Grandview Solar Project LLC

2026-06-24T07:34:39-08:00

A developer sought approval to build a solar farm in Spencer County, Indiana, parts of which would be located both within the Town of Grandview and within its two-mile extraterritorial jurisdiction (“ETJ”) fringe. The Town of Grandview granted a special exception approval for the project, despite its comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance only covering land within the town’s corporate limits and not properly providing for ETJ authority. Years later, landowners adjacent to the proposed solar farm challenged the Town’s approval, arguing it was void because the Town lacked authority over the ETJ at the time the approval was granted. Initially, Grandview Solar obtained approvals from both the Town and County, and invested millions into the project. When the Town later refused to issue an improvement location permit due to public opposition, Grandview Solar sued, leading to a preliminary injunction directing the Town to issue the permit. After settlement and dismissal of that suit, the landowners filed a new declaratory judgment complaint. The Spencer Circuit Court granted summary judgment to the Town and Grandview Solar. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, holding the special exception approval was “ultra vires and void,” subject to collateral attack at any time. The Indiana Supreme Court, on transfer, vacated the Court of Appeals’ opinion and affirmed the trial court. The Court held that the Town’s failure to properly provide for ETJ authority before granting the special exception rendered the approval voidable, not void. Because Indiana’s enabling statutes authorized the Town to provide for ETJ and grant special exceptions, any objections had to be raised within the statutory 30-day review window. The landowners’ late challenge constituted an impermissible collateral attack. The Court clarified that only actions truly outside statutory and ordinance authority are void and subject to collateral attack; errors within general authority are merely voidable. View "Wike v. Grandview Solar Project LLC" on Justia Law

Arrowhead Colo. Metro. Dist. v. Roxborough Park Found.

2026-06-24T06:32:10-08:00

A quasi-municipal corporation sought to exercise eminent domain to condemn easements over two private roads owned by a community association. The entity seeking condemnation owns a parcel of land known as the Homestead Parcel and needed access across the association’s roads. The association opposed immediate possession and, prior to the scheduled possession hearing, requested limited and expedited prehearing discovery, arguing it was necessary to prepare its opposition. The District Court for Douglas County denied the association’s motion for discovery. The court reasoned that neither the relevant eminent domain statutes nor the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure permitted prehearing discovery in condemnation cases. It held that, because such proceedings do not require responsive pleadings, the case could never be “at issue” under the Rules, and therefore discovery was not permitted. The association then sought relief under Colorado Appellate Rule 21, which allows for extraordinary review. The Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc, exercised its original jurisdiction and reviewed the trial court’s interpretation of both the statutes and the Rules. The Supreme Court held that while the statutes do not explicitly provide for discovery, they also do not restrict it. The Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure—specifically Rules 26(d), 26(b)(2), and 16(b)(1)—grant trial courts discretion to authorize discovery, including before a case is formally “at issue,” if the court so directs. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred by finding it lacked authority to order discovery and by not recognizing its discretion under the Rules. The Supreme Court made the order to show cause absolute and remanded to the district court to exercise its discretion in ruling on the association’s discovery request. View "Arrowhead Colo. Metro. Dist. v. Roxborough Park Found." on Justia Law

J.B. v. MKBS, LLC

2026-06-24T05:31:48-08:00

E.B., an adult with cognitive impairment, blindness, and mobility limitations, regularly used a taxi service operated by MKBS, LLC for transportation. Jesus Manuel Ortiz was her regular driver for a period and was accused of sexually assaulting her during one trip. E.B.’s legal guardian, J.B., brought civil claims against both Ortiz and MKBS. While MKBS timely denied the allegations, Ortiz did not respond, leading to a clerk’s entry of default against him. J.B. did not seek a default judgment against Ortiz until nearly two years later, after the civil trial against MKBS. During the trial against MKBS in the Colorado District Court, Ortiz was permitted to testify as a witness, denying the assault. The jury found in favor of MKBS, determining Ortiz had not assaulted E.B. and that E.B. suffered no injuries or damages. Subsequently, J.B. moved for a default judgment against Ortiz, which the district court granted. Ortiz then moved to set aside the default, arguing excusable neglect, and the district court granted his motion. Ortiz, now represented, moved for entry of judgment in his favor, which the district court also granted, relying on the jury verdict from the MKBS trial. J.B. appealed, and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decisions. The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by (1) allowing Ortiz to testify at MKBS’s trial despite his default, (2) setting aside the default judgment against Ortiz based on excusable neglect, and (3) entering judgment in Ortiz’s favor to avoid inconsistent outcomes given the jury’s findings. The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "J.B. v. MKBS, LLC" on Justia Law

Williams v. Gianforte

2026-06-23T13:20:30-08:00

After a plaintiff brought suit in the First Judicial District Court of Montana challenging a gubernatorial appointment, the case’s procedural course was impacted by a series of judicial substitutions. The plaintiff and defendants each exercised their right to substitute the assigned judges, and one judge declined jurisdiction, resulting in all judges in the First Judicial District either having been substituted or having declined the case. At that point, the original assigned judge invited a judge from another district, the Eighth Judicial District, to assume jurisdiction, and that judge accepted. Following this, the defendants moved to have the case returned to the original judge for a random reassignment under Senate Bill 41 (SB 41), which had recently been enacted to address concerns about non-random selection of substitute judges. The District Court denied the motion, reasoning that the Montana Supreme Court had not yet amended its existing judicial substitution rule or formally adopted a new random-selection procedure as contemplated by SB 41. The defendants appealed, arguing that the District Court erred by not following the random-selection procedure set forth in an administrative memorandum and SB 41. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the District Court’s application of judicial substitution procedures de novo. It held that the District Court correctly applied the existing substitution rule, codified at § 3-1-804, MCA, because neither SB 41 nor the administrative memorandum had amended, superseded, or replaced that rule at the relevant time. The Supreme Court clarified that its existing rule remained controlling until formally changed by the Court itself, and affirmed the District Court’s decision. The holding is that, absent formal action by the Supreme Court, legislative enactments or administrative memoranda do not displace Supreme Court-promulgated judicial procedure rules. View "Williams v. Gianforte" on Justia Law

Walton v Comfort Sys. USA (Syracuse), Inc.

2026-06-23T10:25:49-08:00

Technicians employed by the defendant performed installation, maintenance, inspection, testing, repair, and replacement of fire alarms, fire sprinklers, and security system equipment under contracts with public entities in New York. These contracts varied in their language regarding the payment of prevailing wages: some disclaimed any obligation to pay prevailing wages, some were silent, and a few expressly based payment on prevailing wage rates. All contracts included a clause providing that any action against the defendant had to be brought within one year of accrual. The plaintiffs brought a proposed class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, alleging, among other claims, that they were owed prevailing wages as third-party beneficiaries of the contracts. The District Court granted the defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment, finding that the breach of contract claims were time-barred by the contractual limitation period, that the contracts did not expressly entitle plaintiffs to prevailing wages, and, in the alternative, that plaintiffs were not covered by the prevailing wage law. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that plaintiffs were covered by Labor Law § 220 but certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the implicit inclusion of prevailing wage promises in public works contracts and the enforceability of shortened contractual limitation periods. The New York Court of Appeals held that the promise to pay prevailing wages is implicit in every public works contract covered by Labor Law § 220, regardless of whether that promise appears in the contract’s text. As a result, employees may bring third-party beneficiary breach of contract claims to enforce the prevailing wage requirement. The Court further held that contractual agreements to shorten the statute of limitations for such claims are unenforceable. The Court answered the first certified question in the affirmative and the second in the negative. View "Walton v Comfort Sys. USA (Syracuse), Inc." on Justia Law

