U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit - Justia Case Law Summaries

TRACKTIME, LLC v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC

2026-07-02T06:01:58-08:00

TrackTime, LLC owned two patents claiming methods and systems for navigating within multimedia files on a mobile device using a time-correlated transcript. The patents described creating a synchronization index that allows users to tap on text to play corresponding multimedia segments and to annotate and share transcripts. TrackTime sued Amazon.com Services LLC and Audible, Inc. for patent infringement in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, asserting claims from both patents. In the District of Delaware, the court ruled on two sets of claims. For the ’978 patent, the court construed certain limitations as means-plus-function terms under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) and found the claims indefinite due to insufficient structural disclosure in the specification, leading to a holding of invalidity. For the ’638 patent, a jury trial was held focusing on claim 9. The jury found claim 9 not infringed and invalid for anticipation, as well as for other grounds. TrackTime’s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial were denied. Final judgment was entered accordingly. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. For the ’978 patent, the court found that further analysis was needed regarding whether the “executable program code” limitations should be considered means-plus-function terms under § 112(f), especially in light of intervening precedent from Dyfan, LLC v. Target Corp. The court vacated the district court’s indefiniteness ruling and remanded for further proceedings. For the ’638 patent, the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of invalidity for anticipation, holding there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find claim 9 anticipated by LiveNote and affirming the denial of post-trial motions. The disposition was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "TRACKTIME, LLC v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC " on Justia Law

OTSUKA AMERICA PHARMACEUTICAL, INC. v. HETERO LABS LIMITED

2026-07-01T06:32:06-08:00

Otsuka America Pharmaceutical and its subsidiary own a patent covering a method for treating pseudobulbar affect and emotional lability by administering dextromethorphan with quinidine. Their branded drug, Nuedexta, combines these substances in their salt forms. After the FDA approved Hetero Labs’ generic version, which uses identical salt forms and amounts, Hetero announced plans to launch its product. Otsuka responded by filing suit in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, seeking a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to block Hetero’s market entry. The District Court for the District of Delaware first issued a temporary restraining order, then granted a preliminary injunction, preventing Hetero from selling its generic drug. The court found Otsuka likely to succeed in proving patent infringement and determined that equitable factors favored the injunction. It also waived the requirement for Otsuka to post a bond pending appeal, citing strong equities in Otsuka’s favor. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s interpretation of the patent claim terms “dextromethorphan” and “quinidine” as including both the free base and salt forms administered to patients, rather than only the active moiety. This construction meant that Hetero’s generic product infringed the patent. The Federal Circuit also held that the district court acted within its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. However, it vacated the district court’s waiver of the Rule 65(c) bond requirement, finding that such waivers are extremely rare in cases involving commercial activity, and remanded the issue for reconsideration. Thus, the preliminary injunction was affirmed but the bond waiver was vacated and remanded. View "OTSUKA AMERICA PHARMACEUTICAL, INC. v. HETERO LABS LIMITED " on Justia Law

LOVERIDGE v. US

2026-06-30T07:02:25-08:00

Three property owners in Oregon alleged that the federal government committed a taking of their property rights under the Fifth Amendment when the Surface Transportation Board (STB) issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use or Abandonment (NITU) involving a railroad corridor that crossed their properties. The corridor, previously used for freight trains by the Port of Tillamook Bay Railroad (POTB), was also leased to the Oregon Coast Scenic Railroad (OCSR), which operated a scenic passenger-excursion service both before and after the NITU was issued. After severe storm damage in 2007, POTB ceased freight operations, but OCSR continued using the corridor under its lease, which extended at least until 2026. The United States Court of Federal Claims previously found that a taking had occurred due to the issuance of the NITU. The case then proceeded to a valuation phase to determine just compensation. The Court of Federal Claims ruled that the property owners did not meet their burden to prove that the NITU caused a reduction in the fair market value of their land. The court found that the “before” condition for valuation properly included OCSR’s ongoing operations, and that the property owners failed to show an actual market value loss resulting from the NITU and the new trail-use easement. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of Federal Claims’ judgment. The Federal Circuit held that the “before” condition for compensation must reflect the ongoing encumbrance of the scenic railroad’s operations, as the lease and use by OCSR would have existed regardless of the NITU. The court also concluded that the property owners had not proven with reasonable certainty any diminution in market value attributable to the NITU or the trail easement, and thus were not entitled to compensation. The judgment was affirmed. View "LOVERIDGE v. US " on Justia Law

HAMP'S CONSTRUCTION LLC v. SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

2026-06-30T06:32:30-08:00

This case centers on a contractor’s claim for a Type I differing site condition relating to a flood control project in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana. The United States Army Corps of Engineers issued a solicitation for work on the Trapp Canal, which included boring logs and cross-sections of the canal but lacked specific information about the southwest bank. Hamp’s Construction LLC, after being awarded the contract, encountered unexpected bank failures in the southwest quadrant, resulting in unsafe conditions for land-based equipment and significant delays. Hamp’s Construction submitted a request for equitable adjustment and later a formal claim, asserting that the conditions encountered were materially different from those indicated in the contract documents. The contracting officer denied Hamp’s Construction’s request and subsequent claim, concluding there was insufficient proof of a differing site condition under the relevant Federal Acquisition Regulation clause. Hamp’s Construction appealed to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals. After a hearing, the Board found that although Hamp’s Construction had faced unforeseen difficulties and increased costs, the contract documents did not provide representations or indications about the subsurface conditions of the southwest bank. The Board emphasized the absence of boring logs or explicit information for the area where the failures occurred and denied the appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence. The court held that, for a Type I differing site condition claim, the contract must affirmatively indicate conditions at the disputed site. The court determined that Hamp’s Construction could not reasonably rely on contract documents as indications for the southwest bank. The court affirmed the Board’s decision, holding that Hamp’s Construction failed to establish a threshold element of a Type I differing site condition claim. View "HAMP'S CONSTRUCTION LLC v. SECRETARY OF THE ARMY" on Justia Law

JACKSON v. COLLINS

2026-06-26T06:32:17-08:00

The case concerns an attorney who represented a veteran in seeking disability benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The veteran originally filed a claim in 2007 for a bilateral hip disability and received a rating in 2008, which was later increased. In 2018, the Board issued a final denial for a higher rating for the left hip, which was not appealed and thus became final. In 2021, after the veteran underwent left hip replacement surgery, the attorney assisted with a new claim, resulting in a significantly increased rating and an award of past-due benefits. The attorney sought fees from this award, arguing that her work fell within the statutory scheme permitting attorney’s fees for representation after notice of the agency’s initial decision. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied the attorney’s request for fees, reasoning that the December 2021 rating decision was the initial decision for the increased rating claim, and since the attorney had not performed compensable work after that decision, she was not entitled to fees under 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1). The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed, concluding that the September 2021 claim for increased compensation was a new claim, not part of the same “case” as the original 2007 claim, and thus the attorney’s work prior to the December 2021 decision was not compensable. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the matter de novo and affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision. The court held that, for purposes of attorney’s fees under § 5904(c)(1), a new claim for increased disability based on new evidence and circumstances is not part of the same “case” as the original claim. The attorney was not entitled to fees for work performed prior to the December 2021 rating decision. The judgment was affirmed. View "JACKSON v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

ENANTA PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. v. PFIZER INC.

2026-06-23T05:01:57-08:00

Enanta Pharmaceuticals owned a patent directed to certain chemical compounds and methods for inhibiting coronavirus replication. The patent claimed priority to an earlier provisional application filed in July 2020. In the original provisional application, the relevant chemical group was described as containing two to twelve carbon atoms, while in the later patent, the range was changed to include one to twelve carbon atoms. Before the non-provisional patent was filed, Pfizer publicly disclosed a compound that fell within the scope of Enanta’s later patent claims. Enanta filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, asserting that Pfizer’s product infringed its patent. Pfizer countered that the patent was invalid because its public disclosure anticipated the patent claims, and argued that Enanta’s patent could not claim priority to the earlier provisional application since the specific chemical group was not adequately supported in the provisional filing. The district court granted summary judgment in Pfizer’s favor, concluding that the change from two to one carbon atoms was not a correctable typographical error, and that the patent could not claim the earlier priority date. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that the provisional application did not provide written description support for the later patent’s claims, specifically the inclusion of the one-carbon group, and thus the patent was not entitled to the earlier priority date. As a result, Pfizer’s disclosure anticipated all claims of Enanta’s patent, rendering them invalid. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. View "ENANTA PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. v. PFIZER INC. " on Justia Law

JACOBSON v. US

2026-06-18T07:32:19-08:00

Elizabeth Jacobson, a former Wells Fargo mortgage loan officer, filed a whistleblower declaration with the U.S. Attorney General under the Financial Institutions Anti-Fraud Enforcement Act of 1990 (FIAFEA), alleging that Wells Fargo engaged in fraudulent origination of “stated income” loans between 2005 and 2007. The Department of Justice investigated and determined her declaration was deficient, citing the absence of new factual elements, her admitted participation in the alleged conduct, and that the allegations were already publicly disclosed. Subsequently, the government reached a substantial settlement with Wells Fargo over related allegations. Jacobson challenged the Attorney General’s determination in the United States Court of Federal Claims, arguing she was entitled to a share of the settlement under FIAFEA and asserting that the statutory bar on judicial review violated her due process rights. The government moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, invoking FIAFEA’s express provision precluding judicial review of the Attorney General’s actions except for failure to provide required notification. The Court of Federal Claims granted the motion, holding it lacked jurisdiction to review the Attorney General’s determinations regarding Jacobson’s eligibility for a whistleblower award. The court also rejected her constitutional argument, finding no jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The court held that FIAFEA’s statutory language provided a clear and convincing indication that Congress intended to bar judicial review of the Attorney General’s determinations regarding whistleblower declarations, except for notification failures not at issue in this case. The Federal Circuit also held that the lower court was not required to determine whether FIAFEA is money-mandating before dismissing for lack of jurisdiction and found no Tucker Act jurisdiction over Jacobson’s due process claim. View "JACOBSON v. US " on Justia Law

IRONBURG INVENTIONS LTD. v. VALVE CORPORATION

2026-06-18T07:32:18-08:00

Ironburg Inventions Ltd. owns a patent for a video game controller featuring additional, resilient controls on the back of the device. Ironburg alleged that Valve Corporation’s Steam Controller infringed several claims of this patent. Valve responded by filing an inter partes review (IPR) petition in 2016 challenging the patent, and later amended its invalidity contentions in district court proceedings to include new grounds based on prior art references that had been asserted by a third party, Collective Minds Gaming Co. Ltd., in a separate IPR. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted Ironburg’s motion for IPR estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2), barring Valve from asserting two invalidity grounds—one based on the Kotkin reference and another combining Willner, Koji, and Raymond—finding they could have been discovered by a skilled searcher conducting a diligent search. After a jury verdict for Ironburg and an initial appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, instructing the district court to place the burden on Ironburg and to evaluate whether the grounds were reasonably discoverable. On remand, the district court again estopped Valve from raising both grounds. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the evidence and found that the district court erred. Specifically, the district court relied on insufficient evidence to estop the Kotkin ground, as the search results from Valve’s agent included thousands of references without further narrowing. For the Willner-Koji-Raymond ground, the district court failed to properly account for hindsight bias in the evidence presented. The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s estoppel rulings and remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion, instructing the district court to reconsider the invalidity of the patent in light of both grounds. View "IRONBURG INVENTIONS LTD. v. VALVE CORPORATION " on Justia Law

INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES v. MULLIN

2026-06-05T06:32:06-08:00

The plaintiff is an advocacy organization focused on labor rights, which submitted several petitions to the United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP). These petitions requested CBP to investigate whether cocoa and cocoa products imported from Côte d’Ivoire were produced using forced child labor, in violation of section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930. The organization provided extensive evidence, including government reports and firsthand accounts, to support its claims. Despite CBP initiating an investigation and corresponding at various points, no enforcement action, such as a Withhold Release Order, was issued. After years without a definitive response, the organization submitted supplemental petitions with new evidence and eventually filed suit, alleging that CBP unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed action on its petitions. The United States Court of International Trade reviewed the complaint and granted the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, specifically finding that the advocacy organization failed to establish organizational standing. The court determined that the plaintiff did not demonstrate a concrete and demonstrable injury to its activities, as required for Article III standing. The plaintiff appealed this decision, arguing that it suffered financial harm and was denied effective tools for pursuing its mission. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit considered the appeal, applying a de novo standard of review to the dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court held that the plaintiff had not established a concrete injury sufficient for standing, reasoning that the organization’s expenditure of resources to advocate for government action did not constitute a legally cognizable harm. The court also found that the mere denial of a procedural tool was insufficient to confer standing. Therefore, the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal by the Court of International Trade for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES v. MULLIN " on Justia Law

HAFEMAN v. GOOGLE LLC

2026-06-05T06:32:06-08:00

The dispute centers on three patents owned by the appellant, which describe a method for displaying information to facilitate the return of lost or stolen computers. The patented method involves powering on a computer and automatically displaying a screen with return information, either before or alongside the lock screen, and includes the ability to remotely initiate or change the displayed information without assistance from a user with the computer. The appellant alleged that certain devices sold by LG Electronics, featuring Google or Microsoft’s “Find My Device” software, infringed these patents. Following the appellant’s lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Google and Microsoft initiated six inter partes review (IPR) proceedings before the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), contesting the validity of the patents based on prior art. The PTAB instituted review despite the appellant’s arguments referencing a parallel district court action and concerns about duplicative proceedings. LG, named as a real party in interest, filed a “Sotera stipulation,” agreeing not to pursue in district court any grounds raised in the IPRs, which the PTAB considered in its decision to institute review. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the PTAB’s final written decisions, which found all challenged claims unpatentable. The Federal Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review challenges tied to the PTAB’s institution decision, specifically regarding the impact of LG’s violation of the Sotera stipulation. On the merits, the court affirmed the PTAB’s construction of the “without assistance” claim limitation, finding no error and concluding that the prior art disclosed the disputed method. The court also determined that the PTAB’s analysis of secondary considerations of non-obviousness was supported by substantial evidence. The court dismissed the appeal in part and affirmed in part, awarding costs against the appellant. View "HAFEMAN v. GOOGLE LLC " on Justia Law

GREENIDGE v. COLLINS

2026-06-05T06:32:05-08:00

A veteran who served during the Vietnam Era was awarded service connection for PTSD in 1993, effective from May 1991, with a 10% disability rating. In 2019, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals found clear and unmistakable error in the earlier decision and granted an earlier effective date of May 1983. The Board remanded the claim to the regional office to implement the earlier date and determine whether a higher rating was warranted. After the regional office denied a higher rating in a supplemental statement of the case, the Board preemptively issued its own denial before the veteran filed a required notice of disagreement. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims reviewed the Board’s action after the appellant argued the Board lacked jurisdiction, seeking vacatur and remand. The government conceded the Board lacked jurisdiction but argued for vacatur and dismissal, not remand. The Veterans Court vacated the Board’s decision and dismissed the appeal, concluding it lacked jurisdiction since no notice of disagreement had been filed. The court emphasized the veteran had a separate, properly noticed appeal pending regarding the merits of the regional office’s denial, and thus removed the ultra vires Board decision as an obstacle. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed whether the veteran qualified as a “prevailing party” under the Equal Access to Justice Act for purposes of seeking attorney’s fees. The Federal Circuit held that vacatur of the ultra vires Board decision materially altered the legal relationship between the parties and constituted success on the merits of the judicial review action, conferring prevailing party status. The court reversed the Veterans Court’s denial of fees and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "GREENIDGE v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD. v. ECOBEE TECHNOLOGIES ULC

2026-06-04T06:31:26-08:00

A dispute arose between two companies over patents related to wireless communications for building automation systems. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s smart thermostat products infringed four patents, which addressed improvements in wireless network architecture, power and bandwidth usage, and data redundancy within building control systems. At trial, a jury found that the defendant had infringed at least one of the asserted patents (without specifying which), determined that the claims of one patent were not limited to well-understood or routine technology, found another patent’s claims invalid, and awarded the plaintiff lump sum damages. In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, the defendant moved to dismiss based on patent ineligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, but the court denied these motions for the patents at issue, except for one where factual disputes precluded summary judgment. The court also denied the defendant’s post-trial motions, including challenges to the verdict form, jury instructions related to patent eligibility, and motions to exclude expert testimony. The plaintiff, in turn, appealed the district court’s limitation on prejudgment interest. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the district court’s verdict form, which combined all asserted patents into a single infringement question, violated the defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict. The appellate court vacated both the infringement and damages judgments and remanded for a new trial on those issues. The court also vacated and remanded the § 101 eligibility determination for one patent, requiring further proceedings under the Alice framework. However, the court affirmed the district court’s findings that the asserted claims of two other patents were not directed to abstract ideas and that substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict of infringement on one patent. Remaining evidentiary and interest issues were dismissed as moot. View "OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD. v. ECOBEE TECHNOLOGIES ULC " on Justia Law

AGI SURETRACK LLC v. FARMERS EDGE INC.

