<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:case="https://law.justia.com/schema/case">
	<title>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - Justia Case Law Summaries</title>
	<link rel="self" href="https://law.justia.com/summaryfeed/ca5/"/>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/"/>
	<id>https://law.justia.com/summaryfeed/ca5/</id>
	<updated>2026-07-09T00:17:42-08:00</updated>
	<author>
		<name>Justia Inc</name>
		<uri>https://www.justia.com/</uri>
	</author>
	<generator uri="https://law.justia.com/" version="3.0">Justia Law</generator>
	<logo>https://justatic.com/v/20260625083330/shared/images/social-media/law.png</logo>
	<rights>Copyright 2026 Justia Inc</rights>
	        <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40472/24-40472-2026-07-08.html</id>
        	<title>Thorpe v. Weaver</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-08T15:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-08T15:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40472/24-40472-2026-07-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		On a hot day in Texas in 2019, Darren Boykin fled from campus police and, after a half-mile chase, was apprehended by law enforcement officers. During and after the arrest, Boykin complained of being unable to breathe, but officers attributed his symptoms to exhaustion from running, not knowing that he had sickle cell trait—a condition that can cause sudden death after intense physical exertion. Officer Hobbs responded to Boykin’s complaints by increasing the air conditioning. Sergeant Scott arrived after Boykin was already in the patrol car and relied on the assessment of the other officers. Officer Weaver transported Boykin to jail; during the trip, Boykin’s condition worsened, and he lost consciousness. Upon arrival at the jail, Weaver found Boykin unresponsive, began resuscitation, and called for emergency help. Boykin ultimately died at the hospital.

Boykin’s family and estate sued the officers in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers, finding that they were entitled to qualified immunity.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Hobbs or Scott had actual knowledge of a serious medical risk to Boykin; at most, they misinterpreted his symptoms as exhaustion. Regarding Weaver, the court found that a jury could infer she became aware of Boykin’s medical distress during transport. However, the court concluded that, as of 2019, it was not clearly established law that an officer in Weaver’s position was required to immediately secure aid for a detainee losing consciousness during transport. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for all three officers on qualified immunity grounds. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40472/24-40472-2026-07-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Thorpe v. Weaver" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                On a hot day in Texas in 2019, Darren Boykin fled from campus police and, after a half-mile chase, was apprehended by law enforcement officers. During and after the arrest, Boykin complained of being unable to breathe, but officers attributed his symptoms to exhaustion from running, not knowing that he had sickle cell trait—a condition that can cause sudden death after intense physical exertion. Officer Hobbs responded to Boykin’s complaints by increasing the air conditioning. Sergeant Scott arrived after Boykin was already in the patrol car and relied on the assessment of the other officers. Officer Weaver transported Boykin to jail; during the trip, Boykin’s condition worsened, and he lost consciousness. Upon arrival at the jail, Weaver found Boykin unresponsive, began resuscitation, and called for emergency help. Boykin ultimately died at the hospital.

Boykin’s family and estate sued the officers in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers, finding that they were entitled to qualified immunity.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Hobbs or Scott had actual knowledge of a serious medical risk to Boykin; at most, they misinterpreted his symptoms as exhaustion. Regarding Weaver, the court found that a jury could infer she became aware of Boykin’s medical distress during transport. However, the court concluded that, as of 2019, it was not clearly established law that an officer in Weaver’s position was required to immediately secure aid for a detainee losing consciousness during transport. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for all three officers on qualified immunity grounds.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James Graves</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60282/25-60282-2026-07-07.html</id>
        	<title>Center for Bio Diversity v. TRAN</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-07T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-07T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60282/25-60282-2026-07-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Delfin LNG sought approval to construct and operate a deepwater liquefied natural gas export facility in the Gulf of America, consisting of onshore infrastructure in Louisiana and floating offshore vessels. The Maritime Administration (MARAD), after extensive environmental review and public comment, initially approved the project in 2017. Over subsequent years, Delfin altered key aspects of the project, including its design and financing. MARAD determined these changes required further review and asked Delfin to submit an amended application, which Delfin did not do. In 2025, following a presidential executive order, MARAD concluded that the modifications would not cause significantly different environmental impacts and issued the license.

Three environmental organizations challenged MARAD’s decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. They argued MARAD violated the Deepwater Port Act by not requiring an amended application and additional public comment, the National Environmental Policy Act by not preparing a supplemental environmental impact statement, and the Administrative Procedure Act by issuing a license after finding the prior approval was insufficient. They requested the court vacate MARAD’s licensing decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that none of the petitioners demonstrated Article III standing. The court held that the organizations failed to identify a member who suffered a concrete and particularized injury fairly traceable to MARAD’s licensing decision. The declarations submitted did not show a personal and project-specific harm, nor did they establish a sufficient geographic nexus to the affected area. As a result, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits and denied the petition for review. The main holding is that, in the absence of standing, the court cannot reach the substantive environmental or procedural claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60282/25-60282-2026-07-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Center for Bio Diversity v. TRAN" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Delfin LNG sought approval to construct and operate a deepwater liquefied natural gas export facility in the Gulf of America, consisting of onshore infrastructure in Louisiana and floating offshore vessels. The Maritime Administration (MARAD), after extensive environmental review and public comment, initially approved the project in 2017. Over subsequent years, Delfin altered key aspects of the project, including its design and financing. MARAD determined these changes required further review and asked Delfin to submit an amended application, which Delfin did not do. In 2025, following a presidential executive order, MARAD concluded that the modifications would not cause significantly different environmental impacts and issued the license.

Three environmental organizations challenged MARAD’s decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. They argued MARAD violated the Deepwater Port Act by not requiring an amended application and additional public comment, the National Environmental Policy Act by not preparing a supplemental environmental impact statement, and the Administrative Procedure Act by issuing a license after finding the prior approval was insufficient. They requested the court vacate MARAD’s licensing decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that none of the petitioners demonstrated Article III standing. The court held that the organizations failed to identify a member who suffered a concrete and particularized injury fairly traceable to MARAD’s licensing decision. The declarations submitted did not show a personal and project-specific harm, nor did they establish a sufficient geographic nexus to the affected area. As a result, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits and denied the petition for review. The main holding is that, in the absence of standing, the court cannot reach the substantive environmental or procedural claims.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Don Willett</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Environmental Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40779/24-40779-2026-07-07.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Theiler</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-07T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-07T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40779/24-40779-2026-07-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A laboratory testing company, Boston Heart Diagnostics (BHD), and two rural Texas hospitals, Little River Health Care and Integrity Transitional Hospital, entered into arrangements where affiliated physicians referred blood tests to the hospitals, which then billed payors, including Medicare, at advantageous rates. The hospitals used Management Service Organizations (MSOs) as intermediaries to recruit and pay physicians, and BHD’s sales team—including several defendants—facilitated these relationships. Evidence at trial showed MSOs were used to provide kickbacks to physicians based on referral volume, disguised through sham contracts, resulting in unusually high revenues for BHD. The defendants included BHD’s CEO, vice president of sales, and sales representatives, who were involved in managing and growing these partnerships.

A federal grand jury indicted eighteen individuals for conspiracy to commit illegal remunerations in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) and 18 U.S.C. § 371. Five defendants proceeded to a joint jury trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. The government presented testimony from co-conspirators and documentary evidence to show the existence of the scheme and the defendants’ knowledge and participation. The jury found all five guilty of conspiracy. The court denied post-trial motions for acquittal or a new trial, sentenced the defendants, and four of them appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo and other claims under deferential standards. The court affirmed all convictions, holding that a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants knowingly and willfully joined a conspiracy to pay illegal kickbacks to induce referrals for federally insured patients. The court also held there was sufficient evidence of a federal nexus and no error in the district court’s handling of jury notes or instructional refusals. The convictions and sentences were affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40779/24-40779-2026-07-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Theiler" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A laboratory testing company, Boston Heart Diagnostics (BHD), and two rural Texas hospitals, Little River Health Care and Integrity Transitional Hospital, entered into arrangements where affiliated physicians referred blood tests to the hospitals, which then billed payors, including Medicare, at advantageous rates. The hospitals used Management Service Organizations (MSOs) as intermediaries to recruit and pay physicians, and BHD’s sales team—including several defendants—facilitated these relationships. Evidence at trial showed MSOs were used to provide kickbacks to physicians based on referral volume, disguised through sham contracts, resulting in unusually high revenues for BHD. The defendants included BHD’s CEO, vice president of sales, and sales representatives, who were involved in managing and growing these partnerships.

A federal grand jury indicted eighteen individuals for conspiracy to commit illegal remunerations in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) and 18 U.S.C. § 371. Five defendants proceeded to a joint jury trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. The government presented testimony from co-conspirators and documentary evidence to show the existence of the scheme and the defendants’ knowledge and participation. The jury found all five guilty of conspiracy. The court denied post-trial motions for acquittal or a new trial, sentenced the defendants, and four of them appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo and other claims under deferential standards. The court affirmed all convictions, holding that a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants knowingly and willfully joined a conspiracy to pay illegal kickbacks to induce referrals for federally insured patients. The court also held there was sufficient evidence of a federal nexus and no error in the district court’s handling of jury notes or instructional refusals. The convictions and sentences were affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Patrick Higginbotham</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20230/25-20230-2026-07-07.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Quintanilla</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-07T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-07T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20230/25-20230-2026-07-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A defendant pleaded guilty to transporting child pornography pursuant to a written plea agreement with the government. In exchange for the dismissal of two more serious charges—sexual exploitation of a minor and possession of child pornography—the defendant admitted guilt to the transportation offense. The plea agreement included an appellate waiver, allowing appeals only for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant confirmed in court that he understood the agreement’s terms, including the maximum penalties and mandatory restitution. At sentencing, the court imposed 240 months’ imprisonment, lifetime supervised release, and $17,500 in restitution to two victims.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas accepted the defendant&#039;s guilty plea and sentenced him according to the statutory maximum and mandatory minimums outlined in the plea agreement. The court also conducted a joint change-of-plea hearing for the defendant and another individual, advising both about appellate rights. The presentence report attributed 3,092 images of child pornography to the defendant, and the court considered victim-impact statements and restitution requests before issuing its sentence. The defendant did not object to the restitution calculation at sentencing.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the defendant argued that the district court misled him regarding his appellate rights during the plea colloquy, imposed unreasonable prison and supervised release terms, and failed to properly analyze causation and apportionment for restitution as required by Paroline v. United States. The Fifth Circuit held that the appellate waiver was knowing and voluntary, barring challenges to the conviction, sentence, and restitution. The court found no plain error in the district court’s advisement or restitution calculation and affirmed the judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20230/25-20230-2026-07-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Quintanilla" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A defendant pleaded guilty to transporting child pornography pursuant to a written plea agreement with the government. In exchange for the dismissal of two more serious charges—sexual exploitation of a minor and possession of child pornography—the defendant admitted guilt to the transportation offense. The plea agreement included an appellate waiver, allowing appeals only for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant confirmed in court that he understood the agreement’s terms, including the maximum penalties and mandatory restitution. At sentencing, the court imposed 240 months’ imprisonment, lifetime supervised release, and $17,500 in restitution to two victims.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas accepted the defendant&#039;s guilty plea and sentenced him according to the statutory maximum and mandatory minimums outlined in the plea agreement. The court also conducted a joint change-of-plea hearing for the defendant and another individual, advising both about appellate rights. The presentence report attributed 3,092 images of child pornography to the defendant, and the court considered victim-impact statements and restitution requests before issuing its sentence. The defendant did not object to the restitution calculation at sentencing.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the defendant argued that the district court misled him regarding his appellate rights during the plea colloquy, imposed unreasonable prison and supervised release terms, and failed to properly analyze causation and apportionment for restitution as required by Paroline v. United States. The Fifth Circuit held that the appellate waiver was knowing and voluntary, barring challenges to the conviction, sentence, and restitution. The court found no plain error in the district court’s advisement or restitution calculation and affirmed the judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Don Willett</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50675/25-50675-2026-07-07.html</id>
        	<title>Barrier v. USA</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-07T09:30:38-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-07T09:30:38-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50675/25-50675-2026-07-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A federal employee, Robert Duran, who held a full-time union leadership position with the National Border Patrol Council (NBPC), struck Tami Barrier with his vehicle while exiting a United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) station in Del Rio, Texas. Duran was leaving the station to collect pandemic-related supplies donated for CBP agents, a task requested by another union leader. The supplies were intended for distribution among multiple Border Patrol stations. Duran’s work entailed both union responsibilities and CBP overtime hours, and there was ambiguity regarding whether he was on duty at the time of the incident. Video evidence and timesheets provided conflicting accounts of his work hours, and there was dispute over whether collecting the supplies was a personal favor or part of his union duties.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judgment to the Government, finding that Duran was not acting within the course and scope of his employment when the incident occurred. The court concluded that the errand was not a CBP task and was not performed under CBP’s authority, so the United States could not be held vicariously liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that genuine disputes of material fact existed regarding whether Duran was acting within the scope of his employment under Texas law, including whether he was performing a “special mission” for CBP at the time. The court determined that a reasonable jury could find Duran’s actions benefited CBP and were performed with its implied approval. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50675/25-50675-2026-07-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Barrier v. USA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A federal employee, Robert Duran, who held a full-time union leadership position with the National Border Patrol Council (NBPC), struck Tami Barrier with his vehicle while exiting a United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) station in Del Rio, Texas. Duran was leaving the station to collect pandemic-related supplies donated for CBP agents, a task requested by another union leader. The supplies were intended for distribution among multiple Border Patrol stations. Duran’s work entailed both union responsibilities and CBP overtime hours, and there was ambiguity regarding whether he was on duty at the time of the incident. Video evidence and timesheets provided conflicting accounts of his work hours, and there was dispute over whether collecting the supplies was a personal favor or part of his union duties.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judgment to the Government, finding that Duran was not acting within the course and scope of his employment when the incident occurred. The court concluded that the errand was not a CBP task and was not performed under CBP’s authority, so the United States could not be held vicariously liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that genuine disputes of material fact existed regarding whether Duran was acting within the scope of his employment under Texas law, including whether he was performing a “special mission” for CBP at the time. The court determined that a reasonable jury could find Duran’s actions benefited CBP and were performed with its implied approval. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James Graves</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Personal Injury"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20421/25-20421-2026-07-06.html</id>
        	<title>20100 Eastex v. Saltgrass</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-06T15:30:32-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-06T15:30:32-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20421/25-20421-2026-07-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A dispute arose over a property contract concerning two adjacent restaurant parcels in Humble, Texas, formerly owned by affiliates of Landry’s, Inc. After Landry’s sold one parcel, a Reciprocal Easement Agreement was created to regulate construction and modifications on each parcel. Years later, 20100 Eastex, L.L.C. purchased the parcel previously occupied by Joe’s Crab Shack and leased it to BJ’s Brewery, which planned to demolish the existing building and construct a new one. BJ’s requested Saltgrass’s consent for the project, but Saltgrass denied approval, leading Eastex to claim that consent was deemed granted under the contract due to alleged procedural defects.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment to Saltgrass, finding that the Agreement required Eastex to obtain Saltgrass’s express written consent before demolition or new construction, and Eastex failed to properly request approval. Eastex appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit initially found Section 3.3 of the Agreement ambiguous and remanded for further factfinding. On remand, the district court considered extrinsic evidence, particularly the uncontested testimony of the drafter, and again granted summary judgment for Saltgrass.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that undisputed extrinsic evidence clarified Section 3.3, establishing that Saltgrass’s consent was required for any demolition or new construction. The court affirmed summary judgment for Saltgrass, dismissed Eastex’s appeal regarding attorney fees for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded for determination of Saltgrass’s appellate attorney fees. The main holdings were: Saltgrass’s interpretation of the contract was correct; summary judgment was proper due to lack of genuine factual dispute; and Saltgrass is entitled to appellate attorney fees. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20421/25-20421-2026-07-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "20100 Eastex v. Saltgrass" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A dispute arose over a property contract concerning two adjacent restaurant parcels in Humble, Texas, formerly owned by affiliates of Landry’s, Inc. After Landry’s sold one parcel, a Reciprocal Easement Agreement was created to regulate construction and modifications on each parcel. Years later, 20100 Eastex, L.L.C. purchased the parcel previously occupied by Joe’s Crab Shack and leased it to BJ’s Brewery, which planned to demolish the existing building and construct a new one. BJ’s requested Saltgrass’s consent for the project, but Saltgrass denied approval, leading Eastex to claim that consent was deemed granted under the contract due to alleged procedural defects.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment to Saltgrass, finding that the Agreement required Eastex to obtain Saltgrass’s express written consent before demolition or new construction, and Eastex failed to properly request approval. Eastex appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit initially found Section 3.3 of the Agreement ambiguous and remanded for further factfinding. On remand, the district court considered extrinsic evidence, particularly the uncontested testimony of the drafter, and again granted summary judgment for Saltgrass.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that undisputed extrinsic evidence clarified Section 3.3, establishing that Saltgrass’s consent was required for any demolition or new construction. The court affirmed summary judgment for Saltgrass, dismissed Eastex’s appeal regarding attorney fees for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded for determination of Saltgrass’s appellate attorney fees. The main holdings were: Saltgrass’s interpretation of the contract was correct; summary judgment was proper due to lack of genuine factual dispute; and Saltgrass is entitled to appellate attorney fees.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Don Willett</case:judge>
													<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Real Estate &amp; Property Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30645/24-30645-2026-07-06.html</id>
        	<title>AbbVie v. Murrill</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-06T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-06T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30645/24-30645-2026-07-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several pharmaceutical manufacturers and a trade association challenged a Louisiana statute enacted in 2023, which prohibits drug manufacturers and distributors from interfering with the acquisition or delivery of discounted drugs—purchased under the federal Section 340B Drug Pricing Program—to pharmacies contracted by certain healthcare providers. The 340B Program requires drug manufacturers participating in Medicaid and Medicare to provide discounted outpatient drugs to designated healthcare providers serving low-income and rural populations. Many of these providers lack in-house pharmacies and use external contract pharmacies. In response to manufacturer-imposed limits on contract pharmacy use, Louisiana enacted Act 358 to preserve covered entities’ ability to use such pharmacies.

