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	<title>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - Justia Case Law Summaries</title>
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	<id>https://law.justia.com/summaryfeed/ca5/</id>
	<updated>2026-11-08T12:41:33-08:00</updated>
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	        <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20255/24-20255-2026-11-04.html</id>
        	<title>Casa Tradicion v. Casa Azul</title>
        	<updated>2026-11-04T16:30:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-11-04T16:30:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20255/24-20255-2026-11-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		This dispute centers on two companies selling tequila products under similar marks. One company, known for its luxury tequila brand marketed as “Clase Azul,” has been selling its product in the United States since 2003 and registered its mark in 2008. The opposing company, Casa Azul Spirits, began selling tequila sodas in 2022 and later introduced bottled tequila in 2023, both under the “Casa Azul” mark. Casa Azul targets a younger demographic with affordable products, while Clase Azul’s offerings appeal to affluent consumers and are sold at a premium price point. The plaintiff claims that Casa Azul’s use of the mark creates consumer confusion and infringes upon its trademark.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas held a bench trial and found in favor of Casa Azul, concluding that Clase Azul had not demonstrated a likelihood of consumer confusion. The court denied requests by Clase Azul to expand its witness list and extend discovery for additional surveys. It also denied a preliminary injunction and ultimately dismissed claims for trademark infringement, unfair competition, and cancellation of Casa Azul’s trademark registration.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s findings for clear error and legal mistakes. The Fifth Circuit determined that the lower court erred in its analysis of the strength of the mark, similarity of products, retail outlets, and actual confusion evidence. Specifically, the district court misclassified the mark as descriptive instead of suggestive, overlooked substantial evidence of actual confusion, and incorrectly assessed third-party use and product similarity. The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, but affirmed the district court’s evidentiary and discovery rulings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20255/24-20255-2026-11-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Casa Tradicion v. Casa Azul" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                This dispute centers on two companies selling tequila products under similar marks. One company, known for its luxury tequila brand marketed as “Clase Azul,” has been selling its product in the United States since 2003 and registered its mark in 2008. The opposing company, Casa Azul Spirits, began selling tequila sodas in 2022 and later introduced bottled tequila in 2023, both under the “Casa Azul” mark. Casa Azul targets a younger demographic with affordable products, while Clase Azul’s offerings appeal to affluent consumers and are sold at a premium price point. The plaintiff claims that Casa Azul’s use of the mark creates consumer confusion and infringes upon its trademark.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas held a bench trial and found in favor of Casa Azul, concluding that Clase Azul had not demonstrated a likelihood of consumer confusion. The court denied requests by Clase Azul to expand its witness list and extend discovery for additional surveys. It also denied a preliminary injunction and ultimately dismissed claims for trademark infringement, unfair competition, and cancellation of Casa Azul’s trademark registration.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s findings for clear error and legal mistakes. The Fifth Circuit determined that the lower court erred in its analysis of the strength of the mark, similarity of products, retail outlets, and actual confusion evidence. Specifically, the district court misclassified the mark as descriptive instead of suggestive, overlooked substantial evidence of actual confusion, and incorrectly assessed third-party use and product similarity. The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, but affirmed the district court’s evidentiary and discovery rulings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-11-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jennifer Elrod</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Trademark"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-10136/26-10136-2026-11-04.html</id>
        	<title>Thomas v. Leyline Publishing</title>
        	<updated>2026-11-04T10:30:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-11-04T10:30:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-10136/26-10136-2026-11-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A dispute arose between two parties who had entered into a contractual agreement to jointly develop and market a therapeutic tabletop role-playing game. The plaintiffs, including the individual who originally developed the game and his company, had created intellectual property related to the game and later formed a business entity to market and distribute it. The defendants, including a psychologist and his companies, operate a business that integrates therapeutic practices with “geek” culture, and they sought to develop and sell the game using their resources. The parties executed a second licensing agreement (SLA) that allowed the defendants to use, market, and sell the game content, while the plaintiffs retained ownership of the intellectual property until a future sale was negotiated. Disagreements arose after a potential change to a third-party game license led the plaintiffs to propose significant changes to the game, which the defendants opposed due to business concerns. Communication broke down, and the plaintiffs eventually demanded that the defendants cease use of the game and related intellectual property.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas found in favor of the defendants, granting summary judgment and dismissing all claims. The district court determined that the SLA was a valid, binding contract authorizing the defendants to use the content, and that the plaintiffs’ failure to bill for certain services did not constitute a breach allowing them to terminate the agreement. The court also rejected claims related to derivative works, trademark use, and the use of the individual plaintiff’s name and likeness, finding the actions authorized by the contract.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fifth Circuit held that the SLA was valid and enforceable, that it authorized the defendants’ use of the game content and associated intellectual property, and that the plaintiffs’ claims for intellectual property infringement, name-and-image misappropriation, and unjust enrichment were properly dismissed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-10136/26-10136-2026-11-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Thomas v. Leyline Publishing" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A dispute arose between two parties who had entered into a contractual agreement to jointly develop and market a therapeutic tabletop role-playing game. The plaintiffs, including the individual who originally developed the game and his company, had created intellectual property related to the game and later formed a business entity to market and distribute it. The defendants, including a psychologist and his companies, operate a business that integrates therapeutic practices with “geek” culture, and they sought to develop and sell the game using their resources. The parties executed a second licensing agreement (SLA) that allowed the defendants to use, market, and sell the game content, while the plaintiffs retained ownership of the intellectual property until a future sale was negotiated. Disagreements arose after a potential change to a third-party game license led the plaintiffs to propose significant changes to the game, which the defendants opposed due to business concerns. Communication broke down, and the plaintiffs eventually demanded that the defendants cease use of the game and related intellectual property.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas found in favor of the defendants, granting summary judgment and dismissing all claims. The district court determined that the SLA was a valid, binding contract authorizing the defendants to use the content, and that the plaintiffs’ failure to bill for certain services did not constitute a breach allowing them to terminate the agreement. The court also rejected claims related to derivative works, trademark use, and the use of the individual plaintiff’s name and likeness, finding the actions authorized by the contract.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fifth Circuit held that the SLA was valid and enforceable, that it authorized the defendants’ use of the game content and associated intellectual property, and that the plaintiffs’ claims for intellectual property infringement, name-and-image misappropriation, and unjust enrichment were properly dismissed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-11-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Carl Stewart</case:judge>
													<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40388/25-40388-2026-11-02.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Herndon</title>
        	<updated>2026-11-02T16:30:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-11-02T16:30:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40388/25-40388-2026-11-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant led a prostitution operation involving several girls, some as young as 13, 15, and 16 years old. He did not dispute that he trafficked these minors but claimed he was unaware of their ages. The government charged him under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) for sex trafficking of children and under 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c) for conspiracy, alleging that he acted knowingly or in reckless disregard of the victims’ ages. At trial, the government presented substantial evidence indicating the defendant knew or was reckless as to the minors’ ages, including his statements and his actions toward individual victims.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas conducted the trial. During the trial, the court instructed the jury that it could convict the defendant if it found he either knew or recklessly disregarded the victims’ ages, or if he had a reasonable opportunity to observe them—an alternative theory not included in the indictment. The defendant did not object to this instruction at trial. After conviction on all counts and a life sentence, he appealed, arguing that the jury instructions constructively amended the indictment, warranting reversal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the conviction for plain error, as the defendant had not timely objected to the jury instruction. The court concluded that although the instruction was a plain error, it did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights because he had ample notice of the government’s alternative theory and overwhelming evidence supported a finding of knowledge or reckless disregard. The Fifth Circuit also determined that discretionary reversal was unwarranted in light of the substantial evidence against the defendant and affirmed the conviction and sentence. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40388/25-40388-2026-11-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Herndon" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant led a prostitution operation involving several girls, some as young as 13, 15, and 16 years old. He did not dispute that he trafficked these minors but claimed he was unaware of their ages. The government charged him under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) for sex trafficking of children and under 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c) for conspiracy, alleging that he acted knowingly or in reckless disregard of the victims’ ages. At trial, the government presented substantial evidence indicating the defendant knew or was reckless as to the minors’ ages, including his statements and his actions toward individual victims.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas conducted the trial. During the trial, the court instructed the jury that it could convict the defendant if it found he either knew or recklessly disregarded the victims’ ages, or if he had a reasonable opportunity to observe them—an alternative theory not included in the indictment. The defendant did not object to this instruction at trial. After conviction on all counts and a life sentence, he appealed, arguing that the jury instructions constructively amended the indictment, warranting reversal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the conviction for plain error, as the defendant had not timely objected to the jury instruction. The court concluded that although the instruction was a plain error, it did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights because he had ample notice of the government’s alternative theory and overwhelming evidence supported a finding of knowledge or reckless disregard. The Fifth Circuit also determined that discretionary reversal was unwarranted in light of the substantial evidence against the defendant and affirmed the conviction and sentence.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-11-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James C. Ho</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11146/25-11146-2026-10-30.html</id>
        	<title>De Chavez v. UPS</title>
        	<updated>2026-10-30T09:30:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-10-30T09:30:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11146/25-11146-2026-10-30.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		After the death of Juan Chavez, his family members brought a wrongful death action in Texas state court against several defendants, including United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) and a group of other companies alleged to be involved in the incident. After the initial suit was voluntarily dismissed, the plaintiffs filed a new action in state court, naming the same defendants as well as an additional Texas-based defendant, Fusion Recycling, LLC. UPS removed the case to federal court, asserting diversity jurisdiction, but plaintiffs argued that Fusion’s inclusion defeated diversity. UPS countered that Fusion was improperly joined and should not be considered for jurisdictional purposes.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, acting sua sponte, remanded the case to state court. The court found that UPS’s notice of removal failed to establish the plaintiffs’ citizenship, as it relied only on allegations of residency and not citizenship. The district court did not give UPS an opportunity to cure this deficiency and did not make an affirmative finding that complete diversity was lacking.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered whether it had jurisdiction to review the remand order. The Fifth Circuit determined that the district court’s remand was based on a procedural defect—specifically, insufficient pleading of citizenship—rather than a determination of subject matter jurisdiction. Because the remand was sua sponte and not based on a plaintiff’s motion, the appellate bar under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) did not apply. The Fifth Circuit held it had jurisdiction to review the remand order and found that UPS’s allegations of citizenship, made upon information and belief and supported by residency facts, were sufficient at this early stage. The court vacated the remand order and returned the case for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11146/25-11146-2026-10-30.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "De Chavez v. UPS" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                After the death of Juan Chavez, his family members brought a wrongful death action in Texas state court against several defendants, including United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) and a group of other companies alleged to be involved in the incident. After the initial suit was voluntarily dismissed, the plaintiffs filed a new action in state court, naming the same defendants as well as an additional Texas-based defendant, Fusion Recycling, LLC. UPS removed the case to federal court, asserting diversity jurisdiction, but plaintiffs argued that Fusion’s inclusion defeated diversity. UPS countered that Fusion was improperly joined and should not be considered for jurisdictional purposes.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, acting sua sponte, remanded the case to state court. The court found that UPS’s notice of removal failed to establish the plaintiffs’ citizenship, as it relied only on allegations of residency and not citizenship. The district court did not give UPS an opportunity to cure this deficiency and did not make an affirmative finding that complete diversity was lacking.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered whether it had jurisdiction to review the remand order. The Fifth Circuit determined that the district court’s remand was based on a procedural defect—specifically, insufficient pleading of citizenship—rather than a determination of subject matter jurisdiction. Because the remand was sua sponte and not based on a plaintiff’s motion, the appellate bar under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) did not apply. The Fifth Circuit held it had jurisdiction to review the remand order and found that UPS’s allegations of citizenship, made upon information and belief and supported by residency facts, were sufficient at this early stage. The court vacated the remand order and returned the case for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-10-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James C. Ho</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-10747/26-10747-2026-10-29.html</id>
        	<title>Motorola v. Advanced Standard Communication</title>
        	<updated>2026-10-29T09:30:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-10-29T09:30:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-10747/26-10747-2026-10-29.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A company based in Texas purchased a group of telecommunications patents and soon after sued another company for patent infringement in several European courts, including the European Union’s Unified Patent Court (UPC) and a German district court. The defendant in those foreign proceedings argued that its products did not infringe the patents and, in the alternative, that the patents must be licensed on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms. To support its FRAND defense, the defendant sought access to an unredacted patent purchase agreement, which it believed contained information relevant to the appropriate licensing terms.

After the UPC denied the defendant’s request for production of the unredacted agreement—finding the request unsubstantiated and the information likely irrelevant at that stage—the defendant applied to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas for discovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1782. A federal magistrate judge granted the discovery request, and the district court affirmed, applying a deferential standard of review and requiring the plaintiff to provide “authoritative proof” that the European courts would not be receptive to the discovery.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in both its standard of review and its allocation of the burden of proof. The Fifth Circuit clarified that district courts must review magistrate judge recommendations on § 1782 applications de novo, as such applications are dispositive. The Court further held that respondents are not required to provide authoritative proof of foreign court non-receptivity and that the lower court misapplied the discretionary factors set out in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. The appellate court found that the balance of factors weighed against permitting discovery at this time and reversed the district court’s order granting discovery. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-10747/26-10747-2026-10-29.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Motorola v. Advanced Standard Communication" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A company based in Texas purchased a group of telecommunications patents and soon after sued another company for patent infringement in several European courts, including the European Union’s Unified Patent Court (UPC) and a German district court. The defendant in those foreign proceedings argued that its products did not infringe the patents and, in the alternative, that the patents must be licensed on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms. To support its FRAND defense, the defendant sought access to an unredacted patent purchase agreement, which it believed contained information relevant to the appropriate licensing terms.

After the UPC denied the defendant’s request for production of the unredacted agreement—finding the request unsubstantiated and the information likely irrelevant at that stage—the defendant applied to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas for discovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1782. A federal magistrate judge granted the discovery request, and the district court affirmed, applying a deferential standard of review and requiring the plaintiff to provide “authoritative proof” that the European courts would not be receptive to the discovery.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in both its standard of review and its allocation of the burden of proof. The Fifth Circuit clarified that district courts must review magistrate judge recommendations on § 1782 applications de novo, as such applications are dispositive. The Court further held that respondents are not required to provide authoritative proof of foreign court non-receptivity and that the lower court misapplied the discretionary factors set out in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. The appellate court found that the balance of factors weighed against permitting discovery at this time and reversed the district court’s order granting discovery.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-10-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Edith Jones</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60017/25-60017-2026-10-29.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Harris</title>
        	<updated>2026-10-29T09:30:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-10-29T09:30:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60017/25-60017-2026-10-29.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute under federal law. He ultimately pled guilty and, as part of his plea agreement, he waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence, except for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. During the plea process, the defendant confirmed in open court that he had read, discussed, and understood the terms of the plea agreement, including the appeal waiver. He was sentenced to 240 months in prison. The conduct underlying the sentencing enhancements involved the defendant fleeing law enforcement by driving through residential property, which led to the district court applying certain enhancements to his sentence.

Following sentencing, the defendant appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, challenging the application of sentencing enhancements and arguing his appeal waiver was not knowing and voluntary. The government argued that the appeal should be dismissed based on the waiver. The Fifth Circuit initially dismissed the appeal, enforcing the waiver. The Supreme Court of the United States then decided Hunter v. United States, establishing that appeal waivers are unenforceable if enforcing them would result in a miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration under the Hunter standard.

On remand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that the defendant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary. The court further found that, under the Hunter standard, the alleged sentencing errors were not the type of egregious errors that would constitute a miscarriage of justice. As a result, the Fifth Circuit enforced the appeal waiver and dismissed the appeal. The court’s holding was that no miscarriage of justice occurred, and the appeal waiver remained enforceable. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60017/25-60017-2026-10-29.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Harris" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute under federal law. He ultimately pled guilty and, as part of his plea agreement, he waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence, except for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. During the plea process, the defendant confirmed in open court that he had read, discussed, and understood the terms of the plea agreement, including the appeal waiver. He was sentenced to 240 months in prison. The conduct underlying the sentencing enhancements involved the defendant fleeing law enforcement by driving through residential property, which led to the district court applying certain enhancements to his sentence.

Following sentencing, the defendant appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, challenging the application of sentencing enhancements and arguing his appeal waiver was not knowing and voluntary. The government argued that the appeal should be dismissed based on the waiver. The Fifth Circuit initially dismissed the appeal, enforcing the waiver. The Supreme Court of the United States then decided Hunter v. United States, establishing that appeal waivers are unenforceable if enforcing them would result in a miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration under the Hunter standard.

On remand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that the defendant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary. The court further found that, under the Hunter standard, the alleged sentencing errors were not the type of egregious errors that would constitute a miscarriage of justice. As a result, the Fifth Circuit enforced the appeal waiver and dismissed the appeal. The court’s holding was that no miscarriage of justice occurred, and the appeal waiver remained enforceable.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-10-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-60361/23-60361-2026-10-27.html</id>
        	<title>Dufour v. BP Exploration &amp; Production</title>
        	<updated>2026-10-27T15:30:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-10-27T15:30:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-60361/23-60361-2026-10-27.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The plaintiff worked as a cleanup worker in Pascagoula, Mississippi, following the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, allegedly exposed to crude oil and chemical dispersants through inhalation and direct contact. He claimed this exposure caused a chronic worsening of his preexisting asthma. The plaintiff sued BP Exploration &amp; Production, Inc. and BP America Production Company under the Back-End Litigation Option (BELO) of the Medical Settlement Agreement related to the Deepwater Horizon class-action litigation. The parties stipulated to venue in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.

The litigation required the plaintiff to prove that his injuries were legally caused by exposure to oil spill-related substances. He proffered two experts, Dr. Michael Freeman and Dr. Shawn French, to establish causation. BP moved to exclude their testimony and for summary judgment. The district court denied the plaintiff’s request for an evidentiary hearing, excluded the expert testimony, and granted summary judgment in favor of BP, finding that the expert evidence was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to causation. The plaintiff timely appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that toxic tort causation standards, requiring expert testimony to establish both general and specific causation, apply under maritime law for BELO claims involving non-readily observable injuries with multiple possible etiologies. The Fifth Circuit found the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the plaintiff’s experts, both for lack of reliability and relevance under Rule 702 and Daubert, and for deficiencies in qualifications and methodology. The district court’s grant of summary judgment was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-60361/23-60361-2026-10-27.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Dufour v. BP Exploration &amp; Production" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The plaintiff worked as a cleanup worker in Pascagoula, Mississippi, following the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, allegedly exposed to crude oil and chemical dispersants through inhalation and direct contact. He claimed this exposure caused a chronic worsening of his preexisting asthma. The plaintiff sued BP Exploration &amp; Production, Inc. and BP America Production Company under the Back-End Litigation Option (BELO) of the Medical Settlement Agreement related to the Deepwater Horizon class-action litigation. The parties stipulated to venue in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.

The litigation required the plaintiff to prove that his injuries were legally caused by exposure to oil spill-related substances. He proffered two experts, Dr. Michael Freeman and Dr. Shawn French, to establish causation. BP moved to exclude their testimony and for summary judgment. The district court denied the plaintiff’s request for an evidentiary hearing, excluded the expert testimony, and granted summary judgment in favor of BP, finding that the expert evidence was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to causation. The plaintiff timely appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that toxic tort causation standards, requiring expert testimony to establish both general and specific causation, apply under maritime law for BELO claims involving non-readily observable injuries with multiple possible etiologies. The Fifth Circuit found the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the plaintiff’s experts, both for lack of reliability and relevance under Rule 702 and Daubert, and for deficiencies in qualifications and methodology. The district court’s grant of summary judgment was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-10-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Priscilla Richman</case:judge>
													<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Admiralty &amp; Maritime Law"/>
							<category term="Personal Injury"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20348/25-20348-2026-10-27.html</id>
        	<title>Stramaski v. Lawley</title>
        	<updated>2026-10-27T15:30:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-10-27T15:30:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20348/25-20348-2026-10-27.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Eva Stramaski, an academic advisor at Texas A&amp;M University, was concerned her paycheck might arrive late after returning from medical leave. Despite being paid on time, her supervisor, Mark Lawley, accused her of being “aggressive” about the issue, sent her home, and issued a “coaching letter” citing performance problems. Stramaski disputed these allegations, and Lawley fired her a few days later. She then brought suit against Lawley in his personal capacity under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), claiming retaliation for asserting her right to timely pay.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas first heard the case. Lawley moved to dismiss the suit, arguing sovereign immunity and qualified immunity. A magistrate judge recommended dismissing claims for injunctive and declaratory relief but rejected both immunity defenses, and the district court adopted the recommendations over Lawley’s objections. Lawley appealed. In its first review (Stramaski I), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that sovereign immunity did not bar the case against Lawley personally but left open the issue of qualified immunity, remanding for further analysis. On remand, the district court again denied Lawley’s qualified immunity defense, and Lawley appealed a second time.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in this second appeal, addressed whether a public official may invoke qualified immunity in an FLSA retaliation suit. The court held that qualified immunity does not apply to such claims. It reasoned that, at the time Congress authorized private FLSA retaliation suits, the common law did not shield officials from malicious retaliation, and the purposes underlying qualified immunity are incompatible with the FLSA’s anti-retaliation protections. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of Lawley’s motion to dismiss. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20348/25-20348-2026-10-27.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Stramaski v. Lawley" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Eva Stramaski, an academic advisor at Texas A&amp;M University, was concerned her paycheck might arrive late after returning from medical leave. Despite being paid on time, her supervisor, Mark Lawley, accused her of being “aggressive” about the issue, sent her home, and issued a “coaching letter” citing performance problems. Stramaski disputed these allegations, and Lawley fired her a few days later. She then brought suit against Lawley in his personal capacity under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), claiming retaliation for asserting her right to timely pay.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas first heard the case. Lawley moved to dismiss the suit, arguing sovereign immunity and qualified immunity. A magistrate judge recommended dismissing claims for injunctive and declaratory relief but rejected both immunity defenses, and the district court adopted the recommendations over Lawley’s objections. Lawley appealed. In its first review (Stramaski I), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that sovereign immunity did not bar the case against Lawley personally but left open the issue of qualified immunity, remanding for further analysis. On remand, the district court again denied Lawley’s qualified immunity defense, and Lawley appealed a second time.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in this second appeal, addressed whether a public official may invoke qualified immunity in an FLSA retaliation suit. The court held that qualified immunity does not apply to such claims. It reasoned that, at the time Congress authorized private FLSA retaliation suits, the common law did not shield officials from malicious retaliation, and the purposes underlying qualified immunity are incompatible with the FLSA’s anti-retaliation protections. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of Lawley’s motion to dismiss.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-10-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Don Willett</case:judge>
													<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-40061/26-40061-2026-10-26.html</id>
        	<title>Bien v. Union Pacific</title>
        	<updated>2026-10-26T15:30:05-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-10-26T15:30:05-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-40061/26-40061-2026-10-26.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		James Bien worked as a conductor for Union Pacific Railroad Company. In 2013, he failed two vision tests required for his job and was subsequently removed from his conductor position, receiving a work restriction that prevented him from performing duties requiring color signal recognition. After several months, he was employed by Union Pacific in a different, lower-paying role. In 2015, following a notification from the company, Bien took another vision test, which he passed. He then requested a follow-up test to potentially remove his work restriction and be reinstated as a conductor. Union Pacific denied this request, determining that his prior test failures were dispositive and that the new test had been administered in error. Bien filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC in April 2020 and later brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in January 2025.

Prior to Bien&#039;s lawsuit, a class action had been filed in the District of Nebraska, Harris v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, challenging similar employment actions by Union Pacific. The initial class definition was broad, but the court later certified a narrower class. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas concluded that Bien fell within the original class definition but not the certified, narrower one, reasoning that his 2015 testing and related correspondence did not constitute a “fitness-for-duty examination” under the certified class. As a result, the district court held that the statute of limitations barred Bien’s claim and dismissed his case.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo and reversed the district court’s decision. The Fifth Circuit held that, under American Pipe tolling, a plaintiff must be unambiguously excluded from a class definition to terminate tolling of the statute of limitations. Because Bien was not unambiguously excluded from the certified class, he was entitled to tolling, and his suit was not time-barred. The case was remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-40061/26-40061-2026-10-26.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Bien v. Union Pacific" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                James Bien worked as a conductor for Union Pacific Railroad Company. In 2013, he failed two vision tests required for his job and was subsequently removed from his conductor position, receiving a work restriction that prevented him from performing duties requiring color signal recognition. After several months, he was employed by Union Pacific in a different, lower-paying role. In 2015, following a notification from the company, Bien took another vision test, which he passed. He then requested a follow-up test to potentially remove his work restriction and be reinstated as a conductor. Union Pacific denied this request, determining that his prior test failures were dispositive and that the new test had been administered in error. Bien filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC in April 2020 and later brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in January 2025.

Prior to Bien&#039;s lawsuit, a class action had been filed in the District of Nebraska, Harris v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, challenging similar employment actions by Union Pacific. The initial class definition was broad, but the court later certified a narrower class. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas concluded that Bien fell within the original class definition but not the certified, narrower one, reasoning that his 2015 testing and related correspondence did not constitute a “fitness-for-duty examination” under the certified class. As a result, the district court held that the statute of limitations barred Bien’s claim and dismissed his case.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo and reversed the district court’s decision. The Fifth Circuit held that, under American Pipe tolling, a plaintiff must be unambiguously excluded from a class definition to terminate tolling of the statute of limitations. Because Bien was not unambiguously excluded from the certified class, he was entitled to tolling, and his suit was not time-barred. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-10-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40746/25-40746-2026-10-23.html</id>
        	<title>Lucio v. Brownsville Independent School District</title>
        	<updated>2026-10-23T15:30:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-10-23T15:30:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40746/25-40746-2026-10-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A coach and teacher employed by a Texas school district, along with his wife and their son, brought suit after two separate incidents involving the school and its employees. The first incident occurred when the coach’s son was accused by a fellow student of inappropriate conduct, resulting in the seizure of a phone, a public escort through the school by security personnel, and alleged detention and interrogation of the son. The father was sanctioned and ordered not to return to work, and the family claims these actions harmed their reputations and career prospects. The second incident took place the following year when the coach attended a school board meeting to celebrate his team’s achievements. During the event, he refused to shake hands with certain board members and employees, citing both personal grievances and a desire to avoid the appearance of political endorsement. He was subsequently warned and transferred to another school, which he alleges was retaliation.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed several of the plaintiffs’ claims. The court found no Fifth Amendment violation because the plaintiffs did not allege that any compelled statements were used against them in a criminal case. Regarding the First Amendment claim, the court concluded that the coach’s conduct at the board meeting was undertaken in his official capacity, not as a private citizen, and primarily concerned personal matters rather than public concern. The court also dismissed the related Texas constitutional claim for similar reasons. Other claims were voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs, and a final judgment was issued.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissals de novo and affirmed. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs failed to allege a plausible Fifth Amendment violation under Chavez v. Martinez because no compelled statement was used in a criminal case. It further held that the coach’s actions at the board meeting were not protected speech under the First Amendment, as they arose from his official duties rather than as a private citizen. The dismissal of related claims under state law was also affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40746/25-40746-2026-10-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Lucio v. Brownsville Independent School District" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A coach and teacher employed by a Texas school district, along with his wife and their son, brought suit after two separate incidents involving the school and its employees. The first incident occurred when the coach’s son was accused by a fellow student of inappropriate conduct, resulting in the seizure of a phone, a public escort through the school by security personnel, and alleged detention and interrogation of the son. The father was sanctioned and ordered not to return to work, and the family claims these actions harmed their reputations and career prospects. The second incident took place the following year when the coach attended a school board meeting to celebrate his team’s achievements. During the event, he refused to shake hands with certain board members and employees, citing both personal grievances and a desire to avoid the appearance of political endorsement. He was subsequently warned and transferred to another school, which he alleges was retaliation.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed several of the plaintiffs’ claims. The court found no Fifth Amendment violation because the plaintiffs did not allege that any compelled statements were used against them in a criminal case. Regarding the First Amendment claim, the court concluded that the coach’s conduct at the board meeting was undertaken in his official capacity, not as a private citizen, and primarily concerned personal matters rather than public concern. The court also dismissed the related Texas constitutional claim for similar reasons. Other claims were voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs, and a final judgment was issued.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissals de novo and affirmed. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs failed to allege a plausible Fifth Amendment violation under Chavez v. Martinez because no compelled statement was used in a criminal case. It further held that the coach’s actions at the board meeting were not protected speech under the First Amendment, as they arose from his official duties rather than as a private citizen. The dismissal of related claims under state law was also affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-10-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10784/25-10784-2026-10-23.html</id>
        	<title>Rand v. Eyemart Express</title>
        	<updated>2026-10-23T09:30:09-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-10-23T09:30:09-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10784/25-10784-2026-10-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A group of Facebook users who interacted with an optical retailer’s website alleged that the company installed a Meta Pixel tracking tool on its site, which collected and transmitted users’ sensitive health-related information—such as browsing for prescription eyewear, entering prescription details, and scheduling eye exams—to Meta Platforms, Inc. without their consent. The users claimed this information qualified as individually identifiable health information under federal law and should not have been shared without authorization. The plaintiffs divided themselves into two groups: those who browsed or scheduled appointments (“Search Plaintiffs”) and those who entered prescription information to purchase eyewear (“Prescription Plaintiffs”).

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas initially found that the plaintiffs had standing but dismissed their first complaint for failure to state a claim, allowing them to amend. After the plaintiffs filed their amended complaint, the district court again dismissed the case with prejudice. It held that the Search Plaintiffs had not adequately alleged they shared any protected health information with the defendant, and that the Prescription Plaintiffs had failed to show any such information was actually disclosed to Meta through the Pixel.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the unauthorized disclosure of the plaintiffs’ health information to Meta constituted a concrete and particularized injury, affirming that the plaintiffs had standing. The court held that both groups of plaintiffs adequately alleged that their individually identifiable health information was transmitted to Meta without their consent. The Fifth Circuit therefore reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10784/25-10784-2026-10-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Rand v. Eyemart Express" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A group of Facebook users who interacted with an optical retailer’s website alleged that the company installed a Meta Pixel tracking tool on its site, which collected and transmitted users’ sensitive health-related information—such as browsing for prescription eyewear, entering prescription details, and scheduling eye exams—to Meta Platforms, Inc. without their consent. The users claimed this information qualified as individually identifiable health information under federal law and should not have been shared without authorization. The plaintiffs divided themselves into two groups: those who browsed or scheduled appointments (“Search Plaintiffs”) and those who entered prescription information to purchase eyewear (“Prescription Plaintiffs”).

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas initially found that the plaintiffs had standing but dismissed their first complaint for failure to state a claim, allowing them to amend. After the plaintiffs filed their amended complaint, the district court again dismissed the case with prejudice. It held that the Search Plaintiffs had not adequately alleged they shared any protected health information with the defendant, and that the Prescription Plaintiffs had failed to show any such information was actually disclosed to Meta through the Pixel.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the unauthorized disclosure of the plaintiffs’ health information to Meta constituted a concrete and particularized injury, affirming that the plaintiffs had standing. The court held that both groups of plaintiffs adequately alleged that their individually identifiable health information was transmitted to Meta without their consent. The Fifth Circuit therefore reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-10-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Consumer Law"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-50221/26-50221-2026-10-23.html</id>
        	<title>Alvarado v. Vergara</title>
        	<updated>2026-10-23T09:30:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-10-23T09:30:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-50221/26-50221-2026-10-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Three individuals, all foreign nationals who had resided in the United States for many years without lawful admission, were detained by immigration authorities under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) following traffic stops. Each sought habeas corpus relief, arguing that their continued detention without a bond hearing to assess their dangerousness or flight risk violated their Fifth Amendment due process rights.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted habeas relief in each case, ordering the release of the individuals and enjoining federal authorities from further detaining them absent individualized bond hearings. On appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district courts’ rulings, holding that the Fifth Amendment required a bond hearing within 90 days of detention. The panel also consolidated the cases due to their similar legal questions regarding detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, subsequently reconsidered the panel’s decision. The en banc court held that unadmitted aliens detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A) are not constitutionally entitled to individualized hearings on dangerousness or flight risk before detention, and that the duration of their detention did not present constitutional concerns warranting habeas relief. The court reasoned that such procedural protections are not required by the statute, nor by the Fifth Amendment, given Congress’s plenary power over immigration and the specific statutory framework for applicants for admission. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district courts’ judgments and vacated their orders granting habeas relief to the petitioners. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-50221/26-50221-2026-10-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Alvarado v. Vergara" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Three individuals, all foreign nationals who had resided in the United States for many years without lawful admission, were detained by immigration authorities under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) following traffic stops. Each sought habeas corpus relief, arguing that their continued detention without a bond hearing to assess their dangerousness or flight risk violated their Fifth Amendment due process rights.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted habeas relief in each case, ordering the release of the individuals and enjoining federal authorities from further detaining them absent individualized bond hearings. On appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district courts’ rulings, holding that the Fifth Amendment required a bond hearing within 90 days of detention. The panel also consolidated the cases due to their similar legal questions regarding detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, subsequently reconsidered the panel’s decision. The en banc court held that unadmitted aliens detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A) are not constitutionally entitled to individualized hearings on dangerousness or flight risk before detention, and that the duration of their detention did not present constitutional concerns warranting habeas relief. The court reasoned that such procedural protections are not required by the statute, nor by the Fifth Amendment, given Congress’s plenary power over immigration and the specific statutory framework for applicants for admission. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district courts’ judgments and vacated their orders granting habeas relief to the petitioners.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-10-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Cory Wilson</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Immigration Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60496/25-60496-2026-10-22.html</id>
        	<title>Jackson Federation of Teachers v. Fitch</title>
        	<updated>2026-10-22T15:30:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-10-22T15:30:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60496/25-60496-2026-10-22.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In this case, a group of teachers, professors, students, parents, and advocacy organizations challenged the constitutionality of a recently enacted Mississippi law, House Bill 1193, which restricts the use of state education funds for diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives in public schools and colleges. The law prohibits the mandatory implementation of DEI programs, penalizing students for disagreeing with DEI concepts, promoting DEI through official course materials, and engaging in DEI activities in official capacities, while carving out exceptions for scholarly research, creative works, and student group activities.