Popa v. Simpson

2026-06-23T10:03:21-08:00

The case involves a civil dispute between two parties who had a previous romantic relationship. The plaintiff alleged various torts, including sexual battery, psychological abuse, and physical harm, against the defendant. During discovery, the plaintiff inadvertently produced a document containing descriptions of various categories of relevant evidence, along with access information for a Dropbox folder labeled with the plaintiff’s attorney’s name. The Dropbox folder contained numerous documents, including text messages and a handwritten note that contradicted some of the plaintiff’s allegations. The plaintiff’s attorney did not realize the inadvertent production until the defendant’s counsel referenced the documents during settlement discussions. After the defendant’s counsel referenced the documents, the plaintiff moved to disqualify the defendant’s law firm, Callahan & Blaine (C&B), arguing that privileged material had been accessed. The Superior Court of Orange County initially intended to deny the motion but ultimately granted it after a hearing, concluding that the Dropbox folder’s label placed C&B on notice of the privileged nature of the materials, thereby triggering ethical duties to refrain from reviewing them further. The court disqualified C&B, ordered destruction of the Dropbox documents, and sealed the related materials. The defendant appealed the disqualification order. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the order. The appellate court held that the inadvertently produced document was not clearly privileged, as it was ambiguous in its nature and not obviously addressed to an attorney or marked as confidential. The court also found that the Dropbox documents themselves were not privileged and were relevant and discoverable. Consequently, the trial court abused its discretion by disqualifying C&B and ordering destruction of the Dropbox documents. The disqualification order was reversed except as it pertained to the separate “letter/memo,” which was not challenged on appeal. View "Popa v. Simpson" on Justia Law

Legend Lake Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Keshena

2026-06-23T05:45:54-08:00

A group of non-tribal landowners formed an association to regulate the use of parcels in a residential development on land historically belonging to a Native American tribe. After the tribe reacquired several lots through a designated tribal member, the association amended its restrictive covenants to prevent transfer of land to sovereign nations and to block removal of property from county tax rolls. The tribal member purchased multiple lots for the tribe and requested the federal government hold the land in trust. The association then filed suit in state court, seeking to enforce its covenants and prevent the tribe from reacquiring and exempting the land from local control. The Menominee County Circuit Court initially denied the tribe’s motion to dismiss. Later, after reconsideration, the circuit court dismissed the case, finding that federal law preempted the covenants and that tribal sovereign immunity barred the suit. The association appealed. While the state appeal was pending, the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Interior Board of Indian Appeals determined that federal law required acquisition of the lots into trust, and federal court affirmed dismissal of the association’s challenge, citing federal preemption. The association clarified it still sought a declaration on the enforceability of certain covenants. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case following certification from the court of appeals. It held that the tribe’s sovereign immunity barred the lawsuit, finding no congressional abrogation or waiver of immunity. The court also rejected arguments for in rem or immovable property exceptions to tribal immunity and concluded that immunity extended to the tribal member because the tribe was the real party in interest. The judgment of dismissal by the Menominee County Circuit Court was affirmed. View "Legend Lake Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Keshena" on Justia Law

Taker v. Blanche

2026-06-22T13:30:03-08:00

The case centers on Tyler Jon Taker, a resident of Maine, who became subject to a state court order for protection from abuse, which he agreed to. This order prohibited him from possessing firearms and certain other weapons until March 22, 2026. While the protective order was in effect, Taker applied for a concealed handgun permit, but his application was denied by the local police chief due to the existence of the order. Taker then filed a federal lawsuit against various federal, state, and local officials, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from federal and state statutes that prohibit individuals with certain convictions or protective orders from possessing firearms. He also sought damages against the police chief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the denial of his concealed carry permit. The United States District Court for the District of Maine dismissed Taker’s claims. The court found that Taker was not a law-abiding citizen due to his prior felony drug conviction and that the statutes prohibiting his possession of firearms were consistent with historical tradition and thus constitutional. The District Court did not specify whether it dismissed for failure to state a claim or lack of subject matter jurisdiction but appeared to rule on the merits. Taker appealed this dismissal. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Taker lacked Article III standing to pursue declaratory and injunctive relief because the protective order itself independently barred him from possessing firearms, so the relief sought would not redress his alleged injury. As for the damages claim against the police chief, the court found that the chief was entitled to qualified immunity because Taker’s constitutional rights were not clearly established in this context. The First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the damages claim, vacated the dismissal of the declaratory and injunctive claims, and remanded with instructions to dismiss those claims for lack of jurisdiction. View "Taker v. Blanche" on Justia Law

American Academy of Pediatrics v Uthmeier

2026-06-22T13:00:46-08:00

The case centers on a lawsuit filed by the Attorney General of Florida against the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) and other organizations, alleging that their advocacy for gender-affirming care violated several Florida statutes, including the state's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, RICO Act, and antitrust law. The Florida enforcement action targeted AAP's policy statements and legal filings that supported access to gender-affirming care for transgender youth, with the Attorney General seeking significant monetary penalties and organizational restrictions. Although the lawsuit was publicized, there was a three-month delay before the organizations were served. Following the initiation of the Florida state court action, AAP, an Illinois nonprofit, filed a separate suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. AAP claimed that the Florida enforcement proceeding was brought in bad faith to retaliate against its First Amendment–protected advocacy. The district court granted a preliminary injunction to prevent the Florida Attorney General from pursuing the enforcement action against AAP and denied the Attorney General’s motion to dismiss, finding that personal jurisdiction and venue in Illinois were supported, and that the facts suggested the Florida action was brought in bad faith. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed only whether to stay the district court’s injunction during the expedited appeal. The Seventh Circuit denied the motion for a stay, holding that the Attorney General did not make a strong showing of likely success on the merits or irreparable harm. The court found that the bad-faith exception to Younger abstention applied based on the district court’s factual findings, and that jurisdiction and venue in Illinois were appropriate given the circumstances. The injunction against the Florida enforcement action remains in effect pending appeal. View "American Academy of Pediatrics v Uthmeier" on Justia Law

Hallam v. New Life Evang. Baptist Church

2026-06-22T11:08:57-08:00

A lender initiated a foreclosure action against a church and a related entity concerning certain real property in Baltimore City. The church and the related entity, as borrowers, argued that the lender had previously forgiven the debt and that a recorded mortgage was maintained only to protect the church from other creditors, not to reflect a genuine obligation. The borrowers further alleged that the lender’s right to foreclose was based on fraud, claiming that the underlying note either was satisfied or never reflected a true loan. Before the scheduled foreclosure sale, they raised these defenses in a motion, and a merits hearing was scheduled; the court stayed the sale pending that hearing, provided the borrowers obtained property insurance and posted a bond. The borrowers failed to timely obtain the required insurance, resulting in dissolution of the stay. The lender rescheduled the sale, and the borrowers did not appeal the dissolution, move to reinstate the stay after allegedly securing insurance, or request a hearing before the sale. The sale proceeded, and the lender bought the property. In post-sale exceptions, the borrowers repeated their fraud-based defenses and added a new fraud allegation. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City overruled these exceptions, finding they could not be raised post-sale, and ratified the sale. On appeal, the Appellate Court of Maryland reversed, holding the borrowers could assert their fraud claim after the sale, particularly since the lender was the purchaser and the fraud concerned the validity of the lien. The Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the Appellate Court, holding that a borrower who knows or reasonably should know of a defense to foreclosure—such as fraud or lien invalidity—must raise it before the foreclosure sale under Maryland Rule 14-211. Such defenses cannot be raised as post-sale exceptions if they were or should have been raised earlier, regardless of the purchaser’s identity. The Court also clarified the borrower’s options when a stay is dissolved for failure to meet conditions but held the lower court was not required to reschedule the merits hearing on its own initiative. The case was remanded for further proceedings on other issues. View "Hallam v. New Life Evang. Baptist Church" on Justia Law

IN RE REED

2026-06-19T06:17:10-08:00

A railroad switchman suffered a severe injury while working for Rail Link, Inc., leading to the amputation of his leg. He brought a suit against Rail Link under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), alleging negligence and gross negligence related to workplace safety policies, training, and environment. Rail Link responded by moving for summary judgment, arguing that it was not a “common carrier by railroad” as required for liability under FELA. The trial court initially denied Rail Link’s motion but later reconsidered and referred the question of Rail Link’s common-carrier status to the federal Surface Transportation Board (STB). In its petition to the STB, Rail Link sought a determination of its status under the ICC Termination Act (ICCTA), not under FELA. The First Court of Appeals in Houston denied the injured worker’s petition for mandamus relief, finding that the trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion by referring the issue to the STB. The dissent disagreed, reasoning that the STB, as a rate-setting body, lacks jurisdiction to determine common-carrier status for the purpose of FELA liability. The STB stayed its own proceedings while the mandamus petition was under review. The Supreme Court of Texas was then asked to issue a writ of mandamus. The Court held that a trial court may only refer a question to an administrative agency if there is a clear legislative grant of concurrent jurisdiction to the agency regarding the specific issue. The Court found no statutory authority granting the STB jurisdiction to determine common-carrier status under FELA. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by making the referral. The Supreme Court of Texas conditionally granted mandamus relief, directing the trial court to vacate its referral order. View "IN RE REED" on Justia Law