The plaintiffs, including AbbVie, AstraZeneca, and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, filed separate lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana against the Louisiana Attorney General, arguing that Act 358 is preempted by federal law, constitutes an unconstitutional taking, impairs contracts in violation of the Contracts Clause, and is unconstitutionally vague. The district court consolidated the cases, granted summary judgment for Louisiana and the Louisiana Primary Care Association (an intervenor), and rejected all of the manufacturers’ claims.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fifth Circuit held that Act 358 is not preempted by federal law, as the federal 340B Program does not regulate drug distribution logistics or the use of contract pharmacies, and thus leaves room for state regulation. The court further concluded that Act 358 does not effect a taking under the Fifth Amendment, does not substantially impair contractual obligations under the Contracts Clause, and is not unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause. The Fifth Circuit thus upheld summary judgment for Louisiana on all claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30645/24-30645-2026-07-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "AbbVie v. Murrill" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several pharmaceutical manufacturers and a trade association challenged a Louisiana statute enacted in 2023, which prohibits drug manufacturers and distributors from interfering with the acquisition or delivery of discounted drugs—purchased under the federal Section 340B Drug Pricing Program—to pharmacies contracted by certain healthcare providers. The 340B Program requires drug manufacturers participating in Medicaid and Medicare to provide discounted outpatient drugs to designated healthcare providers serving low-income and rural populations. Many of these providers lack in-house pharmacies and use external contract pharmacies. In response to manufacturer-imposed limits on contract pharmacy use, Louisiana enacted Act 358 to preserve covered entities’ ability to use such pharmacies.

The plaintiffs, including AbbVie, AstraZeneca, and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, filed separate lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana against the Louisiana Attorney General, arguing that Act 358 is preempted by federal law, constitutes an unconstitutional taking, impairs contracts in violation of the Contracts Clause, and is unconstitutionally vague. The district court consolidated the cases, granted summary judgment for Louisiana and the Louisiana Primary Care Association (an intervenor), and rejected all of the manufacturers’ claims.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fifth Circuit held that Act 358 is not preempted by federal law, as the federal 340B Program does not regulate drug distribution logistics or the use of contract pharmacies, and thus leaves room for state regulation. The court further concluded that Act 358 does not effect a taking under the Fifth Amendment, does not substantially impair contractual obligations under the Contracts Clause, and is not unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause. The Fifth Circuit thus upheld summary judgment for Louisiana on all claims.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Don Willett</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Drugs &amp; Biotech"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-50183/26-50183-2026-07-02.html</id>
        	<title>Sosnava Rodriguez v. Ortega</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-02T15:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-02T15:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-50183/26-50183-2026-07-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Three individuals, each having entered the United States unlawfully more than a decade ago, were detained by federal immigration authorities after routine traffic stops in Texas. None had criminal histories, and each was a long-term resident and father of U.S. citizen children. They petitioned for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), claiming exceptional hardship to their U.S. citizen children if removed. After being detained without bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), they filed habeas corpus petitions, asserting their detention violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas reviewed each petition, applying the procedural due process framework from Mathews v. Eldridge. The district courts found the mandatory detention regime unconstitutional as applied to these petitioners, ordered their immediate release, and required that any future detention must be preceded by a hearing to determine dangerousness or risk of flight. The government appealed these rulings, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit consolidated the cases.

The Fifth Circuit examined precedent, including Zadvydas v. Davis, Demore v. Kim, and Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, and concluded that physical presence and long-term residence within the United States entitles aliens to due process protections. The court held that mandatory, indefinite detention of noncriminal, long-term resident aliens under § 1225(b)(2)(A) without a bond hearing violates the Fifth Amendment. The government must provide a bond hearing within ninety days of detention to determine if continued detention is justified by individualized findings of dangerousness or flight risk. The court affirmed the district courts’ grants of habeas corpus and clarified the scope of its decision to similar aliens detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A). &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-50183/26-50183-2026-07-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Sosnava Rodriguez v. Ortega" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Three individuals, each having entered the United States unlawfully more than a decade ago, were detained by federal immigration authorities after routine traffic stops in Texas. None had criminal histories, and each was a long-term resident and father of U.S. citizen children. They petitioned for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), claiming exceptional hardship to their U.S. citizen children if removed. After being detained without bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), they filed habeas corpus petitions, asserting their detention violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas reviewed each petition, applying the procedural due process framework from Mathews v. Eldridge. The district courts found the mandatory detention regime unconstitutional as applied to these petitioners, ordered their immediate release, and required that any future detention must be preceded by a hearing to determine dangerousness or risk of flight. The government appealed these rulings, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit consolidated the cases.

The Fifth Circuit examined precedent, including Zadvydas v. Davis, Demore v. Kim, and Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, and concluded that physical presence and long-term residence within the United States entitles aliens to due process protections. The court held that mandatory, indefinite detention of noncriminal, long-term resident aliens under § 1225(b)(2)(A) without a bond hearing violates the Fifth Amendment. The government must provide a bond hearing within ninety days of detention to determine if continued detention is justified by individualized findings of dangerousness or flight risk. The court affirmed the district courts’ grants of habeas corpus and clarified the scope of its decision to similar aliens detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leslie Southwick</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Immigration Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40727/24-40727-2026-07-02.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Kendall</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-02T09:30:55-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-02T09:30:55-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40727/24-40727-2026-07-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon and was sentenced to eighteen months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. The district court imposed standard and special conditions of supervised release, including substance abuse treatment and a battering intervention program. After serving his prison term, the defendant began supervised release but soon violated two conditions: refusing substance abuse treatment and threatening his probation officer. At a hearing, he admitted to these violations, and the district court revoked his supervised release, sentencing him to six months in custody and thirty months of supervised release with new conditions, including home detention and location monitoring.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas issued the revocation judgment, which the defendant appealed, arguing that several conditions of supervised release conflicted with the oral pronouncement at sentencing. During the appeal, his supervised release was revoked again for failing to participate in location monitoring and for not following probation officer instructions. The district court imposed a new custodial sentence and another term of supervised release with similar conditions, except for the removal of the mental health treatment requirement.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found the appeal largely moot due to the superseding revocation, except for conditions that were the basis of the second revocation. The Fifth Circuit held that only the home detention special condition and the requirement to follow probation officer instructions remained live issues and were improperly pronounced at sentencing because the defendant had not been given notice or an opportunity to object. The court vacated the judgment in part, remanded for amendment to remove those conditions, and dismissed the challenge to other conditions as moot. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40727/24-40727-2026-07-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Kendall" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon and was sentenced to eighteen months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. The district court imposed standard and special conditions of supervised release, including substance abuse treatment and a battering intervention program. After serving his prison term, the defendant began supervised release but soon violated two conditions: refusing substance abuse treatment and threatening his probation officer. At a hearing, he admitted to these violations, and the district court revoked his supervised release, sentencing him to six months in custody and thirty months of supervised release with new conditions, including home detention and location monitoring.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas issued the revocation judgment, which the defendant appealed, arguing that several conditions of supervised release conflicted with the oral pronouncement at sentencing. During the appeal, his supervised release was revoked again for failing to participate in location monitoring and for not following probation officer instructions. The district court imposed a new custodial sentence and another term of supervised release with similar conditions, except for the removal of the mental health treatment requirement.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found the appeal largely moot due to the superseding revocation, except for conditions that were the basis of the second revocation. The Fifth Circuit held that only the home detention special condition and the requirement to follow probation officer instructions remained live issues and were improperly pronounced at sentencing because the defendant had not been given notice or an opportunity to object. The court vacated the judgment in part, remanded for amendment to remove those conditions, and dismissed the challenge to other conditions as moot.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leslie Southwick</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60414/25-60414-2026-07-01.html</id>
        	<title>Dilworth v. Tucker</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-01T09:30:54-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-01T09:30:54-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60414/25-60414-2026-07-01.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The plaintiff purchased real property in Corinth, Mississippi, which previously belonged to another individual who had requested police to patrol the property and remove trespassers. After the plaintiff recorded the deed, he was found by a responding police officer at the property following a report of suspicious activity. The officer, believing the prior owner still possessed the property, questioned the plaintiff, who did not respond to ownership inquiries and attempted to move toward the house. The officer tried to detain the plaintiff, resulting in a physical encounter and the use of a taser. The plaintiff was arrested and charged with trespassing, resisting arrest, and disorderly conduct. The trespass charge was dismissed after ownership was confirmed, and the other charges were conditionally retired.

The plaintiff filed suit in state court against the officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging false arrest and excessive force. The defendant removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi and moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The district court granted summary judgment, finding that the plaintiff failed to present evidence raising a triable issue concerning a constitutional violation, and that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity. The plaintiff appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and focused on whether the plaintiff established that the officer violated clearly established law. The court determined that the plaintiff failed to identify controlling precedent or a robust consensus of analogous cases demonstrating a violation of clearly established law for either false arrest or excessive force. Finding the officer entitled to qualified immunity, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60414/25-60414-2026-07-01.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Dilworth v. Tucker" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The plaintiff purchased real property in Corinth, Mississippi, which previously belonged to another individual who had requested police to patrol the property and remove trespassers. After the plaintiff recorded the deed, he was found by a responding police officer at the property following a report of suspicious activity. The officer, believing the prior owner still possessed the property, questioned the plaintiff, who did not respond to ownership inquiries and attempted to move toward the house. The officer tried to detain the plaintiff, resulting in a physical encounter and the use of a taser. The plaintiff was arrested and charged with trespassing, resisting arrest, and disorderly conduct. The trespass charge was dismissed after ownership was confirmed, and the other charges were conditionally retired.

The plaintiff filed suit in state court against the officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging false arrest and excessive force. The defendant removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi and moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The district court granted summary judgment, finding that the plaintiff failed to present evidence raising a triable issue concerning a constitutional violation, and that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity. The plaintiff appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and focused on whether the plaintiff established that the officer violated clearly established law. The court determined that the plaintiff failed to identify controlling precedent or a robust consensus of analogous cases demonstrating a violation of clearly established law for either false arrest or excessive force. Finding the officer entitled to qualified immunity, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Irma Ramirez</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10774/25-10774-2026-07-01.html</id>
        	<title>Alta v. General Electric</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-01T09:30:53-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-01T09:30:53-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10774/25-10774-2026-07-01.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Alta Power, L.L.C. sought to build peaker plants in Texas using refurbished turbines, ultimately contracting with WattStock, which collaborated with General Electric International, Inc. (GE) as a subcontractor. Alta and WattStock’s Master Agreement included a mutual waiver of consequential damages for claims “arising out of or connected in any way to” the agreement, covering both parties and their subcontractors. The turbine arrangement failed in 2020, leading to litigation among Alta, WattStock, and later GE. WattStock filed for bankruptcy and removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Alta sought consequential damages from GE, alleging tortious conduct, fraudulent inducement, and arguing the waiver did not apply to intentional torts.

The district court for the Northern District of Texas granted summary judgment to GE, holding that GE, as WattStock’s subcontractor, was an intended third-party beneficiary of the consequential-damages waiver. The court found the waiver enforceable under Texas law, even in the face of alleged fraudulent inducement, referencing Bombardier Aerospace Corp. v. SPEP Aircraft Holdings, LLC, 572 S.W.3d 213 (Tex. 2019), and concluded that the waiver applied to all causes of action, including intentional torts. The district court dismissed all claims by Alta with prejudice, except for GE’s breach of contract claim, which was also dismissed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the summary judgment de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Fifth Circuit held that GE was an intended third-party beneficiary eligible to enforce the waiver, that alleged fraudulent inducement did not render the waiver unenforceable under Texas law, and that the waiver applied to intentional tort claims. The court affirmed the dismissal of Alta’s claims against GE. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10774/25-10774-2026-07-01.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Alta v. General Electric" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Alta Power, L.L.C. sought to build peaker plants in Texas using refurbished turbines, ultimately contracting with WattStock, which collaborated with General Electric International, Inc. (GE) as a subcontractor. Alta and WattStock’s Master Agreement included a mutual waiver of consequential damages for claims “arising out of or connected in any way to” the agreement, covering both parties and their subcontractors. The turbine arrangement failed in 2020, leading to litigation among Alta, WattStock, and later GE. WattStock filed for bankruptcy and removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Alta sought consequential damages from GE, alleging tortious conduct, fraudulent inducement, and arguing the waiver did not apply to intentional torts.

The district court for the Northern District of Texas granted summary judgment to GE, holding that GE, as WattStock’s subcontractor, was an intended third-party beneficiary of the consequential-damages waiver. The court found the waiver enforceable under Texas law, even in the face of alleged fraudulent inducement, referencing Bombardier Aerospace Corp. v. SPEP Aircraft Holdings, LLC, 572 S.W.3d 213 (Tex. 2019), and concluded that the waiver applied to all causes of action, including intentional torts. The district court dismissed all claims by Alta with prejudice, except for GE’s breach of contract claim, which was also dismissed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the summary judgment de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Fifth Circuit held that GE was an intended third-party beneficiary eligible to enforce the waiver, that alleged fraudulent inducement did not render the waiver unenforceable under Texas law, and that the waiver applied to intentional tort claims. The court affirmed the dismissal of Alta’s claims against GE.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kurt Engelhardt</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60200/25-60200-2026-06-30.html</id>
        	<title>Texas Tobacco Barn v. HHS</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-30T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-30T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60200/25-60200-2026-06-30.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Texas Tobacco Barn operated a laboratory and retail shop in Lubbock, Texas, manufacturing and selling e-liquids and vape products. After applying for authorization to sell over 2,200 vape products, including Barn Brewed Beetle Juice e-liquids, the FDA denied approval and warned that these products were considered “adulterated” and “misbranded.” Despite assurances from Texas Tobacco Barn that it would cease sales, a subsequent FDA inspection revealed continued sale of unauthorized products. The FDA initiated proceedings seeking a civil penalty of $19,192 for violations.

The enforcement action began with an administrative hearing before an HHS administrative law judge (ALJ), who reviewed evidence including inspection photos and testimony from an FDA inspector. Texas Tobacco Barn admitted that the e-liquids lacked FDA authorization but disputed the inspector’s findings and challenged the FDA’s regulatory authority. The ALJ concluded that the FDA proved its case by a preponderance of the evidence and imposed the civil penalty. On appeal, the HHS Departmental Appeals Board affirmed the ALJ’s ruling, agreeing the ALJ lacked jurisdiction to address constitutional challenges but offering advisory comments on those defenses.

Reviewing the agency’s final decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered Texas Tobacco Barn’s statutory and constitutional arguments. The court rejected the nondelegation challenge, citing its own precedent and Supreme Court guidance clarifying FDA’s explicit authority to regulate vape products. However, the Fifth Circuit held that the administrative process violated Texas Tobacco Barn’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The court determined that civil penalties for FDCA violations are legal in nature and do not fall under the public-rights exception that would permit agency adjudication without a jury. As a result, the Fifth Circuit granted the petition and vacated the agency’s decision. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60200/25-60200-2026-06-30.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Texas Tobacco Barn v. HHS" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Texas Tobacco Barn operated a laboratory and retail shop in Lubbock, Texas, manufacturing and selling e-liquids and vape products. After applying for authorization to sell over 2,200 vape products, including Barn Brewed Beetle Juice e-liquids, the FDA denied approval and warned that these products were considered “adulterated” and “misbranded.” Despite assurances from Texas Tobacco Barn that it would cease sales, a subsequent FDA inspection revealed continued sale of unauthorized products. The FDA initiated proceedings seeking a civil penalty of $19,192 for violations.

