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	<title>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - Justia Case Law Summaries</title>
	<link rel="self" href="https://law.justia.com/summaryfeed/ca5/"/>
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	<id>https://law.justia.com/summaryfeed/ca5/</id>
	<updated>2026-09-07T05:43:52-08:00</updated>
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		<name>Justia Inc</name>
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	        <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50319/25-50319-2026-09-04.html</id>
        	<title>Lucid Group USA v. Johnston</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-04T15:30:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-04T15:30:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50319/25-50319-2026-09-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Lucid USA, Inc., which manufactures and sells electric vehicles, sought to sell its vehicles directly to consumers in Texas through its own retail studio. However, Texas law prohibits motor vehicle manufacturers and their affiliates from directly selling vehicles to consumers, instead requiring sales to occur through independent franchised dealers. In 2021, after the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles notified Lucid that it could not sell vehicles at its Plano studio due to this prohibition, Lucid filed suit against officials of the Department, alleging that the law violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Texas Automobile Dealers Association intervened as a defendant.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment and ruled against Lucid. The district court concluded that the Texas prohibition was rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest and, therefore, did not violate either the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses. Lucid appealed this decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. Relying on its previous decisions in Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Department of Transportation, International Truck &amp; Engine Corp. v. Bray, and Tesla, Inc. v. Louisiana Automobile Dealers Association, the Fifth Circuit found those precedents controlling. The court held that the Texas law survives rational basis review because the legislature has a legitimate interest in curtailing vertical integration and preventing monopolistic practices in the automobile market. The court rejected Lucid’s arguments that its as-applied challenge was distinct from the facial challenges previously considered. The court also found that Lucid&#039;s substantive due process claim fails for the same reasons. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50319/25-50319-2026-09-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Lucid Group USA v. Johnston" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Lucid USA, Inc., which manufactures and sells electric vehicles, sought to sell its vehicles directly to consumers in Texas through its own retail studio. However, Texas law prohibits motor vehicle manufacturers and their affiliates from directly selling vehicles to consumers, instead requiring sales to occur through independent franchised dealers. In 2021, after the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles notified Lucid that it could not sell vehicles at its Plano studio due to this prohibition, Lucid filed suit against officials of the Department, alleging that the law violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Texas Automobile Dealers Association intervened as a defendant.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment and ruled against Lucid. The district court concluded that the Texas prohibition was rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest and, therefore, did not violate either the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses. Lucid appealed this decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. Relying on its previous decisions in Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Department of Transportation, International Truck &amp; Engine Corp. v. Bray, and Tesla, Inc. v. Louisiana Automobile Dealers Association, the Fifth Circuit found those precedents controlling. The court held that the Texas law survives rational basis review because the legislature has a legitimate interest in curtailing vertical integration and preventing monopolistic practices in the automobile market. The court rejected Lucid’s arguments that its as-applied challenge was distinct from the facial challenges previously considered. The court also found that Lucid&#039;s substantive due process claim fails for the same reasons. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Patrick Higginbotham</case:judge>
													<category term="Antitrust &amp; Trade Regulation"/>
							<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60650/24-60650-2026-09-04.html</id>
        	<title>Starbucks v. NLRB</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-04T15:30:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-04T15:30:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60650/24-60650-2026-09-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several Starbucks stores in Buffalo, New York, were the site of intense union organizing activity between August 2021 and July 2022, led by Workers United. After the Union launched its campaign, Starbucks responded with a series of actions: dispatching senior executives and support managers to Buffalo, implementing fast-tracked renovations, soliciting employee grievances, offering benefits and promotions, strictly enforcing workplace policies, and terminating several employees, many of whom were union supporters. The Union won certification at eight stores but lost the vote at the Camp Road location, leading to allegations that Starbucks’s conduct affected the fairness of the election.

The National Labor Relations Board’s General Counsel investigated, resulting in consolidated complaints. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found Starbucks violated sections 8(a)(1), (3), (4), and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and sustained the Union’s objections to the Camp Road election. The NLRB issued an extensive order adopting the ALJ’s findings, concluding that Starbucks engaged in unlawful surveillance, coercive interrogation, solicited grievances, promised and granted benefits, threatened employees, changed policies and fired employees without bargaining, closed the Galleria kiosk discriminatorily, and disciplined union supporters. Remedies included a bargaining order at Camp Road, reopening the Galleria kiosk, compensating employees for pecuniary harm, and requiring a public notice reading.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the NLRB’s order. Applying a deferential standard to the Board’s factual findings and reviewing legal conclusions de novo, the Fifth Circuit denied enforcement as to one finding of unlawful surveillance, the sole findings of unlawful interrogation and coercive threats, remanding those portions. It granted enforcement for the Board’s findings under sections 8(a)(3), (4), and (5). The court denied enforcement of the consequential damages remedy and reopening the Galleria kiosk, but enforced the bargaining order at Camp Road and the public notice-reading requirement. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60650/24-60650-2026-09-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Starbucks v. NLRB" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several Starbucks stores in Buffalo, New York, were the site of intense union organizing activity between August 2021 and July 2022, led by Workers United. After the Union launched its campaign, Starbucks responded with a series of actions: dispatching senior executives and support managers to Buffalo, implementing fast-tracked renovations, soliciting employee grievances, offering benefits and promotions, strictly enforcing workplace policies, and terminating several employees, many of whom were union supporters. The Union won certification at eight stores but lost the vote at the Camp Road location, leading to allegations that Starbucks’s conduct affected the fairness of the election.

The National Labor Relations Board’s General Counsel investigated, resulting in consolidated complaints. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found Starbucks violated sections 8(a)(1), (3), (4), and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and sustained the Union’s objections to the Camp Road election. The NLRB issued an extensive order adopting the ALJ’s findings, concluding that Starbucks engaged in unlawful surveillance, coercive interrogation, solicited grievances, promised and granted benefits, threatened employees, changed policies and fired employees without bargaining, closed the Galleria kiosk discriminatorily, and disciplined union supporters. Remedies included a bargaining order at Camp Road, reopening the Galleria kiosk, compensating employees for pecuniary harm, and requiring a public notice reading.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the NLRB’s order. Applying a deferential standard to the Board’s factual findings and reviewing legal conclusions de novo, the Fifth Circuit denied enforcement as to one finding of unlawful surveillance, the sole findings of unlawful interrogation and coercive threats, remanding those portions. It granted enforcement for the Board’s findings under sections 8(a)(3), (4), and (5). The court denied enforcement of the consequential damages remedy and reopening the Galleria kiosk, but enforced the bargaining order at Camp Road and the public notice-reading requirement.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jacques Wiener</case:judge>
													<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60559/25-60559-2026-09-04.html</id>
        	<title>Okene v. Blanche</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-04T15:30:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-04T15:30:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60559/25-60559-2026-09-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The petitioner is a Nigerian citizen who entered the United States on a business visa in 2004 and overstayed after the visa’s expiration in 2005. Following charges of deportability in 2007, he conceded removability in 2008. In 2012, he sought cancellation of removal and also applied for special cancellation of removal under the Violence Against Women Act, citing his current wife’s medical issues and financial challenges, as well as abuse endured from his former wife. At a merits hearing in 2021, the petitioner, his family, and a psychologist testified regarding his eligibility for relief.

An Immigration Judge (IJ) reviewed the evidence and denied both cancellation and special cancellation of removal. The IJ found that the petitioner did not meet the statutory requirements for either form of relief, including the necessary showing of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying relative and sufficient evidence of battery or extreme cruelty. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision in full, explicitly referencing Matter of Burbano to preserve the IJ’s findings for review.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision, applying a substantial-evidence standard to the agency’s hardship and battery/cruelty determinations, consistent with recent Supreme Court precedent. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the BIA did not err in summarily affirming the IJ’s order and that substantial evidence supported the agency’s denial of relief. The court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate either exceptional and extremely unusual hardship or battery/extreme cruelty sufficient to warrant cancellation or special cancellation of removal. The petition for review was denied. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60559/25-60559-2026-09-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Okene v. Blanche" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The petitioner is a Nigerian citizen who entered the United States on a business visa in 2004 and overstayed after the visa’s expiration in 2005. Following charges of deportability in 2007, he conceded removability in 2008. In 2012, he sought cancellation of removal and also applied for special cancellation of removal under the Violence Against Women Act, citing his current wife’s medical issues and financial challenges, as well as abuse endured from his former wife. At a merits hearing in 2021, the petitioner, his family, and a psychologist testified regarding his eligibility for relief.

An Immigration Judge (IJ) reviewed the evidence and denied both cancellation and special cancellation of removal. The IJ found that the petitioner did not meet the statutory requirements for either form of relief, including the necessary showing of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying relative and sufficient evidence of battery or extreme cruelty. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision in full, explicitly referencing Matter of Burbano to preserve the IJ’s findings for review.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision, applying a substantial-evidence standard to the agency’s hardship and battery/cruelty determinations, consistent with recent Supreme Court precedent. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the BIA did not err in summarily affirming the IJ’s order and that substantial evidence supported the agency’s denial of relief. The court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate either exceptional and extremely unusual hardship or battery/extreme cruelty sufficient to warrant cancellation or special cancellation of removal. The petition for review was denied.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Edith Jones</case:judge>
													<category term="Immigration Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60653/24-60653-2026-09-04.html</id>
        	<title>Starbucks v. NLRB</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-04T09:30:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-04T09:30:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60653/24-60653-2026-09-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In 2022, a Starbucks store in Wichita, Kansas, was the site of unionization discussions. The store manager, Carmella Neri, and assistant manager, Lauren Jacobs, made various statements to employees about union organizing, benefit changes, store hour reductions, and hiring practices. Employees testified that Neri referenced union activity during routine performance meetings, specifically suggesting that certain benefits might not be guaranteed if employees chose to unionize. Jacobs explained to an employee that the hiring portal was closed due to difficulties in discussing union matters with prospective hires. Additionally, Neri responded to an inquiry about reduced store hours by attributing the change to union-related pressures.

After a failed union election, the union filed charges against Starbucks with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRB’s General Counsel issued a complaint alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), including threats of loss of benefits, creating an impression of surveillance, and linking adverse employment actions to union activity. An administrative law judge (ALJ) conducted a hearing and found Starbucks in violation on all claims. Starbucks challenged these findings before the NLRB, which largely adopted the ALJ’s conclusions but issued a narrower remedy.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court granted enforcement of the NLRB’s decision as to the finding that Neri’s statements to employee Cuellar-Serafini about loss of benefits constituted an unlawful threat of reprisal. However, the Fifth Circuit denied enforcement regarding the findings on store hours reductions, hiring portal closure, and impression of surveillance, holding that these determinations were not supported by substantial evidence. Thus, only the threat of loss of benefits claim was upheld. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60653/24-60653-2026-09-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Starbucks v. NLRB" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In 2022, a Starbucks store in Wichita, Kansas, was the site of unionization discussions. The store manager, Carmella Neri, and assistant manager, Lauren Jacobs, made various statements to employees about union organizing, benefit changes, store hour reductions, and hiring practices. Employees testified that Neri referenced union activity during routine performance meetings, specifically suggesting that certain benefits might not be guaranteed if employees chose to unionize. Jacobs explained to an employee that the hiring portal was closed due to difficulties in discussing union matters with prospective hires. Additionally, Neri responded to an inquiry about reduced store hours by attributing the change to union-related pressures.

After a failed union election, the union filed charges against Starbucks with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRB’s General Counsel issued a complaint alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), including threats of loss of benefits, creating an impression of surveillance, and linking adverse employment actions to union activity. An administrative law judge (ALJ) conducted a hearing and found Starbucks in violation on all claims. Starbucks challenged these findings before the NLRB, which largely adopted the ALJ’s conclusions but issued a narrower remedy.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court granted enforcement of the NLRB’s decision as to the finding that Neri’s statements to employee Cuellar-Serafini about loss of benefits constituted an unlawful threat of reprisal. However, the Fifth Circuit denied enforcement regarding the findings on store hours reductions, hiring portal closure, and impression of surveillance, holding that these determinations were not supported by substantial evidence. Thus, only the threat of loss of benefits claim was upheld.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40475/25-40475-2026-09-03.html</id>
        	<title>Ramirez v. City of Texas City</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-03T15:30:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-03T15:30:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40475/25-40475-2026-09-03.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Michael Ramirez purchased a house in Texas City, Texas, intending to remodel and resell it. After a fire caused substantial but repairable damage, the City declared the property substandard and, following an inspection, determined it posed a clear and imminent danger. The City sent notice to Ramirez, halted the permit process pending an engineer’s report (which Ramirez never obtained), and the house remained unrepaired for over a year, with Ramirez storing valuable personal property inside. In May 2023, the City demolished the house without further notice. Ramirez then sued, claiming violations of state and federal constitutional rights, including procedural due process and takings, and sought damages for the house, expected profits, personal property, and attorney’s fees.

Upon removal to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Ramirez repeatedly requested a jury trial in various filings. The parties signed a joint case management plan acknowledging a jury demand. The district court initially scheduled a jury trial but, shortly before trial, ordered a bench trial instead, finding the jury demand procedurally deficient. After the bench trial, the court held the City had violated Ramirez’s procedural due process rights but justified the demolition under nuisance abatement, awarding only nominal damages and denying attorney’s fees as Ramirez was not considered the prevailing party.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on the denial of a jury trial and damages determinations. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by denying Ramirez’s Rule 39(b) motion for a jury trial, as there were no strong or compelling reasons to do so and Ramirez’s repeated demands were sufficient. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings, including a jury trial and reconsideration of damages and fees. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40475/25-40475-2026-09-03.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Ramirez v. City of Texas City" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Michael Ramirez purchased a house in Texas City, Texas, intending to remodel and resell it. After a fire caused substantial but repairable damage, the City declared the property substandard and, following an inspection, determined it posed a clear and imminent danger. The City sent notice to Ramirez, halted the permit process pending an engineer’s report (which Ramirez never obtained), and the house remained unrepaired for over a year, with Ramirez storing valuable personal property inside. In May 2023, the City demolished the house without further notice. Ramirez then sued, claiming violations of state and federal constitutional rights, including procedural due process and takings, and sought damages for the house, expected profits, personal property, and attorney’s fees.

Upon removal to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Ramirez repeatedly requested a jury trial in various filings. The parties signed a joint case management plan acknowledging a jury demand. The district court initially scheduled a jury trial but, shortly before trial, ordered a bench trial instead, finding the jury demand procedurally deficient. After the bench trial, the court held the City had violated Ramirez’s procedural due process rights but justified the demolition under nuisance abatement, awarding only nominal damages and denying attorney’s fees as Ramirez was not considered the prevailing party.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on the denial of a jury trial and damages determinations. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by denying Ramirez’s Rule 39(b) motion for a jury trial, as there were no strong or compelling reasons to do so and Ramirez’s repeated demands were sufficient. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings, including a jury trial and reconsideration of damages and fees.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leslie Southwick</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Real Estate &amp; Property Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20045/25-20045-2026-09-03.html</id>
        	<title>Moreau v. Harris County</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-03T15:30:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-03T15:30:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20045/25-20045-2026-09-03.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several lieutenants and captains employed by the Harris County Sheriff’s Office alleged that Harris County violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by failing to properly pay them overtime. These employees, who worked in either law enforcement or the county jail system, claimed that their primary duties were frontline law enforcement or correctional work. Harris County, however, argued that these plaintiffs were exempt from overtime under the FLSA’s administrative and executive exemptions, as their main responsibilities involved management and administrative oversight rather than frontline duties.

The litigation began in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, where the parties consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge. The magistrate judge granted summary judgment in part for Harris County, finding that all captains and criminal justice lieutenants were administratively exempt, but concluded there were factual disputes regarding whether law enforcement patrol and investigative lieutenants were exempt. Those claims proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found that the remaining lieutenants were also exempt as administrative and executive employees. The plaintiffs then moved for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, raising arguments about the sufficiency of the evidence, alleged errors in the jury charge, and an asserted inconsistency in the verdict. The magistrate judge denied these motions.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the plaintiffs’ claims. The court held that Harris County met its burden of proving that all plaintiffs were paid on a salary basis and that the criminal justice lieutenants qualified for the administrative exemption. The panel further found no error in the jury instructions or in allowing the jury to find both exemptions applied. The court also ruled that the evidence supported the jury’s verdict and that there was no abuse of discretion in denying a new trial. Thus, the judgment in favor of Harris County was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20045/25-20045-2026-09-03.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Moreau v. Harris County" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several lieutenants and captains employed by the Harris County Sheriff’s Office alleged that Harris County violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by failing to properly pay them overtime. These employees, who worked in either law enforcement or the county jail system, claimed that their primary duties were frontline law enforcement or correctional work. Harris County, however, argued that these plaintiffs were exempt from overtime under the FLSA’s administrative and executive exemptions, as their main responsibilities involved management and administrative oversight rather than frontline duties.

The litigation began in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, where the parties consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge. The magistrate judge granted summary judgment in part for Harris County, finding that all captains and criminal justice lieutenants were administratively exempt, but concluded there were factual disputes regarding whether law enforcement patrol and investigative lieutenants were exempt. Those claims proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found that the remaining lieutenants were also exempt as administrative and executive employees. The plaintiffs then moved for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, raising arguments about the sufficiency of the evidence, alleged errors in the jury charge, and an asserted inconsistency in the verdict. The magistrate judge denied these motions.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the plaintiffs’ claims. The court held that Harris County met its burden of proving that all plaintiffs were paid on a salary basis and that the criminal justice lieutenants qualified for the administrative exemption. The panel further found no error in the jury instructions or in allowing the jury to find both exemptions applied. The court also ruled that the evidence supported the jury’s verdict and that there was no abuse of discretion in denying a new trial. Thus, the judgment in favor of Harris County was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60348/24-60348-2026-09-03.html</id>
        	<title>Sealed Appellee v. Sealed Juvenile</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-03T09:30:10-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-03T09:30:10-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60348/24-60348-2026-09-03.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A juvenile was charged with two counts of possession or transfer of machinegun conversion devices, known as Glock switches, which enable semiautomatic pistols to fire automatically. The charges were brought under federal statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(o) and 924(a)(2), after the government certified that the State of Mississippi lacked jurisdiction over the alleged conduct because, at the time, Mississippi did not have a law regulating possession or transfer of machineguns. The juvenile moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the certification was inadequate and that the statute violated the Second Amendment, but both motions were denied.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi reviewed the case. After the motions were denied, the juvenile admitted to the charges, waiving appeal rights for all non-jurisdictional issues except his Second Amendment challenge. The district court adjudicated him delinquent and imposed a 19-month term of detention followed by supervised release until age 21.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered whether the district court had jurisdiction, whether the statute violated the Second Amendment, and whether the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms exceeded its authority in classifying Glock switches as machineguns. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court had jurisdiction because Mississippi lacked applicable law at the relevant time, the Second Amendment challenge was foreclosed by United States v. Wilson, 164 F.4th 380 (5th Cir. 2026), which upheld § 922(o) as constitutional, and the statutory challenge regarding ATF’s authority was waived under the terms of the appeal waiver. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60348/24-60348-2026-09-03.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Sealed Appellee v. Sealed Juvenile" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A juvenile was charged with two counts of possession or transfer of machinegun conversion devices, known as Glock switches, which enable semiautomatic pistols to fire automatically. The charges were brought under federal statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(o) and 924(a)(2), after the government certified that the State of Mississippi lacked jurisdiction over the alleged conduct because, at the time, Mississippi did not have a law regulating possession or transfer of machineguns. The juvenile moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the certification was inadequate and that the statute violated the Second Amendment, but both motions were denied.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi reviewed the case. After the motions were denied, the juvenile admitted to the charges, waiving appeal rights for all non-jurisdictional issues except his Second Amendment challenge. The district court adjudicated him delinquent and imposed a 19-month term of detention followed by supervised release until age 21.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered whether the district court had jurisdiction, whether the statute violated the Second Amendment, and whether the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms exceeded its authority in classifying Glock switches as machineguns. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court had jurisdiction because Mississippi lacked applicable law at the relevant time, the Second Amendment challenge was foreclosed by United States v. Wilson, 164 F.4th 380 (5th Cir. 2026), which upheld § 922(o) as constitutional, and the statutory challenge regarding ATF’s authority was waived under the terms of the appeal waiver. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Juvenile Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30372/25-30372-2026-09-03.html</id>
        	<title>Transportation Conslt v. Certain Undwr</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-03T09:30:10-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-03T09:30:10-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30372/25-30372-2026-09-03.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Transportation Consultants, Inc. owned property in Louisiana insured under a surplus lines commercial property policy issued by a group of domestic and foreign insurers. The policy contained an arbitration clause and a provision stating it should be construed as separate contracts between the insured and each underwriter. Following Hurricane Ida, a dispute arose regarding coverage, prompting Transportation Consultants to file suit against all insurers in Louisiana state court.

The insurers removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, relying on the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards to assert federal jurisdiction. The district court initially granted the insurers&#039; motion to compel arbitration and stayed the litigation. After the Louisiana Supreme Court decided Police Jury of Calcasieu Parish v. Indian Harbor Insurance Co., the plaintiff moved for reconsideration. The district court then reversed its earlier decision as to the domestic insurers, finding that Louisiana law prohibits arbitration clauses in insurance contracts between Louisiana parties, and lifted the stay as to the domestic insurers. The order compelling arbitration and staying litigation against the foreign insurers remained.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that, following its precedent in Town of Vinton v. Indian Harbor Insurance Co. and Crescent City Surgical Operating Co. v. Interstate Fire &amp; Casualty Co., the arbitration clauses in contracts with the domestic insurers are unenforceable under Louisiana law and equitable estoppel cannot be used to compel arbitration. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of arbitration as to the domestic insurers but vacated the lifting of the stay. The case was remanded for the district court to reconsider, in light of updated precedent and additional briefing, whether litigation against the domestic insurers should be stayed pending completion of arbitration with the foreign insurers. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30372/25-30372-2026-09-03.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Transportation Conslt v. Certain Undwr" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Transportation Consultants, Inc. owned property in Louisiana insured under a surplus lines commercial property policy issued by a group of domestic and foreign insurers. The policy contained an arbitration clause and a provision stating it should be construed as separate contracts between the insured and each underwriter. Following Hurricane Ida, a dispute arose regarding coverage, prompting Transportation Consultants to file suit against all insurers in Louisiana state court.

The insurers removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, relying on the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards to assert federal jurisdiction. The district court initially granted the insurers&#039; motion to compel arbitration and stayed the litigation. After the Louisiana Supreme Court decided Police Jury of Calcasieu Parish v. Indian Harbor Insurance Co., the plaintiff moved for reconsideration. The district court then reversed its earlier decision as to the domestic insurers, finding that Louisiana law prohibits arbitration clauses in insurance contracts between Louisiana parties, and lifted the stay as to the domestic insurers. The order compelling arbitration and staying litigation against the foreign insurers remained.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that, following its precedent in Town of Vinton v. Indian Harbor Insurance Co. and Crescent City Surgical Operating Co. v. Interstate Fire &amp; Casualty Co., the arbitration clauses in contracts with the domestic insurers are unenforceable under Louisiana law and equitable estoppel cannot be used to compel arbitration. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of arbitration as to the domestic insurers but vacated the lifting of the stay. The case was remanded for the district court to reconsider, in light of updated precedent and additional briefing, whether litigation against the domestic insurers should be stayed pending completion of arbitration with the foreign insurers.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Arbitration &amp; Mediation"/>
							<category term="Insurance Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20590/25-20590-2026-09-02.html</id>
        	<title>Thomas v. Bruss</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-02T09:30:09-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-02T09:30:09-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20590/25-20590-2026-09-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Two police officers, Eric Bruss and Wayne Schultz, arrived at the scene of an active arrest where another officer, Robert Johnson, was already present and handling two suspects. The situation was tense: dispatch had reported a weapon, and one suspect, Kerry Thomas, repeatedly acted erratically and made statements suggesting he wanted to be killed. Johnson, a canine handler, released his police dog on Thomas after repeated warnings, resulting in a 43-second bite while Johnson handcuffed Thomas. Bruss and Schultz, who arrived after the scene had escalated, did not intervene during the dog bite.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied qualified immunity to Bruss and Schultz at both the motion to dismiss and summary judgment stages. The district court determined there were genuine disputes of fact regarding whether the bystander officers had a reasonable opportunity to intervene and concluded that the law was clearly established regarding bystander liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failing to prevent the use of excessive force.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The Fifth Circuit held that, under the specific facts presented—including the short duration of the dog bite, the officers’ late arrival, and absence of direct participation or encouragement—existing precedent did not clearly establish that Bruss and Schultz had a constitutional duty to intervene during an active canine-assisted apprehension. The court emphasized that no controlling or analogous case law put the constitutional question “beyond debate” for reasonable officers in these circumstances. As a result, the Fifth Circuit rendered judgment dismissing the claims against Bruss and Schultz on qualified immunity grounds. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20590/25-20590-2026-09-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Thomas v. Bruss" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Two police officers, Eric Bruss and Wayne Schultz, arrived at the scene of an active arrest where another officer, Robert Johnson, was already present and handling two suspects. The situation was tense: dispatch had reported a weapon, and one suspect, Kerry Thomas, repeatedly acted erratically and made statements suggesting he wanted to be killed. Johnson, a canine handler, released his police dog on Thomas after repeated warnings, resulting in a 43-second bite while Johnson handcuffed Thomas. Bruss and Schultz, who arrived after the scene had escalated, did not intervene during the dog bite.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied qualified immunity to Bruss and Schultz at both the motion to dismiss and summary judgment stages. The district court determined there were genuine disputes of fact regarding whether the bystander officers had a reasonable opportunity to intervene and concluded that the law was clearly established regarding bystander liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failing to prevent the use of excessive force.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The Fifth Circuit held that, under the specific facts presented—including the short duration of the dog bite, the officers’ late arrival, and absence of direct participation or encouragement—existing precedent did not clearly establish that Bruss and Schultz had a constitutional duty to intervene during an active canine-assisted apprehension. The court emphasized that no controlling or analogous case law put the constitutional question “beyond debate” for reasonable officers in these circumstances. As a result, the Fifth Circuit rendered judgment dismissing the claims against Bruss and Schultz on qualified immunity grounds.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20462/24-20462-2026-09-01.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Tampico</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-01T15:30:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-01T15:30:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20462/24-20462-2026-09-01.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Jonathan M. Tampico was convicted in 1999 of possession, receipt, and distribution of child pornography, receiving concurrent sentences totaling 360 months in prison, five years of supervised release, and a $5,000 fine. After beginning his supervised release in March 2024, the district court modified the conditions of his release in October 2024 to include home detention for six months, with the possibility of continuation until he completed a sex offender treatment program. The court also found that $1,992.86 in interest had accrued on his fine and ordered monthly payments of $200.

Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas had not included home detention as a condition of supervised release when Tampico was originally sentenced or resentenced. In 2024, after evidentiary hearings, the district court modified the conditions in response to concerns about Tampico’s progress in treatment. Tampico objected to the location monitoring and home detention but did not appeal the initial March 2024 order. He also contested the October 2024 findings regarding interest on his fine, arguing that no interest was required and that the fine had been fully paid, relying on Bureau of Prisons records showing a zero balance.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. The court held that the district court did not impose an illegal sentence by modifying supervised release conditions to include home detention, finding that the statutory maximums applicable to imprisonment were not implicated because home detention was added as a modification during supervised release, not at sentencing or after revocation. The Fifth Circuit also affirmed the district court’s finding that interest on the fine was due and that the Government was not estopped from collecting it. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20462/24-20462-2026-09-01.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Tampico" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Jonathan M. Tampico was convicted in 1999 of possession, receipt, and distribution of child pornography, receiving concurrent sentences totaling 360 months in prison, five years of supervised release, and a $5,000 fine. After beginning his supervised release in March 2024, the district court modified the conditions of his release in October 2024 to include home detention for six months, with the possibility of continuation until he completed a sex offender treatment program. The court also found that $1,992.86 in interest had accrued on his fine and ordered monthly payments of $200.

Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas had not included home detention as a condition of supervised release when Tampico was originally sentenced or resentenced. In 2024, after evidentiary hearings, the district court modified the conditions in response to concerns about Tampico’s progress in treatment. Tampico objected to the location monitoring and home detention but did not appeal the initial March 2024 order. He also contested the October 2024 findings regarding interest on his fine, arguing that no interest was required and that the fine had been fully paid, relying on Bureau of Prisons records showing a zero balance.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. The court held that the district court did not impose an illegal sentence by modifying supervised release conditions to include home detention, finding that the statutory maximums applicable to imprisonment were not implicated because home detention was added as a modification during supervised release, not at sentencing or after revocation. The Fifth Circuit also affirmed the district court’s finding that interest on the fine was due and that the Government was not estopped from collecting it. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kurt Engelhardt</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40117/25-40117-2026-09-01.html</id>
        	<title>Adams v. Guerrero</title>
        	<updated>2026-09-01T15:30:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-09-01T15:30:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40117/25-40117-2026-09-01.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Michael Kevin Adams was convicted of capital murder after evidence showed he drugged, sexually assaulted, and repeatedly threatened his former fiancée, N.L. Following the assault, Adams violated a protective order and continued to harass N.L., prompting her and her son to relocate for safety. Six months after the assault, N.L. was found shot to death in her home, with evidence at the scene including DNA, condom wrappers, and cartridge casings. Investigators found circumstantial evidence, such as Adams’s DNA at the scene, photographs of firearms similar to the murder weapon, and a screw possibly from a gun in his vehicle. Adams denied involvement and provided an uncorroborated alibi.

At trial in Texas state court, the prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence and witness testimony to establish Adams’s guilt. The jury convicted him of capital murder, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Adams appealed to the Texas Fifth Court of Appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient under the standard set by Jackson v. Virginia. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding the evidence sufficient, though one judge dissented. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals declined discretionary review, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Adams’s subsequent state habeas petition was also denied.

Adams then filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, arguing the state court unreasonably applied Jackson’s sufficiency standard. The district court denied relief and a certificate of appealability. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Adams failed to show that every reasonable jurist would find the state court’s sufficiency determination unreasonable under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and Jackson. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and denied habeas relief. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40117/25-40117-2026-09-01.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Adams v. Guerrero" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Michael Kevin Adams was convicted of capital murder after evidence showed he drugged, sexually assaulted, and repeatedly threatened his former fiancée, N.L. Following the assault, Adams violated a protective order and continued to harass N.L., prompting her and her son to relocate for safety. Six months after the assault, N.L. was found shot to death in her home, with evidence at the scene including DNA, condom wrappers, and cartridge casings. Investigators found circumstantial evidence, such as Adams’s DNA at the scene, photographs of firearms similar to the murder weapon, and a screw possibly from a gun in his vehicle. Adams denied involvement and provided an uncorroborated alibi.

At trial in Texas state court, the prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence and witness testimony to establish Adams’s guilt. The jury convicted him of capital murder, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Adams appealed to the Texas Fifth Court of Appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient under the standard set by Jackson v. Virginia. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding the evidence sufficient, though one judge dissented. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals declined discretionary review, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Adams’s subsequent state habeas petition was also denied.

Adams then filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, arguing the state court unreasonably applied Jackson’s sufficiency standard. The district court denied relief and a certificate of appealability. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Adams failed to show that every reasonable jurist would find the state court’s sufficiency determination unreasonable under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and Jackson. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and denied habeas relief.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-09-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Andrew Oldham</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60550/25-60550-2026-08-27.html</id>
        	<title>Emmerich Nwspr v. Particle Media</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-27T15:30:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-27T15:30:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60550/25-60550-2026-08-27.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A local news publisher brought suit against a technology company that operates a news aggregation app and website. The publisher alleged that the aggregator, through its app, displayed the publisher’s articles either by framing them within the aggregator’s interface (so that users viewed the publisher’s website content within an app frame) or by reproducing the full text of articles under the aggregator’s own URL due to a technical glitch. The publisher claimed this conduct violated its exclusive right to publicly display its content under the Copyright Act, and further alleged that the removal or alteration of its website’s URLs—when articles were shown under the aggregator’s URLs—constituted improper removal of copyright management information (CMI) under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi addressed the publisher’s claims through cross-motions for summary judgment. Relying on the “server test” from Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., the district court held that the aggregator’s framed linking did not infringe the publisher’s display right, because the content was not stored on the aggregator’s servers but only linked to the publisher’s own server. The court also held that URLs do not constitute CMI under the DMCA, as they function merely as locational addresses and do not inherently convey protected copyright information.

On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed two questions: whether the server test is the proper standard for evaluating copyright display right infringement, and whether URLs can be CMI under the DMCA. The Fifth Circuit rejected the server test as inconsistent with the text of the Copyright Act, and instead adopted a “transmit requirement”—finding infringement only if the alleged infringer actually transmits (rather than merely links to) the copyrighted content. The court also held that the DMCA does not categorically foreclose URLs from being CMI, but for a URL to qualify as CMI, it must clearly convey the characteristics specified by statute. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60550/25-60550-2026-08-27.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Emmerich Nwspr v. Particle Media" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A local news publisher brought suit against a technology company that operates a news aggregation app and website. The publisher alleged that the aggregator, through its app, displayed the publisher’s articles either by framing them within the aggregator’s interface (so that users viewed the publisher’s website content within an app frame) or by reproducing the full text of articles under the aggregator’s own URL due to a technical glitch. The publisher claimed this conduct violated its exclusive right to publicly display its content under the Copyright Act, and further alleged that the removal or alteration of its website’s URLs—when articles were shown under the aggregator’s URLs—constituted improper removal of copyright management information (CMI) under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi addressed the publisher’s claims through cross-motions for summary judgment. Relying on the “server test” from Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., the district court held that the aggregator’s framed linking did not infringe the publisher’s display right, because the content was not stored on the aggregator’s servers but only linked to the publisher’s own server. The court also held that URLs do not constitute CMI under the DMCA, as they function merely as locational addresses and do not inherently convey protected copyright information.

