Civil Procedure - Justia Case Law Summaries

Cromwell v. Knudsen

2026-11-06T14:35:24-08:00

A county attorney in Montana advised local officials not to provide confidential criminal justice information (CCJI) to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for civil purposes without a court order, citing Montana law. The Montana Attorney General disagreed, asserting that ICE is a “criminal justice agency” entitled to access such information and ordered the county attorney to change her policy. When the county attorney requested a formal opinion, the Attorney General refused, then formally asserted supervisory control, requiring the county attorney to issue a memo permitting full disclosure of CCJI to ICE. The county attorney complied under protest and filed a petition with the Supreme Court of Montana seeking a declaratory judgment on the matter. The Attorney General claimed the dispute was nonjusticiable, arguing it was a political question, that the county attorney lacked standing, and that any opinion would be advisory. The Supreme Court of Montana found these arguments unpersuasive. The Court determined that the county attorney had standing because she is an independently elected official with statutory duties, including advising county officials, and the Attorney General’s supervisory authority does not extend to this advisory function. The Court also concluded that the dispute did not present a political question or an advisory opinion and thus was justiciable. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the county attorney’s petition is properly before the Court and that the Attorney General exceeded his authority by attempting to direct the county attorney’s legal advice to county officials. The Court declared the Attorney General’s order unenforceable. The Court did not decide whether ICE is a “criminal justice agency” under Montana law but ordered further briefing on that issue and whether such agencies are automatically entitled to CCJI solely by virtue of their status. View "Cromwell v. Knudsen" on Justia Law

Am. Future Fund, Inc. v. N.Y. Bd. of Elections

2026-11-06T08:00:03-08:00

A nonprofit organization planned to run several political advertisements critical of socialism and the Democratic Socialists of America ahead of the 2025 New York City Mayoral Election. New York’s independent expenditure disclosure law, which requires entities spending money on political elections to register and disclose information about their expenditures, was interpreted by state regulators to cover these advertisements, as the only citywide candidate affiliated with the DSA was running for mayor. The organization feared enforcement of the law against its ads and sought judicial relief. After filing its complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the organization moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the State from enforcing the disclosure law against its advertisements before the upcoming election. The district court denied this emergency motion. The organization then appealed the denial to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit while the underlying challenge to the law was stayed in the district court at the organization’s request. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot. The court explained that the motion for preliminary injunction sought relief only for an injury related to the 2025 mayoral election, which had already occurred, making it impossible for the appellate court to grant effectual relief. The court further held that the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness did not apply because the underlying action remained pending in the district court, and thus could still be litigated and reviewed in the future. The appeal was therefore dismissed for lack of a live controversy, with instructions that any future appeals concerning preliminary injunctions in this matter would be heard by the same panel. View "Am. Future Fund, Inc. v. N.Y. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

In re Special Knox Cty. Atty. Begley

2026-11-06T06:05:25-08:00

After a new audio and visual system was installed in a county courthouse, including microphones for security and meeting purposes, certain county board members discovered that audio feeds were accessible during closed meetings and private sessions. This led to concerns about privacy and prompted the board to hire a special attorney and deputy to investigate potential breaches of courthouse security and possible violations of law. A district court determined that a conflict of interest prevented the special attorney from conducting a related criminal investigation and instead appointed the Nebraska Attorney General’s office as a special prosecutor. The court ordered that investigative materials be sealed. After the special prosecutor declined to file charges, the special prosecutor’s appointment was terminated, and additional records summarizing the investigation were also sealed. Subsequently, the board’s own civil investigation led to discipline or discharge of several employees, including a former county attorney whose name had been reported for possible professional misconduct. This former county attorney later moved in the original miscellaneous court file to unseal the records related to the special prosecutor’s investigation, arguing that the documents could be relevant to ongoing litigation and reputational interests. The special prosecutor did not oppose unsealing, but the board, represented by the special attorney, objected, arguing lack of subject matter jurisdiction and insufficient grounds for unsealing. The District Court for Knox County found it had jurisdiction, determined good cause existed, and ordered the records unsealed. On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed whether it had appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s order. The court held that the order to unseal records in a special proceeding was not a final, appealable order because the board failed to demonstrate that any substantial right was affected by unsealing. Therefore, the Nebraska Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "In re Special Knox Cty. Atty. Begley" on Justia Law

Koch v. City of Sargent

2026-11-06T06:05:25-08:00

The plaintiff brought suit against a municipal defendant, raising several claims related to alleged procedural violations during a city council meeting, including purported breaches of Nebraska’s Open Meetings Act. The plaintiff sought to void actions taken at that meeting. The defendant responded by moving to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. After a hearing, the District Court for Custer County dismissed most of the plaintiff’s claims but allowed five to proceed. Subsequently, the plaintiff withdrew two causes of action, and the court held a trial on the remaining three. The court determined it lacked jurisdiction over certain claims and found the plaintiff had not met the burden of proof, ultimately denying all requested relief. Following the district court’s entry of a judgment in April 2026, the plaintiff appealed. The Nebraska Court of Appeals summarily dismissed the appeal, concluding it lacked jurisdiction because, in its view, the district court had not rendered a judgment in compliance with Nebraska statutory requirements. The Court of Appeals relied on the absence of a “single written document” as prescribed by statute and cited the Nebraska Supreme Court’s prior decisions interpreting those requirements. The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the dismissal for plain error. It held that the district court had rendered judgment by signing a single written document that denied all relief and stated judgment was entered against the plaintiff and for the defendant as to each cause of action. The Supreme Court clarified that a judgment exists without explicit dismissal language, provided all relief is addressed in one signed document. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, concluding the appellate court had jurisdiction over the appeal. View "Koch v. City of Sargent" on Justia Law

Priority One Bank v. Hall

2026-11-06T02:18:07-08:00

Derek and Keisha Hall hired Jose Silva to construct their new home and financed the project through Priority One Bank, where Harvey Lott served as the loan officer. The Halls later discovered construction defects and alleged that Silva, Lott, and the bank engaged in a secret arrangement for personal profit, including unauthorized loan disbursements and a failure to conduct proper inspections. The Halls also claimed Silva lacked a contractor’s license and that the relationship between Silva and Lott involved improper payments. Both Lott and the bank denied these allegations, asserting that bank inspections were for their own benefit and that loan advances sometimes occurred before work was completed, in line with their agreement. The Halls brought several claims against the bank, Lott, and Silva in the Jefferson Davis County Circuit Court, including breach of contract, fraud, and conspiracy. In response, the bank and Lott sought summary judgment, but the circuit court denied their motion, finding that genuine issues of material fact remained. Subsequently, the Halls moved to strike a provision in the loan agreement, arguing it was unconscionable and deprived them of legal remedies. The circuit court granted this motion, holding the provision was void, invalid, and unconscionable. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case on interlocutory appeal. It held that the Halls’ “Motion to Strike Contract Provision” was not an appropriate procedural vehicle to challenge the enforceability of a contract provision, as motions to strike under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) are limited to pleadings, not contract clauses. The court reversed the circuit court’s order striking the provision and remanded the case for further proceedings, directing that any challenge to the provision’s enforceability must follow the proper procedures for dispositive motions. View "Priority One Bank v. Hall" on Justia Law

Cheung v. Pena

2026-11-05T09:34:30-08:00

The case centers on a dispute between a judgment creditor and a judgment debtor concerning the period within which a judgment must be renewed to remain enforceable. The creditor, who had previously won a judgment against her former attorney for improperly retaining legal fees, obtained an initial judgment in 2006. This judgment was renewed in 2011 and again in 2016. In 2016, the district court also amended the judgment to correct an error in the amount, pursuant to a clerical correction rule. In 2025, the creditor sought to renew the judgment again, but the debtor objected, arguing that the time to renew had expired and the judgment was now unenforceable. The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, reviewed the creditor’s motion and denied it, finding that the applicable renewal period was five years, as provided by the law in effect when the original judgment was entered in 2006. The court reasoned that subsequent renewals or the amendment of the judgment did not change the operative date of issuance for the purpose of determining the renewal period. The court also found that the 2016 amendment to the statute extending the renewal period to ten years applied only to original judgments issued on or after July 1, 2015, and not to earlier judgments, even if they were renewed or amended after that date. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the ten-year renewal period enacted in 2016 applies exclusively to original judgments entered on or after July 1, 2015. Judgments issued before that date remain subject to the prior five-year renewal period, regardless of subsequent renewals or clerical amendments. Because the creditor’s judgment expired in 2021, her 2025 motion to renew was untimely and properly denied. View "Cheung v. Pena" on Justia Law

H.C. v. NESMITH

2026-11-05T08:01:38-08:00

Four individuals alleged that they were sexually abused as children by James Nesmith, a pediatric doctor and church counselor, between 1995 and 2007. They claimed the abuse occurred during medical visits, at home, and at a church camp. Their lawsuit sought damages for sexual assault, sexual battery, and infliction of extreme emotional distress under Arkansas tort law and a statute granting crime victims a cause of action. However, the plaintiffs did not file their claims within the standard limitations periods applicable to such actions. Instead, they relied on the Justice for Vulnerable Victims of Sex Abuse Act, which revived and extended the statute of limitations for child sex abuse claims within a specific timeframe. The parties conceded that the plaintiffs’ complaint was filed within the revived window provided by the Act. James Nesmith moved for summary judgment in the Pulaski County Circuit Court, arguing that under the Arkansas Supreme Court’s existing vested-rights precedent, the General Assembly lacked the authority to revive claims that were already time-barred, rendering the Act invalid and the claims untimely. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the complaint on statute of limitations grounds. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed, citing binding precedent that prohibited legislative revival of expired claims. The Supreme Court of Arkansas granted review and reversed the lower courts’ decisions. The court overruled its prior vested-rights precedent, finding no constitutional basis for categorically prohibiting the legislature from reviving time-barred claims through legislation. It upheld the Justice for Vulnerable Victims of Sex Abuse Act, concluding that the General Assembly has the authority to set or extend statutes of limitations, including for previously barred claims. The court reversed the circuit court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, and vacated the opinion of the court of appeals. View "H.C. v. NESMITH" on Justia Law

FRANKLIN v. WILLIAMS

2026-11-05T08:01:37-08:00

The dispute involved actions by city officials in Helena-West Helena, Arkansas, concerning two ordinances passed in December 2022 by outgoing city council members. These ordinances, among other things, increased the mayor’s salary from $48,000 to $70,000. The outgoing mayor attempted to veto these ordinances, but the newly elected mayor, Christopher Franklin, sought to rescind the veto. Greg Williams, a local resident, challenged the validity of the ordinances, arguing they had been properly vetoed and were therefore void. The Phillips County Circuit Court initially granted a temporary restraining order against implementation of the ordinances and, after a hearing, issued a declaratory judgment holding the two ordinances null and void. The court did not issue a permanent injunction. The City appealed, and the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the Circuit Court’s declaratory judgment. Subsequently, Williams filed for contempt against Franklin, alleging he had violated the court’s order by accepting the increased salary. The Circuit Court found Franklin in civil contempt for willfully disobeying the declaratory judgment and ordered him to repay part of his salary or face jail. The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the contempt order. The court held that a declaratory judgment, which only settles the rights and obligations of the parties without compelling or prohibiting specific actions, cannot be enforced by contempt; only injunctive orders may be enforced in this manner. Since the Circuit Court’s order was a declaratory judgment, and not an injunction, the contempt finding was improper. The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the Circuit Court’s contempt order and dismissed the contempt proceedings. View "FRANKLIN v. WILLIAMS" on Justia Law

FRANKLIN v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

2026-11-05T08:01:37-08:00

The case concerns Christopher Franklin, who was serving as the mayor of Helena-West Helena, Arkansas. The State filed a lawsuit against Franklin in June 2025, alleging that he had abused his office and committed various illegal acts. The State sought civil penalties, damages, attorneys’ fees, and Franklin’s removal from office. Unusually, instead of the circuit court clerk issuing and signing the summons as required, the circuit court judge did so after the State handed him the complaint in open court. The next day, the documents were filed with the clerk, and the court issued an ex parte temporary restraining order removing Franklin from his mayoral duties. Franklin responded by filing several motions, including one to dismiss the case on the ground that the summons was defective because it had not been signed by the clerk or a deputy clerk. Despite Franklin’s objections, the Phillips County Circuit Court imposed penalties, awarded attorneys’ fees, and removed him from office. Franklin then filed a motion under Rule 60(a) to vacate the orders, which was deemed denied by operation of law. He appealed the case. The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed whether the summons was valid and whether Franklin had waived his objection. The court held that the summons was constitutionally defective because only the clerk or a deputy clerk may sign a summons, not a judge. Since the State did not serve Franklin with a valid summons within the required 120 days, the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction. The court also determined that Franklin did not waive his objection. As a result, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the circuit court’s orders, vacated all actions taken, and dismissed the case without prejudice. View "FRANKLIN v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

Whaleco Inc. v. Gluck

2026-11-04T14:30:03-08:00

A company operating an online shopping platform entered into settlement agreements with two other companies that had previously brought legal claims against it. An intellectual property lawyer, representing these companies, negotiated and personally signed two provisions in each agreement. The lawyer represented that neither he nor his firm had clients intending to sue the shopping platform, but reserved the right to represent future clients. Shortly after the agreements were effective, the lawyer allegedly advertised for new clients to sue the shopping platform and threatened new litigation on behalf of additional clients. Following these events, the shopping platform filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, alleging claims such as intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment. The defendants, including the lawyer and his clients, moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, with some also moving to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court granted the Rule 12(b)(6) motions, dismissing the complaint on the merits, and awarded attorney fees to some defendants. The court explicitly chose not to address the personal jurisdiction challenges raised by certain defendants. Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a federal court may not reach the merits of a case without first determining that it has personal jurisdiction over the parties. Because the district court dismissed the case on the merits without resolving the personal jurisdiction issues, the First Circuit vacated the orders and judgment below and remanded the case. The district court was instructed to first resolve the motions challenging personal jurisdiction before considering the merits or other remedies. Each party was ordered to bear its own appellate costs. View "Whaleco Inc. v. Gluck" on Justia Law

Kaszuba v. Norris

2026-11-04T11:33:36-08:00

An employee of an electric car company was involved in a motor vehicle collision with a motorcyclist while driving a company-owned service truck. The employee had been authorized by his manager to take the truck home the previous evening for his convenience, rather than returning it to the service center after dropping off a company trailer. The following morning, while driving the truck back to work, the employee stopped for gas per an informal company policy recommending that vehicles be returned with at least a quarter tank of fuel. During this stop, the collision occurred, resulting in severe injuries to the motorcyclist. Following the accident, the injured party was found incompetent, and his guardian substituted as plaintiff. The plaintiff sued the employee and his employer, claiming the employer was vicariously liable under respondeat superior because the employee was acting within the scope of his employment. The Marion Superior Court granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiff and the employee, finding as a matter of law that the employer was liable since the employee was on a special errand for his employer. The trial proceeded in two phases: the jury allocated seventy percent fault to the employee and thirty percent to the motorcyclist, and awarded damages, which were then reduced according to comparative fault. On appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment on vicarious liability and the liability phase, but reversed for a new trial on damages due to improper ex parte communications between the judge and jury. The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, vacating the appellate decision. The Indiana Supreme Court held that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the employee was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Therefore, the trial court’s summary judgment on vicarious liability was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial on that issue and on damages, but the jury’s allocation of fault remains intact. View "Kaszuba v. Norris" on Justia Law

Riffenburg v. Rice

2026-11-04T08:30:14-08:00

In this matter, Logan Riffenburg and Vanessa Roper, formerly married, jointly acquired property in Arkansas. After their divorce, each retained a half-interest in the property. Roper subsequently remarried and, with her new husband, filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The bankruptcy trustee sought court approval to sell Roper’s interest in the property to Blue Sun Capital LLC. Riffenburg objected to the sale, but his objection was overruled by the bankruptcy court, which authorized the sale. The court focused on the trustee’s good faith and the fairness of the process but did not address whether Blue Sun Capital was a good-faith purchaser. Following the bankruptcy court’s approval, Riffenburg appealed to the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit (BAP) and requested a stay pending appeal, which was denied. The sale was completed. The trustee then moved to dismiss the appeal as statutorily moot under 11 U.S.C. § 363(m), arguing that the completed sale to a good-faith purchaser could not be unwound in the absence of a stay. The BAP, with one judge dissenting, agreed and dismissed the appeal, finding that Riffenburg had not raised the issue of the purchaser’s good faith in the bankruptcy court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the BAP’s dismissal. The court held that under its precedent, in order to avoid mootness under § 363(m), an objector must challenge the good faith of the purchaser before the bankruptcy court. Because Riffenburg did not do so, the issue was not preserved for appeal, and the appeal was dismissed as statutorily moot. The Eighth Circuit explicitly stated that this precedent remained binding, even after the Supreme Court’s decision in MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC. View "Riffenburg v. Rice" on Justia Law

Ortiz-Resto v. Rivera-Schatz

2026-11-03T14:30:03-08:00

Three former employees of the Senate of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico alleged they were terminated from their positions—Protocol Officer and Liaison Technician—because of their political affiliations, in violation of their First Amendment rights. The suit was brought against Senate officials in their personal capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages for alleged unconstitutional patronage dismissals. The U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico initially heard the case, which involved numerous plaintiffs and claims, including due process, equal protection, and Puerto Rico law claims. Many claims were dismissed at earlier procedural stages. The claims relevant to this appeal survived summary judgment and concerned only the First Amendment-based damages actions brought by the three former employees. The District Court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, which was based on qualified immunity, finding there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding the plaintiffs’ job duties and whether defendants had considered the nature of those duties before termination. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the interlocutory appeal, which focused on the denial of qualified immunity. The First Circuit affirmed the District Court’s order. The appellate court held that the District Court erred in considering whether the officials had subjectively inquired into the plaintiffs’ job duties, as qualified immunity is an objective standard. However, the First Circuit found no error in the District Court’s other reasoning, ruling that unresolved factual disputes about the nature of the plaintiffs’ job responsibilities precluded summary judgment on qualified immunity. The court also determined that claims against the officials in their personal capacities were not discharged by the Commonwealth’s bankruptcy proceedings under PROMESA. Thus, the District Court’s denial of summary judgment was affirmed. View "Ortiz-Resto v. Rivera-Schatz" on Justia Law

SCHRAMMEL & WARD v. COLYER HEREFORDS AND ANGUS, INC.