2026-06-02T06:01:52-08:00

AGI SureTrack LLC brought suit against Farmers Edge Inc. and its U.S. subsidiary, alleging infringement of several patents relating to automated systems and methods for capturing, processing, and sharing farming data. The core patented technology involved using a relay device with generic computer components to collect real-time data from various farming equipment, process this information, and share it via an online exchange. The patent claims described a system using a microprocessor, bus connector, GPS receiver, and memory storage, together with software that records and interprets data from farming implements. The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska granted summary judgment in favor of Farmers Edge. The court found that the asserted patent claims were directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Specifically, the court concluded that the claims merely used generic computer components to collect and process data and did not constitute an inventive concept. The district court also ruled that the case was not exceptional and denied Farmers Edge’s request for attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed both AGI’s challenge to the finding of patent ineligibility and Farmers Edge’s cross-appeal regarding exceptionality. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that the asserted patents were not patent-eligible, holding that the claims were directed to an abstract idea and lacked any inventive concept beyond conventional technology. However, the appellate court vacated the district court’s summary determination that the case was not exceptional, finding the lower court failed to provide adequate reasoning or allow both parties to present argument on the issue. The case was remanded for further proceedings on exceptionality and attorney’s fees. View "AGI SURETRACK LLC v. FARMERS EDGE INC. " on Justia Law

EREGLI DEMIR VE CELIK FABRIKALARI T.A.S. v. ITC

2026-06-01T05:31:25-08:00

A Turkish steel producer was subject to an antidumping-duty order issued in 2016 after the U.S. Department of Commerce found that two Turkish firms, including the appellant, were dumping hot-rolled steel products in the U.S., and the International Trade Commission (ITC) determined that these imports caused material injury to the U.S. industry. The appellant did not challenge the ITC’s injury determination at that time, but both Turkish firms challenged the Commerce dumping determination in the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT). In 2020, Commerce found that the other Turkish firm’s dumping margin was zero, leading to its exclusion from the antidumping order. After the exclusion, the appellant sought relief from the ITC, arguing that Turkish imports were now negligible, and requested: (1) reconsideration of the 2016 injury finding, (2) a changed-circumstances review (CCR), and (3) revocation of the order through a five-year sunset review. The ITC denied reconsideration and the CCR, and in the sunset review decided not to revoke the order. The appellant then filed three separate actions in the CIT to challenge these denials. The CIT sustained the ITC’s refusal to revoke the order in the sunset review, finding the ITC properly relied on its final, unchallenged 2016 injury determination and that the sunset review was forward-looking. The CIT also dismissed the CCR claim, holding that the sunset review provided all the relief a CCR could have provided. Finally, the CIT dismissed the challenge to the denial of reconsideration for lack of jurisdiction, because the appellant could have brought a timely action under the proper statute in 2016. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed all three CIT judgments, holding that the ITC’s actions and the CIT’s dismissals were correct under the law and statutory framework. View "EREGLI DEMIR VE CELIK FABRIKALARI T.A.S. v. ITC " on Justia Law

VETERANS LEGAL ADVOCACY GROUP v. COLLINS

2026-06-01T05:01:22-08:00

A legal advocacy organization petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to update its mailing addresses, alleging that the VA continued to send correspondence to incorrect addresses despite repeated notifications of changes. The petitioner requested court intervention to ensure the VA updated its address records, ceased sending correspondence to wrong addresses, and imposed financial penalties for future errors. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims dismissed the petition as moot after the VA voluntarily corrected the addresses and created a policy to guide attorneys on updating their addresses. The VA also provided affidavits and a fact sheet to confirm these corrections. The petitioner subsequently sought attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), asserting that the Veterans Court’s order requiring affidavits constituted the necessary “judicial imprimatur” for prevailing-party status. The Veterans Court denied the application, relying on Cavaciuti v. McDonough, and found there was no court-mandated decision on the merits and no material alteration to the parties’ legal relationship. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed whether the Veterans Court erred in denying attorney fees under EAJA. The Federal Circuit held that a court order requiring a party only to confirm voluntary corrective actions for the purpose of assessing mootness does not constitute sufficient judicial imprimatur to confer prevailing-party status under EAJA. The court found that the Veterans Court’s order did not address the merits of the petition or alter the legal relationship between the parties. The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the Veterans Court’s denial of the EAJA application. View "VETERANS LEGAL ADVOCACY GROUP v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

INSULET CORP. v. EOFLOW, CO. LTD.

2026-05-28T06:03:04-08:00

A medical device company that manufactures an adhesive, wearable insulin patch pump alleged that a competitor misappropriated trade secrets and infringed patents. The competitor had hired several former employees of the company, including a director who had extensive knowledge of the company’s product design and development. The alleged misappropriation occurred in 2018, when this former director provided design files and technical information to the competitor as it developed a second-generation insulin patch pump. The case was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, which bifurcated the trade secret and patent claims. The company moved for a preliminary injunction, which the district court granted, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed that decision in Insulet Corp. v. EOFlow, Co. (“Insulet I”), finding that the district court had not properly analyzed the statute of limitations and other elements. On remand, the district court denied both sides’ summary judgment motions on the statute of limitations for the trade secret misappropriation claim, and the matter proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff on four trade secrets, found the claims timely, awarded damages, and the district court entered judgment, imposed joint and several liability, and issued a permanent injunction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. It held that it had jurisdiction because the patent claims had been effectively dismissed with prejudice due to the expiration of the statute of limitations for at least one alleged infringing act. On the merits, the Federal Circuit held that, under the applicable statute of limitations standard, the evidence established the plaintiff knew or should have known of the alleged misappropriation more than three years before filing suit. The Court found the claims time-barred and reversed the judgment. View "INSULET CORP. v. EOFLOW, CO. LTD. " on Justia Law

CHAFIN v. OPM

2026-05-27T05:34:35-08:00

The petitioner began working as an Operational Support Technician with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Miramar, Florida, in 1987. Her duties required her physical presence at the office, and she commuted daily from her home. In December 2016, she was found to have engaged in workplace misconduct—specifically, being under the influence while on duty—and was removed from her position in July 2018. In April 2019, she applied for Federal Employees’ Retirement System (FERS) disability retirement benefits, claiming that recurring seizures prevented her from commuting to work and performing the essential duties of her position. The Office of Personnel Management denied her application and subsequent request for reconsideration, determining that she had not established that her medical condition rendered her unable to provide “useful and efficient service” in her position. The petitioner appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board. An administrative judge affirmed OPM’s determination, finding insufficient evidence that she was unable to perform the essential functions of her job. The judge also rejected her argument that her inability to commute, due to seizures and lack of transportation options, should be considered in assessing her disability status. The full Board adopted the administrative judge’s findings. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s final decision. The court held that, under 5 U.S.C. § 8451(a)(1)(B), the statutory definition of disability for FERS benefits does not include an employee’s ability to commute; only the refusal of reassignment to a position within the commuting area is governed by such considerations under § 8451(a)(2)(A). The court also ruled that it is statutorily barred from reviewing factual determinations underlying OPM’s disability findings. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision. View "CHAFIN v. OPM " on Justia Law

VERSATA SOFTWARE, LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY

2026-05-22T06:02:56-08:00

Ford retained Versata to develop specialized software to manage its vehicle configuration processes, resulting in two main products: Automotive Configuration Manager (ACM) and Materials Cost Analytics (MCA). The parties entered into a licensing agreement in 2004, which eventually expired in 2014 without renewal. Ford then released its own software, PDO, which Versata alleged incorporated its proprietary trade secrets from ACM and MCA. Disputes arose when Ford sought a declaratory judgment of non-infringement and non-misappropriation, while Versata counterclaimed, alleging trade secret misappropriation under the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) and the Michigan Uniform Trade Secrets Act (MUTSA), as well as breach of contract. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan excluded Versata’s damages expert’s testimony regarding trade secret damages, limiting Versata to a reasonable royalty model based solely on the parties’ prior licensing history. At trial, the jury found Ford liable for misappropriating three ACM trade secrets and breaching the licensing agreement, awarding Versata $22,386,000 for trade secret misappropriation and $82,260,000 for breach of contract. However, the district court subsequently reduced these awards: it set trade secret damages to zero, citing insufficient evidence regarding the time required for Ford to independently develop the misappropriated trade secrets, and reduced breach of contract damages to $3, finding Versata’s evidence insufficient to support the jury’s calculation. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment on trade secret damages and remanded for a new trial, holding that Versata was entitled to seek unjust enrichment damages under both the DTSA and MUTSA, and that the district court erred in precluding consideration of alternative damages models. The Federal Circuit also reversed the reduction of the breach of contract damages, reinstating the jury’s $82,260,000 award, and affirmed the denial of Ford’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on trade secret misappropriation liability. View "VERSATA SOFTWARE, LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY " on Justia Law

A.L.M. HOLDING COMPANY v. ZYDEX INDUSTRIES PRIVATE LTD.

2026-05-19T07:03:18-08:00

Two companies, both joint owners of several patents related to warm-mix asphalt paving, entered into a licensing agreement in 2008 granting an exclusive, worldwide, royalty-bearing license to another company (and, after a reorganization, its successor). The agreement allowed the licensee to manufacture, use, sell, and sublicense the patented products, but required that sublicensing terms be subject to the patent owners’ prior review and approval (not to be unreasonably withheld). The patent owners retained certain rights, including the right to sue for infringement (with shared or independent control depending on the circumstances), receive royalties, and veto sublicenses. The patent owners also kept limited rights to practice the invention for research and to use products purchased from the licensee. In 2024, the patent owners sued two defendants, alleging infringement of the six patents. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of Article III standing. The United States District Court for the District of Delaware granted the motion, finding that the patent owners had transferred away all exclusionary rights through the license, and that their retained right to sue was not sufficient for constitutional standing. The district court relied on previous decisions holding that a bare right to sue, separated from other substantial patent rights, did not confer standing. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed. The Federal Circuit held that the patent owners retained an exclusionary right sufficient for Article III standing, namely the right to sue for infringement that was not rendered illusory by the licensee’s rights. The court concluded that the combination of the right to sue, the right to veto sublicenses, and the continuing royalty interest demonstrated a concrete, non-illusory exclusionary interest. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "A.L.M. HOLDING COMPANY v. ZYDEX INDUSTRIES PRIVATE LTD. " on Justia Law

DAVIS v. COLLINS

2026-05-19T06:33:34-08:00

The appellant, a veteran who served in the Marine Corps from 1983 to 1987, sought service-connected disability benefits for several conditions, including PTSD, migraine headaches, and frostbite injuries to his hands and feet. Over the years, he received increasing ratings for these conditions and was awarded special monthly compensation (SMC) at the (l) rate for aid and attendance needs due to PTSD. In April 2020, he filed a notice of disagreement regarding a VA regional office decision. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals later granted him additional SMC awards, including at the (o) and (r) rates, for combinations of his disabilities, but did not assign effective dates for these new awards, instead leaving that determination to the regional office. Following a joint motion for partial remand, the Board reconsidered and again awarded the additional SMC ratings but still withheld assigning effective dates. The appellant challenged this before the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, arguing the Board was required to decide the effective dates for the new SMC awards. The Veterans Court concluded that determining the effective date for an SMC award is a separate, downstream issue from entitlement and that the Board was not required to decide this issue when awarding SMC. Therefore, it dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and held that the Veterans Court did not commit legal error in its jurisdictional determination. The Federal Circuit agreed that the assignment of effective dates for SMC awards is a downstream issue for the regional office to decide and is not automatically before the Board unless specifically appealed. Consequently, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court’s dismissal in part and dismissed the remainder of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "DAVIS v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

MCOM IP, LLC v. CITY NATIONAL BANK OF FLORIDA

2026-05-15T06:03:15-08:00

The case concerns a patent dispute involving a company that owns a patent for a unified electronic banking system. After most of the patent’s claims were found unpatentable in an inter partes review (IPR) before the Patent and Trademark Office, only four claims remained. The company then sued a bank in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging infringement of these remaining claims. The allegations were supported by claim charts and references to the bank’s online services. The district court first struck the original complaint as a “shotgun pleading” and allowed an amended complaint. The amended complaint was also challenged by the defendant, who argued that the remaining claims were invalid for obviousness and, alternatively, for claiming ineligible subject matter, and that the infringement allegations were inadequate. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice, finding the asserted claims invalid for obviousness as they did not add anything patentably distinct from those already invalidated in the IPR, and also held that infringement was not adequately pleaded. The court denied leave to further amend the complaint and subsequently awarded attorneys’ fees to the defendant under 35 U.S.C. § 285, finding the case “exceptional,” and imposed sanctions on plaintiff’s counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for alleged bad faith litigation. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, upholding the finding that the patent claims at issue were invalid for obviousness. However, the appellate court reversed the awards of attorneys’ fees and sanctions, holding that the record did not support a finding that the case was exceptional or that counsel acted in bad faith, as required by the respective statutes. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs. View "MCOM IP, LLC v. CITY NATIONAL BANK OF FLORIDA " on Justia Law

TAVAKKOL v. MSPB

2026-05-14T07:02:32-08:00

An employee of the United States Postal Service (USPS) worked as an Operations Industrial Engineer beginning in 2013. He alleged that, shortly after starting, he was harassed by a mentor on the basis of his national origin, race, and religion, and that after he complained, his work environment became more hostile. He also claimed to have faced retaliation for whistleblowing about safety violations and wastefulness. Over time, he received a Letter of Warning, was placed on a Performance Improvement Plan, and issued a Letter of Concern, all of which he believed were retaliatory. The situation resulted in medical issues, leading him to take medical leave, request reasonable accommodation, and ultimately remain on leave for several months. During this time, he filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) complaint, and while it was pending, he resigned, attributing his departure to the intolerable environment and alleged retaliation. The EEOC eventually granted summary judgment in favor of USPS, finding no evidence of unlawful discrimination or that the employee suffered an adverse employment action. Nearly four years after resigning and shortly after the EEOC’s decision, he appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (the Board), asserting that his resignation was involuntary due to duress and coercion by USPS. The Board’s administrative judge found that he failed to non-frivolously allege that his resignation was coerced, misinformed, or otherwise involuntary, noting he could have continued to pursue remedies instead of resigning. The Board affirmed the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case to determine if the employee had made non-frivolous allegations of involuntary resignation that would entitle him to a hearing. The court held that he had not, emphasizing that the facts did not show the agency effectively imposed his resignation or deprived him of reasonable alternatives. The court affirmed the Board’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. View "TAVAKKOL v. MSPB " on Justia Law

DILLON TRUST COMPANY LLC v. US

2026-05-14T06:32:30-08:00

A group of family trusts, managed by a corporate trustee, owned two C corporations with significant appreciated assets, including farmland and investment portfolios. In the early 2000s, the trusts sought to sell these corporations. To maximize after-tax proceeds, they pursued a stock sale rather than an asset sale, aiming to avoid double taxation on built-in gains. The trusts conducted an auction and ultimately sold the corporations’ stock to a newly formed entity, Humboldt Shelby Holding Corporation (HSHC), which financed the purchase with substantial loans. After the transaction, HSHC promptly liquidated the corporations’ assets and engaged in tax shelter transactions to offset the resulting gains, resulting in no taxes paid. The IRS later determined these losses were artificial and assessed taxes, penalties, and interest against HSHC, which went unpaid. The IRS then sought to hold the trusts liable as transferees of HSHC under federal law. The United States Court of Federal Claims found that, under New York’s Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, the trusts could be held liable as transferees. The court determined that the stock sale and subsequent asset sales should be treated as a single transaction and that the trusts had constructive knowledge of the entire scheme to avoid taxes. The court also held the trusts liable for the full amount of HSHC’s unpaid taxes, penalties, and interest, and rejected the trusts’ argument that their liability should be limited to the value received. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of Federal Claims’ rulings. The Federal Circuit held that the trusts had constructive knowledge of the fraudulent scheme, upheld the imposition of transferee liability for the full amount owed, including penalties, and rejected the claim for refund of interest accrued after a deposit was made with the IRS, finding the IRS did not act unlawfully or abuse its discretion in handling the deposit. View "DILLON TRUST COMPANY LLC v. US " on Justia Law

GLOBAL K9 PROTECTION GROUP, LLC v. US

2026-05-14T06:02:26-08:00

The case concerns the United States Postal Service’s contract for canine explosive-detection services. The USPS awarded the contract to K2 Solutions, Inc. (“K2”), while Global K9 Protection Group (“Global K9”) and Michael Stapleton Associates, Ltd. were unsuccessful bidders. Global K9 filed a bid protest in the United States Court of Federal Claims, initially challenging the evaluation of its bid but not directly alleging misconduct by K2. K2 received notice of the original complaint and chose not to intervene, believing the government would adequately defend its interests. The Claims Court case evolved when Global K9 filed an amended complaint under seal, adding new allegations that K2 had materially misrepresented its capabilities during the bidding process. Contrary to court rules and the protective order, Global K9 did not file a redacted public version of the amended complaint, and K2 did not receive notice of these new allegations. The Claims Court ultimately found that K2 had made a material misrepresentation and issued an injunction disqualifying K2 from contract performance. After learning of the injunction, K2 moved to intervene, but by then, the USPS had terminated K2’s contract for default, relying in part on the court’s findings. K2 appealed the denial of its motion to intervene. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held the case was not moot because K2’s interests in contesting the misrepresentation finding remained live in separate proceedings. However, the appellate court affirmed the Claims Court’s decision that K2’s motion to intervene was untimely, as K2 could have sought intervention upon learning of the amended complaint’s existence. The Federal Circuit also found that K2 was not a necessary party because it failed to act promptly to protect its interests. The judgment of the Claims Court was affirmed. View "GLOBAL K9 PROTECTION GROUP, LLC v. US " on Justia Law

ACTELION PHARMACEUTICALS LTD v. MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC.

