Civil Procedure - Justia Case Law Summaries

Sookra v. Pfizer Inc.

2026-07-31T07:32:08-08:00

After the death of their fourteen-year-old daughter Taylor Rose Sookra in December 2021, four months after she received Pfizer’s COVID-19 vaccine, Arthur Sookra and April Burch-Sookra filed a lawsuit. They alleged willful misconduct under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) against Pfizer, federal officials, the physician who administered the vaccine, and the pediatric practice. Their claims included both federal law claims and state-law tort claims. Initially, the case was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. When the Sookras added a PREP Act willful-misconduct claim, they requested and obtained a transfer to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, as required by the statute. The defendants moved to dismiss, and the motions were referred to a magistrate judge who recommended dismissal of the claims against the federal government on sovereign immunity grounds and against Pfizer for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The magistrate also recommended dismissal of Pfizer’s state-law claims based on immunity and advised that the court decline supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. The district court adopted these recommendations, dismissed the case, and denied as moot the plaintiffs’ later request for a three-judge court. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the district court erred by dismissing the complaint without first convening a three-judge court, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(e)(5) for willful-misconduct claims under the PREP Act. The appellate court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to initiate procedures for convening a three-judge court. The court did not address the other arguments raised by the parties. View "Sookra v. Pfizer Inc." on Justia Law

United HealthCare Services, Inc. v. AmerisourceBergen Corporation

2026-07-31T07:30:59-08:00

The dispute centers on allegations by a Minnesota-based health insurer that several related pharmaceutical companies carried out an unlawful scheme involving the distribution and sale of repackaged and adulterated oncology drugs. The scheme allegedly involved breaking sterile seals on medication vials, pooling overfill amounts—which were not intended for patient use—and creating pre-filled syringes that were then sold to healthcare providers. These syringes were ultimately administered to cancer patients, including many insured under programs operated by the plaintiff. The defendants did not themselves submit claims for reimbursement, but the plaintiff asserts it paid for treatments using these adulterated drugs, unaware of their compromised quality. Prior to this lawsuit, the scheme was the subject of other civil actions and federal investigations, including qui tam actions and a federal criminal prosecution. The defendants disclosed these investigations in annual reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and the events received media attention beginning in 2012. In 2017, a related company pleaded guilty to federal charges, admitting to the repackaging scheme, and paid significant fines and settlements. The plaintiff filed suit in 2023, asserting claims for common-law fraud, unjust enrichment, and violations of several Minnesota consumer protection statutes. The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed the complaint, finding the claims were barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations, and that the plaintiff had failed to sufficiently plead fraudulent concealment to toll the limitations period. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. It concluded that publicly available disclosures and the plaintiff’s own allegations established that the plaintiff should have discovered its causes of action no later than 2016. Because the plaintiff did not file suit until 2023, its claims were untimely. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that all claims were barred by the statute of limitations. View "United HealthCare Services, Inc. v. AmerisourceBergen Corporation" on Justia Law

Kim v. Blanche

2026-07-30T14:00:03-08:00

A noncitizen who arrived in the United States from Cambodia as a child and later became a lawful permanent resident was convicted in Rhode Island state court in 1996 of a controlled substance offense. This conviction led to deportation proceedings, and an immigration judge found him deportable in 1998. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal in 1999. Over twenty years later, the Rhode Island prosecutor dismissed his conviction in 2020, citing equitable reasons. The noncitizen then unsuccessfully filed his first motion to reopen his removal proceedings with the BIA, which denied it as untimely and found no substantive or procedural defect in the original conviction. Following this, the noncitizen obtained a consent order from the Rhode Island Superior Court in 2023, vacating his prior plea and sentence based on a violation of Rule 11 of the Rhode Island Rules of Criminal Procedure, which relates to due process in plea colloquies. In April 2024, he filed a second motion to reopen his removal proceedings with the BIA, this time invoking the BIA’s sua sponte authority. The BIA again denied reopening, treating the motion as statutory, finding it time and number barred, and concluding he failed to demonstrate due diligence or a defect in the conviction. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found that the BIA committed legal error by mischaracterizing the second motion as statutory rather than sua sponte. The appellate court held that sua sponte motions are not subject to the same time and number limitations or equitable tolling standards as statutory motions. The court also found that the BIA erred by overlooking the Superior Court's order, which clearly indicated the conviction was vacated due to a procedural defect. The First Circuit granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kim v. Blanche" on Justia Law

DOE v THE CORPORATION

2026-07-30T13:02:23-08:00

Three children, through their representatives, brought claims against a religious organization, individual clergy, and others after their father, Paul Adams, sexually abused them over several years. During the abuse, Paul disclosed his actions to two bishops of his church—first in private meetings and then in a formal disciplinary council where other church members were present. The bishops considered these disclosures confidential under church doctrine and did not report Paul’s admissions to authorities. Years later, law enforcement discovered evidence of the abuse, leading to criminal charges against Paul and his wife. After learning about Paul’s prior disclosures to church officials, the children sued the church and the clergy for, among other things, failing to report the abuse as required by Arizona law. The Cochise County Superior Court granted summary judgment to the church defendants, holding that the bishops’ knowledge of the abuse came exclusively from confidential religious communications. The court found that, under Arizona’s reporting statute and the so-called “clergy exemption,” the bishops were not required to report the abuse because they determined withholding the information was “reasonable and necessary” under the concepts of their religion. The court also ruled that it was not the role of the court or a jury to second-guess the clergy’s interpretation of their religious doctrine. The Arizona Court of Appeals vacated the lower court’s decision, finding that genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the communications were truly confidential, whether the clergy-penitent privilege was waived by the presence of non-clergy, and whether church doctrine actually required non-reporting. The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reversed the court of appeals and reinstated summary judgment for the church defendants. The court held that the First Amendment prohibits courts and juries from examining whether clergy properly applied religious doctrine in deciding not to report abuse under the reporting statute. It further ruled that, absent fraud or collusion for secular purposes, factfinders must defer to a religious institution’s definitions of “confession,” “confidential communication,” and “clergy.” The court concluded that all statutory requirements for the clergy exemption were met and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "DOE v THE CORPORATION" on Justia Law

Arkeyo LLC v Saggezza, Inc.

2026-07-30T12:00:46-08:00

Two software development companies became involved in a dispute after a UK bank, Metro Bank PLC, hired one company, Arkeyo LLC, to create software for its coin-counting machines. Years later, as Arkeyo’s product became outdated, Metro Bank engaged Saggezza UK (a subsidiary of Saggezza, Inc.) to build replacement software. During development, Metro Bank provided Saggezza with an Arkeyo-operated touchscreen computer for reference. Arkeyo later alleged that Saggezza, Inc. infringed its copyrights and trade secrets, interfered with its contract and business relationship with Metro Bank, and converted Arkeyo’s property. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment for Saggezza, Inc. on all claims, ruling that Arkeyo did not show Saggezza, Inc. was responsible for the alleged infringement or tortious acts—these, if they occurred, were committed by Saggezza UK, which was not a defendant. The district court also denied Arkeyo’s motions for sanctions and for reconsideration based on purportedly new evidence, and it awarded attorney’s fees to Saggezza, Inc. under federal statutes. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that Arkeyo’s copyright claims failed because there was no evidence of copying. The trade secret claims failed due to Arkeyo’s public disclosure of its software and the generic nature of the alleged secrets. The tortious interference claims were rejected because Saggezza’s competitive conduct was not “wrongful” under Illinois law, and the conversion claim failed since Arkeyo did not own or demand the property. The appellate court also affirmed the denial of sanctions, the denial of reconsideration, and the award of attorney’s fees. View "Arkeyo LLC v Saggezza, Inc." on Justia Law

Galindez v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority

2026-07-30T09:43:52-08:00

The plaintiff was injured while riding a public bus operated by the Rhode Island Public Transit Authority (RIPTA) after the bus driver braked abruptly when a car cut in front of the bus. The plaintiff alleged the driver acted negligently, causing her injuries, and sought damages for medical expenses and pain and suffering. The incident occurred on May 29, 2016. The plaintiff testified that the driver was distracted and speeding, while the driver stated he was operating safely and only stopped suddenly to avoid a collision after being cut off by another vehicle. The plaintiff did not immediately seek medical attention but visited the emergency room days later, where she was diagnosed with a shoulder fracture and chest contusions. RIPTA contested liability and argued that the plaintiff had preexisting conditions. The Rhode Island Superior Court conducted a jury trial, during which the court made several evidentiary rulings, allowed RIPTA to amend its answer to assert the sudden emergency doctrine, and dismissed a juror who had scheduling conflicts. The court also issued jury instructions on spoliation after it was revealed that bus video footage was not preserved. The jury returned a verdict for RIPTA. The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, which the Superior Court denied after addressing both procedural and substantive arguments. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that the evidentiary rulings were not an abuse of discretion, the spoliation instruction was proper, and the amendment of RIPTA’s answer and the jury instructions were permissible. The Court found that the plaintiff had waived or failed to preserve several arguments and that no reversible error occurred regarding the dismissal of the juror or the denial of the motion for a new trial. View "Galindez v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority" on Justia Law

MCMAHAN v GRASSHOPPER

2026-07-30T09:32:16-08:00

A tractor trailer struck safety barricades at a construction site, injuring a worker, who then sued the company believed to own the trailer, an Illinois corporation, for negligence. The plaintiff attempted to serve the company’s statutory agent by leaving the summons and complaint with the agent’s assistant, who was not authorized to accept service. The assistant forwarded the documents to the company, but proper service was not completed. After the company failed to respond in time, the plaintiff obtained an entry of default. The company later answered the complaint, denied ownership of the trailer, and raised insufficient service as a potential defense. The Superior Court in Maricopa County initially denied the company’s motions to set aside the default, but later, upon a motion for reconsideration recast as one under Rule 60(b)(4), granted relief after finding that the plaintiff had not properly served the company, making the entry of default void for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Arizona Court of Appeals accepted special action jurisdiction and vacated the Superior Court’s order, reasoning that the company had waived its objection to service by appearing in the action, failing to raise the defense in a timely manner, and acknowledging it had been “served.” The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona held that the company’s later conduct—appearing in the case and defending on the merits—could not retroactively cure the jurisdictional defect that existed when the default became effective. The entry of default was void because the court lacked personal jurisdiction at that time due to defective service. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ opinion and affirmed the Superior Court’s order setting aside the entry of default. The main holding is that a party’s post-default conduct does not waive or cure a jurisdictional defect arising from improper service at the time the default was entered. View "MCMAHAN v GRASSHOPPER" on Justia Law

Pinnacle Flooring Solutions v. Premier Homes Group

2026-07-30T04:37:44-08:00

Premier contracted Pinnacle to provide labor and materials for flooring in three homes, with each subcontract containing a clause allowing Premier to recover attorney fees in the event of Pinnacle’s default. Pinnacle sued Premier, alleging breach of contract for unpaid work, attaching the relevant subcontracts as exhibits. Premier counterclaimed, asserting that Pinnacle breached the subcontracts due to defective work, and requested attorney fees. Premier’s counterclaim referenced paragraphs from Pinnacle’s complaint, which incorporated the contracts, but did not explicitly state the basis for its attorney fees request. Pre-trial, Premier’s counsel informed Pinnacle’s counsel by email that the attorney fees request was based on Section 8(b) of the subcontracts, and the parties agreed to bifurcate the fees issue. The Circuit Court of Virginia found for Premier on its counterclaim regarding the breach, but denied Premier’s request for attorney fees, holding that Premier had not sufficiently identified the basis for its fee request in the counterclaim as required by Rule 3:25(b) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia. Premier appealed, and the Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed, concluding that the incorporation of the subcontracts and the attached exhibits were sufficient to put Pinnacle on notice of the contractual basis for the attorney fees claim. The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case de novo and held that Rule 3:25(b) is a pleading requirement, not merely a notice requirement. The court determined that Premier failed to affirmatively identify the basis for its attorney fees request in its counterclaim, and that mere incorporation by reference of the contracts was insufficient. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s denial of attorney fees to Premier, entering final judgment for Pinnacle on the attorney fees issue. View "Pinnacle Flooring Solutions v. Premier Homes Group" on Justia Law

Bonfiglioli USA, Inc. v. Midwest Engineered Components, Inc.

2026-07-29T12:30:40-08:00

A Kentucky-based manufacturer entered into a sales representative agreement with a Minnesota-based company to facilitate sales of industrial parts in several Midwestern states. The contract included a choice of law clause specifying Kentucky law would govern disputes and permitted the manufacturer to terminate the relationship at its discretion. However, a pre-contract email from Minnesota’s representatives revealed their intent to disregard the Kentucky choice of law, planning instead to invoke the Minnesota Termination of Sales Representatives Act (MTSRA), which restricts termination and invalidates conflicting contract terms. After several years, the manufacturer issued a termination notice in line with the contract. The Minnesota company, shortly before the contract’s automatic renewal, claimed protection under the MTSRA and demanded $165,000, threatening litigation. The manufacturer responded by filing suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, seeking declaratory judgment that Kentucky law governed and asserting fraudulent inducement based on the Minnesota company’s misrepresentation of its intent to abide by the choice of law provision. The district court held that Kentucky law applied, rendering the MTSRA inapplicable, and granted declaratory judgment for the manufacturer. It permitted the fraudulent inducement claim to proceed to a jury, which found the Minnesota company liable, awarding nominal actual damages and $280,000 in punitive damages. The court denied post-trial motions challenging the verdict, jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, and the punitive damages award. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Sixth Circuit held that Kentucky’s choice of law rules applied and that Kentucky had the most significant relationship to the contract, making the MTSRA inapplicable. The court upheld the jury’s finding of fraudulent inducement and found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s management of trial issues. The punitive damages award was found not to violate due process. View "Bonfiglioli USA, Inc. v. Midwest Engineered Components, Inc." on Justia Law

The Town of Pine Hill, Alabama v. 3M Company

2026-07-29T07:31:42-08:00

A municipality in Alabama brought a lawsuit against a chemical manufacturer, alleging that the company’s products containing per- and poly-fluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) contaminated the Alabama River. The contamination allegedly originated from PFAS-containing wastewater discharged by paper mills, which used the manufacturer’s products. The municipality relies on water from the river for its drinking supply, and PFAS are difficult to remove with its current filtration system, necessitating expensive upgrades. After being sued in Alabama state court for negligence, nuisance, and trespass, the manufacturer removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, asserting jurisdiction under the federal officer removal statute. The municipality expressly disclaimed any claims related to PFAS contamination from aqueous film forming foam (AFFF), a firefighting product produced by the manufacturer for the military. The district court found that the heart of the claims was the supply of PFAS products to paper mills, not federal conduct, and remanded the case to state court. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision de novo. The appellate court held that the manufacturer sufficiently alleged facts supporting federal officer removal jurisdiction. It concluded that the manufacturer plausibly acted under a federal officer when producing AFFF and that the complaint’s gravamen encompassed PFAS contamination generally, not just from paper mills. The court found the municipality’s disclaimers to be mere artful pleading that did not sever the causal connection required for removal. The manufacturer also plausibly asserted a colorable federal government contractor defense. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s remand order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "The Town of Pine Hill, Alabama v. 3M Company" on Justia Law

State v. Wilson

2026-07-28T14:38:55-08:00

A state employee was involved in a fatal car accident while driving a state-owned vehicle in the course of employment, resulting in the deaths of both himself and another driver, Haley Wilson. Haley was survived by her minor daughter, for whom Thomas Wilson acted as both personal representative of Haley’s estate and as conservator. After the accident, Thomas submitted claims to the state on behalf of the estate and the minor for wrongful death, survivorship, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The state offered to settle all claims for $750,000, referencing a statutory damages cap, but Thomas declined. Following the rejected settlement and before any lawsuit was filed by Thomas, the State of Montana filed a petition in the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, seeking to interplead the $750,000 and obtain a release from further liability. The state’s petition did not specifically invoke Montana’s interpleader rule or the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. The district court granted summary judgment for the state, authorized the deposit of $750,000 into the court registry, discharged the state and the state employee from further liability, and dismissed the state from the interpleader action with prejudice. Thomas appealed, challenging both the use of interpleader and the constitutionality of the statutory damages cap. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the district court erred in permitting the state to proceed via interpleader, because the state was the alleged tortfeasor and not a disinterested stakeholder, and the claims asserted were not adverse in the manner required for interpleader. The court further held that any discussion of the constitutionality of the damages cap would be speculative and advisory given the absence of a filed lawsuit, a determination of liability, or a verdict exceeding the statutory limit. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s summary judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the state’s petition. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Abdullah v Mead Johnson & Company LLC

2026-07-28T11:30:58-08:00

Several parents whose premature infants developed necrotizing enterocolitis (NEC) after being fed cow’s milk-based formula at Pennsylvania Hospital sued the manufacturers of the formula, as well as the hospital, in Pennsylvania state court. The parents alleged that the manufacturers’ products caused NEC and that the hospital failed to warn of the risks and implement policies to protect patients. Some plaintiffs were Pennsylvania citizens and others from New Jersey. The hospital and its related entities were named as defendants, and the claims against them were based on state law. After the lawsuits were filed, the manufacturers removed the cases to federal court. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania transferred the cases to a multidistrict litigation proceeding in the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs’ initial motion to remand was granted after the district court found that the claims against the hospital were potentially viable, defeating removal on diversity grounds. The cases returned to Pennsylvania state court, where discovery proceeded and the hospital was later dismissed with prejudice after the state court sustained preliminary objections. The plaintiffs did not immediately appeal. The manufacturers then removed the cases a second time, arguing that the hospital had been fraudulently joined solely to defeat diversity jurisdiction. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to remand, this time concluding that the plaintiffs’ lack of active pursuit of claims against the hospital showed “no real intention in good faith to prosecute the action,” amounting to fraudulent joinder. On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. The Seventh Circuit held that fraudulent joinder exists only where a plaintiff makes false jurisdictional allegations or has no chance of success against the non-diverse defendant, taking all facts and law in the plaintiff’s favor. The court held that the plaintiffs’ litigation conduct and subjective intent are not proper bases for finding fraudulent joinder. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Abdullah v Mead Johnson & Company LLC" on Justia Law

In Re: Goebel

2026-07-28T06:30:03-08:00

A debtor filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York and subsequently brought an adversary complaint against the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The debtor sought a determination that her federal income tax debts for certain years were dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1), meaning they would be eliminated through bankruptcy. She received a general discharge, but her complaint remained pending due to delays in serving the IRS. Before service was completed, the IRS filed its own complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, seeking to reduce the tax debts to judgment and contending they were excepted from discharge on the grounds of fraud or willful evasion. The IRS moved to dismiss the debtor’s complaint in the bankruptcy court, arguing there was no justiciable dispute because the debtor had not plausibly alleged a concrete injury, and also argued that the Declaratory Judgment Act barred the requested relief. The bankruptcy court denied the motion, allowing the debtor to file a supplemental complaint to address any jurisdictional deficiencies, reasoning that the IRS’s later assertion of nondischargeability in district court created a live controversy. The IRS appealed. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York certified the appeal directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, noting the absence of controlling precedent. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the debtor’s initial complaint failed to allege an injury in fact, as it was based only on hypothetical future harm and not on any concrete action by the IRS. The court further held that, even if a supplemental complaint could cure a jurisdictional defect, the bankruptcy court should have dismissed the case in deference to the district court, which was the first to have jurisdiction over a justiciable dispute. The Second Circuit vacated the bankruptcy court’s order and remanded with instructions to dismiss both the original and supplemental complaints. View "In Re: Goebel" on Justia Law

In re Jewelyette M.