After the plaintiffs filed a pre-enforcement facial challenge on First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment grounds, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) and later a preliminary injunction blocking the law’s enforcement. The district court’s proceedings, however, were marred by multiple errors: the TRO included fabricated facts, non-existent parties, and a citation to a fictitious case, some of which stemmed from the judge’s or his clerk’s reliance on artificial intelligence in drafting. When these issues came to light, the judge revised the TRO without adequate explanation and incorporated the flawed order by reference into the preliminary injunction. The district court’s legal analysis was also found deficient, failing to properly apply binding Supreme Court precedent and misinterpreting the requirements for facial constitutional challenges.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and found grave procedural and substantive errors in the district court’s handling, including the use of fabricated evidence, failure to follow controlling legal standards, and an overbroad injunction. The Fifth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction, holding that the errors justified reassignment of the case to a different district judge on remand. The court provided detailed instructions for the new judge, emphasizing the need to follow the Supreme Court’s framework for facial First Amendment challenges and to properly analyze the law’s scope and constitutionality. The disposition was to vacate the injunction and remand the case for further proceedings before a new judge. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60496/25-60496-2026-10-22.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Jackson Federation of Teachers v. Fitch" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In this case, a group of teachers, professors, students, parents, and advocacy organizations challenged the constitutionality of a recently enacted Mississippi law, House Bill 1193, which restricts the use of state education funds for diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives in public schools and colleges. The law prohibits the mandatory implementation of DEI programs, penalizing students for disagreeing with DEI concepts, promoting DEI through official course materials, and engaging in DEI activities in official capacities, while carving out exceptions for scholarly research, creative works, and student group activities.

After the plaintiffs filed a pre-enforcement facial challenge on First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment grounds, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) and later a preliminary injunction blocking the law’s enforcement. The district court’s proceedings, however, were marred by multiple errors: the TRO included fabricated facts, non-existent parties, and a citation to a fictitious case, some of which stemmed from the judge’s or his clerk’s reliance on artificial intelligence in drafting. When these issues came to light, the judge revised the TRO without adequate explanation and incorporated the flawed order by reference into the preliminary injunction. The district court’s legal analysis was also found deficient, failing to properly apply binding Supreme Court precedent and misinterpreting the requirements for facial constitutional challenges.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and found grave procedural and substantive errors in the district court’s handling, including the use of fabricated evidence, failure to follow controlling legal standards, and an overbroad injunction. The Fifth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction, holding that the errors justified reassignment of the case to a different district judge on remand. The court provided detailed instructions for the new judge, emphasizing the need to follow the Supreme Court’s framework for facial First Amendment challenges and to properly analyze the law’s scope and constitutionality. The disposition was to vacate the injunction and remand the case for further proceedings before a new judge.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-10-22</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Education Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40756/24-40756-2026-10-22.html</id>
        	<title>La Union v. FEMA</title>
        	<updated>2026-10-22T09:30:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-10-22T09:30:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40756/24-40756-2026-10-22.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A Texas-based nonprofit organization that assists low-income residents in accessing federal disaster aid sought information from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) about how eligibility for disaster relief is determined. The organization alleged that FEMA uses unpublished rules, violating the Freedom of Information Act’s (FOIA) “reading-room provision,” which requires certain agency documents and policies to be made available online with an accompanying index. The nonprofit submitted multiple FOIA requests and a letter to FEMA, requesting disclosure of both existing and future standards used for disaster relief decisions, but FEMA did not provide the requested information or publish it online.

Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas partially granted FEMA’s motion to dismiss and for summary judgment, ruling that it lacked jurisdiction over the Administrative Procedure Act claims. It ordered FEMA to conduct further document searches and mediation, resulting in the release of additional documents and an index. The district court found LUPE’s claims not frivolous, but ultimately held that LUPE had not established that FEMA had a policy or practice of violating FOIA’s reading-room provision, declined to address whether courts could order agencies to post documents online, and dismissed the case with prejudice.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that FOIA’s remedial provision empowers courts to issue prospective relief, including orders requiring agencies to make documents available online, to remedy ongoing violations of the reading-room provision. The appellate court concluded that LUPE plausibly alleged an ongoing practice of non-compliance by FEMA and reversed the district court’s partial grant of summary judgment and dismissal. The case was remanded for further factual development and consideration of appropriate equitable relief. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40756/24-40756-2026-10-22.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "La Union v. FEMA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A Texas-based nonprofit organization that assists low-income residents in accessing federal disaster aid sought information from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) about how eligibility for disaster relief is determined. The organization alleged that FEMA uses unpublished rules, violating the Freedom of Information Act’s (FOIA) “reading-room provision,” which requires certain agency documents and policies to be made available online with an accompanying index. The nonprofit submitted multiple FOIA requests and a letter to FEMA, requesting disclosure of both existing and future standards used for disaster relief decisions, but FEMA did not provide the requested information or publish it online.

Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas partially granted FEMA’s motion to dismiss and for summary judgment, ruling that it lacked jurisdiction over the Administrative Procedure Act claims. It ordered FEMA to conduct further document searches and mediation, resulting in the release of additional documents and an index. The district court found LUPE’s claims not frivolous, but ultimately held that LUPE had not established that FEMA had a policy or practice of violating FOIA’s reading-room provision, declined to address whether courts could order agencies to post documents online, and dismissed the case with prejudice.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that FOIA’s remedial provision empowers courts to issue prospective relief, including orders requiring agencies to make documents available online, to remedy ongoing violations of the reading-room provision. The appellate court concluded that LUPE plausibly alleged an ongoing practice of non-compliance by FEMA and reversed the district court’s partial grant of summary judgment and dismissal. The case was remanded for further factual development and consideration of appropriate equitable relief.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-10-22</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30560/25-30560-2026-10-21.html</id>
        	<title>Quality Proc Svc v. Whitney Oil</title>
        	<updated>2026-10-21T17:28:51-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-10-21T17:28:51-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30560/25-30560-2026-10-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Whitney Oil and Gas, which operates oil and gas production platforms off the Louisiana coast, entered into a Master Service Agreement (MSA) with Quality Process Services (QPS) in 2016. Under the MSA, QPS provided contract laborers, primarily production operators, who routinely used vessels to reach Whitney’s platforms where they performed maintenance and monitoring tasks. In 2021, after Hurricane Ida, a Whitney employee was injured while being transported on a Whitney vessel operated by a QPS employee. The injured employee sued both companies in Louisiana state court, prompting Whitney to file a federal limitation action, with QPS seeking indemnity from Whitney under the MSA for injuries to Whitney’s employees.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held a bench trial. The court found that the MSA was not a maritime contract because the parties did not expect vessels to play a substantial role in the completion of the contract beyond transporting workers. It concluded that under Louisiana law, the indemnity provision was unenforceable and dismissed QPS’s indemnity claim with prejudice. The court also ruled that Whitney was entitled to attorney fees under the MSA’s prevailing-party provision but deferred setting the amount until after any appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s judgment that the MSA was not a maritime contract, emphasizing that the parties’ expectations were that vessels served only as transportation and did not directly aid the performance of the contracted work. As a result, Louisiana law applied, and the indemnity provision was voided. The Fifth Circuit also dismissed without prejudice QPS’s appeal of the attorney-fee ruling, since the amount had not yet been determined. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30560/25-30560-2026-10-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Quality Proc Svc v. Whitney Oil" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Whitney Oil and Gas, which operates oil and gas production platforms off the Louisiana coast, entered into a Master Service Agreement (MSA) with Quality Process Services (QPS) in 2016. Under the MSA, QPS provided contract laborers, primarily production operators, who routinely used vessels to reach Whitney’s platforms where they performed maintenance and monitoring tasks. In 2021, after Hurricane Ida, a Whitney employee was injured while being transported on a Whitney vessel operated by a QPS employee. The injured employee sued both companies in Louisiana state court, prompting Whitney to file a federal limitation action, with QPS seeking indemnity from Whitney under the MSA for injuries to Whitney’s employees.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held a bench trial. The court found that the MSA was not a maritime contract because the parties did not expect vessels to play a substantial role in the completion of the contract beyond transporting workers. It concluded that under Louisiana law, the indemnity provision was unenforceable and dismissed QPS’s indemnity claim with prejudice. The court also ruled that Whitney was entitled to attorney fees under the MSA’s prevailing-party provision but deferred setting the amount until after any appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s judgment that the MSA was not a maritime contract, emphasizing that the parties’ expectations were that vessels served only as transportation and did not directly aid the performance of the contracted work. As a result, Louisiana law applied, and the indemnity provision was voided. The Fifth Circuit also dismissed without prejudice QPS’s appeal of the attorney-fee ruling, since the amount had not yet been determined.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-10-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Don Willett</case:judge>
													<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Energy, Oil &amp; Gas Law"/>
							<category term="Admiralty &amp; Maritime Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10754/25-10754-2026-10-21.html</id>
        	<title>Knife Rights v. Blanche</title>
        	<updated>2026-10-21T17:28:50-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-10-21T17:28:50-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10754/25-10754-2026-10-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A group of individuals, businesses, and an advocacy organization challenged the constitutionality of two provisions of the Federal Switchblade Act (FSA), which restricts the introduction, manufacture, transportation, distribution, sale, and possession of switchblade knives. The plaintiffs argued that these restrictions violate their rights under the Second Amendment. Some plaintiffs are individuals who wish to purchase, carry, or sell switchblade knives, while others are businesses that would sell such knives but refrain from doing so due to the FSA’s provisions.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the plaintiffs’ challenge to the provision regulating possession, sale, and manufacture of switchblades in certain federal jurisdictions (15 U.S.C. § 1243) for lack of standing, finding no substantial threat of enforcement. It allowed standing for the challenge to the provision targeting interstate commerce in switchblades (15 U.S.C. § 1242) but ruled that this section did not violate the Second Amendment, reasoning that it was not a de facto ban on possession since switchblades remained available through intrastate commerce. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that plaintiffs had standing to challenge both provisions. Applying the framework from New York State Rifle &amp; Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, the Fifth Circuit determined that switchblades are “arms” under the Second Amendment and that § 1242 burdens constitutionally protected conduct. The court found the government failed to show that the regulation was consistent with the historical tradition of arms regulation, particularly regarding the manner in which it restricted switchblade knives. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the § 1242 claim. However, it affirmed dismissal of the § 1243 claim, concluding that the plaintiffs had not met the demanding standard required for a facial challenge to that provision. The case was remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10754/25-10754-2026-10-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Knife Rights v. Blanche" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A group of individuals, businesses, and an advocacy organization challenged the constitutionality of two provisions of the Federal Switchblade Act (FSA), which restricts the introduction, manufacture, transportation, distribution, sale, and possession of switchblade knives. The plaintiffs argued that these restrictions violate their rights under the Second Amendment. Some plaintiffs are individuals who wish to purchase, carry, or sell switchblade knives, while others are businesses that would sell such knives but refrain from doing so due to the FSA’s provisions.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the plaintiffs’ challenge to the provision regulating possession, sale, and manufacture of switchblades in certain federal jurisdictions (15 U.S.C. § 1243) for lack of standing, finding no substantial threat of enforcement. It allowed standing for the challenge to the provision targeting interstate commerce in switchblades (15 U.S.C. § 1242) but ruled that this section did not violate the Second Amendment, reasoning that it was not a de facto ban on possession since switchblades remained available through intrastate commerce. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that plaintiffs had standing to challenge both provisions. Applying the framework from New York State Rifle &amp; Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, the Fifth Circuit determined that switchblades are “arms” under the Second Amendment and that § 1242 burdens constitutionally protected conduct. The court found the government failed to show that the regulation was consistent with the historical tradition of arms regulation, particularly regarding the manner in which it restricted switchblade knives. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the § 1242 claim. However, it affirmed dismissal of the § 1243 claim, concluding that the plaintiffs had not met the demanding standard required for a facial challenge to that provision. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-10-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jennifer Elrod</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20180/25-20180-2026-10-21.html</id>
        	<title>Garcia v. USA</title>
        	<updated>2026-10-21T09:30:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-10-21T09:30:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20180/25-20180-2026-10-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A man, Ulises Valladares, was kidnapped from his home in Houston, Texas, in front of his twelve-year-old son. The kidnappers, after binding both victims, moved Ulises to another location. The son managed to escape and call for help. Law enforcement involved the FBI, which deployed a SWAT team to conduct a rescue operation. During the nighttime rescue, FBI Special Agent Lappe, believing he faced a threat at a window, fired his weapon and fatally shot Ulises, who was later determined to be bound and blindfolded at the time.

Following the incident, Ulises’s son and mother filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging negligence and wrongful death, among other claims. Their claims against the individual agent were dismissed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which found the shooting was accidental and did not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure. The case proceeded against the United States, and after a bench trial, the district court found the government liable under the FTCA, determining that the discretionary function exception did not apply because the agent acted negligently. The court awarded significant damages and attorney’s fees to the plaintiffs.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s findings. The appellate court affirmed the finding of government liability, holding there was no clear error in concluding the agent acted negligently and that the discretionary function exception did not shield the government. However, it reversed the district court’s amended damages and attorney’s fee award because the attorney’s fees had been improperly awarded in addition to, rather than as part of, the total damages. The case was remanded for the district court to reissue its original damages award with attorney’s fees capped at 25% of the total, as required by the FTCA. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20180/25-20180-2026-10-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Garcia v. USA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A man, Ulises Valladares, was kidnapped from his home in Houston, Texas, in front of his twelve-year-old son. The kidnappers, after binding both victims, moved Ulises to another location. The son managed to escape and call for help. Law enforcement involved the FBI, which deployed a SWAT team to conduct a rescue operation. During the nighttime rescue, FBI Special Agent Lappe, believing he faced a threat at a window, fired his weapon and fatally shot Ulises, who was later determined to be bound and blindfolded at the time.

Following the incident, Ulises’s son and mother filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging negligence and wrongful death, among other claims. Their claims against the individual agent were dismissed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which found the shooting was accidental and did not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure. The case proceeded against the United States, and after a bench trial, the district court found the government liable under the FTCA, determining that the discretionary function exception did not apply because the agent acted negligently. The court awarded significant damages and attorney’s fees to the plaintiffs.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s findings. The appellate court affirmed the finding of government liability, holding there was no clear error in concluding the agent acted negligently and that the discretionary function exception did not shield the government. However, it reversed the district court’s amended damages and attorney’s fee award because the attorney’s fees had been improperly awarded in addition to, rather than as part of, the total damages. The case was remanded for the district court to reissue its original damages award with attorney’s fees capped at 25% of the total, as required by the FTCA.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-10-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Carl Stewart</case:judge>
													<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Personal Injury"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60296/25-60296-2026-10-20.html</id>
        	<title>Zahid v. Blanche</title>
        	<updated>2026-10-20T09:30:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-10-20T09:30:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60296/25-60296-2026-10-20.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A native and citizen of Afghanistan, the petitioner formerly worked for the Afghan Ministry of Education and, following the Taliban’s 2021 return to power, was required by Taliban officials to provide information about female students and their families. After participating in a protest against the Taliban’s closure of girls’ schools and sharing evidence of the protest, he was arrested, detained, and beaten by the Taliban, then released after intervention from his family and community. He subsequently left Afghanistan, entered the United States without valid entry documents, and sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).

An Immigration Judge (IJ) found that the petitioner’s actions constituted material support to a terrorist organization, making him ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal, but did not find him eligible for CAT relief, concluding the petitioner had not shown it was more likely than not that he would be tortured if returned to Afghanistan. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal, denied his motion to remand for the IJ to consider new evidence, and later denied his motion for reconsideration.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed both BIA decisions. The Fifth Circuit applied the substantial evidence standard to the agency’s CAT determination and found that the record did not compel a contrary result. The court held that the BIA did not err in denying CAT relief, did not abuse its discretion in denying remand for new evidence, and did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration. The petitions for review were therefore denied. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60296/25-60296-2026-10-20.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Zahid v. Blanche" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A native and citizen of Afghanistan, the petitioner formerly worked for the Afghan Ministry of Education and, following the Taliban’s 2021 return to power, was required by Taliban officials to provide information about female students and their families. After participating in a protest against the Taliban’s closure of girls’ schools and sharing evidence of the protest, he was arrested, detained, and beaten by the Taliban, then released after intervention from his family and community. He subsequently left Afghanistan, entered the United States without valid entry documents, and sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).

An Immigration Judge (IJ) found that the petitioner’s actions constituted material support to a terrorist organization, making him ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal, but did not find him eligible for CAT relief, concluding the petitioner had not shown it was more likely than not that he would be tortured if returned to Afghanistan. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal, denied his motion to remand for the IJ to consider new evidence, and later denied his motion for reconsideration.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed both BIA decisions. The Fifth Circuit applied the substantial evidence standard to the agency’s CAT determination and found that the record did not compel a contrary result. The court held that the BIA did not err in denying CAT relief, did not abuse its discretion in denying remand for new evidence, and did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration. The petitions for review were therefore denied.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-10-20</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Don Willett</case:judge>
													<category term="Immigration Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-30454/23-30454-2026-10-19.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Chaney</title>
        	<updated>2026-10-19T09:30:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-10-19T09:30:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-30454/23-30454-2026-10-19.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant pleaded guilty to Hobbs Act Robbery and Armed Bank Robbery, after being indicted on eleven counts. As part of a plea agreement, he waived his right to appeal except in limited circumstances, and the government dropped nine counts from the indictment. Despite the waiver, the defendant appealed his sentence, challenging the district court’s designation of him as a career offender under the sentencing guidelines. He argued that his prior Louisiana conviction did not qualify as a predicate offense because the state law included hemp, which was not covered under the federal definition.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana classified the defendant as a career offender and summarily overruled his objection. The defendant appealed, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit initially dismissed the appeal, concluding that the waiver was knowing and voluntary and applied to the circumstances. The Fifth Circuit also rejected the argument for a miscarriage-of-justice exception, noting that the circuit had not adopted such an exception for appeal waivers.

The Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case in light of Hunter v. United States, which established that appeal waivers are unenforceable when enforcement would result in a miscarriage of justice—defined as egregious errors that would bring the judicial system into disrepute. Upon remand, the Fifth Circuit found that while the district court erred in classifying the defendant as a career offender, the error did not rise to the level of a miscarriage of justice. The error was not extreme, obvious, or egregious as required by the new standard. The Fifth Circuit enforced the appeal waiver and dismissed the appeal. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-30454/23-30454-2026-10-19.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Chaney" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant pleaded guilty to Hobbs Act Robbery and Armed Bank Robbery, after being indicted on eleven counts. As part of a plea agreement, he waived his right to appeal except in limited circumstances, and the government dropped nine counts from the indictment. Despite the waiver, the defendant appealed his sentence, challenging the district court’s designation of him as a career offender under the sentencing guidelines. He argued that his prior Louisiana conviction did not qualify as a predicate offense because the state law included hemp, which was not covered under the federal definition.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana classified the defendant as a career offender and summarily overruled his objection. The defendant appealed, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit initially dismissed the appeal, concluding that the waiver was knowing and voluntary and applied to the circumstances. The Fifth Circuit also rejected the argument for a miscarriage-of-justice exception, noting that the circuit had not adopted such an exception for appeal waivers.

The Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case in light of Hunter v. United States, which established that appeal waivers are unenforceable when enforcement would result in a miscarriage of justice—defined as egregious errors that would bring the judicial system into disrepute. Upon remand, the Fifth Circuit found that while the district court erred in classifying the defendant as a career offender, the error did not rise to the level of a miscarriage of justice. The error was not extreme, obvious, or egregious as required by the new standard. The Fifth Circuit enforced the appeal waiver and dismissed the appeal.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-10-19</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60663/25-60663-2026-10-16.html</id>
        	<title>McCain v. Mary Mahoney&#039;s</title>
        	<updated>2026-10-16T09:30:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-10-16T09:30:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60663/25-60663-2026-10-16.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A customer dined at a Mississippi restaurant specializing in local seafood, ordering premium snapper on three occasions between 2013 and 2018. The restaurant, along with its supplier and several managers, was later criminally charged for a long-running scheme to mislabel imported frozen fish as locally caught premium fish. All parties pled guilty, admitting to substituting and fraudulently selling over 29 tons of imported fish as local species during a multi-year period. The customer alleged that he paid high prices for what he believed to be premium Gulf snapper, but was instead served inferior imported fish, and he brought a class action seeking damages under federal and state law.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(1), finding no cognizable Article III injury. The court reasoned that since the plaintiff consumed his meals without complaint, paying for fish he would not have otherwise purchased was not a concrete injury. It also found the allegations insufficiently particularized, as the plaintiff did not specifically allege that imported fish was served on the dates he dined or that all snapper sold on those dates was misbranded. The court denied motions to amend the judgment and complaint, concluding any amendments would be futile.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff plausibly suffered a concrete and particularized injury in fact under Article III, either by being fraudulently induced to purchase inferior fish or by overpaying due to fraud. The court concluded that the allegations of widespread and routine fish substitution at the restaurant plausibly affected the plaintiff’s meals, particularly his August 21, 2018, visit. The denial of leave to amend was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60663/25-60663-2026-10-16.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "McCain v. Mary Mahoney&#039;s" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A customer dined at a Mississippi restaurant specializing in local seafood, ordering premium snapper on three occasions between 2013 and 2018. The restaurant, along with its supplier and several managers, was later criminally charged for a long-running scheme to mislabel imported frozen fish as locally caught premium fish. All parties pled guilty, admitting to substituting and fraudulently selling over 29 tons of imported fish as local species during a multi-year period. The customer alleged that he paid high prices for what he believed to be premium Gulf snapper, but was instead served inferior imported fish, and he brought a class action seeking damages under federal and state law.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(1), finding no cognizable Article III injury. The court reasoned that since the plaintiff consumed his meals without complaint, paying for fish he would not have otherwise purchased was not a concrete injury. It also found the allegations insufficiently particularized, as the plaintiff did not specifically allege that imported fish was served on the dates he dined or that all snapper sold on those dates was misbranded. The court denied motions to amend the judgment and complaint, concluding any amendments would be futile.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff plausibly suffered a concrete and particularized injury in fact under Article III, either by being fraudulently induced to purchase inferior fish or by overpaying due to fraud. The court concluded that the allegations of widespread and routine fish substitution at the restaurant plausibly affected the plaintiff’s meals, particularly his August 21, 2018, visit. The denial of leave to amend was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-10-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Carolyn King</case:judge>
													<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Consumer Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30381/25-30381-2026-10-16.html</id>
        	<title>Banner v. Wright</title>
        	<updated>2026-10-16T09:30:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-10-16T09:30:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30381/25-30381-2026-10-16.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A parish resident attended a council meeting intending to comment on an agenda item involving the retention of special legal counsel related to ethics laws. Shortly before this meeting, she had filed an ethics complaint against the Parish President, alleging a conflict of interest regarding a zoning decision. When she began to speak, she was interrupted by the Parish President and Council Chairman, who told her that discussing her ethics complaint was off-topic and cited a Louisiana statute prohibiting public discussion of private ethics investigations. This statute had been declared unconstitutional years prior, but the officials nonetheless enforced it, leading the resident to end her remarks prematurely. She later sued the parish, the Parish President, and the Council Chairman under federal civil rights law and state law, claiming her First Amendment rights had been violated.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana presided over a jury trial where the jury found in favor of the defendants on all claims. During trial, defense counsel repeatedly violated court instructions, asked improper legal questions, referred to irrelevant and prejudicial matters, and made inappropriate comments. The plaintiff objected to these actions, and the court sustained many objections and issued curative instructions. Despite these issues, the district court denied the plaintiff’s post-trial motion for a new trial, relying in part on a juror’s public interview and noting that curative instructions had been given and no motion for mistrial had been made.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by relying on evidence barred by Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), specifically the juror’s public comments. The appellate court further held that the cumulative effect of defense counsel’s misconduct so thoroughly permeated the trial proceedings that even curative instructions could not remedy the prejudice. The Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30381/25-30381-2026-10-16.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Banner v. Wright" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A parish resident attended a council meeting intending to comment on an agenda item involving the retention of special legal counsel related to ethics laws. Shortly before this meeting, she had filed an ethics complaint against the Parish President, alleging a conflict of interest regarding a zoning decision. When she began to speak, she was interrupted by the Parish President and Council Chairman, who told her that discussing her ethics complaint was off-topic and cited a Louisiana statute prohibiting public discussion of private ethics investigations. This statute had been declared unconstitutional years prior, but the officials nonetheless enforced it, leading the resident to end her remarks prematurely. She later sued the parish, the Parish President, and the Council Chairman under federal civil rights law and state law, claiming her First Amendment rights had been violated.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana presided over a jury trial where the jury found in favor of the defendants on all claims. During trial, defense counsel repeatedly violated court instructions, asked improper legal questions, referred to irrelevant and prejudicial matters, and made inappropriate comments. The plaintiff objected to these actions, and the court sustained many objections and issued curative instructions. Despite these issues, the district court denied the plaintiff’s post-trial motion for a new trial, relying in part on a juror’s public interview and noting that curative instructions had been given and no motion for mistrial had been made.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by relying on evidence barred by Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), specifically the juror’s public comments. The appellate court further held that the cumulative effect of defense counsel’s misconduct so thoroughly permeated the trial proceedings that even curative instructions could not remedy the prejudice. The Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-10-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50879/25-50879-2026-10-16.html</id>
        	<title>GH America v. Fohn</title>
        	<updated>2026-10-16T09:30:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-10-16T09:30:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50879/25-50879-2026-10-16.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A Texas-based energy company, structured as a subsidiary of a Chinese corporation, sought to develop renewable energy projects in Texas, including the Blue Star Solar Project, and to interconnect these projects to the Texas electric grid managed by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT). The Texas Lone Star Infrastructure Protection Act (LSIPA), enacted in 2021, prohibits entities majority-owned or controlled by Chinese citizens or corporations from owning or controlling critical infrastructure, including the state’s electric grid. In 2022, ERCOT, applying LSIPA, denied the company’s request to interconnect the Blue Star project and rejected subsequent efforts to repurpose the project.

The company sued in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, arguing that LSIPA was preempted by federal law—specifically, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) regime under the Defense Production Act and its amendments. The company also asserted constitutional claims, but ultimately narrowed its appeal to the preemption issue. The district court dismissed the claims, holding that LSIPA was not preempted by the federal CFIUS regime, finding no conflict or field preemption.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Fifth Circuit held that the federal CFIUS regime does not impliedly preempt LSIPA. The court found that LSIPA and CFIUS operate in purposive harmony, with LSIPA providing additional state-level protections without conflicting with federal objectives. The court also held that CFIUS is not a pervasive federal regulatory scheme that would field-preempt state law in this area. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the preemption claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50879/25-50879-2026-10-16.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "GH America v. Fohn" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A Texas-based energy company, structured as a subsidiary of a Chinese corporation, sought to develop renewable energy projects in Texas, including the Blue Star Solar Project, and to interconnect these projects to the Texas electric grid managed by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT). The Texas Lone Star Infrastructure Protection Act (LSIPA), enacted in 2021, prohibits entities majority-owned or controlled by Chinese citizens or corporations from owning or controlling critical infrastructure, including the state’s electric grid. In 2022, ERCOT, applying LSIPA, denied the company’s request to interconnect the Blue Star project and rejected subsequent efforts to repurpose the project.

The company sued in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, arguing that LSIPA was preempted by federal law—specifically, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) regime under the Defense Production Act and its amendments. The company also asserted constitutional claims, but ultimately narrowed its appeal to the preemption issue. The district court dismissed the claims, holding that LSIPA was not preempted by the federal CFIUS regime, finding no conflict or field preemption.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Fifth Circuit held that the federal CFIUS regime does not impliedly preempt LSIPA. The court found that LSIPA and CFIUS operate in purposive harmony, with LSIPA providing additional state-level protections without conflicting with federal objectives. The court also held that CFIUS is not a pervasive federal regulatory scheme that would field-preempt state law in this area. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the preemption claims.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-10-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Energy, Oil &amp; Gas Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60535/25-60535-2026-10-15.html</id>
        	<title>Consumers&#039; Research v. FCC</title>
        	<updated>2026-10-15T15:30:05-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-10-15T15:30:05-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60535/25-60535-2026-10-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A group of petitioners, including a telecommunications reseller and several consumers, challenged the Federal Communications Commission’s calculation of the Universal Service Fund’s Fourth Quarter 2025 contribution factor. The FCC collects billions of dollars from telecommunications companies each year to subsidize communication services for underserved communities, using a private corporation, the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC), to administer the fund and calculate the contribution factor. Petitioners argued, among other things, that the FCC’s creation and reliance on USAC violated federal law.

Previously, after USAC submitted its projections for the fourth quarter, the FCC issued a public notice adopting USAC’s data (with a minor adjustment) to set a 38.1% contribution factor. The petitioners filed timely comments with the FCC and, after the FCC’s inaction, sought judicial review. The Supreme Court had recently rejected a broader nondelegation challenge to the universal service statute, but left open other statutory and constitutional questions. The current challenge centered on whether the FCC had statutory authority to establish USAC.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It concluded that the FCC established USAC to act as an instrumentality for administering the Universal Service Fund and that Congress had not specifically authorized the FCC to create such a corporation, as required by the Government Corporation Control Act. The court found that neither the general statutory provisions cited by the FCC nor subsequent congressional actions amounted to the necessary specific authorization. As a result, the court held that the FCC exceeded its statutory authority by relying on USAC’s projections in setting the contribution factor. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the Fourth Quarter 2025 contribution factor, and remanded the matter to the FCC for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60535/25-60535-2026-10-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Consumers&#039; Research v. FCC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A group of petitioners, including a telecommunications reseller and several consumers, challenged the Federal Communications Commission’s calculation of the Universal Service Fund’s Fourth Quarter 2025 contribution factor. The FCC collects billions of dollars from telecommunications companies each year to subsidize communication services for underserved communities, using a private corporation, the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC), to administer the fund and calculate the contribution factor. Petitioners argued, among other things, that the FCC’s creation and reliance on USAC violated federal law.

Previously, after USAC submitted its projections for the fourth quarter, the FCC issued a public notice adopting USAC’s data (with a minor adjustment) to set a 38.1% contribution factor. The petitioners filed timely comments with the FCC and, after the FCC’s inaction, sought judicial review. The Supreme Court had recently rejected a broader nondelegation challenge to the universal service statute, but left open other statutory and constitutional questions. The current challenge centered on whether the FCC had statutory authority to establish USAC.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It concluded that the FCC established USAC to act as an instrumentality for administering the Universal Service Fund and that Congress had not specifically authorized the FCC to create such a corporation, as required by the Government Corporation Control Act. The court found that neither the general statutory provisions cited by the FCC nor subsequent congressional actions amounted to the necessary specific authorization. As a result, the court held that the FCC exceeded its statutory authority by relying on USAC’s projections in setting the contribution factor. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the Fourth Quarter 2025 contribution factor, and remanded the matter to the FCC for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-10-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Edith Clement</case:judge>
													<category term="Communications Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-30021/26-30021-2026-10-15.html</id>
        	<title>Seacor Marine v. GOL</title>
        	<updated>2026-10-15T15:30:05-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-10-15T15:30:05-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-30021/26-30021-2026-10-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		SEACOR Marine, L.L.C., a company that owns and operates marine vessels, entered into a Brokerage Agreement with GOL, L.L.C., a broker connecting vessel owners with oil and gas companies. Under this agreement, GOL acted as SEACOR’s agent to obtain charters, and was responsible for remitting payments to SEACOR if charterers paid GOL. GOL brokered SEACOR’s vessels to Cox Operating, LLC, invoicing Cox for $2.7 million plus a brokerage fee. Cox did not pay, subsequently filing for bankruptcy. GOL submitted a prepetition claim in Cox’s bankruptcy, which included SEACOR’s invoices. The bankruptcy court permitted Cox to pay $13 million toward GOL’s prepetition claim to incentivize continued services during bankruptcy, with GOL agreeing to use these funds for claims secured by liens, including SEACOR’s.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted summary judgment in favor of GOL. It found GOL was not obligated to pay SEACOR from the $13 million, reasoning that GOL had not received payment specifically for SEACOR’s invoices, and that the Trade Agreement required payment only to vendors continuing to provide services to Cox. The court also determined GOL had fulfilled its duty to make reasonable efforts to collect from Cox and dismissed SEACOR’s claims, denying reconsideration.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that genuine disputes of material fact exist as to whether any part of the $13 million payment was for SEACOR’s services and whether GOL breached its contractual and fiduciary duties by not remitting payment to SEACOR. The court found the Trade Agreement did not prohibit GOL from paying SEACOR and reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-30021/26-30021-2026-10-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Seacor Marine v. GOL" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                SEACOR Marine, L.L.C., a company that owns and operates marine vessels, entered into a Brokerage Agreement with GOL, L.L.C., a broker connecting vessel owners with oil and gas companies. Under this agreement, GOL acted as SEACOR’s agent to obtain charters, and was responsible for remitting payments to SEACOR if charterers paid GOL. GOL brokered SEACOR’s vessels to Cox Operating, LLC, invoicing Cox for $2.7 million plus a brokerage fee. Cox did not pay, subsequently filing for bankruptcy. GOL submitted a prepetition claim in Cox’s bankruptcy, which included SEACOR’s invoices. The bankruptcy court permitted Cox to pay $13 million toward GOL’s prepetition claim to incentivize continued services during bankruptcy, with GOL agreeing to use these funds for claims secured by liens, including SEACOR’s.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted summary judgment in favor of GOL. It found GOL was not obligated to pay SEACOR from the $13 million, reasoning that GOL had not received payment specifically for SEACOR’s invoices, and that the Trade Agreement required payment only to vendors continuing to provide services to Cox. The court also determined GOL had fulfilled its duty to make reasonable efforts to collect from Cox and dismissed SEACOR’s claims, denying reconsideration.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that genuine disputes of material fact exist as to whether any part of the $13 million payment was for SEACOR’s services and whether GOL breached its contractual and fiduciary duties by not remitting payment to SEACOR. The court found the Trade Agreement did not prohibit GOL from paying SEACOR and reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-10-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
													<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Admiralty &amp; Maritime Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30528/25-30528-2026-10-12.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Tekippe</title>
        	<updated>2026-10-12T09:30:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-10-12T09:30:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30528/25-30528-2026-10-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A chiropractor who owned and operated a clinic in Louisiana was found to have carried out a scheme to defraud a private health insurer over three and a half years. The fraudulent scheme involved submitting reimbursement claims for services that were either not rendered as described, not medically necessary, or not performed or supervised by a licensed provider as required. Testimony from employees revealed that the owner pressured staff to fabricate treatment notes, and that many records showed signs of copying and pasting with little differentiation between patients. Some employees and patients testified that certain billed services were not actually provided, while massage therapists stated they performed generic massages rather than medically necessary treatments.

A jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana convicted the clinic owner of six counts of health care fraud and one count of wire fraud, but acquitted him of making a false statement to federal agents. At sentencing, the district court accepted that the intended loss equaled the actual payments made by the insurer, but declined to exclude payments for claims the defendant asserted were legitimate, finding the fraud so pervasive that it was not feasible to separate legitimate from fraudulent claims. The court sentenced the defendant to 84 months in prison, below the calculated guideline range, and explained that the loss calculation was based on the evidence of a widespread fraudulent scheme.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed only the district court’s finding that the fraud was pervasive. Applying clear error review, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court’s finding was at least plausible given the trial evidence and affirmed the sentence. The holding is that, where fraud is pervasive and separating legitimate from fraudulent claims is not reasonably practicable, the district court may treat all claims as fraudulent for loss calculation purposes. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30528/25-30528-2026-10-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Tekippe" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A chiropractor who owned and operated a clinic in Louisiana was found to have carried out a scheme to defraud a private health insurer over three and a half years. The fraudulent scheme involved submitting reimbursement claims for services that were either not rendered as described, not medically necessary, or not performed or supervised by a licensed provider as required. Testimony from employees revealed that the owner pressured staff to fabricate treatment notes, and that many records showed signs of copying and pasting with little differentiation between patients. Some employees and patients testified that certain billed services were not actually provided, while massage therapists stated they performed generic massages rather than medically necessary treatments.

A jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana convicted the clinic owner of six counts of health care fraud and one count of wire fraud, but acquitted him of making a false statement to federal agents. At sentencing, the district court accepted that the intended loss equaled the actual payments made by the insurer, but declined to exclude payments for claims the defendant asserted were legitimate, finding the fraud so pervasive that it was not feasible to separate legitimate from fraudulent claims. The court sentenced the defendant to 84 months in prison, below the calculated guideline range, and explained that the loss calculation was based on the evidence of a widespread fraudulent scheme.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed only the district court’s finding that the fraud was pervasive. Applying clear error review, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court’s finding was at least plausible given the trial evidence and affirmed the sentence. The holding is that, where fraud is pervasive and separating legitimate from fraudulent claims is not reasonably practicable, the district court may treat all claims as fraudulent for loss calculation purposes.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-10-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10624/25-10624-2026-10-09.html</id>
        	<title>Texas Captl Bank v. Govt Natl Mtge</title>
        	<updated>2026-10-09T09:30:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-10-09T09:30:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10624/25-10624-2026-10-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A mortgage issuer, Reverse Mortgage Funding, LLC (RMF), participated in a federal program allowing it to securitize reverse mortgages. When RMF entered bankruptcy, Texas Capital Bank provided debtor-in-possession financing, secured by RMF’s interests in certain collateral, specifically incremental balances on the mortgages known as “tails.” After RMF defaulted on its agreement, the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), under its statutory and contractual authority, extinguished RMF’s interests in the underlying mortgages and assumed ownership of the loans, also extinguishing Texas Capital’s lien interest in the mortgage tails. Texas Capital argued that Ginnie Mae’s actions violated federal law and Texas tort law.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas initially allowed Texas Capital’s claims for statutory authority under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and tortious interference to proceed, but dismissed the promissory estoppel claim due to sovereign immunity. Later, the district court granted summary judgment to Ginnie Mae, finding it acted within its statutory authority and concluding that the extinguishment of RMF’s interests necessarily eliminated Texas Capital’s derivative interest in the mortgage tails. The court also dismissed Texas Capital’s tortious interference claim, citing sovereign immunity and a lack of legal basis, and refused to consider Texas Capital’s arbitrary-and-capricious APA theory because it was not sufficiently pled.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that Ginnie Mae acted within its statutory and contractual authority under 12 U.S.C. § 1721(g)(1) in extinguishing both RMF’s and Texas Capital’s interests in the mortgages. The court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment, finding Texas Capital’s tortious interference claim barred by sovereign immunity and ruling that Texas Capital’s failure to plead an arbitrary-and-capricious APA theory justified the district court’s refusal to consider it. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10624/25-10624-2026-10-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Texas Captl Bank v. Govt Natl Mtge" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A mortgage issuer, Reverse Mortgage Funding, LLC (RMF), participated in a federal program allowing it to securitize reverse mortgages. When RMF entered bankruptcy, Texas Capital Bank provided debtor-in-possession financing, secured by RMF’s interests in certain collateral, specifically incremental balances on the mortgages known as “tails.” After RMF defaulted on its agreement, the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), under its statutory and contractual authority, extinguished RMF’s interests in the underlying mortgages and assumed ownership of the loans, also extinguishing Texas Capital’s lien interest in the mortgage tails. Texas Capital argued that Ginnie Mae’s actions violated federal law and Texas tort law.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas initially allowed Texas Capital’s claims for statutory authority under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and tortious interference to proceed, but dismissed the promissory estoppel claim due to sovereign immunity. Later, the district court granted summary judgment to Ginnie Mae, finding it acted within its statutory authority and concluding that the extinguishment of RMF’s interests necessarily eliminated Texas Capital’s derivative interest in the mortgage tails. The court also dismissed Texas Capital’s tortious interference claim, citing sovereign immunity and a lack of legal basis, and refused to consider Texas Capital’s arbitrary-and-capricious APA theory because it was not sufficiently pled.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that Ginnie Mae acted within its statutory and contractual authority under 12 U.S.C. § 1721(g)(1) in extinguishing both RMF’s and Texas Capital’s interests in the mortgages. The court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment, finding Texas Capital’s tortious interference claim barred by sovereign immunity and ruling that Texas Capital’s failure to plead an arbitrary-and-capricious APA theory justified the district court’s refusal to consider it. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-10-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Cory Wilson</case:judge>
													<category term="Bankruptcy"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Real Estate &amp; Property Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50315/25-50315-2026-10-09.html</id>
        	<title>Hogan v. FCI, La Tuna Case Mgr</title>
        	<updated>2026-10-09T09:30:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-10-09T09:30:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50315/25-50315-2026-10-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A federal prisoner, sentenced in August 2020 for enticement of a minor, spent approximately ten months in various facilities before arriving at his designated Bureau of Prisons (BOP) institution in June 2021. He filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that under the First Step Act (FSA), he was entitled to earn time credits for the period between his sentencing and his arrival at the designated facility. He claimed these credits should count toward his eligibility for home confinement and that the BOP was required to recognize his calculation of credits, leading to an earlier projected transfer date.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed his petition. The court found that, under the FSA and relevant BOP regulations, the prisoner was not eligible to earn credits before arrival at his designated BOP facility. The court also held it lacked authority to order the BOP to place him in home confinement or otherwise direct his placement.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that, regardless of any debate over when FSA credit earning may begin, the petitioner failed to show any participation—or even attempted participation—in recidivism reduction programs or productive activities during the period in question. Participation is a statutory prerequisite for earning such credits under the FSA. The court further held that only the BOP has the authority to designate a prisoner’s place of confinement, and the courts cannot review such decisions. Allegations of judicial bias were found to be conclusory and did not meet the standard for plain error. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50315/25-50315-2026-10-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Hogan v. FCI, La Tuna Case Mgr" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A federal prisoner, sentenced in August 2020 for enticement of a minor, spent approximately ten months in various facilities before arriving at his designated Bureau of Prisons (BOP) institution in June 2021. He filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that under the First Step Act (FSA), he was entitled to earn time credits for the period between his sentencing and his arrival at the designated facility. He claimed these credits should count toward his eligibility for home confinement and that the BOP was required to recognize his calculation of credits, leading to an earlier projected transfer date.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed his petition. The court found that, under the FSA and relevant BOP regulations, the prisoner was not eligible to earn credits before arrival at his designated BOP facility. The court also held it lacked authority to order the BOP to place him in home confinement or otherwise direct his placement.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that, regardless of any debate over when FSA credit earning may begin, the petitioner failed to show any participation—or even attempted participation—in recidivism reduction programs or productive activities during the period in question. Participation is a statutory prerequisite for earning such credits under the FSA. The court further held that only the BOP has the authority to designate a prisoner’s place of confinement, and the courts cannot review such decisions. Allegations of judicial bias were found to be conclusory and did not meet the standard for plain error. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-10-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Cory Wilson</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11204/25-11204-2026-10-08.html</id>
        	<title>Mieco v. Pioneer Natural Resources</title>
        	<updated>2026-10-08T15:30:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-10-08T15:30:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11204/25-11204-2026-10-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		MIECO, L.L.C., an energy trading firm, entered into a contract with Pioneer Natural Resources USA, Inc. to purchase a specified quantity of natural gas daily on a Firm basis from November 2020 to March 2021. The contract included a force majeure clause excusing performance for certain uncontrollable events. In February 2021, Winter Storm Uri struck Texas, causing severe weather that disrupted natural gas production and delivery. Pioneer failed to deliver the contracted amount from February 14 to 19 and issued a force majeure notice. MIECO purchased replacement gas at higher prices and later sued Pioneer for breach of contract, seeking over $9 million in damages. Pioneer admitted nonperformance but argued it was excused by the force majeure provision.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas initially granted summary judgment in favor of Pioneer, finding the storm was a force majeure event and Pioneer had exercised due diligence. MIECO appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that genuine disputes of material fact remained regarding whether Pioneer’s performance was truly prevented and if Pioneer exercised reasonable efforts and due diligence. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case for a bench trial. After the trial, the district court again found for Pioneer, determining the storm prevented performance and Pioneer had made reasonable efforts both before and after the storm to mitigate its impacts.

Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal issues de novo. The court held that the district court complied with its mandate, properly found that Winter Storm Uri prevented Pioneer’s performance, and that Pioneer exercised due diligence. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the admission of Pioneer’s expert testimony and exclusion of MIECO’s expert testimony. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11204/25-11204-2026-10-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Mieco v. Pioneer Natural Resources" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                MIECO, L.L.C., an energy trading firm, entered into a contract with Pioneer Natural Resources USA, Inc. to purchase a specified quantity of natural gas daily on a Firm basis from November 2020 to March 2021. The contract included a force majeure clause excusing performance for certain uncontrollable events. In February 2021, Winter Storm Uri struck Texas, causing severe weather that disrupted natural gas production and delivery. Pioneer failed to deliver the contracted amount from February 14 to 19 and issued a force majeure notice. MIECO purchased replacement gas at higher prices and later sued Pioneer for breach of contract, seeking over $9 million in damages. Pioneer admitted nonperformance but argued it was excused by the force majeure provision.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas initially granted summary judgment in favor of Pioneer, finding the storm was a force majeure event and Pioneer had exercised due diligence. MIECO appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that genuine disputes of material fact remained regarding whether Pioneer’s performance was truly prevented and if Pioneer exercised reasonable efforts and due diligence. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case for a bench trial. After the trial, the district court again found for Pioneer, determining the storm prevented performance and Pioneer had made reasonable efforts both before and after the storm to mitigate its impacts.

Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal issues de novo. The court held that the district court complied with its mandate, properly found that Winter Storm Uri prevented Pioneer’s performance, and that Pioneer exercised due diligence. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the admission of Pioneer’s expert testimony and exclusion of MIECO’s expert testimony. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-10-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Dana Douglas</case:judge>
													<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Energy, Oil &amp; Gas Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-51061/25-51061-2026-10-08.html</id>
        	<title>Navejas v. City of El Paso</title>
        	<updated>2026-10-08T09:30:10-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-10-08T09:30:10-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-51061/25-51061-2026-10-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A seventy-year-old man with dementia and Alzheimer’s disease was involved in a late-night domestic violence incident at his home in El Paso, Texas. Police were called after his wife reported that he had become violent and tried to strangle her. Officer Jaso responded and found the man outside, where he ignored commands, picked up and threw objects at Jaso—striking him with at least one object. After repeated noncompliance and object-throwing, Jaso deployed his taser once, causing the man to fall and lose consciousness. The man was hospitalized and subsequently died.

The man’s daughter, on behalf of his estate, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Jaso for excessive force and against the City of El Paso for municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judgment to both defendants. The court found Jaso was entitled to qualified immunity, concluding that the plaintiff failed to show Jaso’s single use of the taser violated clearly established law. The court also determined there was no evidence of the City’s deliberate indifference to a known or obvious risk of constitutional violation.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that, even assuming a Fourth Amendment violation, no precedent clearly established that Jaso’s conduct was unlawful under the specific circumstances—namely, facing an actively resisting, noncompliant suspect who was throwing objects. The court also found that the plaintiff failed to show a pattern of similar constitutional violations or deliberate indifference by the City, and that arguments or evidence not presented to the district court could not be considered on appeal. The court denied the request for additional discovery and affirmed dismissal of all federal claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-51061/25-51061-2026-10-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Navejas v. City of El Paso" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A seventy-year-old man with dementia and Alzheimer’s disease was involved in a late-night domestic violence incident at his home in El Paso, Texas. Police were called after his wife reported that he had become violent and tried to strangle her. Officer Jaso responded and found the man outside, where he ignored commands, picked up and threw objects at Jaso—striking him with at least one object. After repeated noncompliance and object-throwing, Jaso deployed his taser once, causing the man to fall and lose consciousness. The man was hospitalized and subsequently died.

The man’s daughter, on behalf of his estate, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Jaso for excessive force and against the City of El Paso for municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judgment to both defendants. The court found Jaso was entitled to qualified immunity, concluding that the plaintiff failed to show Jaso’s single use of the taser violated clearly established law. The court also determined there was no evidence of the City’s deliberate indifference to a known or obvious risk of constitutional violation.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that, even assuming a Fourth Amendment violation, no precedent clearly established that Jaso’s conduct was unlawful under the specific circumstances—namely, facing an actively resisting, noncompliant suspect who was throwing objects. The court also found that the plaintiff failed to show a pattern of similar constitutional violations or deliberate indifference by the City, and that arguments or evidence not presented to the district court could not be considered on appeal. The court denied the request for additional discovery and affirmed dismissal of all federal claims.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-10-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stuart Kyle Duncan</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10668/25-10668-2026-10-06.html</id>
        	<title>Word v. Department of Energy</title>
        	<updated>2026-10-06T15:30:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-10-06T15:30:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10668/25-10668-2026-10-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Two consumers challenged two rules issued by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) that imposed new water-use standards for residential dishwashers and clothes washers. Their argument was that the DOE exceeded its statutory authority under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), which, they claimed, only authorized DOE to regulate four specific appliances (showerheads, faucets, water closets, and urinals). The DOE had issued direct final rules (DFRs) in 2024 that further reduced water-use limits and changed measurement schemes for dishwashers and clothes washers. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief in federal district court, asking it to invalidate the DOE’s rules and restore the standards set by Congress.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court found that EPCA’s statutory-review mechanism, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 6306(b), vested exclusive jurisdiction for challenges to rules prescribed under § 6295 in the circuit courts, not the district courts. The court rejected plaintiffs’ arguments for concurrent jurisdiction and their reliance on the EPCA’s “savings clause” in § 6306(b)(4), holding that neither provided a jurisdictional basis for their claims. The district court also denied a motion to alter or amend the judgment.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit first determined that the plaintiffs had standing, as their alleged reduction in market choices constituted an injury in fact traceable to the challenged DOE rules. The Fifth Circuit then affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that the circuit courts have exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to DOE rules under EPCA and that the district court was properly stripped of jurisdiction. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10668/25-10668-2026-10-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Word v. Department of Energy" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Two consumers challenged two rules issued by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) that imposed new water-use standards for residential dishwashers and clothes washers. Their argument was that the DOE exceeded its statutory authority under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), which, they claimed, only authorized DOE to regulate four specific appliances (showerheads, faucets, water closets, and urinals). The DOE had issued direct final rules (DFRs) in 2024 that further reduced water-use limits and changed measurement schemes for dishwashers and clothes washers. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief in federal district court, asking it to invalidate the DOE’s rules and restore the standards set by Congress.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court found that EPCA’s statutory-review mechanism, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 6306(b), vested exclusive jurisdiction for challenges to rules prescribed under § 6295 in the circuit courts, not the district courts. The court rejected plaintiffs’ arguments for concurrent jurisdiction and their reliance on the EPCA’s “savings clause” in § 6306(b)(4), holding that neither provided a jurisdictional basis for their claims. The district court also denied a motion to alter or amend the judgment.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit first determined that the plaintiffs had standing, as their alleged reduction in market choices constituted an injury in fact traceable to the challenged DOE rules. The Fifth Circuit then affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that the circuit courts have exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to DOE rules under EPCA and that the district court was properly stripped of jurisdiction. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-10-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Dana Douglas</case:judge>
													<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-40605/26-40605-2026-10-05.html</id>
        	<title>In re Howard</title>
        	<updated>2026-10-05T09:30:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-10-05T09:30:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-40605/26-40605-2026-10-05.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A man convicted of murder in Texas and sentenced to death sought to halt his execution, scheduled for October 7, 2026. He argued that newly developed clinical standards for diagnosing intellectual disability, which became available after his first federal habeas petition, would now classify him as intellectually disabled and therefore constitutionally ineligible for execution. He maintained that these new clinical guidelines constituted either a new rule of constitutional law or a new factual predicate, justifying a second federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. As an alternative, he requested a stay of execution pending a potential relevant decision by the United States Supreme Court.

After his 2001 conviction, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected his Eighth Amendment claim that his mental illness barred execution. His first state and federal habeas petitions were denied, with the federal courts determining in 2017 that he was not intellectually disabled. He later abandoned his initial Atkins v. Virginia claim after the Supreme Court faulted Texas’s standards for such claims in Moore v. Texas. In 2019, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas denied his remaining federal habeas claims, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied a Certificate of Appealability in 2020.

Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the petitioner’s second federal habeas application was barred by the one-year statute of limitations and that he was not entitled to equitable tolling. The court further found that his renewed claim of intellectual disability had already been presented in his prior habeas petition, barring reconsideration under § 2244(b)(1). The court also denied his request for a stay of execution, finding no likelihood of success on the merits and no justification for equitable relief. Both motions were denied. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-40605/26-40605-2026-10-05.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re Howard" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A man convicted of murder in Texas and sentenced to death sought to halt his execution, scheduled for October 7, 2026. He argued that newly developed clinical standards for diagnosing intellectual disability, which became available after his first federal habeas petition, would now classify him as intellectually disabled and therefore constitutionally ineligible for execution. He maintained that these new clinical guidelines constituted either a new rule of constitutional law or a new factual predicate, justifying a second federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. As an alternative, he requested a stay of execution pending a potential relevant decision by the United States Supreme Court.

After his 2001 conviction, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected his Eighth Amendment claim that his mental illness barred execution. His first state and federal habeas petitions were denied, with the federal courts determining in 2017 that he was not intellectually disabled. He later abandoned his initial Atkins v. Virginia claim after the Supreme Court faulted Texas’s standards for such claims in Moore v. Texas. In 2019, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas denied his remaining federal habeas claims, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied a Certificate of Appealability in 2020.

Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the petitioner’s second federal habeas application was barred by the one-year statute of limitations and that he was not entitled to equitable tolling. The court further found that his renewed claim of intellectual disability had already been presented in his prior habeas petition, barring reconsideration under § 2244(b)(1). The court also denied his request for a stay of execution, finding no likelihood of success on the merits and no justification for equitable relief. Both motions were denied.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-10-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50116/25-50116-2026-10-02.html</id>
        	<title>Phillips v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery</title>
        	<updated>2026-10-02T15:30:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-10-02T15:30:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50116/25-50116-2026-10-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A patient underwent surgery in Texas, during which a specific surgical stapler and staple product were used to reconnect sections of his colon. After initial success, he suffered severe complications days later, including sepsis, allegedly caused by a defect in the staple line. This resulted in months of treatment and ultimately his death. His widow and children sued several product manufacturers and sellers, asserting claims for breach of implied warranty of merchantability and other product liability theories.

Initially, the plaintiffs brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas against Johnson &amp; Johnson, Ethicon, and Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (“Phillips I”). Discovery revealed confusion about the identity of the actual seller, prompting the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint against Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. alone, asserting only breach of warranty claims. The magistrate judge recommended dismissing the claim for breach of implied warranty of merchantability without prejudice, primarily due to lack of presuit notice required under Texas law. The district court instead dismissed both claims with prejudice and denied leave to amend, finding that amendment would be futile and that the plaintiffs had not provided proper notice or shown how they could cure the defect.

After dismissal in Phillips I, the plaintiffs filed a second suit in state court (“Phillips II”) against additional parties. This case was removed to federal court, where the defendants moved for dismissal based on res judicata and collateral estoppel. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismissed Phillips II with prejudice. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed both district court judgments, holding that plaintiffs failed to state a claim due to lack of presuit notice, the denial of leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion, and preclusion doctrines properly barred the second suit. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50116/25-50116-2026-10-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Phillips v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A patient underwent surgery in Texas, during which a specific surgical stapler and staple product were used to reconnect sections of his colon. After initial success, he suffered severe complications days later, including sepsis, allegedly caused by a defect in the staple line. This resulted in months of treatment and ultimately his death. His widow and children sued several product manufacturers and sellers, asserting claims for breach of implied warranty of merchantability and other product liability theories.

Initially, the plaintiffs brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas against Johnson &amp; Johnson, Ethicon, and Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (“Phillips I”). Discovery revealed confusion about the identity of the actual seller, prompting the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint against Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. alone, asserting only breach of warranty claims. The magistrate judge recommended dismissing the claim for breach of implied warranty of merchantability without prejudice, primarily due to lack of presuit notice required under Texas law. The district court instead dismissed both claims with prejudice and denied leave to amend, finding that amendment would be futile and that the plaintiffs had not provided proper notice or shown how they could cure the defect.

After dismissal in Phillips I, the plaintiffs filed a second suit in state court (“Phillips II”) against additional parties. This case was removed to federal court, where the defendants moved for dismissal based on res judicata and collateral estoppel. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismissed Phillips II with prejudice. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed both district court judgments, holding that plaintiffs failed to state a claim due to lack of presuit notice, the denial of leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion, and preclusion doctrines properly barred the second suit.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-10-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Personal Injury"/>
							<category term="Products Liability"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11168/25-11168-2026-10-02.html</id>
        	<title>Frankfort v. Metropolis Technologies</title>
        	<updated>2026-10-02T15:30:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-10-02T15:30:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11168/25-11168-2026-10-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Two individuals received fines after failing to pay parking charges at garages operated by a company that uses automated technology, such as cameras and QR codes, to manage parking payments. When the plaintiffs did not pay the required parking fees, the company mailed them notices demanding the original fee plus a significantly larger fine. The plaintiffs alleged that the company’s business model intentionally made it difficult for drivers to pay, thereby increasing the likelihood of nonpayment and enabling the company to collect higher fines.

The plaintiffs brought a putative class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, asserting claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), as well as related Texas statutes. They argued that the company qualified as a “debt collector” under the FDCPA because it mailed notices demanding payment. The company moved to dismiss, and a magistrate judge recommended dismissal, finding that the company’s principal business was operating parking lots, not debt collection, and that it did not collect debts on behalf of others. The district court dismissed the FDCPA claim with prejudice, concluding the company was not a debt collector since it originated the debt and thus fell within a statutory exception. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims and denied leave to amend, finding any amendment would be futile.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district court misapplied the statutory exception for debt originators. The Fifth Circuit clarified that to invoke this exception, a party must both collect debts on behalf of others and have originated the debt. However, the court affirmed the dismissal on alternative grounds, holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a plausible claim that the company was a debt collector under the FDCPA because they did not sufficiently allege either that debt collection was the company&#039;s principal purpose or that it regularly collected debts for others. The Fifth Circuit also affirmed the denial of leave to amend. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11168/25-11168-2026-10-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Frankfort v. Metropolis Technologies" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Two individuals received fines after failing to pay parking charges at garages operated by a company that uses automated technology, such as cameras and QR codes, to manage parking payments. When the plaintiffs did not pay the required parking fees, the company mailed them notices demanding the original fee plus a significantly larger fine. The plaintiffs alleged that the company’s business model intentionally made it difficult for drivers to pay, thereby increasing the likelihood of nonpayment and enabling the company to collect higher fines.

The plaintiffs brought a putative class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, asserting claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), as well as related Texas statutes. They argued that the company qualified as a “debt collector” under the FDCPA because it mailed notices demanding payment. The company moved to dismiss, and a magistrate judge recommended dismissal, finding that the company’s principal business was operating parking lots, not debt collection, and that it did not collect debts on behalf of others. The district court dismissed the FDCPA claim with prejudice, concluding the company was not a debt collector since it originated the debt and thus fell within a statutory exception. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims and denied leave to amend, finding any amendment would be futile.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district court misapplied the statutory exception for debt originators. The Fifth Circuit clarified that to invoke this exception, a party must both collect debts on behalf of others and have originated the debt. However, the court affirmed the dismissal on alternative grounds, holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a plausible claim that the company was a debt collector under the FDCPA because they did not sufficiently allege either that debt collection was the company&#039;s principal purpose or that it regularly collected debts for others. The Fifth Circuit also affirmed the denial of leave to amend.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-10-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Carolyn King</case:judge>
													<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Consumer Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10850/25-10850-2026-10-02.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Koan</title>
        	<updated>2026-10-02T15:30:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-10-02T15:30:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10850/25-10850-2026-10-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		David Koan pled guilty in federal court to two counts of producing child pornography, offenses that arose from the same conduct underlying his prior Texas state conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child. For the state offenses, Koan had already been sentenced to 35 years in prison and had served nearly 40 months in custody by the time of his federal sentencing. The federal presentence report recognized that the state and federal offenses were related and recommended that Koan&#039;s federal sentence be adjusted under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) to account for the time already served on his undischarged state term.

In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Koan was sentenced to 60 years in prison—30 years on each count, to run consecutively—but the court ordered the federal sentence to run concurrently with the remaining state sentence. When defense counsel requested that Koan be given credit for the time already served in state custody, the district court stated it lacked authority to do so and deferred the issue to the Bureau of Prisons. The district court did not address the relevant Guideline provision or make clear reference to the statutory sentencing factors.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Koan had properly preserved his challenge concerning the application of U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b). The court held that the district court erred by failing to consider its authority under § 5G1.3(b) to adjust Koan’s sentence to account for time served on the related state conviction, mistakenly believing that only the Bureau of Prisons could award such credit. The Fifth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing so that the district court could properly consider and apply § 5G1.3(b). &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10850/25-10850-2026-10-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Koan" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                David Koan pled guilty in federal court to two counts of producing child pornography, offenses that arose from the same conduct underlying his prior Texas state conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child. For the state offenses, Koan had already been sentenced to 35 years in prison and had served nearly 40 months in custody by the time of his federal sentencing. The federal presentence report recognized that the state and federal offenses were related and recommended that Koan&#039;s federal sentence be adjusted under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) to account for the time already served on his undischarged state term.

In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Koan was sentenced to 60 years in prison—30 years on each count, to run consecutively—but the court ordered the federal sentence to run concurrently with the remaining state sentence. When defense counsel requested that Koan be given credit for the time already served in state custody, the district court stated it lacked authority to do so and deferred the issue to the Bureau of Prisons. The district court did not address the relevant Guideline provision or make clear reference to the statutory sentencing factors.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Koan had properly preserved his challenge concerning the application of U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b). The court held that the district court erred by failing to consider its authority under § 5G1.3(b) to adjust Koan’s sentence to account for time served on the related state conviction, mistakenly believing that only the Bureau of Prisons could award such credit. The Fifth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing so that the district court could properly consider and apply § 5G1.3(b).
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-10-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kurt Engelhardt</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20486/25-20486-2026-09-30.html</id>
        	<title>Domanic v. Christian Brothers</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-30T15:30:05-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-30T15:30:05-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20486/25-20486-2026-09-30.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A faith-based auto repair company, which exclusively franchises to professing Christians, denied a franchise application from an individual who is both ethnically and religiously Jewish. The applicant had advanced through several steps in the franchise process before being informed that his Jewish faith disqualified him. The company’s franchisees include people of various ethnic backgrounds, including some ethnic Jews who are Christians.

The applicant sued the company in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. He claimed the denial was based on his Jewish ethnicity or that no meaningful distinction exists between Jewish ethnicity and Jewish faith. The company argued its decision was based solely on religious criteria, not ethnicity, and moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion, finding that the applicant had adequately alleged racial discrimination. Later, on summary judgment, the district court applied the McDonnell Douglas framework, found the applicant established a prima facie case, but concluded the company provided a legitimate, race-neutral reason—its Christian-only policy—and there was no evidence of pretext. Summary judgment was granted for the company.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The court held that § 1981 prohibits racial but not religious discrimination in contracting, reaffirming Supreme Court and circuit precedent. It found no evidence that the company’s policy was a pretext for ethnic discrimination, distinguishing between Jewish ancestry (covered by § 1981) and Jewish faith (not covered). The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that § 1981 does not reach religious discrimination and that the applicant’s claim failed for lack of evidence of racial discrimination. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20486/25-20486-2026-09-30.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Domanic v. Christian Brothers" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A faith-based auto repair company, which exclusively franchises to professing Christians, denied a franchise application from an individual who is both ethnically and religiously Jewish. The applicant had advanced through several steps in the franchise process before being informed that his Jewish faith disqualified him. The company’s franchisees include people of various ethnic backgrounds, including some ethnic Jews who are Christians.

The applicant sued the company in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. He claimed the denial was based on his Jewish ethnicity or that no meaningful distinction exists between Jewish ethnicity and Jewish faith. The company argued its decision was based solely on religious criteria, not ethnicity, and moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion, finding that the applicant had adequately alleged racial discrimination. Later, on summary judgment, the district court applied the McDonnell Douglas framework, found the applicant established a prima facie case, but concluded the company provided a legitimate, race-neutral reason—its Christian-only policy—and there was no evidence of pretext. Summary judgment was granted for the company.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The court held that § 1981 prohibits racial but not religious discrimination in contracting, reaffirming Supreme Court and circuit precedent. It found no evidence that the company’s policy was a pretext for ethnic discrimination, distinguishing between Jewish ancestry (covered by § 1981) and Jewish faith (not covered). The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that § 1981 does not reach religious discrimination and that the applicant’s claim failed for lack of evidence of racial discrimination.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stuart Kyle Duncan</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-70019/25-70019-2026-09-22.html</id>
        	<title>Marshall v. Guerrero</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-22T15:30:05-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-22T15:30:05-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-70019/25-70019-2026-09-22.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In this case, the petitioner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death following a 2003 armed robbery in Houston, Texas, during which a restaurant employee was killed. Key evidence included eyewitness testimony, statements from co-defendants and jailhouse informants, and information about the petitioner’s criminal history and conduct in prison. The prosecution’s case centered on the petitioner being the sole gunman, though there was conflicting testimony about whether a second person entered the restaurant.

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct appeal and denied state habeas relief, finding the petitioner’s subsequent and additional habeas claims to be procedurally barred as an abuse of the writ. The petitioner then sought federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, raising thirteen claims, including allegations of false evidence, inconsistent prosecutorial theories, Brady violations, ineffective assistance of counsel, and racial bias. The district court denied relief on the merits where permitted and found the remaining claims procedurally barred due to default under Texas law, ruling that the petitioner had not shown cause, actual prejudice, or a fundamental miscarriage of justice to excuse the default.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether a certificate of appealability (COA) should issue for the claims dismissed as procedurally barred. The court held that the petitioner failed to show that jurists of reason could debate the district court’s procedural rulings. The court concluded that the claims were subject to an adequate and independent state procedural bar, and the petitioner had not demonstrated cause and prejudice or actual innocence to overcome that bar. The Fifth Circuit therefore denied the application for a certificate of appealability. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-70019/25-70019-2026-09-22.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Marshall v. Guerrero" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In this case, the petitioner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death following a 2003 armed robbery in Houston, Texas, during which a restaurant employee was killed. Key evidence included eyewitness testimony, statements from co-defendants and jailhouse informants, and information about the petitioner’s criminal history and conduct in prison. The prosecution’s case centered on the petitioner being the sole gunman, though there was conflicting testimony about whether a second person entered the restaurant.

