U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - Justia Case Law Summaries

PADILLA V. UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT

2026-09-21T08:00:32-08:00

A group of asylum seekers who entered the United States without admission or parole were apprehended, screened for expedited removal, and found to have a credible fear of persecution or torture. As a result, they were transferred from expedited to regular removal proceedings to have their asylum claims adjudicated. However, due to their initial placement in expedited removal, they were subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), which, as interpreted in Jennings v. Rodriguez, does not permit bond hearings or individualized determinations regarding detention. The plaintiffs, forming a certified class, argued that the lack of such hearings violated their rights under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Initially, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted class certification and issued a preliminary injunction requiring bond hearings. After the Attorney General issued a decision, Matter of M-S-, which aligned with Jennings and eliminated the statutory right to bond hearings, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to challenge the constitutionality of mandatory detention. The district court again granted relief, but the government appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit initially affirmed, but the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam. Upon remand, the district court, after further proceedings, denied the government’s motion to dismiss, holding that it had jurisdiction and that the due process claim was not foreclosed by Thuraissigiam. On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the government’s motion to dismiss. The court held that none of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A) or § 1252(e)(3) barred judicial review of the class’s due process claim. The court also held that Thuraissigiam did not eliminate the due process rights of noncitizens apprehended well within the United States, distinguishing the case from those at the “threshold of initial entry.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed that these individuals may pursue constitutional due process claims regarding their detention. View "PADILLA V. UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT" on Justia Law

FAIN V. BISIGNANO

2026-09-18T08:30:42-08:00

The claimant stopped working in December 2018 due to gastrointestinal complications attributed to anxiety and subsequently sought Social Security disability insurance benefits. She alleged disability based on a combination of mental and physical impairments, including PTSD, panic disorder, ADHD, major depressive disorder, fibromyalgia, and irritable bowel disease. Her initial application was denied by the Social Security Administration both initially and upon reconsideration. She requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), who found her not disabled after reviewing her impairments and concluded that she retained the capacity to perform light work with certain limitations. After the Appeals Council denied her request for further review, the claimant filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. The district court affirmed the ALJ’s denial of benefits, maintaining that the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence. Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The court held that the ALJ erred in finding unpersuasive the opinion of the claimant’s treating physician regarding her fibromyalgia, and also erred in rejecting the claimant’s testimony about her physical impairments and symptoms without providing convincing reasons. Additionally, the ALJ failed to provide any reason for disregarding lay testimony from the claimant’s partner, which constituted legal error under the “germane reasons” standard. However, the ALJ’s evaluation of medical opinions from other doctors and rejection of the claimant’s testimony about her mental impairments were supported by substantial evidence. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions for further administrative proceedings, concluding that an immediate award of benefits was inappropriate. View "FAIN V. BISIGNANO" on Justia Law

MEDINA V. BLANCHE

2026-09-18T08:00:37-08:00

The case concerns an individual who entered the United States without inspection and was placed in removal proceedings after being detained by immigration authorities. While in custody, he was properly served with a Notice to Appear and provided the detention center address as his location. Shortly before his release, his relatives posted a bond and filled out a bond form with his residential address and telephone number, but not his mailing address. The relatives were unaware that the individual received mail via a P.O. Box and not at his residential address. After release, the government sent a hearing notice to the residential address listed on the bond form, but the notice was returned as undeliverable since mail could not be received at that address. An Immigration Judge ordered the individual removed in absentia after he failed to appear at the hearing, relying on the assumption that he had received written notice. The individual, who did not know about the hearing, promptly moved to reopen the proceedings, providing his correct mailing address and explaining, via sworn statements, that he had notified the court of his address for receiving notices and had lived at the same location since release. The Immigration Judge denied the motion to reopen, applying a presumption of delivery based on regular mail. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, concluding that the government had complied with statutory notice requirements by sending notice to the last known address and rejecting the argument that he was entitled to actual notice. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the government violated the petitioner’s due process rights by relying solely on a residential address provided by third parties on a bond form, which was not reasonably calculated to provide notice. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the removal order, and remanded for further proceedings. The court dismissed a later petition for review as moot. View "MEDINA V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

USA V. STATE OF IDAHO

2026-09-18T08:00:36-08:00

After the Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA) confirmed thousands of federal stockwater rights on federal land, Idaho enacted a series of statutes known as the “stockwater amendments.” These amendments altered water rights rules, including procedures for forfeiture and appurtenance, and imposed new requirements specifically affecting federal stockwater rights. The United States challenged several provisions, arguing that they were intended to divest it of SRBA-decreed stockwater rights and unlawfully discriminated against the federal government. Two groups—the Idaho Legislature and ranching interests—intervened as defendants. The United States District Court for the District of Idaho rejected jurisdictional challenges based on Rooker-Feldman, prior exclusive jurisdiction, Burford abstention, and claim preclusion, holding it could hear the case. On the merits, the district court found Idaho Code § 42-224 constitutional as applied to the United States, but held Idaho Code §§ 42-113(2)(b), 42-502, and 42-504 were facially unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. The United States appealed the ruling on § 42-224, while the State Defendants and Ranchers cross-appealed the jurisdictional holdings and the ruling on § 42-113(2)(b). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s jurisdictional holdings, concluding that neither the doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction nor Burford abstention applied. The panel reversed the district court’s finding that § 42-224 was constitutional as applied, holding that it is part of a statutory scheme that unlawfully discriminates against the United States and jeopardizes its SRBA-decreed rights. The panel affirmed the district court’s holding that § 42-113(2)(b) is facially unconstitutional because it singles out the United States for unfavorable treatment by changing appurtenance rules only for rights associated with federal land. Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, awarding costs to the United States. View "USA V. STATE OF IDAHO" on Justia Law

S.D. V. REESE

2026-09-17T09:00:44-08:00

Two inmates who identify as transgender women brought a class action against the Oregon Department of Corrections and related officials, alleging Eighth Amendment violations for purportedly exposing transgender women inmates to substantial risk of harm by housing them in men’s prisons. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary mandatory injunction on behalf of a class of all current and future transgender women in Oregon prison facilities, requesting that they be presumptively assigned to the state’s women’s prison and given additional protections. A magistrate judge in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon granted the motion for a preliminary injunction and provisionally certified the class. The injunction required Oregon to presumptively assign transgender women inmates to the women’s prison unless a specific security justification was documented, along with other measures for safety and privacy. Defendants moved for reconsideration, and the district court amended but largely maintained the injunction. Defendants appealed and obtained a stay of the injunction pending appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s order, applying an abuse-of-discretion standard to the injunction and de novo review to underlying legal issues. The Ninth Circuit found the district court committed clear error by basing its injunction on an unsupported finding that the defendants employed a default presumption of housing transgender women in men’s prisons. The appellate court determined that the record showed individualized assessments for inmate placement and that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, or commonality for class certification. The Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction, ordered the class to be decertified, and remanded the case. The mandate was issued forthwith. View "S.D. V. REESE" on Justia Law

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC V. BALDWIN

2026-09-17T08:30:43-08:00

Two American entrepreneurs established three international corporations to invest in the casino and gaming industry in Laos. Two of these corporations became involved in disputes with the Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), resulting in multiple arbitration proceedings in Singapore. The tribunals issued monetary awards in favor of Lao PDR against the two companies. Lao PDR tried to collect the awards through various means, including contacting corporate officers, filing suits abroad, and pursuing enforcement actions in U.S. courts. After an unsuccessful attempt in Idaho, Lao PDR filed a petition in the United States District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands to enforce the arbitral awards, asserting that the entrepreneurs and their third corporation, Bridge Capital, were alter egos of the award-debtor corporations and should also be liable. The District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands granted a joint motion by Baldwin and Bridge Capital to dismiss the petition, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to enforce the awards against parties not named as debtors in the arbitral awards. The court reasoned that Lao PDR would need to bring a separate action to pursue enforcement against alleged alter egos. The court stayed a similar motion by Scott pending the present appeal. Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 203 because the awards arose from a commercial, international relationship and were foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention. The appellate court determined that the district court was required to consider the merits of Lao PDR’s alter ego theory in a single enforcement proceeding, rather than requiring a separate action. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "THE GOVERNMENT OF THE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC V. BALDWIN" on Justia Law

DOE V. GITHUB, INC.

2026-09-16T08:30:45-08:00

Programmers who published open-source code on GitHub sued GitHub, Microsoft, and various OpenAI entities, alleging that GitHub Copilot and Codex—AI tools trained on publicly available code from GitHub—reproduce portions of their code without attribution. These programmers claimed that the AI’s omission of copyright management information (CMI), such as attribution and license terms required by open-source licenses, violated the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), specifically 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b). Plaintiffs alleged that Copilot’s outputs sometimes consist of verbatim or near-verbatim reproductions of their code, but the AI-generated outputs do not include the original CMI. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California reviewed the case and dismissed the DMCA claims under Rule 12(b)(6, first with leave to amend and then with prejudice, concluding that plaintiffs failed to allege that Copilot’s outputs were “identical” to their code and that only identical copies from which CMI had been removed could support a DMCA claim. The court allowed breach of contract claims to proceed. It certified the DMCA dismissal for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), noting the issue of whether § 1202(b) imposes an identicality requirement. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that plaintiffs had Article III standing due to a plausible risk of injury. However, it determined that under their “output” theory, Copilot and Codex do not “remove or alter” CMI from copies of existing protected works; instead, they generate new works that never contained CMI. The court declined to consider the plaintiffs’ “input” theory as it was forfeited. The main holding is that generating new works without CMI does not violate § 1202(b) of the DMCA. View "DOE V. GITHUB, INC." on Justia Law

USA V. MENDONSA

2026-09-16T08:30:44-08:00

Louis Mendonsa pleaded guilty in April 2024 to seven counts of distribution and one count of possession of child pornography, stemming from activities on several “dark web” websites between July and November 2022. Decades earlier, Mendonsa was convicted in California state court for multiple child sex abuse offenses, including lewd and lascivious acts and oral copulation with minors he supervised as newspaper delivery boys. Most of these prior convictions involved the same victim and resulted in a 14-year prison sentence. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, in calculating Mendonsa’s federal sentence, applied a five-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(5) for engaging in a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor. The original presentence report did not recommend this enhancement, but following the government’s objection and submission of evidence from Mendonsa’s 1993 convictions, the final report included it. Mendonsa objected, arguing both that the enhancement should not apply to conduct from thirty years prior and that the evidence was insufficient to establish two separate qualifying incidents. At sentencing, the district court found multiple distinct instances of sexual abuse based on state-court documents and applied the enhancement. Mendonsa was sentenced to 292 months in prison and appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that § 2G2.2(b)(5) is ambiguous regarding whether it covers conduct outside the offense of conviction, and that the Sentencing Guidelines commentary reasonably interprets the enhancement to include such conduct. The court further concluded that the categorical approach does not apply since the enhancement focuses on conduct, not convictions, and found no clear error or abuse of discretion in the district court’s reliance on hearsay evidence or its factual findings. The sentence was affirmed. View "USA V. MENDONSA" on Justia Law

BLUE LAKE RANCHERIA V. KALSHI, INC.

2026-09-16T08:30:42-08:00

Two federally recognized tribes sued several entities, including Kalshi and Robinhood, alleging that Kalshi’s “event contracts”—which pay based on sports outcomes—amounted to unauthorized sports betting offered on tribal lands. The tribes argued this violated the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) and their own gaming ordinances, since only tribally authorized gaming is lawful under secretarial procedures that stand in place of a tribal-state compact. They also challenged Kalshi’s advertisement claiming sports betting was legal nationwide on its platform under the Lanham Act. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the tribes’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the transactions did not occur on Indian lands, found Kalshi not bound by any tribal compact or procedures, and determined that the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) controlled Kalshi’s conduct. The court reasoned that UIGEA exempted Kalshi’s contracts because they were regulated by the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). The Lanham Act claim was rejected as the challenged advertisement was deemed a nonactionable opinion about legality. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the denial of the preliminary injunction in part. The court held that the tribes were likely to succeed on their IGRA claims, finding Kalshi’s sports contracts constituted class III gaming, occurred on Indian lands when entered into from tribal territory, and were unauthorized under the tribes’ ordinances and secretarial procedures. The court determined that neither UIGEA nor CEA displaced IGRA’s remedies or barred the tribes’ claim. However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of the Lanham Act claim, holding Kalshi’s advertisement was a lay opinion. The case was remanded for consideration of the remaining preliminary injunction factors. View "BLUE LAKE RANCHERIA V. KALSHI, INC." on Justia Law

HANDY V. JONES

2026-09-15T08:00:37-08:00

Late at night, Anchorage police officers responded to reports of a domestic disturbance involving Kristopher Handy and his girlfriend. Dispatchers informed the officers that Handy had assaulted his girlfriend, may have discharged a firearm, and was seen waiting for the police outside his apartment, armed with a shotgun. Upon arrival, officers announced themselves and ordered Handy to come out and drop his weapon. Handy exited with the shotgun, refused repeated instructions to disarm, and advanced toward the officers while waving his shotgun overhead and cursing. As Handy stepped off the curb, officers fired, fatally shooting him. Plaintiffs, relatives of Handy, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and deprivation of familial association. Defendants moved to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, Handy’s actions did not necessarily constitute an immediate threat warranting deadly force. The court cited Ninth Circuit precedents suggesting an officer may not use deadly force against an armed suspect unless the suspect makes a threatening gesture, and found that factual disputes about Handy’s behavior precluded dismissal. Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined it had jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal and reviewed the facts de novo. The court held that, considering the totality of the circumstances and the incorporated video evidence, the officers acted reasonably and did not violate Handy’s or plaintiffs’ federal rights. The court also found no clearly established law requiring officers to hold fire until a suspect aimed a weapon at them. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s denial of qualified immunity and remanded with instructions to grant qualified immunity to the officers. View "HANDY V. JONES" on Justia Law

USA V. TROIANO

2026-09-14T09:00:47-08:00

The defendant was convicted in 2006 for robbing a liquor and convenience store in Hawaii, during which he assaulted the store owner and stole cash from the premises. He was found guilty by a jury on four counts: conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, Hobbs Act robbery, brandishing a firearm during a violent crime, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. At sentencing, the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii applied several enhancements under the Sentencing Guidelines, including a career-offender enhancement based on prior state burglary convictions, resulting in a total sentence of 24 years. Following sentencing, the United States Sentencing Commission enacted four amendments to the Guidelines, three of which were not retroactive. If all had applied retroactively, the defendant’s sentence would have been significantly shorter. In 2024, the defendant moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), arguing that the disparity between his sentence and what he would receive under current Guidelines constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason for sentence reduction. The district court denied the motion, citing the policy statement in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, which precludes consideration of nonretroactive Guidelines changes as extraordinary and compelling reasons. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion and the interpretation of statutes and Guidelines de novo. The court held that the Sentencing Commission acted within its statutory authority in promulgating the policy statement, which validly bars courts from considering nonretroactive Guideline amendments—whether individually or in combination—as extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion. View "USA V. TROIANO" on Justia Law

U VISA APPELLANTS V. DIRECTOR, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES

2026-09-14T09:00:45-08:00

A group of more than 150 U-visa petitioners in the United States challenged the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) over delays and denials related to their pending U-visa petitions. Due to a statutory cap on U visas, these petitioners faced long waits. Some were placed on a waiting list (“WLD Plaintiffs”), while others received only a “bona fide determination” (“BFD Plaintiffs”). All had deferred action and work authorization but lacked advance parole, which would allow them to travel abroad and return. The plaintiffs argued that USCIS unlawfully withheld or delayed waiting list decisions (Claim 1), unlawfully withheld or delayed consideration for advance parole (Claim 2), and arbitrarily and capriciously denied advance parole to those on the waiting list (Claim 3). The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Claims 2 and 3 for all plaintiffs, finding that the APA does not permit courts to compel discretionary agency actions and that the plaintiffs did not plead or prove that they requested and were denied parole. The court allowed only Claim 1, brought by BFD Plaintiffs, to proceed, but later granted summary judgment to USCIS, holding that the BFD Plaintiffs lacked standing because being waitlisted would not independently entitle them to parole. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that granting parole to waitlisted U-visa petitioners is discretionary under 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(d)(2), not mandatory. The panel affirmed dismissal of the WLD Plaintiffs’ claims for lack of statutory jurisdiction, as the APA does not permit courts to compel discretionary action and there was no final agency action on parole denials. The panel also affirmed the district court’s rejection of the BFD Plaintiffs’ parole-related injury theory for standing, but reversed and remanded for consideration of their alternative injury theories and, if necessary, the merits of Claim 1. View "U VISA APPELLANTS V. DIRECTOR, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES" on Justia Law

USA V. TOVAR-DURAN

2026-09-14T08:30:48-08:00

In this case, a non-citizen was apprehended by a United States Border Patrol agent near the U.S.-Mexico border and charged with misdemeanor attempted illegal entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1). During the bench trial before a magistrate judge, the defendant requested evidence regarding the government’s witnesses’ involvement in a Facebook group where Border Patrol agents had posted offensive content. The government at first denied any witness involvement but later disclosed that two witnesses were members of the group. The defendant renewed his request for additional discovery related to this issue, but the magistrate judge denied it. The trial proceeded, and the magistrate judge admitted immigration documents over hearsay objections to establish the defendant’s citizenship status. After testimony from three agents, the defendant was convicted and sentenced to time served. The defendant appealed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, arguing that the magistrate judge erred in denying discovery requests for Brady and Rule 16 material and improperly admitted hearsay evidence. The district court affirmed the conviction, finding any error in denying discovery requests harmless because Agent Copenhaver’s testimony and the removal documents sufficed to prove the offense. The district court also determined the removal documents were admissible under the public records exception to hearsay. Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo for Brady issues and for abuse of discretion on discovery and evidentiary rulings. The court held that the magistrate judge abused her discretion by denying further discovery regarding the witnesses’ Facebook group activity, as the government was obligated to disclose such material under Brady and Rule 16. The court also found that the removal documents contained inadmissible hearsay and should not have been relied upon to prove alienage. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order, conditionally vacated the conviction, and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether undisclosed evidence might have affected the verdict. View "USA V. TOVAR-DURAN" on Justia Law

