U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - Justia Case Law Summaries

HEALTHCARE ALLY MANAGEMENT OF CALIFORNIA, LLC V. WSP USA, INC.

2026-08-11T08:01:43-08:00

A dispute arose concerning the payment rate for a surgical procedure performed at an out-of-network facility. The patient receiving the surgery was covered by an ERISA-governed health plan provided by the employer and administered by an insurance company. Prior to the surgery, the facility contacted the plan administrator to verify coverage and was told that the plan would reimburse at the usual, customary, and reasonable (“UCR”) rate, not the lower Medicare rate. Relying on this representation, the facility performed the surgery. However, the plan later paid only at the Medicare rate, far less than the full billed amount. The facility’s successor in interest, having obtained the rights to the claim, sought to recover the unpaid balance. The action was first brought in California state court, then removed to the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiff asserted both ERISA and state law claims. The district court dismissed the ERISA claim for lack of derivative standing, as the plaintiff was not properly assigned the right to sue under ERISA. The court also dismissed the state law claims for negligent misrepresentation and promissory estoppel, holding that these claims were preempted by ERISA because they related to an ERISA-covered plan. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the promissory estoppel claim, holding that, under circuit precedent, such claims are preempted by ERISA. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the negligent misrepresentation claim. The appellate court held that ERISA does not preempt a negligent misrepresentation claim by a provider’s successor in interest when the claim arises from representations made by the plan administrator during a pre-service verification call. The court concluded that such a claim does not sufficiently “relate to” an ERISA plan to trigger preemption, as it is not based on an ERISA-regulated relationship or enforceable under ERISA’s civil enforcement mechanism. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the negligent misrepresentation claim. View "HEALTHCARE ALLY MANAGEMENT OF CALIFORNIA, LLC V. WSP USA, INC." on Justia Law

DURALEV V. USA

2026-08-11T08:01:43-08:00

A Russian citizen entered the United States on a B-2 visitor visa in 2015 and subsequently applied for asylum and work authorization. In 2018, he was detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement after appearing for an interview, and was later ordered removed by an immigration judge. He remained in detention for 525 days, during which time he alleges he was assaulted by detention center staff. Upon release on bond in 2020, he applied for employment authorization but his application was denied based on an alleged miscalculation by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Seeking damages for unlawful arrest, detention, in-custody assault, and denial of employment authorization, the plaintiff filed an administrative claim with the Department of Homeland Security in July 2021, followed by this lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The district court dismissed all but one claim as time-barred under the FTCA’s two-year statute of limitations, finding the remaining timely negligence claim—related to the denial of employment authorization—lacked a private analog in state tort law as required by the FTCA. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that all claims arising from the plaintiff’s arrest, detention, or assault accrued outside the two-year limitations period and were therefore untimely. The court further held that the remaining negligence claim regarding employment authorization denial could not proceed because there is no comparable liability for a private individual under state law for the type of quasi-adjudicative decision at issue. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "DURALEV V. USA" on Justia Law

GONZALEZ-GODINEZ V. BLANCHE

2026-08-10T09:02:10-08:00

A lawful permanent resident who had lived in the United States since 1988 was convicted in Oregon in 2013 for “Using a Child in a Display of Sexually Explicit Content” under Oregon Revised Statutes § 163.670. The conviction stemmed from his conduct involving a fifteen-year-old girl. Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, alleging that he was removable for having committed both an aggravated felony and a crime of child abuse. The individual admitted to the factual allegations but contested his removability. An Immigration Judge concluded he was not removable for an aggravated felony but found him removable for a crime of child abuse, leading to a denial of his application for cancellation of removal. The individual appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, primarily arguing that his conviction did not constitute a crime of child abuse as defined under federal law. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal, agreeing that the conviction rendered him removable. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court applied the categorical approach, focusing on whether the Oregon statute, as interpreted by Oregon courts, categorically matched the federal definition of a crime of child abuse, which requires at least criminal negligence as the mental state and an actus reus that places a minor in a situation likely to cause harm. The court concluded that Oregon courts require intent or knowledge for a conviction under this statute, and that the conduct proscribed by the statute inherently risks harm to minors. The Ninth Circuit held that a conviction under Oregon Revised Statutes § 163.670 is categorically a crime of child abuse for purposes of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), and accordingly denied the petition for review. View "GONZALEZ-GODINEZ V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

ADAME GARCIA V. BLANCHE

2026-08-10T09:02:09-08:00

A citizen of Mexico who entered the United States as a child was convicted in California in 2012 for violating a statute that prohibits distributing harmful material to a minor with the intent to seduce. Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings. The individual sought cancellation of removal, arguing that his conviction should not disqualify him for relief. An Immigration Judge found that the conviction constituted both a crime involving moral turpitude and a crime of child abuse under federal immigration law, pretermitting his application for cancellation of removal. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision, holding specifically that the conviction under California Penal Code § 288.2(b) was categorically a crime of child abuse, and dismissed the appeal. The Board declined to address whether the offense was a crime involving moral turpitude. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo, applying the categorical approach as articulated in its recent precedent, Leon-Briviesca v. Blanche. The court considered the petitioner’s arguments that the California statute was overly broad compared to the generic definition of a crime of child abuse, including claims about actual harm, consensual conduct between minors, mistaken belief about the victim’s age, and communications not received by a minor. The Ninth Circuit found each argument unpersuasive, concluding that the statute requires conduct that meets the federal definition of child abuse and that there was no realistic probability California would apply the statute as broadly as petitioner claimed. The court held that a conviction under California Penal Code § 288.2(b) is categorically a crime of child abuse for immigration purposes, and therefore denied the petition for review. View "ADAME GARCIA V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

DRIP MORE LLC V. FDA

2026-08-10T08:32:04-08:00

A company that manufactures flavored e-liquids for use in electronic nicotine delivery systems (ENDS), including fruit and candy flavors, submitted premarket applications to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) seeking authorization to sell 64 such products. The FDA’s regulatory authority under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA) requires that new tobacco products be shown to be “appropriate for the protection of the public health” before they can be marketed. The FDA denied the company’s applications, citing the failure to provide robust comparative evidence demonstrating that its flavored products offer a public health benefit for adult smokers that outweighs the risks to youth, compared to tobacco-flavored ENDS. Following the FDA’s marketing denial order, the company petitioned for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The company argued that the FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously by requiring comparative efficacy evidence, failed to adequately consider its marketing and sales restriction plans, and improperly denied authorization for “zero nicotine” products. It also argued that the FDA could only impose a comparative efficacy requirement through notice-and-comment rulemaking under the TCA and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review. The court held that the FDA’s denial based on the absence of comparative efficacy evidence was neither arbitrary nor capricious, especially since the applicant offered no evidence distinguishing its products’ youth risks from those of other flavored ENDS. The court also found that any error in declining to consider marketing or access restriction plans was harmless. Additionally, the court ruled that the FDA was not required to undertake notice-and-comment rulemaking before applying the comparative efficacy requirement, and the inclusion of “zero nicotine” products in the denial order was proper based on the company’s own representations. View "DRIP MORE LLC V. FDA" on Justia Law

STATE OF COLORADO V. META PLATFORMS, INC.

2026-08-10T08:01:48-08:00

A large group of plaintiffs, including several states, individuals, school districts, and local governments, brought suit against Meta Platforms, Inc., and associated entities, alleging that Facebook and Instagram’s design features encourage addictive behavior and inadequately protect young users from harmful content. Additional defendants included TikTok-related entities, school districts, and others. The cases were consolidated in multidistrict litigation, where plaintiffs asserted various claims, including personal injury and state law violations. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California organized the litigation into several tracks based on the nature of the claims and plaintiffs. Meta moved to dismiss certain claims, arguing that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act provided them with immunity. The district court granted the dismissal in part, finding some claims barred by Section 230, but denied dismissal as to others, particularly where claims did not target Meta’s role as a publisher of third-party content. Meta sought interlocutory appeal on some orders, which the district court denied, and then appealed other orders as of right under the collateral order doctrine. TikTok entities joined in Meta’s arguments. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether it had appellate jurisdiction to hear Meta’s and TikTok’s interlocutory appeals. The court held that Section 230 provides a defense to liability, not immunity from suit, and that the denial of such a defense is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The court found none of the requirements for a collateral order were met, emphasizing that Section 230 does not constitute a statutory or constitutional guarantee against trial. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeals and cross-appeals for lack of jurisdiction. View "STATE OF COLORADO V. META PLATFORMS, INC." on Justia Law

PACIFICORP V. SIXKILLER

2026-08-07T08:31:45-08:00

A multi-state utility company operating a gas-fired power plant in Washington alleged that the state's Climate Commitment Act (CCA) impermissibly discriminated against interstate commerce by allocating no-cost greenhouse gas emissions allowances only for electricity sold to Washington customers. Under Washington’s Clean Energy Transformation Act (CETA) and the CCA, utilities serving in-state customers receive no-cost allowances to offset compliance costs, while electricity exported to customers in other states does not receive this benefit. The company argued that this scheme increased costs for its non-Washington customers and potentially its shareholders, as out-of-state sales from the Washington facility required purchasing emissions allowances at auction. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington reviewed the complaint and found that the electricity generated for export was not subject to CETA’s decarbonization mandates, distinguishing it from in-state electricity. The district court concluded that the two categories were not similarly situated for purposes of Dormant Commerce Clause analysis. The court reasoned that utilities serving Washington customers were already subject to more aggressive decarbonization requirements under CETA, justifying the allocation of no-cost allowances under the CCA. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding no plausible claim of unconstitutional discrimination, and denied the motion for preliminary injunction as moot. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal and denial of the injunction. The Ninth Circuit held that because the regulatory schemes governing in-state and exported electricity are distinct, the emissions associated with each are not similarly situated. Therefore, Washington’s allocation of no-cost allowances did not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. The court further held that dismissal without leave to amend was appropriate, as any amendment would be futile. The decision was affirmed. View "PACIFICORP V. SIXKILLER" on Justia Law

USA V. DOYLE

2026-08-07T08:01:31-08:00

Federal agents discovered that the defendant had engaged in sexually explicit conduct with a female minor, confirmed by photos on her social media. A search warrant was executed at the defendant’s home, and several electronic devices, including an iPhone 12, were seized. Forensic analysis revealed numerous images and videos depicting the minor victim and other unidentified girls in explicit sexual conduct, stored in a vault application and its deleted space, but still accessible. The defendant was arrested and charged with one count of possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). The United States District Court for the Southern District of California presided over the trial. Before trial, the government moved in limine to admit thirty-six images and videos as evidence. The defendant did not object, reviewed the material with the government, and agreed to oral descriptions. The district court admitted the evidence and published it to the jury in open court, though not in the jury room. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted. He later moved for a new trial, arguing his counsel failed to pursue an affirmative defense under § 2252(c), which applies when fewer than three matters are possessed and reasonable steps are taken to destroy or report them. The district court denied this motion, finding no factual support. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court erred by failing to individually review each item of evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and United States v. Curtin, but found the error harmless as it did not affect the verdict. The court affirmed the denial of a new trial, declined to address ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, and affirmed the 120-month sentence, applying plain error review. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "USA V. DOYLE" on Justia Law

ARIZONA ALLIANCE FOR RETIRED AMERICANS V. MAYES

2026-08-07T08:01:29-08:00

Arizona amended its election laws in 2022, introducing two provisions: one requires county recorders to cancel a voter’s registration in their county if the voter registers in a new county (“Cancellation Provision”), and the other criminalizes knowingly providing a “mechanism for voting” to someone registered in another state (“Felony Provision”). Three organizations engaged in voter registration and education activities claimed these provisions would interfere with their efforts, and sought to enjoin enforcement. They argued that the Cancellation Provision would lead to improper removal of voters and that the Felony Provision was vague and could chill their constitutionally protected activities. The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted a preliminary injunction, barring enforcement of both provisions. The Arizona Attorney General appealed. A three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the injunction, finding that the organizations lacked standing for the Cancellation Provision and were unlikely to succeed on the merits regarding the Felony Provision. The case was then reheard en banc after the prior panel’s opinion was vacated. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the organizations lacked standing to challenge the Cancellation Provision because they did not clearly show that it directly affected or interfered with their core activities, as required by FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine. The court further held that the organizations had standing to challenge the Felony Provision due to a credible threat of prosecution, but were unlikely to succeed on the merits, as the statutory context indicated that “mechanism for voting” likely refers only to a ballot or ballot envelope, not to voter registration or education activities. The court vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case. View "ARIZONA ALLIANCE FOR RETIRED AMERICANS V. MAYES" on Justia Law

IN RE: KOI DESIGN LLC V. MARRON LAWYERS, APC

2026-08-06T08:01:23-08:00

Koi Design LLC retained Marron Lawyers, APC in April 2016 to represent it in a trademark dispute with Strategic Partners, Inc. When SPI sued Koi for trademark infringement, Marron—through its associate, A. Douglas Mastroianni—handled the case. Mastroianni repeatedly missed court deadlines and failed to participate in required discovery meetings, prompting warnings and potential sanctions from the court. Marron did not inform Koi of these mishaps or its internal concerns about Mastroianni’s competence. After repeated lapses, Marron terminated Mastroianni, but again did not disclose the reasons to Koi. Mastroianni continued to represent Koi at a new firm, and Koi ultimately suffered terminating sanctions and a default judgment with trebled damages, leading to bankruptcy. Koi sued Marron, Mastroianni, and another firm for breach of fiduciary duty, legal malpractice, and negligent supervision in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Bloom Firm settled, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Marron on all claims, concluding that Koi had not established that Marron’s conduct caused its injuries. Koi appealed, arguing the district court erred both by granting summary judgment on grounds not adequately noticed and by finding no genuine dispute of material fact. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The court held that Marron owed duties to disclose material facts and supervise its employees under California law and professional conduct rules. The Ninth Circuit found genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Marron breached those duties and whether its conduct was a “but for” cause of Koi’s harm. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could find Marron liable and remanded for further proceedings. View "IN RE: KOI DESIGN LLC V. MARRON LAWYERS, APC" on Justia Law

COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER ARVIN V. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

2026-08-05T09:02:30-08:00

Several environmental nonprofit organizations challenged a final rule issued by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approving California’s State Implementation Plans (SIPs) for air quality in the San Joaquin Valley. The SIPs, developed by the San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District and the California Air Resources Board, were intended to satisfy contingency measure requirements under the Clean Air Act for three particulate matter (PM2.5) standards. The approved measures included stricter wood burning restrictions, enhanced dust control, and expanded vehicle smog checks. However, the groups argued that these measures failed to provide sufficient emissions reductions, particularly for nitrogen oxides (NOx), and contended that the EPA improperly relied on feasibility analyses to justify the shortfall. Prior to reaching the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the SIP submissions underwent notice-and-comment review by the EPA. Despite critical feedback from environmental advocates, the EPA finalized the rule, accepting the agencies’ infeasibility demonstrations and lowering the progress standard for contingency measures from its traditional requirement. This departure from stricter standards allowed approval of the SIPs even though they did not meet the longstanding emissions reduction benchmarks. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the EPA’s approval under the Administrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary, capricious, or not in accordance with law” standard. The court held that the EPA exceeded its statutory authority by reading a feasibility exemption into Section 172(c)(9) of the Clean Air Act, which does not expressly allow for such consideration. The panel concluded that the statute’s best meaning does not include a feasibility exemption and remanded the rule to the EPA without vacatur, citing the potential disruptive consequences of lacking contingency measures. The court also awarded litigation costs and attorney’s fees to the petitioners. View "COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER ARVIN V. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY" on Justia Law

INLAND EMPIRE WATERKEEPER V. CORONA CLAY COMPANY

2026-08-05T08:31:21-08:00

Plaintiffs, Inland Empire Waterkeeper and Orange County Coastkeeper, brought a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act against Corona Clay Company, alleging violations of stormwater-permit requirements at a facility near Temescal Creek in California. The facility discharged stormwater during rainfall, potentially reaching Temescal Creek, a tributary of the Santa Ana River. Plaintiffs claimed Corona failed to implement best management practices, develop a compliant stormwater pollution prevention plan, monitor its facility, and submit accurate reports as required by the permit. Corona defended primarily by arguing it had not discharged pollutants into the creek. The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially granted partial summary judgment for Plaintiffs, but denied it on certain claims. The case proceeded to trial, where the jury found in favor of Corona. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial, in part due to an intervening Supreme Court decision, County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, which expanded the Clean Water Act’s coverage to indirect discharges that are the functional equivalent of direct discharges. After a second trial, Plaintiffs prevailed, and the district court entered judgment and assessed penalties against Corona. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Sackett v. EPA, which narrowed the definition of “waters of the United States” under the Clean Water Act, Corona moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and alternatively sought a new trial. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the question of whether Temescal Creek is a “water of the United States” is a merits issue, not one of subject-matter jurisdiction, affirming the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. However, due to the intervening change in law announced in Sackett, the court reversed the denial of the motion for a new trial under Rule 59 and remanded for further proceedings to litigate whether Temescal Creek falls within the Clean Water Act’s scope. View "INLAND EMPIRE WATERKEEPER V. CORONA CLAY COMPANY" on Justia Law

USA V. CHAPMAN

2026-08-05T08:01:19-08:00

The case involves a defendant diagnosed with autism, Tourette syndrome, OCD, and ADHD, who maintained a romantic relationship with a woman with significant physical disabilities. In September 2019, the defendant and the victim traveled from Pennsylvania to Las Vegas, where the defendant killed the victim in a remote Nevada desert. Prior to the trip, he conducted internet searches related to murder and body disposal. After the murder, he impersonated the victim through her phone and social media, raising suspicions among her friends and family. Eventually, police were alerted, leading to an investigation, the defendant’s arrest, and his confession to the crime. The United States District Court for the District of Nevada presided over the trial, during which the defendant moved to suppress his confession, arguing an invalid Miranda waiver and involuntariness. The district court denied this motion after a magistrate judge held a hearing and issued a report and recommendation. The trial lasted eight days, and the defense presented testimony regarding the defendant’s mental health. After jury deliberations, the defendant moved for a mistrial due to concerns about the interpretation of the “holding” element in the kidnapping statute and alleged jury coercion. The district court denied these motions and the jury returned a guilty verdict. The defendant then filed post-verdict motions for acquittal and a new trial, which were also denied. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the “holding” element of the federal kidnapping statute under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) can be satisfied through non-physical means, including deception, and found sufficient evidence to support the conviction. However, the court vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial because the district court improperly coerced the jury’s verdict, notably by giving an Allen charge while aware of the jury’s numerical division and making coercive comments to a holdout juror. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress, finding that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights and that his confession was voluntary. View "USA V. CHAPMAN" on Justia Law

VIP PRODUCTS, LLC V. JACK DANIEL'S PROPERTIES, INC.