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct appeal and denied state habeas relief, finding the petitioner’s subsequent and additional habeas claims to be procedurally barred as an abuse of the writ. The petitioner then sought federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, raising thirteen claims, including allegations of false evidence, inconsistent prosecutorial theories, Brady violations, ineffective assistance of counsel, and racial bias. The district court denied relief on the merits where permitted and found the remaining claims procedurally barred due to default under Texas law, ruling that the petitioner had not shown cause, actual prejudice, or a fundamental miscarriage of justice to excuse the default.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether a certificate of appealability (COA) should issue for the claims dismissed as procedurally barred. The court held that the petitioner failed to show that jurists of reason could debate the district court’s procedural rulings. The court concluded that the claims were subject to an adequate and independent state procedural bar, and the petitioner had not demonstrated cause and prejudice or actual innocence to overcome that bar. The Fifth Circuit therefore denied the application for a certificate of appealability.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-22</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Cory Wilson</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11206/25-11206-2026-09-18.html</id>
        	<title>Elite Precision v. ATF</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-18T15:30:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-18T15:30:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11206/25-11206-2026-09-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several plaintiffs, including a federally licensed firearm dealer in Texas and two law-abiding residents of Arizona and New Mexico, challenged federal statutes that prohibit the direct sale and transfer of handguns across state lines. The statutes in question, collectively called the Nonresident Handgun Purchase Ban, make it unlawful for unlicensed persons to buy or sell handguns to residents of other states and restrict licensed dealers from directly selling handguns to nonresidents, subject to limited exceptions. While a workaround exists—requiring transfers through an intermediary licensed dealer in the buyer’s home state—this process is not automatic, incurs additional fees, and results in delays. The plaintiffs argued that, but for the Ban, they would engage in interstate handgun sales and purchases.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas reviewed the case. The government moved to dismiss, and the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. With no disputed facts, the court determined the issue was purely a question of law: whether the Ban violates the Second Amendment. The district court upheld the Ban, granting the government’s motion and dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs appealed the decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. Applying the framework from N.Y. State Pistol &amp; Rifle Ass’n v. Bruen, the court found that the Ban implicates conduct covered by the Second Amendment’s plain text and is therefore presumptively unconstitutional. The government failed to identify a sufficient historical tradition to justify the Ban. The Fifth Circuit held that the Ban is inconsistent with the nation’s tradition of firearms regulation under the Second Amendment, reversed the district court’s dismissal, and rendered judgment for the plaintiffs. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11206/25-11206-2026-09-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Elite Precision v. ATF" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several plaintiffs, including a federally licensed firearm dealer in Texas and two law-abiding residents of Arizona and New Mexico, challenged federal statutes that prohibit the direct sale and transfer of handguns across state lines. The statutes in question, collectively called the Nonresident Handgun Purchase Ban, make it unlawful for unlicensed persons to buy or sell handguns to residents of other states and restrict licensed dealers from directly selling handguns to nonresidents, subject to limited exceptions. While a workaround exists—requiring transfers through an intermediary licensed dealer in the buyer’s home state—this process is not automatic, incurs additional fees, and results in delays. The plaintiffs argued that, but for the Ban, they would engage in interstate handgun sales and purchases.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas reviewed the case. The government moved to dismiss, and the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. With no disputed facts, the court determined the issue was purely a question of law: whether the Ban violates the Second Amendment. The district court upheld the Ban, granting the government’s motion and dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs appealed the decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. Applying the framework from N.Y. State Pistol &amp; Rifle Ass’n v. Bruen, the court found that the Ban implicates conduct covered by the Second Amendment’s plain text and is therefore presumptively unconstitutional. The government failed to identify a sufficient historical tradition to justify the Ban. The Fifth Circuit held that the Ban is inconsistent with the nation’s tradition of firearms regulation under the Second Amendment, reversed the district court’s dismissal, and rendered judgment for the plaintiffs.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10887/25-10887-2026-09-18.html</id>
        	<title>Crawford v. West Texas A&amp;M</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-18T09:30:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-18T09:30:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10887/25-10887-2026-09-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A police officer at a university was disciplined after corroborating a fellow officer’s allegations of sexual misconduct during a Title IX investigation. He had encouraged the officer to report the misconduct but did not report it himself. After participating in the investigation, he experienced several incidents he believed were retaliatory, including changes to his work routine and being denied promotion opportunities. He later recorded a conversation between his department chief and assistant chief, believing it would provide evidence of retaliation. The chief suspended him for the recording and initiated an investigation conducted by police chiefs from other schools, which resulted in a recommendation that he be fired and dishonorably discharged. Before the termination could take place, he resigned but was still given a dishonorable discharge. He filed a complaint with the EEOC, received a right to sue letter, and brought a Title VII retaliation claim.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas granted summary judgment to the university, finding that the plaintiff had not established a prima facie case for retaliation. The court held that he did not suffer an adverse employment action and that there was no causal link between his participation in the Title IX investigation and any adverse action.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of retaliation concerning his suspension and the investigation into the phone recording, but not for the dishonorable discharge, as that decision was made by an independent panel with no knowledge of his protected activity. The court found a genuine dispute of material fact about whether the rationale for the suspension and investigation was pretextual. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10887/25-10887-2026-09-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Crawford v. West Texas A&amp;M" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A police officer at a university was disciplined after corroborating a fellow officer’s allegations of sexual misconduct during a Title IX investigation. He had encouraged the officer to report the misconduct but did not report it himself. After participating in the investigation, he experienced several incidents he believed were retaliatory, including changes to his work routine and being denied promotion opportunities. He later recorded a conversation between his department chief and assistant chief, believing it would provide evidence of retaliation. The chief suspended him for the recording and initiated an investigation conducted by police chiefs from other schools, which resulted in a recommendation that he be fired and dishonorably discharged. Before the termination could take place, he resigned but was still given a dishonorable discharge. He filed a complaint with the EEOC, received a right to sue letter, and brought a Title VII retaliation claim.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas granted summary judgment to the university, finding that the plaintiff had not established a prima facie case for retaliation. The court held that he did not suffer an adverse employment action and that there was no causal link between his participation in the Title IX investigation and any adverse action.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of retaliation concerning his suspension and the investigation into the phone recording, but not for the dishonorable discharge, as that decision was made by an independent panel with no knowledge of his protected activity. The court found a genuine dispute of material fact about whether the rationale for the suspension and investigation was pretextual. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James Graves</case:judge>
													<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60558/24-60558-2026-09-17.html</id>
        	<title>Rash v. Lafayette County</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-17T15:30:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-17T15:30:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60558/24-60558-2026-09-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A university professor in Oxford, Mississippi sought to host a nighttime art exhibition on the grounds of the local courthouse, which is frequently used by the public for varied activities, including political protests and social gatherings. The county had implemented a Facility Use Policy requiring permits for use of courthouse grounds, including a ban on nighttime events, advance notice, security fees, insurance, and granting discretionary authority to deny permits based on the nature of the event. The professor’s permit request was denied due to the curfew provision, prompting him to file suit alleging violations of the First Amendment.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi held a bench trial and permanently enjoined enforcement of the curfew provision against the professor, finding it an unreasonable restriction on speech. However, the court dismissed the professor’s other claims for lack of standing, concluding he had not suffered sufficient injury to challenge the remaining policy provisions or to bring a vagueness challenge.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the injunction against the curfew provision, holding that the ban was not narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and burdened more speech than necessary. The court rejected the county’s argument that subsequent policy amendments mooted the case, finding the amended curfew provision still posed the same fundamental issues. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the professor’s facial challenges to the other policy provisions, holding he had standing to challenge them under the First Amendment, though not on vagueness grounds. The case was remanded for further proceedings, requiring the professor to demonstrate that unconstitutional applications of the policy substantially outweigh constitutional ones. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60558/24-60558-2026-09-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Rash v. Lafayette County" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A university professor in Oxford, Mississippi sought to host a nighttime art exhibition on the grounds of the local courthouse, which is frequently used by the public for varied activities, including political protests and social gatherings. The county had implemented a Facility Use Policy requiring permits for use of courthouse grounds, including a ban on nighttime events, advance notice, security fees, insurance, and granting discretionary authority to deny permits based on the nature of the event. The professor’s permit request was denied due to the curfew provision, prompting him to file suit alleging violations of the First Amendment.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi held a bench trial and permanently enjoined enforcement of the curfew provision against the professor, finding it an unreasonable restriction on speech. However, the court dismissed the professor’s other claims for lack of standing, concluding he had not suffered sufficient injury to challenge the remaining policy provisions or to bring a vagueness challenge.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the injunction against the curfew provision, holding that the ban was not narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and burdened more speech than necessary. The court rejected the county’s argument that subsequent policy amendments mooted the case, finding the amended curfew provision still posed the same fundamental issues. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the professor’s facial challenges to the other policy provisions, holding he had standing to challenge them under the First Amendment, though not on vagueness grounds. The case was remanded for further proceedings, requiring the professor to demonstrate that unconstitutional applications of the policy substantially outweigh constitutional ones.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Andrew Oldham</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60227/24-60227-2026-09-15.html</id>
        	<title>East Fork Enterprises v. EPA</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-15T15:30:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-15T15:30:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60227/24-60227-2026-09-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Methylene chloride is a chemical used in various commercial applications, including paint removal and manufacturing of products like air conditioner coolants and EV batteries. While useful, over-exposure to methylene chloride can cause serious health risks, including injury and death. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), determined that nearly all uses of methylene chloride posed an “unreasonable risk of injury to health” and issued a rule severely limiting its manufacture, processing, distribution, and use, allowing only thirteen conditions of use under strict exposure limits.

Prior to this rule, EPA had completed risk evaluations for methylene chloride, first in 2020 and then revised in 2022. The revised evaluation adopted a “whole chemical” determination, finding all but one use posed unreasonable risk, and assumed workers did not use personal protective equipment (PPE), contrary to prior practice and OSHA standards. Industry petitioners, including manufacturers and the American Chemistry Council, filed for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing that EPA’s determinations and rule were arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by substantial evidence. Sierra Club also challenged the rule, asserting EPA did not go far enough to protect vulnerable populations.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that EPA’s “whole chemical” risk determination violated TSCA, which requires separate evaluations for each condition of use. The court also held that EPA’s assumption of no PPE use was unsupported by substantial evidence and contrary to law. EPA’s exposure limits for methylene chloride were deemed excessively conservative and not supported by the record. The court granted the industry petitioners’ review, vacated EPA’s rule and associated risk determination, denied Sierra Club’s petition, and remanded to EPA for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60227/24-60227-2026-09-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "East Fork Enterprises v. EPA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Methylene chloride is a chemical used in various commercial applications, including paint removal and manufacturing of products like air conditioner coolants and EV batteries. While useful, over-exposure to methylene chloride can cause serious health risks, including injury and death. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), determined that nearly all uses of methylene chloride posed an “unreasonable risk of injury to health” and issued a rule severely limiting its manufacture, processing, distribution, and use, allowing only thirteen conditions of use under strict exposure limits.

Prior to this rule, EPA had completed risk evaluations for methylene chloride, first in 2020 and then revised in 2022. The revised evaluation adopted a “whole chemical” determination, finding all but one use posed unreasonable risk, and assumed workers did not use personal protective equipment (PPE), contrary to prior practice and OSHA standards. Industry petitioners, including manufacturers and the American Chemistry Council, filed for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing that EPA’s determinations and rule were arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by substantial evidence. Sierra Club also challenged the rule, asserting EPA did not go far enough to protect vulnerable populations.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that EPA’s “whole chemical” risk determination violated TSCA, which requires separate evaluations for each condition of use. The court also held that EPA’s assumption of no PPE use was unsupported by substantial evidence and contrary to law. EPA’s exposure limits for methylene chloride were deemed excessively conservative and not supported by the record. The court granted the industry petitioners’ review, vacated EPA’s rule and associated risk determination, denied Sierra Club’s petition, and remanded to EPA for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Edith Jones</case:judge>
													<category term="Environmental Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-70010/25-70010-2026-09-15.html</id>
        	<title>Ramirez v. Guerrero</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-15T15:30:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-15T15:30:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-70010/25-70010-2026-09-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The petitioner, a Texas death-row inmate, was convicted of capital murder following his involvement in a multi-victim robbery homicide associated with gang activity in Hidalgo County, Texas. The prosecution’s case relied, in part, on the petitioner’s own recorded confession, which detailed his participation in the crime and described receiving an AK-47 prior to the robbery. The trial lasted thirteen days, and after a day of deliberation, the jury found the petitioner guilty of capital murder and sentenced him to death. At sentencing, the jury heard limited information about the petitioner’s background, despite the existence of extensive juvenile records documenting significant mental health issues.

On direct appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) held that only one count of capital murder could stand due to double jeopardy concerns and otherwise affirmed both the conviction and the death sentence. Subsequent state habeas proceedings, including those before the TCCA, did not lead to relief. The petitioner then filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, raising numerous claims. The district court, relying on a lengthy magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, denied the habeas petition and a certificate of appealability (COA).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the petitioner’s request for a COA on two claims: ineffective assistance of trial counsel for not admitting juvenile records under the business-records hearsay exception, and error in admitting his confession as involuntary. The Fifth Circuit denied the COA, holding that the petitioner had not shown that reasonable jurists could debate the district court’s resolution of either claim. Specifically, the court found that the ineffective assistance claim was procedurally barred because it was raised too late, and the voluntariness claim was not properly before the court due to procedural defaults in presenting new evidence and exhaustion theories. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-70010/25-70010-2026-09-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Ramirez v. Guerrero" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The petitioner, a Texas death-row inmate, was convicted of capital murder following his involvement in a multi-victim robbery homicide associated with gang activity in Hidalgo County, Texas. The prosecution’s case relied, in part, on the petitioner’s own recorded confession, which detailed his participation in the crime and described receiving an AK-47 prior to the robbery. The trial lasted thirteen days, and after a day of deliberation, the jury found the petitioner guilty of capital murder and sentenced him to death. At sentencing, the jury heard limited information about the petitioner’s background, despite the existence of extensive juvenile records documenting significant mental health issues.

On direct appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) held that only one count of capital murder could stand due to double jeopardy concerns and otherwise affirmed both the conviction and the death sentence. Subsequent state habeas proceedings, including those before the TCCA, did not lead to relief. The petitioner then filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, raising numerous claims. The district court, relying on a lengthy magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, denied the habeas petition and a certificate of appealability (COA).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the petitioner’s request for a COA on two claims: ineffective assistance of trial counsel for not admitting juvenile records under the business-records hearsay exception, and error in admitting his confession as involuntary. The Fifth Circuit denied the COA, holding that the petitioner had not shown that reasonable jurists could debate the district court’s resolution of either claim. Specifically, the court found that the ineffective assistance claim was procedurally barred because it was raised too late, and the voluntariness claim was not properly before the court due to procedural defaults in presenting new evidence and exhaustion theories.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Juvenile Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50160/25-50160-2026-09-15.html</id>
        	<title>Harward v. City of Austin</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-15T09:30:11-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-15T09:30:11-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50160/25-50160-2026-09-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several owners of shoreline properties along Lake Austin challenged a 2019 ordinance enacted by the City of Austin. The ordinance declared that their properties had always been within Austin’s full-purpose jurisdiction, repealed a 1986 ordinance that had previously classified the properties as limited-purpose (which restricted taxation until city services were provided), and subjected the properties to full taxation. The plaintiffs alleged that Austin taxed their properties as if they were full-purpose residents but provided fewer municipal services than other full-purpose residents, raising federal and state law claims.

Initially, the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed all claims under the Tax Injunction Act. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of all but two claims and remanded the case. Upon remand, the City reasserted several grounds for dismissal, including the political-question doctrine, Pullman abstention, Burford abstention, and failure to state a claim. The magistrate judge recommended Pullman abstention, which the district court adopted, dismissing the claims without prejudice and entering final judgment. The plaintiffs appealed again.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision and held that the case was not moot, as recent state legislation neither refunded taxes nor automatically disannexed the properties. The Fifth Circuit concluded that Pullman abstention was inappropriate because the plaintiffs’ federal equal protection claim did not hinge on any uncertain or disputed question of Texas law. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for consideration of the City’s remaining grounds for dismissal, expressly declining to reach those grounds itself. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50160/25-50160-2026-09-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Harward v. City of Austin" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several owners of shoreline properties along Lake Austin challenged a 2019 ordinance enacted by the City of Austin. The ordinance declared that their properties had always been within Austin’s full-purpose jurisdiction, repealed a 1986 ordinance that had previously classified the properties as limited-purpose (which restricted taxation until city services were provided), and subjected the properties to full taxation. The plaintiffs alleged that Austin taxed their properties as if they were full-purpose residents but provided fewer municipal services than other full-purpose residents, raising federal and state law claims.

Initially, the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed all claims under the Tax Injunction Act. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of all but two claims and remanded the case. Upon remand, the City reasserted several grounds for dismissal, including the political-question doctrine, Pullman abstention, Burford abstention, and failure to state a claim. The magistrate judge recommended Pullman abstention, which the district court adopted, dismissing the claims without prejudice and entering final judgment. The plaintiffs appealed again.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision and held that the case was not moot, as recent state legislation neither refunded taxes nor automatically disannexed the properties. The Fifth Circuit concluded that Pullman abstention was inappropriate because the plaintiffs’ federal equal protection claim did not hinge on any uncertain or disputed question of Texas law. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for consideration of the City’s remaining grounds for dismissal, expressly declining to reach those grounds itself.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Don Willett</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Real Estate &amp; Property Law"/>
							<category term="Tax Law"/>
							<category term="Zoning, Planning &amp; Land Use"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-20570/23-20570-2026-09-14.html</id>
        	<title>Megalomedia v. Philadelphia Indemnity</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-14T09:30:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-14T09:30:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-20570/23-20570-2026-09-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A television production company maintained insurance coverage for its shows, including one chronicling the struggles of obese individuals to lose weight. In 2011, the insurer added an exclusion to the general liability portion of the policy, barring coverage for “any/all reality shows.” The company did not object to this exclusion. Years later, several participants or their families sued the production company for injuries allegedly arising from the show’s filming. The insurer refused to defend or indemnify the company, citing the “reality show” exclusion.

The insurer brought a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, seeking confirmation that it had no duty to defend or indemnify. The production company counterclaimed for breach of contract, fraudulent inducement, and violations of Texas consumer protection statutes. The district court granted summary judgment to the insurer, finding that the exclusion unambiguously barred coverage for bodily injuries arising from reality shows like the one at issue. At a subsequent bench trial, the district court rejected the company’s fraud and statutory claims, finding no misrepresentation by the insurer and concluding the company could not have justifiably relied on any representation given its knowledge of the exclusion and the show’s nature.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Fifth Circuit held that the company forfeited its argument about the ambiguity of &quot;reality show&quot; by not raising it in the district court and, in fact, previously represented the show as a “reality show.” The appellate court also found no clear error in the district court’s factual findings rejecting the fraud and consumer protection claims, noting substantial evidence of the company’s understanding of the exclusion. The district court’s judgment was affirmed in full. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-20570/23-20570-2026-09-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Megalomedia v. Philadelphia Indemnity" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A television production company maintained insurance coverage for its shows, including one chronicling the struggles of obese individuals to lose weight. In 2011, the insurer added an exclusion to the general liability portion of the policy, barring coverage for “any/all reality shows.” The company did not object to this exclusion. Years later, several participants or their families sued the production company for injuries allegedly arising from the show’s filming. The insurer refused to defend or indemnify the company, citing the “reality show” exclusion.

The insurer brought a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, seeking confirmation that it had no duty to defend or indemnify. The production company counterclaimed for breach of contract, fraudulent inducement, and violations of Texas consumer protection statutes. The district court granted summary judgment to the insurer, finding that the exclusion unambiguously barred coverage for bodily injuries arising from reality shows like the one at issue. At a subsequent bench trial, the district court rejected the company’s fraud and statutory claims, finding no misrepresentation by the insurer and concluding the company could not have justifiably relied on any representation given its knowledge of the exclusion and the show’s nature.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Fifth Circuit held that the company forfeited its argument about the ambiguity of &quot;reality show&quot; by not raising it in the district court and, in fact, previously represented the show as a “reality show.” The appellate court also found no clear error in the district court’s factual findings rejecting the fraud and consumer protection claims, noting substantial evidence of the company’s understanding of the exclusion. The district court’s judgment was affirmed in full.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stuart Kyle Duncan</case:judge>
													<category term="Consumer Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Insurance Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30263/25-30263-2026-09-11.html</id>
        	<title>Sahs v. Loyola Univ New Orleans</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-11T15:30:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-11T15:30:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30263/25-30263-2026-09-11.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A former student at a New Orleans university was reported by a fellow student for stalking after a school-sponsored trip to Honduras. The report included allegations that he had made threatening statements about his ability to build bombs and use chemical agents, and referenced chemical burns. Based on this report, a warrant was issued and he was arrested for misdemeanor stalking. After his arrest, a university police officer gave statements to the campus newspaper, which published articles suggesting he possessed chemical materials capable of killing people and had made threatening posts on social media. The student withdrew from the university shortly after his arrest, and the criminal case was later dismissed with no charges related to weapons or chemicals.

The student filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, asserting various claims including defamation and negligence against the university. The university responded by filing a special motion to strike under Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP statute (Article 971), which provides an expedited procedure for dismissal of claims arising from protected speech or petitioning activity. The district court denied the motion, holding that Article 971 does not apply in federal court when jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed whether Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP statute applies in federal court. The Fifth Circuit held that Article 971 conflicts with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56 because it imposes additional procedural requirements not found in the federal rules, such as burden-shifting and limitations on discovery. As a result, the court concluded that Article 971 does not apply in federal court. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the university’s special motion to strike. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30263/25-30263-2026-09-11.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Sahs v. Loyola Univ New Orleans" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A former student at a New Orleans university was reported by a fellow student for stalking after a school-sponsored trip to Honduras. The report included allegations that he had made threatening statements about his ability to build bombs and use chemical agents, and referenced chemical burns. Based on this report, a warrant was issued and he was arrested for misdemeanor stalking. After his arrest, a university police officer gave statements to the campus newspaper, which published articles suggesting he possessed chemical materials capable of killing people and had made threatening posts on social media. The student withdrew from the university shortly after his arrest, and the criminal case was later dismissed with no charges related to weapons or chemicals.

The student filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, asserting various claims including defamation and negligence against the university. The university responded by filing a special motion to strike under Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP statute (Article 971), which provides an expedited procedure for dismissal of claims arising from protected speech or petitioning activity. The district court denied the motion, holding that Article 971 does not apply in federal court when jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed whether Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP statute applies in federal court. The Fifth Circuit held that Article 971 conflicts with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56 because it imposes additional procedural requirements not found in the federal rules, such as burden-shifting and limitations on discovery. As a result, the court concluded that Article 971 does not apply in federal court. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the university’s special motion to strike.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Priscilla Richman</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50747/25-50747-2026-09-11.html</id>
        	<title>Texas v. Dept of the Interior</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-11T09:30:09-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-11T09:30:09-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50747/25-50747-2026-09-11.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Federal and state agencies enacted a rule listing two distinct population segments of the lesser prairie-chicken as &quot;endangered&quot; and &quot;threatened&quot; under the Endangered Species Act. The rule divided the bird’s range into Northern and Southern segments, based on habitat and genetic differences. Conservation groups, including one that originally petitioned for the listing, were active throughout the process. After a change in presidential administration in 2025, the federal government signaled a shift in environmental policy and, in ongoing litigation, ultimately conceded error in applying the &quot;distinct population segment&quot; policy. The government and various state and industry plaintiffs sought to settle by vacating the listing rule.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas consolidated the lawsuits challenging the listing. Conservation groups moved to intervene twice: the first motion was denied because the court found the government would adequately represent their interests, and the second was denied as untimely and for failure to rebut that presumption. Meanwhile, the district court granted the government’s motion for voluntary vacatur and remand, finding the listing rule unlawful due to the agency’s conceded error.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of intervention de novo and the timeliness determination for abuse of discretion. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in finding the second motion to intervene untimely, as the conservation groups acted promptly after government conduct revealed a divergence of interests. The court found all requirements for intervention of right satisfied and reversed the denial of intervention. However, the Fifth Circuit determined the conservation groups lacked appellate standing to challenge the vacatur and remand of the listing rule, so it did not reach the merits of the district court’s substantive ruling. The case was remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50747/25-50747-2026-09-11.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Texas v. Dept of the Interior" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Federal and state agencies enacted a rule listing two distinct population segments of the lesser prairie-chicken as &quot;endangered&quot; and &quot;threatened&quot; under the Endangered Species Act. The rule divided the bird’s range into Northern and Southern segments, based on habitat and genetic differences. Conservation groups, including one that originally petitioned for the listing, were active throughout the process. After a change in presidential administration in 2025, the federal government signaled a shift in environmental policy and, in ongoing litigation, ultimately conceded error in applying the &quot;distinct population segment&quot; policy. The government and various state and industry plaintiffs sought to settle by vacating the listing rule.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas consolidated the lawsuits challenging the listing. Conservation groups moved to intervene twice: the first motion was denied because the court found the government would adequately represent their interests, and the second was denied as untimely and for failure to rebut that presumption. Meanwhile, the district court granted the government’s motion for voluntary vacatur and remand, finding the listing rule unlawful due to the agency’s conceded error.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of intervention de novo and the timeliness determination for abuse of discretion. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in finding the second motion to intervene untimely, as the conservation groups acted promptly after government conduct revealed a divergence of interests. The court found all requirements for intervention of right satisfied and reversed the denial of intervention. However, the Fifth Circuit determined the conservation groups lacked appellate standing to challenge the vacatur and remand of the listing rule, so it did not reach the merits of the district court’s substantive ruling. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Cory Wilson</case:judge>
													<category term="Environmental Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-60007/26-60007-2026-09-09.html</id>
        	<title>Eriakha v. University of MS</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-09T09:30:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-09T09:30:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-60007/26-60007-2026-09-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Twin brothers, both Black international students, were enrolled as doctoral candidates at the University of Mississippi’s Department of Pharmacy Administration. One brother, Bennard, disagreed with changes to his faculty mentorship arrangement, objected to mandatory in-person meetings, and declined to complete a required program assessment called the Abilities Transcript. After being repeatedly warned and given extensions, he was placed on provisional status for failing to complete the requirement, which also caused the loss of his graduate assistantship. Bennard and his brother each filed lawsuits against the University and several faculty members, alleging constitutional, statutory, and contract violations related to academic sanctions and alleged discriminatory treatment.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi consolidated the brothers’ cases. It dismissed Bennard’s claims against the University on sovereign-immunity grounds, dismissed his remaining federal claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his individual-capacity state contract claims. Bennard appealed, while his brother’s appeal was dismissed for failure to prosecute.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Bennard’s remaining claims. The court held that sovereign immunity barred claims against the University, claims against one defendant in her official capacity, and official-capacity state-law contract claims; those dismissals must be without prejudice. The court further found that Bennard failed to plausibly allege First or Fourteenth Amendment violations, and that the faculty defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on individual-capacity claims. The court affirmed the district court’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining contract claims and upheld consolidation of the cases and dismissal of moot preliminary injunction motions. The judgment was affirmed as modified to clarify the proper form of dismissal for sovereign-immunity-barred claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-60007/26-60007-2026-09-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Eriakha v. University of MS" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Twin brothers, both Black international students, were enrolled as doctoral candidates at the University of Mississippi’s Department of Pharmacy Administration. One brother, Bennard, disagreed with changes to his faculty mentorship arrangement, objected to mandatory in-person meetings, and declined to complete a required program assessment called the Abilities Transcript. After being repeatedly warned and given extensions, he was placed on provisional status for failing to complete the requirement, which also caused the loss of his graduate assistantship. Bennard and his brother each filed lawsuits against the University and several faculty members, alleging constitutional, statutory, and contract violations related to academic sanctions and alleged discriminatory treatment.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi consolidated the brothers’ cases. It dismissed Bennard’s claims against the University on sovereign-immunity grounds, dismissed his remaining federal claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his individual-capacity state contract claims. Bennard appealed, while his brother’s appeal was dismissed for failure to prosecute.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Bennard’s remaining claims. The court held that sovereign immunity barred claims against the University, claims against one defendant in her official capacity, and official-capacity state-law contract claims; those dismissals must be without prejudice. The court further found that Bennard failed to plausibly allege First or Fourteenth Amendment violations, and that the faculty defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on individual-capacity claims. The court affirmed the district court’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining contract claims and upheld consolidation of the cases and dismissal of moot preliminary injunction motions. The judgment was affirmed as modified to clarify the proper form of dismissal for sovereign-immunity-barred claims.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Don Willett</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30552/24-30552-2026-09-08.html</id>
        	<title>I F G Port v. Lake Charles Harbor</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-08T09:30:17-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-08T09:30:17-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30552/24-30552-2026-09-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A dispute arose between a company and a port authority over responsibility for securing permits to dredge a ship channel in Lake Charles, Louisiana. The company had leased the channel to develop a grain terminal, but the lease did not specify which party was responsible for obtaining the dredging permit. After the terminal was built but could not be fully used without dredging, the company and the port disagreed over who bore this responsibility. The company sued in federal court, and, by consent of both parties, a U.S. Magistrate Judge presided over a bench trial and awarded the company nearly $125 million.

After the trial and the entry of judgment, the port discovered that the magistrate judge and the company’s lead trial counsel had been close family friends for four decades—a relationship that was not fully disclosed. The only disclosure had been that the lead counsel’s daughter was the judge’s law clerk, who would be screened from the case. Upon learning about the undisclosed relationship, the port moved to vacate the magistrate judge referral. The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana held an evidentiary hearing and found that the port’s consent to the referral had not been knowing, as it had lacked crucial information about the judge’s conflict, and vacated the referral.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion. The Fifth Circuit held that a party’s consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction waives a fundamental constitutional right and, therefore, must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The court rejected the argument that constructive knowledge by the party’s counsel—rather than actual knowledge—could suffice to establish valid consent. Because the district court applied the correct standard and found no actual knowledge, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the vacation of the referral. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30552/24-30552-2026-09-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "I F G Port v. Lake Charles Harbor" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A dispute arose between a company and a port authority over responsibility for securing permits to dredge a ship channel in Lake Charles, Louisiana. The company had leased the channel to develop a grain terminal, but the lease did not specify which party was responsible for obtaining the dredging permit. After the terminal was built but could not be fully used without dredging, the company and the port disagreed over who bore this responsibility. The company sued in federal court, and, by consent of both parties, a U.S. Magistrate Judge presided over a bench trial and awarded the company nearly $125 million.

After the trial and the entry of judgment, the port discovered that the magistrate judge and the company’s lead trial counsel had been close family friends for four decades—a relationship that was not fully disclosed. The only disclosure had been that the lead counsel’s daughter was the judge’s law clerk, who would be screened from the case. Upon learning about the undisclosed relationship, the port moved to vacate the magistrate judge referral. The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana held an evidentiary hearing and found that the port’s consent to the referral had not been knowing, as it had lacked crucial information about the judge’s conflict, and vacated the referral.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion. The Fifth Circuit held that a party’s consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction waives a fundamental constitutional right and, therefore, must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The court rejected the argument that constructive knowledge by the party’s counsel—rather than actual knowledge—could suffice to establish valid consent. Because the district court applied the correct standard and found no actual knowledge, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the vacation of the referral.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James Graves</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Legal Ethics"/>
							<category term="Admiralty &amp; Maritime Law"/>
							<category term="Professional Malpractice &amp; Ethics"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50319/25-50319-2026-09-04.html</id>
        	<title>Lucid Group USA v. Johnston</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-04T15:30:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-04T15:30:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50319/25-50319-2026-09-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Lucid USA, Inc., which manufactures and sells electric vehicles, sought to sell its vehicles directly to consumers in Texas through its own retail studio. However, Texas law prohibits motor vehicle manufacturers and their affiliates from directly selling vehicles to consumers, instead requiring sales to occur through independent franchised dealers. In 2021, after the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles notified Lucid that it could not sell vehicles at its Plano studio due to this prohibition, Lucid filed suit against officials of the Department, alleging that the law violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Texas Automobile Dealers Association intervened as a defendant.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment and ruled against Lucid. The district court concluded that the Texas prohibition was rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest and, therefore, did not violate either the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses. Lucid appealed this decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. Relying on its previous decisions in Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Department of Transportation, International Truck &amp; Engine Corp. v. Bray, and Tesla, Inc. v. Louisiana Automobile Dealers Association, the Fifth Circuit found those precedents controlling. The court held that the Texas law survives rational basis review because the legislature has a legitimate interest in curtailing vertical integration and preventing monopolistic practices in the automobile market. The court rejected Lucid’s arguments that its as-applied challenge was distinct from the facial challenges previously considered. The court also found that Lucid&#039;s substantive due process claim fails for the same reasons. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50319/25-50319-2026-09-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Lucid Group USA v. Johnston" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Lucid USA, Inc., which manufactures and sells electric vehicles, sought to sell its vehicles directly to consumers in Texas through its own retail studio. However, Texas law prohibits motor vehicle manufacturers and their affiliates from directly selling vehicles to consumers, instead requiring sales to occur through independent franchised dealers. In 2021, after the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles notified Lucid that it could not sell vehicles at its Plano studio due to this prohibition, Lucid filed suit against officials of the Department, alleging that the law violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Texas Automobile Dealers Association intervened as a defendant.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment and ruled against Lucid. The district court concluded that the Texas prohibition was rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest and, therefore, did not violate either the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses. Lucid appealed this decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. Relying on its previous decisions in Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Department of Transportation, International Truck &amp; Engine Corp. v. Bray, and Tesla, Inc. v. Louisiana Automobile Dealers Association, the Fifth Circuit found those precedents controlling. The court held that the Texas law survives rational basis review because the legislature has a legitimate interest in curtailing vertical integration and preventing monopolistic practices in the automobile market. The court rejected Lucid’s arguments that its as-applied challenge was distinct from the facial challenges previously considered. The court also found that Lucid&#039;s substantive due process claim fails for the same reasons. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Patrick Higginbotham</case:judge>
													<category term="Antitrust &amp; Trade Regulation"/>
							<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60650/24-60650-2026-09-04.html</id>
        	<title>Starbucks v. NLRB</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-04T15:30:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-04T15:30:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60650/24-60650-2026-09-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several Starbucks stores in Buffalo, New York, were the site of intense union organizing activity between August 2021 and July 2022, led by Workers United. After the Union launched its campaign, Starbucks responded with a series of actions: dispatching senior executives and support managers to Buffalo, implementing fast-tracked renovations, soliciting employee grievances, offering benefits and promotions, strictly enforcing workplace policies, and terminating several employees, many of whom were union supporters. The Union won certification at eight stores but lost the vote at the Camp Road location, leading to allegations that Starbucks’s conduct affected the fairness of the election.

The National Labor Relations Board’s General Counsel investigated, resulting in consolidated complaints. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found Starbucks violated sections 8(a)(1), (3), (4), and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and sustained the Union’s objections to the Camp Road election. The NLRB issued an extensive order adopting the ALJ’s findings, concluding that Starbucks engaged in unlawful surveillance, coercive interrogation, solicited grievances, promised and granted benefits, threatened employees, changed policies and fired employees without bargaining, closed the Galleria kiosk discriminatorily, and disciplined union supporters. Remedies included a bargaining order at Camp Road, reopening the Galleria kiosk, compensating employees for pecuniary harm, and requiring a public notice reading.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the NLRB’s order. Applying a deferential standard to the Board’s factual findings and reviewing legal conclusions de novo, the Fifth Circuit denied enforcement as to one finding of unlawful surveillance, the sole findings of unlawful interrogation and coercive threats, remanding those portions. It granted enforcement for the Board’s findings under sections 8(a)(3), (4), and (5). The court denied enforcement of the consequential damages remedy and reopening the Galleria kiosk, but enforced the bargaining order at Camp Road and the public notice-reading requirement. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60650/24-60650-2026-09-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Starbucks v. NLRB" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several Starbucks stores in Buffalo, New York, were the site of intense union organizing activity between August 2021 and July 2022, led by Workers United. After the Union launched its campaign, Starbucks responded with a series of actions: dispatching senior executives and support managers to Buffalo, implementing fast-tracked renovations, soliciting employee grievances, offering benefits and promotions, strictly enforcing workplace policies, and terminating several employees, many of whom were union supporters. The Union won certification at eight stores but lost the vote at the Camp Road location, leading to allegations that Starbucks’s conduct affected the fairness of the election.

The National Labor Relations Board’s General Counsel investigated, resulting in consolidated complaints. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found Starbucks violated sections 8(a)(1), (3), (4), and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and sustained the Union’s objections to the Camp Road election. The NLRB issued an extensive order adopting the ALJ’s findings, concluding that Starbucks engaged in unlawful surveillance, coercive interrogation, solicited grievances, promised and granted benefits, threatened employees, changed policies and fired employees without bargaining, closed the Galleria kiosk discriminatorily, and disciplined union supporters. Remedies included a bargaining order at Camp Road, reopening the Galleria kiosk, compensating employees for pecuniary harm, and requiring a public notice reading.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the NLRB’s order. Applying a deferential standard to the Board’s factual findings and reviewing legal conclusions de novo, the Fifth Circuit denied enforcement as to one finding of unlawful surveillance, the sole findings of unlawful interrogation and coercive threats, remanding those portions. It granted enforcement for the Board’s findings under sections 8(a)(3), (4), and (5). The court denied enforcement of the consequential damages remedy and reopening the Galleria kiosk, but enforced the bargaining order at Camp Road and the public notice-reading requirement.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jacques Wiener</case:judge>
													<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60559/25-60559-2026-09-04.html</id>
        	<title>Okene v. Blanche</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-04T15:30:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-04T15:30:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60559/25-60559-2026-09-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The petitioner is a Nigerian citizen who entered the United States on a business visa in 2004 and overstayed after the visa’s expiration in 2005. Following charges of deportability in 2007, he conceded removability in 2008. In 2012, he sought cancellation of removal and also applied for special cancellation of removal under the Violence Against Women Act, citing his current wife’s medical issues and financial challenges, as well as abuse endured from his former wife. At a merits hearing in 2021, the petitioner, his family, and a psychologist testified regarding his eligibility for relief.

