U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - Justia Case Law Summaries

De la Torre v. Cassidy

2026-07-31T07:32:08-08:00

After a major healthcare system filed for bankruptcy in 2024, a Senate committee initiated an investigation to understand the causes. The committee subpoenaed the system’s former CEO, who had overseen its operations, to testify at a hearing about the bankruptcy. The CEO objected, arguing that the committee’s actions—including the subpoena and subsequent contempt proceedings—violated his Fifth Amendment rights, particularly after he formally invoked those rights and refused to appear. The committee nevertheless proceeded, holding hearings and passing both civil and criminal contempt resolutions, with the full Senate adopting the criminal contempt resolution unanimously. The CEO then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the committee and most of its members, seeking to declare their actions unlawful and to quash the subpoena. He also asked the court to enjoin further punishment for his refusal to testify. The committee moved to dismiss the case, relying on the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution, which protects legislative acts from judicial inquiry. The district court agreed, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction and denying the CEO’s request for jurisdictional discovery, finding the challenged actions fell squarely within the protected legislative sphere. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the Speech or Debate Clause absolutely barred the suit because the conduct challenged—issuing the subpoena, conducting the hearing, and voting on contempt resolutions—were core legislative acts. The court further determined that the CEO’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment did not deprive these acts of their legislative character, nor did allegations about the senators’ motives create an exception. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal and its denial of discovery. View "De la Torre v. Cassidy" on Justia Law

Sookra v. Pfizer Inc.

2026-07-31T07:32:08-08:00

After the death of their fourteen-year-old daughter Taylor Rose Sookra in December 2021, four months after she received Pfizer’s COVID-19 vaccine, Arthur Sookra and April Burch-Sookra filed a lawsuit. They alleged willful misconduct under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) against Pfizer, federal officials, the physician who administered the vaccine, and the pediatric practice. Their claims included both federal law claims and state-law tort claims. Initially, the case was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. When the Sookras added a PREP Act willful-misconduct claim, they requested and obtained a transfer to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, as required by the statute. The defendants moved to dismiss, and the motions were referred to a magistrate judge who recommended dismissal of the claims against the federal government on sovereign immunity grounds and against Pfizer for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The magistrate also recommended dismissal of Pfizer’s state-law claims based on immunity and advised that the court decline supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. The district court adopted these recommendations, dismissed the case, and denied as moot the plaintiffs’ later request for a three-judge court. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the district court erred by dismissing the complaint without first convening a three-judge court, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(e)(5) for willful-misconduct claims under the PREP Act. The appellate court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to initiate procedures for convening a three-judge court. The court did not address the other arguments raised by the parties. View "Sookra v. Pfizer Inc." on Justia Law

Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation v. USA

2026-07-31T07:32:08-08:00

The case concerns a dispute over whether the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation is entitled, under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA), to restoration of approximately 1.5 million acres of unallotted land within the Uncompahgre Reservation in Utah. The Tribe argued that it was entitled to reclaim these lands, asserting that historical treaties, statutes, and executive orders granted it compensable title—meaning a right to proceeds from any sale of these lands. The federal government and the State of Utah, on the other hand, contended that the Tribe never acquired such compensable title for the Utah reservation lands; rather, any compensable title extended only to lands within the Tribe’s original reservation in Colorado. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the Tribe’s challenge to the Department of the Interior’s denial of restoration. In that court, all parties agreed that only lands to which the Tribe had compensable title could be restored under the IRA. The district court found that none of the relevant treaties, statutes, or executive orders gave the Tribe compensable title to the disputed lands in Utah, and thus granted summary judgment to the federal defendants and Utah, while denying the Tribe’s cross-motion. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The appellate court held that, under the text and structure of the 1880 Act and subsequent legal developments, the Tribe’s compensable title did not extend to unallotted lands within the Uncompahgre Reservation in Utah. Therefore, those lands are not eligible for restoration under the IRA. The court rejected the Tribe’s various historical and statutory arguments to the contrary and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. View "Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation v. USA" on Justia Law

Ruppe v. Rubio

2026-07-31T07:32:07-08:00

A Foreign Service officer who had worked for the State Department since 1993 alleged discrimination after being denied a promotion and experiencing difficult interactions with a supervisor, whom she accused of discriminatory conduct. She filed an Equal Employment Opportunity complaint and then sued the Department, raising five claims under Title VII, one under the Rehabilitation Act, and one under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), seeking over $10,000 in damages for the FLSA claim. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment for the State Department on all the Title VII and Rehabilitation Act claims. Regarding the FLSA claim, even though both parties argued that the district court had jurisdiction, the court relied on the D.C. Circuit’s prior decision in Waters v. Rumsfeld, which held that only the Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction over FLSA claims against the United States seeking more than $10,000. Based on that precedent, the district court transferred the FLSA claim to the Court of Federal Claims. The plaintiff appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for the State Department on the Title VII and Rehabilitation Act claims. However, the appellate court held that the district courts and the Court of Federal Claims have concurrent jurisdiction over FLSA damages claims against the United States, overruling its previous decision in Waters in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Bormes. The court vacated the transfer of the FLSA claim and remanded the case for further proceedings on that claim in the district court. Thus, the judgment was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Ruppe v. Rubio" on Justia Law

USA v. Johnson

2026-07-31T07:32:07-08:00

The defendant in this case used an encrypted filesharing site to acquire hundreds of videos containing child sexual abuse material (CSAM), which he then uploaded to his Google Drive account and stored on his computer. In October 2020, Google’s automated software identified some of these files as likely CSAM and, following federal law, sent so-called “CyberTip” reports to the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC). NCMEC’s automated system, in turn, forwarded the reports and files to law enforcement, specifically a detective in the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, D.C. The detective initially viewed some of the CSAM files without a warrant, then consulted a federal prosecutor and sought a warrant to review the files. A magistrate judge, however, advised that no warrant was needed, citing the “private search” doctrine, and the detective proceeded accordingly. Subsequent searches led to further evidence and ultimately to the defendant’s arrest and indictment for possession and transportation of CSAM. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied the defendant’s motions to suppress the evidence, reasoning that even if there was a Fourth Amendment violation when the detective first viewed the files without a warrant, suppression was unwarranted under the good-faith exception and independent-source doctrine. The court also rejected the argument that the residential search warrant only permitted seizure, not search, of digital devices. After an eight-day trial, a jury convicted the defendant on multiple counts related to possession and transportation of CSAM. The court further declined to reduce the sentencing offense level as requested by the defendant. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that, even assuming a Fourth Amendment violation occurred when the detective viewed the files without a warrant, suppression was not warranted because the government later obtained lawful authority from a magistrate judge and the detective acted in good faith. The court also found the residential search warrant authorized both seizure and search of digital devices and upheld the sentencing determination. View "USA v. Johnson" on Justia Law

USA v. Payne

2026-07-31T07:32:07-08:00

After a drive-by shooting targeted Antonio Payne’s home in Washington, D.C., police responded to the scene. Surveillance footage from neighbors captured Payne confronting an unidentified man, during which Payne was seen holding a gun, frisking the man, and making threatening statements. Payne was observed stepping off his driveway onto the alley while armed. Officers, invited into the home by Payne’s mother, saw ammunition in plain view. Detective interviews and a review of the footage led to a search warrant application for the home for evidence of carrying a pistol without a license. The warrant, which contained a typographical error in the cited statute but correctly described the offense, was granted. Upon execution, multiple firearms, drugs, and related materials were found. DNA testing linked Payne to several firearms. Before trial, Payne moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the warrant lacked probable cause. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied the motion, finding probable cause based on Payne’s matching clothing, video evidence of him with a gun, and the shooting incident. At trial, Payne conceded he was filmed carrying a gun and stipulated he lacked a license. The jury found him guilty on all counts, including carrying a pistol without a license. Payne was sentenced to 235 months’ imprisonment and 60 months’ supervised release, and he appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court’s rulings. The appellate court held that, even assuming the warrant lacked probable cause, the officers’ objectively reasonable reliance on the warrant triggered the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The court also found sufficient evidence supported Payne’s conviction for carrying a pistol without a license, as video footage and trial concessions established the offense’s elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The court rejected Payne’s new arguments regarding the statute’s typographical error and self-defense. View "USA v. Payne" on Justia Law

Advanced Energy United v. FERC

2026-07-31T07:32:06-08:00

The case centers on reforms to the process by which new energy generators, particularly renewable energy sources, connect to the nation’s power grid. At the end of 2023, a significant backlog existed, with about 2,600 gigawatts of proposed generation and storage capacity awaiting interconnection studies, mainly from solar, wind, and energy storage projects. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) determined that delays and inefficiencies in the existing interconnection process were creating unjust and unreasonable conditions in wholesale energy markets, hindering timely development and competition. FERC responded by issuing Order 2023, acting under its remedial authority in Section 206 of the Federal Power Act. Order 2023 mandated nationwide reforms for transmission providers, replacing the prior serial study model with a clustered study approach, requiring more substantial deposits, imposing withdrawal fines, establishing firm study deadlines, and implementing automatic late fees for missed deadlines. FERC also standardized affected-system study procedures and adopted energy-service modeling as the default. Following thirty-two rehearing and clarification requests, FERC issued Order 2023-A, reaffirming its findings and adjustments. Petitioners challenged three major aspects: the withdrawal fines, study deadlines backed by late fees, and the energy-service modeling requirement. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that FERC acted within its statutory authority, reasonably explained its reforms, and provided adequate process and safeguards. The court denied all petitions, holding that FERC’s nationwide interconnection regime and rulemaking under Order 2023 were lawful, not arbitrary or capricious, and did not unduly discriminate or violate constitutional protections. The court also affirmed that FERC reasonably balanced competing interests and that its reforms were supported by substantial evidence. View "Advanced Energy United v. FERC" on Justia Law

The Estate of Jennions v. CFTC

2026-07-28T07:02:15-08:00

An individual who formerly worked at major international banks provided information to the United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority (UK FCA) regarding alleged manipulation of widely used foreign exchange benchmark rates. This person asserted that traders at certain banks engaged in practices to benefit the institutions at the expense of clients during the setting of the benchmark rates. The UK FCA later became publicly linked to the issue through a media article describing the manipulation scheme. The United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) subsequently initiated an investigation based on the media article, ultimately resulting in enforcement actions and significant penalties against five banks for attempted manipulation of the benchmark rates. After the CFTC’s enforcement actions concluded, the individual submitted an application for a whistleblower award, asserting that his information provided to the UK FCA had set the investigation in motion and led to the enforcement actions. The Whistleblower Claims Review Staff at the CFTC determined that the applicant was ineligible for an award, concluding that the information he provided was not sufficiently specific, credible, or timely to have triggered the investigation, and that the investigation was prompted by the media article rather than his contributions. The applicant challenged the denial, arguing both that his information was central to the investigation and that there was improper internal influence affecting the decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the CFTC’s denial under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court held that the CFTC’s determination was supported by substantial evidence, finding that the investigation was initiated by the media article’s detailed reporting, not by the applicant’s information, and that no evidence demonstrated improper influence or prejudice in the agency’s process. The court denied the petition for review, upholding the CFTC’s denial of the whistleblower award. View "The Estate of Jennions v. CFTC" on Justia Law

Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA

2026-07-28T07:02:15-08:00

Several environmental organizations challenged a rule issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that modified how the agency determines whether a stationary source of air pollution requires a permit for modifications under the Clean Air Act’s New Source Review (NSR) program. The core factual issue concerned whether, in assessing if a physical or operational change at a facility triggers the need for an NSR permit, the EPA may consider both emission increases and decreases attributable to a single project (“project emissions accounting”) at the initial step of the permitting process. Previously, the EPA used a two-step process: Step One evaluated whether a proposed project would itself cause a significant emissions increase, and Step Two determined whether any source-wide emissions decreases would offset that increase. The challenged rule allowed for netting both increases and decreases within a single project at Step One. Petitioners argued that this change would allow regulated entities to avoid NSR by aggregating unrelated activities and relying on emissions decreases that were not contemporaneous with increases. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the petitions after several environmental groups sought judicial review following the EPA’s adoption of the project emissions accounting rule and related interpretive guidance. The court found that at least one petitioner had standing based on alleged injury from increased emissions at a specific facility. The court held that the EPA’s rule was not contrary to law and did not violate the Clean Air Act, as it consistently applied the statutory definition of “modification” and fell within the agency’s reasonable interpretive discretion. The court further held that the rule was not arbitrary or capricious, finding the EPA’s explanations for its approach to project aggregation and recordkeeping requirements sufficient. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA" on Justia Law

PhantomALERT Inc. v. Apple Inc.

2026-07-24T08:02:47-08:00

PhantomALERT, a developer of a traffic app that crowdsources real-time data, modified its app in early 2020 to help users spot and avoid Covid-19 outbreaks. Apple rejected PhantomALERT’s updated app from its App Store, citing new guidelines limiting Covid-19-related apps to those from recognized health entities and requiring apps in highly regulated fields to be submitted by legal entities, not individual developers. PhantomALERT was invited to revise and resubmit its app for compliance. The Google Play Store also rejected the app for similar reasons. Apple later updated its guidelines, allowing certain Covid-related apps endorsed by government entities, but PhantomALERT alleged it was not notified of this change. PhantomALERT sued Apple in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, claiming violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act, California antitrust law, and California unfair competition law. Apple moved to dismiss, and PhantomALERT missed the deadline for an opposition brief, instead filing an amended complaint. The district court dismissed the original complaint without prejudice as conceded and denied leave to late-file the amended complaint, finding it futile. The court determined PhantomALERT’s antitrust allegations failed to define a relevant product or geographic market and that prerequisites for injunctive relief under California law were not met. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s order de novo, finding the dismissal was final and appealable. The Circuit affirmed, holding that PhantomALERT failed to plausibly allege relevant product markets for its Sherman Act claims, including the alleged App Store single-brand aftermarket and submarket for Covid-19-related tracing apps. The court concluded the amended complaint did not state a claim under federal or California antitrust laws, nor under California’s unfair competition law. The dismissal was affirmed without prejudice. View "PhantomALERT Inc. v. Apple Inc." on Justia Law

Fairholme Funds, Inc v. FHFA

2026-07-24T08:02:47-08:00

In the aftermath of the 2008 housing crisis, Congress created the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and authorized it to place Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship. The FHFA and the U.S. Treasury entered into agreements whereby the Treasury would provide capital to these companies, initially in exchange for fixed-rate dividends. In 2012, these agreements were amended so that Fannie and Freddie were required to pay the Treasury dividends equal to their net worth above a specified reserve, a change known as the “Net Worth Sweep.” The announcement of this amendment caused the value of Fannie and Freddie shares to drop significantly, and shareholders, including those holding both common and junior preferred shares, filed suit alleging various statutory and contract violations. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially dismissed most claims, but after appellate review and remand, permitted the shareholders’ implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim to proceed to trial. The jury found the FHFA had violated this implied covenant by adopting the Net Worth Sweep, awarding over $612 million in damages, which the district court increased to $812 million with prejudgment interest. The district court denied the FHFA’s post-trial motions and rejected shareholders’ attempts to seek restitution or reliance damages beyond expectation damages. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Court of Appeals held that the implied covenant claim was not foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent or by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act, that the claim was available against the FHFA as conservator, and that the Net Worth Sweep violated the reasonable expectations of shareholders. The court also determined that post-Net Worth Sweep purchasers of shares could pursue the claim, and that the denial of restitution and reliance damages was proper. Accordingly, the award of expectation damages was affirmed. View "Fairholme Funds, Inc v. FHFA" on Justia Law

American Whitewater v. FERC

2026-07-24T08:02:46-08:00

A non-profit river conservation and recreation organization, whose members include kayakers and canoers in Missouri, sought to intervene out of time in a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) license surrender proceeding for the Niangua Hydroelectric Project in Missouri. The project, completed in 1930, impounded the Niangua River and created Lake Niangua. After decades of operation and relicensing, the licensee decided not to pursue relicensing, proposing to decommission the project but leave the dam in place. The organization argued its members would be directly affected and that its participation would represent public interest, but it missed the intervention deadline due to lack of awareness of the proceeding. FERC denied the organization’s unopposed motion to intervene out of time, finding it failed to demonstrate good cause for late filing under its procedural rules. FERC also denied rehearing, reiterating that lack of awareness of a publicly noticed proceeding did not constitute good cause and that, per its precedent, failure to show good cause was sufficient to deny intervention without considering other factors. The Commission subsequently approved the license surrender with the dam left in place, rejecting the organization’s comments. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. It held that FERC did not err in interpreting its rule to require a late intervenor to show good cause for the late filing, but concluded that FERC acted arbitrarily and capriciously by inconsistently applying its precedent on late intervention without providing a reasoned explanation. The court vacated FERC’s orders and remanded the case for reconsideration and a reasoned explanation consistent with FERC’s precedent. View "American Whitewater v. FERC" on Justia Law

Johnson v. DC

2026-07-24T08:02:46-08:00

A long-serving correctional officer at the District of Columbia Department of Corrections was terminated from her position after nearly three decades of service. During the COVID-19 pandemic, she became increasingly vocal about perceived failures in the Department’s response to the crisis. In her role as a union leader, she forwarded internal Department emails to union attorneys and participated in a local television interview criticizing the Department’s pandemic management. The Department launched an investigation, ultimately determining that she violated confidentiality policies and terminated her employment, despite a hearing officer’s recommendation for a lesser penalty. After her termination, she filed suit in D.C. Superior Court against the Department’s leadership, alleging that her firing violated her First Amendment rights. The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, where both sides moved for summary judgment. The district court found triable issues of fact regarding whether her termination was motivated by protected speech and denied qualified immunity to the individual defendants. The defendants sought reconsideration, which was denied, and then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to her claim that she was fired for forwarding confidential emails, finding no violation of a clearly established First Amendment right in those circumstances. However, the court affirmed the denial of qualified immunity for the claim that she was fired for giving a media interview, concluding that if her termination was motivated by the interview, it would violate clearly established First Amendment law. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. DC" on Justia Law