The enforcement action began with an administrative hearing before an HHS administrative law judge (ALJ), who reviewed evidence including inspection photos and testimony from an FDA inspector. Texas Tobacco Barn admitted that the e-liquids lacked FDA authorization but disputed the inspector’s findings and challenged the FDA’s regulatory authority. The ALJ concluded that the FDA proved its case by a preponderance of the evidence and imposed the civil penalty. On appeal, the HHS Departmental Appeals Board affirmed the ALJ’s ruling, agreeing the ALJ lacked jurisdiction to address constitutional challenges but offering advisory comments on those defenses.

Reviewing the agency’s final decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered Texas Tobacco Barn’s statutory and constitutional arguments. The court rejected the nondelegation challenge, citing its own precedent and Supreme Court guidance clarifying FDA’s explicit authority to regulate vape products. However, the Fifth Circuit held that the administrative process violated Texas Tobacco Barn’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The court determined that civil penalties for FDCA violations are legal in nature and do not fall under the public-rights exception that would permit agency adjudication without a jury. As a result, the Fifth Circuit granted the petition and vacated the agency’s decision.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stuart Kyle Duncan</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50510/25-50510-2026-06-29.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Arrieta</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-29T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-29T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50510/25-50510-2026-06-29.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Six detainees at an Immigration &amp; Customs Enforcement facility in El Paso, including the defendant, used improvised ropes to climb onto an unrailed roof two stories above the ground. For over three and a half hours, they refused commands to come down, demanded release and media attention, and threatened to jump if approached. The standoff required two specialized law-enforcement teams, and ended only after sublethal munitions were deployed. The facility then imposed a six-hour lockdown, suspending all activities, denying access to attorneys and families, and disrupting meal services.

A grand jury charged the defendant and others with mutiny under 18 U.S.C. § 1792. The defendant pleaded guilty. During sentencing in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, the presentence report recommended the highest base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2P1.3, arguing the conduct created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. The defendant objected, advocating for the lowest base offense level, or alternatively, the middle tier for major disruption. The district court found the offense involved a major disruption to the institution’s operation, applied the middle tier (base offense level 16), and sentenced the defendant accordingly.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the district court’s finding of “major disruption” was clearly erroneous. Applying the ordinary meaning of “major disruption,” the court concluded that the prolonged rooftop standoff, involvement of specialized teams, use of sublethal munitions, and subsequent facility-wide lockdown constituted a significant interruption to operations. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court’s finding was plausible in light of the record and not clearly erroneous, and therefore affirmed the district court’s sentence. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50510/25-50510-2026-06-29.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Arrieta" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Six detainees at an Immigration &amp; Customs Enforcement facility in El Paso, including the defendant, used improvised ropes to climb onto an unrailed roof two stories above the ground. For over three and a half hours, they refused commands to come down, demanded release and media attention, and threatened to jump if approached. The standoff required two specialized law-enforcement teams, and ended only after sublethal munitions were deployed. The facility then imposed a six-hour lockdown, suspending all activities, denying access to attorneys and families, and disrupting meal services.

A grand jury charged the defendant and others with mutiny under 18 U.S.C. § 1792. The defendant pleaded guilty. During sentencing in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, the presentence report recommended the highest base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2P1.3, arguing the conduct created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. The defendant objected, advocating for the lowest base offense level, or alternatively, the middle tier for major disruption. The district court found the offense involved a major disruption to the institution’s operation, applied the middle tier (base offense level 16), and sentenced the defendant accordingly.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the district court’s finding of “major disruption” was clearly erroneous. Applying the ordinary meaning of “major disruption,” the court concluded that the prolonged rooftop standoff, involvement of specialized teams, use of sublethal munitions, and subsequent facility-wide lockdown constituted a significant interruption to operations. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court’s finding was plausible in light of the record and not clearly erroneous, and therefore affirmed the district court’s sentence.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Don Willett</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20132/25-20132-2026-06-29.html</id>
        	<title>Tuttle v. Gallegos</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-29T15:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-29T15:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20132/25-20132-2026-06-29.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A squad of Houston Police Department officers executed a no-knock search warrant at a residence in Houston, Texas, on January 28, 2019. The warrant was obtained based on false information provided by both a civilian neighbor and a narcotics officer. During the raid, an exchange of gunfire erupted almost immediately after police entered the home. Multiple officers were shot, including some by friendly fire. Dennis Tuttle and Rhogena Nicholas, the residents, were both killed by Officer Felipe Gallegos, who fired at each during the chaotic confrontation. The plaintiffs, representing the estates and heirs of Tuttle and Nicholas, brought state and federal claims, including allegations of excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Gallegos.

In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Gallegos moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, finding that disputed material facts—primarily concerning the sequence of events and whether the force used was reasonable—precluded summary judgment and required resolution by a jury.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the denial of qualified immunity de novo. The Fifth Circuit determined that the video evidence and expert testimony contradicted the plaintiffs’ version of events regarding key facts, such as the locations of individuals at critical moments. The court held that, even viewing the facts most favorably to the plaintiffs, Gallegos’s use of deadly force did not violate clearly established constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the court found that given the rapidly evolving and dangerous circumstances, an objectively reasonable officer could have perceived an immediate threat justifying the use of deadly force. The Fifth Circuit therefore reversed the district court’s decision and held that Gallegos is entitled to qualified immunity. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20132/25-20132-2026-06-29.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Tuttle v. Gallegos" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A squad of Houston Police Department officers executed a no-knock search warrant at a residence in Houston, Texas, on January 28, 2019. The warrant was obtained based on false information provided by both a civilian neighbor and a narcotics officer. During the raid, an exchange of gunfire erupted almost immediately after police entered the home. Multiple officers were shot, including some by friendly fire. Dennis Tuttle and Rhogena Nicholas, the residents, were both killed by Officer Felipe Gallegos, who fired at each during the chaotic confrontation. The plaintiffs, representing the estates and heirs of Tuttle and Nicholas, brought state and federal claims, including allegations of excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Gallegos.

In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Gallegos moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, finding that disputed material facts—primarily concerning the sequence of events and whether the force used was reasonable—precluded summary judgment and required resolution by a jury.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the denial of qualified immunity de novo. The Fifth Circuit determined that the video evidence and expert testimony contradicted the plaintiffs’ version of events regarding key facts, such as the locations of individuals at critical moments. The court held that, even viewing the facts most favorably to the plaintiffs, Gallegos’s use of deadly force did not violate clearly established constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the court found that given the rapidly evolving and dangerous circumstances, an objectively reasonable officer could have perceived an immediate threat justifying the use of deadly force. The Fifth Circuit therefore reversed the district court’s decision and held that Gallegos is entitled to qualified immunity.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Edith Clement</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30325/25-30325-2026-06-25.html</id>
        	<title>Merriott v. City of Bossier City</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-25T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-25T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30325/25-30325-2026-06-25.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		An online journalist residing in Bossier Parish, Louisiana, attended several Bossier City Council meetings in 2023 to speak on a petition for term limits for city officials. At these meetings, the City Council enforced a policy governing public comment, which barred “personal, impertinent or slanderous remarks” and prohibited “boisterous” conduct. The policy was repeatedly invoked to interrupt the journalist’s remarks, and after a contentious meeting, several councilmembers met privately to discuss further restricting public comment. The journalist later filed an open meetings complaint and sued the city and individual councilmembers under federal and state law, alleging violations of the First Amendment and Louisiana’s Open Meetings Law.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, rejecting all of the journalist’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6). The court found that the policy did not violate constitutional or statutory rights and that the conduct described did not support actionable claims.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the City Council’s policy was facially overbroad and unconstitutionally vague under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as its prohibitions on “personal, impertinent or slanderous remarks” and “boisterous” conduct lacked clear definitions and chilled protected speech. The court also found that the policy constituted viewpoint and content discrimination, except as to the prohibition on “boisterous” conduct, which was deemed viewpoint neutral. The court determined that the journalist had plausibly alleged First Amendment retaliation and an Open Meetings Law violation against certain councilmembers, but not against one councilmember or for civil penalties. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30325/25-30325-2026-06-25.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Merriott v. City of Bossier City" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                An online journalist residing in Bossier Parish, Louisiana, attended several Bossier City Council meetings in 2023 to speak on a petition for term limits for city officials. At these meetings, the City Council enforced a policy governing public comment, which barred “personal, impertinent or slanderous remarks” and prohibited “boisterous” conduct. The policy was repeatedly invoked to interrupt the journalist’s remarks, and after a contentious meeting, several councilmembers met privately to discuss further restricting public comment. The journalist later filed an open meetings complaint and sued the city and individual councilmembers under federal and state law, alleging violations of the First Amendment and Louisiana’s Open Meetings Law.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, rejecting all of the journalist’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6). The court found that the policy did not violate constitutional or statutory rights and that the conduct described did not support actionable claims.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the City Council’s policy was facially overbroad and unconstitutionally vague under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as its prohibitions on “personal, impertinent or slanderous remarks” and “boisterous” conduct lacked clear definitions and chilled protected speech. The court also found that the policy constituted viewpoint and content discrimination, except as to the prohibition on “boisterous” conduct, which was deemed viewpoint neutral. The court determined that the journalist had plausibly alleged First Amendment retaliation and an Open Meetings Law violation against certain councilmembers, but not against one councilmember or for civil penalties. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-25</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Irma Ramirez</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-70008/24-70008-2026-06-25.html</id>
        	<title>Davis v. Guerrero</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-25T09:30:53-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-25T09:30:53-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-70008/24-70008-2026-06-25.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The petitioner was convicted of the rape and murder of a 15-year-old girl. After initially being sentenced to death, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) granted him a new sentencing trial. At the resentencing, the state introduced evidence of his affiliation with Satanism, including personal writings and expert testimony, to argue he posed a future danger. The petitioner claimed this violated his First Amendment rights. He was again sentenced to death.

Following the resentencing, the petitioner’s First Amendment claim was rejected on direct appeal by the CCA, and his ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims were denied by the state habeas court. The CCA adopted the habeas court’s findings. The petitioner then pursued federal habeas relief, but the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas found his claims were either procedurally defaulted or reasonably rejected by the state courts, and denied relief. The petitioner was granted a certificate of appealability on his First Amendment and IAC claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Applying the highly deferential standard mandated by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), the court concluded that the CCA’s rejection of the First Amendment claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The court distinguished the evidence admitted in this case from the Supreme Court’s decision in Dawson v. Delaware and found it was relevant to the question of future dangerousness, not just to abstract beliefs. The court further held that no relief was warranted on the IAC claims because counsel’s performance was not objectively unreasonable and the state habeas court’s findings were not clearly erroneous. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-70008/24-70008-2026-06-25.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Davis v. Guerrero" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The petitioner was convicted of the rape and murder of a 15-year-old girl. After initially being sentenced to death, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) granted him a new sentencing trial. At the resentencing, the state introduced evidence of his affiliation with Satanism, including personal writings and expert testimony, to argue he posed a future danger. The petitioner claimed this violated his First Amendment rights. He was again sentenced to death.

Following the resentencing, the petitioner’s First Amendment claim was rejected on direct appeal by the CCA, and his ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims were denied by the state habeas court. The CCA adopted the habeas court’s findings. The petitioner then pursued federal habeas relief, but the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas found his claims were either procedurally defaulted or reasonably rejected by the state courts, and denied relief. The petitioner was granted a certificate of appealability on his First Amendment and IAC claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Applying the highly deferential standard mandated by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), the court concluded that the CCA’s rejection of the First Amendment claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The court distinguished the evidence admitted in this case from the Supreme Court’s decision in Dawson v. Delaware and found it was relevant to the question of future dangerousness, not just to abstract beliefs. The court further held that no relief was warranted on the IAC claims because counsel’s performance was not objectively unreasonable and the state habeas court’s findings were not clearly erroneous. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-25</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60537/24-60537-2026-06-24.html</id>
        	<title>VDX Distro v. FDA</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-24T09:30:54-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-24T09:30:54-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60537/24-60537-2026-06-24.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A company that manufactures menthol-flavored e-cigarette products applied to the United States Food &amp; Drug Administration (FDA) for marketing authorization, as required under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA). The FDA, concerned about the appeal of non-tobacco-flavored e-cigarettes to minors, especially menthol varieties, evaluated whether the benefits of these products for adult smokers outweighed the risks to youth. After reviewing the evidence and applying its “comparative-efficacy standard,” which requires proof that non-tobacco-flavored e-cigarettes encourage more adult smokers to switch or quit compared to tobacco-flavored versions, the FDA denied the application.

The petitioners challenged the FDA’s denial through a petition for review to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. They raised four main arguments: that the FDA’s authority under the TCA violated the major questions and nondelegation doctrines; that the TCA’s “appropriate for the protection of the public health” (APPH) standard is unconstitutionally vague; that the FDA’s comparative-efficacy standard was an unlawfully adopted tobacco product standard; and that the FDA’s application of the APPH standard to their application was arbitrary and capricious. The petitioners also argued that the FDA improperly disregarded recent data and failed to consider their proposed marketing plan.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the FDA’s decision under the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary and capricious standard. The court held that Congress’s delegation of authority to the FDA was constitutional, the APPH standard was not unconstitutionally vague, and the comparative-efficacy standard was not a tobacco product standard requiring notice-and-comment rulemaking. The court further found that the FDA reasonably explained its decision and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in denying the application. The petition for review was denied. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60537/24-60537-2026-06-24.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "VDX Distro v. FDA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A company that manufactures menthol-flavored e-cigarette products applied to the United States Food &amp; Drug Administration (FDA) for marketing authorization, as required under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA). The FDA, concerned about the appeal of non-tobacco-flavored e-cigarettes to minors, especially menthol varieties, evaluated whether the benefits of these products for adult smokers outweighed the risks to youth. After reviewing the evidence and applying its “comparative-efficacy standard,” which requires proof that non-tobacco-flavored e-cigarettes encourage more adult smokers to switch or quit compared to tobacco-flavored versions, the FDA denied the application.

The petitioners challenged the FDA’s denial through a petition for review to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. They raised four main arguments: that the FDA’s authority under the TCA violated the major questions and nondelegation doctrines; that the TCA’s “appropriate for the protection of the public health” (APPH) standard is unconstitutionally vague; that the FDA’s comparative-efficacy standard was an unlawfully adopted tobacco product standard; and that the FDA’s application of the APPH standard to their application was arbitrary and capricious. The petitioners also argued that the FDA improperly disregarded recent data and failed to consider their proposed marketing plan.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the FDA’s decision under the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary and capricious standard. The court held that Congress’s delegation of authority to the FDA was constitutional, the APPH standard was not unconstitutionally vague, and the comparative-efficacy standard was not a tobacco product standard requiring notice-and-comment rulemaking. The court further found that the FDA reasonably explained its decision and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in denying the application. The petition for review was denied.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-24</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Cory Wilson</case:judge>
													<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60263/25-60263-2026-06-24.html</id>
        	<title>Roberts v. KJ Win</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-24T09:30:53-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-24T09:30:53-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60263/25-60263-2026-06-24.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Cheryl Roberts and William Chambers were injured in a multi-vehicle crash on Interstate 20 in Mississippi, which they allege was caused by a tractor-trailer operated by a KJ Win, Inc. employee. According to the plaintiffs, the KJ Win driver improperly parked his truck on the shoulder, forcing another truck to change lanes suddenly and triggering the collision. Roberts suffered a traumatic brain injury and other ongoing problems, while Chambers sustained a fractured sternum and other injuries. They sued KJ Win for negligence and asserted that the company was vicariously liable for its driver’s actions.