2026-07-28T04:03:32-08:00

A young child was removed from her parents’ custody shortly after birth due to concerns about substance exposure and was placed in foster care. Her mother’s parental rights were terminated, and her father was incarcerated for much of her early life. After the mother’s rights were terminated, the child lived with foster parents for several years. When the father later sought to revoke the child’s commitment, the state agency sought to remove the child from the foster home and place her with a paternal relative, prompting the foster parents to intervene in the case to contest the proposed change. The Superior Court, Juvenile Matters, initially permitted the foster parents limited intervention, but then granted the agency’s motion to remove them as intervenors, relying on an appellate decision that limited foster parent participation. The foster parents appealed, and the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order removing them as intervenors, restoring their status and remanding the case for further proceedings. On remand, without objection from counsel, the trial court appointed the state agency as the child’s statutory parent. The foster parents’ attorney later moved to open (i.e., revisit) this appointment, claiming she had misunderstood the legal implications and failed to object due to that mistake. Before a hearing on this motion could be held, the trial court granted an adoption petition in favor of the child’s paternal relatives. After the adoption, the trial court denied the foster parents’ motion to open as moot, finding it could offer no practical relief. The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by failing to consider the merits of the foster parents’ timely motion to open before proceeding with the adoption. The Supreme Court reversed the denial of the motion to open and remanded the case, instructing the trial court to hold a hearing and decide the motion, including an analysis of the child’s best interests. View "In re Jewelyette M." on Justia Law

Inouye v. Estate of McHugo

2026-07-28T01:46:52-08:00

The case concerns a dispute among siblings arising from mutual wills executed by their parents, John and Patricia, after their divorce. The parents structured their assets as joint tenancies with rights of survivorship, intending that the survivor would use the property during their lifetime and then have it pass equally to their three children upon death. In 1997, both parents executed mutual wills in Arizona, agreeing not to alter or revoke them without mutual consent, and expressing a clear intention that all property owned at death would be divided equally among their children. After John’s death in 2010, all jointly titled assets passed to Patricia outside probate. Patricia later executed a new will in 2006, disinheriting her daughter Susan except for small bequests to Susan’s children and transferring major properties to her other two children, Gregory and Nancy, before she died in 2016. A Vermont probate court allowed Patricia’s 2006 will, rejecting Susan’s attempt to admit the earlier will. The Vermont Supreme Court, in a prior appeal, affirmed the admission of the 2006 will but noted Susan might have other remedies. Susan subsequently brought civil claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment in the Vermont Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Civil Division. The trial court found for Susan on her unjust enrichment claims against Gregory and Nancy, holding that the mutual wills formed a binding contract to divide all property equally among the siblings and that Patricia breached it by transferring properties and disinheriting Susan. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The Court held that the mutual wills were a binding contract requiring equal distribution of all property owned by the survivor at death, regardless of how it was acquired. The Court found that Patricia’s actions unjustly enriched Gregory and Nancy and upheld the remedies awarded, including a monetary judgment and a constructive trust. The Court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of prejudgment interest on the monetary portion of the judgment. View "Inouye v. Estate of McHugo" on Justia Law

Miller v. Collins

2026-07-27T11:33:59-08:00

After a couple ended their relationship, they continued to share custody of a dog they had jointly acquired. This shared arrangement lasted for two years, but in early 2026, one party refused to return the dog as scheduled. The other party then filed a claim in the small claims division of the District Court of the Second Circuit in Hawai‘i, seeking the return of the dog or, alternatively, monetary compensation. The claimant argued she co-owned the dog, had paid for its care, and that money damages would be inadequate. The defendant asserted he assumed full custody after learning the claimant might leave the island and asked the court to confirm his ownership. The District Court of the Second Circuit’s small claims division conducted a trial and found it equitable to grant legal and physical ownership of the dog to the defendant. The court also ordered the defendant to pay the claimant a sum representing half the value of the dog plus half the veterinary bills. The claimant’s motions to set aside the judgment and for reconsideration or new trial were denied, with the court reasoning that she had chosen the forum and was requesting monetary relief. The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case on a petition for a writ of mandamus, as no appeal is allowed from a small claims judgment. The Supreme Court held that the small claims division lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide ownership of the dog because its statutory authority is limited to money claims under $5,000, residential security-deposit disputes, and the return of leased or rented property. The claim for ownership of the dog was not within those categories. The Supreme Court granted the writ, vacated the lower court’s ruling, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case without prejudice. View "Miller v. Collins" on Justia Law

Lichfield v. Kubler

2026-07-27T08:02:04-08:00

The plaintiff, who operated boarding schools and programs for troubled teens, was featured in a three-part documentary series that examined the troubled-teen industry and included depictions and commentary about his role in industry organizations and specific schools. The filmmaker, herself a former student at an affiliated program, created the series based on her personal experience and broader investigative reporting. The series, produced and distributed by a major streaming service, included segments which the plaintiff claimed falsely implied his responsibility for a teen’s death, omitted the ultimate dismissal of criminal charges against him following a facility raid in Costa Rica, and accused him of abusing children and committing crimes. The United States District Court for the District of Utah dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, which included claims for defamation, defamation per se, false light invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy. The court concluded that the challenged statements were either non-actionable opinions protected by law and the First Amendment, true, or not defamatory. The court also granted the defendants’ special motion to strike under anti-SLAPP statutes, awarding attorneys’ fees and costs, and declined to decide between Utah or California law because the outcome was the same under either. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Tenth Circuit held that none of the challenged documentary segments were capable of defamatory meaning under Utah law or the First Amendment. The court found the statements to be either protected opinion, not materially false, or not objectively verifiable. The court also found the anti-SLAPP fee award appropriate and rejected the plaintiff’s arguments regarding amendment and anti-SLAPP procedure, holding that any errors on those points were invited by the plaintiff’s own positions below. View "Lichfield v. Kubler" on Justia Law

In re: Frederick Cnty. Data Center Referendum

2026-07-24T10:38:03-08:00

In 2025, the Frederick County Council enacted legislation establishing a Critical Digital Infrastructure (CDI) Overlay Zone, enabling data centers and related infrastructure to be built on a limited portion of county land. The boundaries and zoning designations of the Overlay Zone were later set by Ordinance 26-01-001 (the CDI Ordinance), which included color maps as exhibits to indicate the precise locations and zoning designations. A group of residents, the Frederick County Data Center Referendum Committee, sought to challenge this ordinance by referendum and gathered sufficient signatures for a petition. However, the petition included only black-and-white reproductions of the ordinance’s maps, which did not clearly show the Overlay Zone boundaries or zoning distinctions. The sufficiency of the petition was initially upheld by the Director of the Frederick County Board of Elections, who found it met requirements as to form, though she did not decide whether the ordinance was a proper subject for referendum. Several parties opposed the referendum, arguing in the Circuit Court for Frederick County that the ordinance was not subject to referendum under the County Charter and that the petition was deficient because it did not include a full and accurate reproduction of the ordinance. The circuit court agreed, finding both that the CDI Ordinance was not a “law” subject to referendum under the Charter and that the petition’s reproduction of the ordinance was insufficient due to the lack of accurate color maps. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. The Court held that under the Frederick County Charter, zoning ordinances, such as the CDI Ordinance, are not subject to referendum because the Charter intended to maintain pre-Charter limitations on referenda for such ordinances. Additionally, the Court held that the petition was insufficient because it did not contain a full and accurate reproduction of the ordinance, as the black-and-white maps omitted essential information. View "In re: Frederick Cnty. Data Center Referendum" on Justia Law

Toy v. City and County of S.F.

2026-07-24T09:33:01-08:00

Several plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit against a city, challenging the validity of recently adopted water rates. They alleged that the city’s new rates, implemented by a resolution passed in May 2023, violated Proposition 218 by including costs for public fire service, resulting in charges exceeding the actual cost of water service. Prior to filing suit, the plaintiffs submitted claims under the Government Claims Act, which were denied. The plaintiffs sought refunds, declaratory relief, equitable relief, and a writ of mandate. After the city litigated the case for more than a year, including discovery and other pretrial activities, it moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that plaintiffs failed to bring a reverse validation action as required by Government Code section 53759 and Code of Civil Procedure sections 860 et seq. The San Francisco County Superior Court granted the city’s motion, holding that the validation statutes applied, were both mandatory and jurisdictional, and that plaintiffs had not complied with them in two ways: their suit was time-barred and they failed to follow proper notice procedures, including service by publication. On appeal to the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, plaintiffs argued that the city had waived the validation requirements by litigating the case and that their action was timely. The appellate court reviewed the matter de novo and held that the validation statutes were mandatory and jurisdictional for challenges to water rates, and plaintiffs’ failure to comply with statutory procedures—including timely filing and notice by publication—was fatal to their claims. The court rejected arguments regarding waiver, good cause, and belated publication, ultimately affirming the trial court’s order and concluding that the procedural requirements for reverse validation actions must be strictly followed. View "Toy v. City and County of S.F." on Justia Law

8451 Melrose Property, LLC v. Akhtarzad

2026-07-24T08:32:54-08:00

A commercial landlord leased a property to an individual, Sina, who stopped paying rent soon after the lease began, causing significant unpaid rent and property damage. The landlord regained possession of the property and found it had been gutted. The landlord sued Sina for breach of contract and prevailed at trial, but the initial judgment was reversed on appeal due to a change in parol evidence law. On retrial before a referee, the landlord again prevailed, with the referee finding substantial damages and the trial court adopting the referee’s decision, entering judgment for the landlord. This judgment was affirmed on appeal. After the second judgment, Sina and his wife filed for bankruptcy. During related bankruptcy proceedings, the landlord discovered new evidence revealing that Sina, his brothers, their wives, and a family-owned corporation, Amey, were all part of a longstanding “one-for-all” family partnership. The landlord moved in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to amend the judgment to add these family members and Amey as judgment debtors, arguing that they were the true parties in interest and had been virtually represented in the litigation by Sina. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the trial court's decision to amend the judgment. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order, holding that substantial evidence supported the findings that the family members and Amey were part of a partnership that controlled the litigation and benefited from it. The court held that under Code of Civil Procedure section 187, a court may amend a judgment to add parties who had sufficient control of the litigation and unity of interest with the original judgment debtor, even if traditional alter ego requirements are not strictly met. The court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the addition of the individual partners and Amey as judgment debtors. View "8451 Melrose Property, LLC v. Akhtarzad" on Justia Law

American Whitewater v. FERC

2026-07-24T08:02:46-08:00

A non-profit river conservation and recreation organization, whose members include kayakers and canoers in Missouri, sought to intervene out of time in a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) license surrender proceeding for the Niangua Hydroelectric Project in Missouri. The project, completed in 1930, impounded the Niangua River and created Lake Niangua. After decades of operation and relicensing, the licensee decided not to pursue relicensing, proposing to decommission the project but leave the dam in place. The organization argued its members would be directly affected and that its participation would represent public interest, but it missed the intervention deadline due to lack of awareness of the proceeding. FERC denied the organization’s unopposed motion to intervene out of time, finding it failed to demonstrate good cause for late filing under its procedural rules. FERC also denied rehearing, reiterating that lack of awareness of a publicly noticed proceeding did not constitute good cause and that, per its precedent, failure to show good cause was sufficient to deny intervention without considering other factors. The Commission subsequently approved the license surrender with the dam left in place, rejecting the organization’s comments. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. It held that FERC did not err in interpreting its rule to require a late intervenor to show good cause for the late filing, but concluded that FERC acted arbitrarily and capriciously by inconsistently applying its precedent on late intervention without providing a reasoned explanation. The court vacated FERC’s orders and remanded the case for reconsideration and a reasoned explanation consistent with FERC’s precedent. View "American Whitewater v. FERC" on Justia Law

WEISS V. PERMANENTE MEDICAL GROUP, INC.

2026-07-24T08:01:25-08:00

An employee of The Permanente Medical Group, Inc. worked remotely as a Managerial Senior Consultant. After the employer instituted a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy requiring all employees to be vaccinated or to obtain a valid exemption, the employee requested a religious exemption, citing her beliefs as a Christian Jew and referencing relevant religious texts. The employer initially granted her a provisional exemption but later required more information to assess the sincerity of her beliefs. When she did not fully answer the supplemental questions, particularly declining to disclose information about her medical history, the employer revoked her exemption and terminated her employment for noncompliance with the vaccine mandate. After her termination, the employee filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging violations of Title VII and California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), as well as a claim under the California Constitution. The district court granted the employer’s motion to dismiss her statutory claims, holding that she had failed to allege that she adequately notified the employer of the conflict between her religious beliefs and the vaccine mandate. The court reasoned that her initial exemption request and responses to supplemental questions provided insufficient notice and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the employee’s allegations regarding notice of a religious conflict. The Ninth Circuit held that to satisfy the notice requirement for a prima facie case of religious accommodation under Title VII and FEHA, an employee must provide enough information for the employer to understand an actual conflict between religious beliefs and work requirements. The court found that the employee’s allegations met this standard at the pleading stage, reversed the district court’s dismissal of her statutory claims, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "WEISS V. PERMANENTE MEDICAL GROUP, INC." on Justia Law

Suri v. Trump

2026-07-23T12:30:21-08:00

An Indian national entered the United States on a J-1 exchange visa for a postdoctoral fellowship at Georgetown University. He and his wife, a U.S. citizen of Palestinian descent, lived in Virginia and publicly opposed the war in Gaza. Following their social media activity and associations, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) detained him under a new program targeting foreign nationals thought to support designated terror groups based on online speech. After his arrest, he was quickly transferred between several detention facilities in Virginia, Louisiana, and Texas, often without notice to his family or counsel, and was held under allegedly punitive and harmful conditions. He filed a habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which was where he lived, was first detained, and initially held. The government moved to dismiss, arguing that the court lacked habeas jurisdiction because he was no longer detained in Virginia. The district court denied the motion, finding it had jurisdiction under the “unknown custodian” exception and the exception articulated in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in *Rumsfeld v. Padilla*, since the petitioner’s location and custodian were unknown due to government actions. The district court also declined to transfer venue and enjoined the government from removing the petitioner while his habeas case was pending, later ordering his release on bail. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s orders. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court had habeas jurisdiction under both the unknown custodian exception and the exception for government conduct thwarting access to the courts. The court further held that no provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, including 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g), 1252(b)(9), or 1252(a)(5), stripped the district court of jurisdiction over the habeas petition. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying transfer or by invoking the All Writs Act to preserve its jurisdiction. View "Suri v. Trump" on Justia Law

La Belle Dairy, LLC v. Sharpe Holdings, Inc.

2026-07-23T07:31:00-08:00

A dairy operator in Northeast Missouri leased thousands of acres of adjacent forage land from a landowner to grow feed for its cattle and manage waste under regulatory requirements. The lease included provisions for renewal at a market rental rate and an agreement for the eventual sale of the leased and surrounding acreage to the dairy, with fair market value to be established by appraisal if necessary. The dairy alleged that the landowner breached the lease by unilaterally raising rent, demanding an unfavorable addendum, and refusing to complete the agreed land sales, while the landowner asserted that the dairy breached by not signing the addendum and threatened eviction. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted the dairy’s request for injunctive relief, enjoining the landowner from evicting or otherwise interfering with the dairy’s possession of the leased land. The landowner appealed, arguing lack of adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, as well as contesting the enforceability of the lease and the propriety of the injunction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit first determined it had jurisdiction, treating the lower court order as a preliminary injunction rather than a temporary restraining order, based on its duration and effect. The appellate court held that the landowner waived or forfeited its due process objections by not raising them below. On the merits, the court found the dairy had a fair chance of prevailing on its contract claims, including the enforceability of the land-sale provision and compliance with notice requirements. The court further concluded that the dairy faced irreparable harm due to threatened loss of unique land, that the balance of harms favored the dairy, and that the public interest did not weigh against the injunction. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s issuance of the preliminary injunction. View "La Belle Dairy, LLC v. Sharpe Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Veneziano v. Saulnier

2026-07-23T07:09:10-08:00

John Veneziano obtained a $3,500,000 money judgment against Bernard J. Saulnier in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maine. Veneziano then sought to enforce this judgment in Maine state court by filing a disclosure subpoena and related documents in the District Court in Biddeford. The case was later transferred to the Business and Consumer Docket. After discovery disputes and a disclosure hearing, the Business and Consumer Docket found that Saulnier’s actual earnings allowed for weekly installment payments of $1,009 and ordered Saulnier to make those payments to satisfy the judgment. Following this order, Saulnier appealed, initially contesting the imputation of income above his reported earnings. During the appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court raised the issue of whether the federal judgment had been domesticated in Maine, as required by statute. The parties provided supplemental briefing on the issue. It was undisputed that the federal judgment had not been domesticated in Maine state court pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that the Business and Consumer Docket lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce an undomesticated federal judgment. The court concluded that Maine’s disclosure statute authorizes enforcement only of judgments entered in Maine state courts, and that a foreign or federal judgment must first be domesticated in Maine before it may be enforced through disclosure proceedings. Because domestication had not occurred, the Business and Consumer Docket had no authority to act, and its order was vacated. The case was remanded with instructions to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction. View "Veneziano v. Saulnier" on Justia Law

Maine Human Rights Commission v. Larkin

2026-07-23T07:09:09-08:00

The Maine Human Rights Commission filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court alleging that a landlord discriminated against his tenant based on sex, asserting claims under both the Maine Human Rights Act and the Fair Housing Act. After litigation began, the tenant requested a judicial settlement conference. The landlord did not attend the conference, but his attorney and daughter attended, allegedly with his authority to settle. After the conference, a record form stated that the parties had agreed to a full and final settlement, but disagreements arose during subsequent exchanges of draft settlement agreements, particularly over provisions related to an acknowledgment of antidiscrimination laws and certain “public-relief terms” such as fair-housing training and property management oversight. The Kennebec County Superior Court reviewed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the court found that the parties intended to be bound by an agreement reached at the settlement conference, as reflected in the settlement conference record form. The court identified five basic terms as the substance of the agreement, including a payment to the tenant and specific non-monetary provisions. The court ordered the parties to execute an agreement consistent with these terms, except for the acknowledgment provision, which it found was not part of the agreement. On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court found that the record was insufficient to support the Superior Court’s finding that the parties mutually assented to all material terms of a binding settlement agreement. The Supreme Judicial Court held that, in the absence of an evidentiary hearing or a sufficiently detailed record, the lower court erred in enforcing the settlement. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Superior Court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the parties actually reached a binding agreement and, if so, its precise terms. View "Maine Human Rights Commission v. Larkin" on Justia Law

One Church v. Bhd. Mut. Ins. Co.