Titan Consortium 1, LLC v. Argentine Republic

2026-07-21T08:02:42-08:00

Spanish investment companies alleged that Argentina unlawfully expropriated their airline investments, violating a bilateral treaty. After Argentina took over private airlines, the investors initiated arbitration at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The ICSID tribunal awarded over $320 million to the investors, and an internal appellate committee later affirmed the award and added more than $1 million in costs. The investors then assigned their rights to Titan Consortium 1, LLC, which sought enforcement of the award in the United States four years after the initial award. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed Titan’s petition to enforce the arbitral award. Argentina moved to dismiss, arguing the petition was untimely under a three-year statute of limitations. The district court denied the motion, holding that the twelve-year statute of limitations for enforcement of money judgments under D.C. Code § 15-101 applied. It granted summary judgment for Titan, enforcing the award. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed Argentina’s appeal, which challenged only the timeliness ruling. The court considered which statute of limitations applies to enforcement actions under 22 U.S.C. § 1650a, the statute implementing the Washington Convention. The court held that D.C. Code § 15-101’s twelve-year limitations period for enforcement of money judgments is the closest analogue and applies to petitions enforcing ICSID awards under § 1650a. It rejected Argentina’s arguments for a three-year limitations period under federal or D.C. arbitration statutes, noting the differences in statutory text and enforcement procedures. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding Titan’s enforcement action was timely. View "Titan Consortium 1, LLC v. Argentine Republic" on Justia Law

Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation v. Kennedy

2026-07-21T08:02:39-08:00

Several pharmaceutical manufacturers participating in the federal 340B program, which requires them to provide discounted drugs to qualifying healthcare providers, proposed changing how they fulfill this obligation. Historically, these manufacturers complied by offering upfront discounts on eligible drug purchases. In 2024, they sought to implement a new rebate model, where providers would purchase drugs at full price and receive a post-purchase rebate to reach the required discounted price. The Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), through the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), responded that such rebate mechanisms had not been approved for these entities, requested further information, and stated that the manufacturers could not move forward with the new models without official approval. The manufacturers sued the Secretary in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that the statute allowed them to unilaterally implement rebate models unless expressly disapproved by the Secretary. Advocacy groups and hospitals intervened, contending that rebate models were not permitted at all. The district court granted summary judgment for the Secretary, concluding that manufacturers could not implement such rebate systems without prior approval. Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the statutory text of Section 340B permits rebate models but requires the Secretary to affirmatively provide for such mechanisms before manufacturers may implement them. The court found that the statute vests authority in the Secretary to determine acceptable pricing mechanisms and that manufacturers cannot act unilaterally in this regard. Because the Secretary had not approved the proposed rebate models, the court concluded that the manufacturers’ intended implementation was properly blocked. The appellate court therefore affirmed the district court’s decision in favor of the Secretary. View "Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Thrivent Financial for Lutherans v. SEC

2026-07-21T08:02:36-08:00

Thrivent Financial for Lutherans and its subsidiary, which sell securities including variable annuities and life insurance contracts, are required as broker-dealers to be members of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). FINRA’s rules mandate that disputes with customers be arbitrated in FINRA’s forum and prohibit class action waivers in customer agreements, which conflicted with Thrivent’s preferred arbitration process. Thrivent sought to have its own dispute resolution program, culminating in binding arbitration in a non-FINRA forum, applied to all customer disputes involving these products. After FINRA interpreted its rules as prohibiting Thrivent’s program, Thrivent petitioned the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to amend or abrogate the relevant FINRA arbitration rules, arguing they violated the Federal Arbitration Act. After receiving no response for nearly a year, Thrivent sought mandamus relief from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which was denied. Eventually, the SEC denied the petition for rulemaking in a brief letter that cited resource constraints and agency discretion but did not specifically address Thrivent’s arguments or provide a substantive rationale. Thrivent then petitioned the D.C. Circuit for review of the SEC’s denial. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that while agency discretion in rulemaking is broad, the SEC’s denial was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to provide a reasoned explanation particular to Thrivent’s petition. The court did not address the underlying merits of Thrivent’s claim or the validity of the FINRA rules. Instead, it granted the petition in part, remanding the matter to the SEC for further consideration and a more reasoned explanation. The court otherwise denied Thrivent’s petition for review. View "Thrivent Financial for Lutherans v. SEC" on Justia Law

USA v. Navarro

2026-07-21T08:02:34-08:00

Peter Navarro, a former senior adviser in the Trump administration, published materials and made public statements in 2021 about a plan to delay the certification of the 2020 presidential election. The U.S. House Select Committee investigating the January 6th Capitol attack subpoenaed Navarro for documents and deposition testimony related to these statements. Navarro refused to comply, asserting executive privilege before even seeing the subpoena and declining to engage with the Committee regarding his privilege claim. After the compliance deadline passed, the House voted to hold him in contempt, and a grand jury indicted him on two counts of contempt of Congress. In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Navarro moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that former President Trump had invoked executive privilege on his behalf. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found no evidence that Trump or his designee had actually invoked executive privilege in connection with the subpoena and denied the motion to dismiss. The court also granted a government motion to prevent Navarro from arguing at trial that a good-faith belief in executive privilege excused his noncompliance. A jury found Navarro guilty on both counts. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that only the President or a designated official can invoke executive privilege and that the district court did not clearly err in finding no such invocation occurred for Navarro’s subpoena. The court further held that executive privilege, even if properly invoked, would not have excused Navarro’s blanket refusal to comply, especially regarding his public statements and writings. It also affirmed that a mistaken belief in the applicability of executive privilege is not a defense to contempt of Congress. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. Navarro" on Justia Law

Public Safety Spectrum Alliance v. FCC

2026-07-21T08:02:30-08:00

The case centers on the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) regulation of the 4.9 GHz band, which is allocated for public safety communications but has seen very limited use. To address underutilization, the FCC created a plan to appoint a “Band Manager” to oversee this spectrum. The new rules allow the Band Manager to transfer unused portions of the spectrum to FirstNet, a federal entity that operates a public safety network in a different frequency band. Incumbent licensees, such as local governments and transit agencies, faced restrictions limiting their rights to expand use within this band, while some organizations argued the FCC did not go far enough in reallocating the spectrum. Several parties challenged the FCC’s order. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit addressed whether the petitioners had standing. It found that the Public Safety Spectrum Alliance and the Public Safety Broadband Technology Association lacked Article III standing due to insufficient evidence of injury to their members, and thus their petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. However, the court determined that at least one petitioner from the Coalition for Emergency Response and Critical Infrastructure, specifically the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District, had standing, allowing the court to consider their claims. On the merits, the court held that the FCC’s order did not violate statutory limitations on FirstNet’s authority, did not require competitive bidding under the Communications Act, and did not unlawfully assign spectrum to a federal entity. The court also found that the FCC’s actions were not arbitrary or capricious, as the agency reasonably balanced the interests of incumbent licensees against the public interest and explained its regulatory choices. Challenges to the lawfulness of future spectrum transfers to FirstNet were deemed unripe. The court dismissed the petitions lacking standing and denied or dismissed the remaining challenges. View "Public Safety Spectrum Alliance v. FCC" on Justia Law

Beyond Nuclear, Inc. v. NRC

2026-07-21T08:02:27-08:00

The case concerns a challenge brought by two environmental organizations to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) 2024 revision of its Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS), which is used to evaluate the environmental effects of renewing operating licenses for nuclear power plants. The petitioners argued that the NRC inadequately considered how aging reactor components and the impacts of climate change could increase the risk of severe nuclear accidents, which in turn could have significant environmental consequences. Previously, the NRC revised its GEIS to generically determine that the environmental risks from “severe accidents” at nuclear plants during license renewals were “small,” relying on updated data and a conservative risk analysis. This revision classified most severe accident risks as “Category 1,” meaning they did not require further plant-specific analysis unless new and significant information arose. The NRC also determined that plants that had previously completed an analysis of severe-accident mitigation alternatives (SAMAs) did not need to repeat that process unless new circumstances warranted it. The petitioners sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, challenging these determinations. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the NRC’s actions under the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard, which is deferential to agency expertise in matters of environmental impact analysis. The court found that the NRC had reasonably considered both aging and climate change as factors influencing accident risk, explained its reliance on regulatory oversight and conservative assumptions, and provided adequate opportunity for site-specific review if new information emerged. The court held that the NRC’s generic analysis and procedures did not violate the National Environmental Policy Act or the Administrative Procedure Act, and it denied the petition for review. View "Beyond Nuclear, Inc. v. NRC" on Justia Law

Save the Sound, Inc. v. FAA

2026-07-21T08:02:24-08:00

A regional airport in Connecticut faced operational challenges due to a short runway and an outdated, flood-prone terminal. To address these issues, the airport authority proposed a project to extend the runway by about 1,000 feet and construct a new terminal. The authority also planned, in its long-term Master Plan, to upgrade taxiways, but those upgrades were not part of the immediate project seeking final approval. The expansion aimed to allow full-capacity flights for common aircraft and improve passenger facilities. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) provided conditional approval for all projects in the Master Plan but granted final approval only for the runway extension and new terminal. The FAA conducted an environmental assessment (EA) for these two elements, concluding there would be no significant environmental effects, and thus did not prepare a full environmental impact statement (EIS). The EA included projections for increased passenger enplanements, consideration of air pollution, and mitigation measures for flooding and wetlands. The FAA determined the taxiway upgrades were not part of the current project because they were not expected to be pursued within five years and had independent utility. Petitioners, an environmental group and a town, challenged the FAA's approval in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. They argued the FAA violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in several ways, including improper segmentation of the project, failure to consider cumulative effects, and inadequate analysis of environmental impacts. The Court applied a highly deferential standard of review, consistent with Supreme Court precedent in Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, and found the FAA acted reasonably in its project definition, environmental analysis, and mitigation measures. The Court denied the petitions for review, holding that the FAA’s approval complied with NEPA’s procedural requirements and was not arbitrary or capricious. View "Save the Sound, Inc. v. FAA" on Justia Law

USA v. Jones

2026-07-21T08:02:21-08:00

Two underage girls, after running away from a residential facility in Virginia in April 2019, traveled to Washington, D.C., where they became involved in commercial sex trafficking. Initially, Curtis Fowler and Brittany Jones attempted to arrange commercial sex encounters for the girls, but were unsuccessful. Jones then contacted Willis Pierre Lewis and his associate Ashley Taylor, who subsequently took control of the girls’ activities, arranged for commercial sex acts, and managed their earnings, often through coercive means, including threats and violence. The girls engaged in numerous commercial sex acts over several weeks under the direction of Lewis and his associates. The trafficking came to light after the FBI received a tip and interviewed the victims. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia tried the case. A jury convicted Lewis and Jones on various charges related to sex trafficking and related offenses. Lewis was sentenced to life imprisonment, while Jones received a sentence of 168 months. Both defendants appealed, raising claims regarding a prejudicial variance between the indictment and trial evidence, evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, sentencing procedures, and, in Jones’s case, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the appeals. The court held that the evidence at trial supported the existence of a single conspiracy, rejecting the claim of a prejudicial variance. The court found any errors in evidentiary rulings to be harmless and concluded that Lewis had not demonstrated reversible plain error in the jury instructions. The court affirmed the convictions of both Lewis and Jones. However, it determined that the district court erred by failing to make necessary factual findings regarding sentencing enhancements and by not adequately explaining its sentencing decision for Lewis. Thus, Lewis’s sentence was vacated and remanded for resentencing, while Jones’s conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "USA v. Jones" on Justia Law

Hospital Menonita de Guayama, Inc. v. NLRB

2026-07-21T08:02:18-08:00

A hospital in Puerto Rico underwent a change in ownership in 2017. The union that had previously represented the hospital’s employees claimed to remain the representative for five bargaining units. However, the union had not secured contracts for two units and the contracts for the other three units had expired several years earlier. After initially recognizing the union, the new hospital owner received evidence that most, and in one case all, employees in each unit no longer supported the union. The hospital then withdrew recognition and refused to bargain with the union. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) charged the hospital with unfair labor practices, alleging unlawful refusal to bargain and withdrawal of recognition. An administrative law judge ruled against the hospital, applying the NLRB’s “successor bar” doctrine, which requires a new employer to recognize and bargain with an incumbent union for up to one year following a change in ownership, regardless of current employee support. A divided panel of the NLRB affirmed this ruling, ordering the hospital to bargain with the union. The hospital petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to review the decision, challenging the legality of the successor bar. Initially, the Court of Appeals upheld the Board’s rule, granting deference to the NLRB’s policy judgment. However, after the Supreme Court decided *Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo*, which eliminated judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations, the Supreme Court vacated the appellate decision and remanded for reconsideration. On remand, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the successor bar conflicts with the National Labor Relations Act’s guarantees of employee choice and majority rule. The court granted the hospital’s petition for review, denied the NLRB’s cross-petition for enforcement, and remanded the case, holding that the Board lacked statutory authority to impose the successor bar. View "Hospital Menonita de Guayama, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Akhmetshin v. Browder

2026-07-17T06:33:11-08:00

Two individuals became involved in a public dispute relating to allegations of Russian interference and the passage of the Magnitsky Act. One party, a British citizen, made several statements in media interviews and social media posts from New York, characterizing the other party—a Russian-American lobbyist—as a “spy operator in Washington, D.C.” and linking him to a controversial meeting at Trump Tower in New York. The lobbyist claimed these statements were defamatory and brought suit in the District of Columbia, arguing that the statements caused harm to his reputation in D.C. and that the speaker’s comments established personal jurisdiction. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the claim and dismissed the case, holding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the British citizen. The district court also denied the speaker’s request for attorney’s fees under the D.C. Anti–SLAPP Act, finding that such fees were not warranted because the dismissal was based on lack of jurisdiction rather than on a motion under the statute. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the British citizen did not “purposefully avail” himself of the benefits and protections of D.C. law, as required under the minimum-contacts test from International Shoe Co. v. Washington. The statements at issue did not focus on D.C. or create jurisdictionally significant contacts with the forum. The court also affirmed the denial of attorney’s fees, ruling that the D.C. Anti–SLAPP Act does not apply when the dismissal is for lack of personal jurisdiction rather than under the statute’s special motion to dismiss. The court denied the request for jurisdictional discovery. View "Akhmetshin v. Browder" on Justia Law

USA v. Zobel

2026-07-17T06:33:06-08:00

David Jeremy Zobel was indicted in the District of Columbia on charges including child-pornography distribution and attempted sexual exploitation of a minor. The charges stemmed from an undercover FBI operation in which an individual, believed to be Zobel, engaged in online chat conversations, shared child pornography, and claimed to be a convicted sex offender. The government matched details from the chat, including photographs of court documents, to Zobel’s prior conviction in Ohio. When agents approached Zobel, he fled but was later apprehended, and evidence linked his device to the chats. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed several motions in limine concerning the admissibility of evidence related to Zobel’s prior conviction. Initially, the court excluded a summary of Zobel’s 2011 conviction under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 414, reasoning that the probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice under Rule 403. The court indicated this decision could be reconsidered if the defense raised an identity argument. Later, as the defense confirmed an identity defense, the government renewed its request to admit the evidence, but the district court maintained its exclusion of all references to the prior conviction, including statements and photographs from the chats. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s evidentiary rulings. The court held it had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 because the government timely appealed the exclusion orders. The main holding was that the district court misapplied the interplay between Rules 403 and 414 by treating any propensity inference from prior child molestation as categorically unfairly prejudicial. The appellate court vacated the district court’s exclusion of evidence related to Zobel’s prior conviction and remanded for reconsideration under the correct legal standard. View "USA v. Zobel" on Justia Law

Clean Air Council v. EPA

2026-07-17T06:33:01-08:00

This case concerns the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) extension of compliance deadlines for steel mills to meet hazardous emission standards. The EPA initially issued an interim rule, then a final rule, extending deadlines for various emission controls and monitoring requirements. EPA explained that the original deadlines were technologically infeasible due to unforeseen technical challenges and incomplete data. The revised deadlines allowed steel mills more time—up to three years after the rule’s promulgation date—to comply with standards for emission sources such as bleeder valve openings, bell leaks, slag processing, beaching, and furnace emissions monitoring. EPA also revised the timeline for fenceline monitoring based on delays in developing testing methods. Environmental groups petitioned for reconsideration of the 2024 Rule, citing procedural and substantive objections. EPA first denied the need for reconsideration but later identified issues warranting further review, issuing a stay and an interim rule. After receiving public comments, EPA promulgated a final rule, confirming the extended deadlines and explaining the compliance difficulties. Petitioners challenged both the interim and final rules, arguing that EPA exceeded its authority and failed to set deadlines as expeditiously as practicable under the Clean Air Act. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the petitions. The court held that EPA’s revised compliance deadlines were consistent with the Clean Air Act and adequately explained, distinguishing the rulemaking from prior actions that merely delayed rules for reconsideration. The court determined that EPA had authority to reset deadlines based on substantive, technological challenges. The court dismissed the procedural challenge to the interim rule as moot, since EPA had followed proper procedures in the final rule. The challenge to the fenceline monitoring deadline was also dismissed, as the new and original deadlines had converged. The court denied all other petitions for review. View "Clean Air Council v. EPA" on Justia Law

