U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - Justia Case Law Summaries

Chishti v. Spottiswoode

2026-07-07T07:32:04-08:00

Zia Chishti, formerly CEO of a technology company, and his wife brought claims against Tatiana Spottiswoode, her attorneys, and related parties. Chishti and Spottiswoode had a prior romantic relationship, and Spottiswoode was later employed by Chishti’s company under an arbitration agreement. In 2017, Spottiswoode accused Chishti of harassment and assault, leading to confidential arbitration, which resulted in an arbitral award in her favor. Years later, Spottiswoode was subpoenaed to testify before Congress about forced arbitration in sexual assault cases, where she recounted her experiences involving Chishti. After her testimony, Spottiswoode and her attorney made public statements to the media and on social media regarding the matter. Chishti alleged these statements were defamatory and part of a campaign to damage his reputation, causing him to resign from his executive roles. His wife also claimed loss of consortium. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court found that Spottiswoode’s statements before Congress were protected by legislative privilege under District of Columbia law, and that the post-hearing public statements were protected opinions or shielded by the fair reporting privilege and the First Amendment. The court also concluded that the other tort claims were duplicative of defamation, that the conspiracy and loss of consortium claims failed without a viable underlying tort, and that the breach of contract claims were barred by privilege or insufficiently pleaded. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The appellate court held that witness statements to Congress and related communications were absolutely privileged under District of Columbia law. It further held that post-hearing statements were protected as opinion or by fair reporting, and that related tort and contract claims failed for lack of an actionable underlying claim. The dismissal with prejudice was affirmed. View "Chishti v. Spottiswoode" on Justia Law

Angelo v. DC

2026-07-07T07:32:03-08:00

Several individuals who hold concealed-carry pistol licenses issued by the District of Columbia challenged a local law prohibiting licensed carriers from possessing firearms on public transportation, including the Metro system. Fearing prosecution if they carried their pistols on the Metro, these plaintiffs avoided using public transit and instead paid for more expensive private transportation. They alleged that this criminal statute violated their Second and Fifth Amendment rights and sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief against the District and several officials in both their official and personal capacities. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially denied the plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief, citing circuit precedent that required them to demonstrate a special law enforcement priority or heightened risk of prosecution. When the plaintiffs amended their complaint to include allegations of increased transportation costs and added defendants, the District Court dismissed the case for lack of standing. Specifically, it found the plaintiffs had not alleged facts indicating a credible and imminent threat of prosecution, and it rejected their economic injury as insufficient for standing. The court also dismissed damages claims against individual defendants, which plaintiffs abandoned. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the plaintiffs had standing for their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against all defendants (except one official capacity claim not appealed), as well as for damages against the District, because their ongoing economic injury—incurred by complying with the Metro Ban—constituted a concrete, imminent, and traceable harm. The Court affirmed the dismissal of damages claims against individual defendants, reversed the dismissal of the remaining claims, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Angelo v. DC" on Justia Law

USA v. De Moya

2026-07-07T07:32:02-08:00

Two business owners in Washington, D.C. sought to reduce their businesses’ tax liabilities by hiring an intermediary who, in turn, paid cash bribes to a supervisor in the D.C. Office of Tax and Revenue. The supervisor used his access to the agency’s tax system to reduce the businesses’ tax obligations without legitimate justification, sometimes using colleagues’ credentials and creating false documents to conceal the scheme. The intermediary relayed proof of these illicit adjustments to his clients, who paid him and the supervisor a share of the savings. The scheme resulted in a loss of approximately $2.3 million to the District of Columbia. After an audit uncovered suspicious tax reductions without proper documentation, authorities traced the scheme to the supervisor, the intermediary, and the clients. Two of the intermediary’s clients pleaded guilty and cooperated with the government. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia tried the case against the intermediary and one client. The jury convicted both defendants of conspiracy, bribery, and wire fraud, while acquitting one defendant on some wire fraud counts. The district court imposed sentences of 110 months and 30 months, respectively. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the bribery jury instructions, one defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding sentencing, and an alleged sentencing penalty for going to trial. The appellate court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, the error in the bribery jury instruction was harmless because the evidence demonstrated a quid pro quo for specific official acts, there was no prejudice from counsel’s failure to challenge sentencing policy, and there was no unconstitutional penalty for exercising the right to trial. The court affirmed the district court’s judgments. View "USA v. De Moya" on Justia Law

Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund v. M & K Employee Solutions

2026-07-07T07:32:02-08:00

A group of affiliated truck dealerships in the Midwest operated through a complex structure of multiple limited liability companies. Each dealership location had a “Sales” company that owned assets and an “Employee Solutions” (ES) company that hired employees and leased them to the Sales company. The ES companies entered collective-bargaining agreements requiring pension contributions to a union fund. Over time, the ES companies stopped contributing and employing workers, transferring employees to newly created entities. One of the companies, ES Alsip, incurred withdrawal liability for ceasing contributions. The pension fund assessed over $6 million in liability, which was disputed and partially paid following an arbitration that substantially reduced the amount. Ultimately, higher courts reinstated the original liability. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to the pension fund, holding that ES Summit was liable for delinquent contributions for work performed at another dealership, ES Alsip’s withdrawal liability was properly calculated and subject to an increased interest rate, and that multiple affiliated entities and individuals were jointly and severally liable for the obligations. The court also imposed liability on successors and individual owners, the Bouchers, based on their house-flipping activities. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the delinquent-contribution claim against ES Summit was not adequately pleaded and reversed summary judgment on that issue. It affirmed the allocation of a partial payment to interest rather than principal, but reversed the application of an increased interest rate retroactively. The court affirmed the finding that each Sales entity was a single employer with its corresponding ES entity and upheld successor liability against Laborforce and ESI. However, it found genuine disputes of fact regarding the personal liability of the Bouchers and remanded that issue. View "Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund v. M & K Employee Solutions" on Justia Law

HMO Louisiana, Inc. v. Department of Health and Human Services

2026-06-26T07:01:51-08:00

A private health insurer that participates in the Medicare Advantage program consolidated two of its contracts in 2024. One of the pre-existing contracts (“consumed contract”) had provided a Special Needs Plan (SNP) and received a star rating for that measure in 2023, while the other (“surviving contract”) did not. After consolidation, the insurer’s new contract offered an SNP for 2025. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) calculates star ratings for consolidated contracts by taking the enrollment-weighted mean of measure scores from the consumed and surviving contracts. Initially, CMS excluded the consumed contract’s SNP data for the 2025 star rating, but after the insurer’s request, CMS included the data, resulting in the same overall rating as before. The insurer challenged this calculation in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that including the consumed contract’s SNP data violated the statute, regulations, and agency guidance, and that CMS failed to adequately explain a change in calculation methodology. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CMS, finding that the agency’s actions complied with applicable law and guidance, and that no further explanation for the calculation was required. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that CMS properly applied its regulations and guidance by including the consumed contract’s SNP measure score in the calculation. The court also found that the methodology provided accurate information to beneficiaries, as required by statute, and that CMS did not make a policy change triggering a requirement for further explanation. The district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of CMS was affirmed. View "HMO Louisiana, Inc. v. Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

Ardelyx, Inc. v. Kennedy

2026-06-26T07:01:50-08:00

A pharmaceutical company, together with a healthcare research organization and a kidney patient advocacy group, challenged regulatory actions by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) concerning the Medicare payment system for end-stage renal disease (ESRD). The dispute arose after CMS included oral-only drugs, specifically XPHOZAH—a drug manufactured by the company for treating hyperphosphatemia in dialysis patients—within the bundled payment for renal dialysis services under Medicare, effective January 1, 2025. Previously, such oral drugs were reimbursed separately under Medicare Part D. The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, contesting both the inclusion of oral-only drugs in the bundled payment regulation and the specific identification of XPHOZAH as a renal dialysis service. They asserted these actions were arbitrary, exceeded statutory authority, and violated the Administrative Procedure Act. CMS moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that federal law expressly bars judicial review of the Secretary’s “identification of renal dialysis services included in the bundled payment.” The district court agreed, finding that both the regulation and the identification of XPHOZAH fell within the statutory bar to judicial review because they constituted “identifications” as defined by the statute and were within the agency’s delegated authority. The court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the relevant statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1395rr(b)(14)(G), clearly precludes judicial review of the Secretary’s identification of renal dialysis services, including oral-only drugs and XPHOZAH. The court found that CMS acted within its statutory authority, and therefore, further judicial review was barred. The district court’s dismissal was affirmed. View "Ardelyx, Inc. v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Baxley v. Driscoll

2026-06-26T07:01:50-08:00

Michael C. Baxley served in the Army beginning in 1974. After various instances of misconduct, he was identified as a drug abuser and entered the Army’s rehabilitation program. In 1975, he was designated a rehabilitation program failure, and subsequent further misconduct led to a recommendation for discharge. During his discharge proceedings, evidence of his rehabilitation failure was introduced, and he was discharged “under other than honorable conditions.” Years later, his discharge status was upgraded to “under honorable conditions (general),” but without “honorable” status, he was unable to access certain veterans benefits. In 2018, following a VA determination of a service-connected mental health condition, Baxley requested the Army Board for Correction of Military Records to upgrade his discharge to “honorable,” arguing that exempt evidence was improperly used against him and that relevant Army guidance regarding mental health conditions was not followed. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the Board’s denial of Baxley’s request and granted summary judgment to the Board. The court found no violation of the Army’s Exemption Policy and concluded that the Board adequately considered the Army guidance for discharge upgrades related to mental health conditions (the Kurta Memorandum). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the administrative action de novo. The Court held that the Board’s decision regarding the Exemption Policy was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to meaningfully assess whether evidence of Baxley’s rehabilitation failure was developed as a direct or indirect result of protected communications during his rehabilitation program, as the policy requires. Therefore, the Court reversed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on this issue, vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded for further proceedings. However, the Court affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment regarding the Kurta Memorandum, finding the Board’s consideration sufficient and not arbitrary or capricious. View "Baxley v. Driscoll" on Justia Law

Commonwealth of Kentucky v. EPA

2026-06-26T07:01:49-08:00

The case concerns a challenge by several states and industry groups to a 2024 rule by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that revised the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for fine particulate matter (PM2.5), lowering the annual standard from 12 µg/m³ to 9 µg/m³. The revision followed new scientific assessments and a unanimous recommendation from the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC) that the prior standard was inadequate to protect public health. Petitioners argued that the EPA lacked statutory authority to promulgate the new rule, that the decision-making process was improperly influenced by environmental justice considerations, and that the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously under the Clean Air Act. Previously, in 2020, the prior EPA Administrator chose to retain the 12 µg/m³ standard, citing scientific uncertainties and a divided CASAC. That decision was challenged but held in abeyance after a change in administration. The Biden-appointed EPA Administrator initiated a review, which led to the 2024 revision. After a further change in administration, the EPA itself moved to vacate the 2024 rule, now agreeing with challengers that the agency had exceeded its authority and failed to consider costs. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the 2024 rule and the EPA’s motion to vacate. The court held that the EPA had statutory authority to revise the NAAQS outside the five-year review cycle without performing a “thorough review” of all criteria, that the agency was not required to consider costs or attainability when revising or setting the standard, and that the decision was not arbitrary or capricious. The court denied both the petitions for review and the EPA’s motion for vacatur, upholding the 2024 rule. View "Commonwealth of Kentucky v. EPA" on Justia Law

Norwich Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Kennedy

2026-06-26T07:01:49-08:00

Norwich Pharmaceuticals sought to market a generic version of Xifaxan, a drug invented by Salix Pharmaceuticals for treating irritable bowel syndrome with diarrhea and hepatic encephalopathy. Norwich submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) to the FDA, identified as number 214369. Salix believed this ANDA infringed its patents and sued Norwich in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware. That court found Norwich’s ANDA infringed Salix’s patents related to hepatic encephalopathy, while the patents for irritable bowel syndrome were invalid as obvious. The court’s final judgment barred FDA approval of Norwich’s ’369 ANDA until Salix’s hepatic encephalopathy patents expired in October 2029. Following the judgment, Norwich amended its ’369 ANDA to remove the indication for hepatic encephalopathy and requested the Delaware District Court modify its judgment to allow immediate FDA approval of the amended ANDA. The court denied this motion, reasoning that Norwich could not change its ANDA after final judgment to circumvent the prior ruling. Norwich appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which agreed the judgment restricted approval of the entire ANDA, including non-infringing indications, until 2029, and affirmed the Delaware District Court’s decision. After the FDA declined to grant final approval of Norwich’s amended ANDA, instead issuing only tentative approval, Norwich sued in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing the FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The court granted summary judgment to the FDA and Salix. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Delaware District Court’s judgment applied to Norwich’s ANDA as amended, so the FDA correctly delayed final approval until October 2029. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Norwich Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Make The Road New York v. Mullin

2026-06-23T07:02:00-08:00

The case concerns a challenge to a 2025 policy by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that expanded the use of expedited removal nationwide. Under the new policy, certain noncitizens who lack valid documentation, have not been admitted or paroled, and cannot demonstrate at least two years of continuous presence in the United States are subject to expedited removal. The policy was accompanied by an internal memorandum providing guidance to immigration officers on its implementation. Plaintiffs, including Make the Road New York, alleged that some of their members were subject to removal under this policy and claimed it violated statutory and constitutional rights, specifically the Due Process Clause. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case and granted a stay under 5 U.S.C. § 705, halting the implementation and enforcement of the 2025 Designation and the accompanying memorandum. The district court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their due process claim, reasoning that the procedures at issue posed a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty interests for affected noncitizens, and that additional procedural safeguards were warranted. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s stay. The appellate court held that the district court had jurisdiction, the plaintiffs had standing, and the challenge was timely. However, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the challenged directives did not violate due process under the applicable Mullane standard, which requires procedures reasonably calculated to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard, but not the additional protections the district court required. Finding that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits, the D.C. Circuit vacated the district court’s stay. View "Make The Road New York v. Mullin" on Justia Law

He v. Rubio

2026-06-23T07:01:59-08:00

A former State Department employee and his family alleged that two law enforcement officers from the State Department arrived unannounced at their home in Virginia, banged on the door, and engaged in aggressive behavior. One officer, previously known to have harassed the employee at work, cursed and shouted at him, grabbed him by the wrist in front of his family, and pointed his fingers in the shape of a gun at the employee’s young son, pretending to shoot and calling him a racial slur. The family claimed they were traumatized by the encounter, with children crying, experiencing nightmares, and the in-laws suffering insomnia and depression. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the family’s claim of common law assault under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), applying Virginia law. The district court concluded that while the officer’s conduct was threatening, it did not plausibly place any family member in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical harm—an essential element for assault under Virginia law. The court stayed other FTCA claims pending Department of Labor review, then dismissed them for lack of jurisdiction when the plaintiff declined to seek a ruling under the Federal Employees Compensation Act. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed de novo the dismissal of the family’s FTCA assault claim. The appellate court held that the facts alleged, if true, plausibly established all elements of assault under Virginia law: overt acts intended to cause harmful or offensive contact or apprehension thereof, and reasonable apprehension of imminent contact, including through the doctrine of transferred intent. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings, holding the family’s claim could proceed. View "He v. Rubio" on Justia Law

USA v. Honesty

2026-06-16T06:31:41-08:00

Police officers in Washington, D.C., arrested a man after he fled from them, dropping a loaded firearm and a satchel containing PCP, other controlled substances, and drug paraphernalia. The defendant, previously convicted of firearm and drug offenses, was charged with six offenses, but entered a Plea Agreement to plead guilty to two counts: felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, and possession of PCP with intent to distribute. The Plea Agreement capped the government's sentencing recommendation at the top of the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, which was ultimately determined to be 77 to 96 months. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia accepted the plea and, after reviewing presentence reports and submissions from both parties, imposed an upward variance, sentencing the defendant to 115 months’ imprisonment. The district court cited four reasons: the defendant’s extensive criminal history, his “brandishing” of the firearm, abandoning the gun near an elementary school, and possession of multiple dangerous drugs. The defendant appealed, arguing that the government breached the Plea Agreement by implicitly advocating for a sentence above the Guidelines range and that the district court erred procedurally by relying on erroneous findings and failing to adequately explain the above-Guidelines sentence. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that while the government did breach the Plea Agreement by implicitly suggesting an above-Guidelines sentence, the defendant failed to show a reasonable likelihood that the breach affected his sentence, and thus, reversal was not warranted under plain error review. The appellate court also found no procedural error in the district court’s sentencing rationale or explanation. The court therefore affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "USA v. Honesty" on Justia Law