IN RE: KIA HYUNDAI VEHICLE THEFT MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION

2026-09-14T08:30:46-08:00

Insurance companies paid claims to policyholders whose Hyundai or Kia vehicles were stolen or damaged due to a vulnerability stemming from the lack of an engine immobilizer in certain models from 2011 to 2022. These companies, as subrogees, filed a nationwide class action alleging that the Korean manufacturers, Hyundai Motor Company and Kia Corporation, defectively designed these vehicles, making them prone to theft. The complaint also asserted claims for breach of warranties, violations of consumer protection statutes, fraud, unjust enrichment, and negligent failure to warn. Multiple lawsuits arising from this issue were consolidated into multidistrict litigation before the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The district court dismissed the claims against the Korean entities for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that the evidence did not establish intentional targeting of California by the manufacturers and that the claims did not arise from California-related conduct. The district court also denied leave to amend and jurisdictional discovery, entering final judgment under Rule 54(b) dismissing the Korean entities from the subrogation track. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that the Korean manufacturers were subject to specific personal jurisdiction in California. The panel found that the manufacturers purposefully directed their activities toward California by sending thousands of shipments of vehicles through California ports and designing vehicles specifically for the U.S. market. The court further held that the claims arose out of these California contacts, as the injuries were caused by vehicles shipped to California. The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, leaving the question of reasonableness of jurisdiction for the district court to resolve. View "IN RE: KIA HYUNDAI VEHICLE THEFT MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION" on Justia Law

BARMAN V. USA

2026-09-14T08:30:46-08:00

The case concerns a long-term resident of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) who applied to United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for NM-1 immigration status, a special status created by the Northern Mariana Islands Long-Term Legal Residents Relief Act. This status was designed to regularize the position of certain residents after federal immigration law was applied to the CNMI, which had previously operated under its own immigration system. The applicant’s request for NM-1 status was denied by USCIS on the grounds that he did not meet the required period of continuous, lawful residence. His request for administrative reconsideration was also denied. The applicant then filed suit in the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, seeking a declaration that his application satisfied the statutory criteria and an injunction ordering USCIS to approve his application. The government moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the Relief Act’s jurisdiction-stripping provision—specifically, 48 U.S.C. § 1806(e)(6)(D)—barred judicial review of the denial. The district court agreed with the government and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the jurisdictional bar in the Relief Act precluded review of decisions made by USCIS as the Secretary of Homeland Security’s delegate. The court held that the statute’s bar on judicial review of any “decision of the Secretary of Homeland Security” covers decisions made by USCIS pursuant to delegated authority. The court reasoned that delegation is a routine administrative practice and that Congress legislated against the backdrop of such delegation. The court further noted that precedent interpreting similar jurisdiction-stripping provisions supported this conclusion. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "BARMAN V. USA" on Justia Law

CEDAR PARK ASSEMBLY OF GOD OF KIRKLAND, WASHINGTON V. KUDERER

2026-09-14T08:00:41-08:00

A church in Washington State challenged the validity of two state laws: the Reproductive Parity Act, which requires health insurance carriers to include coverage for all federally approved contraceptives and, if maternity care is covered, for abortions; and a longstanding conscience statute, which allows employers to object to purchasing coverage for specific healthcare services on religious or moral grounds. The church, as an employer providing health insurance to its employees, argued that these laws forced it to provide, pay for, or facilitate access to abortion and certain contraceptives in violation of its religious beliefs and right to religious autonomy. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington found that the church had standing to sue, but granted summary judgment in favor of the state defendants on the merits, concluding that the challenged laws did not violate the Free Exercise Clause or church autonomy doctrine. Both sides appealed. Previously, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment for lack of standing, but after the Supreme Court’s decision in Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA, 606 U.S. 100 (2025), it vacated its own opinion and reheard the case. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the church had Article III standing, as the laws caused it to facilitate abortion indirectly. Assuming, without deciding, that the laws burdened the church’s religious exercise, the court concluded that the laws are neutral and generally applicable. Therefore, rational basis review applied, and the church conceded the laws met that standard. The court affirmed summary judgment for the state defendants, holding that the laws do not violate the Free Exercise Clause or the church autonomy doctrine. View "CEDAR PARK ASSEMBLY OF GOD OF KIRKLAND, WASHINGTON V. KUDERER" on Justia Law

LEWIS-WILLIAMS V. SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT

2026-09-11T08:30:40-08:00

Six former employees of a regional public transportation agency challenged the agency’s mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy, asserting that it failed to accommodate their sincere religious objections to vaccination. In late 2021, the agency required all employees to be fully vaccinated unless exempted for medical or religious reasons. The agency’s leave management department evaluated religious exemption requests and determined that 70 employees qualified for potential accommodations but ultimately concluded that none could be accommodated without undue hardship. These employees were told to get vaccinated or lose their jobs; many resigned, retired, or were terminated. A group of former employees who lost their jobs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, bringing claims under Title VII, the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (alleging a violation of their right to free exercise of religion). The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant on the § 1983 claim and denied summary judgment on the other claims. After consolidation and a first trial that ended in a mistrial on the defendant’s undue hardship defense, six employees proceeded to a second trial. There, a jury found in their favor, awarding over $7.8 million in damages. The district court denied the defendant’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and its request for a new trial. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the employer was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law or a new trial. The court concluded that the employees established a prima facie case and that the employer failed to prove that accommodating the employees’ religious objections would have caused an undue hardship, as required by law. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court also found no reversible error in the remedial order and deemed the cross-appeal on the free exercise claim moot. View "LEWIS-WILLIAMS V. SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT" on Justia Law

ERWINE V. WESTBROOK

2026-09-11T08:30:37-08:00

A former police officer for a federally recognized Indian tribe was terminated from his position and subsequently brought a lawsuit in federal court against several of his superior officers and the tribe's general counsel. His claims, brought against these individuals in their personal capacities, included federal civil rights causes of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985(2), and 1985(3), a Bivens claim, and a state tort claim for intentional interference with contractual relations. He did not sue the tribe itself. The complaint alleged that the defendants treated him less favorably than Native American employees, subjected him to a racially hostile work environment, interfered with his court testimony, and conspired to deprive him of due process in his employment and reputation. The United States District Court for the District of Nevada dismissed the action. The court held that the individual defendants were entitled to absolute personal immunity, and, alternatively, that the tribe was a required party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 that could not be joined due to tribal sovereign immunity. The court did not address arguments regarding tribal sovereign immunity or qualified immunity as independent grounds for dismissal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court held that tribal sovereign immunity does not bar suits seeking money damages from tribal officials in their individual capacities where any judgment would not operate against the tribe itself. The court further held that the individual defendants were not entitled to absolute immunity, as the functions at issue—personnel and employment decisions—were not historically protected by such immunity at common law. Additionally, the tribe was not a required party under Rule 19 because it lacked a legally protected interest that could be impaired by the litigation’s outcome. The court remanded for the district court to address any qualified immunity defenses in the first instance. View "ERWINE V. WESTBROOK" on Justia Law

BRAHAM V. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION

2026-09-09T10:30:34-08:00

Two college football players began their collegiate athletic careers at junior colleges in 2019 before transferring to NCAA Division I institutions. Both completed the maximum five years of collegiate eligibility allowed by the NCAA’s “Five-Year Rule,” which includes time spent at any full-time collegiate institution, including junior colleges. In 2025, each player sought a preliminary injunction in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, arguing that the NCAA’s five-year limitation on eligibility was anticompetitive under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and seeking to play an additional, sixth year of college football. The players also challenged the NCAA’s “Rule of Restitution,” which allows the NCAA to penalize member schools that permit ineligible athletes to compete pursuant to court orders later vacated or reversed. Both district courts granted the plaintiffs’ requests for preliminary injunctions, permitting them to play in the 2025 college football season. After the season concluded, the NCAA appealed the injunctions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The plaintiffs moved to dismiss the appeals as moot because the 2025 season was over and their collegiate eligibility had ended. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the appeals were moot, as the injunctions had expired and the players’ collegiate careers were over, making it impossible to provide any effective relief to the NCAA. The court further determined that the NCAA did not meet its burden to show that the case fit the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to mootness, because there was no reasonable expectation that these plaintiffs would again be subject to the same NCAA actions. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the NCAA’s appeals as moot and vacated the district courts’ orders. View "BRAHAM V. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION" on Justia Law

BLYTHE V. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION

2026-09-09T10:30:33-08:00

A college baseball player challenged the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s rule that limits athletes to four seasons of eligibility within five years of their initial college enrollment. After exhausting his five years of eligibility through a series of transfers between NCAA and non-NCAA institutions, including one school that closed during his attendance, the athlete sought a waiver to compete in an additional season at a Division I university. The request for a waiver was denied by both the conference and the NCAA. The athlete filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, alleging that the Five-Year Rule violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act and sought a preliminary injunction to allow him to play during the pending litigation. The district court granted the injunction, concluding that the NCAA’s rule was a commercial restraint subject to antitrust scrutiny and that the athlete was likely to succeed on the merits of his claim. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that, consistent with recent decisions from other circuits and in light of NCAA v. Alston, the Five-Year Rule is indeed a commercial restraint subject to review under the Sherman Act. However, the Ninth Circuit determined that the district court abused its discretion by finding a likelihood of success on the merits. The appellate court found the evidentiary support for the athlete’s antitrust claim to be insufficient, particularly regarding the definition of the relevant market and the demonstration of substantial anticompetitive effects. As a result, the Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction, holding that the athlete failed to meet his burden to show a likelihood of success on the merits of his antitrust claim. View "BLYTHE V. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION" on Justia Law

VELLA V. MACD HELICOPTERS, INC.

2026-09-09T10:30:32-08:00

A helicopter owned and operated by the Huntington Beach Police Department crashed in 2022, resulting in the death of Officer Nicholas Vella and serious injury to Officer RJ Garwood. The plaintiffs alleged that the crash was caused by a defect in the helicopter’s stability augmentation system. The helicopter, a model MD520N, was manufactured by The Boeing Company in 1998 and delivered to the police department that same year. It had a seating capacity of five and was type and airworthiness certified by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The plaintiffs initially brought their claims for strict products liability, breach of warranties, and negligence in California state court. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Central District of California on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. The defendants, including The Boeing Company and MacD Helicopters, moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims were barred by the General Aviation Revitalization Act’s (GARA) 18-year statute of repose. The plaintiffs contended that GARA did not apply to “public aircraft” such as those owned by governmental entities. The district court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments, found that the helicopter met GARA’s definition of “general aviation aircraft,” and granted the motions to dismiss. The court certified its decision for interlocutory appeal and stayed further proceedings. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether GARA’s statute of repose applied to the police helicopter. The court held that the statute’s definition of “general aviation aircraft” includes government-owned aircraft, as long as the statutory requirements are met. The panel expressly rejected the argument that the Federal Aviation Act’s “public aircraft” definition is incorporated into GARA and concluded that GARA contains no “public aircraft” exception. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the lawsuit. View "VELLA V. MACD HELICOPTERS, INC." on Justia Law

RIVERA V. ANDERSON

2026-09-09T10:30:31-08:00

A coalition composed of individuals, corporations, trade associations, labor unions, nonprofits, and public utilities brought suit in the Western District of Washington seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Their claims challenged the Washington State Energy Code, arguing that it is preempted by federal law and restricts the installation and maintenance of natural gas appliances, impacting their energy preferences and causing economic harm. The plaintiffs named as defendants the individual members of the Washington State Building Code Council, who had adopted the Energy Code, as well as the Washington Attorney General, all in their official capacities. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington reviewed the case first. All defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, citing sovereign immunity and standing. The district court granted the motion to dismiss solely on the basis of sovereign immunity, dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice and denying leave to amend. Plaintiffs then appealed the dismissal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity barred the plaintiffs’ suit. The court determined that the named defendants did not have a sufficient connection with the enforcement of the Energy Code to be subject to suit under the Ex parte Young exception. The Councilmembers’ promulgation of the Energy Code and their issuance of non-binding advisory opinions did not constitute enforcement, and the Attorney General’s role did not exceed a generalized duty to enforce state law. Thus, all defendants were shielded by sovereign immunity, and the district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "RIVERA V. ANDERSON" on Justia Law

ADOM V. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION

2026-09-08T09:01:16-08:00

An individual incarcerated at a California state prison suffers from a spinal condition causing severe pain and limited mobility, and also experiences incontinence. For nearly a year, prison staff provided him with adult diapers as a medical accommodation. However, after a transfer to a different housing unit, his access to these supplies was abruptly terminated, and his requests for reinstatement were denied for almost five months. During this period, he was forced to soil himself and his environment, resulting in humiliation and distress, despite repeated written and verbal requests for accommodation. He filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and other defendants, concluding he was not entitled to relief under the ADA because it found no evidence of discrimination due to his disability and determined his claims for injunctive relief were moot once supplies were reinstated. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment as to the ADA claim. The appellate court held that a reasonable jury could find the plaintiff is disabled under the ADA due to his spinal condition and incontinence, that he was denied meaningful access to toileting and hygiene services because of his disabilities, and that this denial was because of his disabilities. The court further found there was sufficient evidence to create a triable issue as to whether CDCR acted with deliberate indifference, a necessary element for damages. The panel also clarified that a public entity is not excused from ADA obligations merely because an accommodation is not deemed medically necessary. The case was remanded for further proceedings, including consideration of standing for injunctive relief. View "ADOM V. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION" on Justia Law

USA V. GESSEN

2026-09-08T08:31:27-08:00

During a contentious custody dispute, Allen Gessen faced state kidnapping charges after attempting to remove his son from the country in violation of a court order. Seeking sole custody, Gessen initially tried to bribe an immigration official to deport the mother of his two children, Priscilla Chigariro. Ultimately, he opted for a murder-for-hire scheme as a cheaper, more permanent solution. Gessen met twice with a broker—who was actually an undercover FBI agent—and agreed to pay $50,000 for the murder, providing a gold coin and wiring approximately $23,000 to a San Francisco account. He also supplied detailed information about Chigariro’s whereabouts. On the planned day of the murder, Gessen was arrested, and a grand jury charged him with murder-for-hire under 18 U.S.C. § 1958. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California presided over Gessen’s trial. The government presented evidence including audio recordings and testimony from the undercover agent and Chigariro. Gessen testified that he only wanted Chigariro deported, not killed, but the jury found him guilty. Gessen requested jury instructions reflecting his theory that a murder-for-hire conviction requires a real agreement with a hitman, and challenged venue in California, arguing that the crime was complete before any acts occurred in that district. The district court rejected these instructions, ruling they were unsupported by law, and denied motions for acquittal and a new trial, finding sufficient evidence and proper venue. Gessen was sentenced to 120 months in prison. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 1958 does not require an actual agreement with a hitman or proof of a quid pro quo; intent on the part of the defendant alone suffices. Venue was proper in any district touched by the continuing offense, including the Northern District of California. The district court’s jury instructions and evidentiary rulings were upheld. View "USA V. GESSEN" on Justia Law

PEREZ-CASTILLO V. BLANCHE

2026-09-08T08:00:44-08:00

The case involves an individual, Perez, who entered the United States after completing compulsory military service in El Salvador, where he served as a radio operator in the Fourth Infantry Brigade and was occasionally loaned to the Atonal Battalion, an elite unit associated with severe human rights abuses. Perez and his wife sought immigration relief under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), claiming fear of persecution by guerrillas. During his application and subsequent proceedings, Perez’s testimony contained contradictions regarding his role and actions during his military service, including statements about firing his weapon, witnessing abuses, and his association with the Atonal Battalion. The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Perez not credible due to these inconsistencies and denied his NACARA application, citing his failure to rebut the persecutor bar, lack of credibility, and perjury. Perez appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the IJ’s adverse credibility finding. The BIA determined that Perez’s ties to the Atonal Battalion were sufficient to raise the persecutor bar under NACARA, shifting the burden to Perez to prove the bar did not apply. The BIA concluded Perez failed to rebut the bar due to his lack of credibility and held that even if Perez were credible, a duress defense was foreclosed by the Attorney General’s interpretation in Matter of Negusie. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the petition. The court determined that the persecutor bar does not contain an implied duress defense and that the statutory text excludes such an exception. The court accorded limited weight to the agency’s interpretation, finding the best reading of the statute is to deny a duress defense. The court denied Perez’s petition for review. View "PEREZ-CASTILLO V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

TRIGUEROS QUIZAR V. BLANCHE

2026-09-04T14:00:38-08:00

A noncitizen from Guatemala was ordered removed in absentia after arriving five minutes late to his immigration merits hearing, claiming a flat tire caused his tardiness. He filed a timely, pro se motion to reopen and rescind the removal order, explaining the circumstances in detail and including a receipt for new tires purchased weeks later as gratitude to the tire shop that made the emergency repair. He asserted that the flat tire constituted an “exceptional circumstance” beyond his control. The Immigration Judge acknowledged that the petitioner’s explanation was not inherently unbelievable and that a flat tire could qualify as an exceptional circumstance. However, the judge denied the motion because the petitioner did not supply adequate documentary evidence directly corroborating his claim, such as a same-day repair receipt, and noted there were no administrative records of the phone calls the petitioner claimed were made to the court. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal, concluding that he failed to provide sufficient evidence or an affidavit under penalty of perjury to meet his burden. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the Board of Immigration Appeals erred by imposing evidentiary requirements inconsistent with Ninth Circuit precedent. Specifically, the court held that pro se petitioners are not required to submit a separate formal affidavit under penalty of perjury and that the agency must generally accept a petitioner’s credible explanation as true unless it is inherently unbelievable, without demanding corroborative documentary evidence. The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review and remanded the case for reconsideration under the correct evidentiary standard. View "TRIGUEROS QUIZAR V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

