Civil Procedure - Justia Case Law Summaries

BBC LLC v. LATAH COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

2026-10-05T10:03:12-08:00

BBC, LLC, contracted Germer Construction, Inc. to provide construction services for a subdivision development. A dispute arose regarding the amount owed, leading to arbitration as required by contract. The arbitrator awarded Germer nearly $1,000,000, including costs and fees. BBC sought a court order to vacate the arbitration award, while Germer requested confirmation of the award and entry of judgment. Germer also moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, claiming BBC was dissipating assets. The district court granted an ex parte temporary restraining order restricting BBC’s asset transfers. At a hearing, the district court required BBC to post a $1,000,000 surety bond and Germer a $250,000 bond, characterizing them as “equivalent” to supersedeas bonds, then dissolved the restraining order and denied preliminary injunctive relief. BBC petitioned the Idaho Supreme Court for writs of prohibition or mandamus to vacate the district court’s order and prohibit further pre-judgment asset restrictions, arguing the district court lacked authority to require the bond or injunctive relief solely to secure a potential monetary judgment. The Idaho Supreme Court stayed the district court’s order and sought briefing from Germer and the Attorney General. The Supreme Court of Idaho held that the district court exceeded its authority by requiring BBC to post a surety bond to secure a potential money judgment for an unsecured debt. The court found no rule, statute, or inherent equitable power authorizing such relief in this context. The court issued a writ of review, vacating the district court’s order, including both bond requirements. BBC was found to have no adequate, speedy remedy at law, and the requested writs of prohibition and mandamus were denied. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "BBC LLC v. LATAH COUNTY DISTRICT COURT" on Justia Law

Cornice Ventures I LLC v. Silberstein

2026-10-05T09:32:43-08:00

Investors in an e-commerce company alleged they were defrauded by the founder and former CEO, claiming that their decisions to purchase preferred shares in early 2021 were based on false representations about the company’s profitability and financial health. The founder repeatedly refused to provide audited financial statements before closing, and pressured the investors to move quickly, warning that their allocation would be lost to other parties if they delayed for due diligence. The investors relied on unaudited financial statements and entered into two stock purchase agreements in February and March 2021. After the transactions, the company failed to provide audited financial statements by the contractual deadline, and the founder sold significant personal stock. In June 2022, the investors finally received audited statements revealing substantial losses and inconsistencies with previous unaudited reports. The investors initially filed suit in New Jersey in August 2024. After enforcement of the Delaware forum-selection clause, they dismissed the New Jersey action and refiled in the Superior Court of the State of Delaware in April 2025, asserting claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and a New Jersey statutory claim. The Superior Court dismissed the complaint, holding that the claims accrued no later than March 2021 and were barred by Delaware’s three-year statute of limitations. The court found no basis for tolling under fraudulent concealment or inherently unknowable injury doctrines, reasoning the investors were on inquiry notice when they executed the agreements without the requested information. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed the statute of limitations question de novo. The Court held that, regardless of tolling doctrines, inquiry notice was triggered in April 2021 when the company breached its obligation to provide audited financials. Because the investors filed more than three years later, their claims were time-barred. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal. View "Cornice Ventures I LLC v. Silberstein" on Justia Law

Phillips v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery

2026-10-02T15:30:08-08:00

A patient underwent surgery in Texas, during which a specific surgical stapler and staple product were used to reconnect sections of his colon. After initial success, he suffered severe complications days later, including sepsis, allegedly caused by a defect in the staple line. This resulted in months of treatment and ultimately his death. His widow and children sued several product manufacturers and sellers, asserting claims for breach of implied warranty of merchantability and other product liability theories. Initially, the plaintiffs brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas against Johnson & Johnson, Ethicon, and Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (“Phillips I”). Discovery revealed confusion about the identity of the actual seller, prompting the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint against Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. alone, asserting only breach of warranty claims. The magistrate judge recommended dismissing the claim for breach of implied warranty of merchantability without prejudice, primarily due to lack of presuit notice required under Texas law. The district court instead dismissed both claims with prejudice and denied leave to amend, finding that amendment would be futile and that the plaintiffs had not provided proper notice or shown how they could cure the defect. After dismissal in Phillips I, the plaintiffs filed a second suit in state court (“Phillips II”) against additional parties. This case was removed to federal court, where the defendants moved for dismissal based on res judicata and collateral estoppel. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismissed Phillips II with prejudice. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed both district court judgments, holding that plaintiffs failed to state a claim due to lack of presuit notice, the denial of leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion, and preclusion doctrines properly barred the second suit. View "Phillips v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery" on Justia Law

People ex rel. G.D.M.

2026-10-01T09:22:13-08:00

A woman gave birth to a child in the back of an ambulance and immediately informed hospital staff that she did not want or have the means to care for the baby, expressing her intent to relinquish the child for adoption. The Morgan County Department of Human Services (MCDHS) initiated a dependency or neglect proceeding, treating the matter as a typical abandonment case. MCDHS investigated the mother’s identity, contacted her family members to explore placement options, and took steps to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act, after learning the mother might be a member of a Canadian tribe. The Morgan County District Court, upon learning of MCDHS’s actions, intervened by issuing an order that recognized the birth mother’s right to anonymity and confidentiality under Colorado’s Safe Haven Law. The court directed MCDHS to halt its investigation into the mother’s identity and to cease contacting her family members, reasoning that the Safe Haven Law protected the mother’s privacy. The court also sealed records containing the mother’s name and refused to consider information derived from confidential sources. MCDHS challenged these orders through a C.A.R. 21 petition. Reviewing the matter, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that, although Colorado’s Safe Haven Law does not expressly guarantee anonymity and confidentiality, its structure, related statutory provisions, and underlying purpose imply such protections for parents who properly relinquish newborns under its terms. The Court concluded that county departments cannot pursue the identity of relinquishing parents or investigate their families for placement options. Once a newborn is surrendered pursuant to the Safe Haven Law, the county department must promptly seek adoptive placement and move to terminate parental rights while maintaining the parent’s anonymity and confidentiality. The Supreme Court of Colorado discharged its order to show cause and remanded for proceedings consistent with this holding. View "People ex rel. G.D.M." on Justia Law

Sprague River Cattle Co. v. State of Oregon

2026-10-01T07:46:20-08:00

The plaintiff, a cattle company, alleged that a state agency unconstitutionally took its water rights without compensation as part of the agency’s adjudication of water rights in the Klamath Basin. The agency began the adjudication in 1975 and completed the administrative phase in 2014, with judicial review ongoing in a separate proceeding. The plaintiff claims that administrative determinations prioritizing tribal water rights over its own resulted in a deprivation of its rights. Following the complaint, the plaintiff served discovery requests for documents related to the agency’s determination of tribal water rights. The agency produced a substantial number of records but withheld 446 documents on grounds of attorney-client privilege. The plaintiff moved to compel production of documents over 25 years old, arguing these should be disclosed under Oregon’s public records law. The Marion County Circuit Court ordered the agency to produce the documents, citing a perceived conflict between discovery rules and the public records law, and issued a protective order limiting their use. The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the trial court’s discovery order in an original mandamus proceeding. It held that the public records law and civil discovery rules are independent avenues for obtaining records from a public body. The court determined that discovery in civil litigation is governed by procedural requirements and limitations, including the attorney-client privilege, and that courts may not compel production of privileged records in discovery merely because those records may be subject to disclosure under the public records law. The Supreme Court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its discovery order. View "Sprague River Cattle Co. v. State of Oregon" on Justia Law

Estate of Clark v. Clark

2026-10-01T06:32:34-08:00

The dispute centers on real property originally acquired by John and Constance Clark as part of a family farming operation. In 1988, two parcels were conveyed to their son, Jay Clark, who subsequently transferred the properties to Clover Hollow Farms, Inc., a corporation formed shortly before the conveyance with John Clark as its sole shareholder. Jay Clark served as vice-president and director of Clover Hollow. According to Jay Clark, his parents promised that Clover Hollow would hold the property in trust for him as a premarital asset, to be returned upon demand or subject to his exclusive control. Years later, Jay Clark assigned his interests in one of the properties to C & H Properties, LLC, operated by his children. After John Clark was placed under a conservatorship, the conservator, Judith Appleby, adopted corporate resolutions nullifying Jay Clark’s authority and authorizing the corporation to join litigation seeking a declaration that Jay Clark had no interest in the corporate stock, real property, or tangible property. Jay Clark filed counterclaims challenging the validity of these resolutions and seeking to regain title to the properties. The District Court of the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, granted summary judgment to the Estates and Clover Hollow. It ruled that judicial estoppel barred Jay Clark’s claims due to his failure to disclose the properties in bankruptcy and found that his claims under constructive trust, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment failed as a matter of law. The court also upheld the corporate resolutions enacted by Appleby. The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the district court’s rulings. It held that Ms. Appleby, as executor, lacked authority under Clover Hollow’s bylaws and the Idaho Business Corporation Act to convene a special shareholder meeting and enact corporate resolutions, rendering those actions invalid. Consequently, Clover Hollow was never properly joined in the litigation. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, reversed the grant of summary judgment on Jay Clark’s sixth counterclaim, and remanded the case with instructions to allow reasonable time for proper joinder of Clover Hollow as a party. View "Estate of Clark v. Clark" on Justia Law

In re Petition for the Coordination of Individual Plaintiffs Maui Fire Cases

2026-09-30T15:31:39-08:00

Following the devastating 2023 Lahaina wildfires in Maui, which caused significant loss of life and property, numerous victims initiated litigation against various parties including Hawaiian Electric, the State of Hawaiʻi, the County of Maui, and others. To manage the complex and large-scale proceedings, the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit established a special coordination proceeding, appointed liaison counsel, and ultimately oversaw a $4.037 billion global settlement. A major issue arose regarding attorney fees: the court issued an order capping contingency fees, creating a $222 million Common Benefit Fund for attorneys whose collective efforts benefited all claimants, and appointing a Common Fee Review Board to allocate the fund. Prior to this appeal, the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit managed the coordination, administered discovery, approved the settlement, and issued the attorney fee order. Claimant Michael Bates and attorneys Anthony Ranken, Alex Edrenkin, and John Thickstun challenged the court’s authority to issue the fee order, arguing it was void due to lack of jurisdiction, violated constitutional rights, and improperly limited review of fee awards. They appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals and petitioned the Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi for extraordinary writs. The Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi, after accepting transfer, determined it had jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine and HRS § 602-5(a)(6). The court held that the Circuit Court had authority to issue the fee order based on the ongoing special proceeding and the equitable common fund doctrine. However, three provisions that barred or penalized appeals of fee awards were vacated as they violated statutory and constitutional rights to review. The remainder of the fee order—including the creation of the Common Benefit Fund, the tiered fee schedule, and the processes for fee awards—was affirmed. The constitutional and abuse of discretion challenges were rejected, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "In re Petition for the Coordination of Individual Plaintiffs Maui Fire Cases" on Justia Law

Copper City Gaming v. Allen

2026-09-29T13:05:05-08:00

Copper City Gaming, Inc. alleged that in July 2022, Eric Allen entered into a lease agreement with the corporation, resulting in four payments totaling $14,400. Copper City claimed these payments were fraudulent, part of a conspiracy between Eric and Russ Allen, and asserted causes of action for fraud, violation of the Montana Consumer Protection Act, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy. The complaint specifically alleged the lease used the wrong address and corporate name, Eric lacked authority to sublease or failed to provide usable space, and Copper City never stored property there. Previously, a related action (DV-22-206) involved disputes between shareholder groups over management and use of corporate funds. That action began in Copper City’s name but, by court order, Russ and Camy Allen were substituted as plaintiffs, and Copper City was no longer a named party. The parties reached a mediated settlement, which included a Mutual General Release and Settlement Agreement, and a Special Master’s Order waiving certain business dispute claims, including storage-unit fees. The Special Master dismissed the action with prejudice as fully settled. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the District Court’s order granting Eric Allen’s motion to dismiss under M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on collateral estoppel grounds. The Supreme Court held that the complaint and materials properly considered at the pleading stage did not conclusively establish that the prior adjudication decided the identical issues now raised, that Copper City was adequately represented in the prior action, or that Copper City had a full and fair opportunity to litigate those issues. The Court also found the District Court erred by considering matters outside the pleadings without converting the motion to summary judgment under Rule 12(d). The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Copper City Gaming v. Allen" on Justia Law

SWN Production Co LLC v. Blue Beck Ltd

2026-09-29T09:00:04-08:00

SWN Production Co., LLC leased land from Bluebeck Ltd. and paid royalties for gas extracted from the property. A dispute emerged over the lease’s performance, leading SWN Production Co. to seek a declaratory judgment on whether it was in default, whether Bluebeck was obligated to provide information needed to cure alleged defaults, and whether lease forfeiture required agreement or a judicial finding of default. The underlying issue concerned whether the lease could be terminated based on alleged defaults, which depended on future events. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania found the complaint unripe because any lease termination was contingent on future developments. As a result, it dismissed the action without prejudice, concluding there was no case or controversy suitable for judicial resolution under Article III. After the dismissal, Bluebeck Ltd. filed a motion for attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses based on a fee-shifting provision in the lease. The District Court denied this motion, reasoning that Bluebeck was not a prevailing party since the dismissal did not finally resolve the parties’ rights in its favor. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s assumption of jurisdiction and the denial of the fee motion. The appellate court determined that once the District Court concluded it lacked Article III subject-matter jurisdiction due to unripeness, it had no authority to rule on the fee motion. The main holding by the Third Circuit is that a federal court lacking Article III jurisdiction over the underlying claim cannot adjudicate a motion for attorney’s fees, costs, or expenses based solely on a contractual fee-shifting clause. The Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s order and remanded with instructions to dismiss Bluebeck’s fee motion. View "SWN Production Co LLC v. Blue Beck Ltd" on Justia Law

KANE V. PACAP AVIATION FINANCE, LLC

2026-09-29T08:00:30-08:00

An airline operating among the Hawaiian Islands faced severe financial difficulties over several years, leading to its abrupt shutdown in November 2017. The airline had previously been owned by a trust affiliated with a prominent individual, then partially sold to entities controlled by other businessmen. When the airline closed, employees received only one day's notice and did not receive their final paychecks. Following the closure, a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee was appointed. Together with two unions representing affected employees, the trustee initiated adversary proceedings against the airline’s former owners, directors, and lenders, alleging violations of Hawaii’s Dislocated Workers Act (DWA) and the federal WARN Act for failure to provide the required notice and compensation. Additional claims included breach of fiduciary duties and requests for equitable remedies such as veil piercing and equitable subordination. The proceedings began in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Hawaii, but the District Court for the District of Hawaii withdrew the reference, consolidated the cases, and conducted a jury trial. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law for some claims and allowed others to proceed. The jury returned mixed verdicts, finding some defendants liable for statutory and fiduciary duty violations, but the court denied punitive damages and limited recovery to avoid double compensation. The court also ruled on equitable remedies, including piercing the corporate veil and equitably subordinating certain loans, and ordered contribution from a third-party defendant. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s judgment. It held that it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The panel affirmed the trustee’s and unions’ Article III standing. It reversed in part on fiduciary duty claims, concluding that minority stakeholders and affiliated entities could owe fiduciary duties and be deemed “employers” under the DWA. The court clarified the statutory definition of “employer” and the scope of the DWA’s safe harbor defense, ruling it was unavailable absent a binding divestiture. The panel affirmed evidentiary rulings, vacated the nominal damages award due to erroneous jury instructions, affirmed the prohibition of punitive damages, and upheld the equitable remedies and contribution order. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "KANE V. PACAP AVIATION FINANCE, LLC" on Justia Law

ESCH v. TURNER & COMPANY, INC.

2026-09-29T06:41:10-08:00

The plaintiffs purchased a residential lot from a developer and later alleged that defective grading and drainage in the subdivision caused water and erosion damage to their property. They claimed that the developer and seller deviated from an approved drainage plan, redirecting stormwater onto their lot. The plaintiffs discovered the source of the problem several years after purchasing the property, following a heavy rainstorm. Their claims included negligence, breach of contract, and breach of the implied warranty of workmanlike construction. The District Court of Oklahoma County conducted a bench trial. After the plaintiffs rested their case, the defendants moved for a directed verdict and argued that the tort and warranty claims were barred by Oklahoma’s ten-year statute of repose (12 O.S. § 109), and the contract claim was barred by the five-year statute of limitations (12 O.S. § 95). The trial court found that the improvement causing the harm was substantially completed more than ten years before suit, and that the contract claim accrued on the date the lot was conveyed. The trial court entered judgment for the defendants on all claims. The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the appeal. It held that the statute of repose begins to run upon substantial completion of the specific improvement alleged to have caused harm, not the completion of the overall development. The only evidence of substantial completion was uncontroverted, showing completion more than ten years before suit, barring the tort claims. The implied warranty and contract claims were also time-barred by the statute of limitations, and Turner & Company was not a party to the contract. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "ESCH v. TURNER & COMPANY, INC." on Justia Law

State ex rel. Ellis v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.