Venezuela US SRL v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

2026-06-12T07:02:00-08:00

A Barbados-based company acquired an 18 percent share in a Venezuelan oil company, alongside two state-owned shareholders. When dividends were distributed in 2008 and 2009, the state-owned entities received their share, but the Barbados-based company did not. In 2013, the company initiated arbitration proceedings against Venezuela in The Hague, seeking damages for not receiving its dividends. The arbitral tribunal, after a jurisdictional and merits phase, eventually awarded the company $59 million plus costs, fees, and interest. During the proceedings, a dispute arose about which government and legal counsel represented Venezuela, given the contested presidency between Nicolás Maduro and Juan Guaidó. The company sought to enforce the arbitration award in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Venezuela argued that enforcement would violate U.S. public policy by contradicting the U.S. President’s official recognition of the Guaidó government, as the tribunal had allowed the Maduro regime to change legal counsel during the arbitration. The district court rejected Venezuela’s argument, concluding that the President’s recognition power was not a cognizable public policy under the New York Convention, and even if it were, enforcement would not violate it. The court granted the company’s petition to enforce the award. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that none of the exceptions in the New York Convention, including the public policy exception, applied to prevent recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award. The court found that enforcing the award did not undermine the President’s exclusive recognition power or express any view on the legitimacy of either Venezuelan government, and thus did not violate fundamental U.S. public policy. View "Venezuela US SRL v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela" on Justia Law

TCP Specialists, LLC v. Secretary of Labor

2026-06-12T07:01:56-08:00

At an oil and gas wellsite in Texas, a contractor, TCP Specialists, LLC, provided wireline services alongside other companies that managed the well’s pressure and equipment. During a maintenance operation, a pressurized pipe ruptured while the well was being depressurized, causing fatal injuries to two workers and serious injury to a TCP employee. Although TCP did not control the depressurization or supply the faulty pipe, its employees were standing near the wellhead at the time of the accident. The Department of Labor alleged that TCP exposed its employees to known hazards by not establishing a buffer zone around the well during depressurization. An administrative law judge (ALJ) of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission held a hearing and found that TCP had violated the General Duty Clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. The ALJ determined that TCP had control over its employees’ proximity to the hazard and that a buffer zone would have been a feasible and effective abatement measure. The ALJ concluded that TCP failed to implement adequate safety policies and upheld the citation, imposing a penalty. The full Commission declined to review the ALJ’s decision, making it a final order. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed TCP’s petition and denied it. The court held that the hazard was properly defined by reference to the physical agents (the frac stack and pressurized piping) and that TCP had control over its employees’ exposure to that hazard. The court found substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusions regarding the feasibility and effectiveness of a buffer zone, and rejected TCP’s constitutional and procedural arguments. The order upholding the citation and penalty was affirmed. View "TCP Specialists, LLC v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

Trongone v. Cmsnr. IRS

2026-06-12T07:01:50-08:00

The appellant submitted a whistleblower application to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) alleging that two taxpayers had underpaid taxes from 2004 to 2012 and requested that the IRS also consider similar conduct for 2013 through 2017 when determining any award. The IRS had already begun investigating much of the reported conduct and ultimately collected proceeds from the taxpayers. However, the IRS’s Whistleblower Office denied the claim, reasoning that the information provided was either previously known or “tainted”—meaning it was unlawfully obtained or privileged—and asserted it did not rely on this information when auditing the later years. After receiving this denial, the appellant sought review in the United States Tax Court. The appellant requested to supplement the administrative record or conduct discovery regarding the audits for 2013 through 2017, arguing that the record did not adequately show whether her information was used. The Tax Court denied these requests, citing procedural deficiencies in how discovery was sought, and granted summary judgment to the IRS, finding the administrative record sufficient to support the IRS’s determination. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the IRS’s rationale for denying the whistleblower award for tax years 2013 through 2017 was not supported by the administrative record, which was largely silent regarding those years. The court concluded that the IRS’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because it did not reasonably investigate or explain whether the whistleblower’s application contributed to the audits for those years. The court reversed the Tax Court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Trongone v. Cmsnr. IRS" on Justia Law

Farah Naz v. Wright

2026-06-09T08:34:58-08:00

A Muslim woman of Pakistani origin worked as an economist at the Department of Energy from 2017 to 2021. She initially had a positive relationship with her supervisor, but after testifying in support of a colleague’s Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging race discrimination, her working conditions deteriorated. She experienced hostile treatment, was denied training and promotion opportunities, and was subjected to critical performance reviews. After requesting religious accommodations and reporting further discriminatory remarks from her supervisors, she was placed on multiple performance improvement plans and ultimately terminated. After her dismissal, she filed a pro se lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging discrimination based on race, gender, sex, religion, and national origin, as well as unlawful retaliation, all under Title VII. The Department moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion, finding no facts sufficient to infer discrimination or retaliation; it emphasized that the key discriminatory remark was made by a supervisor not involved in her termination and concluded there was no causal link between her protected activities and the adverse employment actions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court affirmed the dismissal of the retaliation claim, agreeing with the district court’s reasoning on causation. However, it vacated the dismissal of the discrimination claims, finding that the district court failed to consider a material allegation in the plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to dismiss: a supervisor’s alleged refusal to accommodate her religious observance and his discriminatory comment about her faith. The appellate court remanded the discrimination claims for further proceedings, instructing the district court to consider this allegation in evaluating whether the plaintiff stated a plausible claim. View "Farah Naz v. Wright" on Justia Law

Kitchen v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission

2026-06-05T07:33:30-08:00

The appellant, an experienced foreign currency exchange (FX) trader, claimed he uncovered manipulation in the FX market after noticing a sharp drop in the values of several currencies relative to the Swiss franc in 2011. He believed this was due to collusion among market makers and shared his suspicions with various regulators, including the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). His allegations focused on conduct by a retail trading platform, Oanda, and mentioned possible involvement by banks but did not name any specific institutions. Two years later, media reports surfaced about large banks rigging FX benchmark rates, prompting the CFTC to investigate and eventually reach settlements with several banks for manipulating benchmark rates. The CFTC initially investigated the appellant’s allegations against Oanda but found no evidence of wrongdoing and closed the case without action. The CFTC’s later enforcement actions against major banks were initiated after media coverage revealed benchmark-rate manipulation schemes, not because of the appellant’s information. After the settlements were announced, the appellant applied for a whistleblower award, arguing his tips had led to these enforcement actions. The CFTC’s Whistleblower Office and Claims Review Staff recommended denial, finding his tips were not the original source of the information leading to the enforcement actions. The appellant sought reconsideration and, after a delay, petitioned for mandamus relief in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which was rendered moot when the Commission issued final orders denying his application. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the CFTC’s denial for arbitrariness or capriciousness. The court found that the appellant’s tips did not lead to or significantly contribute to the enforcement actions against the banks, nor was he the original or derivative source of the information used. The court affirmed the CFTC’s orders denying the whistleblower award. View "Kitchen v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission" on Justia Law

Grafton & Upton Railroad Company v. Surface Transportation Board

2026-06-05T07:33:25-08:00

A railroad company operating in Massachusetts sought to acquire a 155-acre parcel in the town of Hopedale to build a new transloading facility. The land had been classified as forest land under Massachusetts General Law Chapter 61, which gives municipalities a right of first refusal to purchase such land if the owner wishes to sell or convert it to another use. After an initial notice of intent to sell was deemed deficient by the town, the seller withdrew the notice. Without issuing a new notice, the seller then transferred beneficial ownership of the property to the railroad company through a transaction that attempted to circumvent the town’s rights. Hopedale asserted its rights under Chapter 61 and filed suit in Massachusetts Land Court to enforce its right of first refusal and prevent further site work by the railroad. After a failed settlement agreement—subsequently invalidated by the Massachusetts Superior Court and with state litigation ongoing—the railroad company petitioned the Surface Transportation Board for a declaratory order that the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA) preempted the town’s rights under Chapter 61. The Surface Transportation Board denied the petition, finding that Chapter 61 was a generally applicable property law not categorically preempted by ICCTA, and that the railroad had not established a valid property interest in the land. The Board also concluded that the town’s actions did not unreasonably burden or interfere with rail transportation. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the Board’s order. It held that ICCTA does not preempt Chapter 61’s right-of-first-refusal provisions, as they are generally applicable state property laws and do not directly regulate railroad operations. The court further found that, without a settled property interest, the railroad’s as-applied preemption arguments failed. The court denied the railroad’s petition for review and affirmed the Board’s order. View "Grafton & Upton Railroad Company v. Surface Transportation Board" on Justia Law

Midcontinent Independent System Operator Transmission Owners v. FERC

2026-06-05T07:33:21-08:00

A group of electric transmission companies operating within the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) region, along with the Louisiana Public Service Commission (LPSC), challenged actions taken by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regarding the rates charged to electricity customers. The dispute centered on the return-on-equity (Return) component of transmission rates, which compensates transmission owners for their investments. In 2013 and 2015, customers filed two complaints with FERC alleging that the Return was unlawfully high and violated the Federal Power Act's mandate for "just and reasonable" rates. FERC responded with a series of orders adjusting the Return and ordering limited refunds, but its methodology was challenged and ultimately vacated by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in MISO Transmission Owners v. FERC, which remanded the matter for further proceedings. On remand, FERC issued new orders revising the Return, requiring Transmission Owners to provide refunds for the statutorily authorized 15-month period and, in light of the prior vacatur, ordering additional refunds from September 28, 2016 through October 17, 2024. FERC dismissed the second customer complaint after finding the revised Return was just and reasonable and declined to order additional refunds. Both Transmission Owners and LPSC sought rehearing, raising further objections to the refund periods and the methodology used to set the Return. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the petitions. The court held that FERC acted within its authority in backdating refunds to align with the judicial vacatur, pursuant to FERC’s remedial powers under section 309 of the Federal Power Act. The court also found Transmission Owners lacked standing to challenge FERC’s consideration of the second complaint. LPSC’s objections to FERC’s methodology were rejected under the law-of-the-case doctrine and as lacking merit. The court denied in part and dismissed in part Transmission Owners’ petitions, and denied LPSC’s petitions for review. View "Midcontinent Independent System Operator Transmission Owners v. FERC" on Justia Law

Talbott v. USA

2026-06-01T09:04:24-08:00

A group of current and prospective military service members challenged a new federal policy that disqualified individuals with a history of gender dysphoria or those perceived as expressing a gender identity different from their sex assigned at birth from serving in the military. This policy, known as the Hegseth Policy, was issued following an executive order by the President in 2025. The policy went further than prior military policies by not only excluding individuals with a recent diagnosis of gender dysphoria or those undergoing transition, but by broadly disqualifying anyone with any history of the condition or who had attempted social transition, regardless of current fitness or stability. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. After extensive hearings, the District Court found the Hegseth Policy to be motivated by animus against transgender individuals, characterizing it as a blanket ban that was not justified by legitimate military interests. The court applied intermediate scrutiny, concluded that the policy was not substantially related to the stated goals of military readiness or cohesion, and found that it violated the plaintiffs’ right to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction, preventing enforcement of the policy against both current servicemembers and those seeking to enlist. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the government’s appeal of the preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals held that the Hegseth Policy, as applied to current servicemembers, was likely unconstitutional because it relied on arbitrary classifications and was motivated at least in part by impermissible animus. The court affirmed the preliminary injunction for current servicemembers but vacated it as to individuals seeking to join the military, reasoning that the equities and public interest differed for prospective enlistees. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court’s opinion. View "Talbott v. USA" on Justia Law

Global Voice Group SA v. Republic of Guinea

2026-05-29T06:31:52-08:00

A telecommunications and financial services company based in Seychelles contracted with a Guinean regulatory authority to help develop Guinea’s telecommunications industry. The agreement included an arbitration clause. Disputes arose regarding unpaid invoices and alleged contractual obligations, leading the company to seek arbitration against both the regulatory authority and the Republic of Guinea. The arbitral tribunal determined that Guinea was both a party and beneficiary to the agreement and awarded damages to the company. Attempts to annul the award in French courts were unsuccessful, resulting in a final judgment against Guinea and the regulatory authority. The company then sued Guinea in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking confirmation of the arbitral award and recognition of the foreign court judgment. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed both claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that Guinea was immune from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The court concluded that Guinea was not a party to the arbitration agreement and had not waived its sovereign immunity. It did not distinguish between the award-confirmation and judgment-recognition claims in its analysis. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court incorrectly failed to apply the analytical framework established in TIG Insurance v. Republic of Argentina when considering the award-confirmation claim, which requires determining whether the arbitration agreement legally binds the sovereign, regardless of formal party status. The appellate court vacated the dismissal of the award-confirmation claim and remanded for further proceedings. Separately, relying on Amaplat Mauritius Ltd. v. Zimbabwe Mining Development Corp., it affirmed the dismissal of the judgment-recognition claim, holding that neither the FSIA’s arbitration nor waiver exceptions provide jurisdiction for such claims. View "Global Voice Group SA v. Republic of Guinea" on Justia Law

ModernWest Longmont, LLC v. FAA

2026-05-29T06:31:52-08:00

A property development company sought to build mixed-use housing developments near a public-use airport operated by the City of Longmont, Colorado. The proposed developments were located under the airport’s approach and departure paths. The company received preliminary approvals from the City for its projects and obtained “Determinations of No Hazard” from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which found the developments would not obstruct flight paths. However, the FAA sent letters to the City warning that approving the developments would violate a grant assurance tied to the airport’s federal funding, specifically regarding land use compatibility. The City subsequently denied the company’s proposal, citing multiple reasons, including the FAA’s letters, concerns from state authorities, its own findings of incompatibility, and public opposition. After the City’s decision, the developer asked the FAA to withdraw its letters, but the FAA declined. The company then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to order the FAA to vacate and withdraw these letters, arguing that the FAA’s actions directly caused its injury by influencing the City’s denial. The D.C. Circuit dismissed the petition for lack of standing. The court held that the developer failed to demonstrate that vacating the FAA’s letters would likely result in the City approving the developments, as the City had provided multiple independent reasons for its denial beyond the FAA’s communications. The court also found that the company did not comply with the court’s procedural rule requiring petitioners to argue and provide evidence of standing in their opening brief. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed. View "ModernWest Longmont, LLC v. FAA" on Justia Law

USA v. Flores-Hernandez

2026-05-29T06:31:52-08:00

A Mexican national with a long history of drug trafficking from South America through Mexico into the United States was arrested in 2017. In 2023, he pleaded guilty to participating in a conspiracy to distribute large quantities of cocaine, with the intent that it be unlawfully imported into the United States. Prior to sentencing, he admitted responsibility for up to 450 kilograms of cocaine. At sentencing, witnesses described his leadership of an organization involving at least 20 people, including bodyguards and various workers handling logistics, payments, and transportation of drug proceeds. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia conducted a three-day sentencing hearing, during which it found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was responsible for 450 kilograms or more of cocaine and that he was the organizer or leader of a criminal activity involving five or more participants. The court applied a four-level increase for his aggravating role and denied his request for a two-level reduction under the “zero-point-offender” guideline, finding him ineligible due to his leadership role. The court sentenced him to 21 years and 10 months in prison, plus five years of supervised release. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s use of the preponderance standard, its factual findings regarding his leadership role, and the denial of the zero-point-offender reduction. The appellate court held that the district court properly used the preponderance standard for sentencing facts, did not clearly err in finding the defendant was an organizer or leader of extensive criminal activity, and correctly interpreted the guidelines to deny the zero-point-offender reduction. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v. Flores-Hernandez" on Justia Law

Vermont Information Processing, Inc. v. NLRB

2026-05-26T08:03:37-08:00

Several software engineers at a beverage industry software company created and circulated a spreadsheet among their coworkers to share salary information. Their motivation stemmed from recent company restructuring and discussions about pay equity. The spreadsheet was shared widely, and a notation appeared that all developers were “underpaid.” Management quickly discovered the spreadsheet, traced its creation to one employee, and, within about ninety minutes, terminated him, citing his attitude toward the company and the restructuring. The three other employees who helped create and share the spreadsheet were fired the next day after management reviewed internal messages showing employee dissatisfaction, plans to leave, and criticism of the company. The four terminated employees filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging they were fired for engaging in protected concerted activity under the National Labor Relations Act. After a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found for the employees, ordering reinstatement and financial compensation. The NLRB largely adopted the ALJ’s findings, but expanded its theory for three employees to include their discussions of workplace conditions as protected activity. The NLRB ordered make-whole remedies, including compensation for pecuniary harms regardless of interim earnings. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that substantial evidence supported the finding that the company unlawfully fired the employee who created and shared the spreadsheet based on protected activity. The court denied the company’s petition as to him and enforced the NLRB’s order, including reinstatement and financial remedies. However, the court found that the NLRB exceeded its authority by expanding liability for the other three employees to cover uncharged conduct (general workplace discussions), vacated that portion of the order, and remanded for further proceedings. The court declined to consider unpreserved challenges to the NLRB’s make-whole remedy. View "Vermont Information Processing, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Butters v. National Academy of Sciences

2026-05-22T06:02:29-08:00

A professor of archaeology at a Peruvian university was elected as an international member of a prominent American scientific organization. In 2021, following a sexual harassment complaint filed by a former student, the organization revoked his membership for an alleged violation of its Code of Conduct. Shortly after, the organization’s president notified members via email that an international member’s membership was rescinded for a Code violation, and a public announcement was posted stating the professor’s name and referencing the specific Code section. That section broadly prohibits harassment, discrimination, bullying, and disrespect. A media outlet subsequently reported the professor’s ejection, linking it to sexual harassment, and included a general statement from the organization’s president about role modeling professional conduct. The professor sued the organization and its president in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, raising claims of defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and defamation by implication. The district court dismissed all claims. It held that the statements were not false because the professor admitted the organization expelled him based on allegations that, if true, would have violated the Code of Conduct; thus, it found no actionable false statement. The court also found insufficient factual allegations to support defamation by implication and denied further leave to amend the complaint. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the defamation by implication claim, finding no plausible allegation that the defendants intended or endorsed a defamatory inference. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the defamation and false light claims, holding that the professor had sufficiently alleged that the statements were false and capable of a defamatory meaning. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings on those claims. View "Butters v. National Academy of Sciences" on Justia Law