USA V. VALENCIA

2026-09-03T08:30:40-08:00

During a robbery at La Milpa Market in Yakima, Washington, two masked individuals stole approximately $16,000. In the course of the crime, one robber dropped an envelope and the other lost his left glove. Both items were later linked to Eduardo Valencia: the envelope was addressed to his parents’ home and the glove produced a DNA match. Valencia, who has tattoos on the backs of his hands, was arrested months later while driving a car matching the one seen near the crime scene. At trial, Valencia’s defense centered on surveillance footage that did not clearly show tattoos on the left hand of the robber who lost his glove. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington presided over Valencia’s trial. Valencia’s attorney sought to have him display his hands to the jury without testifying, arguing that this act was not testimonial and would not subject him to cross-examination. The district court rejected this, ruling that displaying his hands on the stand constituted testimony and required him to be subjected to cross-examination. Valencia took the stand, testified about his tattoos, and was cross-examined by the government, which then introduced additional evidence—a Facebook photo allegedly contradicting his testimony about the timing of his tattoos. The jury convicted Valencia of Hobbs Act robbery and brandishing a firearm. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that requiring Valencia to take the stand to display his tattoos violated his Fifth Amendment right not to testify, because displaying identifying physical characteristics is not testimonial evidence. This constitutional error was not harmless, as the government emphasized Valencia’s testimony and the jury focused on his hand tattoos. The court reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial. View "USA V. VALENCIA" on Justia Law

COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. OMUNDSON

2026-09-03T08:30:39-08:00

Courthouse News Service, a nationwide news organization reporting on civil litigation, challenged the Idaho courts' policy of withholding newly filed civil complaints from public and press access until after manual processing by court clerks. Under Idaho’s e-filing system, complaints submitted electronically are placed in a queue and only made public after a clerk reviews and accepts them. This process results in delays ranging from minutes to several days before complaints are accessible to the public, affecting the ability of Courthouse News Service to timely report on new filings. The United States District Court for the District of Idaho reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment from both parties. The district court declined to abstain from exercising jurisdiction, finding that its involvement would not require ongoing supervision of Idaho’s judicial administration. It further concluded that the First Amendment right of public access to judicial documents attaches when a complaint is received by the court, not when it is accepted by a clerk, and that Idaho’s policy violated this right. Applying rigorous scrutiny, the district court determined Idaho’s justifications for delay were insufficient and ruled in favor of Courthouse News Service. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the First Amendment right of timely access to judicial documents attaches at the time a complaint is filed or received by the court. Idaho’s “process-first” policy was found unconstitutional because it failed the strict scrutiny standard established in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court; Idaho did not demonstrate that its delay substantially served compelling interests or that no reasonable alternatives existed. The Ninth Circuit clarified that delays in access to newly filed nonconfidential civil complaints must be justified under strict scrutiny, and Idaho’s current policy does not meet this requirement. The district court’s grant of summary judgment for Courthouse News Service was affirmed. View "COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. OMUNDSON" on Justia Law

INLAND EMPIRE WATERKEEPER V. CORONA CLAY COMPANY

2026-09-03T08:30:38-08:00

The plaintiffs, projects focused on protecting water quality, brought a suit against a clay recycling facility located near Temescal Creek in California, alleging violations of stormwater-permit requirements under the Clean Water Act. The facility, operated by Corona Clay Company, discharged stormwater into Temescal Creek, a tributary of the Santa Ana River. Regulatory authorities had previously issued violation notices to Corona, but no enforcement action was taken by the state. The plaintiffs sought relief for both substantive discharge violations and procedural violations such as monitoring and reporting. The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially found in favor of Corona following a trial. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, citing an intervening Supreme Court decision, County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, which expanded the scope of the Clean Water Act to include indirect discharges that are the “functional equivalent” of direct discharges. On retrial, the plaintiffs prevailed, and Corona was assessed significant penalties. After the Supreme Court’s Sackett v. EPA decision, which narrowed the definition of “waters of the United States,” Corona moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and alternatively sought a new trial. The district court denied both motions, holding that the jurisdictional requirement was met and the issue of whether Temescal Creek qualified as a water of the United States had been conceded. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Corona’s post-judgment motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that whether a waterbody qualifies as a “water of the United States” is a merits question, not a jurisdictional one. However, it reversed the denial of Corona’s motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, concluding that the intervening Sackett decision rendered a previously foreclosed issue viable. The panel remanded for further proceedings to determine, under Sackett’s standard, whether Temescal Creek is a water of the United States. View "INLAND EMPIRE WATERKEEPER V. CORONA CLAY COMPANY" on Justia Law

URIAS-GAXIOLA V. BLANCHE

2026-09-02T09:30:40-08:00

A noncitizen from Mexico was placed in removal proceedings based on the government's charge that he entered the United States without admission or parole. In response, his attorney filed a written pleading admitting to all the government’s factual allegations, including the manner of his entry, and conceded removability. Some time later, before his merits hearing, the noncitizen sought to amend his earlier admissions, asserting that his previous answer was incorrect because he actually entered the United States lawfully with a visa. He moved to amend his pleading and requested an opportunity to testify to this effect. The case was first reviewed by an Immigration Judge (IJ), who denied the motion to amend without allowing the noncitizen to present evidence or testify regarding the alleged error in the initial admission. During the hearing, when the noncitizen attempted to explain the circumstances of his entry, the IJ prevented him from doing so, relying solely on the attorney’s original admission in finding him removable. The noncitizen appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and also moved to remand for the purpose of presenting new evidence, including an affidavit and a copy of his border crossing card. The BIA dismissed the appeal and denied the remand, concluding that the new evidence was insufficient and conflicted with the existing record. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the BIA abused its discretion by affirming the IJ’s denial of the motion to amend without allowing the noncitizen to present evidence that his attorney’s factual admission was untrue. The court further found that the BIA improperly made factual determinations that should have been made by the IJ. The court granted the petition in part, remanding for the IJ to allow live testimony and determine whether the noncitizen may withdraw the challenged admission, and, if so, whether he is nonetheless removable. The remainder of the petition was denied. View "URIAS-GAXIOLA V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

LIU V. KAISER PERMANENTE EMPLOYEES PENSION PLAN FOR THE PERMANENTE MEDICAL GROUP, INC.

2026-08-31T08:31:04-08:00

A woman participated in an employee pension plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). After being diagnosed with cancer and while hospitalized, she initiated an online election to receive her accrued pension benefits as a lump sum and designated her sister as the beneficiary. She died three days later, before completing a required second step of confirming her election and beneficiary designation, according to the plan’s administrative process. After her death, her sister submitted a claim seeking the lump sum benefit. The plan administrator denied the claim, reasoning that the decedent had not finalized her election and beneficiary designation, and that “substantial compliance” with the plan’s requirements was not sufficient under ERISA. On administrative appeal, the committee upheld the denial for the same reasons. The sister then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging entitlement to the benefits. The district court dismissed her complaint with prejudice, holding that the complaint did not plausibly allege that she was entitled to the benefits, even under a substantial compliance theory. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the state law doctrine of substantial compliance is available under ERISA for benefit elections, just as it is for beneficiary designations, consistent with its previous decision in Becker v. Williams, 777 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2015). The court clarified that the Supreme Court’s decision in Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings & Investment Plan, 555 U.S. 285 (2009), did not eliminate the doctrine of substantial compliance. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff’s complaint plausibly alleged substantial compliance with the plan’s requirements and reversed the district court’s dismissal, remanding for further proceedings. View "LIU V. KAISER PERMANENTE EMPLOYEES PENSION PLAN FOR THE PERMANENTE MEDICAL GROUP, INC." on Justia Law

SAUK-SUIATTLE INDIAN TRIBE V. STATE OF WASHINGTON

2026-08-31T08:31:03-08:00

The case concerns a longstanding dispute over tribal fishing rights in western Washington, originating from Judge Boldt’s 1974 decision interpreting treaties that guaranteed tribes the right to fish at their usual and accustomed grounds and stations (U&A). The Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe sought a determination that its U&A included the Skagit River, Baker River, and certain marine waters, arguing that these locations had not been specifically determined in the original Final Decision I or subsequent proceedings. The Tribe relied on historical and anthropological evidence, including materials produced after Final Decision I, to support its claim for expanded fishing rights. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed Sauk-Suiattle’s request for determination under Paragraph 25(a)(6) of the permanent injunction, finding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that Sauk-Suiattle’s U&A had been specifically determined in Final Decision I, thereby excluding any unnamed waters from further consideration. The dismissal was also alternatively supported by collateral estoppel grounds. The district court denied Sauk-Suiattle’s motion for reconsideration, which included additional evidence and expert testimony. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Sauk-Suiattle’s claim to U&A on the Skagit River, holding that this issue was precluded by its prior decision in Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe, 66 F.4th 766 (9th Cir. 2023). However, the Court reversed the district court’s dismissal as to the Baker River and marine waters, finding that Judge Boldt had not specifically determined Sauk-Suiattle’s rights to those locations. The Ninth Circuit remanded for the district court to exercise jurisdiction and consider Sauk-Suiattle’s Baker River and marine waters claims. View "SAUK-SUIATTLE INDIAN TRIBE V. STATE OF WASHINGTON" on Justia Law

MORALES V. BLANCHE

2026-08-31T08:31:03-08:00

A family from Guatemala fled to the United States after a gang leader who had previously murdered a family member threatened to kill them as well. Despite relocating within Guatemala, the gang quickly found them and continued the threats. The local police refused to intervene unless the gang leader was caught in the act. Fearing for their lives, the family left Guatemala and eventually entered the United States between ports of entry. Upon seeking asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, an Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied their applications. The BIA determined that the family was ineligible for asylum under the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways Rule, which imposed a presumption of ineligibility for most non-Mexican asylum seekers who entered the United States between ports of entry during a specific period. The BIA also found that the family did not establish that their membership in certain proposed social groups was a central reason for the harm they experienced or feared. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The Ninth Circuit held that the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways Rule was inconsistent with the asylum statute because the statute guarantees the right to seek asylum regardless of the manner of entry into the United States. The court reaffirmed its prior decisions that the government cannot restrict asylum eligibility based on how a noncitizen entered the country. The Ninth Circuit also found that the BIA committed legal error by not applying the complete “mixed motives” framework when considering whether a protected ground was at least one central reason for the persecution. The court granted the petition for review and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "MORALES V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

USA V. MORGOVSKY

2026-08-31T08:00:30-08:00

The defendant engaged in a long-running scheme to illegally export components for night-vision and thermal-vision rifle scopes, which are classified as “defense articles” under federal law, from California to Russia. He did so without obtaining the required export license from the U.S. State Department and concealed his activities through offshore banking. Over nearly a decade, his illicit exports generated over $9 million in international wire transfers. After federal investigators uncovered the operation, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California charged him with conspiracy to export defense articles without a license under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and its implementing regulations, as well as two counts of money laundering. The defendant pleaded guilty to all three counts without a plea agreement and was sentenced to nine years in prison. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. He claimed his lawyer failed to challenge the validity of the conspiracy regulation under which he was convicted and did not properly inform him about the money-laundering charges. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of this motion de novo. The court held that the AECA authorized the State Department to promulgate regulations criminalizing conspiracies to violate export restrictions, so counsel’s failure to challenge the regulation was not deficient. The factual record also foreclosed the defendant’s claim regarding the money-laundering pleas. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the § 2255 motion and declined to expand the certificate of appealability to include additional claims. View "USA V. MORGOVSKY" on Justia Law

KALSHIEX, LLC V. ASSAD

2026-08-28T09:00:34-08:00

KalshiEX, LLC operates a platform it describes as offering legal sports betting across all 50 states. Its business model involves offering “sports event contracts” on a designated contract market (DCM) registered with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). These contracts allow users to buy and sell positions based on outcomes of sporting events, such as who will win the Super Bowl or specific in-game occurrences, resembling traditional sports betting. In 2025, the Nevada Gaming Control Board sent Kalshi a cease-and-desist letter, stating that Kalshi’s operations violated Nevada’s gaming laws by effectively functioning as an unlicensed sportsbook. Kalshi responded by filing suit in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent Nevada from enforcing its gaming laws against its sports and election event contracts. The district court initially granted the injunction, siding with Kalshi’s argument that its platform was subject only to federal regulation under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) and not state gaming law. However, following conflicting decisions in other federal courts and further briefing, the district court dissolved the injunction, ruling that Kalshi’s sports event contracts were not “swaps” under the CEA and thus not subject to the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction; therefore, Nevada’s gaming laws could apply. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part the district court’s dissolution of the preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit held that Kalshi’s sports event contracts were not “swaps” as defined in the CEA, and that CFTC regulations currently prohibit DCMs from listing contracts involving gaming. As a result, the CEA is unlikely to preempt Nevada’s gaming regulations as applied to Kalshi’s sports event contracts. The court remanded for further consideration of Kalshi’s election contracts. The court’s disposition was to affirm in part and remand in part. View "KALSHIEX, LLC V. ASSAD" on Justia Law

MBUENO-VITA V. BLANCHE

2026-08-28T08:30:32-08:00

A group of Angolan nationals, including the lead petitioner, entered the United States without authorization in September 2022. The lead petitioner applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), alleging persecution based on his political activity as a member of UNITA, an opposition party in Angola. He described multiple incidents of harm and threats from Angolan police and military, including being injured during a protest, detained and tortured at a police compound, and threatened following his public denunciation of government abuses. After these events, the family hid in Angola before fleeing to the United States. An Immigration Judge (IJ) conducted merits hearings at which the lead petitioner testified pro se. The IJ found him not credible, citing perceived inconsistencies and omissions in his account, and denied all forms of relief. The IJ also determined that the record did not establish a particularized risk of torture independent of the petitioner’s testimony and found that internal relocation within Angola was possible. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed the appeal and affirmed the IJ’s findings, including the adverse credibility determination and denial of CAT protection. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed both the IJ and BIA decisions. The court held that the agency’s adverse credibility determination was not supported by substantial evidence, as it relied on trivial inconsistencies and failed to account for significant translation difficulties during the hearings. The court also concluded that the agency committed reversible legal errors in its analysis of the petitioner’s CAT claim, specifically regarding the petitioner’s particularized risk of torture and ability to internally relocate. The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review, reversed the adverse credibility finding, and remanded for further proceedings, accepting the petitioner’s testimony as credible. View "MBUENO-VITA V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

CALDERON V. BLANCHE

2026-08-28T08:30:32-08:00

A native and citizen of El Salvador, the petitioner was placed in removal proceedings in the United States in 2023. He sought protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), arguing that if removed to El Salvador, he would be subject to torture due to his criminal history, gang affiliations, and tattoos, all of which would make him a target under El Salvador’s “State of Exception”—a government policy involving mass detentions and documented abuses in prisons. Initially, an Immigration Judge denied his application for CAT protection in February 2024. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the Immigration Judge to consider certain country conditions evidence and to explain the weight given to an expert report. After further hearings, the Immigration Judge again denied relief, and the BIA affirmed this denial. While the petitioner’s appeal was pending, he filed a motion to reopen based on new, material evidence regarding torture and conditions in El Salvador’s prisons. The BIA equitably tolled the filing deadline due to prior ineffective assistance of counsel but denied the motion on the merits, finding that the petitioner had not provided the “quantitative evidence” it deemed necessary to satisfy CAT’s standard. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen. The court held that the BIA had erred by imposing a requirement for “quantitative evidence” of torture, which is not mandated by CAT’s implementing regulations. The court also found that the BIA failed to give reasoned consideration to the petitioner’s expert reports. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the petitioner had established a reasonable likelihood of succeeding on his CAT claim if proceedings were reopened and therefore ordered the BIA to grant the motion to reopen and conduct a full merits hearing. View "CALDERON V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

JACQUES V. BLANCHE

2026-08-28T08:30:31-08:00

A Jamaican citizen, Jacques, entered the United States as a teenager and overstayed his visa. In 2021, he was arrested in Utah during a traffic stop and pleaded guilty to misdemeanor possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. After serving a suspended sentence and probation, he was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Jacques applied for withholding of removal, arguing his return to Jamaica would place him in danger due to his mother’s political activities and murder. An Immigration Judge twice granted Jacques’s application for withholding of removal, finding his conviction was not a particularly serious crime barring relief. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appealed both grants to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). In both instances, the BIA or DHS failed to send notices of appeal and briefing schedules to the correct detention address, despite having updated information on Jacques’s location. As a result, Jacques was excluded from participating in both appellate proceedings, and did not respond to the appeals or submit briefs. The BIA reversed the Immigration Judge’s decisions each time, determining that Jacques’s conviction constituted a particularly serious crime and denying him withholding of removal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Jacques’s due process rights were violated because the government failed to serve him with reasonably calculated notice of DHS’s appeals, excluding him from participating in the proceedings. The court further held that Jacques was prejudiced by this deprivation, as the outcome of the appeals may have been affected had he been given notice and an opportunity to respond. The Ninth Circuit granted Jacques’s petition, vacated the BIA’s orders, and remanded with instructions to re-notice the appeal and reissue a briefing schedule to the correct address. View "JACQUES V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