After filing the suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Roberts and Chambers attempted to serve KJ Win but had difficulty locating its registered agent. Ultimately, they received permission from the court to effect service through the California Secretary of State. KJ Win did not respond, and the district court entered a default judgment against it following an evidentiary hearing, awarding the plaintiffs over $2.8 million in damages. KJ Win later moved to set aside the default judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), arguing lack of notice, excusable neglect, lack of prejudice to plaintiffs, existence of meritorious defenses, and interests of justice. The district court denied the motion, finding the default was willful.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the denial of relief under Rule 60(b). The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding KJ Win’s default was willful, ending the inquiry under Rule 60(b)(1). The Fifth Circuit also ruled that KJ Win forfeited its arguments regarding defective service and damages, as they were not raised before the district court. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60263/25-60263-2026-06-24.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Roberts v. KJ Win" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Cheryl Roberts and William Chambers were injured in a multi-vehicle crash on Interstate 20 in Mississippi, which they allege was caused by a tractor-trailer operated by a KJ Win, Inc. employee. According to the plaintiffs, the KJ Win driver improperly parked his truck on the shoulder, forcing another truck to change lanes suddenly and triggering the collision. Roberts suffered a traumatic brain injury and other ongoing problems, while Chambers sustained a fractured sternum and other injuries. They sued KJ Win for negligence and asserted that the company was vicariously liable for its driver’s actions.

After filing the suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Roberts and Chambers attempted to serve KJ Win but had difficulty locating its registered agent. Ultimately, they received permission from the court to effect service through the California Secretary of State. KJ Win did not respond, and the district court entered a default judgment against it following an evidentiary hearing, awarding the plaintiffs over $2.8 million in damages. KJ Win later moved to set aside the default judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), arguing lack of notice, excusable neglect, lack of prejudice to plaintiffs, existence of meritorious defenses, and interests of justice. The district court denied the motion, finding the default was willful.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the denial of relief under Rule 60(b). The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding KJ Win’s default was willful, ending the inquiry under Rule 60(b)(1). The Fifth Circuit also ruled that KJ Win forfeited its arguments regarding defective service and damages, as they were not raised before the district court. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-24</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Cory Wilson</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Personal Injury"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60651/24-60651-2026-06-23.html</id>
        	<title>Starbucks v. NLRB</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-23T15:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-23T15:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60651/24-60651-2026-06-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Employees at a Starbucks store in Sylmar, California, engaged in union organizing activities during 2022. Several conversations between store managers and employees occurred regarding the unionization process, pay and benefit increases, and working conditions. Employees reported statements by managers suggesting that certain benefits would be paused or lost due to union negotiations, that unionization would not improve conditions, and that other jobs offered better pay. One employee, Untaran, was interrogated about his union support and subsequently terminated, with conflicting accounts regarding the reasons for his discharge.

After a union election where a majority voted against representation, the union filed objections based on Untaran’s termination and management statements. An Administrative Law Judge for the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found violations of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), including coercive threats, interrogation, and unlawful discharge, and ordered remedies such as reinstatement, back pay, compensatory damages, and a new election. The NLRB adopted some findings and reversed others, particularly expanding the findings regarding coercive interrogation and threats.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the NLRB’s findings and enforcement orders regarding one coercive threat against Pichardo, the threat against Untaran, and Untaran’s coercive interrogation claim, finding these supported by substantial evidence. However, the court denied enforcement for the NLRB’s order regarding Untaran’s unlawful discharge claim and the coercive threat claims involving Sosa and Ramirez, as they lacked substantial evidence. The court dismissed Starbucks’s appeal regarding the order for a second union election, citing lack of jurisdiction over representation proceedings consolidated with unfair labor practice cases. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60651/24-60651-2026-06-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Starbucks v. NLRB" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Employees at a Starbucks store in Sylmar, California, engaged in union organizing activities during 2022. Several conversations between store managers and employees occurred regarding the unionization process, pay and benefit increases, and working conditions. Employees reported statements by managers suggesting that certain benefits would be paused or lost due to union negotiations, that unionization would not improve conditions, and that other jobs offered better pay. One employee, Untaran, was interrogated about his union support and subsequently terminated, with conflicting accounts regarding the reasons for his discharge.

After a union election where a majority voted against representation, the union filed objections based on Untaran’s termination and management statements. An Administrative Law Judge for the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found violations of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), including coercive threats, interrogation, and unlawful discharge, and ordered remedies such as reinstatement, back pay, compensatory damages, and a new election. The NLRB adopted some findings and reversed others, particularly expanding the findings regarding coercive interrogation and threats.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the NLRB’s findings and enforcement orders regarding one coercive threat against Pichardo, the threat against Untaran, and Untaran’s coercive interrogation claim, finding these supported by substantial evidence. However, the court denied enforcement for the NLRB’s order regarding Untaran’s unlawful discharge claim and the coercive threat claims involving Sosa and Ramirez, as they lacked substantial evidence. The court dismissed Starbucks’s appeal regarding the order for a second union election, citing lack of jurisdiction over representation proceedings consolidated with unfair labor practice cases.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50596/25-50596-2026-06-23.html</id>
        	<title>Sanchez v. Nunemaker</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-23T09:30:45-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-23T09:30:45-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50596/25-50596-2026-06-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A deputy sheriff in Medina County, Texas, stopped a vehicle that had been reported stolen and possibly involved in an armed robbery. After detaining the driver, a seventeen-year-old named Branden Sanchez, the officer handcuffed him and placed him in the back seat of his cruiser. Over the course of approximately 50 minutes, Sanchez became disruptive, repeatedly yelling and kicking the cruiser’s doors and demanding to be taken to jail. Although surrounded by multiple officers and restrained by handcuffs and a seatbelt, Sanchez resisted orders to sit properly. In response to his continued noncompliance, the deputy forcibly repositioned Sanchez in the seat and later discharged a high-velocity pepper spray device into Sanchez’s face from a distance shorter than the manufacturer’s recommended minimum, resulting in permanent blindness in one eye.

Sanchez filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The deputy moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, finding that Sanchez had plausibly alleged facts showing a violation of clearly established law regarding the use of excessive force against a restrained and non-threatening suspect.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity de novo. The Fifth Circuit concluded that, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Sanchez, he adequately alleged both a constitutional violation and that the right was clearly established at the time. The court determined that precedent would have put a reasonable officer on notice that using pepper spray in this manner against a restrained, outnumbered, and non-threatening suspect was unlawful. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50596/25-50596-2026-06-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Sanchez v. Nunemaker" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A deputy sheriff in Medina County, Texas, stopped a vehicle that had been reported stolen and possibly involved in an armed robbery. After detaining the driver, a seventeen-year-old named Branden Sanchez, the officer handcuffed him and placed him in the back seat of his cruiser. Over the course of approximately 50 minutes, Sanchez became disruptive, repeatedly yelling and kicking the cruiser’s doors and demanding to be taken to jail. Although surrounded by multiple officers and restrained by handcuffs and a seatbelt, Sanchez resisted orders to sit properly. In response to his continued noncompliance, the deputy forcibly repositioned Sanchez in the seat and later discharged a high-velocity pepper spray device into Sanchez’s face from a distance shorter than the manufacturer’s recommended minimum, resulting in permanent blindness in one eye.

Sanchez filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The deputy moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, finding that Sanchez had plausibly alleged facts showing a violation of clearly established law regarding the use of excessive force against a restrained and non-threatening suspect.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity de novo. The Fifth Circuit concluded that, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Sanchez, he adequately alleged both a constitutional violation and that the right was clearly established at the time. The court determined that precedent would have put a reasonable officer on notice that using pepper spray in this manner against a restrained, outnumbered, and non-threatening suspect was unlawful. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leslie Southwick</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40200/25-40200-2026-06-23.html</id>
        	<title>Brenyah v. Columbia Hospital</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-23T09:30:45-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-23T09:30:45-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40200/25-40200-2026-06-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A registered nurse, who is a black woman and naturalized U.S. citizen from Ghana, began working at a healthcare system in Texas and alleged frequent discrimination and harassment by co-workers, including mockery of her accent and food, derogatory comments about black employees, and preferential treatment of Filipino employees. She reported these incidents to supervisors, but claims their response was inadequate. After further complaints, she alleges retaliation through informal and formal disciplinary actions and the extension of her probation period. She was later injured in a car accident, took medical leave, and upon seeking treatment at a hospital operated by the same employer during a hurricane lockdown, had contentious interactions with staff, but ultimately received care. When she tried to return to work, she requested refresher orientation and additional training, but after further delays and lack of response, she resigned, citing discrimination and retaliation.

She subsequently filed two charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The first charge, encompassing events through September 2017, was timely; the second, covering her resignation and later events, was untimely. In May 2021, she sued her employer for discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation under Title VII and Section 1981, and disability discrimination under the ADA. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas adopted a magistrate judge’s recommendation granting summary judgment to the employer on all claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed summary judgment for the employer on most claims. However, it reversed the grant of summary judgment on the plaintiff’s Title VII and Section 1981 hostile-work-environment claims, holding that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the conduct was severe or pervasive and whether the employer’s response was adequate. The court remanded those claims for further proceedings, limiting them to facts alleged in the plaintiff’s timely EEOC charge. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40200/25-40200-2026-06-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Brenyah v. Columbia Hospital" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A registered nurse, who is a black woman and naturalized U.S. citizen from Ghana, began working at a healthcare system in Texas and alleged frequent discrimination and harassment by co-workers, including mockery of her accent and food, derogatory comments about black employees, and preferential treatment of Filipino employees. She reported these incidents to supervisors, but claims their response was inadequate. After further complaints, she alleges retaliation through informal and formal disciplinary actions and the extension of her probation period. She was later injured in a car accident, took medical leave, and upon seeking treatment at a hospital operated by the same employer during a hurricane lockdown, had contentious interactions with staff, but ultimately received care. When she tried to return to work, she requested refresher orientation and additional training, but after further delays and lack of response, she resigned, citing discrimination and retaliation.

She subsequently filed two charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The first charge, encompassing events through September 2017, was timely; the second, covering her resignation and later events, was untimely. In May 2021, she sued her employer for discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation under Title VII and Section 1981, and disability discrimination under the ADA. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas adopted a magistrate judge’s recommendation granting summary judgment to the employer on all claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed summary judgment for the employer on most claims. However, it reversed the grant of summary judgment on the plaintiff’s Title VII and Section 1981 hostile-work-environment claims, holding that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the conduct was severe or pervasive and whether the employer’s response was adequate. The court remanded those claims for further proceedings, limiting them to facts alleged in the plaintiff’s timely EEOC charge.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jennifer Elrod</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50025/25-50025-2026-06-18.html</id>
        	<title>Marfil v. City of New Braunfels</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-18T15:30:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-18T15:30:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50025/25-50025-2026-06-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several property owners in New Braunfels, Texas, challenged a city zoning ordinance that prohibits short-term rentals in residential districts. The ordinance, originally enacted in 2006 and amended in 2011, was in place prior to the appellants’ purchase of their properties. Despite knowing about the restrictions, the appellants either engaged in or sought to engage in short-term rental activities and, after being denied zoning changes to permit such use, filed suit against the city. Their claims alleged the ordinance violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of both the United States and Texas Constitutions.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially dismissed the appellants’ claims under Rule 12(b)(6). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a prior decision, vacated and remanded, allowing the appellants to proceed to discovery. After discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court again ruled in favor of the city, granting summary judgment on all claims. The appellants then sought review of this decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Texas law does not recognize a protected property interest in the right to lease one’s home on a short-term basis, which is required for a due process claim. It further found that the ordinance’s restrictions on short-term rentals survive rational-basis review under the Equal Protection Clause, as the city’s goal of preserving the residential character of neighborhoods is a legitimate government interest, and the line drawn between short-term and longer-term rentals was not arbitrary. Accordingly, the court found no constitutional violation and affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the city. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50025/25-50025-2026-06-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Marfil v. City of New Braunfels" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several property owners in New Braunfels, Texas, challenged a city zoning ordinance that prohibits short-term rentals in residential districts. The ordinance, originally enacted in 2006 and amended in 2011, was in place prior to the appellants’ purchase of their properties. Despite knowing about the restrictions, the appellants either engaged in or sought to engage in short-term rental activities and, after being denied zoning changes to permit such use, filed suit against the city. Their claims alleged the ordinance violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of both the United States and Texas Constitutions.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially dismissed the appellants’ claims under Rule 12(b)(6). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a prior decision, vacated and remanded, allowing the appellants to proceed to discovery. After discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court again ruled in favor of the city, granting summary judgment on all claims. The appellants then sought review of this decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Texas law does not recognize a protected property interest in the right to lease one’s home on a short-term basis, which is required for a due process claim. It further found that the ordinance’s restrictions on short-term rentals survive rational-basis review under the Equal Protection Clause, as the city’s goal of preserving the residential character of neighborhoods is a legitimate government interest, and the line drawn between short-term and longer-term rentals was not arbitrary. Accordingly, the court found no constitutional violation and affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the city.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Real Estate &amp; Property Law"/>
							<category term="Zoning, Planning &amp; Land Use"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20413/24-20413-2026-06-18.html</id>
        	<title>Larkins v. S.D.P. Manufacturing</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-18T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-18T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20413/24-20413-2026-06-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A maintenance worker was injured when a small derrick tipped over during work on a defective transformer. Two years after the incident, the injured individual and his spouse filed suit against the derrick’s manufacturer and several corporate entities that leased the equipment to the worker’s employer. The complaint was filed on the last day permitted by the Texas statute of limitations. Plaintiffs received service citations the next day, and forwarded them to a process server three days later. Service was completed about fifty days after filing, with delays attributed to confusion over defendants’ identities and addresses, as well as disruptions caused by a courthouse fire in an unrelated case involving plaintiffs’ counsel.

After defendants were served, they removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district court dismissed the claims against the manufacturer for insufficient diligence in service and granted summary judgment for the corporate defendants. The district court found that plaintiffs had waited too long at several points—three days before forwarding citations, several weeks before following up with the process server, and additional days before clarifying instructions—thus concluding that plaintiffs failed to exercise sufficient diligence as required by Texas law.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court applied a more demanding standard than Texas law requires. Under Texas law, a plaintiff must show ordinary diligence in effecting service after timely filing suit. The appellate court found that plaintiffs’ explanations for the short delays, including handling a complex service task involving multiple corporate defendants and temporary distractions from an unrelated courthouse fire, were sufficient to raise a genuine factual dispute regarding diligence. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and summary judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20413/24-20413-2026-06-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Larkins v. S.D.P. Manufacturing" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A maintenance worker was injured when a small derrick tipped over during work on a defective transformer. Two years after the incident, the injured individual and his spouse filed suit against the derrick’s manufacturer and several corporate entities that leased the equipment to the worker’s employer. The complaint was filed on the last day permitted by the Texas statute of limitations. Plaintiffs received service citations the next day, and forwarded them to a process server three days later. Service was completed about fifty days after filing, with delays attributed to confusion over defendants’ identities and addresses, as well as disruptions caused by a courthouse fire in an unrelated case involving plaintiffs’ counsel.

After defendants were served, they removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district court dismissed the claims against the manufacturer for insufficient diligence in service and granted summary judgment for the corporate defendants. The district court found that plaintiffs had waited too long at several points—three days before forwarding citations, several weeks before following up with the process server, and additional days before clarifying instructions—thus concluding that plaintiffs failed to exercise sufficient diligence as required by Texas law.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court applied a more demanding standard than Texas law requires. Under Texas law, a plaintiff must show ordinary diligence in effecting service after timely filing suit. The appellate court found that plaintiffs’ explanations for the short delays, including handling a complex service task involving multiple corporate defendants and temporary distractions from an unrelated courthouse fire, were sufficient to raise a genuine factual dispute regarding diligence. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and summary judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James C. Ho</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Personal Injury"/>
							<category term="Products Liability"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30307/24-30307-2026-06-18.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Comeaux</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-18T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-18T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30307/24-30307-2026-06-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		After law enforcement arrested the defendant for unlawfully discharging a firearm, they executed a search warrant at his home. During the search, officers seized multiple firearms, suspected silencers, and other related paraphernalia. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives evaluated the items and determined the suspected silencers met the statutory definition of devices designed for silencing, muffling, or diminishing the report of a firearm. The defendant admitted to manufacturing and possessing the silencers.

A federal grand jury charged the defendant with possession of unregistered firearms, specifically silencers, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), and possession of a firearm without a serial number under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(i). He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that both statutes violated the Second Amendment facially and as applied to him. The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana denied the motion, finding silencers to be “dangerous and unusual weapons” not protected by the Second Amendment. The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the constitutional issue, and was sentenced to twenty-four months in prison and three years of supervised release.