Narragansett Indian Tribe v. McMaster

2026-05-22T06:02:24-08:00

The case concerns the reconstruction of a bridge on Interstate 95 in Providence, Rhode Island, a project that received federal funding from the Federal Highway Administration. Because the project would affect the Providence Covelands Archaeological District, a site of historic and religious importance to the Narragansett Indian Tribe, federal law required that the agency consult with the Tribe and consider mitigation measures. Initially, a 2011 programmatic agreement provided for the transfer of certain parcels of land to the Tribe, but this transfer stalled when the State of Rhode Island demanded the Tribe waive its sovereign immunity as a condition. The Tribe refused, negotiations failed, and the agreement was terminated. Subsequently, the Highway Administration developed a new programmatic agreement, which did not include land transfers but instead provided for preservation covenants and educational initiatives. The Tribe objected to both the process and substance of the new agreement. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the Tribe’s claims regarding the first agreement for lack of standing but found standing as to claims concerning the second agreement. The district court granted summary judgment to the Highway Administration, ruling that the agency had adequately consulted with the Tribe, was not required to include the Tribe as a signatory, and had reasonably explained changes between agreements. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Tribe had standing to challenge the adequacy of consultation and the process by which the second agreement was adopted. The court further held that the Highway Administration was not required to make the Tribe a signatory since the affected land was not tribal land, that consultation with the Tribe was adequate under the law, and that the agency’s change of position was reasonably explained and not arbitrary or capricious. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Narragansett Indian Tribe v. McMaster" on Justia Law

Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility v. Zeldin

2026-05-01T07:02:47-08:00

The case concerns two organizations that advocate for environmental health and public employee interests. They filed suit against the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), alleging that the EPA failed to meet its statutory obligations under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) to address risks associated with perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), a harmful chemical formed during the fluorination of plastic containers. The plaintiffs argued that, by March 2023, the EPA had sufficient information about the dangers of PFOA to trigger a nondiscretionary duty to act under TSCA section 4(f), and, alternatively, a duty under section 7(a)(2) to pursue enforcement actions against a specific company involved in the fluorination process. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the suit. It found that the EPA had fulfilled any nondiscretionary duty under section 4(f) by publishing a request for public comment, making the primary claim moot. Regarding section 7(a)(2), the court doubted that it imposed a nondiscretionary duty on the EPA but, even if it did, found that the duty had not been triggered under the circumstances. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the claims did not fit within the TSCA’s citizen-suit provisions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal, but on different grounds. The appellate court held that the organizations failed to plausibly allege associational standing. The court explained that neither organization was a traditional membership organization nor had they shown they were the functional equivalent of one. The court found insufficient evidence that the organizations’ employees, supporters, or board members constituted a constituency whose interests the organizations were entitled to represent in court. Accordingly, the appellate court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. View "Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility v. Zeldin" on Justia Law

Doe v. SEC

2026-05-01T07:02:46-08:00

An individual disclosed information about significant misconduct at a large company to the news media. Following these disclosures, both Congress and staff from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) contacted the individual for interviews and further information, which he provided. The SEC subsequently initiated an enforcement action against the company, relying on the information provided, resulting in substantial monetary sanctions. The individual then applied to the SEC for a whistleblower award under the Securities Exchange Act, which provides monetary awards to those who “voluntarily” provide “original information” leading to successful enforcement actions. The SEC denied the whistleblower award application, finding that the individual’s submission was not “voluntary” because it occurred only after the SEC and other authorities had contacted him. Additionally, the SEC found his submission was untimely and summarily denied his request for exemptions from these requirements. The individual challenged these determinations, arguing that the SEC’s interpretation of “voluntarily” conflicted with the statute's purpose and plain meaning, that his submission was timely, and that the denial of his request for exemptions was insufficiently explained and inconsistent with SEC precedent. He also raised First Amendment concerns, suggesting the SEC’s approach penalized whistleblowers for speaking to the press. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the SEC’s order. The court held that the SEC’s interpretation of “voluntarily” was reasonable and consistent with statutory text and purpose, and rejected the First Amendment argument, finding it was based on a mistaken premise. However, the court found that the SEC abused its discretion by inadequately explaining its denial of the request for an exemption from the voluntariness requirement. The court thus denied the petition in part, granted it in part, vacated the denial of the exemption request, and remanded to the SEC for further consideration. View "Doe v. SEC" on Justia Law

Evergreen Shipping Agency (America) Corp. v. FMC

2026-04-28T07:03:02-08:00

A shipping dispute arose when a common carrier charged a trucking company detention fees for the late return of shipping equipment. The delay was caused by a COVID-19-related closure at the consignee’s plant, and when the trucking company attempted to return the equipment, the port was closed for three days due to scheduled closures and a holiday. The trucking company disputed a portion of the detention charges, arguing that it was impossible to return the equipment while the port’s gates were closed. The Federal Maritime Commission initially found the disputed charges unreasonable, concluding they could not have incentivized a faster return because the port was not accepting containers during the relevant days. The carrier sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which vacated and remanded, instructing the Commission to address specific arguments and analyze the charges under the proper legal framework, especially the “incentive principle” as articulated in the Commission’s Interpretive Rule. On remand, the Commission reaffirmed that the charges were unreasonable. It emphasized that the purpose of detention fees is to promote freight fluidity and found that, under the uncontested facts—namely, the plant closure, the port’s closure, and the absence of costs to the carrier—the charges did not serve that purpose. The Commission also addressed and rejected each of the carrier’s justifications and extenuating circumstances. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the Commission’s order on remand. The court held that the Commission’s determination was reasonable, supported by substantial evidence, and consistent with its Interpretive Rule. The court emphasized that the relevant standard is whether the charges promoted freight fluidity and found that the fees did not do so under the specific facts. The court denied the petition for review. View "Evergreen Shipping Agency (America) Corp. v. FMC" on Justia Law

Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC v. NLRB

2026-04-28T07:03:02-08:00

An employee of a Texas electric utility company testified before a legislative committee about technical problems with the company's new smart meters, attributing fire hazards to the meters and referencing specific service calls. He was also the chief spokesperson for the union representing workers at the company, and he testified the day after unsuccessful collective bargaining negotiations. In his testimony, he identified himself as both an employee and a union representative, but did not mention the ongoing labor dispute or the negotiations. After learning of his remarks, the company terminated his employment, citing a violation of its policy against providing misleading information to public officials. An administrative law judge found that the employee’s testimony was protected under federal labor law, specifically section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, which protects concerted activities for mutual aid or collective bargaining. The National Labor Relations Board agreed, concluding the company had committed unfair labor practices and ordering reinstatement and back pay. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit previously found the testimony was not “maliciously untrue” but remanded for the Board to determine whether the employee’s speech sufficiently indicated it was connected to an ongoing labor dispute. On remand, the Board again found the discharge unlawful, reasoning that the context and the employee’s identification as a union representative sufficiently communicated the labor dispute connection. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the employee’s statements were not protected because they did not disclose a connection to an ongoing labor dispute, as required by Supreme Court precedent. The court found the Board’s analysis legally erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence. It therefore granted the company's petition for review, denied enforcement of the Board’s order, and vacated the finding of an unfair labor practice. View "Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services v. Mullin

2026-04-24T07:02:56-08:00

Thirteen individuals and three nonprofit organizations challenged executive actions taken after the issuance of a presidential proclamation in January 2025, which responded to increased crossings at the southern border by suspending the entry of certain noncitizens and instituting new summary removal procedures. These new procedures, set out in subsequent agency guidance, barred individuals who crossed between ports of entry—or at ports without proper documentation—from seeking asylum or other statutory protections. The policies also established new, non-statutory removal processes that bypassed existing procedures and protections mandated by federal law. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed these policies in a putative class action. The court certified a class of all individuals subject to the proclamation, declared the agency guidance unlawful, vacated it, and enjoined agency officials from implementing similar actions under the proclamation. The district court found that the challenged policies supplanted the removal procedures and substantive protections Congress had established in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and related regulations, including the right to apply for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for the plaintiffs and affirmed the modified class certification. The D.C. Circuit held that Congress, in granting the President authority to suspend entry under the INA, did not authorize the executive to circumvent or override the statute’s exclusive and mandatory removal procedures or to categorically deny the right to apply for asylum and other protections. The court further held that neither the proclamation nor its guidance could lawfully suspend or replace statutory and regulatory processes for removal or for considering claims to asylum, withholding of removal, or Convention Against Torture protection. The court also upheld the district court’s class-wide relief and its scope under federal law. View "Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services v. Mullin" on Justia Law

J. Sidak v. United States International Trade Commission

2026-04-24T07:02:56-08:00

An administrative law judge (ALJ) at the International Trade Commission (ITC) issued a protective order during a dispute between Qualcomm and Apple, requiring recipients of confidential business information, including expert witness Gregory Sidak, to return or destroy that information after the case ended. However, the ALJ who issued the order had been appointed solely by the ITC chairman, not by the full commission as required by the Constitution’s Appointments Clause. The ITC later ratified the ALJ’s appointments but did not ratify past actions taken by those ALJs. Years after the underlying case ended, the ITC began investigating Sidak for allegedly violating the protective order’s requirements. Sidak participated in the investigation by exchanging letters and affidavits, but eventually sued, arguing that the protective order was void because it was issued by an unconstitutionally appointed ALJ and never ratified, and sought to enjoin the ITC from enforcing it against him. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia found in Sidak’s favor, holding that the protective order could not lawfully be used as the basis for the investigation or for imposing sanctions on him. It permanently enjoined the ITC from taking further action against Sidak based on the challenged order. The ITC appealed the district court’s decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Sidak had standing, that the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction, and that Sidak had a right of action under the Constitution. The court further held that Sidak’s challenge was both timely and ripe, rejecting the ITC’s arguments that the claim was either too early or too late. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting permanent injunctive relief. View "J. Sidak v. United States International Trade Commission" on Justia Law

USA v. All Petroleum-Product Cargo Onboard the M/T Arina

2026-04-21T06:34:41-08:00

In 2021, the United States seized over 700,000 barrels of crude oil from two tankers in the Mediterranean Sea. The government alleged that the oil belonged to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), an entity it claimed materially supported the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. The government further asserted that NIOC’s activities included supplying, transporting, and selling oil to benefit the IRGC, which used these resources to fund terrorist activities targeting the United States. A Turkish commodities trading company, Aspan Petrokimya Co., claimed ownership of the seized oil and sought to recover the proceeds from its sale. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially dismissed the government’s forfeiture complaints without prejudice, finding that the government had not adequately pled that NIOC’s sale of oil affected foreign commerce. The government then filed an Amended Complaint consolidating the cases and providing additional factual detail. The district court denied Aspan’s renewed motion to dismiss, concluding that the amended allegations sufficiently addressed the jurisdictional element and all other statutory requirements. To expedite appellate review, Aspan admitted the complaint’s factual allegations, consented to judgment on the pleadings, and appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss de novo. The appellate court held that the government needed only to allege NIOC’s ownership of the property at the time of the offense, not at the time of seizure. The court also found that the Amended Complaint plausibly alleged that NIOC’s material support of the IRGC substantially affected foreign commerce, and that NIOC’s actions were calculated to influence the U.S. government. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. All Petroleum-Product Cargo Onboard the M/T Arina" on Justia Law

Inova Health Care Services v. Omni Shoreham Corporation

2026-04-17T07:02:21-08:00

A charity gala honoring Joan Hisaoka was held annually at the Omni Shoreham Hotel in Washington, D.C., with Inova Health Care Services contracting with the hotel for the event and the Smith Center for Healing and the Arts providing financial support. In December 2018, Inova and Omni executed an agreement specifying that the 2019 Gala would be held in the Ambassador and Regency Ballrooms. The contract did not include Omni’s standard clause permitting reassignment of event spaces. A few months before the event, Omni informed Inova it would relocate the Gala to less desirable spaces to accommodate a higher-paying client. Inova objected, found the alternative spaces unsuitable, and relocated the Gala to another venue. Smith Center, though not a party to the contract, paid the deposit as in prior years. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment. Upon reconsideration, it granted summary judgment on liability to Inova and Smith Center, finding Omni had breached the contract’s express terms and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court limited Omni’s mitigation defense and the case proceeded to a jury trial on damages, resulting in awards to both Inova and Smith Center. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed summary judgment and the jury’s damages award in favor of Inova, holding there was no genuine dispute that Omni materially breached the contract and acted in bad faith. The court also held the district court properly precluded Omni’s mitigation defense regarding the alternative spaces. However, the appellate court vacated the damages award to Smith Center, finding a genuine factual dispute regarding its status as an intended third-party beneficiary, and remanded for further proceedings on that issue. View "Inova Health Care Services v. Omni Shoreham Corporation" on Justia Law

Doe v. Blanche

2026-04-17T07:02:21-08:00

Eighteen transgender women incarcerated in federal women’s prisons challenged a federal executive order that directed the Attorney General to ensure that “males”—defined by biological sex assigned at conception—are not detained in women’s facilities. These plaintiffs were a small group of transgender women whom the Bureau of Prisons had, after individualized assessments, placed in women’s facilities. Each had been diagnosed with gender dysphoria, received long-term hormone therapy, and some had undergone gender-affirming surgeries. The plaintiffs alleged that transferring them to men’s prisons would expose them to grave risks of violence, abuse, and psychological harm. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted the plaintiffs preliminary injunctive relief, blocking their transfers and requiring the government to maintain their housing in women’s facilities. The district court found that transgender women are at a significantly higher risk of harm in men’s facilities and that the government was aware of these risks. The court also rejected government arguments that judicial review was barred or that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies, holding instead that no effective administrative remedy was available. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court held that judicial review of constitutional claims was not barred by statute and that the government had not shown exhaustion of available administrative remedies. However, the court vacated the preliminary injunctions, finding that the district court’s broad, categorical reasoning was not defended by the plaintiffs on appeal, who instead advanced more individualized grounds. The record did not contain the necessary factual findings as to each plaintiff’s specific vulnerabilities. The case was remanded for further proceedings, and the expired injunctions were dismissed as moot. View "Doe v. Blanche" on Justia Law

Secretary of Labor v. KC Transport, Inc.