2026-08-04T08:31:30-08:00

A company that owns the trademarks and trade dress for a well-known whiskey product objected to a dog toy produced by another company that parodied its bottle and labeling. The toy, named “Bad Spaniels,” mimicked the whiskey’s visual design and replaced references to the whiskey with scatological humor, including phrases like “Old No. 2 On Your Tennessee Carpet.” The whiskey company demanded the toy’s removal from the market, but the toy company instead filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration of non-infringement and non-dilution. The whiskey company responded with counterclaims for trademark infringement and dilution under federal and state law. The United States District Court for the District of Arizona initially found in favor of the whiskey company after a bench trial, concluding the dog toy infringed and diluted its trademarks and trade dress. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed on the dilution claim and vacated the finding of infringement. After further appeals, including a remand from the Supreme Court, the district court again found the toy company liable for dilution by tarnishment and entered a permanent injunction in favor of the whiskey company. The toy company appealed, arguing the whiskey company failed to establish dilution and that the federal dilution law was unconstitutional as applied. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the whiskey company did not meet its burden to show dilution by tarnishment under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act. The court found that only “Jack Daniel’s” and its trade dress were proven famous, and the parody toy’s marks and trade dress, though similar, did not facially tarnish the famous marks or portray them in an unsavory context likely to damage their reputation. The court vacated the district court’s injunction and remanded for judgment in favor of the toy company. View "VIP PRODUCTS, LLC V. JACK DANIEL'S PROPERTIES, INC." on Justia Law

AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC V. PERPLEXITY AI, INC.

2026-08-04T08:31:29-08:00

Amazon.com Services, LLC filed suit against Perplexity AI, Inc., an artificial intelligence company, asserting that Perplexity’s web browser tool, Comet, unlawfully accessed Amazon’s website in violation of the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and California’s Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act (CDAFA). Perplexity’s Comet browser includes an AI “Assistant” that, when activated by a user, navigates Amazon.com on the user’s behalf, sending browser screenshots to Perplexity’s servers for further instruction. Amazon claimed that this use of the Assistant, despite their explicit prohibition, amounted to unauthorized access to its servers. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted Amazon a preliminary injunction, finding that Amazon was likely to succeed on its claims under both the CFAA and CDAFA. The district court concluded that Perplexity, through its Assistant, accessed Amazon’s password-protected accounts without authorization, obtained private information, and caused Amazon to incur significant costs responding to this activity. The court also determined that the equitable factors supported granting the injunction, citing irreparable harm and the public interest. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. The Ninth Circuit held that Amazon was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its claims because Perplexity did not “access” Amazon’s computers within the meaning of the CFAA or CDAFA; instead, the access was performed by the user employing the Assistant as a tool. The court found that the district court erred in its analysis of the equitable factors, which favored Perplexity, and concluded that an injunction was not warranted under these circumstances. The disposition was to vacate the injunction and remand. View "AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC V. PERPLEXITY AI, INC." on Justia Law

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS

2026-08-04T08:01:19-08:00

Benjamin Hoskins and his wife, Leanne Rodgers, participated in a telemarketing operation that defrauded consumers of more than $130 million by selling worthless “business coaching” services. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) obtained a judgment against Hoskins for over $130 million and against Rodgers for approximately $1.5 million, reflecting the proceeds they received from the scam. Hoskins and Rodgers took steps to hinder collection by transferring assets through trusts and shell entities, including a residence in Las Vegas held via a trust in which they were both trustees and beneficiaries. The United States District Court for the District of Nevada initially blocked the FTC’s attempts to enforce the judgment, concluding that Nevada’s six-year statute of limitations for enforcement of judgments barred the FTC’s action against Rodgers. The court also quashed a writ of execution the FTC obtained under the Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act (FDCPA), reasoning that Nevada law required a separate action to prove the trust holding the property was Rodgers’s alter ego before the property could be levied. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed both of the district court’s rulings. The Ninth Circuit held that the FDCPA preempts inconsistent state statutes of limitations and has no time limit for collecting debts owed to the federal government by writ of execution. The court also determined that the judgment against Rodgers, which is payable to the FTC, qualifies as a “debt” under the FDCPA, regardless of whether the proceeds are ultimately distributed to victims. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit held that the FTC was not required to file a separate alter ego action under state law to levy property held in trust; under the FDCPA, the FTC may levy any property in which the judgment debtors have a substantial nonexempt interest. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS" on Justia Law

SHENZHEN ZEHUIJIN INVESTMENT CENTER V. YINGKUI

2026-08-03T08:01:12-08:00

In 2017, an investment entity loaned approximately 160 million Chinese yuan to an individual, who failed to repay the loan. The lender obtained an arbitral award against the borrower from the Beijing Arbitration Commission for around 150 million yuan. A Singaporean court later ordered the borrower to pay the award, but he still did not comply. The lender, knowing the borrower had been living in California for about two years, sought to enforce the foreign arbitral award in the United States under the Federal Arbitration Act by filing a petition in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. Attempts to serve process directly on the borrower at his California residence were unsuccessful. Eventually, the petition was left with another adult at the residence, mailed, and emailed to the borrower, who later acknowledged receiving notice. The borrower moved to dismiss the case in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, arguing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) that the court lacked personal jurisdiction because his domicile was China and the underlying dispute had no connection to California. He did not raise a defense under Rule 12(b)(5) for insufficient service of process. The district court found that it had general personal jurisdiction over the borrower based on his physical presence in California and confirmed the arbitral award. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that presence-based personal jurisdiction be conditioned on service of process on the defendant’s person; other means of service are sufficient if the defendant is physically present in the forum state. The court declined to address the sufficiency of service of process because the borrower had waived this argument by not raising it in district court. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment. View "SHENZHEN ZEHUIJIN INVESTMENT CENTER V. YINGKUI" on Justia Law

PRZYBOCKI V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

2026-08-03T08:01:10-08:00

The case involves two individuals, Michelle Przybocki and Ketan Vakil, and Vakil’s company, Gourmend Foods, LLC. Przybocki suffers from a digestive condition that requires her to follow a low-FODMAP diet, and Vakil, on medical advice, founded Gourmend Foods to produce and sell low-FODMAP food products. Both plaintiffs wish to see FODMAP levels disclosed on food labels. They allege that federal regulations enforced by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) prohibit food companies from including FODMAP information on product labels, which they claim violates their First Amendment rights—Przybocki’s right to receive information and Vakil and Gourmend’s right to speak. Gourmend’s proposed beef broth label, regulated by the USDA, was rejected due to its inclusion of FODMAP information. The United States District Court for the District of Nevada dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit. It found that Vakil and Gourmend lacked standing against the FDA because they were already selling FODMAP-labeled products and had not received warnings from the agency. The court also concluded Przybocki lacked standing as a listener, finding she had not sufficiently alleged that other food producers would provide FODMAP information absent the regulations and that she was not injured by the chilling of Gourmend’s speech. Additionally, Vakil and Gourmend’s claims against the USDA were dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal for lack of standing with respect to the plaintiffs’ claims against the FDA and Przybocki’s claims against the USDA. The Ninth Circuit held that Przybocki adequately pleaded standing as a listener and that Vakil and Gourmend sufficiently pleaded standing as speakers for a pre-enforcement challenge against the FDA. In a separate memorandum disposition, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Vakil and Gourmend’s claims against the USDA for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. View "PRZYBOCKI V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE" on Justia Law

POVER V. THE CAPITAL GROUP COMPANIES, INC.

2026-07-30T08:01:23-08:00

A former employee brought suit against her previous employer and associated fiduciaries, alleging that they mismanaged the employer's retirement savings plan, which is a defined contribution plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). She claimed that the fiduciaries retained underperforming investment options in the plan’s menu to generate transaction fees, in violation of their duties of prudence and loyalty, and sought plan-wide monetary and equitable relief on behalf of the plan. Previously, the United States District Court for the Central District of California reviewed the case. The defendants moved to compel arbitration, relying on provisions in the plan requiring arbitration of disputes and waiving participants’ rights to bring claims on a “class, collective, or representative basis.” The plaintiff argued that this waiver impermissibly precluded her from enforcing statutory rights under ERISA, which allow participants to sue on behalf of the plan for plan-wide relief. The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration, finding the waiver unenforceable under the effective-vindication doctrine and holding that the waiver provision was expressly non-severable, thus requiring the claims to proceed in court. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration. The Ninth Circuit held that the plan’s waiver provision was unenforceable because it prevented the plaintiff from asserting her right under ERISA to bring representative claims for plan-wide relief—a right that ERISA expressly provides. The court further held that, under the plan’s own terms, once the waiver was found unenforceable, any representative claim must be adjudicated in court, not arbitration. Thus, the plaintiff’s breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims would proceed before the district court. View "POVER V. THE CAPITAL GROUP COMPANIES, INC." on Justia Law

MULTIPLE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES, LLC V. CASDEN

2026-07-30T08:01:22-08:00

Two competing companies in the athleticwear market, both producing bioceramic materials embedded in textiles, became involved in litigation over allegedly false advertising. One company, after settling the initial lawsuit by agreeing to pay $2.5 million and refrain from claiming FDA approval or health benefits for its product, filed for bankruptcy before completing the settlement payments. The plaintiff then brought a new action against the CEO of the defendant company, alleging both tortious interference with the settlement agreement and false advertising in violation of the Lanham Act, asserting that the defendant continued to falsely represent the product's health benefits and FDA approval. The United States District Court for the Central District of California presided over a jury trial. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff on the Lanham Act claim and awarded nominal damages. On post-trial motions, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law for the plaintiff on the tortious interference claim, awarded $2.5 million in damages, and further awarded the plaintiff disgorgement of the CEO’s salary (trebled) as "profits" under the Lanham Act, in addition to nearly $600,000 in attorneys’ fees. Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings. The Ninth Circuit held that, under California law, a corporate officer acting within the scope of agency and not at the expense of the corporation is immune from tortious interference claims, and reversed the district court’s denial of immunity and its tortious interference damages award. The court also reversed the district court’s disgorgement award, concluding that the CEO’s salary was not equivalent to profits under the Lanham Act. However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the award of attorneys’ fees, finding no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that the case was “exceptional.” The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "MULTIPLE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES, LLC V. CASDEN" on Justia Law

VAZQUEZ V. BOSTOCK

2026-07-30T08:01:18-08:00

A group of noncitizens who entered the United States without inspection and were apprehended within the country challenged a new federal immigration policy. Historically, such individuals, though removable, were eligible for release on bond while their removal proceedings were pending. This practice continued after the 1996 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), with unadmitted aliens in the interior detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which allows for bond. In 2025, the government changed course, issuing guidance that these individuals were now subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), which does not permit bond. This policy shift resulted in many detained individuals filing habeas corpus petitions seeking bond hearings. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington certified a class of such detainees and granted summary judgment in their favor, holding they were not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The government appealed, arguing that, as “applicants for admission,” all such individuals were “seeking admission” and thus subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that, based on statutory text, context, and longstanding practice, § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to aliens seeking entry at the border, not to those apprehended in the interior. The court found that § 1226(a) governs detention for unadmitted aliens present in the interior, allowing for bond. The Ninth Circuit rejected the government’s new interpretation, noting it conflicted with prior practice, created statutory redundancies, and lacked clear congressional authorization for such a significant change. The court thus affirmed that these individuals remain eligible for bond hearings under § 1226(a). View "VAZQUEZ V. BOSTOCK" on Justia Law

USA V. YATES

2026-07-29T08:01:16-08:00

A man who had recently been released on parole was stopped by police in San Pablo, California, while driving with his young niece and nephew. After a brief delay in pulling over, the officer learned of his parole status and asked the occupants to exit the car. The officer found a loaded, modified Glock pistol on the nephew, and text messages showed the man had instructed his mother to retrieve the child because he was carrying the gun. The gun and ammunition were manufactured outside California, and the gun was modified to fire automatically. A federal grand jury indicted the defendant for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. He sought to dismiss the indictment on constitutional grounds and to suppress the evidence, but while the United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted the suppression motion, the Ninth Circuit summarily reversed and remanded after a related case clarified that asking about parole status during a stop was permissible. The defendant then requested a stipulated-facts bench trial, after his request for a conditional plea was refused by the government. The district court found him guilty following the bench trial. At sentencing, the district court applied a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility but, over its stated disagreement, did not apply a third point because the government declined to move for it, citing resources expended preparing for trial. The court also applied an enhancement for possessing the firearm in connection with child endangerment, a “wobbler” offense under California law, finding the conduct was felonious. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the government has broad discretion to withhold the motion for the third acceptance point under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b), and the district court properly exercised its discretion in treating the child endangerment offense as a felony for sentencing purposes. View "USA V. YATES" on Justia Law

SERENITY INVESTMENTS, LLC, ET AL. V. SUN HUNG KAI STRATEGIC CAPITAL, LTD.

2026-07-29T08:01:15-08:00

Two investment entities entered into an agreement to sell a significant number of shares of a company to a purchaser. The seller was represented by a law firm as administrative agent and a broker as placement agent. Before the purchaser paid for the shares, it placed the transaction on hold. Despite this, the shares were mistakenly transferred to the purchaser. Multiple parties, including the administrative agent and broker, communicated about the error, and assurances were made that the transfer would be reversed. However, the reversal did not occur, and years later, the purchaser executed documents asserting ownership of the shares, which had notably increased in value. After demands for the return of the shares went unmet, the sellers filed suit. The shares were eventually returned, but their value had dropped. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California addressed claims brought by the sellers against the purchaser for conversion, among other causes of action. The purchaser, in turn, filed a third-party complaint seeking equitable indemnity and statutory contribution from the administrative agent and broker, alleging negligence in their handling of the transaction. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the third-party defendants on the equitable indemnity claim, reasoning that conversion is an intentional tort for which equitable indemnity is unavailable. The sellers and purchaser settled their claims, but the purchaser appealed the indemnity ruling. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. It held that, under California law, conversion is a strict liability tort, not an intentional tort requiring wrongful intent. Accordingly, a party liable for conversion may seek partial equitable indemnity from negligent joint tortfeasors. The panel reversed the district court’s summary judgment for the third-party defendants and remanded for further proceedings. View "SERENITY INVESTMENTS, LLC, ET AL. V. SUN HUNG KAI STRATEGIC CAPITAL, LTD." on Justia Law

USA V. LOPEZ

2026-07-28T08:01:15-08:00

Jonathan Lopez was charged with possessing a firearm as a prohibited person after previously being convicted of two felony offenses under California Penal Code § 273.5, which penalizes willfully inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition on certain victims such as spouses or cohabitants. Lopez pleaded guilty to the federal firearm charge but reserved the right to challenge whether his prior state convictions qualified as “crimes of violence” for the purpose of sentencing enhancements under the federal Sentencing Guidelines. In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, the probation office and the government recommended, and the court applied, an enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2), which raises the base offense level if the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence. The district court found that Lopez’s two prior convictions under § 273.5 met this criterion, following then-binding Ninth Circuit precedent. The court overruled Lopez’s objection to this classification and sentenced him to a term of 67 months, which was below the guideline range due to a downward variance. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered intervening Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit en banc decisions—Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021), and United States v. Gomez, 165 F.4th 1199 (9th Cir. 2026) (en banc)—which clarified that, to be a categorical crime of violence, an offense must require a mens rea greater than recklessness as to the use of force directed at another. The Ninth Circuit held that § 273.5 does not categorically qualify because it requires only the intent to commit the act, not intent or knowledge that force will be directed at another. The court vacated Lopez’s sentence and remanded for resentencing without the enhancement. View "USA V. LOPEZ" on Justia Law

KRZESNI V. WELLPINIT SCHOOL DISTRICT

2026-07-27T08:31:28-08:00

David Krzesni was employed by Wellpinit School District (WSD) as Project Director for a federally funded Native Youth Community Project Grant. Prior to Krzesni’s hiring, WSD had planned a trip to Hawaii for students and staff, believing it would further the grant’s objectives. After Krzesni started, he helped facilitate funding for the trip using grant money. However, federal approval for the trip was not obtained, and the grant’s federal contact later indicated such funding would not be approved. Krzesni participated in the trip, prepared an Annual Performance Report describing it, and later learned the trip expenses had already been paid from grant funds. He also contemplated leaving his position and discussed grant compliance concerns with colleagues and the federal grant contact. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington reviewed Krzesni’s claims for whistleblower retaliation under the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 41 U.S.C. § 4712, and wrongful discharge under Washington law. Krzesni alleged that his contract was not renewed in reprisal for disclosures regarding the unauthorized use of grant funds for the Hawaii trip. The district court granted summary judgment for WSD and its superintendent, reasoning that Krzesni did not make protected disclosures under the NDAA and was not “discharged” under Washington law, as his contract simply expired without renewal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Krzesni’s reporting of the Hawaii trip in the performance report and a rhetorical question to a supervisor did not constitute protected disclosures, as they did not objectively indicate misconduct. Additionally, even if a protected disclosure occurred during Krzesni’s call with the federal grant contact, WSD had already decided not to renew his contract beforehand, so no reprisal could be shown. The court further held that the nonrenewal of Krzesni’s contract was not considered a discharge under Washington law, thus defeating his wrongful discharge claim. View "KRZESNI V. WELLPINIT SCHOOL DISTRICT" on Justia Law