2026-07-23T05:04:35-08:00

A church with property insurance sustained windstorm damage and submitted a claim to its insurer. When the parties could not agree on the amount of loss, the church invoked the insurance policy’s binding appraisal process. Each party selected an appraiser, and the appraisers agreed on an award, which the insurer paid and the church accepted. Afterward, the church alleged it discovered additional, previously hidden damages, and the insurer refused to pay more than the appraisal award. The church then sued, claiming breach of contract and seeking to set aside the binding appraisal based on the later-discovered damage. The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granted judgment on the pleadings to the insurer, finding that the appraisal award was binding and there was no evidence of fraud, misfeasance, or mistake to justify reopening the award. The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the church’s complaint pleaded mistake with sufficient particularity to satisfy Ohio’s Civil Rule 9(B), which requires that mistake be pled with particularity. The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that a binding appraisal award may only be set aside for fraud or manifest mistake, defined as an egregious error undermining the intent of the agreement, not a mere error in judgment. The court further concluded that, to plead mistake with particularity under Civil Rule 9(B), the facts alleged must satisfy the elements of mistake. Since the church only alleged that additional, hidden damages were discovered after the appraisal, and did not plead facts constituting a manifest mistake by the appraisers, the complaint did not state a claim for mistake. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Tenth District’s judgment and reinstated the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint. View "One Church v. Bhd. Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Rodriguez v. Imperial Brands, PLC.

2026-07-23T05:01:45-08:00

Several U.S. nationals, descendants of Ramón Rodriguez Gutiérrez, alleged that their family’s property in Cuba was confiscated by the Cuban government in 1961. They claimed ownership of a significant interest in a Havana cigarette factory and an adjacent mixed-use building, both seized as part of the nationalization of the tobacco industry. The plaintiffs sued multiple corporations, including two British companies, asserting that these entities had trafficked in the confiscated property in violation of the Helms-Burton Act by marketing and publicizing Cuban tobacco products made at the seized factory, including activities on U.S.-based social media platforms. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida reviewed the case after the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. Following jurisdictional discovery, a magistrate judge recommended dismissal for improper venue for some defendants, and for lack of personal jurisdiction for others, specifically Imperial Brands and WPP. The district court adopted the recommendation to dismiss the claims against these British corporations, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to establish personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2), as their alleged U.S.-related activities were insufficient to confer jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit examined whether federal courts could exercise personal jurisdiction over Imperial Brands and WPP in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization. The Eleventh Circuit held that the Fifth Amendment imposes a “reasonableness” standard for personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants. Applying this standard, the court found that neither Imperial Brands nor WPP had sufficient notice, meaningful U.S. connections, or presence to justify jurisdiction. The court concluded that subjecting these companies to U.S. jurisdiction would be unreasonable and affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "Rodriguez v. Imperial Brands, PLC." on Justia Law

Eagle Colton 55, LP v. City of Colton

2026-07-21T09:33:07-08:00

A group of affiliated real estate companies entered into an agreement with a city to develop and manage an affordable senior housing community. The agreement included a promissory note, requiring the companies to provide annual audited financial statements and payments based on residual receipts. The city’s finance director later raised concerns about compliance, and the city issued a breach notice, which was subsequently cured and rescinded. The companies also pursued a similar housing project in a neighboring city, but after city officials discussed the prior project with the original city’s staff, the negotiations ended and the exclusive agreement expired. The companies alleged that false statements made by the original city’s staff about their financial compliance and loan status caused the neighboring city to terminate the project and harmed their reputation. The Superior Court of San Bernardino County reviewed the companies’ complaint for interference, breach of covenant, and defamation. The city filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing the claims arose from protected activity and were barred by the Government Claims Act due to lack of proper claim presentation. The trial court found the city’s activities were protected but determined the companies were likely to prevail, holding that delivering a letter outlining their claims to a city council member was sufficient compliance with the Act. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the city’s communications and actions regarding municipal contracts and development projects were protected activities under the anti-SLAPP statute. It further held that the companies failed to comply with the Government Claims Act’s claim presentation requirement, as delivery to a single council member at a private meeting did not constitute proper service to the governing body or authorized recipient. The court reversed the trial court’s order denying the anti-SLAPP motion, remanded with instructions to grant the motion, and directed further proceedings to determine attorney fees. View "Eagle Colton 55, LP v. City of Colton" on Justia Law

Mahdawi v. Trump

2026-07-21T07:00:03-08:00

The petitioner, a lawful permanent resident originally from the West Bank, lived in Vermont and was pursuing graduate studies at Columbia University. Following his vocal participation in student demonstrations protesting military actions in Gaza, he was arrested at a USCIS facility in April 2025 by Homeland Security agents, who commenced removal proceedings against him. The Notice to Appear cited a determination by the Secretary of State that his presence or activities posed potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences, referencing his alleged rhetoric and conduct at protests. The government also presented prior allegations related to firearm purchases and drug possession, which the petitioner denied or had resolved. After his arrest, the petitioner’s attorney filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, alleging that the government targeted him for removal based on constitutionally protected speech. The petition sought to invalidate the Secretary of State’s determination, bar removal based on advocacy for Palestinian rights, and obtain his release. The district court granted his release pending review of the petition, finding a likelihood of success on the First Amendment claim and determining it had jurisdiction despite statutory provisions that restrict judicial review in immigration matters. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the appeal. Applying a de novo standard for subject matter jurisdiction, the court concluded that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) channels judicial review of questions arising from removal actions to the administrative process and ultimately to a petition for review of a final order of removal in the circuit courts. The court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the habeas petition because the petitioner’s claims were intertwined with the removal proceedings. The court vacated the district court’s release order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Mahdawi v. Trump" on Justia Law

In re Marriage of G.E. & I.D.

2026-07-20T12:04:15-08:00

A wife and her child immigrated from Nigeria to the United States to join her husband. After arriving, she alleged that her husband was verbally and physically abusive, threatened to kill her and their child, and exerted strict control over her finances and social interactions, including threats to have her deported. She filed for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) in San Diego County, seeking protection for herself and her child. The Superior Court issued a temporary restraining order (DVTRO) and granted her sole custody, later modifying the order to allow the husband supervised visitation. The evidentiary hearing on the DVRO was delayed several times for various reasons, including scheduling conflicts and illness. When the hearing finally took place, the wife testified in detail about repeated abuse and threats. Despite the parties’ mutual agreement that more time was needed for the hearing, the court set strict limits. During the continued hearing, after the wife’s case-in-chief and some of the husband’s testimony, the husband's counsel moved orally to dismiss both the DVTRO and the entire DVRO action, citing procedural grounds and the ends of justice, specifically referencing Code of Civil Procedure section 533. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, found that the family court abused its discretion by dismissing the DVRO petition and dissolving the DVTRO based solely on docket management concerns and without resolving the merits. The appellate court held that Code of Civil Procedure section 533 does not authorize dismissal of an unresolved petition for an injunction and that the family court exceeded its inherent authority. The order of dismissal and dissolution was reversed, and the matter was remanded with instructions to reinstate the DVTRO and conduct further proceedings on the DVRO petition. View "In re Marriage of G.E. & I.D." on Justia Law

Mata v. Digital Recognition Network, Inc.

2026-07-20T11:32:32-08:00

A private company operating an automated license plate recognition (ALPR) system collected and stored images of license plates and related data, including date, time, and location, from vehicles in public areas in California. The company maintained a written usage and privacy policy, posted on its website, which set out authorized uses of the ALPR information and procedures for access and security. A California resident whose license plate information was collected by this system filed a class action lawsuit, alleging that the company violated the ALPR statute by failing to meaningfully implement or publicly disclose a compliant usage and privacy policy, by failing to enact adequate security measures, and by improperly allowing customers to use the data for unauthorized purposes. The plaintiff claimed harm based on an asserted invasion of privacy due to the collection and storage of his information, but did not allege any unauthorized access, disclosure, or tangible injury. The Superior Court of San Diego County granted summary judgment to the company, finding that the plaintiff lacked standing because he had not suffered actual harm as required by the ALPR statute. The court also denied another class member’s ex parte application to intervene as a substitute plaintiff, partly because the application was untimely and partly because he too failed to demonstrate actual harm resulting from a statutory violation. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed both rulings. The appellate court held that standing to sue under the ALPR statute requires a showing of actual harm arising from a violation of the statute, not merely a statutory violation or a subjective sense of privacy invasion. The court concluded the plaintiff had not suffered actual harm, and therefore lacked standing. The appellate court also found no reversible error in the denial of the motion to intervene, as the movant failed to address all grounds for the trial court’s decision. View "Mata v. Digital Recognition Network, Inc." on Justia Law

Jefferson Parish Firefighters Association, Local 1374 v. Roberts

2026-07-17T15:30:30-08:00

A fire captain who served as vice president of a local firefighters’ union was also a member of the Jefferson Parish Fire Civil Service Board. The union previously paid for legal counsel for members appearing before the Civil Service Board, but stopped doing so after the Louisiana Board of Ethics issued an advisory opinion, and later a binding declaratory opinion, stating that such payments violated Louisiana law while any union officer served on the board. The union challenged the Board of Ethics’ interpretation in state court, arguing that it misapplied state law, and then filed a federal lawsuit claiming this restriction violated its First Amendment rights. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted the union a preliminary injunction on First Amendment grounds, preventing enforcement of the ethics board’s opinion against the union. The district court also declined to abstain under the doctrines established in Younger v. Harris and Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co. The Louisiana defendants appealed, arguing the district court should have abstained and that granting the injunction was an abuse of discretion. While the appeal was pending, all relevant state court proceedings concluded, and, just before oral argument, the fire captain resigned from the Civil Service Board. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the case was moot due to the resignation, as neither party retained a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. The court determined that no live controversy remained, rejected arguments that mootness exceptions applied, and ruled that the appeal and the entire case must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The court vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss the case. View "Jefferson Parish Firefighters Association, Local 1374 v. Roberts" on Justia Law

Elmar Hotel Management, LLC v Unite Here Local 1

2026-07-17T13:00:47-08:00

Several related companies, along with an individual, operated the Inn of Chicago. After purchasing the property, they assumed an existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with a labor union. When the City of Chicago approached them to use the Inn to house displaced migrants, the operation resumed, but the employers did not use union members for typical hotel functions. Instead, these tasks were handled by an outside staffing agency and later by another company managed by the same people. The labor union learned of this arrangement, filed grievances alleging violations of the CBA, and submitted the dispute to arbitration. The union also filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board, which was consolidated with the arbitration. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, reviewed the arbitration award. The arbitrator had found that the Inn was operating as a “hotel” within the meaning of the CBA while housing migrants, that the related companies and individual were a “single employer” under the CBA, and that they violated both the CBA and the National Labor Relations Act by failing to use union employees and failing to provide notice or bargain with the union. The district court confirmed the arbitration award, rejecting the employers’ arguments regarding arbitrability, notice, and authority. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s confirmation of the arbitration award. The court held that the employers were bound by the arbitration because they participated without reserving objections, and the arbitrator’s findings drew from the CBA and issues submitted by the parties. The court found no due process or public policy violation and affirmed the district court’s confirmation of the award. View "Elmar Hotel Management, LLC v Unite Here Local 1" on Justia Law

Baltimore XV Props. v. Newsteps' Choice North Homeowners Association, Inc.

2026-07-17T10:06:59-08:00

After a homeowners association obtained a money judgment against a homeowner for unpaid assessments, it levied the homeowner’s interest in her property and proceeded with a sheriff’s sale. The homeowner did not satisfy the judgment or obtain release of the levy before the sale occurred. A third-party bidder purchased the homeowner’s interest in the property at auction. After the sale but before the court ratified it, the homeowner paid the judgment in full to the association. The association then notified the court of the satisfaction and requested that the sale be vacated, arguing the judgment had been satisfied prior to ratification. The District Court of Maryland, sitting in Prince George’s County, agreed with the association, concluding that the sale could be vacated since the homeowner satisfied the judgment before ratification. On appeal, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County affirmed, holding a hearing and again ruling that the sale was not complete until ratification and thus could be undone by post-sale satisfaction of the judgment. The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case. It held that a judgment-debtor’s satisfaction of the judgment after a sheriff’s sale, but before ratification, cannot be raised as an exception to the sale under Maryland Rule 14-305(e)(1). Post-sale satisfaction is not an irregularity in the sale and does not void the purchaser’s inchoate equitable interest in the property acquired at auction. The Court emphasized that the judgment-debtor may obtain release of the levy only before sale, and that post-sale options for release are not available. The Court reversed the Circuit Court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to allow the homeowner thirty days to file exceptions to the sale, beginning after remand to the District Court. View "Baltimore XV Props. v. Newsteps' Choice North Homeowners Association, Inc." on Justia Law

G.T. v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company

2026-07-17T07:01:10-08:00

After enduring physical and sexual abuse while in the care of James and Susan McLaurie as a young child, the plaintiff obtained a $150 million judgment against both individuals in Missouri state court. Seeking to collect on this judgment, the plaintiff subsequently filed a new action in state court against the McLauries and their homeowner’s insurer, Liberty Mutual, asserting equitable garnishment claims against all three and additional claims, including bad faith and breach of contract, against Liberty Mutual. Liberty Mutual removed the action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, invoking diversity jurisdiction. At the time of removal, James McLaurie had not yet been served but later entered an appearance. The plaintiff moved to remand, arguing a lack of complete diversity, and James McLaurie joined this motion, expressly refusing to consent to removal. The district court disagreed that diversity was lacking but found that the absence of consent from all defendants rendered removal procedurally defective under the requirement of unanimity in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A). The court granted remand on this procedural ground. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit examined whether it had jurisdiction to review the district court’s remand order. The appellate court held that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), remand orders based on procedural defects—such as a lack of unanimity among defendants—are not reviewable, so long as the district court’s basis was at least “colorably” procedural. The court determined that the district court’s characterization of its order as resting on a procedural defect was colorable. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "G.T. v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Akhmetshin v. Browder

2026-07-17T06:33:11-08:00

Two individuals became involved in a public dispute relating to allegations of Russian interference and the passage of the Magnitsky Act. One party, a British citizen, made several statements in media interviews and social media posts from New York, characterizing the other party—a Russian-American lobbyist—as a “spy operator in Washington, D.C.” and linking him to a controversial meeting at Trump Tower in New York. The lobbyist claimed these statements were defamatory and brought suit in the District of Columbia, arguing that the statements caused harm to his reputation in D.C. and that the speaker’s comments established personal jurisdiction. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the claim and dismissed the case, holding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the British citizen. The district court also denied the speaker’s request for attorney’s fees under the D.C. Anti–SLAPP Act, finding that such fees were not warranted because the dismissal was based on lack of jurisdiction rather than on a motion under the statute. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the British citizen did not “purposefully avail” himself of the benefits and protections of D.C. law, as required under the minimum-contacts test from International Shoe Co. v. Washington. The statements at issue did not focus on D.C. or create jurisdictionally significant contacts with the forum. The court also affirmed the denial of attorney’s fees, ruling that the D.C. Anti–SLAPP Act does not apply when the dismissal is for lack of personal jurisdiction rather than under the statute’s special motion to dismiss. The court denied the request for jurisdictional discovery. View "Akhmetshin v. Browder" on Justia Law

KELLY v. US

2026-07-17T06:02:24-08:00

A group of plaintiffs, including Michael Kelly and several banking entities under his control, alleged that they lost substantial assets following the 2008 financial crisis when the federal government placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship. The plaintiffs had invested significant portions of their Tier 1 Capital in preferred shares of these government-sponsored enterprises, following government incentives. After the conservatorship was imposed, the value of these shares plummeted, causing regulatory insolvency in the banks and leading to receivership and asset liquidation. The plaintiffs claimed a loss of $19.4 billion in combined assets and asserted claims for breach of contract and an unconstitutional Fifth Amendment taking. The United States Court of Federal Claims reviewed the amended complaint, which was filed thirteen years after the events in question. The plaintiffs argued that their filing deadline was tolled during the pendency of Washington Federal v. United States, a related class action filed in the same court and appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Federal Claims Court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, reasoning that the six-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2501 was not tolled by the Washington Federal litigation and was not subject to equitable or class action tolling. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court affirmed the decision, holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2501 is a jurisdictional time bar and is not subject to American Pipe tolling or any equitable tolling. As a result, the plaintiffs’ complaint was untimely, and the dismissal by the Court of Federal Claims was affirmed. The court did not reach the merits of the claims, as lack of jurisdiction was dispositive. View "KELLY v. US " on Justia Law

Manutsom v. Town of Hollis

2026-07-17T05:10:42-08:00

A property in Hollis was owned by a trust with Wisarat Manutsom as trustee. The trustee, often traveling abroad, provided various mailing addresses—including in California, Manchester (New Hampshire), and later Maine—as well as an email address, to the town for tax-related correspondence. Mark Copp was authorized to act for the trust and provided his Manchester address. Over several years, the town sent multiple certified mail notices regarding unpaid property taxes and impending tax liens and deeds to these addresses; some were signed for and received, but several were returned as undeliverable. The town also communicated about the delinquent taxes by email. In 2019, after more undelivered certified mailings and no payment for 2016 taxes, the town executed a tax deed transferring ownership to itself, then sent post-deed notices by regular mail and, years later, by certified mail and email. The plaintiff sued in the Superior Court, alleging the town’s notice regarding the 2016 and 2018 tax liens and the 2016 tax deed was constitutionally deficient under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the town, finding the notice sufficient. The plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was denied, and she appealed. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case de novo. It held that the town’s failure to take additional reasonable steps—such as emailing notice—after certified notices of the impending 2016 tax deed were returned undelivered, and before executing the deed, violated the plaintiff’s due process rights. The court also found the town’s notice of the 2016 tax lien insufficient because it relied on an address that had repeatedly failed. However, notice of the 2018 tax lien, sent to both Manchester and Maine addresses, was deemed sufficient. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Manutsom v. Town of Hollis" on Justia Law

Brooks v. Mitsubishi Electric & Electronics US, Inc.