2026-04-17T07:02:20-08:00

KC Transport, an independent trucking company, provides hauling services for mining and other companies. It operates a maintenance facility for its haul trucks about a mile from one of its primary client’s active mines. During an inspection, a Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) inspector observed two KC Transport trucks at the facility undergoing maintenance in conditions that violated federal safety standards—specifically, the trucks were raised and unblocked, with one worker standing underneath. The inspector issued citations for these violations. In an administrative proceeding, KC Transport contested the citations, arguing that MSHA lacked jurisdiction over its facility and trucks since they were not located at an extraction site or on an appurtenant road. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that MSHA had jurisdiction, reasoning that the facility and trucks were “used in” mining-related activities and thus constituted a “mine” under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act. KC Transport appealed, and the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission reversed the ALJ, holding that only facilities or equipment located at extraction sites or appurtenant roads qualify as “mines” under the Act and vacated the citations. The Secretary of Labor, acting through MSHA, petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review. After an intervening Supreme Court decision overruled Chevron deference, the D.C. Circuit independently interpreted the relevant statutory provisions. The court held that a “facility” constitutes a “mine” under the Mine Act when it is necessarily connected with the use and operation of extracting, milling, or processing minerals, even if not located directly at an extraction site or appurtenant road. Concluding that KC Transport’s facility met this definition, the court vacated the Commission’s decision and affirmed the Secretary’s citations. View "Secretary of Labor v. KC Transport, Inc." on Justia Law

In re: Donald Trump

2026-04-14T06:56:34-08:00

A group of individuals alleged to be members of Tren de Aragua, a Venezuelan criminal gang and foreign terrorist organization, were detained in Texas after the President, invoking the Alien Enemies Act, ordered their removal from the United States. On March 15, 2025, government officials placed several of these detainees, including the plaintiffs, on planes bound for El Salvador. Shortly after their departure, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) barring the government from removing the plaintiffs from the United States for 14 days. Despite the TRO, the planes continued to El Salvador, where the detainees were transferred to Salvadoran custody. The district court then began contempt proceedings against government officials, reasoning that the government’s actions violated the TRO, and threatened criminal contempt unless the government returned the plaintiffs to U.S. custody. The Supreme Court vacated the TRO, holding it was based on a legal error and filed in the wrong venue. Despite this, the district court persisted with contempt proceedings, seeking to identify and potentially prosecute the official responsible for the transfer. The government identified the Secretary of Homeland Security as the responsible party and provided declarations from involved officials. Unsatisfied, the district court ordered further hearings and investigation into the Executive Branch’s decision-making. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted the government’s petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that the district court’s investigation was a clear abuse of discretion. The appellate court found the TRO lacked the clarity required to support criminal contempt for transferring custody and that further judicial inquiry into Executive Branch deliberations was improper, especially given national security concerns. The court ordered the district court to terminate the contempt proceedings. View "In re: Donald Trump" on Justia Law

Bunting v. District of Columbia CVS Pharmacy, LLC

2026-04-14T06:56:33-08:00

On Christmas Eve, Bruce Bunting slipped and fell outside a CVS store in the District of Columbia on a walkway covered with a mix of water and salt or de-icing material, resulting in a serious ankle injury. Photographs taken soon after showed a wet but not icy surface. Bunting and his wife sued CVS in D.C. Superior Court, alleging negligence, negligence per se, and loss of consortium under D.C. law. They argued CVS failed to maintain a safe walkway and did not adequately warn of the hazard. Both sides retained expert witnesses to address whether the walkway met the standard of care, focusing on its static coefficient of friction (COF); the parties agreed a COF below 0.50 indicated a dangerously slippery surface. After CVS removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, that court granted summary judgment to CVS. The district court concluded the plaintiffs were required to present expert testimony showing the walkway was below the COF standard, and found the plaintiffs’ expert testing insufficient because it did not replicate the precise mix of salt and water present at the time of the fall. The court also granted CVS summary judgment on the negligence per se claim, holding that the cited municipal safety regulation did not establish a duty different from the common law standard of care. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The appellate court held that the parties’ expert evidence created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the walkway was unreasonably slippery, making summary judgment inappropriate on the negligence claim. However, the court affirmed summary judgment for CVS on the negligence per se claim, finding that the municipal regulation at issue merely repeated the common law duty of reasonable care. The court vacated the district court’s judgment in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bunting v. District of Columbia CVS Pharmacy, LLC" on Justia Law

Khalid v. Blanche

2026-04-14T06:56:33-08:00

A U.S. citizen of Pakistani descent was denied boarding an international flight in 2019 and subsequently learned, after following the Department of Homeland Security’s redress process, that he was listed on the federal government’s No Fly List. He then sought to challenge his inclusion both on the No Fly List and the broader Terrorist Watchlist, which contains the names of individuals reasonably suspected of terrorism. Placement on the No Fly List is dependent on inclusion in the Terrorist Watchlist. The individual alleged ongoing travel and immigration-related harms due to his watchlist designations. He filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, raising constitutional and statutory claims and seeking removal from both lists. The district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction over the No Fly List claims due to the statutory requirement that such challenges proceed in the circuit court under 49 U.S.C. § 46110, and transferred those claims accordingly. The district court retained the Terrorist Watchlist claims under general federal question jurisdiction. After further briefing, the district court dismissed the remaining Terrorist Watchlist claims for lack of Article III standing, finding it could not redress the alleged injuries because removing the plaintiff from the Terrorist Watchlist would necessarily set aside the TSA Administrator’s order keeping him on the No Fly List—an action reserved for the circuit court. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The court held that while the plaintiff suffered concrete injuries from his inclusion on the Terrorist Watchlist, the district court lacked authority to redress those injuries because any effective remedy would encroach on the circuit court’s exclusive jurisdiction to review and set aside TSA No Fly List orders under § 46110. Thus, the district court properly dismissed the case for lack of standing. View "Khalid v. Blanche" on Justia Law

Khalid v. TSA

2026-04-14T06:56:32-08:00

A United States citizen of Pakistani descent challenged his continued placement on the federal No Fly List, which prohibits individuals from boarding flights in U.S. airspace. After enhanced screening and questioning by the FBI in 2012 and being prevented from boarding a flight in 2019, he sought redress through the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP). He received an unclassified summary stating that his listing was based on concerns about his associations and candor regarding activities in Pakistan. He contested these grounds, denied any terrorist associations, and argued that his inclusion was erroneous. While his DHS TRIP redress was pending, he filed suit in the United States District Court, which ultimately concluded it lacked jurisdiction, as exclusive review of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Administrator’s order rested with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The district court transferred his claims to the appellate court. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the TSA Administrator’s order, applying a “substantial evidence” and “arbitrary and capricious” standard, and reviewed constitutional claims de novo. The court dismissed the petitioner’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act claim for lack of standing, finding insufficient concrete plans to travel for religious purposes. It denied his other claims, holding that there is no fundamental right to air travel under substantive due process, and that the DHS TRIP process provides constitutionally adequate procedural protections. The court found that the Administrator’s order was supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary or capricious. The court also rejected the argument that the major questions doctrine applied, finding TSA’s statutory authority adequate. The petition was dismissed in part and otherwise denied. View "Khalid v. TSA" on Justia Law

True the Vote, Inc. v. IRS

2026-04-10T07:01:56-08:00

A nonprofit organization, after being represented by several law firms over multiple years in a lawsuit against the Internal Revenue Service, was awarded attorneys’ fees by the district court under the Equal Access to Justice Act. The total fee award was almost $789,000. The various law firms that had represented the nonprofit at different times—specifically, a set of former attorneys and the Bopp Law Firm—disputed how much each was entitled to from the award. Both the former attorneys and Bopp asserted they had an equitable charging lien entitling them to direct payment from the fee award, rather than requiring payment first be made to the client. After the resolution of the underlying claims, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia found that the former attorneys had a valid charging lien but denied Bopp’s motion to enforce its own lien. The district court reasoned, based on Indiana law (per a choice-of-law provision in Bopp's fee agreement), that Bopp had to show an agreement with the client that its compensation would come from the fund itself. The court concluded Bopp failed to establish such an agreement and thus did not have a valid lien. Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the district court applied the wrong legal standard under Indiana law. Indiana law recognizes two independent ways an attorney may establish an equitable charging lien: either by securing the fund for the client or by an agreement with the client to be paid from the fund. The Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether Bopp satisfied either prong and for potential resolution of lien priority and the calculation of amounts owed. View "True the Vote, Inc. v. IRS" on Justia Law

Qashu v. Rubio

2026-04-10T07:01:55-08:00

A visually impaired scientist was hired as a one-year fellow at the U.S. Department of State through a program administered by the American Association for the Advancement of Science, with the possibility of a second year if all parties agreed. The State Department provided her with several accommodations, including screen-reading software and noise-cancelling headphones. She experienced difficulties with the software and office environment, and alleged negative treatment by her supervisor. After initially being offered a renewal of her fellowship, negotiations regarding the renewal paperwork stalled, and the offer was rescinded. She filed a formal complaint alleging discrimination and retaliation based on her disability. Later, she was not selected to lead a project portfolio, a position for which she did not self-nominate. She continued to request accommodations, which were addressed with varying speed and effectiveness. After the end of her fellowship, the plaintiff sued the State Department in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging failure to accommodate her disability, disability discrimination, and retaliation in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted summary judgment to the State Department, finding that the agency had provided reasonable accommodations, had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions, and had not retaliated against her. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that the State Department did not deny the plaintiff reasonable accommodations, did not discriminate against her on the basis of disability, and did not retaliate against her for requesting accommodations or filing complaints. The court found that the agency participated in good faith in the interactive process, provided reasonable accommodations, and had legitimate, non-pretextual reasons for its employment decisions. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the State Department. View "Qashu v. Rubio" on Justia Law

Alon Refining Krotz Springs, Inc. v. EPA

2026-04-07T07:02:31-08:00

Several oil refineries with average daily crude oil throughput below 75,000 barrels in 2024 applied to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2025 for exemptions from their obligations under the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program for the 2024 compliance year. The RFS program, established under the Clean Air Act, requires refineries to blend renewable fuels into transportation fuels. The Act provides for a “small refinery” exemption for facilities that do not exceed the 75,000-barrel threshold in a calendar year. The petitioning refineries did not seek exemptions for 2023 and based their applications solely on their 2024 throughput. After the refineries submitted their applications, the EPA informed them that, under its 2014 regulation, eligibility required a refinery to meet the “small refinery” definition both for "the most recent full calendar year prior to seeking an extension" and for "the year or years for which an exemption is sought." The EPA interpreted this to mean petitioners needed to satisfy the throughput limit in both 2023 and 2024. Since the refineries exceeded the threshold in 2023, the EPA denied the exemption requests. The refineries then sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The D.C. Circuit held that the EPA’s interpretation of its 2014 regulation was contrary to the regulation’s plain text. The court found that, because the applications were filed in 2025 for the 2024 compliance year, both the “most recent full calendar year prior to seeking an extension” and “the year for which an exemption is sought” referred to 2024. Since the petitioners met the threshold in 2024, they were eligible under the regulation. The court vacated the EPA’s denial orders and remanded for further proceedings. View "Alon Refining Krotz Springs, Inc. v. EPA" on Justia Law

United Mexican States v. Lion Mexico Consolidated L.P.

2026-04-07T07:02:31-08:00

A Canadian investment company provided loans to Mexican companies owned by a businessman, securing these loans with mortgages and promissory notes. When the Mexican companies defaulted, the investor attempted to recover its funds through negotiations and litigation in Mexico. The investor alleged that a fraudulent scheme, orchestrated by the businessman, led to a forged settlement used in Mexican court to void the loans. After Mexican courts did not provide relief, the investor initiated arbitration against Mexico under NAFTA, claiming Mexico failed to provide the protections required for foreign investments. The arbitral tribunal, seated in Washington, D.C., found that only the mortgages—not the promissory notes—qualified as protected “investments” under NAFTA. The tribunal concluded that Mexico had breached its obligations under Article 1105(1) by failing to provide fair and equitable treatment to the investor’s qualifying investments, awarding $47 million in compensation to the investor. Mexico then petitioned the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to vacate the award, arguing the arbitrators exceeded their authority and disregarded the law. The district court rejected these arguments, confirming the award. Separately, the businessman sought to intervene in the proceedings, claiming his interests were harmed, but the district court denied intervention. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the arbitral tribunal did not exceed its powers, as it at least arguably interpreted the relevant treaty provisions, and did not act in manifest disregard of the law. The appellate court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the businessman’s motion to intervene, finding Mexico adequately represented his interests. The court affirmed the district court’s order in full. View "United Mexican States v. Lion Mexico Consolidated L.P." on Justia Law

Gjoci v. DOS

2026-04-03T06:31:58-08:00

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States government suspended the processing of Diversity Immigrant Visa (DV) applications for the 2021 fiscal year. The State Department halted interviews and adjudication of diversity visa applications, and a presidential proclamation further restricted the entry of DV selectees. Processing resumed only after the proclamation was revoked, leaving many selectees unable to complete the process before the fiscal year ended. Some applicants in this group received visas and became lawful permanent residents, but others did not receive any meaningful response to their applications. Applicants who did not receive visas, as well as those who did, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. They challenged the State Department’s handling of the 2021 DV Program and sought, among other remedies, an injunction requiring the government to adjudicate their visa applications or preserve their eligibility beyond the fiscal year. The district court denied a preliminary injunction and ultimately dismissed the equitable claims as moot, finding that it could not grant relief after the fiscal year ended. The court also dismissed other claims—including requests for declaratory relief and nominal damages—for lack of standing, and denied the plaintiffs’ request to file supplemental briefing. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that claims seeking preservation of visa eligibility were moot in light of prior circuit precedent, since courts cannot order visa processing beyond the relevant fiscal year. It also found that the plaintiffs lacked standing for their remaining claims because past injuries alone did not justify declaratory relief, nominal damages were barred by sovereign immunity, and equitable claims were foreclosed by precedent. The court further concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying supplemental briefing. View "Gjoci v. DOS" on Justia Law

World Shipping Council v. FMC

2026-03-31T06:31:52-08:00

A trade association representing the majority of the world’s liner shipping services challenged a rule issued by the Federal Maritime Commission. Under recent amendments to the Shipping Act, Congress directed the Commission to define what constitutes an “unreasonable refusal to deal or negotiate” by ocean common carriers regarding vessel space accommodations. The Commission responded by adopting a rule specifying non-binding factors for evaluating unreasonable refusals, including whether a carrier quoted rates vastly above market value, required carriers to submit an annual “documented export policy,” and removed explicit reference to “business decisions” from its list of factors. The association objected, arguing that the rule exceeded the Commission’s authority and was arbitrary and capricious. After the Commission published its final rule, the association filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The association claimed that the Commission lacked authority to consider price in its analysis, that the requirement for a documented export policy was ultra vires and arbitrary, and that removal of the “business decisions” factor was likewise arbitrary. The Commission defended the rule’s approach, asserting its statutory power to require reports and to evaluate factors relevant to reasonableness. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied the petition for review. The court held that the Commission’s consideration of price as an indicator of unreasonable refusal did not amount to unauthorized rate regulation, and that the requirement for a documented export policy was within the Commission’s statutory authority. The court also found that the omission of “business decisions” as a listed factor did not preclude their consideration in individual cases. The court concluded that the rule was neither beyond the Commission’s statutory authority nor arbitrary and capricious. View "World Shipping Council v. FMC" on Justia Law

Secretary of Labor v. Knight Hawk Coal, LLC

2026-03-31T06:31:51-08:00

Mine operators received citations from the Secretary of Labor under the Mine Act for alleged safety violations, some of which were designated as “significant and substantial” (S&S). The operators contested these citations before the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission. Subsequently, the Secretary sought to modify some citations by removing S&S designations and reducing penalties, or to vacate certain citations, as part of proposed settlements. The Secretary provided no explanations for these changes. Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) for the Commission denied the Secretary’s motions to settle or dismiss, emphasizing the lack of explanation for the modifications. Upon interlocutory review, the Commission affirmed the ALJs’ decisions, holding that section 110(k) of the Mine Act requires the Secretary to provide sufficient reasoning and justification when removing S&S designations or vacating citations in the context of settlement motions. The Secretary then petitioned for review of these nonfinal orders in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review the Commission’s nonfinal orders, as these orders did not meet the requirements for immediate appeal under the collateral-order doctrine. The court found the Secretary’s interest in modifying or vacating citations via settlement agreements to be adequately protected by the availability of review after a final order. The court determined that delaying review would not imperil a substantial public interest. Therefore, the court dismissed the Secretary’s petitions for review for lack of jurisdiction. View "Secretary of Labor v. Knight Hawk Coal, LLC" on Justia Law

Center for Biological Diversity v. Zeldin

2026-03-27T06:33:18-08:00

Florida sought approval from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to assume authority for issuing permits under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, which would allow parties to discharge pollutants into state waters. To streamline the process for permit applicants and reduce the burden of complying with the Endangered Species Act (ESA), Florida proposed a permitting program in which the state would monitor and protect ESA-listed species primarily through a “technical assistance process,” with only advisory input from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). The EPA and FWS approved Florida’s proposal after the FWS issued a programmatic Biological Opinion (BiOp) and Incidental Take Statement (ITS) that found no jeopardy to protected species and exempted permittees from further ESA liability, relying heavily on Florida’s assurances rather than detailed, up-front analysis. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the actions of the EPA and FWS after environmental groups challenged Florida’s permitting program, asserting violations of the ESA and Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court found that the FWS’s BiOp and ITS were unlawful because they failed to conduct the required analyses and deferred essential protections to a less rigorous state-run process. The court also determined the EPA’s reliance on these documents was impermissible and that the EPA had wrongly failed to consult with the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). As a remedy, the district court vacated the EPA’s approval of Florida’s permitting program along with the BiOp and ITS. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the environmental groups had standing and their claims were ripe. It concluded that the FWS’s BiOp and ITS did not comply with the ESA, that the EPA’s reliance on those documents was unlawful, and that the EPA erred by not consulting with the NMFS. The court required vacatur of the EPA’s approval of Florida’s permitting program and the associated ESA documents. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Zeldin" on Justia Law

Simmons v. Rubio

2026-03-17T06:33:41-08:00

A foreign service officer with the Department of State alleged that her employee evaluation review for 2016 contained false and prejudicial statements, which she claimed delayed her eligibility for tenure. After her administrative grievance was denied, she appealed to the Foreign Service Grievance Board. The Board conditionally dismissed her appeal, contingent on the Department providing certain corrective actions. Over the following years, the officer and the Department exchanged multiple motions regarding the completeness of the relief provided and attorney’s fees. Ultimately, the Board found that the Department had provided the promised relief, denied her motion for attorney’s fees on the grounds she was not a prevailing party, and closed the case, barring further filings. Subsequently, the officer filed a five-count complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging several Board orders as arbitrary and seeking attorney’s fees, costs, and other relief. The district court dismissed counts I through IV as time-barred, holding that the 180-day statute of limitations began when the Board closed the case and was only paused during reconsideration proceedings, making her claims untimely. The court also dismissed count V for lack of jurisdiction, finding no right under Board rules to file further motions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the timely motion for reconsideration rendered the underlying Board order nonfinal for purposes of judicial review and reset the statute of limitations. Therefore, the officer’s claims in counts I through IV were timely. However, the appellate court affirmed dismissal of count V, concluding she failed to state a claim because the Board’s regulations did not guarantee her the right to additional filings or attorney’s fees. The decision was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings on counts I through IV. View "Simmons v. Rubio" on Justia Law