IN RE TAFEL

2026-06-19T06:17:07-08:00

A dentist who worked for a group of dental practices in Texas discovered what he alleged to be a scheme of fraudulent dental procedures billed to the Texas Medicaid program. After being promoted to a leadership role in 2019, he claimed to have uncovered practices where dentists were pressured to perform unnecessary fillings and bill them under specific ADA codes. The dentist filed a qui tam action under the Texas Health Care Program Fraud Prevention Act in 2021, naming the dental group, its management company, and related entities as defendants. The alleged scheme involved hiring dentists burdened by student debt and compensating them in ways that encouraged compliance with these practices. Previously, another employee had filed a similar qui tam action in Travis County in 2012, alleging a broader fraudulent scheme by the same dental group, including unnecessary procedures and improper billing. That action also involved a third-party payment processor and resulted in a large settlement with the State in 2019. The earlier action was still pending on appeal. After the dentist who filed the 2021 action died, the defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the claim was extinguished by his death and barred by the earlier pending action, the public disclosure of fraud allegations, and the doctrine of dominant jurisdiction. The trial court denied all these motions, including substituting the deceased relator’s widow as representative, and the defendants sought mandamus relief in the Court of Appeals for the Fifteenth District of Texas, which denied their petition. The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the petition for writ of mandamus. It held that qui tam claims under the Act survive the relator’s death because they belong to the State, not the individual relator. The Court also found that the defendants had not conclusively shown the later suit was based on the same facts as the earlier action, nor that public disclosure barred the claims. Finally, dominant jurisdiction did not require abatement. The Court denied the petition. View "IN RE TAFEL" on Justia Law

Eagle Rise Development, LLC v. Iowa District Court for Clinton County

2026-06-19T06:04:49-08:00

Eagle Rise Developments, LLC, owned and managed by Troy and Alexander Wilbur, purchased a former middle school in Clinton, Iowa. After the 2020 derecho damaged the property, residents complained about its poor condition. Following an inspection in 2021, the City of Clinton cited Eagle Rise for multiple municipal code violations due to its failure to register the vacant property and address maintenance issues. The Iowa District Court for Clinton County held a small claims trial, resulting in an order for Eagle Rise to pay a civil penalty, register the property, abate various violations, and completely repair the building’s roof. After Eagle Rise only partially repaired the roof and did not pay the penalty, the City sought contempt proceedings. The first contempt hearing resulted in jail sentences for Troy and Alexander, though these were later set aside upon partial compliance. When the roof remained unrepaired, the City initiated a second contempt proceeding. The City had difficulty serving Troy, Alexander, and Eagle Rise personally, ultimately resorting to service by publication after finding they were evading service. However, the notice to show cause was directed only to Eagle Rise, not to Troy or Alexander individually. Troy appeared at the contempt hearing and objected to lack of notice, but the magistrate denied the objection and found all three in contempt, imposing jail time and fines on Troy and Alexander. Troy, Alexander, and Eagle Rise appealed. The Iowa Court of Appeals held that only Alexander was not properly served, annulling the contempt order against him but sustaining it as to Troy and Eagle Rise. On further review, the Supreme Court of Iowa vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision and sustained the writ of certiorari for all three. The Supreme Court held that the district court lacked authority to hold Troy and Alexander in contempt because they were not individually named or served with the required notice. Additionally, Eagle Rise was not given reasonable time to respond, as required by statute. View "Eagle Rise Development, LLC v. Iowa District Court for Clinton County" on Justia Law

Larkins v. S.D.P. Manufacturing

2026-06-18T15:30:30-08:00

A maintenance worker was injured when a small derrick tipped over during work on a defective transformer. Two years after the incident, the injured individual and his spouse filed suit against the derrick’s manufacturer and several corporate entities that leased the equipment to the worker’s employer. The complaint was filed on the last day permitted by the Texas statute of limitations. Plaintiffs received service citations the next day, and forwarded them to a process server three days later. Service was completed about fifty days after filing, with delays attributed to confusion over defendants’ identities and addresses, as well as disruptions caused by a courthouse fire in an unrelated case involving plaintiffs’ counsel. After defendants were served, they removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district court dismissed the claims against the manufacturer for insufficient diligence in service and granted summary judgment for the corporate defendants. The district court found that plaintiffs had waited too long at several points—three days before forwarding citations, several weeks before following up with the process server, and additional days before clarifying instructions—thus concluding that plaintiffs failed to exercise sufficient diligence as required by Texas law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court applied a more demanding standard than Texas law requires. Under Texas law, a plaintiff must show ordinary diligence in effecting service after timely filing suit. The appellate court found that plaintiffs’ explanations for the short delays, including handling a complex service task involving multiple corporate defendants and temporary distractions from an unrelated courthouse fire, were sufficient to raise a genuine factual dispute regarding diligence. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and summary judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Larkins v. S.D.P. Manufacturing" on Justia Law

City of Philadelphia v. DOI

2026-06-18T09:00:12-08:00

The dispute centers on the President’s House Exhibit in Independence National Historical Park, which commemorates the history of enslaved Africans who lived there during George Washington’s presidency. The City of Philadelphia and the National Park Service (NPS) had established the exhibit through a series of cooperative agreements, culminating in a 2009 amendment that transferred ownership and maintenance responsibility to NPS. In 2026, following an executive order, NPS unilaterally removed interpretive panels and video exhibits from the site without consulting the City, prompting the City to file a lawsuit seeking restoration of the materials. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania reviewed the City’s claims and granted a preliminary injunction, ordering NPS to restore the President’s House Site to its previous physical status and prohibiting further changes without mutual agreement. The District Court concluded that it had jurisdiction over four claims brought under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), found that the City had standing based on statutory and contractual rights to mutual agreement and consultation, and determined that NPS’s actions constituted final agency action subject to judicial review. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed the appeal by first confirming the City’s standing based on alleged contractual injury. However, the court determined that the APA did not permit review of Counts II through V because the NPS’s removal of exhibits was not “agency action” as defined by the APA, nor did it constitute “final agency action.” The court also clarified that statutory provisions requiring mutual agreement applied only to Independence Hall National Historic Site, not the entire park or the President’s House. Accordingly, the Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s preliminary injunction and remanded with instructions to dismiss Counts II through V for lack of jurisdiction. View "City of Philadelphia v. DOI" on Justia Law

ZHANG VS. ZHANG

2026-06-18T08:08:55-08:00

Two sisters became involved in a business dispute after one sister contributed $200,000 to the other for the purchase of four residential properties, expecting an equal share of profits from their rental or sale. The properties were titled solely in the recipient sister’s name, who later sold one and kept all proceeds. After attempts to secure her ownership interest failed, the contributing sister filed suit, asserting claims including breach of contract and unjust enrichment, seeking return of her investment and her share of profits. The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County initially entered a default against the defendant for failing to timely answer, but this was later set aside. As the trial approached, the defendant moved to exclude evidence of damages, arguing that the plaintiff had not provided an adequate computation of damages as required by NRCP 16.1. The court gave the plaintiff another chance to supplement her computation but she failed to comply in time. The court granted the motion to exclude all evidence of damages, then dismissed the complaint with prejudice, reasoning that without damages there was nothing left to litigate. The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the case. The court held that the district court correctly required a computation of damages because the claims sought tangible, quantifiable losses. However, it found that by granting the motion to exclude all damages evidence—which resulted in dismissal with prejudice—the district court imposed a case-terminating sanction. Under Nevada law, before issuing such a sanction, the court must analyze the factors set out in Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Building, Inc. Because the district court failed to conduct this analysis, the Supreme Court vacated the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the required standards. View "ZHANG VS. ZHANG" on Justia Law