On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed two questions: whether the server test is the proper standard for evaluating copyright display right infringement, and whether URLs can be CMI under the DMCA. The Fifth Circuit rejected the server test as inconsistent with the text of the Copyright Act, and instead adopted a “transmit requirement”—finding infringement only if the alleged infringer actually transmits (rather than merely links to) the copyrighted content. The court also held that the DMCA does not categorically foreclose URLs from being CMI, but for a URL to qualify as CMI, it must clearly convey the characteristics specified by statute. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Communications Law"/>
							<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Internet Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50383/25-50383-2026-08-26.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Palencia-Berrum</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-26T15:30:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-26T15:30:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50383/25-50383-2026-08-26.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant pled guilty to a single count of illegal reentry after removal from the United States. His presentence report detailed a criminal history that included prior convictions for driving under the influence, obstruction of justice, unlawful possession or consumption of alcohol by a minor, domestic battery, drug trafficking, and a previous illegal reentry. After being deported for his earlier illegal reentry, the defendant returned to the United States, purportedly to assist his wife, who was recovering from a significant injury and mental health issues. About ten months after his return, he was arrested for assaulting his wife, but the charges were later dismissed. The presentence report indicated the incident involved the defendant throwing water bottles at his wife, causing minor injuries, but made no mention of direct physical contact or biting.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas conducted a brief sentencing hearing, during which it adopted the presentence report but made several factual errors. The court incorrectly referenced a 2020 illegal reentry conviction that did not exist and mistakenly asserted that the defendant had bitten his wife during the alleged assault. The district court treated these purported facts as aggravating factors and sentenced the defendant to 46 months, at the top of the Guidelines range, without stating whether the same sentence would have been imposed absent these errors. No contemporaneous objections were raised by the parties.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case under the plain error standard. The court found that the district court relied on clearly erroneous facts, that the errors were clear under established law, and that they affected the defendant’s substantial rights by likely increasing his sentence. The Fifth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding that sentencing based on unfounded facts violates due process and undermines the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50383/25-50383-2026-08-26.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Palencia-Berrum" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant pled guilty to a single count of illegal reentry after removal from the United States. His presentence report detailed a criminal history that included prior convictions for driving under the influence, obstruction of justice, unlawful possession or consumption of alcohol by a minor, domestic battery, drug trafficking, and a previous illegal reentry. After being deported for his earlier illegal reentry, the defendant returned to the United States, purportedly to assist his wife, who was recovering from a significant injury and mental health issues. About ten months after his return, he was arrested for assaulting his wife, but the charges were later dismissed. The presentence report indicated the incident involved the defendant throwing water bottles at his wife, causing minor injuries, but made no mention of direct physical contact or biting.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas conducted a brief sentencing hearing, during which it adopted the presentence report but made several factual errors. The court incorrectly referenced a 2020 illegal reentry conviction that did not exist and mistakenly asserted that the defendant had bitten his wife during the alleged assault. The district court treated these purported facts as aggravating factors and sentenced the defendant to 46 months, at the top of the Guidelines range, without stating whether the same sentence would have been imposed absent these errors. No contemporaneous objections were raised by the parties.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case under the plain error standard. The court found that the district court relied on clearly erroneous facts, that the errors were clear under established law, and that they affected the defendant’s substantial rights by likely increasing his sentence. The Fifth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding that sentencing based on unfounded facts violates due process and undermines the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10897/25-10897-2026-08-26.html</id>
        	<title>Rummans v. HSBC Bank</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-26T15:30:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-26T15:30:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10897/25-10897-2026-08-26.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The plaintiff financed his home with a VA loan in 2003, qualifying due to his military service. After failing to make payments for at least ten years, the loan was assigned to HSBC Bank USA and serviced by Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (SLS). HSBC eventually foreclosed on the property in 2022 and sold it to Northsky, LLC. The VA Servicing Guidelines, which were incorporated into the mortgage contract, required HSBC to notify the plaintiff of the default and explore options to cure it. SLS claimed to have mailed multiple payoff statements and a notice of default to the plaintiff, but he asserted he never received these communications.

The plaintiff brought suit in Texas state court against HSBC, SLS, and Northsky, alleging violations of federal and Texas law and seeking to set aside the foreclosure sale. HSBC and SLS removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The district court granted partial summary judgment for HSBC and SLS, permitting the plaintiff to proceed on claims for violations of the VA Servicing Guidelines, quiet title, and trespass to try title. At a bench trial, HSBC and SLS presented circumstantial evidence of mailing, relying on business records and testimony from a corporate representative. The district court found this evidence sufficient and, applying the mailbox rule, presumed the plaintiff received the notices, concluding the defendants fulfilled their obligations under the VA Servicing Guidelines.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the appeal, applying a deferential standard to the district court’s factual findings. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court correctly applied the mailbox rule based on the evidence presented and that the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of receipt. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10897/25-10897-2026-08-26.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Rummans v. HSBC Bank" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The plaintiff financed his home with a VA loan in 2003, qualifying due to his military service. After failing to make payments for at least ten years, the loan was assigned to HSBC Bank USA and serviced by Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (SLS). HSBC eventually foreclosed on the property in 2022 and sold it to Northsky, LLC. The VA Servicing Guidelines, which were incorporated into the mortgage contract, required HSBC to notify the plaintiff of the default and explore options to cure it. SLS claimed to have mailed multiple payoff statements and a notice of default to the plaintiff, but he asserted he never received these communications.

The plaintiff brought suit in Texas state court against HSBC, SLS, and Northsky, alleging violations of federal and Texas law and seeking to set aside the foreclosure sale. HSBC and SLS removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The district court granted partial summary judgment for HSBC and SLS, permitting the plaintiff to proceed on claims for violations of the VA Servicing Guidelines, quiet title, and trespass to try title. At a bench trial, HSBC and SLS presented circumstantial evidence of mailing, relying on business records and testimony from a corporate representative. The district court found this evidence sufficient and, applying the mailbox rule, presumed the plaintiff received the notices, concluding the defendants fulfilled their obligations under the VA Servicing Guidelines.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the appeal, applying a deferential standard to the district court’s factual findings. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court correctly applied the mailbox rule based on the evidence presented and that the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of receipt. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Patrick Higginbotham</case:judge>
													<category term="Consumer Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Real Estate &amp; Property Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50661/25-50661-2026-08-26.html</id>
        	<title>Natl Infusion Center v. Kennedy</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-26T15:30:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-26T15:30:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50661/25-50661-2026-08-26.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A group of associations representing infusion centers, cancer patients, and pharmaceutical manufacturers challenged the constitutionality of a program created by the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, which directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), through the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), to negotiate prices for high-expenditure prescription drugs under Medicare Parts B and D. The program allows HHS to select drugs based on certain criteria, negotiate a “maximum fair price” with manufacturers, and impose an excise tax on manufacturers who refuse to negotiate. The tax is calculated as a high percentage of sales reimbursed by Medicare. Manufacturers may avoid the program by withdrawing from Medicare and Medicaid participation. The statutory scheme also limits administrative and judicial review of key program decisions and allows HHS to implement early cycles of the program through guidance rather than notice-and-comment rulemaking.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and improper venue. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that at least one plaintiff had standing and venue was proper. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the government, holding that the program did not violate the nondelegation doctrine, that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim, and that the plaintiffs lacked a protected property interest to support their due process claim.

Upon further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the statute provided an “intelligible principle” sufficient to withstand a nondelegation challenge, that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the Eighth Amendment claim but the excise tax did not constitute a punitive fine, and that neither manufacturers, providers, nor patients possessed a protected property or liberty interest implicated by the program. The government’s summary judgment was affirmed in full. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50661/25-50661-2026-08-26.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Natl Infusion Center v. Kennedy" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A group of associations representing infusion centers, cancer patients, and pharmaceutical manufacturers challenged the constitutionality of a program created by the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, which directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), through the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), to negotiate prices for high-expenditure prescription drugs under Medicare Parts B and D. The program allows HHS to select drugs based on certain criteria, negotiate a “maximum fair price” with manufacturers, and impose an excise tax on manufacturers who refuse to negotiate. The tax is calculated as a high percentage of sales reimbursed by Medicare. Manufacturers may avoid the program by withdrawing from Medicare and Medicaid participation. The statutory scheme also limits administrative and judicial review of key program decisions and allows HHS to implement early cycles of the program through guidance rather than notice-and-comment rulemaking.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and improper venue. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that at least one plaintiff had standing and venue was proper. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the government, holding that the program did not violate the nondelegation doctrine, that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim, and that the plaintiffs lacked a protected property interest to support their due process claim.

Upon further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the statute provided an “intelligible principle” sufficient to withstand a nondelegation challenge, that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the Eighth Amendment claim but the excise tax did not constitute a punitive fine, and that neither manufacturers, providers, nor patients possessed a protected property or liberty interest implicated by the program. The government’s summary judgment was affirmed in full.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leslie Southwick</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
							<category term="Tax Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30438/25-30438-2026-08-26.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Mitchell</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-26T09:30:09-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-26T09:30:09-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30438/25-30438-2026-08-26.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Officers responding to a reported burglary encountered Maurice Mitchell near a storage facility, leading to his flight, capture, and discovery of a loaded revolver in a bag on his bicycle. Mitchell has a history of felony convictions, including drug possession and attempting to disarm a peace officer, the latter involving an attempt to grab pepper spray from an officer during an arrest. Based on the January 2023 incident, Mitchell was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana denied Mitchell’s pretrial motions to dismiss the indictment, which asserted Second Amendment protections against prosecution. The court focused on Mitchell’s drug convictions as predicates, not addressing the attempted disarmament conviction. At trial, the court issued a flight instruction over Mitchell’s objection, directing the jury to consider his flight as evidence of consciousness of guilt. The jury ultimately returned a guilty verdict, and Mitchell was sentenced to prison and supervised release. He timely appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Mitchell’s Second Amendment challenge de novo. The court held that Mitchell’s conviction for attempting to disarm a police officer is analogous to robbery, historically a crime for which individuals could be disarmed under firearm regulations. Thus, the application of § 922(g)(1) to Mitchell was constitutional. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the flight instruction, and the evidence was sufficient to support Mitchell’s conviction under the stringent “manifest miscarriage of justice” standard. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30438/25-30438-2026-08-26.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Mitchell" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Officers responding to a reported burglary encountered Maurice Mitchell near a storage facility, leading to his flight, capture, and discovery of a loaded revolver in a bag on his bicycle. Mitchell has a history of felony convictions, including drug possession and attempting to disarm a peace officer, the latter involving an attempt to grab pepper spray from an officer during an arrest. Based on the January 2023 incident, Mitchell was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana denied Mitchell’s pretrial motions to dismiss the indictment, which asserted Second Amendment protections against prosecution. The court focused on Mitchell’s drug convictions as predicates, not addressing the attempted disarmament conviction. At trial, the court issued a flight instruction over Mitchell’s objection, directing the jury to consider his flight as evidence of consciousness of guilt. The jury ultimately returned a guilty verdict, and Mitchell was sentenced to prison and supervised release. He timely appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Mitchell’s Second Amendment challenge de novo. The court held that Mitchell’s conviction for attempting to disarm a police officer is analogous to robbery, historically a crime for which individuals could be disarmed under firearm regulations. Thus, the application of § 922(g)(1) to Mitchell was constitutional. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the flight instruction, and the evidence was sufficient to support Mitchell’s conviction under the stringent “manifest miscarriage of justice” standard. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stuart Kyle Duncan</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50986/25-50986-2026-08-25.html</id>
        	<title>Black v. Unibank</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-25T15:30:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-25T15:30:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50986/25-50986-2026-08-25.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Roy Hill, founder and CEO of Clean Energy Technology Association, Inc. (CETA), solicited investments by representing that CETA owned patented carbon capture technology and promised investors returns from these assets. CETA, however, operated as a Ponzi scheme, using funds from new investors to pay returns to earlier ones. UniBank, a Washington-based commercial bank, provided secured loans to investors who used the funds to buy interests in CETA’s purported assets. UniBank perfected its security interests in the distributions from CETA. After the SEC initiated an enforcement action alleging fraud and sought appointment of a receiver, Albert Black was appointed to marshal CETA’s assets for the benefit of creditors and investors.

In parallel litigation, investors sued UniBank in Washington state court for fraud and negligence, but UniBank obtained summary judgment on the basis that it owed no duty to the investors. Meanwhile, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, the receiver recommended a pro rata distribution of the remaining CETA estate funds to all investors and creditors based on net cash losses, aggregating UniBank’s claims with those of other victims rather than honoring UniBank’s asserted secured creditor priority. UniBank objected, arguing its perfected liens should grant it priority recovery. The district court overruled UniBank’s objection, adopted the receiver’s recommendation, and ordered pro rata distributions.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court failed to provide UniBank with adequate due process because it adopted the receiver’s recommendation with only a cursory analysis and without giving UniBank a meaningful opportunity to present its evidence and arguments, particularly given the extensive record. The court vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with due process requirements, without expressing a view on the merits. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50986/25-50986-2026-08-25.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Black v. Unibank" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Roy Hill, founder and CEO of Clean Energy Technology Association, Inc. (CETA), solicited investments by representing that CETA owned patented carbon capture technology and promised investors returns from these assets. CETA, however, operated as a Ponzi scheme, using funds from new investors to pay returns to earlier ones. UniBank, a Washington-based commercial bank, provided secured loans to investors who used the funds to buy interests in CETA’s purported assets. UniBank perfected its security interests in the distributions from CETA. After the SEC initiated an enforcement action alleging fraud and sought appointment of a receiver, Albert Black was appointed to marshal CETA’s assets for the benefit of creditors and investors.

In parallel litigation, investors sued UniBank in Washington state court for fraud and negligence, but UniBank obtained summary judgment on the basis that it owed no duty to the investors. Meanwhile, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, the receiver recommended a pro rata distribution of the remaining CETA estate funds to all investors and creditors based on net cash losses, aggregating UniBank’s claims with those of other victims rather than honoring UniBank’s asserted secured creditor priority. UniBank objected, arguing its perfected liens should grant it priority recovery. The district court overruled UniBank’s objection, adopted the receiver’s recommendation, and ordered pro rata distributions.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court failed to provide UniBank with adequate due process because it adopted the receiver’s recommendation with only a cursory analysis and without giving UniBank a meaningful opportunity to present its evidence and arguments, particularly given the extensive record. The court vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with due process requirements, without expressing a view on the merits.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-25</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Bankruptcy"/>
							<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40272/25-40272-2026-08-25.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Luna</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-25T15:30:05-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-25T15:30:05-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40272/25-40272-2026-08-25.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Raymond Luna was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The only felony conviction supporting this indictment was Luna’s prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance. The district court found that applying § 922(g)(1) to Luna violated the Second Amendment as applied to him and dismissed the indictment. After the dismissal, the Government moved for reconsideration, providing new evidence from Luna’s prior conviction that suggested he was involved in drug trafficking, rather than mere possession. The district court denied the motion for reconsideration, reasoning that the Government could have, but did not, present this evidence earlier.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion, as the district court declined to consider the new evidence presented by the Government after the original dismissal. The Fifth Circuit observed that the Government did not argue in its opening appellate brief that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to consider the late-submitted evidence, thereby forfeiting that argument. The appellate court further declined to revisit the district court’s ruling based on the late-submitted evidence.

The Fifth Circuit held that, with only the fact of Luna’s conviction for simple possession before it, binding precedent established that such a conviction cannot support a § 922(g)(1) prosecution post-Hembree. The court also rejected the Government’s alternative arguments, including the assertion that historical regulations on illicit marketplaces justified disarmament, and found that Luna’s indictment status for a separate firearm offense was irrelevant under circuit precedent. As a result, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the indictment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40272/25-40272-2026-08-25.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Luna" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Raymond Luna was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The only felony conviction supporting this indictment was Luna’s prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance. The district court found that applying § 922(g)(1) to Luna violated the Second Amendment as applied to him and dismissed the indictment. After the dismissal, the Government moved for reconsideration, providing new evidence from Luna’s prior conviction that suggested he was involved in drug trafficking, rather than mere possession. The district court denied the motion for reconsideration, reasoning that the Government could have, but did not, present this evidence earlier.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion, as the district court declined to consider the new evidence presented by the Government after the original dismissal. The Fifth Circuit observed that the Government did not argue in its opening appellate brief that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to consider the late-submitted evidence, thereby forfeiting that argument. The appellate court further declined to revisit the district court’s ruling based on the late-submitted evidence.

The Fifth Circuit held that, with only the fact of Luna’s conviction for simple possession before it, binding precedent established that such a conviction cannot support a § 922(g)(1) prosecution post-Hembree. The court also rejected the Government’s alternative arguments, including the assertion that historical regulations on illicit marketplaces justified disarmament, and found that Luna’s indictment status for a separate firearm offense was irrelevant under circuit precedent. As a result, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the indictment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-25</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kurt Engelhardt</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30132/25-30132-2026-08-24.html</id>
        	<title>Fogleman-Laxey v. Guillory</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-24T15:30:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-24T15:30:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30132/25-30132-2026-08-24.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case centers on Tara Fogleman-Laxey, who organized a peaceful protest in front of the Lafayette, Louisiana mayor’s residence to address a recent police shooting. Her protest consisted primarily of grilling food on a public street while engaging with community members. During the event, police arrived and informed her that her actions constituted an obstruction of a public roadway under Louisiana law. Although Fogleman-Laxey offered to move her grill, officers refused her offers and ultimately arrested her for obstruction, later adding a charge of disturbing the peace. After being detained and released, formal charges were brought months later but were dismissed when she agreed to a civil stay-away order.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana dismissed all of Fogleman-Laxey’s claims, which were based on alleged violations of her First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as Louisiana state law. The court found that she had not overcome the individual defendants’ qualified immunity defense and failed to sufficiently plead that municipal defendants were liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that Fogleman-Laxey failed to cite precedent that would have given the defendant officers fair notice that arresting her for grilling in the street was unlawful under clearly established law, as required to overcome qualified immunity. The court also affirmed that her allegations against the municipal defendants were conclusory and insufficient to state a Monell claim. As a result, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30132/25-30132-2026-08-24.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Fogleman-Laxey v. Guillory" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case centers on Tara Fogleman-Laxey, who organized a peaceful protest in front of the Lafayette, Louisiana mayor’s residence to address a recent police shooting. Her protest consisted primarily of grilling food on a public street while engaging with community members. During the event, police arrived and informed her that her actions constituted an obstruction of a public roadway under Louisiana law. Although Fogleman-Laxey offered to move her grill, officers refused her offers and ultimately arrested her for obstruction, later adding a charge of disturbing the peace. After being detained and released, formal charges were brought months later but were dismissed when she agreed to a civil stay-away order.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana dismissed all of Fogleman-Laxey’s claims, which were based on alleged violations of her First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as Louisiana state law. The court found that she had not overcome the individual defendants’ qualified immunity defense and failed to sufficiently plead that municipal defendants were liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that Fogleman-Laxey failed to cite precedent that would have given the defendant officers fair notice that arresting her for grilling in the street was unlawful under clearly established law, as required to overcome qualified immunity. The court also affirmed that her allegations against the municipal defendants were conclusory and insufficient to state a Monell claim. As a result, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all claims.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-24</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30542/25-30542-2026-08-21.html</id>
        	<title>Norcave Properties v. IRS</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-21T15:30:34-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-21T15:30:34-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30542/25-30542-2026-08-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A partnership claimed a charitable deduction after donating a conservation servitude on real property. The Internal Revenue Service audited the partnership’s tax filing and, in 2025, issued a Notice of Final Partnership Adjustment, disallowing the deduction and imposing both a civil fraud penalty and several valuation-related penalties for negligence, substantial understatement, and gross-valuation misstatements. The partnership responded by filing suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, seeking a pre-payment jury trial to contest the penalties and requesting both injunctive and declaratory relief. The partnership also filed a parallel petition with the U.S. Tax Court for a downward adjustment of the IRS’s determination.

In the district court, both parties moved for judgment on the pleadings. The court granted the IRS’s motion and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, relying on the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) and the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA). The district court reasoned that the penalties imposed by the IRS constitute “tax” within the meaning of relevant statutes, thereby stripping federal courts of jurisdiction to hear pre-payment challenges to such assessments.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether accuracy-related penalties under 26 U.S.C. § 6662 are treated as “tax” for purposes of the AIA and DJA. The Fifth Circuit held that these penalties are indeed treated as “tax,” and thus, both the AIA and DJA bar federal court jurisdiction over the partnership’s pre-payment challenge. The court further determined that Tax Court provides an alternative forum for such disputes. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30542/25-30542-2026-08-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Norcave Properties v. IRS" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A partnership claimed a charitable deduction after donating a conservation servitude on real property. The Internal Revenue Service audited the partnership’s tax filing and, in 2025, issued a Notice of Final Partnership Adjustment, disallowing the deduction and imposing both a civil fraud penalty and several valuation-related penalties for negligence, substantial understatement, and gross-valuation misstatements. The partnership responded by filing suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, seeking a pre-payment jury trial to contest the penalties and requesting both injunctive and declaratory relief. The partnership also filed a parallel petition with the U.S. Tax Court for a downward adjustment of the IRS’s determination.

In the district court, both parties moved for judgment on the pleadings. The court granted the IRS’s motion and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, relying on the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) and the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA). The district court reasoned that the penalties imposed by the IRS constitute “tax” within the meaning of relevant statutes, thereby stripping federal courts of jurisdiction to hear pre-payment challenges to such assessments.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether accuracy-related penalties under 26 U.S.C. § 6662 are treated as “tax” for purposes of the AIA and DJA. The Fifth Circuit held that these penalties are indeed treated as “tax,” and thus, both the AIA and DJA bar federal court jurisdiction over the partnership’s pre-payment challenge. The court further determined that Tax Court provides an alternative forum for such disputes. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Tax Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10630/25-10630-2026-08-21.html</id>
        	<title>In Re: Media Matters for America</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-21T15:30:33-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-21T15:30:33-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10630/25-10630-2026-08-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A nonprofit organization based in Washington, D.C. published articles critical of a technology company and its CEO, which led to corporations pulling their advertisements from the company’s platform, resulting in significant losses for the company. The technology company filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, alleging interference with contract, business disparagement, and interference with prospective economic advantage under Texas law. The nonprofit and its employees sought dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a claim. After this was denied, and following further discovery showing that affected advertisers were not based in Texas, the nonprofit moved to transfer the case to the Northern District of California, citing venue statutes and a forum-selection clause.

The district court denied both the motion to dismiss and the motion to transfer venue, finding that the transfer request was untimely and that the evidence was insufficient to show the Texas venue was improper. It also expressed concerns about the nonprofit’s litigation conduct and considered possible sanctions. The nonprofit then petitioned for a writ of mandamus from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, seeking to compel a venue transfer.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted the petition in part. It held that the district court erred by failing to consider the required eight public- and private-interest factors when analyzing the transfer motion under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) and 1406(a), instead focusing solely on the timeliness of the motion. The Court ordered the district court to vacate its denial of the transfer motion and conduct a new venue analysis consistent with appellate precedent. The nonprofit’s related interlocutory appeal was held in abeyance pending the outcome of the remand. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10630/25-10630-2026-08-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In Re: Media Matters for America" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A nonprofit organization based in Washington, D.C. published articles critical of a technology company and its CEO, which led to corporations pulling their advertisements from the company’s platform, resulting in significant losses for the company. The technology company filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, alleging interference with contract, business disparagement, and interference with prospective economic advantage under Texas law. The nonprofit and its employees sought dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a claim. After this was denied, and following further discovery showing that affected advertisers were not based in Texas, the nonprofit moved to transfer the case to the Northern District of California, citing venue statutes and a forum-selection clause.

The district court denied both the motion to dismiss and the motion to transfer venue, finding that the transfer request was untimely and that the evidence was insufficient to show the Texas venue was improper. It also expressed concerns about the nonprofit’s litigation conduct and considered possible sanctions. The nonprofit then petitioned for a writ of mandamus from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, seeking to compel a venue transfer.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted the petition in part. It held that the district court erred by failing to consider the required eight public- and private-interest factors when analyzing the transfer motion under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) and 1406(a), instead focusing solely on the timeliness of the motion. The Court ordered the district court to vacate its denial of the transfer motion and conduct a new venue analysis consistent with appellate precedent. The nonprofit’s related interlocutory appeal was held in abeyance pending the outcome of the remand.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James Graves</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Commercial Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-50750/23-50750-2026-08-21.html</id>
        	<title>Flores v. AMH Creekside</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-21T09:31:02-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-21T09:31:02-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-50750/23-50750-2026-08-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		An architecture firm (KFA) held registered copyrights in several building plans and technical drawings. In 2016, the firm licensed certain works to a development company (AHV) for use in the Austin, Texas area, with explicit requirements to include KFA’s copyright management information (CMI) on any displays or copies. KFA later worked directly with third-party graphics companies to create floorplans and renderings, again requiring its CMI be included. However, the floorplans and renderings produced by these companies did not contain KFA’s CMI. When AHV and its affiliates used these images for a new housing development’s online marketing, KFA sent notices of default and, after noncompliance, terminated the licensing agreement and demanded the return of its materials.

KFA then sued AHV and the Creekside defendants in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, alleging violations of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), copyright infringement, conversion, and seeking specific performance. The district court dismissed the DMCA and conversion claims, and parts of the infringement claims, but allowed others to proceed. KFA then voluntarily dismissed its remaining claims with prejudice to facilitate an appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit first addressed whether it had jurisdiction, given that the district court’s dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) was erroneous because it only dismissed part of the action. The appellate court held that this error did not deprive it of jurisdiction. On the merits, the Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the DMCA claims, holding that failure to include CMI on newly created images is not “removal” or “alteration” under the statute. However, it vacated the dismissal of the copyright infringement claims, ruling that the district court erred in applying a statutory exemption beyond its scope and remanded those claims for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-50750/23-50750-2026-08-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Flores v. AMH Creekside" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                An architecture firm (KFA) held registered copyrights in several building plans and technical drawings. In 2016, the firm licensed certain works to a development company (AHV) for use in the Austin, Texas area, with explicit requirements to include KFA’s copyright management information (CMI) on any displays or copies. KFA later worked directly with third-party graphics companies to create floorplans and renderings, again requiring its CMI be included. However, the floorplans and renderings produced by these companies did not contain KFA’s CMI. When AHV and its affiliates used these images for a new housing development’s online marketing, KFA sent notices of default and, after noncompliance, terminated the licensing agreement and demanded the return of its materials.

KFA then sued AHV and the Creekside defendants in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, alleging violations of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), copyright infringement, conversion, and seeking specific performance. The district court dismissed the DMCA and conversion claims, and parts of the infringement claims, but allowed others to proceed. KFA then voluntarily dismissed its remaining claims with prejudice to facilitate an appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit first addressed whether it had jurisdiction, given that the district court’s dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) was erroneous because it only dismissed part of the action. The appellate court held that this error did not deprive it of jurisdiction. On the merits, the Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the DMCA claims, holding that failure to include CMI on newly created images is not “removal” or “alteration” under the statute. However, it vacated the dismissal of the copyright infringement claims, ruling that the district court erred in applying a statutory exemption beyond its scope and remanded those claims for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Don Willett</case:judge>
													<category term="Copyright"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60232/25-60232-2026-08-20.html</id>
        	<title>Hughey v. Tippah County</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-20T15:30:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-20T15:30:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60232/25-60232-2026-08-20.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		James Hughey, who suffered from medical conditions that sometimes caused confusion, entered the home of his ex-girlfriend’s sister while confused. The sister called Deputy Tommy Mason, her ex-husband and a Tippah County sheriff’s deputy, who responded to the scene. Mason used force against Hughey, resulting in severe injuries. Hughey, through his estate, brought claims against Mason for excessive force under federal law and for assault and battery under Mississippi law.

In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, Mason moved for judgment on the pleadings, asserting qualified immunity. The district court granted Mason’s motion, finding that the complaint did not plead sufficient facts to overcome qualified immunity. Hughey subsequently moved to revise the judgment based on new deposition testimony and sought leave to amend the complaint, but the district court denied these requests. Hughey appealed the district court’s judgment, but later abandoned his claims against Tippah County and certain other arguments.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings. The Fifth Circuit held that Hughey’s complaint failed to allege facts necessary to show that Mason’s use of force was excessive or objectively unreasonable, specifically lacking details about the severity of the crime, whether Hughey posed a threat, or whether he resisted arrest. The court also found that Hughey had not identified clearly established law on the facts alleged that would defeat qualified immunity. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hughey’s motion to revise the judgment or his request to amend the complaint. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the claims against Mason and dismissed the remainder of the appeal as abandoned. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60232/25-60232-2026-08-20.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Hughey v. Tippah County" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                James Hughey, who suffered from medical conditions that sometimes caused confusion, entered the home of his ex-girlfriend’s sister while confused. The sister called Deputy Tommy Mason, her ex-husband and a Tippah County sheriff’s deputy, who responded to the scene. Mason used force against Hughey, resulting in severe injuries. Hughey, through his estate, brought claims against Mason for excessive force under federal law and for assault and battery under Mississippi law.

In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, Mason moved for judgment on the pleadings, asserting qualified immunity. The district court granted Mason’s motion, finding that the complaint did not plead sufficient facts to overcome qualified immunity. Hughey subsequently moved to revise the judgment based on new deposition testimony and sought leave to amend the complaint, but the district court denied these requests. Hughey appealed the district court’s judgment, but later abandoned his claims against Tippah County and certain other arguments.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings. The Fifth Circuit held that Hughey’s complaint failed to allege facts necessary to show that Mason’s use of force was excessive or objectively unreasonable, specifically lacking details about the severity of the crime, whether Hughey posed a threat, or whether he resisted arrest. The court also found that Hughey had not identified clearly established law on the facts alleged that would defeat qualified immunity. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hughey’s motion to revise the judgment or his request to amend the complaint. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the claims against Mason and dismissed the remainder of the appeal as abandoned.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-20</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Irma Ramirez</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30603/25-30603-2026-08-19.html</id>
        	<title>Hamm v. Ochsner-Acadia</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-19T09:30:54-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-19T09:30:54-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30603/25-30603-2026-08-19.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Support staff who worked at a psychiatric hospital in Louisiana operated by Acadia-affiliated entities allege that, while they were provided with nominal meal breaks, they were functionally required to remain on call due to company policies and ethical obligations. As a result, they claim they were not properly compensated for this time. The plaintiffs, a former nurse supervisor and a former mental health technician, brought suit on behalf of themselves and similarly situated employees. Their claims included violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Louisiana state-law torts, specifically unjust enrichment and conversion.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana certified both an FLSA collective action and a Rule 23(b)(3) class action for the state-law claims. Acadia sought interlocutory review of the class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was presented with Acadia’s appeal challenging both the collective and class certification decisions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the FLSA collective action certification at this stage, as Rule 23(f) provides for interlocutory review only of class certification orders, not collective actions. The court declined Acadia’s request to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction because the legal standards and issues between the FLSA collective and the Rule 23 class were not sufficiently intertwined. Turning to class certification, the Fifth Circuit found no abuse of discretion by the district court. It held that the Rule 23 requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority were satisfied based on the plaintiffs’ “on-call” theory, which presented common questions suitable for classwide adjudication. The court therefore affirmed the district court’s certification of the Rule 23 class, dismissed the appeal regarding the collective action, and remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30603/25-30603-2026-08-19.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Hamm v. Ochsner-Acadia" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Support staff who worked at a psychiatric hospital in Louisiana operated by Acadia-affiliated entities allege that, while they were provided with nominal meal breaks, they were functionally required to remain on call due to company policies and ethical obligations. As a result, they claim they were not properly compensated for this time. The plaintiffs, a former nurse supervisor and a former mental health technician, brought suit on behalf of themselves and similarly situated employees. Their claims included violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Louisiana state-law torts, specifically unjust enrichment and conversion.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana certified both an FLSA collective action and a Rule 23(b)(3) class action for the state-law claims. Acadia sought interlocutory review of the class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was presented with Acadia’s appeal challenging both the collective and class certification decisions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the FLSA collective action certification at this stage, as Rule 23(f) provides for interlocutory review only of class certification orders, not collective actions. The court declined Acadia’s request to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction because the legal standards and issues between the FLSA collective and the Rule 23 class were not sufficiently intertwined. Turning to class certification, the Fifth Circuit found no abuse of discretion by the district court. It held that the Rule 23 requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority were satisfied based on the plaintiffs’ “on-call” theory, which presented common questions suitable for classwide adjudication. The court therefore affirmed the district court’s certification of the Rule 23 class, dismissed the appeal regarding the collective action, and remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-19</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James Graves</case:judge>
													<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30684/24-30684-2026-08-18.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Enclade</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-18T15:30:32-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-18T15:30:32-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30684/24-30684-2026-08-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Law enforcement conducted a two-month investigation in New Orleans into two relatives, Terence Wilson and Travis Enclade, suspected of trafficking methamphetamine, fentanyl, and heroin. Surveillance techniques included pole cameras, physical observation, GPS tracking, and phone analysis at several residences linked to the defendants. Footage and investigative findings suggested hand-to-hand drug transactions, shared access to a stash house, and the presence of firearms. During a jailhouse call following Wilson’s arrest, coded language was used to direct Enclade to narcotics later found in a kitchen cabinet. Subsequent searches of three residences uncovered large quantities of drugs, distribution materials, and multiple firearms.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana presided over the trial, where both defendants were convicted by a jury of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances. Wilson was also convicted of possession with intent to distribute and being a felon in possession of firearms, while Enclade was convicted of being a felon in possession of firearms. Both were acquitted on one count related to possessing firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking. The district court sentenced Enclade to 288 months and Wilson to 240 months, both below the Guidelines range. Defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, the conduct of the prosecutor, denial of a continuance, their sentences, and the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the convictions and sentences. The court held that the evidence was sufficient for all convictions, that any evidentiary errors or improper prosecutorial remarks did not prejudice the defendants, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings. The court further held that § 922(g)(1) was constitutional and that Enclade’s sentence was reasonable. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30684/24-30684-2026-08-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Enclade" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Law enforcement conducted a two-month investigation in New Orleans into two relatives, Terence Wilson and Travis Enclade, suspected of trafficking methamphetamine, fentanyl, and heroin. Surveillance techniques included pole cameras, physical observation, GPS tracking, and phone analysis at several residences linked to the defendants. Footage and investigative findings suggested hand-to-hand drug transactions, shared access to a stash house, and the presence of firearms. During a jailhouse call following Wilson’s arrest, coded language was used to direct Enclade to narcotics later found in a kitchen cabinet. Subsequent searches of three residences uncovered large quantities of drugs, distribution materials, and multiple firearms.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana presided over the trial, where both defendants were convicted by a jury of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances. Wilson was also convicted of possession with intent to distribute and being a felon in possession of firearms, while Enclade was convicted of being a felon in possession of firearms. Both were acquitted on one count related to possessing firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking. The district court sentenced Enclade to 288 months and Wilson to 240 months, both below the Guidelines range. Defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, the conduct of the prosecutor, denial of a continuance, their sentences, and the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the convictions and sentences. The court held that the evidence was sufficient for all convictions, that any evidentiary errors or improper prosecutorial remarks did not prejudice the defendants, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings. The court further held that § 922(g)(1) was constitutional and that Enclade’s sentence was reasonable. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40137/25-40137-2026-08-18.html</id>
        	<title>R J Reynolds Tobacco Company v. FDA</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-18T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-18T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40137/25-40137-2026-08-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several tobacco companies and retailers challenged a rule issued by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) that required cigarette packaging and advertisements to display eleven rotating health warnings, each paired with a graphic image illustrating the harms of smoking. Congress had previously enacted the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA), which enumerated nine specific warning statements to appear on cigarette packaging and gave the FDA limited, conditional authority to adjust the format or text of these warnings to promote public understanding of smoking risks. The FDA’s new rule went beyond these statutory warnings by mandating two additional warnings, raising industry concerns that the agency had exceeded its statutory authority.