USA v. Abukhatallah

2026-07-17T06:32:56-08:00

In September 2012, a group of terrorists attacked the U.S. Special Mission in Benghazi, Libya, resulting in the deaths of four Americans. Ahmed Abu Khatallah, a leader of the militia Ubaydah Bin Jarrah, played a significant role in planning and executing the attack. He participated in weapons procurement, coordinated with other militants, and was present at the Mission during the assault. Surveillance footage and witness testimony linked Khatallah to key actions before, during, and after the attack, including efforts to undermine the local security force protecting the Mission. After his arrest in 2014, Khatallah was tried in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The jury convicted him on four counts, including conspiracy and material support for terrorism, but acquitted him of charges related to the deaths and the subsequent attack on a nearby compound. The district court initially sentenced him to twenty-two years in prison, a sentence the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit later found unreasonably lenient and vacated. On remand, the district court imposed a twenty-eight-year sentence, justifying its downward variance from the Guidelines based on respect for the jury’s verdict, the context of the offenses, and Khatallah’s status as a deportable alien. Upon the government’s appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit again found the sentence substantively unreasonable. The appellate court held that the district court’s justifications did not support the extent of the downward variance given the seriousness of the offenses, the need for deterrence, and public protection. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, instructing the district court to give greater weight to these considerations and not to minimize the gravity of Khatallah’s conduct. View "USA v. Abukhatallah" on Justia Law

USA v. Littlejohn

2026-07-17T06:32:51-08:00

Charles Littlejohn, seeking to influence the outcome of a presidential election and raise support for tax policy changes, obtained employment as a consultant with the Internal Revenue Service in 2017 for the purpose of unlawfully accessing and leaking confidential tax returns. He stole and leaked the tax returns of then-President Donald Trump, as well as the tax records of approximately 7,600 wealthy Americans and 600 entities. Littlejohn provided these records to media outlets, including the New York Times and ProPublica, resulting in substantial reputational, economic, and personal harm to numerous victims. He attempted to conceal his actions by destroying evidence and deleting files. The leaks caused ongoing distress, with unpublished data still held by ProPublica, leaving victims fearful of further exposure. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia accepted Littlejohn’s guilty plea to one count of unauthorized disclosure under 26 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(1). The court calculated a Sentencing Guidelines range of one to one-and-a-half years, after considering an upward departure due to the scope and harm of the offense. At sentencing, the court imposed the statutory maximum of five years in prison, three years of supervised release, and monetary penalties, citing the targeted nature of the offenses, elaborate planning, and continuing harm to victims. Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit examined procedural and substantive challenges to the sentence. The court found no procedural error, determining the district court did not predetermine the sentence, rely on erroneous facts, improperly consider outside influence, or fail to explain its variance. Substantively, the appellate court concluded the sentence was reasonable given the gravity and scope of the offenses. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that both the procedural and substantive aspects of Littlejohn’s sentence satisfied legal standards. View "USA v. Littlejohn" on Justia Law

Alignment Healthcare Inc. v. HHS

2026-07-14T06:32:08-08:00

Alignment Healthcare, a private health insurer offering Medicare Advantage plans, challenged the accuracy of its star ratings issued by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) for two of its contracts. The ratings are partly determined by an annual survey of enrollees, and Alignment claimed that a significant drop in Spanish-language responses resulted from errors in survey administration—specifically, that some Spanish-speaking enrollees received the survey in English despite indicating a preference for Spanish. Alignment argued that this error negatively affected its ratings, as its internal data showed higher satisfaction among Spanish-speaking enrollees. After receiving preliminary survey results in September 2024, Alignment raised these concerns with CMS, requesting a review of the sampling methodology and suppression of the disputed survey data. CMS reviewed the sampling and response data, consulted with the survey vendor, and ultimately found no evidence of a survey administration error. CMS noted that Spanish-speaking enrollees had access to Spanish-language surveys and that the rates of Spanish responses were higher than average. CMS denied Alignment’s requests for data suppression or further validation, stating it had no authority to remove the results absent evidence of protocol violations. Alignment then filed suit under the Administrative Procedure Act in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, which granted summary judgment for CMS. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that Alignment failed to demonstrate that CMS’s actions were arbitrary or capricious or that survey protocols had been violated. The court found CMS’s investigation and explanation adequate, rejected Alignment’s contentions regarding unequal treatment and nondelegation, and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to CMS. View "Alignment Healthcare Inc. v. HHS" on Justia Law

Diegelmann v. Bessent

2026-07-14T06:32:08-08:00

Two German nationals, Axel Diegelmann and his son Fritz, operated businesses trading in precious metals. In 2024, the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) blocked the property of the Diegelmanns and three companies owned by Axel, finding that Axel, Fritz, and one company operated in the metals and mining sector of the Russian economy, and that the other two companies were controlled by or acted on behalf of Axel. OFAC determined that the Diegelmanns had helped Russia-based metals companies buy and sell precious metals, circumventing international sanctions. The Diegelmanns challenged the sanctions in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that their activities did not amount to operating in the metals and mining sector as defined by the relevant regulations. The district court granted summary judgment to the government, agreeing with OFAC’s application of the sanctions and denying the Diegelmanns’ motion for summary judgment. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo under the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary-or-capricious standard, which is highly deferential, especially for national security matters. The appellate court held that purchasing finished precious metals, including gold bars, constituted “procuring geological materials” as used in the governing regulations. The court rejected the Diegelmanns’ argument that their conduct did not amount to procurement and found their alternative argument—that refined metals are not “geological materials”—was not preserved for appeal. The court also concluded that substantial evidence supported OFAC’s finding that the Diegelmanns’ activities were sufficiently connected to Russia. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Diegelmann v. Bessent" on Justia Law

State of New York v. Trump

2026-07-14T06:32:07-08:00

In 2020, the United States Postal Service implemented operational changes, including reducing high-speed mail sorting machines, decreasing employee overtime, eliminating late or extra mail delivery trips, and altering the sequence by which some mail carriers sort and deliver the mail. Several states and municipalities challenged these changes, alleging they would impede public services and hinder residents’ ability to vote by mail in the upcoming November election. Among their claims was that the Postal Service failed to seek an advisory opinion from the Postal Regulatory Commission before implementing the changes, as required by federal law. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially granted a preliminary injunction against the Postal Policy Changes, finding the plaintiffs likely to succeed on their claim regarding the lack of an advisory opinion. The court rejected the government’s argument that the Postal Regulatory Commission’s review scheme precluded district court jurisdiction. Later, the district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the advisory opinion claim, permanently enjoining the Postal Service from eliminating late or extra mail delivery trips without first seeking an advisory opinion from the Commission. The court maintained that its jurisdiction was not displaced by the statutory review scheme, reasoning that the scheme was merely supplemental and insufficient for immediate relief. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and held that Congress had established a statutory review scheme, channeling complaints about Postal Service policy changes first to the Postal Regulatory Commission, with subsequent review in the Court of Appeals. This scheme implicitly displaced the district court’s jurisdiction over the advisory opinion claim. Therefore, the Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the plaintiffs and remanded with instructions to dismiss the advisory opinion claim. View "State of New York v. Trump" on Justia Law

Trongone v. Cmsnr. IRS

2026-07-13T11:32:37-08:00

The appellant submitted a whistleblower claim to the Internal Revenue Service alleging that two taxpayers, a corporation and its majority shareholder, had underpaid taxes from 2004 to 2012. She also requested that the IRS consider similar conduct for the years 2013 through 2017 when determining any award. The IRS had already begun investigating the conduct she reported and ultimately collected proceeds from both taxpayers. However, the IRS’s Whistleblower Office denied her claim, asserting that her application had not contributed to the collection of any proceeds, largely because much of her information was considered “tainted”—that is, potentially privileged or unlawfully obtained. Upon seeking review in the United States Tax Court, the appellant requested supplementation of the administrative record or discovery relating to the later tax years (2013–2017), arguing that the IRS had used her information in those years. The Tax Court denied her requests, citing failure to comply with its procedural rules for discovery, and granted summary judgment to the IRS. The court found that the administrative record supported the IRS’s determination and declined to supplement the record, ruling that there was no showing that relevant documents were deliberately or negligently excluded. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the Tax Court’s summary judgment de novo, applying the Administrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard. The court held that the IRS’s rationale for denying the whistleblower award for tax years 2013 through 2017 was unsupported by the record; the agency relied on a bare assertion of taint rather than a reasonable inquiry into the merits. The court concluded that the IRS’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and reversed the Tax Court’s judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Trongone v. Cmsnr. IRS" on Justia Law

Chishti v. Spottiswoode

2026-07-07T07:32:04-08:00

Zia Chishti, formerly CEO of a technology company, and his wife brought claims against Tatiana Spottiswoode, her attorneys, and related parties. Chishti and Spottiswoode had a prior romantic relationship, and Spottiswoode was later employed by Chishti’s company under an arbitration agreement. In 2017, Spottiswoode accused Chishti of harassment and assault, leading to confidential arbitration, which resulted in an arbitral award in her favor. Years later, Spottiswoode was subpoenaed to testify before Congress about forced arbitration in sexual assault cases, where she recounted her experiences involving Chishti. After her testimony, Spottiswoode and her attorney made public statements to the media and on social media regarding the matter. Chishti alleged these statements were defamatory and part of a campaign to damage his reputation, causing him to resign from his executive roles. His wife also claimed loss of consortium. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court found that Spottiswoode’s statements before Congress were protected by legislative privilege under District of Columbia law, and that the post-hearing public statements were protected opinions or shielded by the fair reporting privilege and the First Amendment. The court also concluded that the other tort claims were duplicative of defamation, that the conspiracy and loss of consortium claims failed without a viable underlying tort, and that the breach of contract claims were barred by privilege or insufficiently pleaded. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The appellate court held that witness statements to Congress and related communications were absolutely privileged under District of Columbia law. It further held that post-hearing statements were protected as opinion or by fair reporting, and that related tort and contract claims failed for lack of an actionable underlying claim. The dismissal with prejudice was affirmed. View "Chishti v. Spottiswoode" on Justia Law

Angelo v. DC

2026-07-07T07:32:03-08:00

Several individuals who hold concealed-carry pistol licenses issued by the District of Columbia challenged a local law prohibiting licensed carriers from possessing firearms on public transportation, including the Metro system. Fearing prosecution if they carried their pistols on the Metro, these plaintiffs avoided using public transit and instead paid for more expensive private transportation. They alleged that this criminal statute violated their Second and Fifth Amendment rights and sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief against the District and several officials in both their official and personal capacities. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially denied the plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief, citing circuit precedent that required them to demonstrate a special law enforcement priority or heightened risk of prosecution. When the plaintiffs amended their complaint to include allegations of increased transportation costs and added defendants, the District Court dismissed the case for lack of standing. Specifically, it found the plaintiffs had not alleged facts indicating a credible and imminent threat of prosecution, and it rejected their economic injury as insufficient for standing. The court also dismissed damages claims against individual defendants, which plaintiffs abandoned. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the plaintiffs had standing for their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against all defendants (except one official capacity claim not appealed), as well as for damages against the District, because their ongoing economic injury—incurred by complying with the Metro Ban—constituted a concrete, imminent, and traceable harm. The Court affirmed the dismissal of damages claims against individual defendants, reversed the dismissal of the remaining claims, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Angelo v. DC" on Justia Law

USA v. De Moya

2026-07-07T07:32:02-08:00

Two business owners in Washington, D.C. sought to reduce their businesses’ tax liabilities by hiring an intermediary who, in turn, paid cash bribes to a supervisor in the D.C. Office of Tax and Revenue. The supervisor used his access to the agency’s tax system to reduce the businesses’ tax obligations without legitimate justification, sometimes using colleagues’ credentials and creating false documents to conceal the scheme. The intermediary relayed proof of these illicit adjustments to his clients, who paid him and the supervisor a share of the savings. The scheme resulted in a loss of approximately $2.3 million to the District of Columbia. After an audit uncovered suspicious tax reductions without proper documentation, authorities traced the scheme to the supervisor, the intermediary, and the clients. Two of the intermediary’s clients pleaded guilty and cooperated with the government. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia tried the case against the intermediary and one client. The jury convicted both defendants of conspiracy, bribery, and wire fraud, while acquitting one defendant on some wire fraud counts. The district court imposed sentences of 110 months and 30 months, respectively. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the bribery jury instructions, one defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding sentencing, and an alleged sentencing penalty for going to trial. The appellate court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, the error in the bribery jury instruction was harmless because the evidence demonstrated a quid pro quo for specific official acts, there was no prejudice from counsel’s failure to challenge sentencing policy, and there was no unconstitutional penalty for exercising the right to trial. The court affirmed the district court’s judgments. View "USA v. De Moya" on Justia Law

Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund v. M & K Employee Solutions

2026-07-07T07:32:02-08:00

A group of affiliated truck dealerships in the Midwest operated through a complex structure of multiple limited liability companies. Each dealership location had a “Sales” company that owned assets and an “Employee Solutions” (ES) company that hired employees and leased them to the Sales company. The ES companies entered collective-bargaining agreements requiring pension contributions to a union fund. Over time, the ES companies stopped contributing and employing workers, transferring employees to newly created entities. One of the companies, ES Alsip, incurred withdrawal liability for ceasing contributions. The pension fund assessed over $6 million in liability, which was disputed and partially paid following an arbitration that substantially reduced the amount. Ultimately, higher courts reinstated the original liability. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to the pension fund, holding that ES Summit was liable for delinquent contributions for work performed at another dealership, ES Alsip’s withdrawal liability was properly calculated and subject to an increased interest rate, and that multiple affiliated entities and individuals were jointly and severally liable for the obligations. The court also imposed liability on successors and individual owners, the Bouchers, based on their house-flipping activities. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the delinquent-contribution claim against ES Summit was not adequately pleaded and reversed summary judgment on that issue. It affirmed the allocation of a partial payment to interest rather than principal, but reversed the application of an increased interest rate retroactively. The court affirmed the finding that each Sales entity was a single employer with its corresponding ES entity and upheld successor liability against Laborforce and ESI. However, it found genuine disputes of fact regarding the personal liability of the Bouchers and remanded that issue. View "Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund v. M & K Employee Solutions" on Justia Law

HMO Louisiana, Inc. v. Department of Health and Human Services

2026-06-26T07:01:51-08:00

A private health insurer that participates in the Medicare Advantage program consolidated two of its contracts in 2024. One of the pre-existing contracts (“consumed contract”) had provided a Special Needs Plan (SNP) and received a star rating for that measure in 2023, while the other (“surviving contract”) did not. After consolidation, the insurer’s new contract offered an SNP for 2025. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) calculates star ratings for consolidated contracts by taking the enrollment-weighted mean of measure scores from the consumed and surviving contracts. Initially, CMS excluded the consumed contract’s SNP data for the 2025 star rating, but after the insurer’s request, CMS included the data, resulting in the same overall rating as before. The insurer challenged this calculation in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that including the consumed contract’s SNP data violated the statute, regulations, and agency guidance, and that CMS failed to adequately explain a change in calculation methodology. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CMS, finding that the agency’s actions complied with applicable law and guidance, and that no further explanation for the calculation was required. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that CMS properly applied its regulations and guidance by including the consumed contract’s SNP measure score in the calculation. The court also found that the methodology provided accurate information to beneficiaries, as required by statute, and that CMS did not make a policy change triggering a requirement for further explanation. The district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of CMS was affirmed. View "HMO Louisiana, Inc. v. Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

Ardelyx, Inc. v. Kennedy

2026-06-26T07:01:50-08:00

A pharmaceutical company, together with a healthcare research organization and a kidney patient advocacy group, challenged regulatory actions by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) concerning the Medicare payment system for end-stage renal disease (ESRD). The dispute arose after CMS included oral-only drugs, specifically XPHOZAH—a drug manufactured by the company for treating hyperphosphatemia in dialysis patients—within the bundled payment for renal dialysis services under Medicare, effective January 1, 2025. Previously, such oral drugs were reimbursed separately under Medicare Part D. The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, contesting both the inclusion of oral-only drugs in the bundled payment regulation and the specific identification of XPHOZAH as a renal dialysis service. They asserted these actions were arbitrary, exceeded statutory authority, and violated the Administrative Procedure Act. CMS moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that federal law expressly bars judicial review of the Secretary’s “identification of renal dialysis services included in the bundled payment.” The district court agreed, finding that both the regulation and the identification of XPHOZAH fell within the statutory bar to judicial review because they constituted “identifications” as defined by the statute and were within the agency’s delegated authority. The court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the relevant statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1395rr(b)(14)(G), clearly precludes judicial review of the Secretary’s identification of renal dialysis services, including oral-only drugs and XPHOZAH. The court found that CMS acted within its statutory authority, and therefore, further judicial review was barred. The district court’s dismissal was affirmed. View "Ardelyx, Inc. v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Baxley v. Driscoll