ROCKY PATEL PREMIUM CIGARS, INC. V. BONTA

2026-08-27T12:30:35-08:00

A group of premium cigar manufacturers and trade associations challenged California’s Unflavored Tobacco List statute, which requires tobacco products to be approved and listed by the California Attorney General before they may be sold to consumers, retailers, or wholesalers in the state. To be listed, manufacturers must submit detailed applications and pay fees, certifying their products lack any characterizing flavor. The plaintiffs argued that the law would impose considerable compliance costs, particularly burdensome for the premium cigar industry where products are hand-made in smaller batches and change blends frequently. They asserted that their premium cigars, by federal definition, do not contain flavoring additives, and that the application and fee requirements would force them to reduce their product offerings in California. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the statute in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. They contended that the federal Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA) expressly preempts California’s law as applied to premium cigars and that the statute’s presumption against flavoring based on manufacturers’ speech violates the First Amendment. The district court denied the motion, concluding the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims. Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that the TCA’s Savings Clause exempts state requirements related to the sale of tobacco products from preemption, and the challenged statute falls within this exemption as it is directly tied to retail sales. The court also found that, based on the Attorney General’s representations, the statute imposes only a minimal burden on commercial speech and does not restrict speech more than necessary. Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of injunctive relief. View "ROCKY PATEL PREMIUM CIGARS, INC. V. BONTA" on Justia Law

RICHARDS V. NEWSOM

2026-08-27T12:30:35-08:00

Several federally licensed firearms dealers (FFLs), including both brick-and-mortar and home-based businesses, gun rights organizations, and private citizens challenged a California statute, Section 26806, which requires all FFLs to maintain a digital video and audio recording system on their business premises. The statute mandates 24/7 surveillance of specific areas, such as points of sale and firearm display areas, and limits when and how recordings may be released or accessed, including requirements for posting notification signs and annual certification of system functionality. Plaintiffs argued that this law infringed their rights under the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments by imposing surveillance burdens, chilling speech, violating privacy, and effecting a taking of property. The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The district court found that Plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged a likelihood of success on the merits of any claims, denied injunctive relief, and granted leave to amend. Plaintiffs eventually chose not to further amend and requested final judgment, which the district court entered, leading to this appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that Plaintiffs failed to allege a cognizable Fourth Amendment claim because there was no physical government intrusion or access to recordings, nor did mere compliance with the statute transform FFLs into state actors. The court also found no Fifth Amendment violation, as the statute did not result in a physical or regulatory taking; FFLs retained ownership and control over their recording systems, and the economic impact did not rise to a taking. Finally, the court ruled that the First Amendment theories advanced by Plaintiffs—overbreadth, violations of the right to anonymity and association, and chilling of speech—were unsupported because the statute did not regulate or compel speech or disclosure, nor did it plausibly chill protected expression. The Ninth Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "RICHARDS V. NEWSOM" on Justia Law

CABARDO V. PATACSIL

2026-08-27T12:30:34-08:00

Ernesto and Marilyn Patacsil operated group care homes, and in 2012, eight of their employees brought suit in federal district court alleging violations of California labor laws, including failure to provide breaks, pay lawful wages, and maintain accurate records. The employees sought damages and civil penalties under the California Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). The jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, and the district court awarded substantial damages, attorney fees, and PAGA penalties. Of the PAGA penalties, 75% were designated for the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) and 25% for the aggrieved employees. Shortly after the judgment, the Patacsils filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The employees (creditors) initiated an adversary proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court, seeking to have the PAGA judgment debts declared nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(6) and (7). The bankruptcy court determined that a trial was needed to resolve whether most of the judgment was nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6, which requires a showing of willful and malicious injury. Under § 523(a)(7), the court found that only the portion of PAGA penalties payable to the LWDA was excepted from discharge, not the 25% allocated to employees or the attorney fees. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California granted leave for an interlocutory appeal on the § 523(a)(7) issue, affirmed the bankruptcy court’s ruling, and remanded for further proceedings on the remaining issues. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the appeal and determined that because the dischargeability proceeding was not yet final—trial on the § 523(a)(6) issue was still pending—it lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "CABARDO V. PATACSIL" on Justia Law

GRENNING V. KEY

2026-08-26T09:00:34-08:00

An inmate at Airway Heights Corrections Center participated in a prison writing program sponsored by Eastern Washington University, which encouraged submissions to a university literary journal. The inmate wrote a short story containing a brief reference to sexual intimacy and submitted it for consideration. The prison’s Community Partnership Program Coordinator intercepted the submission, deeming it “inappropriate for publication” due to its “sexual content,” and returned it to the inmate. The inmate then mailed the story directly to the university and complained to the prison superintendent, who endorsed the decision to block the submission and warned that further unauthorized correspondence would result in removal from the program. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington granted summary judgment for the prison officials, concluding that they had not violated the inmate’s First Amendment rights and, even if they had, their actions were protected by qualified immunity. The court applied the deferential standard from Turner v. Safley, which governs regulations of prisoner conduct, and found no retaliation. The court also denied the inmate’s motions for additional discovery and to vacate the judgment. Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment, including its qualified immunity determination, and remanded for further proceedings. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred by applying the Turner standard instead of the standard from Procunier v. Martinez, which governs outgoing inmate correspondence. The panel determined that genuine disputes of fact existed and, if proven, could show that the prison officials’ refusal to transmit the inmate’s story constituted prohibited censorship under the First Amendment. The court also held that the district court erred in its analysis of the retaliation claim and instructed that it should be evaluated under Rhodes v. Robinson, which sets forth the elements for a First Amendment retaliation claim in the prison context. View "GRENNING V. KEY" on Justia Law

PATACSIL V. GOOGLE LLC

2026-08-26T09:00:33-08:00

Google was accused of violating the privacy rights of users in the United States by continuing to track and store their location data even after users had disabled the “Location History” feature on their devices. The lawsuit, brought as a class action on behalf of approximately 247.7 million individuals, consolidated multiple complaints. The parties ultimately negotiated a settlement that included both injunctive relief—requiring Google to alter its practices—and a $62 million fund. This settlement fund was to cover attorneys’ fees, litigation costs, service awards for class representatives, and administrative expenses. The remaining funds were to be distributed to selected nonprofit organizations with a focus on internet privacy, rather than directly to class members. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California, after conducting a fairness hearing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2), overruled objections from certain class members. These objectors argued that it was improper to distribute the settlement fund exclusively through the cy pres doctrine without first attempting a direct distribution to class members. The district court found that a direct distribution was infeasible because the pro rata share for each class member would be minimal (less than 25 cents) and administrative costs would further reduce any recovery. It approved the cy pres distribution, finding the selected nonprofit recipients had a substantial nexus to the class’s privacy interests. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The appellate court held that the district court properly considered the relevant factors under amended Rule 23(e), did not improperly presume the fairness of the settlement, and acted within its discretion in approving a cy pres-only monetary distribution where direct payments were deemed infeasible and not verifiable. The court also found the selection of cy pres recipients appropriate and declined to address new constitutional arguments not presented below. The holding is that cy pres-only distributions are permissible in class settlements when direct distribution is infeasible and the selected recipients have a substantial nexus to the interests of the class. View "PATACSIL V. GOOGLE LLC" on Justia Law

ZUNUM AERO, INC. V. THE BOEING COMPANY

2026-08-26T09:00:32-08:00

A company specializing in hybrid electric aircraft technology filed suit in Washington state court against a major aerospace manufacturer and its investment affiliate, alleging misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of contract, and tortious interference, among other state law claims. The plaintiff asserted that the defendant improperly used its confidential information, including by incorporating aspects of the plaintiff’s technology into two patents obtained by the defendant. The plaintiff’s claims involved several theories and more than 30 alleged trade secrets. The aerospace manufacturer responded by counterclaiming for a declaratory judgment that its employees were the sole inventors of one of the patents in question. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington based on this federal patent law counterclaim, and a second inventorship counterclaim was later added regarding another patent. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on both patent inventorship counterclaims. The remainder of the plaintiff’s claims proceeded to a jury, which returned a verdict awarding the plaintiff over $92 million for trade secret misappropriation and tortious interference. However, the district court granted the defendant’s post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law and conditionally granted a new trial, vacating the jury award. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s post-trial rulings and remanded the case with instructions for reassignment to a different district judge. In a subsequent petition for rehearing, the defendant argued for the first time that appellate jurisdiction belonged exclusively to the Federal Circuit because the counterclaims were compulsory and arose under patent law. The Ninth Circuit held that the defendant’s counterclaims, though arising under federal patent law, were permissive—not compulsory—because they did not share the same operative facts as the plaintiff’s state law claims; thus, Ninth Circuit jurisdiction was proper. The court also held that the district court appropriately exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, as they shared a common nucleus of operative fact with the federal counterclaims. The petition for rehearing was denied. View "ZUNUM AERO, INC. V. THE BOEING COMPANY" on Justia Law

COUNTY OF KING V. TURNER

2026-08-25T08:30:27-08:00

Several cities, counties, and local agencies across the United States challenged new conditions imposed by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Department of Transportation (DOT) on federal grants they had already been awarded. These new conditions, added after the grants were awarded, required recipients to certify compliance with federal antidiscrimination laws for all their programs (not just those funded by the grants), acknowledge that such certifications are material for purposes of the False Claims Act, refrain from using grant funds to promote “gender ideology,” “elective abortions,” or “illegal immigration,” and verify the immigration status of individual grant recipients. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington considered the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The district court found that the new conditions went beyond merely enforcing existing legal requirements and exceeded the agencies' statutory authority. It enjoined the agencies from enforcing all of the challenged conditions, from withholding grant funds based on those conditions, from requiring certifications of compliance, and from refusing to process grant agreements because of the litigation. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the agencies’ imposition of these grant conditions was lawful under the relevant statutes. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction in large part. The court held that: (1) the conditions requiring compliance with antidiscrimination laws are unlawful to the extent they apply to programs or activities not receiving federal funds, but are permissible as to federally funded programs; (2) the conditions making compliance certifications “material” for False Claims Act purposes are not authorized by statute; (3) the restrictions on the use of grant funds for promoting certain ideas or activities exceed statutory authority; and (4) the requirement to use a specific immigration verification system is unauthorized. The appellate court remanded with instructions to narrow the injunction to allow antidiscrimination conditions for federally funded programs, but otherwise affirmed the district court’s injunction. View "COUNTY OF KING V. TURNER" on Justia Law

USA V. AGUILERA

2026-08-24T08:30:31-08:00

A man was detained in San Francisco after police responded to reports of gunfire near a bar in the Mission District. Officers received gunshot detection alerts and eyewitness reports describing the shooter as a Hispanic male in a blue jacket. Police pursued a suspect matching this description, who fled when ordered to stop and was later found hiding behind a fence near the reported location. Upon his detention, officers discovered a gun, ammunition, and a magazine in his possession. The man was charged with being a felon in possession of ammunition. In the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him, and also moved to dismiss the indictment on constitutional grounds. The district court denied both motions. The defendant then proceeded to a stipulated bench trial, did not contest the evidence or cross-examine witnesses, and was found guilty. At sentencing, the court declined to grant a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, reasoning that the defendant’s efforts to preserve his right to appeal, including a motion to suppress and going to trial, precluded such a reduction. The defendant was sentenced to 45 months in prison. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the conviction, holding that the district court correctly found reasonable suspicion existed for the seizure based on the officers’ collective knowledge and the totality of the circumstances, including eyewitness identification and the defendant’s proximity and conduct. However, the Ninth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding that the district court applied the wrong legal standard by considering the defendant’s constitutionally protected conduct against him when denying a sentencing reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The error was not harmless because it could have affected the sentence imposed. View "USA V. AGUILERA" on Justia Law

KINNUCAN V. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

2026-08-24T08:00:26-08:00

A researcher and military veteran requested two volumes of a report created by the House Appropriations Committee (HAC) from the National Security Agency (NSA) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The HAC report, prepared in response to the 1967 attack on the U.S.S. Liberty, examined Department of Defense communications failures. The NSA had received a copy of this report from Congress in 1968. The report bore a prominent banner stating, “NOT FOR RELEASE UNLESS AND UNTIL AUTHORIZED BY COMMITTEE,” and was marked “TOP SECRET.” The NSA had never publicly released the report, though it was cited in a later declassified NSA report about the Liberty incident. The NSA denied the FOIA request, asserting that the report was not an agency record subject to FOIA because it was created by and remained under the control of the U.S. House of Representatives. The requester filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. The district court, referencing the D.C. Circuit’s standard for congressional documents, granted summary judgment in favor of the NSA, finding that Congress had manifested a clear intent to control the document, keeping it outside FOIA’s reach. After a voluntary remand for additional disclosures, the district court again granted summary judgment to the NSA. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court formally adopted the D.C. Circuit’s test: a document prepared by Congress and provided to an agency is not subject to FOIA if Congress has clearly manifested its intent to retain control. The court held that the HAC report’s prominent restriction banner demonstrated such intent, and thus, the report was not an agency record under FOIA. The judgment in favor of the NSA was affirmed. View "KINNUCAN V. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY" on Justia Law

USA V. CISNEROS

2026-08-21T09:32:18-08:00

A veteran special agent with Homeland Security Investigations was convicted after a jury trial of accepting bribes from individuals connected to organized crime. In exchange, he misused a confidential government database to assist these individuals and attempted to fraudulently facilitate the entry of an inadmissible foreign national into the United States through immigration parole. The indictment charged him with conspiracy to commit bribery, accepting a bribe as a public official, money laundering, and filing false tax returns. The criminal conduct involved accessing sensitive information and attempting to manipulate immigration processes for personal gain. Previously, the United States District Court for the Central District of California sentenced him to 121 months in prison, applying a four-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(3) for holding a “high-level decision-making or sensitive position.” On his first appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed his convictions but vacated the sentence, remanding for resentencing because the district court had relied on guideline commentary without first finding the guideline text ambiguous, as required by United States v. Castillo. Upon remand, the district court found the guideline text ambiguous and again applied the enhancement, referencing the commentary which includes law enforcement officers as holding “sensitive positions.” The court imposed an 85-month sentence after a downward departure. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the guideline's text is ambiguous regarding whether a “sensitive position” must also be “high-level,” and that it is ambiguous as to what constitutes a “sensitive position.” The court held that deference to the guideline commentary was warranted, finding it reasonable to include law enforcement officers as holding “sensitive positions.” The Ninth Circuit also held that the district court’s sentencing explanation was sufficient. The sentence was affirmed. View "USA V. CISNEROS" on Justia Law

STATE OF CALIFORNIA V. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES

2026-08-21T08:02:15-08:00

The plaintiffs in this case, the State of California and the Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, challenged a federal regulation issued by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF). The regulation expanded the scope of the Gun Control Act to cover certain partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional firearm frames and receivers, but explicitly stated that some unfinished components—such as those not sold with instructions or tools for completion—were not subject to the Act. California claimed that, as a result of the regulation’s limitations, it was forced to increase financial and training expenditures related to state law enforcement and the regulation of “ghost guns.” Giffords Law Center asserted that its core mission was frustrated by the regulation, requiring it to divert resources to address increased ghost gun proliferation. In the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, the plaintiffs and defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court concluded that both California and the Giffords Law Center had standing to bring suit. On the merits, the district court granted summary judgment for ATF on one count, but for the plaintiffs on another, holding that the regulation was arbitrary and capricious. The district court declared the challenged portion of the regulation unlawful, vacated it, and remanded the matter to ATF. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. Focusing on Article III standing, the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffs failed to establish a causal connection between the challenged regulatory example and their alleged injuries. The court held that the plaintiffs’ asserted harms were too speculative and not fairly traceable to the regulation. As a result, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it without prejudice for lack of standing. View "STATE OF CALIFORNIA V. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES" on Justia Law

CHERRY V. WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND WILDLIFE

2026-08-21T08:02:15-08:00

Five employees of the Washington Department of Fish & Wildlife sought and received religious exemptions from a statewide COVID-19 vaccine mandate issued in August 2021. However, the Department informed these employees that it could not accommodate them in their current positions due to job requirements involving in-person work. Instead, it offered them the opportunity to pursue possible reassignment through a process that historically resulted in successful placements only 14 percent of the time, with no assurances that new positions would preserve pay or resolve the religious conflict. The employees did not complete this process, doubting its efficacy, and were subsequently terminated. In the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, the employees brought claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), and both federal and state constitutions. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department on all claims, finding that the Department’s offer of the reassignment process satisfied its duty to provide a reasonable accommodation under Title VII and WLAD. The court also dismissed certain federal claims on procedural grounds and excluded three expert witnesses, while issuing a protective order limiting discovery. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that, as a matter of law, merely offering a limited reassignment process with uncertain prospects does not fulfill an employer’s obligation under Title VII to propose a reasonable accommodation that eliminates the conflict between religious beliefs and job duties. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on most of the Title VII claims and all WLAD claims (except for two employees who failed to meet procedural requirements), but affirmed the dismissal of federal and state constitutional claims, the exclusion of expert testimony, and the issuance of the protective order. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "CHERRY V. WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND WILDLIFE" on Justia Law