2026-05-13T06:03:02-08:00

Actelion Pharmaceuticals Ltd, holder of patents for pharmaceutical compositions involving epoprostenol, alleged that Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc.’s proposed generic drug infringed its patents by manufacturing a bulk solution with a pH of 13 or higher, as claimed in the patents. The dispute centered on whether Mylan’s bulk solution met this pH threshold, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. Actelion argued that pH should be measured at the solution’s actual (refrigerated) temperature, while Mylan maintained that its product’s pH, when measured at industry standard temperature, did not meet the claimed threshold. The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia held a bench trial after remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which had previously vacated a judgment based on incorrect claim construction. On remand, the district court construed “a pH of 13 or higher” to mean a pH measurement of 12.98 or higher at standard temperature (25±2°C), relying on both intrinsic and extrinsic evidence. The court found no literal infringement, as Mylan’s bulk solution did not meet this threshold at standard temperature. It also ruled that Actelion was barred from asserting infringement by an equivalent due to prosecution history estoppel and the disclosure-dedication rule, and that Actelion had not proven equivalence. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed claim construction de novo and factual findings for clear error. The court affirmed the district court’s claim construction, finding that “a pH of 13 or higher” refers to standard-temperature measurement, supported by industry standards and patent evidence. It also upheld the district court’s application of prosecution history estoppel and the disclosure-dedication rule, barring Actelion’s equivalents argument. The judgment for Mylan was affirmed. View "ACTELION PHARMACEUTICALS LTD v. MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC. " on Justia Law

BISSELL, INC. v. ITC

2026-05-11T06:34:02-08:00

Bissell, Inc. and Bissell Homecare, Inc. accused Tineco Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd. and related entities of importing and selling wet dry surface cleaning devices that allegedly infringed certain claims of two U.S. patents concerning surface cleaning apparatuses. After the complaint was filed with the United States International Trade Commission, Tineco introduced redesigned versions of the accused products, which were also evaluated for infringement. The key patent claims at issue involved limitations related to a battery charging circuit being disabled during a self-cleaning mode. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) at the International Trade Commission conducted an evidentiary hearing. The ALJ found that Tineco's original products infringed the asserted patent claims but that the redesigned products did not, as they did not meet the requirement that the battery charging circuit remain disabled during the automatic cleanout cycle. The ALJ also found that Bissell’s domestic industry products practiced the relevant claim limitations, and that all accused products met other disputed limitations. The Commission adopted the ALJ’s findings and issued a limited exclusion order barring importation of only the original infringing products. On appeal, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Bissell challenged the finding of non-infringement for the redesigned products, while Tineco cross-appealed on domestic industry findings and certain infringement determinations. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s Final Determination, holding that substantial evidence supported the findings that Tineco’s redesigned products did not infringe the relevant patent claims, that Bissell’s domestic industry products met the asserted limitations, and that the accused products satisfied the “brushroll within the recovery pathway” and “suction nozzle” limitations. The court affirmed the exclusion order for the original products and denied relief on all appeals. View "BISSELL, INC. v. ITC " on Justia Law

OLIVA v. DVA

2026-05-07T06:32:52-08:00

An employee of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), serving as an Associate Director, was removed from his position following allegations of inappropriate conduct, including harassment and creating a hostile work environment. After the agency conducted an investigation and found lapses in professionalism, the acting director proposed removal based on these findings. The employee, who had previously raised concerns about personnel decisions and filed whistleblower complaints, alleged that his removal was in retaliation for his protected disclosures and challenged the process as procedurally flawed. The initial challenge was reviewed by an administrative judge of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), who sustained the charge of inappropriate conduct, finding that the VA had proved its case by a preponderance of the evidence. The administrative judge also found that, although the employee engaged in protected whistleblower activity, the VA demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that it would have removed him regardless of his disclosures. Additionally, the administrative judge found no harmful procedural error in the agency’s investigation and removal process. The full MSPB denied the employee’s petition for review, adopting the administrative judge’s findings and affirming the removal. Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the MSPB’s decision. The court applied the appropriate standards of review, considering whether the agency’s actions were supported by substantial evidence and adhered to proper legal procedures. The court held that substantial evidence supported the findings that the VA would have removed the employee independent of his whistleblower activity and that there was no harmful procedural error in the removal process. The Federal Circuit affirmed the MSPB’s decision, upholding the removal. View "OLIVA v. DVA " on Justia Law

ENVIRO TECH CHEMICAL SERVICES, INC. v. SAFE FOODS CORP.

2026-05-04T05:02:09-08:00

Enviro Tech Chemical Services, Inc. held a patent covering methods for treating poultry during processing, specifically by using peracetic acid to increase the weight of the poultry. The method involved several steps, including adjusting the pH of peracetic acid-containing water to a range described as “about 7.6 to about 10” by adding an alkaline source. Enviro Tech alleged that Safe Foods Corp. infringed upon various claims of this patent. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas reviewed the case and conducted claim construction. Safe Foods argued that the terms “about” and “an antimicrobial amount” in the patent were indefinite. The district court agreed, finding both terms indefinite and holding the asserted claims invalid. The court entered judgment accordingly. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit examined whether the district court was correct in finding the term “about,” as used to define the pH range, indefinite. The Federal Circuit analyzed the claim language, the patent’s specification, and the prosecution history. The court found that the intrinsic record did not provide reasonable certainty to those skilled in the art about the scope of “about,” especially since the specification and prosecution history showed inconsistent and conflicting guidance regarding permissible pH deviations. Because the term “about” was indefinite, the Federal Circuit concluded that all asserted claims were invalid. The court therefore affirmed the judgment of invalidity entered by the district court. View "ENVIRO TECH CHEMICAL SERVICES, INC. v. SAFE FOODS CORP. " on Justia Law

PRESSLY v. US

2026-04-30T06:04:07-08:00

This case concerns a group of landowners in Indiana who own property adjacent to former railroad corridors once operated by the Peru and Indianapolis Railroad Company (PIRC). The landowners asserted that they also hold fee simple title to the land underlying these corridors. They challenged the federal government's authorization of public recreational trail use on these corridors under the National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983, claiming that this action constituted a taking of their property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The United States Court of Federal Claims reviewed the dispute. The main issue was whether PIRC’s interest in the rail corridors consisted merely of easements, rather than fee simple title. The Court of Federal Claims examined two sets of parcels: those associated with a 1907 Indiana Circuit Court quiet title judgment (the Manship Parcels) and those deriving from a lost 1849 instrument (the Vanlaningham Parcels). The Court of Federal Claims concluded that PIRC held only easements in both sets of parcels, meaning that when railroad operations ceased, full title reverted to the plaintiffs under Indiana law. Thus, the court found in favor of the landowners, holding that the government’s issuance of Notices of Interim Trail Use (NITUs) resulted in an uncompensated taking. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s judgment, holding that the record demonstrated PIRC’s interests were limited to easements for both the Manship and Vanlaningham Parcels. The court concluded that, under Indiana law and the facts presented, the plaintiffs hold fee simple title to the corridor land, and the government’s actions constituted a taking for which just compensation is required. The judgment of the Court of Federal Claims was therefore affirmed. View "PRESSLY v. US " on Justia Law

FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED

2026-04-29T06:33:02-08:00

A corporation owns a patent concerning systems and methods for providing access to shipment information using sensors, which can be attached to items for tracking and reporting data to a central location. The patent allows for customization and control over notifications about shipments, including limiting access to sensor information based on certain rules. Some claims of the patent specify restricting access by delaying when information is reported. Litigation began when the corporation sued another company for infringing this patent in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware. While the litigation was pending, a third party, who was not a defendant in the district court case, filed petitions with the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) challenging some claims of the patent as obvious. The patent owner argued that the PTAB should not consider the petitions because the third party failed to identify all real parties in interest, specifically the company being sued, as required by statute. The PTAB disagreed, instituted review, and later denied a motion to terminate the proceedings for failure to name all real parties in interest. The PTAB issued a final written decision finding all challenged claims unpatentable as obvious. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it lacked authority to review the PTAB’s refusal to determine whether all real parties in interest were named and its denial of the motion to terminate the proceedings, because such issues are barred from judicial review by statute. However, the appellate court found that the PTAB had erred in concluding that the patent owner had not contested one ground of obviousness and vacated the PTAB’s findings of obviousness for certain claims, remanding those issues for further proceedings. View "FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED " on Justia Law

LINYI CHENGEN IMPORT AND EXPORT CO., LTD. v. US

2026-04-29T06:02:24-08:00

The case concerns an anti-dumping investigation initiated by the U.S. Department of Commerce in 2016 into hardwood-plywood products produced in and imported from China. Commerce selected two mandatory respondents, Chengen and Bayley, for individual investigation. Several other exporters and producers, including Jiangyang Wood and Dehua TB, requested voluntary respondent status. The investigation centered on how Chengen calculated its main raw material input—poplar log volumes—which was crucial for determining dumping margins. Initially, Chengen responded to Commerce’s questionnaires by referencing third-party invoices but did not disclose that it used a Conversion Chart, possibly a Chinese National Standard, for measuring log volumes. During the verification stage, Commerce discovered this chart and, suspecting Chengen’s prior responses were incomplete, added only the two-page Conversion Chart to the record, rejecting the rest of a 12-page document Chengen provided at that time. Commerce then switched from the usual factors of production analysis to the intermediate input methodology, using veneer values instead of log volumes, and calculated a 183.36% dumping margin for Chengen and non-mandatory respondents. The United States Court of International Trade (Trade Court) repeatedly remanded the case, directing Commerce to accept the full 12-page document and reconsider its methodology. On remand, Commerce eventually assigned a 0% margin to Chengen and the non-mandatory respondents, and excluded Jiangyang Wood and Dehua TB from the all-others rate due to their qualifying as voluntary respondents. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that Commerce did not abuse its discretion by including only the Conversion Chart in the record and not the rest of the 12-page document. The court found substantial evidence supporting Commerce’s use of the intermediate input methodology and reinstated the 183.36% margin for Chengen and non-mandatory respondents. The court also affirmed the Trade Court’s approval of Commerce’s exclusion of Jiangyang Wood and Dehua TB from the all-others rate. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "LINYI CHENGEN IMPORT AND EXPORT CO., LTD. v. US " on Justia Law

CONSTELLATION DESIGNS, LLC v. LG ELECTRONICS INC.

2026-04-28T06:33:28-08:00

Constellation Designs, LLC sued several branches of LG Electronics, alleging willful infringement of nine claims across four patents related to digital communication systems using non-uniform constellations optimized for greater capacity at a lower signal-to-noise ratio. The accused products were LG televisions compatible with the ATSC 3.0 broadcast standard, which includes specific protocols for signal transmission. The patents at issue fall into two groups: claims reciting a process for optimizing constellations for capacity using parallel decode (PD) capacity, and claims reciting specific non-uniform constellations. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted summary judgment that all asserted claims were patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Following a jury trial, the jury found all asserted claims not invalid, found infringement, and awarded damages to Constellation, finding willful infringement. Post-trial motions by LG for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) of non-infringement and no damages, and to exclude Constellation’s damages expert, were denied. The district court entered final judgment in favor of Constellation, including an ongoing royalty. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the summary judgment of eligibility for the claims that recite optimization for PD capacity, finding them ineligible as they are directed to the abstract idea of “optimizing” a constellation for capacity without sufficient limiting detail. The court affirmed summary judgment of eligibility for the claims reciting specific non-uniform constellations, finding these claims recite concrete technological improvements rather than abstract ideas. The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court’s denial of JMOL of non-infringement and no damages, as well as its denial of LG’s motion to exclude the damages expert. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these rulings. View "CONSTELLATION DESIGNS, LLC v. LG ELECTRONICS INC. " on Justia Law

Garland v. Office of Personnel Management

2026-04-23T21:06:38-08:00

The petitioner, a former Legal Administrative Specialist at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), was diagnosed with major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and insomnia. Her treating psychiatrist determined she was unable to work, and OPM subsequently removed her from federal service, citing her medical inability to perform essential job functions. The removal decision relied on medical documentation from her psychiatrist, which described her symptoms and limitations. Following her removal, the petitioner applied for disability retirement benefits through OPM, submitting the same medical documentation. OPM denied the disability retirement application, stating that while it acknowledged her diagnoses and symptoms, there was insufficient “objective” medical evidence to demonstrate the degree of her impairment and her inability to work. On reconsideration, OPM repeated that the documentation lacked details such as test results, psychotherapy notes, and treatment records. The petitioner appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (the Board), where OPM maintained its position that her evidence was inadequate. The Board’s administrative judge found that OPM had rebutted the presumption of disability—established when an employee is removed for medical inability—by asserting a lack of objective medical evidence. The Board weighed the evidence and affirmed OPM’s denial, making this its final decision. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit addressed whether OPM and the Board could overcome the presumption of disability (as set out in Bruner v. Office of Personnel Management) simply by asserting the absence of objective medical evidence. The court held that such an assertion alone is insufficient to rebut the presumption of disability. Because the Board relied solely on this rationale, the court concluded the presumption was not rebutted, reversed the Board’s final order, and found the petitioner entitled to disability retirement benefits. View "Garland v. Office of Personnel Management" on Justia Law

INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL DEVICES, INC. v. CORNELL

2026-04-17T06:05:20-08:00

A group of plaintiffs, including a medical device company and its founder, developed and sold a cosmetic penile implant. In 2018, a urologist who later became one of the defendants attended a training session hosted by the plaintiffs, where he signed a non-disclosure agreement and was introduced to certain ideas for improving the implant as well as a list of required surgical instruments. Plaintiffs claimed that these ideas and the instrument list were trade secrets. Soon after, the defendants began developing a competing implant, filed patent applications based on allegedly misappropriated information, and advertised using plaintiffs’ trademark. The United States District Court for the Central District of California heard the case, which included claims for trade secret misappropriation, breach of contract under the nondisclosure agreement, trademark counterfeiting, and incorrect inventorship of two patents. The jury found for the plaintiffs on all major claims, including that the asserted trade secrets were protectable and misappropriated, and that there had been a breach of contract. The court awarded substantial damages, including a reasonable royalty, exemplary damages, and a permanent injunction preventing the defendants from using the trade secrets. The court also found for plaintiffs on their counterfeiting claim and invalidated the two patents for failure to name an alleged true inventor. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held there was not legally sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that the asserted information qualified as trade secrets under California law, as the core concepts were either generally known or not subject to reasonable secrecy efforts. The court reversed the denial of judgment as a matter of law on the trade secret and breach-of-contract claims, vacated the damages and injunction based on them, and reversed the invalidation of the patents. However, the court affirmed the verdict and damages for trademark counterfeiting. The result was an affirmance in part, reversal in part, and vacatur in part. View "INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL DEVICES, INC. v. CORNELL " on Justia Law

TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS INTERNATIONAL GMBH v. ELI LILLY AND COMPANY

2026-04-16T06:02:10-08:00

The dispute arose when two pharmaceutical companies, one holding patents on methods of using humanized anti-CGRP antagonist antibodies to treat headaches, accused a competitor of infringing these patents through the marketing of a competing medication. The relevant technology involves antibodies that inhibit the CGRP protein, which is linked to headache by promoting blood vessel dilation. The patents in question claim methods of treating headaches by administering humanized versions of these antibodies. The patent specifications referenced prior art disclosing murine (mouse) antibodies of this type, described methods for their humanization, and included one specific humanized antibody used in the patent holder’s product. Earlier, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts presided over a jury trial. The jury found that the competitor had willfully infringed the asserted patent claims and rejected arguments that the patents were invalid for lack of written description or enablement. Despite the jury’s verdict, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law for the competitor, ruling that the claims were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112 for failing both the written description and enablement requirements. The district court reasoned that the patents did not adequately describe or enable the full scope of the claimed genus of humanized antibodies. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s invalidity judgment. The appellate court held that, in the context of these method claims, the specification and background knowledge in the field were sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the written description and enablement requirements were met. The court emphasized that the invention concerned the use of a well-known genus of antibodies for a specific purpose, and the specification indicated that all members of the genus would function as claimed. The holding reinstated the jury’s verdict, reversing the district court’s judgment of invalidity, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS INTERNATIONAL GMBH v. ELI LILLY AND COMPANY " on Justia Law

LIFE SCIENCE LOGISTICS, LLC v. US

2026-04-15T06:02:17-08:00

A company that had previously operated a federal warehouse under contract with the government challenged the government’s decision to override an automatic statutory stay that halted performance of a newly awarded contract to a competitor. After the incumbent’s contract expired, the government solicited new bids and awarded the contract to another company. The incumbent protested this decision to the Government Accountability Office, which triggered an automatic stay under the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) that prevented the new contractor from beginning performance. A few weeks into the stay period, however, the government determined that urgent and compelling circumstances warranted overriding the stay, and it allowed the new contractor to begin work. The incumbent then filed suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims, contending that the government’s override was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. The Court of Federal Claims ruled in favor of the incumbent, issuing a declaratory judgment that the override was arbitrary and capricious. The court found that in the context of a CICA stay, the protestor was not required to prove the traditional four equitable factors for injunctive relief, since Congress had provided for an automatic stay mechanism. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the government argued that the case was moot after the override was withdrawn, but the Federal Circuit found the dispute to be capable of repetition yet evading review. On the merits, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of Federal Claims, holding that a protestor seeking to set aside a CICA stay override need only show that the agency’s action was arbitrary and capricious, and is not required to satisfy the four-factor test for equitable relief. The judgment was affirmed and costs were awarded to the protestor. View "LIFE SCIENCE LOGISTICS, LLC v. US " on Justia Law

DEFINITIVE HOLDINGS v. POWERTEQ

2026-04-14T06:04:54-08:00

The dispute concerns patented methods and apparatuses for upgrading software in engine controllers by connecting an external device that can replace and restore software without losing the original version. The patent, with a priority date of March 30, 2001, was asserted by the patent owner against a competitor. The accused infringer responded by alleging that a non-party, Hypertech, had sold a device called the Power Programmer III (PP3) well before the patent’s critical date. The PP3 was alleged to have all features described in the asserted patent claims, based on contemporaneous sales records and analysis of its source code. The United States District Court for the District of Utah reviewed the case. The district court granted summary judgment of invalidity under pre-America Invents Act (AIA) 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), finding that the PP3 was on sale more than one year before the patent’s critical date and that it embodied every claim limitation of the asserted patent. In reaching this decision, the district court admitted deposition testimony from Hypertech’s CEO regarding sales records and the device’s code, holding that, at summary judgment, corporate representatives may testify beyond their personal knowledge. The court also found that the source code itself was not hearsay and, even if it were, could be admitted as a business record. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering the evidence at summary judgment. The court further clarified that the on-sale bar under pre-AIA § 102(b) does not require a sale to publicly disclose the inner workings of the device; it is sufficient that the sale of a device embodying the patented invention occurred before the critical date. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the invalidation of all asserted patent claims. View "DEFINITIVE HOLDINGS v. POWERTEQ " on Justia Law

VLSI TECHNOLOGY LLC v. INTEL CORPORATION

2026-04-14T06:04:54-08:00

VLSI Technology LLC brought a lawsuit against Intel Corporation, alleging infringement of multiple patents, including U.S. Patent No. 8,566,836. The patent concerns methods and apparatuses for selecting processor cores in multicore systems to execute tasks based on performance parameters, such as processing speed. VLSI asserted several claims from the patent, including both method and apparatus claims, and introduced expert damages theories to support its case. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California addressed several pretrial issues. It struck certain damages theories from VLSI’s expert Dr. Sullivan, concluding that VLSI had not adequately disclosed these theories in its damages contentions as required under local patent rules. The district court also granted Intel summary judgment of noninfringement on two grounds: first, that the alleged infringing acts occurred outside the United States (extraterritoriality), and second, by rejecting VLSI’s doctrine of equivalents (DOE) theory. The district court’s construction of claim terms, particularly importing an “upon identifying” limitation into an apparatus claim, was central to its resolution of the DOE issue. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s orders. The appellate court reversed the grant of summary judgment of noninfringement on extraterritoriality grounds, finding that a pretrial stipulation between the parties established a U.S. nexus for infringement, and that the district court erred in its analysis of the apparatus claims’ capability to perform the patented functions. The Federal Circuit also reversed the summary judgment for noninfringement under the DOE theory for certain apparatus claims, holding that the district court improperly construed the claims based on prosecution disclaimer. However, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision to strike Dr. Sullivan’s NPV and VPU damages theories, finding no abuse of discretion. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "VLSI TECHNOLOGY LLC v. INTEL CORPORATION " on Justia Law

FUENTE MARKETING LTD. v. VAPOROUS TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

2026-04-08T05:31:51-08:00

Fuente Marketing Ltd., a family-owned company selling premium hand-rolled cigars, owns two registered standard character trademarks for the letter X in connection with cigars and related products. Vaporous Technologies, LLC, designs and manufactures oral vaporizers and sought to register a mark featuring an abstract stick figure composed of intersecting lines forming a stylized X and a shaded circle above it, for use with various smoking-related goods. Fuente opposed this trademark application, alleging a likelihood of confusion with its own X marks. The United States Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB), reviewed the opposition. The parties stipulated certain facts, including a description of Vaporous’s mark. The TTAB applied the In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co. factors, finding that while the goods and trade channels overlapped and thus favored a likelihood of confusion, the dissimilarity of the marks weighed heavily against it. The Board found Fuente’s X marks conceptually strong but commercially weak and determined the relevant DuPont factors were either neutral or favored confusion, except for the critical mark similarity factor. Ultimately, the TTAB concluded that the marks were sufficiently distinct in commercial impression, appearance, and sound to avoid confusion and dismissed Fuente’s opposition. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s factual findings for substantial evidence and its legal conclusions de novo. The Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s decision, holding that the dissimilarity between the marks was sufficient, even in light of other factors, to negate any likelihood of confusion. The court concluded that the Board’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and that Fuente had not shown any harmful legal error. The decision of the TTAB was therefore affirmed. View "FUENTE MARKETING LTD. v. VAPOROUS TECHNOLOGIES, LLC " on Justia Law

IRONSOURCE LTD. v. DIGITAL TURBINE, INC.