2026-06-26T07:01:50-08:00

Michael C. Baxley served in the Army beginning in 1974. After various instances of misconduct, he was identified as a drug abuser and entered the Army’s rehabilitation program. In 1975, he was designated a rehabilitation program failure, and subsequent further misconduct led to a recommendation for discharge. During his discharge proceedings, evidence of his rehabilitation failure was introduced, and he was discharged “under other than honorable conditions.” Years later, his discharge status was upgraded to “under honorable conditions (general),” but without “honorable” status, he was unable to access certain veterans benefits. In 2018, following a VA determination of a service-connected mental health condition, Baxley requested the Army Board for Correction of Military Records to upgrade his discharge to “honorable,” arguing that exempt evidence was improperly used against him and that relevant Army guidance regarding mental health conditions was not followed. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the Board’s denial of Baxley’s request and granted summary judgment to the Board. The court found no violation of the Army’s Exemption Policy and concluded that the Board adequately considered the Army guidance for discharge upgrades related to mental health conditions (the Kurta Memorandum). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the administrative action de novo. The Court held that the Board’s decision regarding the Exemption Policy was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to meaningfully assess whether evidence of Baxley’s rehabilitation failure was developed as a direct or indirect result of protected communications during his rehabilitation program, as the policy requires. Therefore, the Court reversed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on this issue, vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded for further proceedings. However, the Court affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment regarding the Kurta Memorandum, finding the Board’s consideration sufficient and not arbitrary or capricious. View "Baxley v. Driscoll" on Justia Law

Commonwealth of Kentucky v. EPA

2026-06-26T07:01:49-08:00

The case concerns a challenge by several states and industry groups to a 2024 rule by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that revised the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for fine particulate matter (PM2.5), lowering the annual standard from 12 µg/m³ to 9 µg/m³. The revision followed new scientific assessments and a unanimous recommendation from the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC) that the prior standard was inadequate to protect public health. Petitioners argued that the EPA lacked statutory authority to promulgate the new rule, that the decision-making process was improperly influenced by environmental justice considerations, and that the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously under the Clean Air Act. Previously, in 2020, the prior EPA Administrator chose to retain the 12 µg/m³ standard, citing scientific uncertainties and a divided CASAC. That decision was challenged but held in abeyance after a change in administration. The Biden-appointed EPA Administrator initiated a review, which led to the 2024 revision. After a further change in administration, the EPA itself moved to vacate the 2024 rule, now agreeing with challengers that the agency had exceeded its authority and failed to consider costs. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the 2024 rule and the EPA’s motion to vacate. The court held that the EPA had statutory authority to revise the NAAQS outside the five-year review cycle without performing a “thorough review” of all criteria, that the agency was not required to consider costs or attainability when revising or setting the standard, and that the decision was not arbitrary or capricious. The court denied both the petitions for review and the EPA’s motion for vacatur, upholding the 2024 rule. View "Commonwealth of Kentucky v. EPA" on Justia Law

Norwich Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Kennedy

2026-06-26T07:01:49-08:00

Norwich Pharmaceuticals sought to market a generic version of Xifaxan, a drug invented by Salix Pharmaceuticals for treating irritable bowel syndrome with diarrhea and hepatic encephalopathy. Norwich submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) to the FDA, identified as number 214369. Salix believed this ANDA infringed its patents and sued Norwich in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware. That court found Norwich’s ANDA infringed Salix’s patents related to hepatic encephalopathy, while the patents for irritable bowel syndrome were invalid as obvious. The court’s final judgment barred FDA approval of Norwich’s ’369 ANDA until Salix’s hepatic encephalopathy patents expired in October 2029. Following the judgment, Norwich amended its ’369 ANDA to remove the indication for hepatic encephalopathy and requested the Delaware District Court modify its judgment to allow immediate FDA approval of the amended ANDA. The court denied this motion, reasoning that Norwich could not change its ANDA after final judgment to circumvent the prior ruling. Norwich appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which agreed the judgment restricted approval of the entire ANDA, including non-infringing indications, until 2029, and affirmed the Delaware District Court’s decision. After the FDA declined to grant final approval of Norwich’s amended ANDA, instead issuing only tentative approval, Norwich sued in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing the FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The court granted summary judgment to the FDA and Salix. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Delaware District Court’s judgment applied to Norwich’s ANDA as amended, so the FDA correctly delayed final approval until October 2029. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Norwich Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Make The Road New York v. Mullin

2026-06-23T07:02:00-08:00

The case concerns a challenge to a 2025 policy by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that expanded the use of expedited removal nationwide. Under the new policy, certain noncitizens who lack valid documentation, have not been admitted or paroled, and cannot demonstrate at least two years of continuous presence in the United States are subject to expedited removal. The policy was accompanied by an internal memorandum providing guidance to immigration officers on its implementation. Plaintiffs, including Make the Road New York, alleged that some of their members were subject to removal under this policy and claimed it violated statutory and constitutional rights, specifically the Due Process Clause. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case and granted a stay under 5 U.S.C. § 705, halting the implementation and enforcement of the 2025 Designation and the accompanying memorandum. The district court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their due process claim, reasoning that the procedures at issue posed a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty interests for affected noncitizens, and that additional procedural safeguards were warranted. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s stay. The appellate court held that the district court had jurisdiction, the plaintiffs had standing, and the challenge was timely. However, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the challenged directives did not violate due process under the applicable Mullane standard, which requires procedures reasonably calculated to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard, but not the additional protections the district court required. Finding that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits, the D.C. Circuit vacated the district court’s stay. View "Make The Road New York v. Mullin" on Justia Law

He v. Rubio

2026-06-23T07:01:59-08:00

A former State Department employee and his family alleged that two law enforcement officers from the State Department arrived unannounced at their home in Virginia, banged on the door, and engaged in aggressive behavior. One officer, previously known to have harassed the employee at work, cursed and shouted at him, grabbed him by the wrist in front of his family, and pointed his fingers in the shape of a gun at the employee’s young son, pretending to shoot and calling him a racial slur. The family claimed they were traumatized by the encounter, with children crying, experiencing nightmares, and the in-laws suffering insomnia and depression. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the family’s claim of common law assault under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), applying Virginia law. The district court concluded that while the officer’s conduct was threatening, it did not plausibly place any family member in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical harm—an essential element for assault under Virginia law. The court stayed other FTCA claims pending Department of Labor review, then dismissed them for lack of jurisdiction when the plaintiff declined to seek a ruling under the Federal Employees Compensation Act. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed de novo the dismissal of the family’s FTCA assault claim. The appellate court held that the facts alleged, if true, plausibly established all elements of assault under Virginia law: overt acts intended to cause harmful or offensive contact or apprehension thereof, and reasonable apprehension of imminent contact, including through the doctrine of transferred intent. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings, holding the family’s claim could proceed. View "He v. Rubio" on Justia Law

USA v. Honesty

2026-06-16T06:31:41-08:00

Police officers in Washington, D.C., arrested a man after he fled from them, dropping a loaded firearm and a satchel containing PCP, other controlled substances, and drug paraphernalia. The defendant, previously convicted of firearm and drug offenses, was charged with six offenses, but entered a Plea Agreement to plead guilty to two counts: felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, and possession of PCP with intent to distribute. The Plea Agreement capped the government's sentencing recommendation at the top of the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, which was ultimately determined to be 77 to 96 months. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia accepted the plea and, after reviewing presentence reports and submissions from both parties, imposed an upward variance, sentencing the defendant to 115 months’ imprisonment. The district court cited four reasons: the defendant’s extensive criminal history, his “brandishing” of the firearm, abandoning the gun near an elementary school, and possession of multiple dangerous drugs. The defendant appealed, arguing that the government breached the Plea Agreement by implicitly advocating for a sentence above the Guidelines range and that the district court erred procedurally by relying on erroneous findings and failing to adequately explain the above-Guidelines sentence. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that while the government did breach the Plea Agreement by implicitly suggesting an above-Guidelines sentence, the defendant failed to show a reasonable likelihood that the breach affected his sentence, and thus, reversal was not warranted under plain error review. The appellate court also found no procedural error in the district court’s sentencing rationale or explanation. The court therefore affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "USA v. Honesty" on Justia Law

Venezuela US SRL v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

2026-06-12T07:02:00-08:00

A Barbados-based company acquired an 18 percent share in a Venezuelan oil company, alongside two state-owned shareholders. When dividends were distributed in 2008 and 2009, the state-owned entities received their share, but the Barbados-based company did not. In 2013, the company initiated arbitration proceedings against Venezuela in The Hague, seeking damages for not receiving its dividends. The arbitral tribunal, after a jurisdictional and merits phase, eventually awarded the company $59 million plus costs, fees, and interest. During the proceedings, a dispute arose about which government and legal counsel represented Venezuela, given the contested presidency between Nicolás Maduro and Juan Guaidó. The company sought to enforce the arbitration award in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Venezuela argued that enforcement would violate U.S. public policy by contradicting the U.S. President’s official recognition of the Guaidó government, as the tribunal had allowed the Maduro regime to change legal counsel during the arbitration. The district court rejected Venezuela’s argument, concluding that the President’s recognition power was not a cognizable public policy under the New York Convention, and even if it were, enforcement would not violate it. The court granted the company’s petition to enforce the award. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that none of the exceptions in the New York Convention, including the public policy exception, applied to prevent recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award. The court found that enforcing the award did not undermine the President’s exclusive recognition power or express any view on the legitimacy of either Venezuelan government, and thus did not violate fundamental U.S. public policy. View "Venezuela US SRL v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela" on Justia Law

TCP Specialists, LLC v. Secretary of Labor

2026-06-12T07:01:56-08:00

At an oil and gas wellsite in Texas, a contractor, TCP Specialists, LLC, provided wireline services alongside other companies that managed the well’s pressure and equipment. During a maintenance operation, a pressurized pipe ruptured while the well was being depressurized, causing fatal injuries to two workers and serious injury to a TCP employee. Although TCP did not control the depressurization or supply the faulty pipe, its employees were standing near the wellhead at the time of the accident. The Department of Labor alleged that TCP exposed its employees to known hazards by not establishing a buffer zone around the well during depressurization. An administrative law judge (ALJ) of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission held a hearing and found that TCP had violated the General Duty Clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. The ALJ determined that TCP had control over its employees’ proximity to the hazard and that a buffer zone would have been a feasible and effective abatement measure. The ALJ concluded that TCP failed to implement adequate safety policies and upheld the citation, imposing a penalty. The full Commission declined to review the ALJ’s decision, making it a final order. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed TCP’s petition and denied it. The court held that the hazard was properly defined by reference to the physical agents (the frac stack and pressurized piping) and that TCP had control over its employees’ exposure to that hazard. The court found substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusions regarding the feasibility and effectiveness of a buffer zone, and rejected TCP’s constitutional and procedural arguments. The order upholding the citation and penalty was affirmed. View "TCP Specialists, LLC v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

Trongone v. Cmsnr. IRS

2026-06-12T07:01:50-08:00

The appellant submitted a whistleblower application to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) alleging that two taxpayers had underpaid taxes from 2004 to 2012 and requested that the IRS also consider similar conduct for 2013 through 2017 when determining any award. The IRS had already begun investigating much of the reported conduct and ultimately collected proceeds from the taxpayers. However, the IRS’s Whistleblower Office denied the claim, reasoning that the information provided was either previously known or “tainted”—meaning it was unlawfully obtained or privileged—and asserted it did not rely on this information when auditing the later years. After receiving this denial, the appellant sought review in the United States Tax Court. The appellant requested to supplement the administrative record or conduct discovery regarding the audits for 2013 through 2017, arguing that the record did not adequately show whether her information was used. The Tax Court denied these requests, citing procedural deficiencies in how discovery was sought, and granted summary judgment to the IRS, finding the administrative record sufficient to support the IRS’s determination. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the IRS’s rationale for denying the whistleblower award for tax years 2013 through 2017 was not supported by the administrative record, which was largely silent regarding those years. The court concluded that the IRS’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because it did not reasonably investigate or explain whether the whistleblower’s application contributed to the audits for those years. The court reversed the Tax Court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Trongone v. Cmsnr. IRS" on Justia Law

Farah Naz v. Wright

2026-06-09T08:34:58-08:00

A Muslim woman of Pakistani origin worked as an economist at the Department of Energy from 2017 to 2021. She initially had a positive relationship with her supervisor, but after testifying in support of a colleague’s Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging race discrimination, her working conditions deteriorated. She experienced hostile treatment, was denied training and promotion opportunities, and was subjected to critical performance reviews. After requesting religious accommodations and reporting further discriminatory remarks from her supervisors, she was placed on multiple performance improvement plans and ultimately terminated. After her dismissal, she filed a pro se lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging discrimination based on race, gender, sex, religion, and national origin, as well as unlawful retaliation, all under Title VII. The Department moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion, finding no facts sufficient to infer discrimination or retaliation; it emphasized that the key discriminatory remark was made by a supervisor not involved in her termination and concluded there was no causal link between her protected activities and the adverse employment actions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court affirmed the dismissal of the retaliation claim, agreeing with the district court’s reasoning on causation. However, it vacated the dismissal of the discrimination claims, finding that the district court failed to consider a material allegation in the plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to dismiss: a supervisor’s alleged refusal to accommodate her religious observance and his discriminatory comment about her faith. The appellate court remanded the discrimination claims for further proceedings, instructing the district court to consider this allegation in evaluating whether the plaintiff stated a plausible claim. View "Farah Naz v. Wright" on Justia Law

Kitchen v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission

2026-06-05T07:33:30-08:00

The appellant, an experienced foreign currency exchange (FX) trader, claimed he uncovered manipulation in the FX market after noticing a sharp drop in the values of several currencies relative to the Swiss franc in 2011. He believed this was due to collusion among market makers and shared his suspicions with various regulators, including the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). His allegations focused on conduct by a retail trading platform, Oanda, and mentioned possible involvement by banks but did not name any specific institutions. Two years later, media reports surfaced about large banks rigging FX benchmark rates, prompting the CFTC to investigate and eventually reach settlements with several banks for manipulating benchmark rates. The CFTC initially investigated the appellant’s allegations against Oanda but found no evidence of wrongdoing and closed the case without action. The CFTC’s later enforcement actions against major banks were initiated after media coverage revealed benchmark-rate manipulation schemes, not because of the appellant’s information. After the settlements were announced, the appellant applied for a whistleblower award, arguing his tips had led to these enforcement actions. The CFTC’s Whistleblower Office and Claims Review Staff recommended denial, finding his tips were not the original source of the information leading to the enforcement actions. The appellant sought reconsideration and, after a delay, petitioned for mandamus relief in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which was rendered moot when the Commission issued final orders denying his application. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the CFTC’s denial for arbitrariness or capriciousness. The court found that the appellant’s tips did not lead to or significantly contribute to the enforcement actions against the banks, nor was he the original or derivative source of the information used. The court affirmed the CFTC’s orders denying the whistleblower award. View "Kitchen v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission" on Justia Law

Grafton & Upton Railroad Company v. Surface Transportation Board

2026-06-05T07:33:25-08:00

A railroad company operating in Massachusetts sought to acquire a 155-acre parcel in the town of Hopedale to build a new transloading facility. The land had been classified as forest land under Massachusetts General Law Chapter 61, which gives municipalities a right of first refusal to purchase such land if the owner wishes to sell or convert it to another use. After an initial notice of intent to sell was deemed deficient by the town, the seller withdrew the notice. Without issuing a new notice, the seller then transferred beneficial ownership of the property to the railroad company through a transaction that attempted to circumvent the town’s rights. Hopedale asserted its rights under Chapter 61 and filed suit in Massachusetts Land Court to enforce its right of first refusal and prevent further site work by the railroad. After a failed settlement agreement—subsequently invalidated by the Massachusetts Superior Court and with state litigation ongoing—the railroad company petitioned the Surface Transportation Board for a declaratory order that the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA) preempted the town’s rights under Chapter 61. The Surface Transportation Board denied the petition, finding that Chapter 61 was a generally applicable property law not categorically preempted by ICCTA, and that the railroad had not established a valid property interest in the land. The Board also concluded that the town’s actions did not unreasonably burden or interfere with rail transportation. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the Board’s order. It held that ICCTA does not preempt Chapter 61’s right-of-first-refusal provisions, as they are generally applicable state property laws and do not directly regulate railroad operations. The court further found that, without a settled property interest, the railroad’s as-applied preemption arguments failed. The court denied the railroad’s petition for review and affirmed the Board’s order. View "Grafton & Upton Railroad Company v. Surface Transportation Board" on Justia Law

Midcontinent Independent System Operator Transmission Owners v. FERC

2026-06-05T07:33:21-08:00

A group of electric transmission companies operating within the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) region, along with the Louisiana Public Service Commission (LPSC), challenged actions taken by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regarding the rates charged to electricity customers. The dispute centered on the return-on-equity (Return) component of transmission rates, which compensates transmission owners for their investments. In 2013 and 2015, customers filed two complaints with FERC alleging that the Return was unlawfully high and violated the Federal Power Act's mandate for "just and reasonable" rates. FERC responded with a series of orders adjusting the Return and ordering limited refunds, but its methodology was challenged and ultimately vacated by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in MISO Transmission Owners v. FERC, which remanded the matter for further proceedings. On remand, FERC issued new orders revising the Return, requiring Transmission Owners to provide refunds for the statutorily authorized 15-month period and, in light of the prior vacatur, ordering additional refunds from September 28, 2016 through October 17, 2024. FERC dismissed the second customer complaint after finding the revised Return was just and reasonable and declined to order additional refunds. Both Transmission Owners and LPSC sought rehearing, raising further objections to the refund periods and the methodology used to set the Return. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the petitions. The court held that FERC acted within its authority in backdating refunds to align with the judicial vacatur, pursuant to FERC’s remedial powers under section 309 of the Federal Power Act. The court also found Transmission Owners lacked standing to challenge FERC’s consideration of the second complaint. LPSC’s objections to FERC’s methodology were rejected under the law-of-the-case doctrine and as lacking merit. The court denied in part and dismissed in part Transmission Owners’ petitions, and denied LPSC’s petitions for review. View "Midcontinent Independent System Operator Transmission Owners v. FERC" on Justia Law