The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. That court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and enjoined enforcement of the rule on First Amendment grounds, without addressing their claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The FDA appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, ruling that the rule did not violate the First Amendment and remanding the case for consideration of the APA claims. Upon remand, the district court granted the plaintiffs’ request for interim relief under the APA, finding a substantial likelihood of success on their claim that the FDA lacked statutory authority to increase the number of required warnings and that enforcement would inflict irreparable harm through unrecoverable compliance costs. The court postponed the rule’s effective date.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The Fifth Circuit held that the TCA’s nine statutory warning statements form a closed set and that the FDA exceeded its authority by requiring eleven warnings. The court also found that the equities favored interim relief and that universal postponement of the rule’s effective date was appropriate under the APA. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40137/25-40137-2026-08-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "R J Reynolds Tobacco Company v. FDA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several tobacco companies and retailers challenged a rule issued by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) that required cigarette packaging and advertisements to display eleven rotating health warnings, each paired with a graphic image illustrating the harms of smoking. Congress had previously enacted the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA), which enumerated nine specific warning statements to appear on cigarette packaging and gave the FDA limited, conditional authority to adjust the format or text of these warnings to promote public understanding of smoking risks. The FDA’s new rule went beyond these statutory warnings by mandating two additional warnings, raising industry concerns that the agency had exceeded its statutory authority.

The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. That court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and enjoined enforcement of the rule on First Amendment grounds, without addressing their claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The FDA appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, ruling that the rule did not violate the First Amendment and remanding the case for consideration of the APA claims. Upon remand, the district court granted the plaintiffs’ request for interim relief under the APA, finding a substantial likelihood of success on their claim that the FDA lacked statutory authority to increase the number of required warnings and that enforcement would inflict irreparable harm through unrecoverable compliance costs. The court postponed the rule’s effective date.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The Fifth Circuit held that the TCA’s nine statutory warning statements form a closed set and that the FDA exceeded its authority by requiring eleven warnings. The court also found that the equities favored interim relief and that universal postponement of the rule’s effective date was appropriate under the APA.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Don Willett</case:judge>
													<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-70012/25-70012-2026-08-18.html</id>
        	<title>Wessinger v. Vannoy</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-18T09:30:40-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-18T09:30:40-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-70012/25-70012-2026-08-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In this case, the petitioner was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death after shooting several former coworkers at a restaurant in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, in 1995. During his state post-conviction proceedings, he claimed that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance, particularly in failing to conduct an adequate mitigation investigation for the penalty phase. Despite efforts by his post-conviction counsel to secure investigative funding, those requests were denied, but counsel continued with a limited investigation.

The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and relegated the ineffective-assistance claim to post-conviction proceedings, where relief was denied. In federal court, the petitioner renewed his ineffective-assistance claim, presenting new mitigating evidence. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana initially denied relief, finding the claim had been adjudicated on the merits in state court, triggering the deferential standard of review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). After the Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan, the petitioner sought reconsideration, arguing that his new evidence fundamentally altered his claim and that inadequate state post-conviction process excused any procedural default. The district court eventually granted relief twice, both times concluding that the state process was inadequate due to denial of funding, but was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on the first occasion.

On the second appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the petitioner’s amended federal claim was not fundamentally different from his state claim and therefore had already been adjudicated on the merits by the state court. As such, the claim was subject to § 2254(d), and the district court erred by granting relief outside its constraints. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of habeas relief and remanded with instructions to enter final judgment denying the petition. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-70012/25-70012-2026-08-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Wessinger v. Vannoy" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In this case, the petitioner was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death after shooting several former coworkers at a restaurant in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, in 1995. During his state post-conviction proceedings, he claimed that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance, particularly in failing to conduct an adequate mitigation investigation for the penalty phase. Despite efforts by his post-conviction counsel to secure investigative funding, those requests were denied, but counsel continued with a limited investigation.

The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and relegated the ineffective-assistance claim to post-conviction proceedings, where relief was denied. In federal court, the petitioner renewed his ineffective-assistance claim, presenting new mitigating evidence. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana initially denied relief, finding the claim had been adjudicated on the merits in state court, triggering the deferential standard of review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). After the Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan, the petitioner sought reconsideration, arguing that his new evidence fundamentally altered his claim and that inadequate state post-conviction process excused any procedural default. The district court eventually granted relief twice, both times concluding that the state process was inadequate due to denial of funding, but was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on the first occasion.

On the second appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the petitioner’s amended federal claim was not fundamentally different from his state claim and therefore had already been adjudicated on the merits by the state court. As such, the claim was subject to § 2254(d), and the district court erred by granting relief outside its constraints. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of habeas relief and remanded with instructions to enter final judgment denying the petition.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Don Willett</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60462/25-60462-2026-08-18.html</id>
        	<title>Bonds v. Woodall</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-18T09:30:39-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-18T09:30:39-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60462/25-60462-2026-08-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A kindergarten teacher in Mississippi was frustrated after being unable to use a remote entry service to unlock her car and, during a customer service call, told an agent that she was aggravated and might “kill some little kindergarteners.” She reiterated this after her issue was resolved, saying the agent had “saved 20 children from being killed.” The agent reported the statements to the police. The responding officers met with the teacher, who admitted to the remarks but said they were taken out of context. After consulting with an Assistant District Attorney, the teacher was charged with making terroristic threats, processed, and jailed. A grand jury declined to indict her.

The teacher filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi against the city, the chief of police, and an officer, alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution under state and federal law, and a Fourteenth Amendment violation. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied their motion, and the defendants appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, finding that the facts known to the officers at the time provided probable cause for arrest, defeating the constitutional claims. The court also found that, even if the officers erred, the right to be free from arrest under these circumstances was not clearly established. The appellate court reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity and declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state law and municipal liability claims, remanding those for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60462/25-60462-2026-08-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Bonds v. Woodall" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A kindergarten teacher in Mississippi was frustrated after being unable to use a remote entry service to unlock her car and, during a customer service call, told an agent that she was aggravated and might “kill some little kindergarteners.” She reiterated this after her issue was resolved, saying the agent had “saved 20 children from being killed.” The agent reported the statements to the police. The responding officers met with the teacher, who admitted to the remarks but said they were taken out of context. After consulting with an Assistant District Attorney, the teacher was charged with making terroristic threats, processed, and jailed. A grand jury declined to indict her.

The teacher filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi against the city, the chief of police, and an officer, alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution under state and federal law, and a Fourteenth Amendment violation. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied their motion, and the defendants appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, finding that the facts known to the officers at the time provided probable cause for arrest, defeating the constitutional claims. The court also found that, even if the officers erred, the right to be free from arrest under these circumstances was not clearly established. The appellate court reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity and declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state law and municipal liability claims, remanding those for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20415/25-20415-2026-08-18.html</id>
        	<title>Quadvest v. San Jacinto River Auth</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-18T09:30:38-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-18T09:30:38-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20415/25-20415-2026-08-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A conservation district in Montgomery County, Texas, required large water users to reduce groundwater usage by 30%. To facilitate compliance, the San Jacinto River Authority (the “River Authority”), a political subdivision of Texas, created a joint groundwater reduction plan and entered into contracts with about 80 utilities, including Quadvest, L.P. (“Quadvest”). These contracts required participants to pay certain fees and, at the River Authority’s discretion, to connect to surface water provided by the River Authority. The fees aimed to equalize costs between groundwater and surface water users and to finance new infrastructure. Quadvest, a family-owned utility, initially operated only in the retail market and later expanded into wholesale water supply.

After the relevant groundwater regulations were rescinded due to political changes and litigation, Quadvest challenged the lawfulness of its contract with the River Authority in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. It alleged that the contract constituted an unlawful restraint of trade under the Sherman Act, specifically as per se illegal horizontal price-fixing and market allocation. After a bench trial, the district court found in favor of the River Authority, concluding that Quadvest failed to prove its claims.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the challenged contract did not constitute a per se illegal horizontal restraint because the parties were not competitors at the time of contracting, and the agreement was vertical in nature. The court further determined that the contract did not fix prices or allocate markets in a manner prohibited by the Sherman Act. Under the rule of reason, Quadvest also failed to define the relevant market and thus could not demonstrate anticompetitive effects. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20415/25-20415-2026-08-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Quadvest v. San Jacinto River Auth" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A conservation district in Montgomery County, Texas, required large water users to reduce groundwater usage by 30%. To facilitate compliance, the San Jacinto River Authority (the “River Authority”), a political subdivision of Texas, created a joint groundwater reduction plan and entered into contracts with about 80 utilities, including Quadvest, L.P. (“Quadvest”). These contracts required participants to pay certain fees and, at the River Authority’s discretion, to connect to surface water provided by the River Authority. The fees aimed to equalize costs between groundwater and surface water users and to finance new infrastructure. Quadvest, a family-owned utility, initially operated only in the retail market and later expanded into wholesale water supply.

After the relevant groundwater regulations were rescinded due to political changes and litigation, Quadvest challenged the lawfulness of its contract with the River Authority in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. It alleged that the contract constituted an unlawful restraint of trade under the Sherman Act, specifically as per se illegal horizontal price-fixing and market allocation. After a bench trial, the district court found in favor of the River Authority, concluding that Quadvest failed to prove its claims.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the challenged contract did not constitute a per se illegal horizontal restraint because the parties were not competitors at the time of contracting, and the agreement was vertical in nature. The court further determined that the contract did not fix prices or allocate markets in a manner prohibited by the Sherman Act. Under the rule of reason, Quadvest also failed to define the relevant market and thus could not demonstrate anticompetitive effects. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Carolyn King</case:judge>
													<category term="Antitrust &amp; Trade Regulation"/>
							<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60322/25-60322-2026-08-14.html</id>
        	<title>Olibris v. Blanche</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-14T15:30:32-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-14T15:30:32-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60322/25-60322-2026-08-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A lawful permanent resident from Haiti was admitted to the United States in 2016. He later pleaded guilty to smuggling goods, specifically exporting fifty firearms to Haiti without the required license, in violation of federal law. These firearms were concealed in vehicles shipped from Colorado to Florida, and then sent to Haiti. Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, charging him as removable for engaging in activity to violate U.S. laws prohibiting the export of goods.

An Immigration Judge with the U.S. Department of Justice sustained the charges of removability and denied his request for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The judge found his testimony lacking in candor and determined that he failed to demonstrate it was more likely than not he would be tortured if removed to Haiti. The judge noted that threats against him were speculative, not linked to government action or acquiescence, and that his relatives in Haiti remained safe. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision, rejected his argument that the removal provision should apply only to explicit national security threats, and concluded that his conviction for illegal exportation satisfied the statutory grounds for removal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court denied the petition for review, holding that the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(A)(i) covers any activity to violate laws prohibiting the export of goods, not just acts involving national security threats. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the denial of CAT deferral, as the petitioner failed to show a particularized risk of torture or government acquiescence, and that no due process violation had occurred. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60322/25-60322-2026-08-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Olibris v. Blanche" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A lawful permanent resident from Haiti was admitted to the United States in 2016. He later pleaded guilty to smuggling goods, specifically exporting fifty firearms to Haiti without the required license, in violation of federal law. These firearms were concealed in vehicles shipped from Colorado to Florida, and then sent to Haiti. Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, charging him as removable for engaging in activity to violate U.S. laws prohibiting the export of goods.

An Immigration Judge with the U.S. Department of Justice sustained the charges of removability and denied his request for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The judge found his testimony lacking in candor and determined that he failed to demonstrate it was more likely than not he would be tortured if removed to Haiti. The judge noted that threats against him were speculative, not linked to government action or acquiescence, and that his relatives in Haiti remained safe. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision, rejected his argument that the removal provision should apply only to explicit national security threats, and concluded that his conviction for illegal exportation satisfied the statutory grounds for removal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court denied the petition for review, holding that the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(A)(i) covers any activity to violate laws prohibiting the export of goods, not just acts involving national security threats. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the denial of CAT deferral, as the petitioner failed to show a particularized risk of torture or government acquiescence, and that no due process violation had occurred.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Immigration Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10372/25-10372-2026-08-14.html</id>
        	<title>Guerra Quezada v. USA</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-14T15:30:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-14T15:30:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10372/25-10372-2026-08-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Two related cases concern an uncle and nephew, both born in Mexico, who claim United States citizenship through their ancestor, Cruz Rodriguez de Guerra, a woman born in Kansas in 1924. Cruz Rodriguez de Guerra’s son, born in Mexico in 1944, is the father of the older appellant and grandfather of the younger. Both appellants were born in Mexico; one was a long-term lawful permanent resident later removed for a felony, while the other was a former lawful permanent resident subject to a voluntary departure order, a criminal conviction, and subsequent removals. The appellants argue that citizenship passed to them through Cruz Rodriguez de Guerra and seek various forms of relief, including damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, and habeas corpus.

Their cases were brought in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, where both raised claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The district court dismissed all claims. The appellants then filed timely appeals.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the consolidated appeals. The court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the damages claims because, under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), the appellants are considered aliens and the claims arise from actions associated with removal proceedings. The court also concluded that the appellants failed to exhaust administrative remedies required for declaratory judgment claims under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a), and the APA claims were jurisdictionally barred due to lack of final agency action. The habeas claim was barred because the petitioner was not “in custody,” and the due process claims were forfeited for inadequate briefing. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissals and modified one to be without prejudice due to lack of jurisdiction. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10372/25-10372-2026-08-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Guerra Quezada v. USA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Two related cases concern an uncle and nephew, both born in Mexico, who claim United States citizenship through their ancestor, Cruz Rodriguez de Guerra, a woman born in Kansas in 1924. Cruz Rodriguez de Guerra’s son, born in Mexico in 1944, is the father of the older appellant and grandfather of the younger. Both appellants were born in Mexico; one was a long-term lawful permanent resident later removed for a felony, while the other was a former lawful permanent resident subject to a voluntary departure order, a criminal conviction, and subsequent removals. The appellants argue that citizenship passed to them through Cruz Rodriguez de Guerra and seek various forms of relief, including damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, and habeas corpus.

Their cases were brought in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, where both raised claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The district court dismissed all claims. The appellants then filed timely appeals.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the consolidated appeals. The court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the damages claims because, under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), the appellants are considered aliens and the claims arise from actions associated with removal proceedings. The court also concluded that the appellants failed to exhaust administrative remedies required for declaratory judgment claims under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a), and the APA claims were jurisdictionally barred due to lack of final agency action. The habeas claim was barred because the petitioner was not “in custody,” and the due process claims were forfeited for inadequate briefing. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissals and modified one to be without prejudice due to lack of jurisdiction.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leslie Southwick</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Immigration Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20584/25-20584-2026-08-14.html</id>
        	<title>Hunter Marine Group v. Gonzalez</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-14T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-14T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20584/25-20584-2026-08-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case concerns an accident involving the Adalyn, a 38-foot commercial workboat owned by Michael Quain Neward Pittman and chartered by Hunter Marine Group, LLC. In November 2024, eight employees of Encore Dredging Partners, LLC were aboard the Adalyn during maintenance dredging operations on the Alabama River when the vessel ran aground and struck a steel pipe, resulting in injuries. The employees were performing work under a contract where Hunter Marine provided the vessel and received a daily flat fee from Encore, regardless of its use.

Following the incident, the injured Encore employees filed personal injury claims in state court against Hunter Marine and Encore. In May 2025, Hunter Marine and Pittman sought to limit their liability under the federal Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 by filing a petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district court stayed the state proceedings and ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment. It concluded that the Adalyn was a “covered small passenger vessel” excluded from the Act’s limitation of liability protections and granted summary judgment to the claimants.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment decision de novo. The central issue was whether the Adalyn qualified as a “covered small passenger vessel” by carrying “passengers for hire,” given that consideration for carriage had been provided—albeit indirectly—by Encore on behalf of its employees. The Fifth Circuit held that the statute does not require personal payment by the passenger; indirect payment by an employer suffices. Consequently, the court affirmed that the Adalyn was a covered small passenger vessel, making the Limitation of Liability Act inapplicable and upholding the district court’s summary judgment for the claimants. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20584/25-20584-2026-08-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Hunter Marine Group v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case concerns an accident involving the Adalyn, a 38-foot commercial workboat owned by Michael Quain Neward Pittman and chartered by Hunter Marine Group, LLC. In November 2024, eight employees of Encore Dredging Partners, LLC were aboard the Adalyn during maintenance dredging operations on the Alabama River when the vessel ran aground and struck a steel pipe, resulting in injuries. The employees were performing work under a contract where Hunter Marine provided the vessel and received a daily flat fee from Encore, regardless of its use.

Following the incident, the injured Encore employees filed personal injury claims in state court against Hunter Marine and Encore. In May 2025, Hunter Marine and Pittman sought to limit their liability under the federal Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 by filing a petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district court stayed the state proceedings and ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment. It concluded that the Adalyn was a “covered small passenger vessel” excluded from the Act’s limitation of liability protections and granted summary judgment to the claimants.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment decision de novo. The central issue was whether the Adalyn qualified as a “covered small passenger vessel” by carrying “passengers for hire,” given that consideration for carriage had been provided—albeit indirectly—by Encore on behalf of its employees. The Fifth Circuit held that the statute does not require personal payment by the passenger; indirect payment by an employer suffices. Consequently, the court affirmed that the Adalyn was a covered small passenger vessel, making the Limitation of Liability Act inapplicable and upholding the district court’s summary judgment for the claimants.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Edith Clement</case:judge>
													<category term="Admiralty &amp; Maritime Law"/>
							<category term="Personal Injury"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/21-70010/21-70010-2026-08-14.html</id>
        	<title>Holberg v. Guerrero</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-14T15:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-14T15:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/21-70010/21-70010-2026-08-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A woman brutally murdered an 80-year-old man in Amarillo, Texas, stabbing him 58 times, binding him, and shoving a lamp down his throat. After the murder, she used his money to buy drugs and fled the state. She later confessed to the crime. At trial, her defense was self-defense, claiming a prolonged struggle with the victim, who was frail and wheelchair-bound. The prosecution presented evidence from multiple witnesses, including the defendant’s confession relayed by her mother, police officers, and a cellmate, as well as significant physical evidence and testimony about the brutality of the crime.

A Texas jury convicted her of capital murder and sentenced her to death after finding she posed a continuing threat and that there were insufficient mitigating circumstances. On direct appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected her arguments, and the Supreme Court denied review. She then pursued state postconviction relief, raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and that the prosecution failed to disclose evidence impeaching her cellmate, a prosecution witness. The state habeas court denied these claims, finding that her lawyers’ investigation was reasonable and that the allegedly withheld information was not material.

She filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, which was denied. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit later granted relief on one claim, finding a Brady violation, but the Fifth Circuit then reheard the case en banc.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc and reviewing under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), affirmed the district court’s denial of relief. The court held that the state court’s application of Brady v. Maryland was not unreasonable under AEDPA, as the alleged suppression was not material to the outcome given the overwhelming evidence of guilt and future dangerousness. The judgment denying habeas relief was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/21-70010/21-70010-2026-08-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Holberg v. Guerrero" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A woman brutally murdered an 80-year-old man in Amarillo, Texas, stabbing him 58 times, binding him, and shoving a lamp down his throat. After the murder, she used his money to buy drugs and fled the state. She later confessed to the crime. At trial, her defense was self-defense, claiming a prolonged struggle with the victim, who was frail and wheelchair-bound. The prosecution presented evidence from multiple witnesses, including the defendant’s confession relayed by her mother, police officers, and a cellmate, as well as significant physical evidence and testimony about the brutality of the crime.

A Texas jury convicted her of capital murder and sentenced her to death after finding she posed a continuing threat and that there were insufficient mitigating circumstances. On direct appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected her arguments, and the Supreme Court denied review. She then pursued state postconviction relief, raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and that the prosecution failed to disclose evidence impeaching her cellmate, a prosecution witness. The state habeas court denied these claims, finding that her lawyers’ investigation was reasonable and that the allegedly withheld information was not material.

She filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, which was denied. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit later granted relief on one claim, finding a Brady violation, but the Fifth Circuit then reheard the case en banc.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc and reviewing under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), affirmed the district court’s denial of relief. The court held that the state court’s application of Brady v. Maryland was not unreasonable under AEDPA, as the alleged suppression was not material to the outcome given the overwhelming evidence of guilt and future dangerousness. The judgment denying habeas relief was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60475/25-60475-2026-08-14.html</id>
        	<title>Ademola v. Blanche</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-14T09:30:48-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-14T09:30:48-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60475/25-60475-2026-08-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A lawful permanent resident of the United States, who is a Nigerian citizen, pleaded guilty to willfully and knowingly using a forged or counterfeit Nigerian passport to open a bank account, violating federal law. Years after becoming a permanent resident, he was detained upon his return to the country following international travel. The Department of Homeland Security charged him with inadmissibility, alleging that his conviction was for a crime involving moral turpitude, and began removal proceedings.

An immigration judge found him inadmissible based on this conviction and ordered his removal to Nigeria. The Board of Immigration Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the immigration judge’s decision. The petitioner then sought review of the Board’s order, arguing that his conviction for false use of a passport does not qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court stated that it now independently interprets the relevant statutes, following recent Supreme Court guidance. Applying the categorical approach, the Fifth Circuit concluded that a conviction under the relevant passport fraud statute—specifically, willful and knowing use of a false, forged, or invalid passport—requires conduct that is inherently fraudulent or deceitful. The court found that all forms of conduct criminalized by the statute involve moral turpitude because they entail willful deception. Therefore, the court held that the petitioner’s conviction is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, making him inadmissible under immigration law. The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60475/25-60475-2026-08-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Ademola v. Blanche" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A lawful permanent resident of the United States, who is a Nigerian citizen, pleaded guilty to willfully and knowingly using a forged or counterfeit Nigerian passport to open a bank account, violating federal law. Years after becoming a permanent resident, he was detained upon his return to the country following international travel. The Department of Homeland Security charged him with inadmissibility, alleging that his conviction was for a crime involving moral turpitude, and began removal proceedings.

An immigration judge found him inadmissible based on this conviction and ordered his removal to Nigeria. The Board of Immigration Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the immigration judge’s decision. The petitioner then sought review of the Board’s order, arguing that his conviction for false use of a passport does not qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court stated that it now independently interprets the relevant statutes, following recent Supreme Court guidance. Applying the categorical approach, the Fifth Circuit concluded that a conviction under the relevant passport fraud statute—specifically, willful and knowing use of a false, forged, or invalid passport—requires conduct that is inherently fraudulent or deceitful. The court found that all forms of conduct criminalized by the statute involve moral turpitude because they entail willful deception. Therefore, the court held that the petitioner’s conviction is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, making him inadmissible under immigration law. The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Andrew Oldham</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Immigration Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11185/25-11185-2026-08-14.html</id>
        	<title>NexPoint v. Highland</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-14T09:30:48-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-14T09:30:48-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11185/25-11185-2026-08-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Highland Capital Management, L.P. and HCRE Partners (now NexPoint Real Estate Partners) collaborated on a large real estate project in 2018, forming SE Multifamily Holdings, LLC to acquire substantial residential assets. HCRE, controlled by James Dondero, and Highland structured their membership interests in the LLC through an amended agreement after another investor joined. When Highland later entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy, HCRE, led by Dondero, filed a proof of claim asserting entitlement to distributions and seeking contract reformation regarding membership allocation. Both Dondero and another officer, Matt McGraner, admitted during litigation that their claim lacked merit, and evidence showed the claim was filed without investigation, likely to protect SE Multifamily’s assets from Highland’s creditors.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas oversaw the proceedings, including extensive discovery and a motion to disqualify HCRE’s counsel, which the court granted. As discovery continued, HCRE sought to withdraw its claim two days before critical depositions, but the bankruptcy court denied the motion, finding withdrawal would prejudice Highland. After a bench trial, the bankruptcy court ruled against HCRE, rejecting its contract reformation theory and disallowing its proof of claim. Subsequently, the court imposed sanctions on HCRE, finding bad faith in both the filing and litigation of the claim. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas affirmed the imposition of sanctions.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower courts’ decisions. The Fifth Circuit held that clear and convincing evidence supported the bankruptcy court’s finding that HCRE acted in bad faith by filing a baseless claim and litigating it in bad faith, including frivolously opposing the disqualification of counsel and seeking to withdraw the claim to avoid discovery while preserving it for future litigation. The court also held the sanctions were causally related to HCRE’s conduct and not an abuse of discretion. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11185/25-11185-2026-08-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "NexPoint v. Highland" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Highland Capital Management, L.P. and HCRE Partners (now NexPoint Real Estate Partners) collaborated on a large real estate project in 2018, forming SE Multifamily Holdings, LLC to acquire substantial residential assets. HCRE, controlled by James Dondero, and Highland structured their membership interests in the LLC through an amended agreement after another investor joined. When Highland later entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy, HCRE, led by Dondero, filed a proof of claim asserting entitlement to distributions and seeking contract reformation regarding membership allocation. Both Dondero and another officer, Matt McGraner, admitted during litigation that their claim lacked merit, and evidence showed the claim was filed without investigation, likely to protect SE Multifamily’s assets from Highland’s creditors.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas oversaw the proceedings, including extensive discovery and a motion to disqualify HCRE’s counsel, which the court granted. As discovery continued, HCRE sought to withdraw its claim two days before critical depositions, but the bankruptcy court denied the motion, finding withdrawal would prejudice Highland. After a bench trial, the bankruptcy court ruled against HCRE, rejecting its contract reformation theory and disallowing its proof of claim. Subsequently, the court imposed sanctions on HCRE, finding bad faith in both the filing and litigation of the claim. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas affirmed the imposition of sanctions.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower courts’ decisions. The Fifth Circuit held that clear and convincing evidence supported the bankruptcy court’s finding that HCRE acted in bad faith by filing a baseless claim and litigating it in bad faith, including frivolously opposing the disqualification of counsel and seeking to withdraw the claim to avoid discovery while preserving it for future litigation. The court also held the sanctions were causally related to HCRE’s conduct and not an abuse of discretion.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James Graves</case:judge>
													<category term="Bankruptcy"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Legal Ethics"/>
							<category term="Professional Malpractice &amp; Ethics"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-30018/26-30018-2026-08-14.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Morgan</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-14T09:30:48-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-14T09:30:48-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-30018/26-30018-2026-08-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Terrance Morgan was serving a term of supervised release after completing a federal sentence for firearm and drug offenses. During his supervision, Morgan committed several violations: he failed to attend substance abuse treatment, had multiple positive drug tests for controlled substances, did not report to or communicate with his probation officer as required, failed to provide proof of employment, and was convicted in state court for battery upon a dating partner and simple battery. Following his arrest for these violations, Morgan completed a thirty-day inpatient drug treatment program and was placed on home detention with location monitoring.

After these events, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held a revocation hearing. Morgan admitted to the violations but argued that his recent successful completion of inpatient treatment warranted an exception to mandatory revocation of his supervised release. His counsel requested a continuance to allow for further demonstration of progress, but the district court denied the request, revoked his supervised release, and imposed an eight-month prison sentence followed by another term of supervised release. The court expressed concern about the escalation of Morgan’s behavior and the seriousness of the domestic violence conviction. A motion to reconsider was subsequently denied.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Morgan’s claims that the district court failed to consider the statutory exception for drug treatment, relied on erroneous facts, applied the wrong version of the Sentencing Guidelines, and abused its discretion in denying a continuance. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not err in declining to apply the drug treatment exception, did not clearly err in its factual findings, made only harmless error in referencing an earlier version of the Guidelines, and did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-30018/26-30018-2026-08-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Morgan" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Terrance Morgan was serving a term of supervised release after completing a federal sentence for firearm and drug offenses. During his supervision, Morgan committed several violations: he failed to attend substance abuse treatment, had multiple positive drug tests for controlled substances, did not report to or communicate with his probation officer as required, failed to provide proof of employment, and was convicted in state court for battery upon a dating partner and simple battery. Following his arrest for these violations, Morgan completed a thirty-day inpatient drug treatment program and was placed on home detention with location monitoring.

After these events, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held a revocation hearing. Morgan admitted to the violations but argued that his recent successful completion of inpatient treatment warranted an exception to mandatory revocation of his supervised release. His counsel requested a continuance to allow for further demonstration of progress, but the district court denied the request, revoked his supervised release, and imposed an eight-month prison sentence followed by another term of supervised release. The court expressed concern about the escalation of Morgan’s behavior and the seriousness of the domestic violence conviction. A motion to reconsider was subsequently denied.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Morgan’s claims that the district court failed to consider the statutory exception for drug treatment, relied on erroneous facts, applied the wrong version of the Sentencing Guidelines, and abused its discretion in denying a continuance. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not err in declining to apply the drug treatment exception, did not clearly err in its factual findings, made only harmless error in referencing an earlier version of the Guidelines, and did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Carl Stewart</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10534/25-10534-2026-08-13.html</id>
        	<title>W.M.M. v. Trump</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-13T15:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-13T15:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10534/25-10534-2026-08-13.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Three Venezuelan nationals, alleged by the government to be members of the Tren de Aragua gang, were detained in Texas following a presidential proclamation under the Alien Enemies Act (AEA). This proclamation, issued in March 2025, authorized immediate removal of Venezuelan citizens aged fourteen or older, residing in the United States, who were not naturalized or lawful permanent residents and were identified as members of the gang. The petitioners challenged the proclamation, arguing that it exceeded the President’s authority under the AEA and violated due process rights. They sought class certification and injunctive relief to prevent removal under the AEA.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied temporary restraining orders and class certification. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit initially dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, in A.A.R.P. v. Trump, vacated that dismissal and remanded, instructing the Fifth Circuit to address two issues: whether the petitioners were entitled to a preliminary injunction against removal under the AEA, and whether the notice provided for due process claims was sufficient for the putative class. The Supreme Court also allowed the government to remove the petitioners under other lawful authorities.

After remand, the three named petitioners were removed from the United States under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), not the AEA. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that, because the petitioners were no longer in the country and no class had been certified, it was impossible to grant any effectual relief. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot for lack of jurisdiction, declining to substitute new class representatives on appeal but leaving open the possibility for future proceedings in the district court. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10534/25-10534-2026-08-13.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "W.M.M. v. Trump" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Three Venezuelan nationals, alleged by the government to be members of the Tren de Aragua gang, were detained in Texas following a presidential proclamation under the Alien Enemies Act (AEA). This proclamation, issued in March 2025, authorized immediate removal of Venezuelan citizens aged fourteen or older, residing in the United States, who were not naturalized or lawful permanent residents and were identified as members of the gang. The petitioners challenged the proclamation, arguing that it exceeded the President’s authority under the AEA and violated due process rights. They sought class certification and injunctive relief to prevent removal under the AEA.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied temporary restraining orders and class certification. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit initially dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, in A.A.R.P. v. Trump, vacated that dismissal and remanded, instructing the Fifth Circuit to address two issues: whether the petitioners were entitled to a preliminary injunction against removal under the AEA, and whether the notice provided for due process claims was sufficient for the putative class. The Supreme Court also allowed the government to remove the petitioners under other lawful authorities.

After remand, the three named petitioners were removed from the United States under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), not the AEA. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that, because the petitioners were no longer in the country and no class had been certified, it was impossible to grant any effectual relief. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot for lack of jurisdiction, declining to substitute new class representatives on appeal but leaving open the possibility for future proceedings in the district court.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-13</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Immigration Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60202/25-60202-2026-08-12.html</id>
        	<title>Citizens for Clean Air v. Department of Transportation</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-12T15:30:41-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-12T15:30:41-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60202/25-60202-2026-08-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A company applied to construct a deepwater port off the coast of Texas, including a pipeline that would cross the pipeline of another recently approved deepwater port. The relevant federal statute, the Deepwater Port Act of 1974 (DWPA), requires that only one deepwater port be licensed per “application area.” An environmental group, comprised of local residents near the proposed pipeline and tank farm, objected to the approval, claiming that the pipeline should have been included in the application area. Their concerns included increased risks of flooding, pollution, and negative impacts on property value and quality of life.

The United States Maritime Administration (MARAD), acting under authority delegated by the Secretary of Transportation, processed the application. Unlike with previous applications for similar projects, MARAD excluded the proposed pipeline from Texas GulfLink’s application area, reasoning that the DWPA gave it discretion to do so. MARAD then approved Texas GulfLink’s application. The environmental group filed a timely petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, challenging MARAD’s decision on the basis that it violated the DWPA.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the DWPA requires the application area to encompass the entire deepwater port site, including pipelines located seaward of the high water mark. The court found MARAD’s designation of the application area to be unlawful because, if the pipeline had been properly included, the application area would overlap with that of another approved port, contrary to the DWPA’s requirement. The court granted the petition for review, vacated MARAD’s approval of the application, and remanded the matter for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60202/25-60202-2026-08-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Citizens for Clean Air v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A company applied to construct a deepwater port off the coast of Texas, including a pipeline that would cross the pipeline of another recently approved deepwater port. The relevant federal statute, the Deepwater Port Act of 1974 (DWPA), requires that only one deepwater port be licensed per “application area.” An environmental group, comprised of local residents near the proposed pipeline and tank farm, objected to the approval, claiming that the pipeline should have been included in the application area. Their concerns included increased risks of flooding, pollution, and negative impacts on property value and quality of life.