2026-04-07T05:32:33-08:00

A company owned a patent involving technology that allows mobile device applications to be downloaded and installed in the background, without requiring users to visit an application store. Another company, which had previously developed and marketed a product with similar features, initiated a post-grant review proceeding before the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board, challenging the validity of the patent's original claims. During the proceeding, the patent owner sought to amend the claims by proposing substitute claims, which included additional limitations. The challenger argued that the substitute claims were also unpatentable. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board granted the patent owner’s revised motion to amend, finding that the challenger had not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the substitute claims were unpatentable or patent ineligible. The Board also determined that the original claims were unpatentable based on a prior decision invalidating claims of a related parent patent. The challenger appealed the Board’s decision regarding the substitute claims to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit considered whether the challenger had Article III standing to appeal. The court found that the challenger failed to demonstrate an injury in fact because it did not provide evidence showing concrete plans to engage in activities that would potentially infringe the substitute claims, nor did it sufficiently link its previous product features to the limitations in the new claims. As a result, the court held that the challenger lacked standing and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court awarded costs to the patent owner. View "IRONSOURCE LTD. v. DIGITAL TURBINE, INC. " on Justia Law

KERNZ v. COLLINS

2026-04-03T05:32:40-08:00

Two claimants, a veteran and a non-attorney representative, each appealed to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals after an unfavorable Veterans Affairs regional office decision. In both cases, the Board dismissed their appeals as untimely due to a clear miscalculation of the filing deadline. Each claimant then filed a notice of appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”), seeking to overturn the erroneous Board dismissals and to have their cases reinstated for Board review. While the appeals were pending before the Veterans Court, the Board recognized its mistake and, on its own initiative, reinstated both claimants’ cases to its active docket, giving them the relief they had initially sought in their Veterans Court appeals. For one claimant, the Board later granted the full fee award requested; for the other, the Board remanded the benefit claims, and the regional office granted most but not all of the requested benefits. The Veterans Court, sitting en banc and by panel, dismissed both appeals as moot, holding that the Board’s actions rendered further judicial relief unnecessary. The court reasoned that the claimants had already received the relief available through judicial review, so no live controversy remained. The claimants argued that the filing of a notice of appeal divested the Board of jurisdiction and rendered its subsequent actions void. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed with the government that the claimants lacked standing. The Federal Circuit held that, because the claimants had obtained all the specific relief sought prior to appealing to the Federal Circuit, there was no remaining injury that the court could redress. Accordingly, the court dismissed both appeals for lack of jurisdiction. View "KERNZ v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

FORTRESS IRON, LP v. DIGGER SPECIALTIES, INC.

2026-04-02T05:32:27-08:00

Fortress Iron, LP developed a pre-assembled vertical cable railing system for outdoor spaces, collaborating with two Chinese companies for its manufacture and quality control. Fortress's owner originated the idea, and an employee prepared initial sketches. Employees of the quality control company, HuaPing Huang and Alfonso Lin, contributed critical refinements to the design. After incorporating these suggestions, Fortress filed for and obtained two patents, listing only its owner and employee as inventors, omitting Lin and Huang. Huang later left his company and could not be located. Fortress sued Digger Specialties, Inc. for patent infringement in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. During litigation, it emerged that Lin and Huang were coinventors. Fortress successfully added Lin to the patents under 35 U.S.C. § 256(a), but was unable to add Huang due to his unavailability. Fortress then moved for partial summary judgment to correct inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 256(b), while Digger Specialties moved for summary judgment asserting patent invalidity due to incorrect inventorship. The district court denied Fortress’s motion to correct inventorship, holding that notice and an opportunity for hearing must be given to all parties concerned—including Huang—before correction could be ordered. The court granted summary judgment to Digger Specialties, holding the patents invalid for omission of an inventor. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Federal Circuit held that an omitted coinventor is a “party concerned” under 35 U.S.C. § 256(b) and must receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before inventorship can be corrected. As Fortress could not satisfy this statutory requirement, correction was unavailable and the patents were invalid. The Federal Circuit thus affirmed the grant of summary judgment of invalidity. View "FORTRESS IRON, LP v. DIGGER SPECIALTIES, INC. " on Justia Law

KENDALL v. COLLINS

2026-03-31T07:03:01-08:00

An attorney entered into a fee agreement with a veteran to represent him in a claim for increased disability benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The agreement provided that the attorney would receive 20% of any past-due benefits awarded, and this fee would be paid directly by the VA from any such award. The veteran had previously requested an increased rating on his own, and after the attorney became involved and filed a notice of disagreement, the VA granted the increase, awarding past-due benefits. The VA initially determined the attorney was entitled to the agreed fee but failed to withhold it from the benefits paid to the veteran, resulting in an overpayment. The VA later paid the attorney and recouped the overpaid amount from the veteran’s future benefits. Subsequently, the veteran challenged the reasonableness of the attorney’s fee before the VA Office of General Counsel (OGC), which concluded that the fee was excessive considering the attorney’s limited involvement and the fact that the award was based on the veteran’s earlier request. The OGC reduced the allowed fee and ordered the attorney to refund the difference to the veteran. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed this decision. The attorney appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which also affirmed the Board’s determination. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that, under 38 U.S.C. § 7263(d), it lacked jurisdiction to review decisions by the Veterans Court regarding the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees in such proceedings. The statute clearly provides that such orders by the Veterans Court are final and may not be reviewed by any other court. Therefore, the Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "KENDALL v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

MACKEY v. COLLINS

2026-03-30T06:02:50-08:00

The claimant, a veteran who served from 1986 to 1990, sought special monthly compensation (“SMC”) under federal law based on his total disability rating due to individual unemployability (“TDIU”). His TDIU was awarded because of several service-connected disabilities, including bowel and bladder incontinence, intervertebral disc syndrome, hypertension, radiculopathy, and cervical spine arthritis, resulting in a combined rating of ninety percent. He applied for SMC under 38 U.S.C. § 1114(s), arguing that his TDIU and the underlying disabilities qualified him for this additional benefit. His claims for SMC were denied by the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office. He appealed to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, which found that he was not entitled to SMC because he did not have a single service-connected disability rated as totally disabling, nor was his TDIU based on one disability, as the statute required. The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the Board’s decision, rejecting the argument that multiple disabilities could be combined to constitute “a service-connected disability rated as total” under the statute. On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation of 38 U.S.C. § 1114(s). The court held that, based on the plain language of the statute, SMC eligibility requires a single service-connected disability rated as total. The court also held that the regulation allowing multiple disabilities to be combined for TDIU purposes does not satisfy the requirement for SMC under § 1114(s). The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. View "MACKEY v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

ASCENDIS PHARMA A/S v. BIOMARIN PHARMACEUTICAL INC.

2026-03-26T05:33:34-08:00

Two pharmaceutical companies developing treatments for achondroplasia, a genetic disorder, became involved in litigation after one company (Ascendis) filed a New Drug Application (NDA) for its product. The other company (BioMarin), holding a relevant patent, filed a complaint with the United States International Trade Commission (ITC) alleging patent infringement by Ascendis’s product. Shortly afterward, Ascendis filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking a judgment of non-infringement and arguing that its activities were protected under the statutory “safe harbor” for regulatory approval. More than thirty days after filing its district court complaint, Ascendis moved for an expedited hearing. BioMarin responded by seeking to dismiss or stay the district court action pending the ITC’s investigation. Ascendis voluntarily dismissed its complaint without prejudice and promptly refiled a nearly identical complaint, this time moving for a mandatory stay under 28 U.S.C. § 1659(a)(2), which requires a district court to stay its proceedings if requested within thirty days of the action’s filing or of being named as a respondent in the ITC. BioMarin opposed, contending Ascendis’s request was untimely, and sought a discretionary stay instead. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted BioMarin’s motion for a discretionary stay and denied Ascendis’s motion for a mandatory stay as moot. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that § 1659(a)(2) does not permit a litigant to restart the thirty-day period for a mandatory stay by voluntarily dismissing and refiling a substantially identical action. The court reasoned that the statutory deadline applies to the original action and that allowing refiling would circumvent the statute’s purpose. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. View "ASCENDIS PHARMA A/S v. BIOMARIN PHARMACEUTICAL INC. " on Justia Law

NVLSP v. US

2026-03-20T06:32:50-08:00

Three nonprofit organizations filed a nationwide class action against the United States, alleging that the federal judiciary overcharged the public for access to court records through the PACER system. They claimed the government used PACER fees not only to fund the system itself but also for unrelated expenses, contrary to the statutory limits set by the E-Government Act. The plaintiffs sought refunds for allegedly excessive fees collected between 2010 and 2018. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia oversaw extensive litigation, including class certification and an interlocutory appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit previously affirmed that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under the Little Tucker Act and that the government had used PACER fees for unauthorized expenses. After remand, the parties reached a settlement totaling $125 million. The district court approved the settlement, finding it fair, reasonable, and adequate under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court also approved attorneys’ fees, administrative costs, and incentive awards to the class representatives. An objector, Eric Isaacson, challenged the district court’s jurisdiction, the fairness of the settlement, the attorneys’ fees, and the incentive awards. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction under the Little Tucker Act because each PACER transaction constituted a separate claim, none exceeding the $10,000 jurisdictional limit. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in approving the class settlement, the attorneys’ fees, or the incentive awards. The court also held that incentive awards are not categorically prohibited and are permissible if reasonable, joining the majority of federal circuits on this issue. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "NVLSP v. US " on Justia Law

APPLE INC. v. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION

2026-03-19T10:11:16-08:00

Apple Inc. launched the Apple Watch Series 6, featuring technology to estimate the wearer’s blood oxygenation level. Masimo Corporation and Cercacor Laboratories, Inc. alleged that Apple’s importation and sale of the device infringed on several Masimo patents related to wearable blood oxygen measurement technology. Masimo filed a complaint with the United States International Trade Commission, asserting that Apple’s actions violated § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, which prohibits importation of infringing articles if a related domestic industry exists. The patents at issue, called the Poeze Patents, cover user-worn devices utilizing optical emitters and photodetectors for physiological measurements. Following an investigation, an administrative law judge (ALJ) conducted a hearing and concluded that Masimo had established a domestic industry, Apple’s devices infringed some asserted claims, and several claims were not proven invalid. The ALJ found Masimo was not barred from enforcement by prosecution history laches. The ALJ’s decision led to a limited exclusion order barring importation of infringing Apple Watches. Both Apple and Masimo sought review by the Commission. The Commission affirmed the finding of infringement and the existence of a domestic industry, as to certain claims, and maintained the exclusion order. Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Commission’s determinations under the Administrative Procedure Act, affirming its findings as reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. The Federal Circuit held that Masimo satisfied both the technical and economic prongs of the domestic industry requirement, that the Apple Watch infringed valid claims of the asserted patents, and that Apple failed to prove invalidity or prosecution laches. The Commission’s judgment and the exclusion order were affirmed. View "APPLE INC. v. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION" on Justia Law

TRUSTEES OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY v. GEN DIGITAL INC.

2026-03-11T06:02:59-08:00

Columbia University sued Gen Digital Inc., which markets Norton antivirus software, alleging infringement of certain claims in two patents related to methods for detecting anomalous program executions. These patents described techniques using an emulator to execute portions of software and compare function calls against models created from multiple computers, aiming to detect malicious activity. Columbia also sought to correct inventorship on a third patent owned by Norton. Norton’s products, including the SONAR/BASH feature, were sold both domestically and internationally. Columbia claimed that these products infringed the asserted patent claims by utilizing the patented detection methods. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia construed disputed claim terms largely in Columbia’s favor and denied Norton’s motion for judgment on the pleadings under 35 U.S.C. § 101, ruling that the claims were not directed to an abstract idea at Alice step one. Prior to trial, the district court struck Norton’s § 101 defense. At trial, the jury found willful infringement of four claims and awarded substantial damages, including damages based on Norton’s foreign sales. The district court denied Norton’s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law regarding infringement, willfulness, and foreign sales damages. It also awarded enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees, partly relying on a contempt finding against Norton’s counsel. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment. The Federal Circuit held that the asserted claims are abstract at Alice step one and remanded for the district court to address step two. The court found no error in claim construction or in the denial of judgment as a matter of law for infringement and willfulness, but concluded that damages for foreign sales were improperly awarded. The contempt finding having been reversed in a companion case, the enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees awards must also be reconsidered. The disposition was reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "TRUSTEES OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY v. GEN DIGITAL INC. " on Justia Law

GRAMM v. DEERE & COMPANY

2026-03-11T05:33:43-08:00

An inventor and his exclusive licensee filed a lawsuit alleging patent infringement against a manufacturer, asserting claims of a patent related to an apparatus for maintaining a crop harvester’s header at a designated height above the soil. The patent described a device using a controller interface, head controller, and hydraulic control system. The parties agreed that the “control means” term in the patent invoked means-plus-function claiming under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), and further agreed on the basic claimed function and the corresponding structures described in the specification. However, they disagreed over whether the specification sufficiently disclosed the structure for “control means,” particularly regarding whether the disclosure required an algorithm for microprocessor-based controllers. After the case was transferred from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, the district court concluded that the patent’s “control means” limitation was indefinite. The district court found that the only sufficiently disclosed controllers were microprocessor-based versions, which would require a disclosed algorithm that the patent did not provide. The court excluded an earlier version of the controller that used logic circuitry, not a microprocessor, from the corresponding structure. Based on this, the district court held the asserted claims invalid as indefinite and entered judgment for the defendant. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed. The appellate court held that the district court erred by excluding the non-microprocessor-based controller from the corresponding structure, as it performed the claimed function and did not trigger the algorithm disclosure requirement. The Federal Circuit clarified that a means-plus-function limitation need only be supported by one embodiment of corresponding structure. Therefore, the judgment of indefiniteness and invalidity was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. Costs were assessed against the manufacturer. View "GRAMM v. DEERE & COMPANY" on Justia Law

IMPLICIT, LLC v. SONOS, INC.

2026-03-09T06:34:49-08:00

Implicit, LLC owned two patents that named Edward Balassanian and Scott Bradley as the only inventors. Both men worked for BeComm Corporation, Implicit’s predecessor. Sonos, Inc. filed petitions for inter partes review (IPR) with the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, arguing that the claims in both patents were unpatentable due to prior art, specifically referencing a patent by Janevski. Implicit responded that the inventions were conceived and reduced to practice before the Janevski filing date, involving work by engineer Guy Carpenter. The Board found Implicit’s evidence insufficient to establish Carpenter’s role or that any reduction to practice benefited the named inventors, and determined the challenged claims were unpatentable. After the Board’s final written decisions in 2019, Implicit appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, raising Appointments Clause challenges based on Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded for proceedings consistent with Arthrex. After the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Arthrex, Inc., the case was again remanded to allow for Director Review, which was denied. During this period, Implicit sought and obtained certificates of correction to add Carpenter as an inventor. The case was remanded to the Board to consider whether these corrections affected the prior IPR decisions. The Board held that judicial estoppel, waiver, and forfeiture barred Implicit from relying on the corrections to revisit the prior decisions. Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that forfeiture can apply even when inventorship is corrected under 35 U.S.C. § 256. The court found no abuse of discretion by the Board in determining that Implicit forfeited its new inventorship arguments by waiting until after final decisions to seek correction. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decisions. View "IMPLICIT, LLC v. SONOS, INC. " on Justia Law

EXAFER LTD v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION

2026-03-06T07:34:12-08:00

Exafer Ltd. owns two patents related to optimizing communication paths in virtual network environments. Exafer brought suit against Microsoft, alleging that Microsoft’s Azure Platform, specifically its Smart Network Interface Cards and Virtual Filtering Platform Fastpath technology, infringed these patents. To support its damages claim, Exafer submitted expert reports quantifying the technical and financial benefits Microsoft allegedly obtained through the accused features. The damages expert, Mr. Blok, based his analysis on the value of additional virtual machine hours made possible by the accused features. The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas excluded Mr. Blok’s damages testimony, reasoning that his use of unaccused virtual machines as the royalty base improperly included non-infringing activities, relying on Enplas Display Device Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor Co. The district court also denied Exafer’s motion to reopen discovery to present an alternative damages theory and granted Microsoft’s motion for summary judgment due to an absence of a remedy, entering final judgment against Exafer. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the damages expert’s testimony. The appellate court found that Mr. Blok’s methodology—linking the value of the accused features to the additional virtual machine hours they enabled—was sufficiently tied to the patented inventions and did not improperly expand the patent’s scope. The court clarified that there is no categorical bar against using an unaccused product as the royalty base if there is a causal connection to the alleged infringement. The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s exclusion of Mr. Blok’s testimony, vacated the orders denying reopening of discovery and granting summary judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "EXAFER LTD v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION " on Justia Law

MAGNOLIA MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. KURIN, INC.