2026-11-03T06:43:22-08:00

Two Oklahoma cattle ranchers entered into an agreement with an Idaho-based cattle breeder concerning the ownership and profits from a Hereford bull named Guardian. The arrangement involved the Plaintiffs bidding on Guardian at an Oklahoma auction, acquiring a partial ownership interest, and receiving a share of profits from the sale of Guardian’s semen. The agreement also contemplated that Guardian would spend part of each year in Oklahoma. After the auction, Guardian remained in the Defendant’s custody out of state. Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendant’s negligent care led to Guardian’s death and sought compensation and an accounting of profits. The District Court of Oklahoma County dismissed the Plaintiffs’ action for lack of both general and specific personal jurisdiction, finding that the Defendant’s contacts with Oklahoma were insufficient. After the judgment, a dispute arose over the timeliness of the Plaintiffs’ appeal, because proof of service of the judgment was not immediately filed. The Defendant moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely, arguing the appellate deadline had passed. The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma held that the Plaintiffs’ appeal was timely, as the thirty-day period to appeal began when proof of service was filed, not when the judgment was originally served. The Supreme Court further found that, although Oklahoma lacked general jurisdiction over the Defendant, specific personal jurisdiction existed because the Defendant purposefully directed activities toward Oklahoma by facilitating the auction transaction and ongoing custodial arrangement. Plaintiffs’ claims “arose out of or related to” these contacts. The Supreme Court denied the motion to dismiss the appeal, reversed the district court’s order dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction, and remanded for further proceedings. View "SCHRAMMEL & WARD v. COLYER HEREFORDS AND ANGUS, INC." on Justia Law

Estate of Isham v. Richardson

2026-11-02T12:30:07-08:00

The case involves the fatal shooting of Elijah Isham by Moraine, Ohio police officers following a car crash. After the incident, Elijah’s father, Ralph Isham, was appointed administrator of his son’s estate and, acting in that role, filed a federal civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the police chief and several officers. Isham filed the complaint pro se, just before the statute of limitations expired. The complaint alleged violations of Elijah’s Fourth Amendment rights during the police encounter that led to his death. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio sua sponte raised the issue of whether Isham could represent the estate without counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1654. The court determined Isham was not permitted to proceed pro se because he had not sufficiently proven he was the sole beneficiary and that the estate had no creditors. The court ordered him to retain counsel or show cause why he should be allowed to proceed alone. After initial attempts to satisfy the court’s requirements were deemed inadequate, Isham retained counsel, but the district court ultimately dismissed the complaint, holding that the initial pro se filing rendered the lawsuit a legal nullity. The court dismissed the case without prejudice and denied reconsideration, even after new evidence was submitted. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed whether a complaint filed in violation of § 1654 is a “nullity” or whether the defect is curable by retaining counsel. The Sixth Circuit held that, while § 1654 bars non-lawyers from representing estates in most cases, federal law does not mandate treating such complaints as nullities. Instead, district courts have discretion to allow correction by retaining counsel. Because Isham retained counsel within the court’s timeline, dismissal was not required. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Estate of Isham v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Gaylord v. Clifford

2026-11-02T07:32:43-08:00

A law enforcement officer in Ada County, Idaho, was fatally shot during a traffic stop. The incident was captured on the officer’s body camera, which recorded both the shooting and the subsequent response by bystanders, other deputies, and emergency personnel. Several months after the shooting, a member of the public requested the body camera footage under Idaho’s Public Records Act. The sheriff’s office denied the request, citing ongoing investigations and concerns that disclosure would invade the privacy of the officer, his family, and others shown in the video. Following the denial, the requester filed a petition in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District (Ada County), seeking to compel disclosure. The district court reviewed the video in camera and ordered its full release, concluding that it was a public record and that none of the statutory exemptions, including those related to privacy, applied. The court found that the video did not show visible injuries, nor did it impugn the character of the deceased officer or his family, and therefore did not constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Disclosure was stayed pending appeal. The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the district court’s order. It held that the video is a public record under Idaho law, but that the statutory exemption for “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” applies to the segment of the video showing the immediate aftermath of the shooting (from 00:38 to 08:35), as disclosure of this portion would violate the substantial privacy interests of the officer’s family. Other segments of the video, including the initial traffic stop and the post-transport scene, were not exempt and must be disclosed. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment, affirmed the order in part, and reversed in part. No costs or civil penalties were awarded. View "Gaylord v. Clifford" on Justia Law

Estate of Price v. Kidney Care Specialists, L.L.C.

2026-11-02T06:30:11-08:00

A woman, acting as administrator of her late husband’s estate and in her individual capacity, filed a medical malpractice action against multiple doctors and medical practices. The complaint alleged that after an MRI detected a lesion on her husband’s kidney in 2017, recommended follow-up care was not pursued by his medical providers. In 2020, he was diagnosed with kidney cancer and died within months. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ failure to act constituted a breach of the standard of care. Before trial, some defendants were dismissed, and the case proceeded to a jury trial against several remaining doctors and practices. During jury selection, the plaintiff’s counsel challenged four prospective jurors for cause, arguing that their responses during voir dire showed they could not be fair and impartial or would not follow the law as instructed by the court. The trial court denied these for-cause challenges, finding the prospective jurors’ answers did not establish actual bias or unwillingness to follow the law. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants. The plaintiff appealed to the Second District Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court. The appellate court reviewed the trial court’s denial of the for-cause challenges under an abuse-of-discretion standard. The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. It held that under R.C. 2313.17(B)(9), when a principal challenge is made to a prospective juror on grounds of bias or unwillingness to follow the law, the trial court must determine the validity of the challenge, and, if valid, the juror must be absolutely disqualified. The court overruled prior precedent to the extent it permitted discretion at this stage. However, it found that competent, credible evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the challenges were not valid. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the Second District Court of Appeals. View "Estate of Price v. Kidney Care Specialists, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Murphy v. O'Reilly Auto. Stores, Inc.

2026-11-01T10:52:52-08:00

A fatal traffic collision occurred involving Erika Chavez and Jose Ortiz-Muñoz, an employee of O’Reilly Automotive Stores, Inc. Erika Chavez’s widower sought and obtained the appointment of Dennis P. Murphy as the personal representative (PR) for the wrongful death estate. After Murphy’s appointment, but before filing a wrongful death complaint, the plaintiffs conducted examinations under oath of various O’Reilly personnel using subpoenas issued under the appointment proceeding’s case number. O’Reilly was not a party to the appointment proceeding, and its employees were questioned, sometimes without counsel present. Subsequently, a wrongful death complaint was filed against O’Reilly and others, alleging negligent supervision and control related to the vehicle involved in the crash. O’Reilly, in the wrongful death action in the First Judicial District Court, moved to dismiss the case or alternatively sought exclusion of the pre-complaint discovery and disqualification of plaintiffs’ counsel. O’Reilly argued that a PR appointed under the Wrongful Death Act (WDA) does not have subpoena power in an appointment proceeding, as such actions are not pending civil cases under the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court denied the motion, finding O’Reilly’s proposed remedies too severe, but certified the issue for interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico granted certiorari to decide whether a concluded WDA appointment proceeding is a pending action permitting subpoena power. The Court held that issuance of an order appointing a PR under the WDA constitutes a final order, ending the appointment proceeding. Therefore, a PR does not have subpoena power after such appointment and before filing a wrongful death claim. The Court did not address remedies for misuse of subpoena power and remanded for application of its holding. View "Murphy v. O'Reilly Auto. Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Flux Drive v. Sparks

2026-10-30T10:03:37-08:00

Several companies and an individual alleged that certain defendants conspired to steal trade secrets and transfer them to a Chinese company for the manufacture of unauthorized products. The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, where one defendant resided. However, some defendants—the Rong Defendants—were Illinois residents and had limited direct connections to Colorado. Plaintiffs claimed these defendants supervised the alleged misappropriation and provided a loan to another defendant in Colorado, purportedly to facilitate the theft. The Rong Defendants denied these allegations, asserting their contacts were minimal and not related to the alleged injury. After the suit was filed, the Rong Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The magistrate judge recommended granting the motion, finding that while there may have been some contact with Colorado, plaintiffs failed to show their injuries arose from these contacts. The District Court accepted this recommendation, dismissed the Rong Defendants, and later certified the decision as a final judgment under Rule 54(b). Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal. The Rong Defendants then sought attorneys’ fees under Colorado’s fee-shifting statute, and the District Court awarded the fees, as well as a subsequent supplemental award for fees incurred in later proceedings. Plaintiffs appealed both fee awards. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed all three consolidated appeals. It affirmed the District Court’s dismissal, holding that although there were some contacts with Colorado, plaintiffs did not establish their injuries arose out of those contacts, and thus personal jurisdiction was lacking. The Court also affirmed both the initial and supplemental fee awards, finding that Colorado’s mandatory fee-shifting statute applied, the fees were reasonable, and the District Court had authority to award supplemental fees after the initial judgment. View "Flux Drive v. Sparks" on Justia Law

De Chavez v. UPS

2026-10-30T09:30:08-08:00

After the death of Juan Chavez, his family members brought a wrongful death action in Texas state court against several defendants, including United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) and a group of other companies alleged to be involved in the incident. After the initial suit was voluntarily dismissed, the plaintiffs filed a new action in state court, naming the same defendants as well as an additional Texas-based defendant, Fusion Recycling, LLC. UPS removed the case to federal court, asserting diversity jurisdiction, but plaintiffs argued that Fusion’s inclusion defeated diversity. UPS countered that Fusion was improperly joined and should not be considered for jurisdictional purposes. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, acting sua sponte, remanded the case to state court. The court found that UPS’s notice of removal failed to establish the plaintiffs’ citizenship, as it relied only on allegations of residency and not citizenship. The district court did not give UPS an opportunity to cure this deficiency and did not make an affirmative finding that complete diversity was lacking. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered whether it had jurisdiction to review the remand order. The Fifth Circuit determined that the district court’s remand was based on a procedural defect—specifically, insufficient pleading of citizenship—rather than a determination of subject matter jurisdiction. Because the remand was sua sponte and not based on a plaintiff’s motion, the appellate bar under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) did not apply. The Fifth Circuit held it had jurisdiction to review the remand order and found that UPS’s allegations of citizenship, made upon information and belief and supported by residency facts, were sufficient at this early stage. The court vacated the remand order and returned the case for further proceedings. View "De Chavez v. UPS" on Justia Law

IN RE BOSCO

2026-10-30T06:13:28-08:00

Two neighbors in a residential community became involved in a dispute over the use of one party’s homestead property. The property owner kept various animals and had constructed several structures on her fourteen-acre homestead. The community’s Declaration of Easements, Covenants, and Restrictions set limits on the type and number of animals, prohibited certain commercial activities, and regulated the placement of structures and nuisance conditions. After a complaint, the property owner and the community association reached a mediated settlement agreement requiring her to take remedial measures and provide proof of compliance. The neighbors who had originally complained did not participate in the mediation and later sued, alleging ongoing violations regarding animals, nuisance conditions, and structure placements. The dispute proceeded in the 98th District Court, where the plaintiffs sought discovery, including a request under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 196.7 to inspect the entire property except for the residence. The property owner objected, arguing the inspection would be overly intrusive, duplicative, and unnecessary because relevant information had already been provided through depositions, documents, and photographs. The trial court initially granted the inspection and later narrowed its scope after reconsideration, but still authorized a broad entry and inspection. The owner sought mandamus relief from this order. The Texas Court of Appeals for the Third District denied relief. The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the trial court abused its discretion by granting an inspection order that was disproportionate to the needs of the case. The court found that the information sought was available through less burdensome means, and the burden and intrusion of the inspection outweighed any likely benefit. The Supreme Court of Texas conditionally granted mandamus relief, directing the trial court to vacate its discovery order authorizing entry onto the property. View "IN RE BOSCO" on Justia Law

In The Matter of $11,500 Seized from Bitcoin Depot Operating, LLC

2026-10-30T06:04:13-08:00

An individual in Iowa was defrauded by unknown parties in August 2024, leading him to deposit $11,500 in cash into a Bitcoin ATM and transfer an equivalent amount of bitcoin to the fraudsters' account. The ATM operator’s terms required customers to acknowledge that deposited cash became the property of the operator, as it facilitated the bitcoin transfer. Despite warnings not to transfer bitcoin to wallets not under the customer’s control, the victim completed the transaction and later reported the fraud to police. The Cedar Falls Police seized the cash from the ATM, but the transferred bitcoin was never recovered, and the criminal investigation closed without any charges. The Bitcoin ATM operator filed an application in the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County under Iowa Code § 809.5, seeking the return of the seized cash after the investigation concluded. While the operator’s claim was uncontested, the district court determined that a newly enacted statute, Iowa Code § 533C.1004 (effective July 1, 2025), which provided a refund remedy for fraud victims, applied to the dispute. The court denied the operator’s application for return of the cash, reasoning that the refund provision for new consumers defeated the operator’s claim, even though the statute was enacted after the transaction occurred. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The court held that Iowa Code § 533C.1004 does not apply retroactively to transactions that occurred before its effective date, as the statute lacked express retroactivity language and applying it would impose new consequences on past conduct. The court reversed the district court’s ruling, concluding that the ATM operator was entitled to the return of the seized cash, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In The Matter of $11,500 Seized from Bitcoin Depot Operating, LLC" on Justia Law

Hanna Carroll Restaurant Group LLC v. Hagestad

2026-10-29T15:30:57-08:00

A restaurant group based in Orange County provided catering services to a client and his family during the Masters golf tournament in Georgia. The parties discussed a menu for seven days but did not sign a written contract or discuss the cost beforehand. The restaurant group ended up providing meals and services for five days, serving around 25 guests per meal. After the event, the group sent an invoice for nearly $75,000, which the client disputed and refused to pay, leading to an increase in the invoice amount. The client maintained that he had been overcharged and would have made other arrangements had he known the cost. The Superior Court of Orange County heard the breach of contract case. During discovery, the client denied a request for admission that he had contracted with the restaurant group for seven days of service. At trial, the jury found in favor of the restaurant group but awarded a lesser amount than invoiced. After the verdict, the restaurant group sought cost-of-proof attorney’s fees under California Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420 for the client’s denial of the request for admission, as well as court reporter costs. The trial court awarded only a small portion of the requested attorney’s fees, explaining that the restaurant group had not properly identified which fees related specifically to proving contract formation. The court also struck the entire amount claimed for court reporter costs, finding the group had not provided sufficient proof that the costs were recoverable. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed both the fee and costs orders. The court held that the restaurant group was entitled to some cost-of-proof fees because the client denied a request for admission that was later proved true, but the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding only a limited amount due to the group’s failure to segregate relevant fees. The court also upheld the denial of court reporter costs for lack of supporting documentation. View "Hanna Carroll Restaurant Group LLC v. Hagestad" on Justia Law

Greater Boston Legal Services v. Dep't of Homeland Security

2026-10-29T14:30:04-08:00

A group of immigration attorneys, a law firm, and a legal services organization challenged practices by the Department of Homeland Security and its component agencies involved in immigration enforcement and adjudication. They alleged that the agencies routinely require noncitizens and their counsel to obtain key records through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), rather than providing them directly during immigration proceedings. The plaintiffs claimed this so-called “Nondisclosure Policy” causes delays, omissions, and additional burdens that impede their ability to represent clients effectively and limit their capacity to take on more cases. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts reviewed the case in multiple stages. Initially, the court dismissed claims related to removal proceedings and due process violations, but allowed the APA claim regarding asylum proceedings to proceed. After the plaintiffs amended their complaint to add allegations about ICE’s practices following Dent v. Holder, the court again dismissed the removal-related claims, finding no disclosure obligation in those proceedings. The surviving claim then proceeded to summary judgment, where the district court found insufficient evidence of a formal agency-wide policy and ruled that the government’s use of FOIA did not violate relevant regulations or the APA, granting summary judgment for the government. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit examined whether the plaintiffs had Article III standing to bring their claims. The court determined that the plaintiffs failed to establish the existence of a uniform, agency-wide Nondisclosure Policy, and concluded their alleged injuries were too speculative and were not sufficiently concrete to confer standing. The court distinguished this case from precedents like Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman and Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, holding that voluntary expenditures and increased burdens do not, by themselves, amount to an injury in fact. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment for the government on the basis of lack of standing. View "Greater Boston Legal Services v. Dep't of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Motorola v. Advanced Standard Communication

2026-10-29T09:30:06-08:00

A company based in Texas purchased a group of telecommunications patents and soon after sued another company for patent infringement in several European courts, including the European Union’s Unified Patent Court (UPC) and a German district court. The defendant in those foreign proceedings argued that its products did not infringe the patents and, in the alternative, that the patents must be licensed on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms. To support its FRAND defense, the defendant sought access to an unredacted patent purchase agreement, which it believed contained information relevant to the appropriate licensing terms. After the UPC denied the defendant’s request for production of the unredacted agreement—finding the request unsubstantiated and the information likely irrelevant at that stage—the defendant applied to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas for discovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1782. A federal magistrate judge granted the discovery request, and the district court affirmed, applying a deferential standard of review and requiring the plaintiff to provide “authoritative proof” that the European courts would not be receptive to the discovery. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in both its standard of review and its allocation of the burden of proof. The Fifth Circuit clarified that district courts must review magistrate judge recommendations on § 1782 applications de novo, as such applications are dispositive. The Court further held that respondents are not required to provide authoritative proof of foreign court non-receptivity and that the lower court misapplied the discretionary factors set out in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. The appellate court found that the balance of factors weighed against permitting discovery at this time and reversed the district court’s order granting discovery. View "Motorola v. Advanced Standard Communication" on Justia Law

Stephens v. Harcros Chemicals

2026-10-29T07:30:12-08:00

An Arkansas resident applied to work as a warehouse driver for a chemical company. He received a conditional job offer, which was withdrawn after a third-party testing company reported a positive result for marijuana metabolites. The applicant explained to both the employer and the testing company that he had not used marijuana but had consumed a CBD product for anxiety related to a medical condition. He alleged that, despite notifying the employer of his disability and the possible source of a false positive, the employer did not investigate further or engage in any process to accommodate his disability, nor did the employer respond to his request to return to duty. After the withdrawal of the job offer, the applicant filed a charge of disability discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 266 days later. The EEOC dismissed his charge as untimely and issued a right-to-sue letter. The applicant then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), race discrimination under Title VII and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, and a negligence claim against the testing company. The district court dismissed all claims against the testing company, noting the plaintiff conceded the federal statutes did not apply and finding no facts alleged to support racial animus. It declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law negligence claim. As to the employer, the court granted judgment on the pleadings, finding the EEOC charge was untimely and the complaint lacked facts showing race discrimination. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. It held that the Arkansas 180-day filing deadline applied because the applicant was notified of the job offer withdrawal in Arkansas, making his EEOC charge untimely. The court also found the complaint failed to plausibly allege race discrimination and upheld the district court’s decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim. View "Stephens v. Harcros Chemicals" on Justia Law

MORGAN VS. ESSENCE USA, INC.