Reviewing the appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied de novo review to the preserved constitutional questions. The court acknowledged that, per Supreme Court precedent, silencers qualify as Second Amendment “Arms.” However, in light of United States v. Peterson, 161 F.4th 331 (5th Cir. 2025), the Fifth Circuit held that the National Firearms Act’s shall-issue regime for silencer registration is presumptively lawful unless a challenger shows it has been put toward abusive ends, such as through exorbitant fees or lengthy delays. Because the defendant did not allege such abuse, the court held that § 5861(d) did not violate his Second Amendment rights and affirmed the conviction. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30307/24-30307-2026-06-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Comeaux" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                After law enforcement arrested the defendant for unlawfully discharging a firearm, they executed a search warrant at his home. During the search, officers seized multiple firearms, suspected silencers, and other related paraphernalia. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives evaluated the items and determined the suspected silencers met the statutory definition of devices designed for silencing, muffling, or diminishing the report of a firearm. The defendant admitted to manufacturing and possessing the silencers.

A federal grand jury charged the defendant with possession of unregistered firearms, specifically silencers, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), and possession of a firearm without a serial number under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(i). He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that both statutes violated the Second Amendment facially and as applied to him. The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana denied the motion, finding silencers to be “dangerous and unusual weapons” not protected by the Second Amendment. The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the constitutional issue, and was sentenced to twenty-four months in prison and three years of supervised release.

Reviewing the appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied de novo review to the preserved constitutional questions. The court acknowledged that, per Supreme Court precedent, silencers qualify as Second Amendment “Arms.” However, in light of United States v. Peterson, 161 F.4th 331 (5th Cir. 2025), the Fifth Circuit held that the National Firearms Act’s shall-issue regime for silencer registration is presumptively lawful unless a challenger shows it has been put toward abusive ends, such as through exorbitant fees or lengthy delays. Because the defendant did not allege such abuse, the court held that § 5861(d) did not violate his Second Amendment rights and affirmed the conviction.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30331/25-30331-2026-06-17.html</id>
        	<title>Trailer Bridge v. LA Intl Marine</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-17T15:30:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-17T15:30:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30331/25-30331-2026-06-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A freight service company chartered two barges to a third party, Work Cat, under an agreement that included a “no-lien” clause, prohibiting the charterer from incurring liens on the barges. Work Cat, in turn, chartered two tugboats from another company to tow the barges. While Work Cat initially paid for the tug services, it defaulted on the majority of payments and eventually filed for bankruptcy. The tug owner, seeking to recover unpaid invoices, filed maritime lien notices against the barges and demanded payment from the original barge owner, who refused, arguing that the “no-lien” clause prevented such a lien.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held a bench trial. It determined that the tug owner had valid maritime liens against both barges for the value of towage services provided, but excluded the costs of fuel and lubricants. The district court initially awarded attorney’s fees to the tug owner but later reversed this decision, ordering each party to bear its own legal costs. Both parties appealed, challenging the existence, scope, and value of the liens, as well as the award of attorney’s fees.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that a maritime lien attached to the barges because the tug owner provided necessary services without actual knowledge of the “no-lien” clause at the time the towage contract was executed. The court clarified that actual knowledge of such a clause, not constructive knowledge or a duty to investigate, is required to defeat a maritime lien under current law. The value of the lien properly included all towage services but excluded fuel and lubricant costs. The appellate court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of attorney’s fees and its award of prejudgment interest. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30331/25-30331-2026-06-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Trailer Bridge v. LA Intl Marine" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A freight service company chartered two barges to a third party, Work Cat, under an agreement that included a “no-lien” clause, prohibiting the charterer from incurring liens on the barges. Work Cat, in turn, chartered two tugboats from another company to tow the barges. While Work Cat initially paid for the tug services, it defaulted on the majority of payments and eventually filed for bankruptcy. The tug owner, seeking to recover unpaid invoices, filed maritime lien notices against the barges and demanded payment from the original barge owner, who refused, arguing that the “no-lien” clause prevented such a lien.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held a bench trial. It determined that the tug owner had valid maritime liens against both barges for the value of towage services provided, but excluded the costs of fuel and lubricants. The district court initially awarded attorney’s fees to the tug owner but later reversed this decision, ordering each party to bear its own legal costs. Both parties appealed, challenging the existence, scope, and value of the liens, as well as the award of attorney’s fees.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that a maritime lien attached to the barges because the tug owner provided necessary services without actual knowledge of the “no-lien” clause at the time the towage contract was executed. The court clarified that actual knowledge of such a clause, not constructive knowledge or a duty to investigate, is required to defeat a maritime lien under current law. The value of the lien properly included all towage services but excluded fuel and lubricant costs. The appellate court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of attorney’s fees and its award of prejudgment interest.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Edith Jones</case:judge>
													<category term="Admiralty &amp; Maritime Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20094/25-20094-2026-06-16.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Baldemoro</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-16T15:30:38-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-16T15:30:38-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20094/25-20094-2026-06-16.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		James Baldemoro pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography in 2014 and received a statutory maximum sentence of ten years in prison followed by ten years of supervised release. After completing his prison term, Baldemoro began supervised release but twice violated its conditions. For each violation, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas revoked his supervised release and imposed a six-month term of reimprisonment, followed by a new period of supervised release. At each revocation hearing, Baldemoro argued that having already served the statutory maximum prison sentence for his offense, any further imprisonment was unlawful.

The district court rejected Baldemoro’s arguments both times, ruling that reimprisonment following revocation of supervised release was authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), regardless of whether it resulted in more total time in custody than the statutory maximum for the initial offense. Baldemoro appealed both revocation sentences. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit consolidated the appeals and considered whether his challenges were moot and whether his new sentences were lawful.

The Fifth Circuit held that Baldemoro’s appeals were not moot because a favorable decision could allow him to seek a reduction or termination of his supervised release. On the merits, the court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) authorizes reimprisonment beyond the statutory maximum for the underlying offense, limited only by the felony class, not the maximum sentence for the conviction. The court also found that such reimprisonment does not violate the Fifth or Sixth Amendments, as the constitutional protections involved in criminal prosecutions do not apply to supervised release revocation proceedings. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20094/25-20094-2026-06-16.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Baldemoro" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                James Baldemoro pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography in 2014 and received a statutory maximum sentence of ten years in prison followed by ten years of supervised release. After completing his prison term, Baldemoro began supervised release but twice violated its conditions. For each violation, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas revoked his supervised release and imposed a six-month term of reimprisonment, followed by a new period of supervised release. At each revocation hearing, Baldemoro argued that having already served the statutory maximum prison sentence for his offense, any further imprisonment was unlawful.

The district court rejected Baldemoro’s arguments both times, ruling that reimprisonment following revocation of supervised release was authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), regardless of whether it resulted in more total time in custody than the statutory maximum for the initial offense. Baldemoro appealed both revocation sentences. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit consolidated the appeals and considered whether his challenges were moot and whether his new sentences were lawful.

The Fifth Circuit held that Baldemoro’s appeals were not moot because a favorable decision could allow him to seek a reduction or termination of his supervised release. On the merits, the court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) authorizes reimprisonment beyond the statutory maximum for the underlying offense, limited only by the felony class, not the maximum sentence for the conviction. The court also found that such reimprisonment does not violate the Fifth or Sixth Amendments, as the constitutional protections involved in criminal prosecutions do not apply to supervised release revocation proceedings. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Cory Wilson</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50067/25-50067-2026-06-15.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Ma</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-15T09:30:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-15T09:30:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50067/25-50067-2026-06-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The United States initiated a lawsuit against Dr. Dongxin Ma and Ma Acupuncture Center, P.C., alleging violations of the False Claims Act. The government claimed that the defendants submitted inflated reimbursement requests for acupuncture services provided to veterans, resulting in improper payments from the Department of Veterans Affairs. The United States sought substantial damages and civil penalties, while the defendants denied liability and asserted they acted in good faith.

Following mediation, the parties reached significant agreement regarding the terms of settlement. The mediation resulted in an oral agreement that included payment by the defendants of $2.3 million over 42 months, an initial $100,000 payment, dismissal and release of civil claims by the government, reasonable efforts by Dr. Ma to sell certain property, and the government’s right to place liens if obligations were not met. The United States filed a notice of settlement and submitted a written agreement containing additional standard terms. The defendants, later represented by new counsel, contested the validity of the settlement, arguing that the written agreement included material terms not discussed at mediation and that Dr. Ma had not authorized settlement above $1 million.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas held an evidentiary hearing, ultimately concluding that the parties had orally agreed to all material terms at mediation and that the additional terms in the written agreement were immaterial. The court amended its judgment to enforce only the material terms agreed orally. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion and affirmed. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in enforcing the oral settlement agreement, finding that all material terms were agreed to at mediation and that additional terms in the written agreement were not material. The court also found that the defendants had forfeited certain arguments on appeal. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50067/25-50067-2026-06-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Ma" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The United States initiated a lawsuit against Dr. Dongxin Ma and Ma Acupuncture Center, P.C., alleging violations of the False Claims Act. The government claimed that the defendants submitted inflated reimbursement requests for acupuncture services provided to veterans, resulting in improper payments from the Department of Veterans Affairs. The United States sought substantial damages and civil penalties, while the defendants denied liability and asserted they acted in good faith.

Following mediation, the parties reached significant agreement regarding the terms of settlement. The mediation resulted in an oral agreement that included payment by the defendants of $2.3 million over 42 months, an initial $100,000 payment, dismissal and release of civil claims by the government, reasonable efforts by Dr. Ma to sell certain property, and the government’s right to place liens if obligations were not met. The United States filed a notice of settlement and submitted a written agreement containing additional standard terms. The defendants, later represented by new counsel, contested the validity of the settlement, arguing that the written agreement included material terms not discussed at mediation and that Dr. Ma had not authorized settlement above $1 million.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas held an evidentiary hearing, ultimately concluding that the parties had orally agreed to all material terms at mediation and that the additional terms in the written agreement were immaterial. The court amended its judgment to enforce only the material terms agreed orally. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion and affirmed. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in enforcing the oral settlement agreement, finding that all material terms were agreed to at mediation and that additional terms in the written agreement were not material. The court also found that the defendants had forfeited certain arguments on appeal.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Arbitration &amp; Mediation"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50594/25-50594-2026-06-12.html</id>
        	<title>Guilbeau v. Schlumberger Technology</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-12T15:30:38-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-12T15:30:38-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50594/25-50594-2026-06-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Three named plaintiffs, all working for Schlumberger in oilfield drilling positions, challenged their employer’s compensation system under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Their pay structure included both a fixed, predetermined salary paid biweekly and substantial additional daily or activity-based payments, which often comprised the majority of their earnings. The plaintiffs regularly worked more than forty hours per week but did not receive overtime pay. They brought a collective action, arguing that their hybrid compensation arrangement did not meet the requirements for the Fair Labor Standards Act’s “salary basis” exemption, and therefore they were entitled to overtime pay.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas denied Schlumberger’s motion for partial summary judgment, finding that material factual disputes prevented judgment as a matter of law on whether the plaintiffs were paid on a salary basis. The court allowed notice to a proposed collective of Directional Drillers but denied notice to another group, and it later certified an interlocutory appeal due to the unsettled state of the law regarding hybrid pay schemes.

On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of summary judgment de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the hybrid compensation plan, which included a guaranteed, predetermined salary paid on a weekly or less frequent basis, satisfied the regulatory requirements for the salary basis exemption under 29 C.F.R. § 541.602(a), regardless of additional day-based or incentive payments. The court reversed the district court’s decision and ordered summary judgment for Schlumberger as to the named plaintiff Guilbeau, finding him overtime-exempt. However, the court remanded the case for further proceedings regarding other collective members, as their exemption status required additional individualized determinations. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50594/25-50594-2026-06-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Guilbeau v. Schlumberger Technology" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Three named plaintiffs, all working for Schlumberger in oilfield drilling positions, challenged their employer’s compensation system under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Their pay structure included both a fixed, predetermined salary paid biweekly and substantial additional daily or activity-based payments, which often comprised the majority of their earnings. The plaintiffs regularly worked more than forty hours per week but did not receive overtime pay. They brought a collective action, arguing that their hybrid compensation arrangement did not meet the requirements for the Fair Labor Standards Act’s “salary basis” exemption, and therefore they were entitled to overtime pay.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas denied Schlumberger’s motion for partial summary judgment, finding that material factual disputes prevented judgment as a matter of law on whether the plaintiffs were paid on a salary basis. The court allowed notice to a proposed collective of Directional Drillers but denied notice to another group, and it later certified an interlocutory appeal due to the unsettled state of the law regarding hybrid pay schemes.

On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of summary judgment de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the hybrid compensation plan, which included a guaranteed, predetermined salary paid on a weekly or less frequent basis, satisfied the regulatory requirements for the salary basis exemption under 29 C.F.R. § 541.602(a), regardless of additional day-based or incentive payments. The court reversed the district court’s decision and ordered summary judgment for Schlumberger as to the named plaintiff Guilbeau, finding him overtime-exempt. However, the court remanded the case for further proceedings regarding other collective members, as their exemption status required additional individualized determinations.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Patrick Higginbotham</case:judge>
													<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30775/24-30775-2026-06-12.html</id>
        	<title>Wightman v. Ameritas Life Ins</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-12T09:30:38-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-12T09:30:38-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30775/24-30775-2026-06-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Mark and Courtney Wightman, who own a dental clinic in Louisiana, entered into an agreement with DenteMax, a preferred provider organization (PPO), allowing DenteMax to offer their services at discounted rates to its network subscribers in exchange for access to more patients. Unbeknownst to the Wightmans, DenteMax also entered into a separate agreement with Ameritas Life Insurance Corporation, which permitted Ameritas to pay DenteMax’s network providers, including the Wightmans, at the same discounted rates. The Wightmans only became aware of this arrangement when Ameritas reimbursed them at the discounted rates rather than their standard rates for services rendered to Ameritas-insured patients.

The Wightmans filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against Ameritas and DenteMax, alleging breach of contract, violations of Louisiana’s Preferred Provider Organization Act (PPO Act), and unjust enrichment. The district court initially dismissed several claims, partly on the ground that the suit was prescribed (time-barred). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified a question to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which held that PPO Act claims are contractual for prescriptive purposes, making the claims timely. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s prior dismissal. DenteMax settled, and on remand, the district court granted summary judgment to Ameritas, concluding that dental services are not “healthcare services” under the PPO Act, and that the Wightmans had abandoned their non-PPO Act claims.

On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that dental services are “healthcare” under the PPO Act, reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment on those claims. The court also found error in the district court’s treatment of the abandonment of non-PPO Act claims and remanded for further proceedings. The denial of leave to amend was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30775/24-30775-2026-06-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Wightman v. Ameritas Life Ins" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Mark and Courtney Wightman, who own a dental clinic in Louisiana, entered into an agreement with DenteMax, a preferred provider organization (PPO), allowing DenteMax to offer their services at discounted rates to its network subscribers in exchange for access to more patients. Unbeknownst to the Wightmans, DenteMax also entered into a separate agreement with Ameritas Life Insurance Corporation, which permitted Ameritas to pay DenteMax’s network providers, including the Wightmans, at the same discounted rates. The Wightmans only became aware of this arrangement when Ameritas reimbursed them at the discounted rates rather than their standard rates for services rendered to Ameritas-insured patients.

The Wightmans filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against Ameritas and DenteMax, alleging breach of contract, violations of Louisiana’s Preferred Provider Organization Act (PPO Act), and unjust enrichment. The district court initially dismissed several claims, partly on the ground that the suit was prescribed (time-barred). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified a question to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which held that PPO Act claims are contractual for prescriptive purposes, making the claims timely. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s prior dismissal. DenteMax settled, and on remand, the district court granted summary judgment to Ameritas, concluding that dental services are not “healthcare services” under the PPO Act, and that the Wightmans had abandoned their non-PPO Act claims.

On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that dental services are “healthcare” under the PPO Act, reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment on those claims. The court also found error in the district court’s treatment of the abandonment of non-PPO Act claims and remanded for further proceedings. The denial of leave to amend was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James Graves</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20244/25-20244-2026-06-12.html</id>
        	<title>Gannon v. Texas Dept of Trans</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-12T09:30:38-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-12T09:30:38-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20244/25-20244-2026-06-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A company that owned several billboards in Texas faced administrative action by the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT), which sought to cancel four of its billboard permits due to alleged noncompliance with state regulations. The company requested an administrative hearing, after which TxDOT dismissed its claims for cancellation of three permits but proceeded against one. An administrative law judge recommended canceling the remaining permit and imposing significant administrative penalties for violations related to the other permits. The Texas Transportation Commission (TTC) adopted this decision.

The company then filed for judicial review in a Texas state district court, but its petition was dismissed because it was filed past the statutory thirty-day deadline. This dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was affirmed by the state appellate court, and the Supreme Court of Texas declined review. While the state proceedings were ongoing, the company separately filed a federal lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas against TxDOT, TTC, and TxDOT’s Executive Director, asserting five claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. The district court dismissed most claims on sovereign immunity grounds, and held that the remaining claims were barred by res judicata, entering final judgment for the defendants.

Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that it lacked jurisdiction over all of the company’s claims. The court found that the company had failed to adequately allege the necessary connection between the individually named official and the enforcement of the challenged law, a requirement under the Ex parte Young doctrine for suits against state officials. As a result, the Fifth Circuit modified the district court’s judgment to dismiss all claims without prejudice and affirmed the judgment as modified. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20244/25-20244-2026-06-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Gannon v. Texas Dept of Trans" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A company that owned several billboards in Texas faced administrative action by the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT), which sought to cancel four of its billboard permits due to alleged noncompliance with state regulations. The company requested an administrative hearing, after which TxDOT dismissed its claims for cancellation of three permits but proceeded against one. An administrative law judge recommended canceling the remaining permit and imposing significant administrative penalties for violations related to the other permits. The Texas Transportation Commission (TTC) adopted this decision.

The company then filed for judicial review in a Texas state district court, but its petition was dismissed because it was filed past the statutory thirty-day deadline. This dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was affirmed by the state appellate court, and the Supreme Court of Texas declined review. While the state proceedings were ongoing, the company separately filed a federal lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas against TxDOT, TTC, and TxDOT’s Executive Director, asserting five claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. The district court dismissed most claims on sovereign immunity grounds, and held that the remaining claims were barred by res judicata, entering final judgment for the defendants.

Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that it lacked jurisdiction over all of the company’s claims. The court found that the company had failed to adequately allege the necessary connection between the individually named official and the enforcement of the challenged law, a requirement under the Ex parte Young doctrine for suits against state officials. As a result, the Fifth Circuit modified the district court’s judgment to dismiss all claims without prejudice and affirmed the judgment as modified.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40237/25-40237-2026-06-09.html</id>
        	<title>EnvTech v. DeBusk</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-09T09:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-09T09:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40237/25-40237-2026-06-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		EnvTech, Inc., a company specializing in cleaning products and services for hydrofluoric acid alkylation (HF alky) units in oil refineries, alleges that Patrick DeBusk, CEO of USA DeBusk LLC (USAD), orchestrated the theft of its proprietary neutral pH chelation cleaning formula and process. EnvTech claims that DeBusk directed the hiring of key former EnvTech employees, who were privy to EnvTech’s trade secrets, and used their knowledge to allow USAD to enter and compete in the specialized market for HF alky unit cleaning. EnvTech further asserts that this conduct was part of a broader pattern, with USAD hiring competitors’ employees to misappropriate trade secrets under DeBusk’s direction.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed EnvTech’s amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court found that EnvTech had not plausibly alleged that DeBusk personally engaged in trade secret theft with the necessary mental state or that a pattern of racketeering activity under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was sufficiently pleaded. The court dismissed the case with prejudice after EnvTech’s amended complaint did not cure the perceived deficiencies.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo and found that EnvTech plausibly alleged DeBusk’s knowing direction and participation in the theft and use of EnvTech’s trade secrets, as well as a broader pattern of similar conduct involving other competitors. The Fifth Circuit held that EnvTech’s allegations were sufficient to state a RICO claim based on a pattern of trade secret theft and conspiracy, and that the continuity and relatedness requirements for a RICO pattern were satisfied. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40237/25-40237-2026-06-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "EnvTech v. DeBusk" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                EnvTech, Inc., a company specializing in cleaning products and services for hydrofluoric acid alkylation (HF alky) units in oil refineries, alleges that Patrick DeBusk, CEO of USA DeBusk LLC (USAD), orchestrated the theft of its proprietary neutral pH chelation cleaning formula and process. EnvTech claims that DeBusk directed the hiring of key former EnvTech employees, who were privy to EnvTech’s trade secrets, and used their knowledge to allow USAD to enter and compete in the specialized market for HF alky unit cleaning. EnvTech further asserts that this conduct was part of a broader pattern, with USAD hiring competitors’ employees to misappropriate trade secrets under DeBusk’s direction.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed EnvTech’s amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court found that EnvTech had not plausibly alleged that DeBusk personally engaged in trade secret theft with the necessary mental state or that a pattern of racketeering activity under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was sufficiently pleaded. The court dismissed the case with prejudice after EnvTech’s amended complaint did not cure the perceived deficiencies.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo and found that EnvTech plausibly alleged DeBusk’s knowing direction and participation in the theft and use of EnvTech’s trade secrets, as well as a broader pattern of similar conduct involving other competitors. The Fifth Circuit held that EnvTech’s allegations were sufficient to state a RICO claim based on a pattern of trade secret theft and conspiracy, and that the continuity and relatedness requirements for a RICO pattern were satisfied. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Dana Douglas</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30315/24-30315-2026-06-08.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Akula</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-08T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-08T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30315/24-30315-2026-06-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A physician who owned and operated a hospice company in Louisiana was convicted by a jury of twenty-three counts of health care fraud. The company, under his direction, systematically billed Medicare at higher reimbursement rates than were warranted, particularly by utilizing the General Inpatient Care (GIP) rate for patients who did not qualify, and by billing for additional services already included in hospice per diem rates. Despite being notified by Medicare auditors multiple times that the company’s billing was improper and lacked sufficient documentation, the physician failed to disclose these findings to his staff or to change the company’s billing practices. The fraudulent activity resulted in the company billing Medicare for more than $84 million and receiving over $42 million in payments.

Earlier, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana presided over the trial. The defendant attempted to introduce an expert witness on Medicare billing and coding, but the court only permitted the witness to testify regarding clinical decision-making, not billing practices, due to insufficient qualifications. After the jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, the district court sentenced him to 240 months in prison—an upward variance from the Sentencing Guidelines—and ordered restitution. The court justified the increased sentence based on the defendant’s lack of remorse, repeated violations of court orders, and the need to deter similar conduct.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred in excluding expert testimony, whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, and whether the sentence was unconstitutionally excessive or substantively unreasonable. The Fifth Circuit held that any error in excluding the expert testimony was harmless, found the evidence sufficient to support the convictions, and concluded that the sentence was neither grossly disproportionate nor substantively unreasonable. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30315/24-30315-2026-06-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Akula" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A physician who owned and operated a hospice company in Louisiana was convicted by a jury of twenty-three counts of health care fraud. The company, under his direction, systematically billed Medicare at higher reimbursement rates than were warranted, particularly by utilizing the General Inpatient Care (GIP) rate for patients who did not qualify, and by billing for additional services already included in hospice per diem rates. Despite being notified by Medicare auditors multiple times that the company’s billing was improper and lacked sufficient documentation, the physician failed to disclose these findings to his staff or to change the company’s billing practices. The fraudulent activity resulted in the company billing Medicare for more than $84 million and receiving over $42 million in payments.

Earlier, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana presided over the trial. The defendant attempted to introduce an expert witness on Medicare billing and coding, but the court only permitted the witness to testify regarding clinical decision-making, not billing practices, due to insufficient qualifications. After the jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, the district court sentenced him to 240 months in prison—an upward variance from the Sentencing Guidelines—and ordered restitution. The court justified the increased sentence based on the defendant’s lack of remorse, repeated violations of court orders, and the need to deter similar conduct.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred in excluding expert testimony, whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, and whether the sentence was unconstitutionally excessive or substantively unreasonable. The Fifth Circuit held that any error in excluding the expert testimony was harmless, found the evidence sufficient to support the convictions, and concluded that the sentence was neither grossly disproportionate nor substantively unreasonable. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60403/25-60403-2026-06-08.html</id>
        	<title>Fields v. CIR</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-08T09:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-08T09:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60403/25-60403-2026-06-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		An elderly businesswoman, after being diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease, had her great-nephew act as her agent pursuant to a power of attorney. As her condition deteriorated, the agent managed her finances and addressed two instances of financial elder abuse. In the final months of her life, following further health declines, her agent—on the advice of attorneys—created a limited partnership and transferred nearly $17 million of her assets into it. The businesswoman died within weeks of these transfers, leaving her with only about $2.15 million outside the partnership.

When the executor filed the estate tax return, he reported only the value of the partnership interest—appraised at approximately $11 million—rather than the value of the assets transferred into the partnership. This resulted in a substantial reduction in the estate’s tax liability. The Internal Revenue Service audited the return, determined that the gross estate should include the full value of the transferred assets under I.R.C. § 2036(a), and assessed a 20% penalty for underpayment. The executor disputed these findings before the United States Tax Court.

The United States Tax Court upheld the IRS’s deficiency notice and penalty. It found that the transfers were not made pursuant to a bona fide sale for a legitimate non-tax purpose, and that the estate had been negligent in its reporting. The executor appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s decision. It held that the estate failed to demonstrate any substantial non-tax reason for the asset transfers, so the bona fide sale exception to § 2036(a) did not apply. The court also upheld the 20% penalty, finding no clear error in the Tax Court’s determination that the estate lacked reasonable cause and did not act in good faith. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60403/25-60403-2026-06-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Fields v. CIR" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                An elderly businesswoman, after being diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease, had her great-nephew act as her agent pursuant to a power of attorney. As her condition deteriorated, the agent managed her finances and addressed two instances of financial elder abuse. In the final months of her life, following further health declines, her agent—on the advice of attorneys—created a limited partnership and transferred nearly $17 million of her assets into it. The businesswoman died within weeks of these transfers, leaving her with only about $2.15 million outside the partnership.

When the executor filed the estate tax return, he reported only the value of the partnership interest—appraised at approximately $11 million—rather than the value of the assets transferred into the partnership. This resulted in a substantial reduction in the estate’s tax liability. The Internal Revenue Service audited the return, determined that the gross estate should include the full value of the transferred assets under I.R.C. § 2036(a), and assessed a 20% penalty for underpayment. The executor disputed these findings before the United States Tax Court.

The United States Tax Court upheld the IRS’s deficiency notice and penalty. It found that the transfers were not made pursuant to a bona fide sale for a legitimate non-tax purpose, and that the estate had been negligent in its reporting. The executor appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s decision. It held that the estate failed to demonstrate any substantial non-tax reason for the asset transfers, so the bona fide sale exception to § 2036(a) did not apply. The court also upheld the 20% penalty, finding no clear error in the Tax Court’s determination that the estate lacked reasonable cause and did not act in good faith.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stuart Kyle Duncan</case:judge>
													<category term="Trusts &amp; Estates"/>
							<category term="Tax Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40535/24-40535-2026-06-04.html</id>
        	<title>Martinez v. Hinojosa</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-04T15:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-04T15:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40535/24-40535-2026-06-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Police responded to a domestic disturbance at a residence in Laredo, Texas, where a man named Terrazas opened fire on officers with an assault rifle, injuring one. Terrazas then entered the home of Jorge Martinez and his family, shooting Martinez’s mother before Martinez and his sister overpowered and disarmed him. Soon after, Officer Hinojosa, unaware of the suspect’s identity or appearance, arrived, took up a defensive position, and observed a naked man—Martinez—exit the house holding the confiscated rifle. Despite Martinez shouting that he was not the shooter, Officer Hinojosa, perceiving him to be the armed suspect, shot Martinez, inflicting severe injuries.

Martinez filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, alleging excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and failure to properly train officers by the City of Laredo. The district court dismissed all but the claims against Officer Hinojosa and the City. Later, the court granted summary judgment to both, holding that no constitutional violation had occurred and that Officer Hinojosa was entitled to qualified immunity, foreclosing municipal liability.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The court held that although Martinez was seized, the officer’s mistaken belief that Martinez was the shooter was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, given the ongoing danger, Martinez’s possession of the rifle, and his actions upon exiting the residence. The court found that Officer Hinojosa’s failure to issue a warning was also reasonable due to the rapidly evolving situation. As no constitutional violation occurred, summary judgment for Officer Hinojosa and the City of Laredo was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40535/24-40535-2026-06-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Martinez v. Hinojosa" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Police responded to a domestic disturbance at a residence in Laredo, Texas, where a man named Terrazas opened fire on officers with an assault rifle, injuring one. Terrazas then entered the home of Jorge Martinez and his family, shooting Martinez’s mother before Martinez and his sister overpowered and disarmed him. Soon after, Officer Hinojosa, unaware of the suspect’s identity or appearance, arrived, took up a defensive position, and observed a naked man—Martinez—exit the house holding the confiscated rifle. Despite Martinez shouting that he was not the shooter, Officer Hinojosa, perceiving him to be the armed suspect, shot Martinez, inflicting severe injuries.

Martinez filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, alleging excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and failure to properly train officers by the City of Laredo. The district court dismissed all but the claims against Officer Hinojosa and the City. Later, the court granted summary judgment to both, holding that no constitutional violation had occurred and that Officer Hinojosa was entitled to qualified immunity, foreclosing municipal liability.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The court held that although Martinez was seized, the officer’s mistaken belief that Martinez was the shooter was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, given the ongoing danger, Martinez’s possession of the rifle, and his actions upon exiting the residence. The court found that Officer Hinojosa’s failure to issue a warning was also reasonable due to the rapidly evolving situation. As no constitutional violation occurred, summary judgment for Officer Hinojosa and the City of Laredo was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leslie Southwick</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50130/25-50130-2026-06-04.html</id>
        	<title>Lutheran Church v. Christian</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-04T09:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-04T09:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50130/25-50130-2026-06-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A nonprofit religious corporation, incorporated under Missouri law, sought to restore its governance authority over a university in Texas that was established as an agency of the church. The university, although separately incorporated, was subject to church governance under its charter and bylaws. In 2022, the university’s regents unilaterally amended their governing documents to reject the church’s authority. The church’s internal adjudicatory body declared these amendments void, and the church’s convention directed action to restore church control. The university refused to recognize church-appointed regents as its governing body.

Litigation ensued in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The church, through its corporate body, sued the university and its leaders in federal court, asserting diversity jurisdiction. The university counter-sued in Texas state court, naming the church as an unincorporated association. The federal actions were consolidated. The district court, adopting a magistrate judge’s report, held that the church was an unincorporated association and the real party in interest, and that joining the church as a plaintiff destroyed diversity jurisdiction because its members included Texas citizens. The court dismissed the federal suit and remanded the state suit to state court.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the district court’s approach violated the church autonomy doctrine under the First Amendment by imposing secular interpretations on the church’s governance structure and disregarding the church’s own description of its internal polity. The court found that the nonprofit corporation is the appropriate party for civil litigation and that diversity jurisdiction exists. The case was remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50130/25-50130-2026-06-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Lutheran Church v. Christian" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A nonprofit religious corporation, incorporated under Missouri law, sought to restore its governance authority over a university in Texas that was established as an agency of the church. The university, although separately incorporated, was subject to church governance under its charter and bylaws. In 2022, the university’s regents unilaterally amended their governing documents to reject the church’s authority. The church’s internal adjudicatory body declared these amendments void, and the church’s convention directed action to restore church control. The university refused to recognize church-appointed regents as its governing body.

