U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - Justia Case Law Summaries

Giffords v. FEC

2026-09-04T07:01:15-08:00

A nonprofit organization dedicated to gun violence prevention filed several administrative complaints with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) in 2018, alleging violations of the Federal Election Campaign Act by two entities associated with a national advocacy group. After the FEC failed to act within the statutory 120-day period, the nonprofit filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking an order compelling the FEC to act. Due to a lack of quorum, the FEC remained inactive for an extended period. Eventually, the District Court granted summary judgment to the nonprofit, ordered the FEC to act within 30 days, and later determined the FEC had not complied, thereby allowing the nonprofit to file a citizen suit against the NRA-associated entities. The national advocacy group sought to dismiss the citizen suit, arguing the District Court lacked jurisdiction. It also moved to intervene in the original action, but only for the limited purpose of unsealing the judicial record. Subsequently, after the District Court’s final judgment, the advocacy group filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(4) seeking relief from the orders and judgment, contending that the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction due to mootness and lack of adversity. The District Court denied this motion, holding that the group, as a nonparty, lacked standing to seek relief under Rule 60(b). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the appeal from the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion. The Court held that only parties to a lawsuit, or those who properly become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment. Since the advocacy group had not used any procedural mechanism to become a party to the underlying suit, it lacked the procedural ability to appeal. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal as impermissible under binding precedent. View "Giffords v. FEC" on Justia Law

Vertex Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. HHS

2026-09-04T07:01:15-08:00

A biotechnology company developed a gene therapy for two hereditary blood disorders, which may negatively affect patients’ fertility. To address potential deterrence due to fertility concerns, the company created a program offering up to $70,000 for fertility services to patients receiving the therapy. The program was initially limited to privately insured patients, as the company was concerned it might violate federal healthcare statutes if extended to federally insured patients. To clarify the legality, the company requested an advisory opinion from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), arguing that the program did not violate relevant statutes and, alternatively, qualified for statutory exceptions. After significant delays and exchanges, HHS issued an unfavorable advisory opinion, concluding the program violated both the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) and the Beneficiary Inducement Statute (BIS), and denied immunity from enforcement. The company sued HHS and its officials in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging both the advisory opinion and the regulations governing timing for advisory opinions. The district court granted summary judgment to HHS, finding that the program violated the AKS and deferring to HHS’s reasoning regarding the BIS exception, while dismissing the challenge to the timing regulations as moot after the opinion was issued. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The court affirmed summary judgment for HHS regarding the AKS, holding that the program constituted prohibited remuneration intended to induce patients to purchase the therapy. However, it reversed as to the BIS, finding HHS’s determination arbitrary and capricious due to its failure to explain why the statutory exception did not apply. The court also held that the company had standing to challenge HHS’s timing regulations and that those regulations unlawfully evaded the statutory deadline. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Vertex Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. HHS" on Justia Law

Flannery v. Eckenwiler

2026-09-04T07:01:15-08:00

Eric Flannery owns and operates The Big Board, a bar and restaurant in Washington, D.C. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the District imposed masking and proof-of-vaccination requirements for restaurants and bars. Flannery publicly criticized these policies, and The Big Board refused to comply. After the mandates were lifted, Advisory Neighborhood Commission 6C (ANC 6C) formally opposed renewal of The Big Board’s liquor license, citing concerns such as impact on property values and public safety. Flannery and The Big Board attempted to resolve the protest but received little cooperation. Investigators found no evidence supporting ANC 6C’s stated concerns. Ultimately, ANC 6C withdrew its protest after an unproductive mediation session. Flannery and The Big Board sued ANC 6C commissioners in their personal capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation for Flannery's public criticism and the restaurant's noncompliance. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint, holding that The Big Board’s refusal to comply with the mandates was not expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment and that the complaint failed to plausibly allege a causal link between Flannery’s protected speech and ANC 6C’s protest. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the appeal de novo. The court agreed with the district court that The Big Board’s noncompliance was not inherently expressive conduct under the First Amendment. However, it found that the complaint plausibly alleged that Flannery’s public criticism—protected speech—was a but-for cause of ANC 6C’s protest, based on statements by a commissioner and lack of evidence supporting the protest’s grounds. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Flannery v. Eckenwiler" on Justia Law

Davis v. DC

2026-09-04T07:01:14-08:00

The case arose after the District of Columbia’s Child and Family Services Agency, facing a large budget shortfall in 2010, laid off 115 employees as part of a reduction in force. This included eliminating two support positions and creating a new, hybrid role with fewer positions and different qualification requirements. The agency also terminated additional employees across various divisions based on management assessments. A group of former employees, disproportionately Black, filed a class action lawsuit, alleging that these employment practices had a disparate racial impact in violation of Title VII and D.C. law. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially granted summary judgment to the District, finding that the plaintiffs failed to identify specific employment practices as required for a disparate impact claim. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit revived the disparate impact claims, concluding that the plaintiffs had sufficiently challenged two discrete employment practices. On remand, the district court found the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of disparate impact but again granted summary judgment to the District. The court found the agency’s employment practices were consistent with business necessity and that the plaintiffs failed to propose an adequate alternative practice with less disparate impact. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The court held that, under Title VII, an employer satisfies the business necessity defense if the challenged employment practice reasonably fits with its legitimate interests. Applying this standard, the court found both disputed practices fit legitimate governmental interests in reducing costs while maintaining services. Because the plaintiffs did not identify an equally effective alternative practice with less disparate impact, the appellate court affirmed summary judgment for the District. View "Davis v. DC" on Justia Law

Medical Imaging & Technology Alliance v. Library of Congress

2026-09-01T07:01:16-08:00

Manufacturers of medical and digital devices, represented by two trade associations, challenged a regulation enacted by the Librarian of Congress under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). The regulation, known as the medical device repair exemption, allows certain third parties to circumvent technological protection measures on medical equipment software for the purpose of diagnosis, maintenance, or repair. The associations contended that this exemption threatened their copyrights by enabling independent service organizations to access and use software that, they argued, was primarily intended for repair and maintenance. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially dismissed some of the associations’ claims, including those under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), on sovereign immunity grounds and found the rulemaking was within the Librarian’s authority and not unconstitutional. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed in part, directing the district court to evaluate the APA claims. After further rulemaking and additional arguments, including discussion of Supreme Court precedent and the renewal of the exemption, the district court granted summary judgment for the Librarian and Library of Congress. The court concluded that the exemption was consistent with the DMCA, the fair use doctrine, and was supported by the administrative record. On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that the Librarian’s adoption and renewal of the medical device repair exemption were not arbitrary or capricious under the APA. The court found the Librarian’s application of the statutory fair use factors reasonable, including determinations that the use was transformative, the software was primarily functional, the amount of use was justified, and the exemption did not harm the market for the original works. The judgment for the Librarian and Library of Congress was affirmed. View "Medical Imaging & Technology Alliance v. Library of Congress" on Justia Law

Bergdahl v. USA

2026-09-01T07:01:07-08:00

A soldier deployed in Afghanistan in 2009 left his post without permission to report leadership deficiencies, was captured by a Taliban-allied group, and held hostage for five years. His disappearance prompted a search mission that injured several American servicemembers. In 2014, he was released in exchange for five detainees at Guantanamo Bay, an event that sparked political debate. Upon return, he faced court-martial charges for desertion and misbehavior before the enemy. He pled guilty, and the presiding military judge imposed a dishonorable discharge, rather than the lengthy prison sentence sought by the prosecution. After the court-martial, the soldier challenged his conviction, alleging unlawful command influence, citing public comments by Senator John McCain and President Donald Trump, and raised concerns about the presiding judge’s undisclosed application for a Department of Justice position. The U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction, and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces also upheld the decision. Subsequent requests for reconsideration and review were denied, as was a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. He then filed a suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking collateral review and expungement of his conviction and sentence. The District Court granted partial relief, vacating military court orders issued after the judge’s DOJ application and allowing for possible further proceedings. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that Article III district courts lack jurisdiction on collateral review to vacate court-martial judgments, as such authority resides with direct appellate tribunals. The Court vacated the District Court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the claims for lack of jurisdiction. View "Bergdahl v. USA" on Justia Law

USA v. Ortega-Hernandez

2026-09-01T07:01:04-08:00

In 2011, Oscar Ortega-Hernandez fired multiple rounds from an assault rifle at the White House, causing significant property damage. He believed then-President Obama was the anti-Christ and intended to harm him, but the President and First Lady were not present; two other members of the First Family were inside. No one was injured, but the shots struck areas near Secret Service officers and damaged the Truman Balcony. Ortega-Hernandez fled the scene and was arrested in Pennsylvania after a multi-state search. A federal grand jury indicted Ortega-Hernandez on nineteen counts, including attempting to assassinate the President. In 2013, he pled guilty to two counts: injuring a dwelling or placing lives in jeopardy within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States (18 U.S.C. § 1363), and using a firearm during and in relation to a “crime of violence” (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). The predicate crime for the § 924(c) charge was his § 1363 conviction. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia sentenced him to 25 years in prison. After subsequent Supreme Court decisions invalidated § 924(c)’s residual clause, Ortega-Hernandez moved to vacate his firearm conviction, arguing that § 1363 did not qualify as a crime of violence under the force clause. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed whether Ortega-Hernandez’s § 1363 conviction categorically constitutes a crime of violence under § 924(c)’s force clause. The court held that willfully and maliciously injuring a dwelling necessarily involves the use of physical force against the property of another and that § 1363 targets injury to another’s property, not one’s own. Therefore, Ortega-Hernandez’s conviction under § 924(c) stands, and the district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "USA v. Ortega-Hernandez" on Justia Law

Walker v. Uber Technologies, Inc.

2026-08-28T07:01:06-08:00

Cheryl Walker used her Uber account to order a guest ride for her husband, Carroll Walker. Carroll had never downloaded the Uber app or created an account, and he consistently stated that he does not read or reply to text messages. On the relevant occasion, Cheryl ordered a ride for Carroll, and Uber sent Carroll a text message with ride details and a hyperlink to its Terms of Use, which included an arbitration provision. Carroll did not see the message. During the ride, an accident occurred, allegedly due to the driver’s distraction by Uber’s app, resulting in severe injuries to Carroll. In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Cheryl Walker sued Uber on Carroll’s behalf, asserting negligence and products liability claims. Uber moved to compel arbitration, arguing Carroll was bound to arbitrate either because he had notice of the Terms via Uber’s text message or as a third-party beneficiary of Cheryl’s contract with Uber. The district court denied Uber’s motion, finding Uber failed to establish that Carroll was on inquiry notice of the Terms and concluding that Carroll was not bound as a third-party beneficiary or estopped from refusing arbitration. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of Uber’s motion to compel arbitration de novo, applying D.C. contract law. The Court held that Uber had not shown Carroll agreed to be bound by its Terms of Use, as Carroll lacked actual or inquiry notice of the Terms. The Court further determined that Carroll was not bound by Cheryl’s contract as a third-party beneficiary or by equitable estoppel, since Carroll was not seeking to enforce Cheryl’s contract and his claims were independent of it. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Walker v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

USA v. Almonte

2026-08-28T07:01:05-08:00

The case concerns Cesar Gomez Almonte, who was convicted for his role in an international drug-smuggling conspiracy. Beginning in 2016, conspirators based in the Dominican Republic transported large quantities of cocaine into the United States using boats with secret compartments. Almonte was responsible for procuring and outfitting these vessels. After U.S. officials became aware of the operation, Almonte was indicted under seal in Washington, D.C., and later arrested during a layover at Miami International Airport. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia oversaw Almonte’s trial, during which a jury found him guilty of conspiracy to import cocaine and sentenced him to 184 months in prison. Almonte raised several constitutional claims on appeal: he argued that the 18-month delay between his indictment and arrest violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, that venue in D.C. was improper under Article III and 18 U.S.C. § 3238, and that the district court’s refusal to grant a new trial after certain jurors expressed concerns about his counsel denied him an impartial jury. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed these claims. The court held that the delay between indictment and arrest did not violate Almonte’s right to a speedy trial, given the government’s good-faith investigative reasons and his failure to show specific prejudice. On venue, the court found that Almonte waived his only meritorious venue argument regarding the Eastern District of Virginia by not raising it when invited, and his other arguments about venue in Florida were either without merit or forfeited. Regarding juror impartiality, the court concluded that the district court handled the matter appropriately through voir dire and did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial or new trial. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA v. Almonte" on Justia Law

East Tennessee Group v. FERC

2026-08-28T07:01:05-08:00

A natural gas company operating in multiple states applied to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for permission to build new pipeline facilities and abandon some existing ones, requesting that the costs of these improvements be included in future customer rates. The company’s customers, a group of retail natural gas distributors, challenged the application, arguing that less costly alternatives existed, that the improvements were not justified by customer needs, and that FERC should not pre-determine the rate treatment for the project. The core dispute arose when the customers requested access to specific pipeline flow data, designated as sensitive Critical Energy Infrastructure Information, which was withheld from the public docket. FERC eventually released the requested data, but the customers claimed that the delay impaired their ability to participate meaningfully in the proceedings. FERC granted the company’s application, issuing a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity and permitting facility abandonment. The Commission found that the evidence, including flow data, demonstrated the necessity of the project and justified the proposed rate treatment, noting that objections to rates could be addressed in future proceedings. The customers filed a rehearing request, alleging that FERC’s decision was premature and unsupported by substantial evidence due to delayed data access. FERC denied rehearing, later provided the requested data, and solicited comments, but the customers maintained that the timing was inadequate and refused to comment. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the consolidated petitions. The court found the customers had standing, the case was not moot, and limited its review to arguments raised in the rehearing request. Applying the arbitrary and capricious standard, the court held that FERC’s procedures and consideration of the record, including flow data, were sufficient and did not violate due process. The petitions for review were denied. View "East Tennessee Group v. FERC" on Justia Law

SGCI Holdings III LLC v. FCC

2026-08-25T07:01:19-08:00

In 2022, Soohyung Kim and his company, through an affiliate, secured a winning bid to purchase TEGNA, a large broadcast television company. The transaction required regulatory approval from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) within 450 days, as specified in the merger agreement. The proposal drew objections from several organizations and individuals, including labor unions, public interest groups, and a rival bidder. Amid ongoing objections and extended public comment periods, the FCC’s Media Bureau ultimately failed to approve the license transfer within the required timeframe, resulting in the expiration of the merger agreement and obligating Kim’s group to pay significant break-up fees. After the collapse of the merger, the appellants filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against both the FCC and various private parties. They alleged constitutional and statutory violations, including Equal Protection claims, Communications Act violations, federal civil rights and conspiracy claims, and D.C.-law tort claims, asserting that the FCC and private parties conspired to prevent the merger based on race. The District Court dismissed all claims. Regarding the FCC, the court found the appellants lacked standing for prospective relief, as they failed to allege a substantial risk of future injury. The court also dismissed the Communications Act claims for lack of jurisdiction. As to the claims against private parties, the court applied Noerr-Pennington immunity and found no plausible basis for the civil rights or tort claims. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. The court held that the appellants lacked standing against the FCC due to insufficient allegations of likely future injury. The court further held that the claims against private appellees failed because the complaint did not plausibly allege intentional race discrimination or actionable tortious interference, and thus did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. View "SGCI Holdings III LLC v. FCC" on Justia Law

Norwich Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Kennedy

2026-08-25T07:01:15-08:00

A company sought to introduce a generic version of a prescription drug by filing an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The first applicant for the generic version had previously entered into a settlement with the brand-name drug manufacturer following patent litigation, obtaining a license to market the drug at a future date but still needed FDA approval. While the first applicant’s ANDA remained pending, another company (the appellant) submitted its own ANDA for the same drug, including certifications that its product would not infringe certain patents or would not be marketed for patented uses. The FDA determined that the first applicant was eligible for a 180-day period of marketing exclusivity, which prevented final approval of the subsequent applicant’s ANDA. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied the subsequent applicant’s request for an injunction and granted summary judgment in favor of the FDA and parties supporting the FDA’s position. The court found that the first applicant’s exclusivity remained intact, as not all statutory forfeiture conditions had been met. Specifically, it concluded that the first applicant had not forfeited exclusivity by failing to market or by failing to obtain tentative approval, interpreting the relevant statutory provisions in the FDA’s favor. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo. The court held that the FDA correctly determined the first applicant had not forfeited exclusivity under the “failure to market” provision, as forfeiture requires triggering events for each qualifying patent certification in the first applicant’s ANDA. However, the appellate court found the FDA applied an incorrect causation standard in assessing whether the first applicant forfeited exclusivity for failure to obtain tentative approval. The court ruled that a but-for causation standard applies and remanded the case for the FDA to apply this correct standard. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Norwich Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Slash Creek Waterworks, Inc. v. Lutnick