T. M. v. University of Md. Medical System Corporation

2026-06-18T06:45:08-08:00

T.M. suffered an episode related to a medical condition that can induce psychosis upon ingesting gluten, leading to her involuntary commitment at a Maryland medical center after an administrative hearing. During her stay, she was forcibly medicated pursuant to an order affirmed by an administrative law judge. These events led T.M. and her parents to initiate multiple legal actions in both state and federal courts, seeking her release and to prevent forced medication. Eventually, the parties negotiated a settlement, which a Maryland state court entered as a consent order. This order allowed T.M.’s release under several conditions, including that she and her parents dismiss all pending actions against the respondents. Shortly after the consent order was entered, T.M. and her parents, with new counsel, filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. They sought to have the consent order declared unconstitutional and unenforceable, and to enjoin its enforcement. Meanwhile, T.M. also appealed the consent order to the Appellate Court of Maryland, raising similar arguments. She successfully moved to stay the state-court appeal to avoid inconsistent rulings. The District Court dismissed the federal lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which generally bars federal district courts from reviewing state-court judgments. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, rejecting T.M.’s argument that the doctrine should only apply to final judgments from a state’s highest court. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district court jurisdiction over suits seeking review and rejection of state-court judgments, regardless of whether the judgment is still subject to further review in state appellate proceedings. The Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s decision, clarifying that this bar applies even if the state-court judgment is not yet final in the sense required for Supreme Court review under 28 U.S.C. §1257. View "T. M. v. University of Md. Medical System Corporation" on Justia Law

Construction Services, LLC v. RAM-Robertsdale Subdivision Partners, LLC

2026-06-18T05:30:34-08:00

A Mississippi construction company, operating under the name MCA Construction, Inc., entered into a contract with an Alabama property owner to perform site development work on a residential subdivision in Baldwin County. The contract was executed on February 11, 2021, and at that time, the company held an Alabama general contractor’s license with a “Building Construction” (BC) classification and an unlimited bid limit. Shortly before executing the contract, the city engineer raised questions regarding whether the BC classification was adequate for the planned utility work (such as water and sewer installation) and indicated that an additional “Municipal and Utility” (MU) classification might be required before such work began. MCA sought clarification from the state licensing board and subsequently obtained the MU classification in May 2021, before starting the utility work. The property owner, RAM-Robertsdale Subdivision Partners, LLC, along with related parties, later alleged that MCA had performed defective work and failed to pay subcontractors, and they brought suit in Baldwin Circuit Court. MCA filed counterclaims for breach of contract and fraud, asserting that it had not been fully paid for its work. The RAM parties moved for summary judgment, arguing that the contract was void because MCA was not properly licensed with the MU classification at the time the contract was executed. The Baldwin Circuit Court granted summary judgment for the RAM parties, holding that the contract was void because MCA was not “duly licensed” for all aspects of the work at the time of contracting. MCA appealed. The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the statutory and regulatory framework, noting that MCA had a valid BC license, acted in good faith, and obtained the MU classification before performing utility work. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that substantial compliance with the licensing statute was sufficient in these circumstances and that voiding the contract was not warranted. The court reversed the summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Construction Services, LLC v. RAM-Robertsdale Subdivision Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

MARKHAM v. CAHAVA

2026-06-17T09:05:50-08:00

A developer owned all property in a residential community and petitioned a town to create a public improvement district to finance and construct infrastructure improvements, such as roads and water lines. The district’s board, composed of representatives of the developer, was authorized to levy assessments and issue bonds to fund construction. The developer and the district entered a development agreement requiring the developer to fund the improvements, and the district contracted with a construction company to perform the work. After most of the work was done, a payment dispute arose. The construction company obtained an arbitration award against the district but was not fully paid. The construction company then sued the developer and related entities for unjust enrichment, asserting that the developer received the benefit of infrastructure improvements without paying for them. The Superior Court in Maricopa County granted the developer’s motion to dismiss, concluding that, under Arizona law as interpreted in Wang Electric, Inc. v. Smoke Tree Resort, a plaintiff in an unjust enrichment claim must allege improper conduct by the property owner, and the construction company had not done so. The court also denied the construction company’s request to file an amended complaint. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the improper conduct requirement applied only in landlord-tenant-contractor cases, and allowed the construction company to amend its complaint. The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case to clarify when the improper conduct requirement applies to unjust enrichment claims. The court held that the requirement only applies when the owner is a landlord and the improvements are made at the tenant’s direction. It does not extend to situations where the owner directly arranges for improvements and pays no one for them. The court concluded that the construction company’s allegations were sufficient to state a claim for unjust enrichment against the developer. The court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, reversed the superior court’s dismissal, and remanded for further proceedings. View "MARKHAM v. CAHAVA" on Justia Law

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO V. TRUMP

2026-06-17T08:31:22-08:00

Several unions representing approximately 800,000 federal civilian employees challenged an executive order issued by the President in March 2025. This order, Executive Order 14,251, invoked statutory authority to exclude various federal agencies and subdivisions from collective bargaining rights, citing national security concerns. The agencies affected included the Departments of State, Justice, Veterans Affairs, and others, and the order was accompanied by White House and Office of Personnel Management statements which asserted that union activities impeded national security functions. The unions alleged that the President’s action constituted unlawful retaliation against them for engaging in protected First Amendment activities, including lawsuits and public criticism of the Administration. The case originated in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. There, the judge granted a preliminary injunction, enjoining the enforcement of Executive Order 14,251 on the grounds that the unions raised a serious question as to whether the order was issued in retaliation for their protected speech. The district court focused on statements in the White House’s supporting materials, finding these reflected hostility toward the unions’ activities. The court did not address the merits of the unions’ other claims. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit agreed that the district court had jurisdiction to hear the unions’ claims, rejecting the government’s argument that the unions were required to pursue administrative remedies before the Federal Labor Relations Authority. However, the Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that, even if the unions made a prima facie showing of retaliation, the government demonstrated that the President would have issued the order regardless of the unions’ protected conduct, due to legitimate national security concerns. Because the unions did not show a likelihood of success or serious questions on the merits, the preliminary injunction was vacated. View "AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO V. TRUMP" on Justia Law

Hall v. Trivest Partners L.P.

2026-06-16T13:00:40-08:00

Several Michigan residents purchased expensive solar-panel systems from a company that promised substantial reductions in their electricity bills. The company’s advertising, prepared in part by entities connected to Trivest Partners, promoted significant savings and government payments, but the plaintiffs experienced little to no reduction in their bills and, in some cases, saw increases. The company, which operated in both Michigan and Florida, later went bankrupt. Alleging fraud and racketeering violations, the plaintiffs brought a civil RICO action and a Michigan Consumer Protection Act claim against Trivest Partners, its affiliates (all Florida entities), and the company founder. In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, the two Florida-based Trivest defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that the civil RICO statute did not allow them to be sued in Michigan, as a court in Florida could exercise jurisdiction over all defendants. The district court denied the motion, holding that several practical factors—including the pending status of the case in Michigan, local counsel, and comparative convenience—favored retaining jurisdiction. The plaintiffs later added additional Trivest-related defendants, also Florida citizens, with the court again finding personal jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b) de novo. The appellate court held that the district court’s reasons, grounded in convenience and practical considerations, were insufficient as a matter of law to satisfy the “ends of justice require” standard under § 1965(b). The Sixth Circuit concluded that interests of convenience alone cannot justify asserting personal jurisdiction over defendants with no minimum contacts to the forum. The court reversed the district court’s order denying dismissal and vacated the order denying the Trivest defendants’ motions to compel arbitration. View "Hall v. Trivest Partners L.P." on Justia Law