CAN-AM FUEL DISTRIBUTION, LLC V. SINCLAIR OIL, LLC

2026-08-20T08:31:30-08:00

A company operating a gas station in Washington entered into a series of agreements with a petroleum refiner and a logistics company. The agreements allowed the company to rebrand its station and market motor fuel under the refiner’s trademarks, even though the refiner did not supply the actual fuel. Instead, the logistics company served as an intermediary, and fuel was sourced from a third party. Later, the refiner and logistics company claimed the agreements were terminated, demanding the removal of the trademarks. The gas station operator refused, alleging that the termination violated the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (PMPA), which regulates the termination and nonrenewal of petroleum marketing franchises. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed the gas station operator’s PMPA claim. The court held that no PMPA franchise existed because the refiner did not supply the fuel to either the operator or the logistics company. The court reasoned that the statute required the refiner to be the supplier of the fuel for a franchise relationship to exist under the PMPA. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. It held that the PMPA does not require the refiner to supply the actual fuel; rather, a franchise exists if there is a contract authorizing the use of the refiner’s trademark in connection with the sale of motor fuel. The court determined that the operator plausibly alleged franchise relationships with both the refiner and the logistics company, based on the mutual obligations in the agreements and the statutory definitions. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the PMPA claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "CAN-AM FUEL DISTRIBUTION, LLC V. SINCLAIR OIL, LLC" on Justia Law

RIOS V. CITY OF AZUSA

2026-08-20T08:01:56-08:00

The case involves an incident in July 2021, when police officers from Azusa, California, responded to reports of a man, Adrian Rios, acting erratically and making threats in the courtyard of an apartment complex. The officers observed Rios making gestures and repeating phrases related to a shooting but did not see him with a weapon. After Rios did not comply with commands, officers attempted to take him into custody, during which they used a Taser twice and struck him at least 24 times. Rios suffered severe brain damage and remains in a persistent vegetative state. Rios, through his guardian ad litem, along with his two children, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California against the City of Azusa, Los Angeles County, several individual officers, and a paramedic. The claims included violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force, state tort claims, and violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act. During discovery, a witness, Michael Brown, was identified and provided a declaration supporting Rios’s account. Defendants moved to strike Brown’s declaration, alleging late disclosure, and also sought summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The district court denied both motions, finding that Brown had been disclosed in a timely manner and extending discovery to allow his deposition. The district court also denied summary judgment, concluding that a reasonable jury could find excessive force in violation of clearly established law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case on interlocutory appeal. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity, as the appeal concerned only the sufficiency of the evidence—an issue not reviewable at this stage under Johnson v. Jones. The court dismissed the appeal in its entirety. View "RIOS V. CITY OF AZUSA" on Justia Law

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD V. INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE AND WAREHOUSE UNION

2026-08-20T08:01:54-08:00

Two labor unions, each with a collective bargaining agreement covering the same maintenance and repair work at a Seattle shipping terminal, both claimed the right to this work when the terminal was modernized and reopened. The employer, SSA Terminals, was contractually obligated to both the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) to assign the work to their members. When the work was assigned to ILWU, IAM threatened to strike. To resolve the conflict, SSA Terminals invoked the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) provision allowing the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to determine which union should be awarded the work in such jurisdictional disputes. The NLRB conducted a hearing under Section 10(k) of the NLRA and awarded the disputed work to IAM, finding that employer preference, skills, efficiency, and past practice favored IAM. After the decision, ILWU filed a grievance and won an arbitration award against SSA Terminals, arguing that the employer had not adequately defended ILWU’s contractual rights. In response, IAM and SSA Terminals filed an unfair labor practice charge, alleging that ILWU’s actions were intended to coerce the employer to reassign the work, violating Section 8(b)(4)(D) of the NLRA. The NLRB’s administrative law judge and the Board found that ILWU had violated the Act and rejected ILWU’s defense that its actions were permissible work-preservation activity. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the “work-preservation” defense recognized in National Labor Relations Board v. International Longshoremen’s Association does not apply to unfair labor practice charges under Section 8(b)(4)(D) for failing to respect the Board’s resolution of a jurisdictional dispute. The court overruled its prior contrary precedent and enforced the NLRB’s order. View "NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD V. INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE AND WAREHOUSE UNION" on Justia Law

DING V. STRUCTURE THERAPEUTICS, INC.

2026-08-19T08:01:25-08:00

A former Chief Financial Officer of a clinical drug development company was terminated shortly after experiencing a domestic violence incident and requesting limited accommodations at work. She alleged that her supervisor sidelined her, assigned her diminished responsibilities, and ultimately terminated her for reasons related to her gender and experience as a domestic violence victim. After her termination, she initially filed an arbitration demand asserting discrimination and harassment based on national origin and her status as a domestic violence victim. During discovery in the arbitration process, she uncovered evidence suggesting her mistreatment was motivated by sex. She then withdrew from arbitration and filed suit in state court, asserting sex discrimination and hostile work environment claims. The employer removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California and moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the Federal Arbitration Act and related federal law preempted any state procedural rules allowing withdrawal from arbitration. The district court ruled that, although state procedural rules were preempted, the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA) gave the plaintiff the right to invalidate the arbitration agreement and proceed in court based on plausible allegations of sexual harassment. The district court found that the plaintiff did not know of her sexual harassment claim when she initiated arbitration and had not waived her rights under the EFAA. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration. The court held that the EFAA allows plaintiffs to elect to proceed in court once they discover a sexual harassment claim, even if they initially pursued other claims in arbitration, so long as they did not intentionally relinquish a known right. The court further found the plaintiff plausibly alleged a sex-based hostile work environment claim under California law and thus under the EFAA. View "DING V. STRUCTURE THERAPEUTICS, INC." on Justia Law

VERTHELYI V. PENNYMAC MORTGAGE INVESTMENT TRUST

2026-08-19T08:01:25-08:00

A real estate investment trust issued shares governed by corporate charter documents that initially paid fixed dividends but were set to convert to floating rates tied to the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR). The charter provided three fallback options if LIBOR became unavailable. When LIBOR was discontinued, the company determined that the third fallback provision—a fixed rate based on the most recent dividend period—would apply. This decision was announced before the shares were set to convert to floating rates, leading to a decrease in the shares' market value. A shareholder filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, alleging that the company’s failure to convert to SOFR-based floating rates, as selected by the Federal Reserve under the Adjustable Interest Rate (LIBOR) Act, violated California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL). The shareholder claimed that a fixed rate could not serve as a valid “benchmark replacement” under the LIBOR Act. The company moved to dismiss, arguing that the fallback provision was a valid benchmark replacement, thus precluding a UCL claim. The district court denied the motion, finding ambiguity in the statute and relying on legislative history suggesting concern over fixed-rate conversions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order. The Ninth Circuit held that, under the plain text of the LIBOR Act, a “benchmark replacement” may include a fixed dividend rate as provided in the fallback provision, and there is no requirement that it be a floating rate. The court found the fallback provision to be a valid benchmark replacement and concluded that the company’s actions were not “unlawful” or “unfair” under the UCL. The case was remanded for further proceedings on any remaining issues. View "VERTHELYI V. PENNYMAC MORTGAGE INVESTMENT TRUST" on Justia Law

THERMOLIFE INTERNATIONAL, LLC V. BPI SPORTS, LLC

2026-08-18T13:31:25-08:00

ThermoLife International, LLC and Muscle Beach Nutrition, LLC, companies involved in the distribution and licensing of dietary supplement ingredients, pursued false advertising and related claims under the Lanham Act against BPI Sports, LLC, a competitor in the sports nutrition market. ThermoLife had initiated an action against BPI in the District of Arizona in 2018, which was one of several similar lawsuits it filed against different distributors alleging nearly identical claims. These lawsuits were consistently dismissed for failure to allege competitive or commercial injury. Despite these outcomes, ThermoLife continued to assert similar claims against BPI, including filing a new action in the Southern District of Florida after voluntarily dismissing the Arizona case. Following the voluntary dismissal in Arizona and the subsequent refiling in Florida, the Florida court transferred the new case back to Arizona at BPI’s request. The United States District Court for the District of Arizona then dismissed ThermoLife’s claims with prejudice for the same deficiencies previously identified. ThermoLife appealed, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on the merits, finding a lack of direct competition and competitive injury. After prevailing, BPI sought attorney’s fees for both the 2018 and 2020 litigations. The United States District Court for the District of Arizona awarded BPI attorney’s fees, finding the case “exceptional” under the Lanham Act due to ThermoLife’s pattern of vexatious litigation and forum shopping. The court also awarded attorney’s fees as “costs” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(d), reasoning that the Lanham Act allows such awards. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed both the exceptional case finding and the availability of attorney’s fees under Rule 41(d) when the underlying statute provides for such fees, but remanded solely to correct a computational error in the fee calculation. View "THERMOLIFE INTERNATIONAL, LLC V. BPI SPORTS, LLC" on Justia Law

USA V. ENRIQUEZ

2026-08-17T08:31:54-08:00

After the resignation of the United States Attorney for the District of Nevada, the office’s First Assistant automatically became Acting U.S. Attorney under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (FVRA). Later, the Attorney General appointed Sigal Chattah as interim U.S. Attorney for a limited 120-day period, which expired. To keep Chattah in charge, the Attorney General designated her as First Assistant to the now-vacant post, asserting this made her Acting U.S. Attorney under the FVRA, and also delegated to her all the U.S. Attorney’s functions. Chattah’s name appeared on indictments brought against several defendants after her interim term ended, though she did not personally sign them. The United States District Court for the District of Nevada considered the defendants’ motions to dismiss their indictments and to disqualify Chattah from overseeing the prosecutions. The district court found that Chattah was not eligible to serve as Acting U.S. Attorney because she was not First Assistant at the time the vacancy arose, and the FVRA did not permit the Attorney General to delegate all of the U.S. Attorney’s powers to her. The court disqualified Chattah from participating in or supervising the prosecutions but denied dismissal of the indictments, reasoning that Assistant U.S. Attorneys derived authority from the Attorney General, not from Chattah. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s disqualification of Chattah, holding that the Attorney General cannot make someone Acting U.S. Attorney by designating them First Assistant after the vacancy occurs, nor can the Attorney General delegate all the U.S. Attorney’s powers to a single person to circumvent the FVRA. The court dismissed the defendants’ cross-appeals for lack of appellate jurisdiction, concluding that review of the disqualification did not require review of the denial of the motions to dismiss. View "USA V. ENRIQUEZ" on Justia Law

CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF RECLAMATION

2026-08-17T08:01:24-08:00

Water districts in California that received water from the federal Central Valley Project sought to convert their water service contracts into repayment contracts under the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation (WIIN) Act. This conversion allowed the districts to prepay construction costs in exchange for contracts that would last indefinitely, rather than for a set term. The Bureau of Reclamation, which manages the Central Valley Project, converted 67 contracts upon request from water districts, modifying only the payment terms and leaving other contractual rights unchanged. The Bureau did not conduct contract-specific environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) or consult with wildlife agencies under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) before making these conversions. The Center for Biological Diversity and other plaintiffs challenged the Bureau’s actions in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. They argued that the Bureau was required to undertake NEPA review and ESA consultation before converting each contract, because the conversions would impact the environment and protected species in the Bay-Delta ecosystem. The district court compelled joinder of the affected water districts and granted summary judgment to the Bureau and the water districts. The court found that the WIIN Act imposed a mandatory duty on the Bureau to convert contracts upon request, and that the Bureau lacked discretion to alter terms for environmental protection, so NEPA and the ESA did not apply. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that section 4011(a) of the WIIN Act requires the Bureau to convert water service contracts upon request, permitting only changes related to payment structure and not to other contractual rights. Because the conversions are nondiscretionary, the Bureau is not required to conduct NEPA review or ESA consultation. The Ninth Circuit also found that this interpretation does not violate the WIIN Act’s savings clauses. View "CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF RECLAMATION" on Justia Law

RUSOFF V. THE HAPPY GROUP, INC.

2026-08-17T08:01:23-08:00

Two consumers filed a lawsuit against a company that produces and sells eggs, challenging the company’s marketing claims that its hens are “free range” and “pasture raised on over 8 acres.” The plaintiffs alleged that these statements were deceptive because, in their view, the terms “pasture raised” and “free range” have objective meanings set by specific animal welfare certification organizations, and that consumers would expect the eggs to meet those standards. The plaintiffs sought to certify classes of California and New York consumers who purchased the eggs, arguing that the company’s advertising led consumers to pay a premium under false pretenses. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California considered the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. During this process, the court excluded the plaintiffs’ expert’s opinion on the meaning of “pasture raised,” finding the expert’s methodology unreliable under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Without this expert opinion, the district court concluded that the plaintiffs could not show that deception was a common issue capable of classwide resolution, as required for predominance under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). Nonetheless, the court certified the classes, reasoning that common questions remained regarding the materiality of the statements and the calculation of damages. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting class certification. The Ninth Circuit held that, in the absence of admissible expert evidence regarding what consumers understand “pasture raised” to mean, the plaintiffs failed to show that common issues of deception predominated. The court further held that common questions of materiality and damages could not, by themselves, justify class certification when the element of deception was not established on a classwide basis. View "RUSOFF V. THE HAPPY GROUP, INC." on Justia Law

QUEERDOC, PLLC V. DOJ

2026-08-14T08:01:34-08:00

A telehealth clinic specializing in gender-affirming care for minors, including the prescription of puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones, was served with an administrative subpoena by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). The subpoena, issued under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), sought a broad range of documents related to the clinic’s personnel, billing practices, communications with manufacturers and pharmacies, and patient records. The DOJ’s investigation followed executive orders and internal memoranda from the administration, which had publicly articulated opposition to gender-affirming care for minors and directed DOJ to prioritize investigations into potential violations of federal health care laws, particularly the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington quashed the subpoena entirely, finding that it was issued for an “improper purpose”—specifically, to advance the administration’s policy goal of eliminating gender-affirming care, rather than to investigate a legitimate violation of federal law. The district court concluded that the DOJ’s actions were pretextual and that its explanations for the subpoena were inadequate. The court did not reach the clinic’s alternate arguments that the subpoena was overbroad or unduly burdensome. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order. The Ninth Circuit held that the DOJ had statutory authority to issue the subpoena under HIPAA, had complied with procedural requirements, and that the subpoena was relevant to an authorized investigation. The court further held that the clinic had not met the heavy burden to show the subpoena was issued for an improper purpose, stating that the Executive Branch’s public opposition to gender-affirming care was insufficient to establish bad faith. The case was remanded for the district court to consider the unresolved issues of overbreadth and undue burden. View "QUEERDOC, PLLC V. DOJ" on Justia Law

BROWN V. BROOMFIELD

2026-08-14T08:01:34-08:00

In this case, the petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and robbery with special circumstances after a 1992 California jury found that he killed a young woman during a carjacking and personally used a firearm. The prosecution presented evidence that the petitioner had committed several uncharged violent offenses in the year surrounding the murder. At the penalty phase, the prosecution offered aggravating evidence including the uncharged acts and victim impact testimony, while the defense introduced mitigating evidence of the petitioner’s abusive and traumatic childhood, mental health challenges, substance abuse, low intellectual functioning, and the poverty and violence of his upbringing. After his conviction and death sentence were affirmed by the California Supreme Court on direct appeal, the petitioner’s state postconviction petitions were summarily denied. He then filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, raising multiple claims. The district court denied relief but granted a certificate of appealability (COA) as to three claims: ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase, incompetence to stand trial, and ineligibility for execution due to intellectual disability. The petitioner also sought to expand the COA to include additional uncertified claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The court held that the California Supreme Court could have reasonably determined that trial counsel did not render deficient performance at the penalty phase, as counsel’s investigation and strategic choices were not objectively unreasonable and much of the new evidence was cumulative. The court also found that the petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of competence to stand trial, and did not make a prima facie showing of intellectual disability under California law. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief and declined to expand the COA to the uncertified claims. View "BROWN V. BROOMFIELD" on Justia Law

SURGICAL INSTRUMENT SERVICE COMPANY, INC. V. INTUITIVE SURGICAL, INC.