2026-08-25T07:01:11-08:00

A group of commercial fishers and buyers of South Atlantic red snapper challenged a regulation issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service. This regulation, under the South Atlantic Snapper-Grouper Fishery Management Plan, established an annual catch limit for red snapper based solely on “landings” (fish brought ashore), without including “dead discards” (fish that die after being caught and thrown back). The fishers argued that this approach failed to prevent overfishing as required by federal law, since dead discards represent a significant and increasing portion of total red snapper mortality. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the Service. The district court concluded that the D.C. Circuit’s recent decision in A.P. Bell Fish Co. v. Raimondo largely resolved the main legal issues. That precedent had determined that federal law does not require the annual catch limit to directly restrict bycatch, such as dead discards, so long as the regulatory mechanism is designed to prevent overfishing. The district court also found no basis to conclude that excluding dead discards from the enforceable limit made it impossible to address overfishing. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. It first rejected the Service’s argument that the case was moot due to a superseding rule (Amendment 59), finding that the fundamental regulatory approach remained unchanged. On the merits, the court concluded that its prior decision in A.P. Bell Fish Co. controlled: the Service’s landings-only annual catch limit does not violate the statutory requirement to specify catch limits at a level that prevents overfishing. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Slash Creek Waterworks, Inc. v. Lutnick" on Justia Law

Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA

2026-08-25T07:01:08-08:00

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducted a periodic review of the national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for nitrogen oxides, sulfur oxides, and particulate matter, as required by the Clean Air Act. After an extensive eleven-year process, EPA decided to retain the existing standards for nitrogen oxides and particulate matter, while lowering the secondary standard for sulfur oxides. EPA also issued a memorandum explaining its view that the new rule would not change air quality or emissions and thus would have no effect on endangered species or their habitats. Previously, EPA published its proposed rule in April 2024, followed by the final rule in December 2024. The agency’s no-effect determination stated that the revisions would not trigger additional emissions reductions or affect listed species. The Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) challenged EPA’s rule, arguing that the agency violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA) by failing to consult with federal wildlife agencies before issuing the rule. CBD asserted that ongoing and cumulative pollutant effects could harm species, and that EPA’s effects determination was both arbitrary and untimely. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that CBD had standing to bring the challenge, but ultimately determined that EPA’s no-effect finding was reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious. The court explained that the rule would not cause any changes to air quality or emissions, and thus would not trigger consultation obligations under the ESA. The court also held that EPA’s timing of the effects determination was appropriate under regulatory requirements. The main holding is that EPA reasonably determined the rule would have no effect on protected species or critical habitat, and the petition for review was denied. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA" on Justia Law

For a Better Bayou v. FERC

2026-08-25T07:01:03-08:00

Venture Global CP2 LNG and Venture Global CP Express sought authorization from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to construct and operate a liquefied natural gas (LNG) export terminal and an 85-mile pipeline in Louisiana. FERC’s review included extensive environmental analysis in compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), resulting in an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and a Supplemental EIS (SEIS). Both assessments concluded that, with recommended mitigation measures, the project’s environmental impacts, including those on air quality and the commercial fishing industry, would not be significant. Individuals and advocacy groups challenged FERC’s authorization, raising eleven alleged errors under the Natural Gas Act (NGA) and NEPA. After FERC’s initial order in 2024, the challengers sought rehearing. FERC partially granted rehearing to address concerns raised by recent D.C. Circuit decisions and directed additional environmental review, which led to the SEIS. The SEIS found no exceedances of relevant air quality standards for the terminal and compressor station. FERC reaffirmed its authorization in 2025, and subsequent rehearing requests were denied. The challengers then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that FERC’s interpretation and application of the NGA was lawful and not arbitrary, emphasizing the presumption in favor of terminal authorization under Section 3, absent an affirmative showing of inconsistency with the public interest. The court found FERC’s NEPA analysis reasonable, deferring to FERC’s use of established air quality standards and its reliance on expert agency data. The court also upheld FERC’s treatment of cumulative impacts and harm to commercial fisheries as sufficiently addressed and explained. The petitions for review were denied in full. View "For a Better Bayou v. FERC" on Justia Law

Hargrove v. MedStar Washington Hospital Center

2026-08-21T08:32:48-08:00

Kevin Welch underwent emergency surgery for an ascending aortic dissection and was subsequently treated in the intensive care unit of a hospital. After the operation, he exhibited confusion and, later, weakness in his lower extremities. Neurological consultation and imaging were recommended, but an MRI was delayed for safety and stability reasons. When eventually performed, the MRI indicated that Welch had suffered a stroke. He later reported ongoing cognitive and physical impairments, while the hospital maintained that his physical function had largely recovered and that any permanent disability was cognitive rather than physical. Following these events, Welch’s power of attorney, Shana Hargrove, filed a medical malpractice suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the hospital and several physicians, alleging that delays and omissions in post-surgical care worsened Welch’s outcome. After discovery, the hospital moved to exclude the causation testimony of Welch’s experts, Dr. Elakil and Dr. Schulman, and for summary judgment. The District Court excluded Dr. Elakil’s testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 due to insufficient basis for his causation opinions and excluded Dr. Schulman’s testimony because he was not properly disclosed as a causation expert under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 37. With no admissible expert testimony on causation, the court granted summary judgment for the hospital. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the exclusions for abuse of discretion and the summary judgment de novo. The appellate court affirmed the District Court’s rulings, holding that both expert testimonies were properly excluded and summary judgment was warranted, as expert testimony on causation is required under District of Columbia law for medical malpractice claims of this nature. View "Hargrove v. MedStar Washington Hospital Center" on Justia Law

Democracy Partners, LLC v. O'Keefe

2026-08-21T08:32:48-08:00

Two investigative journalists, on assignment for a nonprofit media organization known for undercover reporting, infiltrated Democratic political consulting operations in 2016 using false identities. One reporter, posing as a philanthropist, met with a political consultant who then arranged for his colleague to hire the second reporter, also undercover, as an unpaid intern at the consultant's firm. The intern secretly recorded conversations and internal meetings over eight days, gaining access to nonpublic information. The media organization later published a video series alleging a conspiracy to incite violence at political events, using footage from both public interactions and the intern’s covert recordings. After the video’s release, major clients of the consulting firm terminated their contracts, citing concerns about scandal and the security breach. The consulting firm and its principals sued the journalists and their organizations in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation, conspiracy, and violations of federal and D.C. wiretapping laws. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on some claims but allowed others to proceed to trial. A jury found for the plaintiffs on the remaining claims and awarded damages for lost contracts and statutory damages for wiretapping. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the verdict. It held that the First Amendment barred damages based on losses caused by the publication’s protected speech, as the plaintiffs failed to prove that the unprotected conduct (the infiltration and covert recording) was the predominant cause of their damages. The court also held that the intern did not owe a fiduciary duty to the consulting firm under D.C. law, and therefore the wiretapping claims could not stand. The court reversed the district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law and vacated the damages awards. View "Democracy Partners, LLC v. O'Keefe" on Justia Law

Godson v. Johns Hopkins Medicine

2026-08-21T08:32:48-08:00

Two individuals, both representing themselves, sought to appeal adverse decisions in separate civil cases. In the first case, a plaintiff filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act against a federal official. The district court denied this plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction, and the plaintiff subsequently submitted a document titled as both a “Notice of Appeal” and a “Motion to Transfer Appeal.” This document was filed 69 days after the district court’s order and included statements indicating the plaintiff had not received notice of the order and was requesting more time to appeal. In the second case, another plaintiff alleged mistreatment by a hospital and physician, but the district court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. This plaintiff filed a notice of appeal 37 days after judgment, including various grievances but without clearly acknowledging the late filing or explicitly requesting relief for the delay. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia transmitted both notices to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The appellate court reviewed whether the notices of appeal could be construed as including motions under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) or 4(a)(6), which allow late appeals in certain circumstances if specific requirements are met. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that a pro se notice of appeal should be liberally construed to include a motion for extension or to reopen the time to appeal if it reasonably recognizes the filing is late, provides reasons for the lateness, and seeks relief under Rule 4(a)(5) or (6). Applying this standard, the court found that the first plaintiff’s filing met these criteria and remanded that case to the district court for further proceedings. The second plaintiff’s notice did not meet the standard, and the court dismissed that appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Godson v. Johns Hopkins Medicine" on Justia Law

National Council of Nonprofits v. OMB

2026-08-21T08:32:47-08:00

Several nonprofit organizations and associations that receive federal funding challenged a memorandum issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) shortly after President Trump’s return to office in 2025. The memorandum, M-25-13, directed federal agencies to temporarily pause the obligation and disbursement of all federal financial assistance to analyze compliance with recent executive orders. Plaintiffs argued that the memorandum called for a sweeping freeze on virtually all federal funding, which they alleged would have catastrophic consequences for federally funded programs. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially responded to plaintiffs’ request for emergency relief by issuing a temporary restraining order, and later a preliminary injunction, barring OMB from implementing the memorandum. The district court found that the memorandum was likely to be arbitrary and capricious and possibly beyond OMB’s statutory authority. The court rejected the government’s argument that the case was moot after OMB rescinded the memorandum, relying in part on statements from the White House Press Secretary and ongoing funding disruptions. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the preliminary injunction. It did not address the merits of the plaintiffs’ legal arguments or the district court’s interpretation of the memorandum. Instead, it concluded that the plaintiffs’ challenge was likely moot because OMB had rescinded the memorandum before the government knew of the lawsuit and had clarified, in guidance issued the day after the memorandum, that a global funding freeze was not intended. The court found that there was no reasonable expectation the government would reissue the challenged action. As a result, the court vacated the preliminary injunction. View "National Council of Nonprofits v. OMB" on Justia Law

USA v. Richardson

2026-08-21T08:32:46-08:00

A man with two prior felony convictions for carrying a pistol without a license in the District of Columbia was sentenced in 2022 to a period of supervised probation in lieu of imprisonment for his second offense. While still under this court-ordered supervision, he knowingly possessed a firearm, which was reportedly stolen and modified for automatic firing, and was alleged to have brandished it during a shootout. He was indicted by a federal grand jury under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal felon-in-possession statute. In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(1) violated the Second Amendment both facially and as applied to him, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, which emphasized historical tradition over means-end scrutiny in Second Amendment cases. The district court rejected his arguments, holding that earlier circuit precedent (Medina v. Whitaker) upholding § 922(g)(1) remained good law, and denied the motion to dismiss. The defendant then pleaded guilty while preserving his right to appeal the constitutional issue. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that, even assuming prior precedent did not control and that § 922(g)(1) implicated conduct covered by the Second Amendment, there exists a widespread historical tradition of temporarily disarming felons while they are serving their criminal sentences, including during periods of noncustodial supervision such as probation or supervised release. Therefore, § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to individuals still serving their sentences, and is not facially unconstitutional. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Preferred Building Services, Inc. v. NLRB

2026-08-21T08:32:46-08:00

A group of janitorial employees working for a cleaning company and its subcontractor in San Francisco protested their working conditions, with support from a local union. The protests included picketing outside buildings serviced by the companies, distributing flyers, and carrying signs. The picketing identified the cleaning company as the subject of the labor dispute and included statements clarifying that the protest was not a strike or a call to boycott the buildings. Following these actions, several employees who participated in the protests were fired or had their work assignments reduced. The union filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board, alleging retaliatory discharges and other unfair labor practices. An administrative law judge found that the companies had violated the National Labor Relations Act by retaliating against the workers for protected activity, rejecting the employers’ defenses that the picketing was unlawful secondary or recognitional picketing. The National Labor Relations Board reversed, holding the picketing had an impermissible secondary object and was thus unprotected. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found the Board lacked substantial evidence for this conclusion and remanded the case. On remand, the Board, after considering additional evidence proffered by the employer, reaffirmed the original finding that the picketing did not have a prohibited secondary or recognitional object and that the companies had violated the Act. The Board ordered remedies including reinstatement and compensation for the discharged employees. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, reviewing the case, denied the company’s petition for review and granted the Board’s cross-petition for enforcement. The court held that the Board properly considered and rejected the employer’s defenses, found substantial evidence supporting the Board’s determination that the picketing did not have an illegal objective, and concluded that the company’s challenge to the Board’s remedial order was not properly preserved for appeal. View "Preferred Building Services, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

USA v. Onyewu

2026-08-21T08:32:45-08:00

Three individuals were indicted for participating in a string of ten armed robberies targeting businesses in the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia in January 2018. The robberies followed a consistent pattern: two of the men would enter a store masked and armed, threatening employees and collecting cash and valuables, while the third waited nearby. In one instance, all three entered and used physical violence against staff. Security footage and other evidence linked the defendants to the crimes. Several weeks after the robberies, police responded to an unrelated home invasion, arresting two of the men and discovering a car registered to one of them nearby, which contained clothing and items connected to the earlier robberies. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia conducted a joint trial, after which a jury found all three defendants guilty on all counts, including conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, and for two defendants, additional counts of completed Hobbs Act robbery and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. The district court imposed sentences ranging from 166 to 234 months. The defendants appealed, challenging, among other things, the admission of evidence from a subsequent Missouri traffic stop, the search of the car, the admission of evidence from a cell phone, jury instructions, and the sufficiency of evidence for firearm-related charges. They also raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed each challenge. The court held that evidence from the Missouri traffic stop was properly admitted to show association among co-conspirators and was not unduly prejudicial. It found the seizure and search of the car lawful under the automobile exception and rejected claims that mistakes in the warrant affidavit required suppression. The court concluded that Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), supporting the firearm-related convictions. It also held that the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel lacked merit because no prejudice was shown. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences in full. View "USA v. Onyewu" on Justia Law

Adsync Technologies, Inc. v. FAA

2026-08-20T10:33:07-08:00

Two companies competed for a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) hardware contract related to air traffic control tower simulators. Adacel, having already secured a related software contract, knew that its own software would be used, giving it an informational advantage over Adsync, which was unaware of the software selection. Adacel’s bid was lower, and it initially won the hardware contract. Adsync protested, and the FAA’s Office of Dispute Resolution for Acquisition (ODRA) found Adacel’s advantage unfair. The FAA allowed Adsync to revise its bid with knowledge of the software, but restricted changes to those attributable to the new information and barred Adacel from revising its bid. After Adsync revised its proposal with significant price reductions, the FAA’s contracting team accepted most, but rejected about $734,000 in reductions pertaining to basic hardware, finding Adsync had failed to justify their connection to the software selection. As a result, Adacel’s bid remained lower, and it again won the contract. Adsync filed a second protest with ODRA, challenging the FAA’s rejection of some price reductions, the technical evaluation, and the best value determination. ODRA concluded that the FAA had a rational basis for its decisions and recommended denial of the protest. The FAA adopted ODRA’s recommendations. Adsync sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court held that the FAA did not violate its Acquisition Management System Guidance’s “price realism” provision, as it was not applicable to the remedial rebid context. The court further found substantial evidence supported the FAA’s rejection of certain price reductions and concluded that ODRA did not abuse its discretion in denying bid and proposal costs. Accordingly, the petition was denied. View "Adsync Technologies, Inc. v. FAA" on Justia Law

Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Kennedy

2026-08-18T08:03:32-08:00

A pharmaceutical company that manufactures both branded and generic drugs challenged the federal agency rules implementing the Medicare Drug Price Negotiation Program created under the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022. Specifically, the company objected to two rules: first, the agency’s grouping of two drugs with the same active ingredient and manufacturer, but approved under separate applications, as one “qualifying single source drug” for price negotiation; and second, the agency’s requirement that a generic drug must be engaged in “bona fide marketing” to be considered as marketed, which affects when a branded drug exits the negotiation program. The company argued that these rules exceeded the agency’s statutory authority and that the program deprived it of protected property interests without due process. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case. It found that the statutory bar on judicial review did not prevent the company’s challenges to generally applicable agency guidance. On the merits, the district court upheld the agency’s definition of a qualifying single source drug, ruled that the challenge to the “bona fide marketing” standard was not yet ripe, and rejected the due process claim due to lack of a protected property interest. The company appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The appellate court held that the statutory review bar precludes review only of drug-specific determinations, not generally applicable legal standards. On the merits, it concluded that the statute permits the agency to treat drugs with the same active ingredient and manufacturer as one statutory drug. The court found that the due process challenge failed because the company lacked a protected property interest. However, it determined that the challenge to the “bona fide marketing” requirement was ripe and remanded that issue to the district court for further proceedings. The court thus affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Friends of the Earth v. Export-Import Bank

2026-08-18T08:03:30-08:00

The Export-Import Bank of the United States (Eximbank) agreed to lend up to $5 billion to support the development of a major liquefied natural gas project in Mozambique. After insurgent attacks in the project area halted operations, Eximbank approved an amendment in 2025 to allow disbursement of funds on a revised schedule. Two environmental organizations, Friends of the Earth U.S. and Justiça Ambiental, argued that Eximbank’s actions violated statutory requirements by failing to provide a notice-and-comment period or disclose certain economic and environmental analyses before approving the amendment. The organizations claimed the project’s restart would intensify local conflict, cause environmental harm, and impair their ability to serve affected communities. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that the plaintiffs were unlikely to show standing for most of their claims, including lack of a notice-and-comment period and diversion of organizational resources. However, the district court concluded they had a substantial likelihood of standing on an informational injury theory relating to Eximbank’s failure to provide environmental information, but determined the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits for any of their claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the denial of the preliminary injunction. The court affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that the plaintiffs failed to establish organizational standing because their alleged injuries were either not particularized or too attenuated. The court concluded the plaintiffs demonstrated a substantial likelihood of informational standing for environmental information but failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits, because NEPA does not apply to projects with effects entirely outside U.S. jurisdiction and Eximbank’s disclosure obligations were not triggered. The denial of the preliminary injunction was therefore affirmed. View "Friends of the Earth v. Export-Import Bank" on Justia Law