2026-10-29T07:18:41-08:00

A Nevada resident, Virginia Pass, allegedly suffered injuries and ultimately died after a Care@Home C7000 in-home medical alert system failed to alert emergency services following her fall. The device was purchased from Medical Guardian, a Pennsylvania-based reseller authorized by Essence USA, Inc., a New Jersey corporation that distributes products manufactured by Essence SmartCare Ltd. Pass’s estate and her six children, some residing in Nevada and others in different states, filed suit against Essence USA and Medical Guardian in Nevada. The record did not establish where, how, or by whom the Care@Home device was acquired, only that it was used in Nevada. The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, dismissed Essence USA for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding Essence USA had insufficient contacts with Nevada. Morgan, representing Pass’s estate, was permitted to amend the complaint and conduct limited jurisdictional discovery. The evidence showed that Essence USA attended the Consumer Electronic Show (CES) in Las Vegas to promote its products to resellers, and had entered into agreements with Medical Guardian authorizing resale in the United States and Canada. However, there was no evidence of direct sales or marketing to Nevada consumers, nor confirmation that more than one product ever reached Nevada. The district court denied reconsideration and certified its dismissal as final for appeal. The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the district court’s decision de novo and affirmed the dismissal. The court held that, under Nevada’s adoption of the pure stream-of-commerce test for specific personal jurisdiction, a nonresident defendant must introduce products into the stream of commerce with the expectation of a regular flow to Nevada. The plaintiffs failed to show more than a single isolated instance of a product reaching Nevada or any meaningful connection between their claims and Essence USA’s in-state contacts at CES. Thus, Essence USA was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Nevada. View "MORGAN VS. ESSENCE USA, INC." on Justia Law

Whittington v. Daniels

2026-10-29T06:11:20-08:00

The appellants entered into a contract with the appellee for the construction of a house in Franklin County, Pennsylvania, and paid a $10,000 deposit. After terminating the contract in October 2015, the appellants expected the return of their deposit, but the appellee retained it. On April 10, 2017, the appellants filed a complaint in magisterial district court (MDJ court) seeking the return of the deposit. The MDJ court entered judgment in their favor, awarding the deposit amount plus costs. The appellee then timely appealed to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, which required the appellants to file a new complaint within twenty days. The appellants failed to do so, and the case became dormant until July 2020, when, in response to a notice of intent to terminate, the appellants filed a common pleas court complaint including a conversion claim. The appellee asserted that this claim was barred by the statute of limitations. At trial, the jury found in favor of the appellants on conversion and determined the claim accrued on October 15, 2015. However, the trial court granted a directed verdict for the appellee, holding the complaint was not timely filed within the two-year statute of limitations. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed, holding that the filing of an MDJ complaint tolls the statute of limitations only during the pendency of the MDJ case and that the statute begins to run again after the expiration of the twenty-day period to file a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Superior Court’s holding. It held that the filing of an MDJ complaint tolls the statute of limitations for any cause of action based on the factual averments in that complaint, including during any appeal, and that the subsequent filing of a common pleas court complaint is a continuation of the original action, not the commencement of a new one. The appellants’ claim was thus not time barred. View "Whittington v. Daniels" on Justia Law

A&N Electric Cooperative v. Dietzel Enterprises

2026-10-29T04:26:34-08:00

In 2019, a county initiated a project involving the drilling of new foundations for guy wires attached to a communications tower. The county hired a general contractor, which then subcontracted drilling work to another company. An employee of the subcontractor, while working near the site, carried a steel cable into contact with an overhead high voltage power line owned by an electric cooperative, resulting in his electrocution and subsequent death. The power line was not part of the communications tower and the contractors were not working on it. The estate of the deceased employee sued the electric cooperative, the general contractor, and the subcontractor in the Circuit Court of Accomack County, alleging negligence under Virginia’s Overhead High Voltage Line Safety Act (OHVLSA) for failing to implement safety measures near the power line. The circuit court dismissed the subcontractor based on the exclusivity provision of the Virginia Worker’s Compensation Act. The general contractor settled with the estate, and the electric cooperative also settled before a verdict was reached. Subsequently, the electric cooperative’s insurer, as subrogee, filed a federal suit seeking indemnification from the contractors under the OHVLSA. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the claim, holding that the work performed fell within an exemption in the OHVLSA. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit certified two questions of Virginia law to the Supreme Court of Virginia. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the exemption in Virginia Code § 59.1-413 applies to the contractors’ work on the communications tower, thereby excluding them from the OHVLSA’s requirements. As a result, the court found the second certified question—concerning indemnification requirements—to be moot. View "A&N Electric Cooperative v. Dietzel Enterprises" on Justia Law

Hall Trucking Inc. v. Secretary of Labor

2026-10-28T07:30:15-08:00

Hall Trucking, Inc., a company that moves oil rigs, was cited by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) after an employee was fatally struck by a truck during a rig-moving operation. OSHA alleged that Hall Trucking violated the general duty clause under 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1), which requires employers to provide a workplace free from recognized hazards. The citation suggested that implementing an internal traffic control plan (ITCP)—including measures such as minimizing interactions between employees and trucks, requiring high-visibility gear, and employee training—was a feasible method to reduce the risk. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission reviewed the case. The ALJ excluded testimony from Hall Trucking’s expert, finding he lacked specialized knowledge in traffic control and that his opinions amounted to legal conclusions. The ALJ admitted the Secretary’s expert, who had specific experience with ITCPs, and found his testimony reliable. The ALJ concluded that Hall Trucking’s existing safety procedures were inadequate and that an ITCP was a feasible and effective abatement method. Hall Trucking’s arguments regarding the adequacy of its measures, the specificity of abatement steps, and the industry standards were rejected. Additionally, Hall Trucking’s argument that a specific OSHA regulation supplanted the general duty clause was deemed waived because it was not properly raised before the Commission. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed Hall Trucking’s petition for review. The court held that the ALJ’s factual findings were supported by substantial evidence and that the legal conclusions were not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. The court also found the ALJ’s rulings on expert witness admissibility and reliability were proper. The Eighth Circuit denied Hall Trucking’s petition for review, affirming the Commission’s decision. View "Hall Trucking Inc. v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

A.A. v. S.P.

2026-10-28T05:30:06-08:00

A person sought a civil stalking protection order against another individual in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. After the court denied an initial request for ex parte relief, a magistrate conducted a full hearing and granted the protection order. The trial court then adopted the magistrate’s decision and entered a civil stalking protection order against the respondent. Following the entry of judgment, the respondent did not file objections to the magistrate’s decision as permitted and required by the applicable procedural rule, Civ.R. 65.1(G). Instead, he filed a notice of appeal with the Tenth District Court of Appeals. The Tenth District dismissed the appeal, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the trial court’s judgment because the respondent had not filed timely objections under Civ.R. 65.1(G). The appellate court subsequently certified that its decision conflicted with those of other Ohio appellate districts on whether the objection requirement was jurisdictional, prompting review by the Supreme Court of Ohio. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that a party’s failure to file objections under Civ.R. 65.1(G) does not deprive a court of appeals of jurisdiction over an appeal from a final civil-protection-order judgment. However, such failure means that the party forfeits appellate review of alleged errors that could have been raised by objection. Furthermore, Civ.R. 65.1 does not provide for plain-error review as a substitute for failing to file objections. As a result, the Supreme Court affirmed, with modification, the appellate court’s disposition, clarifying that jurisdiction existed but the respondent had not preserved his right to challenge the trial court’s alleged errors on appeal. View "A.A. v. S.P." on Justia Law

In re Marriage of Kearns

2026-10-27T14:34:54-08:00

A married couple executed a Marital and Property Settlement Agreement (MPSA) in 2012, which allocated their marital debts, including a Parent PLUS student loan, to the husband. He agreed to be solely responsible for the debt and indemnify his former wife. While he resolved other debts, he did not pay the Parent PLUS loan until the wife sought contempt in 2022. The parties then stipulated that the husband would make monthly loan payments and apply proceeds from a business sale toward the loan. The wife remained the borrower, but the husband assumed responsibility for payments. After further nonpayment, the wife again sought contempt in 2024. The Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, held the husband in contempt for failing to pay monthly amounts due in August and September 2024, denied his request for expanded account access, entered an immediately collectible judgment for the entire unpaid loan balance in favor of the wife, and awarded her attorney fees. The court determined that the husband had willfully failed to comply with his payment obligation and found that his unauthorized changes to the account justified restricted access. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the denial of unrestricted account access and the contempt determination based on August and September 2024 nonpayments. It also affirmed the award of $3,237.50 in attorney fees to the wife. However, the Supreme Court vacated the full-balance judgment for the loan, holding that the parties’ agreements did not authorize immediate acceleration of the entire debt based on missed monthly payments. The Court remanded for determination of an enforcement remedy consistent with the agreements and applicable law, and for reasonable appellate attorney fees, while denying appellate sanctions. The underlying allocation of debt and adjudicated obligations from June 2024 remain undisturbed. View "In re Marriage of Kearns" on Justia Law

Wasserman v. Beggs

2026-10-27T11:30:07-08:00

The plaintiff, acting as executor of a probate estate, brought suit against a law firm and its principal, alleging negligent misrepresentations related to their representation in a probate matter. After initially naming multiple defendants and amending her complaint several times, only the law firm and its principal remained as defendants in this appeal. During the proceedings, the plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint that included unsanctioned pro se coplaintiffs and was found by the court to be unnecessarily lengthy and filled with irrelevant allegations. The court struck this complaint and offered the plaintiff options: to dismiss with prejudice, to file a more detailed motion explaining the absence of legal prejudice to the defendants if dismissed without prejudice, or to file a compliant Third Amended Complaint. Instead, the plaintiff filed a notice seeking voluntary dismissal without prejudice, but failed to provide the required explanation. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio determined that, since the defendants had already answered, the dismissal had to proceed under Rule 41(a)(2), which requires a court order and can be with prejudice if warranted. The court found that the plaintiff failed to address its directive and, given her history of frivolous filings and sanctions in other cases, dismissed the action with prejudice. Additionally, the court designated the plaintiff as a vexatious litigator and imposed prefiling restrictions, requiring attorney certification or prior court review for any new cases. Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s actions for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that the district court properly dismissed the action with prejudice, complied with due process in imposing vexatious litigator restrictions, correctly declined to recuse, and found no merit in the claim of failure to report elder abuse. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order in all respects. View "Wasserman v. Beggs" on Justia Law

Civil Rights Dept. v. City of Torrance

2026-10-27T11:00:59-08:00

A city was investigated by the Civil Rights Department (CRD) after a job applicant complained that his conditional job offer for a custodian position was rescinded due to his criminal history. The applicant had explained his prior convictions, and the city stated it considered this information but ultimately decided that a recent conviction for fighting in public was sufficiently relevant to deny him employment. The city asserted it followed all procedural requirements under California’s Fair Chance Act, which restricts when and how employers may consider criminal records in hiring. The CRD began a broader investigation into whether the city’s hiring practices complied with the Fair Chance Act for all applicants. During this investigation, the city refused to provide certain documents related to its individualized assessments of applicants’ criminal histories, claiming these documents were protected by attorney-client and work product privileges, as city attorneys were involved in preparing them. The CRD petitioned the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to compel production, arguing that by defending its hiring decisions as compliant with the law, the city had waived any privilege. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the CRD’s motion, finding the city had waived privilege by putting the adequacy of its compliance at issue. The city appealed. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court’s order. The appellate court held that by asserting its individualized assessments were legally adequate as a defense, the city put those documents directly at issue and therefore waived any claim to privilege regarding them. The court emphasized that an employer cannot shield the content of such assessments from scrutiny by involving counsel in their preparation when claiming compliance with the Fair Chance Act. View "Civil Rights Dept. v. City of Torrance" on Justia Law

CATOOSA COUNTY REPUBLICAN PARTY v. HENRY

2026-10-27T04:31:50-08:00

Several individuals sought to appear as Republican candidates for the Catoosa County Commission in the May 2024 primary election. The local county Republican Party (CCRP), believing that existing state law and party rules did not sufficiently protect against non-Republicans qualifying, adopted a new rule requiring candidates to interview with the CCRP executive committee and obtain a “qualifying affidavit.” When four candidates failed to secure this affidavit and were denied qualification, they brought suit against the CCRP and certain individual members, arguing the rule was unauthorized and prevented their lawful qualification. Reviewing the case, the Superior Court of Catoosa County granted the candidates a temporary restraining order, then a permanent injunction prohibiting the CCRP from enforcing the affidavit rule. After the CCRP persisted in refusing to qualify the candidates, the court found the CCRP and several members in contempt, awarded attorney fees to the candidates, and extended the injunction. The court also awarded attorney fees against certain CCRP members who were not named parties in the litigation. Appeals followed: the CCRP and named members challenged the injunction, contempt finding, and attorney fees; nonparty CCRP members appealed the attorney fee award. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the injunction, holding that county-level party organizations are not authorized by Georgia law to create independent candidate qualification rules beyond those established by the state party and statute. The permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of the qualifying-affidavit rule was upheld, as was the contempt finding and attorney fee award against most named appellants. However, the contempt finding against two individuals was reversed for lack of evidence. The Court dismissed the appeal by nonparty CCRP members for failure to follow the required discretionary appellate procedure for attorney fee awards. View "CATOOSA COUNTY REPUBLICAN PARTY v. HENRY" on Justia Law

U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Bowden

2026-10-26T13:30:02-08:00

A married couple acquired a residential property in Maine, building their home on a subdivided lot. In 2005, the husband alone obtained a mortgage on the property to pay off an earlier joint mortgage, but the wife did not sign the new note. After their divorce, the husband quitclaimed his interest in the property to the wife, then filed for bankruptcy. The mortgage lender and its successors initiated multiple foreclosure actions over the years. In a 2012 foreclosure judgment, only the husband was held liable, as the wife had been dismissed from the suit. The wife later obtained a declaratory judgment in state court: although not personally liable on the debt, her property interest was found to be subject to the mortgage. No payments were made on the mortgage after 2010, and the loan fully matured before the current foreclosure attempt. The lender, U.S. Bank, sent both spouses a statutorily required notice under Maine law before foreclosing, but the notice incorrectly labeled the principal as "Payments" and failed to strictly comply with statutory requirements. When U.S. Bank sued for foreclosure in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine, the wife argued that the notice was deficient. The District Court agreed, granting summary judgment for her based on the notice's noncompliance. The court also found that the wife was entitled to notice as a "mortgagor," even though she had not signed the note, and rejected arguments that the earlier foreclosure judgment against the husband precluded her from raising defenses. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment. The First Circuit held that Maine’s statutory notice requirement applies even after a loan has matured, to a spouse whose property interest is subject to the mortgage but who did not sign the note, and after a prior foreclosure judgment against the signing spouse. The court also held that a noncompliant notice mandates judgment for the mortgagor under the law applicable to this case. View "U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Bowden" on Justia Law

Safe Affordable Georgia, Inc. v. Chairman of the State Ethics Commission

2026-10-26T10:30:44-08:00

Several individuals sought the Republican nomination for Governor in Georgia’s 2026 primary election. Under state law, only certain officials—including the Lieutenant Governor—could create a special “leadership committee” that was permitted to raise and spend unlimited funds in direct coordination with their campaigns. Burt Jones, the Lieutenant Governor, formed such a committee to support his own campaign. Brad Raffensperger, Georgia’s Secretary of State, also ran in the primary, but his supporters—including Safe Affordable Georgia, a hybrid political action committee (PAC) chaired by Raffensperger—were subject to contribution and coordination restrictions and could not operate a leadership committee. Safe Affordable Georgia filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, challenging these campaign finance restrictions as violating the First Amendment. The group sought a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the contribution and coordination limits against it, specifically so it could support Raffensperger’s campaign during the ongoing primary. The district court denied the motion for preliminary injunction. Safe Affordable Georgia appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, seeking expedited review. By the time the Eleventh Circuit heard the appeal, the 2026 primary election was over and Raffensperger’s campaign had ended. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the case was moot because the court could no longer provide meaningful relief relating to the completed election. The court also found that the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to mootness did not apply, as there was no reasonable expectation that the same dispute would recur involving the same parties. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it as moot. View "Safe Affordable Georgia, Inc. v. Chairman of the State Ethics Commission" on Justia Law

Northeast Wyoming Regional Airport Board v. GateOne Gillette, LLC

2026-10-23T07:13:02-08:00

GateOne Gillette, LLC entered into a 20-year lease with the Northeast Wyoming Regional Airport Board to serve as the fixed base operator at the Campbell County airport, providing services such as flight instruction and aircraft maintenance. The Board was responsible for maintaining certain airport facilities and for shared maintenance of the fuel farm. In March 2025, the Board issued a notice terminating GateOne’s lease, asserting breach of contract, and subsequently took over GateOne’s operations and solicited its employees. GateOne filed a lawsuit against the Board in the District Court of Campbell County, seeking declaratory relief, damages for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment. The Board moved to dismiss the suit under Rule 12(b)(6), asserting that it was immune from suit under both the terms of the lease and the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA). The district court denied the Board’s motion, finding that the lease was ambiguous regarding the preservation of governmental immunity and could reasonably be read in more than one way. The Board appealed that denial. The Supreme Court of Wyoming first determined that the order denying the motion to dismiss based on governmental immunity was immediately appealable because immunity under the WGCA constitutes immunity from suit, not merely a defense to liability. On review, the Supreme Court held that the lease was ambiguous as to whether it preserved the Board’s immunity from contract claims, noting conflicting provisions and the need to consider extrinsic evidence. The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and remanded for further proceedings to resolve the ambiguity using extrinsic evidence, as necessary. View "Northeast Wyoming Regional Airport Board v. GateOne Gillette, LLC" on Justia Law

In re: Gulf Shores Power Sports, Inc. v. McCarron Insurance Group, Inc.