2026-09-29T05:30:14-08:00

An incarcerated individual submitted 73 public-records requests over ten days to various offices and employees within a state corrections department, a privately managed prison facility, and a food services provider. The requests sought records-retention schedules, records-retention policies, and public-records policies for the years 2023 or 2024, including department-specific documents from areas such as laundry, dental care, religious services, commissary, and education. After not receiving the documents he believed responsive, the requester filed a lawsuit seeking a writ of mandamus to compel production, statutory damages totaling $73,000, and court costs. The Supreme Court of Ohio previously dismissed claims against individual employees of the prison but allowed claims against the corrections department, the private prison manager, the facility, the food services provider, and certain employees. The corrections department and the private prison manager subsequently provided general records-retention and public-records policies, as well as a records-retention schedule. The requester argued these were insufficient, insisting he sought department-specific policies and schedules. Additional motions filed by the requester, including for default judgment and injunctive relief, were also considered. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the requester failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the department-specific records he sought existed. The court found that the general policies provided applied to all departments and that separate department-specific policies did not exist. As such, the requester could not establish a clear legal right to relief or that any respondent failed to comply with obligations under the Public Records Act. The court also held that the private food-services provider was presumed not subject to the Public Records Act, and the requester failed to rebut that presumption. The court denied the writ, statutory damages, court costs, and all other motions. View "State ex rel. Ellis v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr." on Justia Law

MLA Capital, LLC v. Keagle

2026-09-28T10:31:22-08:00

Linda Keagle and her late husband obtained two loans in 2007 and 2008, totaling $450,000, from MLA Capital, LLC and Encarnacion Alvarez and her late husband. Both loans were evidenced by promissory notes with definite maturity dates in 2012 and 2013. The Keagles failed to make payments before the maturity dates, and subsequently, from August 2018 to March 2020, MLA Capital and the Alvarezes received monthly checks from C&C Organization, a company with which Linda was affiliated. MLA Capital and Encarnacion Alvarez filed a lawsuit in 2022 alleging breach of the promissory notes and related common counts. Linda moved for summary judgment in the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, arguing the claims were untimely under four-year and two-year statutes of limitations. She contended the payments made by C&C Organization did not restart or toll the limitations period, as she neither authorized nor signed the checks. Plaintiffs opposed, asserting a six-year statute of limitations applied and that the checks constituted partial payments restarting the limitations period. The trial court granted summary judgment for Linda, finding no evidence Linda had agreed to bear responsibility for the loans after maturity or authorized the payments. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and held that a six-year statute of limitations under California Uniform Commercial Code section 3118 applies to the promissory note claims and related common counts, as it is more specific and recent than general contract limitations statutes. The court further determined there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether the payments from C&C Organization constituted partial loan repayments authorized by Linda, which could have restarted the limitations period under Code of Civil Procedure section 360. The judgment was reversed, and the trial court was instructed to deny summary judgment. View "MLA Capital, LLC v. Keagle" on Justia Law

EDWARDS V. BROWN

2026-09-28T08:30:33-08:00

An incarcerated individual alleged that correctional officers at an Oregon prison denied him a decontamination shower after his exposure to pepper spray during an incident in a neighboring cell. He claimed the exposure caused pain and burning to his skin and lungs, and that his repeated requests for a shower were denied for two days. The inmate initiated the prison grievance process, submitting his first grievance form shortly after the incident and continuing through several rounds of administrative review and appeal, ultimately exhausting remedies as required under prison rules. The United States District Court for the District of Oregon dismissed the inmate’s lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, finding it was barred by Oregon’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. The district court determined that the claims accrued on the date of exposure and tolled the limitations period only during a portion of the grievance process, starting when the prison received a second grievance. The court concluded the inmate filed his complaint out of time and declined to toll the period from the submission of the first grievance or the time between grievances. Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied Oregon’s tolling statute, Oregon Revised Statutes § 12.210, which tolls the statute of limitations when a statutory prohibition prevents filing suit. The court held that federal law (42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)) required exhaustion of administrative remedies before commencing a § 1983 action, and that the time spent in the grievance process does not count toward the statute of limitations. The tolling period began when the inmate initiated the grievance process and continued until exhaustion was complete. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit found the complaint timely filed, reversed the district court’s dismissal, and remanded for further proceedings. View "EDWARDS V. BROWN" on Justia Law

WASHINGTON V. CROWN RESOURCES CORP.

2026-09-28T08:30:33-08:00

Crown Resources Corporation and its parent company operated the Buckhorn Mountain Mine in Okanogan County, Washington, under a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit issued by the Washington State Department of Ecology. Alleging violations of the Clean Water Act related to the mine’s discharges, both the Okanogan Highlands Alliance (OHA), a private environmental group, and the State of Washington filed separate citizen suits against Crown in 2020. The cases were consolidated and jointly litigated for several years. After mediation failed, OHA and Crown negotiated a settlement without Washington’s involvement. OHA and Crown submitted a proposed consent decree to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, which resolved OHA’s claims only. The district court entered the consent decree. Following the entry of the consent decree, Crown moved for judgment on the pleadings in Washington’s suit, arguing that the claims were barred by claim preclusion due to the prior resolution of OHA’s suit. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington agreed, finding that Washington was in privity with OHA and thus barred from pursuing its claims. Washington’s motion for relief from judgment was denied, leading to this appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that Washington, not being a party to the consent decree and not in privity with OHA, was not barred from bringing its suit. The court found that the exceptions to nonparty preclusion identified in Taylor v. Sturgell did not apply here. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "WASHINGTON V. CROWN RESOURCES CORP." on Justia Law

UNITED STATES V. BURTON

2026-09-28T08:00:33-08:00

Several employees of the Space and Missile Systems Center of the United States Air Force brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act against Jeremy Burton, the Center’s former Deputy Chief Information Officer. The plaintiffs alleged that Burton, in coordination with a defense contractor, manipulated contract awards to ensure profits were shared in violation of federal regulations, thereby submitting fraudulent payment claims to the government. Initially, Burton moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(1) barred the suit because he was a member of the armed forces, which would preclude jurisdiction over actions brought by one member of the armed forces against another arising out of military service. The United States District Court for the Central District of California first agreed and dismissed the claims against Burton. However, after further briefing on the status of the parties, the district court reconsidered and vacated its earlier order, concluding that Burton was a civilian employee and not a member of the armed forces. The suit was permitted to proceed, and Burton appealed before the case reached final judgment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit examined whether it had jurisdiction to review the interlocutory order denying Burton’s defense under section 3730(e)(1). The court held that the district court’s order did not meet the requirements of the collateral order doctrine, specifically because it was not effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. The statute at issue was determined to be a jurisdictional bar, not an immunity from suit, and thus not subject to interlocutory appeal. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "UNITED STATES V. BURTON" on Justia Law

Alstom Transportation, Inc. v. Federal Railroad Administration

2026-09-25T07:01:01-08:00

A privately owned railroad company was engaged by the Nevada Department of Transportation to build a high-speed passenger rail line between Southern California and Las Vegas, Nevada. To fund this $12 billion project, the company sought and received a $3 billion federal grant from the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. The Act contains a “Buy America” requirement, generally mandating that federally funded projects use goods produced in the United States, but it allows waivers if domestic goods are unavailable or unsatisfactory. The railroad company solicited bids for high-speed trains, and only two manufacturers responded: one offering to build most trains domestically but at a lower maximum speed, and another proposing to build the first two trains abroad to meet the project’s higher speed requirement, before shifting production to the U.S. After reviewing the bids, the FRA proposed to waive the Buy America requirement for either bid, but ultimately finalized a waiver only for the foreign-manufactured trains, based on its finding that no domestic manufacturer could produce trains at the required speed. The railroad company then contracted with the foreign manufacturer. The domestic manufacturer, having lost the contract, challenged the waiver in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing it was unlawful and arbitrary. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding the domestic manufacturer lacked standing. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the domestic manufacturer had standing, as it suffered a concrete economic injury traceable to the waiver and redressable by court action. However, the court determined that the waiver was both lawful and reasonable under the statute, as the FRA correctly found no domestic producer could supply the required high-speed trains. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment, converting it from a jurisdictional dismissal to a decision on the merits. View "Alstom Transportation, Inc. v. Federal Railroad Administration" on Justia Law

Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes

2026-09-24T13:31:07-08:00

A fatal accident occurred in 2016 when a bicyclist, Jonathan Tansavatdi, collided with a turning truck at an intersection in the City of Rancho Palos Verdes. The bicycle lane on Hawthorne Boulevard ended before the intersection, forcing cyclists to share the roadway. Jonathan’s mother, Betty Tansavatdi, sued the City, alleging that the intersection constituted a dangerous condition of public property and that the City failed to adequately warn of this danger. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially granted summary judgment for the City based on the affirmative defense of design immunity under Government Code section 830.6. The trial court found the City had established all elements of design immunity regarding the absence of a bicycle lane. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the finding of design immunity but remanded the case for consideration of the failure to warn claim. The California Supreme Court, in Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 639, held that design immunity does not categorically preclude failure to warn claims and remanded the matter, leaving open whether design immunity applies if warnings were part of an approved design. Upon remand, the City renewed its motion for summary judgment, arguing that all warning signs and markings at the intersection were part of the 2009 approved design plans. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, held that when a public entity has provided some warning of a dangerous condition as part of an approved and reasonable design, complaints about the adequacy of that warning fall within the scope of design immunity. The court affirmed summary judgment for the City and upheld the award of expert fees, finding the City’s section 998 settlement offer valid. View "Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes" on Justia Law

Koeberer v. Weir

2026-09-24T13:00:07-08:00

A testamentary trust was created by Ruth Wilson for her daughter, Elizabeth Koeberer, before Wilson’s death in 2013. The trust, named with a misspelling of Koeberer’s surname, was initially managed by Koeberer’s brother, Edson Wilson, who later appointed Robert Weir as successor trustee. JPMorgan Chase Bank held the trust’s financial assets. Nearly a decade after Wilson’s death, Koeberer brought a federal lawsuit against Weir, Chase Bank, her siblings, and her former probate attorney, alleging negligence, violations of federal statutes, and abuse-of-process claims in relation to the trust’s administration. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed all federal claims against the defendants. It found that Koeberer’s claims under the Bank Secrecy Act, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA), and the NACHA operating rules were either untimely, lacked a private right of action, or were unsupported by the agreement between Koeberer and Chase Bank. The court also concluded that the economic-loss rule barred Koeberer’s negligence claim against Chase Bank and found no viable abuse-of-process claim against her siblings. The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims against Weir and Ryan Gordon, dismissing them as well. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo and affirmed. The appellate court held that there was no private right of action under the Bank Secrecy Act for the SAR filing requirement, Koeberer’s EFTA claim was barred by the one-year statute of limitations, and the NACHA rules were not incorporated into her deposit account agreement. The court also upheld dismissal of the negligence and abuse-of-process claims, and found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims. View "Koeberer v. Weir" on Justia Law

Bonta v. Bianco

2026-09-24T09:01:52-08:00

Following the passage of Proposition 50, which revised congressional district maps in California, a community group in Riverside County alleged a discrepancy in the number of ballots counted versus ballots cast during the 2025 special election. Acting on the group’s report, the county sheriff’s department obtained search warrants from the Riverside County Superior Court and seized large quantities of ballots and election materials. The county registrar defended the official tally and explained the discrepancy at a public meeting. Despite the Attorney General’s request for a pause to review the investigation, the sheriff’s department advanced their search and began counting ballots, only halting after direct communication from the Attorney General. The Attorney General issued formal directives to the sheriff, instructing him to pause the investigation, preserve all seized materials, and provide case records for review. The sheriff initially did not respond, began counting ballots, then paused the count and secured the materials. Subsequent communications from the Attorney General reiterated these directives and requested records. After further seizures by the sheriff’s department, the Attorney General initiated litigation, seeking a writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal, which denied relief on procedural grounds. The Attorney General then sought review in the Supreme Court of California. The Supreme Court of California held that the Attorney General, under the state Constitution and Government Code section 12560, possesses the authority to give binding directions to sheriffs regarding specific investigations when necessary to ensure uniform and adequate enforcement of state laws. The court concluded the directives issued in this case were within the Attorney General’s lawful authority and sufficiently specific. It granted writ relief, ordering the sheriff and department to comply with the Attorney General’s instructions to pause investigative actions, retain seized records (with certain exceptions), and provide requested materials. Each party was directed to bear its own costs. View "Bonta v. Bianco" on Justia Law

DOTSON V. CIA DRUG, LLC

2026-09-24T06:04:22-08:00

The dispute involved two sets of co-owners of a Kentucky limited liability company operating a pharmacy. In 2019, the Dotsons acquired a 50 percent ownership interest from the Ingrams, with a promissory note and security agreement (the “Ingram debt”), making the Dotsons and the Andersons equal owners. In 2023, the Andersons and the LLC filed suit against the Dotsons, who counterclaimed. In early 2024, the parties participated in a mediation and reached a settlement agreement, which was recorded on video during a Zoom call. The mediator recited the terms, including payment arrangements and asset/debt allocations, and the parties affirmed the terms verbally. Subsequently, disputes arose regarding the nature of the Ingram debt (whether corporate or personal), leading both sides to refuse to fulfill their respective payment obligations. The Rowan Circuit Court, after a hearing, found the settlement agreement valid, enforceable, and unambiguous. The court determined the Ingram debt was personal to the Dotsons and not assumed by the Andersons, and held that the agreement did not violate Kentucky’s Statute of Frauds. The court did not address the applicability of Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 99.10. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed and concluded that the requirements of CR 99.10 were satisfied. On discretionary review, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals. It held that a video recording of an oral settlement agreement, where parties knowingly affirm the terms, constitutes a valid “electronic record” and “electronic signature” under the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act and satisfies the Statute of Frauds and CR 99.10. The court also found the settlement terms unambiguous and complete, and that the parties mutually assented to them. Issues of alleged breach of contract were deemed premature and not addressed. View "DOTSON V. CIA DRUG, LLC" on Justia Law

Dept. of Fish & Wildlife v. Super. Ct.

2026-09-23T15:01:32-08:00

Following significant property damage due to a rainstorm in January 2023, several local government entities in Merced County, including the City of Merced and a school district, filed suit against the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (CDFW). They alleged that the CDFW’s restrictions on cleaning and maintaining waterways contributed to flooding that caused the damage. Subsequent to this initial complaint, other parties—including homeowners, businesses, and insurers—filed related actions against CDFW, the City, and the County. These cases were ultimately consolidated in Merced County Superior Court. After consolidation, CDFW became the sole nonresident defendant in the case. In late 2025, CDFW sought to transfer the venue out of Merced County, citing Code of Civil Procedure sections 394 and 397, which generally allow for venue changes to guard against local prejudice in actions involving local government plaintiffs and nonresident defendants. The plaintiffs opposed the motion, and the Superior Court of Merced County ruled that venue was proper in Merced County under Government Code section 955.3, which specifically governs actions brought by local agencies against the State of California. The court also found CDFW’s motion untimely. CDFW then petitioned the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, for a writ of mandate to overturn the trial court’s denial of the motion to transfer venue. The Court of Appeal denied the petition, holding that Government Code section 955.3 expressly provides that such actions may be tried in the county where the local government plaintiff is situated, notwithstanding any other provision of law. The court concluded that section 955.3 supersedes section 394 and that the Attorney General’s ability to seek a venue change under section 397 is limited to a pre-answer motion, which was not made here. The stay previously issued was lifted, and costs were awarded to the real parties in interest. View "Dept. of Fish & Wildlife v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Wilson v. Johnson

2026-09-22T11:02:01-08:00

The case involved a personal injury claim filed by the plaintiff against the defendants in Los Angeles County Superior Court. The main issue was whether the action was "brought to trial" within the statutory period required by California law, which mandates dismissal if a civil case is not brought to trial within five years (plus a COVID-19 emergency extension). As the deadline approached, several panels of prospective jurors were assembled and sworn in by the trial court, and the court conducted hardship excusals. However, the parties did not begin their voir dire examination of the sworn juror panels before the deadline expired. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County dismissed the action with prejudice under Code of Civil Procedure section 583.360, concluding the matter was not "brought to trial" by the deadline. The trial court reasoned that jury selection had not sufficiently commenced because the parties had not yet started their voir dire examination of the juror panels. The plaintiff appealed this dismissal. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that, consistent with Stueve v. Nemer, a civil action is "brought to trial" when a panel of prospective jurors assembles in the courtroom for voir dire and is sworn in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 232, subdivision (a). The court determined that the action was timely "brought to trial" on the date the panels were sworn, regardless of whether the parties' examination of the jurors had begun. The court reversed the judgment of dismissal, finding it was error to dismiss the case since the statutory requirements were met when the jury panels were assembled and sworn before the deadline. The plaintiff was awarded costs on appeal. View "Wilson v. Johnson" on Justia Law

DiFronzo v. City of Somerville

2026-09-21T13:30:03-08:00

A police officer in Somerville, Massachusetts was terminated from his position following alleged misconduct connected to his use of an informant, which ultimately resulted in the informant attacking a third party. The officer did not initially disclose all relevant information during the investigation of the attack. After further internal investigation and public accusations, including statements made by city officials to the press, the officer was officially terminated. He challenged his termination by both pursuing arbitration under the police union’s collective bargaining agreement and by filing a civil suit, alleging his termination was retaliatory and violated his constitutional rights, as well as state law regarding interference with advantageous relations. While the lawsuit was pending, an arbitrator ordered his reinstatement but denied him back pay. Following this, the mayor placed the officer on paid administrative leave, which affected his ability to earn overtime and additional compensation. The case was first filed in Middlesex Superior Court and then removed to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The district judge allowed the officer to seek damages at trial not only for the termination but also for being placed on paid leave after reinstatement, even though the officer never amended his complaint to include this post-arbitration event as a basis for liability. The district court permitted the jury to award damages for both the termination and the paid-leave decision, over the defendants’ repeated objections. Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded that the district court erred in allowing the jury to award damages based on the paid-leave decision. The appellate court held that, absent an amended complaint or the defendants’ consent, new factual bases for liability such as the paid-leave decision could not be considered at trial. The First Circuit reversed the damages awarded for the paid-leave decision and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "DiFronzo v. City of Somerville" on Justia Law

ABRAHAM v ARIZONA BOARD OF REGENTS

2026-09-18T11:01:25-08:00

A tenured professor at the University of Arizona, concerned about adherence to an anti-discrimination constitutional amendment in university hiring, submitted a series of public records requests to the university. These requests sought data and documents related to survey results used in hiring, as well as information about appointment and selection processes for certain positions. The university partially complied, providing some records, redacting or withholding others, and denying access to an audio recording of a committee meeting, citing confidentiality. The university later destroyed the recording after offering the professor a chance to listen without copying, which he declined. Following repeated, unsuccessful requests, the professor’s attorney sent a demand letter, prompting the university to release additional records, though some remained withheld or redacted. The professor filed a Special Action Complaint in the Superior Court in Pima County against the Arizona Board of Regents (ABOR), alleging wrongful denial of records and seeking damages and attorney fees. The Superior Court dismissed some counts as time-barred or for failure to state a claim, held a bench trial, and denied relief on remaining counts. The court found the university had eventually provided nearly all requested records and cured any prior abuse of discretion. It denied the professor’s request for attorney fees, reasoning that such fees could not be awarded if the public entity had complied before litigation commenced. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that destruction of requested records amounted to a denial, but the professor was not entitled to damages or fees absent a timely notice of claim and that the trial court’s review of withheld records should combine de novo and abuse-of-discretion standards. The Supreme Court of Arizona reversed, holding that courts must review de novo an agency’s determination of statutory exemptions and the withholding or redacting of specific documents. The Court also held that destruction of a record after a request constitutes denial of access under the Public Records Law. Finally, the Court determined that “substantially prevailed” for attorney fees includes the requester’s overall success throughout the dispute, not just post-litigation results. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "ABRAHAM v ARIZONA BOARD OF REGENTS" on Justia Law

Commw. of Ky. v. Express Scripts, Inc.