Hesai Technology Co., Ltd v. DOD

2026-08-18T08:03:29-08:00

A technology company, along with its U.S. subsidiary, was designated by the Secretary of Defense as a “Chinese military company” under Section 1260H of the National Defense Authorization Act. This listing, published annually in the Federal Register, leads to significant legal consequences, including prohibitions on entering into certain federal contracts and receiving federal funds or support. The designation also carries reputational harm, as it publicly identifies the company as having ties to the Chinese military. The company develops and sells LiDAR products primarily used in advanced driver-assistance and autonomous vehicle systems. After being listed in January 2024, the company sued the Department of Defense in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging both the original and an October 2024 redesignation under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The company argued that it was not provided notice of the unclassified evidence relied upon or a meaningful chance to respond before the designation was finalized. The district court granted summary judgment to the government, upholding the designation and concluding that any due process violation was harmless because the company did not show prejudice. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the company had a protected liberty interest under the “stigma-plus” doctrine, as the designation combined reputational harm with formal exclusion from government contracting opportunities. The Court ruled that the Constitution required the Secretary to provide notice of the unclassified evidence and a meaningful pre-deprivation opportunity to respond. The Secretary’s failure to do so was not harmless error. The appellate court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to remand to the Secretary for further proceedings, but did not vacate the designation pending remedial process. View "Hesai Technology Co., Ltd v. DOD" on Justia Law

Servier Pharmaceuticals LLC v. Kennedy

2026-08-18T08:03:27-08:00

A pharmaceutical company acquired the rights to a cancer drug called Tibsovo from another manufacturer in April 2021, including the drug’s existing stock and its New Drug Application (NDA). After the acquisition, the company sold the previously manufactured Tibsovo tablets to Medicare Part D patients for the remainder of 2021. While the company began producing its own Tibsovo tablets that year, those were not dispensed to any Part D patient until February 2022. The company had no other Part D drug sales in 2021. When the company sought to participate in the Medicare Manufacturer Discount Program, which requires manufacturers to offer discounts on certain drugs but allows “specified manufacturers” and “specified small manufacturers” a more gradual phase-in, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) determined that the company qualified only as a specified manufacturer. CMS found that, although the company owned Tibsovo’s NDA and had manufactured new tablets in 2021, none of those were dispensed to Part D patients during the relevant period; all Tibsovo dispensed in 2021 was manufactured by the prior owner. As a result, the company had zero qualifying sales for 2021 and could not meet the additional requirement for specified small manufacturers. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment for the government, holding that CMS’s decision was lawful and rejecting the company’s statutory and administrative challenges. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The court held that to qualify as a specified small manufacturer, a company must have actually produced, prepared, propagated, compounded, converted, or processed the units of the drug dispensed to Part D patients in 2021. Mere ownership or responsibility for the drug was not enough. The court also rejected challenges to CMS’s use of labeler codes as a means of identifying manufacturers. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Servier Pharmaceuticals LLC v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Vanda Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. FDA

2026-08-18T08:03:26-08:00

A pharmaceutical company developed a medication for a sleep disorder that primarily affects blind individuals. The company’s drug label included the brand name and dosage in both regular print and braille, along with instructions for pharmacists not to cover the braille and to dispense the drug in its original container. When a competing manufacturer sought approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to market a generic version, its proposed label omitted the braille and related instructions. The FDA approved the generic’s label without these features. The original manufacturer objected, arguing that omitting the braille and instructions violated statutory requirements for generic drugs to have labeling “the same as” the brand-name product, except for changes required due to a different manufacturer. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the FDA and the generic manufacturer, holding that the omission of braille and the accompanying instructions fell within the statutory exception for changes required due to a different manufacturer. The court also rejected arguments that the FDA acted arbitrarily or capriciously. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and held that the statutory exception for changes “required” by a different manufacturer applies only to changes that are mandatory, not merely optional or safe. The court concluded that omitting the brand name in braille was required, but omitting the dosage in braille and the related pharmacist instructions was not shown to be necessary due to the manufacturer change. The court vacated the grant of summary judgment on this issue and remanded the case for the agency to determine whether the generic label, without braille dosage or instructions, still meets the requirement of being “the same as” the brand-name label. The court otherwise affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Vanda Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. FDA" on Justia Law

Knight v. NTSB

2026-08-18T08:03:24-08:00

A pilot was selected for a random drug test at work and tested positive for amphetamine, a prohibited substance under federal aviation regulations. He was immediately grounded by his employer but later reinstated after completing a return-to-duty process. The pilot explained that he had inadvertently ingested his son’s prescription medication, Vyvanse, mistaking it for his own, due to a stressful family medical emergency and similar-looking pill bottles. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) initiated proceedings to revoke his pilot and medical certificates, as such a violation typically warrants revocation. The case was first heard by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who found that the pilot had violated the regulations but reduced the sanction from revocation to a 90-day suspension, citing mitigating circumstances. Both parties appealed. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reviewed the case de novo, concluded the pilot had proven his accidental-ingestion defense by a preponderance of the evidence, and upheld the 90-day suspension. The NTSB found aggravating factors as well, including the pilot’s failure to report the ingestion before performing safety-sensitive duties. The pilot then sought attorney’s fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), arguing that he was the prevailing party. An ALJ granted his application, but the NTSB reversed, concluding that although the pilot prevailed in obtaining a reduced sanction, the FAA’s position in seeking revocation was substantially justified. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the NTSB’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. The court denied the petition for review, holding that the FAA’s actions throughout the proceedings had a reasonable basis in law and fact. View "Knight v. NTSB" on Justia Law

Music Choice v. COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BOARD

2026-08-18T08:03:22-08:00

Music Choice, a company that transmits copyrighted sound recordings to businesses for background music, was accused by SoundExchange, Inc. of underpaying required royalties. The dispute centered on the proper interpretation of a federal regulation defining “gross proceeds,” which dictates the revenue base on which Music Choice must pay royalties for its business services. SoundExchange believed all revenues from business transmissions should be included, while Music Choice argued that only revenues derived solely from business services should count, excluding those also attributable to subscription services. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, using the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, stayed the ongoing litigation and allowed the parties to seek an interpretive ruling from the Copyright Royalty Board (the “Royalty Board”). The Royalty Board, after reopening the relevant regulatory dockets, issued a ruling adopting SoundExchange’s interpretation of the regulation. Rather than returning to district court, Music Choice directly petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review and vacatur of the Royalty Board’s decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the Royalty Board’s interpretive ruling. The court reasoned that such a ruling was not a judicially reviewable “determination” under 17 U.S.C. § 803(c) and did not result from a proceeding in which Music Choice was a participant as required by statute. Additionally, the court found that the ruling did not bind Music Choice or any other party. As a result, the court dismissed Music Choice’s petition for review, leaving the parties to pursue their dispute in the district court. View "Music Choice v. COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BOARD" on Justia Law

Mpoy v. Burst

2026-08-18T08:03:20-08:00

In August 2021, a teacher was indefinitely suspended from his position within the District of Columbia Public Schools, allegedly without prior notice or an opportunity to be heard. The teacher subsequently filed a pro se lawsuit in federal court against the Mayor of the District of Columbia and two public school officials. He claimed a violation of his procedural due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and asserted separate claims under District of Columbia law. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the teacher’s section 1983 claim, reasoning that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies available under the District’s Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (CMPA). Since the federal claim was dismissed, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the local law claims and dismissed them as well. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The appellate court held that, under Supreme Court precedent—especially Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida—and its own prior decisions, exhaustion of state or District of Columbia administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to bringing a section 1983 claim in federal court, unless Congress expressly imposes such a requirement. The court found that neither the CMPA nor any federal statute required exhaustion in this context. Thus, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the section 1983 claim and vacated the dismissal of the local law claims, remanding the case for further proceedings. The appellate court emphasized that only Congress, not local law or judicial interpretation, may impose exhaustion requirements for section 1983 actions in federal court. View "Mpoy v. Burst" on Justia Law

Chamber of Commerce v. EPA

2026-08-18T08:03:18-08:00

Two synthetic chemicals, PFOA and PFOS—members of the PFAS group often called “forever chemicals”—have been widely used since the 1940s and are highly persistent in the environment and the human body. Scientific studies have linked exposure to these chemicals to serious health conditions, including cancer and developmental delays. In 2024, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) designated PFOA and PFOS as “hazardous substances” under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), which governs the cleanup of hazardous substances and allows for cost recovery from polluters. This designation was challenged by seven industry groups representing entities that use, transport, or discharge PFOA and PFOS. The challengers argued that EPA misinterpreted CERCLA’s standard for designating hazardous substances, failed to provide adequate notice regarding its cost-benefit analysis, and acted arbitrarily and capriciously by regulating in the face of scientific and economic uncertainties. They also argued that the designation violated the Administrative Procedure Act and constitutional doctrines. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that EPA acted within its statutory authority: CERCLA allows EPA to designate substances that “may present substantial danger” upon release, and the agency’s interpretation of “may” as requiring only the possibility, rather than certainty, of substantial harm was consistent with statutory text and precedent. The court concluded that EPA provided adequate notice and opportunity for public comment regarding its cost-benefit analysis, and that the agency’s rulemaking was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court also held that the agency’s actions did not violate constitutional doctrines. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review, upholding EPA’s designation of PFOA and PFOS as hazardous substances. View "Chamber of Commerce v. EPA" on Justia Law

SZ DJI Technology Co., Ltd. v. DOD

2026-08-14T06:32:42-08:00

A Chinese drone manufacturer and its subsidiary challenged their designation by the U.S. Secretary of Defense as a “Chinese military company” under Section 1260H of the National Defense Authorization Act. The designation, which is published annually, restricts the company from contracting with certain government agencies and can damage its business reputation. DJI was added to the list in 2022 and again in 2024 and 2025 without prior notice. DJI petitioned for removal, which was denied, and subsequently received a report explaining the designation, though portions of the rationale were redacted. DJI filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging violations of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the Administrative Procedure Act. The company argued that it was denied due process, that there was insufficient evidence for the designation, that the agency failed to explain disparate treatment compared to other companies, and that the Secretary’s finding that DJI “contributes” to the Chinese defense industrial base was unsupported. The district court granted summary judgment against DJI, relying solely on the unclassified administrative record and declining to review the classified materials. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s rejection of DJI’s due process, evidentiary, and disparate treatment claims, holding that DJI failed to show deprivation of a protected liberty or property interest, and that sufficient evidence supported the finding that DJI received government assistance. However, the appellate court reversed the district court’s conclusion regarding DJI’s “contribution” to the Chinese defense industrial base, finding that the lower court improperly relied on post hoc agency arguments and failed to review the classified record. The case was remanded for further proceedings on that issue. View "SZ DJI Technology Co., Ltd. v. DOD" on Justia Law

Rodriguez v. Pan American Health Organization

2026-08-14T06:32:39-08:00

A group of Cuban doctors alleged that they were coerced by the Cuban government to participate in Brazil’s Mais Médicos program, which placed healthcare professionals in underserved communities. The doctors claimed that the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) enabled the Cuban government’s actions by acting as a financial intermediary, moving funds from Brazil to Cuba, while retaining a 5% fee. They asserted that PAHO’s conduct facilitated a human trafficking scheme, and they brought claims under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act on behalf of themselves and similarly situated Cuban medical professionals. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially denied PAHO’s motion to dismiss, finding that the doctors’ allegations, if true, would bring the case within the “commercial activity” exception to immunity under the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed this denial, allowing the case to proceed. PAHO then filed a second, “factual” motion to dismiss, contesting the factual basis of the doctors’ claims and submitting evidence to support its immunity argument. In response, the district court granted the doctors’ request for limited jurisdictional discovery to resolve the factual disputes relevant to the immunity question. PAHO appealed the discovery order. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s discovery order at this stage. The court held that immediate appellate review under the collateral order doctrine does not extend to jurisdictional discovery orders issued after a judicial finding that the complaint adequately pleads an immunity exception, where discovery is directly related to those pleaded theories. The appeal was dismissed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Rodriguez v. Pan American Health Organization" on Justia Law

Fishman v. DC

2026-08-11T07:02:49-08:00

A man was detained by Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police officers after a bystander called 9-1-1, reporting what she believed could be a kidnapping or child abuse involving the man and his young daughter. Officers located the man based on his vehicle’s license plate and found him outside his home. When the man attempted to enter his house contrary to police orders, officers restrained and handcuffed him. They questioned both the man and his family members, including the child, and, after determining no crime had occurred, released him after approximately twenty-five minutes. The man subsequently filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the officers unlawfully prolonged his detention after any reasonable suspicion had dissipated, thus violating his Fourth Amendment rights, and also claimed false imprisonment under D.C. law. The district court dismissed most claims but allowed the prolonged-detention and unlawful-arrest claims to proceed. It granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiff against one officer and denied qualified immunity to the officers, reasoning that suspicion of kidnapping had dissipated once police learned of the familial relationship. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the denial of qualified immunity. The court held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because no clearly established law required them to end the detention before they spoke with the child, given the ongoing suspicion of a child-abuse-related offense. The court also found that the plaintiff had forfeited his unlawful-arrest claim by not briefing it on appeal. The court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment against Officer Todaro and remanded for entry of summary judgment for the officers on the Fourth Amendment claims, declining to exercise jurisdiction over the state-law false-imprisonment claim. View "Fishman v. DC" on Justia Law

Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights v. Mullin

2026-08-11T07:02:48-08:00

Several membership organizations representing immigrants challenged two actions taken by the Department of Homeland Security: a memorandum issued by the Acting Secretary and an email from Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Both directed officers to consider subjecting parolees—immigrants temporarily allowed to enter the U.S.—to expedited removal, a process that is faster and offers fewer protections than formal removal proceedings. The organizations argued these directives increased the likelihood that their members would face expedited removal, causing injury. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the challenge and partially granted the plaintiffs’ request to stay the memorandum and email, but not the underlying regulation (8 C.F.R. § 1.2) that independently authorized expedited removal for parolees. The District Court’s stay thus blocked the challenged executive actions to the extent they would subject individuals paroled into the United States to expedited removal, but left the regulation intact. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit considered whether the plaintiffs had standing to seek the relief they requested. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs failed to establish redressability, a necessary element of standing, because even if the memorandum and email were stayed, the government retained authority under the unchallenged regulation to subject parolees to expedited removal. Since the relief requested would not likely lessen the risk of expedited removal for the plaintiffs’ members, the appellate court concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals vacated the District Court’s stay, finding that the lower court lacked jurisdiction to grant it. The main holding is that organizational plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge government actions unless the relief sought would likely redress their members’ alleged injuries. View "Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights v. Mullin" on Justia Law

Friends of Animals v. Williams

2026-08-11T07:02:48-08:00

The case centers on the interpretation of a provision in the Endangered Species Act (ESA) related to how the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (the Service) can extend protections to species based on their similarity in appearance to listed endangered or threatened species. In 2019, the Service listed various subspecies and distinct population segments (DPS) of the scarlet macaw as endangered or threatened. It used its authority under the ESA to treat one population segment as threatened due to its similarity in appearance to listed groups. However, it did not conduct a "similarity of appearance" analysis for a population segment that was already listed as threatened, which would potentially have resulted in stronger protections. A lawsuit was filed challenging the Service’s interpretation, arguing that the ESA requires the Service to consider whether a threatened population should be treated as endangered due to its resemblance to an endangered group. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia agreed with the challengers. It found that the Service’s reading of the relevant statutory provision was flawed and that the Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously under the Administrative Procedure Act by not performing the analysis for the already-listed threatened segment. The District Court partially granted summary judgment for the challengers, ordered remand for further explanation, and set parameters for that remand in a later order, after which the Service filed this appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision. The appellate court held that the statutory text of the ESA only authorizes the Service to treat "unlisted" species as endangered or threatened based on similarity of appearance, not species that are already listed. The court found the Service’s longstanding interpretation, regulatory practice, and the statute’s legislative history supported this reading. Thus, it ruled that the Service did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in declining to conduct the analysis for an already-listed species. View "Friends of Animals v. Williams" on Justia Law

USA v. William

2026-08-11T07:02:48-08:00

Edward Williams pleaded guilty in 1997 to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, based on a prior felony drug conviction for which he had served over two years in prison. Years later, following a Supreme Court decision clarifying that a defendant must know of their felony status to be convicted under the relevant statute, Williams sought to vacate his sentence. He argued that he was not properly informed that knowledge of his felony status was an element of the offense, and claimed he believed his prior conviction was a juvenile matter that had been expunged. After Williams’ initial conviction and sentence were affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, he filed a motion in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing, finding Williams had procedurally defaulted his claim by failing to raise the argument on direct appeal or at sentencing, and that the default was not excused. The district court also declined to issue a certificate of appealability. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that Williams failed to show either cause and prejudice or actual innocence to excuse his procedural default. The court found overwhelming evidence that Williams knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year and concluded that a hearing was unnecessary because the record conclusively demonstrated he was not entitled to relief. The denial of Williams’ § 2255 motion was therefore affirmed. View "USA v. William" on Justia Law