RCB BANK v. STITT

2026-06-16T10:16:59-08:00

Several years ago, an individual, both personally and as trustee for several land trusts, executed three promissory notes in favor of a bank, secured by mortgages on properties in both Tulsa and Washington Counties, Oklahoma. The notes were cross-collateralized, meaning all properties secured all notes. After the borrower defaulted in 2014, the bank initiated foreclosure actions in both counties but dismissed the Tulsa County case, proceeding only in Washington County. There, the court entered judgment on the notes, foreclosed the Washington County property, and, after its sale did not satisfy the full debt, entered an “Agreed Deficiency Judgment” against the borrower for the remaining balance. Subsequently, the bank filed a new foreclosure action in Tulsa County, seeking to foreclose the Tulsa properties based on the same notes and attaching the prior deficiency judgment. The Tulsa County District Court granted summary judgment to the bank, finding the action timely because the deficiency judgment constituted a written acknowledgment of debt, thus reviving the statute of limitations under 12 O.S. § 101. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, agreeing that the statute of limitations had been extended and that the mortgage liens were still valid. The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case. It held that once the promissory notes were reduced to judgment in Washington County, they ceased to exist as independently enforceable contracts, and the bank's remedies became limited to enforcement of the judgment, not the original notes or mortgages. The Court concluded that 12 O.S. § 101, which revives contract-based claims upon written acknowledgment, did not apply to judgments. Therefore, the mortgage liens on the Tulsa properties were extinguished when the statute of limitations on the notes expired, and the subsequent deficiency judgment could not revive them. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals’ opinion, reversed the Tulsa County District Court’s judgment, and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the defendants. View "RCB BANK v. STITT" on Justia Law

CLARK v. LEIGH

2026-06-16T04:25:33-08:00

A woman died after complications from surgery to remove an ovarian cyst, during which her bowel was perforated. Following the procedure, she received post-operative care from several doctors, who were later sued by her husband and daughter. The plaintiffs, acting as statutory wrongful death plaintiff and administrator of the estate, brought claims for wrongful death, conscious pain and suffering, and medical expenses. Several defendants settled before trial, but Dr. Leigh, Dr. Shirley, and their practice went to trial. The jury awarded substantial damages: $29,250,000 for the value of the decedent’s life, $2,500,000 for pain and suffering, and $1,715,176 for medical expenses. After the verdict, the defendants moved for a new trial and to reduce (“remit and amend”) the judgment based on a statutory cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases (OCGA § 51-13-1(b)). The State Court of Bibb County denied the new trial but granted the motion to remit, reducing the wrongful death award to $350,000 under the statutory cap, while leaving pain and suffering and medical expenses unchanged. The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the defendants to invoke the damages cap for the first time in post-trial motions. The court reaffirmed Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, concluding that Georgia’s constitutional right to a jury trial prohibits applying OCGA § 51-13-1(b)’s cap to noneconomic damages for pain and suffering in medical malpractice actions. Statutory construction principles, in light of Nestlehutt, prevent the cap from being applied to a verdict that includes such damages. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s reduction of the wrongful death award and remanded for consideration of an unresolved excessiveness argument. View "CLARK v. LEIGH" on Justia Law

CAYAMCELA v. ADVOCACY TRUST, LLC

2026-06-16T04:25:32-08:00

A woman died in a hospital after giving birth by cesarean section, having suffered a rare and severe complication known as placenta accreta spectrum, which led to a massive hemorrhage. She underwent an emergency hysterectomy and was transferred to the intensive care unit for postoperative management. Her condition deteriorated, resulting in respiratory and cardiac arrest, and she died the following morning. Her fiancé, acting as administrator of her estate, and a conservator for her children, brought a medical malpractice and wrongful death lawsuit against multiple medical providers and the hospital. Most defendants settled before trial, leaving only one doctor and a medical staffing agency as defendants. In the Superior Court of Rockdale County, the plaintiffs presented expert testimony alleging breaches of the standard of care by the remaining defendants. The jury found both liable and awarded $42 million in total damages: $10 million for pain and suffering to the estate and $32 million for wrongful death to the children. The trial court entered judgment accordingly, denied the defendants’ post-trial motions for a new trial, and refused to apply Georgia’s statutory cap on noneconomic damages, finding it unconstitutional and waived due to the defendants’ failure to raise it earlier. The court also granted the plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees under OCGA § 9-11-68, awarding over $11 million. The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain defense expert testimony or in granting the challenged jury instruction, as the defendants had affirmatively waived any instructional error. The court affirmed that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages could not constitutionally be applied to the judgment. Finally, it upheld the award of attorney fees, finding that the plaintiffs’ settlement offer complied with statutory requirements and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount. The judgment was affirmed. View "CAYAMCELA v. ADVOCACY TRUST, LLC" on Justia Law

Ahmed v. Hamtramck Public Schools

2026-06-15T12:00:46-08:00

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Superintendent of Hamtramck Public Schools took voluntary medical leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). When she prepared to return, the school district placed her on paid administrative leave pending an investigation into alleged misconduct. While on leave, she filed charges of discrimination with government agencies and was not allowed to return to her duties for over a year. She alleged that these actions were the result of retaliation and discrimination after she had involuntarily reassigned several teachers, which had sparked conflict with the school board and teachers’ union. While still on paid leave, the Superintendent filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the school district, several board members, and the teachers’ union, alleging multiple claims including discrimination based on disability, sex, and national origin, as well as retaliation. She attempted to amend her complaint multiple times. The district court denied her motion to file a Fourth Amended Complaint, holding that the proposed amendments were futile, and granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss the original complaint with prejudice. She then appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of leave to amend de novo. The appellate court held that the district court erred in finding that her proposed claims for FMLA retaliation and Title IX sex discrimination were futile. The Sixth Circuit concluded that her allegations plausibly stated claims under both statutes, applying the correct legal standards. The appellate court vacated the district court’s dismissal, reversed its futility determination, and remanded the case so the plaintiff could proceed with her amended complaint. View "Ahmed v. Hamtramck Public Schools" on Justia Law

Wightman v. Ameritas Life Ins

2026-06-12T09:30:38-08:00

Mark and Courtney Wightman, who own a dental clinic in Louisiana, entered into an agreement with DenteMax, a preferred provider organization (PPO), allowing DenteMax to offer their services at discounted rates to its network subscribers in exchange for access to more patients. Unbeknownst to the Wightmans, DenteMax also entered into a separate agreement with Ameritas Life Insurance Corporation, which permitted Ameritas to pay DenteMax’s network providers, including the Wightmans, at the same discounted rates. The Wightmans only became aware of this arrangement when Ameritas reimbursed them at the discounted rates rather than their standard rates for services rendered to Ameritas-insured patients. The Wightmans filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against Ameritas and DenteMax, alleging breach of contract, violations of Louisiana’s Preferred Provider Organization Act (PPO Act), and unjust enrichment. The district court initially dismissed several claims, partly on the ground that the suit was prescribed (time-barred). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified a question to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which held that PPO Act claims are contractual for prescriptive purposes, making the claims timely. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s prior dismissal. DenteMax settled, and on remand, the district court granted summary judgment to Ameritas, concluding that dental services are not “healthcare services” under the PPO Act, and that the Wightmans had abandoned their non-PPO Act claims. On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that dental services are “healthcare” under the PPO Act, reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment on those claims. The court also found error in the district court’s treatment of the abandonment of non-PPO Act claims and remanded for further proceedings. The denial of leave to amend was affirmed. View "Wightman v. Ameritas Life Ins" on Justia Law

Trongone v. Cmsnr. IRS

2026-06-12T07:01:50-08:00

The appellant submitted a whistleblower application to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) alleging that two taxpayers had underpaid taxes from 2004 to 2012 and requested that the IRS also consider similar conduct for 2013 through 2017 when determining any award. The IRS had already begun investigating much of the reported conduct and ultimately collected proceeds from the taxpayers. However, the IRS’s Whistleblower Office denied the claim, reasoning that the information provided was either previously known or “tainted”—meaning it was unlawfully obtained or privileged—and asserted it did not rely on this information when auditing the later years. After receiving this denial, the appellant sought review in the United States Tax Court. The appellant requested to supplement the administrative record or conduct discovery regarding the audits for 2013 through 2017, arguing that the record did not adequately show whether her information was used. The Tax Court denied these requests, citing procedural deficiencies in how discovery was sought, and granted summary judgment to the IRS, finding the administrative record sufficient to support the IRS’s determination. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the IRS’s rationale for denying the whistleblower award for tax years 2013 through 2017 was not supported by the administrative record, which was largely silent regarding those years. The court concluded that the IRS’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because it did not reasonably investigate or explain whether the whistleblower’s application contributed to the audits for those years. The court reversed the Tax Court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Trongone v. Cmsnr. IRS" on Justia Law