USA v. Thorne

2026-03-17T06:33:41-08:00

Law enforcement agencies from the FBI, ATF, and the D.C. Metropolitan Police jointly investigated two individuals suspected of drug and firearms trafficking in the D.C., Maryland, and Virginia area. Through surveillance and controlled purchases, officers identified Linwood Thorne as a key supplier. They determined Thorne likely resided in D.C. and operated a business in Maryland. Searches of both locations produced significant quantities of drugs, drug paraphernalia, and firearms, some of which were unregistered and linked to Thorne. When authorities sought to arrest Thorne, they obtained warrants to track two of his cell phones, using both GPS-ping and cell-site-simulator methods. The D.C. magistrate judge issued these warrants. Officers ultimately located and arrested Thorne in Baltimore, Maryland, using the warrant for his D.C.-area code phone. A grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted Thorne on multiple drug and firearms charges. Before trial in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Thorne moved to suppress evidence obtained via the cell-site-simulator warrant, arguing the warrant violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(b) because there was insufficient evidence that the targeted phone was in D.C. when the warrant was issued. The district court denied suppression, reasoning that the warrant was valid or, in the alternative, that the good-faith exception applied. After trial, a jury convicted Thorne on most counts, and he appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court assumed, without deciding, that a Rule 41(b) violation may have occurred, but held that suppression was unwarranted because the law enforcement officers reasonably relied on the warrant in good faith. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion and the convictions, holding that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to warrants with potential Rule 41(b) venue defects. View "USA v. Thorne" on Justia Law

Mitchell v. Phelan

2026-03-13T06:35:21-08:00

Lieutenant Ernest Mitchell, a U.S. Navy officer, was serving as the Command Duty Officer aboard the USS Howard when he left the ship without authorization to move his car prior to the ship’s relocation. He failed to inform his commanding officer or transfer his duties to another qualified person during his absence. This incident, along with prior documented deficiencies in communication and adherence to standards, led to a series of disciplinary actions. These included his detachment from the ship for cause, findings by a Board of Inquiry of violations under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, delay and eventual removal from a promotion list, and denial of his efforts to remove adverse records and secure his promotion. After exhausting administrative remedies, Mitchell filed suit against the Secretary of the Navy in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the Navy’s actions violated the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, determining that the Navy’s actions were reasonable and supported by a satisfactory explanation. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo, applying a highly deferential standard to the military’s factfinding. The appellate court rejected Mitchell’s argument that he was entitled to promotion by operation of law under 10 U.S.C. § 624(d), holding that the statute does not mandate automatic appointment if the Executive decides against it. The court also found that the Board for Correction of Naval Records did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in concluding Mitchell demonstrated substandard performance over an extended period. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the Secretary of the Navy. View "Mitchell v. Phelan" on Justia Law

Clean Fuels Alliance America v. EPA

2026-03-13T06:35:20-08:00

The case concerns a challenge brought by two renewable fuel industry groups to a 2020 rule issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Clean Air Act’s Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) Program. The challenged rule established the percentage of renewable fuel that refiners and importers must include in their annual fuel output. The groups objected to EPA’s refusal to adjust the 2020 standard to account for renewable fuel shortfalls resulting from past retroactive small refinery exemptions. While the case was pending, EPA issued a new rule in 2022 that recalculated the 2020 standards and reaffirmed its approach of not making up for past exemptions. In addition, Congress altered the statutory framework, granting EPA broader discretion in setting future renewable fuel volumes. Following the issuance of the 2022 rule, most petitioners dismissed their challenges, and the two remaining groups shifted their focus, no longer seeking to set aside the 2020 rule but instead seeking a ruling that would require EPA to change its policy in future rulemakings. They did not challenge the 2022 rule, nor did they request its invalidation. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the case was moot. The court reasoned that the 2022 rule superseded the 2020 rule, eliminating any live controversy over that agency action. The court further explained that the legal landscape had changed due to statutory amendments, so the original dispute no longer presented the same question. Because petitioners were not seeking to overturn any concrete, current agency action, their challenge amounted to a request for an impermissible advisory opinion. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petitions as moot. View "Clean Fuels Alliance America v. EPA" on Justia Law

Rose v. Kennedy

2026-03-10T06:02:16-08:00

Three Medicaid beneficiaries in Indiana challenged the federal agency’s approval of a ten-year extension to Indiana’s Medicaid program, known as HIP 2.0, asserting that the program did not comply with the requirements of the federal Medicaid Act. The plaintiffs argued that the agency’s 2020 approval, as well as a 2023 letter maintaining the program despite concerns about coverage reductions, were arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. Indiana, seeking to defend HIP 2.0, intervened in the case. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to the beneficiaries, holding that the agency’s approval was not based on reasoned decision-making and failed to consider all relevant factors, particularly whether the program would help furnish medical assistance. The court vacated the 2020 approval and remanded the matter to the agency for further proceedings but stayed the vacatur order, allowing most of HIP 2.0 to remain in effect except for specific premium requirements. Indiana appealed, seeking review of the district court’s remand order, while the beneficiaries and the federal agency argued that the order was not a final, appealable decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed whether it had jurisdiction over Indiana’s appeal. The court held that the district court’s remand order was not a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because it did not end the litigation on the merits and substantive proceedings before the agency remained. The appellate court also found that none of the exceptions to the final judgment rule applied, including the collateral-order doctrine or Rule 54(b) certification. Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit dismissed Indiana’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Rose v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Paul v. FAA

2026-02-27T07:34:59-08:00

A pilot employed by a cargo airline was on a personal trip abroad when his employer, Amerijet International, selected him for a random drug test and requested that he appear for testing in Seattle on the same day. The pilot was unable to comply due to his location and a medical issue. The airline determined that he had refused the test, reported this to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and subsequently terminated his employment. The FAA corresponded with the pilot, initially investigating the matter and ultimately informing him that, while it was not taking enforcement action against his certificates, he would be subject to return-to-duty requirements because of the refusal determination, and the test refusal would be reported to the Pilot Records Database. The pilot challenged these consequences, arguing that the FAA had not independently reviewed the employer’s determination that he refused the test. The FAA responded that test-refusal determinations were made solely by the employer, not by the agency, and that the FAA did not review such determinations. The case came before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on the pilot’s petition for review of the FAA’s actions. The Court of Appeals held that the FAA’s internal guidance, specifically its Drug and Alcohol Compliance and Enforcement Surveillance Handbook, plausibly requires the FAA to independently review an employer’s test-refusal determination. The court interpreted the Handbook to require such review, partly to avoid serious constitutional concerns that would arise if the FAA entirely delegated this authority to private employers without oversight. Because the FAA conceded that it did not conduct any review, the court found the agency’s actions to be arbitrary and capricious for departing from its own procedures. The court granted the petition in part, remanding the case to the FAA for further review consistent with its opinion. View "Paul v. FAA" on Justia Law

Centro de Trabajadores Unidos v. Bessent

2026-02-24T07:34:31-08:00

A group of organizations challenged the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) policy permitting the sharing of taxpayer address information with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for immigration enforcement. The plaintiffs initiated suit after reports that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) was seeking addresses from the IRS to locate undocumented immigrants. The IRS and DHS subsequently formalized an agreement (Memorandum of Understanding, or MOU) specifying procedures for ICE to request taxpayer addresses from the IRS for use in nontax criminal investigations, provided statutory requirements were met. The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. After denying a temporary restraining order, the District Court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The District Court found that at least one plaintiff had standing and concluded the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their claims. Specifically, the court found that 26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(2) unambiguously allowed the IRS to disclose address information in response to valid requests, and that the IRS’s prior internal guidelines to the contrary did not have the force of law. The court also determined that the MOU was a nonbinding policy statement, not a final agency action subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court’s denial of preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs likely had standing, but were unlikely to succeed on the merits. The court ruled that § 6103(i)(2) clearly authorizes the IRS to disclose taxpayer address information, and that the MOU was not a reviewable agency action. It further held that any challenge to the agency’s change of interpretation was not viable because the court’s interpretation of the statute controls. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "Centro de Trabajadores Unidos v. Bessent" on Justia Law

Friends of Animals v. United States Bureau of Land Management

2026-02-20T07:03:50-08:00

The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) issued four ten-year plans authorizing the gathering and removal of wild horses from public lands in specific areas to achieve and maintain population levels within approved management ranges. Friends of Animals challenged these plans, arguing that they allowed indefinite removals without specific findings of overpopulation, failed to rely on current information, and did not include proper consultation, contrary to requirements under the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act. The BLM responded that the Act permitted multiple removal operations over a period of years within a single plan. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case. The court held that the ten-year plans were unlawful to the extent they permitted additional gathers after achieving the approved management levels, and vacated those portions of the plans. The court also held that future removal operations must be based on current information and proper consultation, and must be conducted promptly, as required by the Act. The court remanded the matter to BLM to revise the plans and clarify which future gathers would require further process before proceeding. Notably, the court did not resolve the parties’ principal disputes, leaving them to be addressed on remand. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the appeal brought by Friends of Animals. The appellate court determined that the District Court’s remand order was not a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because it left the core dispute unresolved for further proceedings. As a result, the appellate court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the case and dismissed the appeal. The disposition was a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Friends of Animals v. United States Bureau of Land Management" on Justia Law

Stabil LLC v. Russian Federation

2026-02-13T08:04:09-08:00

In 2014, Russia invaded and subsequently asserted control over Crimea, an area internationally recognized as part of Ukraine. Ukrainian businesses operating in Crimea—including an electricity distributor and a group of petrol station owners—had their assets seized and operations transferred to Russian-controlled entities without compensation. These businesses, having made investments under Ukrainian law and while the 1998 Agreement Between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on the Encouragement and Mutual Protection of Investments (“Investment Treaty”) was in effect, pursued arbitration against Russia for expropriation and treaty violations. The Ukrainian companies initiated separate arbitrations under the Investment Treaty’s arbitration clause. The arbitral tribunals found Russia liable for breaches and awarded significant damages to the companies. Russia challenged the arbitral jurisdiction and the awards in foreign courts, but those efforts were unsuccessful. The companies then filed petitions in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to enforce the awards under the New York Convention and the Federal Arbitration Act. Russia moved to dismiss, arguing the courts lacked subject-matter and personal jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The District Court rejected Russia’s arguments, finding jurisdiction appropriate under the FSIA’s arbitration exception and personal jurisdiction proper upon valid service. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed whether the District Court correctly exercised jurisdiction. The appellate court held that the FSIA’s arbitration exception applied because the companies established the existence of an arbitration agreement, a qualifying arbitral award, and a treaty potentially governing enforcement. The court further held that foreign states are not entitled to the Fifth Amendment’s due process protections against personal jurisdiction. The judgments of the District Court were affirmed. View "Stabil LLC v. Russian Federation" on Justia Law

Mohammad Hilmi Nassif & Partners v. Republic of Iraq

2026-02-13T08:04:08-08:00

A Jordanian business entity entered into an agreement with the Republic of Iraq in 1995 to settle Iraq’s unpaid debt for delivered goods by providing specified quantities of sulfur and urea, valued at $53 million. The agreement contemplated delivery at the Iraq-Jordan border, and although the supplier anticipated reselling these materials in the United States, this downstream transaction was not included in the written agreement. Iraq did not fulfill its obligations under the agreement, leading the supplier to pursue payment through interactions with Iraqi officials, who orally acknowledged the debt and suggested legal action might facilitate payment. After Iraq failed to deliver the goods, the supplier obtained a judgment in its favor from a Jordanian court in 2015 for the full amount. The Jordanian Court of Cassation affirmed the judgment. However, when the supplier sought to enforce the judgment in Jordan, the Jordanian Court of Appeal held that Iraq had not waived its sovereign immunity in the enforcement proceeding, preventing collection. Iraq has not satisfied any part of the judgment. The supplier then initiated an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking recognition of the Jordanian judgment. Iraq moved to dismiss, invoking sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The district court found that no FSIA exception applied and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, holding that Iraq had not made an explicit waiver of immunity and that Iraq’s conduct did not cause a direct effect in the United States as required by the FSIA’s commercial activity exception. Thus, the supplier’s claim is barred by Iraq’s sovereign immunity. View "Mohammad Hilmi Nassif & Partners v. Republic of Iraq" on Justia Law

EB5 Holdings Inc. v. Edlow

2026-02-13T08:04:08-08:00

Immigrant investors who seek permanent residency in the United States may do so by investing in regional centers that promote economic growth and job creation. In 2022, Congress reformed this program, establishing new oversight measures including an annual fee for all regional centers to fund monitoring and fraud prevention. EB5 Holdings, which owns two regional centers designated before 2022, challenged the application of this fee to “pre-RIA” (pre-2022 Reform and Integrity Act) regional centers. EB5 argued that only centers designated after the 2022 reforms should be subject to the annual fee, claiming the statute did not authorize the fee’s collection from centers designated under previous law. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed EB5’s Administrative Procedure Act challenge after the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services announced that all regional centers must pay the new fee to maintain their status. The district court denied EB5’s motion for summary judgment and granted the government’s motion to dismiss, finding that the fee provision unambiguously applies to both pre- and post-RIA regional centers. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the statutory text requires all currently designated regional centers—regardless of when they were initially designated—to pay the annual Integrity Fund fee. The court reasoned that the phrase “designated under subparagraph (E)” refers to the current status of being designated to operate as a regional center under the reformed program, not the timing of original designation. The court further rejected the argument that applying the fee to pre-RIA centers was impermissibly retroactive, as the fee only applies prospectively to centers wishing to maintain their designation. Thus, the district court’s dismissal was affirmed. View "EB5 Holdings Inc. v. Edlow" on Justia Law

Affirmed Energy, LLC v. FERC

2026-02-10T07:34:07-08:00

A provider of energy efficient resources (EERs), which are projects that reduce electrical consumption, challenged a decision by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approving a change to PJM Interconnection LLC’s tariff. PJM manages the electrical grid in parts of thirteen states and the District of Columbia, and it operates capacity auctions to ensure reliable electricity supply. Historically, EERs were allowed to bid in these auctions for up to four consecutive years to compensate for a lag in PJM’s statistical model (load forecast), which previously did not account for new EERs’ impact on energy consumption. In 2016, PJM updated its model to capture these effects in real time, removing the need for EERs to participate in the auctions. In 2024, PJM proposed a tariff amendment to exclude EERs from future capacity auctions, citing the improved accuracy of its load forecast and the unnecessary costs imposed on consumers by double-counting EERs’ effects. FERC approved this amendment, finding it would lower costs for consumers without compromising grid reliability. Affirmed Energy LLC, an EER aggregator, protested, arguing that the amendment was unlawfully retroactive and arbitrary and capricious, as it would disrupt settled expectations and reliance interests, particularly for projects that had already cleared prior auctions. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. It held that FERC’s orders were not retroactive because they only applied to future auctions and did not strip EER providers of entitlements to past payments or auction results. The court also found that FERC had reasonably evaluated PJM’s updated forecast, weighed the reliance interests at stake, and explained why the amendment was justified. The petition for review was denied. View "Affirmed Energy, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

In re: Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2705(b)

2026-02-03T12:25:52-08:00

Empower Oversight Whistleblowers & Research, a nonprofit organization, filed a motion to intervene in a closed grand jury proceeding and sought to unseal Department of Justice applications for non-disclosure orders related to a 2017 grand jury subpoena for Google account records. At the time of the subpoena, Jason Foster, Empower’s founder, was the Chief Investigative Counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee, investigating alleged misconduct at the Department. Google notified Foster in 2023 that a subpoena and non-disclosure order had been issued and extended multiple times. Empower argued that the applications should be unsealed, claiming they were judicial records subject to public access under common law and the First Amendment, and that grand jury secrecy had been waived due to public disclosures. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia permitted Empower to intervene but granted only partial unsealing. It held that the applications were ancillary grand jury records protected by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(6), limiting unsealing to jurisdictional and legal standard sections. The court found no waiver of secrecy, as disclosures were not sufficiently public to meet the threshold established by precedent. Most of the documents remained sealed, and Empower appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed for abuse of discretion and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the applications were covered by Rule 6(e)(6), which displaces any common law or First Amendment right of access, and that grand jury secrecy had not been waived by the disclosures identified by Empower. The court also declined to review new evidence (the December 2024 OIG report) not presented to the district court but remanded the case for the lower court to consider whether to allow Empower to amend its motion and supplement the record with the OIG report. View "In re: Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2705(b)" on Justia Law

De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary

2026-01-23T08:01:04-08:00

A family that inherited a renowned art collection in Hungary prior to World War II sought to recover dozens of valuable artworks seized by the Hungarian government and its Nazi collaborators during the Holocaust. The heirs, who became citizens of the United States and other countries, alleged that the majority of the collection was confiscated during the Nazi occupation and dispersed across Europe and later deposited at Hungarian institutions. Some pieces were returned to the family after the war, only to be retaken by the government under various circumstances, including criminal forfeiture and postwar policies. The heirs initially pursued their claims in Hungarian courts without success. In 2010, they sued the Republic of Hungary and several Hungarian museums in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, invoking the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) expropriation and commercial activity exceptions. The district court partly dismissed the claims on international comity grounds but retained jurisdiction over most artworks. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the comity dismissal and affirmed jurisdiction on different grounds. Subsequent rulings narrowed the scope of claims, particularly after the Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, which clarified the FSIA’s expropriation exception and incorporated the domestic-takings rule, limiting jurisdiction over property taken from a sovereign’s own nationals. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that U.S. courts lack jurisdiction over the family’s claims. The court held that plaintiffs failed to establish that the seizure of their artwork violated the international law of expropriation, as required by the FSIA. It found no international authority supporting jurisdiction for wartime or stateless-person takings, and that treaties and the domestic-takings rule further barred the claims. The court affirmed the district court’s complete dismissal of the litigation. View "De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary" on Justia Law