2026-03-06T07:34:11-08:00

The dispute involves two patents held by Magnolia Medical Technologies concerning devices that improve the accuracy of blood tests by reducing contamination from skin microbes. When a blood sample is drawn, contaminants are most likely present in the initial portion, which can cause false positives and unnecessary treatments. Magnolia’s patents aim to sequester this initial blood volume, improving test reliability. Kurin, Inc. manufactures the Kurin Lock, a device that separates the initial blood draw using a porous plug that functions first as a vent and then as a seal. The United States District Court for the District of Delaware initially addressed claim construction. Regarding Magnolia’s U.S. Patent 9,855,001, the court determined that the term “diverter” was a means-plus-function limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), restricting infringement to devices with corresponding structures detailed in the patent specification. The parties stipulated that the Kurin Lock did not infringe the ’001 patent based on this construction. For U.S. Patent 10,039,483, the case proceeded to trial on the claims related to “vent” and “seal” limitations. The jury found that Kurin Lock infringed these claims. However, Kurin moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), arguing that the Kurin Lock did not have two separate structures corresponding to the “vent” and “seal” as required. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court's claim constructions and JMOL grant. The court held that the district court did not err in construing “diverter” as a means-plus-function term for the ’001 patent. It also affirmed that, under the plain and ordinary meaning and precedent, the ’483 patent required separate structures for “vent” and “seal,” which the Kurin Lock did not possess. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Kurin, finding no infringement. View "MAGNOLIA MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. KURIN, INC. " on Justia Law

WYOMING TRUST CO. v. US

2026-03-06T07:02:52-08:00

The appellants, including trustees of several trusts and Hall Atlas, LLC, held coal mining rights to the Hall Ranch in Wyoming, containing significant coal reserves. In 1985, the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality (WDEQ) determined that a portion of the Hall Ranch was located on an alluvial valley floor (AVF), which limited mining under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA). For decades, neither the appellants nor Exxon Coal Resources, the lessee at the time, pursued a coal exchange. In 2010, Hall Atlas applied to the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) for a coal exchange. BLM initially rejected WDEQ’s 1985 determination but changed position in 2014, and Hall Atlas submitted a mine plan. In 2016, BLM determined the Hall Ranch AVF coal had a value of $0. In 2017, BLM reiterated its $0 valuation and rejected the appellants’ proposed exchange tract, instead proposing alternatives based on the same valuation. The United States Court of Federal Claims dismissed the appellants’ takings claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the claim was time-barred because it was filed more than six years after the claim accrued. The appellants argued that their claim did not accrue until BLM’s 2017 letter, but the court found that the relevant accrual date was in 2016, when BLM finalized its $0 valuation. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision. The Federal Circuit held that any takings claim accrued no later than 2016, making the 2023 filing untimely under the Tucker Act’s six-year statute of limitations. The court rejected arguments for equitable tolling and the application of the continuing claim or stabilization doctrines, and concluded the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was correct. The judgment was affirmed and costs were awarded to the appellee. View "WYOMING TRUST CO. v. US " on Justia Law

JANICH v. COLLINS

2026-03-05T06:03:29-08:00

A United States Army veteran who served in Vietnam from 1969 to 1972 sought increased disability compensation from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) due to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). After his retirement from a construction consulting career, the veteran was granted service-connected disability compensation for PTSD, and his rating was eventually increased to 50 percent. In 2021, the veteran applied for a total disability rating based on individual unemployability (TDIU) under 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(b), asserting that his PTSD rendered him unable to secure or follow substantially gainful employment. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied the TDIU claim, finding that the veteran’s education, training, and work history demonstrated adaptability, and that he was physically and mentally capable of performing certain jobs with limited social interaction. The Board listed warehouse worker, assembly line worker, and custodian as illustrative occupations he could perform. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) affirmed the Board’s denial, reasoning that the Board was not required to identify actual jobs in the market and that any error in doing so was harmless, relying on precedent that TDIU determinations do not require analysis of specific job market opportunities. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Veterans Court’s decision. The Federal Circuit held that the Veterans Court may have committed legal error in its harmless-error analysis, specifically by misreading precedent and by applying a rigid rule inconsistent with the proper harmless-error standard. The court vacated the Veterans Court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings, instructing it to reconsider the challenge regarding the Board’s use of illustrative jobs in its TDIU denial. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs. View "JANICH v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

NEAL v. DVA

2026-02-27T07:03:51-08:00

Jennifer Neal was employed by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) as a Field Examiner until her removal in August 2020 for alleged unacceptable performance. She challenged her removal before the Merit Systems Protection Board (the Board), arguing that the VA violated the terms of a master collective bargaining agreement by failing to provide her with a performance improvement plan (PIP) prior to removal, and that the performance standards applied to her were unreasonable. During the pendency of her appeal, a Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) decision confirmed the requirement for the VA to provide a PIP before removing bargaining unit employees, as established in a prior arbitration. The administrative judge (AJ) found that the VA's removal of Neal was not in accordance with law and set aside the removal. The VA petitioned for review of the AJ’s decision to the full Board, arguing that the FLRA decision was factually and legally distinguishable. While the petition was pending, the VA voluntarily reinstated Neal, provided her back pay, and otherwise made her whole, effectively granting her all the relief she sought. The Board dismissed the VA’s petition as moot, recognizing that Neal had obtained complete relief. Neal then moved for attorneys’ fees. The AJ granted her request, finding her to be the prevailing party. However, upon the VA’s further petition, the Board reversed, reasoning that because the case became moot before a final Board decision, Neal was not a prevailing party and thus not entitled to fees. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision. The court held that Neal was a prevailing party because the AJ’s merits decision conferred enduring judicial relief that materially altered the legal relationship between the parties, and the subsequent mootness resulting from the VA’s voluntary compliance did not negate her prevailing party status. The court reversed the Board’s denial of attorneys’ fees and awarded costs to Neal. View "NEAL v. DVA " on Justia Law

GLOBAL TUBING LLC v. TENARIS COILED TUBES LLC

2026-02-26T07:02:34-08:00

The case concerns a dispute between two companies involved in the production and sale of coiled tubing for the oil and gas industry. One company, having acquired assets and documents from a predecessor, developed a coiled tubing product and obtained several patents (the ’256, ’074, and ’075 patents) covering aspects of this technology. The predecessor’s documents disclosed a product with overlapping technical specifications compared to at least some claims of these patents. During the patent application process, the company submitted a related public reference to the Patent and Trademark Office (Chitwood), but did not disclose the predecessor’s internal documents (the CYMAX Documents) that contained additional details. Internal discussions reflected uncertainty among inventors and counsel about the relevance and necessity of disclosing these documents. After disputes arose in the marketplace over alleged patent infringement, the manufacturer of a competing product initiated litigation in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, seeking a declaration of non-infringement. The patent holder counterclaimed for infringement and, as the case proceeded, the competitor amended its claims to include allegations of inequitable conduct (fraud on the Patent Office by withholding material information) and Walker Process fraud (antitrust liability for enforcing a patent obtained by fraud). The district court granted summary judgment to the competitor on the inequitable conduct claim, finding clear evidence of intent to deceive and materiality, and granted summary judgment to the patent holder on the Walker Process fraud claim, finding insufficient evidence of market power. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated both summary judgment rulings. The appellate court held that genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment on both inequitable conduct and Walker Process fraud. The court remanded for further proceedings, allowing both claims to proceed, and affirmed the denial of summary judgment for the patent holder on inequitable conduct. View "GLOBAL TUBING LLC v. TENARIS COILED TUBES LLC " on Justia Law

PERFORMANCE ADDITIVES, LLC v. US

2026-02-24T07:03:22-08:00

The plaintiff, a company seeking a refund of customs duties (drawback) on imported petroleum derivatives, filed a drawback claim with U.S. Customs on March 10, 2020, identifying forty-eight import entries and seeking over $1.3 million. Customs did not liquidate the claim within one year, but on April 30, 2021, it liquidated the claim at zero, determining the plaintiff was not entitled to any drawback. The company's appeal did not challenge the merits of this determination but argued that, by operation of law, its claim should have been automatically (“deemed”) liquidated at the amount it initially asserted, because Customs did not act within one year. The critical factual issue was that, while all underlying import entries had been liquidated by March 10, 2021, not all had become final, as finality requires an additional 180-day period after liquidation. The United States Court of International Trade reviewed the case, focusing on the statutory provisions governing when drawback claims are deemed liquidated under 19 U.S.C. § 1504. The court concluded that because the relevant import entries had not yet become final within one year of the drawback claim’s filing, the “deemed liquidation” provision of § 1504(a)(2)(A) did not apply. Instead, the alternative procedures of § 1504(a)(2)(B) governed, which require additional steps by the claimant that were not taken. The court denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment for the government. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court held that when the conditions of § 1504(a)(2)(B) are present—specifically, when underlying import entries are not yet final—automatic deemed liquidation under § 1504(a)(2)(A) does not apply. Customs’ action in liquidating the claim at zero was therefore lawful, and the lower court’s judgment was affirmed. View "PERFORMANCE ADDITIVES, LLC v. US " on Justia Law

REGENXBIO INC. v. SAREPTA THERAPEUTICS, INC.

2026-02-20T08:02:35-08:00

The plaintiffs in this case, owners of a patent involving genetically engineered host cells containing recombinant DNA sequences, accused the defendants of infringing multiple claims of their patent. The technology at issue centers on human-made host cells that include a recombinant nucleic acid molecule encoding a specific adeno-associated virus (AAV) capsid protein, along with a heterologous non-AAV sequence. These recombinant molecules are created by artificially combining genetic material from different species, a process that does not occur in nature. The patented host cells are used in developing gene therapy products, including a product for treating Duchenne muscular dystrophy. The United States District Court for the District of Delaware reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The district court concluded that the asserted claims were ineligible for patent protection, reasoning that they were directed to a natural phenomenon. The court analogized the claims to those at issue in Supreme Court cases such as Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. and Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., finding that merely combining natural sequences did not make the claimed invention patentable. The district court held that the claims lacked an inventive concept and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the decision de novo. The appellate court held that the patented host cells are not naturally occurring and possess markedly different characteristics from any product of nature, consistent with the Supreme Court’s guidance in Diamond v. Chakrabarty and Myriad Genetics. The Federal Circuit concluded that the claims are not directed to a natural phenomenon and are therefore patent-eligible under § 101. The court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "REGENXBIO INC. v. SAREPTA THERAPEUTICS, INC. " on Justia Law

GENUINE ENABLING TECHNOLOGY LLC v. SONY GROUP CORPORATION

2026-02-19T07:03:36-08:00

This case concerns a patent dispute involving input devices for computers. The plaintiff, Genuine Enabling Technology LLC (GET), claimed that Sony’s PlayStation 3 and 4 controllers and consoles infringed several claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,219,730. The patent addresses the problem of limited computer resources by combining data streams from multiple input devices, such as keyboards and sensors, into a single stream. The contested claims include a means-plus-function limitation called “encoding means for synchronizing,” which requires synchronizing two input streams and encoding them into a combined data stream. The U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware handled the case initially. It interpreted the “encoding means” as a means-plus-function limitation and identified logic block 34 in Figure 4A of the patent as the corresponding structure. During litigation, GET’s expert, Dr. Fernald, failed to address most of the elements in logic block 34 when analyzing infringement, focusing primarily on the bit-rate clock signal. The district court excluded Dr. Fernald’s testimony on structural equivalence and ultimately granted Sony summary judgment of noninfringement, finding GET had not raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding infringement. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that GET’s infringement analysis was deficient because it did not adequately account for the full structure of logic block 34 required by the patent specification. The court emphasized that GET failed to explain why it was permissible to omit certain elements from its equivalence analysis. Thus, GET lacked sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find infringement. The district court’s exclusion of expert testimony and summary judgment were affirmed. View "GENUINE ENABLING TECHNOLOGY LLC v. SONY GROUP CORPORATION " on Justia Law

WILLIS ELECTRIC CO., LTD. v. POLYGROUP LTD.

2026-02-17T07:02:10-08:00

The dispute centers on a patented pre-lit artificial tree owned by Willis Electric Co., Ltd., which features separable, modular trunk portions that mechanically and electrically connect to one another, enabling attached lights to illuminate automatically regardless of trunk orientation. The prior art required separate mechanical and electrical connections, but Willis’ patent integrates both functions in a single step. Willis accused Polygroup of infringing claim 15 of its patent, specifically targeting Polygroup trees with the “Quick Set” feature that establishes simultaneous mechanical and electrical connections. After Willis initiated the lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, Polygroup filed multiple inter partes review petitions at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) challenging various claims of Willis’ patent. The PTAB upheld claim 15, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed that finding. The district court proceedings continued with only claim 15 at issue. Polygroup filed a Daubert motion to exclude Willis’ damages expert, which was denied. At trial, the jury found claim 15 infringed and not invalid, awarding Willis over $42 million in damages. Polygroup then moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on obviousness and a new trial on damages, but the district court denied both motions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of JMOL and the motion for a new trial. The court held that substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that a skilled artisan would not have been motivated to combine prior art with coaxial barrel connectors as claimed in claim 15, thus affirming nonobviousness. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the damages expert’s testimony, finding the methodology sufficiently reliable under Rule 702. As a result, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "WILLIS ELECTRIC CO., LTD. v. POLYGROUP LTD." on Justia Law

MAGNUM MAGNETICS CORP. v. US

2026-02-17T07:02:10-08:00

The dispute centers on whether imported plastic shelf dividers containing magnets are subject to U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty orders covering raw flexible magnets from China. Fasteners for Retail, Inc. imports shelf dividers composed of flexible magnets bonded to rigid plastic, which makes the magnets inflexible. The United States Department of Commerce had previously issued duty orders with scope language covering certain flexible magnets, regardless of shape, color, or packaging. Fasteners for Retail requested a scope ruling from Commerce to clarify whether their shelf dividers fell within the scope of these orders. Commerce issued a final scope ruling, finding that although the plain language of the duty orders might appear to include Siffron’s shelf dividers, prior scope rulings and interpretative sources (known as (k)(1) sources) provided further guidance. Based on these sources, Commerce determined that magnets rendered inflexible by attachment to other materials, such as plastic, are not included within the term “flexible magnets” under the duty orders. The United States Court of International Trade reviewed Commerce’s ruling and upheld it, finding Commerce’s determination reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case de novo, applying the same standard as the Trade Court. The court held that Commerce has discretion under the current regulations to consult (k)(1) sources in interpreting scope language regardless of apparent ambiguity. The court concluded that Commerce’s determination that Siffron’s shelf dividers are not “flexible magnets” under the duty orders was supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law. Therefore, the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of the Court of International Trade, sustaining Commerce’s scope ruling that the shelf dividers are not subject to the duty orders. View "MAGNUM MAGNETICS CORP. v. US " on Justia Law

NETFLIX, INC. v. DIVX, LLC

2026-02-13T07:04:54-08:00

This case involves a challenge to the validity of a patent owned by DivX, LLC, which claims systems and methods for streaming partly encrypted media content. DivX sued Netflix, Inc. for patent infringement, leading Netflix to petition for inter partes review (IPR) before the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). Netflix argued that the patent’s claims would have been obvious in view of specific prior-art references. The dispute centered on the proper construction of a claim limitation relating to the location of "encryption information" within the system described by the patent. After the IPR was instituted, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board first issued a final written decision holding that Netflix had not shown the claims were unpatentable, basing its conclusion on issues unrelated to claim construction. Netflix appealed that decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which vacated and remanded. On remand, the Board adopted DivX’s proposed claim construction, holding that the limitation required the encryption information itself to be located within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video, and again found in favor of DivX. Netflix appealed again. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s claim construction de novo. The appellate court held that the Board erred in its construction of the disputed limitation. The correct construction, the court explained, is that only the encrypted portions of the video frames, not the encryption information, must be located within the requested portions of the selected stream. The court found that, under this construction, the asserted prior art meets the limitation. The Federal Circuit therefore reversed the Board’s claim construction, vacated its decision, and remanded for further proceedings. View "NETFLIX, INC. v. DIVX, LLC " on Justia Law

APPLE INC. v. SQUIRES

2026-02-13T06:33:54-08:00

Several technology companies challenged instructions issued by the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) that guided the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) in deciding whether to institute inter partes review (IPR) proceedings. These instructions, known collectively as the NHK-Fintiv instructions, outlined factors for the Board to consider when parallel patent litigation was occurring in district court. The challengers argued that these instructions resulted in too many denials of IPR petitions and were contrary to law, arbitrary and capricious, and issued without the required notice-and-comment rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The United States District Court for the Northern District of California initially found all challenges to the PTO’s instructions to be judicially unreviewable. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit previously held that while the challenges based on statutory and arbitrary-and-capricious grounds were unreviewable, the claim regarding the lack of notice-and-comment rulemaking could proceed. On remand, the district court determined that the instructions were exempt from notice-and-comment requirements because they were “general statements of policy,” not substantive or legislative rules. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The court agreed that the Director’s instructions were general statements of policy exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). It emphasized that there is no statutory right to IPR institution, that the instructions do not bind the Director, and that the Director retains unreviewable discretion to institute or deny IPR. The court found that none of the legal standards or precedents cited by the challengers required a different result, and it affirmed the district court’s judgment rejecting the APA-based challenge. View "APPLE INC. v. SQUIRES " on Justia Law