The United States Maritime Administration (MARAD), acting under authority delegated by the Secretary of Transportation, processed the application. Unlike with previous applications for similar projects, MARAD excluded the proposed pipeline from Texas GulfLink’s application area, reasoning that the DWPA gave it discretion to do so. MARAD then approved Texas GulfLink’s application. The environmental group filed a timely petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, challenging MARAD’s decision on the basis that it violated the DWPA.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the DWPA requires the application area to encompass the entire deepwater port site, including pipelines located seaward of the high water mark. The court found MARAD’s designation of the application area to be unlawful because, if the pipeline had been properly included, the application area would overlap with that of another approved port, contrary to the DWPA’s requirement. The court granted the petition for review, vacated MARAD’s approval of the application, and remanded the matter for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Edith Clement</case:judge>
													<category term="Environmental Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Admiralty &amp; Maritime Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50246/25-50246-2026-08-12.html</id>
        	<title>La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-12T15:30:40-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-12T15:30:40-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50246/25-50246-2026-08-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several organizations and individuals challenged provisions of a 2021 Texas law known as Senate Bill 1, which imposed new requirements on mail-in voting, regulated voter assistance, and restricted compensation for certain election-related activities. The plaintiffs, including advocacy groups and individuals with disabilities, argued that these provisions discriminated against voters with disabilities in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Key facts included reports of rejected mail-in ballots due to missing identification numbers and claims that the law’s requirements created barriers for disabled voters.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas held a bench trial and found that nine provisions of Senate Bill 1 were inconsistent with the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court permanently enjoined the Texas Secretary of State and various local officials from enforcing these provisions. The defendants, including the Governor of Texas and other state and county officials, appealed the injunction.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision in its entirety. The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the identification provisions, as they could not show a substantial risk of future injury to any specific member or demonstrate organizational standing under Supreme Court precedent. The court also found that the plaintiffs’ challenges to voter assistance and compensation provisions were foreclosed by prior Fifth Circuit decisions and failed for lack of standing or on the merits. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court’s grant of permanent injunctive relief was improper and reversed the injunction, declining to interfere with the Texas Legislature’s election regulations. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50246/25-50246-2026-08-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several organizations and individuals challenged provisions of a 2021 Texas law known as Senate Bill 1, which imposed new requirements on mail-in voting, regulated voter assistance, and restricted compensation for certain election-related activities. The plaintiffs, including advocacy groups and individuals with disabilities, argued that these provisions discriminated against voters with disabilities in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Key facts included reports of rejected mail-in ballots due to missing identification numbers and claims that the law’s requirements created barriers for disabled voters.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas held a bench trial and found that nine provisions of Senate Bill 1 were inconsistent with the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court permanently enjoined the Texas Secretary of State and various local officials from enforcing these provisions. The defendants, including the Governor of Texas and other state and county officials, appealed the injunction.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision in its entirety. The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the identification provisions, as they could not show a substantial risk of future injury to any specific member or demonstrate organizational standing under Supreme Court precedent. The court also found that the plaintiffs’ challenges to voter assistance and compensation provisions were foreclosed by prior Fifth Circuit decisions and failed for lack of standing or on the merits. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court’s grant of permanent injunctive relief was improper and reversed the injunction, declining to interfere with the Texas Legislature’s election regulations.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Andrew Oldham</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Election Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-50378/24-50378-2026-08-12.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Brann</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-12T15:30:39-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-12T15:30:39-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-50378/24-50378-2026-08-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Gerald Talman Brann pleaded guilty to sexually exploiting his stepdaughter, agreeing that he and his wife had photographed and videoed sexual abuse of the child and distributed these materials online. The victim, who was as young as six at the time of some offenses, suffered significant psychological and emotional harm, now requiring therapy, tutoring, and counseling. Brann’s plea agreement included a commitment to pay at least $100,000 in restitution for the child&#039;s future counseling costs, and he waived his right to appeal his conviction, sentence, or restitution order.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas accepted Brann’s guilty plea to one count under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), sentenced him to 360 months in prison and a lifetime of supervised release, and ordered $100,000 in restitution. The court’s findings were based on the plea agreement, a presentence investigation report, and a victim impact statement outlining the child&#039;s ongoing and anticipated needs. Brann did not object to the restitution order at sentencing.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Brann argued that the restitution exceeded the statutory maximum under 18 U.S.C. § 2259 because the amount was not supported by evidence of the victim’s actual or projected losses. The Fifth Circuit held that an appeal waiver does not bar a claim that a sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, and reviewed the restitution order de novo. The court determined that Brann’s admissions, along with corroborating evidence and precedent from similar cases, provided sufficient support for the $100,000 amount. The court affirmed the restitution order and remanded the case to the district court solely to correct a clerical error in the written judgment regarding the offense of conviction. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-50378/24-50378-2026-08-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Brann" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Gerald Talman Brann pleaded guilty to sexually exploiting his stepdaughter, agreeing that he and his wife had photographed and videoed sexual abuse of the child and distributed these materials online. The victim, who was as young as six at the time of some offenses, suffered significant psychological and emotional harm, now requiring therapy, tutoring, and counseling. Brann’s plea agreement included a commitment to pay at least $100,000 in restitution for the child&#039;s future counseling costs, and he waived his right to appeal his conviction, sentence, or restitution order.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas accepted Brann’s guilty plea to one count under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), sentenced him to 360 months in prison and a lifetime of supervised release, and ordered $100,000 in restitution. The court’s findings were based on the plea agreement, a presentence investigation report, and a victim impact statement outlining the child&#039;s ongoing and anticipated needs. Brann did not object to the restitution order at sentencing.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Brann argued that the restitution exceeded the statutory maximum under 18 U.S.C. § 2259 because the amount was not supported by evidence of the victim’s actual or projected losses. The Fifth Circuit held that an appeal waiver does not bar a claim that a sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, and reviewed the restitution order de novo. The court determined that Brann’s admissions, along with corroborating evidence and precedent from similar cases, provided sufficient support for the $100,000 amount. The court affirmed the restitution order and remanded the case to the district court solely to correct a clerical error in the written judgment regarding the offense of conviction.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Priscilla Richman</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60529/24-60529-2026-08-11.html</id>
        	<title>State of Mississippi v. DOE</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-11T10:00:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-11T10:00:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60529/24-60529-2026-08-11.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several states challenged a federal agency’s attempt to set new energy efficiency standards for consumer cooking appliances, including gas stoves. The Department of Energy (DOE) had initially tried to implement these standards through the standard notice-and-comment rulemaking process, but after facing substantial opposition, including critical comments from industry groups and states, it abandoned that effort. Subsequently, the DOE used a “Direct Final Rule” (DFR) process to impose similar standards, bypassing the usual public comment period by relying on a joint statement from selected stakeholders. The new rule included a ban on certain power supplies and set limits on annual energy consumption for appliances.

After the DFR was published, the DOE solicited public comments as required by statute. Several states, led by Nebraska, Utah, and Montana, submitted timely adverse comments on the last day of the comment period, arguing that the joint statement did not fairly represent all stakeholders, particularly states opposed to the rule. They also asserted that the DOE failed to properly consider the impact on product reliability and lifespan. The DOE later issued a notice confirming it would not withdraw the DFR, despite these objections.

The case was then reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The court first held that it had authority to review the petition, determining that the rule became “prescribed” for purposes of judicial review only when the DOE confirmed its adherence to the DFR after considering comments. On the merits, the Fifth Circuit found that the DOE failed to meet statutory requirements for using the DFR process, especially by excluding key stakeholders and not adequately addressing concerns about reliability and economic justification. The court granted the states’ petition for review, set aside the rule, and remanded the matter to the DOE for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60529/24-60529-2026-08-11.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "State of Mississippi v. DOE" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several states challenged a federal agency’s attempt to set new energy efficiency standards for consumer cooking appliances, including gas stoves. The Department of Energy (DOE) had initially tried to implement these standards through the standard notice-and-comment rulemaking process, but after facing substantial opposition, including critical comments from industry groups and states, it abandoned that effort. Subsequently, the DOE used a “Direct Final Rule” (DFR) process to impose similar standards, bypassing the usual public comment period by relying on a joint statement from selected stakeholders. The new rule included a ban on certain power supplies and set limits on annual energy consumption for appliances.

After the DFR was published, the DOE solicited public comments as required by statute. Several states, led by Nebraska, Utah, and Montana, submitted timely adverse comments on the last day of the comment period, arguing that the joint statement did not fairly represent all stakeholders, particularly states opposed to the rule. They also asserted that the DOE failed to properly consider the impact on product reliability and lifespan. The DOE later issued a notice confirming it would not withdraw the DFR, despite these objections.

The case was then reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The court first held that it had authority to review the petition, determining that the rule became “prescribed” for purposes of judicial review only when the DOE confirmed its adherence to the DFR after considering comments. On the merits, the Fifth Circuit found that the DOE failed to meet statutory requirements for using the DFR process, especially by excluding key stakeholders and not adequately addressing concerns about reliability and economic justification. The court granted the states’ petition for review, set aside the rule, and remanded the matter to the DOE for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Andrew Oldham</case:judge>
													<category term="Energy, Oil &amp; Gas Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50072/25-50072-2026-08-07.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Mendoza</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-07T15:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-07T15:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50072/25-50072-2026-08-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Federal agents discovered that an individual in San Antonio, Texas had accessed a website on the dark web featuring child sexual abuse material. Upon executing a search warrant, investigators found thousands of illicit images and videos on the suspect&#039;s devices. The defendant subsequently pled guilty to receipt of child pornography under federal law. Because the defendant had a prior Texas state conviction for possession of child pornography, federal prosecutors sought a statutory sentencing enhancement that significantly increased the minimum and maximum prison terms.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas rejected the defendant’s argument that the enhancement was inapplicable, finding the prior Texas conviction sufficiently related to the federal offense. The district judge sentenced the defendant to the enhanced minimum of fifteen years and ordered him to pay $94,000 in restitution to fourteen victims. The defendant’s objections to both the enhancement and the restitution order were overruled.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation issue de novo and the restitution issues for plain error. The court held that the phrase “relating to” in 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1) should be given its ordinary, broad meaning, affirming the district court’s application of the sentencing enhancement. The court also affirmed the restitution order for eleven victims, finding the district court had an adequate basis for proximate-cause analysis as required by Paroline v. United States. However, the court vacated the restitution order for three victims, concluding the record lacked sufficient evidence of proximate-cause analysis for those individuals, and remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50072/25-50072-2026-08-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Mendoza" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Federal agents discovered that an individual in San Antonio, Texas had accessed a website on the dark web featuring child sexual abuse material. Upon executing a search warrant, investigators found thousands of illicit images and videos on the suspect&#039;s devices. The defendant subsequently pled guilty to receipt of child pornography under federal law. Because the defendant had a prior Texas state conviction for possession of child pornography, federal prosecutors sought a statutory sentencing enhancement that significantly increased the minimum and maximum prison terms.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas rejected the defendant’s argument that the enhancement was inapplicable, finding the prior Texas conviction sufficiently related to the federal offense. The district judge sentenced the defendant to the enhanced minimum of fifteen years and ordered him to pay $94,000 in restitution to fourteen victims. The defendant’s objections to both the enhancement and the restitution order were overruled.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation issue de novo and the restitution issues for plain error. The court held that the phrase “relating to” in 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1) should be given its ordinary, broad meaning, affirming the district court’s application of the sentencing enhancement. The court also affirmed the restitution order for eleven victims, finding the district court had an adequate basis for proximate-cause analysis as required by Paroline v. United States. However, the court vacated the restitution order for three victims, concluding the record lacked sufficient evidence of proximate-cause analysis for those individuals, and remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Cory Wilson</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10322/25-10322-2026-08-07.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Williams</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-07T15:30:28-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-07T15:30:28-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10322/25-10322-2026-08-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, admitting to prior felony convictions in California, including robbery and a drug offense. The presentence report assigned him a higher base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines, finding he had two qualifying prior convictions: the California robbery and the California drug conviction. The report also added two criminal history points for the drug conviction, noting that attorney representation was unknown but citing California law requiring counsel or a valid waiver for felony defendants. After reductions for acceptance of responsibility, the Guidelines range was set at 77 to 96 months.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas adopted the presentence report’s findings and sentenced the defendant to 77 months imprisonment. The defendant objected to the classification of his California robbery conviction as a crime of violence under the newer Guideline definition and to the inclusion of criminal history points for the drug conviction, arguing it was uncounseled. The district court overruled his objections, relying on precedent and the record’s presumption of lawful procedure.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted the defendant’s motion to supplement the record. It reviewed de novo whether California robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the amended Guidelines. The court held that California robbery is a categorical match for the Guidelines’ definition of robbery, which does not require a specific mens rea, thus qualifying as a crime of violence. The court also reviewed the addition of criminal history points for the drug conviction for plain error and found no clear or obvious error, given the presumption of regularity for state convictions and insufficient evidence of a constitutional violation. The court affirmed the judgment and sentence of the district court. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10322/25-10322-2026-08-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Williams" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, admitting to prior felony convictions in California, including robbery and a drug offense. The presentence report assigned him a higher base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines, finding he had two qualifying prior convictions: the California robbery and the California drug conviction. The report also added two criminal history points for the drug conviction, noting that attorney representation was unknown but citing California law requiring counsel or a valid waiver for felony defendants. After reductions for acceptance of responsibility, the Guidelines range was set at 77 to 96 months.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas adopted the presentence report’s findings and sentenced the defendant to 77 months imprisonment. The defendant objected to the classification of his California robbery conviction as a crime of violence under the newer Guideline definition and to the inclusion of criminal history points for the drug conviction, arguing it was uncounseled. The district court overruled his objections, relying on precedent and the record’s presumption of lawful procedure.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted the defendant’s motion to supplement the record. It reviewed de novo whether California robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the amended Guidelines. The court held that California robbery is a categorical match for the Guidelines’ definition of robbery, which does not require a specific mens rea, thus qualifying as a crime of violence. The court also reviewed the addition of criminal history points for the drug conviction for plain error and found no clear or obvious error, given the presumption of regularity for state convictions and insufficient evidence of a constitutional violation. The court affirmed the judgment and sentence of the district court.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20036/25-20036-2026-08-06.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Deluna</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-06T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-06T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20036/25-20036-2026-08-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		An investigator with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives received a referral regarding Karina Deluna’s purchase of eight firearms from a Houston pawn shop, one of which was later recovered in Mexico. Subsequent investigation revealed strong indicators of “straw purchasing,” meaning Deluna falsely claimed she was buying the firearms for herself, but was actually acquiring them for others in exchange for commission. Special Agents conducted three interviews with Deluna, none of which included Miranda warnings. During these interviews, Deluna eventually confessed to purchasing firearms for her sister-in-law’s boyfriend, and a search of her phone uncovered further incriminating evidence. Deluna and her associate, Haley Medlin, were indicted on charges related to false statements on firearm records, conspiracy, and smuggling.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas presided over the trial. Medlin pled guilty to aiding and abetting and received probation. Deluna was tried on a superseding indictment for conspiracy, smuggling, and seven counts of false statements. At trial, Medlin and Special Agent Bynog testified, and recordings of Deluna’s interviews and her written confession were admitted. The jury found Deluna guilty of conspiracy and all false statement counts, but acquitted her of smuggling. The court sentenced Deluna to an aggregate of 87 months’ imprisonment, within the Sentencing Guidelines range. Deluna timely appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Deluna’s challenges to the voluntariness of her statements, evidentiary rulings, and the reasonableness of her sentence. The court held that the second interview was voluntary and the admission of the third interview, even if involuntary, was harmless error due to cumulative evidence and overwhelming proof of guilt. The evidentiary rulings were not abuses of discretion, and Deluna’s sentence was substantively reasonable. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20036/25-20036-2026-08-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Deluna" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                An investigator with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives received a referral regarding Karina Deluna’s purchase of eight firearms from a Houston pawn shop, one of which was later recovered in Mexico. Subsequent investigation revealed strong indicators of “straw purchasing,” meaning Deluna falsely claimed she was buying the firearms for herself, but was actually acquiring them for others in exchange for commission. Special Agents conducted three interviews with Deluna, none of which included Miranda warnings. During these interviews, Deluna eventually confessed to purchasing firearms for her sister-in-law’s boyfriend, and a search of her phone uncovered further incriminating evidence. Deluna and her associate, Haley Medlin, were indicted on charges related to false statements on firearm records, conspiracy, and smuggling.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas presided over the trial. Medlin pled guilty to aiding and abetting and received probation. Deluna was tried on a superseding indictment for conspiracy, smuggling, and seven counts of false statements. At trial, Medlin and Special Agent Bynog testified, and recordings of Deluna’s interviews and her written confession were admitted. The jury found Deluna guilty of conspiracy and all false statement counts, but acquitted her of smuggling. The court sentenced Deluna to an aggregate of 87 months’ imprisonment, within the Sentencing Guidelines range. Deluna timely appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Deluna’s challenges to the voluntariness of her statements, evidentiary rulings, and the reasonableness of her sentence. The court held that the second interview was voluntary and the admission of the third interview, even if involuntary, was harmless error due to cumulative evidence and overwhelming proof of guilt. The evidentiary rulings were not abuses of discretion, and Deluna’s sentence was substantively reasonable. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leslie Southwick</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60383/25-60383-2026-08-06.html</id>
        	<title>Knighton v. Benton County</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-06T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-06T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60383/25-60383-2026-08-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Chelsea Knighton, who was married to Rob Graves, experienced an incident involving multiple individuals in Benton County, Mississippi. After Rob was reportedly found passed out at a gas station, his mother, Kathy Graves (the Circuit Clerk), took him to see parole officer Steve Belew. The three then went to Knighton and Rob&#039;s home, where conflicting accounts arose: Knighton claimed Belew forcibly administered a drug test and announced a positive result without showing evidence, while the defendants asserted Knighton consented to the test. Subsequently, Sheriff Robert Goolsby arrested Knighton, leading to her losing custody of her children to Kathy for over a year, although charges were later dropped.

Knighton filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi against Kathy, Belew, Goolsby, and Benton County, alleging various federal and state-law violations. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, including their claim of qualified immunity. The defendants appealed, seeking review of the denial of qualified immunity and other defenses.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court dismissed Benton County’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction because municipalities are not entitled to interlocutory appeals from denials of summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment for Kathy on all federal claims, finding she did not act under color of law, and for certain state-law claims. The court also granted summary judgment to Belew and Goolsby on particular claims, such as false arrest and abuse of process, but allowed others—including claims for unlawful seizure, excessive force, fabrication of evidence, violation of familial association rights, and conspiracy—to proceed to trial due to genuine disputes of material fact. The remaining claims are remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60383/25-60383-2026-08-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Knighton v. Benton County" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Chelsea Knighton, who was married to Rob Graves, experienced an incident involving multiple individuals in Benton County, Mississippi. After Rob was reportedly found passed out at a gas station, his mother, Kathy Graves (the Circuit Clerk), took him to see parole officer Steve Belew. The three then went to Knighton and Rob&#039;s home, where conflicting accounts arose: Knighton claimed Belew forcibly administered a drug test and announced a positive result without showing evidence, while the defendants asserted Knighton consented to the test. Subsequently, Sheriff Robert Goolsby arrested Knighton, leading to her losing custody of her children to Kathy for over a year, although charges were later dropped.

Knighton filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi against Kathy, Belew, Goolsby, and Benton County, alleging various federal and state-law violations. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, including their claim of qualified immunity. The defendants appealed, seeking review of the denial of qualified immunity and other defenses.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court dismissed Benton County’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction because municipalities are not entitled to interlocutory appeals from denials of summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment for Kathy on all federal claims, finding she did not act under color of law, and for certain state-law claims. The court also granted summary judgment to Belew and Goolsby on particular claims, such as false arrest and abuse of process, but allowed others—including claims for unlawful seizure, excessive force, fabrication of evidence, violation of familial association rights, and conspiracy—to proceed to trial due to genuine disputes of material fact. The remaining claims are remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James Graves</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50714/25-50714-2026-08-06.html</id>
        	<title>Rivera Castelan v. Taylor</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-06T15:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-06T15:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50714/25-50714-2026-08-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Moctezuma Rivera-Castelan was arrested in Kinney County, Texas, as part of Operation Lone Star, a state initiative targeting unlawful migrants. Rivera was charged with criminal trespass in a disaster area and processed at the Val Verde Processing Center. Due to a paperwork error at the facility, Rivera did not receive appointed counsel for nearly three months, and his initial attorney performed no work on his case for six months. After a new attorney was appointed, she promptly challenged his detention, resulting in the prosecutor dropping the charges and Rivera’s release after 252 days in custody.

The case was brought in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. Rivera sued several defendants, including Ronny Taylor, the Val Verde facility administrator, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments. Rivera asserted that Taylor had a nondiscretionary duty, typically assigned to a magistrate, to transmit appointed counsel paperwork within 24 hours. The district court denied Taylor&#039;s motion to dismiss, holding that Taylor exceeded his discretionary authority and was therefore not entitled to qualified immunity.

Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity de novo. The Fifth Circuit found that, under Texas law, the statutory duty to transmit counsel appointment paperwork is assigned to the magistrate, not to the facility administrator, and may not be delegated to executive officials. The court concluded that Taylor acted within his discretionary authority and that Rivera failed to show Taylor violated a clearly established federal right. Therefore, Taylor was entitled to qualified immunity. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, dismissed Rivera’s claim against Taylor, and remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50714/25-50714-2026-08-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Rivera Castelan v. Taylor" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Moctezuma Rivera-Castelan was arrested in Kinney County, Texas, as part of Operation Lone Star, a state initiative targeting unlawful migrants. Rivera was charged with criminal trespass in a disaster area and processed at the Val Verde Processing Center. Due to a paperwork error at the facility, Rivera did not receive appointed counsel for nearly three months, and his initial attorney performed no work on his case for six months. After a new attorney was appointed, she promptly challenged his detention, resulting in the prosecutor dropping the charges and Rivera’s release after 252 days in custody.

The case was brought in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. Rivera sued several defendants, including Ronny Taylor, the Val Verde facility administrator, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments. Rivera asserted that Taylor had a nondiscretionary duty, typically assigned to a magistrate, to transmit appointed counsel paperwork within 24 hours. The district court denied Taylor&#039;s motion to dismiss, holding that Taylor exceeded his discretionary authority and was therefore not entitled to qualified immunity.

Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity de novo. The Fifth Circuit found that, under Texas law, the statutory duty to transmit counsel appointment paperwork is assigned to the magistrate, not to the facility administrator, and may not be delegated to executive officials. The court concluded that Taylor acted within his discretionary authority and that Rivera failed to show Taylor violated a clearly established federal right. Therefore, Taylor was entitled to qualified immunity. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, dismissed Rivera’s claim against Taylor, and remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James Graves</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60504/25-60504-2026-08-06.html</id>
        	<title>Eqbal v. Blanche</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-06T09:30:56-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-06T09:30:56-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60504/25-60504-2026-08-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A citizen of Afghanistan who had worked as security personnel for high-ranking Afghan government officials fled the country after the Taliban regained control in 2021. The Taliban targeted him and his family due to his former employment and Tajik ethnicity, leading them to go into hiding and eventually leave Afghanistan. Upon arriving in the United States in 2024, he sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, fearing that returning to Afghanistan would result in his death.

An Immigration Judge found him removable for lacking valid entry documents and denied all relief after concluding that his testimony was not credible. The judge based this adverse credibility determination mainly on perceived discrepancies about his employment history and the dates he held certain positions, as well as inconsistencies regarding his past imprisonment and harm to his family. The Immigration Judge also found that he failed to provide sufficient corroborating evidence. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed these findings and dismissed his appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the adverse credibility determination was not supported by substantial evidence. The court determined there were no material inconsistencies in the applicant’s testimony regarding his employment history or his account of prior imprisonment; any discrepancies were the result of translation errors between the Afghan and Gregorian calendars. The court also concluded that the agency failed to meaningfully consider key pieces of evidence, including photographs, government identification cards, and Taliban-issued warrants for his arrest. The Fifth Circuit therefore granted the petition for review, vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The agency was instructed to reconsider the credibility determination and to meaningfully evaluate key supporting evidence. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60504/25-60504-2026-08-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Eqbal v. Blanche" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A citizen of Afghanistan who had worked as security personnel for high-ranking Afghan government officials fled the country after the Taliban regained control in 2021. The Taliban targeted him and his family due to his former employment and Tajik ethnicity, leading them to go into hiding and eventually leave Afghanistan. Upon arriving in the United States in 2024, he sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, fearing that returning to Afghanistan would result in his death.

An Immigration Judge found him removable for lacking valid entry documents and denied all relief after concluding that his testimony was not credible. The judge based this adverse credibility determination mainly on perceived discrepancies about his employment history and the dates he held certain positions, as well as inconsistencies regarding his past imprisonment and harm to his family. The Immigration Judge also found that he failed to provide sufficient corroborating evidence. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed these findings and dismissed his appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the adverse credibility determination was not supported by substantial evidence. The court determined there were no material inconsistencies in the applicant’s testimony regarding his employment history or his account of prior imprisonment; any discrepancies were the result of translation errors between the Afghan and Gregorian calendars. The court also concluded that the agency failed to meaningfully consider key pieces of evidence, including photographs, government identification cards, and Taliban-issued warrants for his arrest. The Fifth Circuit therefore granted the petition for review, vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The agency was instructed to reconsider the credibility determination and to meaningfully evaluate key supporting evidence.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kurt Engelhardt</case:judge>
													<category term="Immigration Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20475/25-20475-2026-08-06.html</id>
        	<title>Adler v. Energy Debt Holdings</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-06T09:30:54-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-06T09:30:54-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20475/25-20475-2026-08-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A business entity filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and the priority of two loans was disputed: one held by the Small Business Administration (SBA Note), and another by Energy Debt Holdings LLC (EDH Note). During the bankruptcy proceedings, the bankruptcy court entered a Final Cash Collateral Order, recognizing EDH&#039;s secured claim and barring any challenges to the EDH Note’s priority after June 15, 2023. Later, at a confirmation hearing, the SBA’s counsel admitted that the SBA Note was subordinate to the EDH Note, and the parties agreed to a Confirmation Order granting EDH first priority. After the bankruptcy, Joshua Adler acquired the SBA Note and sought a declaratory judgment that it was senior to the EDH Note and requested payment from proceeds received by EDH.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed Adler’s suit, finding him judicially estopped from contesting the EDH Note’s priority due to prior admissions by SBA’s counsel. Adler appealed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, which affirmed the dismissal on alternate grounds. The district court concluded Adler’s claim was barred by both the Cash Collateral Order, due to the late filing, and the Confirmation Order, which established EDH’s priority.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case, applying clear error review for factual findings and de novo review for legal issues. The Fifth Circuit held that Adler’s suit was precluded by both the Cash Collateral Order and the Confirmation Order, as his challenge to EDH’s loan priority was filed after the deadline and contrary to the terms of the orders. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the dismissal of Adler’s claims. Judicial estoppel was not decided as an independent ground. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20475/25-20475-2026-08-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Adler v. Energy Debt Holdings" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A business entity filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and the priority of two loans was disputed: one held by the Small Business Administration (SBA Note), and another by Energy Debt Holdings LLC (EDH Note). During the bankruptcy proceedings, the bankruptcy court entered a Final Cash Collateral Order, recognizing EDH&#039;s secured claim and barring any challenges to the EDH Note’s priority after June 15, 2023. Later, at a confirmation hearing, the SBA’s counsel admitted that the SBA Note was subordinate to the EDH Note, and the parties agreed to a Confirmation Order granting EDH first priority. After the bankruptcy, Joshua Adler acquired the SBA Note and sought a declaratory judgment that it was senior to the EDH Note and requested payment from proceeds received by EDH.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed Adler’s suit, finding him judicially estopped from contesting the EDH Note’s priority due to prior admissions by SBA’s counsel. Adler appealed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, which affirmed the dismissal on alternate grounds. The district court concluded Adler’s claim was barred by both the Cash Collateral Order, due to the late filing, and the Confirmation Order, which established EDH’s priority.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case, applying clear error review for factual findings and de novo review for legal issues. The Fifth Circuit held that Adler’s suit was precluded by both the Cash Collateral Order and the Confirmation Order, as his challenge to EDH’s loan priority was filed after the deadline and contrary to the terms of the orders. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the dismissal of Adler’s claims. Judicial estoppel was not decided as an independent ground.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Bankruptcy"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30536/25-30536-2026-08-06.html</id>
        	<title>MAPP v. Floor and Decor</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-06T09:30:53-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-06T09:30:53-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30536/25-30536-2026-08-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A national flooring retailer contracted with a Louisiana-based construction management company for the construction of a retail store in Metairie, Louisiana. The relationship soured after the retailer terminated the agreement, allegedly due to delays. Shortly after termination, the construction company disputed that it had breached the contract and demanded payment for work performed. The retailer did not respond to the payment demand.

The construction company filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana under the Louisiana Private Works Act, seeking recovery for the work performed. The retailer moved to compel arbitration based on the agreement’s dispute resolution provision and also sought to transfer the case. The district court granted the transfer to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana and denied the motion to compel arbitration without prejudice. When the motion to compel arbitration was renewed in the new court, the district court denied it again, concluding the retailer had not followed the prerequisite steps outlined in the contract’s dispute resolution process.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit conducted de novo review. The appellate court determined that the arbitration clause in the contract, which gave the retailer sole discretion to elect arbitration, was a contract of adhesion under Louisiana law. Applying state contract principles and relevant Louisiana Supreme Court precedent, the court found that the lack of mutuality and the imbalance in bargaining power rendered the clause unenforceable. The court held that the arbitration provision was adhesionary and thus invalid, and affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30536/25-30536-2026-08-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "MAPP v. Floor and Decor" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A national flooring retailer contracted with a Louisiana-based construction management company for the construction of a retail store in Metairie, Louisiana. The relationship soured after the retailer terminated the agreement, allegedly due to delays. Shortly after termination, the construction company disputed that it had breached the contract and demanded payment for work performed. The retailer did not respond to the payment demand.