Petro Star Inc. v. FERC

2026-01-23T08:01:04-08:00

The case centers on the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), which transports crude oil from Alaska’s North Slope, with oil from different shippers being commingled in the pipeline. To address variations in oil quality, a “Quality Bank” compensates shippers who inject higher-quality oil and charges those with lower-quality oil. The valuation of one particular oil component, Resid—the heaviest and least valuable cut—has been disputed for decades. Petro Star, a shipper whose refineries lack specialized units to further process Resid, argued that Resid was undervalued, while ConocoPhillips contended it was overvalued. The TAPS owners, who administer the Quality Bank, also challenged a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) finding that the Bank’s administrator violated tariff provisions. Following a 2013 FERC investigation into the Resid valuation formula, both Petro Star and ConocoPhillips intervened, seeking changes. After initial FERC findings were remanded for further explanation by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, FERC held additional hearings. An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded the formula was just and reasonable, and FERC largely affirmed this result, also finding a tariff violation by the Quality Bank administrator for failing to update formula yields based on monthly Resid testing. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that FERC’s formula for valuing Resid remains just and reasonable, as neither Petro Star nor ConocoPhillips demonstrated the formula to be unjust or unreasonable. The court also upheld FERC’s finding that the Quality Bank administrator violated the tariff by not updating formula yields with each test, but found FERC’s prospective remedy—requiring monthly testing and annual yield updates—was appropriate. The court denied all three petitions. View "Petro Star Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Spokane Airport Board v. TSA

2026-01-20T07:30:46-08:00

This case concerns the Transportation Security Administration’s issuance of an emergency amendment that required certain airport operators to incorporate specific cybersecurity measures and controls into their airport security programs. The amendment, issued in March 2023, responded to increasing cyber threats to the aviation sector, including ransomware and foreign cyberattacks. Under the amendment, airports were required to identify critical systems, submit a cybersecurity implementation plan, and assess their effectiveness annually. The Spokane Airport Board, which operates Spokane International Airport, objected to the amendment on both procedural and substantive grounds. After the amendment was issued, the Spokane Airport Board petitioned the TSA for reconsideration, raising various objections. The TSA denied these petitions, upholding the emergency amendment. Spokane then filed a timely petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, as provided by statute. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the TSA’s order under the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act, specifically considering whether it was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review arguments not properly raised before the TSA, as required by statute. The court found that the objections Spokane did properly exhaust were meritless. It concluded that the TSA possesses broad statutory authority to regulate aviation security—including cybersecurity—in response to threats. The court also found that the emergency amendment was consistent with TSA regulations and was not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the court denied Spokane’s petition for review, leaving the TSA’s emergency cybersecurity amendment in effect. View "Spokane Airport Board v. TSA" on Justia Law

Mehneh v. Rubio

2026-01-16T07:00:55-08:00

Two U.S. citizens petitioned for immigrant visas on behalf of their relatives. After each relative interviewed with a consular officer, their visa applications were placed in administrative processing, requiring additional information. Both applicants submitted the required information but experienced lengthy delays. Eventually, after sixteen months, one applicant and his spouse filed a complaint alleging unreasonable delay; the other applicant and his son did the same after seven months. Both sought to compel the Department of State to adjudicate the applications. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed both complaints for failure to state a claim. The court applied factors from Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC to determine whether there had been an unreasonable delay and ruled that neither complaint met the standard. The applicants appealed the dismissals. While the appeals were pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the Department of State finished processing the applications: one applicant received his visa and entered the United States, while the other was refused a visa due to inadmissibility for terrorist activities, with no waiver available. The Court of Appeals held that these events rendered both appeals moot, as no effectual relief could be provided. The court found that neither of the recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine—voluntary cessation or “capable of repetition yet evading review”—applied. The court vacated the judgments of the district court and remanded with instructions to dismiss the cases as moot. The court also declined the appellants’ request to create a new exception to mootness for unreasonable delay claims. View "Mehneh v. Rubio" on Justia Law

Maryland Office of People's Counsel v. FERC

2026-01-13T08:01:26-08:00

PJM Interconnection, LLC, which manages electricity transmission across several Mid-Atlantic and Midwestern states, conducted its 2024/2025 capacity auction based on certain published parameters intended to ensure sufficient capacity for future electricity needs. After bidding closed, PJM discovered an error in the Locational Delivery Area Reliability Requirement for the Delmarva Power & Light Company South Zone, which would result in inflated auction prices and excess capacity charges for consumers. PJM sought to amend its tariff to correct this issue before finalizing the auction results, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved PJM's request. Capacity suppliers challenged FERC’s approval in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which vacated the decision, finding that the amendment was retroactive and violated the filed-rate doctrine. FERC, complying with the Third Circuit’s mandate, directed PJM to proceed with the unamended tariff, resulting in higher costs for consumers. Following this, agencies, customers, and entities representing customers’ interests filed a complaint under section 206 of the Federal Power Act, seeking modification of the auction outcome. FERC denied the complaint, stating that the Third Circuit’s ruling foreclosed any relief. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed FERC’s orders. The court held that FERC’s denial of the complaint was legally erroneous because the Third Circuit’s decision did not address whether FERC could use its section 206 authority to modify the auction result. The D.C. Circuit clarified that section 206(b) of the Federal Power Act provides a statutory exception to the general prohibition on retroactive rate changes. The court granted the petition for review, vacated FERC’s orders denying the complaint, and remanded the case to FERC for further proceedings. View "Maryland Office of People's Counsel v. FERC" on Justia Law

CenturyTel of Montana, Inc. v. NLRB

2026-01-13T08:01:25-08:00

CenturyTel of Montana, Inc., a telecommunications provider and subsidiary of Lumen Technologies, maintained a longstanding collective bargaining agreement with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union 768, covering technicians in northwest Montana. In 2021, concerns arose among various union locals that Lumen was deploying non-union National Technicians to perform work within the jurisdiction of union-represented employees. In response, Local 768 requested detailed information from CenturyTel about the presence and activities of these technicians, aiming to monitor possible violations of the bargaining agreement. After repeated requests and partial responses from the company, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge, alleging CenturyTel’s failure to furnish information necessary for the union to carry out its representational duties. The National Labor Relations Board’s administrative law judge held an evidentiary hearing, at which testimony established that non-union technicians had worked within the union’s jurisdiction and that the union’s information request was relevant to potential grievances. The ALJ credited the union’s account of communications and found that the requested information was “plainly aimed at ascertaining” possible contract violations. The ALJ rejected the employer’s arguments that the union had failed to show an objective basis for its request and that all relevant information had already been provided. As a result, the ALJ concluded that CenturyTel had violated Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act and ordered the company to provide the requested information and post a notice of the violation. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the Board’s order. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding that the union had a reasonable belief, supported by objective evidence, that the information was relevant to its duties. The court denied CenturyTel’s petition for review and granted the Board’s cross-application for enforcement. View "CenturyTel of Montana, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Independent Market Monitor for PJM v. FERC

2025-12-30T07:31:17-08:00

PJM Interconnection LLC manages an extensive electrical grid across thirteen states and the District of Columbia. To ensure competitive market conditions and compliance with regulatory standards, PJM employs Market Monitoring Analytics LLP as its independent market monitor (IMM). For several years, IMM attended meetings between PJM’s Board of Managers and the Liaison Committee, a nonvoting body designed to facilitate communication between PJM Members and the Board. However, PJM began enforcing the Liaison Committee’s charter provision, restricting attendance to end-use customers and regulated utilities, thereby excluding IMM from future meetings. After this exclusion, IMM filed a complaint with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), arguing that PJM’s action violated Section IV.G of its tariff, which IMM interpreted as granting it the right to participate in such stakeholder processes. FERC reviewed the complaint and dismissed it. The Commission determined that Section IV.G only applied to decision-making bodies within PJM that handle proposed revisions to tariffs or market rules, not to the Liaison Committee, which functions solely as a communication forum and does not engage in decision-making or voting. IMM subsequently petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review of FERC’s decision. The Court, before addressing the merits, examined whether IMM had standing to challenge its exclusion. The Court held that IMM failed to demonstrate a concrete or particularized injury resulting from its inability to attend the Liaison Committee meetings, as IMM retained access to all market data required for its monitoring functions and had alternative avenues for communication with the Board. The Court further found that IMM had not shown any expenditure of resources to counteract the alleged harm. Consequently, the petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction due to IMM’s lack of standing. View "Independent Market Monitor for PJM v. FERC" on Justia Law

USA v. Williamson

2025-12-12T07:32:31-08:00

The appellant was serving an eight-year federal sentence for threatening to murder an FBI agent. As he neared the end of his sentence, he sent letters from prison threatening an Assistant U.S. Attorney, the prosecutor’s family, and another FBI agent. These communications included vivid descriptions of violent acts and references to his own mental state. A grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted him for these new threats, and his pretrial detention continued even after his prior sentence expired. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ordered a psychological evaluation to determine the appellant’s competency and potential mental illness, particularly regarding his capacity to conform his conduct to the law. The evaluation found him competent to stand trial but unable to conform his actions to legal requirements due to a delusional disorder. The government then moved to dismiss the indictment without prejudice, citing the likelihood of a valid insanity defense, and requested that the appellant be evaluated for civil commitment under 18 U.S.C. § 4246. The district court dismissed the charges, stayed the dismissal, and ordered that the appellant remain at the federal facility for up to forty-five days for a dangerousness evaluation by the facility’s director. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed whether the district court had authority to order the facility director to conduct a dangerousness evaluation before deciding to issue a certificate under § 4246. The appellate court held that such an order was proper, as it ensured the statutory process was followed and did not contradict any statutory or procedural requirements. The court affirmed the district court’s order, concluding that the stay and evaluation were reasonable and within the court’s inherent powers. View "USA v. Williamson" on Justia Law

Harris v. Bessent

2025-12-05T08:01:55-08:00

These consolidated cases concern the constitutionality of statutory limits on the President’s authority to remove members of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). Both agencies are composed of members appointed by the President with Senate confirmation, and statutes prohibit the President from removing members except for cause. The NLRB oversees labor relations and union elections, with powers including rulemaking, adjudication, and the issuance of affirmative remedies. The MSPB administers federal employment disputes and can issue final orders, award a range of remedies, and promulgate certain regulations. After the President removed Gwynne Wilcox from the NLRB and Cathy Harris from the MSPB—without alleging the statutory grounds for removal—Wilcox and Harris challenged their removals in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The District Court held that the statutory protections against removal were constitutional under the precedent of Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, declared Wilcox and Harris remained in office, and enjoined the government from interfering with their roles. The government appealed, and the Supreme Court stayed the district court’s orders pending appeal, signaling skepticism about the constitutionality of the removal restrictions. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district courts’ judgments. The court held that, under Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Congress may not restrict the President’s ability to remove principal officers who wield substantial executive power. The court found that both the NLRB and MSPB exercise powers that are executive in nature and go beyond the quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions contemplated in Humphrey’s Executor. Consequently, statutory restrictions on the President’s removal authority for members of these boards are unconstitutional. The court ordered that the removal protections for NLRB and MSPB members be disregarded. View "Harris v. Bessent" on Justia Law

USA v. Arrington

2025-12-02T07:31:17-08:00

Derrek Arrington was convicted by a jury of assaulting a Park Police officer with a deadly weapon—specifically, using a car to trap and drag the officer before shooting him in the face—and for being a felon in possession of a stolen firearm. He received a 240-month prison sentence for these offenses. After completing his federal sentence, Arrington remained incarcerated because his actions violated parole from a prior armed robbery conviction in D.C. Superior Court, resulting in an additional 11-year sentence. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia originally imposed the 240-month sentence. Years later, after Arrington had served his sentence for the assault and firearm convictions, a different district judge vacated the original sentence and resentenced Arrington, again imposing the 240-month term. The resentencing judge decided to depart upward from the Sentencing Guidelines range of 140-175 months, citing the extreme moral depravity of Arrington’s actions, including the severe and permanent injuries caused to the officer. The judge also referenced Arrington’s criminal history and questioned whether the Guidelines adequately accounted for the felon-in-possession charge. Arrington appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, arguing that the resentencing judge failed to consider his rehabilitation during his incarceration. The court found that, while the judge’s oral remarks could be interpreted as ambiguous, the record did not show that the judge ignored the rehabilitation evidence. The appellate court held that any error was not plain and that the upward variance was justified by the egregious nature of the conduct. The court also determined that any error regarding consideration of the firearm conviction was harmless. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA v. Arrington" on Justia Law

USA v. Rosebar

2025-11-18T07:10:04-08:00

Michael Lawrence Rosebar was convicted of multiple counts of bankruptcy fraud, wire fraud, and first-degree fraud after misrepresenting himself as a licensed home improvement contractor and misappropriating funds from homeowners over a seven-year period. Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Rosebar was found guilty on several counts and sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment and thirty-six months of supervised release. His sentence was calculated using a criminal history category of II, which included two status points for committing the offenses while on probation. Rosebar appealed his conviction, but the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. After the Sentencing Commission amended the United States Sentencing Guidelines with Amendment 821, which changed the calculation of status points for defendants with fewer criminal history points, Rosebar filed a motion in the district court seeking a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and USSG § 1B1.10. The district court found Rosebar eligible for a reduction but, after considering the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), denied the motion, citing the seriousness of his offenses, their impact on victims, and his lack of remorse. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that the district court properly followed the required two-step inquiry, considered all relevant factors, and did not abuse its discretion in denying the sentence reduction. The court affirmed the district court’s order denying Rosebar’s motion for a sentence reduction. View "USA v. Rosebar" on Justia Law

Southern Airways Express, LLC v. DOT

2025-11-14T08:00:49-08:00

A commuter airline that had provided federally subsidized air service to a small community in West Virginia for several years sought to continue serving that community under the Essential Air Service (EAS) program. In 2024, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) solicited bids for a new three-year EAS contract. Four airlines, including the incumbent, submitted proposals. The DOT evaluated the applications based on five statutory factors: reliability, agreements with larger carriers, community preferences, marketing plans, and total compensation requested. After reviewing the proposals and soliciting input from the local community, which favored a different airline, the DOT selected a new carrier that offered larger aircraft, a codeshare agreement with a major airline, and a subsidy request within the competitive range. The incumbent airline challenged the DOT’s selection in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, arguing that the agency’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, and exceeded its statutory authority. The petitioner contended that the DOT failed to meaningfully analyze the statutory factors and improperly chose a more expensive proposal. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the DOT’s order under 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a). On the merits, the court found that the DOT’s findings regarding each statutory factor were supported by substantial evidence and that the agency’s reasoning was adequately explained. The court concluded that the DOT’s selection process was reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious, and that the agency did not exceed its statutory authority. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review and upheld the DOT’s selection of the new EAS carrier. View "Southern Airways Express, LLC v. DOT" on Justia Law

USA v. Johnson

2025-11-04T08:02:52-08:00

The appellant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm after police found him with a loaded, illegally modified semiautomatic handgun while he was on supervised release for prior violent felony convictions. During jury selection, the juror in question did not disclose any mental health issues. After the guilty verdict, Juror 8 emailed the court, stating she suffered from chronic anxiety and depression, felt pressured during deliberations, and questioned the fairness of the verdict due to her mental state. Following the verdict, the appellant asked the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to hold an evidentiary hearing to investigate Juror 8’s mental health and her competence to serve. The District Court denied the request, citing Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which generally prohibits inquiry into jury deliberations except for specific exceptions not applicable here. The court also found no evidence during voir dire, trial, or deliberations to suggest Juror 8 was incompetent. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed whether the District Court erred in denying the evidentiary hearing and whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional, either facially or as applied. The appellate court held that Rule 606(b) barred consideration of Juror 8’s email because it concerned internal jury deliberations and mental processes. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying the hearing, given the lack of evidence of incompetence. Regarding the constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1), the court found the arguments untimely and, even under plain error review, rejected them based on binding precedent. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "USA v. Johnson" on Justia Law