2026-10-23T05:30:49-08:00

A marine-equipment dealership purchased insurance policies through its agent, who obtained those policies from a wholesale insurance broker. The dealership alleged it paid its insurance agent a sum significantly greater than the premiums that were ultimately forwarded to the broker and that, after canceling the policies, the agent failed to return the excess amount. The broker refunded a portion of the unearned premiums to the agent, but the dealership maintained that it was also owed the larger sum it paid in excess, as those funds had not been properly applied or returned. The dealership filed suit in the Baldwin Circuit Court against the insurance agent, alleging negligence, wantonness, recklessness, and/or fraud for mishandling and wrongfully retaining premium payments. The insurance agent, in response, moved to interplead the smaller, refunded amount from the broker into court in exchange for its dismissal from the case. The circuit court granted the agent’s motions to interplead those funds, awarded attorney’s fees to the agent from that amount, and dismissed the agent from the action. The dealership’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and subsequently, the dealership and the wholesale broker petitioned for relief. The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the petition for a writ of mandamus. It held that interpleader was not proper in this situation because the funds at issue were not exposed to double or multiple liability, and the claims against the agent included independent allegations of liability beyond the interpleaded sum. The court determined that the trial court erred in dismissing the agent from the lawsuit based solely on the interpleader. The Supreme Court of Alabama granted the petition and issued the writ, directing the circuit court to vacate its order. View "In re: Gulf Shores Power Sports, Inc. v. McCarron Insurance Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Johnson v. Reed

2026-10-23T05:30:47-08:00

A group of plaintiffs filed suit in the Montgomery Circuit Court against the Secretary of the Alabama Department of Workforce, alleging that their applications for unemployment benefits during the COVID-19 pandemic were unreasonably delayed. They also claimed that the Department’s notices regarding the unemployment process were too difficult to understand, violating the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Social Security Act. Their complaint sought various forms of injunctive relief, primarily to require prompt processing of applications and to mandate that notices be written at a level comprehensible to people with an eighth-grade education. The Montgomery Circuit Court dismissed the complaint, holding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs had not exhausted the required state administrative remedies under Alabama law. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed, rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that federal law under Patsy v. Board of Regents of the State of Florida precluded the exhaustion requirement for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The United States Supreme Court subsequently reversed this decision, but only on the narrow ground that, when a state’s exhaustion requirement effectively immunizes state officials from § 1983 claims of administrative delay, such claims cannot be denied for failure to exhaust. The case was remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the Supreme Court of Alabama directed the circuit court to determine if the case was moot, given that the Secretary asserted all plaintiffs had either been paid or received final denials. The circuit court found the case moot. Reviewing this determination, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that the plaintiffs had not shown any remaining justiciable controversy, as their delay claims were moot and their arguments for relief on the notice claims were inadequately supported. The court dismissed the appeal as moot. View "Johnson v. Reed" on Justia Law

Jackson Federation of Teachers v. Fitch

2026-10-22T15:30:07-08:00

In this case, a group of teachers, professors, students, parents, and advocacy organizations challenged the constitutionality of a recently enacted Mississippi law, House Bill 1193, which restricts the use of state education funds for diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives in public schools and colleges. The law prohibits the mandatory implementation of DEI programs, penalizing students for disagreeing with DEI concepts, promoting DEI through official course materials, and engaging in DEI activities in official capacities, while carving out exceptions for scholarly research, creative works, and student group activities. After the plaintiffs filed a pre-enforcement facial challenge on First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment grounds, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) and later a preliminary injunction blocking the law’s enforcement. The district court’s proceedings, however, were marred by multiple errors: the TRO included fabricated facts, non-existent parties, and a citation to a fictitious case, some of which stemmed from the judge’s or his clerk’s reliance on artificial intelligence in drafting. When these issues came to light, the judge revised the TRO without adequate explanation and incorporated the flawed order by reference into the preliminary injunction. The district court’s legal analysis was also found deficient, failing to properly apply binding Supreme Court precedent and misinterpreting the requirements for facial constitutional challenges. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and found grave procedural and substantive errors in the district court’s handling, including the use of fabricated evidence, failure to follow controlling legal standards, and an overbroad injunction. The Fifth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction, holding that the errors justified reassignment of the case to a different district judge on remand. The court provided detailed instructions for the new judge, emphasizing the need to follow the Supreme Court’s framework for facial First Amendment challenges and to properly analyze the law’s scope and constitutionality. The disposition was to vacate the injunction and remand the case for further proceedings before a new judge. View "Jackson Federation of Teachers v. Fitch" on Justia Law

Zurich American Insurance Co. v. First Solar Electric LLC

2026-10-22T09:00:50-08:00

First Solar Electric LLC was constructing a solar power plant in Georgia when five heavy rain events damaged the project. First Solar held a builders risk insurance policy with Zurich American Insurance Company, which covered both water and flood damage but applied different deductibles: $100,000 for water damage and $2.5 million for flood damage. Zurich initially determined the damage was water-related and issued three advance payments to First Solar, applying the lower deductible and not reserving rights to later change its determination. Subsequently, Zurich reversed its coverage decision, classified the events as floods, and asserted that the higher deductible applied, concluding First Solar’s losses did not exceed the deductible and closing the claim. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia reviewed the dispute. It granted partial summary judgment to both parties, finding that, absent waiver, the flood deductible applied, but Zurich had waived its right to enforce the flood deductible for all events by its conduct. The court also ruled that the policy’s suit-against-the-company provision did not bar First Solar’s suit as untimely. The case proceeded to a jury trial solely on damages, after which the court denied Zurich’s motion to strike a damages witness and entered final judgment in favor of First Solar. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that: (1) Georgia law permits an insurer to waive a deductible provision that limits payment, but not coverage; (2) Zurich waived the flood deductible for the first three rain events by its unconditional payments and conduct, but a genuine factual dispute remains as to waiver for the last two events; (3) the suit-against-the-company provision is not a suit-limitation bar; (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying sanctions; and (5) absent waiver, the flood deductible applies. The judgment was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Zurich American Insurance Co. v. First Solar Electric LLC" on Justia Law

Bauer v. Scott Myers and Sons Roofing and Construction

2026-10-22T06:33:11-08:00

Alexander Bauer, an employee of Evans Plumbing, Inc., was injured on a construction site after falling from a second-story balcony. He alleged that Scott Myers and Sons Roofing and Construction, LLC had negligently reinstalled a temporary wood railing, which caused his fall. Bauer received workers’ compensation benefits for his injuries and subsequently filed a civil suit against Myers for negligence, recklessness, and gross negligence. Myers argued that because both it and Evans were contracted by Stack Construction, LLC, they were co-employees under Idaho’s Worker’s Compensation Law and therefore immune from suit under the exclusive remedy rule. The District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County, reviewed Myers’ motion for summary judgment. The court determined that Myers was a subcontractor of Stack based on the contract language, making Myers Stack’s employee for purposes of the Act. As a result, the court held that Myers was entitled to exclusive remedy immunity and dismissed Bauer’s claims. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho examined whether Myers’ status as a subcontractor or independent contractor was determinative for exclusive remedy immunity. The court clarified that the right to control test, not mere contract labels, must be applied to distinguish between employees and independent contractors under the Act. The court found that the district court erred by failing to apply this test. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the right to control test must be used to resolve whether Myers was an employee or independent contractor for purposes of Idaho’s Worker’s Compensation Law. View "Bauer v. Scott Myers and Sons Roofing and Construction" on Justia Law

SHOLLER V. KENTUCKY PAROLE BOARD

2026-10-22T06:05:58-08:00

Several inmates serving life sentences in Kentucky challenged actions by the Kentucky Parole Board regarding their parole eligibility. Historically, the Board had the authority to require inmates to “serve out” their life sentences, making them ineligible for future parole consideration. In January 2021, the Board issued a new policy, called a “Directive,” which retroactively converted all previous serve-out orders for life sentences into ten-year parole deferments, thereby granting those inmates new parole eligibility hearings. After legal challenges were raised, including a temporary restraining order by the Laurel Circuit Court, the Board rescinded the Directive and canceled the scheduled parole hearings. The inmates filed complaints for declaratory judgment in the Franklin Circuit Court, arguing that the Board’s actions in rescinding the Directive and canceling the parole hearings violated their rights. The Commonwealth contended that the Directive was unlawful from its inception because it bypassed required administrative procedures. The Franklin Circuit Court found that the Directive violated multiple statutes and regulations, including requirements under Kentucky law that such policy changes be promulgated as administrative regulations through a formal process. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the Commonwealth. For one appellant, Halvorsen, the court also determined that several of his claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Franklin Circuit Court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the Parole Board’s Directive constituted an administrative regulation and was void and unenforceable because it was not promulgated according to statutory requirements. The Court also found that the Board’s actions violated the Open Meetings Act, relevant statutes, and existing regulations. Additionally, it held that the Board was authorized to rescind the Directive and cancel the newly granted parole hearings, and that certain claims were untimely. View "SHOLLER V. KENTUCKY PAROLE BOARD" on Justia Law

NORTHERN-ALLISON V. SEYMOUR

2026-10-22T06:05:57-08:00

Police officers executed a nighttime search warrant at an individual’s residence. The resident, who was home with his young children, claimed he did not initially hear police announcing their presence. After retrieving his daughters from the basement and attempting to destroy evidence, he opened the door for police and complied with their commands by kneeling and raising his hands. The resident alleged he was then struck in the face with a rifle butt by an officer, causing severe injury, before physically resisting arrest once on the ground. He later required reconstructive surgeries for his injuries. After pleading guilty under North Carolina v. Alford to resisting arrest, he filed a civil suit against several officers, asserting state law claims of excessive force, civil assault, and civil battery based on events before he began resisting. The Jefferson Circuit Court granted summary judgment to the officers, finding that the plaintiff’s Alford plea collaterally estopped him from arguing the officers acted in bad faith, thus entitling them to qualified official immunity. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the Alford plea necessarily implied an acknowledgment of the officers’ good faith in performing their duties during the arrest, thereby barring the plaintiff’s civil claims. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed. It held that an Alford plea does not automatically preclude subsequent civil claims unless the plea colloquy includes express admissions to the underlying facts forming the elements of the crime. In this case, the Alford plea only acknowledged a factual basis for resisting arrest and did not address whether the officers used excessive force before the plaintiff resisted. The Court determined that a genuine issue of material fact remained regarding the alleged excessive force and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "NORTHERN-ALLISON V. SEYMOUR" on Justia Law

BROCK V. HINKEL

2026-10-22T06:05:56-08:00

Charles L. Hinkel, III experienced chest pain at home and, after his son called 911, emergency responders Kristian Brock (an EMT) and Christopher Stone (a paramedic) were dispatched to assist. They used a phone app called “Active 911” for navigation, but due to darkness, rain, and poor lighting, they initially missed the house, arriving about sixteen minutes after dispatch. After bringing Hinkel to the ambulance, he suffered cardiac arrest, and the defibrillator malfunctioned. The responders stopped at another paramedic’s home to get a working defibrillator and continued resuscitation, but Hinkel was pronounced dead at the hospital. Hinkel’s estate sued Brock and Stone in their individual capacities, alleging negligence related to their navigation choices and equipment checks. The Henry Circuit Court dismissed claims against Henry County EMS and the defendants in their official capacities but denied summary judgment for Brock and Stone in their individual capacities, finding their actions involved ministerial duties not protected by qualified official immunity. Rather than immediately appealing, Brock and Stone proceeded to trial, which ended in a mistrial. Afterward, they filed an interlocutory appeal regarding the denial of immunity. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. On discretionary review, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that Brock and Stone forfeited their right to an interlocutory appeal by proceeding to trial rather than appealing the immunity denial before trial. The Court clarified that once trial begins, the summary judgment record is superseded and further appellate review of immunity must occur on the trial record, not the pretrial record. The Court also found it lacked appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine in these circumstances. The Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded the case to the Henry Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "BROCK V. HINKEL" on Justia Law

Knife Rights v. Blanche

2026-10-21T17:28:50-08:00

A group of individuals, businesses, and an advocacy organization challenged the constitutionality of two provisions of the Federal Switchblade Act (FSA), which restricts the introduction, manufacture, transportation, distribution, sale, and possession of switchblade knives. The plaintiffs argued that these restrictions violate their rights under the Second Amendment. Some plaintiffs are individuals who wish to purchase, carry, or sell switchblade knives, while others are businesses that would sell such knives but refrain from doing so due to the FSA’s provisions. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the plaintiffs’ challenge to the provision regulating possession, sale, and manufacture of switchblades in certain federal jurisdictions (15 U.S.C. § 1243) for lack of standing, finding no substantial threat of enforcement. It allowed standing for the challenge to the provision targeting interstate commerce in switchblades (15 U.S.C. § 1242) but ruled that this section did not violate the Second Amendment, reasoning that it was not a de facto ban on possession since switchblades remained available through intrastate commerce. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that plaintiffs had standing to challenge both provisions. Applying the framework from New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, the Fifth Circuit determined that switchblades are “arms” under the Second Amendment and that § 1242 burdens constitutionally protected conduct. The court found the government failed to show that the regulation was consistent with the historical tradition of arms regulation, particularly regarding the manner in which it restricted switchblade knives. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the § 1242 claim. However, it affirmed dismissal of the § 1243 claim, concluding that the plaintiffs had not met the demanding standard required for a facial challenge to that provision. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Knife Rights v. Blanche" on Justia Law

Slamer v. Southern Cal. Permanente Medical Group

2026-10-21T12:31:21-08:00

While working for her employer, Jennifer Slamer suffered respiratory injuries due to exposure to a disinfectant produced by a third party. Her employer settled her claim for workers’ compensation benefits through an administrative proceeding. Subsequently, Jennifer and her spouse sued the manufacturer of the disinfectant, her employer, and related entities for damages stemming from her workplace injuries. After several pretrial motions, the employer and its affiliates were dismissed from the lawsuit with prejudice. The Slamers continued their case against the manufacturer and ultimately settled with it before the matter was submitted to the jury. The entire action was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice after the settlement. During the litigation, the employer paid workers’ compensation benefits to Jennifer and filed lien notices seeking reimbursement from any judgment or settlement obtained by the Slamers. After the settlement and dismissal, the employer moved in the Superior Court of San Bernardino County for reimbursement of the benefits it had paid, arguing it was entitled to recover these funds from the settlement proceeds. The Slamers opposed, contending the court could not order reimbursement after the settlement proceeds had been disbursed and the action dismissed, and further disputed the amount sought. The trial court granted the employer’s motion and ordered the Slamers to reimburse the full amount of the lien plus interest. On appeal, the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, held that once the Slamers voluntarily dismissed the entire action with prejudice, the trial court lost subject matter jurisdiction and could not rule on the reimbursement motion. The court concluded the order requiring reimbursement was void and reversed it, directing the trial court to enter a new order denying the motion for lack of jurisdiction. The decision did not resolve other arguments raised by the Slamers or address potential alternative remedies for the employer. View "Slamer v. Southern Cal. Permanente Medical Group" on Justia Law

Yzaguirre v. Clovis Unified School District

2026-10-21T09:31:17-08:00

A 12-year-old student was injured during a specialized basketball physical education class at his intermediate school when his wrist was broken by an adult instructor blocking his shot during free play. The class, unlike general PE, was an optional course specifically for basketball team members or those aspiring to join, requiring both instructor and counselor approval for enrollment. The student alleged that the instructor either intentionally or recklessly caused his injury, and sought to hold both the instructor and school district liable for negligence and battery, with the district also alleged to be vicariously liable. The Superior Court of Fresno County dismissed some claims before trial, and a jury ultimately found for the defendants on all remaining claims, concluding that the instructor did not act intentionally or recklessly, nor did he act outside the ordinary conduct of coaching basketball. The student’s motion for a new trial was denied, prompting this appeal. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed whether the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk applied in the context of a curricular, yet voluntary and specialized, sports class, and whether the jury had been properly instructed. The appellate court held that primary assumption of the risk was a viable defense in this context, as the student voluntarily participated in an activity inherently involving the risk of such injury. The court also found the jury was correctly instructed under current law, requiring proof of intentional or reckless conduct outside the range of ordinary coaching activity for liability. The judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. View "Yzaguirre v. Clovis Unified School District" on Justia Law

Zhu Zhai Holdings Limited v Ivankovich

2026-10-20T13:30:10-08:00

Two individuals loaned money to entities for which a third person guaranteed repayment. When those loans went unpaid, the lenders obtained a default judgment of approximately $4.5 million against the guarantor. The guarantor did not pay the judgment, leading the lenders to initiate post-judgment proceedings to discover and collect his assets. They issued a citation on funds previously held in escrow by a lender as security for loans on properties owned by entities the guarantor controlled. After property sales fully repaid the loans, the escrowed funds remained frozen pending resolution of who was entitled to them. Several limited liability companies (LLCs) associated with the guarantor, as well as his estranged wife, intervened, each asserting claims to the funds. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois appointed a Special Master to determine the ownership of the escrowed funds. After discovery and a hearing, the Special Master found that the funds belonged to the guarantor, not the LLCs, based on evidence that he exercised complete control over similar proceeds and used them for personal expenses without objection from the LLCs. The district court adopted these findings and ordered further proceedings to determine if the wife’s claim for unpaid child and spousal support had priority. Before those proceedings concluded, the wife and the lenders agreed to split the funds, and the district court approved this resolution, over objections from the LLCs. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over the LLCs’ appeal and dismissed the guarantor’s appeal for lack of standing. The court affirmed the district court’s determination that the escrowed funds belonged to the guarantor and could be used to satisfy the judgment. It also rejected the argument that the proceedings improperly pierced the corporate veil or violated procedural requirements under Illinois law. View "Zhu Zhai Holdings Limited v Ivankovich" on Justia Law