2026-07-16T06:33:18-08:00

A group of plaintiffs, represented by the same counsel as earlier litigants, alleged injuries caused by cellphone radiation exposure. Their complaints were nearly identical to those in a previous set of cases involving similar claims. The plaintiffs agreed, through joint stipulations filed in their cases, that the outcome of expert admissibility litigation in the earlier cases would apply to their own. This agreement included being bound by both the substantive ruling on whether expert testimony about general causation was admissible and all procedural rulings leading up to that determination. The stipulations were signed by counsel for both sides, and subsequent court orders stayed the plaintiffs’ cases pending the resolution of expert admissibility in the earlier litigation. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia managed the earlier cases by first resolving whether the plaintiffs had admissible expert testimony on general causation, limiting discovery to that issue. After several hearings and rulings, the court ultimately excluded the plaintiffs’ expert testimony under the Daubert/Rule 702 standard, and granted summary judgment to the defendants because the plaintiffs lacked the necessary expert evidence to support their claims. The Brooks plaintiffs later moved to lift the stays in their cases, arguing for broader discovery and the opportunity to present new expert witnesses, but the court denied this motion. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed whether the Brooks plaintiffs were bound by their agreements and the trial court’s rulings. The court held that the plaintiffs had agreed—expressly or implicitly—to be bound by both the outcome of the expert admissibility litigation and the procedural rulings in the earlier cases. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the plaintiffs lacked admissible expert testimony required to prove their claims. View "Brooks v. Mitsubishi Electric & Electronics US, Inc." on Justia Law

City of Chicago v BP P.L.C.

2026-07-15T14:00:48-08:00

The case involves a lawsuit filed in March 2024 by the City of Chicago against several major fossil fuel companies and a trade association. Chicago alleges the defendants misrepresented the effects of fossil fuel emissions on climate change, leading consumers to use more fossil fuels, which resulted in harm to the city such as increased illness, property damage, and environmental degradation. The city seeks damages only for harm attributable to increased fossil fuel usage due to the alleged misinformation, and specifically excludes claims related to federal property or specialized fuel sales to the federal government. After the complaint was filed in Illinois state court, the defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, invoking the federal officer removal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)). They argued that their work producing and supplying fossil fuels for the federal government brought the case within federal jurisdiction. The district court disagreed, finding the connection between the alleged misconduct and the defendants’ federal work too attenuated, and remanded the case to state court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s remand order de novo. The Seventh Circuit held that the federal officer removal statute did not support removal here because the defendants’ federal work was not sufficiently connected to Chicago’s claims, which focus on alleged misrepresentations to consumers and resulting non-federal harm. The court noted that the city’s complaint expressly disclaimed injuries related to federal activities, and agreed with the reasoning of other circuits in similar cases. The Seventh Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s remand order. View "City of Chicago v BP P.L.C." on Justia Law

Fernandez v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority

2026-07-15T07:51:44-08:00

On August 12, 2014, Eva Pena was injured while attempting to board a Rhode Island Public Transit Authority (RIPTA) bus in Providence. She alleged that the bus driver closed the doors on her, causing her to fall and sustain serious injuries. After her death in 2019, her estate continued the suit, claiming negligence by RIPTA. At trial, testimony was presented from multiple witnesses, including Pena’s deposition, the bus driver, a RIPTA supervisor, and Pena’s son. Central to the dispute was the supervisor’s account of a conversation with Pena, which had been facilitated by an unidentified Spanish interpreter at the scene. The Providence County Superior Court admitted the supervisor’s testimony and report about what Pena allegedly said through the interpreter, overruling objections that this constituted inadmissible hearsay. The jury returned a verdict for RIPTA, finding that the plaintiff had not proven negligence. The plaintiff moved for a new trial, arguing that the trial justice erred in allowing hearsay testimony via the unidentified interpreter. The trial court denied the motion, finding the issue unsettled under Rhode Island law and suitable for appellate clarification. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the case and reversed the Superior Court’s denial of a new trial. The Supreme Court held that admitting the supervisor’s testimony and report regarding Pena’s statements, relayed through the unidentified interpreter, was an abuse of discretion because it constituted inadmissible hearsay lacking reliability and trustworthiness. The Court found that this evidence was not cumulative and its admission affected the substantial rights of the parties. The case was remanded for a new trial consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. View "Fernandez v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority" on Justia Law

Northwell Health, Inc. v. Group Hospitalization and Medical Services, Inc.

2026-07-15T07:00:09-08:00

A large New York healthcare provider participated for decades in the Blue Cross Blue Shield insurance network through contracts with the New York Blue Cross licensee, Empire. Under this arrangement, the provider offered negotiated pricing and direct billing for Blue Cross patients. The Blue Cross network comprises thirty-four independent companies, each licensed to operate in a specific region. The provider’s current dispute concerns claims for care provided to patients insured by Blue Cross entities based in Washington, D.C., Maryland, and Virginia. These out-of-state insurers, although not directly contracted with the provider and not operating in New York, used the BlueCard Program to facilitate claims processing in New York and relied on Empire’s network to obtain discounted rates. The provider alleged that these insurers underpaid over $5.5 million in claims. After unsuccessful resolution attempts under the Provider Agreement, the provider brought suit in New York state court. The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, which dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The district court also denied leave to amend the complaint. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It found diversity jurisdiction proper, holding that the D.C.-based insurer’s federal charter made it a D.C. citizen for jurisdictional purposes. The court held that the out-of-state insurers’ purposeful business dealings with Empire and exploitation of New York’s healthcare market established personal jurisdiction under both New York’s long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause. On the merits, the Second Circuit held that the provider adequately stated claims for contract liability based on ratification and for quasi-contract, but affirmed dismissal of the provider’s third-party beneficiary claims. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Northwell Health, Inc. v. Group Hospitalization and Medical Services, Inc." on Justia Law

DOUGHERTY ELECTRIC, INC. v. US

2026-07-15T06:32:07-08:00

Dougherty Electric, Inc. sought a refund from the IRS for fraud penalties and interest it paid in connection with employment tax liabilities arising from a payroll scheme orchestrated by its sole shareholder between 2001 and 2005. After the shareholder pleaded guilty to tax evasion and was ordered by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to pay restitution, the IRS audited Dougherty Electric, assessed employment taxes and fraud penalties, and Dougherty Electric paid over $1.5 million. The deadline for filing a refund claim with the IRS was December 11, 2017. Dougherty Electric submitted a timely letter to the IRS on December 7, 2017, asserting a refund claim based on the theory that penalties and interest could not be assessed on criminal restitution, referencing Klein v. Commissioner, 149 T.C. 341 (2017). After the deadline passed, it submitted another letter raising a new theory—that the fraud penalties lacked supervisor approval required by 26 U.S.C. § 6751(b)(1. In 2018, Dougherty Electric submitted formal refund claims and supporting documentation, but the IRS rejected the claims. Dougherty Electric then sued in the United States Court of Federal Claims, which dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that Dougherty Electric had not timely filed a proper refund claim with the IRS. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that failure to comply with the pre-suit filing requirement of 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a) did not deprive the Court of Federal Claims of subject-matter jurisdiction but did require dismissal for failure to state a claim. The court found that Dougherty Electric’s timely claim satisfied the statutory requirement regarding the Klein theory, but not as to the supervisor approval theory. The court affirmed dismissal as to the supervisor theory, vacated dismissal as to the Klein theory, and remanded for further proceedings. View "DOUGHERTY ELECTRIC, INC. v. US " on Justia Law

In Re: School Board of Concordia Parish

2026-07-14T15:30:31-08:00

This case involved a decades-long school desegregation lawsuit in which, after more than sixty years of litigation, all remaining parties—the United States, Delta Charter Group, and the School Board of Concordia Parish—filed a joint stipulation of dismissal with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). Previously, the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana had dismissed the long-absent private plaintiffs in 2025. The key fact is that every party with an ongoing interest in the case agreed to end the litigation through this self-executing mechanism. Despite the jointly filed stipulation, the district court issued a memorandum ruling refusing to recognize the dismissal, reasoning that it was not required to accept and enter the proposed stipulation, particularly when public policy concerns or the protection of others might be implicated. The court then scheduled evidentiary hearings to determine if the school system had achieved “unitary status,” referencing the Green factors from Green v. School Board of New Kent County. In response, the School Board appealed the district court’s orders and, as a precaution, also filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over the School Board’s direct appeal because the challenged orders were neither final decisions nor appealable injunctions. However, the Fifth Circuit granted mandamus relief, ruling that once a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) stipulation of dismissal is filed by all appearing parties, the case is immediately dismissed without need for a court order. Any further action by the district court is a nullity. The Fifth Circuit ordered the district court to vacate its orders and end the proceedings. View "In Re: School Board of Concordia Parish" on Justia Law

In re Parenting of C.R.J.

2026-07-14T15:08:45-08:00

The dispute centers on the development of a parenting plan for a minor child, following years of litigation between the parents. As part of the proceedings, both parties agreed to appoint a parenting evaluator, who was to receive all relevant mental health treatment records from the mother’s providers within ten days. Despite this stipulation, the mother's long-term counselor refused to provide updated treatment records to the evaluator, citing personal distrust, and the mother did not take steps to supplement discovery or seek a protective order. The absence of these records prevented the evaluator from obtaining current information about the mother's mental health status, which was a central issue in determining the child’s best interests. The Ninth Judicial District Court of Pondera County found that both the mother and her counselor had intentionally violated discovery rules and the court-approved stipulation by failing to produce the requested records. As a sanction, the District Court precluded the counselor from testifying about any treatment or records created after the evaluator’s report date. The court allowed testimony regarding earlier treatment but limited further testimony to address the scope of the violation, prevent prejudice, and maintain the integrity of the proceedings. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court abused its discretion in imposing this sanction. Applying the standards for discovery sanctions under Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 37, the Supreme Court found that the violation was intentional and prejudicial, and that the sanction was proportional and carefully tailored. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s decision, holding that the exclusion of the counselor’s testimony about undisclosed treatment was proper and within the lower court’s broad discretion. View "In re Parenting of C.R.J." on Justia Law

Czerno v. General Electric Company

2026-07-14T13:30:03-08:00

A mother brought suit on behalf of herself and her minor son, alleging that the son developed leukemia after attending school near and residing close to a manufacturing plant operated by General Electric Company. The plant, located in Pittsfield, Massachusetts, produced electrical transformers and capacitors containing polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) for decades. The plaintiff claimed that GE’s use, disposal, and storage of PCBs caused the son’s illness, and sought recovery under various legal theories, including strict liability, negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation, nuisance, improper transportation of hazardous material, and loss of consortium. The complaint included claims related to the defective design and use of PCB materials, as well as their disposal and remediation. The plaintiff originally filed suit in Massachusetts state superior court. GE removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, asserting federal officer removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), based on its wartime production of PCB-containing devices for the federal government and its later remediation efforts pursuant to a consent decree with the EPA. The plaintiff moved to remand the case to state court, arguing that GE failed to meet the requirements for federal officer removal. The district court agreed, ordered remand, and stayed that order pending appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s jurisdictional determination de novo. It held that GE satisfied both the “acting under” and “for or relating to” elements of the federal officer removal statute, due to its extensive work producing PCB-containing devices for the federal government. The court reversed the district court’s remand order and remanded the case for the district court to determine whether GE has a colorable federal defense. View "Czerno v. General Electric Company" on Justia Law

Wilkins v. Cruise, LLC

2026-07-14T11:32:49-08:00

A plaintiff was injured while riding in an autonomous vehicle operated by a ride-hailing company. At the time of the incident, the plaintiff was employed by the defendant company, but was using the service as a customer rather than in the scope of employment. The plaintiff sued the ride-hailing company and two related entities, including the vehicle manufacturer. The defendants sought to compel arbitration, arguing that the plaintiff had agreed to arbitration both through an employment agreement and through acceptance of the Terms of Service when signing up for the ride-hailing service as a user. The defendants relied on the sign-in process in the mobile app, which included conspicuous notice and hyperlinks to the Terms of Service containing an arbitration provision. The San Francisco City and County Superior Court denied the motion to compel arbitration. The trial court found the defendants failed to show that the plaintiff agreed to the arbitration provision in the Terms of Service, relying on a recent appellate case. The court also ruled that even if the Terms of Service were enforceable, they did not cover the related entities, and denied arbitration to prevent inconsistent rulings under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, subdivision (c). The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the sign-in wrap agreement used by the ride-hailing service provided sufficiently conspicuous notice of the Terms of Service, including the arbitration provision. It further held that the related entities were not “third parties” for purposes of section 1281.2, subdivision (c), due to the plaintiff’s own allegations of agency and joint venture among the defendants. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded with instructions to grant the motion to compel arbitration. View "Wilkins v. Cruise, LLC" on Justia Law

van Faassen v. Lindberg

2026-07-14T11:00:37-08:00

A Dutch life insurance company, through its trustees, sought to enforce an arbitral award against its former owners after they failed to maintain the company’s required solvency capital ratio, as agreed. When the capital ratio fell below the stipulated threshold, the company initiated urgent arbitration proceedings in the Netherlands, resulting in an award ordering the owners to restore the ratio and imposing a substantial penalty for noncompliance. Despite confirmations of the award by Dutch courts—including the Court of Rotterdam, the Court of Appeal of the Hague, and the Supreme Court of the Netherlands—the owners did not comply, leading to the company's liquidation. The trustees filed a petition in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, seeking to confirm the arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the New York Convention, as well as to recognize the Dutch court’s judgment under the North Carolina Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act. The district court found the arbitration award enforceable, holding the FAA’s three-year statute of limitations was “permissive,” not “mandatory,” and also concluded the Dutch judgment was recognizable as a foreign-country judgment under North Carolina law. The court entered judgment, confirming the award under federal law and did not rule on the alternative state-law claim. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the three-year statute of limitations in 9 U.S.C. § 207 is mandatory, not permissive, and reversed the district court’s order confirming the foreign arbitral award under the FAA due to untimeliness. However, the appellate court agreed that the Dutch court judgment qualifies for recognition under the North Carolina Act and remanded the case for further proceedings on the petitioners’ motion to enforce that judgment under state law. View "van Faassen v. Lindberg" on Justia Law

Baltimore XV Props. V. Newsteps' Choice N.