GAMBOA-AVILA v. HHS

2026-02-11T08:35:30-08:00

The petitioner received a Prevnar 13 pneumococcal conjugate vaccine and soon after began experiencing symptoms that ultimately led to a diagnosis of Guillain-Barré Syndrome (GBS). He sought compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, alleging that the vaccine caused his condition. To support his claim, he presented expert testimony advancing a molecular mimicry theory, arguing that components of the vaccine could trigger an autoimmune response resulting in GBS. The government countered with its own expert, disputing this causation theory. A special master in the United States Court of Federal Claims evaluated the evidence and found that the petitioner failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the vaccine can cause GBS. The special master determined that key elements of the petitioner’s expert’s theory lacked support from reliable scientific literature and that the evidence did not sufficiently establish a causal connection. As a result, the special master denied compensation. The United States Court of Federal Claims reviewed and affirmed the special master’s decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the special master did not require the petitioner to provide direct medical literature establishing causation, which would have been contrary to the standard set forth in Althen v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 418 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Instead, the special master properly considered the absence of supporting literature as one factor in evaluating the reliability of the causation theory, consistent with governing law. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court’s decision, noting concern about inconsistent outcomes among special masters on similar facts but finding no legal error in this case’s resolution. View "GAMBOA-AVILA v. HHS " on Justia Law

INGEVITY CORPORATION v. BASF CORPORATION

2026-02-11T08:35:29-08:00

Two companies that manufacture activated carbon honeycombs, used in automotive emission control systems, became embroiled in a legal dispute. One company holds a patent covering certain dual-stage fuel vapor canister systems, but not honeycombs used in air-intake systems. The other company began marketing a competing honeycomb product, prompting a patent infringement lawsuit. In response, the defendant challenged the validity of the patent, argued non-infringement, and asserted counterclaims alleging antitrust violations—specifically, that the patent holder unlawfully tied licenses for the patent to the purchase of its unpatented honeycomb products. The United States District Court for the District of Delaware first granted summary judgment that the patent was invalid due to prior invention. It then denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment on the antitrust and tortious interference counterclaims, finding a factual dispute about whether the honeycomb products had substantial non-infringing uses. At trial, the jury found the patent holder liable for unlawful tying under federal antitrust law, concluding that it had conditioned patent licenses on customers buying its honeycombs, and awarded significant damages. The district court denied the patent holder’s motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, confirming the jury’s findings that the honeycombs were staple goods with substantial non-infringing uses and that the conduct was not protected by immunity doctrines. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Federal Circuit held that substantial evidence supported the jury’s findings that the honeycomb products had actual and substantial non-infringing uses, making them staple goods and removing the patent holder’s statutory defense against antitrust liability. The court also rejected the argument that the patent holder’s conduct was immunized from antitrust scrutiny, and upheld the damages award, finding no error in the district court’s rulings or the jury’s determinations. View "INGEVITY CORPORATION v. BASF CORPORATION " on Justia Law

GOTV STREAMING, LLC v. NETFLIX, INC.

2026-02-09T08:03:11-08:00

GoTV Streaming, LLC owned three related patents that describe a system in which a server receives a content request from a wireless device, tailors the content to that device’s capabilities (such as screen size), and sends the modified content to the device for display. The patents were designed to reduce the burden of developing unique applications for each device type. Instead, the server uses generic templates and custom configurations that are then tailored to the specific device’s needs. The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially dismissed GoTV’s claims for induced infringement, holding that such claims require the defendant’s knowledge of the patents before the lawsuit. The court also denied Netflix’s motion that the patents were ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101, finding the claims were not directed to abstract ideas. The court later found all claims of the ’865 patent indefinite and invalid, adopted some of GoTV’s proposed claim constructions, and denied GoTV’s motions to exclude certain Netflix damages evidence. At trial, the jury found Netflix infringed only one patent and awarded GoTV $2.5 million in damages. The district court denied GoTV’s post-trial motions, including for retrial on damages and for prejudgment interest predating the complaint. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. It reversed the district court’s indefiniteness finding for the ’865 patent and adopted GoTV’s claim construction. However, it held that all asserted claims were patent-ineligible under § 101 because they were directed to the abstract idea of using a generic template tailored for a user’s device without reciting an inventive concept. The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment for GoTV, ordered judgment for Netflix, and vacated the district court’s rulings on inducement and damages evidence. View "GOTV STREAMING, LLC v. NETFLIX, INC. " on Justia Law

SYNEREN TECHNOLOGIES CORP. v. US

2026-02-05T08:07:26-08:00

The United States Department of Commerce issued a request for proposals seeking enterprise-wide information technology services. After evaluating numerous proposals, the agency announced fifteen presumptive contract awardees. CAN Softtech, Inc. (CSI) and other unsuccessful offerors challenged the awards, alleging flaws in the evaluation process. The agency responded by reevaluating the proposals multiple times, making adjustments to the technical evaluation team, and ultimately reissuing awards to the same fifteen companies. Each time, CSI and others filed new or amended bid protests, contending that the agency’s corrective actions and reevaluations were improper. The United States Court of Federal Claims initially found the agency’s evaluation of CSI’s proposal arbitrary and capricious and enjoined performance of the contracts pending reevaluation. After further corrective action by the agency, including terminating awards and issuing new evaluations, the trial court determined that the agency’s final evaluation and contract awards were rational and supported by the record. The court considered the agency’s process for reevaluation and corrective action to have satisfied procedural requirements, and rejected CSI’s argument that the agency needed to seek voluntary remand before taking corrective action. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the trial court’s judgment de novo. The court held that administrative agencies possess inherent authority to terminate contract awards and take unilateral corrective action in response to bid protests, so long as they act within statutory and procedural bounds and avoid arbitrary or capricious conduct. The court also determined that the agency’s actions in this case did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act and were not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. The Federal Circuit affirmed the trial court’s denial of CSI’s bid protest. View "SYNEREN TECHNOLOGIES CORP. v. US " on Justia Law

CASH v. COLLINS

2026-02-05T08:07:25-08:00

A veteran who served in the U.S. Navy sought service-connected disability benefits for several medical conditions, including asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD), and an enlarged prostate. He claimed that GERD and prostate issues were secondary to COPD, which he alleged was caused by exposure to lead paint during his military service. The veteran submitted medical articles and sworn statements supporting the connection between lead exposure and these conditions in February 2022 during an appeal for asthma and COPD. When he later appealed the denial of benefits for GERD and prostate conditions, he attached an addendum to his Notice of Disagreement (NOD) directing the Board of Veterans’ Appeals to consider the previously submitted evidence. After the regional office denied his claim, the veteran sought higher-level review, which was also denied. He then appealed to the Board, selecting an appeal track that allowed submission of additional evidence without a hearing. The Board denied his appeal, stating that no “new and relevant” evidence had been presented and refusing to consider the February 2022 evidence because it had been submitted before the NOD for the current claim. The Board reasoned that evidence must be submitted anew with each NOD to be considered. The veteran appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which affirmed the Board’s decision, relying on Cook v. McDonough to hold that evidence submitted between the agency decision and the NOD was excluded from consideration. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo and held that the veteran satisfied the evidentiary submission requirement by clearly and timely referencing the prior submission in his NOD addendum. The court reversed the Veterans Court's decision, concluding that the Board must consider the evidence previously submitted and clearly incorporated by reference with the NOD. View "CASH v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

HAMILL v. COLLINS

2026-02-04T08:05:14-08:00

David Hamill served in the U.S. Marine Corps from 2009 to 2013 and was discharged under “Other Than Honorable” conditions. After his discharge, he sought disability compensation for PTSD and other conditions, but the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) denied his application in 2014, citing that his discharge status barred him from most benefits. He did not appeal. In 2017 and again in 2021, Hamill filed new claims for disability benefits, which the VA interpreted as attempts to reopen his character of discharge determination. The VA ultimately granted service connection for PTSD in 2021, but did not address his discharge status, leaving Hamill without an appealable decision on that issue. Hamill’s attorney later requested an adjudication of his discharge characterization, but the VA replied that he should seek a change through the Service Department. Hamill then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for a writ of mandamus to compel the VA to adjudicate his character of discharge claim. The Secretary moved to dismiss the petition as moot after the VA sent a letter in February 2023 explicitly finding no new and material evidence to reopen the discharge determination. Hamill also requested class certification, arguing the petition was not moot due to certain exceptions. A divided panel of the Veterans Court dismissed Hamill’s petition, concluding it was moot based on the implicit denial doctrine, which held that the 2021 VA decision implicitly denied his claim. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and held that under the Appeals Modernization Act (AMA), the VA can no longer implicitly deny claims; decisions must explicitly identify adjudicated issues. The court vacated the Veterans Court’s order dismissing Hamill’s petition and remanded the case for further proceedings, including consideration of mootness exceptions. Costs were awarded to Hamill. View "HAMILL v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

112 GENESEE STREET, LLC v. US

2026-02-04T08:05:13-08:00

Over three hundred restaurants and businesses applied for grants from the Restaurant Revitalization Fund (RRF), a program established by Congress in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and administered by the Small Business Administration (SBA). The plaintiffs submitted their applications on the first day the portal opened, but did not receive grants before the RRF funds were exhausted. They alleged that the SBA improperly awarded grants to later applicants instead of following the statutory requirement to award grants in the order applications were received. The United States Court of Federal Claims considered the plaintiffs’ complaint seeking damages equivalent to the unpaid grants. The Government moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction under the Tucker Act and for failure to state a claim, arguing that the RRF statute did not mandate payment and that Congress imposed a cap on liability. The Court of Federal Claims denied the motion, holding that the RRF statute’s language was money-mandating, thus conferring jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, and that there was no clear statutory cap limiting the Government’s liability for the grants. The court certified its decision for interlocutory appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court held that the RRF statute was money-mandating due to its mandatory “shall award” language and the retrospective nature of the grant calculation. The court further determined that the statutory appropriation language was ambiguous and did not impose a clear cap limiting the Government’s liability. As a result, the plaintiffs’ claims fell within Tucker Act jurisdiction, and they had sufficiently stated a claim for relief. The decision of the Court of Federal Claims was affirmed. View "112 GENESEE STREET, LLC v. US " on Justia Law

In re United States

2026-02-02T07:34:40-08:00

In this case, the central issue arose during a countervailing duty investigation into phosphate fertilizers imported from Morocco and Russia. The International Trade Commission (Commission) collected information through questionnaires sent to various parties, including domestic and foreign producers. The Commission’s longstanding practice was to automatically designate all questionnaire responses as confidential, regardless of whether the submitting party requested confidentiality or whether the information would qualify for such treatment under the relevant statute. This led to heavy redactions in the administrative record when the investigation was challenged in court. A Moroccan producer, OCP S.A., sought review of the Commission’s injury determination in the United States Court of International Trade (CIT). The CIT initially remanded the injury determination due to insufficient evidentiary support. When the remand record again included substantial redactions, the CIT held a hearing to scrutinize the Commission’s confidentiality designations. After reviewing arguments from the Commission and affected parties, the CIT concluded that the Commission’s practice of automatically treating all questionnaire responses as confidential was unauthorized by law. The CIT found that much of the redacted information was either publicly available, generalized, or outdated, and thus not entitled to confidential treatment, with only a small portion warranting protection. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the CIT’s Confidentiality Opinion and Order. The Federal Circuit held that the governing statute does not abrogate the common law right of public access to judicial records and that the Commission’s blanket confidentiality rule conflicts with statutory requirements, which demand public disclosure of non-confidential information and proper justification for confidentiality. The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s order that required the Commission to comply with statutory standards for confidentiality and to cease automatic confidential designation of questionnaire responses. View "In re United States" on Justia Law

In re United States

2026-02-02T07:02:32-08:00

In a dispute concerning antidumping and countervailing duties on mattresses imported from several countries, the U.S. International Trade Commission determined that domestic industry suffered material injury from imports sold at less than fair value and from subsidized imports. The Commission treated certain information submitted in response to its questionnaires as confidential. After the Court of International Trade issued a public opinion sustaining the Commission’s injury determination, it did not redact information the Commission had deemed confidential. The Commission requested retraction of the public opinion and sought redactions for specific company names and numerical data, arguing these deserved confidential treatment. The parties jointly moved for redaction, relying on the Commission’s practice of treating questionnaire data as confidential and citing statutory provisions. The Court of International Trade denied the motion, reasoning that the information was either publicly available or not linked to specific entities, and that some claims of confidentiality had been waived due to procedural oversight. The court also emphasized the common law right of access and transparency, but did not specifically address the statutory authority for disclosure. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the denial of the joint motion. The court found the case moot because the allegedly confidential information had already been publicly disclosed more than two years earlier, rendering any relief unavailable. The Federal Circuit held that the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness did not apply, as the companion case decided that day resolved the same confidentiality issues. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and no costs were awarded. View "In re United States" on Justia Law

RANGE OF MOTION PRODUCTS, LLC v. ARMAID COMPANY INC.

2026-02-02T06:36:42-08:00

Range of Motion Products, LLC owns a design patent for a body massaging apparatus, which is embodied in its product, the Rolflex. Armaid Company Inc. manufactures the Armaid2, an accused product in this suit, as well as an earlier version, the Armaid1, which was covered by a utility patent. RoM alleged that the Armaid2 infringed its design patent. Previously, RoM had filed a similar suit against Armaid in the same court, but that case was dismissed without prejudice following the denial of a preliminary injunction. In the subsequent action, the United States District Court for the District of Maine construed the design patent, carefully distinguishing between functional and ornamental aspects of the claimed design. The court found that many features, notably the shape of the arms and the base, were primarily functional, narrowing the scope of the claimed design. Upon reviewing the evidence, the district court concluded that no reasonable jury could find the design of the Armaid2 substantially similar to the patented design, and granted summary judgment of non-infringement in favor of Armaid. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s claim construction de novo and its grant of summary judgment under the First Circuit’s de novo standard. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the district court did not err in identifying the functional versus ornamental aspects of the claimed design, and finding that the designs were plainly dissimilar when considering only the ornamental features. The court further held that, even when comparing the accused and claimed designs alongside prior art, no reasonable jury could find substantial similarity. The judgment of non-infringement was affirmed. View "RANGE OF MOTION PRODUCTS, LLC v. ARMAID COMPANY INC. " on Justia Law

HOLSTEIN v. COLLINS

2026-01-30T08:03:43-08:00

A veteran sought compensation from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) for a neck injury, initially filing his claim in 2007. The VA denied the claim, and in 2008, the veteran, with the help of a non-attorney representative, filed a notice of disagreement (NOD) to appeal the denial. In 2012, the veteran retained an attorney, who entered into a contingency fee agreement and subsequently filed an additional claim on the veteran’s behalf for service-connected post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The attorney also submitted new evidence and arguments to support both the neck injury claim and a claim for total disability based on individual unemployability (TDIU), referencing both the neck injury and PTSD. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals later found the neck injury was service connected and remanded the neck claim to the VA Regional Office for a rating decision, while referring the TDIU claim to the Regional Office, as it had not been addressed previously. The Regional Office ultimately granted past-due benefits for the neck injury, PTSD, and TDIU, but awarded attorney’s fees to the attorney only for the portion of benefits related to the neck injury—finding that the PTSD claim was not part of the appealed case under the relevant statute. The Board affirmed this determination, and the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims also affirmed, concluding that the PTSD claim was not connected to the original NOD regarding the neck injury. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that, under 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1) (2012), attorney’s fees may only be paid for services provided after an NOD is filed, and only for the “case” addressed by that NOD. The court affirmed that the PTSD claim was not part of the same case as the neck injury claim appealed in the 2008 NOD, and therefore attorney’s fees were not authorized for services related to the PTSD claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the Veterans Court. View "HOLSTEIN v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Sound View Innovations, LLC v. Hulu, LLC

2026-01-29T07:33:45-08:00

The dispute centered on technology for streaming media over networks, specifically a method described in a now-expired patent for reducing latency and improving stream quality using intermediate “helper servers” to cache and coordinate content distribution. The patent’s method claim at issue involved several steps, including receiving a request for a streaming media object from a client at a helper server, allocating a buffer at the helper server to cache part of the requested object, downloading that portion to the client while concurrently retrieving the remaining portion, and adjusting the transfer rate. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s system infringed this method claim by directing third-party edge servers to perform these steps. The United States District Court for the Central District of California previously granted summary judgment of noninfringement in favor of the defendant. The district court found that the accused system did not perform the required steps in the order set out in the claim and that it did not use the kind of “specialized buffer” the patent required. On a prior appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed some claim constructions, vacated the summary judgment, and remanded for further construction of the term “buffer.” On remand, the district court construed “buffer” as “short term storage associated with said requested SM object,” determined that claim 16 required both a specialized buffer and a specific order of steps, and again granted summary judgment for noninfringement. On the present appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in limiting the claim to a specialized buffer, but correctly construed the claim to require the first two steps to be performed in sequence. Because the accused system did not perform the steps in this required order, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment of noninfringement. View "Sound View Innovations, LLC v. Hulu, LLC" on Justia Law

US PATENT NO. 7,679,637 LLC v. GOOGLE LLC

2026-01-22T07:31:13-08:00

The plaintiff, owner of U.S. Patent No. 7,679,637, claimed infringement by the defendant, Google LLC, concerning a patent related to web conferencing systems. The patent describes systems that allow participants to view sessions in real time, with time-shifting capabilities so that sessions can also be viewed with delay or after completion, and at different playback rates while maintaining consistent audio quality. The asserted claims permit asynchronous review of multimedia presentations, such as going back to review one aspect while another continues live. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington reviewed the complaint, in which the plaintiff alleged infringement of claims 2–5 and 7–9 of the patent. Google moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing the asserted claims were patent-ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, finding the claims were directed to an abstract idea without an inventive concept that would make them patent-eligible. The court also denied the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint, citing futility. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo, applying the Alice two-step test for patent eligibility. The appellate court affirmed that the claims were directed to the abstract idea of asynchronous review of presentations and did not disclose a specific technological improvement or inventive concept. The court found that conventional components and result-oriented language did not suffice for eligibility and agreed that amendment of the complaint would be futile. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case. Costs were awarded to Google. View "US PATENT NO. 7,679,637 LLC v. GOOGLE LLC " on Justia Law