An Immigration Judge (IJ) reviewed the evidence and denied both cancellation and special cancellation of removal. The IJ found that the petitioner did not meet the statutory requirements for either form of relief, including the necessary showing of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying relative and sufficient evidence of battery or extreme cruelty. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision in full, explicitly referencing Matter of Burbano to preserve the IJ’s findings for review.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision, applying a substantial-evidence standard to the agency’s hardship and battery/cruelty determinations, consistent with recent Supreme Court precedent. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the BIA did not err in summarily affirming the IJ’s order and that substantial evidence supported the agency’s denial of relief. The court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate either exceptional and extremely unusual hardship or battery/extreme cruelty sufficient to warrant cancellation or special cancellation of removal. The petition for review was denied. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60559/25-60559-2026-09-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Okene v. Blanche" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The petitioner is a Nigerian citizen who entered the United States on a business visa in 2004 and overstayed after the visa’s expiration in 2005. Following charges of deportability in 2007, he conceded removability in 2008. In 2012, he sought cancellation of removal and also applied for special cancellation of removal under the Violence Against Women Act, citing his current wife’s medical issues and financial challenges, as well as abuse endured from his former wife. At a merits hearing in 2021, the petitioner, his family, and a psychologist testified regarding his eligibility for relief.

An Immigration Judge (IJ) reviewed the evidence and denied both cancellation and special cancellation of removal. The IJ found that the petitioner did not meet the statutory requirements for either form of relief, including the necessary showing of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying relative and sufficient evidence of battery or extreme cruelty. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision in full, explicitly referencing Matter of Burbano to preserve the IJ’s findings for review.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision, applying a substantial-evidence standard to the agency’s hardship and battery/cruelty determinations, consistent with recent Supreme Court precedent. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the BIA did not err in summarily affirming the IJ’s order and that substantial evidence supported the agency’s denial of relief. The court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate either exceptional and extremely unusual hardship or battery/extreme cruelty sufficient to warrant cancellation or special cancellation of removal. The petition for review was denied.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Edith Jones</case:judge>
													<category term="Immigration Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60653/24-60653-2026-09-04.html</id>
        	<title>Starbucks v. NLRB</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-04T09:30:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-04T09:30:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60653/24-60653-2026-09-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In 2022, a Starbucks store in Wichita, Kansas, was the site of unionization discussions. The store manager, Carmella Neri, and assistant manager, Lauren Jacobs, made various statements to employees about union organizing, benefit changes, store hour reductions, and hiring practices. Employees testified that Neri referenced union activity during routine performance meetings, specifically suggesting that certain benefits might not be guaranteed if employees chose to unionize. Jacobs explained to an employee that the hiring portal was closed due to difficulties in discussing union matters with prospective hires. Additionally, Neri responded to an inquiry about reduced store hours by attributing the change to union-related pressures.

After a failed union election, the union filed charges against Starbucks with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRB’s General Counsel issued a complaint alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), including threats of loss of benefits, creating an impression of surveillance, and linking adverse employment actions to union activity. An administrative law judge (ALJ) conducted a hearing and found Starbucks in violation on all claims. Starbucks challenged these findings before the NLRB, which largely adopted the ALJ’s conclusions but issued a narrower remedy.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court granted enforcement of the NLRB’s decision as to the finding that Neri’s statements to employee Cuellar-Serafini about loss of benefits constituted an unlawful threat of reprisal. However, the Fifth Circuit denied enforcement regarding the findings on store hours reductions, hiring portal closure, and impression of surveillance, holding that these determinations were not supported by substantial evidence. Thus, only the threat of loss of benefits claim was upheld. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60653/24-60653-2026-09-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Starbucks v. NLRB" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In 2022, a Starbucks store in Wichita, Kansas, was the site of unionization discussions. The store manager, Carmella Neri, and assistant manager, Lauren Jacobs, made various statements to employees about union organizing, benefit changes, store hour reductions, and hiring practices. Employees testified that Neri referenced union activity during routine performance meetings, specifically suggesting that certain benefits might not be guaranteed if employees chose to unionize. Jacobs explained to an employee that the hiring portal was closed due to difficulties in discussing union matters with prospective hires. Additionally, Neri responded to an inquiry about reduced store hours by attributing the change to union-related pressures.

After a failed union election, the union filed charges against Starbucks with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRB’s General Counsel issued a complaint alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), including threats of loss of benefits, creating an impression of surveillance, and linking adverse employment actions to union activity. An administrative law judge (ALJ) conducted a hearing and found Starbucks in violation on all claims. Starbucks challenged these findings before the NLRB, which largely adopted the ALJ’s conclusions but issued a narrower remedy.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court granted enforcement of the NLRB’s decision as to the finding that Neri’s statements to employee Cuellar-Serafini about loss of benefits constituted an unlawful threat of reprisal. However, the Fifth Circuit denied enforcement regarding the findings on store hours reductions, hiring portal closure, and impression of surveillance, holding that these determinations were not supported by substantial evidence. Thus, only the threat of loss of benefits claim was upheld.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40475/25-40475-2026-09-03.html</id>
        	<title>Ramirez v. City of Texas City</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-03T15:30:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-03T15:30:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40475/25-40475-2026-09-03.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Michael Ramirez purchased a house in Texas City, Texas, intending to remodel and resell it. After a fire caused substantial but repairable damage, the City declared the property substandard and, following an inspection, determined it posed a clear and imminent danger. The City sent notice to Ramirez, halted the permit process pending an engineer’s report (which Ramirez never obtained), and the house remained unrepaired for over a year, with Ramirez storing valuable personal property inside. In May 2023, the City demolished the house without further notice. Ramirez then sued, claiming violations of state and federal constitutional rights, including procedural due process and takings, and sought damages for the house, expected profits, personal property, and attorney’s fees.

Upon removal to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Ramirez repeatedly requested a jury trial in various filings. The parties signed a joint case management plan acknowledging a jury demand. The district court initially scheduled a jury trial but, shortly before trial, ordered a bench trial instead, finding the jury demand procedurally deficient. After the bench trial, the court held the City had violated Ramirez’s procedural due process rights but justified the demolition under nuisance abatement, awarding only nominal damages and denying attorney’s fees as Ramirez was not considered the prevailing party.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on the denial of a jury trial and damages determinations. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by denying Ramirez’s Rule 39(b) motion for a jury trial, as there were no strong or compelling reasons to do so and Ramirez’s repeated demands were sufficient. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings, including a jury trial and reconsideration of damages and fees. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40475/25-40475-2026-09-03.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Ramirez v. City of Texas City" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Michael Ramirez purchased a house in Texas City, Texas, intending to remodel and resell it. After a fire caused substantial but repairable damage, the City declared the property substandard and, following an inspection, determined it posed a clear and imminent danger. The City sent notice to Ramirez, halted the permit process pending an engineer’s report (which Ramirez never obtained), and the house remained unrepaired for over a year, with Ramirez storing valuable personal property inside. In May 2023, the City demolished the house without further notice. Ramirez then sued, claiming violations of state and federal constitutional rights, including procedural due process and takings, and sought damages for the house, expected profits, personal property, and attorney’s fees.

Upon removal to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Ramirez repeatedly requested a jury trial in various filings. The parties signed a joint case management plan acknowledging a jury demand. The district court initially scheduled a jury trial but, shortly before trial, ordered a bench trial instead, finding the jury demand procedurally deficient. After the bench trial, the court held the City had violated Ramirez’s procedural due process rights but justified the demolition under nuisance abatement, awarding only nominal damages and denying attorney’s fees as Ramirez was not considered the prevailing party.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on the denial of a jury trial and damages determinations. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by denying Ramirez’s Rule 39(b) motion for a jury trial, as there were no strong or compelling reasons to do so and Ramirez’s repeated demands were sufficient. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings, including a jury trial and reconsideration of damages and fees.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leslie Southwick</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Real Estate &amp; Property Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20045/25-20045-2026-09-03.html</id>
        	<title>Moreau v. Harris County</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-03T15:30:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-03T15:30:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20045/25-20045-2026-09-03.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several lieutenants and captains employed by the Harris County Sheriff’s Office alleged that Harris County violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by failing to properly pay them overtime. These employees, who worked in either law enforcement or the county jail system, claimed that their primary duties were frontline law enforcement or correctional work. Harris County, however, argued that these plaintiffs were exempt from overtime under the FLSA’s administrative and executive exemptions, as their main responsibilities involved management and administrative oversight rather than frontline duties.

The litigation began in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, where the parties consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge. The magistrate judge granted summary judgment in part for Harris County, finding that all captains and criminal justice lieutenants were administratively exempt, but concluded there were factual disputes regarding whether law enforcement patrol and investigative lieutenants were exempt. Those claims proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found that the remaining lieutenants were also exempt as administrative and executive employees. The plaintiffs then moved for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, raising arguments about the sufficiency of the evidence, alleged errors in the jury charge, and an asserted inconsistency in the verdict. The magistrate judge denied these motions.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the plaintiffs’ claims. The court held that Harris County met its burden of proving that all plaintiffs were paid on a salary basis and that the criminal justice lieutenants qualified for the administrative exemption. The panel further found no error in the jury instructions or in allowing the jury to find both exemptions applied. The court also ruled that the evidence supported the jury’s verdict and that there was no abuse of discretion in denying a new trial. Thus, the judgment in favor of Harris County was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20045/25-20045-2026-09-03.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Moreau v. Harris County" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several lieutenants and captains employed by the Harris County Sheriff’s Office alleged that Harris County violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by failing to properly pay them overtime. These employees, who worked in either law enforcement or the county jail system, claimed that their primary duties were frontline law enforcement or correctional work. Harris County, however, argued that these plaintiffs were exempt from overtime under the FLSA’s administrative and executive exemptions, as their main responsibilities involved management and administrative oversight rather than frontline duties.

The litigation began in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, where the parties consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge. The magistrate judge granted summary judgment in part for Harris County, finding that all captains and criminal justice lieutenants were administratively exempt, but concluded there were factual disputes regarding whether law enforcement patrol and investigative lieutenants were exempt. Those claims proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found that the remaining lieutenants were also exempt as administrative and executive employees. The plaintiffs then moved for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, raising arguments about the sufficiency of the evidence, alleged errors in the jury charge, and an asserted inconsistency in the verdict. The magistrate judge denied these motions.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the plaintiffs’ claims. The court held that Harris County met its burden of proving that all plaintiffs were paid on a salary basis and that the criminal justice lieutenants qualified for the administrative exemption. The panel further found no error in the jury instructions or in allowing the jury to find both exemptions applied. The court also ruled that the evidence supported the jury’s verdict and that there was no abuse of discretion in denying a new trial. Thus, the judgment in favor of Harris County was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60348/24-60348-2026-09-03.html</id>
        	<title>Sealed Appellee v. Sealed Juvenile</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-03T09:30:10-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-03T09:30:10-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60348/24-60348-2026-09-03.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A juvenile was charged with two counts of possession or transfer of machinegun conversion devices, known as Glock switches, which enable semiautomatic pistols to fire automatically. The charges were brought under federal statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(o) and 924(a)(2), after the government certified that the State of Mississippi lacked jurisdiction over the alleged conduct because, at the time, Mississippi did not have a law regulating possession or transfer of machineguns. The juvenile moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the certification was inadequate and that the statute violated the Second Amendment, but both motions were denied.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi reviewed the case. After the motions were denied, the juvenile admitted to the charges, waiving appeal rights for all non-jurisdictional issues except his Second Amendment challenge. The district court adjudicated him delinquent and imposed a 19-month term of detention followed by supervised release until age 21.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered whether the district court had jurisdiction, whether the statute violated the Second Amendment, and whether the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms exceeded its authority in classifying Glock switches as machineguns. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court had jurisdiction because Mississippi lacked applicable law at the relevant time, the Second Amendment challenge was foreclosed by United States v. Wilson, 164 F.4th 380 (5th Cir. 2026), which upheld § 922(o) as constitutional, and the statutory challenge regarding ATF’s authority was waived under the terms of the appeal waiver. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60348/24-60348-2026-09-03.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Sealed Appellee v. Sealed Juvenile" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A juvenile was charged with two counts of possession or transfer of machinegun conversion devices, known as Glock switches, which enable semiautomatic pistols to fire automatically. The charges were brought under federal statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(o) and 924(a)(2), after the government certified that the State of Mississippi lacked jurisdiction over the alleged conduct because, at the time, Mississippi did not have a law regulating possession or transfer of machineguns. The juvenile moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the certification was inadequate and that the statute violated the Second Amendment, but both motions were denied.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi reviewed the case. After the motions were denied, the juvenile admitted to the charges, waiving appeal rights for all non-jurisdictional issues except his Second Amendment challenge. The district court adjudicated him delinquent and imposed a 19-month term of detention followed by supervised release until age 21.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered whether the district court had jurisdiction, whether the statute violated the Second Amendment, and whether the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms exceeded its authority in classifying Glock switches as machineguns. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court had jurisdiction because Mississippi lacked applicable law at the relevant time, the Second Amendment challenge was foreclosed by United States v. Wilson, 164 F.4th 380 (5th Cir. 2026), which upheld § 922(o) as constitutional, and the statutory challenge regarding ATF’s authority was waived under the terms of the appeal waiver. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Juvenile Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30372/25-30372-2026-09-03.html</id>
        	<title>Transportation Conslt v. Certain Undwr</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-03T09:30:10-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-03T09:30:10-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30372/25-30372-2026-09-03.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Transportation Consultants, Inc. owned property in Louisiana insured under a surplus lines commercial property policy issued by a group of domestic and foreign insurers. The policy contained an arbitration clause and a provision stating it should be construed as separate contracts between the insured and each underwriter. Following Hurricane Ida, a dispute arose regarding coverage, prompting Transportation Consultants to file suit against all insurers in Louisiana state court.

The insurers removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, relying on the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards to assert federal jurisdiction. The district court initially granted the insurers&#039; motion to compel arbitration and stayed the litigation. After the Louisiana Supreme Court decided Police Jury of Calcasieu Parish v. Indian Harbor Insurance Co., the plaintiff moved for reconsideration. The district court then reversed its earlier decision as to the domestic insurers, finding that Louisiana law prohibits arbitration clauses in insurance contracts between Louisiana parties, and lifted the stay as to the domestic insurers. The order compelling arbitration and staying litigation against the foreign insurers remained.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that, following its precedent in Town of Vinton v. Indian Harbor Insurance Co. and Crescent City Surgical Operating Co. v. Interstate Fire &amp; Casualty Co., the arbitration clauses in contracts with the domestic insurers are unenforceable under Louisiana law and equitable estoppel cannot be used to compel arbitration. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of arbitration as to the domestic insurers but vacated the lifting of the stay. The case was remanded for the district court to reconsider, in light of updated precedent and additional briefing, whether litigation against the domestic insurers should be stayed pending completion of arbitration with the foreign insurers. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30372/25-30372-2026-09-03.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Transportation Conslt v. Certain Undwr" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Transportation Consultants, Inc. owned property in Louisiana insured under a surplus lines commercial property policy issued by a group of domestic and foreign insurers. The policy contained an arbitration clause and a provision stating it should be construed as separate contracts between the insured and each underwriter. Following Hurricane Ida, a dispute arose regarding coverage, prompting Transportation Consultants to file suit against all insurers in Louisiana state court.

The insurers removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, relying on the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards to assert federal jurisdiction. The district court initially granted the insurers&#039; motion to compel arbitration and stayed the litigation. After the Louisiana Supreme Court decided Police Jury of Calcasieu Parish v. Indian Harbor Insurance Co., the plaintiff moved for reconsideration. The district court then reversed its earlier decision as to the domestic insurers, finding that Louisiana law prohibits arbitration clauses in insurance contracts between Louisiana parties, and lifted the stay as to the domestic insurers. The order compelling arbitration and staying litigation against the foreign insurers remained.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that, following its precedent in Town of Vinton v. Indian Harbor Insurance Co. and Crescent City Surgical Operating Co. v. Interstate Fire &amp; Casualty Co., the arbitration clauses in contracts with the domestic insurers are unenforceable under Louisiana law and equitable estoppel cannot be used to compel arbitration. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of arbitration as to the domestic insurers but vacated the lifting of the stay. The case was remanded for the district court to reconsider, in light of updated precedent and additional briefing, whether litigation against the domestic insurers should be stayed pending completion of arbitration with the foreign insurers.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Arbitration &amp; Mediation"/>
							<category term="Insurance Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20590/25-20590-2026-09-02.html</id>
        	<title>Thomas v. Bruss</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-02T09:30:09-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-02T09:30:09-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20590/25-20590-2026-09-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Two police officers, Eric Bruss and Wayne Schultz, arrived at the scene of an active arrest where another officer, Robert Johnson, was already present and handling two suspects. The situation was tense: dispatch had reported a weapon, and one suspect, Kerry Thomas, repeatedly acted erratically and made statements suggesting he wanted to be killed. Johnson, a canine handler, released his police dog on Thomas after repeated warnings, resulting in a 43-second bite while Johnson handcuffed Thomas. Bruss and Schultz, who arrived after the scene had escalated, did not intervene during the dog bite.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied qualified immunity to Bruss and Schultz at both the motion to dismiss and summary judgment stages. The district court determined there were genuine disputes of fact regarding whether the bystander officers had a reasonable opportunity to intervene and concluded that the law was clearly established regarding bystander liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failing to prevent the use of excessive force.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The Fifth Circuit held that, under the specific facts presented—including the short duration of the dog bite, the officers’ late arrival, and absence of direct participation or encouragement—existing precedent did not clearly establish that Bruss and Schultz had a constitutional duty to intervene during an active canine-assisted apprehension. The court emphasized that no controlling or analogous case law put the constitutional question “beyond debate” for reasonable officers in these circumstances. As a result, the Fifth Circuit rendered judgment dismissing the claims against Bruss and Schultz on qualified immunity grounds. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20590/25-20590-2026-09-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Thomas v. Bruss" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Two police officers, Eric Bruss and Wayne Schultz, arrived at the scene of an active arrest where another officer, Robert Johnson, was already present and handling two suspects. The situation was tense: dispatch had reported a weapon, and one suspect, Kerry Thomas, repeatedly acted erratically and made statements suggesting he wanted to be killed. Johnson, a canine handler, released his police dog on Thomas after repeated warnings, resulting in a 43-second bite while Johnson handcuffed Thomas. Bruss and Schultz, who arrived after the scene had escalated, did not intervene during the dog bite.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied qualified immunity to Bruss and Schultz at both the motion to dismiss and summary judgment stages. The district court determined there were genuine disputes of fact regarding whether the bystander officers had a reasonable opportunity to intervene and concluded that the law was clearly established regarding bystander liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failing to prevent the use of excessive force.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The Fifth Circuit held that, under the specific facts presented—including the short duration of the dog bite, the officers’ late arrival, and absence of direct participation or encouragement—existing precedent did not clearly establish that Bruss and Schultz had a constitutional duty to intervene during an active canine-assisted apprehension. The court emphasized that no controlling or analogous case law put the constitutional question “beyond debate” for reasonable officers in these circumstances. As a result, the Fifth Circuit rendered judgment dismissing the claims against Bruss and Schultz on qualified immunity grounds.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20462/24-20462-2026-09-01.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Tampico</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-01T15:30:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-01T15:30:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20462/24-20462-2026-09-01.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Jonathan M. Tampico was convicted in 1999 of possession, receipt, and distribution of child pornography, receiving concurrent sentences totaling 360 months in prison, five years of supervised release, and a $5,000 fine. After beginning his supervised release in March 2024, the district court modified the conditions of his release in October 2024 to include home detention for six months, with the possibility of continuation until he completed a sex offender treatment program. The court also found that $1,992.86 in interest had accrued on his fine and ordered monthly payments of $200.

Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas had not included home detention as a condition of supervised release when Tampico was originally sentenced or resentenced. In 2024, after evidentiary hearings, the district court modified the conditions in response to concerns about Tampico’s progress in treatment. Tampico objected to the location monitoring and home detention but did not appeal the initial March 2024 order. He also contested the October 2024 findings regarding interest on his fine, arguing that no interest was required and that the fine had been fully paid, relying on Bureau of Prisons records showing a zero balance.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. The court held that the district court did not impose an illegal sentence by modifying supervised release conditions to include home detention, finding that the statutory maximums applicable to imprisonment were not implicated because home detention was added as a modification during supervised release, not at sentencing or after revocation. The Fifth Circuit also affirmed the district court’s finding that interest on the fine was due and that the Government was not estopped from collecting it. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20462/24-20462-2026-09-01.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Tampico" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Jonathan M. Tampico was convicted in 1999 of possession, receipt, and distribution of child pornography, receiving concurrent sentences totaling 360 months in prison, five years of supervised release, and a $5,000 fine. After beginning his supervised release in March 2024, the district court modified the conditions of his release in October 2024 to include home detention for six months, with the possibility of continuation until he completed a sex offender treatment program. The court also found that $1,992.86 in interest had accrued on his fine and ordered monthly payments of $200.

Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas had not included home detention as a condition of supervised release when Tampico was originally sentenced or resentenced. In 2024, after evidentiary hearings, the district court modified the conditions in response to concerns about Tampico’s progress in treatment. Tampico objected to the location monitoring and home detention but did not appeal the initial March 2024 order. He also contested the October 2024 findings regarding interest on his fine, arguing that no interest was required and that the fine had been fully paid, relying on Bureau of Prisons records showing a zero balance.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. The court held that the district court did not impose an illegal sentence by modifying supervised release conditions to include home detention, finding that the statutory maximums applicable to imprisonment were not implicated because home detention was added as a modification during supervised release, not at sentencing or after revocation. The Fifth Circuit also affirmed the district court’s finding that interest on the fine was due and that the Government was not estopped from collecting it. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kurt Engelhardt</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40117/25-40117-2026-09-01.html</id>
        	<title>Adams v. Guerrero</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-01T15:30:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-01T15:30:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40117/25-40117-2026-09-01.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Michael Kevin Adams was convicted of capital murder after evidence showed he drugged, sexually assaulted, and repeatedly threatened his former fiancée, N.L. Following the assault, Adams violated a protective order and continued to harass N.L., prompting her and her son to relocate for safety. Six months after the assault, N.L. was found shot to death in her home, with evidence at the scene including DNA, condom wrappers, and cartridge casings. Investigators found circumstantial evidence, such as Adams’s DNA at the scene, photographs of firearms similar to the murder weapon, and a screw possibly from a gun in his vehicle. Adams denied involvement and provided an uncorroborated alibi.

At trial in Texas state court, the prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence and witness testimony to establish Adams’s guilt. The jury convicted him of capital murder, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Adams appealed to the Texas Fifth Court of Appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient under the standard set by Jackson v. Virginia. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding the evidence sufficient, though one judge dissented. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals declined discretionary review, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Adams’s subsequent state habeas petition was also denied.

Adams then filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, arguing the state court unreasonably applied Jackson’s sufficiency standard. The district court denied relief and a certificate of appealability. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Adams failed to show that every reasonable jurist would find the state court’s sufficiency determination unreasonable under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and Jackson. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and denied habeas relief. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40117/25-40117-2026-09-01.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Adams v. Guerrero" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Michael Kevin Adams was convicted of capital murder after evidence showed he drugged, sexually assaulted, and repeatedly threatened his former fiancée, N.L. Following the assault, Adams violated a protective order and continued to harass N.L., prompting her and her son to relocate for safety. Six months after the assault, N.L. was found shot to death in her home, with evidence at the scene including DNA, condom wrappers, and cartridge casings. Investigators found circumstantial evidence, such as Adams’s DNA at the scene, photographs of firearms similar to the murder weapon, and a screw possibly from a gun in his vehicle. Adams denied involvement and provided an uncorroborated alibi.

At trial in Texas state court, the prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence and witness testimony to establish Adams’s guilt. The jury convicted him of capital murder, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Adams appealed to the Texas Fifth Court of Appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient under the standard set by Jackson v. Virginia. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding the evidence sufficient, though one judge dissented. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals declined discretionary review, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Adams’s subsequent state habeas petition was also denied.

Adams then filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, arguing the state court unreasonably applied Jackson’s sufficiency standard. The district court denied relief and a certificate of appealability. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Adams failed to show that every reasonable jurist would find the state court’s sufficiency determination unreasonable under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and Jackson. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and denied habeas relief.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Andrew Oldham</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60550/25-60550-2026-08-27.html</id>
        	<title>Emmerich Nwspr v. Particle Media</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-27T15:30:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-27T15:30:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60550/25-60550-2026-08-27.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A local news publisher brought suit against a technology company that operates a news aggregation app and website. The publisher alleged that the aggregator, through its app, displayed the publisher’s articles either by framing them within the aggregator’s interface (so that users viewed the publisher’s website content within an app frame) or by reproducing the full text of articles under the aggregator’s own URL due to a technical glitch. The publisher claimed this conduct violated its exclusive right to publicly display its content under the Copyright Act, and further alleged that the removal or alteration of its website’s URLs—when articles were shown under the aggregator’s URLs—constituted improper removal of copyright management information (CMI) under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi addressed the publisher’s claims through cross-motions for summary judgment. Relying on the “server test” from Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., the district court held that the aggregator’s framed linking did not infringe the publisher’s display right, because the content was not stored on the aggregator’s servers but only linked to the publisher’s own server. The court also held that URLs do not constitute CMI under the DMCA, as they function merely as locational addresses and do not inherently convey protected copyright information.

On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed two questions: whether the server test is the proper standard for evaluating copyright display right infringement, and whether URLs can be CMI under the DMCA. The Fifth Circuit rejected the server test as inconsistent with the text of the Copyright Act, and instead adopted a “transmit requirement”—finding infringement only if the alleged infringer actually transmits (rather than merely links to) the copyrighted content. The court also held that the DMCA does not categorically foreclose URLs from being CMI, but for a URL to qualify as CMI, it must clearly convey the characteristics specified by statute. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60550/25-60550-2026-08-27.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Emmerich Nwspr v. Particle Media" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A local news publisher brought suit against a technology company that operates a news aggregation app and website. The publisher alleged that the aggregator, through its app, displayed the publisher’s articles either by framing them within the aggregator’s interface (so that users viewed the publisher’s website content within an app frame) or by reproducing the full text of articles under the aggregator’s own URL due to a technical glitch. The publisher claimed this conduct violated its exclusive right to publicly display its content under the Copyright Act, and further alleged that the removal or alteration of its website’s URLs—when articles were shown under the aggregator’s URLs—constituted improper removal of copyright management information (CMI) under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi addressed the publisher’s claims through cross-motions for summary judgment. Relying on the “server test” from Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., the district court held that the aggregator’s framed linking did not infringe the publisher’s display right, because the content was not stored on the aggregator’s servers but only linked to the publisher’s own server. The court also held that URLs do not constitute CMI under the DMCA, as they function merely as locational addresses and do not inherently convey protected copyright information.

On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed two questions: whether the server test is the proper standard for evaluating copyright display right infringement, and whether URLs can be CMI under the DMCA. The Fifth Circuit rejected the server test as inconsistent with the text of the Copyright Act, and instead adopted a “transmit requirement”—finding infringement only if the alleged infringer actually transmits (rather than merely links to) the copyrighted content. The court also held that the DMCA does not categorically foreclose URLs from being CMI, but for a URL to qualify as CMI, it must clearly convey the characteristics specified by statute. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Communications Law"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Internet Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50383/25-50383-2026-08-26.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Palencia-Berrum</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-26T15:30:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-26T15:30:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50383/25-50383-2026-08-26.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant pled guilty to a single count of illegal reentry after removal from the United States. His presentence report detailed a criminal history that included prior convictions for driving under the influence, obstruction of justice, unlawful possession or consumption of alcohol by a minor, domestic battery, drug trafficking, and a previous illegal reentry. After being deported for his earlier illegal reentry, the defendant returned to the United States, purportedly to assist his wife, who was recovering from a significant injury and mental health issues. About ten months after his return, he was arrested for assaulting his wife, but the charges were later dismissed. The presentence report indicated the incident involved the defendant throwing water bottles at his wife, causing minor injuries, but made no mention of direct physical contact or biting.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas conducted a brief sentencing hearing, during which it adopted the presentence report but made several factual errors. The court incorrectly referenced a 2020 illegal reentry conviction that did not exist and mistakenly asserted that the defendant had bitten his wife during the alleged assault. The district court treated these purported facts as aggravating factors and sentenced the defendant to 46 months, at the top of the Guidelines range, without stating whether the same sentence would have been imposed absent these errors. No contemporaneous objections were raised by the parties.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case under the plain error standard. The court found that the district court relied on clearly erroneous facts, that the errors were clear under established law, and that they affected the defendant’s substantial rights by likely increasing his sentence. The Fifth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding that sentencing based on unfounded facts violates due process and undermines the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50383/25-50383-2026-08-26.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Palencia-Berrum" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant pled guilty to a single count of illegal reentry after removal from the United States. His presentence report detailed a criminal history that included prior convictions for driving under the influence, obstruction of justice, unlawful possession or consumption of alcohol by a minor, domestic battery, drug trafficking, and a previous illegal reentry. After being deported for his earlier illegal reentry, the defendant returned to the United States, purportedly to assist his wife, who was recovering from a significant injury and mental health issues. About ten months after his return, he was arrested for assaulting his wife, but the charges were later dismissed. The presentence report indicated the incident involved the defendant throwing water bottles at his wife, causing minor injuries, but made no mention of direct physical contact or biting.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas conducted a brief sentencing hearing, during which it adopted the presentence report but made several factual errors. The court incorrectly referenced a 2020 illegal reentry conviction that did not exist and mistakenly asserted that the defendant had bitten his wife during the alleged assault. The district court treated these purported facts as aggravating factors and sentenced the defendant to 46 months, at the top of the Guidelines range, without stating whether the same sentence would have been imposed absent these errors. No contemporaneous objections were raised by the parties.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case under the plain error standard. The court found that the district court relied on clearly erroneous facts, that the errors were clear under established law, and that they affected the defendant’s substantial rights by likely increasing his sentence. The Fifth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding that sentencing based on unfounded facts violates due process and undermines the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10897/25-10897-2026-08-26.html</id>
        	<title>Rummans v. HSBC Bank</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-26T15:30:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-26T15:30:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10897/25-10897-2026-08-26.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The plaintiff financed his home with a VA loan in 2003, qualifying due to his military service. After failing to make payments for at least ten years, the loan was assigned to HSBC Bank USA and serviced by Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (SLS). HSBC eventually foreclosed on the property in 2022 and sold it to Northsky, LLC. The VA Servicing Guidelines, which were incorporated into the mortgage contract, required HSBC to notify the plaintiff of the default and explore options to cure it. SLS claimed to have mailed multiple payoff statements and a notice of default to the plaintiff, but he asserted he never received these communications.

The plaintiff brought suit in Texas state court against HSBC, SLS, and Northsky, alleging violations of federal and Texas law and seeking to set aside the foreclosure sale. HSBC and SLS removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The district court granted partial summary judgment for HSBC and SLS, permitting the plaintiff to proceed on claims for violations of the VA Servicing Guidelines, quiet title, and trespass to try title. At a bench trial, HSBC and SLS presented circumstantial evidence of mailing, relying on business records and testimony from a corporate representative. The district court found this evidence sufficient and, applying the mailbox rule, presumed the plaintiff received the notices, concluding the defendants fulfilled their obligations under the VA Servicing Guidelines.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the appeal, applying a deferential standard to the district court’s factual findings. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court correctly applied the mailbox rule based on the evidence presented and that the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of receipt. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10897/25-10897-2026-08-26.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Rummans v. HSBC Bank" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The plaintiff financed his home with a VA loan in 2003, qualifying due to his military service. After failing to make payments for at least ten years, the loan was assigned to HSBC Bank USA and serviced by Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (SLS). HSBC eventually foreclosed on the property in 2022 and sold it to Northsky, LLC. The VA Servicing Guidelines, which were incorporated into the mortgage contract, required HSBC to notify the plaintiff of the default and explore options to cure it. SLS claimed to have mailed multiple payoff statements and a notice of default to the plaintiff, but he asserted he never received these communications.

The plaintiff brought suit in Texas state court against HSBC, SLS, and Northsky, alleging violations of federal and Texas law and seeking to set aside the foreclosure sale. HSBC and SLS removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The district court granted partial summary judgment for HSBC and SLS, permitting the plaintiff to proceed on claims for violations of the VA Servicing Guidelines, quiet title, and trespass to try title. At a bench trial, HSBC and SLS presented circumstantial evidence of mailing, relying on business records and testimony from a corporate representative. The district court found this evidence sufficient and, applying the mailbox rule, presumed the plaintiff received the notices, concluding the defendants fulfilled their obligations under the VA Servicing Guidelines.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the appeal, applying a deferential standard to the district court’s factual findings. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court correctly applied the mailbox rule based on the evidence presented and that the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of receipt. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Patrick Higginbotham</case:judge>
													<category term="Consumer Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Real Estate &amp; Property Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50661/25-50661-2026-08-26.html</id>
        	<title>Natl Infusion Center v. Kennedy</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-26T15:30:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-26T15:30:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50661/25-50661-2026-08-26.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A group of associations representing infusion centers, cancer patients, and pharmaceutical manufacturers challenged the constitutionality of a program created by the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, which directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), through the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), to negotiate prices for high-expenditure prescription drugs under Medicare Parts B and D. The program allows HHS to select drugs based on certain criteria, negotiate a “maximum fair price” with manufacturers, and impose an excise tax on manufacturers who refuse to negotiate. The tax is calculated as a high percentage of sales reimbursed by Medicare. Manufacturers may avoid the program by withdrawing from Medicare and Medicaid participation. The statutory scheme also limits administrative and judicial review of key program decisions and allows HHS to implement early cycles of the program through guidance rather than notice-and-comment rulemaking.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and improper venue. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that at least one plaintiff had standing and venue was proper. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the government, holding that the program did not violate the nondelegation doctrine, that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim, and that the plaintiffs lacked a protected property interest to support their due process claim.