The construction company filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana under the Louisiana Private Works Act, seeking recovery for the work performed. The retailer moved to compel arbitration based on the agreement’s dispute resolution provision and also sought to transfer the case. The district court granted the transfer to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana and denied the motion to compel arbitration without prejudice. When the motion to compel arbitration was renewed in the new court, the district court denied it again, concluding the retailer had not followed the prerequisite steps outlined in the contract’s dispute resolution process.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit conducted de novo review. The appellate court determined that the arbitration clause in the contract, which gave the retailer sole discretion to elect arbitration, was a contract of adhesion under Louisiana law. Applying state contract principles and relevant Louisiana Supreme Court precedent, the court found that the lack of mutuality and the imbalance in bargaining power rendered the clause unenforceable. The court held that the arbitration provision was adhesionary and thus invalid, and affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leslie Southwick</case:judge>
													<category term="Arbitration &amp; Mediation"/>
							<category term="Construction Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Real Estate &amp; Property Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30524/25-30524-2026-08-05.html</id>
        	<title>Bodin v. New Orleans</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-05T15:30:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-05T15:30:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30524/25-30524-2026-08-05.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several residential property owners and a short-term rental platform challenged two ordinances enacted by the city. The first ordinance, adopted in 2023, restricts short-term rental licenses to one per residential block and distributes them by lottery. The second ordinance, adopted in 2024, requires short-term rental platforms to verify the license status of properties before facilitating transactions, and to periodically reverify this status. Plaintiffs alleged that these ordinances infringed upon their constitutional and statutory rights, including claims under the Takings Clause and Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana reviewed the plaintiffs’ claims. It dismissed all claims under Rule 12(b)(6), except for Airbnb’s Fourth Amendment challenge regarding a monthly reporting requirement in the 2024 Ordinance. The district court granted Airbnb summary judgment on that particular claim. Airbnb appealed the dismissal of its other claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit examined the case de novo. The court held that the 2023 Ordinance did not constitute a per se or regulatory taking under the Takings Clause, noting that the ordinance neither physically appropriated property nor severely impaired economic expectations. It also found the ordinance to be a reasonable zoning regulation that balanced public interests. Regarding Section 230, the Fifth Circuit ruled that neither the booking nor verification requirements of the 2024 Ordinance treated Airbnb as the publisher or speaker of third-party content, and thus were not preempted. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Takings Clause claim and the Section 230 claim, as well as the dismissal of other claims raised by the plaintiffs. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30524/25-30524-2026-08-05.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Bodin v. New Orleans" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several residential property owners and a short-term rental platform challenged two ordinances enacted by the city. The first ordinance, adopted in 2023, restricts short-term rental licenses to one per residential block and distributes them by lottery. The second ordinance, adopted in 2024, requires short-term rental platforms to verify the license status of properties before facilitating transactions, and to periodically reverify this status. Plaintiffs alleged that these ordinances infringed upon their constitutional and statutory rights, including claims under the Takings Clause and Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana reviewed the plaintiffs’ claims. It dismissed all claims under Rule 12(b)(6), except for Airbnb’s Fourth Amendment challenge regarding a monthly reporting requirement in the 2024 Ordinance. The district court granted Airbnb summary judgment on that particular claim. Airbnb appealed the dismissal of its other claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit examined the case de novo. The court held that the 2023 Ordinance did not constitute a per se or regulatory taking under the Takings Clause, noting that the ordinance neither physically appropriated property nor severely impaired economic expectations. It also found the ordinance to be a reasonable zoning regulation that balanced public interests. Regarding Section 230, the Fifth Circuit ruled that neither the booking nor verification requirements of the 2024 Ordinance treated Airbnb as the publisher or speaker of third-party content, and thus were not preempted. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Takings Clause claim and the Section 230 claim, as well as the dismissal of other claims raised by the plaintiffs.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James Graves</case:judge>
													<category term="Communications Law"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Internet Law"/>
							<category term="Real Estate &amp; Property Law"/>
							<category term="Zoning, Planning &amp; Land Use"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20524/25-20524-2026-08-04.html</id>
        	<title>Polk v. Crawford</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-04T15:30:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-04T15:30:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20524/25-20524-2026-08-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A legal resident of Florida, currently living in Illinois, applied for a Texas escrow-officer license. He is an attorney licensed in at least forty jurisdictions, including Texas, and holds title-producer licenses in twenty-four states. The Texas Department of Insurance denied his application solely because he did not reside in Texas or a state bordering Texas, despite admitting that he met all other licensure requirements. The plaintiff claimed that this residency requirement prevented him from serving existing Texas clients, securing new clients, and maintaining relationships with clients who needed title and escrow services in multiple jurisdictions.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied both the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction and the State’s motion to dismiss. The district court reasoned that it would be “precipitous” to overturn a long-standing statute on a preliminary basis, inferred little irreparable harm due to the plaintiff’s litigation choices in similar cases elsewhere, and found the merits “unclear” given the present record and lack of factual clarity. The plaintiff timely appealed the denial of preliminary relief.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion. The Fifth Circuit found the plaintiff likely to succeed on the merits of his claim under Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, determining escrow work is a protected common calling and that Texas had offered no substantial justification for its discriminatory residency requirement. The court also found that irreparable harm existed because sovereign immunity barred damages, and the equities and public interest favored preliminary relief. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial and remanded with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the residency requirement against the plaintiff. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20524/25-20524-2026-08-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Polk v. Crawford" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A legal resident of Florida, currently living in Illinois, applied for a Texas escrow-officer license. He is an attorney licensed in at least forty jurisdictions, including Texas, and holds title-producer licenses in twenty-four states. The Texas Department of Insurance denied his application solely because he did not reside in Texas or a state bordering Texas, despite admitting that he met all other licensure requirements. The plaintiff claimed that this residency requirement prevented him from serving existing Texas clients, securing new clients, and maintaining relationships with clients who needed title and escrow services in multiple jurisdictions.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied both the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction and the State’s motion to dismiss. The district court reasoned that it would be “precipitous” to overturn a long-standing statute on a preliminary basis, inferred little irreparable harm due to the plaintiff’s litigation choices in similar cases elsewhere, and found the merits “unclear” given the present record and lack of factual clarity. The plaintiff timely appealed the denial of preliminary relief.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion. The Fifth Circuit found the plaintiff likely to succeed on the merits of his claim under Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, determining escrow work is a protected common calling and that Texas had offered no substantial justification for its discriminatory residency requirement. The court also found that irreparable harm existed because sovereign immunity barred damages, and the equities and public interest favored preliminary relief. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial and remanded with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the residency requirement against the plaintiff.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Don Willett</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50717/25-50717-2026-08-03.html</id>
        	<title>Liedtke v. City of Austin</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-03T15:30:28-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-03T15:30:28-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50717/25-50717-2026-08-03.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A female police officer was recruited to an all-male patrol shift in Austin, Texas, partly because supervisors wanted to improve diversity. After joining the shift, she experienced frequent sexist comments and hostility from her male colleagues, including derogatory statements about female officers, personal insults, and threats. The officer reported this behavior to her supervisors but received minimal support or intervention. After she filed complaints, a supervisor issued her an Employee Success Plan (ESP) based largely on allegations from her colleagues, some of which referenced months-old incidents previously addressed by another supervisor. The officer resigned a few weeks after receiving the ESP and subsequently filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judgment to the City of Austin on all claims, finding that none of the challenged acts affected the terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment, and that she suffered no adverse employment action. The court concluded that she had not shown an effect on her employment for her hostile work environment claim and that she did not sustain an adverse employment action for her sex discrimination and retaliation claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the summary judgment for the City on the hostile work environment claim because the officer did not adequately brief that claim as a separate issue on appeal. However, it found that her sex discrimination and retaliation claims raised genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether the ESP and the circumstances of her resignation constituted adverse employment actions motivated by sex-based or retaliatory intent. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision on those claims and remanded them for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50717/25-50717-2026-08-03.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Liedtke v. City of Austin" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A female police officer was recruited to an all-male patrol shift in Austin, Texas, partly because supervisors wanted to improve diversity. After joining the shift, she experienced frequent sexist comments and hostility from her male colleagues, including derogatory statements about female officers, personal insults, and threats. The officer reported this behavior to her supervisors but received minimal support or intervention. After she filed complaints, a supervisor issued her an Employee Success Plan (ESP) based largely on allegations from her colleagues, some of which referenced months-old incidents previously addressed by another supervisor. The officer resigned a few weeks after receiving the ESP and subsequently filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judgment to the City of Austin on all claims, finding that none of the challenged acts affected the terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment, and that she suffered no adverse employment action. The court concluded that she had not shown an effect on her employment for her hostile work environment claim and that she did not sustain an adverse employment action for her sex discrimination and retaliation claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the summary judgment for the City on the hostile work environment claim because the officer did not adequately brief that claim as a separate issue on appeal. However, it found that her sex discrimination and retaliation claims raised genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether the ESP and the circumstances of her resignation constituted adverse employment actions motivated by sex-based or retaliatory intent. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision on those claims and remanded them for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Don Willett</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30556/25-30556-2026-08-03.html</id>
        	<title>Holloway v. Procter &amp; Gamble Mftr</title>
        	<updated>2026-08-03T13:00:28-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-08-03T13:00:28-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30556/25-30556-2026-08-03.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Brandon Holloway was employed by Procter &amp; Gamble Manufacturing Company for several years, performing tasks related to waste management and vendor coordination. In 2020, Holloway violated company procurement policies by directly contacting suppliers, which led to minor disciplinary action. Subsequent internal audits uncovered errors in his waste manifest forms and found he used his corporate credit card for personal expenses. Holloway acknowledged the credit card violation. He also alleged that he complained to management about company practices violating federal and state regulations and that he was subjected to racial discrimination. P&amp;G terminated Holloway’s employment, citing policy violations and misuse of the company credit card.

Holloway filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, alleging claims of racial discrimination, retaliation, and violation of Louisiana’s whistleblower statute. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of P&amp;G on all claims. The court found that Holloway failed to rebut P&amp;G’s legitimate reasons for termination and did not provide evidence of a violation of law to support his whistleblower claim. Holloway appealed the decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment order de novo. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s decisions, holding that: (1) the use of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework in the discrimination and retaliation claims was proper; (2) Holloway failed to show that P&amp;G’s stated reasons for termination were pretextual; (3) Holloway did not provide significant evidence of retaliation beyond temporal proximity; and (4) Holloway did not establish that P&amp;G violated any law, as required for a whistleblower claim under Louisiana law. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for P&amp;G on all claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30556/25-30556-2026-08-03.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Holloway v. Procter &amp; Gamble Mftr" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Brandon Holloway was employed by Procter &amp; Gamble Manufacturing Company for several years, performing tasks related to waste management and vendor coordination. In 2020, Holloway violated company procurement policies by directly contacting suppliers, which led to minor disciplinary action. Subsequent internal audits uncovered errors in his waste manifest forms and found he used his corporate credit card for personal expenses. Holloway acknowledged the credit card violation. He also alleged that he complained to management about company practices violating federal and state regulations and that he was subjected to racial discrimination. P&amp;G terminated Holloway’s employment, citing policy violations and misuse of the company credit card.

Holloway filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, alleging claims of racial discrimination, retaliation, and violation of Louisiana’s whistleblower statute. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of P&amp;G on all claims. The court found that Holloway failed to rebut P&amp;G’s legitimate reasons for termination and did not provide evidence of a violation of law to support his whistleblower claim. Holloway appealed the decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment order de novo. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s decisions, holding that: (1) the use of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework in the discrimination and retaliation claims was proper; (2) Holloway failed to show that P&amp;G’s stated reasons for termination were pretextual; (3) Holloway did not provide significant evidence of retaliation beyond temporal proximity; and (4) Holloway did not establish that P&amp;G violated any law, as required for a whistleblower claim under Louisiana law. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for P&amp;G on all claims.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-08-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
													<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20211/24-20211-2026-07-29.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Hunter</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-29T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-29T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20211/24-20211-2026-07-29.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant, Munson Hunter, was indicted on multiple counts of bank and wire fraud for his role in a scheme that caused significant financial losses. After raising concerns about his mental health and undergoing a competency evaluation, Hunter pleaded guilty to one count in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charges. His plea agreement included a waiver of the right to appeal his conviction and sentence, except for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. At sentencing, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas imposed a term of supervised release with a special condition requiring Hunter to participate in a mental health program and take any medication prescribed by his physician. Hunter objected to being compelled to take medication.

Despite the appellate waiver, Hunter appealed the medication condition, arguing it infringed on his due process rights. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit initially dismissed his appeal, relying on circuit precedent that recognized only limited exceptions to appeal waivers. The Supreme Court of the United States subsequently granted certiorari and announced a new rule: appeal waivers are unenforceable if their enforcement would result in a &quot;miscarriage of justice&quot;—that is, if they would leave in place an obvious and egregious error undermining the integrity of the judicial system.

On remand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s new standard. The court determined that the record supported the imposition of the medication condition, finding no &quot;blatant&quot; constitutional error or egregious statutory violation. The court concluded that requiring Hunter to take prescribed medication as part of supervised release did not constitute the kind of obvious judicial error that would render the waiver unenforceable. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that Hunter’s appeal waiver remained effective and dismissed the appeal. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20211/24-20211-2026-07-29.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Hunter" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant, Munson Hunter, was indicted on multiple counts of bank and wire fraud for his role in a scheme that caused significant financial losses. After raising concerns about his mental health and undergoing a competency evaluation, Hunter pleaded guilty to one count in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charges. His plea agreement included a waiver of the right to appeal his conviction and sentence, except for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. At sentencing, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas imposed a term of supervised release with a special condition requiring Hunter to participate in a mental health program and take any medication prescribed by his physician. Hunter objected to being compelled to take medication.

Despite the appellate waiver, Hunter appealed the medication condition, arguing it infringed on his due process rights. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit initially dismissed his appeal, relying on circuit precedent that recognized only limited exceptions to appeal waivers. The Supreme Court of the United States subsequently granted certiorari and announced a new rule: appeal waivers are unenforceable if their enforcement would result in a &quot;miscarriage of justice&quot;—that is, if they would leave in place an obvious and egregious error undermining the integrity of the judicial system.

On remand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s new standard. The court determined that the record supported the imposition of the medication condition, finding no &quot;blatant&quot; constitutional error or egregious statutory violation. The court concluded that requiring Hunter to take prescribed medication as part of supervised release did not constitute the kind of obvious judicial error that would render the waiver unenforceable. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that Hunter’s appeal waiver remained effective and dismissed the appeal.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>W. Eugene Davis</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-50721/24-50721-2026-07-24.html</id>
        	<title>Computer &amp; Communications Industry Association v. Paxton</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-24T09:30:53-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-24T09:30:53-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-50721/24-50721-2026-07-24.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Texas enacted a law imposing new requirements on certain social media platforms, termed &quot;digital service providers&quot; (DSPs), to restrict minors’ access to specific categories of content. These requirements included monitoring and filtering content deemed harmful, prohibiting targeted ads to minors, preventing unlawful ads, verifying user age for access to certain material, and requiring age registration for account creation. Two groups challenged the law: one group, including technology industry organizations, contested the monitoring and filtering requirement; another group, comprised of a student coalition, individuals, and an ad agency, challenged several provisions, including the monitoring and filtering, targeted ads, unlawful ads, and age-verification requirements.

In the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, both plaintiffs sought preliminary injunctions against enforcement of the law. The district court granted injunctions in part, enjoining the monitoring and filtering requirements for both groups, and enjoining the targeted ads, unlawful ads, and age-verification requirements for the student coalition group. The court found these provisions likely unconstitutional or vague, and held that the plaintiffs had standing based on the chilling effect on their speech and listening rights. The Attorney General of Texas appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit consolidated the cases.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the student coalition plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the monitoring and filtering, targeted ads, and unlawful ads requirements, as they were not directly regulated and failed to show a substantial risk of imminent harm. Their challenge to the age-verification requirement was foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent. However, the court held that the monitoring and filtering requirement, as challenged by the industry groups, is preempted by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s injunction as to the industry group, but vacated and remanded the injunction as to the student coalition plaintiffs. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-50721/24-50721-2026-07-24.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Computer &amp; Communications Industry Association v. Paxton" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Texas enacted a law imposing new requirements on certain social media platforms, termed &quot;digital service providers&quot; (DSPs), to restrict minors’ access to specific categories of content. These requirements included monitoring and filtering content deemed harmful, prohibiting targeted ads to minors, preventing unlawful ads, verifying user age for access to certain material, and requiring age registration for account creation. Two groups challenged the law: one group, including technology industry organizations, contested the monitoring and filtering requirement; another group, comprised of a student coalition, individuals, and an ad agency, challenged several provisions, including the monitoring and filtering, targeted ads, unlawful ads, and age-verification requirements.

In the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, both plaintiffs sought preliminary injunctions against enforcement of the law. The district court granted injunctions in part, enjoining the monitoring and filtering requirements for both groups, and enjoining the targeted ads, unlawful ads, and age-verification requirements for the student coalition group. The court found these provisions likely unconstitutional or vague, and held that the plaintiffs had standing based on the chilling effect on their speech and listening rights. The Attorney General of Texas appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit consolidated the cases.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the student coalition plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the monitoring and filtering, targeted ads, and unlawful ads requirements, as they were not directly regulated and failed to show a substantial risk of imminent harm. Their challenge to the age-verification requirement was foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent. However, the court held that the monitoring and filtering requirement, as challenged by the industry groups, is preempted by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s injunction as to the industry group, but vacated and remanded the injunction as to the student coalition plaintiffs.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-24</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Dana Douglas</case:judge>
													<category term="Communications Law"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Internet Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30380/25-30380-2026-07-23.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Debrow</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-23T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-23T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30380/25-30380-2026-07-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant, after previously pleading guilty to aggravated criminal damage to property under Louisiana law, was found in possession of a firearm. His earlier offense involved intentionally damaging vehicles during a police traffic stop, endangering human life, which led to a three-year sentence. After serving his sentence, he was again found with a firearm, resulting in an indictment for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana reviewed the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment, in which he argued that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to him. The district court denied the motion. The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial, and was sentenced to 56 months’ imprisonment.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as applied to the defendant, considering whether the government&#039;s justification for permanent disarmament was supported by a historical tradition consistent with the Second Amendment, as outlined in New York State Rifle &amp; Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). The Fifth Circuit found that the government had not met its burden to demonstrate a relevant historical analogue for disarming individuals with a property crime predicate like the defendant’s. The court declined to expand precedent by treating aggravated property damage as sufficiently violent for permanent disarmament under historical going-armed laws.

The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying the motion to dismiss and remanded the case for reconsideration. The main holding was that, absent sufficient evidence of a historical tradition supporting disarmament for this type of predicate felony, the government had not justified the application of § 922(g)(1) to the defendant. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30380/25-30380-2026-07-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Debrow" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant, after previously pleading guilty to aggravated criminal damage to property under Louisiana law, was found in possession of a firearm. His earlier offense involved intentionally damaging vehicles during a police traffic stop, endangering human life, which led to a three-year sentence. After serving his sentence, he was again found with a firearm, resulting in an indictment for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana reviewed the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment, in which he argued that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to him. The district court denied the motion. The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial, and was sentenced to 56 months’ imprisonment.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as applied to the defendant, considering whether the government&#039;s justification for permanent disarmament was supported by a historical tradition consistent with the Second Amendment, as outlined in New York State Rifle &amp; Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). The Fifth Circuit found that the government had not met its burden to demonstrate a relevant historical analogue for disarming individuals with a property crime predicate like the defendant’s. The court declined to expand precedent by treating aggravated property damage as sufficiently violent for permanent disarmament under historical going-armed laws.

The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying the motion to dismiss and remanded the case for reconsideration. The main holding was that, absent sufficient evidence of a historical tradition supporting disarmament for this type of predicate felony, the government had not justified the application of § 922(g)(1) to the defendant.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30347/24-30347-2026-07-23.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Murphy</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-23T09:30:52-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-23T09:30:52-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30347/24-30347-2026-07-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant was charged with multiple counts including conspiracy to possess and brandish firearms during crimes of violence and drug trafficking, conspiracy to distribute cocaine and heroin, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, and Hobbs Act robbery. He pleaded guilty to all charges without a plea agreement. The factual basis submitted in support of the plea indicated that he was associated with a street gang, communicated about drug sales and firearms, participated in the use and possession of firearms for drug trafficking, and attempted to rob a rival drug dealer. The presentence report attributed to him the provision of a rifle used in a murder, and found him responsible for specific drug quantities. It recommended applying a cross-reference for first-degree murder under the Sentencing Guidelines, resulting in a significantly higher advisory sentencing range.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held an evidentiary hearing to consider the defendant’s objections to the presentence report, including the factual findings, drug quantity calculations, omission of a mitigating role adjustment, application of the cross-reference, and the standard of proof. The court overruled the objections, found sufficient evidence for the factual findings, adopted the presentence report, denied the mitigating role adjustment, applied the first-degree murder cross-reference, and sentenced the defendant to 360 months’ imprisonment. The defendant timely appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings, affirming its credibility determinations, evidentiary findings, drug quantity calculations, denial of a mitigating role adjustment, and use of the preponderance of the evidence standard. However, the appellate court reversed the district court’s application of the cross-reference for first-degree murder, holding that the firearm used in another offense must be cited in the offense of conviction for the cross-reference to apply. As a result, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30347/24-30347-2026-07-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Murphy" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant was charged with multiple counts including conspiracy to possess and brandish firearms during crimes of violence and drug trafficking, conspiracy to distribute cocaine and heroin, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, and Hobbs Act robbery. He pleaded guilty to all charges without a plea agreement. The factual basis submitted in support of the plea indicated that he was associated with a street gang, communicated about drug sales and firearms, participated in the use and possession of firearms for drug trafficking, and attempted to rob a rival drug dealer. The presentence report attributed to him the provision of a rifle used in a murder, and found him responsible for specific drug quantities. It recommended applying a cross-reference for first-degree murder under the Sentencing Guidelines, resulting in a significantly higher advisory sentencing range.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held an evidentiary hearing to consider the defendant’s objections to the presentence report, including the factual findings, drug quantity calculations, omission of a mitigating role adjustment, application of the cross-reference, and the standard of proof. The court overruled the objections, found sufficient evidence for the factual findings, adopted the presentence report, denied the mitigating role adjustment, applied the first-degree murder cross-reference, and sentenced the defendant to 360 months’ imprisonment. The defendant timely appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings, affirming its credibility determinations, evidentiary findings, drug quantity calculations, denial of a mitigating role adjustment, and use of the preponderance of the evidence standard. However, the appellate court reversed the district court’s application of the cross-reference for first-degree murder, holding that the firearm used in another offense must be cited in the offense of conviction for the cross-reference to apply. As a result, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Irma Ramirez</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60108/25-60108-2026-07-21.html</id>
        	<title>Exxon Mobil Corporation v. OSHC</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-21T16:30:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-21T16:30:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60108/25-60108-2026-07-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A major industrial accident occurred at a petroleum refinery in Texas operated by a large energy company. During repairs, a pipe ruptured, leading to an explosion and fire that injured several workers and required an extensive emergency response. One employee, who played a critical role in the emergency efforts, later sought counseling and was diagnosed by multiple healthcare professionals with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) attributed to the incident. The company, following its procedures and the relevant Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) rule, reviewed these diagnoses to determine if they should be recorded as work-related mental illnesses under federal recordkeeping requirements.

After receiving differing opinions from healthcare providers, the company ultimately concluded that the employee did not have a recordable work-related mental illness, relying on its designated medical evaluator’s assessment. The employee’s union reported the matter to OSHA, which investigated and cited the company for failing to record the PTSD diagnosis as required by OSHA’s rule. The company challenged the citation before an administrative law judge (ALJ) of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC). The ALJ upheld the citation and imposed a monetary penalty. When the company sought further review, OSHRC declined, and the ALJ’s decision became the agency’s final order. The company then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for review.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that OSHA lacked statutory authority under 29 U.S.C. § 657(c)(2) to require employers to record work-related mental illnesses. The court determined that the term “illnesses” in the statute referred only to physical ailments. As a result, the Fifth Circuit vacated OSHA’s rule, the citation, and the penalty imposed on the company. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60108/25-60108-2026-07-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Exxon Mobil Corporation v. OSHC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A major industrial accident occurred at a petroleum refinery in Texas operated by a large energy company. During repairs, a pipe ruptured, leading to an explosion and fire that injured several workers and required an extensive emergency response. One employee, who played a critical role in the emergency efforts, later sought counseling and was diagnosed by multiple healthcare professionals with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) attributed to the incident. The company, following its procedures and the relevant Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) rule, reviewed these diagnoses to determine if they should be recorded as work-related mental illnesses under federal recordkeeping requirements.

After receiving differing opinions from healthcare providers, the company ultimately concluded that the employee did not have a recordable work-related mental illness, relying on its designated medical evaluator’s assessment. The employee’s union reported the matter to OSHA, which investigated and cited the company for failing to record the PTSD diagnosis as required by OSHA’s rule. The company challenged the citation before an administrative law judge (ALJ) of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC). The ALJ upheld the citation and imposed a monetary penalty. When the company sought further review, OSHRC declined, and the ALJ’s decision became the agency’s final order. The company then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for review.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that OSHA lacked statutory authority under 29 U.S.C. § 657(c)(2) to require employers to record work-related mental illnesses. The court determined that the term “illnesses” in the statute referred only to physical ailments. As a result, the Fifth Circuit vacated OSHA’s rule, the citation, and the penalty imposed on the company.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Cory Wilson</case:judge>
													<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-50800/24-50800-2026-07-21.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Fullerton</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-21T16:30:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-21T16:30:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-50800/24-50800-2026-07-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Michael and Tiffany Fullerton participated in a scheme with two others to fraudulently obtain over $3 million from the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) during the COVID-19 pandemic. The conspiracy involved submitting six fraudulent loan applications using defunct or shell companies, falsified tax and employment records, and stolen or fabricated identities. The proceeds were laundered through a series of complex financial transactions, including layered transfers among accounts, use of cashier’s checks, and investments in out-of-state ventures and luxury purchases.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas handled the initial proceedings. Michael pled guilty to eleven counts, including conspiracy, bank fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and identity theft, and was sentenced to 286 months in prison after receiving several sentencing enhancements. Tiffany was convicted at trial of conspiracy to commit bank fraud and money laundering but acquitted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud. She received a 108-month sentence, which included an enhancement for suborning perjury, based on findings that she procured Michael’s false testimony at her trial. Tiffany’s motion for a new trial, based on newly discovered evidence regarding Michael’s prior conduct, was denied.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed multiple issues. The court affirmed all sentence enhancements for Michael—including those for sophisticated means, sophisticated laundering, leadership role, and obstruction of justice—concluding that each enhancement was supported by distinct and sufficient evidence. The court also upheld Tiffany’s obstruction enhancement, denial of her motion for a new trial, and the calculation of her intended loss amount. However, the court remanded the case solely for correction of a clerical error in Tiffany’s judgment, as she was acquitted of one charge listed in the written judgment. The Fifth Circuit otherwise affirmed the district court’s rulings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-50800/24-50800-2026-07-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Fullerton" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Michael and Tiffany Fullerton participated in a scheme with two others to fraudulently obtain over $3 million from the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) during the COVID-19 pandemic. The conspiracy involved submitting six fraudulent loan applications using defunct or shell companies, falsified tax and employment records, and stolen or fabricated identities. The proceeds were laundered through a series of complex financial transactions, including layered transfers among accounts, use of cashier’s checks, and investments in out-of-state ventures and luxury purchases.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas handled the initial proceedings. Michael pled guilty to eleven counts, including conspiracy, bank fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and identity theft, and was sentenced to 286 months in prison after receiving several sentencing enhancements. Tiffany was convicted at trial of conspiracy to commit bank fraud and money laundering but acquitted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud. She received a 108-month sentence, which included an enhancement for suborning perjury, based on findings that she procured Michael’s false testimony at her trial. Tiffany’s motion for a new trial, based on newly discovered evidence regarding Michael’s prior conduct, was denied.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed multiple issues. The court affirmed all sentence enhancements for Michael—including those for sophisticated means, sophisticated laundering, leadership role, and obstruction of justice—concluding that each enhancement was supported by distinct and sufficient evidence. The court also upheld Tiffany’s obstruction enhancement, denial of her motion for a new trial, and the calculation of her intended loss amount. However, the court remanded the case solely for correction of a clerical error in Tiffany’s judgment, as she was acquitted of one charge listed in the written judgment. The Fifth Circuit otherwise affirmed the district court’s rulings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stuart Kyle Duncan</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50171/25-50171-2026-07-17.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Kirkwood</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-17T15:30:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-17T15:30:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50171/25-50171-2026-07-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In early 2023, James Kirkwood committed a series of robberies, including one at a Dollar Tree store in San Antonio, Texas. During this incident, he threatened a 71-year-old cashier by implying he had a gun and demanded cash. The cashier, believing the threat, called her manager, who gave Kirkwood $260. Three days later, Kirkwood was apprehended after robbing another Dollar Tree. He was subsequently charged under a federal robbery statute and pled guilty. The cashier, A.C., quit her job on the day of the robbery, citing ongoing psychological distress, and later took a lower-paying job as a dishwasher. She reported no physical injuries but claimed lost income and damages due to psychological harm.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas sentenced Kirkwood and, under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), ordered him to pay restitution to A.C. for both her alleged mental anguish and lost income. The district court acknowledged uncertainty in the law but proceeded, suggesting the issue could be resolved on appeal. Kirkwood’s counsel objected to the lost-income calculation but did not specifically object to the restitution for mental anguish. Kirkwood appealed the restitution order.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the statutory basis for awarding restitution under the MVRA. The court held that the MVRA does not authorize restitution for purely psychological harm or for lost income unaccompanied by bodily injury. The court found no statutory provision allowing restitution for mental anguish alone and determined that lost income is compensable only when it results from bodily injury. The Fifth Circuit therefore vacated the restitution award to A.C. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50171/25-50171-2026-07-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Kirkwood" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In early 2023, James Kirkwood committed a series of robberies, including one at a Dollar Tree store in San Antonio, Texas. During this incident, he threatened a 71-year-old cashier by implying he had a gun and demanded cash. The cashier, believing the threat, called her manager, who gave Kirkwood $260. Three days later, Kirkwood was apprehended after robbing another Dollar Tree. He was subsequently charged under a federal robbery statute and pled guilty. The cashier, A.C., quit her job on the day of the robbery, citing ongoing psychological distress, and later took a lower-paying job as a dishwasher. She reported no physical injuries but claimed lost income and damages due to psychological harm.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas sentenced Kirkwood and, under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), ordered him to pay restitution to A.C. for both her alleged mental anguish and lost income. The district court acknowledged uncertainty in the law but proceeded, suggesting the issue could be resolved on appeal. Kirkwood’s counsel objected to the lost-income calculation but did not specifically object to the restitution for mental anguish. Kirkwood appealed the restitution order.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the statutory basis for awarding restitution under the MVRA. The court held that the MVRA does not authorize restitution for purely psychological harm or for lost income unaccompanied by bodily injury. The court found no statutory provision allowing restitution for mental anguish alone and determined that lost income is compensable only when it results from bodily injury. The Fifth Circuit therefore vacated the restitution award to A.C.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leslie Southwick</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30305/25-30305-2026-07-17.html</id>
        	<title>Jefferson Parish Firefighters Association, Local 1374 v. Roberts</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-17T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-17T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30305/25-30305-2026-07-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A fire captain who served as vice president of a local firefighters’ union was also a member of the Jefferson Parish Fire Civil Service Board. The union previously paid for legal counsel for members appearing before the Civil Service Board, but stopped doing so after the Louisiana Board of Ethics issued an advisory opinion, and later a binding declaratory opinion, stating that such payments violated Louisiana law while any union officer served on the board. The union challenged the Board of Ethics’ interpretation in state court, arguing that it misapplied state law, and then filed a federal lawsuit claiming this restriction violated its First Amendment rights.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted the union a preliminary injunction on First Amendment grounds, preventing enforcement of the ethics board’s opinion against the union. The district court also declined to abstain under the doctrines established in Younger v. Harris and Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co. The Louisiana defendants appealed, arguing the district court should have abstained and that granting the injunction was an abuse of discretion. While the appeal was pending, all relevant state court proceedings concluded, and, just before oral argument, the fire captain resigned from the Civil Service Board.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the case was moot due to the resignation, as neither party retained a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. The court determined that no live controversy remained, rejected arguments that mootness exceptions applied, and ruled that the appeal and the entire case must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The court vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss the case. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30305/25-30305-2026-07-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Jefferson Parish Firefighters Association, Local 1374 v. Roberts" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A fire captain who served as vice president of a local firefighters’ union was also a member of the Jefferson Parish Fire Civil Service Board. The union previously paid for legal counsel for members appearing before the Civil Service Board, but stopped doing so after the Louisiana Board of Ethics issued an advisory opinion, and later a binding declaratory opinion, stating that such payments violated Louisiana law while any union officer served on the board. The union challenged the Board of Ethics’ interpretation in state court, arguing that it misapplied state law, and then filed a federal lawsuit claiming this restriction violated its First Amendment rights.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted the union a preliminary injunction on First Amendment grounds, preventing enforcement of the ethics board’s opinion against the union. The district court also declined to abstain under the doctrines established in Younger v. Harris and Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co. The Louisiana defendants appealed, arguing the district court should have abstained and that granting the injunction was an abuse of discretion. While the appeal was pending, all relevant state court proceedings concluded, and, just before oral argument, the fire captain resigned from the Civil Service Board.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the case was moot due to the resignation, as neither party retained a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. The court determined that no live controversy remained, rejected arguments that mootness exceptions applied, and ruled that the appeal and the entire case must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The court vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss the case.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10196/25-10196-2026-07-17.html</id>
        	<title>Thompson v. McGehee</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-17T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-17T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10196/25-10196-2026-07-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A city councilwoman in Godley, Texas, was arrested by police minutes before a city council meeting for allegedly tampering with a government record, specifically, a meeting agenda she believed should have included additional items. The arrest occurred after the councilwoman, who was a vocal critic of the mayor and police chief, edited a courtesy copy of the agenda forwarded by the city secretary and returned it with instructions to post the updated version. The tension between the councilwoman and city officials was rooted in prior disputes over city governance and alleged retaliation for her speech. After her arrest, which left the council deadlocked, the mayor used his tiebreaking vote to secure his preferred appointees. The county attorney subsequently declined to prosecute the alleged crime.

Reviewing the case, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed all claims brought by the plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims against various city officials and the City itself. The district court found that the plaintiff failed to state a claim, concluding that the facts did not support constitutional violations, and declined to allow discovery against the City.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed in part. The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff adequately pleaded First Amendment retaliation and Fourth Amendment false arrest claims against Officers Arbuthnot and Templer, First Amendment retaliatory arrest claims against all individual defendants, and Monell claims against the City for municipal liability. The court also remanded a fabrication claim for further consideration. However, it affirmed dismissal of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against the mayor and interim chief. The court remanded the surviving claims for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10196/25-10196-2026-07-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Thompson v. McGehee" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A city councilwoman in Godley, Texas, was arrested by police minutes before a city council meeting for allegedly tampering with a government record, specifically, a meeting agenda she believed should have included additional items. The arrest occurred after the councilwoman, who was a vocal critic of the mayor and police chief, edited a courtesy copy of the agenda forwarded by the city secretary and returned it with instructions to post the updated version. The tension between the councilwoman and city officials was rooted in prior disputes over city governance and alleged retaliation for her speech. After her arrest, which left the council deadlocked, the mayor used his tiebreaking vote to secure his preferred appointees. The county attorney subsequently declined to prosecute the alleged crime.

Reviewing the case, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed all claims brought by the plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims against various city officials and the City itself. The district court found that the plaintiff failed to state a claim, concluding that the facts did not support constitutional violations, and declined to allow discovery against the City.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed in part. The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff adequately pleaded First Amendment retaliation and Fourth Amendment false arrest claims against Officers Arbuthnot and Templer, First Amendment retaliatory arrest claims against all individual defendants, and Monell claims against the City for municipal liability. The court also remanded a fabrication claim for further consideration. However, it affirmed dismissal of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against the mayor and interim chief. The court remanded the surviving claims for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Priscilla Richman</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10572/25-10572-2026-07-16.html</id>
        	<title>Ayers v. Neugebauer</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-16T09:30:55-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-16T09:30:55-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10572/25-10572-2026-07-16.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		With Purpose, Inc., a financial technology start-up, filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in February 2023. Prior to the bankruptcy, With Purpose, Inc. and the Ayers parties, who included a co-founder and early investors, were engaged in arbitration with claims and counterclaims involving both With Purpose, Inc. and Toby Neugebauer, another co-founder. When the bankruptcy was filed, the Ayers parties ceased pursuing claims against the debtor in line with the automatic stay, but continued to pursue claims—including seeking depositions and filing supplemental claims—against Neugebauer. Neugebauer failed to appear for several depositions and ultimately sought relief in bankruptcy court to enforce the automatic stay.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas found that the Ayers parties had willfully violated the automatic stay by pursuing certain claims and depositions against Neugebauer, specifically a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim belonging to the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court awarded Neugebauer actual damages, including attorneys’ fees. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas affirmed the bankruptcy court’s rulings, rejecting arguments that Neugebauer lacked prudential standing, that the violation was not willful, and that the damages award was excessive.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that Neugebauer, as a creditor, had standing to enforce the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) and Fifth Circuit precedent. The court concluded that the Ayers parties willfully violated the automatic stay by pursuing estate property claims and depositions against Neugebauer. It further determined that the award of actual damages, including attorneys’ fees, was not clearly erroneous. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the decisions of the bankruptcy and district courts. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10572/25-10572-2026-07-16.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Ayers v. Neugebauer" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                With Purpose, Inc., a financial technology start-up, filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in February 2023. Prior to the bankruptcy, With Purpose, Inc. and the Ayers parties, who included a co-founder and early investors, were engaged in arbitration with claims and counterclaims involving both With Purpose, Inc. and Toby Neugebauer, another co-founder. When the bankruptcy was filed, the Ayers parties ceased pursuing claims against the debtor in line with the automatic stay, but continued to pursue claims—including seeking depositions and filing supplemental claims—against Neugebauer. Neugebauer failed to appear for several depositions and ultimately sought relief in bankruptcy court to enforce the automatic stay.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas found that the Ayers parties had willfully violated the automatic stay by pursuing certain claims and depositions against Neugebauer, specifically a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim belonging to the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court awarded Neugebauer actual damages, including attorneys’ fees. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas affirmed the bankruptcy court’s rulings, rejecting arguments that Neugebauer lacked prudential standing, that the violation was not willful, and that the damages award was excessive.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that Neugebauer, as a creditor, had standing to enforce the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) and Fifth Circuit precedent. The court concluded that the Ayers parties willfully violated the automatic stay by pursuing estate property claims and depositions against Neugebauer. It further determined that the award of actual damages, including attorneys’ fees, was not clearly erroneous. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the decisions of the bankruptcy and district courts.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jennifer Elrod</case:judge>
													<category term="Bankruptcy"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50204/25-50204-2026-07-15.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Allred</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-15T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-15T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50204/25-50204-2026-07-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant was convicted in Texas state court in 2004 for assault causing bodily injury to a family member, which qualifies as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under Texas law. The incident involved the defendant pushing his wife during an argument and, when she attempted to call 911, striking her in the face while trying to knock the phone from her hand. Based on this conviction, he was later indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) for possessing a firearm after being convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.