Samuel Lee Services LLC v. Bangeman

2026-10-20T06:32:29-08:00

A Montana company that provides mold remediation services was contacted to perform emergency work at a home in Idaho. The homeowner’s father, a long-time acquaintance of the company’s owner, facilitated the arrangement. Although the company disclosed it was not registered as a contractor in Idaho, it entered into an agreement with the homeowner and completed the remediation work. The company billed over $44,000 for its services, but the homeowner, after receiving insurance funds, refused to pay, claiming the work was not properly completed and instead used the funds to pay another contractor. The company then filed a complaint for unjust enrichment in the District Court of the First Judicial District of Idaho, Bonner County. The homeowner moved to dismiss, arguing that under the Idaho Contractor Registration Act (ICRA), unregistered contractors are barred from bringing actions in Idaho courts to recover compensation for work performed. The district court treated the motion as one for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint, finding that the company’s failure to register precluded its claim and that no equitable exception applied. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment. The Supreme Court held that the plain language of ICRA unambiguously bars unregistered contractors from seeking compensation through Idaho courts, even under equitable theories such as unjust enrichment, when the claim is against a member of the general public—the party the statute is designed to protect. The court affirmed the district court’s decision and declined to award attorney fees on appeal, concluding that the appeal raised legitimate legal questions, though the arguments did not prevail. View "Samuel Lee Services LLC v. Bangeman" on Justia Law

Austin v. Charleston Day School

2026-10-19T11:00:50-08:00

Marshall Austin, a former federal prosecutor, joined the board of trustees of a private school attended by his children. During his tenure, the school had received and transferred federal COVID relief funds, and Austin became concerned about potential misuse or fraud related to these funds. He and his wife also vocally opposed the school's mask mandate policies, resulting in ongoing disputes with school administration. Austin’s access to board resources was revoked after he investigated financial documents, and the board ultimately voted to remove him, citing disruptive conduct and threats of legal action. After his removal, Austin filed suit under the False Claims Act’s anti-retaliation provision in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, naming the school, its Chair, and its Head of School as defendants. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, dismissing individual liability claims against the Chair and Head of School, and holding that Austin, as a trustee, was not an “employee, contractor, or agent” under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). Additionally, the court found no evidence that the school knew of Austin’s protected activities or acted against him because of them. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment, holding that Austin was not an “employee, contractor, or agent” of the school as defined by the False Claims Act and common-law agency principles. The court concluded that individual trustees lack authority to bind the institution and do not create agency relationships merely by engaging in fundraising or recruitment. Therefore, Austin could not maintain a retaliation claim under the False Claims Act, and the district court’s decision was affirmed. View "Austin v. Charleston Day School" on Justia Law

Parrish v. US

2026-10-19T11:00:49-08:00

While serving a 180-month sentence at a federal prison, an inmate was implicated in the 2009 killing of another inmate during a prison altercation. Based on a prison official’s review, the inmate was charged administratively but, given the seriousness of the allegation, the prison deferred its process pending FBI and U.S. Attorney review. While no criminal charges were filed, the inmate remained in restrictive confinement for nearly three years. After the federal investigation concluded without prosecution, the prison resumed its disciplinary process, leading first to a finding against the inmate, then an administrative remand, and ultimately, in January 2017, to a complete expungement of the incident from his record. In 2016, the inmate filed two administrative tort claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), one alleging abuse of process related to the administrative remand, and a broader one alleging wrongful confinement, emotional distress, and other injuries. Both claims were denied by the Bureau of Prisons, the latter with explicit notice of a six-month period in which to file suit. The inmate filed his complaint in April or May 2017 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, which ultimately dismissed his claims as either time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) or unexhausted under 28 U.S.C. § 2675, concluding that the relevant limitations period began before his record was expunged and that his timely administrative claim did not encompass all pleaded causes of action. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the inmate’s tort claims did not accrue until his disciplinary record was expunged on January 25, 2017, under the principles articulated in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Since the complaint was filed within six months of that date, the action was timely. The appellate court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings, including an exhaustion analysis in light of its holding. View "Parrish v. US" on Justia Law

Allen v. Whitehead

2026-10-19T08:03:00-08:00

The appellant, who is the paternal grandmother and legal custodian of her two grandchildren, sought a civil protection order (CPO) against the children’s biological mother. The grandmother alleged that the mother had repeatedly threatened her, including incidents of verbal abuse and harassment, such as banging on her door, yelling obscenities, and threatening to kill her. The mother admitted in court to actions and statements reflecting animosity towards the grandmother. The grandmother was awarded permanent sole legal and physical custody of the children, while the mother retained supervised visitation rights. The case was initially reviewed by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Before the biological mother was served with the CPO petition, the court dismissed the grandmother’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded that the grandmother was not a “family member” within the meaning of the D.C. Intrafamily Offenses Act, as they were not related by blood, marriage, adoption, legal custody, or domestic partnership. The court was not persuaded by the argument that their relationship through legal custody sufficed under the statute. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case de novo, focusing on statutory interpretation of “family member” under the Intrafamily Offenses Act. The court held that the relationship between the grandmother and the mother, based on their respective blood relationships to the children and the grandmother’s legal custody, is familial within the meaning of the Act. The court concluded that these connections, considered together, satisfy the statutory requirement. The main holding is that the Superior Court had jurisdiction over the grandmother’s petition, and the dismissal was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Allen v. Whitehead" on Justia Law

Banner v. Wright

2026-10-16T09:30:07-08:00

A parish resident attended a council meeting intending to comment on an agenda item involving the retention of special legal counsel related to ethics laws. Shortly before this meeting, she had filed an ethics complaint against the Parish President, alleging a conflict of interest regarding a zoning decision. When she began to speak, she was interrupted by the Parish President and Council Chairman, who told her that discussing her ethics complaint was off-topic and cited a Louisiana statute prohibiting public discussion of private ethics investigations. This statute had been declared unconstitutional years prior, but the officials nonetheless enforced it, leading the resident to end her remarks prematurely. She later sued the parish, the Parish President, and the Council Chairman under federal civil rights law and state law, claiming her First Amendment rights had been violated. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana presided over a jury trial where the jury found in favor of the defendants on all claims. During trial, defense counsel repeatedly violated court instructions, asked improper legal questions, referred to irrelevant and prejudicial matters, and made inappropriate comments. The plaintiff objected to these actions, and the court sustained many objections and issued curative instructions. Despite these issues, the district court denied the plaintiff’s post-trial motion for a new trial, relying in part on a juror’s public interview and noting that curative instructions had been given and no motion for mistrial had been made. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by relying on evidence barred by Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), specifically the juror’s public comments. The appellate court further held that the cumulative effect of defense counsel’s misconduct so thoroughly permeated the trial proceedings that even curative instructions could not remedy the prejudice. The Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Banner v. Wright" on Justia Law

In re: Southern Logistics, Inc. v. UOP, LLC

2026-10-16T05:30:59-08:00

This dispute arose from a series of business dealings among several corporate parties involved in the repurposing of ammonium nitrate water from a landfill in Mobile County, Alabama. The plaintiffs, two corporate entities, accused certain defendants of disrupting long-standing contracts and business relationships by sharing confidential information in violation of a 2013 contract. The alleged conduct resulted in the plaintiffs being cut out of relationships they had developed over many years. The 2013 contract at issue contained a forum-selection clause requiring that disputes be brought exclusively in courts located in New York, New York. After the plaintiffs initiated suit in the Monroe Circuit Court, the defendants sought dismissal for improper venue, citing the forum-selection clause and arguing in the alternative that, even if venue were proper in Alabama, it was not proper in Monroe County. The defendants also asserted that the plaintiffs’ tort claims failed to state a claim. While these motions were pending, disputes arose over the scope and timing of discovery. The trial court issued a series of discovery-related orders, culminating in a January 6, 2026, order requiring the defendants to provide broad discovery, including depositions and responses to interrogatories, before the motion to dismiss would be heard. The Supreme Court of Alabama granted the defendants’ petition for a writ of mandamus. The Court held that venue is a threshold issue that should be addressed as soon as practicable and that the trial court exceeded its discretion by requiring the defendants to participate in extensive merits-based discovery before ruling on the venue motion. The Court directed the trial court to vacate its January discovery order and to rule expeditiously on the motion to dismiss. Pending that ruling, any discovery must be limited to issues relevant to venue. View "In re: Southern Logistics, Inc. v. UOP, LLC" on Justia Law

McConico v. Haynes

2026-10-16T05:30:58-08:00

An inmate at Easterling Correctional Facility filed a lawsuit against his former wife and two employees of the Alabama Department of Corrections. He alleged that his ex-wife falsely told one of the employees, an agent, that he had hired someone to kill her. He further claimed that the agent failed to exercise due diligence and then falsely imprisoned him in a segregation unit without due process. The inmate also alleged that a correctional officer defamed, libeled, and slandered him, and denied him access to the courts by refusing to notarize a petition he attempted to file. He asserted similar claims of defamation against his former wife. The employees sought to transfer venue from the Barbour Circuit Court to the Montgomery Circuit Court, arguing that the complaint was essentially a petition for a writ of certiorari. The Barbour Circuit Court granted the transfer. The employees then moved for summary judgment in the Montgomery Circuit Court. Five days after the motion was filed, the Montgomery Circuit Court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The inmate filed for an extension of time to respond and later sought to alter or vacate the judgment, explaining that he had not received the motion until after the court had already ruled. The Montgomery Circuit Court denied these motions. The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It determined that the Montgomery Circuit Court erred by granting summary judgment before the inmate received the motion and without providing him a meaningful opportunity to respond, as required by Rule 56 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the lower court’s failure to provide notice or an opportunity to respond prejudiced the inmate and violated procedural safeguards. View "McConico v. Haynes" on Justia Law

Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Charalambidou

2026-10-16T05:30:58-08:00

A landlord and a tenant, a ballet studio, entered into two lease agreements for suites in a shopping center. The leases contained provisions for indemnification, default, and attorney fees. After the ballet studio vacated the premises, alleging that the landlord failed to address mold issues that caused personal injuries to two individuals associated with the studio and damage to the studio’s property, the studio and the individuals filed a multi-count complaint against the landlord. The landlord counterclaimed for unpaid rent and sought defense and indemnity from the ballet studio for the claims made by the individuals. The Montgomery Circuit Court addressed a partial summary judgment motion filed by the landlord, which concerned only the claims between the landlord and the ballet studio, not the individuals’ personal injury claims. The ballet studio and the individuals filed a response to the summary judgment motion, but it was submitted one business day late. The trial court granted the landlord’s motion to strike the late response and, later, denied the plaintiffs’ attempt to resubmit the same response. The court then entered a partial summary judgment in favor of the landlord. Subsequently, the court certified this partial summary judgment as final under Rule 54(b), Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, but also included language purporting to dismiss the entire case. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court’s orders striking the untimely response and denying its resubmission, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The Supreme Court also affirmed the certification of the partial summary judgment as final but reversed the dismissal of the entire case, noting that claims by the individuals against the landlord and the determination of damages owed to the landlord remained unresolved. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Charalambidou" on Justia Law

E.K.W. v. Prentiss County Department of Child Protection Services

2026-10-16T01:21:12-08:00

A woman, Emily, had been under a conservatorship granted to her mother in 2012 due to mental incapacity and remained under that conservatorship, which was never formally terminated. Emily became a mother of four children. In early 2023, after concerns about the care and living situation of her youngest child, Zane, the Prentiss County Department of Child Protection Services (CPS) intervened. Zane was removed from Emily's custody and placed in foster care following an emergency order. Emily was given a reunification service plan, but failed to comply with its requirements, including obtaining stable housing and addressing drug use. Over the next two years, Emily struggled with housing, employment, and substance abuse, while Zane remained in foster care and developed a bond with his foster family. The Prentiss County Youth Court adjudicated Zane as a neglected child in April 2023, though Emily’s conservator, Lisa, was not served with process or present at the adjudication. Both Emily and Lisa participated in later proceedings. No appeal was taken from the adjudication or disposition orders. In August 2024, a permanency review led to a plan for Zane's adoption. Subsequently, the Prentiss County Chancery Court heard a petition to terminate parental rights. Carter, the father, voluntarily surrendered his rights. At the termination hearing, Emily argued that the underlying adjudication was void due to lack of service on her conservator, but the chancellor found this objection had been waived due to ongoing participation in the proceedings without timely objection or appeal. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed whether the youth court had personal jurisdiction over Emily and whether the chancellor erred in terminating her parental rights. The court held that any deficiency in service was waived by the parties’ participation and failure to timely object. The court also found that substantial evidence supported termination of Emily’s parental rights under statutory grounds, including desertion and substantial erosion of the parent-child relationship. The judgment of the chancery court was affirmed. View "E.K.W. v. Prentiss County Department of Child Protection Services" on Justia Law

In re Recall of Weyrich

2026-10-15T07:19:33-08:00

Several residents of Skagit County sought to recall the county prosecuting attorney and three county commissioners. Their charges did not allege any misconduct related to the officials’ own oaths of office, but instead focused on alleged defects in the filing of oaths by other public servants, such as judges, a court commissioner, and deputy prosecuting attorneys. The recall petitions advanced five theories, including claims that the elected officials had a duty to address purported failures by others to timely file oaths, that paying salaries to these officials constituted a loss of public funds, and that election law violations were improperly handled. The evidence showed that the officials whose oaths were questioned had, in fact, taken oaths, and there was no statutory requirement for some of the filings alleged. The recall charges were initially reviewed in the Skagit County Superior Court by visiting judges. Each judge found the charges legally and factually insufficient, determining that the allegations lacked a basis in law or fact, and dismissed the recall petitions. The court found the recall efforts were intentionally frivolous and coordinated to harass the elected officials, imposing joint and several sanctions totaling $5,348.22 against six of the seven residents who filed charges. One appellant was not sanctioned due to his conduct at the hearing. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the consolidated appeals de novo. The court held that all charges were legally and factually insufficient, as no law imposed a duty on the elected officials to ensure other public servants’ oaths were properly filed, nor was there evidence of intentional misconduct or loss of public funds. The court affirmed the superior court’s dismissal and sanctions, finding substantial evidence of coordinated harassment. Additionally, the Supreme Court awarded attorney fees to the elected officials for the appeal. View "In re Recall of Weyrich" on Justia Law

St. Paul's Newman Center v. P.J. Swartz, Inc.

2026-10-15T06:40:14-08:00

A church contracted with a corporation, operated by its president, to refurbish and install a pipe organ. The corporation delivered an unfinished, nonfunctional organ. The church then sued both the corporation and its president, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment, and sought to hold the president personally liable by piercing the corporate veil. Both defendants were properly served but did not respond to the complaint. Subsequently, the church moved for a default judgment. The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, granted the motion, adopting the church’s proposed findings and order verbatim. The court concluded that the corporate veil could be pierced, found fraudulent conduct, and awarded damages totaling $324,640 against both defendants. After judgment was entered, the defendants retained counsel and moved to vacate the default judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1), presenting evidence that the president had suffered cognitive decline that excused the failure to respond. The district court denied the motion, finding the evidence of incapacity insufficient and, in its written order, applied additional legal requirements not supported by the cases it cited, including showing diligence, lack of prejudice to the plaintiff, and good faith. On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion to vacate. The Supreme Court held that the district court erred by imposing a heightened legal standard not supported by precedent and by adopting the church’s proposed order verbatim without adequate independent analysis, especially given that many of the order’s case citations were inaccurate or nonexistent. The Supreme Court reversed the order denying the motion to vacate the default judgment and remanded for further proceedings under the correct legal standard. View "St. Paul's Newman Center v. P.J. Swartz, Inc." on Justia Law

Kohn v. Glenmede Trust Co., N.A.