2026-07-14T10:07:50-08:00

A homeowners association obtained a money judgment against a homeowner for unpaid assessments and placed a levy on the homeowner’s property. The homeowner did not satisfy the judgment prior to a sheriff’s auction, and the property was sold to a third-party purchaser. After the auction, but before the court ratified the sale, the homeowner satisfied the judgment by paying the full amount to the association. The association then asked the court to vacate the sale and return the purchase funds to the buyer, arguing that the post-sale satisfaction of the judgment should nullify the auction outcome. The District Court of Maryland sitting in Prince George’s County agreed with the association, finding it proper to vacate the sale since the judgment was satisfied before ratification. On appeal, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County held a de novo hearing and affirmed the District Court’s decision, maintaining that the sale was not complete until ratified and thus could be undone by satisfaction of the judgment at that stage. The purchaser sought review from the Supreme Court of Maryland. The Supreme Court of Maryland held that a judgment-debtor’s post-sale satisfaction of the judgment cannot be raised as an exception to a sheriff’s sale under Maryland Rule 14-305(e)(1). The Court explained that such satisfaction is not an irregularity with respect to the sale, and that a purchaser acquires an inchoate equitable interest after the auction, with a right to the ratification process. Allowing satisfaction of the judgment after the sale to void the auction would undermine that right and negatively affect the sheriff’s sale system. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the Circuit Court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, permitting the homeowner thirty days to file exceptions to the sale under the proper rule. View "Baltimore XV Props. V. Newsteps' Choice N." on Justia Law

Nathanson v. Tortoise Capital Advisors

2026-07-14T05:37:06-08:00

Two shareholders brought a derivative action on behalf of two Maryland closed-end investment funds against the funds’ investment adviser and members of the funds’ board of directors. The shareholders alleged that the board’s failure to control the funds’ use of leverage led to substantial losses during a downturn in the energy sector, and that the investment adviser benefited from the increased leverage through higher fees. The board consisted of five directors, four of whom were allegedly independent, and one who was the chief executive officer of the adviser. The board renewed the adviser’s contract and took defensive actions after the losses were realized. The shareholders did not make a pre-suit demand on the board before filing suit, claiming that such a demand would have been futile. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City dismissed the derivative claim with prejudice, finding that the shareholders had not pleaded sufficient facts to excuse the demand requirement under Maryland law. The court reviewed each allegation and concluded that none established demand futility. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed, holding that the allegations indicated only that a demand was unlikely to succeed, not that it was futile. The appellate court also rejected the shareholders’ argument that potential personal liability for directors constituted a disabling conflict sufficient to excuse demand. The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the lower courts’ decisions. It clarified that under Werbowsky v. Collomb, the futility exception is satisfied only if shareholders clearly and particularly allege that a majority of the board could not consider a litigation demand in accordance with the statutory standard of conduct for directors. The court held that futility depends on the board’s capacity to consider a demand, not on the likelihood of refusal, and that allegations of potential personal liability or hostility to litigation do not excuse the demand requirement. The judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland was affirmed. View "Nathanson v. Tortoise Capital Advisors" on Justia Law

Human Rights Commission v. Durkee

2026-07-14T04:37:29-08:00

A landlord leased a rental property unit to a tenant, who later filed a complaint with the Vermont Human Rights Commission (HRC), alleging discrimination in violation of the Vermont Fair Housing and Public Accommodations Act (VFHPAA). The HRC, acting on behalf of the tenant, filed suit against the landlord, seeking legal and equitable relief for these alleged violations. After the suit was filed, the landlord died. His wife, who jointly owned the property, then also passed away. Ownership of the rental property shifted by operation of law and through an enhanced life-estate deed to their four adult children. No estate was opened in the landlord’s name. After being notified of the landlord’s death, the HRC moved in the Vermont Superior Court, Washington Unit, Civil Division, to substitute the landlord’s four children and his wife’s estate as parties, intending to amend the complaint to impose liability on the new parties due to their receipt of the property. The trial court denied this motion, concluding the proper party for substitution under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 25 would be the decedent’s estate or those standing in its place, not unrelated individuals against whom new claims were sought. The court gave HRC an opportunity to file further pleadings to name a proper party but, when HRC declined, dismissed the case without prejudice. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed whether the trial court correctly interpreted Rule 25 in denying substitution. The Supreme Court held that, although the underlying remedial claim survived the landlord’s death, the HRC failed to demonstrate that the proposed substitute parties—the children and wife’s estate—were proper parties for substitution under Vermont law, as there was no evidence they were executors, heirs, devisees, or legatees of an estate. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to substitute and upheld the dismissal. View "Human Rights Commission v. Durkee" on Justia Law

Khedr v. Superior Court

2026-07-13T14:33:34-08:00

Two individuals, who were part-time police officers, submitted claims against a police protection district and associated personnel, alleging retaliation and harassment following their whistleblowing activities related to fiscal mismanagement and conflicts of interest involving a former police commissioner and chief of police. Their claim forms described various acts of misconduct but, instead of specifying when these actions occurred, stated that the “loss is ongoing” and provided no date or date range for the alleged conduct. The Superior Court of San Mateo County reviewed the claims and found them deficient for failing to comply with California Government Code section 910, which requires that a claim state the “date, place and other circumstances of the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted.” Despite being notified of the deficiency and given an opportunity to provide date information, the petitioners did not amend their claims. The trial court sustained demurrers filed by the district and other defendants, concluding the forms neither complied nor substantially complied with the statutory requirements, and denied leave to amend for several causes of action. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the trial court’s orders after the petitioners sought writ relief. The appellate court held that claim forms stating only “Numerous—Loss is ongoing” without any specific dates or date ranges do not satisfy section 910’s requirements, nor do they substantially comply. The court emphasized that even in cases of continuing or ongoing misconduct, claimants must provide at least some date or date range to allow the public entity to investigate the claim. The petition for writ of mandate was denied, and the appellate court affirmed that the trial court correctly sustained the demurrers without leave to amend. View "Khedr v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

P. v. Miranda

2026-07-13T14:33:33-08:00

The case involves an individual who broke the windows of a parked vehicle at a grocery store in Monrovia and entered the driver’s seat. The owner of the vehicle had kept a long knife under the seat for protection. After fleeing the scene, the individual was observed by police carrying a scooter, complied initially with commands, but then removed a knife from his waistband, dropped it, and ran before eventually being apprehended. The knife was 14 inches long with an eight-inch blade. Following these events, the Los Angeles County Superior Court charged the individual with felony vandalism and carrying a concealed dirk or dagger, with additional allegations regarding the amount of property damage and prior criminal conduct. A jury found the individual guilty on both counts and found true the allegation of damages exceeding $400. The court dismissed certain sentencing allegations and imposed a total sentence of two years in county jail. The defendant filed a timely appeal challenging both the constitutionality of California Penal Code section 21310, which prohibits carrying a concealed dirk or dagger, and the sentencing decision. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that Penal Code section 21310 is constitutional under the Second Amendment. Applying the framework set out in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, the court found that bans on carrying concealed dirks or daggers are consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of arms regulation. The court also determined that the defendant forfeited his sentencing challenge by failing to object at the time of sentencing, in accordance with California procedural law. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "P. v. Miranda" on Justia Law

Millrace Condo. v. Shapiro Sher etc., PA

2026-07-13T06:08:27-08:00

A group of homeowners and their associations opposed amendments to a planned unit development in Baltimore City, actively communicating their disapproval to the Planning Commission. After the Commission approved the amendments, the developer filed suit against the homeowners and associations, seeking damages and alleging breach of contract and tortious interference. The homeowners and associations, believing the suit to be a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP), moved to dismiss under Maryland’s anti-SLAPP statute, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-807. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City found the lawsuit was a SLAPP and dismissed it, and the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the dismissal, citing evidence that the suit was intended to deter the homeowners from exercising their rights. Two years after the Appellate Court affirmed the SLAPP dismissal, the homeowners and associations filed a class action for malicious use of process against the developer, its law firm, and its attorney. They alleged unique injuries, including emotional distress, intimidation, diminished property values, and burdensome discovery demands. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City dismissed the suit, concluding that the plaintiffs had not pleaded the “special injury” required for malicious use of process. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed, holding that the alleged injuries were typical of litigation and not “special” as required by Maryland law. The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for malicious use of process because they did not plead a special injury. The Court clarified that litigation expenses, temporary property value diminution, emotional distress, and chilling of constitutional rights are not special injuries under Maryland law. The Court also declined to adopt a rule that victims of a SLAPP inherently satisfy the special-injury requirement. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court. View "Millrace Condo. v. Shapiro Sher etc., PA" on Justia Law

Del Biaggio v. Bansen

2026-07-10T11:34:27-08:00

A contract between two parties provided for a succession plan at a dairy farm, outlining salary, livestock transfers, and an option to lease the farm. After four years, the party working at the dairy claimed not to have received all payments and livestock owed, resulting in a lawsuit for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion. A jury awarded damages to the plaintiff but did not specify which claims were the basis for the award. The plaintiff then sought to recover attorney fees and paralegal fees under a contractual provision. The Superior Court of Humboldt County found the plaintiff to be the prevailing party and awarded attorney fees but significantly reduced the compensable hours and, on its own initiative, excluded all paralegal fees, finding the contract did not authorize their recovery. When the plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the paralegal fee exclusion, the court denied the motion and ordered the plaintiff’s attorney to pay the defendants’ fees for opposing it, treating the motion as procedurally improper. The defendants also sought appellate sanctions, arguing the appeal was frivolous and that the plaintiff’s opening brief contained misrepresentations, including fabricated case law quotations. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, affirmed the trial court’s reduction of attorney hours, finding no abuse of discretion. However, it reversed the categorical exclusion of paralegal fees, holding that the contractual language allowing recovery of “attorneys’ fees” encompasses reasonable paralegal fees. The appellate court also vacated the sanctions imposed for the reconsideration motion, finding that the motion was procedurally permitted and not frivolous. While the court declined to sanction the appeal as frivolous, it ordered the plaintiff’s attorney to pay sanctions to the court for submitting a brief with fabricated legal quotations. The case was remanded for the trial court to determine reasonable paralegal fees. View "Del Biaggio v. Bansen" on Justia Law

Dmarcian, Inc. v. Millen

2026-07-10T10:30:53-08:00

A North Carolina software company initiated a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina against its former business partner, a Dutch entity, after their business relationship dissolved. The plaintiff alleged copyright and trademark infringement, misappropriation of trade secrets, and various state law violations. Shortly after the complaint, the plaintiff obtained a preliminary injunction limiting the defendant’s business activities. Meanwhile, the defendant commenced related litigation in the Netherlands. During those Dutch proceedings, the defendant’s American attorney, Pressly Millen, submitted an affidavit that the plaintiff claimed misrepresented the scope and timing of the U.S. litigation. The Dutch court initially denied the plaintiff’s request to stay the Dutch proceedings, partly relying on representations from the defendant’s counsel. The plaintiff returned to the North Carolina court, seeking an order requiring the defendant to correct these alleged misrepresentations in the Dutch court. The district court ordered the defendant to submit both its order and a corrective statement to the Dutch court. The defendant submitted the order but did not file the separate corrective statement. Later, the Dutch court stayed its proceedings. The plaintiff then moved for contempt sanctions in the North Carolina court against the defendant and its attorneys for failing to comply fully with the correction order. Following a show cause hearing, the district court held the defendant and Millen in civil contempt, sanctioning Millen by suspending his ability to practice in the district, though not holding him jointly liable for monetary sanctions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that it had jurisdiction to review the contempt order against Millen, a nonparty. The appellate court held that the district court abused its discretion by imposing civil contempt sanctions on Millen without clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff was harmed by Millen’s failure to submit the separate statement. The court vacated the civil contempt adjudication and sanction against Millen. View "Dmarcian, Inc. v. Millen" on Justia Law

Dmarcian, Inc. v. DMARC Advisor BV

2026-07-10T10:30:53-08:00

An American software company based in North Carolina and a Dutch company entered into a business relationship that later soured. The American company alleged that the Dutch company stole its brand name, software code, and customer base. The Dutch company operated a website nearly identical to the American company’s, using its name, logo, and marketing materials, and targeted American customers, even convincing at least one U.S. company to switch providers. Disputes between the parties also led to reciprocal lawsuits in both the United States and the Netherlands, with overlapping subject matter. The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina initially issued a preliminary injunction against the Dutch company, finding the American company was likely to succeed on its copyright, trademark, trade secret, and tortious interference claims. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic International, Inc. altered the standard for the extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act, the district court modified its injunction to comply with the new “conduct-focused” approach and dismissed the copyright claim. The district court also ordered the Dutch company to correct statements made to the Dutch court and later held the company in civil contempt for failing to comply fully, imposing a monetary sanction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. Applying the Supreme Court’s new guidance from Abitron, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the second amended preliminary injunction, holding that the Dutch company’s conduct constituted infringing use in U.S. commerce under the Lanham Act, and that the Defend Trade Secrets Act’s express extraterritorial provision was satisfied by acts in furtherance of misappropriation occurring in the United States. The court dismissed the appeals from the correction and contempt orders for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Dmarcian, Inc. v. DMARC Advisor BV" on Justia Law

Estate Of O'Farrell v. O'Farrell

2026-07-10T07:22:01-08:00

The case involves a dispute among members of the O’Farrell family and related entities regarding farmland, family trusts, and a sale of land to a third-party corporation. Paul O’Farrell, having longstanding involvement with the family land and farming operations, brought a lawsuit naming himself, his estate, and Skyline Cattle Company as plaintiffs. He asserted claims for declaratory relief, rescission of a land sale to Grand Valley Hutterian Brethren, Inc., and damages for alleged torts. Paul argued he was acting not only in his individual capacity but also on behalf of the Estate of Victoria O’Farrell, VOR, Inc., and the Raymond and Victoria O’Farrell Living Trust, based on allegations of undue influence and mismanagement involving his brother Kelly and his father Raymond. The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, Grant County, South Dakota, previously granted summary judgment for the defendants, dismissing VOR and the Estate as plaintiffs on the grounds that Paul lacked authority to act on their behalf. The court also denied Paul’s request to conduct further discovery under Rule 56(f), his motion to amend the complaint, and his request for a physical and mental examination of Raymond under Rule 35(a). The court additionally awarded attorney fees to certain defendants, finding Paul’s action frivolous. The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment, agreeing that Paul lacked authority to sue on behalf of VOR and the Estate and could not seek rescission of the land sale as he was not a party to the contract. The Supreme Court also affirmed the denial of additional discovery. However, it vacated the circuit court’s denial of the motion to amend the complaint (insofar as it prevented joining VOR and Raymond as defendants), the denial of the Rule 35(a) examination, and the award of attorney fees, finding those decisions either premature or not sufficiently supported by the record. View "Estate Of O'Farrell v. O'Farrell" on Justia Law

Leo Investments Hong Kong Limited v. Tomales Bay Capital Anduril III, L.P.

2026-07-10T07:03:02-08:00

A China-based company sought to invest indirectly in SpaceX by becoming a limited partner in a Delaware fund, despite SpaceX’s preferences against China-based investors and public disclosure. The fund’s principal allowed the company’s investment and negotiated disclosure terms, which the company followed. The disclosure, accompanied by a press release, attracted significant media attention. When SpaceX learned of the investment through the media, it objected and refused to allow the fund to purchase its shares with the company as a partner. To appease SpaceX, the fund’s principal initially asked the company to withdraw voluntarily, but ultimately removed it unilaterally. The company’s investment was returned, and the fund later purchased SpaceX shares at a higher price. The company sued the fund, its general partner, and the principal in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty and the partnership agreement. At summary judgment, the court held that the company’s disclosure was permitted. After trial, it found that the company had not proved breach of loyalty or care, applying the business judgment rule. However, it found a breach of the “duty of candor” in communications surrounding the forced withdrawal, awarding nominal damages and nearly $16 million in attorneys’ fees. Both sides appealed some rulings. The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware affirmed the Court of Chancery’s application of the business judgment rule and its finding of no breach of loyalty or care, as well as its interpretation of the forum-selection clause. It also affirmed the nominal damages award for the breach of the duty to communicate honestly. However, it reversed the award of attorneys’ fees, holding that fee-shifting was not warranted under the circumstances where the plaintiff prevailed only on a minor issue and failed to prove causation or damages. View "Leo Investments Hong Kong Limited v. Tomales Bay Capital Anduril III, L.P." on Justia Law

Rey v. LCMC Health Care Partners

2026-07-09T15:30:33-08:00

Five individuals residing near a New Orleans hospital brought suit after the hospital moved its helicopter landing pad from a one-story building near the Mississippi River to the top of a new tower in the center of the hospital complex. The plaintiffs, claiming that the new helipad created excessive noise and vibrations, sought a mandatory injunction requiring the hospital to relocate the helipad or otherwise abate the disturbance, as well as damages for nuisance and negligence. The defendants removed the case from state court to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ request to remand the case to state court, finding that their subsequent removal of class-action allegations and request to decline supplemental jurisdiction amounted to improper forum shopping. The district court then granted the defendants partial summary judgment, holding that Federal Aviation Administration regulations preempted any permanent injunction to relocate the helipad. The court also dismissed some of the plaintiffs’ claims for damages, but allowed their claims for general nuisance damages to proceed to trial. Before trial, the plaintiffs appealed the order, seeking review of the denial of their request for an injunction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal because the district court’s order did not explicitly deny an injunction and, even if it had the practical effect of denying injunctive relief, the plaintiffs did not show that they satisfied the requirements for interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) and Carson v. American Brands, Inc. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Rey v. LCMC Health Care Partners" on Justia Law

Juneau Group v. Vendera Management

2026-07-09T15:30:33-08:00

A Louisiana limited liability company (LLC) with a sole member voluntarily dissolved in April 2024 and subsequently had its Texas registration terminated in May 2024. Prior to dissolution, the LLC had developed a bid strategy for certain oilfield assets and shared confidential information with a bank to seek financing. The assets were ultimately acquired by a different bidder, also financed by the same bank, and the LLC alleged that its confidential information was improperly conveyed to the winning bidder. After dissolution, the LLC initiated a lawsuit in July 2024 against the bank and the winning bidder, asserting trade secret misappropriation and breach of contract. In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, the defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing the LLC lacked capacity to sue due to its prior dissolution. The LLC did not contest its lack of capacity but requested a stay while it sought reinstatement in Louisiana state court. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings for lack of capacity, denied the LLC’s request for a stay, and denied the defendants’ request to seek attorneys’ fees. The court also sealed various filings relating to the mental health of the LLC’s sole member. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s judgment on the pleadings, holding that under Texas law, an entity dissolved prior to suit lacks capacity to file suit, and that Louisiana law does not permit retroactive reinstatement of an LLC dissolved by affidavit to pursue claims known before dissolution but filed after. The Fifth Circuit denied the LLC’s request to certify a question to the Louisiana Supreme Court and affirmed the denial of attorneys’ fees. However, it vacated the district court’s sealing order, remanding for proper balancing of the public’s right of access to court records, as required by precedent. View "Juneau Group v. Vendera Management" on Justia Law

Mutual Fund Opt-Out Plaintiffs v. Calamari

2026-07-09T07:00:03-08:00

Investors, referred to as the Opt-Out Plaintiffs, brought state court actions against Quasar Distributors, LLC, the underwriter of a collapsed mutual fund, after choosing not to participate in a class action settlement following the fund’s collapse. The collapse was caused by fraudulent inflation of asset values by the fund’s adviser, resulting in substantial losses. The Securities and Exchange Commission initiated a federal action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which oversaw the distribution of the remaining assets of the fund, known as the Special Reserve, through a court-appointed Special Master. While the class action settlement in New York state court resolved claims against several parties without drawing from the Special Reserve, the Opt-Out Plaintiffs pursued separate state law claims against Quasar and others. The District Court entered an order staying litigation, later amended to permit certain claims, but ultimately issued a permanent injunction against the Opt-Out Plaintiffs' state court actions against Quasar. The court reasoned that permitting these actions would create indemnification obligations for the fund, potentially depleting the Special Reserve and undermining its equitable distribution. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed whether the injunction was permissible under the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. The court held that the “in aid of jurisdiction” exception to the Act—which generally applies only to actions involving control over a specific property or res—did not justify enjoining the Opt-Out Plaintiffs’ state court in personam actions against Quasar. The court found that the Opt-Out Plaintiffs’ claims did not threaten federal jurisdiction over the Special Reserve, and the narrow exception recognized in In re Baldwin-United Corp. did not apply. Accordingly, the Second Circuit vacated the injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mutual Fund Opt-Out Plaintiffs v. Calamari" on Justia Law