Upon further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the statute provided an “intelligible principle” sufficient to withstand a nondelegation challenge, that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the Eighth Amendment claim but the excise tax did not constitute a punitive fine, and that neither manufacturers, providers, nor patients possessed a protected property or liberty interest implicated by the program. The government’s summary judgment was affirmed in full. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50661/25-50661-2026-08-26.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Natl Infusion Center v. Kennedy" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A group of associations representing infusion centers, cancer patients, and pharmaceutical manufacturers challenged the constitutionality of a program created by the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, which directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), through the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), to negotiate prices for high-expenditure prescription drugs under Medicare Parts B and D. The program allows HHS to select drugs based on certain criteria, negotiate a “maximum fair price” with manufacturers, and impose an excise tax on manufacturers who refuse to negotiate. The tax is calculated as a high percentage of sales reimbursed by Medicare. Manufacturers may avoid the program by withdrawing from Medicare and Medicaid participation. The statutory scheme also limits administrative and judicial review of key program decisions and allows HHS to implement early cycles of the program through guidance rather than notice-and-comment rulemaking.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and improper venue. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that at least one plaintiff had standing and venue was proper. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the government, holding that the program did not violate the nondelegation doctrine, that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim, and that the plaintiffs lacked a protected property interest to support their due process claim.

Upon further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the statute provided an “intelligible principle” sufficient to withstand a nondelegation challenge, that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the Eighth Amendment claim but the excise tax did not constitute a punitive fine, and that neither manufacturers, providers, nor patients possessed a protected property or liberty interest implicated by the program. The government’s summary judgment was affirmed in full.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leslie Southwick</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
							<category term="Tax Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30438/25-30438-2026-08-26.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Mitchell</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-26T09:30:09-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-26T09:30:09-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30438/25-30438-2026-08-26.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Officers responding to a reported burglary encountered Maurice Mitchell near a storage facility, leading to his flight, capture, and discovery of a loaded revolver in a bag on his bicycle. Mitchell has a history of felony convictions, including drug possession and attempting to disarm a peace officer, the latter involving an attempt to grab pepper spray from an officer during an arrest. Based on the January 2023 incident, Mitchell was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana denied Mitchell’s pretrial motions to dismiss the indictment, which asserted Second Amendment protections against prosecution. The court focused on Mitchell’s drug convictions as predicates, not addressing the attempted disarmament conviction. At trial, the court issued a flight instruction over Mitchell’s objection, directing the jury to consider his flight as evidence of consciousness of guilt. The jury ultimately returned a guilty verdict, and Mitchell was sentenced to prison and supervised release. He timely appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Mitchell’s Second Amendment challenge de novo. The court held that Mitchell’s conviction for attempting to disarm a police officer is analogous to robbery, historically a crime for which individuals could be disarmed under firearm regulations. Thus, the application of § 922(g)(1) to Mitchell was constitutional. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the flight instruction, and the evidence was sufficient to support Mitchell’s conviction under the stringent “manifest miscarriage of justice” standard. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30438/25-30438-2026-08-26.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Mitchell" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Officers responding to a reported burglary encountered Maurice Mitchell near a storage facility, leading to his flight, capture, and discovery of a loaded revolver in a bag on his bicycle. Mitchell has a history of felony convictions, including drug possession and attempting to disarm a peace officer, the latter involving an attempt to grab pepper spray from an officer during an arrest. Based on the January 2023 incident, Mitchell was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana denied Mitchell’s pretrial motions to dismiss the indictment, which asserted Second Amendment protections against prosecution. The court focused on Mitchell’s drug convictions as predicates, not addressing the attempted disarmament conviction. At trial, the court issued a flight instruction over Mitchell’s objection, directing the jury to consider his flight as evidence of consciousness of guilt. The jury ultimately returned a guilty verdict, and Mitchell was sentenced to prison and supervised release. He timely appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Mitchell’s Second Amendment challenge de novo. The court held that Mitchell’s conviction for attempting to disarm a police officer is analogous to robbery, historically a crime for which individuals could be disarmed under firearm regulations. Thus, the application of § 922(g)(1) to Mitchell was constitutional. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the flight instruction, and the evidence was sufficient to support Mitchell’s conviction under the stringent “manifest miscarriage of justice” standard. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stuart Kyle Duncan</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50986/25-50986-2026-08-25.html</id>
        	<title>Black v. Unibank</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-25T15:30:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-25T15:30:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50986/25-50986-2026-08-25.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Roy Hill, founder and CEO of Clean Energy Technology Association, Inc. (CETA), solicited investments by representing that CETA owned patented carbon capture technology and promised investors returns from these assets. CETA, however, operated as a Ponzi scheme, using funds from new investors to pay returns to earlier ones. UniBank, a Washington-based commercial bank, provided secured loans to investors who used the funds to buy interests in CETA’s purported assets. UniBank perfected its security interests in the distributions from CETA. After the SEC initiated an enforcement action alleging fraud and sought appointment of a receiver, Albert Black was appointed to marshal CETA’s assets for the benefit of creditors and investors.

In parallel litigation, investors sued UniBank in Washington state court for fraud and negligence, but UniBank obtained summary judgment on the basis that it owed no duty to the investors. Meanwhile, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, the receiver recommended a pro rata distribution of the remaining CETA estate funds to all investors and creditors based on net cash losses, aggregating UniBank’s claims with those of other victims rather than honoring UniBank’s asserted secured creditor priority. UniBank objected, arguing its perfected liens should grant it priority recovery. The district court overruled UniBank’s objection, adopted the receiver’s recommendation, and ordered pro rata distributions.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court failed to provide UniBank with adequate due process because it adopted the receiver’s recommendation with only a cursory analysis and without giving UniBank a meaningful opportunity to present its evidence and arguments, particularly given the extensive record. The court vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with due process requirements, without expressing a view on the merits. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50986/25-50986-2026-08-25.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Black v. Unibank" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Roy Hill, founder and CEO of Clean Energy Technology Association, Inc. (CETA), solicited investments by representing that CETA owned patented carbon capture technology and promised investors returns from these assets. CETA, however, operated as a Ponzi scheme, using funds from new investors to pay returns to earlier ones. UniBank, a Washington-based commercial bank, provided secured loans to investors who used the funds to buy interests in CETA’s purported assets. UniBank perfected its security interests in the distributions from CETA. After the SEC initiated an enforcement action alleging fraud and sought appointment of a receiver, Albert Black was appointed to marshal CETA’s assets for the benefit of creditors and investors.

In parallel litigation, investors sued UniBank in Washington state court for fraud and negligence, but UniBank obtained summary judgment on the basis that it owed no duty to the investors. Meanwhile, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, the receiver recommended a pro rata distribution of the remaining CETA estate funds to all investors and creditors based on net cash losses, aggregating UniBank’s claims with those of other victims rather than honoring UniBank’s asserted secured creditor priority. UniBank objected, arguing its perfected liens should grant it priority recovery. The district court overruled UniBank’s objection, adopted the receiver’s recommendation, and ordered pro rata distributions.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court failed to provide UniBank with adequate due process because it adopted the receiver’s recommendation with only a cursory analysis and without giving UniBank a meaningful opportunity to present its evidence and arguments, particularly given the extensive record. The court vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with due process requirements, without expressing a view on the merits.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-25</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Bankruptcy"/>
							<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40272/25-40272-2026-08-25.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Luna</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-25T15:30:05-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-25T15:30:05-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40272/25-40272-2026-08-25.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Raymond Luna was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The only felony conviction supporting this indictment was Luna’s prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance. The district court found that applying § 922(g)(1) to Luna violated the Second Amendment as applied to him and dismissed the indictment. After the dismissal, the Government moved for reconsideration, providing new evidence from Luna’s prior conviction that suggested he was involved in drug trafficking, rather than mere possession. The district court denied the motion for reconsideration, reasoning that the Government could have, but did not, present this evidence earlier.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion, as the district court declined to consider the new evidence presented by the Government after the original dismissal. The Fifth Circuit observed that the Government did not argue in its opening appellate brief that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to consider the late-submitted evidence, thereby forfeiting that argument. The appellate court further declined to revisit the district court’s ruling based on the late-submitted evidence.

The Fifth Circuit held that, with only the fact of Luna’s conviction for simple possession before it, binding precedent established that such a conviction cannot support a § 922(g)(1) prosecution post-Hembree. The court also rejected the Government’s alternative arguments, including the assertion that historical regulations on illicit marketplaces justified disarmament, and found that Luna’s indictment status for a separate firearm offense was irrelevant under circuit precedent. As a result, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the indictment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40272/25-40272-2026-08-25.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Luna" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Raymond Luna was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The only felony conviction supporting this indictment was Luna’s prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance. The district court found that applying § 922(g)(1) to Luna violated the Second Amendment as applied to him and dismissed the indictment. After the dismissal, the Government moved for reconsideration, providing new evidence from Luna’s prior conviction that suggested he was involved in drug trafficking, rather than mere possession. The district court denied the motion for reconsideration, reasoning that the Government could have, but did not, present this evidence earlier.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion, as the district court declined to consider the new evidence presented by the Government after the original dismissal. The Fifth Circuit observed that the Government did not argue in its opening appellate brief that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to consider the late-submitted evidence, thereby forfeiting that argument. The appellate court further declined to revisit the district court’s ruling based on the late-submitted evidence.

The Fifth Circuit held that, with only the fact of Luna’s conviction for simple possession before it, binding precedent established that such a conviction cannot support a § 922(g)(1) prosecution post-Hembree. The court also rejected the Government’s alternative arguments, including the assertion that historical regulations on illicit marketplaces justified disarmament, and found that Luna’s indictment status for a separate firearm offense was irrelevant under circuit precedent. As a result, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the indictment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-25</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kurt Engelhardt</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30132/25-30132-2026-08-24.html</id>
        	<title>Fogleman-Laxey v. Guillory</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-24T15:30:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-24T15:30:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30132/25-30132-2026-08-24.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case centers on Tara Fogleman-Laxey, who organized a peaceful protest in front of the Lafayette, Louisiana mayor’s residence to address a recent police shooting. Her protest consisted primarily of grilling food on a public street while engaging with community members. During the event, police arrived and informed her that her actions constituted an obstruction of a public roadway under Louisiana law. Although Fogleman-Laxey offered to move her grill, officers refused her offers and ultimately arrested her for obstruction, later adding a charge of disturbing the peace. After being detained and released, formal charges were brought months later but were dismissed when she agreed to a civil stay-away order.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana dismissed all of Fogleman-Laxey’s claims, which were based on alleged violations of her First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as Louisiana state law. The court found that she had not overcome the individual defendants’ qualified immunity defense and failed to sufficiently plead that municipal defendants were liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that Fogleman-Laxey failed to cite precedent that would have given the defendant officers fair notice that arresting her for grilling in the street was unlawful under clearly established law, as required to overcome qualified immunity. The court also affirmed that her allegations against the municipal defendants were conclusory and insufficient to state a Monell claim. As a result, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30132/25-30132-2026-08-24.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Fogleman-Laxey v. Guillory" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case centers on Tara Fogleman-Laxey, who organized a peaceful protest in front of the Lafayette, Louisiana mayor’s residence to address a recent police shooting. Her protest consisted primarily of grilling food on a public street while engaging with community members. During the event, police arrived and informed her that her actions constituted an obstruction of a public roadway under Louisiana law. Although Fogleman-Laxey offered to move her grill, officers refused her offers and ultimately arrested her for obstruction, later adding a charge of disturbing the peace. After being detained and released, formal charges were brought months later but were dismissed when she agreed to a civil stay-away order.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana dismissed all of Fogleman-Laxey’s claims, which were based on alleged violations of her First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as Louisiana state law. The court found that she had not overcome the individual defendants’ qualified immunity defense and failed to sufficiently plead that municipal defendants were liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that Fogleman-Laxey failed to cite precedent that would have given the defendant officers fair notice that arresting her for grilling in the street was unlawful under clearly established law, as required to overcome qualified immunity. The court also affirmed that her allegations against the municipal defendants were conclusory and insufficient to state a Monell claim. As a result, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all claims.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-24</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30542/25-30542-2026-08-21.html</id>
        	<title>Norcave Properties v. IRS</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-21T15:30:34-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-21T15:30:34-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30542/25-30542-2026-08-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A partnership claimed a charitable deduction after donating a conservation servitude on real property. The Internal Revenue Service audited the partnership’s tax filing and, in 2025, issued a Notice of Final Partnership Adjustment, disallowing the deduction and imposing both a civil fraud penalty and several valuation-related penalties for negligence, substantial understatement, and gross-valuation misstatements. The partnership responded by filing suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, seeking a pre-payment jury trial to contest the penalties and requesting both injunctive and declaratory relief. The partnership also filed a parallel petition with the U.S. Tax Court for a downward adjustment of the IRS’s determination.

In the district court, both parties moved for judgment on the pleadings. The court granted the IRS’s motion and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, relying on the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) and the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA). The district court reasoned that the penalties imposed by the IRS constitute “tax” within the meaning of relevant statutes, thereby stripping federal courts of jurisdiction to hear pre-payment challenges to such assessments.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether accuracy-related penalties under 26 U.S.C. § 6662 are treated as “tax” for purposes of the AIA and DJA. The Fifth Circuit held that these penalties are indeed treated as “tax,” and thus, both the AIA and DJA bar federal court jurisdiction over the partnership’s pre-payment challenge. The court further determined that Tax Court provides an alternative forum for such disputes. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30542/25-30542-2026-08-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Norcave Properties v. IRS" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A partnership claimed a charitable deduction after donating a conservation servitude on real property. The Internal Revenue Service audited the partnership’s tax filing and, in 2025, issued a Notice of Final Partnership Adjustment, disallowing the deduction and imposing both a civil fraud penalty and several valuation-related penalties for negligence, substantial understatement, and gross-valuation misstatements. The partnership responded by filing suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, seeking a pre-payment jury trial to contest the penalties and requesting both injunctive and declaratory relief. The partnership also filed a parallel petition with the U.S. Tax Court for a downward adjustment of the IRS’s determination.

In the district court, both parties moved for judgment on the pleadings. The court granted the IRS’s motion and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, relying on the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) and the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA). The district court reasoned that the penalties imposed by the IRS constitute “tax” within the meaning of relevant statutes, thereby stripping federal courts of jurisdiction to hear pre-payment challenges to such assessments.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether accuracy-related penalties under 26 U.S.C. § 6662 are treated as “tax” for purposes of the AIA and DJA. The Fifth Circuit held that these penalties are indeed treated as “tax,” and thus, both the AIA and DJA bar federal court jurisdiction over the partnership’s pre-payment challenge. The court further determined that Tax Court provides an alternative forum for such disputes. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Tax Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10630/25-10630-2026-08-21.html</id>
        	<title>In Re: Media Matters for America</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-21T15:30:33-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-21T15:30:33-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10630/25-10630-2026-08-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A nonprofit organization based in Washington, D.C. published articles critical of a technology company and its CEO, which led to corporations pulling their advertisements from the company’s platform, resulting in significant losses for the company. The technology company filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, alleging interference with contract, business disparagement, and interference with prospective economic advantage under Texas law. The nonprofit and its employees sought dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a claim. After this was denied, and following further discovery showing that affected advertisers were not based in Texas, the nonprofit moved to transfer the case to the Northern District of California, citing venue statutes and a forum-selection clause.

The district court denied both the motion to dismiss and the motion to transfer venue, finding that the transfer request was untimely and that the evidence was insufficient to show the Texas venue was improper. It also expressed concerns about the nonprofit’s litigation conduct and considered possible sanctions. The nonprofit then petitioned for a writ of mandamus from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, seeking to compel a venue transfer.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted the petition in part. It held that the district court erred by failing to consider the required eight public- and private-interest factors when analyzing the transfer motion under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) and 1406(a), instead focusing solely on the timeliness of the motion. The Court ordered the district court to vacate its denial of the transfer motion and conduct a new venue analysis consistent with appellate precedent. The nonprofit’s related interlocutory appeal was held in abeyance pending the outcome of the remand. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10630/25-10630-2026-08-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In Re: Media Matters for America" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A nonprofit organization based in Washington, D.C. published articles critical of a technology company and its CEO, which led to corporations pulling their advertisements from the company’s platform, resulting in significant losses for the company. The technology company filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, alleging interference with contract, business disparagement, and interference with prospective economic advantage under Texas law. The nonprofit and its employees sought dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a claim. After this was denied, and following further discovery showing that affected advertisers were not based in Texas, the nonprofit moved to transfer the case to the Northern District of California, citing venue statutes and a forum-selection clause.

The district court denied both the motion to dismiss and the motion to transfer venue, finding that the transfer request was untimely and that the evidence was insufficient to show the Texas venue was improper. It also expressed concerns about the nonprofit’s litigation conduct and considered possible sanctions. The nonprofit then petitioned for a writ of mandamus from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, seeking to compel a venue transfer.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted the petition in part. It held that the district court erred by failing to consider the required eight public- and private-interest factors when analyzing the transfer motion under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) and 1406(a), instead focusing solely on the timeliness of the motion. The Court ordered the district court to vacate its denial of the transfer motion and conduct a new venue analysis consistent with appellate precedent. The nonprofit’s related interlocutory appeal was held in abeyance pending the outcome of the remand.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James Graves</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Commercial Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-50750/23-50750-2026-08-21.html</id>
        	<title>Flores v. AMH Creekside</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-21T09:31:02-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-21T09:31:02-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-50750/23-50750-2026-08-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		An architecture firm (KFA) held registered copyrights in several building plans and technical drawings. In 2016, the firm licensed certain works to a development company (AHV) for use in the Austin, Texas area, with explicit requirements to include KFA’s copyright management information (CMI) on any displays or copies. KFA later worked directly with third-party graphics companies to create floorplans and renderings, again requiring its CMI be included. However, the floorplans and renderings produced by these companies did not contain KFA’s CMI. When AHV and its affiliates used these images for a new housing development’s online marketing, KFA sent notices of default and, after noncompliance, terminated the licensing agreement and demanded the return of its materials.

KFA then sued AHV and the Creekside defendants in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, alleging violations of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), copyright infringement, conversion, and seeking specific performance. The district court dismissed the DMCA and conversion claims, and parts of the infringement claims, but allowed others to proceed. KFA then voluntarily dismissed its remaining claims with prejudice to facilitate an appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit first addressed whether it had jurisdiction, given that the district court’s dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) was erroneous because it only dismissed part of the action. The appellate court held that this error did not deprive it of jurisdiction. On the merits, the Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the DMCA claims, holding that failure to include CMI on newly created images is not “removal” or “alteration” under the statute. However, it vacated the dismissal of the copyright infringement claims, ruling that the district court erred in applying a statutory exemption beyond its scope and remanded those claims for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-50750/23-50750-2026-08-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Flores v. AMH Creekside" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                An architecture firm (KFA) held registered copyrights in several building plans and technical drawings. In 2016, the firm licensed certain works to a development company (AHV) for use in the Austin, Texas area, with explicit requirements to include KFA’s copyright management information (CMI) on any displays or copies. KFA later worked directly with third-party graphics companies to create floorplans and renderings, again requiring its CMI be included. However, the floorplans and renderings produced by these companies did not contain KFA’s CMI. When AHV and its affiliates used these images for a new housing development’s online marketing, KFA sent notices of default and, after noncompliance, terminated the licensing agreement and demanded the return of its materials.

KFA then sued AHV and the Creekside defendants in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, alleging violations of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), copyright infringement, conversion, and seeking specific performance. The district court dismissed the DMCA and conversion claims, and parts of the infringement claims, but allowed others to proceed. KFA then voluntarily dismissed its remaining claims with prejudice to facilitate an appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit first addressed whether it had jurisdiction, given that the district court’s dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) was erroneous because it only dismissed part of the action. The appellate court held that this error did not deprive it of jurisdiction. On the merits, the Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the DMCA claims, holding that failure to include CMI on newly created images is not “removal” or “alteration” under the statute. However, it vacated the dismissal of the copyright infringement claims, ruling that the district court erred in applying a statutory exemption beyond its scope and remanded those claims for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Don Willett</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60232/25-60232-2026-08-20.html</id>
        	<title>Hughey v. Tippah County</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-20T15:30:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-20T15:30:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60232/25-60232-2026-08-20.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		James Hughey, who suffered from medical conditions that sometimes caused confusion, entered the home of his ex-girlfriend’s sister while confused. The sister called Deputy Tommy Mason, her ex-husband and a Tippah County sheriff’s deputy, who responded to the scene. Mason used force against Hughey, resulting in severe injuries. Hughey, through his estate, brought claims against Mason for excessive force under federal law and for assault and battery under Mississippi law.

In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, Mason moved for judgment on the pleadings, asserting qualified immunity. The district court granted Mason’s motion, finding that the complaint did not plead sufficient facts to overcome qualified immunity. Hughey subsequently moved to revise the judgment based on new deposition testimony and sought leave to amend the complaint, but the district court denied these requests. Hughey appealed the district court’s judgment, but later abandoned his claims against Tippah County and certain other arguments.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings. The Fifth Circuit held that Hughey’s complaint failed to allege facts necessary to show that Mason’s use of force was excessive or objectively unreasonable, specifically lacking details about the severity of the crime, whether Hughey posed a threat, or whether he resisted arrest. The court also found that Hughey had not identified clearly established law on the facts alleged that would defeat qualified immunity. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hughey’s motion to revise the judgment or his request to amend the complaint. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the claims against Mason and dismissed the remainder of the appeal as abandoned. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60232/25-60232-2026-08-20.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Hughey v. Tippah County" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                James Hughey, who suffered from medical conditions that sometimes caused confusion, entered the home of his ex-girlfriend’s sister while confused. The sister called Deputy Tommy Mason, her ex-husband and a Tippah County sheriff’s deputy, who responded to the scene. Mason used force against Hughey, resulting in severe injuries. Hughey, through his estate, brought claims against Mason for excessive force under federal law and for assault and battery under Mississippi law.

In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, Mason moved for judgment on the pleadings, asserting qualified immunity. The district court granted Mason’s motion, finding that the complaint did not plead sufficient facts to overcome qualified immunity. Hughey subsequently moved to revise the judgment based on new deposition testimony and sought leave to amend the complaint, but the district court denied these requests. Hughey appealed the district court’s judgment, but later abandoned his claims against Tippah County and certain other arguments.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings. The Fifth Circuit held that Hughey’s complaint failed to allege facts necessary to show that Mason’s use of force was excessive or objectively unreasonable, specifically lacking details about the severity of the crime, whether Hughey posed a threat, or whether he resisted arrest. The court also found that Hughey had not identified clearly established law on the facts alleged that would defeat qualified immunity. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hughey’s motion to revise the judgment or his request to amend the complaint. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the claims against Mason and dismissed the remainder of the appeal as abandoned.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-20</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Irma Ramirez</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30603/25-30603-2026-08-19.html</id>
        	<title>Hamm v. Ochsner-Acadia</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-19T09:30:54-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-19T09:30:54-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30603/25-30603-2026-08-19.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Support staff who worked at a psychiatric hospital in Louisiana operated by Acadia-affiliated entities allege that, while they were provided with nominal meal breaks, they were functionally required to remain on call due to company policies and ethical obligations. As a result, they claim they were not properly compensated for this time. The plaintiffs, a former nurse supervisor and a former mental health technician, brought suit on behalf of themselves and similarly situated employees. Their claims included violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Louisiana state-law torts, specifically unjust enrichment and conversion.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana certified both an FLSA collective action and a Rule 23(b)(3) class action for the state-law claims. Acadia sought interlocutory review of the class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was presented with Acadia’s appeal challenging both the collective and class certification decisions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the FLSA collective action certification at this stage, as Rule 23(f) provides for interlocutory review only of class certification orders, not collective actions. The court declined Acadia’s request to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction because the legal standards and issues between the FLSA collective and the Rule 23 class were not sufficiently intertwined. Turning to class certification, the Fifth Circuit found no abuse of discretion by the district court. It held that the Rule 23 requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority were satisfied based on the plaintiffs’ “on-call” theory, which presented common questions suitable for classwide adjudication. The court therefore affirmed the district court’s certification of the Rule 23 class, dismissed the appeal regarding the collective action, and remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30603/25-30603-2026-08-19.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Hamm v. Ochsner-Acadia" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Support staff who worked at a psychiatric hospital in Louisiana operated by Acadia-affiliated entities allege that, while they were provided with nominal meal breaks, they were functionally required to remain on call due to company policies and ethical obligations. As a result, they claim they were not properly compensated for this time. The plaintiffs, a former nurse supervisor and a former mental health technician, brought suit on behalf of themselves and similarly situated employees. Their claims included violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Louisiana state-law torts, specifically unjust enrichment and conversion.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana certified both an FLSA collective action and a Rule 23(b)(3) class action for the state-law claims. Acadia sought interlocutory review of the class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was presented with Acadia’s appeal challenging both the collective and class certification decisions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the FLSA collective action certification at this stage, as Rule 23(f) provides for interlocutory review only of class certification orders, not collective actions. The court declined Acadia’s request to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction because the legal standards and issues between the FLSA collective and the Rule 23 class were not sufficiently intertwined. Turning to class certification, the Fifth Circuit found no abuse of discretion by the district court. It held that the Rule 23 requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority were satisfied based on the plaintiffs’ “on-call” theory, which presented common questions suitable for classwide adjudication. The court therefore affirmed the district court’s certification of the Rule 23 class, dismissed the appeal regarding the collective action, and remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-19</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James Graves</case:judge>
													<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30684/24-30684-2026-08-18.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Enclade</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-18T15:30:32-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-18T15:30:32-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30684/24-30684-2026-08-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Law enforcement conducted a two-month investigation in New Orleans into two relatives, Terence Wilson and Travis Enclade, suspected of trafficking methamphetamine, fentanyl, and heroin. Surveillance techniques included pole cameras, physical observation, GPS tracking, and phone analysis at several residences linked to the defendants. Footage and investigative findings suggested hand-to-hand drug transactions, shared access to a stash house, and the presence of firearms. During a jailhouse call following Wilson’s arrest, coded language was used to direct Enclade to narcotics later found in a kitchen cabinet. Subsequent searches of three residences uncovered large quantities of drugs, distribution materials, and multiple firearms.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana presided over the trial, where both defendants were convicted by a jury of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances. Wilson was also convicted of possession with intent to distribute and being a felon in possession of firearms, while Enclade was convicted of being a felon in possession of firearms. Both were acquitted on one count related to possessing firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking. The district court sentenced Enclade to 288 months and Wilson to 240 months, both below the Guidelines range. Defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, the conduct of the prosecutor, denial of a continuance, their sentences, and the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the convictions and sentences. The court held that the evidence was sufficient for all convictions, that any evidentiary errors or improper prosecutorial remarks did not prejudice the defendants, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings. The court further held that § 922(g)(1) was constitutional and that Enclade’s sentence was reasonable. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30684/24-30684-2026-08-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Enclade" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Law enforcement conducted a two-month investigation in New Orleans into two relatives, Terence Wilson and Travis Enclade, suspected of trafficking methamphetamine, fentanyl, and heroin. Surveillance techniques included pole cameras, physical observation, GPS tracking, and phone analysis at several residences linked to the defendants. Footage and investigative findings suggested hand-to-hand drug transactions, shared access to a stash house, and the presence of firearms. During a jailhouse call following Wilson’s arrest, coded language was used to direct Enclade to narcotics later found in a kitchen cabinet. Subsequent searches of three residences uncovered large quantities of drugs, distribution materials, and multiple firearms.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana presided over the trial, where both defendants were convicted by a jury of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances. Wilson was also convicted of possession with intent to distribute and being a felon in possession of firearms, while Enclade was convicted of being a felon in possession of firearms. Both were acquitted on one count related to possessing firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking. The district court sentenced Enclade to 288 months and Wilson to 240 months, both below the Guidelines range. Defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, the conduct of the prosecutor, denial of a continuance, their sentences, and the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the convictions and sentences. The court held that the evidence was sufficient for all convictions, that any evidentiary errors or improper prosecutorial remarks did not prejudice the defendants, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings. The court further held that § 922(g)(1) was constitutional and that Enclade’s sentence was reasonable. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40137/25-40137-2026-08-18.html</id>
        	<title>R J Reynolds Tobacco Company v. FDA</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-18T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-18T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40137/25-40137-2026-08-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several tobacco companies and retailers challenged a rule issued by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) that required cigarette packaging and advertisements to display eleven rotating health warnings, each paired with a graphic image illustrating the harms of smoking. Congress had previously enacted the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA), which enumerated nine specific warning statements to appear on cigarette packaging and gave the FDA limited, conditional authority to adjust the format or text of these warnings to promote public understanding of smoking risks. The FDA’s new rule went beyond these statutory warnings by mandating two additional warnings, raising industry concerns that the agency had exceeded its statutory authority.

The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. That court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and enjoined enforcement of the rule on First Amendment grounds, without addressing their claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The FDA appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, ruling that the rule did not violate the First Amendment and remanding the case for consideration of the APA claims. Upon remand, the district court granted the plaintiffs’ request for interim relief under the APA, finding a substantial likelihood of success on their claim that the FDA lacked statutory authority to increase the number of required warnings and that enforcement would inflict irreparable harm through unrecoverable compliance costs. The court postponed the rule’s effective date.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The Fifth Circuit held that the TCA’s nine statutory warning statements form a closed set and that the FDA exceeded its authority by requiring eleven warnings. The court also found that the equities favored interim relief and that universal postponement of the rule’s effective date was appropriate under the APA. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40137/25-40137-2026-08-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "R J Reynolds Tobacco Company v. FDA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several tobacco companies and retailers challenged a rule issued by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) that required cigarette packaging and advertisements to display eleven rotating health warnings, each paired with a graphic image illustrating the harms of smoking. Congress had previously enacted the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA), which enumerated nine specific warning statements to appear on cigarette packaging and gave the FDA limited, conditional authority to adjust the format or text of these warnings to promote public understanding of smoking risks. The FDA’s new rule went beyond these statutory warnings by mandating two additional warnings, raising industry concerns that the agency had exceeded its statutory authority.

The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. That court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and enjoined enforcement of the rule on First Amendment grounds, without addressing their claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The FDA appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, ruling that the rule did not violate the First Amendment and remanding the case for consideration of the APA claims. Upon remand, the district court granted the plaintiffs’ request for interim relief under the APA, finding a substantial likelihood of success on their claim that the FDA lacked statutory authority to increase the number of required warnings and that enforcement would inflict irreparable harm through unrecoverable compliance costs. The court postponed the rule’s effective date.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The Fifth Circuit held that the TCA’s nine statutory warning statements form a closed set and that the FDA exceeded its authority by requiring eleven warnings. The court also found that the equities favored interim relief and that universal postponement of the rule’s effective date was appropriate under the APA.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Don Willett</case:judge>
													<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-70012/25-70012-2026-08-18.html</id>
        	<title>Wessinger v. Vannoy</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-18T09:30:40-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-18T09:30:40-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-70012/25-70012-2026-08-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In this case, the petitioner was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death after shooting several former coworkers at a restaurant in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, in 1995. During his state post-conviction proceedings, he claimed that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance, particularly in failing to conduct an adequate mitigation investigation for the penalty phase. Despite efforts by his post-conviction counsel to secure investigative funding, those requests were denied, but counsel continued with a limited investigation.

The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and relegated the ineffective-assistance claim to post-conviction proceedings, where relief was denied. In federal court, the petitioner renewed his ineffective-assistance claim, presenting new mitigating evidence. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana initially denied relief, finding the claim had been adjudicated on the merits in state court, triggering the deferential standard of review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). After the Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan, the petitioner sought reconsideration, arguing that his new evidence fundamentally altered his claim and that inadequate state post-conviction process excused any procedural default. The district court eventually granted relief twice, both times concluding that the state process was inadequate due to denial of funding, but was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on the first occasion.

On the second appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the petitioner’s amended federal claim was not fundamentally different from his state claim and therefore had already been adjudicated on the merits by the state court. As such, the claim was subject to § 2254(d), and the district court erred by granting relief outside its constraints. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of habeas relief and remanded with instructions to enter final judgment denying the petition. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-70012/25-70012-2026-08-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Wessinger v. Vannoy" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In this case, the petitioner was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death after shooting several former coworkers at a restaurant in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, in 1995. During his state post-conviction proceedings, he claimed that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance, particularly in failing to conduct an adequate mitigation investigation for the penalty phase. Despite efforts by his post-conviction counsel to secure investigative funding, those requests were denied, but counsel continued with a limited investigation.

The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and relegated the ineffective-assistance claim to post-conviction proceedings, where relief was denied. In federal court, the petitioner renewed his ineffective-assistance claim, presenting new mitigating evidence. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana initially denied relief, finding the claim had been adjudicated on the merits in state court, triggering the deferential standard of review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). After the Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan, the petitioner sought reconsideration, arguing that his new evidence fundamentally altered his claim and that inadequate state post-conviction process excused any procedural default. The district court eventually granted relief twice, both times concluding that the state process was inadequate due to denial of funding, but was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on the first occasion.

On the second appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the petitioner’s amended federal claim was not fundamentally different from his state claim and therefore had already been adjudicated on the merits by the state court. As such, the claim was subject to § 2254(d), and the district court erred by granting relief outside its constraints. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of habeas relief and remanded with instructions to enter final judgment denying the petition.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Don Willett</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60462/25-60462-2026-08-18.html</id>
        	<title>Bonds v. Woodall</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-18T09:30:39-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-18T09:30:39-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60462/25-60462-2026-08-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A kindergarten teacher in Mississippi was frustrated after being unable to use a remote entry service to unlock her car and, during a customer service call, told an agent that she was aggravated and might “kill some little kindergarteners.” She reiterated this after her issue was resolved, saying the agent had “saved 20 children from being killed.” The agent reported the statements to the police. The responding officers met with the teacher, who admitted to the remarks but said they were taken out of context. After consulting with an Assistant District Attorney, the teacher was charged with making terroristic threats, processed, and jailed. A grand jury declined to indict her.

The teacher filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi against the city, the chief of police, and an officer, alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution under state and federal law, and a Fourteenth Amendment violation. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied their motion, and the defendants appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, finding that the facts known to the officers at the time provided probable cause for arrest, defeating the constitutional claims. The court also found that, even if the officers erred, the right to be free from arrest under these circumstances was not clearly established. The appellate court reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity and declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state law and municipal liability claims, remanding those for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60462/25-60462-2026-08-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Bonds v. Woodall" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A kindergarten teacher in Mississippi was frustrated after being unable to use a remote entry service to unlock her car and, during a customer service call, told an agent that she was aggravated and might “kill some little kindergarteners.” She reiterated this after her issue was resolved, saying the agent had “saved 20 children from being killed.” The agent reported the statements to the police. The responding officers met with the teacher, who admitted to the remarks but said they were taken out of context. After consulting with an Assistant District Attorney, the teacher was charged with making terroristic threats, processed, and jailed. A grand jury declined to indict her.