2026-10-15T05:30:05-08:00

A party entered into a contract for investment-management services with a trust company and later brought suit asserting multiple claims related to the agreement. The plaintiff initially filed the action in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas in 2016, but voluntarily dismissed it in 2017. Within a year, the plaintiff refiled the action, which was again dismissed without prejudice in 2022. Shortly after, and within one year of the second dismissal, the plaintiff commenced a third action asserting similar claims. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings in the trial court, contending that the plaintiff could not invoke Ohio’s saving statute, R.C. 2305.19(A), more than once, as the statute of limitations had expired for some claims before the second refiling. The trial court agreed, holding that the saving statute did not apply to the third action and that the claims were time-barred. On appeal, the Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the negligence claims but reversed as to the fraud, breach-of-contract, and promissory-estoppel claims, concluding that the latter had not previously relied on the saving statute because their statute-of-limitations periods had not expired at the time of the second filing. The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and clarified that R.C. 2305.19(A) does not limit the number of times an action may be recommenced if the statute’s requirements are met, regardless of whether the statute of limitations for a claim expired before a prior use of the saving statute. The court held that the saving statute applied to the entire action and that all claims could proceed. The judgment of the Eighth District was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Kohn v. Glenmede Trust Co., N.A." on Justia Law

CHATHAM COUNTY v. SMITH

2026-10-14T04:04:10-08:00

Chatham County established a fire protection service fee, assessed either as a flat charge per parcel or based on the square footage of structures, on all real property in a special district comprising unincorporated areas of the county. Initially, fire services were provided by Chatham Emergency Services, Inc. (CES), funded by direct payments from property owners. When payment rates fell and CES could no longer provide services as before, the county contracted with CES and adopted a fire service protection tax, later replaced by the Fire Protection Service Fee Ordinance in 2022 and revised in 2023. The fee was collected from property owners in the designated area, with enforcement measures including penalties, collection costs, and potential liens. Property owners Damon L. and Sebrell E. Smith, subject to the fee, filed a class action in the Superior Court of Chatham County, seeking refunds. They contended the fee was actually an illegal tax because it was not ad valorem, as required by Georgia law. The county moved to dismiss and for summary judgment, while the plaintiffs sought class certification and summary judgment. After discovery and hearings, the superior court certified the class and granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, holding the fire fee was a tax on real property and invalid because it was not assessed ad valorem. The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case de novo. The Court agreed with the lower court that the fire protection service fee was, in substance, a tax rather than a fee or assessment. It further held that, under Georgia constitutional and statutory law, taxes on real property—including those levied in special districts—must be ad valorem. Because the county’s ordinance imposed a non-ad-valorem tax, it was unauthorized and illegal. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the superior court’s judgment in favor of the property owners. View "CHATHAM COUNTY v. SMITH" on Justia Law

GARDEI v. TAYLOR

2026-10-14T04:04:09-08:00

An individual who was convicted in Arizona for several sexual offenses moved to Georgia after completing his sentence and registration period in New Mexico. Upon arrival in Georgia, he was advised by law enforcement that he would need to register as a sex offender under Georgia law. After several years, he sought removal from the registry, arguing that he had fulfilled his obligations elsewhere, that the crimes for which he was convicted did not require registration in Georgia, and that continued enforcement of the registry against him violated his constitutional rights. The Superior Court of DeKalb County initially dismissed his petition for declaratory relief, finding it time-barred under the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. The Court of Appeals affirmed this dismissal. The Supreme Court of Georgia later reversed, holding that his claims for prospective relief had not accrued and thus were not time-barred, and remanded the case. On remand, after further amendments and substitution of parties, the trial court dismissed the petition again, this time as moot, citing recent revisions to Georgia’s Registry Act which provided a statutory mechanism for requesting removal from registration requirements. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, but on the alternative ground that any decision would be an impermissible advisory opinion since only prospective relief was sought. The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and held that seeking prospective relief in a declaratory judgment action is not grounds for dismissal as an impermissible advisory opinion. The Court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, directing the Court of Appeals to address whether the trial court’s dismissal on mootness grounds was proper and, if not, to instruct the trial court to adjudicate the merits of the declaratory judgment claim. View "GARDEI v. TAYLOR" on Justia Law

Fajardo-Rivas v. Blanche

2026-10-13T10:30:11-08:00

After her husband was kidnapped and likely murdered in Honduras, and her brother-in-law—who had opposed a local gang—was murdered, a woman and her young daughter fled to the United States. The woman believed the 18th Street Gang was responsible for both crimes and feared retaliation against her family. After arriving in the U.S., she applied for asylum, citing her relationship to her husband’s immediate family as the basis for her claim. She submitted supporting evidence including a death certificate, police report, and affidavits. Later, after receiving direct death threats from individuals identified as gang members, she sought to reopen her asylum proceedings based on this new evidence. The Immigration Judge found her testimony credible but determined the evidence did not sufficiently establish persecution on account of her membership in a protected group—her husband’s family—due to a lack of proof regarding the gang’s involvement in the murders. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reviewed and affirmed this decision. After the death threats, the woman filed a motion to reopen, providing new evidence; however, the BIA denied the motion, concluding the threats did not demonstrate a nexus between the persecution and her family membership. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s denial. The Fourth Circuit held that the BIA abused its discretion by failing to adequately consider the new evidence and the context surrounding the threats. The court found that the nexus requirement was satisfied, as the threats and violence were sufficiently connected to the woman’s family membership. The Fourth Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA’s order, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Fajardo-Rivas v. Blanche" on Justia Law

Perrin v. Windham Southeast Supervisory Union

2026-10-13T06:48:51-08:00

A high school principal was terminated by his school district’s board after an internal investigation into allegations that he mistreated a female student over several years and attempted to dissuade staff from making a mandatory report of child abuse. The investigation included interviews with the student, a school counselor, the principal, and other witnesses. The board provided the principal with written notice of the allegations and an opportunity to respond, after which it held a multi-day hearing where both sides presented evidence and witnesses. The board found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the principal had engaged in inappropriate conduct toward the student and interfered with mandatory reporting obligations, and concluded that there was just and sufficient cause for termination. The principal appealed the dismissal to the Windham Southeast School District Board and, following the board’s decision, filed suit in the Vermont Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Civil Division. He challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, argued that the pre-termination and post-termination processes violated his constitutional rights, and asserted claims of breach of contract, wrongful termination, denial of due process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation. The civil division dismissed some claims, granted summary judgment to the defendants on the remaining claims, and found that the board’s decision was supported by the record, that the principal was afforded adequate due process, and that no evidence supported claims of bias or other wrongdoing. The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the civil division’s decision. The Court held that the principal received constitutionally adequate pre- and post-termination process, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying discovery related to alleged bias, and that sufficient evidence supported the board’s findings and conclusion that just cause existed for dismissal. The Court also found that structural or actual bias claims were either unpreserved or unsupported. View "Perrin v. Windham Southeast Supervisory Union" on Justia Law

R.H. v. Hayashi

2026-10-09T13:02:21-08:00

A student with severe cognitive disabilities attended a public high school in Hawai‘i and was repeatedly sexually abused by male students, resulting in significant psychological harm, including a psychotic breakdown and persistent post-traumatic stress disorder. The student’s mother, acting for herself and her daughter, sued the State of Hawai‘i, the Department of Education, and school employees for negligence, alleging failure to protect her daughter despite the school’s awareness of her vulnerabilities and repeated warning signs. The evidence at trial showed that school staff recognized the student’s extraordinary vulnerability and received multiple reports of abuse but failed to take reasonable steps to prevent or address it. The Circuit Court of the First Circuit conducted a lengthy bench trial and found the State liable for negligently failing to protect the student, awarding over $14 million in damages to the plaintiffs. However, without a request from the State, the court sua sponte reduced the damages by 30%, attributing that portion of fault to the male students who committed the abuse, citing Hawai‘i Revised Statutes § 663-10.5. The State had not argued at trial that the male students should be apportioned fault; instead, its arguments for apportionment focused on the mother’s alleged negligence, which the court rejected. Plaintiffs moved to amend the judgment to reverse the apportionment, but the court denied the motion. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i held that the circuit court’s sua sponte allocation of fault to the male students violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional due process rights because they lacked notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue. The court further found insufficient evidence that the male students were “other tortfeasors” under the statute and held that apportionment under HRS § 663-10.5 is an affirmative defense, for which the State bears the burden of pleading and proof. The Supreme Court vacated the apportionment, affirmed the remainder of the circuit court’s judgment, and remanded for entry of an amended judgment awarding plaintiffs the full damages. The State’s cross-appeal regarding discovery and damages was rejected. View "R.H. v. Hayashi" on Justia Law

Fanuc Corp. v. Super. Ct.

2026-10-09T13:01:42-08:00

A maintenance technician was injured at a bottling plant in California when a robot and a depalletizer malfunctioned while he was performing repairs. The depalletizer, manufactured by Krones, Inc., released its gripper head and severely injured the technician. The robot involved in the incident was manufactured by a Japanese company. The technician sued Krones, the Japanese robot manufacturer, and the American subsidiary of the Japanese manufacturer. While the American subsidiary did not challenge the court’s jurisdiction, the Japanese parent company moved to quash service, arguing that California courts lacked personal jurisdiction over it. The Superior Court of San Bernardino County denied the Japanese company’s motion to quash, finding that it was subject to general jurisdiction in California based on an agency theory, relying on the relationship between the Japanese parent and its American subsidiary. The trial court also referenced its earlier finding, during a summary judgment motion, that there was evidence the parent and subsidiary operated as a single enterprise, or alter egos. On review, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, independently analyzed whether California courts could exercise personal jurisdiction over the Japanese company. The appellate court held that neither general nor specific jurisdiction applied. It determined that, under United States Supreme Court precedent, the connections between the Japanese company and California, even when considering the actions of its American subsidiary, were insufficient to render the parent company “at home” in California for general jurisdiction. The court also found that the plaintiff failed to show that his claims arose out of or related to the Japanese company’s contacts with California, as required for specific jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and directed that the motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction be granted. View "Fanuc Corp. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Berkshire v. Berkshire

2026-10-09T05:06:34-08:00

The case centers on a longstanding family partnership, formed originally in 1988 and later converted to a limited partnership. Rick served as the managing partner, with other family members as partners. Following the death of a parent in 2011, annual financial meetings ceased, and several partners alleged they did not receive adequate financial records or updates for years. Concerns arose over Rick’s management, including incomplete and disorganized financial disclosures, and withdrawals from accounts over which Rick had power of attorney. These issues, along with disputed partnership interests and controversial financial transactions, led to Rick’s removal as managing partner and triggered litigation over his alleged breach of fiduciary duties. The District Court for Douglas County was presented with an amended complaint alleging Rick’s breach of fiduciary duties to the partnership. Rick moved to dismiss, arguing that a related county court proceeding involving a family trust precluded jurisdiction, but the district court denied the motion. Rick filed responses and counterclaims, but failed to properly plead affirmative defenses such as the statute of limitations. Extensive discovery and a bench trial followed, with evidence showing Rick’s negative capital account and numerous questionable withdrawals and transfers. The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s rulings de novo, including jurisdictional questions, evidentiary issues, and the award of attorney fees. The Court held that it had jurisdiction, affirmed the district court's findings that Rick no longer had an ownership interest in the partnership due to his negative capital account, and upheld the damages awarded for his breaches of fiduciary duty. The Court also affirmed the award of attorney fees to the prevailing parties and rejected Rick’s arguments regarding lack of specificity in pleadings, statute of limitations, and the district court’s jurisdiction. The district court’s orders were affirmed in full. View "Berkshire v. Berkshire" on Justia Law

AF, LLC v. Nessel

2026-10-09T01:19:38-08:00

A Mississippi-based furniture company and its principal operated an online “drop shipping” business, selling to customers nationwide. They fulfilled over a thousand orders for Michigan residents, accepting payments and arranging deliveries to Michigan addresses, but beginning in 2020, they kept payments for furniture they never delivered. After numerous complaints, the Michigan Attorney General sued them for violations of Michigan’s consumer protection laws and statutory conversion involving ten Michigan consumers. The defendants did not appear in the Michigan court, asserting that their website’s terms limited legal disputes to Mississippi and that Michigan lacked personal jurisdiction. Default judgments were entered against both defendants, awarding damages, civil fines, and attorneys’ fees. Following the Michigan judgment, the Attorney General enrolled it in the Lowndes County Circuit Court in Mississippi under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. The defendants objected, arguing that the Michigan court lacked jurisdiction due to their choice-of-law provision and that the forum-selection clause in their terms of service precluded jurisdiction. The circuit court held that the forum-selection clause was irrelevant to the statutory action and that Michigan law governed its validity, overruling the objections and directing enrollment of the judgment. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the appeal de novo. It held that the Michigan court had personal jurisdiction over the defendants because they knowingly and repeatedly contracted with Michigan residents, took their money, and arranged deliveries into Michigan, thus purposefully availing themselves of Michigan’s market. The choice-of-law provision in the website’s terms did not negate purposeful availment. The court found that Michigan’s long-arm statutes and due process requirements were satisfied. It also held that the size of the judgment was irrelevant to full faith and credit. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the circuit court’s order enrolling the Michigan judgment. View "AF, LLC v. Nessel" on Justia Law

KENNEDY v. WHITE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT JUDSONIA

2026-10-08T12:01:43-08:00

Kennedy filed a petition for writ of prohibition in the White County Circuit Court, seeking dismissal of misdemeanor charges pending against him in the Judsonia District Court. He argued that the charges should be dismissed on the grounds of a speedy-trial violation. After filing his petition, Kennedy attempted to serve process on the district court by mailing the summons and complaint. The district court clerk acknowledged receipt of the documents, but Kennedy did not address them to a specific person, nor did he use certified mail with a return receipt requested. The White County Circuit Court reviewed Kennedy’s petition and determined that service of process had not been properly perfected within the 120-day period required by Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i). Specifically, the circuit court found that Kennedy did not comply with Rule 4’s requirements: he failed to serve by certified mail addressed to a specific person, did not provide a notarized affidavit of proof of service, and did not include a copy of the summons in the record. As a result, the circuit court dismissed Kennedy’s petition without prejudice. The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the appeal. Applying a clearly erroneous standard to the circuit court’s factual findings, the Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that Kennedy’s failure to comply with Rule 4’s service requirements rendered the process defective. The Supreme Court held that because the dismissal was without prejudice and Kennedy could refile his claims, the order was not final or appealable. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order. View "KENNEDY v. WHITE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT JUDSONIA" on Justia Law

Luna v. Top Dawg Entertainment

2026-10-08T10:31:17-08:00

Two plaintiffs brought suit against a prominent music record label and several executives, alleging sexual battery, harassment, assault, and unpaid wages. One plaintiff claimed that while performing services for the label, she was sexually battered and harassed by executives and not paid for her work. The other plaintiff alleged assault and harassment by an employee while residing in a label-owned home to support an artist. The lawsuit was initially filed under pseudonyms, but the plaintiffs did not seek court approval to proceed anonymously. After the lawsuit was filed, plaintiffs’ counsel issued a press release using the pseudonyms to publicize the allegations. The defendants then issued their own press release, which publicly disclosed the plaintiffs’ real names. Plaintiffs amended their complaint to add a claim for doxing under Civil Code section 1708.89, asserting that the disclosure of their names constituted doxing. Defendants responded with a special motion to strike this cause of action under California's anti-SLAPP statute, arguing the press release was protected activity. Plaintiffs conceded the activity was protected but argued they could show a probability of prevailing. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the anti-SLAPP motion, reasoning that the disclosure was not necessary and referencing the Rules of Professional Conduct to find potential prejudice to judicial proceedings. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Two reviewed the denial. The court held that the defendants' press release was protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute and that the disclosure of plaintiffs’ names was protected by the fair report privilege, since plaintiffs had not sought court authorization to proceed anonymously. The court reversed the trial court’s order, directed it to grant the anti-SLAPP motion, and strike the doxing cause of action. Defendants were awarded costs on appeal. View "Luna v. Top Dawg Entertainment" on Justia Law

BBC LLC v. LATAH COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

2026-10-05T10:03:12-08:00

BBC, LLC, contracted Germer Construction, Inc. to provide construction services for a subdivision development. A dispute arose regarding the amount owed, leading to arbitration as required by contract. The arbitrator awarded Germer nearly $1,000,000, including costs and fees. BBC sought a court order to vacate the arbitration award, while Germer requested confirmation of the award and entry of judgment. Germer also moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, claiming BBC was dissipating assets. The district court granted an ex parte temporary restraining order restricting BBC’s asset transfers. At a hearing, the district court required BBC to post a $1,000,000 surety bond and Germer a $250,000 bond, characterizing them as “equivalent” to supersedeas bonds, then dissolved the restraining order and denied preliminary injunctive relief. BBC petitioned the Idaho Supreme Court for writs of prohibition or mandamus to vacate the district court’s order and prohibit further pre-judgment asset restrictions, arguing the district court lacked authority to require the bond or injunctive relief solely to secure a potential monetary judgment. The Idaho Supreme Court stayed the district court’s order and sought briefing from Germer and the Attorney General. The Supreme Court of Idaho held that the district court exceeded its authority by requiring BBC to post a surety bond to secure a potential money judgment for an unsecured debt. The court found no rule, statute, or inherent equitable power authorizing such relief in this context. The court issued a writ of review, vacating the district court’s order, including both bond requirements. BBC was found to have no adequate, speedy remedy at law, and the requested writs of prohibition and mandamus were denied. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "BBC LLC v. LATAH COUNTY DISTRICT COURT" on Justia Law

Cornice Ventures I LLC v. Silberstein

2026-10-05T09:32:43-08:00

Investors in an e-commerce company alleged they were defrauded by the founder and former CEO, claiming that their decisions to purchase preferred shares in early 2021 were based on false representations about the company’s profitability and financial health. The founder repeatedly refused to provide audited financial statements before closing, and pressured the investors to move quickly, warning that their allocation would be lost to other parties if they delayed for due diligence. The investors relied on unaudited financial statements and entered into two stock purchase agreements in February and March 2021. After the transactions, the company failed to provide audited financial statements by the contractual deadline, and the founder sold significant personal stock. In June 2022, the investors finally received audited statements revealing substantial losses and inconsistencies with previous unaudited reports. The investors initially filed suit in New Jersey in August 2024. After enforcement of the Delaware forum-selection clause, they dismissed the New Jersey action and refiled in the Superior Court of the State of Delaware in April 2025, asserting claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and a New Jersey statutory claim. The Superior Court dismissed the complaint, holding that the claims accrued no later than March 2021 and were barred by Delaware’s three-year statute of limitations. The court found no basis for tolling under fraudulent concealment or inherently unknowable injury doctrines, reasoning the investors were on inquiry notice when they executed the agreements without the requested information. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed the statute of limitations question de novo. The Court held that, regardless of tolling doctrines, inquiry notice was triggered in April 2021 when the company breached its obligation to provide audited financials. Because the investors filed more than three years later, their claims were time-barred. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal. View "Cornice Ventures I LLC v. Silberstein" on Justia Law

Phillips v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery

2026-10-02T15:30:08-08:00

A patient underwent surgery in Texas, during which a specific surgical stapler and staple product were used to reconnect sections of his colon. After initial success, he suffered severe complications days later, including sepsis, allegedly caused by a defect in the staple line. This resulted in months of treatment and ultimately his death. His widow and children sued several product manufacturers and sellers, asserting claims for breach of implied warranty of merchantability and other product liability theories. Initially, the plaintiffs brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas against Johnson & Johnson, Ethicon, and Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (“Phillips I”). Discovery revealed confusion about the identity of the actual seller, prompting the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint against Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. alone, asserting only breach of warranty claims. The magistrate judge recommended dismissing the claim for breach of implied warranty of merchantability without prejudice, primarily due to lack of presuit notice required under Texas law. The district court instead dismissed both claims with prejudice and denied leave to amend, finding that amendment would be futile and that the plaintiffs had not provided proper notice or shown how they could cure the defect. After dismissal in Phillips I, the plaintiffs filed a second suit in state court (“Phillips II”) against additional parties. This case was removed to federal court, where the defendants moved for dismissal based on res judicata and collateral estoppel. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismissed Phillips II with prejudice. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed both district court judgments, holding that plaintiffs failed to state a claim due to lack of presuit notice, the denial of leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion, and preclusion doctrines properly barred the second suit. View "Phillips v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery" on Justia Law

People ex rel. G.D.M.