2026-09-18T09:00:12-08:00

The Commonwealth of Kentucky initiated a lawsuit against several pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) and related entities, asserting that these firms contributed to the opioid crisis in Kentucky by conspiring with drug manufacturers to increase opioid supply. Kentucky alleged the PBMs negotiated with drug companies to give opioids preferred placement on formularies in exchange for rebates and fees, thus violating state consumer protection laws and creating a public nuisance. The PBMs served both federal and commercial clients, including federal workers under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act, TRICARE members, and Veterans Health Administration beneficiaries. Following removal of the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky by the PBMs under the federal officer removal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1442), Kentucky sought to remand the case to state court, arguing its complaint disclaimed liability for conduct undertaken at the direction of federal officers. The district court granted Kentucky’s motion to remand. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. Relying on its prior decision in Ohio ex rel. Yost v. Ascent Health Services, LLC, and similar decisions from other circuits, the Sixth Circuit determined the PBMs acted under federal officers when administering federal health benefits and that Kentucky’s claims related to conduct performed under federal supervision. The court found the PBMs had raised colorable federal defenses, including immunity and preemption under federal statutes governing federal health plans, TRICARE, ERISA, and Medicare Part D. The court concluded that Kentucky’s complaint targeted indivisible conduct relating to federal duties, so the PBMs met the requirements for removal under § 1442. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s remand order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Commw. of Ky. v. Express Scripts, Inc." on Justia Law

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC V. BALDWIN

2026-09-17T08:30:43-08:00

Two American entrepreneurs established three international corporations to invest in the casino and gaming industry in Laos. Two of these corporations became involved in disputes with the Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), resulting in multiple arbitration proceedings in Singapore. The tribunals issued monetary awards in favor of Lao PDR against the two companies. Lao PDR tried to collect the awards through various means, including contacting corporate officers, filing suits abroad, and pursuing enforcement actions in U.S. courts. After an unsuccessful attempt in Idaho, Lao PDR filed a petition in the United States District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands to enforce the arbitral awards, asserting that the entrepreneurs and their third corporation, Bridge Capital, were alter egos of the award-debtor corporations and should also be liable. The District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands granted a joint motion by Baldwin and Bridge Capital to dismiss the petition, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to enforce the awards against parties not named as debtors in the arbitral awards. The court reasoned that Lao PDR would need to bring a separate action to pursue enforcement against alleged alter egos. The court stayed a similar motion by Scott pending the present appeal. Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 203 because the awards arose from a commercial, international relationship and were foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention. The appellate court determined that the district court was required to consider the merits of Lao PDR’s alter ego theory in a single enforcement proceeding, rather than requiring a separate action. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "THE GOVERNMENT OF THE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC V. BALDWIN" on Justia Law

In re Petition of Industrial Tower and Wireless LLC

2026-09-17T08:14:27-08:00

A telecommunications developer sought approval to construct a wireless tower near Lake Willoughby in Westmore, Vermont. Residents of the town, referred to as neighbors, opposed the project, raising concerns about the tower’s impact on aesthetics and its compliance with the Town Plan. The developer filed a petition with the Vermont Public Utility Commission (PUC) for a Certificate of Public Good (CPG). The PUC hearing officer deemed the petition administratively complete and set deadlines for intervention and public comment. Neighbors were permitted to intervene, focusing on aesthetic impact and municipal plan compliance. The Town Planning Commission and Selectboard submitted comments both within and after the deadline, expressing mixed views about the tower’s conformity with the Town Plan. The Planning Commission’s late motion for party status and subsequent comments were denied by the hearing officer for untimeliness, citing procedural rules. The PUC excluded comments filed after the deadline and held an evidentiary hearing on the merits. The hearing officer recommended granting the CPG, and the PUC adopted this recommendation in its final order. Neighbors’ motion for reconsideration was denied, and they appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court. The Planning Commission and Selectboard did not appeal. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the PUC’s decision. It held that neighbors lacked standing to challenge the exclusion of the Planning Commission and Selectboard’s late comments, as they could not assert procedural injury on behalf of the town. The Court found that the PUC gave the required substantial deference to the Town Plan, concluding the tower did not violate clear community standards. The Court also determined that the PUC properly applied the Quechee test in its aesthetics analysis, considering all vantage points and finding the tower’s visibility limited and not offensive to the average viewer. The PUC’s findings and legal conclusions were upheld as rational and supported by the record. View "In re Petition of Industrial Tower and Wireless LLC" on Justia Law

ISLAND CREEK ASSOCIATES, LLC v. US

2026-09-16T06:00:55-08:00

Island Creek Associates, LLC was awarded a multiple award contract (MAC) known as SeaPort-NxG by the United States Navy, alongside two other companies, Don Selvy Enterprises, Inc. (DSE) and Precise Systems Inc., each receiving contracts on identical terms. In 2022, DSE and Precise formed a joint venture, Secise, under the Small Business Administration’s Mentor-Protégé Program (MPP). In 2024, the Navy issued a modification to the SeaPort-NxG MAC, allowing MPP joint ventures, as well as their mentor and protégé members, to each hold a separate MAC, creating an exception to the previous “One Prime Contract Per Company” rule. Following this modification and the issuance of a task order to Secise, Island Creek filed a five-count complaint in the United States Court of Federal Claims, raising challenges to the contract modification, its implementation, and an alleged organizational conflict of interest involving a Navy contracting official and a Precise employee. After Island Creek’s complaint, the Navy took corrective action by rescinding the challenged portions of the contract modification, thereby reverting to the original rules. The Navy then moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the corrective action mooted four counts and that the remaining count was barred by statutory restrictions. The United States Court of Federal Claims dismissed the complaint, holding that Island Creek lacked statutory standing as an “interested party” under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1), but did not rule on mootness or the application of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal, but on alternative grounds. The appellate court held that Counts I–III and V were moot due to the Navy’s corrective action, which eradicated the effects of the challenged modification. It further held that Count IV was barred under the FASA’s task order protest provision, 10 U.S.C. § 3406(f), and Island Creek lacked statutory standing to challenge Precise’s award. The judgment of the Court of Federal Claims was affirmed. View "ISLAND CREEK ASSOCIATES, LLC v. US " on Justia Law

Mueller v. Walmart Corporation

2026-09-16T05:30:47-08:00

Todd Mueller was shopping at a Walmart in Duluth, Georgia, when store employee Brandon Burston suspected him of shoplifting and surveilled him. After Mueller checked out, Burston and another associate approached him, resulting in a disputed encounter that led Mueller to exit through a rear entrance. Police pursued and arrested Mueller for obstruction of justice, and Burston later applied for a shoplifting warrant. Mueller also filed assault claims with police, but an additional warrant was issued against him for filing a false report. Ultimately, Mueller faced charges for obstruction, shoplifting, and filing a false police report. The district attorney declined to prosecute the false-report charge, negotiated a plea for obstruction resulting in probation, and dropped the shoplifting charge, with the parties disputing whether the latter was connected to the plea deal. Mueller initially sued Walmart and Burston in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, asserting federal civil-rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982, as well as various state-law claims including false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, assault, and battery. Mueller abandoned the federal claims, which the district court dismissed. The court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the false-arrest, false-imprisonment, and malicious-prosecution claims, granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants, but declined jurisdiction over the assault and battery claims, dismissing them. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that district courts have broad discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over some, but not all, state-law claims after federal claims are dismissed. The court affirmed the district court’s jurisdictional decisions but reversed the summary judgment on Mueller’s malicious-prosecution claim, concluding that a reasonable jury could find in Mueller’s favor regarding favorable termination of the shoplifting charge. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Mueller v. Walmart Corporation" on Justia Law

Nelson v. Frisk

2026-09-15T13:37:00-08:00

A school principal and special education teacher sought a protective order against the mother of an autistic student after an incident at a local gas station. The mother, who worked at the station, threw change at the principal and made a comment interpreted as a threat. The event was captured on security cameras. The principal petitioned for a temporary order of protection, alleging assault and fear of bodily injury. The Richland County Justice Court held two hearings. At the evidentiary hearing, it reviewed testimony and video footage, determining the change had been thrown purposefully as a message, and that the accompanying statement was threatening. While the court concluded the act was not an assault in a criminal sense, it found that the totality of the actions and words caused reasonable apprehension of bodily injury. The Justice Court granted a permanent order of protection for one year, barring the mother from approaching the principal and certain locations, and prohibiting any contact. The mother appealed to the Seventh Judicial District Court, arguing that no crime had been committed and the protective order was unwarranted. The District Court affirmed the Justice Court’s decision, finding that the mother had caused reasonable apprehension of bodily injury and had not preserved an objection to the scope of the order for appeal. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana determined the case was not moot due to the public interest exception. It clarified that the standard of proof for making an order of protection permanent is a preponderance of the evidence, not a separate “good cause” standard. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s findings, holding that sufficient evidence supported the protective order and that the appellant had not preserved a challenge to its scope. View "Nelson v. Frisk" on Justia Law

Doe v. Smith

2026-09-15T12:30:04-08:00

A plaintiff who won a substantial lottery prize in Maine sought to protect his identity and that of his minor daughter from public disclosure. He entered into a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) with the mother of his child, intending to keep details of his lottery win and finances private. After the plaintiff believed the NDA was breached, he sued for injunctive relief and damages in the United States District Court for the District of Maine. Throughout the proceedings, both parties were initially allowed to litigate under pseudonyms, and a local news organization intervened to advocate for public access. As trial approached, the plaintiff moved to close the courtroom to the public and to continue using pseudonyms, arguing that disclosure could jeopardize his family’s safety and his daughter’s privacy. The District Court for the District of Maine denied both requests. It issued a detailed opinion emphasizing the strong presumption of public access to judicial proceedings, citing common-law tradition and relevant federal rules. The court found that while the case involved sensitive financial and familial information, such concerns did not outweigh the public’s right to access. The court determined that the plaintiff’s wealth and desire for privacy did not constitute “unusually severe harm” justifying deviation from established principles. Additionally, the court noted that any potential harm to the minor child would be mitigated by identifying her only by initials, a standard protocol. The plaintiff timely appealed these rulings. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case under the abuse of discretion standard. It affirmed the District Court’s decision, holding that neither the plaintiff’s wealth nor purported risks to his family met the exceptional circumstances required for trial closure or continued pseudonymity. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the lower court’s balancing of public access against privacy interests and awarded costs to the appellees. View "Doe v. Smith" on Justia Law

THOMAS & GOZA v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.

2026-09-15T11:39:47-08:00

After a motor vehicle accident in October 2020, Maryann Thomas sought uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage from Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. She filed a lawsuit in March 2021. Liberty’s legal representation changed several times, with attorney transitions and withdrawals occurring between law firms in 2021 and 2022. Thomas sent requests for admission to Liberty’s previous counsel in June 2022, but Liberty’s new attorneys were not notified nor served with these requests. Thomas’s counsel did not follow up or inform the new attorneys about the requests, and Liberty did not respond. Thomas later moved for summary judgment, arguing that Liberty’s failure to respond meant the requests were deemed admitted under Oklahoma law, establishing liability for coverage. Liberty’s new counsel asserted they had no knowledge of the requests until Thomas moved for summary judgment a year later, asked the court to allow withdrawal of the admissions, and opposed summary judgment. The District Court of Oklahoma County granted summary judgment to Thomas based on deemed admissions, finding liability, and denied Liberty’s motion for summary judgment. The district court certified its order for immediate appeal. The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the certified interlocutory order. It held that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to allow Liberty to withdraw the admissions. The Supreme Court found that permitting withdrawal would serve the presentation of the merits and that Thomas was not prejudiced, especially given the early stage of litigation and notice of disputed coverage. The Court reversed the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Thomas and remanded with instructions to allow Liberty to withdraw the admissions. View "THOMAS & GOZA v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO." on Justia Law

RIVERO v. STAHLHEBER

2026-09-15T08:10:18-08:00

A physician reported another doctor to the Oklahoma Board of Medical Licensure and Supervision for allegedly performing a wrong-site surgery. The Board initiated disciplinary proceedings but ultimately dismissed the complaint after a hearing. Following these events, the reported physician brought a lawsuit in Tulsa County District Court against the reporting doctor, asserting claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution, and tortious interference with business relations. The defendant moved to dismiss the suit under the Oklahoma Citizens Participation Act (OCPA), which provides an expedited process for dismissing lawsuits based on protected First Amendment conduct. The trial court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss and allowed limited discovery but did not rule on the motion within the statutory 30-day period. More than six years later, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the motion to dismiss was denied by operation of law when the trial court failed to rule within the required deadline. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals agreed, reversing the trial court’s dismissal and remanding the case. Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma held that the February 4, 2019 proceeding constituted a hearing on the motion to dismiss under the OCPA. Although the trial court permitted limited discovery, it did not extend the hearing date as allowed by statute. Therefore, the court was required to rule within 30 days, and its failure to do so meant that the motion to dismiss was denied by operation of law on March 6, 2019. The trial court lacked authority to grant the motion years later. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals’ opinion, reversed the trial court’s order granting dismissal, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "RIVERO v. STAHLHEBER" on Justia Law

In re SCP 3330 Brighton OPCO, LLC

2026-09-15T07:30:12-08:00

Several companies owning and operating commercial properties in Denver’s River North Art District filed a lawsuit against a cement company, alleging that cement dust emitted from the defendant’s terminal was damaging their properties and business operations. Their initial complaint included claims for trespass, nuisance, and negligence, and sought both injunctive relief and monetary damages. The cement company responded by denying liability, and neither party initially requested a jury trial or paid the required jury fee, so the case was scheduled for a bench trial. Almost a year later, and two months before the scheduled bench trial, the plaintiffs sought permission to amend their complaint. The amended complaint added clarifying factual details and included new claims for continuing trespass, continuing nuisance, and exemplary damages, along with a demand for a jury trial for the first time. The defendant opposed this amendment, arguing that it was untimely and did not raise any new triable issues, thus not reviving the right to a jury trial. The District Court for the City and County of Denver granted both the motion to amend and the jury demand, relying on its interpretation of the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in Mason v. Farm Credit of Southern Colorado, ACA. The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case in an original proceeding under C.A.R. 21. It held that, under C.R.C.P. 38, a party who previously waived its right to a jury trial cannot revive that right by amending its complaint unless the amendment raises new triable issues not previously asserted. The court found that the plaintiffs’ amended complaint merely presented new legal theories and clarifying details based on the same basic facts and did not raise new triable issues. Therefore, the jury demand was untimely and ineffective. The Supreme Court made its order to show cause absolute and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this ruling. View "In re SCP 3330 Brighton OPCO, LLC" on Justia Law

T.L.P. v. People

2026-09-15T06:30:43-08:00

The case involves a father who was the primary caregiver of his minor child in Colorado. After expressing difficulty parenting alone and requesting assistance from the county department, the father set a deadline for the department to locate the child's mother. Following a concerning home visit, where the department observed possible neglect and suspected substance use, the department sought and received a verbal removal order. The child was placed in the temporary custody of the department and later moved to Kansas to live with her mother, after a magistrate granted the department's request. The father objected and sought review of the temporary custody order. While the father’s request for review was pending, the Arapahoe County Department of Human Services moved to dismiss the dependency and neglect petition, asserting the child was now with a safe caregiver and no longer at risk. The District Court for Arapahoe County granted the dismissal, terminated its jurisdiction over the child, and found the father’s request for review moot. The father appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, which dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the dismissal was not a final, appealable order since it did not determine the merits of the petition and the department was the sole authority to prosecute such cases. The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that, under these circumstances, the dismissal order was a final, appealable order. The dismissal and the termination of jurisdiction effectively made the temporary custody order permanent, depriving the father of parental rights and preventing further proceedings regarding the child’s placement. Because the dismissal adversely affected the father's fundamental rights and locked in the change of custody, the court concluded it was appealable. The Supreme Court reversed the order of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "T.L.P. v. People" on Justia Law

IN RE: KIA HYUNDAI VEHICLE THEFT MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION

2026-09-14T08:30:46-08:00

Insurance companies paid claims to policyholders whose Hyundai or Kia vehicles were stolen or damaged due to a vulnerability stemming from the lack of an engine immobilizer in certain models from 2011 to 2022. These companies, as subrogees, filed a nationwide class action alleging that the Korean manufacturers, Hyundai Motor Company and Kia Corporation, defectively designed these vehicles, making them prone to theft. The complaint also asserted claims for breach of warranties, violations of consumer protection statutes, fraud, unjust enrichment, and negligent failure to warn. Multiple lawsuits arising from this issue were consolidated into multidistrict litigation before the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The district court dismissed the claims against the Korean entities for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that the evidence did not establish intentional targeting of California by the manufacturers and that the claims did not arise from California-related conduct. The district court also denied leave to amend and jurisdictional discovery, entering final judgment under Rule 54(b) dismissing the Korean entities from the subrogation track. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that the Korean manufacturers were subject to specific personal jurisdiction in California. The panel found that the manufacturers purposefully directed their activities toward California by sending thousands of shipments of vehicles through California ports and designing vehicles specifically for the U.S. market. The court further held that the claims arose out of these California contacts, as the injuries were caused by vehicles shipped to California. The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, leaving the question of reasonableness of jurisdiction for the district court to resolve. View "IN RE: KIA HYUNDAI VEHICLE THEFT MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION" on Justia Law

TEXASLDPC INC. v. BROADCOM INC.