Wood v. Health Care Authority for Baptist Health

2026-06-12T05:30:49-08:00

A woman was seriously injured as a passenger in a car accident in Montgomery County, Alabama. She first received treatment at one hospital and was then transferred to another for further care. Both hospitals, which are affiliated with public entities, filed statutory hospital liens in probate courts to secure payment for her medical expenses from any settlement or recovery she might obtain related to her injuries. The total amount of the liens exceeded the amount available from the car owner’s insurance, which provided $75,000 in coverage. The woman settled with the insurance company and received a portion of the proceeds, with the rest held by her attorney pending resolution of the hospital liens. Afterward, she filed an action in the Montgomery Circuit Court, seeking interpleader and declaratory relief to determine the validity and amounts of the hospitals’ liens. One hospital, the University of South Alabama Health University Hospital, argued it was immune from suit under Article I, § 14, of the Alabama Constitution because it is a state agency. The trial court agreed, found that the state hospital was a necessary party, and dismissed the claims against both hospitals with prejudice, concluding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the dismissal de novo. It held that an interpleader action brought under Rule 22 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure to resolve the validity and amount of hospital liens does not implicate state immunity and does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction, even when a state entity is named as a defendant. The Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the plaintiff’s interpleader claim to go forward. View "Wood v. Health Care Authority for Baptist Health" on Justia Law

Millette v. Burger

2026-06-12T01:21:55-08:00

A group of plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, alleging misuse, misappropriation, and conflicts of interest related to an investment in Mockingbird Cannabis LLC, a medical marijuana manufacturer. The case was initially assigned to Judge Debra Gibbs. Before the defendants were served, one defendant, Millette, filed motions to compel arbitration, to dismiss the case, and to stay proceedings. The plaintiffs responded and also sought leave to file an amended complaint that expanded the number of parties and clarified their claims. Subsequently, without a hearing, a specially appointed judge, Barry Ford, granted the plaintiffs’ motion to amend. Millette questioned Judge Ford’s authority to act in the case, arguing that Ford’s appointment was limited to cases pending as of a prior administrative order dated February 21, 2024, and this case was filed after that date. Millette opposed the reassignment and sought appellate review, raising the issue of the judge’s authority to issue orders in this matter. The Supreme Court of Mississippi considered whether Judge Ford was properly authorized to act in the case. The Court examined the language of the appointment order and relevant statutory provisions, concluding that Judge Ford’s authority was limited to cases pending as of February 21, 2024, and did not extend to this case, which was filed later. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the actions taken by Judge Ford and remanded the case to proceed before the originally assigned circuit-court judge. The Court further held that remaining issues raised on appeal were moot in light of this disposition. View "Millette v. Burger" on Justia Law

Smith v. Mississippi Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company

2026-06-12T01:21:32-08:00

A pregnant woman was involved in a car accident and suffered a miscarriage a few days later. She subsequently filed a claim for uninsured- and underinsured-motorist benefits with her auto insurance provider, which was denied. She then brought a wrongful-death lawsuit against the insurer, alleging that she was run off the road by a negligently operated, unknown vehicle. After litigation lasting several years, she reached a settlement with the insurance company. The father of the unborn child, who had maintained a relationship with the woman, filed a motion to intervene in the lawsuit, asserting that he had only recently learned of relevant facts and alleging that the insurer and the mother had concealed or failed to disclose information regarding the accident. The Jones County Circuit Court considered whether the father’s motion to intervene was timely, applying the four-factor test from Partnership for Healthy Mississippi v. State ex rel. Barbour (In re Hood ex rel. State Tobacco Litigation). The court found that the father knew or should have known of his interest for several years, and that granting intervention at this late stage would significantly prejudice the existing parties, especially after the settlement had already been reached. The court also noted there were no affirmative acts of concealment and found that any prejudice to the father from denial of intervention was outweighed by the prejudice to the settled parties. The court denied the motion as untimely and dismissed the claims with prejudice. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the appeal and applied the same four-factor timeliness test. The Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the motion to intervene untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the motion to intervene was properly denied due to untimeliness. View "Smith v. Mississippi Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Crawford v. Salve Regina University

2026-06-11T13:30:02-08:00

A tenured professor at a university was terminated in 2022 following a classroom incident where students objected to terminology used in an assigned reading and a subsequent discussion of LGBTQ+ rights in Latin America. The professor alleged that her Department Chair encouraged students to submit complaints against her, and that there was a coordinated effort to undermine her reputation. After complaints were submitted, the university held a student meeting about the professor’s conduct, restricted some of her duties, and ultimately terminated her employment "for cause," citing continued misconduct and failure to fulfill faculty responsibilities. The professor appealed her termination to the Faculty Hearing Board, which upheld the decision by a narrow margin, citing procedural issues but attributing them to outdated dismissal procedures rather than prejudice. The Board found her teaching was not culturally responsive and noted longstanding concerns about her interaction with students. The minority opinion of the Board disagreed, finding the process unfair. The university’s Board of Trustees unanimously affirmed the termination. The professor then filed a verified complaint in Rhode Island Superior Court against the university, its Board of Trustees, and several colleagues. She alleged violations of federal and state anti-discrimination laws, as well as state tort and contract claims related to her termination. The university removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island and moved to dismiss. The district court dismissed the federal and state anti-discrimination claims for failure to state a claim, finding insufficient factual allegations connecting protected characteristics to the termination. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims and remanded them to state court. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The First Circuit held that the professor failed to plead sufficient facts to make her discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation claims plausible, and found no error in the district court’s consideration of certain documents. View "Crawford v. Salve Regina University" on Justia Law

LHL Realty Company DC LLC v. District of Columbia

2026-06-11T09:01:42-08:00

A Virginia-based partnership owned a property in the District of Columbia. In 2002, this partnership and a limited liability company (LLC), both related entities, executed a merger under Virginia law, with the LLC surviving and acquiring the property. The merger documents referenced Virginia statutes governing mergers, and the transaction resulted in the property being transferred from the partnership to the LLC. No deed was recorded at the time, and no recordation or transfer taxes were paid. In 2019, when the LLC sought to sell the property, it attempted to record a deed reflecting the 2002 transfer as a no-consideration event, claiming the transaction was a non-taxable conversion rather than a taxable merger. The Recorder of Deeds (ROD) determined the 2002 transaction was a merger, requiring payment of recordation and transfer taxes based on the property’s 2019 fair market value, since no consideration was paid. LHL, the taxpayer, paid the taxes under protest and pursued an administrative refund, which was denied. The taxpayer then challenged the decision in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the District, finding the transfer was a taxable merger, not a conversion, and upholding the calculation of taxes based on the 2019 value. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the 2002 transaction was a merger between two distinct entities, making the property transfer taxable, and that taxes on no- or nominal-consideration transfers are properly based on the property’s fair market value at the time of recordation. The court also upheld the trial court’s finding of excusable neglect regarding the District’s untimely filing of its answer. View "LHL Realty Company DC LLC v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Perlmutter v. Federal Insurance Company

2026-06-11T07:02:19-08:00

A dispute arose among residents of a Palm Beach community after Harold Peerenboom sued Isaac and Laura Perlmutter for defamation, alleging they orchestrated a hate mail campaign. The Perlmutters counterclaimed for various torts, including defamation and invasion of privacy, and later sought to amend their counterclaims to add punitive damages against Peerenboom, his attorney William Douberley, and Douberley’s employer, Federal Insurance Company. The Perlmutters alleged that Peerenboom and Douberley improperly collected their DNA and manipulated evidence to falsely implicate them, while Federal Insurance was accused of inadequate oversight. After reviewing the Perlmutters’ evidentiary submission and hearing arguments, the Circuit Court granted their motion to amend and add punitive damages claims. Peerenboom, Douberley, and Federal Insurance appealed. The Fourth District Court of Appeal, sitting en banc, reversed the trial court, holding that the trial court should have denied the motion because the evidence could not support a finding of intentional misconduct or gross negligence by clear and convincing evidence. The Fourth District required that, at the pleading stage, the court must determine whether a reasonable jury could find punitive damages warranted by clear and convincing evidence, considering all evidence from both sides. On review, the Supreme Court of Florida held that, under section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes, the trial court at the pleading stage should only consider the evidence proffered by the claimant and not opposing evidence. The Court further held that the clear and convincing evidence standard does not apply at this stage; instead, the trial court must determine only whether a reasonable person could conclude, based on the claimant’s evidence, that the defendant’s conduct could meet the statutory standard for punitive damages. The court quashed the Fourth District’s decision and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this holding. View "Perlmutter v. Federal Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc.