USA V. ANTEN

2026-07-27T08:01:19-08:00

The case centers on Mark William Anten, who, after previously serving as a confidential informant for the FBI, began sending a series of increasingly disturbing emails to former FBI handlers and other agents. These communications included self-identification as the “Unabomber,” explicit threats to bomb the Los Angeles FBI headquarters, and attachments referencing mass violence and bomb-making. The messages, sent in 2023, alarmed the agents involved, leading them to notify security and initiate threat assessments. Anten’s emails persisted despite warnings, culminating in his arrest in December 2023. A search of his residence uncovered no weapons or bomb-making materials. The United States District Court for the Central District of California presided over Anten’s trial. The jury convicted him on two counts of transmitting threats to injure others via interstate communications, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). During trial, Anten contested the jury instructions, arguing they failed to include an objective element for what constitutes a “threat,” and challenged the court’s response to a jury note about which exhibits were referenced in the indictment. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit examined whether the statute requires both an objective “threat” element and a subjective mental state element. The appellate court held that 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) indeed requires: (1) an objective element—meaning the communication must be viewed as a threat by a reasonable person—and (2) a subjective element—requiring at least recklessness as to whether the statement would be perceived as a threat. The court found that, while the jury instructions could have been clearer, they sufficiently included both elements. It also concluded that the district court’s response to the jury’s note was not improper. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction. View "USA V. ANTEN" on Justia Law

USA V. PATTERSON

2026-07-27T08:01:19-08:00

The case concerns a defendant who pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, after police discovered a loaded pistol on his person during a traffic stop. The prosecution sought an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), based on the defendant’s prior Oregon state felony convictions: two for third-degree assault and one for strangulation. The defendant challenged the use of these convictions as ACCA predicate offenses, arguing they did not meet the definition of “violent felonies.” He also argued that his constitutional rights were violated because the judge, rather than a jury, determined that his prior offenses occurred on different occasions, a necessary finding to trigger the ACCA enhancement. The United States District Court for the District of Oregon found that the prior convictions were for violent felonies and had been committed on different occasions, and imposed the ACCA’s mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years. The defendant appealed, raising the same constitutional and statutory objections. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It concluded that, in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Erlinger v. United States, the district court had erred under Apprendi v. New Jersey by making the separate-occasions finding itself, rather than submitting it to a jury. However, the Ninth Circuit held that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, because the record contained overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence that the offenses occurred on different occasions. The court also held that the defendant’s Oregon convictions for third-degree assault and strangulation qualified as violent felonies under the ACCA. The court therefore affirmed the sentence imposed by the district court. View "USA V. PATTERSON" on Justia Law

WEISS V. PERMANENTE MEDICAL GROUP, INC.

2026-07-24T08:01:25-08:00

An employee of The Permanente Medical Group, Inc. worked remotely as a Managerial Senior Consultant. After the employer instituted a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy requiring all employees to be vaccinated or to obtain a valid exemption, the employee requested a religious exemption, citing her beliefs as a Christian Jew and referencing relevant religious texts. The employer initially granted her a provisional exemption but later required more information to assess the sincerity of her beliefs. When she did not fully answer the supplemental questions, particularly declining to disclose information about her medical history, the employer revoked her exemption and terminated her employment for noncompliance with the vaccine mandate. After her termination, the employee filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging violations of Title VII and California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), as well as a claim under the California Constitution. The district court granted the employer’s motion to dismiss her statutory claims, holding that she had failed to allege that she adequately notified the employer of the conflict between her religious beliefs and the vaccine mandate. The court reasoned that her initial exemption request and responses to supplemental questions provided insufficient notice and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the employee’s allegations regarding notice of a religious conflict. The Ninth Circuit held that to satisfy the notice requirement for a prima facie case of religious accommodation under Title VII and FEHA, an employee must provide enough information for the employer to understand an actual conflict between religious beliefs and work requirements. The court found that the employee’s allegations met this standard at the pleading stage, reversed the district court’s dismissal of her statutory claims, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "WEISS V. PERMANENTE MEDICAL GROUP, INC." on Justia Law

USA V. PEREDA

2026-07-23T08:31:31-08:00

The defendant, a state supervisee subject to warrantless search conditions, was found by police in a trailer located near his girlfriend’s parents’ home. Officers searched both the trailer and a nearby Ford F-150 pickup truck believed to be used by the defendant. The trailer yielded ammunition, while the truck contained drugs. The defendant had reported his parents’ home as his residence, but GPS monitoring indicated he frequently stayed at the Goleta address, near the trailer. Officers had also previously conducted home visits at the Goleta address, and Pereda’s supervising officer had admonished him for not updating his reported residence. The United States District Court for the Central District of California reviewed the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence discovered in both the trailer and the pickup truck. The district court found that the officers lacked probable cause to believe either that the trailer was the defendant’s residence or that the truck was property under his control. Consequently, the district court granted the motion to suppress and excluded all evidence recovered from the searches. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether the searches were consistent with Fourth Amendment requirements, specifically the parolee exception to the warrant requirement. The Ninth Circuit concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had probable cause to believe the defendant resided in or controlled the trailer and owned or controlled the pickup truck. Accordingly, the panel held that both searches were valid under the defendant’s supervised release conditions and the Fourth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting the motion to suppress and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "USA V. PEREDA" on Justia Law

DIAZ-BOYZO V. BLANCHE

2026-07-23T08:01:16-08:00

A lawful permanent resident from Mexico pleaded guilty in Oregon state court to two counts of felony fourth-degree assault for physically assaulting his wife in the immediate presence of their minor children. The events occurred in 2013, and the charges were brought under Oregon Revised Statutes § 163.160(1)(a), (3)(c), which enhances misdemeanor assault to a felony when committed in the presence of a minor child. He was sentenced to two years in prison, followed by probation. After his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security charged him with removability from the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), arguing his conviction constituted a “crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment.” An Immigration Judge found him removable on this ground, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed that decision. The individual then petitioned for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the Oregon statute was overbroad and indivisible, and thus not a categorical match to the federal offense. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that, although the Oregon statute covered conduct unrelated to children and was therefore overbroad, it was divisible into alternative elements. Applying the modified categorical approach, the court determined that the petitioner’s conviction was specifically for assault in the presence of his minor children. The court held that this offense matched the definition of a “crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment” under federal law, as interpreted in Leon-Briviesca v. Blanche, because committing assault in a child’s presence places the child at real risk of bodily or mental harm and requires at least criminal negligence. The Ninth Circuit therefore denied the petition for review. View "DIAZ-BOYZO V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

TORRES-CASAS V. BLANCHE

2026-07-22T08:01:26-08:00

A native and citizen of Mexico applied for cancellation of removal, claiming that his removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his U.S.-citizen son and daughter, as well as his lawful permanent resident parents. At the time of the immigration judge’s decision, his son was 20 years old, just under the statutory age cutoff for qualifying as a “child” under the relevant immigration law. The applicant lived with his family, worked as an auto mechanic, and provided significant financial support. His mother had several health issues, but received assistance from her daughter. An Immigration Judge denied the application, finding that, although removal would cause emotional and financial hardship, it would not rise to the level required by statute. The judge noted that family members could visit the applicant in Mexico and maintain relationships, and that his mother would continue to have access to medical care. The applicant appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). While the appeal was pending, his son turned 21. The BIA determined it could no longer consider hardship to the son, since he had aged out, and affirmed the denial based on insufficient hardship to the other qualifying relatives. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the petition for review. The court held that under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D), qualifying relatives must be assessed at the time of the agency’s final adjudication, meaning a child who turns 21 during an appeal to the BIA ceases to be a qualifying relative. The court also concluded that substantial evidence supported the agency’s determination that the petitioner failed to establish the required level of hardship to his remaining qualifying relatives, and denied the petition. View "TORRES-CASAS V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

THEIS V. INTERMOUNTAIN EDUCATION SERVICE DISTRICT

2026-07-21T08:33:10-08:00

A licensed clinical social worker employed as an Education Specialist by a regional education service district in Oregon displayed books in his school offices that expressed particular viewpoints on gender identity. These books, visible to students during evaluations and meetings, prompted a complaint alleging that the displays constituted a hostile bias incident under the district’s policy designed to prevent discrimination and address bias in public education settings. The district investigated, concluded that the displays violated its policy, and ordered the employee to remove the books when students were present, warning that failure to comply could result in discipline, including termination. The employee filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon alleging violations of his First Amendment free speech rights and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the district from enforcing its directive. The district court granted the injunction in part, allowing the employee to display the books when students were not present but prohibiting displays during student-facing activities. The court reasoned that, while engaging with students as part of his official duties, the employee spoke as a government employee rather than as a private citizen and therefore was not entitled to First Amendment protection for his displays. After the employee continued to display the books in the presence of students, the district initiated additional proceedings, resulting in his termination. The employee appealed both the partial denial of injunctive relief and the denial of his motion to enforce the injunction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The Ninth Circuit held that the employee’s display of the books while meeting with students in his official capacity was speech as a government employee and not protected by the First Amendment. Because this speech was undertaken pursuant to his professional responsibilities, the court did not apply the Pickering balancing test. The denial of preliminary injunctive relief was found not to be an abuse of discretion. View "THEIS V. INTERMOUNTAIN EDUCATION SERVICE DISTRICT" on Justia Law

SEAGRAVES V. WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN YOUTH AND FAMILIES

2026-07-21T08:01:27-08:00

A group of former employees of the Washington Department of Children, Youth, and Families challenged the agency’s implementation of a COVID-19 vaccine mandate issued by the Governor of Washington. After their requests for religious exemptions were granted, the agency denied their requests for reasonable accommodations that would allow them to remain unvaccinated and continue in their positions. The agency explained that, due to the nature of their roles, unvaccinated employees could not safely perform essential functions without posing a risk to others. The employees were ultimately separated from employment. They alleged constitutional violations and state law claims, asserting that the agency and certain officials discriminated against them based on religion and failed to provide required procedural protections. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed all claims. It found that the employees had not sufficiently alleged ongoing violations of federal law for injunctive relief, nor had they adequately alleged personal involvement by any official in the claimed constitutional violations. The court dismissed the federal claims and all state law claims, initially granting leave to amend. After the employees filed an amended complaint naming additional officials and asserting similar legal theories without new factual allegations, the district court dismissed the case without leave to amend and denied reconsideration. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the employees failed to plausibly allege personal involvement by any official in constitutional violations, and that official-capacity claims for prospective injunctive relief were barred by the Eleventh Amendment because there was no ongoing violation of federal law. It further concluded that the district court acted within its discretion in denying leave to amend, as amendment would have been futile. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal and denial of leave to amend. View "SEAGRAVES V. WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN YOUTH AND FAMILIES" on Justia Law

USA V. COLAR

2026-07-21T08:01:27-08:00

A defendant was charged with 44 federal offenses, including bank fraud, wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, obstruction of official proceedings, and witness tampering, arising from an alleged scheme to defraud the Paycheck Protection Program. The defendant, a Black Muslim man, co-founded a nonprofit for transitional housing and allegedly used stolen identities and fraudulent loan applications for the nonprofit and two shell entities. He represented himself at trial, arguing law enforcement targeted him due to his race and religion. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California presided over the trial. During jury selection, an alternate juror expressed strong negative reactions to the defendant’s defense, stating he could not put aside his personal experiences and doubted his ability to be impartial. Despite the defendant’s request to excuse this juror, the district court deferred its inquiry and allowed the juror to serve as an alternate. When a regular juror was dismissed during trial, the alternate joined the deliberating jury after a brief, belated colloquy in which he claimed to have moved past his initial bias. The defendant objected, arguing the juror remained biased. The jury subsequently convicted the defendant on all counts, and the district court sentenced him to 204 months’ imprisonment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the proceedings and held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to promptly investigate the alternate juror’s bias and by conducting an inadequate inquiry after the juror had heard evidence. The appellate court found that these errors deprived the defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury and constituted structural error. The Ninth Circuit vacated the convictions, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded the case for a new trial. View "USA V. COLAR" on Justia Law

DEMETRIO V. BLANCHE

2026-07-20T08:01:19-08:00

A mother and her three minor children, all citizens of Mexico, fled to the United States after threats from a criminal group. The threats followed the unexplained disappearance of her husband, which local authorities failed to investigate. Soon after, two men claiming to be government officials lured her to an office, where she was confronted by masked, armed men. These men threatened to use her adolescent son and daughter for drug trafficking and sexual exploitation, and promised to kill the family if she did not comply. Fearing for their safety, the mother and her children fled to Mexico City and then entered the United States, seeking asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The Immigration Judge denied all relief after a hearing, and the mother appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The BIA dismissed her appeal, affirming the Immigration Judge’s denial on the merits and not addressing the adverse credibility determination. The BIA determined that her proposed particular social group (PSG) of “mothers of adolescent children living in Mexico” was not legally cognizable due to lack of immutability, and found no clear error in the Immigration Judge’s finding that there was no nexus between her persecution and membership in another PSG of “single women targeted by criminal groups in Mexico.” The BIA also denied Convention Against Torture protection, concluding the family could safely relocate within Mexico. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that age-based PSGs are “immutable” as a matter of law because asylum applicants cannot change their age to avoid persecution. The court also found the BIA erred in applying a clear error standard, rather than de novo review, to the nexus determination for the gender-based PSG. The court granted the petition for review and remanded the case to the BIA for reconsideration consistent with its opinion. View "DEMETRIO V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. HIGGINS

2026-07-16T10:31:32-08:00

The case concerns a restoration project, known as the Hanna Flats Good Neighbor Authority Project, in the Idaho Panhandle National Forest. The United States Forest Service proposed this project to address insect and disease infestations and to reduce wildfire risks. The project was developed through a collaborative process with state actors, local landowners, and conservation groups. The Forest Service published a Scoping Notice describing the project's objectives and solicited public feedback, asserting that the project was entirely within the "wildland-urban interface," making it eligible for a categorical exclusion from the full environmental review typically required under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The Alliance for the Wild Rockies contested the Forest Service’s use of the Healthy Forest Restoration Act (HFRA) exemption, arguing that the project did not fall within the "wildland-urban interface" as defined by HFRA, and thus should not be exempt from NEPA review. The United States District Court for the District of Idaho granted summary judgment for the Forest Service, holding that the Alliance had forfeited its argument by not raising the specific issue regarding the definition of "wildland-urban interface" during the project’s scoping process—a concept known as issue exhaustion. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that neither HFRA nor any relevant regulations imposed an issue-exhaustion requirement for the HFRA scoping process, and that the nature of this informal, non-adversarial proceeding did not warrant a judicially imposed issue-exhaustion requirement. The panel further held that the type of claim brought by the Alliance—challenging the statutory authority for the Forest Service’s decision—was not the kind of claim that typically requires administrative exhaustion. The Ninth Circuit therefore reversed the district court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for consideration of the merits of Alliance’s challenge. View "ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. HIGGINS" on Justia Law

BROWN V. OLIVER

2026-07-16T10:31:32-08:00

Lamar Brown originally pleaded guilty in Nevada state court to a felony violation of lifetime supervision based on his failure to comply with conditions such as participating in counseling, reporting as directed, and not changing his address without permission. He was sentenced to five to twenty years in prison. After exhausting his appeals and state post-conviction proceedings, Brown filed a federal habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer advised him to plead guilty to a felony and did not advise him to withdraw his plea before sentencing. The United States District Court for the District of Nevada found merit in Brown’s ineffective assistance claims and granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus, ordering that his felony conviction be vacated. The court directed that, after appellate review was complete or the time for appeal expired, the state court should hold a status conference to determine next steps. The Nevada attorney general appealed this order. However, during the pendency of the federal appeal and without informing the state court judge of the pending appeal, the local prosecutor negotiated a new plea agreement with Brown. Under this agreement, Brown pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor violation for the same conduct and was sentenced to time served. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the state’s appeal. The court held that the appeal was moot because, after the district court’s order, the state had voluntarily entered into a new plea agreement resulting in a new conviction and sentence, which Brown has a due process right to enforce. The appellate court determined it could not provide the state any effective relief by reversing the district court’s order regarding the original felony conviction. The appeal was therefore dismissed as moot. View "BROWN V. OLIVER" on Justia Law