City Utilities of Springfield, Missouri v. FERC

2026-08-11T07:02:47-08:00

Four electric transmission facilities located in the Sunflower Zone of central and western Kansas had their costs primarily allocated to local customers under the existing regional cost allocation method, known as the Highway/Byway framework. Over time, due to the growth of wind generation in the Sunflower Zone, these facilities increasingly served customers outside the local zone, transmitting surplus wind-generated electricity to other areas within the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) region. SPP, the regional transmission organization, determined that these facilities were functioning more like regional “Highway” facilities, which typically have their costs spread across the entire SPP region, rather than “Byway” facilities, whose costs are mostly local. SPP initially attempted to institute a process that would allow for waivers from the voltage-based cost allocation on a facility-by-facility basis, but the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) rejected these proposals due to concerns over discretion and transparency. Subsequently, SPP made a more targeted filing under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, seeking prospective reclassification of the four facilities as Highway assets based on specific studies and criteria. FERC approved this reclassification, finding that the facilities primarily benefited customers outside the Sunflower Zone, and reaffirmed its decision on rehearing. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed FERC’s orders under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard. The court held that FERC’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and was adequately reasoned. The court found that FERC was not required to conduct zone-by-zone benefit analysis or adhere strictly to the existing allocation method when evidence showed that the facilities’ benefits were primarily regional. The court denied the petitions for review and upheld FERC’s orders. View "City Utilities of Springfield, Missouri v. FERC" on Justia Law

National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States v. NPS

2026-08-07T06:32:12-08:00

President Trump, without congressional approval or proper consultation, demolished the White House East Wing over three days in October 2025 to build a privately funded 90,000 square-foot ballroom. The National Park Service’s environmental assessment acknowledged that the project would cause permanent and adverse impacts on President’s Park’s historical landscape, disrupting architectural integrity and historical continuity. The National Trust for Historic Preservation, a congressionally chartered organization with longstanding ties to President’s Park, challenged the construction, citing irreparable harm to the historic, aesthetic, and cultural interests of its members. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia first denied a temporary restraining order, relying on government assurances about the timing and separability of underground and above-ground work. Later, after the National Trust amended its complaint and renewed its request, the district court issued a preliminary injunction against above-ground ballroom construction, but exempted below-ground work and measures necessary for safety and security. The court found both statutory (APA) and ultra vires claims likely to succeed, concluding that neither the President nor the National Park Service had congressional authority for such dramatic alterations. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s modified preliminary injunction. The court held that Congress exercises exclusive control over federal property, including the White House, under the Property and District Clauses. Statutory language and appropriations history did not authorize unilateral demolition and replacement of the East Wing with a privately funded ballroom. The court ruled that the National Trust had associational standing, that the Trust was likely to succeed on the merits, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored the injunction. The court vacated its prior administrative stay and stayed its ruling for fourteen days to permit further review. View "National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States v. NPS" on Justia Law

Gligorov v. Nation of Brunei

2026-08-07T06:32:11-08:00

A Slovenian businessman, who had served as a consultant to the government of Brunei, entered into an agreement to investigate corruption within the Bruneian government. He alleges that after delivering his findings—which implicated high-level officials in theft, money laundering, and terrorism financing—his contractual partners refused to pay him and conspired, along with three corporate entities, to ruin his reputation and business. The suit claims violations under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and various common law contract and tort theories. The corporate defendants are Audley Property Management Company Limited, Seven Properties AG, and The Dorchester Group, LLC. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the claims against the corporate defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding neither general nor specific jurisdiction was established. It also denied the plaintiff’s request for jurisdictional discovery, concluding that his allegations were speculative and that the proposed discovery would not show purposeful direction of activities toward the United States. Partial final judgment was entered in favor of the corporate defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo and the denial of jurisdictional discovery for abuse of discretion. The appellate court assumed, based on the parties’ agreement and post-Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization, that personal jurisdiction under the Fifth Amendment required reasonableness and a meaningful nexus to the United States. The court found the plaintiff had not established any concrete interest in litigating in the U.S., nor had he identified any meaningful U.S. interest in the dispute. The burden on the foreign corporate defendants would be unjustified. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal and denial of jurisdictional discovery. View "Gligorov v. Nation of Brunei" on Justia Law

Englehardt v. Blanche

2026-08-04T06:32:10-08:00

Two individuals who were victims of terrorist attacks sponsored by Iran obtained judgments against Iran under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s terrorism exception and were deemed eligible for compensation from the United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund. The Fund is financed by criminal penalties and forfeitures related to certain offenses involving state sponsors of terrorism. After British American Tobacco and its subsidiary agreed to pay over $629 million in criminal penalties and forfeitures for conspiracies involving illicit business with North Korean entities, the Department of Justice allocated only a small fraction of those proceeds to the Fund. The Department’s allocation was based on its interpretation that only proceeds from offenses with a direct nexus to a state sponsor of terrorism should be deposited. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment for the Department of Justice, upholding its interpretation of the relevant statutory funding provision. The district court reasoned that only proceeds from transactions or conduct occurring while North Korea was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism should be deposited into the Fund, and that the Department’s allocation was consistent with statutory requirements. Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Court of Appeals held that the Department of Justice erred in its allocation. The statutory language requires all proceeds from violations of IEEPA and TWEA, including conspiracy offenses charged under IEEPA, to be deposited into the Fund regardless of any nexus to a state sponsor of terrorism. Additionally, for related criminal conspiracies such as BAT’s bank fraud conspiracy, if the offense originated from doing business with a state sponsor of terrorism, all proceeds must be deposited into the Fund. The Court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for the plaintiffs. View "Englehardt v. Blanche" on Justia Law

De la Torre v. Cassidy

2026-07-31T07:32:08-08:00

After a major healthcare system filed for bankruptcy in 2024, a Senate committee initiated an investigation to understand the causes. The committee subpoenaed the system’s former CEO, who had overseen its operations, to testify at a hearing about the bankruptcy. The CEO objected, arguing that the committee’s actions—including the subpoena and subsequent contempt proceedings—violated his Fifth Amendment rights, particularly after he formally invoked those rights and refused to appear. The committee nevertheless proceeded, holding hearings and passing both civil and criminal contempt resolutions, with the full Senate adopting the criminal contempt resolution unanimously. The CEO then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the committee and most of its members, seeking to declare their actions unlawful and to quash the subpoena. He also asked the court to enjoin further punishment for his refusal to testify. The committee moved to dismiss the case, relying on the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution, which protects legislative acts from judicial inquiry. The district court agreed, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction and denying the CEO’s request for jurisdictional discovery, finding the challenged actions fell squarely within the protected legislative sphere. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the Speech or Debate Clause absolutely barred the suit because the conduct challenged—issuing the subpoena, conducting the hearing, and voting on contempt resolutions—were core legislative acts. The court further determined that the CEO’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment did not deprive these acts of their legislative character, nor did allegations about the senators’ motives create an exception. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal and its denial of discovery. View "De la Torre v. Cassidy" on Justia Law

Sookra v. Pfizer Inc.

2026-07-31T07:32:08-08:00

After the death of their fourteen-year-old daughter Taylor Rose Sookra in December 2021, four months after she received Pfizer’s COVID-19 vaccine, Arthur Sookra and April Burch-Sookra filed a lawsuit. They alleged willful misconduct under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) against Pfizer, federal officials, the physician who administered the vaccine, and the pediatric practice. Their claims included both federal law claims and state-law tort claims. Initially, the case was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. When the Sookras added a PREP Act willful-misconduct claim, they requested and obtained a transfer to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, as required by the statute. The defendants moved to dismiss, and the motions were referred to a magistrate judge who recommended dismissal of the claims against the federal government on sovereign immunity grounds and against Pfizer for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The magistrate also recommended dismissal of Pfizer’s state-law claims based on immunity and advised that the court decline supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. The district court adopted these recommendations, dismissed the case, and denied as moot the plaintiffs’ later request for a three-judge court. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the district court erred by dismissing the complaint without first convening a three-judge court, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(e)(5) for willful-misconduct claims under the PREP Act. The appellate court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to initiate procedures for convening a three-judge court. The court did not address the other arguments raised by the parties. View "Sookra v. Pfizer Inc." on Justia Law

Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation v. USA

2026-07-31T07:32:08-08:00

The case concerns a dispute over whether the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation is entitled, under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA), to restoration of approximately 1.5 million acres of unallotted land within the Uncompahgre Reservation in Utah. The Tribe argued that it was entitled to reclaim these lands, asserting that historical treaties, statutes, and executive orders granted it compensable title—meaning a right to proceeds from any sale of these lands. The federal government and the State of Utah, on the other hand, contended that the Tribe never acquired such compensable title for the Utah reservation lands; rather, any compensable title extended only to lands within the Tribe’s original reservation in Colorado. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the Tribe’s challenge to the Department of the Interior’s denial of restoration. In that court, all parties agreed that only lands to which the Tribe had compensable title could be restored under the IRA. The district court found that none of the relevant treaties, statutes, or executive orders gave the Tribe compensable title to the disputed lands in Utah, and thus granted summary judgment to the federal defendants and Utah, while denying the Tribe’s cross-motion. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The appellate court held that, under the text and structure of the 1880 Act and subsequent legal developments, the Tribe’s compensable title did not extend to unallotted lands within the Uncompahgre Reservation in Utah. Therefore, those lands are not eligible for restoration under the IRA. The court rejected the Tribe’s various historical and statutory arguments to the contrary and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. View "Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation v. USA" on Justia Law

Ruppe v. Rubio

2026-07-31T07:32:07-08:00

A Foreign Service officer who had worked for the State Department since 1993 alleged discrimination after being denied a promotion and experiencing difficult interactions with a supervisor, whom she accused of discriminatory conduct. She filed an Equal Employment Opportunity complaint and then sued the Department, raising five claims under Title VII, one under the Rehabilitation Act, and one under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), seeking over $10,000 in damages for the FLSA claim. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment for the State Department on all the Title VII and Rehabilitation Act claims. Regarding the FLSA claim, even though both parties argued that the district court had jurisdiction, the court relied on the D.C. Circuit’s prior decision in Waters v. Rumsfeld, which held that only the Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction over FLSA claims against the United States seeking more than $10,000. Based on that precedent, the district court transferred the FLSA claim to the Court of Federal Claims. The plaintiff appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for the State Department on the Title VII and Rehabilitation Act claims. However, the appellate court held that the district courts and the Court of Federal Claims have concurrent jurisdiction over FLSA damages claims against the United States, overruling its previous decision in Waters in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Bormes. The court vacated the transfer of the FLSA claim and remanded the case for further proceedings on that claim in the district court. Thus, the judgment was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Ruppe v. Rubio" on Justia Law

USA v. Johnson

2026-07-31T07:32:07-08:00

The defendant in this case used an encrypted filesharing site to acquire hundreds of videos containing child sexual abuse material (CSAM), which he then uploaded to his Google Drive account and stored on his computer. In October 2020, Google’s automated software identified some of these files as likely CSAM and, following federal law, sent so-called “CyberTip” reports to the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC). NCMEC’s automated system, in turn, forwarded the reports and files to law enforcement, specifically a detective in the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, D.C. The detective initially viewed some of the CSAM files without a warrant, then consulted a federal prosecutor and sought a warrant to review the files. A magistrate judge, however, advised that no warrant was needed, citing the “private search” doctrine, and the detective proceeded accordingly. Subsequent searches led to further evidence and ultimately to the defendant’s arrest and indictment for possession and transportation of CSAM. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied the defendant’s motions to suppress the evidence, reasoning that even if there was a Fourth Amendment violation when the detective first viewed the files without a warrant, suppression was unwarranted under the good-faith exception and independent-source doctrine. The court also rejected the argument that the residential search warrant only permitted seizure, not search, of digital devices. After an eight-day trial, a jury convicted the defendant on multiple counts related to possession and transportation of CSAM. The court further declined to reduce the sentencing offense level as requested by the defendant. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that, even assuming a Fourth Amendment violation occurred when the detective viewed the files without a warrant, suppression was not warranted because the government later obtained lawful authority from a magistrate judge and the detective acted in good faith. The court also found the residential search warrant authorized both seizure and search of digital devices and upheld the sentencing determination. View "USA v. Johnson" on Justia Law

USA v. Payne

2026-07-31T07:32:07-08:00

After a drive-by shooting targeted Antonio Payne’s home in Washington, D.C., police responded to the scene. Surveillance footage from neighbors captured Payne confronting an unidentified man, during which Payne was seen holding a gun, frisking the man, and making threatening statements. Payne was observed stepping off his driveway onto the alley while armed. Officers, invited into the home by Payne’s mother, saw ammunition in plain view. Detective interviews and a review of the footage led to a search warrant application for the home for evidence of carrying a pistol without a license. The warrant, which contained a typographical error in the cited statute but correctly described the offense, was granted. Upon execution, multiple firearms, drugs, and related materials were found. DNA testing linked Payne to several firearms. Before trial, Payne moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the warrant lacked probable cause. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied the motion, finding probable cause based on Payne’s matching clothing, video evidence of him with a gun, and the shooting incident. At trial, Payne conceded he was filmed carrying a gun and stipulated he lacked a license. The jury found him guilty on all counts, including carrying a pistol without a license. Payne was sentenced to 235 months’ imprisonment and 60 months’ supervised release, and he appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court’s rulings. The appellate court held that, even assuming the warrant lacked probable cause, the officers’ objectively reasonable reliance on the warrant triggered the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The court also found sufficient evidence supported Payne’s conviction for carrying a pistol without a license, as video footage and trial concessions established the offense’s elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The court rejected Payne’s new arguments regarding the statute’s typographical error and self-defense. View "USA v. Payne" on Justia Law

Advanced Energy United v. FERC

2026-07-31T07:32:06-08:00

The case centers on reforms to the process by which new energy generators, particularly renewable energy sources, connect to the nation’s power grid. At the end of 2023, a significant backlog existed, with about 2,600 gigawatts of proposed generation and storage capacity awaiting interconnection studies, mainly from solar, wind, and energy storage projects. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) determined that delays and inefficiencies in the existing interconnection process were creating unjust and unreasonable conditions in wholesale energy markets, hindering timely development and competition. FERC responded by issuing Order 2023, acting under its remedial authority in Section 206 of the Federal Power Act. Order 2023 mandated nationwide reforms for transmission providers, replacing the prior serial study model with a clustered study approach, requiring more substantial deposits, imposing withdrawal fines, establishing firm study deadlines, and implementing automatic late fees for missed deadlines. FERC also standardized affected-system study procedures and adopted energy-service modeling as the default. Following thirty-two rehearing and clarification requests, FERC issued Order 2023-A, reaffirming its findings and adjustments. Petitioners challenged three major aspects: the withdrawal fines, study deadlines backed by late fees, and the energy-service modeling requirement. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that FERC acted within its statutory authority, reasonably explained its reforms, and provided adequate process and safeguards. The court denied all petitions, holding that FERC’s nationwide interconnection regime and rulemaking under Order 2023 were lawful, not arbitrary or capricious, and did not unduly discriminate or violate constitutional protections. The court also affirmed that FERC reasonably balanced competing interests and that its reforms were supported by substantial evidence. View "Advanced Energy United v. FERC" on Justia Law

The Estate of Jennions v. CFTC

2026-07-28T07:02:15-08:00

An individual who formerly worked at major international banks provided information to the United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority (UK FCA) regarding alleged manipulation of widely used foreign exchange benchmark rates. This person asserted that traders at certain banks engaged in practices to benefit the institutions at the expense of clients during the setting of the benchmark rates. The UK FCA later became publicly linked to the issue through a media article describing the manipulation scheme. The United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) subsequently initiated an investigation based on the media article, ultimately resulting in enforcement actions and significant penalties against five banks for attempted manipulation of the benchmark rates. After the CFTC’s enforcement actions concluded, the individual submitted an application for a whistleblower award, asserting that his information provided to the UK FCA had set the investigation in motion and led to the enforcement actions. The Whistleblower Claims Review Staff at the CFTC determined that the applicant was ineligible for an award, concluding that the information he provided was not sufficiently specific, credible, or timely to have triggered the investigation, and that the investigation was prompted by the media article rather than his contributions. The applicant challenged the denial, arguing both that his information was central to the investigation and that there was improper internal influence affecting the decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the CFTC’s denial under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court held that the CFTC’s determination was supported by substantial evidence, finding that the investigation was initiated by the media article’s detailed reporting, not by the applicant’s information, and that no evidence demonstrated improper influence or prejudice in the agency’s process. The court denied the petition for review, upholding the CFTC’s denial of the whistleblower award. View "The Estate of Jennions v. CFTC" on Justia Law

Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA

2026-07-28T07:02:15-08:00

Several environmental organizations challenged a rule issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that modified how the agency determines whether a stationary source of air pollution requires a permit for modifications under the Clean Air Act’s New Source Review (NSR) program. The core factual issue concerned whether, in assessing if a physical or operational change at a facility triggers the need for an NSR permit, the EPA may consider both emission increases and decreases attributable to a single project (“project emissions accounting”) at the initial step of the permitting process. Previously, the EPA used a two-step process: Step One evaluated whether a proposed project would itself cause a significant emissions increase, and Step Two determined whether any source-wide emissions decreases would offset that increase. The challenged rule allowed for netting both increases and decreases within a single project at Step One. Petitioners argued that this change would allow regulated entities to avoid NSR by aggregating unrelated activities and relying on emissions decreases that were not contemporaneous with increases. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the petitions after several environmental groups sought judicial review following the EPA’s adoption of the project emissions accounting rule and related interpretive guidance. The court found that at least one petitioner had standing based on alleged injury from increased emissions at a specific facility. The court held that the EPA’s rule was not contrary to law and did not violate the Clean Air Act, as it consistently applied the statutory definition of “modification” and fell within the agency’s reasonable interpretive discretion. The court further held that the rule was not arbitrary or capricious, finding the EPA’s explanations for its approach to project aggregation and recordkeeping requirements sufficient. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA" on Justia Law

PhantomALERT Inc. v. Apple Inc.