2026-10-01T09:22:13-08:00

A woman gave birth to a child in the back of an ambulance and immediately informed hospital staff that she did not want or have the means to care for the baby, expressing her intent to relinquish the child for adoption. The Morgan County Department of Human Services (MCDHS) initiated a dependency or neglect proceeding, treating the matter as a typical abandonment case. MCDHS investigated the mother’s identity, contacted her family members to explore placement options, and took steps to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act, after learning the mother might be a member of a Canadian tribe. The Morgan County District Court, upon learning of MCDHS’s actions, intervened by issuing an order that recognized the birth mother’s right to anonymity and confidentiality under Colorado’s Safe Haven Law. The court directed MCDHS to halt its investigation into the mother’s identity and to cease contacting her family members, reasoning that the Safe Haven Law protected the mother’s privacy. The court also sealed records containing the mother’s name and refused to consider information derived from confidential sources. MCDHS challenged these orders through a C.A.R. 21 petition. Reviewing the matter, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that, although Colorado’s Safe Haven Law does not expressly guarantee anonymity and confidentiality, its structure, related statutory provisions, and underlying purpose imply such protections for parents who properly relinquish newborns under its terms. The Court concluded that county departments cannot pursue the identity of relinquishing parents or investigate their families for placement options. Once a newborn is surrendered pursuant to the Safe Haven Law, the county department must promptly seek adoptive placement and move to terminate parental rights while maintaining the parent’s anonymity and confidentiality. The Supreme Court of Colorado discharged its order to show cause and remanded for proceedings consistent with this holding. View "People ex rel. G.D.M." on Justia Law

Sprague River Cattle Co. v. State of Oregon

2026-10-01T07:46:20-08:00

The plaintiff, a cattle company, alleged that a state agency unconstitutionally took its water rights without compensation as part of the agency’s adjudication of water rights in the Klamath Basin. The agency began the adjudication in 1975 and completed the administrative phase in 2014, with judicial review ongoing in a separate proceeding. The plaintiff claims that administrative determinations prioritizing tribal water rights over its own resulted in a deprivation of its rights. Following the complaint, the plaintiff served discovery requests for documents related to the agency’s determination of tribal water rights. The agency produced a substantial number of records but withheld 446 documents on grounds of attorney-client privilege. The plaintiff moved to compel production of documents over 25 years old, arguing these should be disclosed under Oregon’s public records law. The Marion County Circuit Court ordered the agency to produce the documents, citing a perceived conflict between discovery rules and the public records law, and issued a protective order limiting their use. The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the trial court’s discovery order in an original mandamus proceeding. It held that the public records law and civil discovery rules are independent avenues for obtaining records from a public body. The court determined that discovery in civil litigation is governed by procedural requirements and limitations, including the attorney-client privilege, and that courts may not compel production of privileged records in discovery merely because those records may be subject to disclosure under the public records law. The Supreme Court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its discovery order. View "Sprague River Cattle Co. v. State of Oregon" on Justia Law

Estate of Clark v. Clark

2026-10-01T06:32:34-08:00

The dispute centers on real property originally acquired by John and Constance Clark as part of a family farming operation. In 1988, two parcels were conveyed to their son, Jay Clark, who subsequently transferred the properties to Clover Hollow Farms, Inc., a corporation formed shortly before the conveyance with John Clark as its sole shareholder. Jay Clark served as vice-president and director of Clover Hollow. According to Jay Clark, his parents promised that Clover Hollow would hold the property in trust for him as a premarital asset, to be returned upon demand or subject to his exclusive control. Years later, Jay Clark assigned his interests in one of the properties to C & H Properties, LLC, operated by his children. After John Clark was placed under a conservatorship, the conservator, Judith Appleby, adopted corporate resolutions nullifying Jay Clark’s authority and authorizing the corporation to join litigation seeking a declaration that Jay Clark had no interest in the corporate stock, real property, or tangible property. Jay Clark filed counterclaims challenging the validity of these resolutions and seeking to regain title to the properties. The District Court of the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, granted summary judgment to the Estates and Clover Hollow. It ruled that judicial estoppel barred Jay Clark’s claims due to his failure to disclose the properties in bankruptcy and found that his claims under constructive trust, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment failed as a matter of law. The court also upheld the corporate resolutions enacted by Appleby. The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the district court’s rulings. It held that Ms. Appleby, as executor, lacked authority under Clover Hollow’s bylaws and the Idaho Business Corporation Act to convene a special shareholder meeting and enact corporate resolutions, rendering those actions invalid. Consequently, Clover Hollow was never properly joined in the litigation. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, reversed the grant of summary judgment on Jay Clark’s sixth counterclaim, and remanded the case with instructions to allow reasonable time for proper joinder of Clover Hollow as a party. View "Estate of Clark v. Clark" on Justia Law

In re Petition for the Coordination of Individual Plaintiffs Maui Fire Cases

2026-09-30T15:31:39-08:00

Following the devastating 2023 Lahaina wildfires in Maui, which caused significant loss of life and property, numerous victims initiated litigation against various parties including Hawaiian Electric, the State of Hawaiʻi, the County of Maui, and others. To manage the complex and large-scale proceedings, the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit established a special coordination proceeding, appointed liaison counsel, and ultimately oversaw a $4.037 billion global settlement. A major issue arose regarding attorney fees: the court issued an order capping contingency fees, creating a $222 million Common Benefit Fund for attorneys whose collective efforts benefited all claimants, and appointing a Common Fee Review Board to allocate the fund. Prior to this appeal, the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit managed the coordination, administered discovery, approved the settlement, and issued the attorney fee order. Claimant Michael Bates and attorneys Anthony Ranken, Alex Edrenkin, and John Thickstun challenged the court’s authority to issue the fee order, arguing it was void due to lack of jurisdiction, violated constitutional rights, and improperly limited review of fee awards. They appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals and petitioned the Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi for extraordinary writs. The Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi, after accepting transfer, determined it had jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine and HRS § 602-5(a)(6). The court held that the Circuit Court had authority to issue the fee order based on the ongoing special proceeding and the equitable common fund doctrine. However, three provisions that barred or penalized appeals of fee awards were vacated as they violated statutory and constitutional rights to review. The remainder of the fee order—including the creation of the Common Benefit Fund, the tiered fee schedule, and the processes for fee awards—was affirmed. The constitutional and abuse of discretion challenges were rejected, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "In re Petition for the Coordination of Individual Plaintiffs Maui Fire Cases" on Justia Law

Copper City Gaming v. Allen

2026-09-29T13:05:05-08:00

Copper City Gaming, Inc. alleged that in July 2022, Eric Allen entered into a lease agreement with the corporation, resulting in four payments totaling $14,400. Copper City claimed these payments were fraudulent, part of a conspiracy between Eric and Russ Allen, and asserted causes of action for fraud, violation of the Montana Consumer Protection Act, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy. The complaint specifically alleged the lease used the wrong address and corporate name, Eric lacked authority to sublease or failed to provide usable space, and Copper City never stored property there. Previously, a related action (DV-22-206) involved disputes between shareholder groups over management and use of corporate funds. That action began in Copper City’s name but, by court order, Russ and Camy Allen were substituted as plaintiffs, and Copper City was no longer a named party. The parties reached a mediated settlement, which included a Mutual General Release and Settlement Agreement, and a Special Master’s Order waiving certain business dispute claims, including storage-unit fees. The Special Master dismissed the action with prejudice as fully settled. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the District Court’s order granting Eric Allen’s motion to dismiss under M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on collateral estoppel grounds. The Supreme Court held that the complaint and materials properly considered at the pleading stage did not conclusively establish that the prior adjudication decided the identical issues now raised, that Copper City was adequately represented in the prior action, or that Copper City had a full and fair opportunity to litigate those issues. The Court also found the District Court erred by considering matters outside the pleadings without converting the motion to summary judgment under Rule 12(d). The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Copper City Gaming v. Allen" on Justia Law

SWN Production Co LLC v. Blue Beck Ltd

2026-09-29T09:00:04-08:00

SWN Production Co., LLC leased land from Bluebeck Ltd. and paid royalties for gas extracted from the property. A dispute emerged over the lease’s performance, leading SWN Production Co. to seek a declaratory judgment on whether it was in default, whether Bluebeck was obligated to provide information needed to cure alleged defaults, and whether lease forfeiture required agreement or a judicial finding of default. The underlying issue concerned whether the lease could be terminated based on alleged defaults, which depended on future events. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania found the complaint unripe because any lease termination was contingent on future developments. As a result, it dismissed the action without prejudice, concluding there was no case or controversy suitable for judicial resolution under Article III. After the dismissal, Bluebeck Ltd. filed a motion for attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses based on a fee-shifting provision in the lease. The District Court denied this motion, reasoning that Bluebeck was not a prevailing party since the dismissal did not finally resolve the parties’ rights in its favor. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s assumption of jurisdiction and the denial of the fee motion. The appellate court determined that once the District Court concluded it lacked Article III subject-matter jurisdiction due to unripeness, it had no authority to rule on the fee motion. The main holding by the Third Circuit is that a federal court lacking Article III jurisdiction over the underlying claim cannot adjudicate a motion for attorney’s fees, costs, or expenses based solely on a contractual fee-shifting clause. The Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s order and remanded with instructions to dismiss Bluebeck’s fee motion. View "SWN Production Co LLC v. Blue Beck Ltd" on Justia Law

KANE V. PACAP AVIATION FINANCE, LLC

2026-09-29T08:00:30-08:00

An airline operating among the Hawaiian Islands faced severe financial difficulties over several years, leading to its abrupt shutdown in November 2017. The airline had previously been owned by a trust affiliated with a prominent individual, then partially sold to entities controlled by other businessmen. When the airline closed, employees received only one day's notice and did not receive their final paychecks. Following the closure, a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee was appointed. Together with two unions representing affected employees, the trustee initiated adversary proceedings against the airline’s former owners, directors, and lenders, alleging violations of Hawaii’s Dislocated Workers Act (DWA) and the federal WARN Act for failure to provide the required notice and compensation. Additional claims included breach of fiduciary duties and requests for equitable remedies such as veil piercing and equitable subordination. The proceedings began in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Hawaii, but the District Court for the District of Hawaii withdrew the reference, consolidated the cases, and conducted a jury trial. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law for some claims and allowed others to proceed. The jury returned mixed verdicts, finding some defendants liable for statutory and fiduciary duty violations, but the court denied punitive damages and limited recovery to avoid double compensation. The court also ruled on equitable remedies, including piercing the corporate veil and equitably subordinating certain loans, and ordered contribution from a third-party defendant. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s judgment. It held that it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The panel affirmed the trustee’s and unions’ Article III standing. It reversed in part on fiduciary duty claims, concluding that minority stakeholders and affiliated entities could owe fiduciary duties and be deemed “employers” under the DWA. The court clarified the statutory definition of “employer” and the scope of the DWA’s safe harbor defense, ruling it was unavailable absent a binding divestiture. The panel affirmed evidentiary rulings, vacated the nominal damages award due to erroneous jury instructions, affirmed the prohibition of punitive damages, and upheld the equitable remedies and contribution order. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "KANE V. PACAP AVIATION FINANCE, LLC" on Justia Law

ESCH v. TURNER & COMPANY, INC.

2026-09-29T06:41:10-08:00

The plaintiffs purchased a residential lot from a developer and later alleged that defective grading and drainage in the subdivision caused water and erosion damage to their property. They claimed that the developer and seller deviated from an approved drainage plan, redirecting stormwater onto their lot. The plaintiffs discovered the source of the problem several years after purchasing the property, following a heavy rainstorm. Their claims included negligence, breach of contract, and breach of the implied warranty of workmanlike construction. The District Court of Oklahoma County conducted a bench trial. After the plaintiffs rested their case, the defendants moved for a directed verdict and argued that the tort and warranty claims were barred by Oklahoma’s ten-year statute of repose (12 O.S. § 109), and the contract claim was barred by the five-year statute of limitations (12 O.S. § 95). The trial court found that the improvement causing the harm was substantially completed more than ten years before suit, and that the contract claim accrued on the date the lot was conveyed. The trial court entered judgment for the defendants on all claims. The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the appeal. It held that the statute of repose begins to run upon substantial completion of the specific improvement alleged to have caused harm, not the completion of the overall development. The only evidence of substantial completion was uncontroverted, showing completion more than ten years before suit, barring the tort claims. The implied warranty and contract claims were also time-barred by the statute of limitations, and Turner & Company was not a party to the contract. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "ESCH v. TURNER & COMPANY, INC." on Justia Law

State ex rel. Ellis v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.

2026-09-29T05:30:14-08:00

An incarcerated individual submitted 73 public-records requests over ten days to various offices and employees within a state corrections department, a privately managed prison facility, and a food services provider. The requests sought records-retention schedules, records-retention policies, and public-records policies for the years 2023 or 2024, including department-specific documents from areas such as laundry, dental care, religious services, commissary, and education. After not receiving the documents he believed responsive, the requester filed a lawsuit seeking a writ of mandamus to compel production, statutory damages totaling $73,000, and court costs. The Supreme Court of Ohio previously dismissed claims against individual employees of the prison but allowed claims against the corrections department, the private prison manager, the facility, the food services provider, and certain employees. The corrections department and the private prison manager subsequently provided general records-retention and public-records policies, as well as a records-retention schedule. The requester argued these were insufficient, insisting he sought department-specific policies and schedules. Additional motions filed by the requester, including for default judgment and injunctive relief, were also considered. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the requester failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the department-specific records he sought existed. The court found that the general policies provided applied to all departments and that separate department-specific policies did not exist. As such, the requester could not establish a clear legal right to relief or that any respondent failed to comply with obligations under the Public Records Act. The court also held that the private food-services provider was presumed not subject to the Public Records Act, and the requester failed to rebut that presumption. The court denied the writ, statutory damages, court costs, and all other motions. View "State ex rel. Ellis v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr." on Justia Law

MLA Capital, LLC v. Keagle

2026-09-28T10:31:22-08:00

Linda Keagle and her late husband obtained two loans in 2007 and 2008, totaling $450,000, from MLA Capital, LLC and Encarnacion Alvarez and her late husband. Both loans were evidenced by promissory notes with definite maturity dates in 2012 and 2013. The Keagles failed to make payments before the maturity dates, and subsequently, from August 2018 to March 2020, MLA Capital and the Alvarezes received monthly checks from C&C Organization, a company with which Linda was affiliated. MLA Capital and Encarnacion Alvarez filed a lawsuit in 2022 alleging breach of the promissory notes and related common counts. Linda moved for summary judgment in the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, arguing the claims were untimely under four-year and two-year statutes of limitations. She contended the payments made by C&C Organization did not restart or toll the limitations period, as she neither authorized nor signed the checks. Plaintiffs opposed, asserting a six-year statute of limitations applied and that the checks constituted partial payments restarting the limitations period. The trial court granted summary judgment for Linda, finding no evidence Linda had agreed to bear responsibility for the loans after maturity or authorized the payments. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and held that a six-year statute of limitations under California Uniform Commercial Code section 3118 applies to the promissory note claims and related common counts, as it is more specific and recent than general contract limitations statutes. The court further determined there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether the payments from C&C Organization constituted partial loan repayments authorized by Linda, which could have restarted the limitations period under Code of Civil Procedure section 360. The judgment was reversed, and the trial court was instructed to deny summary judgment. View "MLA Capital, LLC v. Keagle" on Justia Law

EDWARDS V. BROWN

2026-09-28T08:30:33-08:00

An incarcerated individual alleged that correctional officers at an Oregon prison denied him a decontamination shower after his exposure to pepper spray during an incident in a neighboring cell. He claimed the exposure caused pain and burning to his skin and lungs, and that his repeated requests for a shower were denied for two days. The inmate initiated the prison grievance process, submitting his first grievance form shortly after the incident and continuing through several rounds of administrative review and appeal, ultimately exhausting remedies as required under prison rules. The United States District Court for the District of Oregon dismissed the inmate’s lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, finding it was barred by Oregon’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. The district court determined that the claims accrued on the date of exposure and tolled the limitations period only during a portion of the grievance process, starting when the prison received a second grievance. The court concluded the inmate filed his complaint out of time and declined to toll the period from the submission of the first grievance or the time between grievances. Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied Oregon’s tolling statute, Oregon Revised Statutes § 12.210, which tolls the statute of limitations when a statutory prohibition prevents filing suit. The court held that federal law (42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)) required exhaustion of administrative remedies before commencing a § 1983 action, and that the time spent in the grievance process does not count toward the statute of limitations. The tolling period began when the inmate initiated the grievance process and continued until exhaustion was complete. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit found the complaint timely filed, reversed the district court’s dismissal, and remanded for further proceedings. View "EDWARDS V. BROWN" on Justia Law

WASHINGTON V. CROWN RESOURCES CORP.