BARRY v. DEPUY SYNTHES COMPANIES

2026-01-20T07:00:49-08:00

A physician brought suit against several related companies, alleging that they induced surgeons to infringe claims of three patents covering surgical techniques and tools for treating spinal deformities. These patents involve methods and devices for correcting misaligned vertebrae, including the use of “handle means” and “cross-linking members” in en bloc derotation procedures. The defendant companies manufacture derotation devices that, according to the plaintiff, infringe the asserted patents when used in certain configurations. The dispute centered on whether the accused devices contained the claimed “handle means” and whether surgeons actually used the devices in infringing ways. In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the parties disputed the meaning of “handle means,” and the court adopted the plaintiff’s proposed construction. During the trial, the plaintiff presented testimony from two experts: one on infringement and another who conducted a survey on surgical practices. The defendants moved to exclude both experts under Daubert, challenging the reliability and relevance of their methods and opinions. Initially, the district court denied these motions, finding that the experts’ application of the court’s claim construction and survey methodology affected the weight of their testimony, not its admissibility. However, following the experts’ testimony at trial, the district court reversed its earlier decision, excluded substantial portions of both experts’ testimony as unreliable and contradictory to the court’s claim construction, and then granted judgment as a matter of law to the defendants due to the lack of admissible evidence supporting infringement. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the expert testimony and erred in granting judgment as a matter of law. The appellate court reversed the district court’s rulings, holding that the excluded testimony did not contradict the court’s claim construction and that any methodological concerns went to evidentiary weight, not admissibility. The case was remanded for a new trial in which both experts may testify. View "BARRY v. DEPUY SYNTHES COMPANIES " on Justia Law

MCKINNEY v. SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS

2026-01-14T08:03:01-08:00

A veteran who suffered a traumatic brain injury from an improvised explosive device while deployed sought financial assistance under the Traumatic Servicemembers’ Group Life Insurance (TSGLI) program after experiencing a stroke within two years of the injury. The Army denied his claim, determining the stroke was a physical illness or disease, not a qualifying traumatic injury as defined by the relevant statute and regulations. The veteran then petitioned the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to amend its rules to include coverage for illnesses or diseases caused by explosive ordnance, arguing these conditions are analogous to those already covered under existing exceptions for injuries resulting from chemical, biological, or radiological weapons. The VA initially denied the rulemaking petition but agreed to further review as part of a program-wide assessment. After several years, extensive consultation with medical experts, and consideration of the petition and supporting materials, the VA issued a final denial. It concluded that expanding coverage to delayed illnesses or diseases linked to explosive ordnance would be inconsistent with TSGLI’s purpose, which focuses on immediate injuries, would deviate from the insurance model underlying the program, and could threaten its financial stability. The VA also found insufficient evidence of a direct causal relationship between explosive ordnance, traumatic brain injury, and downstream illnesses like stroke. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the VA’s denial under the highly deferential “arbitrary and capricious” standard of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court held that the VA provided a reasoned explanation addressing the petitioner’s arguments and the record, and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously. The petition for review was therefore denied. View "MCKINNEY v. SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS " on Justia Law

PALMERI v. MSPB

2026-01-13T07:01:51-08:00

Mr. Palmeri began his employment with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in 1997 and was promoted to the Senior Executive Service (SES) in 2020. He was not informed that joining the DEA SES would affect his appeal rights. In January 2022, the DEA proposed his removal based on alleged misconduct, but before the removal was finalized, Mr. Palmeri retired. The agency stated that, had he not retired, he would have been removed. He then appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (the Board), claiming his retirement was involuntary and constituted a constructive removal. The DEA moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that SES employees in the DEA do not have the right to appeal adverse actions to the Board under 5 U.S.C. § 3151. After allowing for discovery and briefing, an Administrative Judge dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The full Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed and adopted this initial decision, explaining that DEA SES employees can only appeal adverse actions through procedures established by the Attorney General, but no such procedures or regulations have been promulgated. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit considered whether the Board had jurisdiction over Mr. Palmeri’s appeal. The court held that the governing statutes clearly exclude DEA SES employees from Board appeal rights and require any hearing or appeal to be decided pursuant to regulations issued by the Attorney General, which do not exist. The court rejected arguments that lack of notice or absence of regulations should confer jurisdiction on the Board, and clarified that any constitutional claims must be pursued in a different forum. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. View "PALMERI v. MSPB " on Justia Law

YOUNG v. COLLINS

2026-01-13T06:31:34-08:00

James Young, a veteran who served in the military during the mid-1980s, initially filed a claim for service-connected disability benefits in 1988, alleging head injuries from an in-service car accident. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) regional office denied his claim in 1991, and after several years of proceedings, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied the claim in 1999, citing Young’s failure to appear for scheduled medical examinations. Young did not appeal the Board’s 1999 denial. Years later, in 2017, following a new claim and medical examinations, the VA granted service connection for his head injuries effective August 17, 2012. Seeking an earlier effective date linked to his original 1988 claim, Young filed a motion in 2022 with the Board to vacate its 1999 denial, alleging due process violations because the Board had failed to ensure the regional office complied with orders to search for certain records. The Board denied the motion, characterizing the alleged error as a “duty to assist error” rather than a due process error. Young appealed this denial to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which dismissed the appeal. The Veterans Court found that while the appeal was timely regarding the denial of the motion to vacate, such a denial was not an appealable decision under its jurisdictional statute. Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court’s dismissal. The Federal Circuit held that the Board’s denial of a motion to vacate under 38 C.F.R. § 20.1000(a), when based solely on alleged material error known at the time of the original decision, does not constitute an appealable “decision” under 38 U.S.C. § 7252. The court determined that allowing appeals from such procedural denials would undermine the statutory time bar and permit indefinite judicial review of Board decisions. View "YOUNG v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

CROCS, INC. v. ITC

2026-01-08T07:31:32-08:00

Crocs, Inc. owns two U.S. trademarks covering features of its Classic Clog shoes. In June 2021, Crocs filed a complaint with the United States International Trade Commission (ITC), alleging that several respondents violated Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 by importing or selling footwear that infringed or diluted Crocs’s trademarks. Crocs sought a general exclusion order (GEO) or, in the alternative, a limited exclusion order (LEO). During the investigation, some respondents were found in default for failing to participate, while others actively defended against the claims. An Administrative Law Judge conducted an evidentiary hearing for the three active respondents and, in January 2023, issued an Initial Determination finding no violation of Section 337. The judge concluded that Crocs had not shown infringement or dilution of its trademarks and had waived infringement contentions against the defaulting respondents. The Commission reviewed parts of this determination and, in September 2023, issued a final decision: it found no violation by the active respondents and determined not to apply the waiver to the defaulting respondents. For the defaulting respondents, the ITC presumed the facts in Crocs’s complaint to be true, as required by statute, and issued an LEO against them, finding no public interest factors weighed against exclusion. On appeal, Crocs challenged both the no violation finding as to active respondents and the issuance of only an LEO rather than a GEO for the defaulting respondents. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that Crocs’s appeal regarding the active respondents was untimely and dismissed it. Regarding the defaulting respondents, the court affirmed the Commission’s decision to issue a limited exclusion order, finding no abuse of discretion or error in law. Thus, the appeal was dismissed in part and affirmed in part. View "CROCS, INC. v. ITC " on Justia Law

MIDWEST-CBK, LLC v. US

2026-01-08T07:01:35-08:00

The case centers on Midwest-CBK, LLC, a Minnesota-based retailer of Christmas ornaments. Midwest operated its corporate office in Minnesota and managed inventory and warehousing in Ontario, Canada. Merchandise was purchased from foreign suppliers for export to Canada, stored in Ontario, and sold to U.S. customers by Midwest’s U.S.-based sales staff. Orders were processed in Canada and shipped from Ontario to the United States, with purchase orders stating “FOB Buffalo, NY.” Between 2013 and 2016, Midwest entered merchandise with U.S. Customs and Border Protection using “deductive value.” Customs extended the liquidation deadline and conducted a regulatory audit to determine the correct valuation method, ultimately concluding that “transaction value” should apply, resulting in a recalculated duty assessment. The United States Court of International Trade reviewed Midwest’s challenge to Customs’ appraisement and its extensions of liquidation. Midwest argued that Customs lacked authority to extend liquidation beyond June 14, 2014, when all requested information had been provided, and asserted that the sales were domestic, not “for exportation to the United States.” The CIT found that Customs had a reasonable basis for the extension, given the ongoing audit and internal review, and determined that the transactions qualified as sales for exportation under the relevant statute. The CIT denied Midwest’s motion for partial summary judgment and granted summary judgment to the government. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s decision. The court held that Customs properly extended the liquidation period and did not abuse its discretion. It further held that Midwest’s sales were “for exportation to the United States” under 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b)(1), making transaction value the appropriate basis for appraisement. The judgment of the Court of International Trade was affirmed. View "MIDWEST-CBK, LLC v. US " on Justia Law

ETHANOL BOOSTING SYSTEMS, LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY

2025-12-23T07:01:56-08:00

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology owns three patents related to fuel management systems for spark ignition engines, which are exclusively licensed to Ethanol Boosting Systems, LLC. These patents describe a system that uses both direct and port fuel injection to mitigate engine knock and optimize performance. The system operates with varying injection mechanisms depending on engine torque or manifold pressure, and includes a three-way catalyst to reduce emissions. The patents contain claims focusing on the interplay of injection types with engine operating ranges and the use of anti-knock agents. Previously, Ford Motor Company petitioned the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) for inter partes review (IPR) of all three patents. The PTAB initially denied institution, largely due to a claim construction that restricted the definition of “fuel” in a manner consistent with a district court’s prior interpretation, which required the directly injected fuel to differ from the port-injected fuel and to contain an anti-knock agent other than gasoline. After the Federal Circuit, in Ethanol Boosting Sys., LLC v. Ford Motor Co., vacated the district court’s construction regarding the “different fuel” requirement (but did not address the anti-gasoline requirement), the PTAB granted Ford’s rehearing request and instituted the IPRs. On appeal from the PTAB, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s final written decisions, which found the relevant claims of all three patents unpatentable as obvious. The Federal Circuit rejected EBS’s arguments that the Board lacked authority to delay its rehearing decision and that the Board was bound by the non-appealed portion of the district court’s claim construction. The court affirmed the Board’s adoption of the plain and ordinary meaning of the disputed terms and found substantial evidence supporting the Board’s factual findings regarding obviousness. The holding is that the PTAB’s decisions finding all challenged claims unpatentable as obvious are affirmed. View "ETHANOL BOOSTING SYSTEMS, LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY " on Justia Law

ABLAN v. US

2025-12-22T07:32:17-08:00

Several property owners upstream of the Addicks and Barker Dams in Houston, Texas, experienced flooding on their land during Hurricane Harvey in 2017. The Army Corps of Engineers, responsible for the design and operation of these dams, had long maintained a protocol to protect downtown Houston from flooding, which involved allowing reservoir water to inundate upstream private property under extraordinary storm conditions. The Corps had previously considered purchasing all land that would flood during such events but ultimately acquired only a portion, leaving other private lands at risk. When Hurricane Harvey produced record rainfall, water exceeded government-owned land and flooded privately owned properties, resulting in significant damage. The property owners brought suit against the United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims, alleging that the government’s operation of the dams constituted an uncompensated taking of their property under the Fifth Amendment. The court consolidated and subdivided the cases, held a liability trial for thirteen bellwether properties, and found the government liable for taking flowage easements. The court later denied a motion for class certification on grounds of untimeliness and selected six bellwether properties for a damages trial, awarding a total of $454,535.03 plus interest. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of Federal Claims’ findings of liability and its denial of class certification. With respect to damages, the Federal Circuit affirmed the awards for leasehold advantage, damaged personal property, and the offsetting of FEMA relief, but vacated the awards for lost rent, displacement, and the valuation of the flowage easement for one property owner, remanding those issues for further proceedings. The main holdings are that the government’s operation of the dams constituted a permanent physical taking of flowage easements, and that certain categories of damages were compensable while others were not. View "ABLAN v. US " on Justia Law

Mutakaber v. Secretary of State

2025-12-18T07:02:59-08:00

In August 2021, following the withdrawal of U.S. military and diplomatic personnel from Afghanistan due to the Doha Agreement with the Taliban, the U.S. government vacated several leased properties in Kabul, comprising five residential villas owned by Abdul Mutakaber and two military vehicle storage lots owned by Hamidullah. These leases were executed between 2013 and 2020, during Afghanistan’s Ghani administration. After the Taliban seized control of Kabul, they occupied all the properties previously leased by the U.S., preventing the owners from regaining access. The U.S. government then sent notices to terminate the leases, invoking force majeure, and requested refunds of advance rental payments from both landlords. Both Mutakaber and Hamidullah filed certified claims with the State Department under the Contract Disputes Act, seeking unpaid rent, restoration of possession, or purchase of the properties. After the contracting officer denied their claims, they appealed to the United States Civilian Board of Contract Appeals. The Board denied their breach of contract claims, finding that the government did not properly terminate the leases under the force majeure clause but did validly terminate for convenience under the leases’ termination provisions. The Board also determined the government was not obligated to return physical possession of the properties, as the leases did not impose such a duty. The Board awarded judgments for unpaid rent and refunds based on pre-paid amounts: Mutakaber was found to owe the government $115,429.85, while Hamidullah was awarded $193,270.15. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s legal conclusions de novo. The court held that the leases did not expressly or impliedly obligate the government to restore physical possession of the properties to the landlords upon termination, nor did Afghan law require such action under the circumstances. The court affirmed the Board’s judgments. View "Mutakaber v. Secretary of State" on Justia Law

Micron Technology, Inc. v. Longhorn IP LLC

2025-12-18T06:33:44-08:00

Micron Technology and its subsidiaries, along with the State of Idaho, were sued for patent infringement by Katana Silicon Technologies in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The patents at issue related to technology for shrinking semiconductor devices and had expired. In response, Micron asserted a counterclaim under the Idaho Bad Faith Assertions of Patent Infringement Act, alleging that Katana had made bad faith assertions of patent infringement. Katana moved to dismiss the counterclaim, arguing that the Idaho Act was preempted by federal patent law. The case was transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, where the State of Idaho intervened to defend the statute. Separately, Micron filed suit in Idaho state court against Longhorn IP, alleging similar bad faith assertions and seeking the imposition of a bond. Longhorn removed that case to federal court and also moved to dismiss on preemption grounds. The United States District Court for the District of Idaho denied both motions to dismiss, holding that federal law did not preempt the Idaho statute. The court also imposed an $8 million bond on Longhorn and Katana pursuant to the Act, finding that there was a reasonable likelihood that a bad faith assertion of patent infringement had occurred. Katana and Longhorn appealed these decisions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The appellate court determined that there was no final judgment from the district court, as the only decisions made were the denial of motions to dismiss and the imposition of a bond, neither of which ended the litigation on the merits. The Federal Circuit also found that none of the exceptions for interlocutory appellate review applied, including those for injunctions, the collateral order doctrine, or mandamus, nor was pendent jurisdiction appropriate. View "Micron Technology, Inc. v. Longhorn IP LLC" on Justia Law

BRIMER v. NAVY

2025-12-17T07:02:24-08:00

David S. Brimer, a disabled veteran with preference eligibility, was employed as a GS-13 Supervisory Human Resources Specialist for the Naval Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. He applied for a merit promotion to a GS-14 Assistant Human Resources Officer position with the Naval Education and Training Command. Although the position was open to current permanent employees, VEOA eligibles, and DoD Military Spouse Preference eligibles, his application was not initially referred to the hiring official due to an erroneous belief by the agency that he had not met the time-in-grade requirement. After Brimer filed a complaint with the Department of Labor, the agency acknowledged the error but determined, upon review, that Brimer was not among the most highly qualified candidates for the position. Brimer subsequently appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board, alleging that the agency obstructed his right to compete for employment and violated his veterans’ preference rights under 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1). The administrative judge denied his request for corrective action, stating that the initial error had been remedied through a proper merit review. The Board affirmed, relying on Kerner v. Department of the Interior, 778 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and concluded that § 3304(f) does not apply to veterans already employed by the federal government, thus denying Brimer corrective action as a matter of law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision. Applying the standard set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c), the court held that the Board correctly interpreted precedent and the statute, affirming that 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1) does not entitle currently employed federal veterans to corrective action under VEOA for merit promotion vacancies. The Board’s decision denying Brimer's claims was affirmed. View "BRIMER v. NAVY " on Justia Law

WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG v. EVENFLO COMPANY, INC.