Before the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, raising two constitutional challenges: that the statute exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, and that, as applied to him, it violates the Second Amendment. The district court denied the motion. The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss, and was sentenced to imprisonment and supervised release.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It rejected the Commerce Clause challenge, extending the reasoning from United States v. Alcantar to § 922(g)(9). The court then addressed the as-applied Second Amendment challenge, applying the historical tradition test articulated in New York State Rifle &amp; Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen and clarified in United States v. Rahimi. The Fifth Circuit concluded that § 922(g)(9), as applied to the defendant, is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of disarming individuals found to threaten the physical safety of others. The court found that the statute’s rationale and burden are supported by historical analogues and that the defendant’s conduct was sufficiently dangerous to warrant disarmament. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50204/25-50204-2026-07-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Allred" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant was convicted in Texas state court in 2004 for assault causing bodily injury to a family member, which qualifies as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under Texas law. The incident involved the defendant pushing his wife during an argument and, when she attempted to call 911, striking her in the face while trying to knock the phone from her hand. Based on this conviction, he was later indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) for possessing a firearm after being convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.

Before the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, raising two constitutional challenges: that the statute exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, and that, as applied to him, it violates the Second Amendment. The district court denied the motion. The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss, and was sentenced to imprisonment and supervised release.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It rejected the Commerce Clause challenge, extending the reasoning from United States v. Alcantar to § 922(g)(9). The court then addressed the as-applied Second Amendment challenge, applying the historical tradition test articulated in New York State Rifle &amp; Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen and clarified in United States v. Rahimi. The Fifth Circuit concluded that § 922(g)(9), as applied to the defendant, is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of disarming individuals found to threaten the physical safety of others. The court found that the statute’s rationale and burden are supported by historical analogues and that the defendant’s conduct was sufficiently dangerous to warrant disarmament. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leslie Southwick</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-30074/26-30074-2026-07-14.html</id>
        	<title>In Re: School Board of Concordia Parish</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-14T15:30:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-14T15:30:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-30074/26-30074-2026-07-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		This case involved a decades-long school desegregation lawsuit in which, after more than sixty years of litigation, all remaining parties—the United States, Delta Charter Group, and the School Board of Concordia Parish—filed a joint stipulation of dismissal with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). Previously, the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana had dismissed the long-absent private plaintiffs in 2025. The key fact is that every party with an ongoing interest in the case agreed to end the litigation through this self-executing mechanism.

Despite the jointly filed stipulation, the district court issued a memorandum ruling refusing to recognize the dismissal, reasoning that it was not required to accept and enter the proposed stipulation, particularly when public policy concerns or the protection of others might be implicated. The court then scheduled evidentiary hearings to determine if the school system had achieved “unitary status,” referencing the Green factors from Green v. School Board of New Kent County. In response, the School Board appealed the district court’s orders and, as a precaution, also filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over the School Board’s direct appeal because the challenged orders were neither final decisions nor appealable injunctions. However, the Fifth Circuit granted mandamus relief, ruling that once a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) stipulation of dismissal is filed by all appearing parties, the case is immediately dismissed without need for a court order. Any further action by the district court is a nullity. The Fifth Circuit ordered the district court to vacate its orders and end the proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-30074/26-30074-2026-07-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In Re: School Board of Concordia Parish" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                This case involved a decades-long school desegregation lawsuit in which, after more than sixty years of litigation, all remaining parties—the United States, Delta Charter Group, and the School Board of Concordia Parish—filed a joint stipulation of dismissal with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). Previously, the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana had dismissed the long-absent private plaintiffs in 2025. The key fact is that every party with an ongoing interest in the case agreed to end the litigation through this self-executing mechanism.

Despite the jointly filed stipulation, the district court issued a memorandum ruling refusing to recognize the dismissal, reasoning that it was not required to accept and enter the proposed stipulation, particularly when public policy concerns or the protection of others might be implicated. The court then scheduled evidentiary hearings to determine if the school system had achieved “unitary status,” referencing the Green factors from Green v. School Board of New Kent County. In response, the School Board appealed the district court’s orders and, as a precaution, also filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over the School Board’s direct appeal because the challenged orders were neither final decisions nor appealable injunctions. However, the Fifth Circuit granted mandamus relief, ruling that once a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) stipulation of dismissal is filed by all appearing parties, the case is immediately dismissed without need for a court order. Any further action by the district court is a nullity. The Fifth Circuit ordered the district court to vacate its orders and end the proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Don Willett</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Education Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30541/25-30541-2026-07-14.html</id>
        	<title>Brown v. Burmaster</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-14T15:30:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-14T15:30:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30541/25-30541-2026-07-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In this case, two plaintiffs sued a New Orleans police officer and the City of New Orleans after the officer shot and killed their 16-week-old puppy, Apollo, while responding to a domestic disturbance call. The officer entered the plaintiffs’ yard, encountered Apollo, and fired three shots, resulting in the puppy’s death. The plaintiffs alleged violation of their Fourth Amendment rights and brought several state-law claims against the officer, the City, and the police superintendent.

Prior to trial, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana denied the officer’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, finding factual disputes that precluded resolution at that stage. After additional motions and pretrial discussions, the case proceeded to trial. The jury found the officer had acted in an objectively unreasonable manner and harmed the plaintiffs, but also found him entitled to qualified immunity. Regarding the City, the jury returned inconsistent findings: it found the City’s policies did not cause Apollo’s death, yet determined the City was liable for violating the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights. The district court entered judgment for the officer and the City on the constitutional claims, but for the plaintiffs on state-law claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court held that the district court properly submitted the fact-bound qualified immunity question to the jury after instructing it on the clearly established law, consistent with circuit precedent. However, the court found the jury’s verdict against the City was internally inconsistent—municipal liability requires both culpability and causation, and the jury’s answers could not be reconciled. The Fifth Circuit therefore affirmed the judgment for the officer, reversed the judgment for the City, and remanded for a new trial on municipal liability. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30541/25-30541-2026-07-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Brown v. Burmaster" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In this case, two plaintiffs sued a New Orleans police officer and the City of New Orleans after the officer shot and killed their 16-week-old puppy, Apollo, while responding to a domestic disturbance call. The officer entered the plaintiffs’ yard, encountered Apollo, and fired three shots, resulting in the puppy’s death. The plaintiffs alleged violation of their Fourth Amendment rights and brought several state-law claims against the officer, the City, and the police superintendent.

Prior to trial, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana denied the officer’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, finding factual disputes that precluded resolution at that stage. After additional motions and pretrial discussions, the case proceeded to trial. The jury found the officer had acted in an objectively unreasonable manner and harmed the plaintiffs, but also found him entitled to qualified immunity. Regarding the City, the jury returned inconsistent findings: it found the City’s policies did not cause Apollo’s death, yet determined the City was liable for violating the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights. The district court entered judgment for the officer and the City on the constitutional claims, but for the plaintiffs on state-law claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court held that the district court properly submitted the fact-bound qualified immunity question to the jury after instructing it on the clearly established law, consistent with circuit precedent. However, the court found the jury’s verdict against the City was internally inconsistent—municipal liability requires both culpability and causation, and the jury’s answers could not be reconciled. The Fifth Circuit therefore affirmed the judgment for the officer, reversed the judgment for the City, and remanded for a new trial on municipal liability.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Don Willett</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60583/24-60583-2026-07-10.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Payne</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-10T15:30:40-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-10T15:30:40-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60583/24-60583-2026-07-10.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In June 2023, the defendant was arrested for selling a substantial quantity of methamphetamine to a government informant in two separate transactions, leading to a two-count federal indictment for drug trafficking offenses. Before pleading guilty to one count (with the other dismissed as part of a plea agreement), the defendant successfully petitioned a Mississippi state court to expunge a 2006 felony marijuana conviction. The expungement order, granted without a hearing or any findings of rehabilitation, restored the defendant to his pre-arrest legal status but preserved certain nonpublic records and did not address potential use in later proceedings.

During sentencing in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, the presentence report included the expunged marijuana conviction in the defendant’s criminal history, resulting in a higher offense level and a calculated guideline range of 262 to 327 months. The defendant objected, arguing the expunged conviction should not count. The district court overruled this objection, finding the expungement did not meet federal Sentencing Guidelines criteria, particularly as it was not based on innocence or legal error, and was instead a mechanism to restore civil rights. The court also questioned the circumstances of the expungement but ultimately imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 180 months, stating it would have imposed the same sentence even if the prior conviction had not been counted.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district court properly included the expunged conviction in the criminal history calculation. The Fifth Circuit clarified that, under the Sentencing Guidelines, only convictions expunged due to innocence or legal error are excluded; expungements granted for other reasons, such as restoring civil rights, must be counted. The court affirmed the sentence. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60583/24-60583-2026-07-10.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Payne" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In June 2023, the defendant was arrested for selling a substantial quantity of methamphetamine to a government informant in two separate transactions, leading to a two-count federal indictment for drug trafficking offenses. Before pleading guilty to one count (with the other dismissed as part of a plea agreement), the defendant successfully petitioned a Mississippi state court to expunge a 2006 felony marijuana conviction. The expungement order, granted without a hearing or any findings of rehabilitation, restored the defendant to his pre-arrest legal status but preserved certain nonpublic records and did not address potential use in later proceedings.

During sentencing in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, the presentence report included the expunged marijuana conviction in the defendant’s criminal history, resulting in a higher offense level and a calculated guideline range of 262 to 327 months. The defendant objected, arguing the expunged conviction should not count. The district court overruled this objection, finding the expungement did not meet federal Sentencing Guidelines criteria, particularly as it was not based on innocence or legal error, and was instead a mechanism to restore civil rights. The court also questioned the circumstances of the expungement but ultimately imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 180 months, stating it would have imposed the same sentence even if the prior conviction had not been counted.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district court properly included the expunged conviction in the criminal history calculation. The Fifth Circuit clarified that, under the Sentencing Guidelines, only convictions expunged due to innocence or legal error are excluded; expungements granted for other reasons, such as restoring civil rights, must be counted. The court affirmed the sentence.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-10</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Edith Clement</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30661/25-30661-2026-07-09.html</id>
        	<title>Rey v. LCMC Health Care Partners</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-09T15:30:33-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-09T15:30:33-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30661/25-30661-2026-07-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Five individuals residing near a New Orleans hospital brought suit after the hospital moved its helicopter landing pad from a one-story building near the Mississippi River to the top of a new tower in the center of the hospital complex. The plaintiffs, claiming that the new helipad created excessive noise and vibrations, sought a mandatory injunction requiring the hospital to relocate the helipad or otherwise abate the disturbance, as well as damages for nuisance and negligence.

The defendants removed the case from state court to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ request to remand the case to state court, finding that their subsequent removal of class-action allegations and request to decline supplemental jurisdiction amounted to improper forum shopping. The district court then granted the defendants partial summary judgment, holding that Federal Aviation Administration regulations preempted any permanent injunction to relocate the helipad. The court also dismissed some of the plaintiffs’ claims for damages, but allowed their claims for general nuisance damages to proceed to trial. Before trial, the plaintiffs appealed the order, seeking review of the denial of their request for an injunction.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal because the district court’s order did not explicitly deny an injunction and, even if it had the practical effect of denying injunctive relief, the plaintiffs did not show that they satisfied the requirements for interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) and Carson v. American Brands, Inc. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30661/25-30661-2026-07-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Rey v. LCMC Health Care Partners" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Five individuals residing near a New Orleans hospital brought suit after the hospital moved its helicopter landing pad from a one-story building near the Mississippi River to the top of a new tower in the center of the hospital complex. The plaintiffs, claiming that the new helipad created excessive noise and vibrations, sought a mandatory injunction requiring the hospital to relocate the helipad or otherwise abate the disturbance, as well as damages for nuisance and negligence.

The defendants removed the case from state court to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ request to remand the case to state court, finding that their subsequent removal of class-action allegations and request to decline supplemental jurisdiction amounted to improper forum shopping. The district court then granted the defendants partial summary judgment, holding that Federal Aviation Administration regulations preempted any permanent injunction to relocate the helipad. The court also dismissed some of the plaintiffs’ claims for damages, but allowed their claims for general nuisance damages to proceed to trial. Before trial, the plaintiffs appealed the order, seeking review of the denial of their request for an injunction.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal because the district court’s order did not explicitly deny an injunction and, even if it had the practical effect of denying injunctive relief, the plaintiffs did not show that they satisfied the requirements for interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) and Carson v. American Brands, Inc. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stuart Kyle Duncan</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Real Estate &amp; Property Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20258/25-20258-2026-07-09.html</id>
        	<title>Juneau Group v. Vendera Management</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-09T15:30:33-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-09T15:30:33-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20258/25-20258-2026-07-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A Louisiana limited liability company (LLC) with a sole member voluntarily dissolved in April 2024 and subsequently had its Texas registration terminated in May 2024. Prior to dissolution, the LLC had developed a bid strategy for certain oilfield assets and shared confidential information with a bank to seek financing. The assets were ultimately acquired by a different bidder, also financed by the same bank, and the LLC alleged that its confidential information was improperly conveyed to the winning bidder. After dissolution, the LLC initiated a lawsuit in July 2024 against the bank and the winning bidder, asserting trade secret misappropriation and breach of contract.

In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, the defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing the LLC lacked capacity to sue due to its prior dissolution. The LLC did not contest its lack of capacity but requested a stay while it sought reinstatement in Louisiana state court. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings for lack of capacity, denied the LLC’s request for a stay, and denied the defendants’ request to seek attorneys’ fees. The court also sealed various filings relating to the mental health of the LLC’s sole member.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s judgment on the pleadings, holding that under Texas law, an entity dissolved prior to suit lacks capacity to file suit, and that Louisiana law does not permit retroactive reinstatement of an LLC dissolved by affidavit to pursue claims known before dissolution but filed after. The Fifth Circuit denied the LLC’s request to certify a question to the Louisiana Supreme Court and affirmed the denial of attorneys’ fees. However, it vacated the district court’s sealing order, remanding for proper balancing of the public’s right of access to court records, as required by precedent. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20258/25-20258-2026-07-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Juneau Group v. Vendera Management" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A Louisiana limited liability company (LLC) with a sole member voluntarily dissolved in April 2024 and subsequently had its Texas registration terminated in May 2024. Prior to dissolution, the LLC had developed a bid strategy for certain oilfield assets and shared confidential information with a bank to seek financing. The assets were ultimately acquired by a different bidder, also financed by the same bank, and the LLC alleged that its confidential information was improperly conveyed to the winning bidder. After dissolution, the LLC initiated a lawsuit in July 2024 against the bank and the winning bidder, asserting trade secret misappropriation and breach of contract.

In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, the defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing the LLC lacked capacity to sue due to its prior dissolution. The LLC did not contest its lack of capacity but requested a stay while it sought reinstatement in Louisiana state court. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings for lack of capacity, denied the LLC’s request for a stay, and denied the defendants’ request to seek attorneys’ fees. The court also sealed various filings relating to the mental health of the LLC’s sole member.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s judgment on the pleadings, holding that under Texas law, an entity dissolved prior to suit lacks capacity to file suit, and that Louisiana law does not permit retroactive reinstatement of an LLC dissolved by affidavit to pursue claims known before dissolution but filed after. The Fifth Circuit denied the LLC’s request to certify a question to the Louisiana Supreme Court and affirmed the denial of attorneys’ fees. However, it vacated the district court’s sealing order, remanding for proper balancing of the public’s right of access to court records, as required by precedent.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Carolyn King</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10898/25-10898-2026-07-09.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Texas</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-09T15:30:32-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-09T15:30:32-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10898/25-10898-2026-07-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Texas law allows certain students, including those who are not lawfully present in the United States, to qualify for in-state tuition rates at public colleges if they meet residency requirements. The Texas Education Code provisions in question—sections 54.051(m) and 54.052(a)—permit illegal aliens who establish residency in Texas to pay discounted tuition, while out-of-state U.S. citizens must pay higher rates. The United States brought suit against Texas, alleging that these provisions violate federal law, specifically 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a), which bars states from granting postsecondary education benefits to illegal aliens based on residency unless all U.S. citizens and nationals are eligible for the same benefit regardless of residency.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas approved a consent judgment permanently enjoining Texas from enforcing the challenged provisions. After judgment, advocacy groups, a community college, and a student moved to intervene and sought to vacate or alter the judgment, arguing the provisions were not preempted by federal law. The district court denied intervention, reasoning it was legally futile because 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a) expressly preempts the Texas statutes.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the denial de novo and affirmed. The court held that intervention was futile because federal law expressly preempts the Texas provisions, barring states from conferring in-state tuition benefits to illegal aliens based on residency unless all U.S. citizens and nationals may receive the same benefit without regard to residency. The court also dismissed the remaining claims for lack of appellate jurisdiction, as the movants were not parties to the case and therefore had no right to appeal the consent judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10898/25-10898-2026-07-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Texas" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Texas law allows certain students, including those who are not lawfully present in the United States, to qualify for in-state tuition rates at public colleges if they meet residency requirements. The Texas Education Code provisions in question—sections 54.051(m) and 54.052(a)—permit illegal aliens who establish residency in Texas to pay discounted tuition, while out-of-state U.S. citizens must pay higher rates. The United States brought suit against Texas, alleging that these provisions violate federal law, specifically 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a), which bars states from granting postsecondary education benefits to illegal aliens based on residency unless all U.S. citizens and nationals are eligible for the same benefit regardless of residency.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas approved a consent judgment permanently enjoining Texas from enforcing the challenged provisions. After judgment, advocacy groups, a community college, and a student moved to intervene and sought to vacate or alter the judgment, arguing the provisions were not preempted by federal law. The district court denied intervention, reasoning it was legally futile because 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a) expressly preempts the Texas statutes.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the denial de novo and affirmed. The court held that intervention was futile because federal law expressly preempts the Texas provisions, barring states from conferring in-state tuition benefits to illegal aliens based on residency unless all U.S. citizens and nationals may receive the same benefit without regard to residency. The court also dismissed the remaining claims for lack of appellate jurisdiction, as the movants were not parties to the case and therefore had no right to appeal the consent judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20383/25-20383-2026-07-09.html</id>
        	<title>Searles v. City of Houston</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-09T09:30:53-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-09T09:30:53-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20383/25-20383-2026-07-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Police officers in Houston attempted to arrest an individual, Jalen Randle, pursuant to three outstanding felony warrants. During their operation, officers pursued Randle as he entered a vehicle. After the police immobilized the car, Randle exited, briefly returned to the vehicle to retrieve a closed bag, and then turned. Within seconds, Officer Shane Privette exited his vehicle, drew his firearm, and commanded Randle to show his hands. Before finishing his warning, Privette fired one fatal shot. The bag Randle retrieved was later found to contain a firearm. Randle was pronounced dead after being taken to the hospital.

Randle’s estate and family sued various parties, including Officer Privette, the Houston Police Chief, and the City of Houston, alleging excessive force, supervisory liability, and municipal liability under Monell. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas converted motions to dismiss into motions for summary judgment after limited discovery, specifically to evaluate Privette’s qualified immunity claim. The district court granted summary judgment to Privette, holding that his actions were objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that he was entitled to qualified immunity because there was no clearly established law prohibiting his conduct at the time.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s ruling de novo. The court focused on the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis—whether Randle’s right was clearly established—and held that plaintiffs failed to cite controlling authority or a robust consensus of persuasive authority with sufficiently similar facts to place the constitutional question “beyond debate.” The appellate court concluded that Privette was entitled to qualified immunity and therefore affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20383/25-20383-2026-07-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Searles v. City of Houston" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Police officers in Houston attempted to arrest an individual, Jalen Randle, pursuant to three outstanding felony warrants. During their operation, officers pursued Randle as he entered a vehicle. After the police immobilized the car, Randle exited, briefly returned to the vehicle to retrieve a closed bag, and then turned. Within seconds, Officer Shane Privette exited his vehicle, drew his firearm, and commanded Randle to show his hands. Before finishing his warning, Privette fired one fatal shot. The bag Randle retrieved was later found to contain a firearm. Randle was pronounced dead after being taken to the hospital.

Randle’s estate and family sued various parties, including Officer Privette, the Houston Police Chief, and the City of Houston, alleging excessive force, supervisory liability, and municipal liability under Monell. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas converted motions to dismiss into motions for summary judgment after limited discovery, specifically to evaluate Privette’s qualified immunity claim. The district court granted summary judgment to Privette, holding that his actions were objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that he was entitled to qualified immunity because there was no clearly established law prohibiting his conduct at the time.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s ruling de novo. The court focused on the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis—whether Randle’s right was clearly established—and held that plaintiffs failed to cite controlling authority or a robust consensus of persuasive authority with sufficiently similar facts to place the constitutional question “beyond debate.” The appellate court concluded that Privette was entitled to qualified immunity and therefore affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10491/25-10491-2026-07-09.html</id>
        	<title>EEOC v. SkyWest Airlines</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-09T09:30:53-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-09T09:30:53-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10491/25-10491-2026-07-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Sarah Budd, employed by SkyWest Airlines at Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport, was subjected to severe and persistent sexual harassment by coworkers and a supervisor, including degrading comments, sexual jokes, and references to prostitution and rape. Despite reporting these incidents to her supervisor, the harassment continued and escalated, resulting in significant emotional distress and physical symptoms for Budd. Following an internal investigation by SkyWest that resulted in minimal disciplinary action, Budd elected to take early retirement during the COVID-19 pandemic, fearing the work environment would not improve.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed suit on Budd’s behalf in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, alleging violations of Title VII. After trial, a jury found that Budd had been harassed based on her sex and that SkyWest had failed to take prompt remedial action, but did not find retaliation. The jury awarded Budd both compensatory and punitive damages. SkyWest moved for a new trial based on evidentiary objections, challenged the jury instructions regarding mitigation of emotional damages, and sought judgment as a matter of law on punitive damages. The district court denied these motions.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fifth Circuit held that the text messages admitted at trial were properly admitted as present sense impressions or statements of then-existing mental and physical condition under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court further held that Title VII plaintiffs are not required to mitigate damages for emotional distress, as neither statutory text nor well-established common law supports such a requirement. Finally, the court concluded that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s punitive damages award, as at least one manager acted with malice or reckless indifference and SkyWest failed to demonstrate a good-faith effort to address the harassment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10491/25-10491-2026-07-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "EEOC v. SkyWest Airlines" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Sarah Budd, employed by SkyWest Airlines at Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport, was subjected to severe and persistent sexual harassment by coworkers and a supervisor, including degrading comments, sexual jokes, and references to prostitution and rape. Despite reporting these incidents to her supervisor, the harassment continued and escalated, resulting in significant emotional distress and physical symptoms for Budd. Following an internal investigation by SkyWest that resulted in minimal disciplinary action, Budd elected to take early retirement during the COVID-19 pandemic, fearing the work environment would not improve.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed suit on Budd’s behalf in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, alleging violations of Title VII. After trial, a jury found that Budd had been harassed based on her sex and that SkyWest had failed to take prompt remedial action, but did not find retaliation. The jury awarded Budd both compensatory and punitive damages. SkyWest moved for a new trial based on evidentiary objections, challenged the jury instructions regarding mitigation of emotional damages, and sought judgment as a matter of law on punitive damages. The district court denied these motions.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fifth Circuit held that the text messages admitted at trial were properly admitted as present sense impressions or statements of then-existing mental and physical condition under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court further held that Title VII plaintiffs are not required to mitigate damages for emotional distress, as neither statutory text nor well-established common law supports such a requirement. Finally, the court concluded that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s punitive damages award, as at least one manager acted with malice or reckless indifference and SkyWest failed to demonstrate a good-faith effort to address the harassment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James Graves</case:judge>
													<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40472/24-40472-2026-07-08.html</id>
        	<title>Thorpe v. Weaver</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-08T15:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-08T15:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40472/24-40472-2026-07-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		On a hot day in Texas in 2019, Darren Boykin fled from campus police and, after a half-mile chase, was apprehended by law enforcement officers. During and after the arrest, Boykin complained of being unable to breathe, but officers attributed his symptoms to exhaustion from running, not knowing that he had sickle cell trait—a condition that can cause sudden death after intense physical exertion. Officer Hobbs responded to Boykin’s complaints by increasing the air conditioning. Sergeant Scott arrived after Boykin was already in the patrol car and relied on the assessment of the other officers. Officer Weaver transported Boykin to jail; during the trip, Boykin’s condition worsened, and he lost consciousness. Upon arrival at the jail, Weaver found Boykin unresponsive, began resuscitation, and called for emergency help. Boykin ultimately died at the hospital.

Boykin’s family and estate sued the officers in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers, finding that they were entitled to qualified immunity.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Hobbs or Scott had actual knowledge of a serious medical risk to Boykin; at most, they misinterpreted his symptoms as exhaustion. Regarding Weaver, the court found that a jury could infer she became aware of Boykin’s medical distress during transport. However, the court concluded that, as of 2019, it was not clearly established law that an officer in Weaver’s position was required to immediately secure aid for a detainee losing consciousness during transport. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for all three officers on qualified immunity grounds. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40472/24-40472-2026-07-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Thorpe v. Weaver" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                On a hot day in Texas in 2019, Darren Boykin fled from campus police and, after a half-mile chase, was apprehended by law enforcement officers. During and after the arrest, Boykin complained of being unable to breathe, but officers attributed his symptoms to exhaustion from running, not knowing that he had sickle cell trait—a condition that can cause sudden death after intense physical exertion. Officer Hobbs responded to Boykin’s complaints by increasing the air conditioning. Sergeant Scott arrived after Boykin was already in the patrol car and relied on the assessment of the other officers. Officer Weaver transported Boykin to jail; during the trip, Boykin’s condition worsened, and he lost consciousness. Upon arrival at the jail, Weaver found Boykin unresponsive, began resuscitation, and called for emergency help. Boykin ultimately died at the hospital.

Boykin’s family and estate sued the officers in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers, finding that they were entitled to qualified immunity.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Hobbs or Scott had actual knowledge of a serious medical risk to Boykin; at most, they misinterpreted his symptoms as exhaustion. Regarding Weaver, the court found that a jury could infer she became aware of Boykin’s medical distress during transport. However, the court concluded that, as of 2019, it was not clearly established law that an officer in Weaver’s position was required to immediately secure aid for a detainee losing consciousness during transport. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for all three officers on qualified immunity grounds.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James Graves</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60282/25-60282-2026-07-07.html</id>
        	<title>Center for Bio Diversity v. TRAN</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-07T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-07T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60282/25-60282-2026-07-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Delfin LNG sought approval to construct and operate a deepwater liquefied natural gas export facility in the Gulf of America, consisting of onshore infrastructure in Louisiana and floating offshore vessels. The Maritime Administration (MARAD), after extensive environmental review and public comment, initially approved the project in 2017. Over subsequent years, Delfin altered key aspects of the project, including its design and financing. MARAD determined these changes required further review and asked Delfin to submit an amended application, which Delfin did not do. In 2025, following a presidential executive order, MARAD concluded that the modifications would not cause significantly different environmental impacts and issued the license.

Three environmental organizations challenged MARAD’s decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. They argued MARAD violated the Deepwater Port Act by not requiring an amended application and additional public comment, the National Environmental Policy Act by not preparing a supplemental environmental impact statement, and the Administrative Procedure Act by issuing a license after finding the prior approval was insufficient. They requested the court vacate MARAD’s licensing decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that none of the petitioners demonstrated Article III standing. The court held that the organizations failed to identify a member who suffered a concrete and particularized injury fairly traceable to MARAD’s licensing decision. The declarations submitted did not show a personal and project-specific harm, nor did they establish a sufficient geographic nexus to the affected area. As a result, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits and denied the petition for review. The main holding is that, in the absence of standing, the court cannot reach the substantive environmental or procedural claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60282/25-60282-2026-07-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Center for Bio Diversity v. TRAN" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Delfin LNG sought approval to construct and operate a deepwater liquefied natural gas export facility in the Gulf of America, consisting of onshore infrastructure in Louisiana and floating offshore vessels. The Maritime Administration (MARAD), after extensive environmental review and public comment, initially approved the project in 2017. Over subsequent years, Delfin altered key aspects of the project, including its design and financing. MARAD determined these changes required further review and asked Delfin to submit an amended application, which Delfin did not do. In 2025, following a presidential executive order, MARAD concluded that the modifications would not cause significantly different environmental impacts and issued the license.

Three environmental organizations challenged MARAD’s decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. They argued MARAD violated the Deepwater Port Act by not requiring an amended application and additional public comment, the National Environmental Policy Act by not preparing a supplemental environmental impact statement, and the Administrative Procedure Act by issuing a license after finding the prior approval was insufficient. They requested the court vacate MARAD’s licensing decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that none of the petitioners demonstrated Article III standing. The court held that the organizations failed to identify a member who suffered a concrete and particularized injury fairly traceable to MARAD’s licensing decision. The declarations submitted did not show a personal and project-specific harm, nor did they establish a sufficient geographic nexus to the affected area. As a result, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits and denied the petition for review. The main holding is that, in the absence of standing, the court cannot reach the substantive environmental or procedural claims.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Don Willett</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Environmental Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40779/24-40779-2026-07-07.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Theiler</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-07T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-07T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40779/24-40779-2026-07-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A laboratory testing company, Boston Heart Diagnostics (BHD), and two rural Texas hospitals, Little River Health Care and Integrity Transitional Hospital, entered into arrangements where affiliated physicians referred blood tests to the hospitals, which then billed payors, including Medicare, at advantageous rates. The hospitals used Management Service Organizations (MSOs) as intermediaries to recruit and pay physicians, and BHD’s sales team—including several defendants—facilitated these relationships. Evidence at trial showed MSOs were used to provide kickbacks to physicians based on referral volume, disguised through sham contracts, resulting in unusually high revenues for BHD. The defendants included BHD’s CEO, vice president of sales, and sales representatives, who were involved in managing and growing these partnerships.

A federal grand jury indicted eighteen individuals for conspiracy to commit illegal remunerations in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) and 18 U.S.C. § 371. Five defendants proceeded to a joint jury trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. The government presented testimony from co-conspirators and documentary evidence to show the existence of the scheme and the defendants’ knowledge and participation. The jury found all five guilty of conspiracy. The court denied post-trial motions for acquittal or a new trial, sentenced the defendants, and four of them appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo and other claims under deferential standards. The court affirmed all convictions, holding that a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants knowingly and willfully joined a conspiracy to pay illegal kickbacks to induce referrals for federally insured patients. The court also held there was sufficient evidence of a federal nexus and no error in the district court’s handling of jury notes or instructional refusals. The convictions and sentences were affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40779/24-40779-2026-07-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Theiler" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A laboratory testing company, Boston Heart Diagnostics (BHD), and two rural Texas hospitals, Little River Health Care and Integrity Transitional Hospital, entered into arrangements where affiliated physicians referred blood tests to the hospitals, which then billed payors, including Medicare, at advantageous rates. The hospitals used Management Service Organizations (MSOs) as intermediaries to recruit and pay physicians, and BHD’s sales team—including several defendants—facilitated these relationships. Evidence at trial showed MSOs were used to provide kickbacks to physicians based on referral volume, disguised through sham contracts, resulting in unusually high revenues for BHD. The defendants included BHD’s CEO, vice president of sales, and sales representatives, who were involved in managing and growing these partnerships.