Talbott v. USA

2026-06-01T09:04:24-08:00

A group of current and prospective military service members challenged a new federal policy that disqualified individuals with a history of gender dysphoria or those perceived as expressing a gender identity different from their sex assigned at birth from serving in the military. This policy, known as the Hegseth Policy, was issued following an executive order by the President in 2025. The policy went further than prior military policies by not only excluding individuals with a recent diagnosis of gender dysphoria or those undergoing transition, but by broadly disqualifying anyone with any history of the condition or who had attempted social transition, regardless of current fitness or stability. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. After extensive hearings, the District Court found the Hegseth Policy to be motivated by animus against transgender individuals, characterizing it as a blanket ban that was not justified by legitimate military interests. The court applied intermediate scrutiny, concluded that the policy was not substantially related to the stated goals of military readiness or cohesion, and found that it violated the plaintiffs’ right to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction, preventing enforcement of the policy against both current servicemembers and those seeking to enlist. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the government’s appeal of the preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals held that the Hegseth Policy, as applied to current servicemembers, was likely unconstitutional because it relied on arbitrary classifications and was motivated at least in part by impermissible animus. The court affirmed the preliminary injunction for current servicemembers but vacated it as to individuals seeking to join the military, reasoning that the equities and public interest differed for prospective enlistees. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court’s opinion. View "Talbott v. USA" on Justia Law

Global Voice Group SA v. Republic of Guinea

2026-05-29T06:31:52-08:00

A telecommunications and financial services company based in Seychelles contracted with a Guinean regulatory authority to help develop Guinea’s telecommunications industry. The agreement included an arbitration clause. Disputes arose regarding unpaid invoices and alleged contractual obligations, leading the company to seek arbitration against both the regulatory authority and the Republic of Guinea. The arbitral tribunal determined that Guinea was both a party and beneficiary to the agreement and awarded damages to the company. Attempts to annul the award in French courts were unsuccessful, resulting in a final judgment against Guinea and the regulatory authority. The company then sued Guinea in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking confirmation of the arbitral award and recognition of the foreign court judgment. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed both claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that Guinea was immune from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The court concluded that Guinea was not a party to the arbitration agreement and had not waived its sovereign immunity. It did not distinguish between the award-confirmation and judgment-recognition claims in its analysis. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court incorrectly failed to apply the analytical framework established in TIG Insurance v. Republic of Argentina when considering the award-confirmation claim, which requires determining whether the arbitration agreement legally binds the sovereign, regardless of formal party status. The appellate court vacated the dismissal of the award-confirmation claim and remanded for further proceedings. Separately, relying on Amaplat Mauritius Ltd. v. Zimbabwe Mining Development Corp., it affirmed the dismissal of the judgment-recognition claim, holding that neither the FSIA’s arbitration nor waiver exceptions provide jurisdiction for such claims. View "Global Voice Group SA v. Republic of Guinea" on Justia Law

ModernWest Longmont, LLC v. FAA

2026-05-29T06:31:52-08:00

A property development company sought to build mixed-use housing developments near a public-use airport operated by the City of Longmont, Colorado. The proposed developments were located under the airport’s approach and departure paths. The company received preliminary approvals from the City for its projects and obtained “Determinations of No Hazard” from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which found the developments would not obstruct flight paths. However, the FAA sent letters to the City warning that approving the developments would violate a grant assurance tied to the airport’s federal funding, specifically regarding land use compatibility. The City subsequently denied the company’s proposal, citing multiple reasons, including the FAA’s letters, concerns from state authorities, its own findings of incompatibility, and public opposition. After the City’s decision, the developer asked the FAA to withdraw its letters, but the FAA declined. The company then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to order the FAA to vacate and withdraw these letters, arguing that the FAA’s actions directly caused its injury by influencing the City’s denial. The D.C. Circuit dismissed the petition for lack of standing. The court held that the developer failed to demonstrate that vacating the FAA’s letters would likely result in the City approving the developments, as the City had provided multiple independent reasons for its denial beyond the FAA’s communications. The court also found that the company did not comply with the court’s procedural rule requiring petitioners to argue and provide evidence of standing in their opening brief. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed. View "ModernWest Longmont, LLC v. FAA" on Justia Law

USA v. Flores-Hernandez

2026-05-29T06:31:52-08:00

A Mexican national with a long history of drug trafficking from South America through Mexico into the United States was arrested in 2017. In 2023, he pleaded guilty to participating in a conspiracy to distribute large quantities of cocaine, with the intent that it be unlawfully imported into the United States. Prior to sentencing, he admitted responsibility for up to 450 kilograms of cocaine. At sentencing, witnesses described his leadership of an organization involving at least 20 people, including bodyguards and various workers handling logistics, payments, and transportation of drug proceeds. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia conducted a three-day sentencing hearing, during which it found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was responsible for 450 kilograms or more of cocaine and that he was the organizer or leader of a criminal activity involving five or more participants. The court applied a four-level increase for his aggravating role and denied his request for a two-level reduction under the “zero-point-offender” guideline, finding him ineligible due to his leadership role. The court sentenced him to 21 years and 10 months in prison, plus five years of supervised release. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s use of the preponderance standard, its factual findings regarding his leadership role, and the denial of the zero-point-offender reduction. The appellate court held that the district court properly used the preponderance standard for sentencing facts, did not clearly err in finding the defendant was an organizer or leader of extensive criminal activity, and correctly interpreted the guidelines to deny the zero-point-offender reduction. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v. Flores-Hernandez" on Justia Law

Vermont Information Processing, Inc. v. NLRB

2026-05-26T08:03:37-08:00

Several software engineers at a beverage industry software company created and circulated a spreadsheet among their coworkers to share salary information. Their motivation stemmed from recent company restructuring and discussions about pay equity. The spreadsheet was shared widely, and a notation appeared that all developers were “underpaid.” Management quickly discovered the spreadsheet, traced its creation to one employee, and, within about ninety minutes, terminated him, citing his attitude toward the company and the restructuring. The three other employees who helped create and share the spreadsheet were fired the next day after management reviewed internal messages showing employee dissatisfaction, plans to leave, and criticism of the company. The four terminated employees filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging they were fired for engaging in protected concerted activity under the National Labor Relations Act. After a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found for the employees, ordering reinstatement and financial compensation. The NLRB largely adopted the ALJ’s findings, but expanded its theory for three employees to include their discussions of workplace conditions as protected activity. The NLRB ordered make-whole remedies, including compensation for pecuniary harms regardless of interim earnings. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that substantial evidence supported the finding that the company unlawfully fired the employee who created and shared the spreadsheet based on protected activity. The court denied the company’s petition as to him and enforced the NLRB’s order, including reinstatement and financial remedies. However, the court found that the NLRB exceeded its authority by expanding liability for the other three employees to cover uncharged conduct (general workplace discussions), vacated that portion of the order, and remanded for further proceedings. The court declined to consider unpreserved challenges to the NLRB’s make-whole remedy. View "Vermont Information Processing, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Butters v. National Academy of Sciences

2026-05-22T06:02:29-08:00

A professor of archaeology at a Peruvian university was elected as an international member of a prominent American scientific organization. In 2021, following a sexual harassment complaint filed by a former student, the organization revoked his membership for an alleged violation of its Code of Conduct. Shortly after, the organization’s president notified members via email that an international member’s membership was rescinded for a Code violation, and a public announcement was posted stating the professor’s name and referencing the specific Code section. That section broadly prohibits harassment, discrimination, bullying, and disrespect. A media outlet subsequently reported the professor’s ejection, linking it to sexual harassment, and included a general statement from the organization’s president about role modeling professional conduct. The professor sued the organization and its president in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, raising claims of defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and defamation by implication. The district court dismissed all claims. It held that the statements were not false because the professor admitted the organization expelled him based on allegations that, if true, would have violated the Code of Conduct; thus, it found no actionable false statement. The court also found insufficient factual allegations to support defamation by implication and denied further leave to amend the complaint. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the defamation by implication claim, finding no plausible allegation that the defendants intended or endorsed a defamatory inference. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the defamation and false light claims, holding that the professor had sufficiently alleged that the statements were false and capable of a defamatory meaning. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings on those claims. View "Butters v. National Academy of Sciences" on Justia Law

Narragansett Indian Tribe v. McMaster

2026-05-22T06:02:24-08:00

The case concerns the reconstruction of a bridge on Interstate 95 in Providence, Rhode Island, a project that received federal funding from the Federal Highway Administration. Because the project would affect the Providence Covelands Archaeological District, a site of historic and religious importance to the Narragansett Indian Tribe, federal law required that the agency consult with the Tribe and consider mitigation measures. Initially, a 2011 programmatic agreement provided for the transfer of certain parcels of land to the Tribe, but this transfer stalled when the State of Rhode Island demanded the Tribe waive its sovereign immunity as a condition. The Tribe refused, negotiations failed, and the agreement was terminated. Subsequently, the Highway Administration developed a new programmatic agreement, which did not include land transfers but instead provided for preservation covenants and educational initiatives. The Tribe objected to both the process and substance of the new agreement. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the Tribe’s claims regarding the first agreement for lack of standing but found standing as to claims concerning the second agreement. The district court granted summary judgment to the Highway Administration, ruling that the agency had adequately consulted with the Tribe, was not required to include the Tribe as a signatory, and had reasonably explained changes between agreements. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Tribe had standing to challenge the adequacy of consultation and the process by which the second agreement was adopted. The court further held that the Highway Administration was not required to make the Tribe a signatory since the affected land was not tribal land, that consultation with the Tribe was adequate under the law, and that the agency’s change of position was reasonably explained and not arbitrary or capricious. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Narragansett Indian Tribe v. McMaster" on Justia Law

Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility v. Zeldin

2026-05-01T07:02:47-08:00

The case concerns two organizations that advocate for environmental health and public employee interests. They filed suit against the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), alleging that the EPA failed to meet its statutory obligations under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) to address risks associated with perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), a harmful chemical formed during the fluorination of plastic containers. The plaintiffs argued that, by March 2023, the EPA had sufficient information about the dangers of PFOA to trigger a nondiscretionary duty to act under TSCA section 4(f), and, alternatively, a duty under section 7(a)(2) to pursue enforcement actions against a specific company involved in the fluorination process. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the suit. It found that the EPA had fulfilled any nondiscretionary duty under section 4(f) by publishing a request for public comment, making the primary claim moot. Regarding section 7(a)(2), the court doubted that it imposed a nondiscretionary duty on the EPA but, even if it did, found that the duty had not been triggered under the circumstances. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the claims did not fit within the TSCA’s citizen-suit provisions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal, but on different grounds. The appellate court held that the organizations failed to plausibly allege associational standing. The court explained that neither organization was a traditional membership organization nor had they shown they were the functional equivalent of one. The court found insufficient evidence that the organizations’ employees, supporters, or board members constituted a constituency whose interests the organizations were entitled to represent in court. Accordingly, the appellate court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. View "Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility v. Zeldin" on Justia Law

Doe v. SEC

2026-05-01T07:02:46-08:00

An individual disclosed information about significant misconduct at a large company to the news media. Following these disclosures, both Congress and staff from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) contacted the individual for interviews and further information, which he provided. The SEC subsequently initiated an enforcement action against the company, relying on the information provided, resulting in substantial monetary sanctions. The individual then applied to the SEC for a whistleblower award under the Securities Exchange Act, which provides monetary awards to those who “voluntarily” provide “original information” leading to successful enforcement actions. The SEC denied the whistleblower award application, finding that the individual’s submission was not “voluntary” because it occurred only after the SEC and other authorities had contacted him. Additionally, the SEC found his submission was untimely and summarily denied his request for exemptions from these requirements. The individual challenged these determinations, arguing that the SEC’s interpretation of “voluntarily” conflicted with the statute's purpose and plain meaning, that his submission was timely, and that the denial of his request for exemptions was insufficiently explained and inconsistent with SEC precedent. He also raised First Amendment concerns, suggesting the SEC’s approach penalized whistleblowers for speaking to the press. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the SEC’s order. The court held that the SEC’s interpretation of “voluntarily” was reasonable and consistent with statutory text and purpose, and rejected the First Amendment argument, finding it was based on a mistaken premise. However, the court found that the SEC abused its discretion by inadequately explaining its denial of the request for an exemption from the voluntariness requirement. The court thus denied the petition in part, granted it in part, vacated the denial of the exemption request, and remanded to the SEC for further consideration. View "Doe v. SEC" on Justia Law

Evergreen Shipping Agency (America) Corp. v. FMC

2026-04-28T07:03:02-08:00

A shipping dispute arose when a common carrier charged a trucking company detention fees for the late return of shipping equipment. The delay was caused by a COVID-19-related closure at the consignee’s plant, and when the trucking company attempted to return the equipment, the port was closed for three days due to scheduled closures and a holiday. The trucking company disputed a portion of the detention charges, arguing that it was impossible to return the equipment while the port’s gates were closed. The Federal Maritime Commission initially found the disputed charges unreasonable, concluding they could not have incentivized a faster return because the port was not accepting containers during the relevant days. The carrier sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which vacated and remanded, instructing the Commission to address specific arguments and analyze the charges under the proper legal framework, especially the “incentive principle” as articulated in the Commission’s Interpretive Rule. On remand, the Commission reaffirmed that the charges were unreasonable. It emphasized that the purpose of detention fees is to promote freight fluidity and found that, under the uncontested facts—namely, the plant closure, the port’s closure, and the absence of costs to the carrier—the charges did not serve that purpose. The Commission also addressed and rejected each of the carrier’s justifications and extenuating circumstances. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the Commission’s order on remand. The court held that the Commission’s determination was reasonable, supported by substantial evidence, and consistent with its Interpretive Rule. The court emphasized that the relevant standard is whether the charges promoted freight fluidity and found that the fees did not do so under the specific facts. The court denied the petition for review. View "Evergreen Shipping Agency (America) Corp. v. FMC" on Justia Law

Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC v. NLRB

2026-04-28T07:03:02-08:00

An employee of a Texas electric utility company testified before a legislative committee about technical problems with the company's new smart meters, attributing fire hazards to the meters and referencing specific service calls. He was also the chief spokesperson for the union representing workers at the company, and he testified the day after unsuccessful collective bargaining negotiations. In his testimony, he identified himself as both an employee and a union representative, but did not mention the ongoing labor dispute or the negotiations. After learning of his remarks, the company terminated his employment, citing a violation of its policy against providing misleading information to public officials. An administrative law judge found that the employee’s testimony was protected under federal labor law, specifically section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, which protects concerted activities for mutual aid or collective bargaining. The National Labor Relations Board agreed, concluding the company had committed unfair labor practices and ordering reinstatement and back pay. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit previously found the testimony was not “maliciously untrue” but remanded for the Board to determine whether the employee’s speech sufficiently indicated it was connected to an ongoing labor dispute. On remand, the Board again found the discharge unlawful, reasoning that the context and the employee’s identification as a union representative sufficiently communicated the labor dispute connection. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the employee’s statements were not protected because they did not disclose a connection to an ongoing labor dispute, as required by Supreme Court precedent. The court found the Board’s analysis legally erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence. It therefore granted the company's petition for review, denied enforcement of the Board’s order, and vacated the finding of an unfair labor practice. View "Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services v. Mullin

2026-04-24T07:02:56-08:00

Thirteen individuals and three nonprofit organizations challenged executive actions taken after the issuance of a presidential proclamation in January 2025, which responded to increased crossings at the southern border by suspending the entry of certain noncitizens and instituting new summary removal procedures. These new procedures, set out in subsequent agency guidance, barred individuals who crossed between ports of entry—or at ports without proper documentation—from seeking asylum or other statutory protections. The policies also established new, non-statutory removal processes that bypassed existing procedures and protections mandated by federal law. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed these policies in a putative class action. The court certified a class of all individuals subject to the proclamation, declared the agency guidance unlawful, vacated it, and enjoined agency officials from implementing similar actions under the proclamation. The district court found that the challenged policies supplanted the removal procedures and substantive protections Congress had established in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and related regulations, including the right to apply for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for the plaintiffs and affirmed the modified class certification. The D.C. Circuit held that Congress, in granting the President authority to suspend entry under the INA, did not authorize the executive to circumvent or override the statute’s exclusive and mandatory removal procedures or to categorically deny the right to apply for asylum and other protections. The court further held that neither the proclamation nor its guidance could lawfully suspend or replace statutory and regulatory processes for removal or for considering claims to asylum, withholding of removal, or Convention Against Torture protection. The court also upheld the district court’s class-wide relief and its scope under federal law. View "Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services v. Mullin" on Justia Law