2025-12-17T07:02:24-08:00

Wonderland Switzerland AG owns two patents related to child car seats, U.S. Patent Nos. 7,625,043 and 8,141,951. Wonderland sued Evenflo Company, Inc., alleging that five Evenflo convertible car seat models, categorized as “4-in-1” and “3-in-1” seats, infringed claims of both patents. The dispute focused on specific features of the accused car seats, such as mechanisms for attaching the seat back to the seat assembly and the structure of engaging components. A jury in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware found that both Evenflo’s 3-in-1 and 4-in-1 seats infringed claim 1 of the ’043 patent under the doctrine of equivalents and that the 4-in-1 seats also infringed claims 1 and 5 of the ’951 patent, both literally and under the doctrine of equivalents. The jury found Evenflo’s infringement of the ’043 patent was not willful. The district court denied both parties’ motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, granted a permanent injunction covering both patents, and denied Wonderland’s motion for a new trial on willful infringement. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the judgment that Evenflo’s 4-in-1 seats infringe claim 1 of the ’043 patent under the doctrine of equivalents, finding no substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict on that point. The court also reversed the permanent injunction as to both patents because the injunction for the ’951 patent was not requested and the showing for irreparable harm as to the ’043 patent was insufficient. Furthermore, the court reversed the denial of a new trial on willful infringement of the ’043 patent (for the 3-in-1 seats only) due to wrongful exclusion of key evidence. The judgment was otherwise affirmed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG v. EVENFLO COMPANY, INC. " on Justia Law

Lesko v. United States

2025-12-12T12:03:26-08:00

A registered nurse who worked for the Indian Health Service during the COVID-19 pandemic claimed that she and similarly situated nurses were required by supervisors to work overtime without compensation. After resigning, she filed a class action lawsuit in the United States Court of Federal Claims, alleging, among other things, that the government violated the federal overtime statute by failing to pay for overtime that was allegedly induced by supervisors. Specifically, she argued that the statutory requirement for overtime to be “officially ordered or approved” should cover such induced overtime, even in the absence of written authorization. The United States Court of Federal Claims dismissed all counts of her complaint for failure to state a claim. With respect to the overtime claim (Count II), the court found that she did not allege that she or any potential class members had written authorization for their overtime, as required by the relevant Office of Personnel Management (OPM) regulation. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, reviewed the validity of the OPM’s regulation that requires overtime orders or approvals to be in writing, in light of the statutory language and recent Supreme Court precedent on agency rulemaking authority. The court held that the statute delegates to OPM the authority to prescribe necessary regulations for administering the overtime pay statute, and that this includes the discretion to require written authorization as part of the “officially ordered or approved” process. The court concluded that the writing requirement is a valid exercise of OPM’s rulemaking authority and does not contradict the statute. The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal of the overtime claim and remanded the remaining claims to the original panel for further consideration. View "Lesko v. United States" on Justia Law

GOLDEN v. COLLINS

2025-12-12T06:31:45-08:00

The appellant, a Navy veteran who served as a flight deck signalman from 1984 to 1988, filed claims with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in 2009 seeking service connection for bilateral hearing loss and tinnitus. The VA regional office denied both claims in 2010. Upon appeal, a VA medical examination in 2011 found the appellant’s hearing to be within normal limits during service and opined that his tinnitus was likely associated with hearing loss, but did not address whether the tinnitus itself was service connected. The regional office again denied both claims in 2012. In 2017, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals granted service connection for tinnitus, finding the veteran credible in reporting symptoms since service, and remanded the hearing loss claim for further medical opinion. After additional examinations, the Board denied service connection for bilateral hearing loss in 2021, with no discussion of whether the hearing loss could be connected to the now service-connected tinnitus. The appellant appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, arguing that the Board erred by not discussing secondary service connection for hearing loss. That court affirmed the Board, finding no clear error in denying direct service connection for hearing loss and concluding that the record did not reasonably raise the theory of secondary service connection. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that to establish secondary service connection under 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a), a veteran must show a causal link between the secondary condition and an underlying primary condition for which service connection was granted, not merely a direct link to an in-service event. The Federal Circuit found no error in the Veterans Court’s interpretation of the regulation or its treatment of the facts and affirmed the decision. View "GOLDEN v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

GAME PLAN, INC. v. UNINTERRUPTED IP, LLC

2025-12-10T07:32:42-08:00

A non-profit organization focused on supporting student-athletes registered a stylized mark incorporating the phrase “I AM MORE THAN AN ATHLETE. GP GAME PLAN” for use in charitable fundraising via apparel sales. Later, a media company filed six intent-to-use applications for marks containing “I AM MORE THAN AN ATHLETE” and “MORE THAN AN ATHLETE,” covering clothing and entertainment services. The non-profit opposed these applications before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, arguing likelihood of confusion and asserting priority based on both its registration and alleged common law rights. The media company counterclaimed, seeking cancellation of the non-profit’s registration and asserting that it had acquired priority through an assignment of common law rights from a third party who had used “MORE THAN AN ATHLETE” since at least 2012. During the Board proceeding, the non-profit failed to introduce any trial evidence to establish its common law rights or priority. The Board dismissed the opposition due to lack of evidence. As to the counterclaim, the Board found that the media company had acquired valid and enforceable common law rights in the mark through its assignment, which included the goodwill associated with the mark. The Board rejected arguments that the assignment was invalid because it occurred during litigation or was an assignment in gross, and concluded that, at least for clothing, the transfer was valid. The Board canceled the non-profit’s registration and dismissed its opposition. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s factual findings for substantial evidence and legal conclusions de novo. The court held that the Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and affirmed that the assignment was not in gross, did not violate statutory or regulatory prohibitions, and that the non-profit’s failure to submit evidence justified dismissal. The decision to cancel the non-profit’s registration and dismiss its opposition was affirmed. View "GAME PLAN, INC. v. UNINTERRUPTED IP, LLC " on Justia Law

IBM v. ZILLOW GROUP, INC.

2025-12-09T07:31:58-08:00

IBM owns a patent concerning single sign-on (SSO) technology, which allows users to access protected resources on a second system using credentials from a first system. In simplified terms, the invention facilitates account creation on a second platform (such as a healthcare provider) using a user identifier already stored by the first platform (such as a social media website), thereby avoiding the need for users to create separate accounts for each service. The patent describes specific systems and processes for transmitting user identifiers and managing account creation in distributed environments. Ebates Performance Marketing, Inc. (Rakuten) filed petitions for inter partes review of IBM’s patent at the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), asserting anticipation and obviousness based on several prior art references, especially a system disclosed in Sunada. The PTAB adopted IBM’s construction of certain claim terms but found that Sunada taught or suggested most relevant limitations. The Board held claims 1–4, 12–16, and 18–19 unpatentable, while claims 5–11, 17, and 20 were found not unpatentable because the prior art did not disclose a specific process required by those claims. IBM appealed the PTAB’s ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, arguing that the Board’s analysis exceeded the scope of Rakuten’s petition and that its findings lacked substantial evidence. Zillow, which had joined the review, cross-appealed regarding claims found not unpatentable. The Federal Circuit held that the Board’s analysis was consistent with the petition and supported by substantial evidence. It found the Board’s distinction between similar claims reasonable and affirmed both the appeal and cross-appeal, leaving the PTAB’s patentability determinations undisturbed. View "IBM v. ZILLOW GROUP, INC. " on Justia Law

In Re BAYOU GRANDE COFFEE ROASTING CO.

2025-12-09T07:02:14-08:00

Bayou Grande Coffee Roasting Company applied to register the trademark KAHWA for use in connection with cafés and coffee shops. The trademark examiner refused registration on the grounds that KAHWA was generic or merely descriptive, relying on two meanings: one, that KAHWA allegedly means “coffee” in Arabic, and two, that it refers to a specific type of Kashmiri green tea. The examiner also invoked the doctrine of foreign equivalents, which tests foreign words for genericness and descriptiveness by translating them into English. After Bayou responded, arguing that KAHWA does not mean coffee in Arabic and that the Kashmiri green tea meaning is not relevant to American cafés and coffee shops, the examiner maintained refusals on both grounds. Bayou requested reconsideration, and the examiner continued to refuse registration, reiterating both rationales. Bayou appealed to the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, which affirmed the refusal solely on the basis of the Kashmiri green tea meaning, without addressing the Arabic coffee meaning. On further appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Bayou contended that the Board’s findings of genericness and mere descriptiveness were unsupported by substantial evidence, and also challenged reliance on the doctrine of foreign equivalents. The Federal Circuit held that there was no evidence showing any café or coffee shop in the United States has ever sold kahwa, and thus KAHWA cannot be generic or merely descriptive for cafés and coffee shops. The court also concluded that the doctrine of foreign equivalents does not apply because KAHWA has a well-established English meaning as Kashmiri green tea. The Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s decision, holding that KAHWA is registrable for the identified services. View "In Re BAYOU GRANDE COFFEE ROASTING CO. " on Justia Law

CODA DEVELOPMENT S.R.O. v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY

2025-12-08T08:01:49-08:00

The plaintiffs, Coda Development s.r.o., Coda Innovations s.r.o., and Frantisek Hrabal, brought claims against Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company and Robert Benedict, alleging misappropriation of trade secrets related to self-inflating tire technology and seeking correction of inventorship on a Goodyear patent. Coda claimed that Goodyear misappropriated five specific trade secrets involving technical solutions, testing data, and optimal component placement for this technology. The alleged misappropriation stemmed from communications and interactions between the parties concerning this technology. In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, the case proceeded to a jury trial on the trade secret claims. The jury found in favor of Coda, concluding that Goodyear misappropriated five trade secrets and awarding substantial compensatory and punitive damages. Following the trial, the district court granted Goodyear’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, determining that the asserted trade secrets were either not sufficiently definite, not secret, not used by Goodyear, or not adequately conveyed to Goodyear, and thus set aside the jury’s verdict. The court also denied Coda’s claim seeking correction of inventorship on Goodyear’s patent, after considering the parties’ briefing in lieu of a bench trial. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment as a matter of law, holding that no reasonable jury could have found that all elements required for trade secret misappropriation were met for any of the asserted trade secrets. The Federal Circuit also affirmed the denial of the correction of inventorship claim, concluding that Coda failed to provide evidence that would entitle it to such relief. The district court’s judgment was affirmed in all respects. View "CODA DEVELOPMENT S.R.O. v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY" on Justia Law

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE v. PRATT & WHITNEY

2025-12-05T07:31:54-08:00

A manufacturer of aircraft engines contracted with both the federal government and commercial clients. The contracts at issue were cost-plus agreements, requiring the government to reimburse the manufacturer for a share of overhead costs, calculated under federal Cost Accounting Standards (CAS), specifically CAS 418. The manufacturer used unique “collaboration agreements” with suppliers, involving payments tied to program revenues rather than direct part costs. A central dispute arose over whether certain costs, known as “Drag”—representing amounts paid by collaborators to compensate the manufacturer for shared expenses—should be included in the pool of overhead costs to be allocated, and over how to measure the material costs of parts for allocation purposes. After protracted disagreements and administrative decisions dating back to the 1990s, a contracting officer in 2013 determined that the manufacturer’s accounting violated CAS 418 and that Drag amounts should be excluded from the overhead pool. The manufacturer appealed to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals. The Board held in part for each side: it found the Drag agreement between the parties valid, so Drag need not be excluded, but rejected the manufacturer’s method for calculating material costs, settling on a “net revenue share” approach. The Board remanded to the parties to negotiate quantum (the amount owed), retaining jurisdiction if they failed to agree. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. It held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision on the material cost allocation base (CAS 418 Claim) because no final determination of quantum had been made. However, the court found the Board’s decision on the Drag Claim was final and reviewable. The Federal Circuit held that the Drag agreement was unenforceable against the government because it did not comply with required federal regulations for advance agreements, and therefore reversed the Board’s ruling on that point. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "SECRETARY OF DEFENSE v. PRATT & WHITNEY" on Justia Law

MOSAIC COMPANY v. US

2025-12-05T07:31:53-08:00

Russian producers of phosphate fertilizers were investigated by the U.S. Department of Commerce after a domestic company alleged that the Russian government was providing subsidies, specifically through the provision of natural gas at prices below market value. Commerce’s investigation focused on whether these subsidies were both “specific” to an industry or enterprise and constituted a financial benefit through the sale of gas at less than adequate remuneration. During the investigation, Commerce requested and reviewed data from Russian authorities and Gazprom, Russia’s state-controlled gas supplier, about the volume and pricing of natural gas provided to various Russian industries. The evidence showed that the agrochemical industry, which includes fertilizer producers, was the largest industrial consumer of natural gas, though some non-industrial sectors consumed more in total. Commerce determined that the subsidy was “de facto specific” because the agrochemical industry was a predominant industrial user of natural gas. It also found that natural gas was provided at less than adequate remuneration, using a third-tier benchmark analysis that relied on international energy price data, after concluding that Russian market prices were distorted by government intervention and not set by market principles. Commerce’s final determination imposed countervailing duties on Russian phosphate fertilizer imports. The United States Court of International Trade reviewed Commerce’s decisions and upheld both the specificity and pricing determinations, remanding only on unrelated issues. Upon remand, Commerce reaffirmed its conclusions, and the Trade Court entered final judgment in support of the agency’s findings. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court’s judgment. The court held that Commerce has reasonable flexibility in determining the appropriate comparator group for the “predominant user” analysis and that its approach in this case was reasonable. The court also upheld Commerce’s less-than-adequate-remuneration analysis and rejected arguments that further adjustments were required by statute. The judgment sustaining the countervailing duties was affirmed. View "MOSAIC COMPANY v. US " on Justia Law

ADNEXUS INC. v. META PLATFORMS, INC.

2025-12-05T07:02:28-08:00

Adnexus, Inc. owns a patent for a system and method of online advertising that aims to deliver targeted advertisements to users without overwhelming them with irrelevant content. Adnexus alleged that Meta Platforms, Inc.'s Lead Ads product infringed at least one claim of this patent. Specifically, Adnexus argued that Lead Ads retrieves a user profile containing delivery method preferences and other information, which matches the patent’s claim requirement. Adnexus attached detailed claim charts and a preliminary infringement analysis to its amended complaint to show how Lead Ads purportedly meets each element of the asserted claim. In the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Meta moved to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that Adnexus failed to plausibly allege that Lead Ads met the claim limitation requiring retrieval of a user profile containing delivery method preferences. The district court agreed with Meta, finding that “contact information” was distinct from “delivery method preferences” and that Adnexus’s allegations were insufficient. The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, as Adnexus had already amended its pleading once. The court also dismissed indirect and willful infringement claims, and found Adnexus estopped from asserting infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that the district court erred in implicitly construing the claim term “delivery method preferences” against Adnexus, the non-moving party, without providing Adnexus an opportunity to address claim construction. The Federal Circuit found that Adnexus’s amended complaint, when taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to Adnexus, plausibly alleged infringement of the relevant claim limitation. The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "ADNEXUS INC. v. META PLATFORMS, INC. " on Justia Law

BLUE SKY THE COLOR OF IMAGINATION, LLC v. US

2025-12-04T06:31:38-08:00

Blue Sky The Color of Imagination, LLC imported a spiral-bound paper product that combines monthly calendars, weekly planning pages, note sections, and additional pages for goals and contacts. Blue Sky labeled this item a “weekly/monthly planning calendar,” while the government referred to it as a “planner.” The product was designed for users to schedule future appointments and events. Initially, Customs and Border Protection classified this product under subheading 4820.10.40.00 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), as “[o]ther” stationery items. Blue Sky protested, seeking classification under heading 4910 as a “calendar,” but Customs denied the protest. Blue Sky then filed suit in the United States Court of International Trade. The Trade Court granted summary judgment, rejecting both parties’ proposed classifications and instead classified the product as a “diary” under subheading 4820.10.20.10. The Trade Court reasoned that “diary” covers both retrospective journals and prospective scheduling devices, and found Blue Sky’s product fit this category. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Trade Court’s summary judgment de novo. The Federal Circuit found that the Trade Court’s definition of “diary” conflicted with the controlling precedent set in Mead Corp. v. United States, which held that a “diary” is retrospective, not prospective. Because Blue Sky’s product is used to note future appointments, the Federal Circuit concluded that it cannot be classified as a “diary.” The court reversed the Trade Court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, directing the Trade Court to reconsider the proper classification under the HTSUS. View "BLUE SKY THE COLOR OF IMAGINATION, LLC v. US " on Justia Law

COLAGE v. COLLINS

2025-12-03T06:30:49-08:00

The claimant served in the U.S. Navy and, upon his voluntary separation in 1992, received a lump sum Special Separation Benefit (SSB) under 10 U.S.C. § 1174a. Many years later, in 2017, he was awarded VA disability compensation with entitlement to a total disability rating, effective from late 2016. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) notified him that it would withhold a portion of his monthly disability benefits to recoup the SSB payment, which the claimant contested, arguing that SSB payments are not subject to recoupment and that the relevant statutory authority did not apply to his situation. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals found that the VA acted properly in withholding his disability compensation to recoup the SSB payment. The claimant then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which affirmed the Board’s decision. He sought reconsideration, asserting that the court had relied upon the wrong statutory provision. The Veterans Court granted reconsideration, but in its new decision, it again held that the relevant statute required recoupment of his SSB payment from his VA disability compensation, and affirmed the Board’s decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo. The court held that 10 U.S.C. § 1174(h)(2) applies to SSB payments received under 10 U.S.C. § 1174a, requiring such payments to be deducted from VA disability compensation. The court rejected the claimant’s alternative statutory interpretation, finding it inconsistent with the statutory text and structure. The court also dismissed for lack of jurisdiction arguments that were not addressed by the Veterans Court. The judgment was affirmed in part and dismissed in part. View "COLAGE v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

SEAGEN INC. v. DAIICHI SANKYO COMPANY, LTD.

2025-12-02T06:30:53-08:00

The dispute centers on a patent for a type of cancer treatment called an antibody-drug conjugate (ADC), which combines an antibody, a cytotoxic drug, and a linker protein. The patent at issue claimed a particular kind of linker, a tetrapeptide consisting only of glycine and phenylalanine amino acids. Seagen, the patent holder, sued Daichii Sankyo and AstraZeneca, alleging that their ADC product, Enhertu, infringed claims of this patent. Notably, Enhertu contains the specific tetrapeptide sequence described in the patent. The patent’s priority was claimed from a 2004 application, though the sequence in question had not been expressly disclosed in that earlier filing. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas presided over a jury trial. The jury found the asserted patent claims valid, not invalid for lack of written description or enablement, and determined that the defendants had willfully infringed. Damages exceeding $41 million were awarded to Seagen. The district court denied the defendants’ post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), upholding the jury’s verdict and entering final judgment for Seagen. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the district court erred in denying JMOL because the original 2004 application did not provide adequate written description support for the claimed subgenus of Gly/Phe-only tetrapeptides. The Federal Circuit found that the patent specification failed to demonstrate that the inventors possessed the claimed invention as of the 2004 filing date, and that the patent was not enabled because a skilled artisan would need to engage in undue experimentation to make and use the full scope of the claimed ADCs. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, found the patent invalid, and vacated the jury’s findings of infringement and damages. View "SEAGEN INC. v. DAIICHI SANKYO COMPANY, LTD. " on Justia Law