Litigation ensued in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The church, through its corporate body, sued the university and its leaders in federal court, asserting diversity jurisdiction. The university counter-sued in Texas state court, naming the church as an unincorporated association. The federal actions were consolidated. The district court, adopting a magistrate judge’s report, held that the church was an unincorporated association and the real party in interest, and that joining the church as a plaintiff destroyed diversity jurisdiction because its members included Texas citizens. The court dismissed the federal suit and remanded the state suit to state court.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the district court’s approach violated the church autonomy doctrine under the First Amendment by imposing secular interpretations on the church’s governance structure and disregarding the church’s own description of its internal polity. The court found that the nonprofit corporation is the appropriate party for civil litigation and that diversity jurisdiction exists. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Edith Jones</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Non-Profit Corporations"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40616/25-40616-2026-06-03.html</id>
        	<title>Wertenbroch v. Hardeman</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-03T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-03T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40616/25-40616-2026-06-03.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Two plaintiffs alleged that the City Manager of Pittsburg, Texas discriminated against them in violation of the Equal Protection Clause by failing to investigate crimes on their properties, listing their properties for sale without consent, and enforcing city codes unequally. They brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City Manager, both individually and officially. The defendant moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing the plaintiffs failed to state a plausible equal protection claim, were barred from asserting claims against a related entity, failed to plead a viable Monell claim, did not allege personal involvement, and did not plead facts to overcome qualified immunity.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas referred the motion to a magistrate judge, who recommended denial of the motion, finding that the plaintiffs’ allegations, though thin, plausibly stated an equal protection violation. The magistrate judge’s report did not address the qualified immunity defense. The defendant objected, specifically noting the omission regarding qualified immunity. The district court overruled the objections and adopted the recommendation, again without mentioning qualified immunity. The defendant then appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether it had jurisdiction to consider the appeal under the collateral-order doctrine, since the district court’s order denied a motion to dismiss without expressly resolving the qualified immunity defense. The Fifth Circuit held that when a district court allows litigation to proceed without adjudicating qualified immunity at the earliest possible stage, the resulting order is immediately appealable, even if qualified immunity is not expressly addressed. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40616/25-40616-2026-06-03.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Wertenbroch v. Hardeman" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Two plaintiffs alleged that the City Manager of Pittsburg, Texas discriminated against them in violation of the Equal Protection Clause by failing to investigate crimes on their properties, listing their properties for sale without consent, and enforcing city codes unequally. They brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City Manager, both individually and officially. The defendant moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing the plaintiffs failed to state a plausible equal protection claim, were barred from asserting claims against a related entity, failed to plead a viable Monell claim, did not allege personal involvement, and did not plead facts to overcome qualified immunity.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas referred the motion to a magistrate judge, who recommended denial of the motion, finding that the plaintiffs’ allegations, though thin, plausibly stated an equal protection violation. The magistrate judge’s report did not address the qualified immunity defense. The defendant objected, specifically noting the omission regarding qualified immunity. The district court overruled the objections and adopted the recommendation, again without mentioning qualified immunity. The defendant then appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether it had jurisdiction to consider the appeal under the collateral-order doctrine, since the district court’s order denied a motion to dismiss without expressly resolving the qualified immunity defense. The Fifth Circuit held that when a district court allows litigation to proceed without adjudicating qualified immunity at the earliest possible stage, the resulting order is immediately appealable, even if qualified immunity is not expressly addressed. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Edith Clement</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50144/25-50144-2026-06-02.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. James</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-02T15:31:46-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-02T15:31:46-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50144/25-50144-2026-06-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In June 2000, a woman identified as M.M. was attacked in her barracks at Fort Hood, where she was stabbed multiple times and sexually assaulted by an unknown assailant. The investigation initially went cold after DNA collected at the scene did not match any suspects. Nearly two decades later, forensic genetic genealogy linked the DNA to Allen James, who had been stationed at Fort Hood and matched the description of the attacker. He was indicted and ultimately convicted by a jury for attempted murder based on DNA evidence and M.M.&#039;s testimony.

Proceedings in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas resulted in James&#039;s conviction for attempted murder. At sentencing, the district court used the 2023 Sentencing Guidelines Manual, which prescribed a higher advisory range than the 1998 Manual that was in effect when the offense occurred. James was sentenced to 200 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. He appealed, arguing insufficient evidence of intent to kill, erroneous jury instructions regarding intent, and a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause due to use of the later Guidelines Manual.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court held that the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find specific intent to kill, and the jury instructions, while imperfect, did not constitute reversible error because any defect was invited by James’s own proposed language and did not result in manifest injustice. However, the court found plain error in the district court’s application of the later Guidelines Manual, in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause, as this resulted in a higher sentencing range. The Fifth Circuit affirmed James’s conviction, vacated his sentence, and remanded for resentencing under the correct Guidelines Manual. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50144/25-50144-2026-06-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. James" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In June 2000, a woman identified as M.M. was attacked in her barracks at Fort Hood, where she was stabbed multiple times and sexually assaulted by an unknown assailant. The investigation initially went cold after DNA collected at the scene did not match any suspects. Nearly two decades later, forensic genetic genealogy linked the DNA to Allen James, who had been stationed at Fort Hood and matched the description of the attacker. He was indicted and ultimately convicted by a jury for attempted murder based on DNA evidence and M.M.&#039;s testimony.

Proceedings in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas resulted in James&#039;s conviction for attempted murder. At sentencing, the district court used the 2023 Sentencing Guidelines Manual, which prescribed a higher advisory range than the 1998 Manual that was in effect when the offense occurred. James was sentenced to 200 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. He appealed, arguing insufficient evidence of intent to kill, erroneous jury instructions regarding intent, and a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause due to use of the later Guidelines Manual.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court held that the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find specific intent to kill, and the jury instructions, while imperfect, did not constitute reversible error because any defect was invited by James’s own proposed language and did not result in manifest injustice. However, the court found plain error in the district court’s application of the later Guidelines Manual, in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause, as this resulted in a higher sentencing range. The Fifth Circuit affirmed James’s conviction, vacated his sentence, and remanded for resentencing under the correct Guidelines Manual.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Don Willett</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30449/25-30449-2026-06-02.html</id>
        	<title>Herbert v. St. James Parish School Bd</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-02T15:31:46-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-02T15:31:46-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30449/25-30449-2026-06-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A mother sought to enroll her disabled child, D.H., in a public Montessori academy operated by a school board in St. James Parish, Louisiana. The school board’s policy required both the child and parent to reside in the parish for enrollment eligibility. Although the mother initially provided an affidavit stating both she and D.H. lived in St. James Parish, it was later discovered that she resided in neighboring St. John the Baptist Parish. After confirming this, the school board disenrolled D.H., citing violation of its residency requirement.

The mother filed administrative requests with the Louisiana Department of Education, seeking a due process hearing, a “stay-put” order to keep D.H. enrolled during proceedings, and an independent educational evaluation. The administrative law judge granted a temporary stay-put order but, after an evidentiary hearing, determined D.H. was not a resident of St. James Parish and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The mother then brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and requested reversal of the residency finding, reinstatement of the stay-put order, and compensatory education. The district court denied her preliminary injunction, dismissed her claims with prejudice, and held that she failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fifth Circuit held that the school board was not obligated to provide a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to D.H. because residency was an essential eligibility requirement under both Louisiana and federal law. The court also found that the mother’s claims of disability discrimination and requests for equitable remedies lacked sufficient factual support. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30449/25-30449-2026-06-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Herbert v. St. James Parish School Bd" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A mother sought to enroll her disabled child, D.H., in a public Montessori academy operated by a school board in St. James Parish, Louisiana. The school board’s policy required both the child and parent to reside in the parish for enrollment eligibility. Although the mother initially provided an affidavit stating both she and D.H. lived in St. James Parish, it was later discovered that she resided in neighboring St. John the Baptist Parish. After confirming this, the school board disenrolled D.H., citing violation of its residency requirement.

The mother filed administrative requests with the Louisiana Department of Education, seeking a due process hearing, a “stay-put” order to keep D.H. enrolled during proceedings, and an independent educational evaluation. The administrative law judge granted a temporary stay-put order but, after an evidentiary hearing, determined D.H. was not a resident of St. James Parish and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The mother then brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and requested reversal of the residency finding, reinstatement of the stay-put order, and compensatory education. The district court denied her preliminary injunction, dismissed her claims with prejudice, and held that she failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fifth Circuit held that the school board was not obligated to provide a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to D.H. because residency was an essential eligibility requirement under both Louisiana and federal law. The court also found that the mother’s claims of disability discrimination and requests for equitable remedies lacked sufficient factual support.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Carl Stewart</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Education Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30324/25-30324-2026-06-02.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Squire</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-02T15:31:46-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-02T15:31:46-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30324/25-30324-2026-06-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Curtis Squire was indicted on a federal charge for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon after police found a handgun in his home during a search related to a shooting investigation. Although the firearm was not linked to the shooting and state charges were dropped, Squire was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) due to his prior felony convictions, which included drug trafficking, firearm offenses, obstruction of justice, burglary, and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana denied Squire’s motion to dismiss the indictment. Squire’s motion argued, among other things, that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to him under the Second Amendment, particularly following New York State Rifle &amp; Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi. He contended that his right to possess a firearm in his home was protected by historical tradition. After the denial, Squire pleaded guilty without a plea agreement and was sentenced to fifty-two months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. He preserved his right to appeal and timely did so.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and considered whether the Second Amendment protects a convicted drug trafficker from being dispossessed of a firearm in his home. The court held that, in light of historical tradition and its own precedent, Congress may disarm individuals convicted of dangerous offenses like drug trafficking, even within the home. The court clarified that this holding is narrow and does not address whether Congress may disarm individuals in the home based on non-dangerous convictions. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30324/25-30324-2026-06-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Squire" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Curtis Squire was indicted on a federal charge for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon after police found a handgun in his home during a search related to a shooting investigation. Although the firearm was not linked to the shooting and state charges were dropped, Squire was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) due to his prior felony convictions, which included drug trafficking, firearm offenses, obstruction of justice, burglary, and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana denied Squire’s motion to dismiss the indictment. Squire’s motion argued, among other things, that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to him under the Second Amendment, particularly following New York State Rifle &amp; Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi. He contended that his right to possess a firearm in his home was protected by historical tradition. After the denial, Squire pleaded guilty without a plea agreement and was sentenced to fifty-two months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. He preserved his right to appeal and timely did so.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and considered whether the Second Amendment protects a convicted drug trafficker from being dispossessed of a firearm in his home. The court held that, in light of historical tradition and its own precedent, Congress may disarm individuals convicted of dangerous offenses like drug trafficking, even within the home. The court clarified that this holding is narrow and does not address whether Congress may disarm individuals in the home based on non-dangerous convictions. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Edith Clement</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10982/25-10982-2026-06-01.html</id>
        	<title>Bravo v. Dallas ISD</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-01T15:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-01T15:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10982/25-10982-2026-06-01.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Joe Bravo, a Mexican-American teacher, was terminated by the Dallas Independent School District after six students reported that he made racially insensitive remarks in the classroom. Bravo filed suit, alleging that his dismissal constituted unlawful employment discrimination based on his ancestry, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of the Dallas Independent School District. The court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework and found that Bravo failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he did not present evidence of a similarly situated employee outside his protected class who was treated more favorably under nearly identical circumstances. The district court concluded that, without such comparator evidence, Bravo could not proceed with his claim.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Bravo contended that a recent Supreme Court decision, Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, had effectively overruled the Fifth Circuit’s requirement that plaintiffs show a similarly situated comparator to establish a prima facie case. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, holding that Ames did not clearly abrogate its precedent and that its flexible comparator standard remained binding. The appellate court concluded that, because Bravo failed to offer evidence of a similarly situated comparator, he did not meet the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas framework. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the Dallas Independent School District. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10982/25-10982-2026-06-01.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Bravo v. Dallas ISD" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Joe Bravo, a Mexican-American teacher, was terminated by the Dallas Independent School District after six students reported that he made racially insensitive remarks in the classroom. Bravo filed suit, alleging that his dismissal constituted unlawful employment discrimination based on his ancestry, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of the Dallas Independent School District. The court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework and found that Bravo failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he did not present evidence of a similarly situated employee outside his protected class who was treated more favorably under nearly identical circumstances. The district court concluded that, without such comparator evidence, Bravo could not proceed with his claim.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Bravo contended that a recent Supreme Court decision, Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, had effectively overruled the Fifth Circuit’s requirement that plaintiffs show a similarly situated comparator to establish a prima facie case. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, holding that Ames did not clearly abrogate its precedent and that its flexible comparator standard remained binding. The appellate court concluded that, because Bravo failed to offer evidence of a similarly situated comparator, he did not meet the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas framework. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the Dallas Independent School District.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James Graves</case:judge>
													<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50049/25-50049-2026-06-01.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Filline</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-01T09:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-01T09:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50049/25-50049-2026-06-01.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves Christopher Filline, who was the police chief of Castroville, Texas. In 2016, Filline’s wife’s Lincoln Navigator was found burned on a remote road. Filline later reported the vehicle stolen and submitted an insurance claim to Farmers Insurance Group, which paid out on the policy. The government alleged that Filline, facing significant financial difficulties, orchestrated the destruction of the Navigator to fraudulently obtain insurance proceeds. Evidence at trial showed Filline discussed his financial problems openly and repeatedly expressed a desire to “get rid of” the vehicle. He recruited an animal-control officer, Rymers, who then enlisted his cousin Hernandez, known for a criminal background, to burn the vehicle in exchange for no payment. The scheme involved staging the car with keys accessible, burning it, and then filing a false theft report and insurance claim.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas presided over the trial. A jury found Filline guilty of conspiracy to commit wire fraud. Filline twice moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing the government failed to prove an agreement—an essential element of conspiracy—but the district court denied these motions. The court sentenced Filline to probation, a fine, and restitution. Filline appealed, contesting only the sufficiency of evidence regarding the existence of a conspiratorial agreement.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The Fifth Circuit applied a de novo standard, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. It held that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Filline and at least one other person agreed to pursue the fraudulent objective. The court affirmed Filline’s conviction. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50049/25-50049-2026-06-01.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Filline" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves Christopher Filline, who was the police chief of Castroville, Texas. In 2016, Filline’s wife’s Lincoln Navigator was found burned on a remote road. Filline later reported the vehicle stolen and submitted an insurance claim to Farmers Insurance Group, which paid out on the policy. The government alleged that Filline, facing significant financial difficulties, orchestrated the destruction of the Navigator to fraudulently obtain insurance proceeds. Evidence at trial showed Filline discussed his financial problems openly and repeatedly expressed a desire to “get rid of” the vehicle. He recruited an animal-control officer, Rymers, who then enlisted his cousin Hernandez, known for a criminal background, to burn the vehicle in exchange for no payment. The scheme involved staging the car with keys accessible, burning it, and then filing a false theft report and insurance claim.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas presided over the trial. A jury found Filline guilty of conspiracy to commit wire fraud. Filline twice moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing the government failed to prove an agreement—an essential element of conspiracy—but the district court denied these motions. The court sentenced Filline to probation, a fine, and restitution. Filline appealed, contesting only the sufficiency of evidence regarding the existence of a conspiratorial agreement.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The Fifth Circuit applied a de novo standard, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. It held that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Filline and at least one other person agreed to pursue the fraudulent objective. The court affirmed Filline’s conviction.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Don Willett</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Insurance Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30067/25-30067-2026-05-28.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Phillips</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-28T15:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-28T15:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30067/25-30067-2026-05-28.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Federal agents suspected an individual of marijuana trafficking and coordinated with local law enforcement to stop his vehicle. Instead of complying, the individual led police on a high-speed chase, reaching speeds over 135 miles per hour and striking another vehicle before being apprehended. He was subsequently indicted and pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute marijuana.

During sentencing in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, the defendant argued that he qualified for the “safety valve” exception under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), which allows certain nonviolent drug offenders to avoid statutory minimum sentences if they meet specific criteria, including not having used violence or credible threats of violence in connection with the offense. The district court imposed a 60-month sentence, reflecting the statutory minimum, but initially did not explain its reasoning for denying safety valve relief. On a limited remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the district court clarified that denial was based on its finding that the defendant’s high-speed flight from police, including striking another vehicle, constituted the “use of violence” under § 3553(f)(2).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s legal interpretation de novo and its factual findings for clear error. The appellate court agreed with the district court that leading police on a dangerous high-speed chase and colliding with another vehicle amounted to “use of violence” within the meaning of the statute. As a result, the defendant was ineligible for safety valve relief. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the safety valve and upheld the 60-month sentence. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30067/25-30067-2026-05-28.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Phillips" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Federal agents suspected an individual of marijuana trafficking and coordinated with local law enforcement to stop his vehicle. Instead of complying, the individual led police on a high-speed chase, reaching speeds over 135 miles per hour and striking another vehicle before being apprehended. He was subsequently indicted and pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute marijuana.