RELATOR, LLC V. ERSKINE

2026-07-15T11:01:52-08:00

A company operating as a mortgage lender applied for and received a Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan during the COVID-19 pandemic. The company’s PPP loan was later forgiven. A private party, acting as a qui tam relator under the False Claims Act (FCA), alleged that the company and its chief executive officer made several false statements in their loan application and forgiveness process. The key allegations were that the company was ineligible for PPP funds as a financial business primarily engaged in lending, that it misrepresented its use and need for the loan, and that it falsified the number of employees to increase the loan amount. The relator argued that these misrepresentations led the government to approve and forgive the loan improperly. Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed the relator’s amended complaint. The district court found that the FCA’s public disclosure bar applied, reasoning that the necessary information supporting the ineligibility allegation was already publicly available on a government website, specifically concerning the company’s business classification. The district court also concluded that the relator’s allegations regarding the inflated employee count were speculative. The relator was denied leave to further amend the complaint, on the basis that amendment would be futile. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the public disclosure bar did not apply because the information on the government website was not “substantially the same” as the relator’s allegations, and the company’s own website did not qualify as “news media” under the statute. The appellate court agreed that the relator’s claim regarding the number of employees was not sufficiently pleaded but found the district court abused its discretion by denying leave to amend. The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "RELATOR, LLC V. ERSKINE" on Justia Law

USA V. HENRIKSON

2026-07-15T11:01:52-08:00

The defendant operated trucking and oil-drilling businesses and hired a hit man to murder two business associates, resulting in their deaths. He also solicited another hit man to kill three additional associates, but those killings did not occur. In 2016, a jury found the defendant guilty of multiple offenses, including four counts of solicitation to commit a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. §§ 373(a) and 1958(a). Two of these solicitation convictions were based on acts that resulted in death, and two were based on acts that did not. Following the jury verdict, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment and other terms. In 2023, the defendant filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his four solicitation convictions, arguing that a violation of § 1958(a) is not categorically a crime of violence and thus cannot serve as a predicate offense under § 373(a). The district court vacated the convictions on counts related to solicitations that did not result in death, citing United States v. Linehan, but declined to vacate the convictions related to solicitations that resulted in death, reasoning that those offenses were categorically crimes of violence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s partial denial and partial grant of the § 2255 motion. The Ninth Circuit held that solicitation of murder-for-hire resulting in death under § 1958(a) is not categorically a crime of violence because the death-results element lacks a mens rea requirement. Therefore, it cannot serve as a predicate offense under § 373(a). The court affirmed the district court’s vacatur of two convictions, reversed its denial regarding the other two, and remanded with instructions to vacate those remaining convictions. View "USA V. HENRIKSON" on Justia Law

COMET TECHNOLOGIES USA, INC. V. XP POWER, LLC

2026-07-14T13:01:20-08:00

Senior engineers left their positions at a technology company to join a competitor, bringing with them thousands of confidential documents related to product development, research strategies, and technical know-how. Within days, the competitor was able to deliver complete designs for new product lines using this information. The original employer soon discovered the transfer of trade secrets and filed suit, alleging violations under the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) and initially, the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA). Before trial, the case was narrowed to focus on five specific trade secrets, and the plaintiff ultimately dropped the state law claims, proceeding only under the DTSA. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California presided over a jury trial. The jury found that the defendant had misappropriated three trade secrets, awarding $20 million in compensatory damages and $20 million in punitive damages. The court also granted a permanent injunction against the defendant’s use of the trade secrets and awarded over $17 million in attorney fees. However, the court had instructed the jury that the defendant bore the burden of proving that the trade secrets were readily ascertainable by proper means, an element relevant under the California UTSA but not under the DTSA. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court erred by instructing the jury that the defendant bore the burden of disproving that the trade secrets were readily ascertainable, a burden that should have remained with the plaintiff under the DTSA. The appellate court found that this error was neither invited by the defendant nor harmless, given conflicting evidence and the potential impact on the verdict and damages calculation. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for a new trial on liability and damages for the trade secrets the jury found had been misappropriated. View "COMET TECHNOLOGIES USA, INC. V. XP POWER, LLC" on Justia Law

COMET TECHNOLOGIES USA, INC. V. XP POWER, LLC

2026-07-14T08:01:20-08:00

Several senior engineers departed from a semiconductor component manufacturer in 2018, joining a competing firm and bringing with them thousands of confidential documents detailing product designs, research strategies, and proprietary technologies. Within days, the new employer had complete product designs and development plans based on the stolen information. The original employer discovered the theft and initiated a lawsuit for trade secret misappropriation under the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), eventually narrowing the claims to five specific alleged trade secrets and dismissing related state law claims. The case focused on whether the stolen information qualified as trade secrets and the extent of damages. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California presided over a jury trial. The jury found that the defendant had misappropriated several of the alleged trade secrets and awarded $40 million in compensatory and punitive damages. The court granted a permanent injunction barring further use or disclosure of the trade secrets and later approved an attorney fee award exceeding $17 million. The defendant appealed, challenging both the trial conduct and the judgment, while the plaintiff cross-appealed regarding damages for one trade secret. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court erred in instructing the jury that the defendant bore the burden of disproving that the trade secrets were not readily ascertainable by proper means. The DTSA requires the plaintiff to prove this element. The appellate court found that the error was not harmless given conflicting evidence and the impact on damages. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, including the damages, injunction, and attorney fees, and remanded for a new trial on liability and damages for the relevant trade secrets. View "COMET TECHNOLOGIES USA, INC. V. XP POWER, LLC" on Justia Law

PRICE V. DIAB

2026-07-13T11:31:32-08:00

A woman who uses a wheelchair due to Parkinson’s disease visited a retail store in Fontana, California, on four occasions in 2021. During each visit, she encountered barriers to accessibility, such as poorly marked disabled parking, uneven walkways, and narrow aisles. She sued the store and its owner, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act. The defendants did not respond to the lawsuit, and the plaintiff sought a default judgment along with an injunction to require the store to update its premises for greater accessibility. The United States District Court for the Central District of California entered default judgment and granted injunctive relief, ordering the store and its owner to make the requested accessibility improvements. However, the district court declined to award attorney’s fees to the plaintiff. It reasoned that she was not a “prevailing party” under 42 U.S.C. § 12205 because the injunction only required the defendants to do what federal law already mandated. The court also expressed concerns about the amount and quality of the fee petition but did not reach a determination on the reasonable amount of fees. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that a plaintiff who obtains a final injunctive order requiring a defendant to remedy ADA violations is a prevailing party, even if the injunction merely enforces preexisting legal obligations. The Ninth Circuit found that the district court misunderstood relevant precedent and clarified that obtaining an enforceable judgment that materially alters the defendant’s behavior is sufficient for prevailing party status. The appellate court reversed the denial of attorney’s fees and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine a reasonable fee award. View "PRICE V. DIAB" on Justia Law

NOVEDADES Y SERVICIOS, INC. V. FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK

2026-07-13T11:31:31-08:00

A federal agency issued an order requiring all money services businesses located in specified ZIP codes along the southwest border to file currency transaction reports for any cash transaction between $200 and $10,000, lowering the traditional reporting threshold of $10,000. The order applied to a wide geographic area, affecting businesses serving over one million people, including a small San Diego-based business and its owner. The plaintiffs alleged that complying with the order would require significant additional labor, threaten their viability due to increased costs and a loss of customers, and damage their goodwill, as customers expressed distrust and planned to take their business elsewhere. After the order took effect, the plaintiffs experienced a significant loss of customers and filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the order. The district court granted a temporary restraining order, then a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claims that the agency had exceeded its statutory authority, failed to conduct notice and comment rulemaking, and acted arbitrarily and capriciously by not considering compliance costs. The court also found a likelihood of irreparable harm due to threatened business extinction and loss of customers, and determined that the balance of equities and public interest favored the plaintiffs. The scope of the injunction was limited to the Southern District of California. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit held that the order was likely a rule rather than an adjudicative order, required notice and comment, and was likely arbitrary and capricious because the agency failed to consider compliance costs. The court also found no clear error in the district court’s findings regarding irreparable harm or abuse of discretion in the scope of relief. View "NOVEDADES Y SERVICIOS, INC. V. FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK" on Justia Law

MENJIVAR-AYALA V. BLANCHE

2026-07-09T10:01:17-08:00

A family from Honduras entered the United States in 2021 and sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, claiming they faced violent threats in their home country. Their applications were denied by an Immigration Judge. On December 19, 2023, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the denial. The BIA sent notice of its decision to the family’s attorney and a courtesy copy to the family. However, their attorney failed to inform them of the decision or the thirty-day deadline to file a petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. As a result, the family missed the deadline to seek further review. The attorney acknowledged her error and withdrew from representing the family. The family, with new counsel, filed a motion with the BIA to reopen the case and reissue the decision, arguing that their prior attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to notify them of the decision and deadline. The BIA denied the motion, reasoning that it lacked authority to address ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to actions before a different tribunal and that the courtesy copy of its decision sent to the family provided sufficient notice. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the BIA abused its discretion in denying the motion to reopen. The Ninth Circuit clarified that the BIA does have the authority to consider ineffective assistance claims for conduct that impacts a petitioner’s ability to seek review in federal court. It also held that mailing a courtesy copy to the petitioners did not rebut the presumption of prejudice created by counsel’s deficient performance. The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings. View "MENJIVAR-AYALA V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

COMBS V. NETFLIX, INC.

2026-07-08T10:31:55-08:00

The plaintiff accepted a job at the defendant company in May 2017, signing an employment agreement that included an arbitration clause covering all employment-related disputes. Over several years, the plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to a sexually charged work environment and specific instances of sexual harassment. She repeatedly complained internally to supervisors and management from 2017 through 2021, but claims her concerns were ignored and that no corrective action was taken. The plaintiff further alleges she experienced retaliation, humiliation, and targeted harassment following her complaints, culminating in her termination by the defendant in December 2021, allegedly in retaliation for reporting the workplace environment. After her termination, the plaintiff filed an administrative complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing in August 2023 and received a right-to-sue letter. In July 2024, she initiated a lawsuit in California state court raising claims of discrimination, harassment, and hostile work environment. The defendant removed the case to the United States District Court for the Central District of California based on diversity jurisdiction and moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the employment agreement. The district court granted the motion, finding that the dispute between the parties arose and the plaintiff’s claims accrued before the effective date of the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA), which was March 3, 2022. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s order de novo. The court held that the EFAA applies only to disputes or claims that arise or accrue on or after March 3, 2022. Because the plaintiff’s dispute with the defendant arose and her claims accrued before that date, the statutory exception to arbitration in the EFAA did not apply. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order compelling arbitration. View "COMBS V. NETFLIX, INC." on Justia Law

SARR V. BLANCHE

2026-07-07T11:31:56-08:00

A Gambian national, who entered the United States on a temporary business visa and later became a lawful permanent resident after marriage, was convicted in federal court of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. His conviction stemmed from a series of transactions over four months, during which he received and transferred substantial quantities of methamphetamine, ultimately leading to his removal proceedings. Upon his release from prison, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, charging him with being removable for committing an aggravated felony and a controlled substance offense. In his removal hearing, the individual applied for asylum, withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and protection under the Convention Against Torture, citing fear of harm by radical Islamists if returned to The Gambia. An Immigration Judge found him removable and denied his applications for relief, ruling that his conviction was a particularly serious crime, which made him ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, applying the Attorney General's decision in Matter of Y-L-, which creates a strong presumption that drug trafficking aggravated felonies are particularly serious crimes. The BIA concluded that the presumption was not rebutted, and therefore, the conviction rendered him ineligible for withholding of removal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on whether the agency was required to make an individualized determination of dangerousness beyond the Y-L- presumption, and whether its precedent, Miguel-Miguel v. Gonzales, should be overruled in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo. The court held that under existing precedent, the application of the Y-L- presumption sufficed to establish the petitioner’s ineligibility for withholding of removal and declined to overrule its prior statutory interpretation. The petition for review was denied. View "SARR V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

RINNAI AMERICA CORP. V. SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT

2026-07-02T08:31:35-08:00

A regional air quality agency responsible for the South Coast Air Basin, an area with some of the nation’s worst ozone pollution, amended its regulations to phase in zero nitrous oxide (NOx) emissions standards for certain appliances, such as water heaters, boilers, and process heaters. The agency determined that only widespread adoption of zero emissions standards across stationary sources could bring the region into compliance with federal ozone requirements imposed by the Clean Air Act (CAA). The rule’s implementation was staggered over several years, with the goal of achieving significant NOx reductions. Plaintiffs, including manufacturers and industry groups, challenged this rule, arguing that it was preempted by the federal Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), which sets national energy efficiency standards for consumer products. The United States District Court for the Central District of California considered the plaintiffs’ facial preemption challenge. The district court granted summary judgment to the air quality agency, finding that the rule did not concern the “energy use” of appliances as defined by EPCA, but instead addressed air pollution and health risks. The court concluded that the rule did not trigger EPCA’s preemption provisions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that EPCA does not preempt the agency’s amended rule because nothing in EPCA’s text, structure, or history indicates Congressional intent to interfere with state and local efforts to achieve federal air quality standards under the CAA. The court also found that plaintiffs had not shown any EPCA language preempting CAA-based emissions regulations, and distinguished its earlier decision in California Restaurant Association v. City of Berkeley as inapplicable here. Finally, the court held that the facial challenge failed because the rule applies to some products not covered by EPCA, and thus was not unconstitutional in every application. The judgment for the agency was affirmed. View "RINNAI AMERICA CORP. V. SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT" on Justia Law

USA v. SHI

2026-07-02T08:01:10-08:00

Three individuals participated over the course of a year in a complex money laundering operation involving Target gift cards. These cards were obtained through telephone scams, with victims deceived into purchasing the cards and providing the card numbers and access codes to overseas scammers. The defendants received these codes through encrypted messaging, then employed “runners” to quickly use the cards at Target stores—often buying high-value electronics or transferring balances to new gift cards. The merchandise was resold, and most of the proceeds were sent back to the scam’s organizers in China after taking a cut for themselves. One defendant continued to participate in the conspiracy even after being arrested and released on bond. The United States District Court for the Central District of California presided over their trial. A jury convicted all three of conspiracy to commit money laundering, with one also convicted for continuing the conspiracy while on pretrial release. At sentencing, the district court adopted the presentence reports, calculated the offense levels based on the scope and nature of their conduct, and applied several enhancements, including those for the amount laundered, sophisticated laundering, aggravated roles, and for being in the business of laundering funds. The court sentenced the defendants to terms below the calculated Guidelines range, but above the mandatory minimums. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s calculation of the loss amount and its application of aggravated and minor role adjustments. However, the appellate court held that the district court erred in applying a two-level enhancement for sophisticated laundering; under the Sentencing Guidelines, this enhancement can only be imposed if a different, specific enhancement was also applied, which did not occur here. The sentences were therefore vacated in part and remanded for limited resentencing to correct the guideline computation. View "USA v. SHI" on Justia Law

CANNON V. USA

2026-06-29T08:01:23-08:00

The case centers on an FBI investigation into Lionel Cannon for federal drug trafficking. During a lawful search, agents seized $585,000 in cash from Cannon’s bedroom safe. However, FBI Special Agent Scott Bowman stole $218,200 of that cash before it was officially inventoried. Bowman was later indicted and pleaded guilty to conversion of property and related crimes, with a money judgment of forfeiture reflecting the proceeds of his theft, much of which was attributable to Cannon’s safe. After Bowman’s conviction and forfeiture proceedings, Cannon pleaded guilty to drug-trafficking charges and agreed to forfeit $366,800, the amount remaining after Bowman’s theft. Despite awareness of the larger sum, the government never initiated forfeiture proceedings for the stolen $218,200. Cannon subsequently filed a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) for the return of the un-forfeited cash. The United States District Court for the Central District of California treated Cannon’s motion as a civil complaint and granted summary judgment for the government. The district court concluded that Cannon had agreed to forfeit all property seized and found his evidence regarding lawful possession of some of the funds insufficient. Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that sovereign immunity does not bar a Rule 41(g) claim for the return of cash when the government has recovered money traceable to funds it lost, even if it is not the exact physical currency seized. The court determined that Cannon had provided evidence of lawful sources for some of the cash and that the government had not rebutted this evidence sufficiently. The panel remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the proper disposition of the recovered funds. View "CANNON V. USA" on Justia Law

LEON-BRIVIESCA V. BLANCHE

2026-06-25T08:01:11-08:00

Two petitioners, each noncitizens with longstanding residence in the United States, faced removal proceedings based on state convictions involving harm to children. One was convicted in California for “cruelty to a child” under Penal Code § 273a(a) following an assault on a minor who had sought his counsel; the other was convicted in Oregon for child neglect after leaving his young children unattended, resulting in one child wandering onto the street. Immigration Judges determined that both offenses constituted crimes “of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment” as defined by federal immigration law, specifically 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed these findings, denying both cancellation of removal and other immigration relief. After the BIA’s decisions, the petitioners brought their cases to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. They argued that their convictions were not covered by the federal statute because the statute did not include child endangerment without actual harm, did not require the same levels of mens rea or actus reus as their respective state statutes, and should apply only to parents or guardians. They also challenged the statute on vagueness grounds. Reviewing the cases after significant developments in administrative law, the Ninth Circuit held that § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) covers child endangerment, requires a mens rea of at least criminal negligence, and an actus reus of placing a child in a situation likely to produce bodily or mental harm, and applies to any person, not just parents or guardians. The court rejected arguments that the petitioners’ statutes were broader than the federal standard or that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. The Ninth Circuit denied both petitions for review, affirming the BIA’s decisions. View "LEON-BRIVIESCA V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

GARCIA CORRALES V. BLANCHE

2026-06-24T08:01:26-08:00

A native and citizen of Mexico, Jesus Garcia Corrales, entered the United States as a child without inspection and was placed in removal proceedings in 2020. He applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. An immigration judge (IJ) found him removable and denied his applications for relief, setting a deadline for appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Garcia’s attorney mailed a notice of appeal via USPS certified mail eleven days before the deadline, but it was not delivered until forty-two days later, well past the deadline. The BIA dismissed Garcia’s appeal as untimely because it was not received within thirty days of the IJ’s order. The BIA’s dismissal advised Garcia that he could challenge the untimeliness determination by filing a motion with the Board. Garcia subsequently filed a motion to reopen, presenting evidence of the mailing delay and requesting equitable tolling of the appeal deadline. Despite the motion’s caption and its reliance on new evidence, the BIA construed it as a motion to reconsider and found it untimely, since it was not filed within thirty days of the dismissal order. The BIA also rejected the motion on the merits under the reconsideration standard, stating Garcia had not alleged any error of fact or law in its prior decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Garcia’s motion should have been treated as a motion to reopen, not a motion to reconsider, because it was based on evidence not previously before the BIA. Thus, the motion was timely, having been filed within the ninety-day deadline for motions to reopen. The court granted Garcia’s petition for review and remanded the case to the BIA to evaluate the motion under the correct standard for motions to reopen. View "GARCIA CORRALES V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

ORTIZ V. BISIGNANO

2026-06-24T08:01:26-08:00

The plaintiff, born in 1959, alleged disability beginning in 2016 due to chronic lower back and neck pain, degenerative disc disease, several mental health conditions, and a seizure disorder. His medical history included diagnoses of bipolar disorder, anxiety disorder, personality disorder, and non-epileptic seizures, all of which interfered with his ability to work and perform daily activities. He had not worked since 2010. His treating physician and two examining psychologists provided opinions that, if credited, would have required a disability finding. After an initial denial by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and a remand by the Social Security Administration’s Appeals Council due to inconsistencies, the ALJ again denied benefits in 2020. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington reversed and remanded, finding the ALJ’s rejection of the treating physician’s opinion was not supported by substantial evidence. On remand, a new ALJ issued another denial, again discounting the opinions of the treating and examining physicians and psychologists, and finding the plaintiff not disabled based mainly on nonexamining sources and selected evidence of normal functioning. The Magistrate Judge affirmed this decision, relying on the ALJ’s findings of inconsistencies and the law of the case doctrine regarding earlier credibility challenges. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the ALJ erred by not providing specific and legitimate reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for discounting the plaintiff’s treating physician’s and examining psychologists’ opinions, as well as the plaintiff’s subjective testimony regarding seizures and mental health symptoms. The court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to award benefits, concluding that the record was fully developed and did not leave serious doubt as to disability. View "ORTIZ V. BISIGNANO" on Justia Law

BROWN V. ALASKA AIRLINES, INC.