2026-06-11T06:45:17-08:00

Thomas Keathley and his wife filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in December 2019. During the bankruptcy proceedings, they were required to disclose all assets, including any claims against third parties. In August 2021, while the bankruptcy case was still open, Keathley was involved in a car accident with an employee of Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc. He hired a personal injury attorney and told his bankruptcy counsel that he intended to file a lawsuit, but neither he nor his counsel disclosed this potential claim to the Bankruptcy Court. Later, Keathley filed a negligence lawsuit in federal district court without updating his bankruptcy disclosures. Buddy Ayers Construction moved for summary judgment in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi based on judicial estoppel, arguing Keathley was barred from bringing the lawsuit because he had not disclosed the claim to the Bankruptcy Court. When faced with the motion, Keathley amended his bankruptcy filings to include the claim and submitted affidavits asserting the omission was inadvertent. The District Court, following Fifth Circuit precedent, granted summary judgment for Buddy Ayers Construction, finding the omission was not inadvertent because Keathley knew of the facts and had a potential motive to conceal the claim. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, though a concurring judge questioned whether this approach furthered the goals of judicial estoppel. The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that courts must examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a debtor’s omission in bankruptcy was inadvertent or mistaken for purposes of judicial estoppel. The Court found that the Fifth Circuit’s rule—which considered only whether the debtor knew of the claim and had a motive to conceal—was too rigid and overly broad for an equitable doctrine. The Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Boddy v. Grech

2026-06-10T12:30:37-08:00

At a school board meeting in Xenia, Ohio, a member of the public sought to use her allotted time during the public comment period to criticize the school district’s handling of alleged critical race theory instruction, as well as the conduct of the superintendent and board. Although her remarks were calmly delivered, board president Mary Grech interrupted her, threatened to cut her microphone, and eventually did so, recessing the meeting amid disruptions from the audience. The speaker was not permitted to complete her five-minute comment, nor was she allowed additional time after the meeting resumed. The individual who was silenced brought a lawsuit against the school board and its president under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that her First Amendment rights were violated. She sought a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the board’s public comment policy against her in the future. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio conducted a hearing and denied the request for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm, and found the facts and motives for the board president’s actions to be equivocal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the matter and reversed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that the plaintiff’s speech—critical of school officials—was protected by the First Amendment and did not fall into any unprotected category. The court found that the board president engaged in impermissible viewpoint discrimination by curtailing speech because of its critical content, and also ratified a heckler’s veto by silencing the speaker rather than the disruptive audience. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits and that irreparable harm to constitutional rights was presumed. The case was remanded with instructions to grant the preliminary injunction. View "Boddy v. Grech" on Justia Law

Jewel Sanitary Napkins, LLC v Busy Beaver Publications, LLC

2026-06-10T11:30:47-08:00

Jewel Sanitary Napkins, a Georgia-based company, sells feminine hygiene products that it claims provide health benefits, including products containing graphene. The company developed a market among the Amish community and advertised its products through Busy Beaver Publications, which circulates regional advertising papers to that community. In August 2022, Busy Beaver published an ad submitted by a reader, Betty Lantz, that questioned the safety of Jewel's products, suggesting that graphene could attract electrical waves or radiation and pose health risks. The ad was published anonymously at Lantz’s request. Jewel asserted that the ad contained false statements and damaged its reputation. After the ad’s publication, Jewel contacted Busy Beaver to request a retraction, but Busy Beaver instead offered free advertising, consistent with its policy of not issuing retractions. Jewel declined and sued in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin for libel and trade libel. During discovery, Jewel sought the original ad submission. Busy Beaver initially believed the form had been destroyed per company practice, but later obtained it from Lantz and provided it to Jewel. Jewel withdrew a related spoliation motion but then sought sanctions over the delay. The district court denied Jewel’s motions, including a request to reopen summary judgment briefing, and granted summary judgment to Busy Beaver. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that, under Wisconsin law and the First Amendment standard for public figures, Jewel failed to present evidence that Busy Beaver acted with actual malice when publishing the ad. The appellate court also found no abuse of discretion in denying sanctions against Busy Beaver. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Busy Beaver. View "Jewel Sanitary Napkins, LLC v Busy Beaver Publications, LLC" on Justia Law

Johnson v. Mayor, City of Jacksonville

2026-06-10T08:33:27-08:00

A Black resident of the Middle District of Florida, descended from enslaved individuals, brought suit against the Mayor of Jacksonville and the Governor of Florida in their official capacities. He alleged that the continued presence and maintenance of nearly fifty Confederate memorials, monuments, and naming tributes on public land, funded by city or state tax dollars, caused him to feel “deeply repulsed, disheartened, and intimidated.” He asserted that these symbols were governmental celebrations of White supremacy, and sought a declaratory judgment that their presence violated his rights under Title II of the Civil Rights Act, the Thirteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida dismissed the complaint. The magistrate judge had recommended dismissal, finding that the plaintiff failed to allege facts showing a particularized injury, and thus lacked Article III standing. The magistrate also found that the plaintiff did not have taxpayer standing, as he failed to allege a direct injury or that taxpayer funds were specifically used to maintain the memorials. The district court adopted the recommendation, concluding that the plaintiff’s objections were not sufficiently specific, but nonetheless conducted a de novo review and agreed that standing was lacking. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the plaintiff’s alleged psychological harm—feelings of repulsion and intimidation—did not constitute a concrete or particularized injury for Article III standing. It further found he did not demonstrate municipal taxpayer standing, as he failed to allege facts indicating that taxpayer funds were used for the memorials. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing and affirmed the dismissal. View "Johnson v. Mayor, City of Jacksonville" on Justia Law

EnvTech v. DeBusk

2026-06-09T09:30:29-08:00

EnvTech, Inc., a company specializing in cleaning products and services for hydrofluoric acid alkylation (HF alky) units in oil refineries, alleges that Patrick DeBusk, CEO of USA DeBusk LLC (USAD), orchestrated the theft of its proprietary neutral pH chelation cleaning formula and process. EnvTech claims that DeBusk directed the hiring of key former EnvTech employees, who were privy to EnvTech’s trade secrets, and used their knowledge to allow USAD to enter and compete in the specialized market for HF alky unit cleaning. EnvTech further asserts that this conduct was part of a broader pattern, with USAD hiring competitors’ employees to misappropriate trade secrets under DeBusk’s direction. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed EnvTech’s amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court found that EnvTech had not plausibly alleged that DeBusk personally engaged in trade secret theft with the necessary mental state or that a pattern of racketeering activity under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was sufficiently pleaded. The court dismissed the case with prejudice after EnvTech’s amended complaint did not cure the perceived deficiencies. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo and found that EnvTech plausibly alleged DeBusk’s knowing direction and participation in the theft and use of EnvTech’s trade secrets, as well as a broader pattern of similar conduct involving other competitors. The Fifth Circuit held that EnvTech’s allegations were sufficient to state a RICO claim based on a pattern of trade secret theft and conspiracy, and that the continuity and relatedness requirements for a RICO pattern were satisfied. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "EnvTech v. DeBusk" on Justia Law