2026-09-14T06:31:02-08:00

TexasLDPC Inc. held an exclusive license to several patents and copyrights relating to LDPC code technology, originally developed by Dr. Kiran Gunnam while at Texas A&M University (A&M). After attempts to commercialize and sublicense the technology failed, TexasLDPC shifted its business focus exclusively to enforcing its rights through litigation. TexasLDPC filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware against Broadcom Inc., LSI Corporation, and Avago Technologies U.S. Inc. for infringement, without joining A&M, the patent owner. The District Court for the District of Delaware dismissed the suit, holding first that TexasLDPC’s license agreement with A&M had automatically terminated when TexasLDPC ceased its business operations by focusing solely on enforcement. Second, the court found that even if the agreement had not terminated, TexasLDPC could not proceed without joining A&M, as the agreement did not convey “all substantial rights” in the patents and copyrights. The court also determined A&M was a necessary party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a) due to its interests and sovereign immunity, and dismissed the federal claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. It held that TexasLDPC’s exclusive license agreement had not terminated, as the contract contemplated enforcement as a legitimate business operation. The court also determined that the agreement conveyed “all substantial rights” in the asserted patents to TexasLDPC, enabling TexasLDPC to sue for infringement in its own name without joining A&M. Furthermore, A&M was not a necessary party under Rule 19(a). The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the action. View "TEXASLDPC INC. v. BROADCOM INC. " on Justia Law

Sahs v. Loyola Univ New Orleans

2026-09-11T15:30:07-08:00

A former student at a New Orleans university was reported by a fellow student for stalking after a school-sponsored trip to Honduras. The report included allegations that he had made threatening statements about his ability to build bombs and use chemical agents, and referenced chemical burns. Based on this report, a warrant was issued and he was arrested for misdemeanor stalking. After his arrest, a university police officer gave statements to the campus newspaper, which published articles suggesting he possessed chemical materials capable of killing people and had made threatening posts on social media. The student withdrew from the university shortly after his arrest, and the criminal case was later dismissed with no charges related to weapons or chemicals. The student filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, asserting various claims including defamation and negligence against the university. The university responded by filing a special motion to strike under Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP statute (Article 971), which provides an expedited procedure for dismissal of claims arising from protected speech or petitioning activity. The district court denied the motion, holding that Article 971 does not apply in federal court when jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed whether Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP statute applies in federal court. The Fifth Circuit held that Article 971 conflicts with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56 because it imposes additional procedural requirements not found in the federal rules, such as burden-shifting and limitations on discovery. As a result, the court concluded that Article 971 does not apply in federal court. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the university’s special motion to strike. View "Sahs v. Loyola Univ New Orleans" on Justia Law

ERWINE V. WESTBROOK

2026-09-11T08:30:37-08:00

A former police officer for a federally recognized Indian tribe was terminated from his position and subsequently brought a lawsuit in federal court against several of his superior officers and the tribe's general counsel. His claims, brought against these individuals in their personal capacities, included federal civil rights causes of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985(2), and 1985(3), a Bivens claim, and a state tort claim for intentional interference with contractual relations. He did not sue the tribe itself. The complaint alleged that the defendants treated him less favorably than Native American employees, subjected him to a racially hostile work environment, interfered with his court testimony, and conspired to deprive him of due process in his employment and reputation. The United States District Court for the District of Nevada dismissed the action. The court held that the individual defendants were entitled to absolute personal immunity, and, alternatively, that the tribe was a required party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 that could not be joined due to tribal sovereign immunity. The court did not address arguments regarding tribal sovereign immunity or qualified immunity as independent grounds for dismissal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court held that tribal sovereign immunity does not bar suits seeking money damages from tribal officials in their individual capacities where any judgment would not operate against the tribe itself. The court further held that the individual defendants were not entitled to absolute immunity, as the functions at issue—personnel and employment decisions—were not historically protected by such immunity at common law. Additionally, the tribe was not a required party under Rule 19 because it lacked a legally protected interest that could be impaired by the litigation’s outcome. The court remanded for the district court to address any qualified immunity defenses in the first instance. View "ERWINE V. WESTBROOK" on Justia Law

SNAP! MOBILE v. VERTICAL RAISE

2026-09-11T06:32:07-08:00

Snap, a Delaware corporation, sued Vertical Raise, an Idaho LLC, and an individual, alleging tortious interference, misappropriation of trade secrets, and unfair competition. Liability was resolved in Snap’s favor on summary judgment. At trial, the jury awarded Snap $750,000 in unjust enrichment damages and $250,000 in punitive damages. However, the district court mistakenly entered judgment for $800,000, not $1,000,000. Snap sought an additur or new trial and discretionary costs. The district court granted both: costs were awarded, and the damages were increased via additur, but without giving Vertical Raise the option to accept or reject it. Vertical Raise appealed to the Supreme Court of Idaho, which in the prior case, Snap! Mobile, Inc. v. Vertical Raise, LLC, 173 Idaho 499, 544 P.3d 714 (2024), affirmed the costs award, reversed the grant of additur or new trial, and remanded with instructions to reinstate the jury verdict and enter an amended judgment accordingly. After remand, Vertical Raise’s surety bond paid the judgment and costs, but not post-judgment interest. Disputes arose over whether interest accrued from the dates of the original and amended judgments, or only from the post-remand judgment. In the present appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed whether the district court erred by awarding post-judgment interest starting from the entry dates of the original and amended judgments. The Court held that post-judgment interest accrues from the dates when the original and amended judgments were entered, not from the date of the post-remand judgment, even if later judgments modify the amount owed. The Third Amended Judgment was affirmed. The Court also awarded Snap its attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121, finding Vertical Raise’s appeal unreasonable and without foundation. Costs on appeal were awarded as a matter of course. View "SNAP! MOBILE v. VERTICAL RAISE" on Justia Law

Kuehn v. Pillen

2026-09-11T05:06:51-08:00

An individual Nebraska resident, voter, and taxpayer sought declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the constitutionality of two medical cannabis laws enacted by voter-approved initiatives in the November 2024 general election. He named as defendants the Governor, other state officials, members of the Nebraska Medical Cannabis Commission, and the sponsors of the initiatives. The plaintiff alleged the laws violated the federal Supremacy Clause, improperly delegated regulatory authority in violation of Nebraska’s separation of powers, and were otherwise unconstitutional. He further claimed public officials and agencies would expend state funds and resources to implement these laws, and that this expenditure was unlawful. Previously, before the laws passed, the same individual brought a preelection challenge to the legal sufficiency of the initiative petitions in the District Court for Lancaster County. That challenge was rejected, and the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed. After the election, he filed a new action in the same district court, seeking to enjoin the Governor from certifying the measures. The district court denied his request for a temporary restraining order. Once the laws were certified and enacted, he amended his complaint several times, ultimately alleging taxpayer standing, standing for a matter of great public concern, and standing under a Nebraska statute governing initiative challenges. The defendants moved to dismiss, contending he lacked standing. The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the suit. Specifically, it concluded he did not have taxpayer standing, as his allegations of incidental expenditures and government employee time spent implementing the laws did not amount to illegal expenditures sufficient to confer standing under Nebraska law. The Court also found he did not qualify for any exception for matters of great public concern. The order dismissing his complaint without prejudice was affirmed. View "Kuehn v. Pillen" on Justia Law

Mary D. v. McCauley

2026-09-10T14:31:13-08:00

A woman brought a civil lawsuit against her uncle and godfather, alleging years of sexual abuse that began when she was a minor. The defendant was previously convicted in a criminal court for related offenses and was incarcerated. After his conviction, the plaintiff filed the civil suit seeking compensatory and punitive damages for personal injuries resulting from the abuse. The defendant initially had legal representation using personal funds, but those funds became inaccessible due to a blocked account ordered by a family court during concurrent divorce proceedings. When his accessible funds were depleted, the defendant began representing himself. He sought access to the blocked funds to retain new counsel but experienced significant delays in obtaining a family court order to release the money. The Superior Court of Alameda County presided over the civil trial, during which the defendant appeared remotely from prison. Despite repeated requests for continuances to secure counsel after finally gaining access to some funds, the trial court denied these requests. The trial proceeded, and a jury found the defendant liable for several torts, awarding the plaintiff substantial compensatory and punitive damages. Upon appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, determined that the trial court abused its discretion and violated the defendant’s constitutional rights by denying his continuance requests, given his indigency, incarceration, and the fundamental right to meaningful access to the courts. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial on all issues, including punitive damages. The court clarified that the plaintiff is entitled to retry all issues. The court did not address other trial errors or the excessiveness of damages due to its disposition. The appellate court also explained that the trial court did not err in admitting school photographs of the plaintiff, which may be relevant upon retrial. View "Mary D. v. McCauley" on Justia Law

State ex rel. Davis v. Evnen

2026-09-10T12:06:59-08:00

Sponsors of a ballot initiative in Nebraska sought to have their proposed constitutional amendment, which would protect the powers of initiative and referendum, placed on the November 2026 general election ballot. The initiative aimed to require a four-fifths vote of the Legislature to amend, repeal, or impair laws enacted by initiative after November 2, 2004, and to similarly restrict the Legislature’s authority over laws affecting the initiative and referendum process itself. It also imposed a requirement that any laws facilitating or safeguarding the process advance a compelling state interest by the least restrictive means and prohibited legislative acts that would condition, restrict, burden, or impair these reserved powers. After the sponsors collected sufficient signatures, the Nebraska Secretary of State reviewed the measure. Following an objection by a current and a former state senator, the Secretary determined that the initiative violated Nebraska’s constitutional single subject rule and announced that he would not place it on the ballot. The sponsors filed an emergency application for a writ of mandamus directly with the Nebraska Supreme Court, asking the court to compel the Secretary to certify the initiative for the ballot. The Secretary argued that he was obligated to withhold ballot placement because the initiative contained more than one subject, contrary to the Nebraska Constitution. The Nebraska Supreme Court, exercising original jurisdiction, reviewed the matter de novo as a question of law. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the proposed initiative violated the single subject rule because it addressed at least two distinct subjects: limiting legislative power over both the initiative process and the substance of laws enacted by initiative. The court concluded that these subjects were not naturally and necessarily connected. Accordingly, the court denied the writ of mandamus and dissolved its alternative writ, holding that the Secretary had no duty to place the initiative on the ballot. View "State ex rel. Davis v. Evnen" on Justia Law

Carr v. First Commonwealth Bank

2026-09-10T11:36:25-08:00

Three individuals deposited approximately $85,000 into a joint account with a bank. When one of the depositors became subject to a civil judgment in an unrelated matter, the judgment creditor garnished the account. The bank paid about $38,000 from the joint account to the creditor without seeking the depositors’ permission. The depositors sued the bank for breach of contract and fiduciary duty in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, which compelled arbitration under the account agreement. The arbitrator ruled in favor of the bank and awarded attorney fees. After the award, the bank sought confirmation of the arbitration award. The depositors’ attorney missed the 30-day deadline to seek judicial review due to a family emergency, specifically the unexpected death of his stepson. The depositors’ counsel filed a motion for nunc pro tunc relief in the Court of Common Pleas, requesting an extension to file for review. The court granted an additional 20 days. Counsel filed the belated appeal, and the court vacated the attorney fee award but otherwise affirmed the arbitration award. The bank appealed. The Pennsylvania Superior Court, after remanding for an unrelated issue, considered cross-appeals. The depositors argued due process violations during arbitration, while the bank contended the court lacked jurisdiction to modify the award after the statutory deadline and erred in granting nunc pro tunc relief. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether the “non-negligent happenstance” exception to statutory filing deadlines—established in Bass v. Commonwealth—remained viable and whether it applied to the attorney’s family emergency. The Court held that the statutory 30-day period in 42 Pa.C.S. § 7342(b) is mandatory and not subject to an equitable, non-negligent-happenstance exception absent express statutory language. The Court affirmed the Superior Court’s order, disapproving Bass as a basis for extending arbitration review deadlines without legislative authorization. View "Carr v. First Commonwealth Bank" on Justia Law

Tubbs v. Payton

2026-09-10T11:00:08-08:00

The plaintiff, an incarcerated individual at Earnest C. Brooks Correctional Facility in Michigan, sought to challenge the withholding of a book authored by his sister from his mail. The book, which addressed childhood sexual assault, was rejected by a mailroom clerk on the grounds that it allegedly encouraged or provided instruction in criminal activity. After receiving notice of the rejection, the plaintiff requested an administrative hearing. There was a dispute between the parties regarding the timing and number of hearings, but ultimately, the plaintiff claimed he did not receive the hearing report detailing the final decision until May 9, 2022. He then filed a grievance that same day, alleging unjust censorship and procedural due process violations. The Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) maintains a multi-step grievance process for prisoner complaints, and under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), prisoners must exhaust these remedies before filing suit. The plaintiff’s grievances were denied at each step by MDOC as untimely, based on the department’s interpretation that the grievance should have been filed within five business days of the April 5, 2022, hearing. After exhausting the MDOC process, the plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant, concluding that the plaintiff had not properly exhausted his administrative remedies due to untimeliness. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and applied de novo review. The court held that the defendant, as the party asserting the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust, did not meet the burden of proving that no genuine dispute existed regarding when the plaintiff received notice of the final decision. The court found that a genuine dispute of material fact remained about the timing of the plaintiff’s awareness of the unresolved issue. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Tubbs v. Payton" on Justia Law

Hello Farms Licensing MI, LLC v. GR Vending MI, LLC

2026-09-10T11:00:07-08:00

A Michigan marijuana grower entered into a contract with two subsidiaries of a larger company to supply all marijuana grown in its 2020 and 2021 harvests. At the time of contracting, the grower was licensed by Michigan to produce medical marijuana, while the buyers held both medical and recreational licenses. The contract required the marijuana to meet recreational testing standards, and the buyers paid a deposit. After the initial shipment, the buyers refused further deliveries due to a price drop, prompting the grower to sell the remaining harvests to other entities at lower prices. The grower sued the buyers for breach of contract in Michigan state court, seeking lost profits. The buyers removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, raised counterclaims, and asserted that the contract was unenforceable due to federal illegality. After cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court denied the buyers’ illegality defense and allowed the case to proceed to trial. A jury found the buyers liable and awarded substantial damages to the grower. The buyers renewed their motion for judgment as a matter of law and requested a new trial, again arguing federal illegality. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial de novo. The Sixth Circuit held that federal courts cannot enforce contracts founded on agreements to commit conduct that is explicitly prohibited by federal law, such as distribution and possession of marijuana under the Controlled Substances Act. Because the contract was not limited to medical use and encompassed conduct criminalized under federal law, the court found the contract unenforceable. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the buyers’ motion for judgment as a matter of law. View "Hello Farms Licensing MI, LLC v. GR Vending MI, LLC" on Justia Law

Gallo v. Schwalb

2026-09-10T06:01:32-08:00

The appellant, Alexander Gallo, acting without counsel, brought suit in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia against Latham & Watkins LLP, the District of Columbia, and Attorney General Brian Schwalb. He alleged misconduct in prior litigation related to an eviction dispute during the COVID-19 pandemic. In the earlier case, Mr. Gallo attempted to evict a foreclosed homeowner but was prevented from doing so by a pandemic-related moratorium. He sued the District under several legal theories, but those claims were dismissed by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and the dismissal was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. After the federal appellate proceedings but before the D.C. Circuit issued its decision, Mr. Gallo filed the current lawsuit in the Superior Court, seeking damages and injunctive relief for alleged fraudulent litigation tactics used by the defendants in the previous case. He also moved for a preliminary injunction. The District opposed the injunction, arguing he was unlikely to succeed on the merits; Latham did not respond. The Superior Court denied the preliminary injunction and, without a hearing or prior notice to Mr. Gallo, dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), issuing a brief, unexplained order. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that it is reversible error for the Superior Court to dismiss a complaint sua sponte under Rule 12(b)(6) without providing the plaintiff with notice and an opportunity to respond. The appellate court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Gallo v. Schwalb" on Justia Law

Vance v. Aldrich

2026-09-09T10:31:08-08:00

In November 2022, Anderson Aldrich entered Club Q, an LGBTQIA+ nightclub in Colorado Springs, and shot patrons, killing five people and injuring twenty-five others. Survivors and families of victims sued multiple defendants: the El Paso County Board of County Commissioners, the Sheriff, and Club Q’s owners and associated entities. Against the County Defendants, plaintiffs raised federal substantive due process claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging county policies prevented law enforcement from seeking emergency protection orders (ERPOs), thereby increasing vulnerability to private violence. Against Club Q Defendants, plaintiffs brought claims under the Colorado Premises Liability Act (CPLA), as well as negligence and wrongful-death claims, alleging inadequate security and safety measures. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss all federal claims, finding plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged affirmative danger-creating conduct required under the state-created-danger theory. The court also dismissed the CPLA claims against Club Q Defendants due to lack of causation, but denied dismissal of negligence and wrongful-death claims, reasoning the exclusivity of the CPLA was a fact-intensive issue not suitable for resolution at the pleading stage. Once federal claims were dismissed, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state claims and entered judgment. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the § 1983 claims, holding plaintiffs failed to allege that county conduct placed them at immediate risk, thus not satisfying the affirmative-conduct requirement. The court also affirmed dismissal of the CPLA claims, concluding Aldrich’s actions were the predominant cause of injury under Colorado law. However, it reversed the district court’s denial of dismissal for negligence and wrongful-death claims, holding the CPLA provides the exclusive remedy for injuries arising from Club Q’s conditions and precludes those common-law claims. View "Vance v. Aldrich" on Justia Law