2026-06-24T08:01:25-08:00

Two former flight attendants alleged that their employer terminated them because of their religious beliefs after they commented on the company’s internal communications platform regarding the company’s public support for proposed federal legislation expanding protections for LGBTQ individuals. One plaintiff’s comment explicitly referenced religious concerns, while the other plaintiff’s comment raised a question about the regulation of morality. Both plaintiffs were members of the flight attendants’ union, which actively participated in the internal investigation and disciplinary process. The union representatives made statements that could be interpreted as disparaging the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs. Both plaintiffs had good employment records, though one had a prior disciplinary history. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted summary judgment for the employer and the union on the federal Title VII claims, finding no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the terminations were motivated by religious discrimination. The district court also ruled that the Railway Labor Act preempted the plaintiffs’ state-law anti-discrimination claims against the union, dismissing those claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings de novo. The appeals court held that, based on the evidence and under both direct/circumstantial and burden-shifting standards, there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the employer terminated the plaintiffs because of their religious beliefs, and as to whether the union attempted to cause or acquiesced in their terminations for the same reason. The court also held that the Railway Labor Act’s duty of fair representation does not impliedly preempt state anti-discrimination claims against unions. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and its dismissal of the state-law claims, remanding for further proceedings. View "BROWN V. ALASKA AIRLINES, INC." on Justia Law

COCOM V. ABM AVIATION, INC.

2026-06-23T08:01:19-08:00

Robert Cocom, a former airport janitor, brought a putative class action against his previous employer, ABM Aviation, Inc., alleging wage and hour violations. When he was hired, Cocom signed a Mutual Arbitration Agreement (MAA) requiring employment-related disputes to be resolved through arbitration. The MAA included waivers of class, collective, and representative actions, as well as a provision stating that arbitration awards would not have preclusive or precedential effect in other proceedings. Cocom’s lawsuit was originally filed in state court but was removed to federal court by ABM, which then moved to compel arbitration and strike the class claims. The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied ABM’s motion, finding the arbitration agreement both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The court relied heavily on the California Court of Appeal’s decision in Cook v. University of Southern California, interpreting the MAA as having an overly broad scope, indefinite duration, and lack of mutuality, and concluding that certain waivers violated California law. Finding multiple provisions unconscionable, the district court declined to sever them and refused to enforce the MAA. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the MAA’s provisions were distinguishable from those in Cook, noting that the MAA was limited to employment-related disputes, thereby avoiding the overbreadth, indefinite duration, and mutuality issues identified in Cook. The Ninth Circuit also found that any potentially unconscionable waivers (such as those related to representative actions or public injunctive relief) were severable. The main holding was that the MAA was not substantively unconscionable and should be enforced, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "COCOM V. ABM AVIATION, INC." on Justia Law

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO V. TRUMP

2026-06-17T08:31:22-08:00

Several unions representing approximately 800,000 federal civilian employees challenged an executive order issued by the President in March 2025. This order, Executive Order 14,251, invoked statutory authority to exclude various federal agencies and subdivisions from collective bargaining rights, citing national security concerns. The agencies affected included the Departments of State, Justice, Veterans Affairs, and others, and the order was accompanied by White House and Office of Personnel Management statements which asserted that union activities impeded national security functions. The unions alleged that the President’s action constituted unlawful retaliation against them for engaging in protected First Amendment activities, including lawsuits and public criticism of the Administration. The case originated in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. There, the judge granted a preliminary injunction, enjoining the enforcement of Executive Order 14,251 on the grounds that the unions raised a serious question as to whether the order was issued in retaliation for their protected speech. The district court focused on statements in the White House’s supporting materials, finding these reflected hostility toward the unions’ activities. The court did not address the merits of the unions’ other claims. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit agreed that the district court had jurisdiction to hear the unions’ claims, rejecting the government’s argument that the unions were required to pursue administrative remedies before the Federal Labor Relations Authority. However, the Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that, even if the unions made a prima facie showing of retaliation, the government demonstrated that the President would have issued the order regardless of the unions’ protected conduct, due to legitimate national security concerns. Because the unions did not show a likelihood of success or serious questions on the merits, the preliminary injunction was vacated. View "AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO V. TRUMP" on Justia Law

DETRICH v. THORNELL

2026-06-17T08:01:18-08:00

A man was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and sexual abuse in connection with the 1989 killing of a woman. The prosecution relied heavily on testimony from a codefendant, who received a plea deal and testified that the defendant killed the victim after a dispute over drugs. Other witnesses, including the victim’s family and friends, corroborated aspects of the prosecution’s account. The defendant’s counsel presented a misidentification defense and a mere-presence defense, but the jury found him guilty and he was sentenced to death after the trial court determined the crime was especially cruel, heinous, or depraved. Following the initial conviction, the Arizona Supreme Court reversed some convictions and remanded for a retrial, after which the defendant was again convicted and sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, finding both aggravating factors met and that mitigating evidence, including the defendant’s abusive childhood and substance abuse, did not outweigh aggravation. The defendant filed state postconviction petitions, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel at both the guilt and penalty phases, and raising issues about mitigation evidence. Both the trial court and Arizona Supreme Court denied relief, often finding the claims procedurally barred or unsupported. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of federal habeas relief. The court held that most guilt-phase ineffective assistance claims were procedurally defaulted and not excused under Martinez v. Ryan, as the defendant failed to show cause and prejudice. The court found one claim—failure to retain a forensic expert to challenge testimony about the victim’s gurgling—was not defaulted, but concluded the state court reasonably found no prejudice given overwhelming evidence of guilt. The court also found the Arizona Supreme Court reasonably rejected penalty-phase ineffective assistance claims and denied a certificate of appealability on the claim regarding mitigation evidence and the causal nexus test. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "DETRICH v. THORNELL" on Justia Law

YUROK TRIBE V. KLAMATH WATER USERS ASSOCIATION

2026-06-17T08:01:18-08:00

A dispute arose over the operation of the Klamath Project, a large federal water management system serving both agricultural and wildlife needs in Northern California and Southern Oregon. The Bureau of Reclamation manages the project, which involves distributing water from Upper Klamath Lake, a reservoir that also provides habitat for endangered and threatened species, including two species of suckers and coho salmon. In response to ongoing drought and the listing of these species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the Bureau consulted with federal wildlife agencies and adopted procedures requiring minimum water levels and stream flows to protect the listed species. Competing interests include tribal fishing rights, agricultural irrigation, and wildlife conservation. The conflict intensified when the Klamath Water Users Association and Klamath Irrigation District challenged the Bureau’s authority to release water from Upper Klamath Lake to comply with the ESA, arguing such releases diminished water available for irrigation and exceeded the Bureau’s authority under state and federal law. The Oregon Water Resources Department issued an order to halt these releases, which led federal agencies and tribal groups to seek declaratory and injunctive relief in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The district court held that the Bureau's operations were subject to the ESA and enjoined enforcement of the state order. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the ESA applies to the Bureau’s operation of the Klamath Project, whether the district court’s order constituted a judicial taking of water rights, and whether the district court had jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit held that Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA applies to the Bureau’s Klamath Project operations, reaffirming its precedent that the ESA governs such federal water management actions. The court rejected the judicial taking claim, finding no adjudication of water rights occurred, and determined that neither prior exclusive jurisdiction nor Colorado River abstention doctrines barred the district court from deciding the case. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. View "YUROK TRIBE V. KLAMATH WATER USERS ASSOCIATION" on Justia Law

RIENHARDT V. THORNELL

2026-06-15T08:01:10-08:00

The petitioner was convicted in Arizona of first-degree murder, kidnapping, attempted transfer of a dangerous drug, and attempted arson. The crimes involved a failed drug transaction in which the petitioner, after threatening a victim, ultimately abducted and killed him with an accomplice. Following the crime, the petitioner, his girlfriend, and his accomplice attempted to destroy evidence by burning a vehicle, but were apprehended after a police chase. Substantial physical evidence and testimony, including from the girlfriend who accepted a plea bargain, linked the petitioner to the offenses. At sentencing, the petitioner, after consulting with counsel, declined to present mitigating evidence and was sentenced to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and death sentence, although it reversed one aggravating factor and independently reweighed the remaining factors. The petitioner’s first state post-conviction relief (PCR) petition was denied on the merits, and later PCR petitions asserting additional ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims were dismissed as precluded. In federal habeas proceedings in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, the petitioner raised several IAC claims, some of which relied on evidence not presented in state court. The district court denied relief, finding some claims procedurally defaulted and others meritless, and declined to expand the record or hold an evidentiary hearing. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It held that, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) and Shinn v. Ramirez, the district court properly declined to consider evidence not presented in state court. The panel rejected the petitioner’s IAC claims, finding no unreasonable application of federal law or evidence of prejudice, and held that procedural defaults were not excused. It also denied certification for additional claims, finding no substantial showing of a constitutional violation. View "RIENHARDT V. THORNELL" on Justia Law

ORR V. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, RIVERSIDE

2026-06-09T08:32:53-08:00

A former seasonal employee of a package delivery company filed suit against her employer, alleging violations of California labor laws, including wage-related claims and a Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) claim. She had signed an arbitration agreement as a condition of employment, which included a class action waiver and a delegation clause assigning threshold arbitrability issues to an arbitrator. The agreement specified that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) would govern unless it did not apply, in which case state law would control. After her work schedule was repeatedly changed or canceled with little notice, she was not given further work despite her inquiries and subsequently initiated legal action on behalf of herself and proposed classes. After the case was removed from state court, the United States District Court for the Central District of California granted the employer’s motion to compel arbitration of the individual claims and stayed class claims. The district court declined to decide whether the FAA or the California Arbitration Act (CAA) governed the agreement, reasoning that the result would be the same under either statute. The court also denied the employee’s motion for clarification, maintaining that the question of which law applied and whether the FAA’s “contracts of employment” exclusion was relevant could be resolved by the arbitrator rather than the court. On mandamus review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court committed clear legal error by failing to determine whether the FAA or state law governed the arbitration agreement before compelling arbitration. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that, under New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, the court—not an arbitrator—must decide whether the FAA applies, including any statutory exclusions. The Ninth Circuit granted the writ of mandamus, directing the district court to vacate its prior order and to determine the statutory basis for its authority to compel arbitration before referring the parties to arbitration. View "ORR V. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, RIVERSIDE" on Justia Law

FORWARD, INC. V. MACOMBER

2026-06-09T08:32:52-08:00

Forward, Inc. operates a landfill near Stockton, California, which is bordered by several state facilities. Forward was required by a local water quality board to remediate groundwater contamination at its landfill. During this process, Forward suspected that nearby state facilities—including correctional and health care centers—were contributing hazardous waste to the groundwater, hindering its remediation efforts. Forward entered into an agreement with two California state agencies to access these facilities and collected data suggesting ongoing hazardous waste generation stemming from activities such as dry cleaning, solvent use, and well-water treatment at the state facilities. Forward filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and the Director of the California Department of General Services (DGS). Forward alleged that, due to their official positions, these defendants had control over the generation, handling, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste at the relevant facilities. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Forward had not established a sufficiently direct connection between the defendants and the alleged violations under the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. It affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that Forward failed to establish the “fairly direct” connection required by Ex parte Young. The court found that the defendants’ general supervisory roles over their respective agencies did not suffice to subject them to suit for the alleged RCRA violations, as neither their statutory duties nor alleged actions were directly tied to the waste management at the specific state facilities. The Ninth Circuit’s disposition was to affirm the district court’s dismissal. View "FORWARD, INC. V. MACOMBER" on Justia Law

CIRIA V. GERRANS

2026-06-05T09:33:05-08:00

Joaquin Ciria was convicted in 1991 for the murder of Felix Bastarrica in San Francisco, based largely on the testimony of George Varela, who was 18 at the time and an accomplice to the actual shooter. The conviction rested primarily on Varela’s statement, which he later recanted, claiming that police investigators threatened him with prosecution and fed him a story implicating Ciria. There was no physical evidence linking Ciria to the crime, and eyewitnesses could not positively identify him. In 2022, after serving thirty-two years, Ciria was exonerated when new evidence and witness statements showed he was factually innocent, and it was revealed that the investigators had used coercive tactics during their interrogation of Varela. Following his exoneration, Ciria filed a federal civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. He alleged that San Francisco Police Inspectors James Crowley and Arthur Gerrans fabricated evidence and maliciously prosecuted him. The district court denied Crowley and Gerrans’s motion for qualified immunity on Ciria’s fabrication-of-evidence and malicious prosecution claims, concluding that a reasonable jury could find the officers had used coercive interrogation tactics and lacked probable cause to charge Ciria. On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The court held that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Ciria, a reasonable jury could find that the officers threatened and coerced a key witness into fabricating evidence against Ciria and that, as of 1990, it was clearly established that such conduct would violate due process rights. The Ninth Circuit also held that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on the malicious prosecution claim because, without the coerced statement, it was not reasonably arguable that probable cause existed to charge Ciria. The court’s decision was affirmed. View "CIRIA V. GERRANS" on Justia Law

PIZZUTO V. VALLEY

2026-06-05T08:31:39-08:00

In 1985, Gerald Ross Pizzuto, Jr. was convicted by a jury in Idaho state court of murdering Berta and Del Herndon during a robbery, and he was sentenced to death. Over the following decades, Pizzuto challenged his conviction and death sentence through numerous state and federal post-conviction proceedings, but those efforts were unsuccessful. In 2021, Pizzuto sought clemency from the Idaho Commission of Pardons and Parole, which recommended that his death sentences be commuted to life without parole. However, the Governor of Idaho rejected this recommendation in accordance with an Idaho statute requiring gubernatorial approval for commutation in capital cases. Following the Governor’s denial, Pizzuto argued in Idaho state court that the Governor lacked authority under the Idaho Constitution to overrule the Commission’s recommendation. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the statute granting the Governor final authority in capital commutation cases, concluding that a 1986 amendment to the Idaho Constitution permitted the legislature to establish the procedures for granting clemency. Pizzuto filed a petition for rehearing, asserting that the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision was so arbitrary as to violate his federal due process rights, but the Idaho Supreme Court summarily denied rehearing. Pizzuto then brought a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, raising the due process claim. The district court denied relief, finding that the claim was not cognizable in federal habeas and would fail on the merits. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Pizzuto’s claim essentially challenged the Idaho Supreme Court’s interpretation of state law, which is not a cognizable federal habeas claim. Even if the claim were cognizable, the court determined that Pizzuto did not demonstrate a due process violation under clearly established federal law, and the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision was not so arbitrary as to support habeas relief. View "PIZZUTO V. VALLEY" on Justia Law

USA V. DEBORBA

2026-06-04T15:01:12-08:00

The defendant entered the United States in 1999 and remained without legal status after his tourist visa expired in 2000. He applied for and received a Washington concealed pistol license in 2019, falsely claiming to be a U.S. citizen. He also submitted Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives forms indicating citizenship to register handguns. A series of domestic violence incidents led to multiple restraining orders against him, each including a prohibition on owning or possessing firearms. Law enforcement seized firearms, ammunition, and a silencer from his residence in 2022. The defendant admitted to being a Brazilian citizen and acknowledged that he was not permitted to possess firearms due to his immigration status and domestic violence convictions. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington denied the defendant’s motions to dismiss charges on Second Amendment, materiality, and vagueness grounds. The defendant was convicted in a bench trial based on stipulated facts for unlawful possession of firearms and ammunition as a noncitizen and as a person under a domestic violence restraining order, making false statements during firearm purchases, falsely claiming U.S. citizenship, and unlawful possession of a firearm silencer. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed all convictions. The court held that precedent from United States v. Vazquez-Ramirez controlled challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), confirming the constitutionality of prohibiting firearm possession by noncitizens unlawfully present. Materiality challenges to false statement convictions failed because the Second Amendment does not protect firearm possession by such individuals. The court found that United States v. Rahimi and United States v. VanDyke foreclosed challenges to convictions based on domestic violence restraining orders. The court held that the National Firearms Act’s silencer regulations do not violate the Second Amendment or the Fifth Amendment’s vagueness doctrine. The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA V. DEBORBA" on Justia Law