J. Sidak v. United States International Trade Commission

2026-04-24T07:02:56-08:00

An administrative law judge (ALJ) at the International Trade Commission (ITC) issued a protective order during a dispute between Qualcomm and Apple, requiring recipients of confidential business information, including expert witness Gregory Sidak, to return or destroy that information after the case ended. However, the ALJ who issued the order had been appointed solely by the ITC chairman, not by the full commission as required by the Constitution’s Appointments Clause. The ITC later ratified the ALJ’s appointments but did not ratify past actions taken by those ALJs. Years after the underlying case ended, the ITC began investigating Sidak for allegedly violating the protective order’s requirements. Sidak participated in the investigation by exchanging letters and affidavits, but eventually sued, arguing that the protective order was void because it was issued by an unconstitutionally appointed ALJ and never ratified, and sought to enjoin the ITC from enforcing it against him. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia found in Sidak’s favor, holding that the protective order could not lawfully be used as the basis for the investigation or for imposing sanctions on him. It permanently enjoined the ITC from taking further action against Sidak based on the challenged order. The ITC appealed the district court’s decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Sidak had standing, that the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction, and that Sidak had a right of action under the Constitution. The court further held that Sidak’s challenge was both timely and ripe, rejecting the ITC’s arguments that the claim was either too early or too late. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting permanent injunctive relief. View "J. Sidak v. United States International Trade Commission" on Justia Law

USA v. All Petroleum-Product Cargo Onboard the M/T Arina

2026-04-21T06:34:41-08:00

In 2021, the United States seized over 700,000 barrels of crude oil from two tankers in the Mediterranean Sea. The government alleged that the oil belonged to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), an entity it claimed materially supported the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. The government further asserted that NIOC’s activities included supplying, transporting, and selling oil to benefit the IRGC, which used these resources to fund terrorist activities targeting the United States. A Turkish commodities trading company, Aspan Petrokimya Co., claimed ownership of the seized oil and sought to recover the proceeds from its sale. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially dismissed the government’s forfeiture complaints without prejudice, finding that the government had not adequately pled that NIOC’s sale of oil affected foreign commerce. The government then filed an Amended Complaint consolidating the cases and providing additional factual detail. The district court denied Aspan’s renewed motion to dismiss, concluding that the amended allegations sufficiently addressed the jurisdictional element and all other statutory requirements. To expedite appellate review, Aspan admitted the complaint’s factual allegations, consented to judgment on the pleadings, and appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss de novo. The appellate court held that the government needed only to allege NIOC’s ownership of the property at the time of the offense, not at the time of seizure. The court also found that the Amended Complaint plausibly alleged that NIOC’s material support of the IRGC substantially affected foreign commerce, and that NIOC’s actions were calculated to influence the U.S. government. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. All Petroleum-Product Cargo Onboard the M/T Arina" on Justia Law

Inova Health Care Services v. Omni Shoreham Corporation

2026-04-17T07:02:21-08:00

A charity gala honoring Joan Hisaoka was held annually at the Omni Shoreham Hotel in Washington, D.C., with Inova Health Care Services contracting with the hotel for the event and the Smith Center for Healing and the Arts providing financial support. In December 2018, Inova and Omni executed an agreement specifying that the 2019 Gala would be held in the Ambassador and Regency Ballrooms. The contract did not include Omni’s standard clause permitting reassignment of event spaces. A few months before the event, Omni informed Inova it would relocate the Gala to less desirable spaces to accommodate a higher-paying client. Inova objected, found the alternative spaces unsuitable, and relocated the Gala to another venue. Smith Center, though not a party to the contract, paid the deposit as in prior years. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment. Upon reconsideration, it granted summary judgment on liability to Inova and Smith Center, finding Omni had breached the contract’s express terms and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court limited Omni’s mitigation defense and the case proceeded to a jury trial on damages, resulting in awards to both Inova and Smith Center. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed summary judgment and the jury’s damages award in favor of Inova, holding there was no genuine dispute that Omni materially breached the contract and acted in bad faith. The court also held the district court properly precluded Omni’s mitigation defense regarding the alternative spaces. However, the appellate court vacated the damages award to Smith Center, finding a genuine factual dispute regarding its status as an intended third-party beneficiary, and remanded for further proceedings on that issue. View "Inova Health Care Services v. Omni Shoreham Corporation" on Justia Law

Doe v. Blanche

2026-04-17T07:02:21-08:00

Eighteen transgender women incarcerated in federal women’s prisons challenged a federal executive order that directed the Attorney General to ensure that “males”—defined by biological sex assigned at conception—are not detained in women’s facilities. These plaintiffs were a small group of transgender women whom the Bureau of Prisons had, after individualized assessments, placed in women’s facilities. Each had been diagnosed with gender dysphoria, received long-term hormone therapy, and some had undergone gender-affirming surgeries. The plaintiffs alleged that transferring them to men’s prisons would expose them to grave risks of violence, abuse, and psychological harm. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted the plaintiffs preliminary injunctive relief, blocking their transfers and requiring the government to maintain their housing in women’s facilities. The district court found that transgender women are at a significantly higher risk of harm in men’s facilities and that the government was aware of these risks. The court also rejected government arguments that judicial review was barred or that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies, holding instead that no effective administrative remedy was available. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court held that judicial review of constitutional claims was not barred by statute and that the government had not shown exhaustion of available administrative remedies. However, the court vacated the preliminary injunctions, finding that the district court’s broad, categorical reasoning was not defended by the plaintiffs on appeal, who instead advanced more individualized grounds. The record did not contain the necessary factual findings as to each plaintiff’s specific vulnerabilities. The case was remanded for further proceedings, and the expired injunctions were dismissed as moot. View "Doe v. Blanche" on Justia Law

Secretary of Labor v. KC Transport, Inc.

2026-04-17T07:02:20-08:00

KC Transport, an independent trucking company, provides hauling services for mining and other companies. It operates a maintenance facility for its haul trucks about a mile from one of its primary client’s active mines. During an inspection, a Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) inspector observed two KC Transport trucks at the facility undergoing maintenance in conditions that violated federal safety standards—specifically, the trucks were raised and unblocked, with one worker standing underneath. The inspector issued citations for these violations. In an administrative proceeding, KC Transport contested the citations, arguing that MSHA lacked jurisdiction over its facility and trucks since they were not located at an extraction site or on an appurtenant road. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that MSHA had jurisdiction, reasoning that the facility and trucks were “used in” mining-related activities and thus constituted a “mine” under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act. KC Transport appealed, and the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission reversed the ALJ, holding that only facilities or equipment located at extraction sites or appurtenant roads qualify as “mines” under the Act and vacated the citations. The Secretary of Labor, acting through MSHA, petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review. After an intervening Supreme Court decision overruled Chevron deference, the D.C. Circuit independently interpreted the relevant statutory provisions. The court held that a “facility” constitutes a “mine” under the Mine Act when it is necessarily connected with the use and operation of extracting, milling, or processing minerals, even if not located directly at an extraction site or appurtenant road. Concluding that KC Transport’s facility met this definition, the court vacated the Commission’s decision and affirmed the Secretary’s citations. View "Secretary of Labor v. KC Transport, Inc." on Justia Law

In re: Donald Trump

2026-04-14T06:56:34-08:00

A group of individuals alleged to be members of Tren de Aragua, a Venezuelan criminal gang and foreign terrorist organization, were detained in Texas after the President, invoking the Alien Enemies Act, ordered their removal from the United States. On March 15, 2025, government officials placed several of these detainees, including the plaintiffs, on planes bound for El Salvador. Shortly after their departure, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) barring the government from removing the plaintiffs from the United States for 14 days. Despite the TRO, the planes continued to El Salvador, where the detainees were transferred to Salvadoran custody. The district court then began contempt proceedings against government officials, reasoning that the government’s actions violated the TRO, and threatened criminal contempt unless the government returned the plaintiffs to U.S. custody. The Supreme Court vacated the TRO, holding it was based on a legal error and filed in the wrong venue. Despite this, the district court persisted with contempt proceedings, seeking to identify and potentially prosecute the official responsible for the transfer. The government identified the Secretary of Homeland Security as the responsible party and provided declarations from involved officials. Unsatisfied, the district court ordered further hearings and investigation into the Executive Branch’s decision-making. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted the government’s petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that the district court’s investigation was a clear abuse of discretion. The appellate court found the TRO lacked the clarity required to support criminal contempt for transferring custody and that further judicial inquiry into Executive Branch deliberations was improper, especially given national security concerns. The court ordered the district court to terminate the contempt proceedings. View "In re: Donald Trump" on Justia Law

Bunting v. District of Columbia CVS Pharmacy, LLC

2026-04-14T06:56:33-08:00

On Christmas Eve, Bruce Bunting slipped and fell outside a CVS store in the District of Columbia on a walkway covered with a mix of water and salt or de-icing material, resulting in a serious ankle injury. Photographs taken soon after showed a wet but not icy surface. Bunting and his wife sued CVS in D.C. Superior Court, alleging negligence, negligence per se, and loss of consortium under D.C. law. They argued CVS failed to maintain a safe walkway and did not adequately warn of the hazard. Both sides retained expert witnesses to address whether the walkway met the standard of care, focusing on its static coefficient of friction (COF); the parties agreed a COF below 0.50 indicated a dangerously slippery surface. After CVS removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, that court granted summary judgment to CVS. The district court concluded the plaintiffs were required to present expert testimony showing the walkway was below the COF standard, and found the plaintiffs’ expert testing insufficient because it did not replicate the precise mix of salt and water present at the time of the fall. The court also granted CVS summary judgment on the negligence per se claim, holding that the cited municipal safety regulation did not establish a duty different from the common law standard of care. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The appellate court held that the parties’ expert evidence created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the walkway was unreasonably slippery, making summary judgment inappropriate on the negligence claim. However, the court affirmed summary judgment for CVS on the negligence per se claim, finding that the municipal regulation at issue merely repeated the common law duty of reasonable care. The court vacated the district court’s judgment in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bunting v. District of Columbia CVS Pharmacy, LLC" on Justia Law

Khalid v. Blanche

2026-04-14T06:56:33-08:00

A U.S. citizen of Pakistani descent was denied boarding an international flight in 2019 and subsequently learned, after following the Department of Homeland Security’s redress process, that he was listed on the federal government’s No Fly List. He then sought to challenge his inclusion both on the No Fly List and the broader Terrorist Watchlist, which contains the names of individuals reasonably suspected of terrorism. Placement on the No Fly List is dependent on inclusion in the Terrorist Watchlist. The individual alleged ongoing travel and immigration-related harms due to his watchlist designations. He filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, raising constitutional and statutory claims and seeking removal from both lists. The district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction over the No Fly List claims due to the statutory requirement that such challenges proceed in the circuit court under 49 U.S.C. § 46110, and transferred those claims accordingly. The district court retained the Terrorist Watchlist claims under general federal question jurisdiction. After further briefing, the district court dismissed the remaining Terrorist Watchlist claims for lack of Article III standing, finding it could not redress the alleged injuries because removing the plaintiff from the Terrorist Watchlist would necessarily set aside the TSA Administrator’s order keeping him on the No Fly List—an action reserved for the circuit court. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The court held that while the plaintiff suffered concrete injuries from his inclusion on the Terrorist Watchlist, the district court lacked authority to redress those injuries because any effective remedy would encroach on the circuit court’s exclusive jurisdiction to review and set aside TSA No Fly List orders under § 46110. Thus, the district court properly dismissed the case for lack of standing. View "Khalid v. Blanche" on Justia Law

Khalid v. TSA

2026-04-14T06:56:32-08:00

A United States citizen of Pakistani descent challenged his continued placement on the federal No Fly List, which prohibits individuals from boarding flights in U.S. airspace. After enhanced screening and questioning by the FBI in 2012 and being prevented from boarding a flight in 2019, he sought redress through the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP). He received an unclassified summary stating that his listing was based on concerns about his associations and candor regarding activities in Pakistan. He contested these grounds, denied any terrorist associations, and argued that his inclusion was erroneous. While his DHS TRIP redress was pending, he filed suit in the United States District Court, which ultimately concluded it lacked jurisdiction, as exclusive review of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Administrator’s order rested with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The district court transferred his claims to the appellate court. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the TSA Administrator’s order, applying a “substantial evidence” and “arbitrary and capricious” standard, and reviewed constitutional claims de novo. The court dismissed the petitioner’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act claim for lack of standing, finding insufficient concrete plans to travel for religious purposes. It denied his other claims, holding that there is no fundamental right to air travel under substantive due process, and that the DHS TRIP process provides constitutionally adequate procedural protections. The court found that the Administrator’s order was supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary or capricious. The court also rejected the argument that the major questions doctrine applied, finding TSA’s statutory authority adequate. The petition was dismissed in part and otherwise denied. View "Khalid v. TSA" on Justia Law

True the Vote, Inc. v. IRS

2026-04-10T07:01:56-08:00

A nonprofit organization, after being represented by several law firms over multiple years in a lawsuit against the Internal Revenue Service, was awarded attorneys’ fees by the district court under the Equal Access to Justice Act. The total fee award was almost $789,000. The various law firms that had represented the nonprofit at different times—specifically, a set of former attorneys and the Bopp Law Firm—disputed how much each was entitled to from the award. Both the former attorneys and Bopp asserted they had an equitable charging lien entitling them to direct payment from the fee award, rather than requiring payment first be made to the client. After the resolution of the underlying claims, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia found that the former attorneys had a valid charging lien but denied Bopp’s motion to enforce its own lien. The district court reasoned, based on Indiana law (per a choice-of-law provision in Bopp's fee agreement), that Bopp had to show an agreement with the client that its compensation would come from the fund itself. The court concluded Bopp failed to establish such an agreement and thus did not have a valid lien. Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the district court applied the wrong legal standard under Indiana law. Indiana law recognizes two independent ways an attorney may establish an equitable charging lien: either by securing the fund for the client or by an agreement with the client to be paid from the fund. The Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether Bopp satisfied either prong and for potential resolution of lien priority and the calculation of amounts owed. View "True the Vote, Inc. v. IRS" on Justia Law

Qashu v. Rubio

2026-04-10T07:01:55-08:00

A visually impaired scientist was hired as a one-year fellow at the U.S. Department of State through a program administered by the American Association for the Advancement of Science, with the possibility of a second year if all parties agreed. The State Department provided her with several accommodations, including screen-reading software and noise-cancelling headphones. She experienced difficulties with the software and office environment, and alleged negative treatment by her supervisor. After initially being offered a renewal of her fellowship, negotiations regarding the renewal paperwork stalled, and the offer was rescinded. She filed a formal complaint alleging discrimination and retaliation based on her disability. Later, she was not selected to lead a project portfolio, a position for which she did not self-nominate. She continued to request accommodations, which were addressed with varying speed and effectiveness. After the end of her fellowship, the plaintiff sued the State Department in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging failure to accommodate her disability, disability discrimination, and retaliation in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted summary judgment to the State Department, finding that the agency had provided reasonable accommodations, had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions, and had not retaliated against her. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that the State Department did not deny the plaintiff reasonable accommodations, did not discriminate against her on the basis of disability, and did not retaliate against her for requesting accommodations or filing complaints. The court found that the agency participated in good faith in the interactive process, provided reasonable accommodations, and had legitimate, non-pretextual reasons for its employment decisions. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the State Department. View "Qashu v. Rubio" on Justia Law

Alon Refining Krotz Springs, Inc. v. EPA

2026-04-07T07:02:31-08:00

Several oil refineries with average daily crude oil throughput below 75,000 barrels in 2024 applied to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2025 for exemptions from their obligations under the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program for the 2024 compliance year. The RFS program, established under the Clean Air Act, requires refineries to blend renewable fuels into transportation fuels. The Act provides for a “small refinery” exemption for facilities that do not exceed the 75,000-barrel threshold in a calendar year. The petitioning refineries did not seek exemptions for 2023 and based their applications solely on their 2024 throughput. After the refineries submitted their applications, the EPA informed them that, under its 2014 regulation, eligibility required a refinery to meet the “small refinery” definition both for "the most recent full calendar year prior to seeking an extension" and for "the year or years for which an exemption is sought." The EPA interpreted this to mean petitioners needed to satisfy the throughput limit in both 2023 and 2024. Since the refineries exceeded the threshold in 2023, the EPA denied the exemption requests. The refineries then sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The D.C. Circuit held that the EPA’s interpretation of its 2014 regulation was contrary to the regulation’s plain text. The court found that, because the applications were filed in 2025 for the 2024 compliance year, both the “most recent full calendar year prior to seeking an extension” and “the year for which an exemption is sought” referred to 2024. Since the petitioners met the threshold in 2024, they were eligible under the regulation. The court vacated the EPA’s denial orders and remanded for further proceedings. View "Alon Refining Krotz Springs, Inc. v. EPA" on Justia Law

United Mexican States v. Lion Mexico Consolidated L.P.