2026-07-24T08:02:47-08:00

PhantomALERT, a developer of a traffic app that crowdsources real-time data, modified its app in early 2020 to help users spot and avoid Covid-19 outbreaks. Apple rejected PhantomALERT’s updated app from its App Store, citing new guidelines limiting Covid-19-related apps to those from recognized health entities and requiring apps in highly regulated fields to be submitted by legal entities, not individual developers. PhantomALERT was invited to revise and resubmit its app for compliance. The Google Play Store also rejected the app for similar reasons. Apple later updated its guidelines, allowing certain Covid-related apps endorsed by government entities, but PhantomALERT alleged it was not notified of this change. PhantomALERT sued Apple in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, claiming violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act, California antitrust law, and California unfair competition law. Apple moved to dismiss, and PhantomALERT missed the deadline for an opposition brief, instead filing an amended complaint. The district court dismissed the original complaint without prejudice as conceded and denied leave to late-file the amended complaint, finding it futile. The court determined PhantomALERT’s antitrust allegations failed to define a relevant product or geographic market and that prerequisites for injunctive relief under California law were not met. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s order de novo, finding the dismissal was final and appealable. The Circuit affirmed, holding that PhantomALERT failed to plausibly allege relevant product markets for its Sherman Act claims, including the alleged App Store single-brand aftermarket and submarket for Covid-19-related tracing apps. The court concluded the amended complaint did not state a claim under federal or California antitrust laws, nor under California’s unfair competition law. The dismissal was affirmed without prejudice. View "PhantomALERT Inc. v. Apple Inc." on Justia Law

Fairholme Funds, Inc v. FHFA

2026-07-24T08:02:47-08:00

In the aftermath of the 2008 housing crisis, Congress created the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and authorized it to place Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship. The FHFA and the U.S. Treasury entered into agreements whereby the Treasury would provide capital to these companies, initially in exchange for fixed-rate dividends. In 2012, these agreements were amended so that Fannie and Freddie were required to pay the Treasury dividends equal to their net worth above a specified reserve, a change known as the “Net Worth Sweep.” The announcement of this amendment caused the value of Fannie and Freddie shares to drop significantly, and shareholders, including those holding both common and junior preferred shares, filed suit alleging various statutory and contract violations. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially dismissed most claims, but after appellate review and remand, permitted the shareholders’ implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim to proceed to trial. The jury found the FHFA had violated this implied covenant by adopting the Net Worth Sweep, awarding over $612 million in damages, which the district court increased to $812 million with prejudgment interest. The district court denied the FHFA’s post-trial motions and rejected shareholders’ attempts to seek restitution or reliance damages beyond expectation damages. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Court of Appeals held that the implied covenant claim was not foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent or by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act, that the claim was available against the FHFA as conservator, and that the Net Worth Sweep violated the reasonable expectations of shareholders. The court also determined that post-Net Worth Sweep purchasers of shares could pursue the claim, and that the denial of restitution and reliance damages was proper. Accordingly, the award of expectation damages was affirmed. View "Fairholme Funds, Inc v. FHFA" on Justia Law

American Whitewater v. FERC

2026-07-24T08:02:46-08:00

A non-profit river conservation and recreation organization, whose members include kayakers and canoers in Missouri, sought to intervene out of time in a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) license surrender proceeding for the Niangua Hydroelectric Project in Missouri. The project, completed in 1930, impounded the Niangua River and created Lake Niangua. After decades of operation and relicensing, the licensee decided not to pursue relicensing, proposing to decommission the project but leave the dam in place. The organization argued its members would be directly affected and that its participation would represent public interest, but it missed the intervention deadline due to lack of awareness of the proceeding. FERC denied the organization’s unopposed motion to intervene out of time, finding it failed to demonstrate good cause for late filing under its procedural rules. FERC also denied rehearing, reiterating that lack of awareness of a publicly noticed proceeding did not constitute good cause and that, per its precedent, failure to show good cause was sufficient to deny intervention without considering other factors. The Commission subsequently approved the license surrender with the dam left in place, rejecting the organization’s comments. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. It held that FERC did not err in interpreting its rule to require a late intervenor to show good cause for the late filing, but concluded that FERC acted arbitrarily and capriciously by inconsistently applying its precedent on late intervention without providing a reasoned explanation. The court vacated FERC’s orders and remanded the case for reconsideration and a reasoned explanation consistent with FERC’s precedent. View "American Whitewater v. FERC" on Justia Law

Johnson v. DC

2026-07-24T08:02:46-08:00

A long-serving correctional officer at the District of Columbia Department of Corrections was terminated from her position after nearly three decades of service. During the COVID-19 pandemic, she became increasingly vocal about perceived failures in the Department’s response to the crisis. In her role as a union leader, she forwarded internal Department emails to union attorneys and participated in a local television interview criticizing the Department’s pandemic management. The Department launched an investigation, ultimately determining that she violated confidentiality policies and terminated her employment, despite a hearing officer’s recommendation for a lesser penalty. After her termination, she filed suit in D.C. Superior Court against the Department’s leadership, alleging that her firing violated her First Amendment rights. The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, where both sides moved for summary judgment. The district court found triable issues of fact regarding whether her termination was motivated by protected speech and denied qualified immunity to the individual defendants. The defendants sought reconsideration, which was denied, and then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to her claim that she was fired for forwarding confidential emails, finding no violation of a clearly established First Amendment right in those circumstances. However, the court affirmed the denial of qualified immunity for the claim that she was fired for giving a media interview, concluding that if her termination was motivated by the interview, it would violate clearly established First Amendment law. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. DC" on Justia Law

Titan Consortium 1, LLC v. Argentine Republic

2026-07-21T08:02:42-08:00

Spanish investment companies alleged that Argentina unlawfully expropriated their airline investments, violating a bilateral treaty. After Argentina took over private airlines, the investors initiated arbitration at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The ICSID tribunal awarded over $320 million to the investors, and an internal appellate committee later affirmed the award and added more than $1 million in costs. The investors then assigned their rights to Titan Consortium 1, LLC, which sought enforcement of the award in the United States four years after the initial award. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed Titan’s petition to enforce the arbitral award. Argentina moved to dismiss, arguing the petition was untimely under a three-year statute of limitations. The district court denied the motion, holding that the twelve-year statute of limitations for enforcement of money judgments under D.C. Code § 15-101 applied. It granted summary judgment for Titan, enforcing the award. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed Argentina’s appeal, which challenged only the timeliness ruling. The court considered which statute of limitations applies to enforcement actions under 22 U.S.C. § 1650a, the statute implementing the Washington Convention. The court held that D.C. Code § 15-101’s twelve-year limitations period for enforcement of money judgments is the closest analogue and applies to petitions enforcing ICSID awards under § 1650a. It rejected Argentina’s arguments for a three-year limitations period under federal or D.C. arbitration statutes, noting the differences in statutory text and enforcement procedures. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding Titan’s enforcement action was timely. View "Titan Consortium 1, LLC v. Argentine Republic" on Justia Law

Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation v. Kennedy

2026-07-21T08:02:39-08:00

Several pharmaceutical manufacturers participating in the federal 340B program, which requires them to provide discounted drugs to qualifying healthcare providers, proposed changing how they fulfill this obligation. Historically, these manufacturers complied by offering upfront discounts on eligible drug purchases. In 2024, they sought to implement a new rebate model, where providers would purchase drugs at full price and receive a post-purchase rebate to reach the required discounted price. The Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), through the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), responded that such rebate mechanisms had not been approved for these entities, requested further information, and stated that the manufacturers could not move forward with the new models without official approval. The manufacturers sued the Secretary in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that the statute allowed them to unilaterally implement rebate models unless expressly disapproved by the Secretary. Advocacy groups and hospitals intervened, contending that rebate models were not permitted at all. The district court granted summary judgment for the Secretary, concluding that manufacturers could not implement such rebate systems without prior approval. Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the statutory text of Section 340B permits rebate models but requires the Secretary to affirmatively provide for such mechanisms before manufacturers may implement them. The court found that the statute vests authority in the Secretary to determine acceptable pricing mechanisms and that manufacturers cannot act unilaterally in this regard. Because the Secretary had not approved the proposed rebate models, the court concluded that the manufacturers’ intended implementation was properly blocked. The appellate court therefore affirmed the district court’s decision in favor of the Secretary. View "Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Thrivent Financial for Lutherans v. SEC

2026-07-21T08:02:36-08:00

Thrivent Financial for Lutherans and its subsidiary, which sell securities including variable annuities and life insurance contracts, are required as broker-dealers to be members of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). FINRA’s rules mandate that disputes with customers be arbitrated in FINRA’s forum and prohibit class action waivers in customer agreements, which conflicted with Thrivent’s preferred arbitration process. Thrivent sought to have its own dispute resolution program, culminating in binding arbitration in a non-FINRA forum, applied to all customer disputes involving these products. After FINRA interpreted its rules as prohibiting Thrivent’s program, Thrivent petitioned the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to amend or abrogate the relevant FINRA arbitration rules, arguing they violated the Federal Arbitration Act. After receiving no response for nearly a year, Thrivent sought mandamus relief from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which was denied. Eventually, the SEC denied the petition for rulemaking in a brief letter that cited resource constraints and agency discretion but did not specifically address Thrivent’s arguments or provide a substantive rationale. Thrivent then petitioned the D.C. Circuit for review of the SEC’s denial. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that while agency discretion in rulemaking is broad, the SEC’s denial was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to provide a reasoned explanation particular to Thrivent’s petition. The court did not address the underlying merits of Thrivent’s claim or the validity of the FINRA rules. Instead, it granted the petition in part, remanding the matter to the SEC for further consideration and a more reasoned explanation. The court otherwise denied Thrivent’s petition for review. View "Thrivent Financial for Lutherans v. SEC" on Justia Law

USA v. Navarro

2026-07-21T08:02:34-08:00

Peter Navarro, a former senior adviser in the Trump administration, published materials and made public statements in 2021 about a plan to delay the certification of the 2020 presidential election. The U.S. House Select Committee investigating the January 6th Capitol attack subpoenaed Navarro for documents and deposition testimony related to these statements. Navarro refused to comply, asserting executive privilege before even seeing the subpoena and declining to engage with the Committee regarding his privilege claim. After the compliance deadline passed, the House voted to hold him in contempt, and a grand jury indicted him on two counts of contempt of Congress. In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Navarro moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that former President Trump had invoked executive privilege on his behalf. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found no evidence that Trump or his designee had actually invoked executive privilege in connection with the subpoena and denied the motion to dismiss. The court also granted a government motion to prevent Navarro from arguing at trial that a good-faith belief in executive privilege excused his noncompliance. A jury found Navarro guilty on both counts. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that only the President or a designated official can invoke executive privilege and that the district court did not clearly err in finding no such invocation occurred for Navarro’s subpoena. The court further held that executive privilege, even if properly invoked, would not have excused Navarro’s blanket refusal to comply, especially regarding his public statements and writings. It also affirmed that a mistaken belief in the applicability of executive privilege is not a defense to contempt of Congress. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. Navarro" on Justia Law

Public Safety Spectrum Alliance v. FCC

2026-07-21T08:02:30-08:00

The case centers on the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) regulation of the 4.9 GHz band, which is allocated for public safety communications but has seen very limited use. To address underutilization, the FCC created a plan to appoint a “Band Manager” to oversee this spectrum. The new rules allow the Band Manager to transfer unused portions of the spectrum to FirstNet, a federal entity that operates a public safety network in a different frequency band. Incumbent licensees, such as local governments and transit agencies, faced restrictions limiting their rights to expand use within this band, while some organizations argued the FCC did not go far enough in reallocating the spectrum. Several parties challenged the FCC’s order. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit addressed whether the petitioners had standing. It found that the Public Safety Spectrum Alliance and the Public Safety Broadband Technology Association lacked Article III standing due to insufficient evidence of injury to their members, and thus their petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. However, the court determined that at least one petitioner from the Coalition for Emergency Response and Critical Infrastructure, specifically the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District, had standing, allowing the court to consider their claims. On the merits, the court held that the FCC’s order did not violate statutory limitations on FirstNet’s authority, did not require competitive bidding under the Communications Act, and did not unlawfully assign spectrum to a federal entity. The court also found that the FCC’s actions were not arbitrary or capricious, as the agency reasonably balanced the interests of incumbent licensees against the public interest and explained its regulatory choices. Challenges to the lawfulness of future spectrum transfers to FirstNet were deemed unripe. The court dismissed the petitions lacking standing and denied or dismissed the remaining challenges. View "Public Safety Spectrum Alliance v. FCC" on Justia Law

Beyond Nuclear, Inc. v. NRC

2026-07-21T08:02:27-08:00

The case concerns a challenge brought by two environmental organizations to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) 2024 revision of its Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS), which is used to evaluate the environmental effects of renewing operating licenses for nuclear power plants. The petitioners argued that the NRC inadequately considered how aging reactor components and the impacts of climate change could increase the risk of severe nuclear accidents, which in turn could have significant environmental consequences. Previously, the NRC revised its GEIS to generically determine that the environmental risks from “severe accidents” at nuclear plants during license renewals were “small,” relying on updated data and a conservative risk analysis. This revision classified most severe accident risks as “Category 1,” meaning they did not require further plant-specific analysis unless new and significant information arose. The NRC also determined that plants that had previously completed an analysis of severe-accident mitigation alternatives (SAMAs) did not need to repeat that process unless new circumstances warranted it. The petitioners sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, challenging these determinations. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the NRC’s actions under the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard, which is deferential to agency expertise in matters of environmental impact analysis. The court found that the NRC had reasonably considered both aging and climate change as factors influencing accident risk, explained its reliance on regulatory oversight and conservative assumptions, and provided adequate opportunity for site-specific review if new information emerged. The court held that the NRC’s generic analysis and procedures did not violate the National Environmental Policy Act or the Administrative Procedure Act, and it denied the petition for review. View "Beyond Nuclear, Inc. v. NRC" on Justia Law

Save the Sound, Inc. v. FAA

2026-07-21T08:02:24-08:00

A regional airport in Connecticut faced operational challenges due to a short runway and an outdated, flood-prone terminal. To address these issues, the airport authority proposed a project to extend the runway by about 1,000 feet and construct a new terminal. The authority also planned, in its long-term Master Plan, to upgrade taxiways, but those upgrades were not part of the immediate project seeking final approval. The expansion aimed to allow full-capacity flights for common aircraft and improve passenger facilities. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) provided conditional approval for all projects in the Master Plan but granted final approval only for the runway extension and new terminal. The FAA conducted an environmental assessment (EA) for these two elements, concluding there would be no significant environmental effects, and thus did not prepare a full environmental impact statement (EIS). The EA included projections for increased passenger enplanements, consideration of air pollution, and mitigation measures for flooding and wetlands. The FAA determined the taxiway upgrades were not part of the current project because they were not expected to be pursued within five years and had independent utility. Petitioners, an environmental group and a town, challenged the FAA's approval in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. They argued the FAA violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in several ways, including improper segmentation of the project, failure to consider cumulative effects, and inadequate analysis of environmental impacts. The Court applied a highly deferential standard of review, consistent with Supreme Court precedent in Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, and found the FAA acted reasonably in its project definition, environmental analysis, and mitigation measures. The Court denied the petitions for review, holding that the FAA’s approval complied with NEPA’s procedural requirements and was not arbitrary or capricious. View "Save the Sound, Inc. v. FAA" on Justia Law

USA v. Jones

2026-07-21T08:02:21-08:00

Two underage girls, after running away from a residential facility in Virginia in April 2019, traveled to Washington, D.C., where they became involved in commercial sex trafficking. Initially, Curtis Fowler and Brittany Jones attempted to arrange commercial sex encounters for the girls, but were unsuccessful. Jones then contacted Willis Pierre Lewis and his associate Ashley Taylor, who subsequently took control of the girls’ activities, arranged for commercial sex acts, and managed their earnings, often through coercive means, including threats and violence. The girls engaged in numerous commercial sex acts over several weeks under the direction of Lewis and his associates. The trafficking came to light after the FBI received a tip and interviewed the victims. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia tried the case. A jury convicted Lewis and Jones on various charges related to sex trafficking and related offenses. Lewis was sentenced to life imprisonment, while Jones received a sentence of 168 months. Both defendants appealed, raising claims regarding a prejudicial variance between the indictment and trial evidence, evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, sentencing procedures, and, in Jones’s case, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the appeals. The court held that the evidence at trial supported the existence of a single conspiracy, rejecting the claim of a prejudicial variance. The court found any errors in evidentiary rulings to be harmless and concluded that Lewis had not demonstrated reversible plain error in the jury instructions. The court affirmed the convictions of both Lewis and Jones. However, it determined that the district court erred by failing to make necessary factual findings regarding sentencing enhancements and by not adequately explaining its sentencing decision for Lewis. Thus, Lewis’s sentence was vacated and remanded for resentencing, while Jones’s conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "USA v. Jones" on Justia Law