Egan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

2026-07-09T06:11:23-08:00

Frank Egan brought claims alleging injury from asbestos exposure against Union Carbide Corporation and others. In an earlier lawsuit, Egan had asserted similar claims against Union Carbide, but those claims were dismissed without prejudice by stipulation. Egan then filed a new suit raising the same type of allegations, contending that the defendants placed asbestos into the stream of commerce, causing his injuries. Union Carbide, a corporation organized under New York law with its principal place of business in Texas, responded that North Dakota courts lacked personal jurisdiction over it and raised this defense in its answer. The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, granted Union Carbide’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court found Union Carbide did not have sufficient contacts with North Dakota to justify exercising personal jurisdiction. Egan argued that Union Carbide had waived this defense by not raising it in the prior litigation and that the company’s business registration in North Dakota constituted consent to jurisdiction, but the district court rejected these arguments. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that merely registering to do business in North Dakota does not amount to consent to general personal jurisdiction, as North Dakota law explicitly states that such registration alone is insufficient. The court further held that a defendant does not waive a personal jurisdiction defense by failing to raise it in an earlier case that was dismissed without prejudice. Finally, the act of negotiating a dismissal in the earlier litigation did not amount to the purposeful availment required by due process for establishing personal jurisdiction. Thus, the judgment dismissing Egan’s claims against Union Carbide was affirmed. View "Egan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In Re Axsome Therapeutics, Inc. Stockholder Derivative Litigation

2026-07-09T06:03:34-08:00

Axsome Therapeutics, Inc., a biopharmaceutical company, developed AXS-07, an experimental migraine treatment. Beginning in late 2019, Axsome and its officers made public statements about AXS-07’s regulatory prospects and estimated filing dates for FDA approval, which plaintiffs allege were false and misleading because they omitted significant manufacturing and control deficiencies. Throughout 2020 and 2021, Axsome repeatedly delayed the expected FDA filing date for AXS-07. In April 2022, Axsome disclosed that the FDA had identified unresolved issues, causing its stock price to drop. After these disclosures, Axsome faced related litigation in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, including a securities class action and derivative lawsuits. The Securities Action was ultimately settled in 2026. The federal derivative suits were consolidated and stayed during the securities litigation. Meanwhile, in April and May 2025, plaintiffs in this Delaware action sent Section 220 books and records demands to Axsome, seeking company documents before filing suit. Axsome produced documents in September 2025, and the plaintiffs then filed this derivative lawsuit in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware. The Court of Chancery ruled that the plaintiffs’ claims were untimely under the doctrine of laches, applying Delaware’s three-year statute of limitations by analogy. The court held that the claims accrued by April 22, 2022, at the latest, and that neither the late and informally served Section 220 demands nor the existence of federal litigation tolled or excused the delay. The Court of Chancery concluded that the mere transmission of books and records demands did not suspend the limitations period, found no extraordinary circumstances to rebut the presumption of prejudice, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice as time-barred. View "In Re Axsome Therapeutics, Inc. Stockholder Derivative Litigation" on Justia Law

Davis v. City of Elgin, Illinois

2026-07-09T06:00:46-08:00

After threatening his ex-wife and her nephew with what appeared to be a firearm while intoxicated, an individual left his home and fell asleep at a neighbor’s house. Police were alerted, and, believing him to be inside and armed, surrounded the residence with S.W.A.T. teams and other tactical units. Negotiators eventually reached him by phone, during which he threatened self-harm and was reported to have threatened the officers, though he denied threatening the officers directly. When he exited the house, police fired non-lethal projectiles after he refused commands to come off the porch, seriously injuring his arm. After briefly retreating indoors, he reemerged and was shot three more times with similar ammunition when he acted aggressively and shouted threats at the officers. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted summary judgment in favor of the officers and the City, holding that the plaintiff failed to show the police violated clearly established constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment. The district court distinguished the facts of this case from prior circuit precedent, including Phillips v. Community Insurance Corp., and found that the officers’ actions did not clearly contravene established law. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the summary judgment ruling de novo. The appellate court held that qualified immunity shielded the officers because no binding precedent placed the unconstitutionality of their specific actions beyond debate, given the circumstances—namely, threats involving firearms and knives and the plaintiff’s aggressive behavior. The court also noted that the plaintiff failed to articulate a viable claim against the City of Elgin. The Seventh Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for all defendants. View "Davis v. City of Elgin, Illinois" on Justia Law

Cowan v. Slann

2026-07-09T05:42:15-08:00

A patient filed a medical malpractice action after a surgery was performed on her uninjured foot instead of her injured foot. The surgeon settled and was dismissed from the case prior to trial, and the case against the hospital proceeded to a jury trial. The jury awarded the patient substantial economic and noneconomic damages, apportioning 65% of the fault to the hospital and 35% to the surgeon. The hospital moved to reduce the noneconomic damages to the statutory cap, and the patient challenged the constitutionality of this cap. The District Court of Williams County held that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages was constitutional and reduced the noneconomic damages accordingly. The court apportioned fault and entered an amended judgment in favor of the patient, reflecting the statutory cap and including interest and costs. The hospital paid the full amount of the amended judgment, and the patient accepted payment and filed a satisfaction of judgment, though the satisfaction did not strictly comply with statutory requirements. Later, the patient filed a notice of appeal, challenging the constitutionality of the statutory cap, and the hospital filed a conditional cross-appeal regarding allocation of damages. The Supreme Court of North Dakota determined that by accepting full payment of the amended judgment and filing a satisfaction—without reserving any right to appeal—the patient waived her right to appeal. The court clarified that in non-divorce cases, voluntarily accepting the full amount of a judgment without expressly preserving any appellate issues constitutes waiver of the right to appeal. As a result, both the patient’s appeal and the hospital’s cross-appeal were dismissed. The court expressly abrogated any contrary rule suggested by the earlier decision in Tyler v. Shea, 4 N.D. 377, 61 N.W. 468 (1894). View "Cowan v. Slann" on Justia Law

Damak v. Super. Ct.

2026-07-08T13:32:44-08:00

In this case, an individual sued several defendants over employment issues at a motel, including wage and hour violations, improper meal and rest breaks, retaliation, and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff, acting without an attorney and having received a fee waiver, served extensive discovery requests on the defendants. Despite confirming receipt of the discovery documents, the defendants and their counsel failed to respond or communicate over a period of months. The plaintiff repeatedly attempted to follow up and warned that he would seek sanctions if no response was forthcoming. Ultimately, after more than five months without any discovery responses or communication, the plaintiff filed motions to compel compliance and requested monetary sanctions of at least $1,000 for each motion. The Superior Court of Orange County granted the motions to compel, ordering defendants to comply with discovery. However, it denied the requests for monetary sanctions, reasoning that the relevant statutes only permitted sanctions for "reasonable expenses actually incurred," and since the plaintiff was self-represented and had a fee waiver, he had not shown any actual expenses. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case through a writ of mandate. The court held that the trial court was correct to focus on whether expenses were incurred under certain Discovery Act provisions, consistent with longstanding statutory language and case law. However, it found the lower court erred by failing to consider section 2023.050 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which requires a mandatory $1,000 sanction for certain discovery abuses related to document production, regardless of whether the opposing party incurred expenses. The appellate court granted the petition in part, directing the trial court to reconsider the monetary sanctions requests in light of section 2023.050, and denied the petition in other respects. View "Damak v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

SHAW v. SHAW

2026-07-08T10:04:13-08:00

A dispute arose over ownership of a lakeside property in Sandpoint, Idaho, after Rhoda Shaw quitclaimed her interest in the property to her son, Bobby Shaw, in September 2021. Rhoda, elderly and experiencing cognitive issues, lived part-time in Arizona and Idaho. Her daughter, Cynthia Shaw Beck, later learned of the transfer and, concerned about Rhoda’s capacity, petitioned for and was appointed Rhoda’s guardian and conservator in Arizona in March 2022. Acting in that capacity, Cynthia filed a quiet title action and related claims in Bonner County, Idaho, seeking to invalidate the transfer to Bobby, alleging Rhoda lacked capacity and asserting fraud, and later attempted to add claims for undue influence and tortious interference. The Superior Court of Arizona, Cochise County, had already established Cynthia as Rhoda’s guardian and conservator, and subsequently issued orders retroactively determining Rhoda’s incapacity as predating the property transfer. Cynthia repeatedly sought to have the Idaho District Court either stay its proceedings or accept the Arizona court’s retroactive findings regarding Rhoda’s capacity as controlling. The District Court of the First Judicial District of Idaho denied these motions, finding that the Idaho litigation directly concerned the conveyance of Idaho property and that the Arizona guardianship proceeding did not address this specific issue. The Idaho court also denied Cynthia’s late motion to amend her complaint to add new claims and parties, citing undue delay and prejudice to defendants. The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the appeal and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the Arizona guardianship court’s jurisdiction did not preclude Idaho courts from adjudicating the quiet title action concerning Idaho real property. The Idaho district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to stay the case or enforce the Arizona court’s retroactive order, nor in denying Cynthia’s untimely motion to amend her complaint. No attorney fees were awarded on appeal, but costs were granted to respondents. View "SHAW v. SHAW" on Justia Law

Abdulla v. Progressive Southeastern Insurance Company

2026-07-08T05:00:03-08:00

A commercial truck driver was injured in an accident while operating a tractor-trailer in Missouri. The tractor was registered in Michigan and titled to a limited liability company (LLC) solely owned by the plaintiff, while the trailer was owned by a different LLC. Under a lease agreement, the plaintiff’s LLC leased the tractor to the other LLC, and the plaintiff exclusively operated the tractor. Insurance coverage for the tractor was provided by a policy that excluded personal protection insurance (PIP) when the vehicle was used to transport cargo, and the other LLC’s insurance did not cover PIP for the tractor. The plaintiff, who lived with his parents in Michigan, was not a named insured on his father’s auto policy, nor was the tractor listed as a covered vehicle. After the accident, the plaintiff sued several insurers, arguing that one of them should provide PIP benefits under Michigan’s no-fault act. The Wayne Circuit Court denied summary disposition to one insurer and dismissed others from the case. On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, finding insufficient evidence to classify the plaintiff as the tractor’s owner or registrant. It ruled that the plaintiff’s claim for PIP benefits was not barred and that his father’s insurer was the highest priority insurer. The Michigan Supreme Court, in reviewing the case, held that the plaintiff was an “owner” of the tractor under MCL 500.3101(3)(l)(i) because he had the right to use the vehicle in a manner consistent with ownership for more than 30 days. The Court found that his exclusive, regular use and control of the tractor, as the sole member and agent of the LLC, satisfied the statutory definition of ownership. Because he failed to maintain the required insurance, the plaintiff was excluded from recovering PIP benefits under MCL 500.3113. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court. View "Abdulla v. Progressive Southeastern Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Center for Bio Diversity v. TRAN

2026-07-07T15:30:30-08:00

Delfin LNG sought approval to construct and operate a deepwater liquefied natural gas export facility in the Gulf of America, consisting of onshore infrastructure in Louisiana and floating offshore vessels. The Maritime Administration (MARAD), after extensive environmental review and public comment, initially approved the project in 2017. Over subsequent years, Delfin altered key aspects of the project, including its design and financing. MARAD determined these changes required further review and asked Delfin to submit an amended application, which Delfin did not do. In 2025, following a presidential executive order, MARAD concluded that the modifications would not cause significantly different environmental impacts and issued the license. Three environmental organizations challenged MARAD’s decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. They argued MARAD violated the Deepwater Port Act by not requiring an amended application and additional public comment, the National Environmental Policy Act by not preparing a supplemental environmental impact statement, and the Administrative Procedure Act by issuing a license after finding the prior approval was insufficient. They requested the court vacate MARAD’s licensing decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that none of the petitioners demonstrated Article III standing. The court held that the organizations failed to identify a member who suffered a concrete and particularized injury fairly traceable to MARAD’s licensing decision. The declarations submitted did not show a personal and project-specific harm, nor did they establish a sufficient geographic nexus to the affected area. As a result, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits and denied the petition for review. The main holding is that, in the absence of standing, the court cannot reach the substantive environmental or procedural claims. View "Center for Bio Diversity v. TRAN" on Justia Law

Hernandez v. Blanche

2026-07-07T13:30:03-08:00

The plaintiff worked for over twenty years in various administrative roles for the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in Puerto Rico, eventually becoming Secretary to the Assistant Special Agent in Charge. In 2016, after suffering a foot injury, she requested workplace accommodations, some of which were denied. She filed an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging discrimination based on disability and national origin. Subsequently, other DEA agents filed an EEO complaint against her, and she filed a retaliation complaint with the Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General. A series of workplace conflicts followed, including a verbal altercation, revocation of outside work permission, and eventual suspension. After further absence and issues with communication with supervisors, she was reassigned to another office. An internal investigation led to her termination for insubordination and alleged lack of candor. She appealed her termination to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), arguing it was retaliatory and unsupported by evidence. The MSPB found no lack of candor, but upheld the insubordination charge and her termination. She then sought judicial review in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, which denied her discovery motions and granted summary judgment to the government, finding no prima facie case of retaliation and holding that the MSPB’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s rulings. The court held that the denial of the plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) motion for additional discovery was not an abuse of discretion, as she did not show good cause for her delay. On the merits, the court concluded that the MSPB’s finding of insubordination was supported by substantial evidence and that the plaintiff failed to show the employer’s stated reasons for termination were pretext for retaliation under Title VII. View "Hernandez v. Blanche" on Justia Law

Barrier v. USA

2026-07-07T09:30:38-08:00

A federal employee, Robert Duran, who held a full-time union leadership position with the National Border Patrol Council (NBPC), struck Tami Barrier with his vehicle while exiting a United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) station in Del Rio, Texas. Duran was leaving the station to collect pandemic-related supplies donated for CBP agents, a task requested by another union leader. The supplies were intended for distribution among multiple Border Patrol stations. Duran’s work entailed both union responsibilities and CBP overtime hours, and there was ambiguity regarding whether he was on duty at the time of the incident. Video evidence and timesheets provided conflicting accounts of his work hours, and there was dispute over whether collecting the supplies was a personal favor or part of his union duties. The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judgment to the Government, finding that Duran was not acting within the course and scope of his employment when the incident occurred. The court concluded that the errand was not a CBP task and was not performed under CBP’s authority, so the United States could not be held vicariously liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that genuine disputes of material fact existed regarding whether Duran was acting within the scope of his employment under Texas law, including whether he was performing a “special mission” for CBP at the time. The court determined that a reasonable jury could find Duran’s actions benefited CBP and were performed with its implied approval. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Barrier v. USA" on Justia Law

Reagan Marine Construction, LLC v. Costa

2026-07-07T08:17:35-08:00

A general contractor hired a subcontractor to perform electrical work on a marina expansion project in Bristol, Rhode Island. The subcontract specified that time was critical and required timely written notice of delays, as well as an indemnification clause. After the parties negotiated an expanded scope of work and the general contractor paid a deposit, the subcontractor failed to meet the estimated completion schedule and did not provide required delay notices. As a result, the town threatened to terminate the general contract. The general contractor then terminated the subcontract and hired a replacement. The contractor sued the subcontractor and its CEO in Providence County Superior Court, alleging breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and conversion, and sought damages and attorney’s fees. The defendants answered and asserted affirmative defenses. After repeated failures to comply with discovery orders and to retain new counsel following their attorney’s withdrawal, the Superior Court issued conditional orders of default, giving the defendants multiple opportunities to comply. When they did not, the court entered a default judgment for the contractor, including damages, costs, prejudgment interest, and attorney’s fees. The CEO appeared at some hearings but not others, raising concerns about notice and service, which were addressed by the trial justice, who instructed him to file a Rule 60 motion to vacate the default if he wished to contest notice. No such motion was filed. Both sides subsequently filed motions with the Rhode Island Supreme Court relating to remand and post-judgment relief. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed whether the trial justice abused discretion in entering the default judgment. It held that the defendants’ failure to file a Rule 60 motion or properly raise notice issues in the lower court precluded appellate review of those issues. The Court found no abuse of discretion in the entry of default and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The imposition of a cash bond as a condition for remand did not violate due process. View "Reagan Marine Construction, LLC v. Costa" on Justia Law

Chishti v. Spottiswoode

2026-07-07T07:32:04-08:00

Zia Chishti, formerly CEO of a technology company, and his wife brought claims against Tatiana Spottiswoode, her attorneys, and related parties. Chishti and Spottiswoode had a prior romantic relationship, and Spottiswoode was later employed by Chishti’s company under an arbitration agreement. In 2017, Spottiswoode accused Chishti of harassment and assault, leading to confidential arbitration, which resulted in an arbitral award in her favor. Years later, Spottiswoode was subpoenaed to testify before Congress about forced arbitration in sexual assault cases, where she recounted her experiences involving Chishti. After her testimony, Spottiswoode and her attorney made public statements to the media and on social media regarding the matter. Chishti alleged these statements were defamatory and part of a campaign to damage his reputation, causing him to resign from his executive roles. His wife also claimed loss of consortium. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court found that Spottiswoode’s statements before Congress were protected by legislative privilege under District of Columbia law, and that the post-hearing public statements were protected opinions or shielded by the fair reporting privilege and the First Amendment. The court also concluded that the other tort claims were duplicative of defamation, that the conspiracy and loss of consortium claims failed without a viable underlying tort, and that the breach of contract claims were barred by privilege or insufficiently pleaded. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The appellate court held that witness statements to Congress and related communications were absolutely privileged under District of Columbia law. It further held that post-hearing statements were protected as opinion or by fair reporting, and that related tort and contract claims failed for lack of an actionable underlying claim. The dismissal with prejudice was affirmed. View "Chishti v. Spottiswoode" on Justia Law