BRAHAM V. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION

2026-09-09T10:30:34-08:00

Two college football players began their collegiate athletic careers at junior colleges in 2019 before transferring to NCAA Division I institutions. Both completed the maximum five years of collegiate eligibility allowed by the NCAA’s “Five-Year Rule,” which includes time spent at any full-time collegiate institution, including junior colleges. In 2025, each player sought a preliminary injunction in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, arguing that the NCAA’s five-year limitation on eligibility was anticompetitive under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and seeking to play an additional, sixth year of college football. The players also challenged the NCAA’s “Rule of Restitution,” which allows the NCAA to penalize member schools that permit ineligible athletes to compete pursuant to court orders later vacated or reversed. Both district courts granted the plaintiffs’ requests for preliminary injunctions, permitting them to play in the 2025 college football season. After the season concluded, the NCAA appealed the injunctions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The plaintiffs moved to dismiss the appeals as moot because the 2025 season was over and their collegiate eligibility had ended. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the appeals were moot, as the injunctions had expired and the players’ collegiate careers were over, making it impossible to provide any effective relief to the NCAA. The court further determined that the NCAA did not meet its burden to show that the case fit the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to mootness, because there was no reasonable expectation that these plaintiffs would again be subject to the same NCAA actions. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the NCAA’s appeals as moot and vacated the district courts’ orders. View "BRAHAM V. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION" on Justia Law

Eriakha v. University of MS

2026-09-09T09:30:07-08:00

Twin brothers, both Black international students, were enrolled as doctoral candidates at the University of Mississippi’s Department of Pharmacy Administration. One brother, Bennard, disagreed with changes to his faculty mentorship arrangement, objected to mandatory in-person meetings, and declined to complete a required program assessment called the Abilities Transcript. After being repeatedly warned and given extensions, he was placed on provisional status for failing to complete the requirement, which also caused the loss of his graduate assistantship. Bennard and his brother each filed lawsuits against the University and several faculty members, alleging constitutional, statutory, and contract violations related to academic sanctions and alleged discriminatory treatment. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi consolidated the brothers’ cases. It dismissed Bennard’s claims against the University on sovereign-immunity grounds, dismissed his remaining federal claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his individual-capacity state contract claims. Bennard appealed, while his brother’s appeal was dismissed for failure to prosecute. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Bennard’s remaining claims. The court held that sovereign immunity barred claims against the University, claims against one defendant in her official capacity, and official-capacity state-law contract claims; those dismissals must be without prejudice. The court further found that Bennard failed to plausibly allege First or Fourteenth Amendment violations, and that the faculty defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on individual-capacity claims. The court affirmed the district court’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining contract claims and upheld consolidation of the cases and dismissal of moot preliminary injunction motions. The judgment was affirmed as modified to clarify the proper form of dismissal for sovereign-immunity-barred claims. View "Eriakha v. University of MS" on Justia Law

NEELY v. PARSELL

2026-09-09T04:11:06-08:00

The dispute concerned ownership of a strip of land at the boundary between two neighboring properties. The petitioner initiated litigation to resolve title to this land, and the respondents answered and asserted counterclaims. With both parties’ consent, a special master reviewed the title issues. The trial court adopted part of the special master’s recommendation, rejected the petitioner’s claims, and vested title in the respondents. Before the respondents’ counterclaims could be tried, they voluntarily dismissed those claims. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal challenging the trial court’s order on title. The Court of Appeals of Georgia reviewed the case and determined that the petitioner’s appeal was untimely. The court reasoned that the notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days after the entry of the trial court’s order and held that the voluntary dismissal of the counterclaims did not render the earlier order appealable as a final judgment. The majority relied on Dykes v. Atlanta Paving & Concrete Construction, which held that the date of entry of the original order determines its finality for appeal purposes, not subsequent dismissals of remaining claims. A dissent argued that an order could become final due to subsequent events, such as dismissal of remaining claims. The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari and concluded that the appeal was timely. The Court held that when all remaining claims were dismissed, the prior order became a final judgment, triggering the 30-day period to file a notice of appeal. The Court overruled Dykes and similar precedents, clarifying that a judgment can become final due to subsequent events and not solely upon original entry. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ dismissal and remanded the case for consideration of the merits. View "NEELY v. PARSELL" on Justia Law

Brock v. Tompkins

2026-09-08T14:36:08-08:00

A dispute arose regarding the right to use a private roadway, Forgotten Lane, which crosses property owned by Shan and Dana Tompkins and abuts parcels owned by Christine Brock as co-trustee of a family trust. The properties, all originally part of a single tract, were divided over several decades by a series of conveyances beginning in the 1940s. The parties disagreed about whether Brock held an easement over Forgotten Lane, the nature of historical use of the road, and whether any rights to use the road continued to exist after the division of the property. In 2016–2017, physical barriers were placed on the disputed road, leading to this litigation after Brock claimed an easement and sought to remove the obstructions. The Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, first considered only Brock’s claim of an express easement based on a certificate of survey, ultimately denying summary judgment to both sides but inviting Brock to amend her complaint to include implied, prescriptive, and public easement theories. The court permitted the amendment and later bifurcated the proceedings, assigning the express, implied, and public easement claims to a bench trial, while reserving the prescriptive easement and trespass counterclaims for a potential jury trial. After a bench trial, the District Court found Brock did not prove an express easement but held she had established an implied easement across the Tompkins’ property and issued a permanent injunction. When the implied easement was found to provide the relief sought, the District Court dismissed the remaining claims and counterclaims as moot and denied Brock’s request for attorney fees on procedural grounds. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and held that the District Court erred by not granting summary judgment to the Tompkins on the original express-easement claim, but that this error did not affect the fairness of proceedings on the amended complaint. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment finding an implied easement, vacated the permanent injunction, and remanded for further proceedings on any unresolved alternative theories, including public and prescriptive easements, and the trespass counterclaim. It also reversed the procedural denial of Brock’s request for costs and fees, remanding for a new determination after final judgment. Other procedural and bifurcation orders were affirmed. View "Brock v. Tompkins" on Justia Law

Hudson Revocable Trust v. Freedom Pass

2026-09-08T14:36:06-08:00

In this case, a dispute arose over membership interests in Freedom Pass Partners, LLC, which owns undeveloped property near Big Sky, Montana. Carol Hudson, through her estate and beneficiaries Alan and Jeffrey Johnson, claimed that Hudson funded the purchase of the property based on assurances she would be a member of Freedom Pass. After Hudson’s death, her sons, acting as trustees and beneficiaries of her trust, filed suit asserting multiple claims including breach of contract, fraud, unjust enrichment, and conversion, alleging Hudson’s investment entitled her to membership or ownership interests. The Eighteenth Judicial District Court reviewed the claims and granted summary judgment for Freedom Pass Partners, LLC. It found that the Johnsons lacked standing because the estate’s personal representative had not joined the litigation, and concluded that all claims were time-barred based on the statute of limitations. The court also denied Johnsons’ motions to amend the complaint, to compel discovery identifying a prospective property buyer, and for relief from judgment regarding the dissolution of a lis pendens notice. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the District Court’s decisions de novo for summary judgment and for abuse of discretion on the remaining motions. It held that genuine disputes of material fact existed about whether Hudson knew or should have known she was not a member of Freedom Pass, particularly given conflicting evidence and potential concealment or fiduciary duties. The Supreme Court also found the denial of leave to amend the complaint was an abuse of discretion because adding the estate’s personal representative could cure the standing defect. The denial of discovery and failure to consider mootness regarding the lis pendens were also found to be abuses of discretion. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s rulings and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hudson Revocable Trust v. Freedom Pass" on Justia Law

I F G Port v. Lake Charles Harbor

2026-09-08T09:30:17-08:00

A dispute arose between a company and a port authority over responsibility for securing permits to dredge a ship channel in Lake Charles, Louisiana. The company had leased the channel to develop a grain terminal, but the lease did not specify which party was responsible for obtaining the dredging permit. After the terminal was built but could not be fully used without dredging, the company and the port disagreed over who bore this responsibility. The company sued in federal court, and, by consent of both parties, a U.S. Magistrate Judge presided over a bench trial and awarded the company nearly $125 million. After the trial and the entry of judgment, the port discovered that the magistrate judge and the company’s lead trial counsel had been close family friends for four decades—a relationship that was not fully disclosed. The only disclosure had been that the lead counsel’s daughter was the judge’s law clerk, who would be screened from the case. Upon learning about the undisclosed relationship, the port moved to vacate the magistrate judge referral. The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana held an evidentiary hearing and found that the port’s consent to the referral had not been knowing, as it had lacked crucial information about the judge’s conflict, and vacated the referral. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion. The Fifth Circuit held that a party’s consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction waives a fundamental constitutional right and, therefore, must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The court rejected the argument that constructive knowledge by the party’s counsel—rather than actual knowledge—could suffice to establish valid consent. Because the district court applied the correct standard and found no actual knowledge, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the vacation of the referral. View "I F G Port v. Lake Charles Harbor" on Justia Law

National Shooting Sports Foundation v. Attorney General New Jersey

2026-09-08T09:00:05-08:00

A national firearms industry trade association challenged the constitutionality of a New Jersey statute enacted in 2022, which imposes civil liability on gun industry members for certain “public nuisance” conduct related to the sale, manufacture, distribution, import, or marketing of firearms and related products. The law allows the state to bring enforcement actions against gun industry members for actions deemed unlawful or unreasonable, as well as for failing to implement “reasonable controls.” The association argued that the statute is unconstitutional under the Interstate Commerce Clause, the First and Second Amendments, and is preempted by the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA). Initially, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the law, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated that injunction, holding that the association lacked Article III standing because enforcement of the law was speculative at that time. After the state initiated several enforcement actions under the statute—including suits against two members of the association—the association moved to reopen the case, amend its complaint, and again seek a preliminary injunction. The District Court found standing but abstained from ruling on the merits under the Younger abstention doctrine, which generally prohibits federal courts from interfering with certain ongoing state proceedings. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and held that the association now has standing due to the substantial risk of imminent enforcement against its members, evidenced by the state’s recent lawsuits. The court further held that Younger abstention does not apply because the association is not a party to any ongoing state proceeding and does not have the type of control or relationship with its members that would warrant abstention. Accordingly, the Third Circuit reversed the District Court’s order. View "National Shooting Sports Foundation v. Attorney General New Jersey" on Justia Law

Guzman v. Super. Ct.

2026-09-04T11:02:37-08:00

A jury found that the defendant was negligent and awarded the plaintiff over $18.5 million in damages, which, after adding costs and interest, resulted in a judgment of more than $20 million. To stay enforcement of this judgment pending appeal, the defendant was required to post a bond under California law. The defendant, despite having about $1.75 million in assets, asserted that he could not obtain a bond in the statutorily required amount, which was over $30 million, and requested the trial court to waive or reduce the bond to the limit of his insurance policy ($1.25 million). The Superior Court of Sacramento County considered the defendant’s financial declaration and a supplemental declaration detailing the costs and collateral requirements for various bond levels from a bond broker. After evaluating these submissions and hearing arguments, the trial court found the defendant qualified for relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 995.240 and ordered him to post a reduced bond of $1.25 million. The plaintiff then filed a petition for writ of mandate or prohibition, challenging the trial court’s interpretation of “indigent” within the statute and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the bond reduction. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the trial court’s decision for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that “indigent” under section 995.240 is not limited to those in extreme poverty but includes any person unable to obtain sufficient sureties, considering access to the judicial process. The trial court retains discretion to weigh all relevant factors, including the nature of the obligation and the potential harm to the beneficiary. The appellate court also found no evidentiary error in the trial court’s consideration of the defendant’s declarations. Accordingly, the petition was denied, and the trial court’s order was affirmed. View "Guzman v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Giffords v. FEC

2026-09-04T07:01:15-08:00

A nonprofit organization dedicated to gun violence prevention filed several administrative complaints with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) in 2018, alleging violations of the Federal Election Campaign Act by two entities associated with a national advocacy group. After the FEC failed to act within the statutory 120-day period, the nonprofit filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking an order compelling the FEC to act. Due to a lack of quorum, the FEC remained inactive for an extended period. Eventually, the District Court granted summary judgment to the nonprofit, ordered the FEC to act within 30 days, and later determined the FEC had not complied, thereby allowing the nonprofit to file a citizen suit against the NRA-associated entities. The national advocacy group sought to dismiss the citizen suit, arguing the District Court lacked jurisdiction. It also moved to intervene in the original action, but only for the limited purpose of unsealing the judicial record. Subsequently, after the District Court’s final judgment, the advocacy group filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(4) seeking relief from the orders and judgment, contending that the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction due to mootness and lack of adversity. The District Court denied this motion, holding that the group, as a nonparty, lacked standing to seek relief under Rule 60(b). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the appeal from the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion. The Court held that only parties to a lawsuit, or those who properly become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment. Since the advocacy group had not used any procedural mechanism to become a party to the underlying suit, it lacked the procedural ability to appeal. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal as impermissible under binding precedent. View "Giffords v. FEC" on Justia Law

Ramirez v. City of Texas City

2026-09-03T15:30:07-08:00

Michael Ramirez purchased a house in Texas City, Texas, intending to remodel and resell it. After a fire caused substantial but repairable damage, the City declared the property substandard and, following an inspection, determined it posed a clear and imminent danger. The City sent notice to Ramirez, halted the permit process pending an engineer’s report (which Ramirez never obtained), and the house remained unrepaired for over a year, with Ramirez storing valuable personal property inside. In May 2023, the City demolished the house without further notice. Ramirez then sued, claiming violations of state and federal constitutional rights, including procedural due process and takings, and sought damages for the house, expected profits, personal property, and attorney’s fees. Upon removal to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Ramirez repeatedly requested a jury trial in various filings. The parties signed a joint case management plan acknowledging a jury demand. The district court initially scheduled a jury trial but, shortly before trial, ordered a bench trial instead, finding the jury demand procedurally deficient. After the bench trial, the court held the City had violated Ramirez’s procedural due process rights but justified the demolition under nuisance abatement, awarding only nominal damages and denying attorney’s fees as Ramirez was not considered the prevailing party. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on the denial of a jury trial and damages determinations. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by denying Ramirez’s Rule 39(b) motion for a jury trial, as there were no strong or compelling reasons to do so and Ramirez’s repeated demands were sufficient. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings, including a jury trial and reconsideration of damages and fees. View "Ramirez v. City of Texas City" on Justia Law

INLAND EMPIRE WATERKEEPER V. CORONA CLAY COMPANY

2026-09-03T08:30:38-08:00

The plaintiffs, projects focused on protecting water quality, brought a suit against a clay recycling facility located near Temescal Creek in California, alleging violations of stormwater-permit requirements under the Clean Water Act. The facility, operated by Corona Clay Company, discharged stormwater into Temescal Creek, a tributary of the Santa Ana River. Regulatory authorities had previously issued violation notices to Corona, but no enforcement action was taken by the state. The plaintiffs sought relief for both substantive discharge violations and procedural violations such as monitoring and reporting. The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially found in favor of Corona following a trial. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, citing an intervening Supreme Court decision, County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, which expanded the scope of the Clean Water Act to include indirect discharges that are the “functional equivalent” of direct discharges. On retrial, the plaintiffs prevailed, and Corona was assessed significant penalties. After the Supreme Court’s Sackett v. EPA decision, which narrowed the definition of “waters of the United States,” Corona moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and alternatively sought a new trial. The district court denied both motions, holding that the jurisdictional requirement was met and the issue of whether Temescal Creek qualified as a water of the United States had been conceded. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Corona’s post-judgment motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that whether a waterbody qualifies as a “water of the United States” is a merits question, not a jurisdictional one. However, it reversed the denial of Corona’s motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, concluding that the intervening Sackett decision rendered a previously foreclosed issue viable. The panel remanded for further proceedings to determine, under Sackett’s standard, whether Temescal Creek is a water of the United States. View "INLAND EMPIRE WATERKEEPER V. CORONA CLAY COMPANY" on Justia Law

HAVENS VS. DIST. CT.