The teacher filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi against the city, the chief of police, and an officer, alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution under state and federal law, and a Fourteenth Amendment violation. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied their motion, and the defendants appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, finding that the facts known to the officers at the time provided probable cause for arrest, defeating the constitutional claims. The court also found that, even if the officers erred, the right to be free from arrest under these circumstances was not clearly established. The appellate court reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity and declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state law and municipal liability claims, remanding those for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20415/25-20415-2026-08-18.html</id>
        	<title>Quadvest v. San Jacinto River Auth</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-18T09:30:38-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-18T09:30:38-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20415/25-20415-2026-08-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A conservation district in Montgomery County, Texas, required large water users to reduce groundwater usage by 30%. To facilitate compliance, the San Jacinto River Authority (the “River Authority”), a political subdivision of Texas, created a joint groundwater reduction plan and entered into contracts with about 80 utilities, including Quadvest, L.P. (“Quadvest”). These contracts required participants to pay certain fees and, at the River Authority’s discretion, to connect to surface water provided by the River Authority. The fees aimed to equalize costs between groundwater and surface water users and to finance new infrastructure. Quadvest, a family-owned utility, initially operated only in the retail market and later expanded into wholesale water supply.

After the relevant groundwater regulations were rescinded due to political changes and litigation, Quadvest challenged the lawfulness of its contract with the River Authority in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. It alleged that the contract constituted an unlawful restraint of trade under the Sherman Act, specifically as per se illegal horizontal price-fixing and market allocation. After a bench trial, the district court found in favor of the River Authority, concluding that Quadvest failed to prove its claims.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the challenged contract did not constitute a per se illegal horizontal restraint because the parties were not competitors at the time of contracting, and the agreement was vertical in nature. The court further determined that the contract did not fix prices or allocate markets in a manner prohibited by the Sherman Act. Under the rule of reason, Quadvest also failed to define the relevant market and thus could not demonstrate anticompetitive effects. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20415/25-20415-2026-08-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Quadvest v. San Jacinto River Auth" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A conservation district in Montgomery County, Texas, required large water users to reduce groundwater usage by 30%. To facilitate compliance, the San Jacinto River Authority (the “River Authority”), a political subdivision of Texas, created a joint groundwater reduction plan and entered into contracts with about 80 utilities, including Quadvest, L.P. (“Quadvest”). These contracts required participants to pay certain fees and, at the River Authority’s discretion, to connect to surface water provided by the River Authority. The fees aimed to equalize costs between groundwater and surface water users and to finance new infrastructure. Quadvest, a family-owned utility, initially operated only in the retail market and later expanded into wholesale water supply.

After the relevant groundwater regulations were rescinded due to political changes and litigation, Quadvest challenged the lawfulness of its contract with the River Authority in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. It alleged that the contract constituted an unlawful restraint of trade under the Sherman Act, specifically as per se illegal horizontal price-fixing and market allocation. After a bench trial, the district court found in favor of the River Authority, concluding that Quadvest failed to prove its claims.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the challenged contract did not constitute a per se illegal horizontal restraint because the parties were not competitors at the time of contracting, and the agreement was vertical in nature. The court further determined that the contract did not fix prices or allocate markets in a manner prohibited by the Sherman Act. Under the rule of reason, Quadvest also failed to define the relevant market and thus could not demonstrate anticompetitive effects. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Carolyn King</case:judge>
													<category term="Antitrust &amp; Trade Regulation"/>
							<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60322/25-60322-2026-08-14.html</id>
        	<title>Olibris v. Blanche</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-14T15:30:32-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-14T15:30:32-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60322/25-60322-2026-08-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A lawful permanent resident from Haiti was admitted to the United States in 2016. He later pleaded guilty to smuggling goods, specifically exporting fifty firearms to Haiti without the required license, in violation of federal law. These firearms were concealed in vehicles shipped from Colorado to Florida, and then sent to Haiti. Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, charging him as removable for engaging in activity to violate U.S. laws prohibiting the export of goods.

An Immigration Judge with the U.S. Department of Justice sustained the charges of removability and denied his request for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The judge found his testimony lacking in candor and determined that he failed to demonstrate it was more likely than not he would be tortured if removed to Haiti. The judge noted that threats against him were speculative, not linked to government action or acquiescence, and that his relatives in Haiti remained safe. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision, rejected his argument that the removal provision should apply only to explicit national security threats, and concluded that his conviction for illegal exportation satisfied the statutory grounds for removal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court denied the petition for review, holding that the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(A)(i) covers any activity to violate laws prohibiting the export of goods, not just acts involving national security threats. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the denial of CAT deferral, as the petitioner failed to show a particularized risk of torture or government acquiescence, and that no due process violation had occurred. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60322/25-60322-2026-08-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Olibris v. Blanche" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A lawful permanent resident from Haiti was admitted to the United States in 2016. He later pleaded guilty to smuggling goods, specifically exporting fifty firearms to Haiti without the required license, in violation of federal law. These firearms were concealed in vehicles shipped from Colorado to Florida, and then sent to Haiti. Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, charging him as removable for engaging in activity to violate U.S. laws prohibiting the export of goods.

An Immigration Judge with the U.S. Department of Justice sustained the charges of removability and denied his request for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The judge found his testimony lacking in candor and determined that he failed to demonstrate it was more likely than not he would be tortured if removed to Haiti. The judge noted that threats against him were speculative, not linked to government action or acquiescence, and that his relatives in Haiti remained safe. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision, rejected his argument that the removal provision should apply only to explicit national security threats, and concluded that his conviction for illegal exportation satisfied the statutory grounds for removal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court denied the petition for review, holding that the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(A)(i) covers any activity to violate laws prohibiting the export of goods, not just acts involving national security threats. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the denial of CAT deferral, as the petitioner failed to show a particularized risk of torture or government acquiescence, and that no due process violation had occurred.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Immigration Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10372/25-10372-2026-08-14.html</id>
        	<title>Guerra Quezada v. USA</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-14T15:30:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-14T15:30:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10372/25-10372-2026-08-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Two related cases concern an uncle and nephew, both born in Mexico, who claim United States citizenship through their ancestor, Cruz Rodriguez de Guerra, a woman born in Kansas in 1924. Cruz Rodriguez de Guerra’s son, born in Mexico in 1944, is the father of the older appellant and grandfather of the younger. Both appellants were born in Mexico; one was a long-term lawful permanent resident later removed for a felony, while the other was a former lawful permanent resident subject to a voluntary departure order, a criminal conviction, and subsequent removals. The appellants argue that citizenship passed to them through Cruz Rodriguez de Guerra and seek various forms of relief, including damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, and habeas corpus.

Their cases were brought in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, where both raised claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The district court dismissed all claims. The appellants then filed timely appeals.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the consolidated appeals. The court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the damages claims because, under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), the appellants are considered aliens and the claims arise from actions associated with removal proceedings. The court also concluded that the appellants failed to exhaust administrative remedies required for declaratory judgment claims under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a), and the APA claims were jurisdictionally barred due to lack of final agency action. The habeas claim was barred because the petitioner was not “in custody,” and the due process claims were forfeited for inadequate briefing. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissals and modified one to be without prejudice due to lack of jurisdiction. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10372/25-10372-2026-08-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Guerra Quezada v. USA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Two related cases concern an uncle and nephew, both born in Mexico, who claim United States citizenship through their ancestor, Cruz Rodriguez de Guerra, a woman born in Kansas in 1924. Cruz Rodriguez de Guerra’s son, born in Mexico in 1944, is the father of the older appellant and grandfather of the younger. Both appellants were born in Mexico; one was a long-term lawful permanent resident later removed for a felony, while the other was a former lawful permanent resident subject to a voluntary departure order, a criminal conviction, and subsequent removals. The appellants argue that citizenship passed to them through Cruz Rodriguez de Guerra and seek various forms of relief, including damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, and habeas corpus.

Their cases were brought in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, where both raised claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The district court dismissed all claims. The appellants then filed timely appeals.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the consolidated appeals. The court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the damages claims because, under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), the appellants are considered aliens and the claims arise from actions associated with removal proceedings. The court also concluded that the appellants failed to exhaust administrative remedies required for declaratory judgment claims under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a), and the APA claims were jurisdictionally barred due to lack of final agency action. The habeas claim was barred because the petitioner was not “in custody,” and the due process claims were forfeited for inadequate briefing. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissals and modified one to be without prejudice due to lack of jurisdiction.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leslie Southwick</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Immigration Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20584/25-20584-2026-08-14.html</id>
        	<title>Hunter Marine Group v. Gonzalez</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-14T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-14T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20584/25-20584-2026-08-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case concerns an accident involving the Adalyn, a 38-foot commercial workboat owned by Michael Quain Neward Pittman and chartered by Hunter Marine Group, LLC. In November 2024, eight employees of Encore Dredging Partners, LLC were aboard the Adalyn during maintenance dredging operations on the Alabama River when the vessel ran aground and struck a steel pipe, resulting in injuries. The employees were performing work under a contract where Hunter Marine provided the vessel and received a daily flat fee from Encore, regardless of its use.

Following the incident, the injured Encore employees filed personal injury claims in state court against Hunter Marine and Encore. In May 2025, Hunter Marine and Pittman sought to limit their liability under the federal Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 by filing a petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district court stayed the state proceedings and ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment. It concluded that the Adalyn was a “covered small passenger vessel” excluded from the Act’s limitation of liability protections and granted summary judgment to the claimants.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment decision de novo. The central issue was whether the Adalyn qualified as a “covered small passenger vessel” by carrying “passengers for hire,” given that consideration for carriage had been provided—albeit indirectly—by Encore on behalf of its employees. The Fifth Circuit held that the statute does not require personal payment by the passenger; indirect payment by an employer suffices. Consequently, the court affirmed that the Adalyn was a covered small passenger vessel, making the Limitation of Liability Act inapplicable and upholding the district court’s summary judgment for the claimants. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20584/25-20584-2026-08-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Hunter Marine Group v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case concerns an accident involving the Adalyn, a 38-foot commercial workboat owned by Michael Quain Neward Pittman and chartered by Hunter Marine Group, LLC. In November 2024, eight employees of Encore Dredging Partners, LLC were aboard the Adalyn during maintenance dredging operations on the Alabama River when the vessel ran aground and struck a steel pipe, resulting in injuries. The employees were performing work under a contract where Hunter Marine provided the vessel and received a daily flat fee from Encore, regardless of its use.

Following the incident, the injured Encore employees filed personal injury claims in state court against Hunter Marine and Encore. In May 2025, Hunter Marine and Pittman sought to limit their liability under the federal Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 by filing a petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district court stayed the state proceedings and ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment. It concluded that the Adalyn was a “covered small passenger vessel” excluded from the Act’s limitation of liability protections and granted summary judgment to the claimants.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment decision de novo. The central issue was whether the Adalyn qualified as a “covered small passenger vessel” by carrying “passengers for hire,” given that consideration for carriage had been provided—albeit indirectly—by Encore on behalf of its employees. The Fifth Circuit held that the statute does not require personal payment by the passenger; indirect payment by an employer suffices. Consequently, the court affirmed that the Adalyn was a covered small passenger vessel, making the Limitation of Liability Act inapplicable and upholding the district court’s summary judgment for the claimants.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Edith Clement</case:judge>
													<category term="Admiralty &amp; Maritime Law"/>
							<category term="Personal Injury"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/21-70010/21-70010-2026-08-14.html</id>
        	<title>Holberg v. Guerrero</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-14T15:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-14T15:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/21-70010/21-70010-2026-08-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A woman brutally murdered an 80-year-old man in Amarillo, Texas, stabbing him 58 times, binding him, and shoving a lamp down his throat. After the murder, she used his money to buy drugs and fled the state. She later confessed to the crime. At trial, her defense was self-defense, claiming a prolonged struggle with the victim, who was frail and wheelchair-bound. The prosecution presented evidence from multiple witnesses, including the defendant’s confession relayed by her mother, police officers, and a cellmate, as well as significant physical evidence and testimony about the brutality of the crime.

A Texas jury convicted her of capital murder and sentenced her to death after finding she posed a continuing threat and that there were insufficient mitigating circumstances. On direct appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected her arguments, and the Supreme Court denied review. She then pursued state postconviction relief, raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and that the prosecution failed to disclose evidence impeaching her cellmate, a prosecution witness. The state habeas court denied these claims, finding that her lawyers’ investigation was reasonable and that the allegedly withheld information was not material.

She filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, which was denied. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit later granted relief on one claim, finding a Brady violation, but the Fifth Circuit then reheard the case en banc.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc and reviewing under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), affirmed the district court’s denial of relief. The court held that the state court’s application of Brady v. Maryland was not unreasonable under AEDPA, as the alleged suppression was not material to the outcome given the overwhelming evidence of guilt and future dangerousness. The judgment denying habeas relief was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/21-70010/21-70010-2026-08-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Holberg v. Guerrero" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A woman brutally murdered an 80-year-old man in Amarillo, Texas, stabbing him 58 times, binding him, and shoving a lamp down his throat. After the murder, she used his money to buy drugs and fled the state. She later confessed to the crime. At trial, her defense was self-defense, claiming a prolonged struggle with the victim, who was frail and wheelchair-bound. The prosecution presented evidence from multiple witnesses, including the defendant’s confession relayed by her mother, police officers, and a cellmate, as well as significant physical evidence and testimony about the brutality of the crime.

A Texas jury convicted her of capital murder and sentenced her to death after finding she posed a continuing threat and that there were insufficient mitigating circumstances. On direct appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected her arguments, and the Supreme Court denied review. She then pursued state postconviction relief, raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and that the prosecution failed to disclose evidence impeaching her cellmate, a prosecution witness. The state habeas court denied these claims, finding that her lawyers’ investigation was reasonable and that the allegedly withheld information was not material.

She filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, which was denied. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit later granted relief on one claim, finding a Brady violation, but the Fifth Circuit then reheard the case en banc.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc and reviewing under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), affirmed the district court’s denial of relief. The court held that the state court’s application of Brady v. Maryland was not unreasonable under AEDPA, as the alleged suppression was not material to the outcome given the overwhelming evidence of guilt and future dangerousness. The judgment denying habeas relief was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60475/25-60475-2026-08-14.html</id>
        	<title>Ademola v. Blanche</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-14T09:30:48-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-14T09:30:48-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60475/25-60475-2026-08-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A lawful permanent resident of the United States, who is a Nigerian citizen, pleaded guilty to willfully and knowingly using a forged or counterfeit Nigerian passport to open a bank account, violating federal law. Years after becoming a permanent resident, he was detained upon his return to the country following international travel. The Department of Homeland Security charged him with inadmissibility, alleging that his conviction was for a crime involving moral turpitude, and began removal proceedings.

An immigration judge found him inadmissible based on this conviction and ordered his removal to Nigeria. The Board of Immigration Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the immigration judge’s decision. The petitioner then sought review of the Board’s order, arguing that his conviction for false use of a passport does not qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court stated that it now independently interprets the relevant statutes, following recent Supreme Court guidance. Applying the categorical approach, the Fifth Circuit concluded that a conviction under the relevant passport fraud statute—specifically, willful and knowing use of a false, forged, or invalid passport—requires conduct that is inherently fraudulent or deceitful. The court found that all forms of conduct criminalized by the statute involve moral turpitude because they entail willful deception. Therefore, the court held that the petitioner’s conviction is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, making him inadmissible under immigration law. The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60475/25-60475-2026-08-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Ademola v. Blanche" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A lawful permanent resident of the United States, who is a Nigerian citizen, pleaded guilty to willfully and knowingly using a forged or counterfeit Nigerian passport to open a bank account, violating federal law. Years after becoming a permanent resident, he was detained upon his return to the country following international travel. The Department of Homeland Security charged him with inadmissibility, alleging that his conviction was for a crime involving moral turpitude, and began removal proceedings.

An immigration judge found him inadmissible based on this conviction and ordered his removal to Nigeria. The Board of Immigration Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the immigration judge’s decision. The petitioner then sought review of the Board’s order, arguing that his conviction for false use of a passport does not qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court stated that it now independently interprets the relevant statutes, following recent Supreme Court guidance. Applying the categorical approach, the Fifth Circuit concluded that a conviction under the relevant passport fraud statute—specifically, willful and knowing use of a false, forged, or invalid passport—requires conduct that is inherently fraudulent or deceitful. The court found that all forms of conduct criminalized by the statute involve moral turpitude because they entail willful deception. Therefore, the court held that the petitioner’s conviction is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, making him inadmissible under immigration law. The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Andrew Oldham</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Immigration Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11185/25-11185-2026-08-14.html</id>
        	<title>NexPoint v. Highland</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-14T09:30:48-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-14T09:30:48-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11185/25-11185-2026-08-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Highland Capital Management, L.P. and HCRE Partners (now NexPoint Real Estate Partners) collaborated on a large real estate project in 2018, forming SE Multifamily Holdings, LLC to acquire substantial residential assets. HCRE, controlled by James Dondero, and Highland structured their membership interests in the LLC through an amended agreement after another investor joined. When Highland later entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy, HCRE, led by Dondero, filed a proof of claim asserting entitlement to distributions and seeking contract reformation regarding membership allocation. Both Dondero and another officer, Matt McGraner, admitted during litigation that their claim lacked merit, and evidence showed the claim was filed without investigation, likely to protect SE Multifamily’s assets from Highland’s creditors.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas oversaw the proceedings, including extensive discovery and a motion to disqualify HCRE’s counsel, which the court granted. As discovery continued, HCRE sought to withdraw its claim two days before critical depositions, but the bankruptcy court denied the motion, finding withdrawal would prejudice Highland. After a bench trial, the bankruptcy court ruled against HCRE, rejecting its contract reformation theory and disallowing its proof of claim. Subsequently, the court imposed sanctions on HCRE, finding bad faith in both the filing and litigation of the claim. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas affirmed the imposition of sanctions.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower courts’ decisions. The Fifth Circuit held that clear and convincing evidence supported the bankruptcy court’s finding that HCRE acted in bad faith by filing a baseless claim and litigating it in bad faith, including frivolously opposing the disqualification of counsel and seeking to withdraw the claim to avoid discovery while preserving it for future litigation. The court also held the sanctions were causally related to HCRE’s conduct and not an abuse of discretion. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11185/25-11185-2026-08-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "NexPoint v. Highland" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Highland Capital Management, L.P. and HCRE Partners (now NexPoint Real Estate Partners) collaborated on a large real estate project in 2018, forming SE Multifamily Holdings, LLC to acquire substantial residential assets. HCRE, controlled by James Dondero, and Highland structured their membership interests in the LLC through an amended agreement after another investor joined. When Highland later entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy, HCRE, led by Dondero, filed a proof of claim asserting entitlement to distributions and seeking contract reformation regarding membership allocation. Both Dondero and another officer, Matt McGraner, admitted during litigation that their claim lacked merit, and evidence showed the claim was filed without investigation, likely to protect SE Multifamily’s assets from Highland’s creditors.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas oversaw the proceedings, including extensive discovery and a motion to disqualify HCRE’s counsel, which the court granted. As discovery continued, HCRE sought to withdraw its claim two days before critical depositions, but the bankruptcy court denied the motion, finding withdrawal would prejudice Highland. After a bench trial, the bankruptcy court ruled against HCRE, rejecting its contract reformation theory and disallowing its proof of claim. Subsequently, the court imposed sanctions on HCRE, finding bad faith in both the filing and litigation of the claim. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas affirmed the imposition of sanctions.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower courts’ decisions. The Fifth Circuit held that clear and convincing evidence supported the bankruptcy court’s finding that HCRE acted in bad faith by filing a baseless claim and litigating it in bad faith, including frivolously opposing the disqualification of counsel and seeking to withdraw the claim to avoid discovery while preserving it for future litigation. The court also held the sanctions were causally related to HCRE’s conduct and not an abuse of discretion.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James Graves</case:judge>
													<category term="Bankruptcy"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Legal Ethics"/>
							<category term="Professional Malpractice &amp; Ethics"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-30018/26-30018-2026-08-14.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Morgan</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-14T09:30:48-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-14T09:30:48-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-30018/26-30018-2026-08-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Terrance Morgan was serving a term of supervised release after completing a federal sentence for firearm and drug offenses. During his supervision, Morgan committed several violations: he failed to attend substance abuse treatment, had multiple positive drug tests for controlled substances, did not report to or communicate with his probation officer as required, failed to provide proof of employment, and was convicted in state court for battery upon a dating partner and simple battery. Following his arrest for these violations, Morgan completed a thirty-day inpatient drug treatment program and was placed on home detention with location monitoring.

After these events, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held a revocation hearing. Morgan admitted to the violations but argued that his recent successful completion of inpatient treatment warranted an exception to mandatory revocation of his supervised release. His counsel requested a continuance to allow for further demonstration of progress, but the district court denied the request, revoked his supervised release, and imposed an eight-month prison sentence followed by another term of supervised release. The court expressed concern about the escalation of Morgan’s behavior and the seriousness of the domestic violence conviction. A motion to reconsider was subsequently denied.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Morgan’s claims that the district court failed to consider the statutory exception for drug treatment, relied on erroneous facts, applied the wrong version of the Sentencing Guidelines, and abused its discretion in denying a continuance. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not err in declining to apply the drug treatment exception, did not clearly err in its factual findings, made only harmless error in referencing an earlier version of the Guidelines, and did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-30018/26-30018-2026-08-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Morgan" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Terrance Morgan was serving a term of supervised release after completing a federal sentence for firearm and drug offenses. During his supervision, Morgan committed several violations: he failed to attend substance abuse treatment, had multiple positive drug tests for controlled substances, did not report to or communicate with his probation officer as required, failed to provide proof of employment, and was convicted in state court for battery upon a dating partner and simple battery. Following his arrest for these violations, Morgan completed a thirty-day inpatient drug treatment program and was placed on home detention with location monitoring.

After these events, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held a revocation hearing. Morgan admitted to the violations but argued that his recent successful completion of inpatient treatment warranted an exception to mandatory revocation of his supervised release. His counsel requested a continuance to allow for further demonstration of progress, but the district court denied the request, revoked his supervised release, and imposed an eight-month prison sentence followed by another term of supervised release. The court expressed concern about the escalation of Morgan’s behavior and the seriousness of the domestic violence conviction. A motion to reconsider was subsequently denied.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Morgan’s claims that the district court failed to consider the statutory exception for drug treatment, relied on erroneous facts, applied the wrong version of the Sentencing Guidelines, and abused its discretion in denying a continuance. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not err in declining to apply the drug treatment exception, did not clearly err in its factual findings, made only harmless error in referencing an earlier version of the Guidelines, and did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Carl Stewart</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10534/25-10534-2026-08-13.html</id>
        	<title>W.M.M. v. Trump</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-13T15:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-13T15:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10534/25-10534-2026-08-13.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Three Venezuelan nationals, alleged by the government to be members of the Tren de Aragua gang, were detained in Texas following a presidential proclamation under the Alien Enemies Act (AEA). This proclamation, issued in March 2025, authorized immediate removal of Venezuelan citizens aged fourteen or older, residing in the United States, who were not naturalized or lawful permanent residents and were identified as members of the gang. The petitioners challenged the proclamation, arguing that it exceeded the President’s authority under the AEA and violated due process rights. They sought class certification and injunctive relief to prevent removal under the AEA.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied temporary restraining orders and class certification. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit initially dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, in A.A.R.P. v. Trump, vacated that dismissal and remanded, instructing the Fifth Circuit to address two issues: whether the petitioners were entitled to a preliminary injunction against removal under the AEA, and whether the notice provided for due process claims was sufficient for the putative class. The Supreme Court also allowed the government to remove the petitioners under other lawful authorities.

After remand, the three named petitioners were removed from the United States under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), not the AEA. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that, because the petitioners were no longer in the country and no class had been certified, it was impossible to grant any effectual relief. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot for lack of jurisdiction, declining to substitute new class representatives on appeal but leaving open the possibility for future proceedings in the district court. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10534/25-10534-2026-08-13.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "W.M.M. v. Trump" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Three Venezuelan nationals, alleged by the government to be members of the Tren de Aragua gang, were detained in Texas following a presidential proclamation under the Alien Enemies Act (AEA). This proclamation, issued in March 2025, authorized immediate removal of Venezuelan citizens aged fourteen or older, residing in the United States, who were not naturalized or lawful permanent residents and were identified as members of the gang. The petitioners challenged the proclamation, arguing that it exceeded the President’s authority under the AEA and violated due process rights. They sought class certification and injunctive relief to prevent removal under the AEA.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied temporary restraining orders and class certification. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit initially dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, in A.A.R.P. v. Trump, vacated that dismissal and remanded, instructing the Fifth Circuit to address two issues: whether the petitioners were entitled to a preliminary injunction against removal under the AEA, and whether the notice provided for due process claims was sufficient for the putative class. The Supreme Court also allowed the government to remove the petitioners under other lawful authorities.

After remand, the three named petitioners were removed from the United States under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), not the AEA. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that, because the petitioners were no longer in the country and no class had been certified, it was impossible to grant any effectual relief. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot for lack of jurisdiction, declining to substitute new class representatives on appeal but leaving open the possibility for future proceedings in the district court.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-13</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Immigration Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60202/25-60202-2026-08-12.html</id>
        	<title>Citizens for Clean Air v. Department of Transportation</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-12T15:30:41-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-12T15:30:41-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60202/25-60202-2026-08-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A company applied to construct a deepwater port off the coast of Texas, including a pipeline that would cross the pipeline of another recently approved deepwater port. The relevant federal statute, the Deepwater Port Act of 1974 (DWPA), requires that only one deepwater port be licensed per “application area.” An environmental group, comprised of local residents near the proposed pipeline and tank farm, objected to the approval, claiming that the pipeline should have been included in the application area. Their concerns included increased risks of flooding, pollution, and negative impacts on property value and quality of life.

The United States Maritime Administration (MARAD), acting under authority delegated by the Secretary of Transportation, processed the application. Unlike with previous applications for similar projects, MARAD excluded the proposed pipeline from Texas GulfLink’s application area, reasoning that the DWPA gave it discretion to do so. MARAD then approved Texas GulfLink’s application. The environmental group filed a timely petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, challenging MARAD’s decision on the basis that it violated the DWPA.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the DWPA requires the application area to encompass the entire deepwater port site, including pipelines located seaward of the high water mark. The court found MARAD’s designation of the application area to be unlawful because, if the pipeline had been properly included, the application area would overlap with that of another approved port, contrary to the DWPA’s requirement. The court granted the petition for review, vacated MARAD’s approval of the application, and remanded the matter for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60202/25-60202-2026-08-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Citizens for Clean Air v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A company applied to construct a deepwater port off the coast of Texas, including a pipeline that would cross the pipeline of another recently approved deepwater port. The relevant federal statute, the Deepwater Port Act of 1974 (DWPA), requires that only one deepwater port be licensed per “application area.” An environmental group, comprised of local residents near the proposed pipeline and tank farm, objected to the approval, claiming that the pipeline should have been included in the application area. Their concerns included increased risks of flooding, pollution, and negative impacts on property value and quality of life.

The United States Maritime Administration (MARAD), acting under authority delegated by the Secretary of Transportation, processed the application. Unlike with previous applications for similar projects, MARAD excluded the proposed pipeline from Texas GulfLink’s application area, reasoning that the DWPA gave it discretion to do so. MARAD then approved Texas GulfLink’s application. The environmental group filed a timely petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, challenging MARAD’s decision on the basis that it violated the DWPA.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the DWPA requires the application area to encompass the entire deepwater port site, including pipelines located seaward of the high water mark. The court found MARAD’s designation of the application area to be unlawful because, if the pipeline had been properly included, the application area would overlap with that of another approved port, contrary to the DWPA’s requirement. The court granted the petition for review, vacated MARAD’s approval of the application, and remanded the matter for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Edith Clement</case:judge>
													<category term="Environmental Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Admiralty &amp; Maritime Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50246/25-50246-2026-08-12.html</id>
        	<title>La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-12T15:30:40-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-12T15:30:40-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50246/25-50246-2026-08-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several organizations and individuals challenged provisions of a 2021 Texas law known as Senate Bill 1, which imposed new requirements on mail-in voting, regulated voter assistance, and restricted compensation for certain election-related activities. The plaintiffs, including advocacy groups and individuals with disabilities, argued that these provisions discriminated against voters with disabilities in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Key facts included reports of rejected mail-in ballots due to missing identification numbers and claims that the law’s requirements created barriers for disabled voters.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas held a bench trial and found that nine provisions of Senate Bill 1 were inconsistent with the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court permanently enjoined the Texas Secretary of State and various local officials from enforcing these provisions. The defendants, including the Governor of Texas and other state and county officials, appealed the injunction.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision in its entirety. The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the identification provisions, as they could not show a substantial risk of future injury to any specific member or demonstrate organizational standing under Supreme Court precedent. The court also found that the plaintiffs’ challenges to voter assistance and compensation provisions were foreclosed by prior Fifth Circuit decisions and failed for lack of standing or on the merits. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court’s grant of permanent injunctive relief was improper and reversed the injunction, declining to interfere with the Texas Legislature’s election regulations. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50246/25-50246-2026-08-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several organizations and individuals challenged provisions of a 2021 Texas law known as Senate Bill 1, which imposed new requirements on mail-in voting, regulated voter assistance, and restricted compensation for certain election-related activities. The plaintiffs, including advocacy groups and individuals with disabilities, argued that these provisions discriminated against voters with disabilities in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Key facts included reports of rejected mail-in ballots due to missing identification numbers and claims that the law’s requirements created barriers for disabled voters.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas held a bench trial and found that nine provisions of Senate Bill 1 were inconsistent with the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court permanently enjoined the Texas Secretary of State and various local officials from enforcing these provisions. The defendants, including the Governor of Texas and other state and county officials, appealed the injunction.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision in its entirety. The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the identification provisions, as they could not show a substantial risk of future injury to any specific member or demonstrate organizational standing under Supreme Court precedent. The court also found that the plaintiffs’ challenges to voter assistance and compensation provisions were foreclosed by prior Fifth Circuit decisions and failed for lack of standing or on the merits. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court’s grant of permanent injunctive relief was improper and reversed the injunction, declining to interfere with the Texas Legislature’s election regulations.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Andrew Oldham</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Election Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-50378/24-50378-2026-08-12.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Brann</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-12T15:30:39-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-12T15:30:39-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-50378/24-50378-2026-08-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Gerald Talman Brann pleaded guilty to sexually exploiting his stepdaughter, agreeing that he and his wife had photographed and videoed sexual abuse of the child and distributed these materials online. The victim, who was as young as six at the time of some offenses, suffered significant psychological and emotional harm, now requiring therapy, tutoring, and counseling. Brann’s plea agreement included a commitment to pay at least $100,000 in restitution for the child&#039;s future counseling costs, and he waived his right to appeal his conviction, sentence, or restitution order.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas accepted Brann’s guilty plea to one count under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), sentenced him to 360 months in prison and a lifetime of supervised release, and ordered $100,000 in restitution. The court’s findings were based on the plea agreement, a presentence investigation report, and a victim impact statement outlining the child&#039;s ongoing and anticipated needs. Brann did not object to the restitution order at sentencing.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Brann argued that the restitution exceeded the statutory maximum under 18 U.S.C. § 2259 because the amount was not supported by evidence of the victim’s actual or projected losses. The Fifth Circuit held that an appeal waiver does not bar a claim that a sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, and reviewed the restitution order de novo. The court determined that Brann’s admissions, along with corroborating evidence and precedent from similar cases, provided sufficient support for the $100,000 amount. The court affirmed the restitution order and remanded the case to the district court solely to correct a clerical error in the written judgment regarding the offense of conviction. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-50378/24-50378-2026-08-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Brann" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Gerald Talman Brann pleaded guilty to sexually exploiting his stepdaughter, agreeing that he and his wife had photographed and videoed sexual abuse of the child and distributed these materials online. The victim, who was as young as six at the time of some offenses, suffered significant psychological and emotional harm, now requiring therapy, tutoring, and counseling. Brann’s plea agreement included a commitment to pay at least $100,000 in restitution for the child&#039;s future counseling costs, and he waived his right to appeal his conviction, sentence, or restitution order.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas accepted Brann’s guilty plea to one count under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), sentenced him to 360 months in prison and a lifetime of supervised release, and ordered $100,000 in restitution. The court’s findings were based on the plea agreement, a presentence investigation report, and a victim impact statement outlining the child&#039;s ongoing and anticipated needs. Brann did not object to the restitution order at sentencing.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Brann argued that the restitution exceeded the statutory maximum under 18 U.S.C. § 2259 because the amount was not supported by evidence of the victim’s actual or projected losses. The Fifth Circuit held that an appeal waiver does not bar a claim that a sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, and reviewed the restitution order de novo. The court determined that Brann’s admissions, along with corroborating evidence and precedent from similar cases, provided sufficient support for the $100,000 amount. The court affirmed the restitution order and remanded the case to the district court solely to correct a clerical error in the written judgment regarding the offense of conviction.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Priscilla Richman</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60529/24-60529-2026-08-11.html</id>
        	<title>State of Mississippi v. DOE</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-11T10:00:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-11T10:00:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60529/24-60529-2026-08-11.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several states challenged a federal agency’s attempt to set new energy efficiency standards for consumer cooking appliances, including gas stoves. The Department of Energy (DOE) had initially tried to implement these standards through the standard notice-and-comment rulemaking process, but after facing substantial opposition, including critical comments from industry groups and states, it abandoned that effort. Subsequently, the DOE used a “Direct Final Rule” (DFR) process to impose similar standards, bypassing the usual public comment period by relying on a joint statement from selected stakeholders. The new rule included a ban on certain power supplies and set limits on annual energy consumption for appliances.

After the DFR was published, the DOE solicited public comments as required by statute. Several states, led by Nebraska, Utah, and Montana, submitted timely adverse comments on the last day of the comment period, arguing that the joint statement did not fairly represent all stakeholders, particularly states opposed to the rule. They also asserted that the DOE failed to properly consider the impact on product reliability and lifespan. The DOE later issued a notice confirming it would not withdraw the DFR, despite these objections.