Hospital Menonita de Guayama, Inc. v. NLRB

2026-07-21T08:02:18-08:00

A hospital in Puerto Rico underwent a change in ownership in 2017. The union that had previously represented the hospital’s employees claimed to remain the representative for five bargaining units. However, the union had not secured contracts for two units and the contracts for the other three units had expired several years earlier. After initially recognizing the union, the new hospital owner received evidence that most, and in one case all, employees in each unit no longer supported the union. The hospital then withdrew recognition and refused to bargain with the union. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) charged the hospital with unfair labor practices, alleging unlawful refusal to bargain and withdrawal of recognition. An administrative law judge ruled against the hospital, applying the NLRB’s “successor bar” doctrine, which requires a new employer to recognize and bargain with an incumbent union for up to one year following a change in ownership, regardless of current employee support. A divided panel of the NLRB affirmed this ruling, ordering the hospital to bargain with the union. The hospital petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to review the decision, challenging the legality of the successor bar. Initially, the Court of Appeals upheld the Board’s rule, granting deference to the NLRB’s policy judgment. However, after the Supreme Court decided *Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo*, which eliminated judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations, the Supreme Court vacated the appellate decision and remanded for reconsideration. On remand, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the successor bar conflicts with the National Labor Relations Act’s guarantees of employee choice and majority rule. The court granted the hospital’s petition for review, denied the NLRB’s cross-petition for enforcement, and remanded the case, holding that the Board lacked statutory authority to impose the successor bar. View "Hospital Menonita de Guayama, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Akhmetshin v. Browder

2026-07-17T06:33:11-08:00

Two individuals became involved in a public dispute relating to allegations of Russian interference and the passage of the Magnitsky Act. One party, a British citizen, made several statements in media interviews and social media posts from New York, characterizing the other party—a Russian-American lobbyist—as a “spy operator in Washington, D.C.” and linking him to a controversial meeting at Trump Tower in New York. The lobbyist claimed these statements were defamatory and brought suit in the District of Columbia, arguing that the statements caused harm to his reputation in D.C. and that the speaker’s comments established personal jurisdiction. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the claim and dismissed the case, holding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the British citizen. The district court also denied the speaker’s request for attorney’s fees under the D.C. Anti–SLAPP Act, finding that such fees were not warranted because the dismissal was based on lack of jurisdiction rather than on a motion under the statute. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the British citizen did not “purposefully avail” himself of the benefits and protections of D.C. law, as required under the minimum-contacts test from International Shoe Co. v. Washington. The statements at issue did not focus on D.C. or create jurisdictionally significant contacts with the forum. The court also affirmed the denial of attorney’s fees, ruling that the D.C. Anti–SLAPP Act does not apply when the dismissal is for lack of personal jurisdiction rather than under the statute’s special motion to dismiss. The court denied the request for jurisdictional discovery. View "Akhmetshin v. Browder" on Justia Law

USA v. Zobel

2026-07-17T06:33:06-08:00

David Jeremy Zobel was indicted in the District of Columbia on charges including child-pornography distribution and attempted sexual exploitation of a minor. The charges stemmed from an undercover FBI operation in which an individual, believed to be Zobel, engaged in online chat conversations, shared child pornography, and claimed to be a convicted sex offender. The government matched details from the chat, including photographs of court documents, to Zobel’s prior conviction in Ohio. When agents approached Zobel, he fled but was later apprehended, and evidence linked his device to the chats. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed several motions in limine concerning the admissibility of evidence related to Zobel’s prior conviction. Initially, the court excluded a summary of Zobel’s 2011 conviction under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 414, reasoning that the probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice under Rule 403. The court indicated this decision could be reconsidered if the defense raised an identity argument. Later, as the defense confirmed an identity defense, the government renewed its request to admit the evidence, but the district court maintained its exclusion of all references to the prior conviction, including statements and photographs from the chats. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s evidentiary rulings. The court held it had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 because the government timely appealed the exclusion orders. The main holding was that the district court misapplied the interplay between Rules 403 and 414 by treating any propensity inference from prior child molestation as categorically unfairly prejudicial. The appellate court vacated the district court’s exclusion of evidence related to Zobel’s prior conviction and remanded for reconsideration under the correct legal standard. View "USA v. Zobel" on Justia Law

Clean Air Council v. EPA

2026-07-17T06:33:01-08:00

This case concerns the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) extension of compliance deadlines for steel mills to meet hazardous emission standards. The EPA initially issued an interim rule, then a final rule, extending deadlines for various emission controls and monitoring requirements. EPA explained that the original deadlines were technologically infeasible due to unforeseen technical challenges and incomplete data. The revised deadlines allowed steel mills more time—up to three years after the rule’s promulgation date—to comply with standards for emission sources such as bleeder valve openings, bell leaks, slag processing, beaching, and furnace emissions monitoring. EPA also revised the timeline for fenceline monitoring based on delays in developing testing methods. Environmental groups petitioned for reconsideration of the 2024 Rule, citing procedural and substantive objections. EPA first denied the need for reconsideration but later identified issues warranting further review, issuing a stay and an interim rule. After receiving public comments, EPA promulgated a final rule, confirming the extended deadlines and explaining the compliance difficulties. Petitioners challenged both the interim and final rules, arguing that EPA exceeded its authority and failed to set deadlines as expeditiously as practicable under the Clean Air Act. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the petitions. The court held that EPA’s revised compliance deadlines were consistent with the Clean Air Act and adequately explained, distinguishing the rulemaking from prior actions that merely delayed rules for reconsideration. The court determined that EPA had authority to reset deadlines based on substantive, technological challenges. The court dismissed the procedural challenge to the interim rule as moot, since EPA had followed proper procedures in the final rule. The challenge to the fenceline monitoring deadline was also dismissed, as the new and original deadlines had converged. The court denied all other petitions for review. View "Clean Air Council v. EPA" on Justia Law

USA v. Abukhatallah

2026-07-17T06:32:56-08:00

In September 2012, a group of terrorists attacked the U.S. Special Mission in Benghazi, Libya, resulting in the deaths of four Americans. Ahmed Abu Khatallah, a leader of the militia Ubaydah Bin Jarrah, played a significant role in planning and executing the attack. He participated in weapons procurement, coordinated with other militants, and was present at the Mission during the assault. Surveillance footage and witness testimony linked Khatallah to key actions before, during, and after the attack, including efforts to undermine the local security force protecting the Mission. After his arrest in 2014, Khatallah was tried in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The jury convicted him on four counts, including conspiracy and material support for terrorism, but acquitted him of charges related to the deaths and the subsequent attack on a nearby compound. The district court initially sentenced him to twenty-two years in prison, a sentence the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit later found unreasonably lenient and vacated. On remand, the district court imposed a twenty-eight-year sentence, justifying its downward variance from the Guidelines based on respect for the jury’s verdict, the context of the offenses, and Khatallah’s status as a deportable alien. Upon the government’s appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit again found the sentence substantively unreasonable. The appellate court held that the district court’s justifications did not support the extent of the downward variance given the seriousness of the offenses, the need for deterrence, and public protection. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, instructing the district court to give greater weight to these considerations and not to minimize the gravity of Khatallah’s conduct. View "USA v. Abukhatallah" on Justia Law

USA v. Littlejohn

2026-07-17T06:32:51-08:00

Charles Littlejohn, seeking to influence the outcome of a presidential election and raise support for tax policy changes, obtained employment as a consultant with the Internal Revenue Service in 2017 for the purpose of unlawfully accessing and leaking confidential tax returns. He stole and leaked the tax returns of then-President Donald Trump, as well as the tax records of approximately 7,600 wealthy Americans and 600 entities. Littlejohn provided these records to media outlets, including the New York Times and ProPublica, resulting in substantial reputational, economic, and personal harm to numerous victims. He attempted to conceal his actions by destroying evidence and deleting files. The leaks caused ongoing distress, with unpublished data still held by ProPublica, leaving victims fearful of further exposure. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia accepted Littlejohn’s guilty plea to one count of unauthorized disclosure under 26 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(1). The court calculated a Sentencing Guidelines range of one to one-and-a-half years, after considering an upward departure due to the scope and harm of the offense. At sentencing, the court imposed the statutory maximum of five years in prison, three years of supervised release, and monetary penalties, citing the targeted nature of the offenses, elaborate planning, and continuing harm to victims. Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit examined procedural and substantive challenges to the sentence. The court found no procedural error, determining the district court did not predetermine the sentence, rely on erroneous facts, improperly consider outside influence, or fail to explain its variance. Substantively, the appellate court concluded the sentence was reasonable given the gravity and scope of the offenses. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that both the procedural and substantive aspects of Littlejohn’s sentence satisfied legal standards. View "USA v. Littlejohn" on Justia Law

Alignment Healthcare Inc. v. HHS

2026-07-14T06:32:08-08:00

Alignment Healthcare, a private health insurer offering Medicare Advantage plans, challenged the accuracy of its star ratings issued by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) for two of its contracts. The ratings are partly determined by an annual survey of enrollees, and Alignment claimed that a significant drop in Spanish-language responses resulted from errors in survey administration—specifically, that some Spanish-speaking enrollees received the survey in English despite indicating a preference for Spanish. Alignment argued that this error negatively affected its ratings, as its internal data showed higher satisfaction among Spanish-speaking enrollees. After receiving preliminary survey results in September 2024, Alignment raised these concerns with CMS, requesting a review of the sampling methodology and suppression of the disputed survey data. CMS reviewed the sampling and response data, consulted with the survey vendor, and ultimately found no evidence of a survey administration error. CMS noted that Spanish-speaking enrollees had access to Spanish-language surveys and that the rates of Spanish responses were higher than average. CMS denied Alignment’s requests for data suppression or further validation, stating it had no authority to remove the results absent evidence of protocol violations. Alignment then filed suit under the Administrative Procedure Act in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, which granted summary judgment for CMS. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that Alignment failed to demonstrate that CMS’s actions were arbitrary or capricious or that survey protocols had been violated. The court found CMS’s investigation and explanation adequate, rejected Alignment’s contentions regarding unequal treatment and nondelegation, and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to CMS. View "Alignment Healthcare Inc. v. HHS" on Justia Law

Diegelmann v. Bessent

2026-07-14T06:32:08-08:00

Two German nationals, Axel Diegelmann and his son Fritz, operated businesses trading in precious metals. In 2024, the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) blocked the property of the Diegelmanns and three companies owned by Axel, finding that Axel, Fritz, and one company operated in the metals and mining sector of the Russian economy, and that the other two companies were controlled by or acted on behalf of Axel. OFAC determined that the Diegelmanns had helped Russia-based metals companies buy and sell precious metals, circumventing international sanctions. The Diegelmanns challenged the sanctions in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that their activities did not amount to operating in the metals and mining sector as defined by the relevant regulations. The district court granted summary judgment to the government, agreeing with OFAC’s application of the sanctions and denying the Diegelmanns’ motion for summary judgment. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo under the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary-or-capricious standard, which is highly deferential, especially for national security matters. The appellate court held that purchasing finished precious metals, including gold bars, constituted “procuring geological materials” as used in the governing regulations. The court rejected the Diegelmanns’ argument that their conduct did not amount to procurement and found their alternative argument—that refined metals are not “geological materials”—was not preserved for appeal. The court also concluded that substantial evidence supported OFAC’s finding that the Diegelmanns’ activities were sufficiently connected to Russia. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Diegelmann v. Bessent" on Justia Law

State of New York v. Trump

2026-07-14T06:32:07-08:00

In 2020, the United States Postal Service implemented operational changes, including reducing high-speed mail sorting machines, decreasing employee overtime, eliminating late or extra mail delivery trips, and altering the sequence by which some mail carriers sort and deliver the mail. Several states and municipalities challenged these changes, alleging they would impede public services and hinder residents’ ability to vote by mail in the upcoming November election. Among their claims was that the Postal Service failed to seek an advisory opinion from the Postal Regulatory Commission before implementing the changes, as required by federal law. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially granted a preliminary injunction against the Postal Policy Changes, finding the plaintiffs likely to succeed on their claim regarding the lack of an advisory opinion. The court rejected the government’s argument that the Postal Regulatory Commission’s review scheme precluded district court jurisdiction. Later, the district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the advisory opinion claim, permanently enjoining the Postal Service from eliminating late or extra mail delivery trips without first seeking an advisory opinion from the Commission. The court maintained that its jurisdiction was not displaced by the statutory review scheme, reasoning that the scheme was merely supplemental and insufficient for immediate relief. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and held that Congress had established a statutory review scheme, channeling complaints about Postal Service policy changes first to the Postal Regulatory Commission, with subsequent review in the Court of Appeals. This scheme implicitly displaced the district court’s jurisdiction over the advisory opinion claim. Therefore, the Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the plaintiffs and remanded with instructions to dismiss the advisory opinion claim. View "State of New York v. Trump" on Justia Law

Trongone v. Cmsnr. IRS

2026-07-13T11:32:37-08:00

The appellant submitted a whistleblower claim to the Internal Revenue Service alleging that two taxpayers, a corporation and its majority shareholder, had underpaid taxes from 2004 to 2012. She also requested that the IRS consider similar conduct for the years 2013 through 2017 when determining any award. The IRS had already begun investigating the conduct she reported and ultimately collected proceeds from both taxpayers. However, the IRS’s Whistleblower Office denied her claim, asserting that her application had not contributed to the collection of any proceeds, largely because much of her information was considered “tainted”—that is, potentially privileged or unlawfully obtained. Upon seeking review in the United States Tax Court, the appellant requested supplementation of the administrative record or discovery relating to the later tax years (2013–2017), arguing that the IRS had used her information in those years. The Tax Court denied her requests, citing failure to comply with its procedural rules for discovery, and granted summary judgment to the IRS. The court found that the administrative record supported the IRS’s determination and declined to supplement the record, ruling that there was no showing that relevant documents were deliberately or negligently excluded. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the Tax Court’s summary judgment de novo, applying the Administrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard. The court held that the IRS’s rationale for denying the whistleblower award for tax years 2013 through 2017 was unsupported by the record; the agency relied on a bare assertion of taint rather than a reasonable inquiry into the merits. The court concluded that the IRS’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and reversed the Tax Court’s judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Trongone v. Cmsnr. IRS" on Justia Law

Chishti v. Spottiswoode

2026-07-07T07:32:04-08:00

Zia Chishti, formerly CEO of a technology company, and his wife brought claims against Tatiana Spottiswoode, her attorneys, and related parties. Chishti and Spottiswoode had a prior romantic relationship, and Spottiswoode was later employed by Chishti’s company under an arbitration agreement. In 2017, Spottiswoode accused Chishti of harassment and assault, leading to confidential arbitration, which resulted in an arbitral award in her favor. Years later, Spottiswoode was subpoenaed to testify before Congress about forced arbitration in sexual assault cases, where she recounted her experiences involving Chishti. After her testimony, Spottiswoode and her attorney made public statements to the media and on social media regarding the matter. Chishti alleged these statements were defamatory and part of a campaign to damage his reputation, causing him to resign from his executive roles. His wife also claimed loss of consortium. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court found that Spottiswoode’s statements before Congress were protected by legislative privilege under District of Columbia law, and that the post-hearing public statements were protected opinions or shielded by the fair reporting privilege and the First Amendment. The court also concluded that the other tort claims were duplicative of defamation, that the conspiracy and loss of consortium claims failed without a viable underlying tort, and that the breach of contract claims were barred by privilege or insufficiently pleaded. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The appellate court held that witness statements to Congress and related communications were absolutely privileged under District of Columbia law. It further held that post-hearing statements were protected as opinion or by fair reporting, and that related tort and contract claims failed for lack of an actionable underlying claim. The dismissal with prejudice was affirmed. View "Chishti v. Spottiswoode" on Justia Law

Angelo v. DC

2026-07-07T07:32:03-08:00

Several individuals who hold concealed-carry pistol licenses issued by the District of Columbia challenged a local law prohibiting licensed carriers from possessing firearms on public transportation, including the Metro system. Fearing prosecution if they carried their pistols on the Metro, these plaintiffs avoided using public transit and instead paid for more expensive private transportation. They alleged that this criminal statute violated their Second and Fifth Amendment rights and sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief against the District and several officials in both their official and personal capacities. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially denied the plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief, citing circuit precedent that required them to demonstrate a special law enforcement priority or heightened risk of prosecution. When the plaintiffs amended their complaint to include allegations of increased transportation costs and added defendants, the District Court dismissed the case for lack of standing. Specifically, it found the plaintiffs had not alleged facts indicating a credible and imminent threat of prosecution, and it rejected their economic injury as insufficient for standing. The court also dismissed damages claims against individual defendants, which plaintiffs abandoned. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the plaintiffs had standing for their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against all defendants (except one official capacity claim not appealed), as well as for damages against the District, because their ongoing economic injury—incurred by complying with the Metro Ban—constituted a concrete, imminent, and traceable harm. The Court affirmed the dismissal of damages claims against individual defendants, reversed the dismissal of the remaining claims, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Angelo v. DC" on Justia Law