American Gas Association v. DOE

2025-11-04T08:02:51-08:00

The case concerns a challenge to amended energy efficiency standards issued by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for consumer furnaces (specifically, residential non-weatherized gas furnaces and mobile home gas furnaces) and certain commercial water heaters under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA). Petitioners, including trade associations, manufacturers, and energy providers, argued that the new standards would effectively eliminate non-condensing appliances from the market, claiming these products offer unique features and performance characteristics not available in condensing models. They also contended that DOE failed to provide adequate economic justification for the new standards and did not comply with procedural requirements during rulemaking. Previously, DOE had issued a series of proposed rules and interpretive rules regarding whether non-condensing technology constituted a protected performance characteristic under EPCA. After public comment and a period of shifting interpretations, DOE ultimately concluded in its 2021 Interpretive Rule that non-condensing technology does not provide a unique performance-related feature compared to condensing appliances. DOE then promulgated final rules in 2023 amending the efficiency standards for both consumer furnaces and commercial water heaters. Petitioners sought review of these actions in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that DOE’s interpretation—that non-condensing appliances do not offer performance characteristics or features substantially different from condensing appliances—was reasonable and supported by the record. The court also found that DOE’s economic justification for the amended standards was robust and supported by substantial evidence (and, for commercial water heaters, by clear and convincing evidence). Additionally, the court determined that DOE provided an adequate opportunity for public comment. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review, upholding DOE’s rules. View "American Gas Association v. DOE" on Justia Law

Campaign for Accountability v. DOJ

2025-10-17T06:34:11-08:00

A non-profit watchdog organization sought disclosure of formal written opinions issued by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) within the Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). After initial litigation, the dispute narrowed to three categories of OLC opinions: those resolving interagency disputes, those concerning the adjudication or determination of private rights, and those interpreting non-discretionary legal duties. OLC opinions are considered authoritative within the Executive Branch, but are rarely published. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the claims seeking disclosure of OLC opinions concerning private rights and non-discretionary legal duties, finding these were not subject to FOIA’s reading-room provision because they did not constitute “working law” unless adopted by the agency. However, the district court held that OLC opinions resolving interagency disputes were disclosable, reasoning that OLC’s process for resolving such disputes was adjudicative in nature and that agencies effectively adopted these opinions by agreeing in advance to abide by them. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff on this category, and both parties appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that none of the OLC opinions sought by the plaintiff were subject to mandatory disclosure under FOIA’s reading-room provision. The court found that OLC’s opinions do not constitute “final opinions made in the adjudication of cases” nor “statements of policy and interpretations which have been adopted by the agency” unless the agency takes further action to adopt the advice as its own working law. The court reversed the district court’s judgment requiring disclosure of opinions resolving interagency disputes and affirmed the dismissal of claims regarding private rights and non-discretionary duties. View "Campaign for Accountability v. DOJ" on Justia Law

Cboe Global Markets, Inc. v. SEC

2025-10-14T06:03:17-08:00

Several national securities exchanges challenged a 2024 rule adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that lowered the cap on fees exchanges may charge investors for executing orders. The SEC had previously set a cap of 30 mils ($0.003) per share for stocks priced at or above $1, and 0.3% of the quotation price for stocks below $1. In 2024, after gathering new data and considering market developments, the SEC reduced these caps to 10 mils for stocks priced at or above $1, and 0.1% for stocks below $1. The SEC explained that the changes were necessary to address market distortions and to align fee caps with reduced minimum tick sizes, thereby promoting price transparency and market efficiency. After the SEC adopted the new rule, several exchanges petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review, arguing that the SEC exceeded its statutory authority and acted arbitrarily or capriciously. The SEC agreed to stay the amendment pending judicial review. The exchanges contended that the SEC lacked authority to impose an industry-wide fee cap and that, if it had such authority, it was required to proceed on an exchange-by-exchange basis. They also argued that the SEC’s decision-making was arbitrary, particularly in its assessment of market effects and its choice of the 10-mil cap. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the SEC acted within its statutory authority under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, which grants the SEC broad discretion to regulate the national market system, including the power to set universal access-fee caps. The court further found that the SEC’s rulemaking was not arbitrary or capricious, as the agency reasonably considered relevant issues, explained its decision, and relied on both economic theory and empirical data. The petition for review was denied. View "Cboe Global Markets, Inc. v. SEC" on Justia Law

USA v. Clark

2025-10-10T06:01:58-08:00

A police officer with the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, D.C., was involved in two separate incidents within five days, during which he used neck restraints—specifically, trachea and carotid artery holds—on two individuals while on duty. Both incidents occurred at McDonald’s restaurants, and in each case, the officer initiated physical contact and applied prohibited neck restraints, despite the individuals not posing an immediate threat or actively resisting arrest. The officer was aware that such holds were forbidden by department policy, and in one instance, had been warned about his conduct just days before repeating it. A grand jury indicted the officer on five charges related to these events. Before trial, three charges were dropped. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia conducted a jury trial, after which the officer was convicted on two counts of depriving individuals of their rights under color of law, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242. The jury found that the officer acted willfully, used excessive force, and caused bodily injury. The court sentenced him to concurrent six-month prison terms and supervised release. The officer moved for acquittal and a new trial, arguing, among other things, that the jury instructions on willfulness were improper and that the evidence was insufficient. The District Court denied these motions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the officer’s challenges. The court held that the jury instructions on willfulness were not plainly erroneous, as precedent allows conviction under § 242 for conduct done in reckless disregard of constitutional rights. The court also found sufficient evidence supported the jury’s findings of excessive force and willfulness, and that no impermissible amendment or variance of the indictment occurred. The appellate court affirmed the District Court’s evidentiary rulings and the officer’s convictions. View "USA v. Clark" on Justia Law

Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co. v. Petroleos De Venezuela, S.A.

2025-10-03T07:33:11-08:00

In 2010, the Venezuelan government expropriated assets belonging to a Venezuelan subsidiary of a U.S.-based energy company. The subsidiary had provided drilling services to a state-owned Venezuelan energy company, but after a breakdown in their business relationship and significant unpaid invoices, Venezuelan authorities blockaded the subsidiary’s operations, issued public statements about nationalization, and ultimately transferred the subsidiary’s assets to the state-owned company, which began operating them. The U.S. parent company claimed that this expropriation rendered its ownership interest in the subsidiary worthless and deprived it of its rights to control the subsidiary’s assets. The U.S. parent company and its Venezuelan subsidiary filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against Venezuela and its state-owned energy company, alleging unlawful expropriation. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit initially affirmed. However, the Supreme Court vacated that decision, clarifying the standard for the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) expropriation exception. On remand, the D.C. Circuit found that only the U.S. parent company had a valid claim under international law, as the domestic-takings rule barred the subsidiary’s claim. The district court later dismissed Venezuela as a defendant, leaving the state-owned company as the sole defendant. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the state-owned company’s motion to dismiss. The court held that the FSIA’s expropriation exception applied because Venezuela indirectly expropriated the U.S. company’s property, the state-owned company owns and operates the expropriated assets, and it engages in commercial activity in the United States. The court also held that personal jurisdiction was proper and that the act-of-state doctrine, as limited by the Second Hickenlooper Amendment, did not bar the claim. View "Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co. v. Petroleos De Venezuela, S.A." on Justia Law

Deutsche Telekom, A.G. v. Republic of India

2025-10-03T07:33:11-08:00

A German telecommunications company invested nearly $100 million in an Indian company through a Singaporean subsidiary, acquiring a significant minority stake. The Indian government, through its wholly owned space company, later terminated a contract with the Indian company, prompting the German investor to initiate arbitration in Switzerland under a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between Germany and India. The arbitral tribunal ruled in favor of the German company, awarding it over $93 million, and courts in Switzerland, Germany, and Singapore confirmed the award. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia was then asked to confirm the arbitral award. India moved to dismiss, arguing sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), forum non conveniens, and that the dispute did not fall within the scope of the BIT’s arbitration clause. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the FSIA’s arbitration exception applied, that forum non conveniens was unavailable in such proceedings, and that the parties had delegated questions of arbitrability to the arbitrators, thus precluding judicial review of those issues. The court also found that India had forfeited other merits defenses by not raising them earlier. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the denial of dismissal on immunity and forum non conveniens grounds, but held that the district court erred in refusing to consider India’s substantive defenses to enforcement of the award. The appellate court found that the BIT did not clearly and unmistakably delegate exclusive authority over arbitrability to the arbitrators, so the district court must consider India’s merits defenses under the New York Convention. The judgment confirming the award was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Deutsche Telekom, A.G. v. Republic of India" on Justia Law

America First Legal Foundation v. Greer

2025-10-03T07:33:10-08:00

A nonprofit organization requested that the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) investigate an alleged policy by the Department of Justice (DOJ) that, according to the organization, improperly limited searches for emails in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. The organization believed that DOJ’s refusal to search employee emails without their consent was arbitrary and violated FOIA. After DOJ began producing some records in response to the FOIA request, the organization separately asked OSC to investigate DOJ’s policy under a statutory provision that directs OSC to investigate arbitrary or capricious withholdings of information prohibited by FOIA. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially found that OSC had misinterpreted its authority by refusing to investigate solely because certain statutory prerequisites were not met. However, the district court ultimately dismissed the case, concluding that the decision to investigate under the relevant statute was committed to OSC’s discretion and remanded the matter to OSC for further consideration. After OSC again declined to investigate, the district court dismissed the organization’s remaining claims, leading to this appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo and determined that the organization lacked Article III standing to pursue its claims. The court held that the organization had not suffered a concrete and particularized injury traceable to OSC’s actions, nor was it likely that a favorable court decision would redress any alleged injury. The court found both of the organization’s standing theories—relating to the denial of FOIA records and to the lack of information from an OSC investigation—insufficient. As a result, the court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "America First Legal Foundation v. Greer" on Justia Law

Chen v. FBI

2025-09-30T06:34:16-08:00

A woman who immigrated from China to the United States and later became a U.S. citizen founded an educational institution that participated in a Department of Defense tuition program. In 2010, the FBI began investigating her for statements made on immigration forms, conducting interviews, searches, and seizing personal and business materials. Although the U.S. Attorney’s Office ultimately declined to file charges, Fox News later published reports about her, including confidential materials from the FBI investigation. These reports cited anonymous sources and included documents and photographs seized during the FBI’s search. Following the reports, the Department of Defense terminated her institution’s participation in the tuition program, resulting in significant financial losses. She filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the FBI and other federal agencies, alleging violations of the Privacy Act due to the unauthorized disclosure of her records. During discovery, she was unable to identify the source of the leak despite extensive efforts. She then subpoenaed a Fox News journalist, who authored the reports, to reveal her confidential source. The journalist invoked a qualified First Amendment reporter’s privilege. The district court found that the plaintiff had met the requirements to overcome this privilege—demonstrating both the centrality of the information to her case and exhaustion of alternative sources—and ordered the journalist to testify. When the journalist refused, the court held her in civil contempt. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders. The appellate court held that, under its precedents, a qualified First Amendment reporter’s privilege may be overcome in civil cases if the information sought is crucial to the case and all reasonable alternative sources have been exhausted. The court also declined to recognize a broader federal common law reporter’s privilege. View "Chen v. FBI" on Justia Law

Sierra Club v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

2025-09-30T06:34:15-08:00

The case concerns the approval of a 32-mile natural gas pipeline intended to supply fuel to a new natural-gas turbine that will replace one of two coal-fired units at the Cumberland Fossil Plant in Tennessee. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a federal agency, decided to retire the coal units and replace one with a gas turbine, which is expected to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved the pipeline after preparing a detailed environmental impact statement. The Sierra Club and Appalachian Voices challenged this approval, arguing that FERC’s decision violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Natural Gas Act. Previously, FERC issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the pipeline, finding that market need was established by TVA’s long-term agreement to purchase all pipeline capacity and that the project’s benefits outweighed its harms. FERC also credited the pipeline with enabling a net reduction in emissions due to the coal-to-gas transition. After the Sierra Club requested rehearing, FERC clarified that only one coal unit would be replaced but maintained its approval. The Sierra Club then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied the petitions. The court held that FERC’s approval complied with NEPA and the Natural Gas Act. It found that FERC reasonably analyzed downstream emissions, properly considered the no-action alternative, and was not required to analyze the pipeline and power plant as connected actions because FERC lacked regulatory authority over power generation. The court also held that FERC’s reliance on TVA’s precedent agreement established market need and that FERC’s public interest balancing was reasonable. The court emphasized that, following recent Supreme Court precedent, judicial review of NEPA compliance is highly deferential. View "Sierra Club v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

Antero Resources Corporation v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

2025-09-30T06:34:15-08:00

An independent natural gas producer contracted with a pipeline operator to secure firm transportation capacity through an expansion project, which involved adding new compressor stations to an existing pipeline segment. The producer agreed to pay for the construction of these facilities and the applicable fuel and power charges. The pipeline operator recoups fuel costs through rates based on the amount of gas shipped, with costs increasing exponentially as more gas is transported. After the expansion, the pipeline operator implemented a two-tier fuel rate system: the producer was always charged the highest marginal fuel rate, as if its gas was the last and most expensive to move through the pipeline, while all other shippers paid an average rate. Initially, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved the pipeline operator’s tariff, including the two-tier rate structure, and later reaffirmed this approach when the producer protested after experiencing significantly higher fuel rates compared to other shippers. The producer argued that the rate structure was unduly discriminatory and not “just and reasonable” under the Natural Gas Act. An administrative law judge upheld the rates, and FERC affirmed, reasoning that the producer, as the “but for” cause of the expansion, should bear the highest marginal costs to prevent subsidization by other shippers. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and held that FERC’s approval of the two-tier fuel rate was arbitrary and capricious. The court found that perpetually assigning the producer the highest marginal fuel rate was disconnected from the actual costs imposed by its use of the pipeline and violated the principle of cost causation. The court granted the producer’s petition for review, vacated FERC’s order, and remanded for further proceedings to establish a just and reasonable rate consistent with cost-causation principles. View "Antero Resources Corporation v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

Farahi v. Federal Bureau of Investigation

2025-09-30T06:34:14-08:00

An individual who had lived in the United States since 1993 became the subject of removal proceedings after overstaying his visa. During these proceedings, he sought various forms of relief, while the government opposed his applications by presenting evidence and testimony linking him to high-level terrorists. The individual subsequently submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for his file. The FBI located a substantial volume of potentially responsive records but withheld most of them, citing law enforcement concerns. The requester then filed suit to compel disclosure. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially denied the FBI’s motion for summary judgment without prejudice, requiring updated information on whether enforcement proceedings were still pending or reasonably anticipated, and more detail regarding the segregability of non-exempt information. After the FBI submitted updated public and ex parte declarations confirming that investigations remained ongoing and providing further explanation about segregability, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the FBI. The court found that the records were compiled for law enforcement purposes, that disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere with ongoing or anticipated enforcement proceedings, and that no meaningful non-exempt information was reasonably segregable. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The appellate court held that the FBI met its burden under FOIA Exemption 7(A) by showing the records were compiled for law enforcement purposes and that disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere with pending or reasonably anticipated enforcement proceedings. The court also affirmed the district court’s finding that no reasonably segregable non-exempt information existed. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Farahi v. Federal Bureau of Investigation" on Justia Law

Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Kennedy

2025-09-26T06:02:13-08:00

Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation manufactures Entresto, a drug used to treat chronic heart failure. MSN Pharmaceuticals, Inc. sought approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to market a generic version of Entresto by submitting an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA). MSN’s application excluded certain methods of use protected by Novartis’s patents and claimed that the generic drug contained the same active ingredients as Entresto. The FDA approved MSN’s application, prompting Novartis to challenge the approval, arguing that the generic’s labeling and composition were unlawfully different from Entresto. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed Novartis’s claims under the Administrative Procedure Act. Novartis argued that the FDA’s approval of MSN’s ANDA and denial of Novartis’s citizen petitions were arbitrary and capricious, particularly regarding the omission of patented dosing regimens and indications from the generic’s label, and the determination that the generic contained the same active ingredients as Entresto. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the FDA, finding that the agency’s actions were reasonable and consistent with statutory and regulatory requirements. Novartis appealed this decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the FDA reasonably concluded the generic drug’s labeling changes were permissible to avoid patent infringement and did not render the generic less safe or effective for non-patented uses. The court also found that the FDA’s determination that the generic and Entresto shared the same active ingredients was supported by scientific evidence and regulatory guidance. The court applied de novo review to legal questions and deferred to the FDA’s scientific expertise, ultimately upholding the agency’s approval of MSN’s ANDA. View "Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Estate of Levin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

2025-09-26T06:02:12-08:00

An instrumentality of Iran attempted to wire nearly $10 million through an American bank, but the funds were blocked by the U.S. government under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) due to Iran’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. Two groups of plaintiffs, each holding substantial judgments against Iran for its support of terrorist acts, sought to attach these blocked funds to satisfy their judgments. The funds had been frozen by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and were the subject of a pending civil-forfeiture action initiated by the United States. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially quashed the plaintiffs’ writs of attachment. The court reasoned, first, that the funds were not “blocked assets” as defined by the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) and thus were immune from attachment. Second, it held that the government’s earlier-filed civil-forfeiture action invoked the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, barring any subsequent in rem proceedings against the same property. The district court also noted that the existence of the Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund suggested Congress did not intend to encourage individual attachment actions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. The court held that the funds in question are “blocked assets” under TRIA, as they remain frozen by OFAC and are not subject to a license required by a statute other than IEEPA. The court further held that the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine does not bar multiple in rem proceedings filed in the same court. Accordingly, the court concluded that neither sovereign immunity nor the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine prevented the plaintiffs from seeking attachment of the funds and reversed the district court’s order quashing the writs of attachment. View "Estate of Levin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

United States v. U.S. Cellular Corp.