2026-09-03T07:08:11-08:00

A former employee entered into a noncompete agreement with his employer, which barred him from engaging in similar business activities for 12 months within the company’s client base area after his employment ended in April 2024. Months later, the employer alleged that the former employee and his new business violated the agreement and sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary injunction to enforce it. After the parties exchanged filings, the district court issued a TRO in June 2025, set to remain in effect indefinitely, and delayed the hearing on the preliminary injunction multiple times, citing new evidence related to a superseding noncompete agreement. The district court clarified the TRO’s scope, found the petitioners in contempt for violating it, and denied their motion to dissolve the TRO. The court eventually allowed the employer to amend its complaint to reflect the new agreement and later issued an amended TRO. A preliminary injunction was finally issued in April 2026. The petitioners challenged the original TRO by writ petition, arguing that it exceeded the 14-day limit allowed by Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b). The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and clarified that, under NRCP 65(b)(2), the 14-day time limit applies to TROs regardless of whether they are issued with or without notice. The court held that a TRO cannot be indefinite and must expire after 14 days unless properly extended for good cause or by consent. Because the district court’s TRO was indefinite and not properly extended, it automatically expired 14 days after issuance. The Supreme Court of Nevada granted the writ of mandamus and directed the district court to declare the TRO expired as of June 23, 2025. View "HAVENS VS. DIST. CT." on Justia Law

Allen v. Allen

2026-09-03T05:07:40-08:00

A dispute arose over a deed transferring a one-half interest in a farm from a mother to her son, Peter, without consideration, while she was alive. After the mother’s death, her estate, left to four children in equal shares, was inventoried; the contested property was listed as belonging to Peter due to the earlier transfer. David, another son and a beneficiary, objected, claiming that the mother lacked capacity and was unduly influenced when she executed the deed. The estate administrator declined to pursue the claim, believing litigation costs would outweigh the benefit. David then initiated a separate action to invalidate the deed and impose a constructive trust, seeking to restore the property interest to the estate. The 6th Circuit Court–Concord Probate Division held a trial and ruled in favor of David, finding that Peter had unduly influenced the mother and that she lacked capacity at the time of the transfer. The probate court invalidated the deed, deferred ruling on the constructive trust, and awarded attorney’s fees to David. Peter’s motion for reconsideration was denied. He appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court and subsequently moved in probate court to vacate all orders for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; the probate court declined to address the motion, noting the issue was already raised on appeal. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and determined that the probate court lacked statutory subject matter jurisdiction over David’s claims. The court found that the claims, concerning an inter vivos property transfer, did not have the direct connection to estate administration or distribution required for probate court jurisdiction. The Supreme Court vacated the probate court’s order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition without prejudice. View "Allen v. Allen" on Justia Law

Instituto Medico del Norte, Inc. v. Greengift Capital, LLC

2026-09-02T13:00:03-08:00

A medical institution in Puerto Rico borrowed over $10 million from a bank in 1984 to build a hospital, but soon disputes arose regarding the loan. The bank claimed the institution defaulted, while the institution asserted the bank failed to disburse funds as required. Litigation and bankruptcy proceedings followed. In 1991, the parties settled, but the terms of that settlement—whether the debt was split into interest-bearing and non-interest-bearing portions—remained contested. Over the next decades, the loan changed hands, and in 2013 the institution filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy again. The current loan-holder claimed a significantly higher outstanding balance than the institution believed was owed, due in part to differing interpretations of the 1991 agreement and subsequent bankruptcy plan. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico previously addressed these disputes. It issued orders requiring the institution to demonstrate, with evidence, that the 1991 agreement created a non-interest-bearing note and that it had made payments in accordance with the bankruptcy plan. The court denied discovery, required summary judgment briefing, and ultimately issued an order with minimal analysis, granting the loan-holder’s motion to dismiss and denying the institution’s motion for summary judgment. The court’s reasoning was ambiguous, referencing both summary judgment and pleading standards, and did not clearly identify the basis for its decision. On appeal, the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico affirmed, concluding the bankruptcy plan did not incorporate the 1991 bifurcated note arrangement. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, reviewing the case, found the bankruptcy court’s order insufficiently reasoned to permit meaningful appellate review. The First Circuit vacated the lower courts’ decisions and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the bankruptcy court to clarify its reasoning, identify the applicable legal standards, and consider whether summary judgment or further fact-finding is appropriate. View "Instituto Medico del Norte, Inc. v. Greengift Capital, LLC" on Justia Law

County of Westchester v. Express Scripts

2026-09-02T06:30:15-08:00

Several counties and municipalities in New York initiated lawsuits in state courts against two pharmacy benefit managers, Express Scripts, Inc. and OptumRx, Inc., alleging that these companies contributed to the opioid epidemic in their communities. The claims are based on state law and center on the defendants’ alleged practices in negotiating with opioid manufacturers and managing prescription formularies, which plaintiffs contend led to an oversupply of prescription opioids and caused substantial public harm and government expense. The defendants removed the cases to federal court—the United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York—arguing removal was proper under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), because some of the challenged conduct was performed under contracts with federal agencies, such as the Department of Defense (TRICARE), the Office of Personnel Management (FEHBP), and the Veterans Health Administration. After removal, the plaintiffs amended their complaints to disclaim any claims based on the defendants’ work for federal clients, seeking to have the cases remanded to state court. The district courts accepted the disclaimers and remanded the cases. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district courts’ decisions. It concluded that the disclaimers were ineffective because the alleged wrongful conduct and resulting harms could not be separated between federal and non-federal clients; the conduct was indivisible. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, the Second Circuit held that the defendants satisfied all statutory requirements for federal officer removal: they acted under federal direction, were sued for acts relating to federal authority, and asserted colorable federal defenses. The Second Circuit therefore reversed the remand orders and returned the cases to the district courts for further proceedings. View "County of Westchester v. Express Scripts" on Justia Law

Moreno v. Ranger Energy Servs.

2026-09-01T10:47:04-08:00

The plaintiff suffered severe injuries while working at a drilling site in New Mexico. Nearly two years and eight months after the incident, he filed his first lawsuit in Texas state court, alleging negligence and related claims against the defendants. Texas law provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, and the Texas court dismissed his suit with prejudice as time-barred. The plaintiff did not appeal that dismissal. Four months later, the plaintiff brought a substantially similar lawsuit in New Mexico state court, seeking to take advantage of New Mexico’s three-year statute of limitations and its savings statute, which allows a plaintiff to refile within six months after certain dismissals. The New Mexico district court dismissed the second suit, agreeing with the defendants that the savings statute did not apply because the plaintiff failed to timely file his first action. The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that pursuing the claim in Texas constituted a failure to prosecute with reasonable diligence, and that the savings statute’s exception for negligence in prosecution applied. The Court of Appeals relied on precedent that interpreted the exception broadly. The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico granted certiorari to review whether the lower courts correctly applied the savings statute in light of its new decision in Zangara v. LSF9 Master Participation Trust. The Supreme Court clarified that the “negligence in prosecution” exception only applies when the first action is dismissed for failure to prosecute, and rejected the Court of Appeals’ broader analysis. However, the Supreme Court held that the New Mexico savings statute requires the first action to be timely commenced. Because the plaintiff’s Texas lawsuit was itself untimely, the New Mexico savings statute did not apply, and the second suit could not proceed. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. View "Moreno v. Ranger Energy Servs." on Justia Law

National Park Service v. National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States

2026-08-31T12:45:06-08:00

The federal government initiated a project to replace the East Wing of the White House, completing demolition in December 2025 and beginning construction of a new wing, which included both a below-ground military installation and an above-ground ballroom. The National Trust for Historic Preservation challenged aspects of the ongoing construction and sought a preliminary injunction to halt the above-ground work due to concerns about its impact on aesthetic, cultural, and historical interests. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted the Trust’s motion for a preliminary injunction, allowing only construction strictly necessary for security purposes above ground but permitting below-ground work to continue. The government appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit initially stayed the injunction, then ultimately affirmed the district court’s order. With the injunction set to take effect, the government sought relief from the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court granted the requested stay of the district court's injunction pending the government’s petition for certiorari. The Court held that the government is likely to succeed in showing the Trust lacks Article III standing, as the Trust’s asserted injury—distress at viewing the new ballroom’s design—does not constitute a concrete and particularized injury. The Court also found that the government would likely suffer irreparable harm from halting construction, given national security concerns and operational needs, while the Trust’s claimed harm was outweighed by these factors. The stay will remain in effect until certiorari is denied or, if granted, until the judgment is issued. View "National Park Service v. National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States" on Justia Law

SMITH v. POULTER

2026-08-31T09:32:38-08:00

Bryan Smith requested court records from the Bonneville County District Court in April 2025, specifically seeking copies of judgments and certificates of service for 169 small claims cases. The Clerk’s Office charged him $352 for the records, relying on a 2017 Administrative Order that set fees for electronic records production. Smith paid the fee after the Clerk refused to reduce the charge, then filed suit against the Clerk in his official capacity, alleging he was overcharged and that Idaho Code section 74-102(10) should control the fee charged for electronic records. He sought declaratory relief and damages for the alleged overcharge. The Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County, heard cross motions for summary judgment. The Clerk asserted quasi-judicial immunity based on following an administrative court order. The district court granted summary judgment for the Clerk, holding he had absolute quasi-judicial immunity and declining to address the merits of Smith’s claims, including whether the fee was excessive or inconsistent with Idaho law. The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the appeal. Applying a de novo standard, the Court held that quasi-judicial immunity is only a defense to personal liability, not official capacity suits, and the district court erred in applying that defense. On the merits, the Court found the 2017 Administrative Order’s fee structure was inconsistent with Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32 and Idaho Code section 74-102(10), which require fees to reflect actual labor and material costs. Smith was overcharged by $330.67. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, vacated the amended judgment, and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Smith, directing the Clerk to refund $330.67 and awarding Smith costs on appeal. View "SMITH v. POULTER" on Justia Law

In re A.H.

2026-08-31T09:31:32-08:00

A child who is an enrolled member of a federally recognized tribe was placed in the guardianship of his paternal grandmother after his biological parents were found unable to care for him. Over the years, concerns arose regarding the guardian’s ability to meet the child’s medical and educational needs, leading to multiple child welfare referrals. Ultimately, the county child welfare agency filed a juvenile dependency petition, asserting the guardian’s failure to protect and provide for the child due to alleged mental illness and neglect. The child’s tribe, which had been involved in the child’s probate and dependency matters for several years, requested a court-ordered psychological evaluation of the guardian to assess her capacity to care for the child. The Superior Court of Riverside County ordered the psychological evaluation but specified it was for “case planning purposes only.” When the tribe later sought access to the evaluation to assist in case monitoring and planning, the guardian objected, arguing privacy and privilege concerns. The juvenile court denied the tribe’s request, finding the evaluation was not ordered for the tribe’s benefit and that there were no compelling reasons to release it. The tribe appealed, contending that it had a presumptive right to the evaluation under state and federal law due to its role in protecting the welfare of its citizen child. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, held that the tribe is presumptively entitled to access the guardian’s psychological evaluation under Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 and related statutes. The court concluded that the tribe, as a party to the proceedings and as a multidisciplinary team member, did not need to file a separate petition for access, and that neither privacy nor privilege barred disclosure of the court-ordered report. The appellate court reversed the juvenile court’s order and directed the release of the evaluation to the tribe. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law

In re: Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints

2026-08-31T09:00:57-08:00

Plaintiffs, who had donated funds to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, alleged that the Church and its investment subsidiary, Ensign Peak Advisors, Inc., fraudulently induced donations by concealing the true use and accumulation of donated funds. They claimed that the Church misrepresented that tithing would be used for charitable and religious purposes, when instead large portions were invested and used for commercial ventures, such as the development of the City Creek Mall. A key event in the case was the publication of a whistleblower report in December 2019, which was widely reported in national and local media and described how the Church managed and concealed a large investment portfolio. The Church publicly responded, and three other lawsuits were filed by different donors based on similar allegations. After actions were filed in several federal district courts, the cases were consolidated in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. Plaintiffs brought claims for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment, seeking to represent a nationwide class of post-1997 donors. The district court dismissed the consolidated complaint with prejudice, ruling that the claims were untimely under Utah’s three-year statute of limitations for fraud. The court found that the widespread news coverage of the whistleblower report meant that plaintiffs, exercising reasonable diligence, should have discovered the alleged fraud more than three years before filing suit. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred because the whistleblower report and related media coverage provided sufficient public notice to trigger the statute of limitations, and that reasonable diligence would have led to earlier discovery. The court also found no error in the district court’s procedural rulings and denied the request for leave to amend. View "In re: Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints" on Justia Law

Utah Vapor Business Association v. State of Utah

2026-08-31T09:00:57-08:00

Businesses selling flavored e-cigarettes in Utah challenged a state law passed in March 2024 that banned the sale of any e-cigarette flavors other than tobacco or menthol. The plaintiffs, representing Retail Tobacco Specialty Businesses (RTSBs), argued that this “Flavor Ban” would severely affect their operations, as the majority of their sales involved flavored products. They asserted that the ban was preempted by the Federal Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act and also contended that the law’s enforcement mechanism, which authorized warrantless searches by local health departments, violated the Fourth Amendment. The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, seeking preliminary injunctions against both the Flavor Ban and the enforcement mechanism. The district court denied the preliminary injunction regarding the Flavor Ban, concluding that federal law did not preempt the state’s action, but granted an injunction against the enforcement provision, finding the warrantless search mechanism unconstitutional. The court determined that the enforcement provision was severable from the rest of the Act, so it left the remainder of the law, including the Flavor Ban, intact. Both sides appealed the rulings adverse to them. After the Utah legislature amended the enforcement provision, both parties agreed that the Fourth Amendment issue was moot. The only remaining issue on appeal was whether the federal law preempted the state’s Flavor Ban. However, the plaintiffs failed to properly identify the relevant district court order denying the preliminary injunction against the Flavor Ban in their notice of appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that because the plaintiffs’ notice of appeal did not specify the order they sought to challenge, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the preemption issue. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Utah Vapor Business Association v. State of Utah" on Justia Law

Skatteforvaltningen v. Markowitz

2026-08-31T06:30:16-08:00

Several individuals, including Richard and Jocelyn Markowitz, John and Elizabeth van Merkensteijn, and pension funds they controlled, were found by a jury to have defrauded the Danish tax authority (Skat) by submitting false claims for tax refunds. The defendants conceded before trial that they were never entitled to the refunds under the U.S.-Denmark tax treaty, admitting that they had not owned Danish shares or received dividends subject to Danish withholding tax. However, they argued that they had been misled by a London-based trading partner into believing otherwise and were unaware that the refund claims submitted on their behalf were fraudulent. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presided over the case after it was consolidated as part of multidistrict litigation. The defendants unsuccessfully moved to dismiss Skat’s claims, contending that the common law revenue rule barred the suit. The district court held that because the defendants never owned the relevant Danish stocks or paid taxes, Skat’s claims were for commercial fraud rather than enforcement of Danish tax law. After trial, the jury found each defendant liable, and the district court entered judgments totaling over $476 million based on Skat’s gross payments and prejudgment interest. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Skat’s lawsuit was not barred by the revenue rule because it did not seek to enforce foreign tax laws, but rather sought recovery for fraud. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s exclusion of certain evidence and upheld the sufficiency of evidence supporting judgments against Jocelyn Markowitz and Elizabeth van Merkensteijn under an agency theory. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Skatteforvaltningen v. Markowitz" on Justia Law

JADUE v. DHS

2026-08-31T06:01:02-08:00

An employee who had previously worked for the Department of State, and later for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as a criminal investigator, was removed from his position by DHS. The removal was based on a charge of lack of candor, relating to allegedly deceptive or incomplete responses he gave during the background investigation process, including failing to disclose an agreement with the U.S. Attorney’s Office that led to his resignation from State, and omitting details about prior criminal charges and a security clearance suspension. The employee contested the removal, arguing that his omissions were not deceptive and that he had legitimate reasons for his responses. After his removal, the employee filed a "mixed case" complaint with DHS’s Office of Diversity and Civil Rights, alleging both discrimination and non-discrimination grounds for his termination. DHS failed to meet certain regulatory deadlines for handling his complaint. The employee eventually appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (the Board), including a motion for sanctions against DHS for missing deadlines. The Board’s administrative judge denied the sanctions request, sustained four of the eleven specifications supporting the lack of candor charge, and upheld the penalty of removal. The full Board split, making the initial decision final and appealable. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that, because the employee had formally abandoned his discrimination claims, the court lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of sanctions, as those arguments were based solely on the discrimination aspects of the case. The court affirmed the Board’s findings that four specifications of lack of candor were supported by substantial evidence and that the penalty of removal was reasonable. The court dismissed the appeal as to sanctions for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the Board in all other respects. View "JADUE v. DHS " on Justia Law

Iwasa v. Nago

2026-08-28T13:03:00-08:00

A dispute arose from the City and County of Honolulu’s first special election for the District IV councilmember seat, held August 8, 2026. The controversy centered on whether the term limit provision in the Revised Charter—which prohibits anyone from being “elected to the office of councilmember for more than two consecutive four-year terms”—barred the incumbent, who had been elected in both 2019 (in a special election following the invalidation of the 2018 results) and 2022, from running again for the 2027–2031 term. The 2019 election had followed a court-ordered re-run between the same two candidates after irregularities invalidated the 2018 contest. After the Acting City Clerk rejected objections to the incumbent’s eligibility, a candidate filed a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, which ruled the incumbent ineligible. Because ballots had already been printed, election officials notified voters that votes for the incumbent would not count toward determining an eligible candidate for the next round. As no candidate received a majority in the August election, officials prepared to advance the top two eligible candidates, excluding the incumbent, to the second special election. The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed both the procedural and substantive issues. The court held that the Circuit Court should have dismissed the declaratory judgment action as procedurally improper, because Hawai‘i Revised Statutes § 12-8 provided the exclusive remedy for pre-election eligibility challenges. However, the Supreme Court determined it could address the merits under the statutes governing election contests. On the merits, the court concluded the incumbent was “elected to” two consecutive four-year terms and was thus ineligible to run for a third consecutive term under the Revised Charter. The court ordered that only the two eligible candidates be placed on the ballot for the second special election. Judgment was entered for the defendants. View "Iwasa v. Nago" on Justia Law

Williams v. Mastronardi Produce-USA, Inc.