2026-08-13T10:02:30-08:00

A company that services and repairs surgical instruments entered into an arrangement to reset the use counters on certain robotic surgical instrument components, allowing hospitals to reuse these components beyond the manufacturer’s programmed limits. The manufacturer of the surgical robots and the associated instruments, which holds more than 99% of the market for the robots and 100% of the market for the instruments, responded by warning hospitals that the use of unauthorized repairs would violate their agreements and that such use could result in the manufacturer refusing service calls. Following these warnings, all hospitals ceased using the servicer’s offerings. The servicer filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that the manufacturer engaged in unlawful tying, exclusive dealing, monopolization, and attempted monopolization under the Sherman Act. The dispute at trial centered on the proper standard for defining a relevant antitrust market. The district court instructed the jury that the servicer was required to prove the so-called “Kodak/Epic factors” to establish the existence of a single-brand aftermarket. The servicer conceded it had not presented evidence on these factors and stipulated to judgment in favor of the manufacturer. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the district court erred in requiring proof of the Kodak/Epic factors. The Ninth Circuit held that these factors apply only when a plaintiff cannot show the defendant possesses market power in the foremarket and instead relies solely on aftermarket power. Because the servicer presented evidence that the manufacturer had near-total market power in both the foremarket (surgical robots) and the aftermarket (robotic instruments), proof of the Kodak/Epic factors was not required. The court further held that there was sufficient evidence supporting the servicer’s claims and reversed the district court’s judgment, remanding for further proceedings. View "SURGICAL INSTRUMENT SERVICE COMPANY, INC. V. INTUITIVE SURGICAL, INC." on Justia Law

NILSEN V. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

2026-08-13T10:02:29-08:00

A group of former employees of a public university in Washington State were terminated after failing to comply with a COVID-19 vaccine mandate issued by the state’s governor. These employees had requested, and in some cases received, religious or medical exemptions from the vaccine requirement. However, the university determined that accommodating these exemptions would impose undue hardship and, as a result, denied many accommodation requests. None of the employees received the vaccine or could be accommodated, so they lost their jobs. The former employees filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington against the university and certain human resources officers, alleging that their terminations violated their constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Both parties moved for summary judgment on these claims. The district court ruled in favor of the university, finding that it is an “arm of the state” under the test articulated in Kohn v. State Bar of California and thus is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. The employees appealed this ruling. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Galette v. New Jersey Transit Corp., clarifying the “arm of the state” analysis. The Ninth Circuit held that its prior three-factor test remains valid but must be applied in accordance with the Supreme Court’s guidance, giving the greatest weight to whether the state intended to create a legally independent entity, less weight to formal liability for debts, and the least weight to state control. Applying the refined test, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the university is an arm of the state under the Eleventh Amendment and not a “person” under § 1983, affirming summary judgment for the university and dismissing the § 1983 claims. View "NILSEN V. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON" on Justia Law

GONZALEZ-ARGUETA V. BLANCHE

2026-08-13T10:02:29-08:00

A native and citizen of El Salvador entered the United States without valid documents in 2018 after leaving his home country due to threats from the MS-13 gang. He had been a national civil police officer in El Salvador and testified that gang members targeted him and his family because he interfered with their criminal activities. The threats and attempts on his life all occurred while he was still serving as a police officer. After an incident involving his brother, he left El Salvador and has not received threats since his departure or since leaving the police force. An Immigration Judge found his testimony credible but denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The judge concluded that while his proposed social group as a former police officer was cognizable, he failed to show a sufficient nexus between the harm he feared and his status as a former police officer. The judge reasoned that the threats were due to his actions disrupting criminal activities, not simply his former police status. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the denial, adopting the Immigration Judge’s reasoning and finding no error in the determination regarding the motive behind the threats. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed both the Immigration Judge’s and the Board’s decisions. Applying the substantial evidence standard, the court held that because all threats occurred while the petitioner was still an active police officer and no harm or threats arose after he left the police force, there was insufficient nexus between the harm claimed and his status as a former police officer. Thus, the court denied the petition, holding that he was ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal. View "GONZALEZ-ARGUETA V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

AL-NOURI V. RUBIO

2026-08-12T08:31:40-08:00

A naturalized U.S. citizen originally from Iraq was sought for extradition by the Iraqi government to stand trial for two counts of premeditated murder. Iraq alleged that he served as a local leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), involved in the planning and execution of the murders of two Iraqi police officers in Fallujah in 2006. The extradition request was supported by witness statements, including those from a cooperating witness and eyewitnesses who placed him at the scene and described his participation. The defendant had previously fled Iraq for Syria before coming to the United States. After Iraq’s extradition request, the United States filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, where a magistrate judge certified the defendant’s extradition. The defendant challenged the certification through a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He argued that there was not sufficient probable cause for the charges, that the alleged offenses constituted political acts covered by the political offense exception in the U.S.-Iraq Extradition Treaty, that humanitarian considerations should bar extradition, and that Iraq might prosecute him for offenses beyond those charged. The district court denied the habeas petition, finding the probable cause standard was met, the political offense exception inapplicable, and declining to consider humanitarian grounds or speculative future prosecutions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. The court held that competent evidence supported probable cause for the charged murders, the district court correctly excluded newly submitted contradictory declarations, and the political offense exception did not apply because AQI was not part of the domestic Sunni insurgency but an international terrorist organization. The panel also held that humanitarian objections and speculative concerns about additional charges were not grounds for relief in this context. View "AL-NOURI V. RUBIO" on Justia Law

TURREY V. VERVENT, INC.

2026-08-12T08:01:30-08:00

A group of former students who attended ITT Technical Institute, a for-profit college, brought suit against companies and individuals involved in servicing and collecting on certain private student loans known as the PEAKS loans. After the 2008 financial crisis, ITT, needing to comply with federal regulations limiting reliance on federal funds, established the PEAKS loan program with the backing of Deutsche Bank to generate non-federal revenue. The loans were internally backed by guarantees from ITT, and as default rates rose, ITT concealed the program’s financial troubles from investors and regulators. The PEAKS loans continued to be serviced by Vervent, Inc. and its affiliates, even after ITT’s collapse and bankruptcy in 2016. Students alleged that they were not aware that their loan payments were induced by fraud until after ITT’s public downfall. In the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, the plaintiffs, as a putative class, alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and various state-law claims. The defendants argued that the RICO claims were untimely, asserting that the statute of limitations began when the students received or began paying the loans, and also challenged proximate causation. The district court denied summary judgment on both grounds, finding fact issues precluded judgment as a matter of law. A jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding damages that were trebled under RICO. The district court denied defendants’ post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It held there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the students neither knew nor reasonably should have known of their fraud-based injuries more than four years before suit was filed, so the claims were timely under RICO’s four-year statute of limitations. The court also concluded that defendants did not preserve their proximate cause argument for appeal because they did not properly raise it after trial. The judgment was affirmed. View "TURREY V. VERVENT, INC." on Justia Law

DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LTD. V. ANTRIX CORP. LTD.

2026-08-12T08:01:30-08:00

Devas Multimedia Private Limited, an Indian corporation, along with several related entities, sought to confirm a $562.5 million international arbitral award against Antrix Corporation Limited, a company wholly owned by India. The award stemmed from a 2005 agreement between Devas and Antrix, under which Antrix was to provide satellite capacity to Devas in exchange for fees. In 2011, Antrix terminated the agreement following a policy decision by the Indian government. Devas initiated arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce, which resulted in an award in Devas’s favor. Devas then petitioned to confirm the award under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”) in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. The district court confirmed the award, finding it had subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) arbitration exception and the New York Convention, and personal jurisdiction under the FSIA. The court also rejected Antrix’s argument that the case should be dismissed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Antrix appealed, and the Ninth Circuit initially ruled in Antrix’s favor on personal jurisdiction grounds. However, the Supreme Court in CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp., 605 U.S. 223 (2025), reversed, holding that the FSIA does not require a minimum contacts analysis beyond its statutory provisions, and remanded for consideration of alternative arguments. On remand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the FSIA’s arbitration exception supplied subject matter jurisdiction, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Antrix was reasonable and comported with the Fifth Amendment, and that forum non conveniens does not apply to actions to confirm foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in part, and reversed and vacated in part on issues related to the standing of certain intervenors, remanding for further proceedings. View "DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LTD. V. ANTRIX CORP. LTD." on Justia Law

DURALEV V. USA

2026-08-11T08:01:43-08:00

A Russian citizen entered the United States on a B-2 visitor visa in 2015 and subsequently applied for asylum and work authorization. In 2018, he was detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement after appearing for an interview, and was later ordered removed by an immigration judge. He remained in detention for 525 days, during which time he alleges he was assaulted by detention center staff. Upon release on bond in 2020, he applied for employment authorization but his application was denied based on an alleged miscalculation by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Seeking damages for unlawful arrest, detention, in-custody assault, and denial of employment authorization, the plaintiff filed an administrative claim with the Department of Homeland Security in July 2021, followed by this lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The district court dismissed all but one claim as time-barred under the FTCA’s two-year statute of limitations, finding the remaining timely negligence claim—related to the denial of employment authorization—lacked a private analog in state tort law as required by the FTCA. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that all claims arising from the plaintiff’s arrest, detention, or assault accrued outside the two-year limitations period and were therefore untimely. The court further held that the remaining negligence claim regarding employment authorization denial could not proceed because there is no comparable liability for a private individual under state law for the type of quasi-adjudicative decision at issue. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "DURALEV V. USA" on Justia Law

HEALTHCARE ALLY MANAGEMENT OF CALIFORNIA, LLC V. WSP USA, INC.

2026-08-11T08:01:43-08:00

A dispute arose concerning the payment rate for a surgical procedure performed at an out-of-network facility. The patient receiving the surgery was covered by an ERISA-governed health plan provided by the employer and administered by an insurance company. Prior to the surgery, the facility contacted the plan administrator to verify coverage and was told that the plan would reimburse at the usual, customary, and reasonable (“UCR”) rate, not the lower Medicare rate. Relying on this representation, the facility performed the surgery. However, the plan later paid only at the Medicare rate, far less than the full billed amount. The facility’s successor in interest, having obtained the rights to the claim, sought to recover the unpaid balance. The action was first brought in California state court, then removed to the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiff asserted both ERISA and state law claims. The district court dismissed the ERISA claim for lack of derivative standing, as the plaintiff was not properly assigned the right to sue under ERISA. The court also dismissed the state law claims for negligent misrepresentation and promissory estoppel, holding that these claims were preempted by ERISA because they related to an ERISA-covered plan. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the promissory estoppel claim, holding that, under circuit precedent, such claims are preempted by ERISA. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the negligent misrepresentation claim. The appellate court held that ERISA does not preempt a negligent misrepresentation claim by a provider’s successor in interest when the claim arises from representations made by the plan administrator during a pre-service verification call. The court concluded that such a claim does not sufficiently “relate to” an ERISA plan to trigger preemption, as it is not based on an ERISA-regulated relationship or enforceable under ERISA’s civil enforcement mechanism. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the negligent misrepresentation claim. View "HEALTHCARE ALLY MANAGEMENT OF CALIFORNIA, LLC V. WSP USA, INC." on Justia Law

GONZALEZ-GODINEZ V. BLANCHE

2026-08-10T09:02:10-08:00

A lawful permanent resident who had lived in the United States since 1988 was convicted in Oregon in 2013 for “Using a Child in a Display of Sexually Explicit Content” under Oregon Revised Statutes § 163.670. The conviction stemmed from his conduct involving a fifteen-year-old girl. Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, alleging that he was removable for having committed both an aggravated felony and a crime of child abuse. The individual admitted to the factual allegations but contested his removability. An Immigration Judge concluded he was not removable for an aggravated felony but found him removable for a crime of child abuse, leading to a denial of his application for cancellation of removal. The individual appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, primarily arguing that his conviction did not constitute a crime of child abuse as defined under federal law. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal, agreeing that the conviction rendered him removable. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court applied the categorical approach, focusing on whether the Oregon statute, as interpreted by Oregon courts, categorically matched the federal definition of a crime of child abuse, which requires at least criminal negligence as the mental state and an actus reus that places a minor in a situation likely to cause harm. The court concluded that Oregon courts require intent or knowledge for a conviction under this statute, and that the conduct proscribed by the statute inherently risks harm to minors. The Ninth Circuit held that a conviction under Oregon Revised Statutes § 163.670 is categorically a crime of child abuse for purposes of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), and accordingly denied the petition for review. View "GONZALEZ-GODINEZ V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

ADAME GARCIA V. BLANCHE

2026-08-10T09:02:09-08:00

A citizen of Mexico who entered the United States as a child was convicted in California in 2012 for violating a statute that prohibits distributing harmful material to a minor with the intent to seduce. Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings. The individual sought cancellation of removal, arguing that his conviction should not disqualify him for relief. An Immigration Judge found that the conviction constituted both a crime involving moral turpitude and a crime of child abuse under federal immigration law, pretermitting his application for cancellation of removal. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision, holding specifically that the conviction under California Penal Code § 288.2(b) was categorically a crime of child abuse, and dismissed the appeal. The Board declined to address whether the offense was a crime involving moral turpitude. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo, applying the categorical approach as articulated in its recent precedent, Leon-Briviesca v. Blanche. The court considered the petitioner’s arguments that the California statute was overly broad compared to the generic definition of a crime of child abuse, including claims about actual harm, consensual conduct between minors, mistaken belief about the victim’s age, and communications not received by a minor. The Ninth Circuit found each argument unpersuasive, concluding that the statute requires conduct that meets the federal definition of child abuse and that there was no realistic probability California would apply the statute as broadly as petitioner claimed. The court held that a conviction under California Penal Code § 288.2(b) is categorically a crime of child abuse for immigration purposes, and therefore denied the petition for review. View "ADAME GARCIA V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

DRIP MORE LLC V. FDA

2026-08-10T08:32:04-08:00

A company that manufactures flavored e-liquids for use in electronic nicotine delivery systems (ENDS), including fruit and candy flavors, submitted premarket applications to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) seeking authorization to sell 64 such products. The FDA’s regulatory authority under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA) requires that new tobacco products be shown to be “appropriate for the protection of the public health” before they can be marketed. The FDA denied the company’s applications, citing the failure to provide robust comparative evidence demonstrating that its flavored products offer a public health benefit for adult smokers that outweighs the risks to youth, compared to tobacco-flavored ENDS. Following the FDA’s marketing denial order, the company petitioned for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The company argued that the FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously by requiring comparative efficacy evidence, failed to adequately consider its marketing and sales restriction plans, and improperly denied authorization for “zero nicotine” products. It also argued that the FDA could only impose a comparative efficacy requirement through notice-and-comment rulemaking under the TCA and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review. The court held that the FDA’s denial based on the absence of comparative efficacy evidence was neither arbitrary nor capricious, especially since the applicant offered no evidence distinguishing its products’ youth risks from those of other flavored ENDS. The court also found that any error in declining to consider marketing or access restriction plans was harmless. Additionally, the court ruled that the FDA was not required to undertake notice-and-comment rulemaking before applying the comparative efficacy requirement, and the inclusion of “zero nicotine” products in the denial order was proper based on the company’s own representations. View "DRIP MORE LLC V. FDA" on Justia Law

STATE OF COLORADO V. META PLATFORMS, INC.

2026-08-10T08:01:48-08:00

A large group of plaintiffs, including several states, individuals, school districts, and local governments, brought suit against Meta Platforms, Inc., and associated entities, alleging that Facebook and Instagram’s design features encourage addictive behavior and inadequately protect young users from harmful content. Additional defendants included TikTok-related entities, school districts, and others. The cases were consolidated in multidistrict litigation, where plaintiffs asserted various claims, including personal injury and state law violations. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California organized the litigation into several tracks based on the nature of the claims and plaintiffs. Meta moved to dismiss certain claims, arguing that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act provided them with immunity. The district court granted the dismissal in part, finding some claims barred by Section 230, but denied dismissal as to others, particularly where claims did not target Meta’s role as a publisher of third-party content. Meta sought interlocutory appeal on some orders, which the district court denied, and then appealed other orders as of right under the collateral order doctrine. TikTok entities joined in Meta’s arguments. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether it had appellate jurisdiction to hear Meta’s and TikTok’s interlocutory appeals. The court held that Section 230 provides a defense to liability, not immunity from suit, and that the denial of such a defense is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The court found none of the requirements for a collateral order were met, emphasizing that Section 230 does not constitute a statutory or constitutional guarantee against trial. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeals and cross-appeals for lack of jurisdiction. View "STATE OF COLORADO V. META PLATFORMS, INC." on Justia Law

PACIFICORP V. SIXKILLER

2026-08-07T08:31:45-08:00

A multi-state utility company operating a gas-fired power plant in Washington alleged that the state's Climate Commitment Act (CCA) impermissibly discriminated against interstate commerce by allocating no-cost greenhouse gas emissions allowances only for electricity sold to Washington customers. Under Washington’s Clean Energy Transformation Act (CETA) and the CCA, utilities serving in-state customers receive no-cost allowances to offset compliance costs, while electricity exported to customers in other states does not receive this benefit. The company argued that this scheme increased costs for its non-Washington customers and potentially its shareholders, as out-of-state sales from the Washington facility required purchasing emissions allowances at auction. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington reviewed the complaint and found that the electricity generated for export was not subject to CETA’s decarbonization mandates, distinguishing it from in-state electricity. The district court concluded that the two categories were not similarly situated for purposes of Dormant Commerce Clause analysis. The court reasoned that utilities serving Washington customers were already subject to more aggressive decarbonization requirements under CETA, justifying the allocation of no-cost allowances under the CCA. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding no plausible claim of unconstitutional discrimination, and denied the motion for preliminary injunction as moot. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal and denial of the injunction. The Ninth Circuit held that because the regulatory schemes governing in-state and exported electricity are distinct, the emissions associated with each are not similarly situated. Therefore, Washington’s allocation of no-cost allowances did not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. The court further held that dismissal without leave to amend was appropriate, as any amendment would be futile. The decision was affirmed. View "PACIFICORP V. SIXKILLER" on Justia Law

USA V. DOYLE

2026-08-07T08:01:31-08:00

Federal agents discovered that the defendant had engaged in sexually explicit conduct with a female minor, confirmed by photos on her social media. A search warrant was executed at the defendant’s home, and several electronic devices, including an iPhone 12, were seized. Forensic analysis revealed numerous images and videos depicting the minor victim and other unidentified girls in explicit sexual conduct, stored in a vault application and its deleted space, but still accessible. The defendant was arrested and charged with one count of possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). The United States District Court for the Southern District of California presided over the trial. Before trial, the government moved in limine to admit thirty-six images and videos as evidence. The defendant did not object, reviewed the material with the government, and agreed to oral descriptions. The district court admitted the evidence and published it to the jury in open court, though not in the jury room. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted. He later moved for a new trial, arguing his counsel failed to pursue an affirmative defense under § 2252(c), which applies when fewer than three matters are possessed and reasonable steps are taken to destroy or report them. The district court denied this motion, finding no factual support. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court erred by failing to individually review each item of evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and United States v. Curtin, but found the error harmless as it did not affect the verdict. The court affirmed the denial of a new trial, declined to address ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, and affirmed the 120-month sentence, applying plain error review. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "USA V. DOYLE" on Justia Law