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. FMCSA

2026-06-04T15:01:11-08:00

California officials challenged a determination by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) that California’s meal and rest break (MRB) rules, as applied to drivers of passenger-carrying commercial motor vehicles, were preempted by federal law. The MRB rules require employers to provide drivers with specified meal and rest periods during the workday. The FMCSA concluded that these state rules regulated commercial motor vehicle safety, were more stringent than federal hours-of-service (HOS) regulations, and imposed requirements not found in federal law. Previously, in 2019, the American Bus Association petitioned the FMCSA to preempt California’s MRB rules for passenger-carrying drivers. After public notice and comment, the FMCSA issued a final order in 2020 preempting these rules, finding they added no measurable safety benefit beyond federal HOS rules, were incompatible with federal regulations, and placed an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. California officials petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for review of the FMCSA’s preemption decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the FMCSA’s action under the highly deferential standard of the Administrative Procedure Act. It held that its earlier decision in International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 2785 v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 986 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2021), foreclosed California’s main arguments and confirmed that the FMCSA had authority to preempt the MRB rules. The court also held that the FMCSA’s determination that the MRB rules imposed an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce was supported by the administrative record and not arbitrary or capricious. The petition for review was denied, and the FMCSA’s preemption determination was upheld. View "PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL. V. FMCSA" on Justia Law

COFFEY V. FAST EASY OFFER, LLC

2026-06-04T15:01:11-08:00

The plaintiff, an Arizona resident, registered her personal cell phone on the national “do not call” registry in 2004. She alleged that a real estate company, Fast Easy Offer, LLC, and related entities, contacted her through at least six phone calls and two text messages in the fall of 2024. The messages asked if she had given up on selling her property. According to the plaintiff, Fast Easy Offer’s business model involves purchasing homes below market value and remarketing them, and if a home is not purchased, the lead is given to a real estate brokerage, Keller Williams Realty Phoenix, with revenues shared. The plaintiff claimed that the purpose of these communications was to solicit the purchase of real estate brokerage services. The plaintiff filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the communications did not qualify as “telephone solicitations” under the Act and that Keller Williams Realty, Inc. was not vicariously liable. The district court granted the motion, dismissing the complaint with prejudice. The court held that the calls and texts were not telephone solicitations because they did not expressly encourage the purchase of services. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that under the TCPA’s definition, and consistent with Chesbro v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 705 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2012), the plaintiff had adequately pleaded that the messages qualified as telephone solicitations. The court concluded that the purpose of initiation of the calls or messages is determinative, and the plaintiff’s allegations about defendants’ intent sufficed. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "COFFEY V. FAST EASY OFFER, LLC" on Justia Law

WELSH V. LOUDBEAR

2026-06-04T15:01:11-08:00

Kyle and Jill Welsh, members of the Colorado River Indian Tribes (CRIT) and owners of WW Young Money, LLC, leased tribal land to operate a smoke shop. After renewing their lease in 2020, tribal officials notified the Welshes in 2021 that their lease was terminated, alleging violations of the CRIT property code, including untimely rent payments, continued occupancy after a demand to vacate, and property damage. The Welshes responded by filing a civil RICO action in federal court, alleging that the tribal officials engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity that included illegal lease termination, conversion of inventory, extortion, and providing false information to law enforcement. The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the complaint. It held that the tribal officials were entitled to sovereign immunity because their alleged conduct occurred within the scope of their authority and in their representative capacities. The court also ruled that CRIT was a required party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, as it had a legally protected interest in the lease, and that the action could not continue without the tribe, whose joinder was barred by sovereign immunity. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the tribal officials were not entitled to sovereign immunity because they were sued in their individual capacities for money damages, and any recovery would come from them personally, not from CRIT. The appellate court also determined that CRIT was not a required party because the outcome would not affect its real property or contractual rights, as the plaintiffs did not seek to reinstate the lease. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(7) and remanded for consideration of whether the complaint states a valid claim and if leave to amend should be granted. View "WELSH V. LOUDBEAR" on Justia Law

CONOCOPHILLIPS ALASKA, INC. V. ALASKA OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION COMMISSION

2026-05-27T08:32:45-08:00

ConocoPhillips Alaska, Inc., an oil and gas producer, conducted drilling operations in the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska, a federal property located within the territorial bounds of Alaska. As required by federal lease terms and the Naval Petroleum Reserves Production Act, ConocoPhillips submitted well data to the U.S. Department of the Interior. To comply with Alaska law, it also submitted a subset of that data to the Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission. Alaska law requires such well data to be kept confidential for 24 months, after which it must be disclosed to the public unless certain additional confidentiality conditions are met. ConocoPhillips sought to prevent the Commission from releasing this data, citing concerns about the loss of trade secrets. After the Alaska Department of Natural Resources denied ConocoPhillips’s request to extend the confidentiality period, ConocoPhillips filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court denied the Commission’s motion to dismiss, granted partial summary judgment to ConocoPhillips, and entered final judgment in its favor. The district court concluded that while the federal Production Act did not expressly preempt Alaska law, it did impliedly preempt the state’s disclosure provision because releasing the data would conflict with the purposes of the federal statute. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and reversed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the Production Act does not expressly preempt Alaska’s disclosure statute, nor do Department of the Interior regulations do so. The court also found there was no implied preemption, as the Production Act does not demonstrate a congressional intent that would be obstructed by Alaska’s law. Thus, Alaska’s disclosure requirements were not preempted by federal law. View "CONOCOPHILLIPS ALASKA, INC. V. ALASKA OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION COMMISSION" on Justia Law

USA V. JOHNSEN

2026-05-26T08:01:14-08:00

Law enforcement identified an individual using the eMule peer-to-peer file-sharing platform who was sharing files with hash values matching those of known child pornography. The account was traced to the defendant, who had a prior record of offenses involving minors. Despite being unable to directly download the flagged files from the defendant’s account, agents matched the hash values and observed filenames indicative of child pornography. The officers obtained a search warrant, searched the defendant’s residence, and seized numerous electronic devices. Forensic analysis uncovered tens of thousands of images and hundreds of videos containing child pornography. The United States District Court for the District of Arizona reviewed several pretrial motions. The defendant moved to suppress evidence, arguing the search warrant lacked probable cause since agents had not visually confirmed the files’ content and that the review of his publicly shared files violated his Fourth Amendment rights and the Wiretap Act. The defendant also moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming prejudice from forensic analysis conducted without counsel present, and argued selective prosecution due to his status as a registered sex offender. Following hearings, the district court denied all motions. After a jury convicted the defendant on all counts, the court also denied his Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, and sentenced him to concurrent prison terms and supervised release. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction. The court held that hash value matches, even without visual confirmation, provided probable cause to support the search warrant, especially when reinforced by descriptive filenames and the defendant’s criminal history. The court found no Fourth Amendment or Wiretap Act violations because the files had been made publicly available. It ruled there was no right to counsel during the non-critical stage of forensic analysis and found no evidence supporting selective prosecution. The court declined to review the sufficiency of the evidence claim due to lack of argumentation. View "USA V. JOHNSEN" on Justia Law

THAKUR V. TRUMP

2026-05-26T08:01:13-08:00

Several researchers at the University of California received multi-year federal grants from agencies including the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Science Foundation, and the National Endowment for the Humanities. In April 2025, these agencies terminated the research grants by issuing form letters, citing shifts in agency priorities and referencing multiple Executive Orders issued by the President, some of which explicitly aimed to eliminate diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) and related initiatives from the federal government. The affected researchers alleged these terminations resulted in lost funding, harm to their reputations, and disruption to their projects, with no ready alternative sources of support. The researchers filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, asserting constitutional and statutory claims, including violations of the First Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court provisionally certified two classes: one consisting of researchers whose grants were terminated by form letter without grant-specific explanation (the Form Termination Class), and another whose grants were terminated specifically due to the DEI Executive Orders (the DEI Termination Class). The district court granted a preliminary injunction, ordering the reinstatement of the grants for both classes. The government appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs had established Article III standing. It reversed the preliminary injunction for the Form Termination Class, concluding that the district court likely lacked jurisdiction over their APA claim because the claim was essentially contractual and thus barred by the Tucker Act. However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction for the DEI Termination Class, finding that the class was likely to succeed on its First Amendment claim because the grant terminations were based on viewpoint discrimination. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "THAKUR V. TRUMP" on Justia Law

HEDRINGTON V. USA

2026-05-22T08:01:17-08:00

The case involves Orlonzo Hedrington, who underwent heart surgery and subsequent rehabilitation at a Veterans Administration medical center in California. Hedrington alleged that, during his discharge, he was sexually assaulted by nursing staff and administered drugs to disguise the assault. He filed a timely administrative claim with the Department of Veterans Affairs, which was denied. Hedrington then filed a timely lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), claiming negligence. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California first reviewed Hedrington’s timely FTCA action (“Hedrington I”). The United States moved for summary judgment, raising issues related to judicial estoppel and standing due to Hedrington’s bankruptcy proceedings. After the bankruptcy trustee was substituted as plaintiff, the district court denied the United States’s summary judgment motion. Later, Hedrington filed a second, untimely pro se lawsuit (“Hedrington II”), which was removed to the same district court. The court dismissed Hedrington II as time-barred under the FTCA. Subsequently, the United States moved for summary judgment in Hedrington I, asserting claim preclusion based on the judgment in Hedrington II. The district court granted summary judgment on both claim preclusion and insufficient evidence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Hedrington I was not barred by claim preclusion. Following Filice v. United States, the Ninth Circuit applied California claim preclusion law, under which a dismissal for untimeliness does not have claim preclusive effect. Additionally, the court found that applying claim preclusion here would result in manifest injustice, triggering California’s public policy exception. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment on claim preclusion and remanded for further proceedings. View "HEDRINGTON V. USA" on Justia Law

OLSON V. FCA US, LLC

2026-05-21T08:01:11-08:00

Jeffrey Olson leased a Jeep Grand Cherokee from a car dealership under a lease agreement that included an arbitration provision and a delegation clause, which assigned questions about the scope of arbitration to an arbitrator. FCA US, LLC, the manufacturer of the Jeep, was not a signatory to the lease agreement. Olson later became the named plaintiff in a federal class-action lawsuit against FCA, alleging defects in the vehicle’s headrest system. FCA, not being a party to the lease, sought to compel Olson to arbitrate the dispute based on the arbitration agreement between Olson and the dealership. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied FCA’s motion to compel arbitration. The district court found that FCA, as a non-signatory to the lease agreement, could not enforce the arbitration provision or its delegation clause against Olson. The court concluded that the arbitration agreement applied only to Olson and the dealership (including its employees, agents, successors, or assigns), and FCA did not qualify under any of those categories. Additionally, the court rejected FCA’s argument that it could use equitable estoppel to compel arbitration, holding that none of Olson’s claims were sufficiently intertwined with the lease agreement to justify such an exception under California law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that FCA could not compel Olson to arbitrate because FCA was not a party to the arbitration agreement and no applicable exception—such as equitable estoppel—applied. The court clarified that, under both federal and California law, only parties to an arbitration agreement (or those qualifying under specific, limited exceptions) may enforce it. The court also rejected FCA’s reliance on Supreme Court precedent, finding it inapplicable to non-signatories in these circumstances. View "OLSON V. FCA US, LLC" on Justia Law

USA V. TEKOLA

2026-05-20T08:01:43-08:00

Federal agents identified the defendant as the source of fentanyl that caused a fatal overdose in Goleta, California. Their investigation revealed that he had been selling drugs for years, frequently operating from his apartment. A search of the apartment uncovered nearly $13,000 in cash, various tools associated with drug distribution, and significant quantities of cocaine, fentanyl, methamphetamine, and Alprazolam. The defendant admitted that the cash was proceeds from drug dealing and that a safe in his bedroom was primarily used to store drugs and drug proceeds. His phone also contained substantial evidence indicating his apartment functioned as the center of his drug-trafficking activities. A grand jury indicted the defendant for possession with intent to distribute multiple controlled substances. He pleaded guilty to all charges without a plea agreement. At sentencing, the United States District Court for the Central District of California considered—over defense objection—a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) for maintaining a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance. The defendant argued that his apartment was primarily his residence, not a stash house, and that the enhancement should not apply. The district court found ample evidence that the apartment was used as a place to sell drugs and imposed the enhancement, ultimately sentencing the defendant to 105 months’ imprisonment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s application of the sentencing enhancement for abuse of discretion and affirmed the sentence. The court held that the enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(12) applies when a defendant regularly uses his home for substantial drug trafficking, even if the residence also serves as his primary home. The Ninth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that drug trafficking was a primary or principal use of the apartment. The sentence was affirmed. View "USA V. TEKOLA" on Justia Law

TRAMMELL V. KLN ENTERPRISES, INC.

2026-05-15T08:31:24-08:00

A consumer purchased a licorice product manufactured by a Minnesota company, relying on packaging that stated the product was “Naturally Flavored,” “Natural Strawberry & Raspberry Flavored Licorice,” and “Free of . . . Artificial Colors & Flavors.” The consumer later learned, through laboratory testing, that the product contained DL malic acid, which is an artificial flavor created from petrochemical sources. The consumer alleged that this ingredient rendered the product’s labeling false or misleading, and filed a putative class action in California, asserting claims for violation of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, unjust enrichment, and breach of express warranty. The United States District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The court found that the complaint failed to plead with sufficient particularity that the malic acid was artificial, thus not meeting the heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The district court also held that the plaintiff did not plausibly allege that a reasonable consumer would be misled by the product’s labeling, reasoning that the labels did not explicitly state the product was “all natural” or “100% natural,” and that the ingredients list disclosed both natural and artificial ingredients. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the complaint satisfied Rule 9(b) because it identified the specifics of the alleged fraud and provided details about the laboratory testing. The court also held that the plaintiff plausibly alleged that a reasonable consumer could be misled by the product’s claim to be free of artificial flavors when it allegedly contained an artificial flavor. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "TRAMMELL V. KLN ENTERPRISES, INC." on Justia Law

BRADFORD V. VANG

2026-05-14T08:01:17-08:00

A man was convicted in California state court of first-degree murder, rape, and sodomy arising from the 1988 killing of a woman at an apartment lodge where both lived. On the day of the crime, the man consumed large amounts of alcohol and interacted repeatedly with the victim, ultimately assaulting and killing her in her apartment. Physical evidence and the man’s own detailed post-arrest confessions were central to the prosecution’s case; he admitted to deliberating about ensuring the victim’s death after an initial assault. The defense at trial argued intoxication, but the jury convicted him of first-degree murder and found a special circumstance, leading to a death sentence. After the California Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and special circumstances (but reversed a robbery charge), the man pursued state and federal habeas relief. His federal habeas petition alleged, among other things, that the prosecution withheld exculpatory blood-alcohol test results (a Brady claim) and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present additional evidence of intoxication and mental impairment (Strickland claims). The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California initially denied most relief but later set aside the murder conviction and special circumstance finding based on the Brady and Strickland claims. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court. The Ninth Circuit held that under AEDPA’s deferential standards, the California Supreme Court could reasonably have concluded that there was insufficient factual support for the existence of undisclosed blood-alcohol test results and that counsel’s alleged failures did not prejudice the defense. The Ninth Circuit directed the district court to deny habeas relief as to the convictions and special circumstances, remanding solely for resolution of any remaining penalty-phase claims. View "BRADFORD V. VANG" on Justia Law

YUROK TRIBE V. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

2026-05-13T08:01:14-08:00

Decabromodiphenyl Ether (decaBDE) is a flame retardant used in numerous products, including electronics, vehicles, and appliances, and is known for its persistence, bioaccumulation, and toxic effects on human and environmental health. In response to concerns about such chemicals, Congress amended the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) in 2016, adding a subsection mandating expedited risk-management rules for certain chemicals, including decaBDE. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated rules in 2021 and amended them in 2024, regulating some uses of decaBDE but declining to regulate exposures arising from recycling, disposal, wastewater, and sewage sludge in several contexts. Following the 2021 rule, several petitioners challenged the EPA’s approach in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The EPA voluntarily sought a remand to reconsider aspects of its rule, which the Ninth Circuit granted. After seeking additional public comment, the EPA issued the 2024 amendments, which still did not address all the petitioners’ concerns, particularly regarding the areas of recycling, disposal, wastewater discharges, and sewage sludge. The petitioners renewed their challenge, arguing that EPA’s failure to regulate these areas violated TSCA’s mandate. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the EPA’s decisions not to further regulate decaBDE exposures in recyclable articles, disposal, wastewater, and sewage sludge were not supported by substantial evidence as required by TSCA. The court held that EPA could not justify a failure to regulate based on low exposure levels or general policy preferences and found the agency had not adequately addressed evidence in the record. The court granted the petition for review, remanded the rule to the EPA for renewed rulemaking and further proceedings, but left the 2024 rule in place during the remand. View "YUROK TRIBE V. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY" on Justia Law