2026-08-28T11:00:07-08:00

The plaintiff alleged she experienced race and gender discrimination, harassment, and retaliation while employed at a facility operated by a subsidiary corporation in Michigan. Initially, she sued the parent corporation, claiming it was her employer and responsible for the alleged misconduct. The parent corporation contended she had sued the wrong entity and provided evidence that the subsidiary, not the parent, was her employer. The district court in the first case sided with the parent corporation, finding that it was not the plaintiff’s employer and that the complaint did not support a joint-employer theory or veil-piercing. After this ruling, the plaintiff filed a new suit against the subsidiary, asserting similar factual allegations and an additional hostile work environment claim under Michigan law. In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, the subsidiary moved to dismiss the new case, arguing that claim preclusion barred the suit because the parent and subsidiary were in privity. The district court rejected the argument that the subsidiary had controlled the prior litigation but applied a “close-and-significant-relationship” test based on the parent-subsidiary relationship and equitable considerations. Concluding that privity existed and the other elements of claim preclusion were met, the district court granted the subsidiary’s motion to dismiss. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that the district court erred by applying the “close-and-significant-relationship” test for privity, rather than the six recognized exceptions to nonparty preclusion from Taylor v. Sturgell. None of the exceptions—pre-existing substantive legal relationship, control, or adequate representation—applied to the facts. Therefore, claim preclusion did not bar the plaintiff’s suit against the subsidiary. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision. View "Williams v. Mastronardi Produce-USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Fischer v. XTO Energy

2026-08-28T08:00:46-08:00

A family group brought claims in Oklahoma state court against an energy company, alleging underpayment of oil and gas royalties over several decades. These claims overlapped with those in a separate class action brought by another party against the company and its related entities, also concerning underpayment of royalties. The class action was removed to federal court, where a settlement was reached and approved by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma. The settlement covered claims for a defined period, and included a permanent injunction barring class members from pursuing similar claims. The family did not opt out of the settlement and received compensation under its terms. Later, the energy company sought summary judgment in the family’s original state case, arguing that the federal settlement released the company from liability for claims during the covered period. When summary judgment was denied, the company returned to the federal district court, seeking enforcement of the settlement’s injunction against further pursuit of those claims by the family in state court. The federal court declined to issue a new injunction but found that the family’s ongoing litigation of released claims violated the original injunction. The court ordered the family to either show cause for their violation or agree to abide by the injunction and dismiss the released claims. The family appealed this order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit determined that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over the order. The court held that a post-judgment civil contempt or enforcement order is not final and appealable unless the district court both finds contempt and imposes a specific, unavoidable sanction. Because the district court’s order did neither, and because no alternative grounds for appellate jurisdiction applied, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal. View "Fischer v. XTO Energy" on Justia Law

Cronick v. City of Colorado Springs

2026-08-28T08:00:46-08:00

A woman was arrested and searched by Colorado Springs police officers in the parking lot of a motel where she lived, following her involvement in assisting an overdose victim and recording the police response. The officers claimed she was disruptive and failed to comply with commands to leave the scene, while she maintained she was cooperative and was wrongfully arrested. After her acquittal of the municipal charge, she brought a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the officers for unlawful arrest and search, seeking damages including for emotional distress. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado addressed extensive disputes during discovery. The plaintiff had deleted social media videos of her later police encounters, as well as records and messages related to the arrest. The court sanctioned her and her attorneys with a monetary penalty and gave adverse-inference jury instructions, directing the jury to presume that she regularly disrupted police business and profited from posting such videos. At trial, over her objection, the court admitted more than twenty clips from her unrelated copwatching videos, which portrayed her berating officers and threatening lawsuits. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the officers. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the unrelated videos and by issuing an adverse-inference instruction that invited improper propensity reasoning, thereby unfairly prejudicing the plaintiff before the jury and depriving her of a fair trial. The Tenth Circuit vacated the judgment for the officers and remanded the case for a new trial. However, it affirmed the monetary sanction against the plaintiff and her attorneys for discovery violations. View "Cronick v. City of Colorado Springs" on Justia Law

Public Interest Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Simon

2026-08-28T08:00:11-08:00

An organization based in Virginia requested access to Minnesota’s Registered Voter List under a federal statute, asserting it was entitled to the records despite Minnesota’s exemption from the law. Minnesota denied the request, citing its exemption as a state with continuous election-day registration since August 1, 1994. The organization also sought the information under a Minnesota statute, but was again denied because no Minnesota-registered voter joined the request. The organization acknowledged it could obtain the information by recruiting a Minnesota voter but did not do so. It then filed suit, claiming Minnesota’s exemption from the federal disclosure requirement was unconstitutional, alleging informational injury and other adverse consequences. The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota reviewed the case. Minnesota moved to dismiss, and the United States intervened to defend the statute’s constitutionality. The district court dismissed the organization’s claim on the merits, concluding that the “equal sovereignty” principle does not apply to Congress’s authority under the Elections Clause. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered whether the organization had Article III standing. The court reviewed standing de novo and focused on whether the plaintiff had suffered a concrete injury in fact. The court held that a purely informational injury does not satisfy Article III’s requirements and found the plaintiff’s alleged downstream consequences insufficient, as they lacked a nexus to the interests Congress sought to protect. The court concluded the plaintiff failed to allege a concrete injury and therefore lacked standing. The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. View "Public Interest Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Simon" on Justia Law

CABARDO V. PATACSIL

2026-08-27T12:30:34-08:00

Ernesto and Marilyn Patacsil operated group care homes, and in 2012, eight of their employees brought suit in federal district court alleging violations of California labor laws, including failure to provide breaks, pay lawful wages, and maintain accurate records. The employees sought damages and civil penalties under the California Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). The jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, and the district court awarded substantial damages, attorney fees, and PAGA penalties. Of the PAGA penalties, 75% were designated for the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) and 25% for the aggrieved employees. Shortly after the judgment, the Patacsils filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The employees (creditors) initiated an adversary proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court, seeking to have the PAGA judgment debts declared nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(6) and (7). The bankruptcy court determined that a trial was needed to resolve whether most of the judgment was nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6, which requires a showing of willful and malicious injury. Under § 523(a)(7), the court found that only the portion of PAGA penalties payable to the LWDA was excepted from discharge, not the 25% allocated to employees or the attorney fees. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California granted leave for an interlocutory appeal on the § 523(a)(7) issue, affirmed the bankruptcy court’s ruling, and remanded for further proceedings on the remaining issues. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the appeal and determined that because the dischargeability proceeding was not yet final—trial on the § 523(a)(6) issue was still pending—it lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "CABARDO V. PATACSIL" on Justia Law

DAVIS VS. DIST. CT.

2026-08-27T09:37:34-08:00

A bus passenger, Vasken Ohanian, sued the bus driver Tamisha Davis and her employer MV Transportation, Inc. after being struck by a bus and allegedly suffering both physical and psychological injuries. Davis and MV retained an expert psychologist, Dr. Thomas Kinsora, to conduct a neuropsychological evaluation of Ohanian. Dr. Kinsora’s report criticized the evaluation by Ohanian’s own expert, Dr. Michael A. Elliott, and concluded that Ohanian’s symptoms were inconsistent with true traumatic injury. Ohanian requested disclosure of the raw psychological test data, including exam questions used by Dr. Kinsora, claiming this was necessary for effective cross-examination. The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County ordered Davis and MV to disclose the raw test data to Ohanian’s counsel, subject to a protective order. Davis and MV partially complied but refused to disclose the exam questions, arguing that a newly-enacted regulation, NAC 641.234(3), prohibited such disclosure absent a specific state or federal law. The district court found that Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure (NRCP) 16.1 and NRS 50.305 constituted specific state laws requiring disclosure and repeatedly ordered compliance. Davis and MV continued to resist full disclosure and petitioned for a writ of mandamus to the Supreme Court of Nevada. The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed whether NAC 641.234(3) superseded the district court’s discovery order. The Court held that the Board of Psychological Examiners’ authority under NRS 641.100(2) extends only to regulating the practice of psychology, not court-ordered discovery. The Court found that district courts have broad discretion to control discovery under NRCP 16.1 and NRCP 35, including ordering disclosure of raw test data. It concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion and denied the petition for a writ of mandamus. View "DAVIS VS. DIST. CT." on Justia Law

Rokhvand & Barmada v. Herzfeld

2026-08-27T06:31:38-08:00

Two activists participated in demonstrations outside the Israeli embassy in Washington, D.C., protesting Israel's military actions in Gaza. Over several months, three incidents occurred involving Rabbi Herzfeld, a local rabbi and community leader, and the activists. During these incidents, the activists alleged that Rabbi Herzfeld and his companions made provocative and upsetting remarks, engaged in intimidating behavior, and, in one instance, initiated a federal lawsuit and media coverage that the activists felt endangered them. The activists felt harassed and took steps to increase their personal security after these events. Following the third incident, the activists filed petitions for anti-stalking orders in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, alleging that Rabbi Herzfeld’s conduct constituted stalking under D.C. law. Rabbi Herzfeld moved to dismiss the petitions, arguing that his actions were protected by the First Amendment and did not meet the statutory definition of stalking, citing precedent from Mashaud v. Boone. The trial court held a summary trial and ultimately denied the petitions, finding that the conduct did not amount to threats or surveillance within the meaning of the statute and was constitutionally protected speech. Rabbi Herzfeld later sought attorney’s fees under the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act and, alternatively, for alleged bad faith. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It affirmed the denial of the anti-stalking petitions, holding that Rabbi Herzfeld’s conduct did not constitute “true threats” and was protected political speech, not actionable as stalking. The court vacated the award of attorney’s fees, finding the trial court had applied the wrong legal standard under the Anti-SLAPP Act and had not given proper notice for a bad-faith fee award. The matter was remanded for further proceedings regarding attorney’s fees. View "Rokhvand & Barmada v. Herzfeld" on Justia Law

Ari Law v. Autonation.com

2026-08-26T13:32:05-08:00

A dispute arose from a vehicle lease agreement, leading Ari Law P.C. to file a Second Amended Complaint in May 2024 against BMW Financial Services NA, LLC and other defendants. Ari Law alleged breach of contract, breach of express and implied warranties, unfair business practices, fraud, and violations of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The San Mateo County Superior Court sustained BMW FS’s demurrer as to counts 2, 3, and 6 (warranty claims and Rosenthal Act claim) without leave to amend. Despite this, Ari Law included these dismissed counts in a Third Amended Complaint filed in September 2024. BMW FS repeatedly requested Ari Law to withdraw the improper claims, but Ari Law refused. BMW FS then served Ari Law with a motion for sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure sections 128.5 and 128.7, initially noticing a hearing for January 17, 2025, and later re-serving and filing the motion with a hearing date of March 18, 2025. The trial court sustained BMW FS’s demurrer to the same counts without leave to amend, and after considering the sanctions motion, imposed monetary sanctions of $29,055 against Ari Law and its counsel. Ari Law challenged the sanctions order, arguing that the notice of motion did not comply with statutory requirements due to differing hearing dates and insufficient time for the safe harbor period. The trial court rejected these procedural objections, finding that Ari Law had adequate notice and opportunity to address the motion, and denied Ari Law’s motion for reconsideration. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It held that the discrepancy in hearing dates between the served and filed notices did not invalidate the sanctions order, so long as the substance of the motion remained the same and the safe harbor provisions were strictly satisfied. The court affirmed the sanctions order, denied BMW FS’s request for sanctions on appeal, and awarded BMW FS costs. View "Ari Law v. Autonation.com" on Justia Law

Hickenbottom v. Medical Solutions

2026-08-26T12:01:06-08:00

A healthcare staffing company hired an employee as a travel nurse, requiring him to sign multiple agreements containing arbitration provisions with varying language. When the employee later accepted a temporary assignment at a hospital, he signed an additional agreement incorporating the employer’s most recent arbitration policy. After his assignment ended, the employee filed a class action lawsuit alleging wage and hour violations against the company. The company responded by filing a motion in the Superior Court of San Diego County to compel arbitration, relying on the arbitration provision from the employee handbook. The employee opposed, arguing that the handbook’s provision was superseded by the newer arbitration agreement incorporated into his most recent assignment. The court denied the motion, finding that the company had relied on the wrong agreement. The company then filed a second motion to compel arbitration, this time based on the updated agreement, but failed to provide the affidavit or explanation required by California Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 for renewed motions. The employee objected, contending that the second motion sought the same relief as the first and was subject to section 1008(b), which the company had not satisfied. The Superior Court agreed, ruled it lacked jurisdiction to consider the renewed motion, and denied it. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed whether the trial court properly applied section 1008(b) and whether the second motion was a renewed motion for the same relief. The appellate court held that the company’s second motion sought identical relief as the first—compelling arbitration of the same claims—regardless of which agreement formed the basis. Because the company failed to comply with section 1008(b), the trial court lacked jurisdiction, and the order denying the renewed motion was not appealable. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. View "Hickenbottom v. Medical Solutions" on Justia Law

ZUNUM AERO, INC. V. THE BOEING COMPANY

2026-08-26T09:00:32-08:00

A company specializing in hybrid electric aircraft technology filed suit in Washington state court against a major aerospace manufacturer and its investment affiliate, alleging misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of contract, and tortious interference, among other state law claims. The plaintiff asserted that the defendant improperly used its confidential information, including by incorporating aspects of the plaintiff’s technology into two patents obtained by the defendant. The plaintiff’s claims involved several theories and more than 30 alleged trade secrets. The aerospace manufacturer responded by counterclaiming for a declaratory judgment that its employees were the sole inventors of one of the patents in question. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington based on this federal patent law counterclaim, and a second inventorship counterclaim was later added regarding another patent. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on both patent inventorship counterclaims. The remainder of the plaintiff’s claims proceeded to a jury, which returned a verdict awarding the plaintiff over $92 million for trade secret misappropriation and tortious interference. However, the district court granted the defendant’s post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law and conditionally granted a new trial, vacating the jury award. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s post-trial rulings and remanded the case with instructions for reassignment to a different district judge. In a subsequent petition for rehearing, the defendant argued for the first time that appellate jurisdiction belonged exclusively to the Federal Circuit because the counterclaims were compulsory and arose under patent law. The Ninth Circuit held that the defendant’s counterclaims, though arising under federal patent law, were permissive—not compulsory—because they did not share the same operative facts as the plaintiff’s state law claims; thus, Ninth Circuit jurisdiction was proper. The court also held that the district court appropriately exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, as they shared a common nucleus of operative fact with the federal counterclaims. The petition for rehearing was denied. View "ZUNUM AERO, INC. V. THE BOEING COMPANY" on Justia Law

All Does v. Conrad & Scherer, LLP

2026-08-26T07:30:58-08:00

A group of Colombian plaintiffs retained two attorneys under a contingency fee agreement to sue a multinational corporation for allegedly funding a paramilitary group that murdered their relatives. The agreement specified that the attorneys would receive one-third of any monetary award obtained before trial. A conflict soon arose between the attorneys after one joined a law firm, leading to disputes over representation and eventual court intervention. The case was consolidated into multidistrict litigation in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, and over time, one attorney was discharged, with the court instructing the discharged attorney’s firm to file a charging lien to preserve its claim for fees and costs. After a settlement was reached that allocated $12.8 million to the plaintiffs and their counsel, the discharged firm moved to enforce its charging lien against the attorney’s share of the recovery. The district court referred the motion to a magistrate judge, who recommended nearly full payment to the firm. The district court adopted this recommendation, ordered the disputed funds to be held in the court registry pending appeal, and required that the funds not be disbursed until appellate review was exhausted. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether it had jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal of the district court’s order enforcing the charging lien. The Eleventh Circuit held that such orders do not fall within the collateral-order doctrine because they do not resolve important issues separate from the merits and are not effectively unreviewable after final judgment. The court explained that attorneys’ contractual or equitable rights to payment do not implicate substantial public interests or values of a high order and can be adequately reviewed after final judgment. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "All Does v. Conrad & Scherer, LLP" on Justia Law

Black v. Unibank

2026-08-25T15:30:06-08:00

Roy Hill, founder and CEO of Clean Energy Technology Association, Inc. (CETA), solicited investments by representing that CETA owned patented carbon capture technology and promised investors returns from these assets. CETA, however, operated as a Ponzi scheme, using funds from new investors to pay returns to earlier ones. UniBank, a Washington-based commercial bank, provided secured loans to investors who used the funds to buy interests in CETA’s purported assets. UniBank perfected its security interests in the distributions from CETA. After the SEC initiated an enforcement action alleging fraud and sought appointment of a receiver, Albert Black was appointed to marshal CETA’s assets for the benefit of creditors and investors. In parallel litigation, investors sued UniBank in Washington state court for fraud and negligence, but UniBank obtained summary judgment on the basis that it owed no duty to the investors. Meanwhile, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, the receiver recommended a pro rata distribution of the remaining CETA estate funds to all investors and creditors based on net cash losses, aggregating UniBank’s claims with those of other victims rather than honoring UniBank’s asserted secured creditor priority. UniBank objected, arguing its perfected liens should grant it priority recovery. The district court overruled UniBank’s objection, adopted the receiver’s recommendation, and ordered pro rata distributions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court failed to provide UniBank with adequate due process because it adopted the receiver’s recommendation with only a cursory analysis and without giving UniBank a meaningful opportunity to present its evidence and arguments, particularly given the extensive record. The court vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with due process requirements, without expressing a view on the merits. View "Black v. Unibank" on Justia Law

West Development, LLC v. Town of W. Yellowstone

2026-08-25T14:38:29-08:00

A developer formed a company in 2006 and purchased property in the Town of West Yellowstone, Montana, intending to construct a 48-unit condominium project. The developer obtained a building permit and a “Will Serve Letter” from the Town, confirming that water, sewer, and storm drainage services would be provided. Construction began in 2007 but ceased in 2011, after which the building permit expired due to inactivity. The developer did not reapply for a permit, nor did it renew related approvals. In 2019, the Town adopted a resolution limiting new wastewater connections due to capacity concerns. In 2020, the developer attempted to sell the property, contingent on confirmation that service connections would still be honored. The Town responded that hookups would be permitted when capacity allowed but did not guarantee immediate service. The Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, denied the Town’s argument that the developer’s claims were time-barred under statutory limitations, ruling that the claims accrued only when the Town refused to guarantee connections in 2020. However, the District Court granted summary judgment for the Town on the merits, finding that the Will Serve Letter did not create an enforceable contract or vested right to service after years of inactivity and expired permits, and that the Town did not owe a special duty under the public duty doctrine. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s rulings. It held that the developer’s claims were timely but that, even assuming a contract existed, any right to service under the Will Serve Letter expired after a prolonged period of project inactivity and lapsed permits. The Court further held that the Town owed no special duty to the developer beyond its general obligations to the public, and summary judgment for the Town was appropriate. View "West Development, LLC v. Town of W. Yellowstone" on Justia Law

Doe v. Carnival Corporation

2026-08-25T12:01:05-08:00

A passenger aboard a cruise ship alleged that, after becoming inebriated, she was separated from her friends and ended up in a maintenance closet with a crewmember. She stated that she was held against her will and sexually assaulted. Both she and the crewmember gave differing accounts of the incident to FBI agents: she could not recall if she consented to sexual conduct, while the crewmember claimed it was consensual and that he did not know she was intoxicated. The FBI investigator ultimately concluded the encounter was consensual, and prosecutors declined to bring criminal charges. The passenger brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida asserting claims including false imprisonment and sexual assault. In pretrial proceedings, the district court granted her motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of false imprisonment liability, finding that the cruise line had not produced admissible evidence to create a dispute of material fact. The district court excluded the FBI reports as hearsay. At trial, the district court instructed the jury that the cruise line was already liable for false imprisonment and limited the ability of the defendant to challenge the factual basis for that claim. The jury found the cruise line liable for sexual assault but rejected the negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, awarding over $10 million in damages. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred in granting partial summary judgment on false imprisonment and in excluding the FBI investigator’s conclusions, which were admissible under the public records exception to the hearsay rule. The appellate court reversed the partial summary judgment on the false imprisonment claim, vacated the judgment as to the false imprisonment and sexual assault claims, and remanded for a new trial on those claims. The negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims remain resolved in favor of the cruise line. View "Doe v. Carnival Corporation" on Justia Law