2026-04-07T07:02:31-08:00

A Canadian investment company provided loans to Mexican companies owned by a businessman, securing these loans with mortgages and promissory notes. When the Mexican companies defaulted, the investor attempted to recover its funds through negotiations and litigation in Mexico. The investor alleged that a fraudulent scheme, orchestrated by the businessman, led to a forged settlement used in Mexican court to void the loans. After Mexican courts did not provide relief, the investor initiated arbitration against Mexico under NAFTA, claiming Mexico failed to provide the protections required for foreign investments. The arbitral tribunal, seated in Washington, D.C., found that only the mortgages—not the promissory notes—qualified as protected “investments” under NAFTA. The tribunal concluded that Mexico had breached its obligations under Article 1105(1) by failing to provide fair and equitable treatment to the investor’s qualifying investments, awarding $47 million in compensation to the investor. Mexico then petitioned the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to vacate the award, arguing the arbitrators exceeded their authority and disregarded the law. The district court rejected these arguments, confirming the award. Separately, the businessman sought to intervene in the proceedings, claiming his interests were harmed, but the district court denied intervention. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the arbitral tribunal did not exceed its powers, as it at least arguably interpreted the relevant treaty provisions, and did not act in manifest disregard of the law. The appellate court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the businessman’s motion to intervene, finding Mexico adequately represented his interests. The court affirmed the district court’s order in full. View "United Mexican States v. Lion Mexico Consolidated L.P." on Justia Law

Gjoci v. DOS

2026-04-03T06:31:58-08:00

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States government suspended the processing of Diversity Immigrant Visa (DV) applications for the 2021 fiscal year. The State Department halted interviews and adjudication of diversity visa applications, and a presidential proclamation further restricted the entry of DV selectees. Processing resumed only after the proclamation was revoked, leaving many selectees unable to complete the process before the fiscal year ended. Some applicants in this group received visas and became lawful permanent residents, but others did not receive any meaningful response to their applications. Applicants who did not receive visas, as well as those who did, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. They challenged the State Department’s handling of the 2021 DV Program and sought, among other remedies, an injunction requiring the government to adjudicate their visa applications or preserve their eligibility beyond the fiscal year. The district court denied a preliminary injunction and ultimately dismissed the equitable claims as moot, finding that it could not grant relief after the fiscal year ended. The court also dismissed other claims—including requests for declaratory relief and nominal damages—for lack of standing, and denied the plaintiffs’ request to file supplemental briefing. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that claims seeking preservation of visa eligibility were moot in light of prior circuit precedent, since courts cannot order visa processing beyond the relevant fiscal year. It also found that the plaintiffs lacked standing for their remaining claims because past injuries alone did not justify declaratory relief, nominal damages were barred by sovereign immunity, and equitable claims were foreclosed by precedent. The court further concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying supplemental briefing. View "Gjoci v. DOS" on Justia Law

World Shipping Council v. FMC

2026-03-31T06:31:52-08:00

A trade association representing the majority of the world’s liner shipping services challenged a rule issued by the Federal Maritime Commission. Under recent amendments to the Shipping Act, Congress directed the Commission to define what constitutes an “unreasonable refusal to deal or negotiate” by ocean common carriers regarding vessel space accommodations. The Commission responded by adopting a rule specifying non-binding factors for evaluating unreasonable refusals, including whether a carrier quoted rates vastly above market value, required carriers to submit an annual “documented export policy,” and removed explicit reference to “business decisions” from its list of factors. The association objected, arguing that the rule exceeded the Commission’s authority and was arbitrary and capricious. After the Commission published its final rule, the association filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The association claimed that the Commission lacked authority to consider price in its analysis, that the requirement for a documented export policy was ultra vires and arbitrary, and that removal of the “business decisions” factor was likewise arbitrary. The Commission defended the rule’s approach, asserting its statutory power to require reports and to evaluate factors relevant to reasonableness. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied the petition for review. The court held that the Commission’s consideration of price as an indicator of unreasonable refusal did not amount to unauthorized rate regulation, and that the requirement for a documented export policy was within the Commission’s statutory authority. The court also found that the omission of “business decisions” as a listed factor did not preclude their consideration in individual cases. The court concluded that the rule was neither beyond the Commission’s statutory authority nor arbitrary and capricious. View "World Shipping Council v. FMC" on Justia Law

Secretary of Labor v. Knight Hawk Coal, LLC

2026-03-31T06:31:51-08:00

Mine operators received citations from the Secretary of Labor under the Mine Act for alleged safety violations, some of which were designated as “significant and substantial” (S&S). The operators contested these citations before the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission. Subsequently, the Secretary sought to modify some citations by removing S&S designations and reducing penalties, or to vacate certain citations, as part of proposed settlements. The Secretary provided no explanations for these changes. Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) for the Commission denied the Secretary’s motions to settle or dismiss, emphasizing the lack of explanation for the modifications. Upon interlocutory review, the Commission affirmed the ALJs’ decisions, holding that section 110(k) of the Mine Act requires the Secretary to provide sufficient reasoning and justification when removing S&S designations or vacating citations in the context of settlement motions. The Secretary then petitioned for review of these nonfinal orders in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review the Commission’s nonfinal orders, as these orders did not meet the requirements for immediate appeal under the collateral-order doctrine. The court found the Secretary’s interest in modifying or vacating citations via settlement agreements to be adequately protected by the availability of review after a final order. The court determined that delaying review would not imperil a substantial public interest. Therefore, the court dismissed the Secretary’s petitions for review for lack of jurisdiction. View "Secretary of Labor v. Knight Hawk Coal, LLC" on Justia Law

Center for Biological Diversity v. Zeldin

2026-03-27T06:33:18-08:00

Florida sought approval from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to assume authority for issuing permits under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, which would allow parties to discharge pollutants into state waters. To streamline the process for permit applicants and reduce the burden of complying with the Endangered Species Act (ESA), Florida proposed a permitting program in which the state would monitor and protect ESA-listed species primarily through a “technical assistance process,” with only advisory input from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). The EPA and FWS approved Florida’s proposal after the FWS issued a programmatic Biological Opinion (BiOp) and Incidental Take Statement (ITS) that found no jeopardy to protected species and exempted permittees from further ESA liability, relying heavily on Florida’s assurances rather than detailed, up-front analysis. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the actions of the EPA and FWS after environmental groups challenged Florida’s permitting program, asserting violations of the ESA and Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court found that the FWS’s BiOp and ITS were unlawful because they failed to conduct the required analyses and deferred essential protections to a less rigorous state-run process. The court also determined the EPA’s reliance on these documents was impermissible and that the EPA had wrongly failed to consult with the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). As a remedy, the district court vacated the EPA’s approval of Florida’s permitting program along with the BiOp and ITS. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the environmental groups had standing and their claims were ripe. It concluded that the FWS’s BiOp and ITS did not comply with the ESA, that the EPA’s reliance on those documents was unlawful, and that the EPA erred by not consulting with the NMFS. The court required vacatur of the EPA’s approval of Florida’s permitting program and the associated ESA documents. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Zeldin" on Justia Law

Simmons v. Rubio

2026-03-17T06:33:41-08:00

A foreign service officer with the Department of State alleged that her employee evaluation review for 2016 contained false and prejudicial statements, which she claimed delayed her eligibility for tenure. After her administrative grievance was denied, she appealed to the Foreign Service Grievance Board. The Board conditionally dismissed her appeal, contingent on the Department providing certain corrective actions. Over the following years, the officer and the Department exchanged multiple motions regarding the completeness of the relief provided and attorney’s fees. Ultimately, the Board found that the Department had provided the promised relief, denied her motion for attorney’s fees on the grounds she was not a prevailing party, and closed the case, barring further filings. Subsequently, the officer filed a five-count complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging several Board orders as arbitrary and seeking attorney’s fees, costs, and other relief. The district court dismissed counts I through IV as time-barred, holding that the 180-day statute of limitations began when the Board closed the case and was only paused during reconsideration proceedings, making her claims untimely. The court also dismissed count V for lack of jurisdiction, finding no right under Board rules to file further motions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the timely motion for reconsideration rendered the underlying Board order nonfinal for purposes of judicial review and reset the statute of limitations. Therefore, the officer’s claims in counts I through IV were timely. However, the appellate court affirmed dismissal of count V, concluding she failed to state a claim because the Board’s regulations did not guarantee her the right to additional filings or attorney’s fees. The decision was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings on counts I through IV. View "Simmons v. Rubio" on Justia Law

USA v. Thorne

2026-03-17T06:33:41-08:00

Law enforcement agencies from the FBI, ATF, and the D.C. Metropolitan Police jointly investigated two individuals suspected of drug and firearms trafficking in the D.C., Maryland, and Virginia area. Through surveillance and controlled purchases, officers identified Linwood Thorne as a key supplier. They determined Thorne likely resided in D.C. and operated a business in Maryland. Searches of both locations produced significant quantities of drugs, drug paraphernalia, and firearms, some of which were unregistered and linked to Thorne. When authorities sought to arrest Thorne, they obtained warrants to track two of his cell phones, using both GPS-ping and cell-site-simulator methods. The D.C. magistrate judge issued these warrants. Officers ultimately located and arrested Thorne in Baltimore, Maryland, using the warrant for his D.C.-area code phone. A grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted Thorne on multiple drug and firearms charges. Before trial in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Thorne moved to suppress evidence obtained via the cell-site-simulator warrant, arguing the warrant violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(b) because there was insufficient evidence that the targeted phone was in D.C. when the warrant was issued. The district court denied suppression, reasoning that the warrant was valid or, in the alternative, that the good-faith exception applied. After trial, a jury convicted Thorne on most counts, and he appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court assumed, without deciding, that a Rule 41(b) violation may have occurred, but held that suppression was unwarranted because the law enforcement officers reasonably relied on the warrant in good faith. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion and the convictions, holding that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to warrants with potential Rule 41(b) venue defects. View "USA v. Thorne" on Justia Law

Mitchell v. Phelan

2026-03-13T06:35:21-08:00

Lieutenant Ernest Mitchell, a U.S. Navy officer, was serving as the Command Duty Officer aboard the USS Howard when he left the ship without authorization to move his car prior to the ship’s relocation. He failed to inform his commanding officer or transfer his duties to another qualified person during his absence. This incident, along with prior documented deficiencies in communication and adherence to standards, led to a series of disciplinary actions. These included his detachment from the ship for cause, findings by a Board of Inquiry of violations under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, delay and eventual removal from a promotion list, and denial of his efforts to remove adverse records and secure his promotion. After exhausting administrative remedies, Mitchell filed suit against the Secretary of the Navy in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the Navy’s actions violated the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, determining that the Navy’s actions were reasonable and supported by a satisfactory explanation. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo, applying a highly deferential standard to the military’s factfinding. The appellate court rejected Mitchell’s argument that he was entitled to promotion by operation of law under 10 U.S.C. § 624(d), holding that the statute does not mandate automatic appointment if the Executive decides against it. The court also found that the Board for Correction of Naval Records did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in concluding Mitchell demonstrated substandard performance over an extended period. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the Secretary of the Navy. View "Mitchell v. Phelan" on Justia Law

Clean Fuels Alliance America v. EPA

2026-03-13T06:35:20-08:00

The case concerns a challenge brought by two renewable fuel industry groups to a 2020 rule issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Clean Air Act’s Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) Program. The challenged rule established the percentage of renewable fuel that refiners and importers must include in their annual fuel output. The groups objected to EPA’s refusal to adjust the 2020 standard to account for renewable fuel shortfalls resulting from past retroactive small refinery exemptions. While the case was pending, EPA issued a new rule in 2022 that recalculated the 2020 standards and reaffirmed its approach of not making up for past exemptions. In addition, Congress altered the statutory framework, granting EPA broader discretion in setting future renewable fuel volumes. Following the issuance of the 2022 rule, most petitioners dismissed their challenges, and the two remaining groups shifted their focus, no longer seeking to set aside the 2020 rule but instead seeking a ruling that would require EPA to change its policy in future rulemakings. They did not challenge the 2022 rule, nor did they request its invalidation. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the case was moot. The court reasoned that the 2022 rule superseded the 2020 rule, eliminating any live controversy over that agency action. The court further explained that the legal landscape had changed due to statutory amendments, so the original dispute no longer presented the same question. Because petitioners were not seeking to overturn any concrete, current agency action, their challenge amounted to a request for an impermissible advisory opinion. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petitions as moot. View "Clean Fuels Alliance America v. EPA" on Justia Law

Rose v. Kennedy

2026-03-10T06:02:16-08:00

Three Medicaid beneficiaries in Indiana challenged the federal agency’s approval of a ten-year extension to Indiana’s Medicaid program, known as HIP 2.0, asserting that the program did not comply with the requirements of the federal Medicaid Act. The plaintiffs argued that the agency’s 2020 approval, as well as a 2023 letter maintaining the program despite concerns about coverage reductions, were arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. Indiana, seeking to defend HIP 2.0, intervened in the case. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to the beneficiaries, holding that the agency’s approval was not based on reasoned decision-making and failed to consider all relevant factors, particularly whether the program would help furnish medical assistance. The court vacated the 2020 approval and remanded the matter to the agency for further proceedings but stayed the vacatur order, allowing most of HIP 2.0 to remain in effect except for specific premium requirements. Indiana appealed, seeking review of the district court’s remand order, while the beneficiaries and the federal agency argued that the order was not a final, appealable decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed whether it had jurisdiction over Indiana’s appeal. The court held that the district court’s remand order was not a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because it did not end the litigation on the merits and substantive proceedings before the agency remained. The appellate court also found that none of the exceptions to the final judgment rule applied, including the collateral-order doctrine or Rule 54(b) certification. Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit dismissed Indiana’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Rose v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Paul v. FAA

2026-02-27T07:34:59-08:00

A pilot employed by a cargo airline was on a personal trip abroad when his employer, Amerijet International, selected him for a random drug test and requested that he appear for testing in Seattle on the same day. The pilot was unable to comply due to his location and a medical issue. The airline determined that he had refused the test, reported this to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and subsequently terminated his employment. The FAA corresponded with the pilot, initially investigating the matter and ultimately informing him that, while it was not taking enforcement action against his certificates, he would be subject to return-to-duty requirements because of the refusal determination, and the test refusal would be reported to the Pilot Records Database. The pilot challenged these consequences, arguing that the FAA had not independently reviewed the employer’s determination that he refused the test. The FAA responded that test-refusal determinations were made solely by the employer, not by the agency, and that the FAA did not review such determinations. The case came before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on the pilot’s petition for review of the FAA’s actions. The Court of Appeals held that the FAA’s internal guidance, specifically its Drug and Alcohol Compliance and Enforcement Surveillance Handbook, plausibly requires the FAA to independently review an employer’s test-refusal determination. The court interpreted the Handbook to require such review, partly to avoid serious constitutional concerns that would arise if the FAA entirely delegated this authority to private employers without oversight. Because the FAA conceded that it did not conduct any review, the court found the agency’s actions to be arbitrary and capricious for departing from its own procedures. The court granted the petition in part, remanding the case to the FAA for further review consistent with its opinion. View "Paul v. FAA" on Justia Law

Centro de Trabajadores Unidos v. Bessent

2026-02-24T07:34:31-08:00

A group of organizations challenged the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) policy permitting the sharing of taxpayer address information with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for immigration enforcement. The plaintiffs initiated suit after reports that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) was seeking addresses from the IRS to locate undocumented immigrants. The IRS and DHS subsequently formalized an agreement (Memorandum of Understanding, or MOU) specifying procedures for ICE to request taxpayer addresses from the IRS for use in nontax criminal investigations, provided statutory requirements were met. The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. After denying a temporary restraining order, the District Court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The District Court found that at least one plaintiff had standing and concluded the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their claims. Specifically, the court found that 26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(2) unambiguously allowed the IRS to disclose address information in response to valid requests, and that the IRS’s prior internal guidelines to the contrary did not have the force of law. The court also determined that the MOU was a nonbinding policy statement, not a final agency action subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court’s denial of preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs likely had standing, but were unlikely to succeed on the merits. The court ruled that § 6103(i)(2) clearly authorizes the IRS to disclose taxpayer address information, and that the MOU was not a reviewable agency action. It further held that any challenge to the agency’s change of interpretation was not viable because the court’s interpretation of the statute controls. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "Centro de Trabajadores Unidos v. Bessent" on Justia Law

Friends of Animals v. United States Bureau of Land Management

2026-02-20T07:03:50-08:00

The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) issued four ten-year plans authorizing the gathering and removal of wild horses from public lands in specific areas to achieve and maintain population levels within approved management ranges. Friends of Animals challenged these plans, arguing that they allowed indefinite removals without specific findings of overpopulation, failed to rely on current information, and did not include proper consultation, contrary to requirements under the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act. The BLM responded that the Act permitted multiple removal operations over a period of years within a single plan. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case. The court held that the ten-year plans were unlawful to the extent they permitted additional gathers after achieving the approved management levels, and vacated those portions of the plans. The court also held that future removal operations must be based on current information and proper consultation, and must be conducted promptly, as required by the Act. The court remanded the matter to BLM to revise the plans and clarify which future gathers would require further process before proceeding. Notably, the court did not resolve the parties’ principal disputes, leaving them to be addressed on remand. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the appeal brought by Friends of Animals. The appellate court determined that the District Court’s remand order was not a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because it left the core dispute unresolved for further proceedings. As a result, the appellate court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the case and dismissed the appeal. The disposition was a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Friends of Animals v. United States Bureau of Land Management" on Justia Law

Stabil LLC v. Russian Federation

2026-02-13T08:04:09-08:00

In 2014, Russia invaded and subsequently asserted control over Crimea, an area internationally recognized as part of Ukraine. Ukrainian businesses operating in Crimea—including an electricity distributor and a group of petrol station owners—had their assets seized and operations transferred to Russian-controlled entities without compensation. These businesses, having made investments under Ukrainian law and while the 1998 Agreement Between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on the Encouragement and Mutual Protection of Investments (“Investment Treaty”) was in effect, pursued arbitration against Russia for expropriation and treaty violations. The Ukrainian companies initiated separate arbitrations under the Investment Treaty’s arbitration clause. The arbitral tribunals found Russia liable for breaches and awarded significant damages to the companies. Russia challenged the arbitral jurisdiction and the awards in foreign courts, but those efforts were unsuccessful. The companies then filed petitions in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to enforce the awards under the New York Convention and the Federal Arbitration Act. Russia moved to dismiss, arguing the courts lacked subject-matter and personal jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The District Court rejected Russia’s arguments, finding jurisdiction appropriate under the FSIA’s arbitration exception and personal jurisdiction proper upon valid service. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed whether the District Court correctly exercised jurisdiction. The appellate court held that the FSIA’s arbitration exception applied because the companies established the existence of an arbitration agreement, a qualifying arbitral award, and a treaty potentially governing enforcement. The court further held that foreign states are not entitled to the Fifth Amendment’s due process protections against personal jurisdiction. The judgments of the District Court were affirmed. View "Stabil LLC v. Russian Federation" on Justia Law