ARIZONA ALLIANCE FOR RETIRED AMERICANS V. MAYES

2026-08-07T08:01:29-08:00

Arizona amended its election laws in 2022, introducing two provisions: one requires county recorders to cancel a voter’s registration in their county if the voter registers in a new county (“Cancellation Provision”), and the other criminalizes knowingly providing a “mechanism for voting” to someone registered in another state (“Felony Provision”). Three organizations engaged in voter registration and education activities claimed these provisions would interfere with their efforts, and sought to enjoin enforcement. They argued that the Cancellation Provision would lead to improper removal of voters and that the Felony Provision was vague and could chill their constitutionally protected activities. The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted a preliminary injunction, barring enforcement of both provisions. The Arizona Attorney General appealed. A three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the injunction, finding that the organizations lacked standing for the Cancellation Provision and were unlikely to succeed on the merits regarding the Felony Provision. The case was then reheard en banc after the prior panel’s opinion was vacated. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the organizations lacked standing to challenge the Cancellation Provision because they did not clearly show that it directly affected or interfered with their core activities, as required by FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine. The court further held that the organizations had standing to challenge the Felony Provision due to a credible threat of prosecution, but were unlikely to succeed on the merits, as the statutory context indicated that “mechanism for voting” likely refers only to a ballot or ballot envelope, not to voter registration or education activities. The court vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case. View "ARIZONA ALLIANCE FOR RETIRED AMERICANS V. MAYES" on Justia Law

IN RE: KOI DESIGN LLC V. MARRON LAWYERS, APC

2026-08-06T08:01:23-08:00

Koi Design LLC retained Marron Lawyers, APC in April 2016 to represent it in a trademark dispute with Strategic Partners, Inc. When SPI sued Koi for trademark infringement, Marron—through its associate, A. Douglas Mastroianni—handled the case. Mastroianni repeatedly missed court deadlines and failed to participate in required discovery meetings, prompting warnings and potential sanctions from the court. Marron did not inform Koi of these mishaps or its internal concerns about Mastroianni’s competence. After repeated lapses, Marron terminated Mastroianni, but again did not disclose the reasons to Koi. Mastroianni continued to represent Koi at a new firm, and Koi ultimately suffered terminating sanctions and a default judgment with trebled damages, leading to bankruptcy. Koi sued Marron, Mastroianni, and another firm for breach of fiduciary duty, legal malpractice, and negligent supervision in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Bloom Firm settled, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Marron on all claims, concluding that Koi had not established that Marron’s conduct caused its injuries. Koi appealed, arguing the district court erred both by granting summary judgment on grounds not adequately noticed and by finding no genuine dispute of material fact. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The court held that Marron owed duties to disclose material facts and supervise its employees under California law and professional conduct rules. The Ninth Circuit found genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Marron breached those duties and whether its conduct was a “but for” cause of Koi’s harm. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could find Marron liable and remanded for further proceedings. View "IN RE: KOI DESIGN LLC V. MARRON LAWYERS, APC" on Justia Law

COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER ARVIN V. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

2026-08-05T09:02:30-08:00

Several environmental nonprofit organizations challenged a final rule issued by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approving California’s State Implementation Plans (SIPs) for air quality in the San Joaquin Valley. The SIPs, developed by the San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District and the California Air Resources Board, were intended to satisfy contingency measure requirements under the Clean Air Act for three particulate matter (PM2.5) standards. The approved measures included stricter wood burning restrictions, enhanced dust control, and expanded vehicle smog checks. However, the groups argued that these measures failed to provide sufficient emissions reductions, particularly for nitrogen oxides (NOx), and contended that the EPA improperly relied on feasibility analyses to justify the shortfall. Prior to reaching the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the SIP submissions underwent notice-and-comment review by the EPA. Despite critical feedback from environmental advocates, the EPA finalized the rule, accepting the agencies’ infeasibility demonstrations and lowering the progress standard for contingency measures from its traditional requirement. This departure from stricter standards allowed approval of the SIPs even though they did not meet the longstanding emissions reduction benchmarks. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the EPA’s approval under the Administrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary, capricious, or not in accordance with law” standard. The court held that the EPA exceeded its statutory authority by reading a feasibility exemption into Section 172(c)(9) of the Clean Air Act, which does not expressly allow for such consideration. The panel concluded that the statute’s best meaning does not include a feasibility exemption and remanded the rule to the EPA without vacatur, citing the potential disruptive consequences of lacking contingency measures. The court also awarded litigation costs and attorney’s fees to the petitioners. View "COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER ARVIN V. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY" on Justia Law

INLAND EMPIRE WATERKEEPER V. CORONA CLAY COMPANY

2026-08-05T08:31:21-08:00

Plaintiffs, Inland Empire Waterkeeper and Orange County Coastkeeper, brought a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act against Corona Clay Company, alleging violations of stormwater-permit requirements at a facility near Temescal Creek in California. The facility discharged stormwater during rainfall, potentially reaching Temescal Creek, a tributary of the Santa Ana River. Plaintiffs claimed Corona failed to implement best management practices, develop a compliant stormwater pollution prevention plan, monitor its facility, and submit accurate reports as required by the permit. Corona defended primarily by arguing it had not discharged pollutants into the creek. The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially granted partial summary judgment for Plaintiffs, but denied it on certain claims. The case proceeded to trial, where the jury found in favor of Corona. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial, in part due to an intervening Supreme Court decision, County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, which expanded the Clean Water Act’s coverage to indirect discharges that are the functional equivalent of direct discharges. After a second trial, Plaintiffs prevailed, and the district court entered judgment and assessed penalties against Corona. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Sackett v. EPA, which narrowed the definition of “waters of the United States” under the Clean Water Act, Corona moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and alternatively sought a new trial. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the question of whether Temescal Creek is a “water of the United States” is a merits issue, not one of subject-matter jurisdiction, affirming the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. However, due to the intervening change in law announced in Sackett, the court reversed the denial of the motion for a new trial under Rule 59 and remanded for further proceedings to litigate whether Temescal Creek falls within the Clean Water Act’s scope. View "INLAND EMPIRE WATERKEEPER V. CORONA CLAY COMPANY" on Justia Law

USA V. CHAPMAN

2026-08-05T08:01:19-08:00

The case involves a defendant diagnosed with autism, Tourette syndrome, OCD, and ADHD, who maintained a romantic relationship with a woman with significant physical disabilities. In September 2019, the defendant and the victim traveled from Pennsylvania to Las Vegas, where the defendant killed the victim in a remote Nevada desert. Prior to the trip, he conducted internet searches related to murder and body disposal. After the murder, he impersonated the victim through her phone and social media, raising suspicions among her friends and family. Eventually, police were alerted, leading to an investigation, the defendant’s arrest, and his confession to the crime. The United States District Court for the District of Nevada presided over the trial, during which the defendant moved to suppress his confession, arguing an invalid Miranda waiver and involuntariness. The district court denied this motion after a magistrate judge held a hearing and issued a report and recommendation. The trial lasted eight days, and the defense presented testimony regarding the defendant’s mental health. After jury deliberations, the defendant moved for a mistrial due to concerns about the interpretation of the “holding” element in the kidnapping statute and alleged jury coercion. The district court denied these motions and the jury returned a guilty verdict. The defendant then filed post-verdict motions for acquittal and a new trial, which were also denied. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the “holding” element of the federal kidnapping statute under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) can be satisfied through non-physical means, including deception, and found sufficient evidence to support the conviction. However, the court vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial because the district court improperly coerced the jury’s verdict, notably by giving an Allen charge while aware of the jury’s numerical division and making coercive comments to a holdout juror. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress, finding that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights and that his confession was voluntary. View "USA V. CHAPMAN" on Justia Law

VIP PRODUCTS, LLC V. JACK DANIEL'S PROPERTIES, INC.

2026-08-04T08:31:30-08:00

A company that owns the trademarks and trade dress for a well-known whiskey product objected to a dog toy produced by another company that parodied its bottle and labeling. The toy, named “Bad Spaniels,” mimicked the whiskey’s visual design and replaced references to the whiskey with scatological humor, including phrases like “Old No. 2 On Your Tennessee Carpet.” The whiskey company demanded the toy’s removal from the market, but the toy company instead filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration of non-infringement and non-dilution. The whiskey company responded with counterclaims for trademark infringement and dilution under federal and state law. The United States District Court for the District of Arizona initially found in favor of the whiskey company after a bench trial, concluding the dog toy infringed and diluted its trademarks and trade dress. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed on the dilution claim and vacated the finding of infringement. After further appeals, including a remand from the Supreme Court, the district court again found the toy company liable for dilution by tarnishment and entered a permanent injunction in favor of the whiskey company. The toy company appealed, arguing the whiskey company failed to establish dilution and that the federal dilution law was unconstitutional as applied. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the whiskey company did not meet its burden to show dilution by tarnishment under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act. The court found that only “Jack Daniel’s” and its trade dress were proven famous, and the parody toy’s marks and trade dress, though similar, did not facially tarnish the famous marks or portray them in an unsavory context likely to damage their reputation. The court vacated the district court’s injunction and remanded for judgment in favor of the toy company. View "VIP PRODUCTS, LLC V. JACK DANIEL'S PROPERTIES, INC." on Justia Law

AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC V. PERPLEXITY AI, INC.

2026-08-04T08:31:29-08:00

Amazon.com Services, LLC filed suit against Perplexity AI, Inc., an artificial intelligence company, asserting that Perplexity’s web browser tool, Comet, unlawfully accessed Amazon’s website in violation of the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and California’s Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act (CDAFA). Perplexity’s Comet browser includes an AI “Assistant” that, when activated by a user, navigates Amazon.com on the user’s behalf, sending browser screenshots to Perplexity’s servers for further instruction. Amazon claimed that this use of the Assistant, despite their explicit prohibition, amounted to unauthorized access to its servers. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted Amazon a preliminary injunction, finding that Amazon was likely to succeed on its claims under both the CFAA and CDAFA. The district court concluded that Perplexity, through its Assistant, accessed Amazon’s password-protected accounts without authorization, obtained private information, and caused Amazon to incur significant costs responding to this activity. The court also determined that the equitable factors supported granting the injunction, citing irreparable harm and the public interest. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. The Ninth Circuit held that Amazon was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its claims because Perplexity did not “access” Amazon’s computers within the meaning of the CFAA or CDAFA; instead, the access was performed by the user employing the Assistant as a tool. The court found that the district court erred in its analysis of the equitable factors, which favored Perplexity, and concluded that an injunction was not warranted under these circumstances. The disposition was to vacate the injunction and remand. View "AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC V. PERPLEXITY AI, INC." on Justia Law

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS

2026-08-04T08:01:19-08:00

Benjamin Hoskins and his wife, Leanne Rodgers, participated in a telemarketing operation that defrauded consumers of more than $130 million by selling worthless “business coaching” services. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) obtained a judgment against Hoskins for over $130 million and against Rodgers for approximately $1.5 million, reflecting the proceeds they received from the scam. Hoskins and Rodgers took steps to hinder collection by transferring assets through trusts and shell entities, including a residence in Las Vegas held via a trust in which they were both trustees and beneficiaries. The United States District Court for the District of Nevada initially blocked the FTC’s attempts to enforce the judgment, concluding that Nevada’s six-year statute of limitations for enforcement of judgments barred the FTC’s action against Rodgers. The court also quashed a writ of execution the FTC obtained under the Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act (FDCPA), reasoning that Nevada law required a separate action to prove the trust holding the property was Rodgers’s alter ego before the property could be levied. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed both of the district court’s rulings. The Ninth Circuit held that the FDCPA preempts inconsistent state statutes of limitations and has no time limit for collecting debts owed to the federal government by writ of execution. The court also determined that the judgment against Rodgers, which is payable to the FTC, qualifies as a “debt” under the FDCPA, regardless of whether the proceeds are ultimately distributed to victims. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit held that the FTC was not required to file a separate alter ego action under state law to levy property held in trust; under the FDCPA, the FTC may levy any property in which the judgment debtors have a substantial nonexempt interest. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. HOSKINS" on Justia Law

SHENZHEN ZEHUIJIN INVESTMENT CENTER V. YINGKUI

2026-08-03T08:01:12-08:00

In 2017, an investment entity loaned approximately 160 million Chinese yuan to an individual, who failed to repay the loan. The lender obtained an arbitral award against the borrower from the Beijing Arbitration Commission for around 150 million yuan. A Singaporean court later ordered the borrower to pay the award, but he still did not comply. The lender, knowing the borrower had been living in California for about two years, sought to enforce the foreign arbitral award in the United States under the Federal Arbitration Act by filing a petition in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. Attempts to serve process directly on the borrower at his California residence were unsuccessful. Eventually, the petition was left with another adult at the residence, mailed, and emailed to the borrower, who later acknowledged receiving notice. The borrower moved to dismiss the case in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, arguing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) that the court lacked personal jurisdiction because his domicile was China and the underlying dispute had no connection to California. He did not raise a defense under Rule 12(b)(5) for insufficient service of process. The district court found that it had general personal jurisdiction over the borrower based on his physical presence in California and confirmed the arbitral award. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that presence-based personal jurisdiction be conditioned on service of process on the defendant’s person; other means of service are sufficient if the defendant is physically present in the forum state. The court declined to address the sufficiency of service of process because the borrower had waived this argument by not raising it in district court. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment. View "SHENZHEN ZEHUIJIN INVESTMENT CENTER V. YINGKUI" on Justia Law

PRZYBOCKI V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

2026-08-03T08:01:10-08:00

The case involves two individuals, Michelle Przybocki and Ketan Vakil, and Vakil’s company, Gourmend Foods, LLC. Przybocki suffers from a digestive condition that requires her to follow a low-FODMAP diet, and Vakil, on medical advice, founded Gourmend Foods to produce and sell low-FODMAP food products. Both plaintiffs wish to see FODMAP levels disclosed on food labels. They allege that federal regulations enforced by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) prohibit food companies from including FODMAP information on product labels, which they claim violates their First Amendment rights—Przybocki’s right to receive information and Vakil and Gourmend’s right to speak. Gourmend’s proposed beef broth label, regulated by the USDA, was rejected due to its inclusion of FODMAP information. The United States District Court for the District of Nevada dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit. It found that Vakil and Gourmend lacked standing against the FDA because they were already selling FODMAP-labeled products and had not received warnings from the agency. The court also concluded Przybocki lacked standing as a listener, finding she had not sufficiently alleged that other food producers would provide FODMAP information absent the regulations and that she was not injured by the chilling of Gourmend’s speech. Additionally, Vakil and Gourmend’s claims against the USDA were dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal for lack of standing with respect to the plaintiffs’ claims against the FDA and Przybocki’s claims against the USDA. The Ninth Circuit held that Przybocki adequately pleaded standing as a listener and that Vakil and Gourmend sufficiently pleaded standing as speakers for a pre-enforcement challenge against the FDA. In a separate memorandum disposition, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Vakil and Gourmend’s claims against the USDA for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. View "PRZYBOCKI V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE" on Justia Law

POVER V. THE CAPITAL GROUP COMPANIES, INC.

2026-07-30T08:01:23-08:00

A former employee brought suit against her previous employer and associated fiduciaries, alleging that they mismanaged the employer's retirement savings plan, which is a defined contribution plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). She claimed that the fiduciaries retained underperforming investment options in the plan’s menu to generate transaction fees, in violation of their duties of prudence and loyalty, and sought plan-wide monetary and equitable relief on behalf of the plan. Previously, the United States District Court for the Central District of California reviewed the case. The defendants moved to compel arbitration, relying on provisions in the plan requiring arbitration of disputes and waiving participants’ rights to bring claims on a “class, collective, or representative basis.” The plaintiff argued that this waiver impermissibly precluded her from enforcing statutory rights under ERISA, which allow participants to sue on behalf of the plan for plan-wide relief. The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration, finding the waiver unenforceable under the effective-vindication doctrine and holding that the waiver provision was expressly non-severable, thus requiring the claims to proceed in court. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration. The Ninth Circuit held that the plan’s waiver provision was unenforceable because it prevented the plaintiff from asserting her right under ERISA to bring representative claims for plan-wide relief—a right that ERISA expressly provides. The court further held that, under the plan’s own terms, once the waiver was found unenforceable, any representative claim must be adjudicated in court, not arbitration. Thus, the plaintiff’s breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims would proceed before the district court. View "POVER V. THE CAPITAL GROUP COMPANIES, INC." on Justia Law

MULTIPLE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES, LLC V. CASDEN

2026-07-30T08:01:22-08:00

Two competing companies in the athleticwear market, both producing bioceramic materials embedded in textiles, became involved in litigation over allegedly false advertising. One company, after settling the initial lawsuit by agreeing to pay $2.5 million and refrain from claiming FDA approval or health benefits for its product, filed for bankruptcy before completing the settlement payments. The plaintiff then brought a new action against the CEO of the defendant company, alleging both tortious interference with the settlement agreement and false advertising in violation of the Lanham Act, asserting that the defendant continued to falsely represent the product's health benefits and FDA approval. The United States District Court for the Central District of California presided over a jury trial. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff on the Lanham Act claim and awarded nominal damages. On post-trial motions, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law for the plaintiff on the tortious interference claim, awarded $2.5 million in damages, and further awarded the plaintiff disgorgement of the CEO’s salary (trebled) as "profits" under the Lanham Act, in addition to nearly $600,000 in attorneys’ fees. Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings. The Ninth Circuit held that, under California law, a corporate officer acting within the scope of agency and not at the expense of the corporation is immune from tortious interference claims, and reversed the district court’s denial of immunity and its tortious interference damages award. The court also reversed the district court’s disgorgement award, concluding that the CEO’s salary was not equivalent to profits under the Lanham Act. However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the award of attorneys’ fees, finding no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that the case was “exceptional.” The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "MULTIPLE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES, LLC V. CASDEN" on Justia Law

VAZQUEZ V. BOSTOCK

2026-07-30T08:01:18-08:00

A group of noncitizens who entered the United States without inspection and were apprehended within the country challenged a new federal immigration policy. Historically, such individuals, though removable, were eligible for release on bond while their removal proceedings were pending. This practice continued after the 1996 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), with unadmitted aliens in the interior detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which allows for bond. In 2025, the government changed course, issuing guidance that these individuals were now subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), which does not permit bond. This policy shift resulted in many detained individuals filing habeas corpus petitions seeking bond hearings. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington certified a class of such detainees and granted summary judgment in their favor, holding they were not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The government appealed, arguing that, as “applicants for admission,” all such individuals were “seeking admission” and thus subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that, based on statutory text, context, and longstanding practice, § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to aliens seeking entry at the border, not to those apprehended in the interior. The court found that § 1226(a) governs detention for unadmitted aliens present in the interior, allowing for bond. The Ninth Circuit rejected the government’s new interpretation, noting it conflicted with prior practice, created statutory redundancies, and lacked clear congressional authorization for such a significant change. The court thus affirmed that these individuals remain eligible for bond hearings under § 1226(a). View "VAZQUEZ V. BOSTOCK" on Justia Law

USA V. YATES

2026-07-29T08:01:16-08:00

A man who had recently been released on parole was stopped by police in San Pablo, California, while driving with his young niece and nephew. After a brief delay in pulling over, the officer learned of his parole status and asked the occupants to exit the car. The officer found a loaded, modified Glock pistol on the nephew, and text messages showed the man had instructed his mother to retrieve the child because he was carrying the gun. The gun and ammunition were manufactured outside California, and the gun was modified to fire automatically. A federal grand jury indicted the defendant for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. He sought to dismiss the indictment on constitutional grounds and to suppress the evidence, but while the United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted the suppression motion, the Ninth Circuit summarily reversed and remanded after a related case clarified that asking about parole status during a stop was permissible. The defendant then requested a stipulated-facts bench trial, after his request for a conditional plea was refused by the government. The district court found him guilty following the bench trial. At sentencing, the district court applied a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility but, over its stated disagreement, did not apply a third point because the government declined to move for it, citing resources expended preparing for trial. The court also applied an enhancement for possessing the firearm in connection with child endangerment, a “wobbler” offense under California law, finding the conduct was felonious. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the government has broad discretion to withhold the motion for the third acceptance point under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b), and the district court properly exercised its discretion in treating the child endangerment offense as a felony for sentencing purposes. View "USA V. YATES" on Justia Law

SERENITY INVESTMENTS, LLC, ET AL. V. SUN HUNG KAI STRATEGIC CAPITAL, LTD.