USA v. De Moya

2026-07-07T07:32:02-08:00

Two business owners in Washington, D.C. sought to reduce their businesses’ tax liabilities by hiring an intermediary who, in turn, paid cash bribes to a supervisor in the D.C. Office of Tax and Revenue. The supervisor used his access to the agency’s tax system to reduce the businesses’ tax obligations without legitimate justification, sometimes using colleagues’ credentials and creating false documents to conceal the scheme. The intermediary relayed proof of these illicit adjustments to his clients, who paid him and the supervisor a share of the savings. The scheme resulted in a loss of approximately $2.3 million to the District of Columbia. After an audit uncovered suspicious tax reductions without proper documentation, authorities traced the scheme to the supervisor, the intermediary, and the clients. Two of the intermediary’s clients pleaded guilty and cooperated with the government. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia tried the case against the intermediary and one client. The jury convicted both defendants of conspiracy, bribery, and wire fraud, while acquitting one defendant on some wire fraud counts. The district court imposed sentences of 110 months and 30 months, respectively. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the bribery jury instructions, one defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding sentencing, and an alleged sentencing penalty for going to trial. The appellate court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, the error in the bribery jury instruction was harmless because the evidence demonstrated a quid pro quo for specific official acts, there was no prejudice from counsel’s failure to challenge sentencing policy, and there was no unconstitutional penalty for exercising the right to trial. The court affirmed the district court’s judgments. View "USA v. De Moya" on Justia Law

Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund v. M & K Employee Solutions

2026-07-07T07:32:02-08:00

A group of affiliated truck dealerships in the Midwest operated through a complex structure of multiple limited liability companies. Each dealership location had a “Sales” company that owned assets and an “Employee Solutions” (ES) company that hired employees and leased them to the Sales company. The ES companies entered collective-bargaining agreements requiring pension contributions to a union fund. Over time, the ES companies stopped contributing and employing workers, transferring employees to newly created entities. One of the companies, ES Alsip, incurred withdrawal liability for ceasing contributions. The pension fund assessed over $6 million in liability, which was disputed and partially paid following an arbitration that substantially reduced the amount. Ultimately, higher courts reinstated the original liability. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to the pension fund, holding that ES Summit was liable for delinquent contributions for work performed at another dealership, ES Alsip’s withdrawal liability was properly calculated and subject to an increased interest rate, and that multiple affiliated entities and individuals were jointly and severally liable for the obligations. The court also imposed liability on successors and individual owners, the Bouchers, based on their house-flipping activities. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the delinquent-contribution claim against ES Summit was not adequately pleaded and reversed summary judgment on that issue. It affirmed the allocation of a partial payment to interest rather than principal, but reversed the application of an increased interest rate retroactively. The court affirmed the finding that each Sales entity was a single employer with its corresponding ES entity and upheld successor liability against Laborforce and ESI. However, it found genuine disputes of fact regarding the personal liability of the Bouchers and remanded that issue. View "Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund v. M & K Employee Solutions" on Justia Law

HMO Louisiana, Inc. v. Department of Health and Human Services

2026-06-26T07:01:51-08:00

A private health insurer that participates in the Medicare Advantage program consolidated two of its contracts in 2024. One of the pre-existing contracts (“consumed contract”) had provided a Special Needs Plan (SNP) and received a star rating for that measure in 2023, while the other (“surviving contract”) did not. After consolidation, the insurer’s new contract offered an SNP for 2025. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) calculates star ratings for consolidated contracts by taking the enrollment-weighted mean of measure scores from the consumed and surviving contracts. Initially, CMS excluded the consumed contract’s SNP data for the 2025 star rating, but after the insurer’s request, CMS included the data, resulting in the same overall rating as before. The insurer challenged this calculation in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that including the consumed contract’s SNP data violated the statute, regulations, and agency guidance, and that CMS failed to adequately explain a change in calculation methodology. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CMS, finding that the agency’s actions complied with applicable law and guidance, and that no further explanation for the calculation was required. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that CMS properly applied its regulations and guidance by including the consumed contract’s SNP measure score in the calculation. The court also found that the methodology provided accurate information to beneficiaries, as required by statute, and that CMS did not make a policy change triggering a requirement for further explanation. The district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of CMS was affirmed. View "HMO Louisiana, Inc. v. Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

Baxley v. Driscoll

2026-06-26T07:01:50-08:00

Michael C. Baxley served in the Army beginning in 1974. After various instances of misconduct, he was identified as a drug abuser and entered the Army’s rehabilitation program. In 1975, he was designated a rehabilitation program failure, and subsequent further misconduct led to a recommendation for discharge. During his discharge proceedings, evidence of his rehabilitation failure was introduced, and he was discharged “under other than honorable conditions.” Years later, his discharge status was upgraded to “under honorable conditions (general),” but without “honorable” status, he was unable to access certain veterans benefits. In 2018, following a VA determination of a service-connected mental health condition, Baxley requested the Army Board for Correction of Military Records to upgrade his discharge to “honorable,” arguing that exempt evidence was improperly used against him and that relevant Army guidance regarding mental health conditions was not followed. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the Board’s denial of Baxley’s request and granted summary judgment to the Board. The court found no violation of the Army’s Exemption Policy and concluded that the Board adequately considered the Army guidance for discharge upgrades related to mental health conditions (the Kurta Memorandum). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the administrative action de novo. The Court held that the Board’s decision regarding the Exemption Policy was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to meaningfully assess whether evidence of Baxley’s rehabilitation failure was developed as a direct or indirect result of protected communications during his rehabilitation program, as the policy requires. Therefore, the Court reversed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on this issue, vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded for further proceedings. However, the Court affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment regarding the Kurta Memorandum, finding the Board’s consideration sufficient and not arbitrary or capricious. View "Baxley v. Driscoll" on Justia Law

Ardelyx, Inc. v. Kennedy

2026-06-26T07:01:50-08:00

A pharmaceutical company, together with a healthcare research organization and a kidney patient advocacy group, challenged regulatory actions by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) concerning the Medicare payment system for end-stage renal disease (ESRD). The dispute arose after CMS included oral-only drugs, specifically XPHOZAH—a drug manufactured by the company for treating hyperphosphatemia in dialysis patients—within the bundled payment for renal dialysis services under Medicare, effective January 1, 2025. Previously, such oral drugs were reimbursed separately under Medicare Part D. The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, contesting both the inclusion of oral-only drugs in the bundled payment regulation and the specific identification of XPHOZAH as a renal dialysis service. They asserted these actions were arbitrary, exceeded statutory authority, and violated the Administrative Procedure Act. CMS moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that federal law expressly bars judicial review of the Secretary’s “identification of renal dialysis services included in the bundled payment.” The district court agreed, finding that both the regulation and the identification of XPHOZAH fell within the statutory bar to judicial review because they constituted “identifications” as defined by the statute and were within the agency’s delegated authority. The court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the relevant statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1395rr(b)(14)(G), clearly precludes judicial review of the Secretary’s identification of renal dialysis services, including oral-only drugs and XPHOZAH. The court found that CMS acted within its statutory authority, and therefore, further judicial review was barred. The district court’s dismissal was affirmed. View "Ardelyx, Inc. v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Commonwealth of Kentucky v. EPA

2026-06-26T07:01:49-08:00

The case concerns a challenge by several states and industry groups to a 2024 rule by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that revised the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for fine particulate matter (PM2.5), lowering the annual standard from 12 µg/m³ to 9 µg/m³. The revision followed new scientific assessments and a unanimous recommendation from the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC) that the prior standard was inadequate to protect public health. Petitioners argued that the EPA lacked statutory authority to promulgate the new rule, that the decision-making process was improperly influenced by environmental justice considerations, and that the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously under the Clean Air Act. Previously, in 2020, the prior EPA Administrator chose to retain the 12 µg/m³ standard, citing scientific uncertainties and a divided CASAC. That decision was challenged but held in abeyance after a change in administration. The Biden-appointed EPA Administrator initiated a review, which led to the 2024 revision. After a further change in administration, the EPA itself moved to vacate the 2024 rule, now agreeing with challengers that the agency had exceeded its authority and failed to consider costs. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the 2024 rule and the EPA’s motion to vacate. The court held that the EPA had statutory authority to revise the NAAQS outside the five-year review cycle without performing a “thorough review” of all criteria, that the agency was not required to consider costs or attainability when revising or setting the standard, and that the decision was not arbitrary or capricious. The court denied both the petitions for review and the EPA’s motion for vacatur, upholding the 2024 rule. View "Commonwealth of Kentucky v. EPA" on Justia Law

Norwich Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Kennedy

2026-06-26T07:01:49-08:00

Norwich Pharmaceuticals sought to market a generic version of Xifaxan, a drug invented by Salix Pharmaceuticals for treating irritable bowel syndrome with diarrhea and hepatic encephalopathy. Norwich submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) to the FDA, identified as number 214369. Salix believed this ANDA infringed its patents and sued Norwich in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware. That court found Norwich’s ANDA infringed Salix’s patents related to hepatic encephalopathy, while the patents for irritable bowel syndrome were invalid as obvious. The court’s final judgment barred FDA approval of Norwich’s ’369 ANDA until Salix’s hepatic encephalopathy patents expired in October 2029. Following the judgment, Norwich amended its ’369 ANDA to remove the indication for hepatic encephalopathy and requested the Delaware District Court modify its judgment to allow immediate FDA approval of the amended ANDA. The court denied this motion, reasoning that Norwich could not change its ANDA after final judgment to circumvent the prior ruling. Norwich appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which agreed the judgment restricted approval of the entire ANDA, including non-infringing indications, until 2029, and affirmed the Delaware District Court’s decision. After the FDA declined to grant final approval of Norwich’s amended ANDA, instead issuing only tentative approval, Norwich sued in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing the FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The court granted summary judgment to the FDA and Salix. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Delaware District Court’s judgment applied to Norwich’s ANDA as amended, so the FDA correctly delayed final approval until October 2029. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Norwich Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Make The Road New York v. Mullin

2026-06-23T07:02:00-08:00

The case concerns a challenge to a 2025 policy by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that expanded the use of expedited removal nationwide. Under the new policy, certain noncitizens who lack valid documentation, have not been admitted or paroled, and cannot demonstrate at least two years of continuous presence in the United States are subject to expedited removal. The policy was accompanied by an internal memorandum providing guidance to immigration officers on its implementation. Plaintiffs, including Make the Road New York, alleged that some of their members were subject to removal under this policy and claimed it violated statutory and constitutional rights, specifically the Due Process Clause. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case and granted a stay under 5 U.S.C. § 705, halting the implementation and enforcement of the 2025 Designation and the accompanying memorandum. The district court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their due process claim, reasoning that the procedures at issue posed a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty interests for affected noncitizens, and that additional procedural safeguards were warranted. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s stay. The appellate court held that the district court had jurisdiction, the plaintiffs had standing, and the challenge was timely. However, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the challenged directives did not violate due process under the applicable Mullane standard, which requires procedures reasonably calculated to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard, but not the additional protections the district court required. Finding that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits, the D.C. Circuit vacated the district court’s stay. View "Make The Road New York v. Mullin" on Justia Law

He v. Rubio

2026-06-23T07:01:59-08:00

A former State Department employee and his family alleged that two law enforcement officers from the State Department arrived unannounced at their home in Virginia, banged on the door, and engaged in aggressive behavior. One officer, previously known to have harassed the employee at work, cursed and shouted at him, grabbed him by the wrist in front of his family, and pointed his fingers in the shape of a gun at the employee’s young son, pretending to shoot and calling him a racial slur. The family claimed they were traumatized by the encounter, with children crying, experiencing nightmares, and the in-laws suffering insomnia and depression. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the family’s claim of common law assault under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), applying Virginia law. The district court concluded that while the officer’s conduct was threatening, it did not plausibly place any family member in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical harm—an essential element for assault under Virginia law. The court stayed other FTCA claims pending Department of Labor review, then dismissed them for lack of jurisdiction when the plaintiff declined to seek a ruling under the Federal Employees Compensation Act. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed de novo the dismissal of the family’s FTCA assault claim. The appellate court held that the facts alleged, if true, plausibly established all elements of assault under Virginia law: overt acts intended to cause harmful or offensive contact or apprehension thereof, and reasonable apprehension of imminent contact, including through the doctrine of transferred intent. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings, holding the family’s claim could proceed. View "He v. Rubio" on Justia Law

USA v. Honesty

2026-06-16T06:31:41-08:00

Police officers in Washington, D.C., arrested a man after he fled from them, dropping a loaded firearm and a satchel containing PCP, other controlled substances, and drug paraphernalia. The defendant, previously convicted of firearm and drug offenses, was charged with six offenses, but entered a Plea Agreement to plead guilty to two counts: felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, and possession of PCP with intent to distribute. The Plea Agreement capped the government's sentencing recommendation at the top of the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, which was ultimately determined to be 77 to 96 months. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia accepted the plea and, after reviewing presentence reports and submissions from both parties, imposed an upward variance, sentencing the defendant to 115 months’ imprisonment. The district court cited four reasons: the defendant’s extensive criminal history, his “brandishing” of the firearm, abandoning the gun near an elementary school, and possession of multiple dangerous drugs. The defendant appealed, arguing that the government breached the Plea Agreement by implicitly advocating for a sentence above the Guidelines range and that the district court erred procedurally by relying on erroneous findings and failing to adequately explain the above-Guidelines sentence. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that while the government did breach the Plea Agreement by implicitly suggesting an above-Guidelines sentence, the defendant failed to show a reasonable likelihood that the breach affected his sentence, and thus, reversal was not warranted under plain error review. The appellate court also found no procedural error in the district court’s sentencing rationale or explanation. The court therefore affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "USA v. Honesty" on Justia Law

Venezuela US SRL v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

2026-06-12T07:02:00-08:00

A Barbados-based company acquired an 18 percent share in a Venezuelan oil company, alongside two state-owned shareholders. When dividends were distributed in 2008 and 2009, the state-owned entities received their share, but the Barbados-based company did not. In 2013, the company initiated arbitration proceedings against Venezuela in The Hague, seeking damages for not receiving its dividends. The arbitral tribunal, after a jurisdictional and merits phase, eventually awarded the company $59 million plus costs, fees, and interest. During the proceedings, a dispute arose about which government and legal counsel represented Venezuela, given the contested presidency between Nicolás Maduro and Juan Guaidó. The company sought to enforce the arbitration award in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Venezuela argued that enforcement would violate U.S. public policy by contradicting the U.S. President’s official recognition of the Guaidó government, as the tribunal had allowed the Maduro regime to change legal counsel during the arbitration. The district court rejected Venezuela’s argument, concluding that the President’s recognition power was not a cognizable public policy under the New York Convention, and even if it were, enforcement would not violate it. The court granted the company’s petition to enforce the award. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that none of the exceptions in the New York Convention, including the public policy exception, applied to prevent recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award. The court found that enforcing the award did not undermine the President’s exclusive recognition power or express any view on the legitimacy of either Venezuelan government, and thus did not violate fundamental U.S. public policy. View "Venezuela US SRL v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela" on Justia Law

TCP Specialists, LLC v. Secretary of Labor

2026-06-12T07:01:56-08:00

At an oil and gas wellsite in Texas, a contractor, TCP Specialists, LLC, provided wireline services alongside other companies that managed the well’s pressure and equipment. During a maintenance operation, a pressurized pipe ruptured while the well was being depressurized, causing fatal injuries to two workers and serious injury to a TCP employee. Although TCP did not control the depressurization or supply the faulty pipe, its employees were standing near the wellhead at the time of the accident. The Department of Labor alleged that TCP exposed its employees to known hazards by not establishing a buffer zone around the well during depressurization. An administrative law judge (ALJ) of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission held a hearing and found that TCP had violated the General Duty Clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. The ALJ determined that TCP had control over its employees’ proximity to the hazard and that a buffer zone would have been a feasible and effective abatement measure. The ALJ concluded that TCP failed to implement adequate safety policies and upheld the citation, imposing a penalty. The full Commission declined to review the ALJ’s decision, making it a final order. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed TCP’s petition and denied it. The court held that the hazard was properly defined by reference to the physical agents (the frac stack and pressurized piping) and that TCP had control over its employees’ exposure to that hazard. The court found substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusions regarding the feasibility and effectiveness of a buffer zone, and rejected TCP’s constitutional and procedural arguments. The order upholding the citation and penalty was affirmed. View "TCP Specialists, LLC v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

Trongone v. Cmsnr. IRS

2026-06-12T07:01:50-08:00

The appellant submitted a whistleblower application to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) alleging that two taxpayers had underpaid taxes from 2004 to 2012 and requested that the IRS also consider similar conduct for 2013 through 2017 when determining any award. The IRS had already begun investigating much of the reported conduct and ultimately collected proceeds from the taxpayers. However, the IRS’s Whistleblower Office denied the claim, reasoning that the information provided was either previously known or “tainted”—meaning it was unlawfully obtained or privileged—and asserted it did not rely on this information when auditing the later years. After receiving this denial, the appellant sought review in the United States Tax Court. The appellant requested to supplement the administrative record or conduct discovery regarding the audits for 2013 through 2017, arguing that the record did not adequately show whether her information was used. The Tax Court denied these requests, citing procedural deficiencies in how discovery was sought, and granted summary judgment to the IRS, finding the administrative record sufficient to support the IRS’s determination. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the IRS’s rationale for denying the whistleblower award for tax years 2013 through 2017 was not supported by the administrative record, which was largely silent regarding those years. The court concluded that the IRS’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because it did not reasonably investigate or explain whether the whistleblower’s application contributed to the audits for those years. The court reversed the Tax Court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Trongone v. Cmsnr. IRS" on Justia Law