Angelo v. DC

2026-07-07T07:32:03-08:00

Several individuals who hold concealed-carry pistol licenses issued by the District of Columbia challenged a local law prohibiting licensed carriers from possessing firearms on public transportation, including the Metro system. Fearing prosecution if they carried their pistols on the Metro, these plaintiffs avoided using public transit and instead paid for more expensive private transportation. They alleged that this criminal statute violated their Second and Fifth Amendment rights and sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief against the District and several officials in both their official and personal capacities. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially denied the plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief, citing circuit precedent that required them to demonstrate a special law enforcement priority or heightened risk of prosecution. When the plaintiffs amended their complaint to include allegations of increased transportation costs and added defendants, the District Court dismissed the case for lack of standing. Specifically, it found the plaintiffs had not alleged facts indicating a credible and imminent threat of prosecution, and it rejected their economic injury as insufficient for standing. The court also dismissed damages claims against individual defendants, which plaintiffs abandoned. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the plaintiffs had standing for their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against all defendants (except one official capacity claim not appealed), as well as for damages against the District, because their ongoing economic injury—incurred by complying with the Metro Ban—constituted a concrete, imminent, and traceable harm. The Court affirmed the dismissal of damages claims against individual defendants, reversed the dismissal of the remaining claims, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Angelo v. DC" on Justia Law

Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund v. M & K Employee Solutions

2026-07-07T07:32:02-08:00

A group of affiliated truck dealerships in the Midwest operated through a complex structure of multiple limited liability companies. Each dealership location had a “Sales” company that owned assets and an “Employee Solutions” (ES) company that hired employees and leased them to the Sales company. The ES companies entered collective-bargaining agreements requiring pension contributions to a union fund. Over time, the ES companies stopped contributing and employing workers, transferring employees to newly created entities. One of the companies, ES Alsip, incurred withdrawal liability for ceasing contributions. The pension fund assessed over $6 million in liability, which was disputed and partially paid following an arbitration that substantially reduced the amount. Ultimately, higher courts reinstated the original liability. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to the pension fund, holding that ES Summit was liable for delinquent contributions for work performed at another dealership, ES Alsip’s withdrawal liability was properly calculated and subject to an increased interest rate, and that multiple affiliated entities and individuals were jointly and severally liable for the obligations. The court also imposed liability on successors and individual owners, the Bouchers, based on their house-flipping activities. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the delinquent-contribution claim against ES Summit was not adequately pleaded and reversed summary judgment on that issue. It affirmed the allocation of a partial payment to interest rather than principal, but reversed the application of an increased interest rate retroactively. The court affirmed the finding that each Sales entity was a single employer with its corresponding ES entity and upheld successor liability against Laborforce and ESI. However, it found genuine disputes of fact regarding the personal liability of the Bouchers and remanded that issue. View "Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund v. M & K Employee Solutions" on Justia Law

Wilbur-Ellis Company v. Gompert

2026-07-07T07:01:21-08:00

Four former employees of an agricultural products and services company resigned and soon after began working for a competitor. The company alleged that these employees breached their duty of loyalty, misappropriated trade secrets in violation of federal and state law, and tortiously interfered with its business relationships. The employees were paid by both companies for a two-week period during the transition. In total, at least eleven employees moved from the plaintiff company to the competitor during the same period. After the company filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska, several discovery disputes arose. The magistrate judge and the district court denied the company’s attempts to obtain discovery from the competitor before seeking discovery from the employees and found the company’s identification of trade secrets to be overly broad and nonspecific. The company’s subsequent motion to compel discovery from the employees was denied on procedural grounds for failing to follow court-ordered procedures, and the district court affirmed this decision. The company also unsuccessfully requested a stay of summary judgment, which the district court denied as untimely. On summary judgment, the district court dismissed most of the company’s claims, finding insufficient evidence to support the trade secrets, tortious interference, and most duty of loyalty claims, but allowed a limited claim regarding dual employment during the two-week period to proceed. The parties later stipulated to dismiss this remaining claim without prejudice. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s orders in full. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its discovery rulings or in denying a stay. It further held that summary judgment was properly granted for the employees on all claims due to the company’s failure to identify specific trade secrets, provide admissible evidence of breach, or substantiate tortious interference. View "Wilbur-Ellis Company v. Gompert" on Justia Law

Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Secord

2026-07-07T05:17:18-08:00

A group sought access to certain court forms used to notify election officials when a person under guardianship has been found incompetent to vote. These forms, known as Notice of Voting Eligibility (NVE) forms, contain personal information about the individual and details about the court’s finding of incompetency. The group submitted public records requests for completed NVE forms held by the Walworth County register in probate, seeking to identify individuals found incompetent to vote. The requests were denied, and the group filed a mandamus action to compel disclosure. The Walworth County Circuit Court denied the request, holding that NVE forms were confidential under Wisconsin law. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals initially reversed, but because of a prior, conflicting published appellate decision (Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Reynolds), the Wisconsin Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration. On remand, the Court of Appeals held it was bound by the Reynolds precedent and affirmed the circuit court’s denial. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case. It clarified the standard for mandamus actions in public records cases, holding that courts should focus solely on whether the requester has a legal right to the records, and not on other traditional mandamus elements. The court concluded that NVE forms are “court records pertinent to the finding of incompetency” and are therefore “closed” under Wisconsin Statute § 54.75, which protects the privacy of individuals in guardianship proceedings. As a result, the forms are exempt from disclosure under the public records law, the group has no legal right to access them, and the writ of mandamus must be denied. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Secord" on Justia Law

State ex rel. Mobley v. Banks

2026-07-07T05:00:57-08:00

An inmate submitted a written request to the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction for four specific records: emails between corrections officers about him, a “Certificate of Disposal,” an “Authorization for Crisis Precaution” form, and a “Mental Health Protocol I-8.” The institution’s public-information officer responded by informing the inmate that the emails and protocol could be provided if he paid the copying costs, the certificate of disposal did not exist, and the authorization-for-crisis-precaution form was not a public record. The inmate did not pay for the copies or inquire about the cost, but instead initiated a mandamus action seeking to compel production of all four records and requesting statutory damages. Prior to review by the Supreme Court of Ohio, the director moved to dismiss the suit. The court denied the motion, ordered an answer from the director, and required submission of the contested authorization-for-crisis-precaution form under seal for in camera review. The parties proceeded to submit evidence and briefs as scheduled. The Supreme Court of Ohio determined that the director had not proven the authorization-for-crisis-precaution form was exempt as a medical record under Ohio law, so the inmate was entitled to that record. However, the court denied the writ as to the emails and protocol, finding the records custodian had complied with the Public Records Act by agreeing to provide them upon advance payment of copying costs; the Act does not require proactive statements of cost. The writ was also denied for the certificate of disposal because the inmate did not prove it existed. The court further denied statutory damages, finding the director’s assertion of the medical-record exemption reasonable and consistent with public policy. The disposition was a grant of the writ in part and denial in part. View "State ex rel. Mobley v. Banks" on Justia Law

Adelanto Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Krause

2026-07-06T11:03:28-08:00

A former superintendent of a California school district, who later became an elected member of the district’s Board of Trustees, was subject to a workplace violence restraining order (WVRO) requested by the district on behalf of three employees. These employees, who worked closely with the superintendent, reported that he engaged in a persistent course of conduct that included angry outbursts, threats of termination, intrusive and inappropriate text messages, stalking behaviors, and unsolicited photographs. The conduct caused substantial emotional distress and fear among the employees, leading them to seek mental health treatment and report his actions to the police. After his termination, the superintendent continued to interact with the employees in ways they perceived as intimidating, including the placement of campaign signs near their homes and the publication of internal documents on social media. The Superior Court of San Bernardino County granted a temporary restraining order and, after a multi-day hearing, issued a WVRO prohibiting the superintendent from harassing, disturbing the peace of, or contacting the three employees. The WVRO imposed restrictions on his proximity to the employees and their workplace, allowed his attendance at board meetings only under specific conditions, and included a provision barring him from commenting on the WVRO at board meetings. The order was set to last four years, subject to early termination if he was no longer associated with the district. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that an employer’s right to seek a WVRO on behalf of employees is unwaivable under Civil Code section 3513, rejected arguments concerning insufficient evidence and violation of parental rights, and found sufficient evidence of a future threat of harassment. However, it determined that the WVRO’s prohibition on comments at board meetings was overbroad and violated First Amendment rights, and that the order’s four-year duration exceeded the statutory maximum. The court modified the order to remove the speech restriction and limit its duration to three years, then affirmed the WVRO as modified. View "Adelanto Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Krause" on Justia Law

Colorado Montana Wyoming State Area Conference of the NAACP v. Smith

2026-07-06T10:31:41-08:00

Following the 2020 presidential election, three individuals—Shawn Smith, Ashley Epp, and Holly Kasun—formed an unincorporated association called the United States Election Integrity Plan (USEIP) to investigate what they believed was widespread election fraud in Colorado. In 2021, USEIP organized volunteers to go door-to-door canvassing, asking voters questions about their voting history and, in some instances, about whom they voted for. The Colorado Montana Wyoming State Area Conference of the NAACP, the League of Women Voters of Colorado, and Mi Familia Vota (collectively, the Voter Organizations) filed suit against USEIP and its founders, alleging that these canvassing activities constituted voter intimidation. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted summary judgment for USEIP, holding that unincorporated associations could not be sued under the statutes invoked: Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. The district court then held a bench trial against the individual defendants. After the plaintiffs presented their case, the district court granted judgment on partial findings for the individuals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c), finding insufficient evidence that any defendant engaged in voter intimidation. The court denied the defendants’ subsequent motion for attorney’s fees. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of USEIP, holding that unincorporated associations can be sued under both Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act and § 1985. The appellate court found that the district court’s exclusion of USEIP significantly narrowed the scope of relevant evidence at trial, affecting the plaintiffs’ substantial rights. The Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for a new trial against all defendants. The related appeal regarding attorney’s fees was dismissed as moot. View "Colorado Montana Wyoming State Area Conference of the NAACP v. Smith" on Justia Law

Compeer Financial, ACA v. Corp. Amer. Lending, Inc.

2026-07-06T07:30:57-08:00

Compeer, a group of federally chartered farm credit associations, entered into a master participation agreement with Corporate America Lending, Inc. (CAL), under which Compeer paid CAL $58 million in exchange for the right to receive all payments due on a set of agricultural loans CAL had originated to Famoso Hills Ranch in California. Under the agreement, CAL was to promptly remit any payments or proceeds received on these loans to Compeer. When Famoso refinanced its loans and paid off the balance to CAL, CAL failed to notify Compeer or transfer the payoff proceeds as required and instead concealed receipt of the funds and withheld them as a negotiation tactic, eventually claiming a right to offset based on alleged damages suffered. Arbitration proceedings commenced, resulting in an award in favor of Compeer, finding it was unconditionally entitled to the payoff proceeds and that CAL had no legal basis to withhold them. The arbitration panel found for Compeer on its claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment. Compeer moved in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota to confirm the award and appoint a receiver to secure the funds. The district court confirmed the arbitration award, finding it final and enforceable, and appointed a receiver due to CAL’s repeated noncompliance and attempts to dissipate the funds. CAL appealed, arguing the award was nonfinal, violated public policy, and the receivership was improper due to a forum-selection clause and lack of necessity. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The court held that the arbitration award was final and confirmable, the public policy exception to vacatur under the Federal Arbitration Act did not require setting aside the award given the alternative equitable bases for Compeer’s recovery, and the district court acted within its discretion in appointing a receiver due to CAL’s conduct and the inadequacy of alternative remedies. View "Compeer Financial, ACA v. Corp. Amer. Lending, Inc." on Justia Law

Idler v. Idler

2026-07-06T07:18:36-08:00

A married couple with ten minor children separated, and the mother filed for divorce. During the marriage, the father engaged in a pattern of severe and chronic domestic violence, which was witnessed and at times experienced by the children. The father pled guilty to several criminal charges, including felony child abuse and domestic violence-related offenses, resulting in incarceration at the time of the divorce proceedings. The mother sought and was awarded sole legal and physical custody of the children. The divorce decree denied the father immediate visitation but established conditions for potential future contact. In dividing the marital property, the mother was awarded the marital home, while the father received the family business and was assigned nearly all marital debt, except for the home’s mortgage and related utilities. The District Court of Crook County held a bench trial and issued a divorce decree reflecting these terms. The father appealed, challenging, among other things, the division of property and debts, the restricted visitation, and aspects of the trial process. In his briefs, the father raised numerous issues but failed to provide developed legal arguments or cite authorities connecting the issues to the facts of his case. The mother responded that the appeal lacked cogent legal argument and requested attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case. Applying longstanding Wyoming law, the court found the father’s briefs did not comply with the requirement to present cogent arguments and pertinent authority. The court summarily affirmed the district court’s decree of divorce, declining to award attorney fees but granting costs to the mother. The main holding is that an appeal may be summarily affirmed when the appellant fails to present cogent argument or relevant authority, as required by the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure. View "Idler v. Idler" on Justia Law

LYTLE VS. SEPTEMBER TRUST, DATED MARCH 23, 1972

2026-07-02T10:07:43-08:00

Several trusts, including the Lytle Trust and September Trust, own homes in a subdivision governed by a property owners association. After the Lytle Trust secured judgments against the association, it attempted to collect from other property owners by recording abstracts of judgment against their homes. September Trust and other property owners sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, resulting in the court striking the abstracts and enjoining the Lytles from enforcing their judgments against the homes. The Lytles later sought to collect through a receivership, prompting September Trust to seek contempt sanctions. The court found the Lytles violated the injunction and held them in contempt, awarding attorney fees to September Trust for defending the contempt judgment. The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County awarded September Trust attorney fees for the contempt proceedings and for defending those awards on appeal. September Trust’s attorneys initially billed at rates of $260-$265 per hour, which the district court used in its first two fee awards. For the third fee award, September Trust requested fees at higher “market” rates, resulting in a substantial markup over the actual fees billed. The district court granted this request, awarding fees calculated at the higher rates. The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the appeal. The court held that, under Nevada’s contempt statute (NRS 22.100(3)), attorney fees awarded as compensation for civil contempt must be both reasonable and actually incurred. For parties with private counsel working at an agreed-upon hourly rate, the actual billing arrangement is a significant, though not necessarily controlling, factor in determining the reasonable fee. Because September Trust did not demonstrate its attorneys charged discounted rates for public-spirited or noneconomic reasons, the court found the higher-than-billed rates unjustified. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s third fee award, remanding for recalculation at the rates actually billed, and affirmed the remainder of the order. View "LYTLE VS. SEPTEMBER TRUST, DATED MARCH 23, 1972" on Justia Law

Doe v. Marysville Joint Unified School Dist.

2026-07-02T09:02:45-08:00

Several individuals who were former students at an elementary school within a California school district alleged that a school counselor sexually assaulted them between 1993 and 2001. These plaintiffs initially filed lawsuits regarding the alleged abuse in California state court, then voluntarily dismissed those actions without prejudice. On the same day as those state court dismissals, they filed a similar action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, alleging both state and federal claims. Before the federal court ruled on the defendant school district’s motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs again voluntarily dismissed the case, this time under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i), designating the dismissal as without prejudice. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a new action in California state court based on the same underlying facts. The school district demurred, arguing that the so-called two-dismissal rule in Federal Rule 41(a)(1)(B)—which states that a plaintiff who twice voluntarily dismisses claims is subject to an adjudication on the merits—operated as a bar to the new state court action. The Yuba County Superior Court agreed, sustaining the district’s demurrer without leave to amend, and entered a judgment of dismissal. The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed in a split decision, holding that the federal procedural rule precluded the state court claims. The Supreme Court of California reversed. The court held that Federal Rule 41(a)(1)(B) is a procedural rule that limits a plaintiff’s ability to refile the same claim in federal court but does not itself create a rule of claim preclusion applicable in state courts. Therefore, a second voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(B) does not bar a subsequent suit on the same state law claims in California state court. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Doe v. Marysville Joint Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

Gibson v. Gibson

2026-07-02T07:11:48-08:00

Delores Gibson created the Gibson Family Limited Partnership (GFLP) to distribute farmland to her children, with herself as general partner and her sons, Michael and Greg Gibson, as equal limited partners. Michael initiated multiple lawsuits regarding GFLP, including claims of breach of fiduciary duty and undue influence. In this third action, Michael alleged that Delores was unduly influenced by Greg and Joan Gibson, challenging a land transaction favoring Greg and implicating Robert Ronayne, an attorney involved in the sale. Michael’s central claim was that Delores lacked capacity, with Greg acting as de facto general partner and violating fiduciary duties. The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, Codington County, reviewed repeated discovery abuses by Michael’s counsel, including improper subpoenas for Delores’s medical records while a motion to quash was pending. The subpoenas failed to comply with the requirements of SDCL 15-6-45 (Rule 45). Michael’s counsel advanced an unsustainable interpretation of Rule 45(b), arguing that unless the court ruled on a motion to quash before the subpoena’s compliance date, he was entitled to the records. The court found that Michael’s counsel disregarded the rules, failed to accept responsibility, and obtained privileged medical records improperly. The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed whether the circuit court erred in dismissing the case as a sanction under Rule 41(b) for failure to comply with the rules of civil procedure. The Court held that Rule 45(b) requires forestalling compliance with subpoenas until the court has acted on a timely motion to quash, and that Michael’s counsel’s conduct constituted an egregious violation justifying dismissal. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal with prejudice and denial of the motion to reconsider. View "Gibson v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Trace Elements, Inc. v. Mackensen

2026-07-02T07:04:28-08:00

A married couple contracted with a design company to oversee renovations to their vacation rental property. After the company ended its work prematurely, the couple sued for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, and the company countersued for breach of contract and tortious interference with a business relationship. Before trial, the couple submitted a proposal for settlement to the company, offering to resolve all claims for a single lump sum. The company rejected this proposal, and after trial, the jury awarded the couple damages on their breach of contract claim. The company received nothing on its counterclaims. Following the verdict, the couple moved for attorney’s fees under section 768.79, Florida Statutes, which allows fees when a plaintiff’s settlement proposal is rejected and the plaintiff prevails by a sufficient margin. The Circuit Court denied their motion, finding the proposal for settlement invalid because it did not allocate the settlement amount separately to each plaintiff, as required by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(c)(3). On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that apportionment was not required for a joint proposal involving a unified, single claim. The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case because the Fourth District’s decision conflicted with the Second District Court of Appeal’s decision in Cobb v. Durando. The Supreme Court held that Rule 1.442(c)(3) requires apportionment for all joint proposals, even those involving a single, unified claim. The Court quashed the Fourth District's decision, approved the Second District’s approach in Cobb, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The holding requires strict compliance with the apportionment requirement in joint proposals for settlement under Florida law. View "Trace Elements, Inc. v. Mackensen" on Justia Law