USA V. SANCHEZ

2026-05-12T08:01:15-08:00

The defendant, a person of Mexican descent, worked at a tax preparation business serving Spanish-speaking clients in Boise, Idaho. He was indicted on seven counts of preparing and presenting false and fraudulent tax returns. During jury deliberations, it became undisputed that one juror made racially biased comments about Mexicans. This juror, identified as Juror 5, participated in nearly all deliberations and expressed views suggesting animus toward Mexicans, including remarks about how Mexicans "hate Americans" and allegations connecting the defendant's employer to criminal activity. After the biased statements were reported, the United States District Court for the District of Idaho conducted a special voir dire with all jurors to determine the impact of the comments. Several jurors confirmed hearing the remarks, but most denied being influenced by them. The district court excused Juror 5 for good cause but allowed the remaining eleven jurors to continue deliberations without instructing them to start anew. Thirteen minutes later, the jury returned a partial verdict. The defendant moved for a mistrial and later for a new trial, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury was violated. The district court denied both motions, applying the standard from United States v. Sarkisian, which asks whether exposure to prejudicial comments tainted the verdict. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the proper standard is from United States v. Remmer, which presumes prejudice when juror bias is discovered before a verdict is accepted, and places a heavy burden on the government to prove harmlessness. The court found that the government failed to rebut this presumption, and therefore reversed the district court’s denial of the motion for a new trial and remanded for a new trial. View "USA V. SANCHEZ" on Justia Law

USA V. CHAPMAN

2026-05-08T08:01:18-08:00

John Chapman, who has multiple neurodevelopmental disorders, maintained a romantic relationship with Jamie Feden for several years, despite being married to another woman. In 2019, Chapman and Feden traveled together from Pennsylvania to Las Vegas. Prior to and during this period, Chapman conducted online searches related to murder and body disposal. While in Nevada, Chapman took Feden to a remote desert location, restrained her with zip ties and duct tape under the pretense of a bondage photoshoot, and ultimately caused her death by asphyxiation. He left her body in the desert and returned to Pennsylvania, where he used her phone to communicate with her friends and family to conceal her death. After suspicions arose, Chapman was questioned by police and confessed to the crime after being read his Miranda rights. The United States District Court for the District of Nevada denied Chapman’s motion to suppress his confession, finding that he had knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights and that his confession was voluntary. During trial, Chapman argued his mental conditions affected his perception and intent. After lengthy deliberations and substantive jury notes indicating a deadlock, the district court gave an Allen charge and made coercive comments to a holdout juror. The jury returned a guilty verdict for kidnapping resulting in death. Chapman’s post-verdict motions for acquittal and a new trial were denied. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated Chapman’s conviction and remanded for a new trial, finding impermissible jury coercion due to the undisclosed jury notes, the coercive Allen charge, and the court’s direct comments to a holdout juror. The court also held, for the first time in the circuit, that the “holding” element of the federal kidnapping statute can be satisfied by non-physical means such as deception. The court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress Chapman’s confession. View "USA V. CHAPMAN" on Justia Law

URQUIA-YANEZ V. BLANCHE

2026-05-08T08:01:17-08:00

A native and citizen of Honduras entered the United States without admission or parole and was taken into custody. Shortly after her release, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) served her with a Notice to Appear, written in English, which informed her of the obligation to notify the immigration court of any change of address. She provided an address in Hanford, California, which was used for subsequent correspondence. After moving to a new address without notifying the immigration court, she missed a scheduled removal hearing, and was ordered removed in absentia. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied her motion to reopen the removal proceedings, finding that she had received proper notice by mail to her last known address. Her subsequent motion to reconsider was also denied; the IJ found she had constructive notice because the Notice to Appear was sent to her last provided address, and that she had been properly informed of her obligation to update her address. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ’s decisions, concluding that jurisdiction was not impacted by the allegedly defective Notice to Appear, and that mailing the Notice of Hearing to her last provided address was sufficient under the applicable statutory and Supreme Court precedent. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that DHS is not constitutionally required to provide a translation of the entirety of a Notice to Appear—including the obligation to update an address—in an alien’s native language. The court found that English-language notices are generally sufficient to satisfy due process because they are reasonably calculated to inform recipients of their obligations. The petition for review was denied. View "URQUIA-YANEZ V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

PHILLIPS V. GOLDMAN

2026-05-07T18:01:14-08:00

A creditor and her law firm, holding pre-bankruptcy judgments against a debtor, sought to recover assets from the debtor's Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate. The debtor had declared bankruptcy in 2011, disclosing interests in two Los Angeles properties. The Chapter 7 trustee initially reported no assets available for distribution. After protracted litigation regarding exemptions and the value of the properties, including appeals, the creditor asserted the trustee had failed to preserve estate assets by allowing the properties to deteriorate and by not collecting rental income that could benefit the estate. The creditor began an adversary proceeding against the trustee, alleging gross negligence and breach of fiduciary duty related to the management of estate property. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding the trustee was protected by quasi-judicial immunity because the conduct amounted, at most, to ordinary negligence and was time-barred. On appeal, the United States District Court for the Central District of California affirmed dismissal on the grounds of immunity, but reversed the statute of limitations ruling and remanded for consideration of whether amendment of the complaint would be futile. Upon further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held it had jurisdiction to review the district court’s order, given the creditor’s counsel’s representation that they would not amend the complaint. The Ninth Circuit clarified that a bankruptcy trustee may have quasi-judicial immunity only for actions involving discretionary judgment essential to adjudicating private rights in the estate. The court held that the trustee’s alleged failures in property management and rent collection were administrative, not adjudicative, and thus not protected by quasi-judicial immunity. The court also found the trustee was not entitled to derived judicial immunity on the current record. The decision of the district court was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "PHILLIPS V. GOLDMAN" on Justia Law

FUHR V. CITY OF SEATTLE

2026-05-07T09:04:36-08:00

The case concerns a police shooting in Seattle involving an officer and an individual named Shaun Fuhr. Fuhr threatened the mother of his infant daughter, fired a handgun in a public park, and then fled on foot with the child. Despite police commands to stop and a search involving a helicopter and SWAT officers, Fuhr continued to evade authorities for over thirty minutes while still holding his daughter. Eventually, SWAT officers, including Noah Zech, encountered Fuhr in a residential alley. As Fuhr appeared from behind bushes, advancing with the infant in his arms, Zech fired a single shot, killing Fuhr. The baby was unharmed, and Fuhr’s gun was later found nearby. Prior to this appeal, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted summary judgment in favor of Zech and the City of Seattle. The district court held that Zech was entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and dismissed the plaintiffs’ other claims, including negligence, wrongful death, and claims under state law. The plaintiffs appealed these rulings. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that, even when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, Zech did not violate clearly established law by shooting Fuhr under these circumstances. The court found no precedent clearly establishing a Fourth Amendment violation in a case involving a fleeing, possibly armed suspect holding a child after firing a gun and ignoring police commands. Accordingly, Zech was entitled to qualified immunity. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ remaining claims. View "FUHR V. CITY OF SEATTLE" on Justia Law

CRAIN WALNUT SHELLING, LP V. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

2026-05-07T09:04:35-08:00

The case concerns the process for selecting a lead plaintiff in a securities fraud class action brought under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). After investors filed federal securities claims against a company and its executives, several parties moved to be appointed as lead plaintiff, including Crain Walnut Shelling, LP. Crain Walnut reported the largest financial losses among the movants and made a prima facie showing of adequacy and typicality, initially making it the presumptive lead plaintiff. However, a competing movant, Universal, challenged Crain Walnut’s adequacy, raising concerns about inaccuracies in Crain Walnut’s filings and inconsistent representations about its ownership and organizational structure. During discovery, further issues arose when Crain Walnut’s representative gave problematic deposition testimony, indicating an unwillingness to comply with potential discovery obligations. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California evaluated these challenges. After initial proceedings and discovery, the district court concluded that the evidence raised doubts about Crain Walnut’s adequacy but initially applied a “genuine and serious doubt” standard. Ultimately, Universal was appointed as lead plaintiff after the district court found that Crain Walnut’s adequacy was rebutted based on the evidence. Crain Walnut then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for a writ of mandamus to vacate the district court’s orders. The Ninth Circuit clarified that the correct standard for rebutting the PSLRA’s presumption of adequacy is the preponderance of the evidence, not a lower standard. The appellate court held that, even under the correct standard, the district court did not commit clear error in finding Crain Walnut inadequate, and thus mandamus relief was not warranted. The court therefore denied the petition for writ of mandamus. View "CRAIN WALNUT SHELLING, LP V. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA" on Justia Law

BURNEY V. BROOMFIELD

2026-05-07T08:31:42-08:00

Three defendants, including the petitioner, were convicted in California state court for the robbery, kidnapping, and murder of a victim who was forced into a car trunk and subsequently killed. The petitioner, who was 18 at the time, confessed to police after being advised of his Miranda rights. At trial, the judge made several offhand, jocular, and at times insensitive comments, including remarks touching on race, gender, and capital punishment. The petitioner did not testify and raised claims at various points about judicial bias and misconduct, an involuntary confession, invalid Miranda waiver, and the improper admission of codefendants’ statements. After conviction and a death sentence, the petitioner’s direct appeal and two state habeas petitions were denied by the California Supreme Court, which rejected his claims both on the merits and on procedural grounds. The petitioner then filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, which denied relief. The district court also denied a request to expand the certificate of appealability to include claims regarding his confession and the admission of codefendants’ statements. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. The court held that the petitioner’s claims of judicial bias and misconduct failed because the trial judge’s comments, while inappropriate, did not demonstrate actual bias or render the trial fundamentally unfair under the Due Process Clause. The Ninth Circuit also declined to expand the certificate of appealability, finding that the petitioner’s claims regarding the voluntariness of his confession, the validity of his Miranda waiver, and any Bruton violation were not debatable among reasonable jurists and that any error was harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. The denial of habeas relief was affirmed. View "BURNEY V. BROOMFIELD" on Justia Law

VERICOOL WORLD, LLC V. IGLOO PRODUCTS CORP.

2026-05-06T09:32:01-08:00

A manufacturer of biodegradable coolers developed and released its product several years before a competing company launched a similar cooler. The first manufacturer’s early product was initially not available in retail stores but was later marketed directly to consumers. The competing company’s cooler, introduced later, was sold in major retail chains. The dispute arose when the second company advertised its cooler as the “world’s first eco sensitive cooler, made from 100% biodegradable materials.” The first manufacturer objected, asserting that these statements were false because it had marketed a biodegradable cooler before its competitor. The first manufacturer sued in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging false advertising under the Lanham Act and unfair competition under California law. The claim was that the competitor’s statements about being “first” deprived it of recognition, market cachet, and associated goodwill, causing harm to its reputation and marketing opportunities. The district court held that the Lanham Act does not provide a cause of action for claims based on inventorship or being “first to market” and granted summary judgment to the defendant. The court found the state law claim derivative and dismissed it as well. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that, under the Lanham Act, actionable false advertising must concern observable characteristics of the tangible product, not the origin of ideas or claims of market primacy. It concluded that statements about which company was first to market refer to the origin of a concept, not the qualities or characteristics of the product itself, and thus are not cognizable under the Lanham Act. The court also found that the plaintiff had waived any argument that consumers were confused about whether its product was biodegradable. The judgment for the defendant was affirmed. View "VERICOOL WORLD, LLC V. IGLOO PRODUCTS CORP." on Justia Law

WILLIAMS V. LEGACY HEALTH

2026-05-06T08:01:12-08:00

A group of employees working at a regional healthcare system sought religious exemptions from their employer’s COVID-19 vaccination policy, which was instituted in August 2021 amid the rise of the Delta variant. These employees, whose positions required close contact with patients or staff, timely applied for religious exemptions, but their requests were denied. As a result, most were placed on administrative leave and then terminated; one employee eventually complied with the policy and returned to work. The employees brought claims for religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Washington state law in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. The district court assumed the employees established a prima facie case of religious discrimination but granted summary judgment for the employer. The court found that the employer had demonstrated that granting the exemptions would impose a substantial burden on its ability to provide quality healthcare, citing risks to staffing, patient safety, and overall operations, and that the employees failed to rebut this showing. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the employer. The Ninth Circuit held that, under the standard articulated in Groff v. DeJoy, an employer must show a substantial burden in the overall context of its business, not merely a de minimis cost, to establish undue hardship. The court determined that the healthcare employer’s evidence of substantial risks to health, safety, and operations sufficed to establish undue hardship. The court also clarified that an employer is not required to prove exclusively financial hardship, nor to provide individualized accommodations if any accommodation would present an undue hardship. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "WILLIAMS V. LEGACY HEALTH" on Justia Law

TWENTY-NINE PALMS BAND OF MISSION INDIANS V. BLANCHE

2026-05-06T08:01:11-08:00

A federally recognized tribe in southern California operated a wholesale tobacco distribution business, selling cigarettes exclusively to other California tribes. These tribal businesses, in turn, sold the cigarettes to individual consumers on their respective reservations. Neither the distributing tribe nor its customers held state licenses to distribute or sell cigarettes, and no state cigarette taxes were collected at any point in the distribution chain. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) placed the tribe on the Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking (PACT) Act’s noncompliant list, which restricts delivery of cigarettes by common carriers, due to violations of California’s cigarette tax and licensing laws. After the California Department of Justice notified the tribe of noncompliance, the state asked ATF to add the tribe to the noncompliant list. The tribe responded by arguing the PACT Act did not apply to its sales, but continued to make sales without appropriate licenses or tax payments. ATF issued notices of violations and, after considering the tribe’s responses, confirmed its decision to list the tribe. The tribe then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, challenging ATF’s actions as contrary to law and procedurally deficient. The district court granted summary judgment to ATF, finding that the agency’s decision was adequately reasoned and procedurally proper. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the tribe’s remote cigarette sales to other tribes constituted “off-reservation” activity subject to California’s licensing and tax laws. The court found that the tribe’s customers were “consumers” under the PACT Act, rendering the tribe a “delivery seller” required to comply with state law. The court also held that ATF did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act’s procedural requirements. The decision of the district court was affirmed. View "TWENTY-NINE PALMS BAND OF MISSION INDIANS V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

3PAK LLC V. CITY OF SEATTLE

2026-05-05T08:01:13-08:00

In June 2020, following the murder of George Floyd, protestors established the Capitol Hill Occupied Protest (CHOP), occupying a sixteen-block area in Seattle’s Capitol Hill neighborhood. In response, the Seattle Police Department abandoned its East Precinct and significantly reduced police presence in the affected area, including Cal Anderson Park. The protests and encampments continued to cause disruption, vandalism, and crime for months, with CHOP forcibly disbanded on July 1, 2020, but neighborhood disturbances persisting until December 2020. Two businesses located near Cal Anderson Park, one a restaurant and the other a property owner, claimed that the City’s actions and inaction led to severe economic losses, including lost revenue, property damage, and tenant departures. Previously, these businesses were absent putative class members in the Hunters Capital, LLC v. City of Seattle class action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, which raised similar claims. After class certification was denied and the case settled, the businesses filed individual lawsuits in April and June 2023, consolidated in the district court. The district court dismissed the state-created danger and Takings Clause claims, and found their nuisance claims untimely under the applicable two-year statute of limitations, but did not initially decide on equitable tolling pending further guidance from the Washington Supreme Court. After the Campeau v. Yakima HMA, LLC decision, the district court dismissed the nuisance claims and entered final judgment. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the state-created danger and Takings Clause claims, holding that the state-created danger doctrine does not extend to purely economic harm and that the cessation of police services did not constitute a compensable taking. However, the appellate court reversed the dismissal of the nuisance claims, holding that equitable tolling under American Pipe is available under Washington law, and remanded for further proceedings on those claims. View "3PAK LLC V. CITY OF SEATTLE" on Justia Law

DOERR V. SHINN

2026-05-04T10:01:17-08:00

A man was convicted by a jury in Arizona of kidnapping, sexual assault, and murder in 1996, and received a death sentence from a judge. After his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal by the Arizona Supreme Court, he sought postconviction relief in state court, but his counsel failed to investigate or present any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) at the sentencing phase. The first postconviction relief (PCR) attorney never met with him and was unaware of the need to investigate sentencing issues. No mitigating evidence or penalty-phase IAC claim was presented to the state courts at that time. The state trial court dismissed his initial PCR petition, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied further review. He then filed a federal habeas petition, raising, for the first time, claims that his trial and PCR counsel were ineffective at sentencing and arguing that he was ineligible for execution due to intellectual disability. The United States District Court for the District of Arizona found his claims procedurally defaulted because they had not been presented in state court and Arizona law generally bars such successive claims. The district court also found that ineffective assistance of PCR counsel did not excuse the default. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan, which allowed ineffective PCR counsel as cause to excuse certain procedural defaults, the case was remanded for further consideration. New mitigating evidence was presented, but subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence (Shinn v. Ramirez) prevented the federal court from considering evidence not first presented to the state court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that it was not clear whether Arizona courts would find the penalty-phase IAC claim procedurally barred and, applying Rhines v. Weber, granted a stay and abeyance. This allows the petitioner to return to state court to present his unexhausted IAC claim, as the Rhines criteria were satisfied: good cause existed, the claim was potentially meritorious, and there was no intentional delay. The court remanded with instructions to stay federal proceedings pending state court exhaustion of the claim. View "DOERR V. SHINN" on Justia Law