Mohammad Hilmi Nassif & Partners v. Republic of Iraq

2026-02-13T08:04:08-08:00

A Jordanian business entity entered into an agreement with the Republic of Iraq in 1995 to settle Iraq’s unpaid debt for delivered goods by providing specified quantities of sulfur and urea, valued at $53 million. The agreement contemplated delivery at the Iraq-Jordan border, and although the supplier anticipated reselling these materials in the United States, this downstream transaction was not included in the written agreement. Iraq did not fulfill its obligations under the agreement, leading the supplier to pursue payment through interactions with Iraqi officials, who orally acknowledged the debt and suggested legal action might facilitate payment. After Iraq failed to deliver the goods, the supplier obtained a judgment in its favor from a Jordanian court in 2015 for the full amount. The Jordanian Court of Cassation affirmed the judgment. However, when the supplier sought to enforce the judgment in Jordan, the Jordanian Court of Appeal held that Iraq had not waived its sovereign immunity in the enforcement proceeding, preventing collection. Iraq has not satisfied any part of the judgment. The supplier then initiated an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking recognition of the Jordanian judgment. Iraq moved to dismiss, invoking sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The district court found that no FSIA exception applied and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, holding that Iraq had not made an explicit waiver of immunity and that Iraq’s conduct did not cause a direct effect in the United States as required by the FSIA’s commercial activity exception. Thus, the supplier’s claim is barred by Iraq’s sovereign immunity. View "Mohammad Hilmi Nassif & Partners v. Republic of Iraq" on Justia Law

EB5 Holdings Inc. v. Edlow

2026-02-13T08:04:08-08:00

Immigrant investors who seek permanent residency in the United States may do so by investing in regional centers that promote economic growth and job creation. In 2022, Congress reformed this program, establishing new oversight measures including an annual fee for all regional centers to fund monitoring and fraud prevention. EB5 Holdings, which owns two regional centers designated before 2022, challenged the application of this fee to “pre-RIA” (pre-2022 Reform and Integrity Act) regional centers. EB5 argued that only centers designated after the 2022 reforms should be subject to the annual fee, claiming the statute did not authorize the fee’s collection from centers designated under previous law. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed EB5’s Administrative Procedure Act challenge after the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services announced that all regional centers must pay the new fee to maintain their status. The district court denied EB5’s motion for summary judgment and granted the government’s motion to dismiss, finding that the fee provision unambiguously applies to both pre- and post-RIA regional centers. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the statutory text requires all currently designated regional centers—regardless of when they were initially designated—to pay the annual Integrity Fund fee. The court reasoned that the phrase “designated under subparagraph (E)” refers to the current status of being designated to operate as a regional center under the reformed program, not the timing of original designation. The court further rejected the argument that applying the fee to pre-RIA centers was impermissibly retroactive, as the fee only applies prospectively to centers wishing to maintain their designation. Thus, the district court’s dismissal was affirmed. View "EB5 Holdings Inc. v. Edlow" on Justia Law

Affirmed Energy, LLC v. FERC

2026-02-10T07:34:07-08:00

A provider of energy efficient resources (EERs), which are projects that reduce electrical consumption, challenged a decision by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approving a change to PJM Interconnection LLC’s tariff. PJM manages the electrical grid in parts of thirteen states and the District of Columbia, and it operates capacity auctions to ensure reliable electricity supply. Historically, EERs were allowed to bid in these auctions for up to four consecutive years to compensate for a lag in PJM’s statistical model (load forecast), which previously did not account for new EERs’ impact on energy consumption. In 2016, PJM updated its model to capture these effects in real time, removing the need for EERs to participate in the auctions. In 2024, PJM proposed a tariff amendment to exclude EERs from future capacity auctions, citing the improved accuracy of its load forecast and the unnecessary costs imposed on consumers by double-counting EERs’ effects. FERC approved this amendment, finding it would lower costs for consumers without compromising grid reliability. Affirmed Energy LLC, an EER aggregator, protested, arguing that the amendment was unlawfully retroactive and arbitrary and capricious, as it would disrupt settled expectations and reliance interests, particularly for projects that had already cleared prior auctions. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. It held that FERC’s orders were not retroactive because they only applied to future auctions and did not strip EER providers of entitlements to past payments or auction results. The court also found that FERC had reasonably evaluated PJM’s updated forecast, weighed the reliance interests at stake, and explained why the amendment was justified. The petition for review was denied. View "Affirmed Energy, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

In re: Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2705(b)

2026-02-03T12:25:52-08:00

Empower Oversight Whistleblowers & Research, a nonprofit organization, filed a motion to intervene in a closed grand jury proceeding and sought to unseal Department of Justice applications for non-disclosure orders related to a 2017 grand jury subpoena for Google account records. At the time of the subpoena, Jason Foster, Empower’s founder, was the Chief Investigative Counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee, investigating alleged misconduct at the Department. Google notified Foster in 2023 that a subpoena and non-disclosure order had been issued and extended multiple times. Empower argued that the applications should be unsealed, claiming they were judicial records subject to public access under common law and the First Amendment, and that grand jury secrecy had been waived due to public disclosures. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia permitted Empower to intervene but granted only partial unsealing. It held that the applications were ancillary grand jury records protected by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(6), limiting unsealing to jurisdictional and legal standard sections. The court found no waiver of secrecy, as disclosures were not sufficiently public to meet the threshold established by precedent. Most of the documents remained sealed, and Empower appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed for abuse of discretion and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the applications were covered by Rule 6(e)(6), which displaces any common law or First Amendment right of access, and that grand jury secrecy had not been waived by the disclosures identified by Empower. The court also declined to review new evidence (the December 2024 OIG report) not presented to the district court but remanded the case for the lower court to consider whether to allow Empower to amend its motion and supplement the record with the OIG report. View "In re: Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2705(b)" on Justia Law

De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary

2026-01-23T08:01:04-08:00

A family that inherited a renowned art collection in Hungary prior to World War II sought to recover dozens of valuable artworks seized by the Hungarian government and its Nazi collaborators during the Holocaust. The heirs, who became citizens of the United States and other countries, alleged that the majority of the collection was confiscated during the Nazi occupation and dispersed across Europe and later deposited at Hungarian institutions. Some pieces were returned to the family after the war, only to be retaken by the government under various circumstances, including criminal forfeiture and postwar policies. The heirs initially pursued their claims in Hungarian courts without success. In 2010, they sued the Republic of Hungary and several Hungarian museums in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, invoking the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) expropriation and commercial activity exceptions. The district court partly dismissed the claims on international comity grounds but retained jurisdiction over most artworks. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the comity dismissal and affirmed jurisdiction on different grounds. Subsequent rulings narrowed the scope of claims, particularly after the Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, which clarified the FSIA’s expropriation exception and incorporated the domestic-takings rule, limiting jurisdiction over property taken from a sovereign’s own nationals. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that U.S. courts lack jurisdiction over the family’s claims. The court held that plaintiffs failed to establish that the seizure of their artwork violated the international law of expropriation, as required by the FSIA. It found no international authority supporting jurisdiction for wartime or stateless-person takings, and that treaties and the domestic-takings rule further barred the claims. The court affirmed the district court’s complete dismissal of the litigation. View "De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary" on Justia Law

Petro Star Inc. v. FERC

2026-01-23T08:01:04-08:00

The case centers on the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), which transports crude oil from Alaska’s North Slope, with oil from different shippers being commingled in the pipeline. To address variations in oil quality, a “Quality Bank” compensates shippers who inject higher-quality oil and charges those with lower-quality oil. The valuation of one particular oil component, Resid—the heaviest and least valuable cut—has been disputed for decades. Petro Star, a shipper whose refineries lack specialized units to further process Resid, argued that Resid was undervalued, while ConocoPhillips contended it was overvalued. The TAPS owners, who administer the Quality Bank, also challenged a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) finding that the Bank’s administrator violated tariff provisions. Following a 2013 FERC investigation into the Resid valuation formula, both Petro Star and ConocoPhillips intervened, seeking changes. After initial FERC findings were remanded for further explanation by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, FERC held additional hearings. An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded the formula was just and reasonable, and FERC largely affirmed this result, also finding a tariff violation by the Quality Bank administrator for failing to update formula yields based on monthly Resid testing. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that FERC’s formula for valuing Resid remains just and reasonable, as neither Petro Star nor ConocoPhillips demonstrated the formula to be unjust or unreasonable. The court also upheld FERC’s finding that the Quality Bank administrator violated the tariff by not updating formula yields with each test, but found FERC’s prospective remedy—requiring monthly testing and annual yield updates—was appropriate. The court denied all three petitions. View "Petro Star Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Spokane Airport Board v. TSA

2026-01-20T07:30:46-08:00

This case concerns the Transportation Security Administration’s issuance of an emergency amendment that required certain airport operators to incorporate specific cybersecurity measures and controls into their airport security programs. The amendment, issued in March 2023, responded to increasing cyber threats to the aviation sector, including ransomware and foreign cyberattacks. Under the amendment, airports were required to identify critical systems, submit a cybersecurity implementation plan, and assess their effectiveness annually. The Spokane Airport Board, which operates Spokane International Airport, objected to the amendment on both procedural and substantive grounds. After the amendment was issued, the Spokane Airport Board petitioned the TSA for reconsideration, raising various objections. The TSA denied these petitions, upholding the emergency amendment. Spokane then filed a timely petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, as provided by statute. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the TSA’s order under the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act, specifically considering whether it was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review arguments not properly raised before the TSA, as required by statute. The court found that the objections Spokane did properly exhaust were meritless. It concluded that the TSA possesses broad statutory authority to regulate aviation security—including cybersecurity—in response to threats. The court also found that the emergency amendment was consistent with TSA regulations and was not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the court denied Spokane’s petition for review, leaving the TSA’s emergency cybersecurity amendment in effect. View "Spokane Airport Board v. TSA" on Justia Law

Mehneh v. Rubio

2026-01-16T07:00:55-08:00

Two U.S. citizens petitioned for immigrant visas on behalf of their relatives. After each relative interviewed with a consular officer, their visa applications were placed in administrative processing, requiring additional information. Both applicants submitted the required information but experienced lengthy delays. Eventually, after sixteen months, one applicant and his spouse filed a complaint alleging unreasonable delay; the other applicant and his son did the same after seven months. Both sought to compel the Department of State to adjudicate the applications. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed both complaints for failure to state a claim. The court applied factors from Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC to determine whether there had been an unreasonable delay and ruled that neither complaint met the standard. The applicants appealed the dismissals. While the appeals were pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the Department of State finished processing the applications: one applicant received his visa and entered the United States, while the other was refused a visa due to inadmissibility for terrorist activities, with no waiver available. The Court of Appeals held that these events rendered both appeals moot, as no effectual relief could be provided. The court found that neither of the recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine—voluntary cessation or “capable of repetition yet evading review”—applied. The court vacated the judgments of the district court and remanded with instructions to dismiss the cases as moot. The court also declined the appellants’ request to create a new exception to mootness for unreasonable delay claims. View "Mehneh v. Rubio" on Justia Law

Maryland Office of People's Counsel v. FERC

2026-01-13T08:01:26-08:00

PJM Interconnection, LLC, which manages electricity transmission across several Mid-Atlantic and Midwestern states, conducted its 2024/2025 capacity auction based on certain published parameters intended to ensure sufficient capacity for future electricity needs. After bidding closed, PJM discovered an error in the Locational Delivery Area Reliability Requirement for the Delmarva Power & Light Company South Zone, which would result in inflated auction prices and excess capacity charges for consumers. PJM sought to amend its tariff to correct this issue before finalizing the auction results, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved PJM's request. Capacity suppliers challenged FERC’s approval in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which vacated the decision, finding that the amendment was retroactive and violated the filed-rate doctrine. FERC, complying with the Third Circuit’s mandate, directed PJM to proceed with the unamended tariff, resulting in higher costs for consumers. Following this, agencies, customers, and entities representing customers’ interests filed a complaint under section 206 of the Federal Power Act, seeking modification of the auction outcome. FERC denied the complaint, stating that the Third Circuit’s ruling foreclosed any relief. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed FERC’s orders. The court held that FERC’s denial of the complaint was legally erroneous because the Third Circuit’s decision did not address whether FERC could use its section 206 authority to modify the auction result. The D.C. Circuit clarified that section 206(b) of the Federal Power Act provides a statutory exception to the general prohibition on retroactive rate changes. The court granted the petition for review, vacated FERC’s orders denying the complaint, and remanded the case to FERC for further proceedings. View "Maryland Office of People's Counsel v. FERC" on Justia Law

CenturyTel of Montana, Inc. v. NLRB

2026-01-13T08:01:25-08:00

CenturyTel of Montana, Inc., a telecommunications provider and subsidiary of Lumen Technologies, maintained a longstanding collective bargaining agreement with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union 768, covering technicians in northwest Montana. In 2021, concerns arose among various union locals that Lumen was deploying non-union National Technicians to perform work within the jurisdiction of union-represented employees. In response, Local 768 requested detailed information from CenturyTel about the presence and activities of these technicians, aiming to monitor possible violations of the bargaining agreement. After repeated requests and partial responses from the company, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge, alleging CenturyTel’s failure to furnish information necessary for the union to carry out its representational duties. The National Labor Relations Board’s administrative law judge held an evidentiary hearing, at which testimony established that non-union technicians had worked within the union’s jurisdiction and that the union’s information request was relevant to potential grievances. The ALJ credited the union’s account of communications and found that the requested information was “plainly aimed at ascertaining” possible contract violations. The ALJ rejected the employer’s arguments that the union had failed to show an objective basis for its request and that all relevant information had already been provided. As a result, the ALJ concluded that CenturyTel had violated Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act and ordered the company to provide the requested information and post a notice of the violation. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the Board’s order. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding that the union had a reasonable belief, supported by objective evidence, that the information was relevant to its duties. The court denied CenturyTel’s petition for review and granted the Board’s cross-application for enforcement. View "CenturyTel of Montana, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Independent Market Monitor for PJM v. FERC

2025-12-30T07:31:17-08:00

PJM Interconnection LLC manages an extensive electrical grid across thirteen states and the District of Columbia. To ensure competitive market conditions and compliance with regulatory standards, PJM employs Market Monitoring Analytics LLP as its independent market monitor (IMM). For several years, IMM attended meetings between PJM’s Board of Managers and the Liaison Committee, a nonvoting body designed to facilitate communication between PJM Members and the Board. However, PJM began enforcing the Liaison Committee’s charter provision, restricting attendance to end-use customers and regulated utilities, thereby excluding IMM from future meetings. After this exclusion, IMM filed a complaint with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), arguing that PJM’s action violated Section IV.G of its tariff, which IMM interpreted as granting it the right to participate in such stakeholder processes. FERC reviewed the complaint and dismissed it. The Commission determined that Section IV.G only applied to decision-making bodies within PJM that handle proposed revisions to tariffs or market rules, not to the Liaison Committee, which functions solely as a communication forum and does not engage in decision-making or voting. IMM subsequently petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review of FERC’s decision. The Court, before addressing the merits, examined whether IMM had standing to challenge its exclusion. The Court held that IMM failed to demonstrate a concrete or particularized injury resulting from its inability to attend the Liaison Committee meetings, as IMM retained access to all market data required for its monitoring functions and had alternative avenues for communication with the Board. The Court further found that IMM had not shown any expenditure of resources to counteract the alleged harm. Consequently, the petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction due to IMM’s lack of standing. View "Independent Market Monitor for PJM v. FERC" on Justia Law

USA v. Williamson

2025-12-12T07:32:31-08:00

The appellant was serving an eight-year federal sentence for threatening to murder an FBI agent. As he neared the end of his sentence, he sent letters from prison threatening an Assistant U.S. Attorney, the prosecutor’s family, and another FBI agent. These communications included vivid descriptions of violent acts and references to his own mental state. A grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted him for these new threats, and his pretrial detention continued even after his prior sentence expired. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ordered a psychological evaluation to determine the appellant’s competency and potential mental illness, particularly regarding his capacity to conform his conduct to the law. The evaluation found him competent to stand trial but unable to conform his actions to legal requirements due to a delusional disorder. The government then moved to dismiss the indictment without prejudice, citing the likelihood of a valid insanity defense, and requested that the appellant be evaluated for civil commitment under 18 U.S.C. § 4246. The district court dismissed the charges, stayed the dismissal, and ordered that the appellant remain at the federal facility for up to forty-five days for a dangerousness evaluation by the facility’s director. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed whether the district court had authority to order the facility director to conduct a dangerousness evaluation before deciding to issue a certificate under § 4246. The appellate court held that such an order was proper, as it ensured the statutory process was followed and did not contradict any statutory or procedural requirements. The court affirmed the district court’s order, concluding that the stay and evaluation were reasonable and within the court’s inherent powers. View "USA v. Williamson" on Justia Law