In re: Stoudmire v. City of Birmingham

2026-07-02T05:30:46-08:00

A motorcyclist suffered severe injuries after crashing on Avenue V in Birmingham due to a defect in the road. He submitted a notice of claim to the City of Birmingham within six months as required by state law and later filed a negligence lawsuit, alleging the City failed to repair the defect after being notified. The key factual dispute involved whether the City had actual or constructive knowledge of the defect prior to the accident. The Jefferson Circuit Court reviewed the case and, after discovery, denied the City’s initial motion for summary judgment. The City later renewed its motion, attaching new evidence and seeking to strike some of the plaintiff’s evidence. The trial court struck several items, including an affidavit, an unsworn witness statement, and a patient-care report, but again denied summary judgment. The City’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting it to petition for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the petition, focusing on whether the City was entitled to municipal immunity. Applying a de novo standard, the court found that the admissible evidence did not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the City had actual or constructive knowledge of the defect. The court held that the plaintiff’s remaining evidence was speculative and insufficient to overcome the City’s prima facie case for immunity. The court granted the City’s petition, issued the writ of mandamus, and directed the trial court to vacate its order denying summary judgment and instead grant summary judgment in favor of the City. View "In re: Stoudmire v. City of Birmingham" on Justia Law

In re: Busby v. City of Tuskegee

2026-07-02T05:30:44-08:00

A group of individuals who had received traffic citations under a local ordinance enacted by the City of Tuskegee permitting automated photographic enforcement of traffic laws brought suit against the City, certain city officials, and JENOPTIK, the company involved in the installation and operation of the enforcement devices. The plaintiffs challenged the validity of the ordinance, raised constitutional concerns, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as damages, including tort claims for negligence, invasion of privacy, and fraud. The City later enacted resolutions cancelling outstanding citations, refunding fines, and ultimately suspending enforcement of the ordinance. The case was initially filed in the Macon Circuit Court. The City and JENOPTIK moved to dismiss, arguing lack of a justiciable controversy, mootness, lack of standing, and other grounds, including lack of personal jurisdiction over JENOPTIK. The trial court denied these motions to dismiss, treating them as motions under Rule 12 and excluding extraneous materials, but did not provide detailed reasoning. On review, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that because the plaintiffs either paid the fines or failed to contest the citations under the administrative procedures provided in the ordinance, and because the City subsequently nullified the citations and provided for reimbursement, their claims challenging the legality of the ordinance were moot. The Court directed the trial court to dismiss those claims. However, the Supreme Court denied the petitions insofar as they sought dismissal of the plaintiffs’ tort claims, holding that the City and JENOPTIK did not demonstrate a clear right to mandamus relief on those claims at this stage. The Court likewise declined to dismiss the tort claims against JENOPTIK for lack of personal jurisdiction based on the current record. View "In re: Busby v. City of Tuskegee" on Justia Law

Spencer v. Vapor Technology Association

2026-07-02T05:30:43-08:00

The plaintiffs, a trade association and a vape shop operator, filed suit challenging an Alabama law regulating electronic nicotine delivery systems (ENDS), which includes e-cigarettes and vapes. The law, effective June 1, 2025, established strict requirements for the sale of ENDS, including a product directory listing only approved products, mandates that products be manufactured in the United States or have federal FDA marketing authorization, and imposed significant penalties for violations. The plaintiffs claimed these regulations would cause them immediate and irreparable harm, including loss of profits, employees, and potential closure of their businesses due to prohibitions and penalties outlined in the law. The Montgomery Circuit Court initially granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) in favor of the plaintiffs, finding they would suffer irreparable harm and had no adequate remedy at law because the State defendants were protected by sovereign immunity. After a hearing, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction but extended the TRO pending appeal. The State defendants appealed, challenging the plaintiffs’ standing, while the plaintiffs cross-appealed the denial of the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed both appeals. It held that the plaintiffs had standing, as they faced concrete, particularized, and actual harm directly resulting from the enforcement of the Alabama law. However, the Court found the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of their constitutional claims, including implied preemption and dormant Commerce Clause challenges. The Court determined that the Alabama Act was not preempted by federal law and served legitimate state interests related to health and safety. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court's denial of the preliminary injunction. View "Spencer v. Vapor Technology Association" on Justia Law

1 Cono Contracting v. Lopez

2026-07-02T05:08:03-08:00

After the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court entered an award against Mauro Rubio and Cono Contracting, LLC in favor of Catarino Lopez, Rubio alleged the award was procured by fraud, irregularity, and was inequitable. Rubio’s attorney withdrew unexpectedly at trial, leaving Rubio unrepresented. Rubio claimed Lopez exaggerated his injuries and sought to vacate the award, citing Nebraska statutory and equitable grounds. The award had been filed in the District Court for Douglas County. Lopez moved to dismiss Rubio’s independent action in the district court, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to vacate the Workers’ Compensation Court’s award, asserting the district court’s authority was limited to enforcement. The district court agreed, finding it had no authority to vacate or modify the compensation court award and that Rubio’s complaint failed to state a claim for relief under § 25-2001. Rubio appealed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals. Prior to briefing, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, reasoning that the district court lacked jurisdiction to vacate the award and, consequently, the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. Rubio’s motion for rehearing was denied. The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the district court had equitable jurisdiction to vacate the compensation court’s award once it had been filed as a judgment in the district court, pursuant to § 48-188. The Court held that the district court’s jurisdiction was not limited to enforcement and that it could entertain an independent action to vacate such an award. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ dismissal and retained the case for further proceedings, allowing briefing on whether Rubio had stated a claim for relief. View "1 Cono Contracting v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Hernandez-Castrodad v. Steidel-Figueroa

2026-07-01T13:00:03-08:00

Plaintiffs had their property taken by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico through eminent domain. They received over two million dollars in compensation, including interest accrued up to the time of payment. However, they alleged a second violation occurred when the court-administered disbursement process failed to notify them of further accrued interest and deducted a 15% administrative fee from that interest. They challenged these practices as unconstitutional takings and violations of due process, seeking declaratory and equitable relief against the Administrator of the Administration of Tribunals. The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico initially dismissed most claims, finding plaintiffs lacked standing because they had not alleged an attempt to withdraw the accrued interest, making their injury speculative. After reconsideration, the court revived the claim challenging the deduction of administrative fees, but limited relief to prospective injunctive relief due to Eleventh Amendment constraints. The court ultimately granted summary judgment to the defendant, finding the administrative fee reasonable and not an unconstitutional taking, as plaintiffs provided no evidence to the contrary. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and confronted jurisdictional issues arising from Puerto Rico’s Title III bankruptcy under PROMESA. The court held that the administrative fee claim was void for violating the automatic stay provisions, as it amounted to a demand for property of the debtor (the Commonwealth), and dismissed that portion of the appeal. Regarding the interest claim, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, ruling plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to allege they sought disbursement or challenged existing procedures. The First Circuit thus dismissed the appeal from summary judgment and affirmed the district court's dismissal. View "Hernandez-Castrodad v. Steidel-Figueroa" on Justia Law

United States v. I-44 Truck Cntr & Wrecker Svc

2026-07-01T07:31:07-08:00

The defendant operated a trucking and towing business with a facility in Rolla, Missouri, where the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) conducted inspections and issued two citations for safety violations in June and October 2017. The first citation imposed a penalty of $5,541 and the second a penalty of $65,184 for failure to abate a prior violation. The defendant did not respond or pay either penalty, causing both citations to become final orders. After the penalties remained unpaid for more than 180 days, OSHA referred the debts to the Department of Treasury, which then referred them to private collection agencies and ultimately to the Department of Justice. Two demand letters were sent to the defendant in March 2022 seeking payment. In January 2023, the government filed suit under the Debt Collection Improvement Act (DCIA) to collect the debts, which had accrued to $124,567.78. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that the statute of limitations found in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 did not apply to collection actions under the DCIA. The court struck the defendant’s notice defense and granted summary judgment to the government. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss de novo. The appellate court held that § 2462’s five-year statute of limitations does apply to government actions seeking to collect civil penalties, even when proceeding under the DCIA. Because the penalties were punitive in nature and the government’s collection action was filed more than five years after the penalties became final orders, the action was time-barred. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the government’s collection action. View "United States v. I-44 Truck Cntr & Wrecker Svc" on Justia Law

Texas Tobacco Barn v. HHS

2026-06-30T15:30:30-08:00

Texas Tobacco Barn operated a laboratory and retail shop in Lubbock, Texas, manufacturing and selling e-liquids and vape products. After applying for authorization to sell over 2,200 vape products, including Barn Brewed Beetle Juice e-liquids, the FDA denied approval and warned that these products were considered “adulterated” and “misbranded.” Despite assurances from Texas Tobacco Barn that it would cease sales, a subsequent FDA inspection revealed continued sale of unauthorized products. The FDA initiated proceedings seeking a civil penalty of $19,192 for violations. The enforcement action began with an administrative hearing before an HHS administrative law judge (ALJ), who reviewed evidence including inspection photos and testimony from an FDA inspector. Texas Tobacco Barn admitted that the e-liquids lacked FDA authorization but disputed the inspector’s findings and challenged the FDA’s regulatory authority. The ALJ concluded that the FDA proved its case by a preponderance of the evidence and imposed the civil penalty. On appeal, the HHS Departmental Appeals Board affirmed the ALJ’s ruling, agreeing the ALJ lacked jurisdiction to address constitutional challenges but offering advisory comments on those defenses. Reviewing the agency’s final decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered Texas Tobacco Barn’s statutory and constitutional arguments. The court rejected the nondelegation challenge, citing its own precedent and Supreme Court guidance clarifying FDA’s explicit authority to regulate vape products. However, the Fifth Circuit held that the administrative process violated Texas Tobacco Barn’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The court determined that civil penalties for FDCA violations are legal in nature and do not fall under the public-rights exception that would permit agency adjudication without a jury. As a result, the Fifth Circuit granted the petition and vacated the agency’s decision. View "Texas Tobacco Barn v. HHS" on Justia Law

In re Estate of Pfeifer-Murphy

2026-06-30T13:38:36-08:00

The dispute centered on farmland in Chouteau County, Montana, inherited by Linda Reynolds and Gerald Cook, who formed the Cook-Reynolds Partnership to lease and operate the land. Gerald and his wife, Karin Cook, became involved in probate proceedings in Idaho, where Karin, as personal representative of the Estate of Ann Lafferty Pfeifer-Murphy, misappropriated funds to benefit herself, Gerald, and their company. Gerald executed promissory notes pledging land in Chouteau County as collateral, but these actions did not reference the Partnership. In Idaho, the Estate and its beneficiaries sought restraining orders against Gerald, Karin, their company Pneumex, Inc., and the Partnership, but only Gerald was served regarding the Partnership. Subsequently, Gerald and Karin entered into a settlement agreement confessing to a judgment exceeding $1 million, with Gerald purporting to bind the Partnership as a debtor. The Idaho court entered judgment against the Partnership and others. The Estate domesticated this judgment in Montana’s Twelfth Judicial District Court and sought to execute it against the Partnership. Linda, the managing partner, challenged the Idaho judgment, arguing lack of personal jurisdiction and that she had no knowledge or authorization of Gerald’s actions on behalf of the Partnership. The District Court held a hearing but ultimately the Partnership’s motion for relief was deemed denied by operation of rule due to the court’s inaction. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the District Court’s denial de novo. It held that the Idaho court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Partnership because Gerald did not have authority to bind the Partnership in the proceedings, and Linda neither authorized nor ratified Gerald’s actions. The Montana Supreme Court also found the Partnership’s motion was made within a reasonable time. The Court reversed the District Court’s denial and vacated the Idaho judgment as to the Partnership, while leaving the judgment intact as to other debtors. View "In re Estate of Pfeifer-Murphy" on Justia Law

Smith v. Super. Ct.

2026-06-30T12:03:26-08:00

A large group of former employees alleged that they suffered racial discrimination and harassment while working at a Tesla manufacturing facility. These individuals were initially part of a class action lawsuit seeking relief under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, claiming Tesla maintained a factory-wide policy of ignoring and failing to address pervasive racial harassment. After the trial court in that class action certified only certain common issues and ordered that each worker seeking damages must file a separate lawsuit, Tesla’s former employees filed five new lawsuits, each joining between 54 and 98 plaintiffs, all making similar allegations regarding their experiences at the same facility. In response to the five new actions, the Superior Court of Alameda County issued an order to show cause regarding whether the plaintiffs were improperly joined. After briefing and argument, the trial court found misjoinder, dismissed all plaintiffs except the first-named in each suit, and ordered the remaining plaintiffs to file separate, single-plaintiff lawsuits. The court justified its decision by citing the impracticality of managing such large, multi-plaintiff cases and the anticipated differences in each plaintiff’s experiences. The plaintiffs then filed petitions for writ of mandate challenging the misjoinder rulings. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that the trial court erred in finding misjoinder under California’s permissive joinder statute (Code of Civil Procedure section 378). The Court of Appeal clarified that plaintiffs alleging harm from a common policy or practice, as in this case, could join their claims in a single action. The appellate court further held that the trial court lacked authority under section 379.5 to dismiss properly joined plaintiffs solely due to concerns about case management or judicial efficiency. The Court of Appeal granted the petitions and directed the trial court to allow the multi-plaintiff complaints to proceed. View "Smith v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Osorio-Calderon v. Sandstone

2026-06-30T11:01:22-08:00

Jose Osorio-Calderon, a federal inmate sentenced for coercion and enticement of a minor, participated in recidivism reduction programs while incarcerated and earned significant time credits under the First Step Act (FSA). These credits advanced his projected release date and made him eligible for prerelease custody starting July 3, 2024. Osorio-Calderon initially sought placement in New York, but the United States Probation Office found his sister’s residence unsuitable. The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) then explored options in Puerto Rico but determined, due to local ordinances and proximity to schools and daycare centers, that residential reentry center placement was not feasible. Despite eligibility, Osorio-Calderon remains incarcerated after exhausting administrative remedies. The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota reviewed Osorio-Calderon's habeas petition, which sought to compel the BOP to transfer him to prerelease custody based on his earned time credits. A magistrate judge recommended granting the petition, reasoning that the FSA’s language required the transfer. However, the district court rejected that recommendation and dismissed the petition, holding that, despite the FSA’s mandatory language, it lacked jurisdiction to review BOP’s placement decisions due to statutory preclusion in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. It held that, although the FSA directs the BOP to transfer eligible prisoners to prerelease custody, Congress preserved the BOP’s broad discretion under § 3621(b) and expressly barred judicial review of placement decisions. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, concluding that Osorio-Calderon's petition sought relief that is not reviewable by any court, regardless of the FSA’s mandatory language. View "Osorio-Calderon v. Sandstone" on Justia Law

Bedell v. Parsons

2026-06-30T09:05:02-08:00

Two unmarried individuals were in a long-term romantic relationship and jointly purchased real property in Idaho, with both names appearing on the purchase and sale agreement and the warranty deed. During their relationship, they lived together in California, and Bedell contributed to household expenses but not to rent or mortgage. After their relationship ended, Parsons attempted to quitclaim her interest in the Idaho property to a nonprofit, which then transferred it back to her. Bedell made the property his primary residence and filed suit seeking to quiet title in his name or, alternatively, to partition the property entirely to himself. Parsons counterclaimed, asserting she had a 50% interest and sought to quiet title in both names. The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District reviewed a series of summary judgment motions. It determined that Parsons had a 50% ownership interest in the property, relying on the presumption of equal shares when both parties’ names are on a deed without specified percentages, as set forth in Demoney-Hendrickson v. Larsen. The court found Bedell had not rebutted this presumption, ordered partition by sale, and awarded Parsons attorney fees. On reconsideration, the court maintained its conclusions, and later held that Bedell had waived any claim for contribution by not pleading it. The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case. It held that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to Parsons because genuine disputes of material fact existed regarding the parties’ intent about their respective ownership interests. The Supreme Court clarified that Idaho law does not preclude a co-tenant from having a 0% ownership interest, and the presumption of equal shares can be rebutted by evidence of the parties’ intent. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s rulings on summary judgment, reconsideration, and attorney fees, but affirmed the finding that Bedell had waived any contribution claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Bedell v. Parsons" on Justia Law

Utah Political Watch v. Musselman

2026-06-30T08:32:44-08:00

A journalist with over twenty-five years of experience covering the Utah Legislature previously received media credentials while working for established news organizations. After founding an independent news outlet, he applied for a media credential under a new policy that categorically excluded bloggers, independent media, and freelance journalists from receiving credentials. This exclusion prevented him from accessing restricted areas and events within the Capitol that were available only to credentialed journalists, limiting his ability to gather news directly from legislative press conferences and availabilities. The plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah against legislative officials, alleging that the credentialing policy was unconstitutional as both facial and as-applied viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment, along with claims of retaliation, prior restraint, and vagueness. The district court dismissed all claims, including denying a preliminary injunction as moot. The court reasoned, in part, that there was no protected speech implicated by the policy and that the plaintiff’s continued reporting without a credential undercut the retaliation claim. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that the district court erred in dismissing both the facial and as-applied viewpoint discrimination claims. The appellate court found that the plaintiff plausibly alleged denial of access based on his viewpoint and that the exclusion from a government-created forum for journalists implicated protected speech. The court remanded those claims for further proceedings. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the retaliation, prior restraint, and vagueness claims, finding no plausible allegation of chilling effect and determining the policy did not regulate expression sufficiently to support a prior restraint or vagueness challenge. View "Utah Political Watch v. Musselman" on Justia Law