2026-09-28T08:30:33-08:00

Crown Resources Corporation and its parent company operated the Buckhorn Mountain Mine in Okanogan County, Washington, under a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit issued by the Washington State Department of Ecology. Alleging violations of the Clean Water Act related to the mine’s discharges, both the Okanogan Highlands Alliance (OHA), a private environmental group, and the State of Washington filed separate citizen suits against Crown in 2020. The cases were consolidated and jointly litigated for several years. After mediation failed, OHA and Crown negotiated a settlement without Washington’s involvement. OHA and Crown submitted a proposed consent decree to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, which resolved OHA’s claims only. The district court entered the consent decree. Following the entry of the consent decree, Crown moved for judgment on the pleadings in Washington’s suit, arguing that the claims were barred by claim preclusion due to the prior resolution of OHA’s suit. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington agreed, finding that Washington was in privity with OHA and thus barred from pursuing its claims. Washington’s motion for relief from judgment was denied, leading to this appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that Washington, not being a party to the consent decree and not in privity with OHA, was not barred from bringing its suit. The court found that the exceptions to nonparty preclusion identified in Taylor v. Sturgell did not apply here. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "WASHINGTON V. CROWN RESOURCES CORP." on Justia Law

UNITED STATES V. BURTON

2026-09-28T08:00:33-08:00

Several employees of the Space and Missile Systems Center of the United States Air Force brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act against Jeremy Burton, the Center’s former Deputy Chief Information Officer. The plaintiffs alleged that Burton, in coordination with a defense contractor, manipulated contract awards to ensure profits were shared in violation of federal regulations, thereby submitting fraudulent payment claims to the government. Initially, Burton moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(1) barred the suit because he was a member of the armed forces, which would preclude jurisdiction over actions brought by one member of the armed forces against another arising out of military service. The United States District Court for the Central District of California first agreed and dismissed the claims against Burton. However, after further briefing on the status of the parties, the district court reconsidered and vacated its earlier order, concluding that Burton was a civilian employee and not a member of the armed forces. The suit was permitted to proceed, and Burton appealed before the case reached final judgment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit examined whether it had jurisdiction to review the interlocutory order denying Burton’s defense under section 3730(e)(1). The court held that the district court’s order did not meet the requirements of the collateral order doctrine, specifically because it was not effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. The statute at issue was determined to be a jurisdictional bar, not an immunity from suit, and thus not subject to interlocutory appeal. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "UNITED STATES V. BURTON" on Justia Law

Alstom Transportation, Inc. v. Federal Railroad Administration

2026-09-25T07:01:01-08:00

A privately owned railroad company was engaged by the Nevada Department of Transportation to build a high-speed passenger rail line between Southern California and Las Vegas, Nevada. To fund this $12 billion project, the company sought and received a $3 billion federal grant from the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. The Act contains a “Buy America” requirement, generally mandating that federally funded projects use goods produced in the United States, but it allows waivers if domestic goods are unavailable or unsatisfactory. The railroad company solicited bids for high-speed trains, and only two manufacturers responded: one offering to build most trains domestically but at a lower maximum speed, and another proposing to build the first two trains abroad to meet the project’s higher speed requirement, before shifting production to the U.S. After reviewing the bids, the FRA proposed to waive the Buy America requirement for either bid, but ultimately finalized a waiver only for the foreign-manufactured trains, based on its finding that no domestic manufacturer could produce trains at the required speed. The railroad company then contracted with the foreign manufacturer. The domestic manufacturer, having lost the contract, challenged the waiver in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing it was unlawful and arbitrary. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding the domestic manufacturer lacked standing. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the domestic manufacturer had standing, as it suffered a concrete economic injury traceable to the waiver and redressable by court action. However, the court determined that the waiver was both lawful and reasonable under the statute, as the FRA correctly found no domestic producer could supply the required high-speed trains. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment, converting it from a jurisdictional dismissal to a decision on the merits. View "Alstom Transportation, Inc. v. Federal Railroad Administration" on Justia Law

Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes

2026-09-24T13:31:07-08:00

A fatal accident occurred in 2016 when a bicyclist, Jonathan Tansavatdi, collided with a turning truck at an intersection in the City of Rancho Palos Verdes. The bicycle lane on Hawthorne Boulevard ended before the intersection, forcing cyclists to share the roadway. Jonathan’s mother, Betty Tansavatdi, sued the City, alleging that the intersection constituted a dangerous condition of public property and that the City failed to adequately warn of this danger. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially granted summary judgment for the City based on the affirmative defense of design immunity under Government Code section 830.6. The trial court found the City had established all elements of design immunity regarding the absence of a bicycle lane. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the finding of design immunity but remanded the case for consideration of the failure to warn claim. The California Supreme Court, in Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 639, held that design immunity does not categorically preclude failure to warn claims and remanded the matter, leaving open whether design immunity applies if warnings were part of an approved design. Upon remand, the City renewed its motion for summary judgment, arguing that all warning signs and markings at the intersection were part of the 2009 approved design plans. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, held that when a public entity has provided some warning of a dangerous condition as part of an approved and reasonable design, complaints about the adequacy of that warning fall within the scope of design immunity. The court affirmed summary judgment for the City and upheld the award of expert fees, finding the City’s section 998 settlement offer valid. View "Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes" on Justia Law

Koeberer v. Weir

2026-09-24T13:00:07-08:00

A testamentary trust was created by Ruth Wilson for her daughter, Elizabeth Koeberer, before Wilson’s death in 2013. The trust, named with a misspelling of Koeberer’s surname, was initially managed by Koeberer’s brother, Edson Wilson, who later appointed Robert Weir as successor trustee. JPMorgan Chase Bank held the trust’s financial assets. Nearly a decade after Wilson’s death, Koeberer brought a federal lawsuit against Weir, Chase Bank, her siblings, and her former probate attorney, alleging negligence, violations of federal statutes, and abuse-of-process claims in relation to the trust’s administration. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed all federal claims against the defendants. It found that Koeberer’s claims under the Bank Secrecy Act, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA), and the NACHA operating rules were either untimely, lacked a private right of action, or were unsupported by the agreement between Koeberer and Chase Bank. The court also concluded that the economic-loss rule barred Koeberer’s negligence claim against Chase Bank and found no viable abuse-of-process claim against her siblings. The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims against Weir and Ryan Gordon, dismissing them as well. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo and affirmed. The appellate court held that there was no private right of action under the Bank Secrecy Act for the SAR filing requirement, Koeberer’s EFTA claim was barred by the one-year statute of limitations, and the NACHA rules were not incorporated into her deposit account agreement. The court also upheld dismissal of the negligence and abuse-of-process claims, and found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims. View "Koeberer v. Weir" on Justia Law

Bonta v. Bianco

2026-09-24T09:01:52-08:00

Following the passage of Proposition 50, which revised congressional district maps in California, a community group in Riverside County alleged a discrepancy in the number of ballots counted versus ballots cast during the 2025 special election. Acting on the group’s report, the county sheriff’s department obtained search warrants from the Riverside County Superior Court and seized large quantities of ballots and election materials. The county registrar defended the official tally and explained the discrepancy at a public meeting. Despite the Attorney General’s request for a pause to review the investigation, the sheriff’s department advanced their search and began counting ballots, only halting after direct communication from the Attorney General. The Attorney General issued formal directives to the sheriff, instructing him to pause the investigation, preserve all seized materials, and provide case records for review. The sheriff initially did not respond, began counting ballots, then paused the count and secured the materials. Subsequent communications from the Attorney General reiterated these directives and requested records. After further seizures by the sheriff’s department, the Attorney General initiated litigation, seeking a writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal, which denied relief on procedural grounds. The Attorney General then sought review in the Supreme Court of California. The Supreme Court of California held that the Attorney General, under the state Constitution and Government Code section 12560, possesses the authority to give binding directions to sheriffs regarding specific investigations when necessary to ensure uniform and adequate enforcement of state laws. The court concluded the directives issued in this case were within the Attorney General’s lawful authority and sufficiently specific. It granted writ relief, ordering the sheriff and department to comply with the Attorney General’s instructions to pause investigative actions, retain seized records (with certain exceptions), and provide requested materials. Each party was directed to bear its own costs. View "Bonta v. Bianco" on Justia Law

DOTSON V. CIA DRUG, LLC

2026-09-24T06:04:22-08:00

The dispute involved two sets of co-owners of a Kentucky limited liability company operating a pharmacy. In 2019, the Dotsons acquired a 50 percent ownership interest from the Ingrams, with a promissory note and security agreement (the “Ingram debt”), making the Dotsons and the Andersons equal owners. In 2023, the Andersons and the LLC filed suit against the Dotsons, who counterclaimed. In early 2024, the parties participated in a mediation and reached a settlement agreement, which was recorded on video during a Zoom call. The mediator recited the terms, including payment arrangements and asset/debt allocations, and the parties affirmed the terms verbally. Subsequently, disputes arose regarding the nature of the Ingram debt (whether corporate or personal), leading both sides to refuse to fulfill their respective payment obligations. The Rowan Circuit Court, after a hearing, found the settlement agreement valid, enforceable, and unambiguous. The court determined the Ingram debt was personal to the Dotsons and not assumed by the Andersons, and held that the agreement did not violate Kentucky’s Statute of Frauds. The court did not address the applicability of Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 99.10. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed and concluded that the requirements of CR 99.10 were satisfied. On discretionary review, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals. It held that a video recording of an oral settlement agreement, where parties knowingly affirm the terms, constitutes a valid “electronic record” and “electronic signature” under the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act and satisfies the Statute of Frauds and CR 99.10. The court also found the settlement terms unambiguous and complete, and that the parties mutually assented to them. Issues of alleged breach of contract were deemed premature and not addressed. View "DOTSON V. CIA DRUG, LLC" on Justia Law

Dept. of Fish & Wildlife v. Super. Ct.

2026-09-23T15:01:32-08:00

Following significant property damage due to a rainstorm in January 2023, several local government entities in Merced County, including the City of Merced and a school district, filed suit against the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (CDFW). They alleged that the CDFW’s restrictions on cleaning and maintaining waterways contributed to flooding that caused the damage. Subsequent to this initial complaint, other parties—including homeowners, businesses, and insurers—filed related actions against CDFW, the City, and the County. These cases were ultimately consolidated in Merced County Superior Court. After consolidation, CDFW became the sole nonresident defendant in the case. In late 2025, CDFW sought to transfer the venue out of Merced County, citing Code of Civil Procedure sections 394 and 397, which generally allow for venue changes to guard against local prejudice in actions involving local government plaintiffs and nonresident defendants. The plaintiffs opposed the motion, and the Superior Court of Merced County ruled that venue was proper in Merced County under Government Code section 955.3, which specifically governs actions brought by local agencies against the State of California. The court also found CDFW’s motion untimely. CDFW then petitioned the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, for a writ of mandate to overturn the trial court’s denial of the motion to transfer venue. The Court of Appeal denied the petition, holding that Government Code section 955.3 expressly provides that such actions may be tried in the county where the local government plaintiff is situated, notwithstanding any other provision of law. The court concluded that section 955.3 supersedes section 394 and that the Attorney General’s ability to seek a venue change under section 397 is limited to a pre-answer motion, which was not made here. The stay previously issued was lifted, and costs were awarded to the real parties in interest. View "Dept. of Fish & Wildlife v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Wilson v. Johnson

2026-09-22T11:02:01-08:00

The case involved a personal injury claim filed by the plaintiff against the defendants in Los Angeles County Superior Court. The main issue was whether the action was "brought to trial" within the statutory period required by California law, which mandates dismissal if a civil case is not brought to trial within five years (plus a COVID-19 emergency extension). As the deadline approached, several panels of prospective jurors were assembled and sworn in by the trial court, and the court conducted hardship excusals. However, the parties did not begin their voir dire examination of the sworn juror panels before the deadline expired. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County dismissed the action with prejudice under Code of Civil Procedure section 583.360, concluding the matter was not "brought to trial" by the deadline. The trial court reasoned that jury selection had not sufficiently commenced because the parties had not yet started their voir dire examination of the juror panels. The plaintiff appealed this dismissal. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that, consistent with Stueve v. Nemer, a civil action is "brought to trial" when a panel of prospective jurors assembles in the courtroom for voir dire and is sworn in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 232, subdivision (a). The court determined that the action was timely "brought to trial" on the date the panels were sworn, regardless of whether the parties' examination of the jurors had begun. The court reversed the judgment of dismissal, finding it was error to dismiss the case since the statutory requirements were met when the jury panels were assembled and sworn before the deadline. The plaintiff was awarded costs on appeal. View "Wilson v. Johnson" on Justia Law

DiFronzo v. City of Somerville

2026-09-21T13:30:03-08:00

A police officer in Somerville, Massachusetts was terminated from his position following alleged misconduct connected to his use of an informant, which ultimately resulted in the informant attacking a third party. The officer did not initially disclose all relevant information during the investigation of the attack. After further internal investigation and public accusations, including statements made by city officials to the press, the officer was officially terminated. He challenged his termination by both pursuing arbitration under the police union’s collective bargaining agreement and by filing a civil suit, alleging his termination was retaliatory and violated his constitutional rights, as well as state law regarding interference with advantageous relations. While the lawsuit was pending, an arbitrator ordered his reinstatement but denied him back pay. Following this, the mayor placed the officer on paid administrative leave, which affected his ability to earn overtime and additional compensation. The case was first filed in Middlesex Superior Court and then removed to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The district judge allowed the officer to seek damages at trial not only for the termination but also for being placed on paid leave after reinstatement, even though the officer never amended his complaint to include this post-arbitration event as a basis for liability. The district court permitted the jury to award damages for both the termination and the paid-leave decision, over the defendants’ repeated objections. Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded that the district court erred in allowing the jury to award damages based on the paid-leave decision. The appellate court held that, absent an amended complaint or the defendants’ consent, new factual bases for liability such as the paid-leave decision could not be considered at trial. The First Circuit reversed the damages awarded for the paid-leave decision and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "DiFronzo v. City of Somerville" on Justia Law

ABRAHAM v ARIZONA BOARD OF REGENTS

2026-09-18T11:01:25-08:00

A tenured professor at the University of Arizona, concerned about adherence to an anti-discrimination constitutional amendment in university hiring, submitted a series of public records requests to the university. These requests sought data and documents related to survey results used in hiring, as well as information about appointment and selection processes for certain positions. The university partially complied, providing some records, redacting or withholding others, and denying access to an audio recording of a committee meeting, citing confidentiality. The university later destroyed the recording after offering the professor a chance to listen without copying, which he declined. Following repeated, unsuccessful requests, the professor’s attorney sent a demand letter, prompting the university to release additional records, though some remained withheld or redacted. The professor filed a Special Action Complaint in the Superior Court in Pima County against the Arizona Board of Regents (ABOR), alleging wrongful denial of records and seeking damages and attorney fees. The Superior Court dismissed some counts as time-barred or for failure to state a claim, held a bench trial, and denied relief on remaining counts. The court found the university had eventually provided nearly all requested records and cured any prior abuse of discretion. It denied the professor’s request for attorney fees, reasoning that such fees could not be awarded if the public entity had complied before litigation commenced. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that destruction of requested records amounted to a denial, but the professor was not entitled to damages or fees absent a timely notice of claim and that the trial court’s review of withheld records should combine de novo and abuse-of-discretion standards. The Supreme Court of Arizona reversed, holding that courts must review de novo an agency’s determination of statutory exemptions and the withholding or redacting of specific documents. The Court also held that destruction of a record after a request constitutes denial of access under the Public Records Law. Finally, the Court determined that “substantially prevailed” for attorney fees includes the requester’s overall success throughout the dispute, not just post-litigation results. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "ABRAHAM v ARIZONA BOARD OF REGENTS" on Justia Law

Commw. of Ky. v. Express Scripts, Inc.

2026-09-18T09:00:12-08:00

The Commonwealth of Kentucky initiated a lawsuit against several pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) and related entities, asserting that these firms contributed to the opioid crisis in Kentucky by conspiring with drug manufacturers to increase opioid supply. Kentucky alleged the PBMs negotiated with drug companies to give opioids preferred placement on formularies in exchange for rebates and fees, thus violating state consumer protection laws and creating a public nuisance. The PBMs served both federal and commercial clients, including federal workers under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act, TRICARE members, and Veterans Health Administration beneficiaries. Following removal of the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky by the PBMs under the federal officer removal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1442), Kentucky sought to remand the case to state court, arguing its complaint disclaimed liability for conduct undertaken at the direction of federal officers. The district court granted Kentucky’s motion to remand. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. Relying on its prior decision in Ohio ex rel. Yost v. Ascent Health Services, LLC, and similar decisions from other circuits, the Sixth Circuit determined the PBMs acted under federal officers when administering federal health benefits and that Kentucky’s claims related to conduct performed under federal supervision. The court found the PBMs had raised colorable federal defenses, including immunity and preemption under federal statutes governing federal health plans, TRICARE, ERISA, and Medicare Part D. The court concluded that Kentucky’s complaint targeted indivisible conduct relating to federal duties, so the PBMs met the requirements for removal under § 1442. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s remand order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Commw. of Ky. v. Express Scripts, Inc." on Justia Law

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC V. BALDWIN

2026-09-17T08:30:43-08:00

Two American entrepreneurs established three international corporations to invest in the casino and gaming industry in Laos. Two of these corporations became involved in disputes with the Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), resulting in multiple arbitration proceedings in Singapore. The tribunals issued monetary awards in favor of Lao PDR against the two companies. Lao PDR tried to collect the awards through various means, including contacting corporate officers, filing suits abroad, and pursuing enforcement actions in U.S. courts. After an unsuccessful attempt in Idaho, Lao PDR filed a petition in the United States District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands to enforce the arbitral awards, asserting that the entrepreneurs and their third corporation, Bridge Capital, were alter egos of the award-debtor corporations and should also be liable. The District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands granted a joint motion by Baldwin and Bridge Capital to dismiss the petition, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to enforce the awards against parties not named as debtors in the arbitral awards. The court reasoned that Lao PDR would need to bring a separate action to pursue enforcement against alleged alter egos. The court stayed a similar motion by Scott pending the present appeal. Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 203 because the awards arose from a commercial, international relationship and were foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention. The appellate court determined that the district court was required to consider the merits of Lao PDR’s alter ego theory in a single enforcement proceeding, rather than requiring a separate action. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "THE GOVERNMENT OF THE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC V. BALDWIN" on Justia Law

In re Petition of Industrial Tower and Wireless LLC

2026-09-17T08:14:27-08:00

A telecommunications developer sought approval to construct a wireless tower near Lake Willoughby in Westmore, Vermont. Residents of the town, referred to as neighbors, opposed the project, raising concerns about the tower’s impact on aesthetics and its compliance with the Town Plan. The developer filed a petition with the Vermont Public Utility Commission (PUC) for a Certificate of Public Good (CPG). The PUC hearing officer deemed the petition administratively complete and set deadlines for intervention and public comment. Neighbors were permitted to intervene, focusing on aesthetic impact and municipal plan compliance. The Town Planning Commission and Selectboard submitted comments both within and after the deadline, expressing mixed views about the tower’s conformity with the Town Plan. The Planning Commission’s late motion for party status and subsequent comments were denied by the hearing officer for untimeliness, citing procedural rules. The PUC excluded comments filed after the deadline and held an evidentiary hearing on the merits. The hearing officer recommended granting the CPG, and the PUC adopted this recommendation in its final order. Neighbors’ motion for reconsideration was denied, and they appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court. The Planning Commission and Selectboard did not appeal. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the PUC’s decision. It held that neighbors lacked standing to challenge the exclusion of the Planning Commission and Selectboard’s late comments, as they could not assert procedural injury on behalf of the town. The Court found that the PUC gave the required substantial deference to the Town Plan, concluding the tower did not violate clear community standards. The Court also determined that the PUC properly applied the Quechee test in its aesthetics analysis, considering all vantage points and finding the tower’s visibility limited and not offensive to the average viewer. The PUC’s findings and legal conclusions were upheld as rational and supported by the record. View "In re Petition of Industrial Tower and Wireless LLC" on Justia Law