A federal grand jury indicted eighteen individuals for conspiracy to commit illegal remunerations in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) and 18 U.S.C. § 371. Five defendants proceeded to a joint jury trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. The government presented testimony from co-conspirators and documentary evidence to show the existence of the scheme and the defendants’ knowledge and participation. The jury found all five guilty of conspiracy. The court denied post-trial motions for acquittal or a new trial, sentenced the defendants, and four of them appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo and other claims under deferential standards. The court affirmed all convictions, holding that a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants knowingly and willfully joined a conspiracy to pay illegal kickbacks to induce referrals for federally insured patients. The court also held there was sufficient evidence of a federal nexus and no error in the district court’s handling of jury notes or instructional refusals. The convictions and sentences were affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Patrick Higginbotham</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20230/25-20230-2026-07-07.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Quintanilla</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-07T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-07T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20230/25-20230-2026-07-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A defendant pleaded guilty to transporting child pornography pursuant to a written plea agreement with the government. In exchange for the dismissal of two more serious charges—sexual exploitation of a minor and possession of child pornography—the defendant admitted guilt to the transportation offense. The plea agreement included an appellate waiver, allowing appeals only for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant confirmed in court that he understood the agreement’s terms, including the maximum penalties and mandatory restitution. At sentencing, the court imposed 240 months’ imprisonment, lifetime supervised release, and $17,500 in restitution to two victims.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas accepted the defendant&#039;s guilty plea and sentenced him according to the statutory maximum and mandatory minimums outlined in the plea agreement. The court also conducted a joint change-of-plea hearing for the defendant and another individual, advising both about appellate rights. The presentence report attributed 3,092 images of child pornography to the defendant, and the court considered victim-impact statements and restitution requests before issuing its sentence. The defendant did not object to the restitution calculation at sentencing.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the defendant argued that the district court misled him regarding his appellate rights during the plea colloquy, imposed unreasonable prison and supervised release terms, and failed to properly analyze causation and apportionment for restitution as required by Paroline v. United States. The Fifth Circuit held that the appellate waiver was knowing and voluntary, barring challenges to the conviction, sentence, and restitution. The court found no plain error in the district court’s advisement or restitution calculation and affirmed the judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20230/25-20230-2026-07-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Quintanilla" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A defendant pleaded guilty to transporting child pornography pursuant to a written plea agreement with the government. In exchange for the dismissal of two more serious charges—sexual exploitation of a minor and possession of child pornography—the defendant admitted guilt to the transportation offense. The plea agreement included an appellate waiver, allowing appeals only for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant confirmed in court that he understood the agreement’s terms, including the maximum penalties and mandatory restitution. At sentencing, the court imposed 240 months’ imprisonment, lifetime supervised release, and $17,500 in restitution to two victims.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas accepted the defendant&#039;s guilty plea and sentenced him according to the statutory maximum and mandatory minimums outlined in the plea agreement. The court also conducted a joint change-of-plea hearing for the defendant and another individual, advising both about appellate rights. The presentence report attributed 3,092 images of child pornography to the defendant, and the court considered victim-impact statements and restitution requests before issuing its sentence. The defendant did not object to the restitution calculation at sentencing.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the defendant argued that the district court misled him regarding his appellate rights during the plea colloquy, imposed unreasonable prison and supervised release terms, and failed to properly analyze causation and apportionment for restitution as required by Paroline v. United States. The Fifth Circuit held that the appellate waiver was knowing and voluntary, barring challenges to the conviction, sentence, and restitution. The court found no plain error in the district court’s advisement or restitution calculation and affirmed the judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Don Willett</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50675/25-50675-2026-07-07.html</id>
        	<title>Barrier v. USA</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-07T09:30:38-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-07T09:30:38-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50675/25-50675-2026-07-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A federal employee, Robert Duran, who held a full-time union leadership position with the National Border Patrol Council (NBPC), struck Tami Barrier with his vehicle while exiting a United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) station in Del Rio, Texas. Duran was leaving the station to collect pandemic-related supplies donated for CBP agents, a task requested by another union leader. The supplies were intended for distribution among multiple Border Patrol stations. Duran’s work entailed both union responsibilities and CBP overtime hours, and there was ambiguity regarding whether he was on duty at the time of the incident. Video evidence and timesheets provided conflicting accounts of his work hours, and there was dispute over whether collecting the supplies was a personal favor or part of his union duties.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judgment to the Government, finding that Duran was not acting within the course and scope of his employment when the incident occurred. The court concluded that the errand was not a CBP task and was not performed under CBP’s authority, so the United States could not be held vicariously liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that genuine disputes of material fact existed regarding whether Duran was acting within the scope of his employment under Texas law, including whether he was performing a “special mission” for CBP at the time. The court determined that a reasonable jury could find Duran’s actions benefited CBP and were performed with its implied approval. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50675/25-50675-2026-07-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Barrier v. USA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A federal employee, Robert Duran, who held a full-time union leadership position with the National Border Patrol Council (NBPC), struck Tami Barrier with his vehicle while exiting a United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) station in Del Rio, Texas. Duran was leaving the station to collect pandemic-related supplies donated for CBP agents, a task requested by another union leader. The supplies were intended for distribution among multiple Border Patrol stations. Duran’s work entailed both union responsibilities and CBP overtime hours, and there was ambiguity regarding whether he was on duty at the time of the incident. Video evidence and timesheets provided conflicting accounts of his work hours, and there was dispute over whether collecting the supplies was a personal favor or part of his union duties.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judgment to the Government, finding that Duran was not acting within the course and scope of his employment when the incident occurred. The court concluded that the errand was not a CBP task and was not performed under CBP’s authority, so the United States could not be held vicariously liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that genuine disputes of material fact existed regarding whether Duran was acting within the scope of his employment under Texas law, including whether he was performing a “special mission” for CBP at the time. The court determined that a reasonable jury could find Duran’s actions benefited CBP and were performed with its implied approval. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James Graves</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Personal Injury"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20421/25-20421-2026-07-06.html</id>
        	<title>20100 Eastex v. Saltgrass</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-06T15:30:32-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-06T15:30:32-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20421/25-20421-2026-07-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A dispute arose over a property contract concerning two adjacent restaurant parcels in Humble, Texas, formerly owned by affiliates of Landry’s, Inc. After Landry’s sold one parcel, a Reciprocal Easement Agreement was created to regulate construction and modifications on each parcel. Years later, 20100 Eastex, L.L.C. purchased the parcel previously occupied by Joe’s Crab Shack and leased it to BJ’s Brewery, which planned to demolish the existing building and construct a new one. BJ’s requested Saltgrass’s consent for the project, but Saltgrass denied approval, leading Eastex to claim that consent was deemed granted under the contract due to alleged procedural defects.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment to Saltgrass, finding that the Agreement required Eastex to obtain Saltgrass’s express written consent before demolition or new construction, and Eastex failed to properly request approval. Eastex appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit initially found Section 3.3 of the Agreement ambiguous and remanded for further factfinding. On remand, the district court considered extrinsic evidence, particularly the uncontested testimony of the drafter, and again granted summary judgment for Saltgrass.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that undisputed extrinsic evidence clarified Section 3.3, establishing that Saltgrass’s consent was required for any demolition or new construction. The court affirmed summary judgment for Saltgrass, dismissed Eastex’s appeal regarding attorney fees for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded for determination of Saltgrass’s appellate attorney fees. The main holdings were: Saltgrass’s interpretation of the contract was correct; summary judgment was proper due to lack of genuine factual dispute; and Saltgrass is entitled to appellate attorney fees. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20421/25-20421-2026-07-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "20100 Eastex v. Saltgrass" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A dispute arose over a property contract concerning two adjacent restaurant parcels in Humble, Texas, formerly owned by affiliates of Landry’s, Inc. After Landry’s sold one parcel, a Reciprocal Easement Agreement was created to regulate construction and modifications on each parcel. Years later, 20100 Eastex, L.L.C. purchased the parcel previously occupied by Joe’s Crab Shack and leased it to BJ’s Brewery, which planned to demolish the existing building and construct a new one. BJ’s requested Saltgrass’s consent for the project, but Saltgrass denied approval, leading Eastex to claim that consent was deemed granted under the contract due to alleged procedural defects.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment to Saltgrass, finding that the Agreement required Eastex to obtain Saltgrass’s express written consent before demolition or new construction, and Eastex failed to properly request approval. Eastex appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit initially found Section 3.3 of the Agreement ambiguous and remanded for further factfinding. On remand, the district court considered extrinsic evidence, particularly the uncontested testimony of the drafter, and again granted summary judgment for Saltgrass.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that undisputed extrinsic evidence clarified Section 3.3, establishing that Saltgrass’s consent was required for any demolition or new construction. The court affirmed summary judgment for Saltgrass, dismissed Eastex’s appeal regarding attorney fees for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded for determination of Saltgrass’s appellate attorney fees. The main holdings were: Saltgrass’s interpretation of the contract was correct; summary judgment was proper due to lack of genuine factual dispute; and Saltgrass is entitled to appellate attorney fees.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Don Willett</case:judge>
													<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Real Estate &amp; Property Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30645/24-30645-2026-07-06.html</id>
        	<title>AbbVie v. Murrill</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-06T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-06T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30645/24-30645-2026-07-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several pharmaceutical manufacturers and a trade association challenged a Louisiana statute enacted in 2023, which prohibits drug manufacturers and distributors from interfering with the acquisition or delivery of discounted drugs—purchased under the federal Section 340B Drug Pricing Program—to pharmacies contracted by certain healthcare providers. The 340B Program requires drug manufacturers participating in Medicaid and Medicare to provide discounted outpatient drugs to designated healthcare providers serving low-income and rural populations. Many of these providers lack in-house pharmacies and use external contract pharmacies. In response to manufacturer-imposed limits on contract pharmacy use, Louisiana enacted Act 358 to preserve covered entities’ ability to use such pharmacies.

The plaintiffs, including AbbVie, AstraZeneca, and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, filed separate lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana against the Louisiana Attorney General, arguing that Act 358 is preempted by federal law, constitutes an unconstitutional taking, impairs contracts in violation of the Contracts Clause, and is unconstitutionally vague. The district court consolidated the cases, granted summary judgment for Louisiana and the Louisiana Primary Care Association (an intervenor), and rejected all of the manufacturers’ claims.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fifth Circuit held that Act 358 is not preempted by federal law, as the federal 340B Program does not regulate drug distribution logistics or the use of contract pharmacies, and thus leaves room for state regulation. The court further concluded that Act 358 does not effect a taking under the Fifth Amendment, does not substantially impair contractual obligations under the Contracts Clause, and is not unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause. The Fifth Circuit thus upheld summary judgment for Louisiana on all claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30645/24-30645-2026-07-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "AbbVie v. Murrill" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several pharmaceutical manufacturers and a trade association challenged a Louisiana statute enacted in 2023, which prohibits drug manufacturers and distributors from interfering with the acquisition or delivery of discounted drugs—purchased under the federal Section 340B Drug Pricing Program—to pharmacies contracted by certain healthcare providers. The 340B Program requires drug manufacturers participating in Medicaid and Medicare to provide discounted outpatient drugs to designated healthcare providers serving low-income and rural populations. Many of these providers lack in-house pharmacies and use external contract pharmacies. In response to manufacturer-imposed limits on contract pharmacy use, Louisiana enacted Act 358 to preserve covered entities’ ability to use such pharmacies.

The plaintiffs, including AbbVie, AstraZeneca, and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, filed separate lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana against the Louisiana Attorney General, arguing that Act 358 is preempted by federal law, constitutes an unconstitutional taking, impairs contracts in violation of the Contracts Clause, and is unconstitutionally vague. The district court consolidated the cases, granted summary judgment for Louisiana and the Louisiana Primary Care Association (an intervenor), and rejected all of the manufacturers’ claims.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fifth Circuit held that Act 358 is not preempted by federal law, as the federal 340B Program does not regulate drug distribution logistics or the use of contract pharmacies, and thus leaves room for state regulation. The court further concluded that Act 358 does not effect a taking under the Fifth Amendment, does not substantially impair contractual obligations under the Contracts Clause, and is not unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause. The Fifth Circuit thus upheld summary judgment for Louisiana on all claims.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Don Willett</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Drugs &amp; Biotech"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-50183/26-50183-2026-07-02.html</id>
        	<title>Sosnava Rodriguez v. Ortega</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-02T15:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-02T15:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-50183/26-50183-2026-07-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Three individuals, each having entered the United States unlawfully more than a decade ago, were detained by federal immigration authorities after routine traffic stops in Texas. None had criminal histories, and each was a long-term resident and father of U.S. citizen children. They petitioned for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), claiming exceptional hardship to their U.S. citizen children if removed. After being detained without bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), they filed habeas corpus petitions, asserting their detention violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas reviewed each petition, applying the procedural due process framework from Mathews v. Eldridge. The district courts found the mandatory detention regime unconstitutional as applied to these petitioners, ordered their immediate release, and required that any future detention must be preceded by a hearing to determine dangerousness or risk of flight. The government appealed these rulings, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit consolidated the cases.

The Fifth Circuit examined precedent, including Zadvydas v. Davis, Demore v. Kim, and Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, and concluded that physical presence and long-term residence within the United States entitles aliens to due process protections. The court held that mandatory, indefinite detention of noncriminal, long-term resident aliens under § 1225(b)(2)(A) without a bond hearing violates the Fifth Amendment. The government must provide a bond hearing within ninety days of detention to determine if continued detention is justified by individualized findings of dangerousness or flight risk. The court affirmed the district courts’ grants of habeas corpus and clarified the scope of its decision to similar aliens detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A). &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-50183/26-50183-2026-07-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Sosnava Rodriguez v. Ortega" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Three individuals, each having entered the United States unlawfully more than a decade ago, were detained by federal immigration authorities after routine traffic stops in Texas. None had criminal histories, and each was a long-term resident and father of U.S. citizen children. They petitioned for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), claiming exceptional hardship to their U.S. citizen children if removed. After being detained without bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), they filed habeas corpus petitions, asserting their detention violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas reviewed each petition, applying the procedural due process framework from Mathews v. Eldridge. The district courts found the mandatory detention regime unconstitutional as applied to these petitioners, ordered their immediate release, and required that any future detention must be preceded by a hearing to determine dangerousness or risk of flight. The government appealed these rulings, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit consolidated the cases.

The Fifth Circuit examined precedent, including Zadvydas v. Davis, Demore v. Kim, and Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, and concluded that physical presence and long-term residence within the United States entitles aliens to due process protections. The court held that mandatory, indefinite detention of noncriminal, long-term resident aliens under § 1225(b)(2)(A) without a bond hearing violates the Fifth Amendment. The government must provide a bond hearing within ninety days of detention to determine if continued detention is justified by individualized findings of dangerousness or flight risk. The court affirmed the district courts’ grants of habeas corpus and clarified the scope of its decision to similar aliens detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leslie Southwick</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Immigration Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40727/24-40727-2026-07-02.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Kendall</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-02T09:30:55-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-02T09:30:55-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40727/24-40727-2026-07-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon and was sentenced to eighteen months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. The district court imposed standard and special conditions of supervised release, including substance abuse treatment and a battering intervention program. After serving his prison term, the defendant began supervised release but soon violated two conditions: refusing substance abuse treatment and threatening his probation officer. At a hearing, he admitted to these violations, and the district court revoked his supervised release, sentencing him to six months in custody and thirty months of supervised release with new conditions, including home detention and location monitoring.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas issued the revocation judgment, which the defendant appealed, arguing that several conditions of supervised release conflicted with the oral pronouncement at sentencing. During the appeal, his supervised release was revoked again for failing to participate in location monitoring and for not following probation officer instructions. The district court imposed a new custodial sentence and another term of supervised release with similar conditions, except for the removal of the mental health treatment requirement.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found the appeal largely moot due to the superseding revocation, except for conditions that were the basis of the second revocation. The Fifth Circuit held that only the home detention special condition and the requirement to follow probation officer instructions remained live issues and were improperly pronounced at sentencing because the defendant had not been given notice or an opportunity to object. The court vacated the judgment in part, remanded for amendment to remove those conditions, and dismissed the challenge to other conditions as moot. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40727/24-40727-2026-07-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Kendall" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon and was sentenced to eighteen months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. The district court imposed standard and special conditions of supervised release, including substance abuse treatment and a battering intervention program. After serving his prison term, the defendant began supervised release but soon violated two conditions: refusing substance abuse treatment and threatening his probation officer. At a hearing, he admitted to these violations, and the district court revoked his supervised release, sentencing him to six months in custody and thirty months of supervised release with new conditions, including home detention and location monitoring.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas issued the revocation judgment, which the defendant appealed, arguing that several conditions of supervised release conflicted with the oral pronouncement at sentencing. During the appeal, his supervised release was revoked again for failing to participate in location monitoring and for not following probation officer instructions. The district court imposed a new custodial sentence and another term of supervised release with similar conditions, except for the removal of the mental health treatment requirement.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found the appeal largely moot due to the superseding revocation, except for conditions that were the basis of the second revocation. The Fifth Circuit held that only the home detention special condition and the requirement to follow probation officer instructions remained live issues and were improperly pronounced at sentencing because the defendant had not been given notice or an opportunity to object. The court vacated the judgment in part, remanded for amendment to remove those conditions, and dismissed the challenge to other conditions as moot.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leslie Southwick</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60414/25-60414-2026-07-01.html</id>
        	<title>Dilworth v. Tucker</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-01T09:30:54-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-01T09:30:54-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60414/25-60414-2026-07-01.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The plaintiff purchased real property in Corinth, Mississippi, which previously belonged to another individual who had requested police to patrol the property and remove trespassers. After the plaintiff recorded the deed, he was found by a responding police officer at the property following a report of suspicious activity. The officer, believing the prior owner still possessed the property, questioned the plaintiff, who did not respond to ownership inquiries and attempted to move toward the house. The officer tried to detain the plaintiff, resulting in a physical encounter and the use of a taser. The plaintiff was arrested and charged with trespassing, resisting arrest, and disorderly conduct. The trespass charge was dismissed after ownership was confirmed, and the other charges were conditionally retired.

The plaintiff filed suit in state court against the officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging false arrest and excessive force. The defendant removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi and moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The district court granted summary judgment, finding that the plaintiff failed to present evidence raising a triable issue concerning a constitutional violation, and that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity. The plaintiff appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and focused on whether the plaintiff established that the officer violated clearly established law. The court determined that the plaintiff failed to identify controlling precedent or a robust consensus of analogous cases demonstrating a violation of clearly established law for either false arrest or excessive force. Finding the officer entitled to qualified immunity, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60414/25-60414-2026-07-01.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Dilworth v. Tucker" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The plaintiff purchased real property in Corinth, Mississippi, which previously belonged to another individual who had requested police to patrol the property and remove trespassers. After the plaintiff recorded the deed, he was found by a responding police officer at the property following a report of suspicious activity. The officer, believing the prior owner still possessed the property, questioned the plaintiff, who did not respond to ownership inquiries and attempted to move toward the house. The officer tried to detain the plaintiff, resulting in a physical encounter and the use of a taser. The plaintiff was arrested and charged with trespassing, resisting arrest, and disorderly conduct. The trespass charge was dismissed after ownership was confirmed, and the other charges were conditionally retired.

The plaintiff filed suit in state court against the officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging false arrest and excessive force. The defendant removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi and moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The district court granted summary judgment, finding that the plaintiff failed to present evidence raising a triable issue concerning a constitutional violation, and that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity. The plaintiff appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and focused on whether the plaintiff established that the officer violated clearly established law. The court determined that the plaintiff failed to identify controlling precedent or a robust consensus of analogous cases demonstrating a violation of clearly established law for either false arrest or excessive force. Finding the officer entitled to qualified immunity, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Irma Ramirez</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10774/25-10774-2026-07-01.html</id>
        	<title>Alta v. General Electric</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-01T09:30:53-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-01T09:30:53-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10774/25-10774-2026-07-01.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Alta Power, L.L.C. sought to build peaker plants in Texas using refurbished turbines, ultimately contracting with WattStock, which collaborated with General Electric International, Inc. (GE) as a subcontractor. Alta and WattStock’s Master Agreement included a mutual waiver of consequential damages for claims “arising out of or connected in any way to” the agreement, covering both parties and their subcontractors. The turbine arrangement failed in 2020, leading to litigation among Alta, WattStock, and later GE. WattStock filed for bankruptcy and removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Alta sought consequential damages from GE, alleging tortious conduct, fraudulent inducement, and arguing the waiver did not apply to intentional torts.

The district court for the Northern District of Texas granted summary judgment to GE, holding that GE, as WattStock’s subcontractor, was an intended third-party beneficiary of the consequential-damages waiver. The court found the waiver enforceable under Texas law, even in the face of alleged fraudulent inducement, referencing Bombardier Aerospace Corp. v. SPEP Aircraft Holdings, LLC, 572 S.W.3d 213 (Tex. 2019), and concluded that the waiver applied to all causes of action, including intentional torts. The district court dismissed all claims by Alta with prejudice, except for GE’s breach of contract claim, which was also dismissed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the summary judgment de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Fifth Circuit held that GE was an intended third-party beneficiary eligible to enforce the waiver, that alleged fraudulent inducement did not render the waiver unenforceable under Texas law, and that the waiver applied to intentional tort claims. The court affirmed the dismissal of Alta’s claims against GE. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10774/25-10774-2026-07-01.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Alta v. General Electric" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Alta Power, L.L.C. sought to build peaker plants in Texas using refurbished turbines, ultimately contracting with WattStock, which collaborated with General Electric International, Inc. (GE) as a subcontractor. Alta and WattStock’s Master Agreement included a mutual waiver of consequential damages for claims “arising out of or connected in any way to” the agreement, covering both parties and their subcontractors. The turbine arrangement failed in 2020, leading to litigation among Alta, WattStock, and later GE. WattStock filed for bankruptcy and removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Alta sought consequential damages from GE, alleging tortious conduct, fraudulent inducement, and arguing the waiver did not apply to intentional torts.

The district court for the Northern District of Texas granted summary judgment to GE, holding that GE, as WattStock’s subcontractor, was an intended third-party beneficiary of the consequential-damages waiver. The court found the waiver enforceable under Texas law, even in the face of alleged fraudulent inducement, referencing Bombardier Aerospace Corp. v. SPEP Aircraft Holdings, LLC, 572 S.W.3d 213 (Tex. 2019), and concluded that the waiver applied to all causes of action, including intentional torts. The district court dismissed all claims by Alta with prejudice, except for GE’s breach of contract claim, which was also dismissed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the summary judgment de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Fifth Circuit held that GE was an intended third-party beneficiary eligible to enforce the waiver, that alleged fraudulent inducement did not render the waiver unenforceable under Texas law, and that the waiver applied to intentional tort claims. The court affirmed the dismissal of Alta’s claims against GE.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kurt Engelhardt</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60200/25-60200-2026-06-30.html</id>
        	<title>Texas Tobacco Barn v. HHS</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-30T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-30T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60200/25-60200-2026-06-30.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Texas Tobacco Barn operated a laboratory and retail shop in Lubbock, Texas, manufacturing and selling e-liquids and vape products. After applying for authorization to sell over 2,200 vape products, including Barn Brewed Beetle Juice e-liquids, the FDA denied approval and warned that these products were considered “adulterated” and “misbranded.” Despite assurances from Texas Tobacco Barn that it would cease sales, a subsequent FDA inspection revealed continued sale of unauthorized products. The FDA initiated proceedings seeking a civil penalty of $19,192 for violations.

The enforcement action began with an administrative hearing before an HHS administrative law judge (ALJ), who reviewed evidence including inspection photos and testimony from an FDA inspector. Texas Tobacco Barn admitted that the e-liquids lacked FDA authorization but disputed the inspector’s findings and challenged the FDA’s regulatory authority. The ALJ concluded that the FDA proved its case by a preponderance of the evidence and imposed the civil penalty. On appeal, the HHS Departmental Appeals Board affirmed the ALJ’s ruling, agreeing the ALJ lacked jurisdiction to address constitutional challenges but offering advisory comments on those defenses.

Reviewing the agency’s final decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered Texas Tobacco Barn’s statutory and constitutional arguments. The court rejected the nondelegation challenge, citing its own precedent and Supreme Court guidance clarifying FDA’s explicit authority to regulate vape products. However, the Fifth Circuit held that the administrative process violated Texas Tobacco Barn’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The court determined that civil penalties for FDCA violations are legal in nature and do not fall under the public-rights exception that would permit agency adjudication without a jury. As a result, the Fifth Circuit granted the petition and vacated the agency’s decision. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60200/25-60200-2026-06-30.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Texas Tobacco Barn v. HHS" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Texas Tobacco Barn operated a laboratory and retail shop in Lubbock, Texas, manufacturing and selling e-liquids and vape products. After applying for authorization to sell over 2,200 vape products, including Barn Brewed Beetle Juice e-liquids, the FDA denied approval and warned that these products were considered “adulterated” and “misbranded.” Despite assurances from Texas Tobacco Barn that it would cease sales, a subsequent FDA inspection revealed continued sale of unauthorized products. The FDA initiated proceedings seeking a civil penalty of $19,192 for violations.

The enforcement action began with an administrative hearing before an HHS administrative law judge (ALJ), who reviewed evidence including inspection photos and testimony from an FDA inspector. Texas Tobacco Barn admitted that the e-liquids lacked FDA authorization but disputed the inspector’s findings and challenged the FDA’s regulatory authority. The ALJ concluded that the FDA proved its case by a preponderance of the evidence and imposed the civil penalty. On appeal, the HHS Departmental Appeals Board affirmed the ALJ’s ruling, agreeing the ALJ lacked jurisdiction to address constitutional challenges but offering advisory comments on those defenses.

Reviewing the agency’s final decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered Texas Tobacco Barn’s statutory and constitutional arguments. The court rejected the nondelegation challenge, citing its own precedent and Supreme Court guidance clarifying FDA’s explicit authority to regulate vape products. However, the Fifth Circuit held that the administrative process violated Texas Tobacco Barn’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The court determined that civil penalties for FDCA violations are legal in nature and do not fall under the public-rights exception that would permit agency adjudication without a jury. As a result, the Fifth Circuit granted the petition and vacated the agency’s decision.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stuart Kyle Duncan</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50510/25-50510-2026-06-29.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Arrieta</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-29T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-29T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50510/25-50510-2026-06-29.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Six detainees at an Immigration &amp; Customs Enforcement facility in El Paso, including the defendant, used improvised ropes to climb onto an unrailed roof two stories above the ground. For over three and a half hours, they refused commands to come down, demanded release and media attention, and threatened to jump if approached. The standoff required two specialized law-enforcement teams, and ended only after sublethal munitions were deployed. The facility then imposed a six-hour lockdown, suspending all activities, denying access to attorneys and families, and disrupting meal services.

A grand jury charged the defendant and others with mutiny under 18 U.S.C. § 1792. The defendant pleaded guilty. During sentencing in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, the presentence report recommended the highest base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2P1.3, arguing the conduct created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. The defendant objected, advocating for the lowest base offense level, or alternatively, the middle tier for major disruption. The district court found the offense involved a major disruption to the institution’s operation, applied the middle tier (base offense level 16), and sentenced the defendant accordingly.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the district court’s finding of “major disruption” was clearly erroneous. Applying the ordinary meaning of “major disruption,” the court concluded that the prolonged rooftop standoff, involvement of specialized teams, use of sublethal munitions, and subsequent facility-wide lockdown constituted a significant interruption to operations. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court’s finding was plausible in light of the record and not clearly erroneous, and therefore affirmed the district court’s sentence. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50510/25-50510-2026-06-29.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Arrieta" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Six detainees at an Immigration &amp; Customs Enforcement facility in El Paso, including the defendant, used improvised ropes to climb onto an unrailed roof two stories above the ground. For over three and a half hours, they refused commands to come down, demanded release and media attention, and threatened to jump if approached. The standoff required two specialized law-enforcement teams, and ended only after sublethal munitions were deployed. The facility then imposed a six-hour lockdown, suspending all activities, denying access to attorneys and families, and disrupting meal services.

A grand jury charged the defendant and others with mutiny under 18 U.S.C. § 1792. The defendant pleaded guilty. During sentencing in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, the presentence report recommended the highest base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2P1.3, arguing the conduct created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. The defendant objected, advocating for the lowest base offense level, or alternatively, the middle tier for major disruption. The district court found the offense involved a major disruption to the institution’s operation, applied the middle tier (base offense level 16), and sentenced the defendant accordingly.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the district court’s finding of “major disruption” was clearly erroneous. Applying the ordinary meaning of “major disruption,” the court concluded that the prolonged rooftop standoff, involvement of specialized teams, use of sublethal munitions, and subsequent facility-wide lockdown constituted a significant interruption to operations. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court’s finding was plausible in light of the record and not clearly erroneous, and therefore affirmed the district court’s sentence.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Don Willett</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20132/25-20132-2026-06-29.html</id>
        	<title>Tuttle v. Gallegos</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-29T15:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-29T15:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20132/25-20132-2026-06-29.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A squad of Houston Police Department officers executed a no-knock search warrant at a residence in Houston, Texas, on January 28, 2019. The warrant was obtained based on false information provided by both a civilian neighbor and a narcotics officer. During the raid, an exchange of gunfire erupted almost immediately after police entered the home. Multiple officers were shot, including some by friendly fire. Dennis Tuttle and Rhogena Nicholas, the residents, were both killed by Officer Felipe Gallegos, who fired at each during the chaotic confrontation. The plaintiffs, representing the estates and heirs of Tuttle and Nicholas, brought state and federal claims, including allegations of excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Gallegos.

In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Gallegos moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, finding that disputed material facts—primarily concerning the sequence of events and whether the force used was reasonable—precluded summary judgment and required resolution by a jury.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the denial of qualified immunity de novo. The Fifth Circuit determined that the video evidence and expert testimony contradicted the plaintiffs’ version of events regarding key facts, such as the locations of individuals at critical moments. The court held that, even viewing the facts most favorably to the plaintiffs, Gallegos’s use of deadly force did not violate clearly established constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the court found that given the rapidly evolving and dangerous circumstances, an objectively reasonable officer could have perceived an immediate threat justifying the use of deadly force. The Fifth Circuit therefore reversed the district court’s decision and held that Gallegos is entitled to qualified immunity. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20132/25-20132-2026-06-29.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Tuttle v. Gallegos" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A squad of Houston Police Department officers executed a no-knock search warrant at a residence in Houston, Texas, on January 28, 2019. The warrant was obtained based on false information provided by both a civilian neighbor and a narcotics officer. During the raid, an exchange of gunfire erupted almost immediately after police entered the home. Multiple officers were shot, including some by friendly fire. Dennis Tuttle and Rhogena Nicholas, the residents, were both killed by Officer Felipe Gallegos, who fired at each during the chaotic confrontation. The plaintiffs, representing the estates and heirs of Tuttle and Nicholas, brought state and federal claims, including allegations of excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Gallegos.

In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Gallegos moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, finding that disputed material facts—primarily concerning the sequence of events and whether the force used was reasonable—precluded summary judgment and required resolution by a jury.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the denial of qualified immunity de novo. The Fifth Circuit determined that the video evidence and expert testimony contradicted the plaintiffs’ version of events regarding key facts, such as the locations of individuals at critical moments. The court held that, even viewing the facts most favorably to the plaintiffs, Gallegos’s use of deadly force did not violate clearly established constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the court found that given the rapidly evolving and dangerous circumstances, an objectively reasonable officer could have perceived an immediate threat justifying the use of deadly force. The Fifth Circuit therefore reversed the district court’s decision and held that Gallegos is entitled to qualified immunity.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Edith Clement</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30325/25-30325-2026-06-25.html</id>
        	<title>Merriott v. City of Bossier City</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-25T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-25T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30325/25-30325-2026-06-25.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		An online journalist residing in Bossier Parish, Louisiana, attended several Bossier City Council meetings in 2023 to speak on a petition for term limits for city officials. At these meetings, the City Council enforced a policy governing public comment, which barred “personal, impertinent or slanderous remarks” and prohibited “boisterous” conduct. The policy was repeatedly invoked to interrupt the journalist’s remarks, and after a contentious meeting, several councilmembers met privately to discuss further restricting public comment. The journalist later filed an open meetings complaint and sued the city and individual councilmembers under federal and state law, alleging violations of the First Amendment and Louisiana’s Open Meetings Law.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, rejecting all of the journalist’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6). The court found that the policy did not violate constitutional or statutory rights and that the conduct described did not support actionable claims.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the City Council’s policy was facially overbroad and unconstitutionally vague under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as its prohibitions on “personal, impertinent or slanderous remarks” and “boisterous” conduct lacked clear definitions and chilled protected speech. The court also found that the policy constituted viewpoint and content discrimination, except as to the prohibition on “boisterous” conduct, which was deemed viewpoint neutral. The court determined that the journalist had plausibly alleged First Amendment retaliation and an Open Meetings Law violation against certain councilmembers, but not against one councilmember or for civil penalties. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30325/25-30325-2026-06-25.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Merriott v. City of Bossier City" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                An online journalist residing in Bossier Parish, Louisiana, attended several Bossier City Council meetings in 2023 to speak on a petition for term limits for city officials. At these meetings, the City Council enforced a policy governing public comment, which barred “personal, impertinent or slanderous remarks” and prohibited “boisterous” conduct. The policy was repeatedly invoked to interrupt the journalist’s remarks, and after a contentious meeting, several councilmembers met privately to discuss further restricting public comment. The journalist later filed an open meetings complaint and sued the city and individual councilmembers under federal and state law, alleging violations of the First Amendment and Louisiana’s Open Meetings Law.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, rejecting all of the journalist’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6). The court found that the policy did not violate constitutional or statutory rights and that the conduct described did not support actionable claims.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the City Council’s policy was facially overbroad and unconstitutionally vague under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as its prohibitions on “personal, impertinent or slanderous remarks” and “boisterous” conduct lacked clear definitions and chilled protected speech. The court also found that the policy constituted viewpoint and content discrimination, except as to the prohibition on “boisterous” conduct, which was deemed viewpoint neutral. The court determined that the journalist had plausibly alleged First Amendment retaliation and an Open Meetings Law violation against certain councilmembers, but not against one councilmember or for civil penalties. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-25</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Irma Ramirez</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-70008/24-70008-2026-06-25.html</id>
        	<title>Davis v. Guerrero</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-25T09:30:53-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-25T09:30:53-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-70008/24-70008-2026-06-25.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The petitioner was convicted of the rape and murder of a 15-year-old girl. After initially being sentenced to death, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) granted him a new sentencing trial. At the resentencing, the state introduced evidence of his affiliation with Satanism, including personal writings and expert testimony, to argue he posed a future danger. The petitioner claimed this violated his First Amendment rights. He was again sentenced to death.

Following the resentencing, the petitioner’s First Amendment claim was rejected on direct appeal by the CCA, and his ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims were denied by the state habeas court. The CCA adopted the habeas court’s findings. The petitioner then pursued federal habeas relief, but the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas found his claims were either procedurally defaulted or reasonably rejected by the state courts, and denied relief. The petitioner was granted a certificate of appealability on his First Amendment and IAC claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Applying the highly deferential standard mandated by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), the court concluded that the CCA’s rejection of the First Amendment claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The court distinguished the evidence admitted in this case from the Supreme Court’s decision in Dawson v. Delaware and found it was relevant to the question of future dangerousness, not just to abstract beliefs. The court further held that no relief was warranted on the IAC claims because counsel’s performance was not objectively unreasonable and the state habeas court’s findings were not clearly erroneous. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-70008/24-70008-2026-06-25.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Davis v. Guerrero" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The petitioner was convicted of the rape and murder of a 15-year-old girl. After initially being sentenced to death, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) granted him a new sentencing trial. At the resentencing, the state introduced evidence of his affiliation with Satanism, including personal writings and expert testimony, to argue he posed a future danger. The petitioner claimed this violated his First Amendment rights. He was again sentenced to death.