2026-07-29T08:01:15-08:00

Two investment entities entered into an agreement to sell a significant number of shares of a company to a purchaser. The seller was represented by a law firm as administrative agent and a broker as placement agent. Before the purchaser paid for the shares, it placed the transaction on hold. Despite this, the shares were mistakenly transferred to the purchaser. Multiple parties, including the administrative agent and broker, communicated about the error, and assurances were made that the transfer would be reversed. However, the reversal did not occur, and years later, the purchaser executed documents asserting ownership of the shares, which had notably increased in value. After demands for the return of the shares went unmet, the sellers filed suit. The shares were eventually returned, but their value had dropped. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California addressed claims brought by the sellers against the purchaser for conversion, among other causes of action. The purchaser, in turn, filed a third-party complaint seeking equitable indemnity and statutory contribution from the administrative agent and broker, alleging negligence in their handling of the transaction. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the third-party defendants on the equitable indemnity claim, reasoning that conversion is an intentional tort for which equitable indemnity is unavailable. The sellers and purchaser settled their claims, but the purchaser appealed the indemnity ruling. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. It held that, under California law, conversion is a strict liability tort, not an intentional tort requiring wrongful intent. Accordingly, a party liable for conversion may seek partial equitable indemnity from negligent joint tortfeasors. The panel reversed the district court’s summary judgment for the third-party defendants and remanded for further proceedings. View "SERENITY INVESTMENTS, LLC, ET AL. V. SUN HUNG KAI STRATEGIC CAPITAL, LTD." on Justia Law

USA V. LOPEZ

2026-07-28T08:01:15-08:00

Jonathan Lopez was charged with possessing a firearm as a prohibited person after previously being convicted of two felony offenses under California Penal Code § 273.5, which penalizes willfully inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition on certain victims such as spouses or cohabitants. Lopez pleaded guilty to the federal firearm charge but reserved the right to challenge whether his prior state convictions qualified as “crimes of violence” for the purpose of sentencing enhancements under the federal Sentencing Guidelines. In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, the probation office and the government recommended, and the court applied, an enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2), which raises the base offense level if the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence. The district court found that Lopez’s two prior convictions under § 273.5 met this criterion, following then-binding Ninth Circuit precedent. The court overruled Lopez’s objection to this classification and sentenced him to a term of 67 months, which was below the guideline range due to a downward variance. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered intervening Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit en banc decisions—Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021), and United States v. Gomez, 165 F.4th 1199 (9th Cir. 2026) (en banc)—which clarified that, to be a categorical crime of violence, an offense must require a mens rea greater than recklessness as to the use of force directed at another. The Ninth Circuit held that § 273.5 does not categorically qualify because it requires only the intent to commit the act, not intent or knowledge that force will be directed at another. The court vacated Lopez’s sentence and remanded for resentencing without the enhancement. View "USA V. LOPEZ" on Justia Law

KRZESNI V. WELLPINIT SCHOOL DISTRICT

2026-07-27T08:31:28-08:00

David Krzesni was employed by Wellpinit School District (WSD) as Project Director for a federally funded Native Youth Community Project Grant. Prior to Krzesni’s hiring, WSD had planned a trip to Hawaii for students and staff, believing it would further the grant’s objectives. After Krzesni started, he helped facilitate funding for the trip using grant money. However, federal approval for the trip was not obtained, and the grant’s federal contact later indicated such funding would not be approved. Krzesni participated in the trip, prepared an Annual Performance Report describing it, and later learned the trip expenses had already been paid from grant funds. He also contemplated leaving his position and discussed grant compliance concerns with colleagues and the federal grant contact. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington reviewed Krzesni’s claims for whistleblower retaliation under the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 41 U.S.C. § 4712, and wrongful discharge under Washington law. Krzesni alleged that his contract was not renewed in reprisal for disclosures regarding the unauthorized use of grant funds for the Hawaii trip. The district court granted summary judgment for WSD and its superintendent, reasoning that Krzesni did not make protected disclosures under the NDAA and was not “discharged” under Washington law, as his contract simply expired without renewal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Krzesni’s reporting of the Hawaii trip in the performance report and a rhetorical question to a supervisor did not constitute protected disclosures, as they did not objectively indicate misconduct. Additionally, even if a protected disclosure occurred during Krzesni’s call with the federal grant contact, WSD had already decided not to renew his contract beforehand, so no reprisal could be shown. The court further held that the nonrenewal of Krzesni’s contract was not considered a discharge under Washington law, thus defeating his wrongful discharge claim. View "KRZESNI V. WELLPINIT SCHOOL DISTRICT" on Justia Law

USA V. PATTERSON

2026-07-27T08:01:19-08:00

The case concerns a defendant who pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, after police discovered a loaded pistol on his person during a traffic stop. The prosecution sought an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), based on the defendant’s prior Oregon state felony convictions: two for third-degree assault and one for strangulation. The defendant challenged the use of these convictions as ACCA predicate offenses, arguing they did not meet the definition of “violent felonies.” He also argued that his constitutional rights were violated because the judge, rather than a jury, determined that his prior offenses occurred on different occasions, a necessary finding to trigger the ACCA enhancement. The United States District Court for the District of Oregon found that the prior convictions were for violent felonies and had been committed on different occasions, and imposed the ACCA’s mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years. The defendant appealed, raising the same constitutional and statutory objections. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It concluded that, in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Erlinger v. United States, the district court had erred under Apprendi v. New Jersey by making the separate-occasions finding itself, rather than submitting it to a jury. However, the Ninth Circuit held that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, because the record contained overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence that the offenses occurred on different occasions. The court also held that the defendant’s Oregon convictions for third-degree assault and strangulation qualified as violent felonies under the ACCA. The court therefore affirmed the sentence imposed by the district court. View "USA V. PATTERSON" on Justia Law

USA V. ANTEN

2026-07-27T08:01:19-08:00

The case centers on Mark William Anten, who, after previously serving as a confidential informant for the FBI, began sending a series of increasingly disturbing emails to former FBI handlers and other agents. These communications included self-identification as the “Unabomber,” explicit threats to bomb the Los Angeles FBI headquarters, and attachments referencing mass violence and bomb-making. The messages, sent in 2023, alarmed the agents involved, leading them to notify security and initiate threat assessments. Anten’s emails persisted despite warnings, culminating in his arrest in December 2023. A search of his residence uncovered no weapons or bomb-making materials. The United States District Court for the Central District of California presided over Anten’s trial. The jury convicted him on two counts of transmitting threats to injure others via interstate communications, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). During trial, Anten contested the jury instructions, arguing they failed to include an objective element for what constitutes a “threat,” and challenged the court’s response to a jury note about which exhibits were referenced in the indictment. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit examined whether the statute requires both an objective “threat” element and a subjective mental state element. The appellate court held that 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) indeed requires: (1) an objective element—meaning the communication must be viewed as a threat by a reasonable person—and (2) a subjective element—requiring at least recklessness as to whether the statement would be perceived as a threat. The court found that, while the jury instructions could have been clearer, they sufficiently included both elements. It also concluded that the district court’s response to the jury’s note was not improper. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction. View "USA V. ANTEN" on Justia Law

WEISS V. PERMANENTE MEDICAL GROUP, INC.

2026-07-24T08:01:25-08:00

An employee of The Permanente Medical Group, Inc. worked remotely as a Managerial Senior Consultant. After the employer instituted a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy requiring all employees to be vaccinated or to obtain a valid exemption, the employee requested a religious exemption, citing her beliefs as a Christian Jew and referencing relevant religious texts. The employer initially granted her a provisional exemption but later required more information to assess the sincerity of her beliefs. When she did not fully answer the supplemental questions, particularly declining to disclose information about her medical history, the employer revoked her exemption and terminated her employment for noncompliance with the vaccine mandate. After her termination, the employee filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging violations of Title VII and California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), as well as a claim under the California Constitution. The district court granted the employer’s motion to dismiss her statutory claims, holding that she had failed to allege that she adequately notified the employer of the conflict between her religious beliefs and the vaccine mandate. The court reasoned that her initial exemption request and responses to supplemental questions provided insufficient notice and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the employee’s allegations regarding notice of a religious conflict. The Ninth Circuit held that to satisfy the notice requirement for a prima facie case of religious accommodation under Title VII and FEHA, an employee must provide enough information for the employer to understand an actual conflict between religious beliefs and work requirements. The court found that the employee’s allegations met this standard at the pleading stage, reversed the district court’s dismissal of her statutory claims, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "WEISS V. PERMANENTE MEDICAL GROUP, INC." on Justia Law

USA V. PEREDA

2026-07-23T08:31:31-08:00

The defendant, a state supervisee subject to warrantless search conditions, was found by police in a trailer located near his girlfriend’s parents’ home. Officers searched both the trailer and a nearby Ford F-150 pickup truck believed to be used by the defendant. The trailer yielded ammunition, while the truck contained drugs. The defendant had reported his parents’ home as his residence, but GPS monitoring indicated he frequently stayed at the Goleta address, near the trailer. Officers had also previously conducted home visits at the Goleta address, and Pereda’s supervising officer had admonished him for not updating his reported residence. The United States District Court for the Central District of California reviewed the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence discovered in both the trailer and the pickup truck. The district court found that the officers lacked probable cause to believe either that the trailer was the defendant’s residence or that the truck was property under his control. Consequently, the district court granted the motion to suppress and excluded all evidence recovered from the searches. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether the searches were consistent with Fourth Amendment requirements, specifically the parolee exception to the warrant requirement. The Ninth Circuit concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had probable cause to believe the defendant resided in or controlled the trailer and owned or controlled the pickup truck. Accordingly, the panel held that both searches were valid under the defendant’s supervised release conditions and the Fourth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting the motion to suppress and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "USA V. PEREDA" on Justia Law

DIAZ-BOYZO V. BLANCHE

2026-07-23T08:01:16-08:00

A lawful permanent resident from Mexico pleaded guilty in Oregon state court to two counts of felony fourth-degree assault for physically assaulting his wife in the immediate presence of their minor children. The events occurred in 2013, and the charges were brought under Oregon Revised Statutes § 163.160(1)(a), (3)(c), which enhances misdemeanor assault to a felony when committed in the presence of a minor child. He was sentenced to two years in prison, followed by probation. After his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security charged him with removability from the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), arguing his conviction constituted a “crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment.” An Immigration Judge found him removable on this ground, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed that decision. The individual then petitioned for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the Oregon statute was overbroad and indivisible, and thus not a categorical match to the federal offense. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that, although the Oregon statute covered conduct unrelated to children and was therefore overbroad, it was divisible into alternative elements. Applying the modified categorical approach, the court determined that the petitioner’s conviction was specifically for assault in the presence of his minor children. The court held that this offense matched the definition of a “crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment” under federal law, as interpreted in Leon-Briviesca v. Blanche, because committing assault in a child’s presence places the child at real risk of bodily or mental harm and requires at least criminal negligence. The Ninth Circuit therefore denied the petition for review. View "DIAZ-BOYZO V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

TORRES-CASAS V. BLANCHE

2026-07-22T08:01:26-08:00

A native and citizen of Mexico applied for cancellation of removal, claiming that his removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his U.S.-citizen son and daughter, as well as his lawful permanent resident parents. At the time of the immigration judge’s decision, his son was 20 years old, just under the statutory age cutoff for qualifying as a “child” under the relevant immigration law. The applicant lived with his family, worked as an auto mechanic, and provided significant financial support. His mother had several health issues, but received assistance from her daughter. An Immigration Judge denied the application, finding that, although removal would cause emotional and financial hardship, it would not rise to the level required by statute. The judge noted that family members could visit the applicant in Mexico and maintain relationships, and that his mother would continue to have access to medical care. The applicant appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). While the appeal was pending, his son turned 21. The BIA determined it could no longer consider hardship to the son, since he had aged out, and affirmed the denial based on insufficient hardship to the other qualifying relatives. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the petition for review. The court held that under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D), qualifying relatives must be assessed at the time of the agency’s final adjudication, meaning a child who turns 21 during an appeal to the BIA ceases to be a qualifying relative. The court also concluded that substantial evidence supported the agency’s determination that the petitioner failed to establish the required level of hardship to his remaining qualifying relatives, and denied the petition. View "TORRES-CASAS V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

THEIS V. INTERMOUNTAIN EDUCATION SERVICE DISTRICT

2026-07-21T08:33:10-08:00

A licensed clinical social worker employed as an Education Specialist by a regional education service district in Oregon displayed books in his school offices that expressed particular viewpoints on gender identity. These books, visible to students during evaluations and meetings, prompted a complaint alleging that the displays constituted a hostile bias incident under the district’s policy designed to prevent discrimination and address bias in public education settings. The district investigated, concluded that the displays violated its policy, and ordered the employee to remove the books when students were present, warning that failure to comply could result in discipline, including termination. The employee filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon alleging violations of his First Amendment free speech rights and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the district from enforcing its directive. The district court granted the injunction in part, allowing the employee to display the books when students were not present but prohibiting displays during student-facing activities. The court reasoned that, while engaging with students as part of his official duties, the employee spoke as a government employee rather than as a private citizen and therefore was not entitled to First Amendment protection for his displays. After the employee continued to display the books in the presence of students, the district initiated additional proceedings, resulting in his termination. The employee appealed both the partial denial of injunctive relief and the denial of his motion to enforce the injunction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The Ninth Circuit held that the employee’s display of the books while meeting with students in his official capacity was speech as a government employee and not protected by the First Amendment. Because this speech was undertaken pursuant to his professional responsibilities, the court did not apply the Pickering balancing test. The denial of preliminary injunctive relief was found not to be an abuse of discretion. View "THEIS V. INTERMOUNTAIN EDUCATION SERVICE DISTRICT" on Justia Law

SEAGRAVES V. WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN YOUTH AND FAMILIES

2026-07-21T08:01:27-08:00

A group of former employees of the Washington Department of Children, Youth, and Families challenged the agency’s implementation of a COVID-19 vaccine mandate issued by the Governor of Washington. After their requests for religious exemptions were granted, the agency denied their requests for reasonable accommodations that would allow them to remain unvaccinated and continue in their positions. The agency explained that, due to the nature of their roles, unvaccinated employees could not safely perform essential functions without posing a risk to others. The employees were ultimately separated from employment. They alleged constitutional violations and state law claims, asserting that the agency and certain officials discriminated against them based on religion and failed to provide required procedural protections. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed all claims. It found that the employees had not sufficiently alleged ongoing violations of federal law for injunctive relief, nor had they adequately alleged personal involvement by any official in the claimed constitutional violations. The court dismissed the federal claims and all state law claims, initially granting leave to amend. After the employees filed an amended complaint naming additional officials and asserting similar legal theories without new factual allegations, the district court dismissed the case without leave to amend and denied reconsideration. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the employees failed to plausibly allege personal involvement by any official in constitutional violations, and that official-capacity claims for prospective injunctive relief were barred by the Eleventh Amendment because there was no ongoing violation of federal law. It further concluded that the district court acted within its discretion in denying leave to amend, as amendment would have been futile. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal and denial of leave to amend. View "SEAGRAVES V. WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN YOUTH AND FAMILIES" on Justia Law