Farah Naz v. Wright

2026-06-09T08:34:58-08:00

A Muslim woman of Pakistani origin worked as an economist at the Department of Energy from 2017 to 2021. She initially had a positive relationship with her supervisor, but after testifying in support of a colleague’s Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging race discrimination, her working conditions deteriorated. She experienced hostile treatment, was denied training and promotion opportunities, and was subjected to critical performance reviews. After requesting religious accommodations and reporting further discriminatory remarks from her supervisors, she was placed on multiple performance improvement plans and ultimately terminated. After her dismissal, she filed a pro se lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging discrimination based on race, gender, sex, religion, and national origin, as well as unlawful retaliation, all under Title VII. The Department moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion, finding no facts sufficient to infer discrimination or retaliation; it emphasized that the key discriminatory remark was made by a supervisor not involved in her termination and concluded there was no causal link between her protected activities and the adverse employment actions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court affirmed the dismissal of the retaliation claim, agreeing with the district court’s reasoning on causation. However, it vacated the dismissal of the discrimination claims, finding that the district court failed to consider a material allegation in the plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to dismiss: a supervisor’s alleged refusal to accommodate her religious observance and his discriminatory comment about her faith. The appellate court remanded the discrimination claims for further proceedings, instructing the district court to consider this allegation in evaluating whether the plaintiff stated a plausible claim. View "Farah Naz v. Wright" on Justia Law

Kitchen v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission

2026-06-05T07:33:30-08:00

The appellant, an experienced foreign currency exchange (FX) trader, claimed he uncovered manipulation in the FX market after noticing a sharp drop in the values of several currencies relative to the Swiss franc in 2011. He believed this was due to collusion among market makers and shared his suspicions with various regulators, including the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). His allegations focused on conduct by a retail trading platform, Oanda, and mentioned possible involvement by banks but did not name any specific institutions. Two years later, media reports surfaced about large banks rigging FX benchmark rates, prompting the CFTC to investigate and eventually reach settlements with several banks for manipulating benchmark rates. The CFTC initially investigated the appellant’s allegations against Oanda but found no evidence of wrongdoing and closed the case without action. The CFTC’s later enforcement actions against major banks were initiated after media coverage revealed benchmark-rate manipulation schemes, not because of the appellant’s information. After the settlements were announced, the appellant applied for a whistleblower award, arguing his tips had led to these enforcement actions. The CFTC’s Whistleblower Office and Claims Review Staff recommended denial, finding his tips were not the original source of the information leading to the enforcement actions. The appellant sought reconsideration and, after a delay, petitioned for mandamus relief in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which was rendered moot when the Commission issued final orders denying his application. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the CFTC’s denial for arbitrariness or capriciousness. The court found that the appellant’s tips did not lead to or significantly contribute to the enforcement actions against the banks, nor was he the original or derivative source of the information used. The court affirmed the CFTC’s orders denying the whistleblower award. View "Kitchen v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission" on Justia Law

Grafton & Upton Railroad Company v. Surface Transportation Board

2026-06-05T07:33:25-08:00

A railroad company operating in Massachusetts sought to acquire a 155-acre parcel in the town of Hopedale to build a new transloading facility. The land had been classified as forest land under Massachusetts General Law Chapter 61, which gives municipalities a right of first refusal to purchase such land if the owner wishes to sell or convert it to another use. After an initial notice of intent to sell was deemed deficient by the town, the seller withdrew the notice. Without issuing a new notice, the seller then transferred beneficial ownership of the property to the railroad company through a transaction that attempted to circumvent the town’s rights. Hopedale asserted its rights under Chapter 61 and filed suit in Massachusetts Land Court to enforce its right of first refusal and prevent further site work by the railroad. After a failed settlement agreement—subsequently invalidated by the Massachusetts Superior Court and with state litigation ongoing—the railroad company petitioned the Surface Transportation Board for a declaratory order that the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA) preempted the town’s rights under Chapter 61. The Surface Transportation Board denied the petition, finding that Chapter 61 was a generally applicable property law not categorically preempted by ICCTA, and that the railroad had not established a valid property interest in the land. The Board also concluded that the town’s actions did not unreasonably burden or interfere with rail transportation. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the Board’s order. It held that ICCTA does not preempt Chapter 61’s right-of-first-refusal provisions, as they are generally applicable state property laws and do not directly regulate railroad operations. The court further found that, without a settled property interest, the railroad’s as-applied preemption arguments failed. The court denied the railroad’s petition for review and affirmed the Board’s order. View "Grafton & Upton Railroad Company v. Surface Transportation Board" on Justia Law

Midcontinent Independent System Operator Transmission Owners v. FERC

2026-06-05T07:33:21-08:00

A group of electric transmission companies operating within the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) region, along with the Louisiana Public Service Commission (LPSC), challenged actions taken by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regarding the rates charged to electricity customers. The dispute centered on the return-on-equity (Return) component of transmission rates, which compensates transmission owners for their investments. In 2013 and 2015, customers filed two complaints with FERC alleging that the Return was unlawfully high and violated the Federal Power Act's mandate for "just and reasonable" rates. FERC responded with a series of orders adjusting the Return and ordering limited refunds, but its methodology was challenged and ultimately vacated by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in MISO Transmission Owners v. FERC, which remanded the matter for further proceedings. On remand, FERC issued new orders revising the Return, requiring Transmission Owners to provide refunds for the statutorily authorized 15-month period and, in light of the prior vacatur, ordering additional refunds from September 28, 2016 through October 17, 2024. FERC dismissed the second customer complaint after finding the revised Return was just and reasonable and declined to order additional refunds. Both Transmission Owners and LPSC sought rehearing, raising further objections to the refund periods and the methodology used to set the Return. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the petitions. The court held that FERC acted within its authority in backdating refunds to align with the judicial vacatur, pursuant to FERC’s remedial powers under section 309 of the Federal Power Act. The court also found Transmission Owners lacked standing to challenge FERC’s consideration of the second complaint. LPSC’s objections to FERC’s methodology were rejected under the law-of-the-case doctrine and as lacking merit. The court denied in part and dismissed in part Transmission Owners’ petitions, and denied LPSC’s petitions for review. View "Midcontinent Independent System Operator Transmission Owners v. FERC" on Justia Law

Talbott v. USA

2026-06-01T09:04:24-08:00

A group of current and prospective military service members challenged a new federal policy that disqualified individuals with a history of gender dysphoria or those perceived as expressing a gender identity different from their sex assigned at birth from serving in the military. This policy, known as the Hegseth Policy, was issued following an executive order by the President in 2025. The policy went further than prior military policies by not only excluding individuals with a recent diagnosis of gender dysphoria or those undergoing transition, but by broadly disqualifying anyone with any history of the condition or who had attempted social transition, regardless of current fitness or stability. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. After extensive hearings, the District Court found the Hegseth Policy to be motivated by animus against transgender individuals, characterizing it as a blanket ban that was not justified by legitimate military interests. The court applied intermediate scrutiny, concluded that the policy was not substantially related to the stated goals of military readiness or cohesion, and found that it violated the plaintiffs’ right to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction, preventing enforcement of the policy against both current servicemembers and those seeking to enlist. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the government’s appeal of the preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals held that the Hegseth Policy, as applied to current servicemembers, was likely unconstitutional because it relied on arbitrary classifications and was motivated at least in part by impermissible animus. The court affirmed the preliminary injunction for current servicemembers but vacated it as to individuals seeking to join the military, reasoning that the equities and public interest differed for prospective enlistees. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court’s opinion. View "Talbott v. USA" on Justia Law

Global Voice Group SA v. Republic of Guinea

2026-05-29T06:31:52-08:00

A telecommunications and financial services company based in Seychelles contracted with a Guinean regulatory authority to help develop Guinea’s telecommunications industry. The agreement included an arbitration clause. Disputes arose regarding unpaid invoices and alleged contractual obligations, leading the company to seek arbitration against both the regulatory authority and the Republic of Guinea. The arbitral tribunal determined that Guinea was both a party and beneficiary to the agreement and awarded damages to the company. Attempts to annul the award in French courts were unsuccessful, resulting in a final judgment against Guinea and the regulatory authority. The company then sued Guinea in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking confirmation of the arbitral award and recognition of the foreign court judgment. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed both claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that Guinea was immune from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The court concluded that Guinea was not a party to the arbitration agreement and had not waived its sovereign immunity. It did not distinguish between the award-confirmation and judgment-recognition claims in its analysis. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court incorrectly failed to apply the analytical framework established in TIG Insurance v. Republic of Argentina when considering the award-confirmation claim, which requires determining whether the arbitration agreement legally binds the sovereign, regardless of formal party status. The appellate court vacated the dismissal of the award-confirmation claim and remanded for further proceedings. Separately, relying on Amaplat Mauritius Ltd. v. Zimbabwe Mining Development Corp., it affirmed the dismissal of the judgment-recognition claim, holding that neither the FSIA’s arbitration nor waiver exceptions provide jurisdiction for such claims. View "Global Voice Group SA v. Republic of Guinea" on Justia Law

ModernWest Longmont, LLC v. FAA

2026-05-29T06:31:52-08:00

A property development company sought to build mixed-use housing developments near a public-use airport operated by the City of Longmont, Colorado. The proposed developments were located under the airport’s approach and departure paths. The company received preliminary approvals from the City for its projects and obtained “Determinations of No Hazard” from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which found the developments would not obstruct flight paths. However, the FAA sent letters to the City warning that approving the developments would violate a grant assurance tied to the airport’s federal funding, specifically regarding land use compatibility. The City subsequently denied the company’s proposal, citing multiple reasons, including the FAA’s letters, concerns from state authorities, its own findings of incompatibility, and public opposition. After the City’s decision, the developer asked the FAA to withdraw its letters, but the FAA declined. The company then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to order the FAA to vacate and withdraw these letters, arguing that the FAA’s actions directly caused its injury by influencing the City’s denial. The D.C. Circuit dismissed the petition for lack of standing. The court held that the developer failed to demonstrate that vacating the FAA’s letters would likely result in the City approving the developments, as the City had provided multiple independent reasons for its denial beyond the FAA’s communications. The court also found that the company did not comply with the court’s procedural rule requiring petitioners to argue and provide evidence of standing in their opening brief. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed. View "ModernWest Longmont, LLC v. FAA" on Justia Law

USA v. Flores-Hernandez

2026-05-29T06:31:52-08:00

A Mexican national with a long history of drug trafficking from South America through Mexico into the United States was arrested in 2017. In 2023, he pleaded guilty to participating in a conspiracy to distribute large quantities of cocaine, with the intent that it be unlawfully imported into the United States. Prior to sentencing, he admitted responsibility for up to 450 kilograms of cocaine. At sentencing, witnesses described his leadership of an organization involving at least 20 people, including bodyguards and various workers handling logistics, payments, and transportation of drug proceeds. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia conducted a three-day sentencing hearing, during which it found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was responsible for 450 kilograms or more of cocaine and that he was the organizer or leader of a criminal activity involving five or more participants. The court applied a four-level increase for his aggravating role and denied his request for a two-level reduction under the “zero-point-offender” guideline, finding him ineligible due to his leadership role. The court sentenced him to 21 years and 10 months in prison, plus five years of supervised release. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s use of the preponderance standard, its factual findings regarding his leadership role, and the denial of the zero-point-offender reduction. The appellate court held that the district court properly used the preponderance standard for sentencing facts, did not clearly err in finding the defendant was an organizer or leader of extensive criminal activity, and correctly interpreted the guidelines to deny the zero-point-offender reduction. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v. Flores-Hernandez" on Justia Law

Vermont Information Processing, Inc. v. NLRB

2026-05-26T08:03:37-08:00

Several software engineers at a beverage industry software company created and circulated a spreadsheet among their coworkers to share salary information. Their motivation stemmed from recent company restructuring and discussions about pay equity. The spreadsheet was shared widely, and a notation appeared that all developers were “underpaid.” Management quickly discovered the spreadsheet, traced its creation to one employee, and, within about ninety minutes, terminated him, citing his attitude toward the company and the restructuring. The three other employees who helped create and share the spreadsheet were fired the next day after management reviewed internal messages showing employee dissatisfaction, plans to leave, and criticism of the company. The four terminated employees filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging they were fired for engaging in protected concerted activity under the National Labor Relations Act. After a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found for the employees, ordering reinstatement and financial compensation. The NLRB largely adopted the ALJ’s findings, but expanded its theory for three employees to include their discussions of workplace conditions as protected activity. The NLRB ordered make-whole remedies, including compensation for pecuniary harms regardless of interim earnings. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that substantial evidence supported the finding that the company unlawfully fired the employee who created and shared the spreadsheet based on protected activity. The court denied the company’s petition as to him and enforced the NLRB’s order, including reinstatement and financial remedies. However, the court found that the NLRB exceeded its authority by expanding liability for the other three employees to cover uncharged conduct (general workplace discussions), vacated that portion of the order, and remanded for further proceedings. The court declined to consider unpreserved challenges to the NLRB’s make-whole remedy. View "Vermont Information Processing, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Butters v. National Academy of Sciences

2026-05-22T06:02:29-08:00

A professor of archaeology at a Peruvian university was elected as an international member of a prominent American scientific organization. In 2021, following a sexual harassment complaint filed by a former student, the organization revoked his membership for an alleged violation of its Code of Conduct. Shortly after, the organization’s president notified members via email that an international member’s membership was rescinded for a Code violation, and a public announcement was posted stating the professor’s name and referencing the specific Code section. That section broadly prohibits harassment, discrimination, bullying, and disrespect. A media outlet subsequently reported the professor’s ejection, linking it to sexual harassment, and included a general statement from the organization’s president about role modeling professional conduct. The professor sued the organization and its president in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, raising claims of defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and defamation by implication. The district court dismissed all claims. It held that the statements were not false because the professor admitted the organization expelled him based on allegations that, if true, would have violated the Code of Conduct; thus, it found no actionable false statement. The court also found insufficient factual allegations to support defamation by implication and denied further leave to amend the complaint. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the defamation by implication claim, finding no plausible allegation that the defendants intended or endorsed a defamatory inference. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the defamation and false light claims, holding that the professor had sufficiently alleged that the statements were false and capable of a defamatory meaning. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings on those claims. View "Butters v. National Academy of Sciences" on Justia Law

Narragansett Indian Tribe v. McMaster

2026-05-22T06:02:24-08:00

The case concerns the reconstruction of a bridge on Interstate 95 in Providence, Rhode Island, a project that received federal funding from the Federal Highway Administration. Because the project would affect the Providence Covelands Archaeological District, a site of historic and religious importance to the Narragansett Indian Tribe, federal law required that the agency consult with the Tribe and consider mitigation measures. Initially, a 2011 programmatic agreement provided for the transfer of certain parcels of land to the Tribe, but this transfer stalled when the State of Rhode Island demanded the Tribe waive its sovereign immunity as a condition. The Tribe refused, negotiations failed, and the agreement was terminated. Subsequently, the Highway Administration developed a new programmatic agreement, which did not include land transfers but instead provided for preservation covenants and educational initiatives. The Tribe objected to both the process and substance of the new agreement. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the Tribe’s claims regarding the first agreement for lack of standing but found standing as to claims concerning the second agreement. The district court granted summary judgment to the Highway Administration, ruling that the agency had adequately consulted with the Tribe, was not required to include the Tribe as a signatory, and had reasonably explained changes between agreements. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Tribe had standing to challenge the adequacy of consultation and the process by which the second agreement was adopted. The court further held that the Highway Administration was not required to make the Tribe a signatory since the affected land was not tribal land, that consultation with the Tribe was adequate under the law, and that the agency’s change of position was reasonably explained and not arbitrary or capricious. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Narragansett Indian Tribe v. McMaster" on Justia Law

Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility v. Zeldin

2026-05-01T07:02:47-08:00

The case concerns two organizations that advocate for environmental health and public employee interests. They filed suit against the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), alleging that the EPA failed to meet its statutory obligations under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) to address risks associated with perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), a harmful chemical formed during the fluorination of plastic containers. The plaintiffs argued that, by March 2023, the EPA had sufficient information about the dangers of PFOA to trigger a nondiscretionary duty to act under TSCA section 4(f), and, alternatively, a duty under section 7(a)(2) to pursue enforcement actions against a specific company involved in the fluorination process. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the suit. It found that the EPA had fulfilled any nondiscretionary duty under section 4(f) by publishing a request for public comment, making the primary claim moot. Regarding section 7(a)(2), the court doubted that it imposed a nondiscretionary duty on the EPA but, even if it did, found that the duty had not been triggered under the circumstances. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the claims did not fit within the TSCA’s citizen-suit provisions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal, but on different grounds. The appellate court held that the organizations failed to plausibly allege associational standing. The court explained that neither organization was a traditional membership organization nor had they shown they were the functional equivalent of one. The court found insufficient evidence that the organizations’ employees, supporters, or board members constituted a constituency whose interests the organizations were entitled to represent in court. Accordingly, the appellate court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. View "Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility v. Zeldin" on Justia Law