Following the resentencing, the petitioner’s First Amendment claim was rejected on direct appeal by the CCA, and his ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims were denied by the state habeas court. The CCA adopted the habeas court’s findings. The petitioner then pursued federal habeas relief, but the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas found his claims were either procedurally defaulted or reasonably rejected by the state courts, and denied relief. The petitioner was granted a certificate of appealability on his First Amendment and IAC claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Applying the highly deferential standard mandated by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), the court concluded that the CCA’s rejection of the First Amendment claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The court distinguished the evidence admitted in this case from the Supreme Court’s decision in Dawson v. Delaware and found it was relevant to the question of future dangerousness, not just to abstract beliefs. The court further held that no relief was warranted on the IAC claims because counsel’s performance was not objectively unreasonable and the state habeas court’s findings were not clearly erroneous. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-25</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60537/24-60537-2026-06-24.html</id>
        	<title>VDX Distro v. FDA</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-24T09:30:54-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-24T09:30:54-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60537/24-60537-2026-06-24.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A company that manufactures menthol-flavored e-cigarette products applied to the United States Food &amp; Drug Administration (FDA) for marketing authorization, as required under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA). The FDA, concerned about the appeal of non-tobacco-flavored e-cigarettes to minors, especially menthol varieties, evaluated whether the benefits of these products for adult smokers outweighed the risks to youth. After reviewing the evidence and applying its “comparative-efficacy standard,” which requires proof that non-tobacco-flavored e-cigarettes encourage more adult smokers to switch or quit compared to tobacco-flavored versions, the FDA denied the application.

The petitioners challenged the FDA’s denial through a petition for review to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. They raised four main arguments: that the FDA’s authority under the TCA violated the major questions and nondelegation doctrines; that the TCA’s “appropriate for the protection of the public health” (APPH) standard is unconstitutionally vague; that the FDA’s comparative-efficacy standard was an unlawfully adopted tobacco product standard; and that the FDA’s application of the APPH standard to their application was arbitrary and capricious. The petitioners also argued that the FDA improperly disregarded recent data and failed to consider their proposed marketing plan.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the FDA’s decision under the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary and capricious standard. The court held that Congress’s delegation of authority to the FDA was constitutional, the APPH standard was not unconstitutionally vague, and the comparative-efficacy standard was not a tobacco product standard requiring notice-and-comment rulemaking. The court further found that the FDA reasonably explained its decision and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in denying the application. The petition for review was denied. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60537/24-60537-2026-06-24.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "VDX Distro v. FDA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A company that manufactures menthol-flavored e-cigarette products applied to the United States Food &amp; Drug Administration (FDA) for marketing authorization, as required under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA). The FDA, concerned about the appeal of non-tobacco-flavored e-cigarettes to minors, especially menthol varieties, evaluated whether the benefits of these products for adult smokers outweighed the risks to youth. After reviewing the evidence and applying its “comparative-efficacy standard,” which requires proof that non-tobacco-flavored e-cigarettes encourage more adult smokers to switch or quit compared to tobacco-flavored versions, the FDA denied the application.

The petitioners challenged the FDA’s denial through a petition for review to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. They raised four main arguments: that the FDA’s authority under the TCA violated the major questions and nondelegation doctrines; that the TCA’s “appropriate for the protection of the public health” (APPH) standard is unconstitutionally vague; that the FDA’s comparative-efficacy standard was an unlawfully adopted tobacco product standard; and that the FDA’s application of the APPH standard to their application was arbitrary and capricious. The petitioners also argued that the FDA improperly disregarded recent data and failed to consider their proposed marketing plan.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the FDA’s decision under the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary and capricious standard. The court held that Congress’s delegation of authority to the FDA was constitutional, the APPH standard was not unconstitutionally vague, and the comparative-efficacy standard was not a tobacco product standard requiring notice-and-comment rulemaking. The court further found that the FDA reasonably explained its decision and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in denying the application. The petition for review was denied.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-24</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Cory Wilson</case:judge>
													<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60263/25-60263-2026-06-24.html</id>
        	<title>Roberts v. KJ Win</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-24T09:30:53-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-24T09:30:53-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60263/25-60263-2026-06-24.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Cheryl Roberts and William Chambers were injured in a multi-vehicle crash on Interstate 20 in Mississippi, which they allege was caused by a tractor-trailer operated by a KJ Win, Inc. employee. According to the plaintiffs, the KJ Win driver improperly parked his truck on the shoulder, forcing another truck to change lanes suddenly and triggering the collision. Roberts suffered a traumatic brain injury and other ongoing problems, while Chambers sustained a fractured sternum and other injuries. They sued KJ Win for negligence and asserted that the company was vicariously liable for its driver’s actions.

After filing the suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Roberts and Chambers attempted to serve KJ Win but had difficulty locating its registered agent. Ultimately, they received permission from the court to effect service through the California Secretary of State. KJ Win did not respond, and the district court entered a default judgment against it following an evidentiary hearing, awarding the plaintiffs over $2.8 million in damages. KJ Win later moved to set aside the default judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), arguing lack of notice, excusable neglect, lack of prejudice to plaintiffs, existence of meritorious defenses, and interests of justice. The district court denied the motion, finding the default was willful.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the denial of relief under Rule 60(b). The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding KJ Win’s default was willful, ending the inquiry under Rule 60(b)(1). The Fifth Circuit also ruled that KJ Win forfeited its arguments regarding defective service and damages, as they were not raised before the district court. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60263/25-60263-2026-06-24.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Roberts v. KJ Win" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Cheryl Roberts and William Chambers were injured in a multi-vehicle crash on Interstate 20 in Mississippi, which they allege was caused by a tractor-trailer operated by a KJ Win, Inc. employee. According to the plaintiffs, the KJ Win driver improperly parked his truck on the shoulder, forcing another truck to change lanes suddenly and triggering the collision. Roberts suffered a traumatic brain injury and other ongoing problems, while Chambers sustained a fractured sternum and other injuries. They sued KJ Win for negligence and asserted that the company was vicariously liable for its driver’s actions.

After filing the suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Roberts and Chambers attempted to serve KJ Win but had difficulty locating its registered agent. Ultimately, they received permission from the court to effect service through the California Secretary of State. KJ Win did not respond, and the district court entered a default judgment against it following an evidentiary hearing, awarding the plaintiffs over $2.8 million in damages. KJ Win later moved to set aside the default judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), arguing lack of notice, excusable neglect, lack of prejudice to plaintiffs, existence of meritorious defenses, and interests of justice. The district court denied the motion, finding the default was willful.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the denial of relief under Rule 60(b). The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding KJ Win’s default was willful, ending the inquiry under Rule 60(b)(1). The Fifth Circuit also ruled that KJ Win forfeited its arguments regarding defective service and damages, as they were not raised before the district court. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-24</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Cory Wilson</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Personal Injury"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60651/24-60651-2026-06-23.html</id>
        	<title>Starbucks v. NLRB</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-23T15:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-23T15:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60651/24-60651-2026-06-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Employees at a Starbucks store in Sylmar, California, engaged in union organizing activities during 2022. Several conversations between store managers and employees occurred regarding the unionization process, pay and benefit increases, and working conditions. Employees reported statements by managers suggesting that certain benefits would be paused or lost due to union negotiations, that unionization would not improve conditions, and that other jobs offered better pay. One employee, Untaran, was interrogated about his union support and subsequently terminated, with conflicting accounts regarding the reasons for his discharge.

After a union election where a majority voted against representation, the union filed objections based on Untaran’s termination and management statements. An Administrative Law Judge for the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found violations of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), including coercive threats, interrogation, and unlawful discharge, and ordered remedies such as reinstatement, back pay, compensatory damages, and a new election. The NLRB adopted some findings and reversed others, particularly expanding the findings regarding coercive interrogation and threats.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the NLRB’s findings and enforcement orders regarding one coercive threat against Pichardo, the threat against Untaran, and Untaran’s coercive interrogation claim, finding these supported by substantial evidence. However, the court denied enforcement for the NLRB’s order regarding Untaran’s unlawful discharge claim and the coercive threat claims involving Sosa and Ramirez, as they lacked substantial evidence. The court dismissed Starbucks’s appeal regarding the order for a second union election, citing lack of jurisdiction over representation proceedings consolidated with unfair labor practice cases. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60651/24-60651-2026-06-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Starbucks v. NLRB" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Employees at a Starbucks store in Sylmar, California, engaged in union organizing activities during 2022. Several conversations between store managers and employees occurred regarding the unionization process, pay and benefit increases, and working conditions. Employees reported statements by managers suggesting that certain benefits would be paused or lost due to union negotiations, that unionization would not improve conditions, and that other jobs offered better pay. One employee, Untaran, was interrogated about his union support and subsequently terminated, with conflicting accounts regarding the reasons for his discharge.

After a union election where a majority voted against representation, the union filed objections based on Untaran’s termination and management statements. An Administrative Law Judge for the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found violations of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), including coercive threats, interrogation, and unlawful discharge, and ordered remedies such as reinstatement, back pay, compensatory damages, and a new election. The NLRB adopted some findings and reversed others, particularly expanding the findings regarding coercive interrogation and threats.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the NLRB’s findings and enforcement orders regarding one coercive threat against Pichardo, the threat against Untaran, and Untaran’s coercive interrogation claim, finding these supported by substantial evidence. However, the court denied enforcement for the NLRB’s order regarding Untaran’s unlawful discharge claim and the coercive threat claims involving Sosa and Ramirez, as they lacked substantial evidence. The court dismissed Starbucks’s appeal regarding the order for a second union election, citing lack of jurisdiction over representation proceedings consolidated with unfair labor practice cases.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50596/25-50596-2026-06-23.html</id>
        	<title>Sanchez v. Nunemaker</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-23T09:30:45-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-23T09:30:45-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50596/25-50596-2026-06-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A deputy sheriff in Medina County, Texas, stopped a vehicle that had been reported stolen and possibly involved in an armed robbery. After detaining the driver, a seventeen-year-old named Branden Sanchez, the officer handcuffed him and placed him in the back seat of his cruiser. Over the course of approximately 50 minutes, Sanchez became disruptive, repeatedly yelling and kicking the cruiser’s doors and demanding to be taken to jail. Although surrounded by multiple officers and restrained by handcuffs and a seatbelt, Sanchez resisted orders to sit properly. In response to his continued noncompliance, the deputy forcibly repositioned Sanchez in the seat and later discharged a high-velocity pepper spray device into Sanchez’s face from a distance shorter than the manufacturer’s recommended minimum, resulting in permanent blindness in one eye.

Sanchez filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The deputy moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, finding that Sanchez had plausibly alleged facts showing a violation of clearly established law regarding the use of excessive force against a restrained and non-threatening suspect.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity de novo. The Fifth Circuit concluded that, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Sanchez, he adequately alleged both a constitutional violation and that the right was clearly established at the time. The court determined that precedent would have put a reasonable officer on notice that using pepper spray in this manner against a restrained, outnumbered, and non-threatening suspect was unlawful. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50596/25-50596-2026-06-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Sanchez v. Nunemaker" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A deputy sheriff in Medina County, Texas, stopped a vehicle that had been reported stolen and possibly involved in an armed robbery. After detaining the driver, a seventeen-year-old named Branden Sanchez, the officer handcuffed him and placed him in the back seat of his cruiser. Over the course of approximately 50 minutes, Sanchez became disruptive, repeatedly yelling and kicking the cruiser’s doors and demanding to be taken to jail. Although surrounded by multiple officers and restrained by handcuffs and a seatbelt, Sanchez resisted orders to sit properly. In response to his continued noncompliance, the deputy forcibly repositioned Sanchez in the seat and later discharged a high-velocity pepper spray device into Sanchez’s face from a distance shorter than the manufacturer’s recommended minimum, resulting in permanent blindness in one eye.

Sanchez filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The deputy moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, finding that Sanchez had plausibly alleged facts showing a violation of clearly established law regarding the use of excessive force against a restrained and non-threatening suspect.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity de novo. The Fifth Circuit concluded that, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Sanchez, he adequately alleged both a constitutional violation and that the right was clearly established at the time. The court determined that precedent would have put a reasonable officer on notice that using pepper spray in this manner against a restrained, outnumbered, and non-threatening suspect was unlawful. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leslie Southwick</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40200/25-40200-2026-06-23.html</id>
        	<title>Brenyah v. Columbia Hospital</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-23T09:30:45-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-23T09:30:45-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40200/25-40200-2026-06-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A registered nurse, who is a black woman and naturalized U.S. citizen from Ghana, began working at a healthcare system in Texas and alleged frequent discrimination and harassment by co-workers, including mockery of her accent and food, derogatory comments about black employees, and preferential treatment of Filipino employees. She reported these incidents to supervisors, but claims their response was inadequate. After further complaints, she alleges retaliation through informal and formal disciplinary actions and the extension of her probation period. She was later injured in a car accident, took medical leave, and upon seeking treatment at a hospital operated by the same employer during a hurricane lockdown, had contentious interactions with staff, but ultimately received care. When she tried to return to work, she requested refresher orientation and additional training, but after further delays and lack of response, she resigned, citing discrimination and retaliation.

She subsequently filed two charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The first charge, encompassing events through September 2017, was timely; the second, covering her resignation and later events, was untimely. In May 2021, she sued her employer for discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation under Title VII and Section 1981, and disability discrimination under the ADA. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas adopted a magistrate judge’s recommendation granting summary judgment to the employer on all claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed summary judgment for the employer on most claims. However, it reversed the grant of summary judgment on the plaintiff’s Title VII and Section 1981 hostile-work-environment claims, holding that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the conduct was severe or pervasive and whether the employer’s response was adequate. The court remanded those claims for further proceedings, limiting them to facts alleged in the plaintiff’s timely EEOC charge. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40200/25-40200-2026-06-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Brenyah v. Columbia Hospital" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A registered nurse, who is a black woman and naturalized U.S. citizen from Ghana, began working at a healthcare system in Texas and alleged frequent discrimination and harassment by co-workers, including mockery of her accent and food, derogatory comments about black employees, and preferential treatment of Filipino employees. She reported these incidents to supervisors, but claims their response was inadequate. After further complaints, she alleges retaliation through informal and formal disciplinary actions and the extension of her probation period. She was later injured in a car accident, took medical leave, and upon seeking treatment at a hospital operated by the same employer during a hurricane lockdown, had contentious interactions with staff, but ultimately received care. When she tried to return to work, she requested refresher orientation and additional training, but after further delays and lack of response, she resigned, citing discrimination and retaliation.

She subsequently filed two charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The first charge, encompassing events through September 2017, was timely; the second, covering her resignation and later events, was untimely. In May 2021, she sued her employer for discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation under Title VII and Section 1981, and disability discrimination under the ADA. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas adopted a magistrate judge’s recommendation granting summary judgment to the employer on all claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed summary judgment for the employer on most claims. However, it reversed the grant of summary judgment on the plaintiff’s Title VII and Section 1981 hostile-work-environment claims, holding that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the conduct was severe or pervasive and whether the employer’s response was adequate. The court remanded those claims for further proceedings, limiting them to facts alleged in the plaintiff’s timely EEOC charge.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jennifer Elrod</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50025/25-50025-2026-06-18.html</id>
        	<title>Marfil v. City of New Braunfels</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-18T15:30:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-18T15:30:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50025/25-50025-2026-06-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several property owners in New Braunfels, Texas, challenged a city zoning ordinance that prohibits short-term rentals in residential districts. The ordinance, originally enacted in 2006 and amended in 2011, was in place prior to the appellants’ purchase of their properties. Despite knowing about the restrictions, the appellants either engaged in or sought to engage in short-term rental activities and, after being denied zoning changes to permit such use, filed suit against the city. Their claims alleged the ordinance violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of both the United States and Texas Constitutions.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially dismissed the appellants’ claims under Rule 12(b)(6). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a prior decision, vacated and remanded, allowing the appellants to proceed to discovery. After discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court again ruled in favor of the city, granting summary judgment on all claims. The appellants then sought review of this decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Texas law does not recognize a protected property interest in the right to lease one’s home on a short-term basis, which is required for a due process claim. It further found that the ordinance’s restrictions on short-term rentals survive rational-basis review under the Equal Protection Clause, as the city’s goal of preserving the residential character of neighborhoods is a legitimate government interest, and the line drawn between short-term and longer-term rentals was not arbitrary. Accordingly, the court found no constitutional violation and affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the city. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50025/25-50025-2026-06-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Marfil v. City of New Braunfels" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several property owners in New Braunfels, Texas, challenged a city zoning ordinance that prohibits short-term rentals in residential districts. The ordinance, originally enacted in 2006 and amended in 2011, was in place prior to the appellants’ purchase of their properties. Despite knowing about the restrictions, the appellants either engaged in or sought to engage in short-term rental activities and, after being denied zoning changes to permit such use, filed suit against the city. Their claims alleged the ordinance violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of both the United States and Texas Constitutions.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially dismissed the appellants’ claims under Rule 12(b)(6). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a prior decision, vacated and remanded, allowing the appellants to proceed to discovery. After discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court again ruled in favor of the city, granting summary judgment on all claims. The appellants then sought review of this decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Texas law does not recognize a protected property interest in the right to lease one’s home on a short-term basis, which is required for a due process claim. It further found that the ordinance’s restrictions on short-term rentals survive rational-basis review under the Equal Protection Clause, as the city’s goal of preserving the residential character of neighborhoods is a legitimate government interest, and the line drawn between short-term and longer-term rentals was not arbitrary. Accordingly, the court found no constitutional violation and affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the city.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Real Estate &amp; Property Law"/>
							<category term="Zoning, Planning &amp; Land Use"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30307/24-30307-2026-06-18.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Comeaux</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-18T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-18T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30307/24-30307-2026-06-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		After law enforcement arrested the defendant for unlawfully discharging a firearm, they executed a search warrant at his home. During the search, officers seized multiple firearms, suspected silencers, and other related paraphernalia. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives evaluated the items and determined the suspected silencers met the statutory definition of devices designed for silencing, muffling, or diminishing the report of a firearm. The defendant admitted to manufacturing and possessing the silencers.

A federal grand jury charged the defendant with possession of unregistered firearms, specifically silencers, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), and possession of a firearm without a serial number under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(i). He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that both statutes violated the Second Amendment facially and as applied to him. The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana denied the motion, finding silencers to be “dangerous and unusual weapons” not protected by the Second Amendment. The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the constitutional issue, and was sentenced to twenty-four months in prison and three years of supervised release.

Reviewing the appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied de novo review to the preserved constitutional questions. The court acknowledged that, per Supreme Court precedent, silencers qualify as Second Amendment “Arms.” However, in light of United States v. Peterson, 161 F.4th 331 (5th Cir. 2025), the Fifth Circuit held that the National Firearms Act’s shall-issue regime for silencer registration is presumptively lawful unless a challenger shows it has been put toward abusive ends, such as through exorbitant fees or lengthy delays. Because the defendant did not allege such abuse, the court held that § 5861(d) did not violate his Second Amendment rights and affirmed the conviction. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30307/24-30307-2026-06-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Comeaux" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                After law enforcement arrested the defendant for unlawfully discharging a firearm, they executed a search warrant at his home. During the search, officers seized multiple firearms, suspected silencers, and other related paraphernalia. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives evaluated the items and determined the suspected silencers met the statutory definition of devices designed for silencing, muffling, or diminishing the report of a firearm. The defendant admitted to manufacturing and possessing the silencers.

A federal grand jury charged the defendant with possession of unregistered firearms, specifically silencers, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), and possession of a firearm without a serial number under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(i). He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that both statutes violated the Second Amendment facially and as applied to him. The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana denied the motion, finding silencers to be “dangerous and unusual weapons” not protected by the Second Amendment. The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the constitutional issue, and was sentenced to twenty-four months in prison and three years of supervised release.

Reviewing the appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied de novo review to the preserved constitutional questions. The court acknowledged that, per Supreme Court precedent, silencers qualify as Second Amendment “Arms.” However, in light of United States v. Peterson, 161 F.4th 331 (5th Cir. 2025), the Fifth Circuit held that the National Firearms Act’s shall-issue regime for silencer registration is presumptively lawful unless a challenger shows it has been put toward abusive ends, such as through exorbitant fees or lengthy delays. Because the defendant did not allege such abuse, the court held that § 5861(d) did not violate his Second Amendment rights and affirmed the conviction.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20413/24-20413-2026-06-18.html</id>
        	<title>Larkins v. S.D.P. Manufacturing</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-18T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-18T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20413/24-20413-2026-06-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A maintenance worker was injured when a small derrick tipped over during work on a defective transformer. Two years after the incident, the injured individual and his spouse filed suit against the derrick’s manufacturer and several corporate entities that leased the equipment to the worker’s employer. The complaint was filed on the last day permitted by the Texas statute of limitations. Plaintiffs received service citations the next day, and forwarded them to a process server three days later. Service was completed about fifty days after filing, with delays attributed to confusion over defendants’ identities and addresses, as well as disruptions caused by a courthouse fire in an unrelated case involving plaintiffs’ counsel.

After defendants were served, they removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district court dismissed the claims against the manufacturer for insufficient diligence in service and granted summary judgment for the corporate defendants. The district court found that plaintiffs had waited too long at several points—three days before forwarding citations, several weeks before following up with the process server, and additional days before clarifying instructions—thus concluding that plaintiffs failed to exercise sufficient diligence as required by Texas law.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court applied a more demanding standard than Texas law requires. Under Texas law, a plaintiff must show ordinary diligence in effecting service after timely filing suit. The appellate court found that plaintiffs’ explanations for the short delays, including handling a complex service task involving multiple corporate defendants and temporary distractions from an unrelated courthouse fire, were sufficient to raise a genuine factual dispute regarding diligence. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and summary judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20413/24-20413-2026-06-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Larkins v. S.D.P. Manufacturing" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A maintenance worker was injured when a small derrick tipped over during work on a defective transformer. Two years after the incident, the injured individual and his spouse filed suit against the derrick’s manufacturer and several corporate entities that leased the equipment to the worker’s employer. The complaint was filed on the last day permitted by the Texas statute of limitations. Plaintiffs received service citations the next day, and forwarded them to a process server three days later. Service was completed about fifty days after filing, with delays attributed to confusion over defendants’ identities and addresses, as well as disruptions caused by a courthouse fire in an unrelated case involving plaintiffs’ counsel.

After defendants were served, they removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district court dismissed the claims against the manufacturer for insufficient diligence in service and granted summary judgment for the corporate defendants. The district court found that plaintiffs had waited too long at several points—three days before forwarding citations, several weeks before following up with the process server, and additional days before clarifying instructions—thus concluding that plaintiffs failed to exercise sufficient diligence as required by Texas law.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court applied a more demanding standard than Texas law requires. Under Texas law, a plaintiff must show ordinary diligence in effecting service after timely filing suit. The appellate court found that plaintiffs’ explanations for the short delays, including handling a complex service task involving multiple corporate defendants and temporary distractions from an unrelated courthouse fire, were sufficient to raise a genuine factual dispute regarding diligence. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and summary judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James C. Ho</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Personal Injury"/>
							<category term="Products Liability"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30331/25-30331-2026-06-17.html</id>
        	<title>Trailer Bridge v. LA Intl Marine</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-17T15:30:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-17T15:30:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30331/25-30331-2026-06-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A freight service company chartered two barges to a third party, Work Cat, under an agreement that included a “no-lien” clause, prohibiting the charterer from incurring liens on the barges. Work Cat, in turn, chartered two tugboats from another company to tow the barges. While Work Cat initially paid for the tug services, it defaulted on the majority of payments and eventually filed for bankruptcy. The tug owner, seeking to recover unpaid invoices, filed maritime lien notices against the barges and demanded payment from the original barge owner, who refused, arguing that the “no-lien” clause prevented such a lien.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held a bench trial. It determined that the tug owner had valid maritime liens against both barges for the value of towage services provided, but excluded the costs of fuel and lubricants. The district court initially awarded attorney’s fees to the tug owner but later reversed this decision, ordering each party to bear its own legal costs. Both parties appealed, challenging the existence, scope, and value of the liens, as well as the award of attorney’s fees.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that a maritime lien attached to the barges because the tug owner provided necessary services without actual knowledge of the “no-lien” clause at the time the towage contract was executed. The court clarified that actual knowledge of such a clause, not constructive knowledge or a duty to investigate, is required to defeat a maritime lien under current law. The value of the lien properly included all towage services but excluded fuel and lubricant costs. The appellate court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of attorney’s fees and its award of prejudgment interest. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30331/25-30331-2026-06-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Trailer Bridge v. LA Intl Marine" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A freight service company chartered two barges to a third party, Work Cat, under an agreement that included a “no-lien” clause, prohibiting the charterer from incurring liens on the barges. Work Cat, in turn, chartered two tugboats from another company to tow the barges. While Work Cat initially paid for the tug services, it defaulted on the majority of payments and eventually filed for bankruptcy. The tug owner, seeking to recover unpaid invoices, filed maritime lien notices against the barges and demanded payment from the original barge owner, who refused, arguing that the “no-lien” clause prevented such a lien.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held a bench trial. It determined that the tug owner had valid maritime liens against both barges for the value of towage services provided, but excluded the costs of fuel and lubricants. The district court initially awarded attorney’s fees to the tug owner but later reversed this decision, ordering each party to bear its own legal costs. Both parties appealed, challenging the existence, scope, and value of the liens, as well as the award of attorney’s fees.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that a maritime lien attached to the barges because the tug owner provided necessary services without actual knowledge of the “no-lien” clause at the time the towage contract was executed. The court clarified that actual knowledge of such a clause, not constructive knowledge or a duty to investigate, is required to defeat a maritime lien under current law. The value of the lien properly included all towage services but excluded fuel and lubricant costs. The appellate court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of attorney’s fees and its award of prejudgment interest.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Edith Jones</case:judge>
													<category term="Admiralty &amp; Maritime Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20094/25-20094-2026-06-16.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Baldemoro</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-16T15:30:38-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-16T15:30:38-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20094/25-20094-2026-06-16.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		James Baldemoro pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography in 2014 and received a statutory maximum sentence of ten years in prison followed by ten years of supervised release. After completing his prison term, Baldemoro began supervised release but twice violated its conditions. For each violation, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas revoked his supervised release and imposed a six-month term of reimprisonment, followed by a new period of supervised release. At each revocation hearing, Baldemoro argued that having already served the statutory maximum prison sentence for his offense, any further imprisonment was unlawful.

The district court rejected Baldemoro’s arguments both times, ruling that reimprisonment following revocation of supervised release was authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), regardless of whether it resulted in more total time in custody than the statutory maximum for the initial offense. Baldemoro appealed both revocation sentences. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit consolidated the appeals and considered whether his challenges were moot and whether his new sentences were lawful.

The Fifth Circuit held that Baldemoro’s appeals were not moot because a favorable decision could allow him to seek a reduction or termination of his supervised release. On the merits, the court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) authorizes reimprisonment beyond the statutory maximum for the underlying offense, limited only by the felony class, not the maximum sentence for the conviction. The court also found that such reimprisonment does not violate the Fifth or Sixth Amendments, as the constitutional protections involved in criminal prosecutions do not apply to supervised release revocation proceedings. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20094/25-20094-2026-06-16.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Baldemoro" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                James Baldemoro pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography in 2014 and received a statutory maximum sentence of ten years in prison followed by ten years of supervised release. After completing his prison term, Baldemoro began supervised release but twice violated its conditions. For each violation, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas revoked his supervised release and imposed a six-month term of reimprisonment, followed by a new period of supervised release. At each revocation hearing, Baldemoro argued that having already served the statutory maximum prison sentence for his offense, any further imprisonment was unlawful.

The district court rejected Baldemoro’s arguments both times, ruling that reimprisonment following revocation of supervised release was authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), regardless of whether it resulted in more total time in custody than the statutory maximum for the initial offense. Baldemoro appealed both revocation sentences. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit consolidated the appeals and considered whether his challenges were moot and whether his new sentences were lawful.

The Fifth Circuit held that Baldemoro’s appeals were not moot because a favorable decision could allow him to seek a reduction or termination of his supervised release. On the merits, the court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) authorizes reimprisonment beyond the statutory maximum for the underlying offense, limited only by the felony class, not the maximum sentence for the conviction. The court also found that such reimprisonment does not violate the Fifth or Sixth Amendments, as the constitutional protections involved in criminal prosecutions do not apply to supervised release revocation proceedings. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Cory Wilson</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50067/25-50067-2026-06-15.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Ma</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-15T09:30:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-15T09:30:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50067/25-50067-2026-06-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The United States initiated a lawsuit against Dr. Dongxin Ma and Ma Acupuncture Center, P.C., alleging violations of the False Claims Act. The government claimed that the defendants submitted inflated reimbursement requests for acupuncture services provided to veterans, resulting in improper payments from the Department of Veterans Affairs. The United States sought substantial damages and civil penalties, while the defendants denied liability and asserted they acted in good faith.

Following mediation, the parties reached significant agreement regarding the terms of settlement. The mediation resulted in an oral agreement that included payment by the defendants of $2.3 million over 42 months, an initial $100,000 payment, dismissal and release of civil claims by the government, reasonable efforts by Dr. Ma to sell certain property, and the government’s right to place liens if obligations were not met. The United States filed a notice of settlement and submitted a written agreement containing additional standard terms. The defendants, later represented by new counsel, contested the validity of the settlement, arguing that the written agreement included material terms not discussed at mediation and that Dr. Ma had not authorized settlement above $1 million.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas held an evidentiary hearing, ultimately concluding that the parties had orally agreed to all material terms at mediation and that the additional terms in the written agreement were immaterial. The court amended its judgment to enforce only the material terms agreed orally. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion and affirmed. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in enforcing the oral settlement agreement, finding that all material terms were agreed to at mediation and that additional terms in the written agreement were not material. The court also found that the defendants had forfeited certain arguments on appeal. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50067/25-50067-2026-06-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Ma" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The United States initiated a lawsuit against Dr. Dongxin Ma and Ma Acupuncture Center, P.C., alleging violations of the False Claims Act. The government claimed that the defendants submitted inflated reimbursement requests for acupuncture services provided to veterans, resulting in improper payments from the Department of Veterans Affairs. The United States sought substantial damages and civil penalties, while the defendants denied liability and asserted they acted in good faith.

Following mediation, the parties reached significant agreement regarding the terms of settlement. The mediation resulted in an oral agreement that included payment by the defendants of $2.3 million over 42 months, an initial $100,000 payment, dismissal and release of civil claims by the government, reasonable efforts by Dr. Ma to sell certain property, and the government’s right to place liens if obligations were not met. The United States filed a notice of settlement and submitted a written agreement containing additional standard terms. The defendants, later represented by new counsel, contested the validity of the settlement, arguing that the written agreement included material terms not discussed at mediation and that Dr. Ma had not authorized settlement above $1 million.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas held an evidentiary hearing, ultimately concluding that the parties had orally agreed to all material terms at mediation and that the additional terms in the written agreement were immaterial. The court amended its judgment to enforce only the material terms agreed orally. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion and affirmed. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in enforcing the oral settlement agreement, finding that all material terms were agreed to at mediation and that additional terms in the written agreement were not material. The court also found that the defendants had forfeited certain arguments on appeal.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Arbitration &amp; Mediation"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50594/25-50594-2026-06-12.html</id>
        	<title>Guilbeau v. Schlumberger Technology</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-12T15:30:38-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-12T15:30:38-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50594/25-50594-2026-06-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Three named plaintiffs, all working for Schlumberger in oilfield drilling positions, challenged their employer’s compensation system under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Their pay structure included both a fixed, predetermined salary paid biweekly and substantial additional daily or activity-based payments, which often comprised the majority of their earnings. The plaintiffs regularly worked more than forty hours per week but did not receive overtime pay. They brought a collective action, arguing that their hybrid compensation arrangement did not meet the requirements for the Fair Labor Standards Act’s “salary basis” exemption, and therefore they were entitled to overtime pay.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas denied Schlumberger’s motion for partial summary judgment, finding that material factual disputes prevented judgment as a matter of law on whether the plaintiffs were paid on a salary basis. The court allowed notice to a proposed collective of Directional Drillers but denied notice to another group, and it later certified an interlocutory appeal due to the unsettled state of the law regarding hybrid pay schemes.

On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of summary judgment de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the hybrid compensation plan, which included a guaranteed, predetermined salary paid on a weekly or less frequent basis, satisfied the regulatory requirements for the salary basis exemption under 29 C.F.R. § 541.602(a), regardless of additional day-based or incentive payments. The court reversed the district court’s decision and ordered summary judgment for Schlumberger as to the named plaintiff Guilbeau, finding him overtime-exempt. However, the court remanded the case for further proceedings regarding other collective members, as their exemption status required additional individualized determinations. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50594/25-50594-2026-06-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Guilbeau v. Schlumberger Technology" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Three named plaintiffs, all working for Schlumberger in oilfield drilling positions, challenged their employer’s compensation system under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Their pay structure included both a fixed, predetermined salary paid biweekly and substantial additional daily or activity-based payments, which often comprised the majority of their earnings. The plaintiffs regularly worked more than forty hours per week but did not receive overtime pay. They brought a collective action, arguing that their hybrid compensation arrangement did not meet the requirements for the Fair Labor Standards Act’s “salary basis” exemption, and therefore they were entitled to overtime pay.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas denied Schlumberger’s motion for partial summary judgment, finding that material factual disputes prevented judgment as a matter of law on whether the plaintiffs were paid on a salary basis. The court allowed notice to a proposed collective of Directional Drillers but denied notice to another group, and it later certified an interlocutory appeal due to the unsettled state of the law regarding hybrid pay schemes.

On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of summary judgment de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the hybrid compensation plan, which included a guaranteed, predetermined salary paid on a weekly or less frequent basis, satisfied the regulatory requirements for the salary basis exemption under 29 C.F.R. § 541.602(a), regardless of additional day-based or incentive payments. The court reversed the district court’s decision and ordered summary judgment for Schlumberger as to the named plaintiff Guilbeau, finding him overtime-exempt. However, the court remanded the case for further proceedings regarding other collective members, as their exemption status required additional individualized determinations.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Patrick Higginbotham</case:judge>
													<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
    </feed>