The case was then reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The court first held that it had authority to review the petition, determining that the rule became “prescribed” for purposes of judicial review only when the DOE confirmed its adherence to the DFR after considering comments. On the merits, the Fifth Circuit found that the DOE failed to meet statutory requirements for using the DFR process, especially by excluding key stakeholders and not adequately addressing concerns about reliability and economic justification. The court granted the states’ petition for review, set aside the rule, and remanded the matter to the DOE for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60529/24-60529-2026-08-11.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "State of Mississippi v. DOE" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several states challenged a federal agency’s attempt to set new energy efficiency standards for consumer cooking appliances, including gas stoves. The Department of Energy (DOE) had initially tried to implement these standards through the standard notice-and-comment rulemaking process, but after facing substantial opposition, including critical comments from industry groups and states, it abandoned that effort. Subsequently, the DOE used a “Direct Final Rule” (DFR) process to impose similar standards, bypassing the usual public comment period by relying on a joint statement from selected stakeholders. The new rule included a ban on certain power supplies and set limits on annual energy consumption for appliances.

After the DFR was published, the DOE solicited public comments as required by statute. Several states, led by Nebraska, Utah, and Montana, submitted timely adverse comments on the last day of the comment period, arguing that the joint statement did not fairly represent all stakeholders, particularly states opposed to the rule. They also asserted that the DOE failed to properly consider the impact on product reliability and lifespan. The DOE later issued a notice confirming it would not withdraw the DFR, despite these objections.

The case was then reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The court first held that it had authority to review the petition, determining that the rule became “prescribed” for purposes of judicial review only when the DOE confirmed its adherence to the DFR after considering comments. On the merits, the Fifth Circuit found that the DOE failed to meet statutory requirements for using the DFR process, especially by excluding key stakeholders and not adequately addressing concerns about reliability and economic justification. The court granted the states’ petition for review, set aside the rule, and remanded the matter to the DOE for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Andrew Oldham</case:judge>
													<category term="Energy, Oil &amp; Gas Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50072/25-50072-2026-08-07.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Mendoza</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-07T15:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-07T15:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50072/25-50072-2026-08-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Federal agents discovered that an individual in San Antonio, Texas had accessed a website on the dark web featuring child sexual abuse material. Upon executing a search warrant, investigators found thousands of illicit images and videos on the suspect&#039;s devices. The defendant subsequently pled guilty to receipt of child pornography under federal law. Because the defendant had a prior Texas state conviction for possession of child pornography, federal prosecutors sought a statutory sentencing enhancement that significantly increased the minimum and maximum prison terms.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas rejected the defendant’s argument that the enhancement was inapplicable, finding the prior Texas conviction sufficiently related to the federal offense. The district judge sentenced the defendant to the enhanced minimum of fifteen years and ordered him to pay $94,000 in restitution to fourteen victims. The defendant’s objections to both the enhancement and the restitution order were overruled.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation issue de novo and the restitution issues for plain error. The court held that the phrase “relating to” in 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1) should be given its ordinary, broad meaning, affirming the district court’s application of the sentencing enhancement. The court also affirmed the restitution order for eleven victims, finding the district court had an adequate basis for proximate-cause analysis as required by Paroline v. United States. However, the court vacated the restitution order for three victims, concluding the record lacked sufficient evidence of proximate-cause analysis for those individuals, and remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50072/25-50072-2026-08-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Mendoza" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Federal agents discovered that an individual in San Antonio, Texas had accessed a website on the dark web featuring child sexual abuse material. Upon executing a search warrant, investigators found thousands of illicit images and videos on the suspect&#039;s devices. The defendant subsequently pled guilty to receipt of child pornography under federal law. Because the defendant had a prior Texas state conviction for possession of child pornography, federal prosecutors sought a statutory sentencing enhancement that significantly increased the minimum and maximum prison terms.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas rejected the defendant’s argument that the enhancement was inapplicable, finding the prior Texas conviction sufficiently related to the federal offense. The district judge sentenced the defendant to the enhanced minimum of fifteen years and ordered him to pay $94,000 in restitution to fourteen victims. The defendant’s objections to both the enhancement and the restitution order were overruled.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation issue de novo and the restitution issues for plain error. The court held that the phrase “relating to” in 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1) should be given its ordinary, broad meaning, affirming the district court’s application of the sentencing enhancement. The court also affirmed the restitution order for eleven victims, finding the district court had an adequate basis for proximate-cause analysis as required by Paroline v. United States. However, the court vacated the restitution order for three victims, concluding the record lacked sufficient evidence of proximate-cause analysis for those individuals, and remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Cory Wilson</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10322/25-10322-2026-08-07.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Williams</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-07T15:30:28-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-07T15:30:28-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10322/25-10322-2026-08-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, admitting to prior felony convictions in California, including robbery and a drug offense. The presentence report assigned him a higher base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines, finding he had two qualifying prior convictions: the California robbery and the California drug conviction. The report also added two criminal history points for the drug conviction, noting that attorney representation was unknown but citing California law requiring counsel or a valid waiver for felony defendants. After reductions for acceptance of responsibility, the Guidelines range was set at 77 to 96 months.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas adopted the presentence report’s findings and sentenced the defendant to 77 months imprisonment. The defendant objected to the classification of his California robbery conviction as a crime of violence under the newer Guideline definition and to the inclusion of criminal history points for the drug conviction, arguing it was uncounseled. The district court overruled his objections, relying on precedent and the record’s presumption of lawful procedure.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted the defendant’s motion to supplement the record. It reviewed de novo whether California robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the amended Guidelines. The court held that California robbery is a categorical match for the Guidelines’ definition of robbery, which does not require a specific mens rea, thus qualifying as a crime of violence. The court also reviewed the addition of criminal history points for the drug conviction for plain error and found no clear or obvious error, given the presumption of regularity for state convictions and insufficient evidence of a constitutional violation. The court affirmed the judgment and sentence of the district court. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10322/25-10322-2026-08-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Williams" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, admitting to prior felony convictions in California, including robbery and a drug offense. The presentence report assigned him a higher base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines, finding he had two qualifying prior convictions: the California robbery and the California drug conviction. The report also added two criminal history points for the drug conviction, noting that attorney representation was unknown but citing California law requiring counsel or a valid waiver for felony defendants. After reductions for acceptance of responsibility, the Guidelines range was set at 77 to 96 months.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas adopted the presentence report’s findings and sentenced the defendant to 77 months imprisonment. The defendant objected to the classification of his California robbery conviction as a crime of violence under the newer Guideline definition and to the inclusion of criminal history points for the drug conviction, arguing it was uncounseled. The district court overruled his objections, relying on precedent and the record’s presumption of lawful procedure.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted the defendant’s motion to supplement the record. It reviewed de novo whether California robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the amended Guidelines. The court held that California robbery is a categorical match for the Guidelines’ definition of robbery, which does not require a specific mens rea, thus qualifying as a crime of violence. The court also reviewed the addition of criminal history points for the drug conviction for plain error and found no clear or obvious error, given the presumption of regularity for state convictions and insufficient evidence of a constitutional violation. The court affirmed the judgment and sentence of the district court.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20036/25-20036-2026-08-06.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Deluna</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-06T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-06T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20036/25-20036-2026-08-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		An investigator with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives received a referral regarding Karina Deluna’s purchase of eight firearms from a Houston pawn shop, one of which was later recovered in Mexico. Subsequent investigation revealed strong indicators of “straw purchasing,” meaning Deluna falsely claimed she was buying the firearms for herself, but was actually acquiring them for others in exchange for commission. Special Agents conducted three interviews with Deluna, none of which included Miranda warnings. During these interviews, Deluna eventually confessed to purchasing firearms for her sister-in-law’s boyfriend, and a search of her phone uncovered further incriminating evidence. Deluna and her associate, Haley Medlin, were indicted on charges related to false statements on firearm records, conspiracy, and smuggling.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas presided over the trial. Medlin pled guilty to aiding and abetting and received probation. Deluna was tried on a superseding indictment for conspiracy, smuggling, and seven counts of false statements. At trial, Medlin and Special Agent Bynog testified, and recordings of Deluna’s interviews and her written confession were admitted. The jury found Deluna guilty of conspiracy and all false statement counts, but acquitted her of smuggling. The court sentenced Deluna to an aggregate of 87 months’ imprisonment, within the Sentencing Guidelines range. Deluna timely appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Deluna’s challenges to the voluntariness of her statements, evidentiary rulings, and the reasonableness of her sentence. The court held that the second interview was voluntary and the admission of the third interview, even if involuntary, was harmless error due to cumulative evidence and overwhelming proof of guilt. The evidentiary rulings were not abuses of discretion, and Deluna’s sentence was substantively reasonable. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20036/25-20036-2026-08-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Deluna" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                An investigator with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives received a referral regarding Karina Deluna’s purchase of eight firearms from a Houston pawn shop, one of which was later recovered in Mexico. Subsequent investigation revealed strong indicators of “straw purchasing,” meaning Deluna falsely claimed she was buying the firearms for herself, but was actually acquiring them for others in exchange for commission. Special Agents conducted three interviews with Deluna, none of which included Miranda warnings. During these interviews, Deluna eventually confessed to purchasing firearms for her sister-in-law’s boyfriend, and a search of her phone uncovered further incriminating evidence. Deluna and her associate, Haley Medlin, were indicted on charges related to false statements on firearm records, conspiracy, and smuggling.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas presided over the trial. Medlin pled guilty to aiding and abetting and received probation. Deluna was tried on a superseding indictment for conspiracy, smuggling, and seven counts of false statements. At trial, Medlin and Special Agent Bynog testified, and recordings of Deluna’s interviews and her written confession were admitted. The jury found Deluna guilty of conspiracy and all false statement counts, but acquitted her of smuggling. The court sentenced Deluna to an aggregate of 87 months’ imprisonment, within the Sentencing Guidelines range. Deluna timely appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Deluna’s challenges to the voluntariness of her statements, evidentiary rulings, and the reasonableness of her sentence. The court held that the second interview was voluntary and the admission of the third interview, even if involuntary, was harmless error due to cumulative evidence and overwhelming proof of guilt. The evidentiary rulings were not abuses of discretion, and Deluna’s sentence was substantively reasonable. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leslie Southwick</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60383/25-60383-2026-08-06.html</id>
        	<title>Knighton v. Benton County</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-06T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-06T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60383/25-60383-2026-08-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Chelsea Knighton, who was married to Rob Graves, experienced an incident involving multiple individuals in Benton County, Mississippi. After Rob was reportedly found passed out at a gas station, his mother, Kathy Graves (the Circuit Clerk), took him to see parole officer Steve Belew. The three then went to Knighton and Rob&#039;s home, where conflicting accounts arose: Knighton claimed Belew forcibly administered a drug test and announced a positive result without showing evidence, while the defendants asserted Knighton consented to the test. Subsequently, Sheriff Robert Goolsby arrested Knighton, leading to her losing custody of her children to Kathy for over a year, although charges were later dropped.

Knighton filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi against Kathy, Belew, Goolsby, and Benton County, alleging various federal and state-law violations. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, including their claim of qualified immunity. The defendants appealed, seeking review of the denial of qualified immunity and other defenses.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court dismissed Benton County’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction because municipalities are not entitled to interlocutory appeals from denials of summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment for Kathy on all federal claims, finding she did not act under color of law, and for certain state-law claims. The court also granted summary judgment to Belew and Goolsby on particular claims, such as false arrest and abuse of process, but allowed others—including claims for unlawful seizure, excessive force, fabrication of evidence, violation of familial association rights, and conspiracy—to proceed to trial due to genuine disputes of material fact. The remaining claims are remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60383/25-60383-2026-08-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Knighton v. Benton County" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Chelsea Knighton, who was married to Rob Graves, experienced an incident involving multiple individuals in Benton County, Mississippi. After Rob was reportedly found passed out at a gas station, his mother, Kathy Graves (the Circuit Clerk), took him to see parole officer Steve Belew. The three then went to Knighton and Rob&#039;s home, where conflicting accounts arose: Knighton claimed Belew forcibly administered a drug test and announced a positive result without showing evidence, while the defendants asserted Knighton consented to the test. Subsequently, Sheriff Robert Goolsby arrested Knighton, leading to her losing custody of her children to Kathy for over a year, although charges were later dropped.

Knighton filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi against Kathy, Belew, Goolsby, and Benton County, alleging various federal and state-law violations. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, including their claim of qualified immunity. The defendants appealed, seeking review of the denial of qualified immunity and other defenses.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court dismissed Benton County’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction because municipalities are not entitled to interlocutory appeals from denials of summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment for Kathy on all federal claims, finding she did not act under color of law, and for certain state-law claims. The court also granted summary judgment to Belew and Goolsby on particular claims, such as false arrest and abuse of process, but allowed others—including claims for unlawful seizure, excessive force, fabrication of evidence, violation of familial association rights, and conspiracy—to proceed to trial due to genuine disputes of material fact. The remaining claims are remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James Graves</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50714/25-50714-2026-08-06.html</id>
        	<title>Rivera Castelan v. Taylor</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-06T15:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-06T15:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50714/25-50714-2026-08-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Moctezuma Rivera-Castelan was arrested in Kinney County, Texas, as part of Operation Lone Star, a state initiative targeting unlawful migrants. Rivera was charged with criminal trespass in a disaster area and processed at the Val Verde Processing Center. Due to a paperwork error at the facility, Rivera did not receive appointed counsel for nearly three months, and his initial attorney performed no work on his case for six months. After a new attorney was appointed, she promptly challenged his detention, resulting in the prosecutor dropping the charges and Rivera’s release after 252 days in custody.

The case was brought in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. Rivera sued several defendants, including Ronny Taylor, the Val Verde facility administrator, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments. Rivera asserted that Taylor had a nondiscretionary duty, typically assigned to a magistrate, to transmit appointed counsel paperwork within 24 hours. The district court denied Taylor&#039;s motion to dismiss, holding that Taylor exceeded his discretionary authority and was therefore not entitled to qualified immunity.

Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity de novo. The Fifth Circuit found that, under Texas law, the statutory duty to transmit counsel appointment paperwork is assigned to the magistrate, not to the facility administrator, and may not be delegated to executive officials. The court concluded that Taylor acted within his discretionary authority and that Rivera failed to show Taylor violated a clearly established federal right. Therefore, Taylor was entitled to qualified immunity. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, dismissed Rivera’s claim against Taylor, and remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50714/25-50714-2026-08-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Rivera Castelan v. Taylor" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Moctezuma Rivera-Castelan was arrested in Kinney County, Texas, as part of Operation Lone Star, a state initiative targeting unlawful migrants. Rivera was charged with criminal trespass in a disaster area and processed at the Val Verde Processing Center. Due to a paperwork error at the facility, Rivera did not receive appointed counsel for nearly three months, and his initial attorney performed no work on his case for six months. After a new attorney was appointed, she promptly challenged his detention, resulting in the prosecutor dropping the charges and Rivera’s release after 252 days in custody.

The case was brought in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. Rivera sued several defendants, including Ronny Taylor, the Val Verde facility administrator, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments. Rivera asserted that Taylor had a nondiscretionary duty, typically assigned to a magistrate, to transmit appointed counsel paperwork within 24 hours. The district court denied Taylor&#039;s motion to dismiss, holding that Taylor exceeded his discretionary authority and was therefore not entitled to qualified immunity.

Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity de novo. The Fifth Circuit found that, under Texas law, the statutory duty to transmit counsel appointment paperwork is assigned to the magistrate, not to the facility administrator, and may not be delegated to executive officials. The court concluded that Taylor acted within his discretionary authority and that Rivera failed to show Taylor violated a clearly established federal right. Therefore, Taylor was entitled to qualified immunity. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, dismissed Rivera’s claim against Taylor, and remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James Graves</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60504/25-60504-2026-08-06.html</id>
        	<title>Eqbal v. Blanche</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-06T09:30:56-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-06T09:30:56-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60504/25-60504-2026-08-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A citizen of Afghanistan who had worked as security personnel for high-ranking Afghan government officials fled the country after the Taliban regained control in 2021. The Taliban targeted him and his family due to his former employment and Tajik ethnicity, leading them to go into hiding and eventually leave Afghanistan. Upon arriving in the United States in 2024, he sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, fearing that returning to Afghanistan would result in his death.

An Immigration Judge found him removable for lacking valid entry documents and denied all relief after concluding that his testimony was not credible. The judge based this adverse credibility determination mainly on perceived discrepancies about his employment history and the dates he held certain positions, as well as inconsistencies regarding his past imprisonment and harm to his family. The Immigration Judge also found that he failed to provide sufficient corroborating evidence. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed these findings and dismissed his appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the adverse credibility determination was not supported by substantial evidence. The court determined there were no material inconsistencies in the applicant’s testimony regarding his employment history or his account of prior imprisonment; any discrepancies were the result of translation errors between the Afghan and Gregorian calendars. The court also concluded that the agency failed to meaningfully consider key pieces of evidence, including photographs, government identification cards, and Taliban-issued warrants for his arrest. The Fifth Circuit therefore granted the petition for review, vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The agency was instructed to reconsider the credibility determination and to meaningfully evaluate key supporting evidence. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60504/25-60504-2026-08-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Eqbal v. Blanche" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A citizen of Afghanistan who had worked as security personnel for high-ranking Afghan government officials fled the country after the Taliban regained control in 2021. The Taliban targeted him and his family due to his former employment and Tajik ethnicity, leading them to go into hiding and eventually leave Afghanistan. Upon arriving in the United States in 2024, he sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, fearing that returning to Afghanistan would result in his death.

An Immigration Judge found him removable for lacking valid entry documents and denied all relief after concluding that his testimony was not credible. The judge based this adverse credibility determination mainly on perceived discrepancies about his employment history and the dates he held certain positions, as well as inconsistencies regarding his past imprisonment and harm to his family. The Immigration Judge also found that he failed to provide sufficient corroborating evidence. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed these findings and dismissed his appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the adverse credibility determination was not supported by substantial evidence. The court determined there were no material inconsistencies in the applicant’s testimony regarding his employment history or his account of prior imprisonment; any discrepancies were the result of translation errors between the Afghan and Gregorian calendars. The court also concluded that the agency failed to meaningfully consider key pieces of evidence, including photographs, government identification cards, and Taliban-issued warrants for his arrest. The Fifth Circuit therefore granted the petition for review, vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The agency was instructed to reconsider the credibility determination and to meaningfully evaluate key supporting evidence.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kurt Engelhardt</case:judge>
													<category term="Immigration Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20475/25-20475-2026-08-06.html</id>
        	<title>Adler v. Energy Debt Holdings</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-06T09:30:54-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-06T09:30:54-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20475/25-20475-2026-08-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A business entity filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and the priority of two loans was disputed: one held by the Small Business Administration (SBA Note), and another by Energy Debt Holdings LLC (EDH Note). During the bankruptcy proceedings, the bankruptcy court entered a Final Cash Collateral Order, recognizing EDH&#039;s secured claim and barring any challenges to the EDH Note’s priority after June 15, 2023. Later, at a confirmation hearing, the SBA’s counsel admitted that the SBA Note was subordinate to the EDH Note, and the parties agreed to a Confirmation Order granting EDH first priority. After the bankruptcy, Joshua Adler acquired the SBA Note and sought a declaratory judgment that it was senior to the EDH Note and requested payment from proceeds received by EDH.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed Adler’s suit, finding him judicially estopped from contesting the EDH Note’s priority due to prior admissions by SBA’s counsel. Adler appealed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, which affirmed the dismissal on alternate grounds. The district court concluded Adler’s claim was barred by both the Cash Collateral Order, due to the late filing, and the Confirmation Order, which established EDH’s priority.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case, applying clear error review for factual findings and de novo review for legal issues. The Fifth Circuit held that Adler’s suit was precluded by both the Cash Collateral Order and the Confirmation Order, as his challenge to EDH’s loan priority was filed after the deadline and contrary to the terms of the orders. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the dismissal of Adler’s claims. Judicial estoppel was not decided as an independent ground. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20475/25-20475-2026-08-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Adler v. Energy Debt Holdings" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A business entity filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and the priority of two loans was disputed: one held by the Small Business Administration (SBA Note), and another by Energy Debt Holdings LLC (EDH Note). During the bankruptcy proceedings, the bankruptcy court entered a Final Cash Collateral Order, recognizing EDH&#039;s secured claim and barring any challenges to the EDH Note’s priority after June 15, 2023. Later, at a confirmation hearing, the SBA’s counsel admitted that the SBA Note was subordinate to the EDH Note, and the parties agreed to a Confirmation Order granting EDH first priority. After the bankruptcy, Joshua Adler acquired the SBA Note and sought a declaratory judgment that it was senior to the EDH Note and requested payment from proceeds received by EDH.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed Adler’s suit, finding him judicially estopped from contesting the EDH Note’s priority due to prior admissions by SBA’s counsel. Adler appealed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, which affirmed the dismissal on alternate grounds. The district court concluded Adler’s claim was barred by both the Cash Collateral Order, due to the late filing, and the Confirmation Order, which established EDH’s priority.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case, applying clear error review for factual findings and de novo review for legal issues. The Fifth Circuit held that Adler’s suit was precluded by both the Cash Collateral Order and the Confirmation Order, as his challenge to EDH’s loan priority was filed after the deadline and contrary to the terms of the orders. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the dismissal of Adler’s claims. Judicial estoppel was not decided as an independent ground.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Bankruptcy"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30536/25-30536-2026-08-06.html</id>
        	<title>MAPP v. Floor and Decor</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-06T09:30:53-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-06T09:30:53-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30536/25-30536-2026-08-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A national flooring retailer contracted with a Louisiana-based construction management company for the construction of a retail store in Metairie, Louisiana. The relationship soured after the retailer terminated the agreement, allegedly due to delays. Shortly after termination, the construction company disputed that it had breached the contract and demanded payment for work performed. The retailer did not respond to the payment demand.

The construction company filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana under the Louisiana Private Works Act, seeking recovery for the work performed. The retailer moved to compel arbitration based on the agreement’s dispute resolution provision and also sought to transfer the case. The district court granted the transfer to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana and denied the motion to compel arbitration without prejudice. When the motion to compel arbitration was renewed in the new court, the district court denied it again, concluding the retailer had not followed the prerequisite steps outlined in the contract’s dispute resolution process.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit conducted de novo review. The appellate court determined that the arbitration clause in the contract, which gave the retailer sole discretion to elect arbitration, was a contract of adhesion under Louisiana law. Applying state contract principles and relevant Louisiana Supreme Court precedent, the court found that the lack of mutuality and the imbalance in bargaining power rendered the clause unenforceable. The court held that the arbitration provision was adhesionary and thus invalid, and affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30536/25-30536-2026-08-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "MAPP v. Floor and Decor" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A national flooring retailer contracted with a Louisiana-based construction management company for the construction of a retail store in Metairie, Louisiana. The relationship soured after the retailer terminated the agreement, allegedly due to delays. Shortly after termination, the construction company disputed that it had breached the contract and demanded payment for work performed. The retailer did not respond to the payment demand.

The construction company filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana under the Louisiana Private Works Act, seeking recovery for the work performed. The retailer moved to compel arbitration based on the agreement’s dispute resolution provision and also sought to transfer the case. The district court granted the transfer to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana and denied the motion to compel arbitration without prejudice. When the motion to compel arbitration was renewed in the new court, the district court denied it again, concluding the retailer had not followed the prerequisite steps outlined in the contract’s dispute resolution process.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit conducted de novo review. The appellate court determined that the arbitration clause in the contract, which gave the retailer sole discretion to elect arbitration, was a contract of adhesion under Louisiana law. Applying state contract principles and relevant Louisiana Supreme Court precedent, the court found that the lack of mutuality and the imbalance in bargaining power rendered the clause unenforceable. The court held that the arbitration provision was adhesionary and thus invalid, and affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leslie Southwick</case:judge>
													<category term="Arbitration &amp; Mediation"/>
							<category term="Construction Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Real Estate &amp; Property Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30524/25-30524-2026-08-05.html</id>
        	<title>Bodin v. New Orleans</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-05T15:30:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-05T15:30:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30524/25-30524-2026-08-05.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several residential property owners and a short-term rental platform challenged two ordinances enacted by the city. The first ordinance, adopted in 2023, restricts short-term rental licenses to one per residential block and distributes them by lottery. The second ordinance, adopted in 2024, requires short-term rental platforms to verify the license status of properties before facilitating transactions, and to periodically reverify this status. Plaintiffs alleged that these ordinances infringed upon their constitutional and statutory rights, including claims under the Takings Clause and Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana reviewed the plaintiffs’ claims. It dismissed all claims under Rule 12(b)(6), except for Airbnb’s Fourth Amendment challenge regarding a monthly reporting requirement in the 2024 Ordinance. The district court granted Airbnb summary judgment on that particular claim. Airbnb appealed the dismissal of its other claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit examined the case de novo. The court held that the 2023 Ordinance did not constitute a per se or regulatory taking under the Takings Clause, noting that the ordinance neither physically appropriated property nor severely impaired economic expectations. It also found the ordinance to be a reasonable zoning regulation that balanced public interests. Regarding Section 230, the Fifth Circuit ruled that neither the booking nor verification requirements of the 2024 Ordinance treated Airbnb as the publisher or speaker of third-party content, and thus were not preempted. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Takings Clause claim and the Section 230 claim, as well as the dismissal of other claims raised by the plaintiffs. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30524/25-30524-2026-08-05.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Bodin v. New Orleans" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several residential property owners and a short-term rental platform challenged two ordinances enacted by the city. The first ordinance, adopted in 2023, restricts short-term rental licenses to one per residential block and distributes them by lottery. The second ordinance, adopted in 2024, requires short-term rental platforms to verify the license status of properties before facilitating transactions, and to periodically reverify this status. Plaintiffs alleged that these ordinances infringed upon their constitutional and statutory rights, including claims under the Takings Clause and Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana reviewed the plaintiffs’ claims. It dismissed all claims under Rule 12(b)(6), except for Airbnb’s Fourth Amendment challenge regarding a monthly reporting requirement in the 2024 Ordinance. The district court granted Airbnb summary judgment on that particular claim. Airbnb appealed the dismissal of its other claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit examined the case de novo. The court held that the 2023 Ordinance did not constitute a per se or regulatory taking under the Takings Clause, noting that the ordinance neither physically appropriated property nor severely impaired economic expectations. It also found the ordinance to be a reasonable zoning regulation that balanced public interests. Regarding Section 230, the Fifth Circuit ruled that neither the booking nor verification requirements of the 2024 Ordinance treated Airbnb as the publisher or speaker of third-party content, and thus were not preempted. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Takings Clause claim and the Section 230 claim, as well as the dismissal of other claims raised by the plaintiffs.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James Graves</case:judge>
													<category term="Communications Law"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Internet Law"/>
							<category term="Real Estate &amp; Property Law"/>
							<category term="Zoning, Planning &amp; Land Use"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20524/25-20524-2026-08-04.html</id>
        	<title>Polk v. Crawford</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-04T15:30:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-04T15:30:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20524/25-20524-2026-08-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A legal resident of Florida, currently living in Illinois, applied for a Texas escrow-officer license. He is an attorney licensed in at least forty jurisdictions, including Texas, and holds title-producer licenses in twenty-four states. The Texas Department of Insurance denied his application solely because he did not reside in Texas or a state bordering Texas, despite admitting that he met all other licensure requirements. The plaintiff claimed that this residency requirement prevented him from serving existing Texas clients, securing new clients, and maintaining relationships with clients who needed title and escrow services in multiple jurisdictions.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied both the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction and the State’s motion to dismiss. The district court reasoned that it would be “precipitous” to overturn a long-standing statute on a preliminary basis, inferred little irreparable harm due to the plaintiff’s litigation choices in similar cases elsewhere, and found the merits “unclear” given the present record and lack of factual clarity. The plaintiff timely appealed the denial of preliminary relief.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion. The Fifth Circuit found the plaintiff likely to succeed on the merits of his claim under Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, determining escrow work is a protected common calling and that Texas had offered no substantial justification for its discriminatory residency requirement. The court also found that irreparable harm existed because sovereign immunity barred damages, and the equities and public interest favored preliminary relief. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial and remanded with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the residency requirement against the plaintiff. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20524/25-20524-2026-08-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Polk v. Crawford" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A legal resident of Florida, currently living in Illinois, applied for a Texas escrow-officer license. He is an attorney licensed in at least forty jurisdictions, including Texas, and holds title-producer licenses in twenty-four states. The Texas Department of Insurance denied his application solely because he did not reside in Texas or a state bordering Texas, despite admitting that he met all other licensure requirements. The plaintiff claimed that this residency requirement prevented him from serving existing Texas clients, securing new clients, and maintaining relationships with clients who needed title and escrow services in multiple jurisdictions.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied both the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction and the State’s motion to dismiss. The district court reasoned that it would be “precipitous” to overturn a long-standing statute on a preliminary basis, inferred little irreparable harm due to the plaintiff’s litigation choices in similar cases elsewhere, and found the merits “unclear” given the present record and lack of factual clarity. The plaintiff timely appealed the denial of preliminary relief.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion. The Fifth Circuit found the plaintiff likely to succeed on the merits of his claim under Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, determining escrow work is a protected common calling and that Texas had offered no substantial justification for its discriminatory residency requirement. The court also found that irreparable harm existed because sovereign immunity barred damages, and the equities and public interest favored preliminary relief. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial and remanded with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the residency requirement against the plaintiff.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Don Willett</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50717/25-50717-2026-08-03.html</id>
        	<title>Liedtke v. City of Austin</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-03T15:30:28-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-03T15:30:28-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50717/25-50717-2026-08-03.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A female police officer was recruited to an all-male patrol shift in Austin, Texas, partly because supervisors wanted to improve diversity. After joining the shift, she experienced frequent sexist comments and hostility from her male colleagues, including derogatory statements about female officers, personal insults, and threats. The officer reported this behavior to her supervisors but received minimal support or intervention. After she filed complaints, a supervisor issued her an Employee Success Plan (ESP) based largely on allegations from her colleagues, some of which referenced months-old incidents previously addressed by another supervisor. The officer resigned a few weeks after receiving the ESP and subsequently filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judgment to the City of Austin on all claims, finding that none of the challenged acts affected the terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment, and that she suffered no adverse employment action. The court concluded that she had not shown an effect on her employment for her hostile work environment claim and that she did not sustain an adverse employment action for her sex discrimination and retaliation claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the summary judgment for the City on the hostile work environment claim because the officer did not adequately brief that claim as a separate issue on appeal. However, it found that her sex discrimination and retaliation claims raised genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether the ESP and the circumstances of her resignation constituted adverse employment actions motivated by sex-based or retaliatory intent. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision on those claims and remanded them for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50717/25-50717-2026-08-03.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Liedtke v. City of Austin" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A female police officer was recruited to an all-male patrol shift in Austin, Texas, partly because supervisors wanted to improve diversity. After joining the shift, she experienced frequent sexist comments and hostility from her male colleagues, including derogatory statements about female officers, personal insults, and threats. The officer reported this behavior to her supervisors but received minimal support or intervention. After she filed complaints, a supervisor issued her an Employee Success Plan (ESP) based largely on allegations from her colleagues, some of which referenced months-old incidents previously addressed by another supervisor. The officer resigned a few weeks after receiving the ESP and subsequently filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judgment to the City of Austin on all claims, finding that none of the challenged acts affected the terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment, and that she suffered no adverse employment action. The court concluded that she had not shown an effect on her employment for her hostile work environment claim and that she did not sustain an adverse employment action for her sex discrimination and retaliation claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the summary judgment for the City on the hostile work environment claim because the officer did not adequately brief that claim as a separate issue on appeal. However, it found that her sex discrimination and retaliation claims raised genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether the ESP and the circumstances of her resignation constituted adverse employment actions motivated by sex-based or retaliatory intent. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision on those claims and remanded them for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Don Willett</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30556/25-30556-2026-08-03.html</id>
        	<title>Holloway v. Procter &amp; Gamble Mftr</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-03T13:00:28-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-03T13:00:28-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30556/25-30556-2026-08-03.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Brandon Holloway was employed by Procter &amp; Gamble Manufacturing Company for several years, performing tasks related to waste management and vendor coordination. In 2020, Holloway violated company procurement policies by directly contacting suppliers, which led to minor disciplinary action. Subsequent internal audits uncovered errors in his waste manifest forms and found he used his corporate credit card for personal expenses. Holloway acknowledged the credit card violation. He also alleged that he complained to management about company practices violating federal and state regulations and that he was subjected to racial discrimination. P&amp;G terminated Holloway’s employment, citing policy violations and misuse of the company credit card.

Holloway filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, alleging claims of racial discrimination, retaliation, and violation of Louisiana’s whistleblower statute. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of P&amp;G on all claims. The court found that Holloway failed to rebut P&amp;G’s legitimate reasons for termination and did not provide evidence of a violation of law to support his whistleblower claim. Holloway appealed the decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment order de novo. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s decisions, holding that: (1) the use of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework in the discrimination and retaliation claims was proper; (2) Holloway failed to show that P&amp;G’s stated reasons for termination were pretextual; (3) Holloway did not provide significant evidence of retaliation beyond temporal proximity; and (4) Holloway did not establish that P&amp;G violated any law, as required for a whistleblower claim under Louisiana law. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for P&amp;G on all claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30556/25-30556-2026-08-03.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Holloway v. Procter &amp; Gamble Mftr" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Brandon Holloway was employed by Procter &amp; Gamble Manufacturing Company for several years, performing tasks related to waste management and vendor coordination. In 2020, Holloway violated company procurement policies by directly contacting suppliers, which led to minor disciplinary action. Subsequent internal audits uncovered errors in his waste manifest forms and found he used his corporate credit card for personal expenses. Holloway acknowledged the credit card violation. He also alleged that he complained to management about company practices violating federal and state regulations and that he was subjected to racial discrimination. P&amp;G terminated Holloway’s employment, citing policy violations and misuse of the company credit card.

Holloway filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, alleging claims of racial discrimination, retaliation, and violation of Louisiana’s whistleblower statute. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of P&amp;G on all claims. The court found that Holloway failed to rebut P&amp;G’s legitimate reasons for termination and did not provide evidence of a violation of law to support his whistleblower claim. Holloway appealed the decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment order de novo. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s decisions, holding that: (1) the use of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework in the discrimination and retaliation claims was proper; (2) Holloway failed to show that P&amp;G’s stated reasons for termination were pretextual; (3) Holloway did not provide significant evidence of retaliation beyond temporal proximity; and (4) Holloway did not establish that P&amp;G violated any law, as required for a whistleblower claim under Louisiana law. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for P&amp;G on all claims.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
													<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
    </feed>