2025-09-26T06:02:12-08:00

Two individuals brought a lawsuit under the False Claims Act, alleging that a telecommunications company, through a controlled shell entity, fraudulently obtained nearly $113 million in bidding credits during a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum license auction. The core claim was that the shell entity misrepresented its independence and concealed its relationship with the larger company, which, if disclosed, would have disqualified it from receiving small business credits. The relators asserted that the shell entity never operated as a genuine business and had an undisclosed agreement to transfer licenses to the larger company after a regulatory waiting period. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia twice dismissed the case, first without prejudice and then with prejudice, finding that the public-disclosure bar of the False Claims Act applied. The court concluded that the alleged fraud had already been publicly disclosed through the shell entity’s FCC filings, and that the relators’ complaint did not materially add to the information already available. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that, even assuming the prior FCC filings constituted public disclosures of substantially the same fraud, the relators qualified as “original sources” because their allegations materially added to the publicly disclosed information. Specifically, the relators provided new evidence that the shell entity never functioned as an independent business and plausibly alleged an undisclosed agreement to transfer licenses, both of which were not revealed in the public filings. The court found that these additions were significant enough to potentially influence the government’s decision to pursue the case. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. U.S. Cellular Corp." on Justia Law

Capital Power Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

2025-09-26T06:02:11-08:00

Several electricity generators challenged a change in how they are compensated for producing reactive power, a component of electricity necessary for grid stability but not directly consumed by end users. For many years, the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) provided generators with cost-based compensation for reactive power, in addition to market-based payments for real power. In 2022, MISO amended its tariff to eliminate separate compensation for reactive power, meaning neither transmission owners nor independent generators would receive payment for producing it within a standard range. This change was approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and given immediate effect, despite objections from generators who argued they had made investments and entered contracts in reliance on the prior compensation structure. FERC approved MISO’s tariff amendment and denied requests for rehearing, concluding that the comparability standard justified the change and that generators’ reliance interests were either unsupported or outweighed by other considerations. FERC reasoned that generators should not have expected compensation for reactive power to continue indefinitely, especially since prior orders had made such compensation contingent on similar treatment for transmission owners. Generators petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review, arguing that FERC failed to adequately consider their short-term financial reliance on the previous compensation scheme. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that FERC acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to adequately consider the generators’ short-term reliance interests before allowing the tariff change to take immediate effect. The court did not address the substantive validity of the tariff amendment itself but found that FERC’s explanation was insufficient regarding the abrupt elimination of compensation. The court granted the petitions for review, set aside FERC’s orders, and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Capital Power Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

World Shipping Council v. FMC

2025-09-23T06:31:29-08:00

The case concerns a rule issued by the Federal Maritime Commission in 2024 to address concerns about demurrage and detention charges in maritime shipping. These charges are imposed by ocean carriers and marine terminal operators on shippers, truckers, and other entities for delays in the movement or return of shipping containers. The rule sought to clarify which parties could be billed for these charges, limiting invoices to those in a contractual relationship with the billing party—typically shippers or consignees. However, the rule categorically excluded motor carriers from being billed, even when they had a direct contract with the ocean carrier. Prior to review by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the Federal Maritime Commission promulgated the rule and responded to public comments. Initially, the Commission suggested that motor carriers in contractual privity could be billed, but later issued a correction stating that motor carriers could not be billed under any circumstances, regardless of contractual relationship. The World Shipping Council, representing ocean carriers, petitioned for review, arguing that the rule was arbitrary and capricious, among other challenges. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that the Commission’s rule was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court held that the Commission failed to reasonably explain its exclusion of motor carriers from the set of billable parties, despite its stated rationale of limiting billing to those in contractual privity. The court granted the petition for review, severed and set aside the portion of the rule (46 C.F.R. § 541.4) that confined billing to shippers or consignees, and left the remainder of the rule intact. View "World Shipping Council v. FMC" on Justia Law

Marseille-Kliniken AG v. Republic of Equatorial Guinea

2025-09-23T06:31:28-08:00

A Swiss healthcare company entered into a contract with the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to modernize and operate a medical clinic. After the relationship deteriorated, with Equatorial Guinea refusing to allow the company to run the clinic, the company initiated arbitration in Switzerland and was awarded damages. The parties settled the first arbitration, but the company later sought further damages in a second arbitration. Equatorial Guinea challenged the arbitrators’ jurisdiction, arguing that the contract’s dispute-resolution clause required the company to first seek relief in Equatoguinean courts before pursuing international arbitration. The arbitral panel found the clause ambiguous but ultimately concluded that exhaustion of local remedies was not required and awarded the company over $9 million. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the company’s petition to confirm the arbitral award. The court found it had subject-matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s arbitration exception. On the merits, the court deferred to the arbitrators’ interpretation of the dispute-resolution clause, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina, and confirmed the award. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed that the district court had jurisdiction but disagreed with its deferential approach to the arbitrators’ interpretation of the dispute-resolution clause. The appellate court held that, in this context, the question of whether exhaustion of local remedies was required is a substantive arbitrability issue for courts, not arbitrators, to decide. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to resolve the proper interpretation of the dispute-resolution clause. View "Marseille-Kliniken AG v. Republic of Equatorial Guinea" on Justia Law

El Puente de Williamsburg, Inc. v. FERC

2025-09-19T06:32:11-08:00

NFEnergía LLC operates a liquefied natural gas (LNG) import facility in San Juan, Puerto Rico, which was constructed and operated without prior authorization from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). After a series of hurricanes severely damaged Puerto Rico’s electrical grid, NFEnergía sought to expand its operations by building a new pipeline to supply emergency generators operated by the Army Corps of Engineers. FERC asserted jurisdiction over the facility and instructed NFEnergía to apply for the necessary authorization but declined to require the facility to cease operations. When NFEnergía applied for authorization to build the new pipeline, FERC stated it would not take action to prevent construction and operation pending its review, citing the urgent need to stabilize Puerto Rico’s grid and the involvement of multiple federal agencies. Previously, FERC had issued orders asserting jurisdiction over the import facility and requiring NFEnergía to seek authorization, but allowed continued operation due to the emergency circumstances. After NFEnergía applied for authorization for the new pipeline, FERC issued further orders clarifying that it would not prevent immediate construction and operation, and that both the facility and pipeline applications would be reviewed together. FERC denied rehearing and continued processing the applications in a consolidated proceeding. Environmental organizations petitioned for review of these orders, arguing that FERC’s actions amounted to de facto authorization without proper statutory or environmental review. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that FERC’s orders reflected an unreviewable exercise of enforcement discretion, rather than a substantive authorization of the pipeline’s construction and operation. The court found that the Natural Gas Act does not provide guidelines that would rebut the presumption against judicial review of agency non-enforcement decisions. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "El Puente de Williamsburg, Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Compania Cervecera de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. NLRB

2025-09-05T07:00:55-08:00

A brewing and bottling company in Puerto Rico sought to expand its operations and required a continuous, 24/7 work schedule. However, its existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the union representing its employees limited work to five days and forty hours per week, generally excluding weekends. During negotiations for a successor CBA, the employer attempted to impose a six-day work schedule, contrary to the active CBA, and later placed the union president on unpaid leave after he exceeded his annual paid union leave hours. The union president had not requested additional unpaid leave, and the employer had not previously enforced this provision in a similar situation. The union filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging unfair labor practices. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the employer committed three unfair labor practices: retaliating against the union president for protected activities, unilaterally changing a mandatory subject of bargaining by placing him on unpaid leave without a request, and implementing its final offer on work schedules without reaching a good-faith impasse. The NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s findings and conclusions. The employer then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review, while the NLRB sought enforcement of its order. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the NLRB’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and not reversible error. The court denied the employer’s petition for review and granted the NLRB’s cross-application for enforcement. The main holdings were that the employer’s actions constituted adverse employment actions motivated by anti-union animus, that the employer unlawfully changed a mandatory subject of bargaining, and that it improperly implemented its final offer without a good-faith impasse or an overall breakdown in negotiations. View "Compania Cervecera de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

SSM Litigation Group v. EPA

2025-09-05T07:00:55-08:00

A coalition of trade associations, whose members operate stationary sources of air pollution and hold Title V permits under the Clean Air Act, challenged the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) 2023 rescission of a longstanding affirmative defense. This defense had protected permit holders from liability for exceeding emission limits during emergency events, provided certain conditions were met. The EPA rescinded the defense, arguing it was unlawful because it encroached on the judiciary’s authority to impose civil penalties and rendered emission standards non-continuous, allegedly violating the Clean Air Act. The SSM Litigation Group petitioned for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The EPA and environmental intervenors contested the group’s standing, but the court found that SSM had associational standing, as its members were directly regulated and injured by the rescission. SSM’s standing was supported by the administrative record and further confirmed by declarations submitted in its reply brief, which the court accepted. On the merits, the D.C. Circuit reviewed EPA’s action under the Clean Air Act’s standard, which mirrors the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary and capricious review. The court held that EPA’s rescission was based entirely on erroneous legal grounds. First, the court found that the affirmative defense was a complete defense to liability, not a limitation on judicial remedies, and thus did not encroach on the judiciary’s authority. Second, the court determined that the defense did not render emission limitations non-continuous, as it did not suspend the underlying standards. The court concluded that EPA’s rescission was not reasonably explained and not in accordance with law, granted the petition, and reversed the rescission. View "SSM Litigation Group v. EPA" on Justia Law

Jones v. WMATA

2025-09-05T07:00:55-08:00

An employee of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), represented by her union, was the subject of two union grievances: one alleging improper performance evaluations and another alleging bullying by her supervisor. While these grievances were pending, the employee also filed a separate lawsuit in federal district court, asserting claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for race discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation, based on some of the same underlying events. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to WMATA, holding that the settlement agreement reached between WMATA and the union in the grievance process barred the employee’s Title VII lawsuit. The district court interpreted the settlement as an unambiguous release of all claims related to the grievances, including those raised in the federal lawsuit, and therefore did not address the merits of the Title VII claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that the settlement agreement resolved only the union’s contractual grievance claims under the collective bargaining agreement and did not extend to the employee’s independent statutory claims under Title VII. The court emphasized that the agreement’s language was limited to the union grievances and did not reference the pending Title VII lawsuit or purport to waive those claims. The court also noted that any waiver of Title VII rights would require clear and unmistakable language, which was absent here. Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Jones v. WMATA" on Justia Law

Climate United Fund v. Citibank, N.A.

2025-09-02T07:32:29-08:00

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) awarded $16 billion in grants to five nonprofit organizations to support the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, as part of a larger $27 billion congressional appropriation under the Inflation Reduction Act. The grants were structured through agreements between the nonprofits and EPA, with Citibank acting as a financial agent to hold and disburse the funds. After concerns arose regarding conflicts of interest, lack of oversight, and last-minute amendments to the grant agreements, EPA terminated the grants in early 2025. Citibank, following an FBI recommendation, froze the accounts associated with the grants. The nonprofits sued, seeking to prevent the termination and to restore access to the funds. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted a preliminary injunction, ordering EPA and Citibank to continue funding the grants. The district court found it had jurisdiction, concluding the plaintiffs’ claims were not essentially contractual and thus did not need to be brought in the Court of Federal Claims. The court determined the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their constitutional, regulatory, and arbitrary and capricious claims, and that the balance of harms and public interest favored the injunction. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in issuing the injunction. The appellate court found that the plaintiffs’ regulatory and arbitrary and capricious claims were essentially contractual, meaning jurisdiction lay exclusively in the Court of Federal Claims, not the district court. The court also held that the constitutional claim was meritless. The equities and public interest, the appellate court concluded, favored the government’s need for oversight and management of public funds. Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Climate United Fund v. Citibank, N.A." on Justia Law

Forbes v. Phelan

2025-09-02T07:32:28-08:00

A former Navy sailor, Lamar Forbes, was diagnosed with HIV in 2012 and instructed by medical personnel to disclose his status before engaging in sexual activity. Between 2013 and 2015, while stationed in Virginia, Forbes had unprotected sex with four women without informing them of his HIV-positive status. He was charged under several articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), including making a false official statement, sexual assault, and violating Article 134 by incorporating Virginia’s infected sexual battery statute through the Assimilative Crimes Act. Forbes pleaded guilty to some charges, and the military judge sentenced him to eight years’ confinement, reduction in paygrade, and a dishonorable discharge. Forbes appealed his sexual assault convictions to the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (NMCCA), arguing that his conduct did not constitute sexual assault under the UCMJ and that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. He did not appeal his Article 134 or Article 107 convictions. The NMCCA affirmed, relying on precedent that failure to disclose HIV status vitiates consent, making the sexual act an “offensive touching.” The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) affirmed, holding that Forbes’s conduct met the definition of sexual assault under Article 120. On supervised release, Forbes petitioned the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for habeas relief, arguing that the military courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that their interpretation of Article 120 was an unconstitutional ex post facto expansion. The district court denied his petition, finding his challenges nonjurisdictional and procedurally defaulted, and that the military courts had fully and fairly considered his preserved claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Forbes’s challenges were nonjurisdictional, subject to procedural default rules, and that the military courts had given full and fair consideration to his preserved claims. View "Forbes v. Phelan" on Justia Law

United States v. Scott

2025-08-29T06:32:09-08:00

Rowena Joyce Scott served as both the president of the board and general manager of Park Southern Neighborhood Corporation (PSNC), a nonprofit that owned a large apartment building in Washington, D.C. During her tenure, Scott exercised near-total control over PSNC’s finances and operations. She used corporate funds for personal expenses, including luxury items and services, and made significant cash withdrawals from PSNC’s accounts. After PSNC defaulted on a loan, the District of Columbia’s Department of Housing and Community Development intervened, replacing Scott and the board with a new property manager, Vesta Management Corporation, which took possession of PSNC’s records and computers. Subsequent investigation by the IRS led to Scott’s indictment for wire fraud, credit card fraud, and tax offenses. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia presided over Scott’s criminal trial. Scott filed pre-trial motions to suppress statements made to law enforcement and evidence obtained from PSNC’s computers, arguing violations of her Fifth and Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied both motions. After trial, a jury convicted Scott on all counts, and the district court sentenced her to eighteen months’ imprisonment, supervised release, restitution, and a special assessment. Scott appealed her convictions, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the denial of her suppression motions. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Scott forfeited her statute of limitations defense by not raising it in the district court. It found the evidence sufficient to support all convictions, including wire fraud and tax offenses, and determined that Scott was not in Miranda custody during her interview with IRS agents. The court also concluded that the search warrant for PSNC’s computers was supported by probable cause, and that Vesta’s consent validated the search. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "United States v. Scott" on Justia Law

United States v. Pole

2025-08-29T06:32:08-08:00

Ngozi Pole, who served as office manager for Senator Edward Kennedy from 1998 to 2007, was responsible for overseeing the office budget and handling staff bonuses. Between 2003 and 2007, Pole awarded himself substantial, unauthorized bonuses without approval from the Senator or his chief of staff. The scheme was discovered in late 2006 when Pole sought a departure bonus, which he also awarded himself without authorization. After an internal inquiry, the matter was referred to the FBI, leading to Pole’s indictment on five counts of wire fraud and one count of theft of government property. Following a three-week trial in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the jury found Pole guilty on all counts. The court sentenced him to 20 months in prison and ordered restitution of $75,042.37, representing the total unauthorized bonuses minus a small recovered amount. On his initial appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit remanded the case for the district court to consider Pole’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and vacated the restitution order for lack of factual findings. On remand, the district court rejected the ineffective assistance claim and reinstated the restitution order after making the necessary findings. On renewed appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The court held that, even assuming counsel’s performance was deficient, Pole failed to show prejudice as required by Strickland v. Washington, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt and the limited impact of the alleged errors. The court also held that, under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act, restitution could include all losses from the fraudulent scheme, not just those tied to the specific counts of conviction, and found the restitution amount supported by the evidence. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Pole" on Justia Law

Healthy Gulf v. Department of the Interior

2025-08-29T06:32:08-08:00

The case concerns a challenge to the United States Department of the Interior’s approval of the 2024–2029 National Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program, which authorizes up to three lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico region. Environmental organizations argued that the Department failed to adequately assess the risks to vulnerable coastal communities, did not properly consider the endangered Rice’s whale in its environmental sensitivity analysis, overlooked potential conflicts with other ocean uses, and did not sufficiently balance the program’s projected benefits against its environmental costs. The Department, in coordination with the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, had developed the program through a multi-year process involving public comment and environmental review. After the Department finalized the program, the environmental groups and the American Petroleum Institute (API) each petitioned for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. API later withdrew its petition but remained as an intervenor. The environmental petitioners sought to have the program remanded for further consideration, arguing violations of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA). The Department and API contested the petitioners’ standing and the merits of their claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the environmental petitioners had associational standing to pursue their claims. On the merits, the court found that the Department of the Interior had satisfied OCSLA’s requirements by reasonably evaluating environmental justice concerns, the selection of representative species for environmental sensitivity analysis, and potential conflicts with other uses of the Gulf. The court concluded that the Department’s decision-making process was reasoned and not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review, leaving the 2024–2029 leasing program in effect. View "Healthy Gulf v. Department of the Interior" on Justia Law