SANCHEZ GONZALEZ V. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

2026-04-30T08:32:23-08:00

A Mexican national who entered the United States unlawfully in 1992 married a U.S. citizen, and together they had three children who are U.S. citizens. In seeking to obtain lawful permanent residency, the noncitizen husband traveled to Mexico for a required consular interview. After the interview, the consular officer denied his visa application, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii) (“3A2”) and concluding there was reason to believe he was a member of a known criminal organization. The denial notice referenced a review of interview statements, law enforcement information, the immigration record, and all documents submitted. The applicant had no criminal record and disputed gang affiliation, contending that his tattoos were the basis for suspicion. The couple filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, asserting that the visa denial was based solely on the noncitizen’s tattoos, violated their First Amendment rights, and that 3A2 was unconstitutionally vague. The district court dismissed the case, finding the noncitizen could not overcome the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, and that the U.S. citizen spouse had not plausibly alleged the absence of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason for the visa denial. The court also rejected the vagueness challenge to 3A2. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the noncitizen could not rely on his own First Amendment rights to challenge the visa denial, but the U.S. citizen spouse’s First Amendment right to receive information was implicated, triggering the narrow Mandel exception to consular nonreviewability. Nevertheless, applying the limited review allowed, the court found the government provided a facially legitimate and bona fide reason for denial, the applicants did not show bad faith, and the relevant statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "SANCHEZ GONZALEZ V. DEPARTMENT OF STATE" on Justia Law

SCOTT V. BROOMFIELD

2026-04-29T08:31:41-08:00

In this case, the petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder with special circumstances after he brutally assaulted a woman, set her on fire, and left her to die. The victim survived for ten months before dying from complications related to her injuries. The petitioner had previously pleaded guilty to rape and attempted murder relating to the same incident, but after the victim’s eventual death, he was charged with murder and sentenced to death following a bench trial. His confessions to law enforcement, as well as physical evidence and eyewitness testimony, connected him to the crime. After his conviction and sentence were affirmed by the California Supreme Court, the petitioner filed several state habeas petitions, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective in various respects during both the guilt and penalty phases. The California Supreme Court denied relief, often adopting the factual findings of a referee appointed to conduct an evidentiary hearing. The referee found trial counsel credible and discounted much of the petitioner’s new evidence as lacking credibility or being recently fabricated. The petitioner then sought federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The district court granted relief based on cumulative ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase, finding that trial counsel’s multiple deficiencies prejudiced the petitioner. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied the deferential standards required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. The court concluded that the California Supreme Court had reasonably determined that trial counsel was not deficient in most respects and that any errors did not result in prejudice sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. The Ninth Circuit therefore reversed the district court’s grant of habeas relief and remanded for consideration of the petitioner’s remaining claims. View "SCOTT V. BROOMFIELD" on Justia Law

PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC. V. NAGO

2026-04-28T08:02:19-08:00

A nonprofit organization focused on election integrity requested that Hawaii’s State Elections Office provide a statewide list of registered voters, citing a provision in the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) that allows for public inspection of certain election records. Hawaii’s State Elections Office declined to provide the statewide list and recommended that the organization seek separate county-level lists from each of the four County Clerks, as the Office does not maintain or distribute such a combined list. After receiving this response, the organization sought injunctive and declaratory relief in federal court, arguing that the NVRA entitled it to the statewide voter list. The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii dismissed the action, holding that the organization’s claim was not ripe because it had not first requested the information from the counties. The court found there was no Article III jurisdiction, as the organization had not suffered a concrete injury and could still pursue county-level records. The district court allowed time for the organization to amend its complaint if its claims became ripe, but the organization declined, maintaining that the NVRA required disclosure by the State. Final judgment was entered, and the organization appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the organization did have standing, as the denial of information requested under the NVRA constitutes a sufficient injury for Article III purposes. The appellate court also found the claim to be ripe, as the State had made clear it would not provide the requested information. However, on the merits, the Ninth Circuit held that the NVRA does not require disclosure of a statewide voter list, as such a list is not a record “concerning the implementation” of list-maintenance programs under the statute. The court therefore affirmed dismissal, but on the merits, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the claim with prejudice. View "PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC. V. NAGO" on Justia Law

HANAN V. UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES

2026-04-27T08:01:39-08:00

A noncitizen from Israel entered the United States on a tourist visa, overstayed, and married a U.S. citizen (his first wife). They divorced less than two years later, and no immigration benefit was sought based on that marriage. Years later, the noncitizen married another U.S. citizen, with whom he has a child. His current wife filed a petition (Form I-130) for him to be classified as an immediate relative, a necessary step toward permanent residency. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied this petition, concluding the noncitizen’s prior marriage was a sham, entered solely to obtain immigration benefits. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld USCIS’s denial, finding the noncitizen’s first marriage was fraudulent. The plaintiffs then challenged the decision in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, arguing that the marriage fraud bar in 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c) should not apply since no immigration benefit had been sought from the first marriage, and that their procedural due process rights had been violated by the reliance on the ex-wife’s statement without cross-examination. The district court granted summary judgment to the government. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that, under the plain meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c)(2), the marriage fraud bar applies when a noncitizen attempts or conspires to enter into a marriage for the purpose of evading immigration laws, regardless of whether an immigration benefit was sought. The court also held that the plaintiffs received adequate procedural due process and that substantial evidence supported the agency’s finding of marriage fraud. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. View "HANAN V. UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES" on Justia Law

FORWARD, INC. V. MACOMBER

2026-04-27T07:32:10-08:00

A company operating a landfill in California suspected that neighboring state facilities were contributing hazardous waste, complicating its efforts to clean up groundwater contamination. The company alleged that activities at several state-run institutions bordering its landfill—including a correctional facility and a health care center—involved the use and disposal of hazardous substances that were leaching into the groundwater. In response, the company entered into an agreement allowing it to collect data from these state facilities, which it then used to support its claim that hazardous waste generation at those sites was undermining its remediation efforts. The company brought a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) against the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and the Director of the California Department of General Services. The lawsuit alleged that, by virtue of their official positions, these state officials controlled the generation and management of hazardous waste at the implicated facilities. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the officials’ general supervisory roles were insufficient to establish the “fairly direct” connection to the alleged violations required for an exception to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity under the doctrine established in Ex parte Young. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a “fairly direct” connection between the named officials and the alleged RCRA violations. The court clarified that general supervisory authority or oversight of state agencies does not, by itself, subject state officials to suit under Ex parte Young; a more specific connection to the alleged unlawful conduct is required. Thus, the action against these particular officials could not proceed. View "FORWARD, INC. V. MACOMBER" on Justia Law

COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO V. INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

2026-04-23T08:31:16-08:00

The dispute centers on insurance coverage for environmental remediation costs incurred by a county at an airport property it owned. The activities causing contamination began during and after World War II, including industrial waste disposal and manufacturing by various tenants. In the 1990s and beyond, state authorities ordered the county to investigate and clean up hazardous groundwater pollution. The county sought coverage under a series of insurance policies issued by its insurer between 1966 and 1975, which provided both excess and umbrella liability coverage. The core disagreement was whether the insurer’s liability for property damage was limited to $9 million per occurrence, as the county argued, or subject to a $9 million annual aggregate limit, as the insurer contended. Initially, the United States District Court for the Central District of California allowed the insurer to withdraw an admission that no aggregate limit applied. The district court ultimately sided with the insurer, holding that the policies imposed an annual aggregate limit on property damage claims and relying on a California appellate decision, Garamendi v. Mission Insurance Co., to support this view. After granting the insurer’s motion, the district court dismissed the county’s claim for declaratory relief, reasoning that no further controversy existed and that any determination of future benefits would be speculative. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that, under California law, the aggregate limit provisions in these policies were ambiguous regarding whether they applied to property damage. The court found that Garamendi did not bind its interpretation, considering the policies’ language and extrinsic evidence, including industry practice and the insurer’s own statements. Concluding the policies did not specify an aggregate limit for property damage, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO V. INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA" on Justia Law

PETREY V. PRINCESS CRUISE LINES, LTD.

2026-04-23T08:01:14-08:00

A hotel guest, who was staying at a lodge as part of a cruise package, fell in his bathroom after tripping over a raised shower ledge situated close to the toilet. He alleged that the bathroom’s configuration was unreasonably dangerous, and that the cruise line and hotel operator were negligent in constructing or maintaining that configuration. The guest asserted both a traditional maritime negligence claim and an alternative theory of negligence per se, arguing that the bathroom violated applicable plumbing codes. The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment for the defendants on both theories. Regarding the negligence claim, the district court ruled that the plaintiff had not provided evidence that the defendants had actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition. On the negligence per se theory, the district court found that there was insufficient evidence that a plumbing code violation caused the plaintiff’s injury. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court held that, because the defendants owned and constructed the lodge’s bathroom, there was no dispute that they knew or should have known the configuration existed. It found that the plaintiff’s expert evidence created a genuine dispute about whether the defendants knew or should have known that the configuration was unreasonably dangerous. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s summary judgment on the maritime negligence claim. However, the appellate court agreed with the district court that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the negligence per se theory, concluding that a movable shower curtain did not violate the cited plumbing code. The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on negligence per se and remanded the general negligence claim for further proceedings. View "PETREY V. PRINCESS CRUISE LINES, LTD." on Justia Law

USA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA

2026-04-22T09:06:03-08:00

California enacted the No Vigilantes Act, which requires non-uniformed federal law enforcement officers operating in the state to visibly display identification while performing enforcement duties, with certain exceptions. Officers who fail to comply face potential criminal prosecution under California law. The law also provides a safe harbor: if a law enforcement agency maintains and posts a written policy requiring visible identification, the agency and its personnel are exempt from the identification mandate and associated penalties. The United States filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, challenging the constitutionality of the Act’s identification requirement (Section 10) and related provisions, arguing that these provisions violate the Supremacy Clause by attempting to directly regulate federal operations. The district court declined to enjoin enforcement of Section 10 against federal agencies and officers, reasoning that the United States had not shown that the state’s identification requirement interfered with or controlled essential federal law enforcement operations. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s refusal to grant preliminary injunctive relief. The Ninth Circuit held that Section 10 of the No Vigilantes Act attempts to directly regulate the federal government in its performance of governmental functions, which the Supremacy Clause forbids. The court explained that states may not directly regulate the conduct of the federal government or its officers, regardless of whether the regulation is minimal or aligns with state requirements for state officers. Concluding that the United States is likely to succeed on the merits of its claim, and that the remaining preliminary injunction factors favored the United States, the Ninth Circuit granted an injunction pending appeal, enjoining California from enforcing Section 10 against federal agencies and officers. View "USA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA" on Justia Law

J. R. V. VENTURA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

2026-04-22T09:06:00-08:00

A child attended the Ventura Unified School District from 2012 to 2021. During this time, the district performed several psychoeducational assessments, identifying the child as having a specific learning disability but failing to assess for autism. The child’s parents, aware of his persistent academic and behavioral struggles, repeatedly collaborated with the district, sought private assessments, and requested additional services, which were denied. The child was ultimately diagnosed with autism in 2021, after which the parents initiated legal action seeking remedies for allegedly inadequate education dating back to 2012. After the parents filed a due process complaint in 2021, an Administrative Law Judge concluded that claims for services before April 8, 2019, were time-barred under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s (IDEA) two-year statute of limitations, finding the parents knew or should have known of the district’s failure to assess for autism and of the child’s inadequate education before that date. The ALJ awarded relief only for the period after April 8, 2019. The parents then sought further review in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, which reversed the ALJ. The district court held that the statute of limitations did not begin until the autism diagnosis in 2021, reasoning the parents lacked the requisite knowledge to challenge the district’s actions earlier. The court also found both statutory exceptions to the limitations period applied and awarded remedies for the 2012–2019 period. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court. The court held that the IDEA’s two-year statute of limitations begins when parents knew or should have known both of the district’s action or inaction and that their child was being denied a free appropriate public education. It concluded that the parents’ claims for pre-2019 educational services were untimely. The appellate court vacated the district court’s remedial orders and remanded for further proceedings regarding attorneys’ fees. View "J. R. V. VENTURA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT" on Justia Law

MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. LOPEZ

2026-04-22T08:31:11-08:00

A nonprofit political advocacy organization challenged a set of municipal campaign finance rules adopted by a California city after a history of local government scandals involving city officials and local business interests. The ballot measure, approved by 82% of city voters, imposed per candidate contribution limits for individuals and political action committees, as well as aggregate contribution limits, for city elections. The measure was adopted in response to a series of incidents where city officials accepted valuable gifts or travel from local business figures and subsequently took official actions arguably benefiting those providers. A district attorney’s investigation and report, media coverage, and a resident survey indicating strong public demand for accountability preceded the measure. After the measure took effect, the advocacy organization sued in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, arguing that the per candidate and aggregate contribution limits violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Both sides filed for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for the city, holding that the per candidate limits were justified by a sufficiently important governmental interest and closely drawn to that interest, and that the aggregate limits did not impermissibly discriminate against candidates who also supported ballot measures. The court also upheld a related gift ban, but the plaintiffs did not appeal that aspect. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the city established an important governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, and that the contribution limits were closely drawn, not unconstitutionally low, and comparable to other cities’ limits. The court further found that the aggregate limits were constitutional, as they did not apply to ballot measure committees. Thus, the city’s campaign finance limits were upheld. View "MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. LOPEZ" on Justia Law

USA V. BOLANDIAN

2026-04-21T08:31:43-08:00

Shahriyar Bolandian was convicted of insider trading based on allegations that he traded on nonpublic information regarding the mergers of two companies, information allegedly obtained from a friend, Ashish Aggarwal, who worked at J.P. Morgan. Bolandian executed trades in the stocks of PLX Technologies and ExactTarget before their respective acquisitions, ultimately earning substantial profits. These trades occurred while Aggarwal, though not assigned to the deals, worked in the relevant banking group. The case revolved around whether Aggarwal had improperly shared confidential information, and whether Bolandian knowingly traded on it. Initially, the United States District Court for the Central District of California severed Aggarwal’s trial from that of Bolandian and another co-defendant, Sadigh, due to the risk of antagonistic defenses. Aggarwal was ultimately acquitted by a jury. Afterward, a superseding indictment charged only Bolandian and Sadigh, and eventually Bolandian alone proceeded to trial. During Bolandian’s trial, a juror (Juror No. 6) expressed uncertainty about his ability to be impartial due to a family connection to J.P. Morgan. The district court questioned Juror No. 6 briefly, but allowed him to remain on the jury after both parties did not object. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Bolandian’s conviction and focused on the issue of juror bias. The court held that the district court failed in its independent duty to investigate credible allegations of juror bias after Juror No. 6 expressed doubt about his impartiality. The panel concluded that defense counsel’s agreement to keep Juror No. 6 did not waive Bolandian’s right to challenge for bias, as a proper investigation is a prerequisite to waiver. The Ninth Circuit found plain error, vacated Bolandian’s conviction, and remanded for a new trial. View "USA V. BOLANDIAN" on Justia Law

MCAULIFFE V. ROBINSON HELICOPTER COMPANY

2026-04-21T08:31:41-08:00

The case concerns a fatal helicopter crash during a sightseeing tour in Hawaii, resulting in the deaths of all aboard, including the plaintiffs’ daughter. The helicopter, manufactured by Robinson Helicopter Company in 2000, had its main rotor hub and blades replaced with new, identical parts from Robinson in December 2018, which was over eighteen years after the helicopter’s initial delivery. The plaintiffs alleged that defects in the replaced rotor hub and blades caused the crash, and brought claims for negligence, strict products liability, and failure to warn. The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii heard the case first. Robinson invoked the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), which generally bars actions against manufacturers eighteen years after delivery of the aircraft. The plaintiffs argued for exceptions under GARA’s “rolling provision”—which restarts the repose period for newly replaced parts—and the “fraud exception”—which removes the bar if the manufacturer concealed or misrepresented material information to the FAA. The district court granted summary judgment for Robinson, holding that the rolling provision did not apply because the replacement parts were not substantively altered from the originals, and that the plaintiffs failed to plead fraud with the necessary specificity. The court also denied the plaintiffs’ motion to further amend their complaint. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in requiring a “substantive alteration” for the rolling provision to apply, as GARA only requires that a new part replaces an old one. The Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment in part and remanded for a new causation analysis regarding the replaced parts. However, the court affirmed the lower court’s determinations that the plaintiffs failed to meet the requirements for the fraud exception and that denying leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion. View "MCAULIFFE V. ROBINSON HELICOPTER COMPANY" on Justia Law

BROWN V. SALCIDO

2026-04-20T09:03:20-08:00

Several individuals alleged that Google collected and misused the private browsing data of Chrome users who utilized Incognito mode, despite Google’s representations about the privacy of this feature. In June 2020, five plaintiffs brought a putative class action on behalf of these users, seeking both injunctive relief and damages. After extensive discovery, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California certified a class for injunctive relief but denied certification for a damages class, finding the plaintiffs had not shown that common issues predominated over individual ones. Following the denial of damages class certification, the named plaintiffs sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit under Rule 23(f), but the petition was denied. The case proceeded, and as trial approached, the parties settled: Google agreed to change its policies, the named plaintiffs would arbitrate their individual damages claims, and they waived their rights to appeal the denial of damages class certification. The settlement explicitly stated that absent class members were not releasing damages claims or appellate rights. Several months after the settlement, a group of 185 Chrome users, referred to as the Salcido plaintiffs, moved to intervene to preserve absent class members’ appellate rights regarding damages. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the intervention motion. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the intervention motion untimely. Applying the circuit’s traditional three-part test for intervention—considering the stage of the proceedings, prejudice to other parties, and the reason for and length of delay—the court found that intervention at this late stage would prejudice the existing parties, that the delay was unjustified, and that the timing weighed against intervention. The denial of the motion to intervene was therefore affirmed. View "BROWN V. SALCIDO" on Justia Law