Dillinger's LLC v. CR-GTD, LLC

2026-08-25T07:24:26-08:00

Cowboy Racing was formed in Wyoming with two members: EFTI, which held a 51% interest and was managed by William Edwards, and Dillinger’s, with a 49% interest, managed by Ryan Clement. The company’s operating agreement appointed Edwards and Clement as the initial managers and set out procedures for removing a manager, including both a for-cause provision and a mechanism for removal with the consent of a majority interest. In February 2025, EFTI, holding the majority interest, removed Clement as a manager citing his unauthorized expenditures. Despite his removal, Clement continued to act as though he had authority on behalf of Cowboy Racing. EFTI and Cowboy Racing then filed suit in the District Court of Laramie County, seeking a declaration that Clement could not act on behalf of the company, enforcement of a purchase right under the operating agreement, damages for breach of a letter of intent, and, relevant here, a preliminary injunction to prevent Clement from representing himself as a manager. Clement objected, arguing that the removal process was procedurally and substantively improper and conflicted with the operating agreement. The Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming reviewed the district court’s grant of the preliminary injunction, applying an abuse of discretion standard. The Court held that while the district court’s order was inartfully phrased as a final determination, it properly found that Cowboy Racing and EFTI were likely to succeed on their claim that Clement was lawfully removed under the operating agreement. The Court concluded the agreement was unambiguous and that EFTI, as the majority member, had the authority to remove Clement with express written consent. The preliminary injunction was affirmed, but the parties retain the right to present further evidence at trial on the merits. View "Dillinger's LLC v. CR-GTD, LLC" on Justia Law

SGCI Holdings III LLC v. FCC

2026-08-25T07:01:19-08:00

In 2022, Soohyung Kim and his company, through an affiliate, secured a winning bid to purchase TEGNA, a large broadcast television company. The transaction required regulatory approval from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) within 450 days, as specified in the merger agreement. The proposal drew objections from several organizations and individuals, including labor unions, public interest groups, and a rival bidder. Amid ongoing objections and extended public comment periods, the FCC’s Media Bureau ultimately failed to approve the license transfer within the required timeframe, resulting in the expiration of the merger agreement and obligating Kim’s group to pay significant break-up fees. After the collapse of the merger, the appellants filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against both the FCC and various private parties. They alleged constitutional and statutory violations, including Equal Protection claims, Communications Act violations, federal civil rights and conspiracy claims, and D.C.-law tort claims, asserting that the FCC and private parties conspired to prevent the merger based on race. The District Court dismissed all claims. Regarding the FCC, the court found the appellants lacked standing for prospective relief, as they failed to allege a substantial risk of future injury. The court also dismissed the Communications Act claims for lack of jurisdiction. As to the claims against private parties, the court applied Noerr-Pennington immunity and found no plausible basis for the civil rights or tort claims. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. The court held that the appellants lacked standing against the FCC due to insufficient allegations of likely future injury. The court further held that the claims against private appellees failed because the complaint did not plausibly allege intentional race discrimination or actionable tortious interference, and thus did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. View "SGCI Holdings III LLC v. FCC" on Justia Law

Trump v. California

2026-08-25T05:15:05-08:00

The President issued an Executive Order that directed certain federal agencies to take actions related to election integrity, including creating and distributing lists of eligible voters, prioritizing prosecution of officials issuing ballots to ineligible voters, and initiating a rulemaking related to ballot tracking. The Order did not impose any requirements on states or parties outside the Executive Branch, and all actions were subject to feasibility and compliance with existing law. Shortly after the Order was issued, several states and the District of Columbia sued, arguing that the Order unconstitutionally infringed on their authority to administer elections. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts agreed with the states and entered a final judgment enjoining the federal government from implementing the challenged provisions of the Order as to the plaintiff states for the upcoming midterm elections. The government sought a stay of this injunction from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which was denied, prompting an emergency application to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of the United States granted the stay, holding that the government is likely to succeed on its argument that the District Court lacked jurisdiction because the states lacked standing and their claims were not ripe for adjudication. The Court reasoned that the Order was an internal directive that did not cause concrete or imminent harm to the states, and any alleged injury was speculative and dependent on uncertain future events. The Court also found that the government would likely suffer irreparable harm from the injunction, which interfered with the internal workings of the Executive Branch. As a result, the Supreme Court stayed the District Court’s injunction pending further appellate review. View "Trump v. California" on Justia Law

Drushal v. Miller

2026-08-25T05:01:05-08:00

In December 2024, two individuals, Drushal and Eager, initiated a civil action in the Pike County Court of Common Pleas seeking to enforce satisfaction of a prior judgment from the Jackson County Court of Common Pleas against Tyler Miller. The plaintiffs aimed to seize the Millers’ interest in a land contract for real property in Pike County, which the Millers had contracted to purchase from Glenn and Sharon Nickell. The complaint attached the Jackson County certificate of judgment, creating a lien on property owned by Tyler Miller in Pike County. After none of the defendants answered or appeared, Drushal moved for default judgment requesting substitution in the land contract and a writ of possession, as well as a declaration voiding the Nickells’ interest. The Pike County Court of Common Pleas granted a default judgment on May 15, 2025, substituting Drushal for the Millers in the land contract, granting possession to Drushal, and nullifying the Nickells’ interest. The judgment was recorded with the county recorder on June 2, 2025. The Nickells timely appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeals but did not obtain a stay of execution or post a supersedeas bond. They also filed a motion for relief from judgment under Civil Rule 60(B), which remained unresolved. The appellate court dismissed their appeal as moot, reasoning that the recording of the judgment satisfied it, relying on Blodgett v. Blodgett, and denied the motion to remand for consideration of the Rule 60(B) motion. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Fourth District Court of Appeals. It held that the record did not show a voluntary satisfaction of judgment by the Nickells, as the recording of the judgment was executed by Drushal, not the Nickells. The absence of a stay did not render the appeal moot because restitution could still be available if the judgment were reversed. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Pike County Court of Common Pleas for consideration of the Nickells' motion for relief from judgment. View "Drushal v. Miller" on Justia Law

Gharraee v. Trader Joe's Co.

2026-08-24T15:02:05-08:00

The plaintiff suffered harm as a result of an incident at a Trader Joe’s store. Following a trial in the Superior Court of Stanislaus County, a jury found Trader Joe’s negligent and determined that its negligence was a substantial factor in causing injury to the plaintiff. The jury awarded damages of $23,509,165. After a post-trial motion, the court conditionally granted a new trial unless the plaintiff accepted a reduced award. The plaintiff accepted the remittitur, and an amended judgment was entered for $10,809,165. Trader Joe’s sought to appeal the amended judgment. The deadline to file the notice of appeal was January 20, 2026. On that date, Trader Joe’s submitted its notice of appeal electronically, receiving confirmation of receipt. However, the Superior Court clerk later rejected the filing, citing a local rule and a court website provision that classified notices of appeal as documents that could not be filed electronically. After further attempts, the notice of appeal was eventually accepted and filed on February 17, 2026. The plaintiff then moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that the local rule and related court website provisions barring e-filing of notices of appeal were inconsistent with state law, particularly California Rules of Court, rule 2.253. As such, the rule was invalid. The court further held that since Trader Joe’s had delivered the notice of appeal to the clerk electronically on the jurisdictional deadline, the notice was timely. The court denied the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the appeal. View "Gharraee v. Trader Joe's Co." on Justia Law

UMB Bank, N.A. v. Tupulua

2026-08-24T14:36:28-08:00

In this case, the defendants executed a promissory note and mortgage in 2008, which were eventually assigned to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. In 2015, Wells Fargo initiated a foreclosure action against the defendants, alleging default on the mortgage. During the pendency of the proceedings, Wells Fargo assigned the mortgage to UMB Bank, National Association, which was substituted as the plaintiff. A central issue in the case was whether Wells Fargo possessed the original promissory note at the time the foreclosure complaint was filed, a requirement for standing to foreclose. The Circuit Court of the First Circuit first denied Wells Fargo’s summary judgment motion, finding insufficient admissible evidence of note possession at the time the lawsuit commenced. Later, UMB as successor plaintiff submitted additional declarations and business records in support of a renewed summary judgment motion. The circuit court found these sufficient and ruled in favor of UMB on standing. Shortly before trial, the parties entered into a stipulation regarding certain facts, including that Wells Fargo held the note before the action began and was the current holder, but the stipulation did not specify continuous possession or possession specifically on the complaint’s filing date. The circuit court relied on both the earlier summary judgment ruling and the stipulation, ultimately issuing a foreclosure decree for UMB. On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed, emphasizing enforcement of the stipulation. The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi reviewed the case and held that there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Wells Fargo possessed the note when the complaint was filed. The court found the evidence submitted by UMB ambiguous and the stipulation insufficiently specific to establish standing. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts and remanded the case for further proceedings to resolve this factual issue. View "UMB Bank, N.A. v. Tupulua" on Justia Law

US v. Reynoso

2026-08-24T13:30:04-08:00

Federal prosecutors obtained a seizure warrant from a magistrate judge in the District of Puerto Rico authorizing the seizure of approximately 119.65 Bitcoin from a wallet associated with Juan Carlos Reynoso. The warrant required that the assets be transferred to a government-controlled wallet within 24 hours and prohibited Reynoso from obstructing or interfering with the seizure. Reynoso’s attorney, Walter Reynoso, agreed to accept service of the warrant on his client’s behalf, but due to family commitments, did not promptly relay the warrant to Reynoso. By the time Walter opened the warrant email, the deadline had passed, and multiple transfers had already occurred from the wallet. Additional transfers took place in the days following, resulting in the complete dissipation of the assets. The government filed a motion in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico to hold Reynoso in civil contempt for failing to comply with the warrant. The court issued an order to show cause, and Reynoso responded by seeking to quash service and requesting an evidentiary hearing, arguing that material facts were in dispute. The government opposed, asserting there were no significant factual disputes. The District Court denied the motion to quash, granted the contempt motion, and held Reynoso in civil contempt, stating that a hearing was unnecessary because the facts were not in dispute. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Reynoso argued that the District Court abused its discretion by denying an evidentiary hearing. The First Circuit affirmed the contempt order, holding that an evidentiary hearing is not required when the record reveals no genuine dispute of material fact, and that Reynoso failed to identify any evidence that would have created such a dispute regarding any element necessary for a civil contempt finding. View "US v. Reynoso" on Justia Law

Woodcock v. Univ. of Kentucky

2026-08-24T11:30:06-08:00

A tenured law professor at a state university posted an online petition calling for military action against Israel. The university responded by placing the professor on administrative leave and restricting his campus access while it investigated whether his actions violated university policy or law. The investigation included notices to the professor, requests for evidence, and allegations from students, but had not progressed beyond the preliminary fact-finding stage. No formal hearing or charges had been initiated by the university at the time of the lawsuit. The professor filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, seeking a preliminary injunction to stop the university’s actions. The university moved for abstention under the doctrine established in *Younger v. Harris*, arguing that the ongoing university investigation constituted a state proceeding warranting federal court abstention. The district court agreed with the university and abstained from hearing the case, prompting the professor to appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s abstention decision de novo. The Sixth Circuit held that the university’s investigation was still in a preliminary, investigatory stage and did not constitute an ongoing formal proceeding as required under the *Younger* abstention framework. The court distinguished the circumstances from prior cases involving formal disciplinary hearings, noting that no formal charges or hearings had yet been initiated. As a result, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision to abstain and remanded the case for consideration of the professor’s motion for a preliminary injunction. View "Woodcock v. Univ. of Kentucky" on Justia Law

ALLER v. STATE

2026-08-24T09:02:03-08:00

The petitioner, who served as president of a company selected by a school district to develop and manage two middle schools, was indicted by a state grand jury on felony counts related to alleged violations of procurement rules during the project. The indictment was initially remanded because the wrong version of the procurement code was presented to the grand jury. After a second presentation, a new indictment was issued. The State later dismissed the charges with prejudice, citing the passage of time and evidentiary concerns. The petitioner, who lawfully possessed the grand jury transcripts, sought permission from the Superior Court in Maricopa County to use those transcripts in a civil lawsuit against the State and its agents for malicious prosecution, alleging fabricated evidence led to his indictment. The Superior Court denied the motion, reasoning that the petitioner could rely on the publicly available Auditor General Report to prove his claims in the civil action, and thus had no "particularized need" for the grand jury transcripts. The court also found no possible injustice because relevant information was accessible from public records. The Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, accepted special action jurisdiction and upheld the Superior Court’s ruling, agreeing that the petitioner failed to establish prejudice or a need for the transcripts outweighing grand jury secrecy. The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reversed the lower courts' decisions. It held that the "particularized need" framework, as established in State ex rel. Ronan v. Superior Court, applies to requests by former defendants who lawfully possess grand jury transcripts and seek to use them in subsequent civil actions. The Court found error in the Superior Court’s conclusion that public records were a functional equivalent to grand jury transcripts and remanded for an in camera review to balance the petitioner’s need against societal interests in grand jury secrecy, and to determine appropriate conditions for transcript use. View "ALLER v. STATE" on Justia Law

Norcave Properties v. IRS

2026-08-21T15:30:34-08:00

A partnership claimed a charitable deduction after donating a conservation servitude on real property. The Internal Revenue Service audited the partnership’s tax filing and, in 2025, issued a Notice of Final Partnership Adjustment, disallowing the deduction and imposing both a civil fraud penalty and several valuation-related penalties for negligence, substantial understatement, and gross-valuation misstatements. The partnership responded by filing suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, seeking a pre-payment jury trial to contest the penalties and requesting both injunctive and declaratory relief. The partnership also filed a parallel petition with the U.S. Tax Court for a downward adjustment of the IRS’s determination. In the district court, both parties moved for judgment on the pleadings. The court granted the IRS’s motion and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, relying on the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) and the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA). The district court reasoned that the penalties imposed by the IRS constitute “tax” within the meaning of relevant statutes, thereby stripping federal courts of jurisdiction to hear pre-payment challenges to such assessments. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether accuracy-related penalties under 26 U.S.C. § 6662 are treated as “tax” for purposes of the AIA and DJA. The Fifth Circuit held that these penalties are indeed treated as “tax,” and thus, both the AIA and DJA bar federal court jurisdiction over the partnership’s pre-payment challenge. The court further determined that Tax Court provides an alternative forum for such disputes. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Norcave Properties v. IRS" on Justia Law

In Re: Media Matters for America

2026-08-21T15:30:33-08:00

A nonprofit organization based in Washington, D.C. published articles critical of a technology company and its CEO, which led to corporations pulling their advertisements from the company’s platform, resulting in significant losses for the company. The technology company filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, alleging interference with contract, business disparagement, and interference with prospective economic advantage under Texas law. The nonprofit and its employees sought dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a claim. After this was denied, and following further discovery showing that affected advertisers were not based in Texas, the nonprofit moved to transfer the case to the Northern District of California, citing venue statutes and a forum-selection clause. The district court denied both the motion to dismiss and the motion to transfer venue, finding that the transfer request was untimely and that the evidence was insufficient to show the Texas venue was improper. It also expressed concerns about the nonprofit’s litigation conduct and considered possible sanctions. The nonprofit then petitioned for a writ of mandamus from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, seeking to compel a venue transfer. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted the petition in part. It held that the district court erred by failing to consider the required eight public- and private-interest factors when analyzing the transfer motion under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) and 1406(a), instead focusing solely on the timeliness of the motion. The Court ordered the district court to vacate its denial of the transfer motion and conduct a new venue analysis consistent with appellate precedent. The nonprofit’s related interlocutory appeal was held in abeyance pending the outcome of the remand. View "In Re: Media Matters for America" on Justia Law

1 Community Compact v. City of Fresno

2026-08-21T15:02:36-08:00

A city council adopted a resolution to rename three historically significant streets—East Kings Canyon Road, East Ventura Avenue, and West California Avenue—in honor of Cesar Chavez, a prominent labor leader and civil rights activist. The plaintiff, an association of residents and business owners on or near these streets, opposed the renaming, arguing that it disrupted their personal and community identities, imposed financial and administrative burdens, and forced them to be associated with a political figure they found objectionable. The association also alleged that the renaming process was procedurally unfair and failed to provide adequate notice or opportunity for input from those affected. After the city proceeded with the renaming, the plaintiff filed suit in the Superior Court of Fresno County, raising claims that the city’s action constituted an invalid exercise of police power, violated due process, infringed on free speech and association rights, amounted to waste of public funds, and denied equal protection. The Superior Court sustained the city’s demurrer to the due process, free speech, and equal protection claims, and granted summary judgment to the city on the police power and waste claims, finding the city’s actions valid and within its discretion. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, considered the case even though the city had reverted the street names after new information about Cesar Chavez emerged. Applying the public interest exception to mootness, the court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the renaming constituted government speech, which is generally not subject to free speech protections, and did not compel residents or business owners to espouse a particular message. The court further held that the city’s action was a valid exercise of its police power, reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, and that the use of public funds for the renaming was discretionary and not subject to challenge as waste. The court’s decision affirmed the judgment in favor of the city. View "1 Community Compact v. City of Fresno" on Justia Law

Godson v. Johns Hopkins Medicine

2026-08-21T08:32:48-08:00

Two individuals, both representing themselves, sought to appeal adverse decisions in separate civil cases. In the first case, a plaintiff filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act against a federal official. The district court denied this plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction, and the plaintiff subsequently submitted a document titled as both a “Notice of Appeal” and a “Motion to Transfer Appeal.” This document was filed 69 days after the district court’s order and included statements indicating the plaintiff had not received notice of the order and was requesting more time to appeal. In the second case, another plaintiff alleged mistreatment by a hospital and physician, but the district court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. This plaintiff filed a notice of appeal 37 days after judgment, including various grievances but without clearly acknowledging the late filing or explicitly requesting relief for the delay. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia transmitted both notices to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The appellate court reviewed whether the notices of appeal could be construed as including motions under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) or 4(a)(6), which allow late appeals in certain circumstances if specific requirements are met. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that a pro se notice of appeal should be liberally construed to include a motion for extension or to reopen the time to appeal if it reasonably recognizes the filing is late, provides reasons for the lateness, and seeks relief under Rule 4(a)(5) or (6). Applying this standard, the court found that the first plaintiff’s filing met these criteria and remanded that case to the district court for further proceedings. The second plaintiff’s notice did not meet the standard, and the court dismissed that appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Godson v. Johns Hopkins Medicine" on Justia Law