Voutsiotis v. PNC Bank, NA

2026-06-08T11:02:25-08:00

An individual named Antonas established investment entities and solicited funds from members of his community, ultimately losing much of the invested money and covering up losses through fraudulent means. After Antonas’s actions came to light, and following his death by suicide, a group of investors initiated several lawsuits against various parties, including Antonas’s estate, other investors, a brokerage firm, and, in this particular action, a bank (PNC) and one of its employees (Koutrodimos), alleging that the bank and its employee facilitated or failed to prevent Antonas’s fraud. The case was originally filed in an Ohio state court, but PNC removed it to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, asserting that the non-diverse defendant (Koutrodimos) had been fraudulently joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction. The district court agreed, dismissed Koutrodimos from the lawsuit, denied the plaintiffs’ motion to remand to state court, and subsequently granted PNC’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The plaintiffs appealed these decisions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings de novo where appropriate. The court held that the plaintiffs had no colorable claim against the non-diverse PNC employee because the complaint failed to allege specific fraudulent acts, did not establish a duty of disclosure under Ohio law, and included causes of action (such as aiding and abetting fraud) not recognized under Ohio law. Regarding PNC, the court found that the Ohio Uniform Fiduciary Act barred the claims, as the complaint did not plausibly allege PNC’s actual knowledge or bad faith in connection with Antonas’s misconduct. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of remand and dismissal of all claims against both defendants. View "Voutsiotis v. PNC Bank, NA" on Justia Law

STATE v. CITY OF MCALLEN

2026-06-05T14:22:49-08:00

Several cities challenged recent Texas legislative changes that reduced the fees cities could charge telecommunications companies for using public property alongside city streets. The cities argued that requiring them to charge less than market rates for this use amounted to an unconstitutional gift to the telecom companies, contrary to the Texas Constitution’s Gift Clauses. Seeking a judicial declaration to this effect, the cities sued the State of Texas as the sole defendant, asserting that the statutory rate reductions were unconstitutional. At the trial level, the district court partially granted the cities’ request for a declaratory judgment. The Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas went further, largely siding with the cities and holding that the statutory reductions violated the Gift Clauses. The State then sought review by the Supreme Court of Texas. The Supreme Court of Texas determined that the lower courts lacked jurisdiction over the case because the cities had sued the wrong defendant. The court explained that in constitutional challenges to state statutes, the proper defendant must be the officer or agency with authority to enforce the challenged law, not the State of Texas in the abstract. The court noted that the cities failed to identify any such officer or agency, and there was no indication that any state official had enforced or threatened to enforce the challenged statutes against the cities. Because a judgment against the “State of Texas” would not redress the cities’ alleged injuries nor bind the telecommunications companies, the dispute lacked the concrete adversarial parties necessary for a justiciable controversy. The Supreme Court of Texas vacated the judgments of the lower courts and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. View "STATE v. CITY OF MCALLEN" on Justia Law

Deque Systems Inc. v. Browserstack, Inc.

2026-06-05T10:30:42-08:00

Deque Systems Inc., a company specializing in web accessibility software, developed and registered multiple versions of its DevTools and Rules Help Pages products. To access these, users agreed not to copy, reverse-engineer, or otherwise misuse the software or its documentation. In 2021, BrowserStack, a competing firm, sought to develop its own accessibility testing tools. More than 100 BrowserStack employees created accounts with Deque—agreeing to Deque’s terms—and later, BrowserStack released an Accessibility Toolkit, which Deque alleged was developed by unlawfully copying and reverse-engineering DevTools and the Rules Help Pages. Deque filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, claiming copyright infringement, false advertising, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment, and sought injunctive relief, damages, and other remedies. During discovery, Deque repeatedly failed to properly disclose its damages calculations and supporting evidence by the deadlines set in the court’s scheduling order. Despite several opportunities to supplement its disclosures and a late attempt to introduce expert testimony, Deque did not timely provide the required information. BrowserStack moved to exclude Deque’s damages evidence and for summary judgment. The district court granted these motions, finding that Deque’s noncompliance with disclosure rules was neither substantially justified nor harmless, and that Deque presented no evidence supporting injunctive or other relief. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding all evidence of Deque’s damages under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) due to repeated and unjustified failures to comply with disclosure requirements. The court also held that summary judgment for BrowserStack was warranted because Deque could not establish entitlement to injunctive, declaratory, or monetary relief. View "Deque Systems Inc. v. Browserstack, Inc." on Justia Law

INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES v. MULLIN

2026-06-05T06:32:06-08:00

The plaintiff is an advocacy organization focused on labor rights, which submitted several petitions to the United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP). These petitions requested CBP to investigate whether cocoa and cocoa products imported from Côte d’Ivoire were produced using forced child labor, in violation of section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930. The organization provided extensive evidence, including government reports and firsthand accounts, to support its claims. Despite CBP initiating an investigation and corresponding at various points, no enforcement action, such as a Withhold Release Order, was issued. After years without a definitive response, the organization submitted supplemental petitions with new evidence and eventually filed suit, alleging that CBP unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed action on its petitions. The United States Court of International Trade reviewed the complaint and granted the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, specifically finding that the advocacy organization failed to establish organizational standing. The court determined that the plaintiff did not demonstrate a concrete and demonstrable injury to its activities, as required for Article III standing. The plaintiff appealed this decision, arguing that it suffered financial harm and was denied effective tools for pursuing its mission. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit considered the appeal, applying a de novo standard of review to the dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court held that the plaintiff had not established a concrete injury sufficient for standing, reasoning that the organization’s expenditure of resources to advocate for government action did not constitute a legally cognizable harm. The court also found that the mere denial of a procedural tool was insufficient to confer standing. Therefore, the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal by the Court of International Trade for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES v. MULLIN " on Justia Law

Muckle v. Lamothe

2026-06-05T04:20:11-08:00

The case centers on a civil lawsuit brought by Paul L. Muckle in the Brockton Division of the District Court Department. During the proceedings, a defendant attempted to remove the case to the Superior Court due to the amount in controversy, but the District Court judge denied the motion, treating it instead as a motion to dismiss. After Muckle filed a second amended complaint, both defendants moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and the District Court granted these motions. The court also denied several motions by Muckle, including a motion for summary judgment. Following these rulings, Muckle submitted a petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3 to the Supreme Judicial Court's single justice, seeking to challenge the District Court's decisions and address the trial court’s refusal to rule on some of his motions for clarification and reconsideration. The single justice denied the petition without a hearing, finding that Muckle had other adequate and effective remedies available, such as pursuing an ordinary appeal from a final judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the single justice’s denial of relief. Applying the standard that reversal is warranted only for abuse of discretion or clear error of law, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment. The Court held that the single justice did not err or abuse her discretion in denying relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, because Muckle had not shown the absence or inadequacy of other remedies, and he could obtain review through the normal appellate process. Judgment was affirmed. View "Muckle v. Lamothe" on Justia Law

Askins v. CRST Expedited, Inc.

2026-06-04T14:03:10-08:00

A trucking company conducted background checks on a job applicant, both before and during his employment, using disclosure and authorization forms. The applicant alleged these forms did not comply with the requirements of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), and initiated a class action on behalf of similarly situated job seekers and employees. He asserted that the company obtained background checks without proper, legally compliant disclosures and authorizations, in violation of federal law. The San Mateo County Superior Court initially certified the class for claims under the FCRA. After the Fifth District Court of Appeal decided *Limon v. Circle K Stores Inc.*, which interpreted the FCRA as requiring plaintiffs to show concrete injury for standing in California courts, the defendant moved to decertify the class, arguing the applicant had not identified any actual harm. The Superior Court agreed, finding that the applicant’s confusion and lack of awareness about the background checks did not amount to concrete injury, and decertified the class. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that California courts are not bound by Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which requires concrete injury in federal courts. The Court interpreted the FCRA’s language and legislative history to mean that statutory damages are available for willful violations, even absent proof of actual harm. It found that a statutory violation alone is sufficient to confer standing in California courts for FCRA claims, and that the applicant’s interest in his statutory rights was adequate. The Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court’s order decertifying the class, holding that proof of actual injury is not required to maintain a class action under the FCRA in California state court. View "Askins v. CRST Expedited, Inc." on Justia Law