During sentencing in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, the defendant argued that he qualified for the “safety valve” exception under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), which allows certain nonviolent drug offenders to avoid statutory minimum sentences if they meet specific criteria, including not having used violence or credible threats of violence in connection with the offense. The district court imposed a 60-month sentence, reflecting the statutory minimum, but initially did not explain its reasoning for denying safety valve relief. On a limited remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the district court clarified that denial was based on its finding that the defendant’s high-speed flight from police, including striking another vehicle, constituted the “use of violence” under § 3553(f)(2).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s legal interpretation de novo and its factual findings for clear error. The appellate court agreed with the district court that leading police on a dangerous high-speed chase and colliding with another vehicle amounted to “use of violence” within the meaning of the statute. As a result, the defendant was ineligible for safety valve relief. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the safety valve and upheld the 60-month sentence.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-28</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Cory Wilson</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10690/25-10690-2026-05-26-0.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Hackney</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-26T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-26T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10690/25-10690-2026-05-26-0.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant pleaded guilty to charges of producing and transporting child pornography under federal statutes. As part of a plea agreement, he waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence, with an exception allowing an appeal if his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum punishment. The presentence report recommended a lengthy prison term and a life term of supervised release, including specific conditions such as prohibiting contact with minors and requiring full disclosure of financial information. The district court adopted these recommendations and sentenced him to 50 years in prison and 15 years of supervised release with the specified conditions. The defendant did not object to these conditions at sentencing.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas imposed the sentence. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the defendant challenged the supervised release conditions, arguing they violated the statutory requirements under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and thus resulted in a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum punishment as contemplated by his plea agreement exception.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the appeal waiver in the plea agreement barred the defendant’s appeal. The court held that the exception for a sentence “exceeding the statutory maximum punishment” refers only to the quantitative aspects of a sentence—such as the length of imprisonment or supervised release—not the qualitative conditions imposed. The court determined that challenges to the reasonableness of supervised release conditions under § 3583(d) do not fall within the statutory maximum exception. Thus, the defendant’s waiver barred his appeal, and the court dismissed it. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10690/25-10690-2026-05-26-0.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Hackney" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant pleaded guilty to charges of producing and transporting child pornography under federal statutes. As part of a plea agreement, he waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence, with an exception allowing an appeal if his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum punishment. The presentence report recommended a lengthy prison term and a life term of supervised release, including specific conditions such as prohibiting contact with minors and requiring full disclosure of financial information. The district court adopted these recommendations and sentenced him to 50 years in prison and 15 years of supervised release with the specified conditions. The defendant did not object to these conditions at sentencing.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas imposed the sentence. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the defendant challenged the supervised release conditions, arguing they violated the statutory requirements under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and thus resulted in a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum punishment as contemplated by his plea agreement exception.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the appeal waiver in the plea agreement barred the defendant’s appeal. The court held that the exception for a sentence “exceeding the statutory maximum punishment” refers only to the quantitative aspects of a sentence—such as the length of imprisonment or supervised release—not the qualitative conditions imposed. The court determined that challenges to the reasonableness of supervised release conditions under § 3583(d) do not fall within the statutory maximum exception. Thus, the defendant’s waiver barred his appeal, and the court dismissed it.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11254/25-11254-2026-05-22.html</id>
        	<title>Ryan v. USA</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-22T15:30:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-22T15:30:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11254/25-11254-2026-05-22.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Two major airline crashes in 2018 and 2019 involving Boeing 737 MAX aircraft led to the deaths of hundreds of passengers and crew. Investigations revealed that Boeing had concealed important safety information about modifications to the planes’ flight control system, contributing to the crashes. The Department of Justice (DOJ) charged Boeing with conspiracy to defraud the United States but later entered a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) in 2021, requiring Boeing to pay significant penalties and undertake compliance measures. After Boeing allegedly breached the DPA, the DOJ pursued a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) in 2025, again imposing penalties and compliance obligations in exchange for dismissing the criminal charge. Family members of crash victims challenged both agreements, asserting violations of their rights under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA).

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas found that while the DOJ had originally failed to confer with families before the 2021 DPA due to a legal error, there was no bad faith, and the court lacked authority to modify or review the substance of the DPA or NPA. The district court later granted the DOJ’s motion to dismiss the prosecution against Boeing after the NPA, finding the DOJ’s actions were not in bad faith and were adequately explained.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the families’ challenge to the 2021 DPA was moot since the agreement was no longer in effect after Boeing’s breach. Addressing the NPA, the Fifth Circuit concluded the DOJ had fulfilled its obligation to confer with the families and had not misled them. The court also determined it lacked jurisdiction under the CVRA to substantively review the district court’s dismissal of the prosecution. The petitions for writ of mandamus were denied. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11254/25-11254-2026-05-22.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Ryan v. USA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Two major airline crashes in 2018 and 2019 involving Boeing 737 MAX aircraft led to the deaths of hundreds of passengers and crew. Investigations revealed that Boeing had concealed important safety information about modifications to the planes’ flight control system, contributing to the crashes. The Department of Justice (DOJ) charged Boeing with conspiracy to defraud the United States but later entered a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) in 2021, requiring Boeing to pay significant penalties and undertake compliance measures. After Boeing allegedly breached the DPA, the DOJ pursued a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) in 2025, again imposing penalties and compliance obligations in exchange for dismissing the criminal charge. Family members of crash victims challenged both agreements, asserting violations of their rights under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA).

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas found that while the DOJ had originally failed to confer with families before the 2021 DPA due to a legal error, there was no bad faith, and the court lacked authority to modify or review the substance of the DPA or NPA. The district court later granted the DOJ’s motion to dismiss the prosecution against Boeing after the NPA, finding the DOJ’s actions were not in bad faith and were adequately explained.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the families’ challenge to the 2021 DPA was moot since the agreement was no longer in effect after Boeing’s breach. Addressing the NPA, the Fifth Circuit concluded the DOJ had fulfilled its obligation to confer with the families and had not misled them. The court also determined it lacked jurisdiction under the CVRA to substantively review the district court’s dismissal of the prosecution. The petitions for writ of mandamus were denied.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-22</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20339/25-20339-2026-05-18.html</id>
        	<title>Cortez v. Rubio</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-18T15:30:32-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-18T15:30:32-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20339/25-20339-2026-05-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The plaintiff claimed he was born in Laredo, Texas, and used a U.S. passport for travel. After reporting his passport stolen in Mexico and later recovering it, he attempted to re-enter the United States, where the passport was retained. Over the following years, he submitted four separate passport applications, each denied by the Department of State. The agency cited concerns including a birth certificate filed by a birth attendant suspected of submitting false records, the existence of a conflicting Mexican birth certificate, and insufficient early life documentation to prove a U.S. birthplace. The plaintiff failed to provide requested records or adequate explanations for the discrepancies.

After the repeated denials, the plaintiff petitioned the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas for a writ of mandamus and declaratory relief, asserting claims under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Mandamus Act, and constitutional provisions. The district court granted the defendant&#039;s motion to dismiss, finding the claims time-barred, jurisdictionally barred, or insufficiently pleaded.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court held that the plaintiff’s claim under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) was untimely, as it was not brought within five years of the first final administrative denial, and equitable tolling was not warranted. The court affirmed that the APA and Mandamus Act claims were jurisdictionally barred because § 1503(a) provides an adequate remedy, regardless of whether the plaintiff timely pursued it. The court also held that the constitutional claims failed to state a claim, as no independent constitutional right to the relief sought existed beyond the statutory remedy. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20339/25-20339-2026-05-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Cortez v. Rubio" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The plaintiff claimed he was born in Laredo, Texas, and used a U.S. passport for travel. After reporting his passport stolen in Mexico and later recovering it, he attempted to re-enter the United States, where the passport was retained. Over the following years, he submitted four separate passport applications, each denied by the Department of State. The agency cited concerns including a birth certificate filed by a birth attendant suspected of submitting false records, the existence of a conflicting Mexican birth certificate, and insufficient early life documentation to prove a U.S. birthplace. The plaintiff failed to provide requested records or adequate explanations for the discrepancies.

After the repeated denials, the plaintiff petitioned the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas for a writ of mandamus and declaratory relief, asserting claims under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Mandamus Act, and constitutional provisions. The district court granted the defendant&#039;s motion to dismiss, finding the claims time-barred, jurisdictionally barred, or insufficiently pleaded.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court held that the plaintiff’s claim under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) was untimely, as it was not brought within five years of the first final administrative denial, and equitable tolling was not warranted. The court affirmed that the APA and Mandamus Act claims were jurisdictionally barred because § 1503(a) provides an adequate remedy, regardless of whether the plaintiff timely pursued it. The court also held that the constitutional claims failed to state a claim, as no independent constitutional right to the relief sought existed beyond the statutory remedy. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all claims.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Immigration Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40576/24-40576-2026-05-18.html</id>
        	<title>Morris v. USA</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-18T09:30:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-18T09:30:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40576/24-40576-2026-05-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The plaintiff was violently attacked by her ex-boyfriend, who was on federal supervised release at the time. Prior to the attack, the plaintiff informed the supervising probation officer of specific threats made against her and was assured that steps would be taken to protect her, including issuing an arrest warrant. Despite these promises, the officer failed to take urgent action or communicate the immediate danger to the court or law enforcement. Days later, the ex-boyfriend assaulted the plaintiff, causing severe injuries.

In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, the plaintiff brought claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) alleging negligence and negligent undertaking by the United States. The government moved to dismiss, asserting the FTCA’s misrepresentation and discretionary function exceptions deprived the court of jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion, holding that the misrepresentation exception applied because the officer’s promises were central to the plaintiff’s claims. The court did not address the discretionary function exception.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s claims for negligent failure to protect were not barred by the misrepresentation exception, as the essence of the claims concerned operational negligence rather than faulty communication. The court also held that the discretionary function exception did not apply, finding that after the officer made the discretionary decision to seek an expedited warrant, subsequent failures to act were not susceptible to policy analysis and were not shielded by the exception.

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the plaintiff’s claims for negligence and negligent undertaking to move forward. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40576/24-40576-2026-05-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Morris v. USA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The plaintiff was violently attacked by her ex-boyfriend, who was on federal supervised release at the time. Prior to the attack, the plaintiff informed the supervising probation officer of specific threats made against her and was assured that steps would be taken to protect her, including issuing an arrest warrant. Despite these promises, the officer failed to take urgent action or communicate the immediate danger to the court or law enforcement. Days later, the ex-boyfriend assaulted the plaintiff, causing severe injuries.

In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, the plaintiff brought claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) alleging negligence and negligent undertaking by the United States. The government moved to dismiss, asserting the FTCA’s misrepresentation and discretionary function exceptions deprived the court of jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion, holding that the misrepresentation exception applied because the officer’s promises were central to the plaintiff’s claims. The court did not address the discretionary function exception.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s claims for negligent failure to protect were not barred by the misrepresentation exception, as the essence of the claims concerned operational negligence rather than faulty communication. The court also held that the discretionary function exception did not apply, finding that after the officer made the discretionary decision to seek an expedited warrant, subsequent failures to act were not susceptible to policy analysis and were not shielded by the exception.

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the plaintiff’s claims for negligence and negligent undertaking to move forward.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leslie Southwick</case:judge>
													<category term="Personal Injury"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40364/25-40364-2026-05-15.html</id>
        	<title>Moreau v. White</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-15T09:30:32-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-15T09:30:32-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40364/25-40364-2026-05-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case centers on a protracted child custody dispute between two parents, one residing in Canada and the other in Texas. After their separation, the mother relocated to Canada with the children, initially under a Texas court order allowing her to determine their residence without geographic restriction. Over several years, both parents engaged in parallel legal proceedings in Texas and Canada, with each court issuing conflicting orders regarding custody and the children’s primary residence. The father later retained the children in Texas, prompting the mother to file a federal petition under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, alleging wrongful retention in violation of her Canadian custody rights.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas conducted a bench trial. It found the children’s habitual residence was Canada, based on their long-term integration there, and concluded the father&#039;s retention in Texas was wrongful under the Hague Convention. The district court ordered the children’s return to Canada and rejected three defenses: consent, age and maturity, and judicial estoppel. Subsequently, as the father continued custody litigation in Texas, the district court issued a preliminary injunction barring him and two Texas judges from further proceedings and directed that the Canadian courts should resolve custody.

Reviewing the appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision ordering the children’s return to Canada, holding that the children were habitually resident in Canada and the retention in Texas violated the mother’s rights of custody under Canadian law. The appellate court also ruled that the defenses raised by the father did not bar the return remedy. However, it vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction, finding it improper to enjoin state and foreign courts from adjudicating custody. Thus, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the return order but vacated the injunctions restricting proceedings in Texas and Canada. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40364/25-40364-2026-05-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Moreau v. White" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case centers on a protracted child custody dispute between two parents, one residing in Canada and the other in Texas. After their separation, the mother relocated to Canada with the children, initially under a Texas court order allowing her to determine their residence without geographic restriction. Over several years, both parents engaged in parallel legal proceedings in Texas and Canada, with each court issuing conflicting orders regarding custody and the children’s primary residence. The father later retained the children in Texas, prompting the mother to file a federal petition under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, alleging wrongful retention in violation of her Canadian custody rights.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas conducted a bench trial. It found the children’s habitual residence was Canada, based on their long-term integration there, and concluded the father&#039;s retention in Texas was wrongful under the Hague Convention. The district court ordered the children’s return to Canada and rejected three defenses: consent, age and maturity, and judicial estoppel. Subsequently, as the father continued custody litigation in Texas, the district court issued a preliminary injunction barring him and two Texas judges from further proceedings and directed that the Canadian courts should resolve custody.

Reviewing the appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision ordering the children’s return to Canada, holding that the children were habitually resident in Canada and the retention in Texas violated the mother’s rights of custody under Canadian law. The appellate court also ruled that the defenses raised by the father did not bar the return remedy. However, it vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction, finding it improper to enjoin state and foreign courts from adjudicating custody. Thus, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the return order but vacated the injunctions restricting proceedings in Texas and Canada.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kurt Engelhardt</case:judge>
													<category term="Family Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20002/25-20002-2026-05-15.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Kuyoro</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-15T09:30:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-15T09:30:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20002/25-20002-2026-05-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		After Hurricane Harvey in 2017, an individual applied for disaster relief from FEMA, claiming her Houston residence was damaged and providing supporting documentation for her claim, such as hotel receipts, utility bills, and repair estimates. FEMA awarded her approximately $33,000. Later, federal authorities investigated and alleged that the application was fraudulent, asserting that the listed residence did not exist as described, the applicant never lived in Houston, and the supporting documents were fabricated.

The United States charged the applicant with disaster relief fraud and wire fraud in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. During trial, the government revealed late disclosures of two items: civil recoupment letters sent to the defendant in 2020 and an email to a third-party contractor who had supposedly inspected the property. The defense argued these late disclosures violated the government&#039;s obligations under Brady v. Maryland. The district court ultimately dismissed the indictment without prejudice, citing its supervisory powers and referencing concerns over discovery violations in this and other recent cases before it, despite finding no intentional misconduct by prosecutors.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred in dismissing the indictment. The appellate court held there was no Brady violation because the defense failed to show prejudice from the late-disclosed evidence, and the information could have been obtained through reasonable diligence. The court further found that, even assuming a Rule 16 violation, the district court had not properly considered the required factors or imposed the least severe sanction. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the indictment and therefore reversed the dismissal order, remanding with instructions to reinstate the indictment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20002/25-20002-2026-05-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Kuyoro" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                After Hurricane Harvey in 2017, an individual applied for disaster relief from FEMA, claiming her Houston residence was damaged and providing supporting documentation for her claim, such as hotel receipts, utility bills, and repair estimates. FEMA awarded her approximately $33,000. Later, federal authorities investigated and alleged that the application was fraudulent, asserting that the listed residence did not exist as described, the applicant never lived in Houston, and the supporting documents were fabricated.

The United States charged the applicant with disaster relief fraud and wire fraud in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. During trial, the government revealed late disclosures of two items: civil recoupment letters sent to the defendant in 2020 and an email to a third-party contractor who had supposedly inspected the property. The defense argued these late disclosures violated the government&#039;s obligations under Brady v. Maryland. The district court ultimately dismissed the indictment without prejudice, citing its supervisory powers and referencing concerns over discovery violations in this and other recent cases before it, despite finding no intentional misconduct by prosecutors.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred in dismissing the indictment. The appellate court held there was no Brady violation because the defense failed to show prejudice from the late-disclosed evidence, and the information could have been obtained through reasonable diligence. The court further found that, even assuming a Rule 16 violation, the district court had not properly considered the required factors or imposed the least severe sanction. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the indictment and therefore reversed the dismissal order, remanding with instructions to reinstate the indictment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10606/25-10606-2026-05-14.html</id>
        	<title>Arzu v. American Airlines</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-14T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-14T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10606/25-10606-2026-05-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A 14-year-old passenger, Kevin Greenidge, died from cardiac arrest aboard an American Airlines international flight from Honduras to Florida. Kevin, who suffered from multiple health conditions, began experiencing breathing difficulties soon after takeoff. Despite the crew’s efforts and the assistance of two medical professionals on board, Kevin did not survive. During the resuscitation attempt, there was a dispute about whether the aircraft’s automated external defibrillator (AED) functioned properly, as several witnesses reported it failed to deliver a shock, despite internal device data indicating otherwise.

Following Kevin’s death, his aunt, Melissa Arzu, acting individually and as administrator of his estate, filed suit against American Airlines in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. She alleged liability and loss of consortium under the Montreal Convention and breach of contract under Texas law. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of American Airlines on all claims, finding that the alleged deviations from airline policy and medical response did not constitute an “accident” under Article 17 of the Montreal Convention.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed summary judgment on the claims based on the crew’s allegedly ineffective medical response, holding that such a response does not amount to an “accident” under Article 17 without unusual circumstances or willful inaction. However, the court reversed summary judgment on the claims premised on the AED malfunction, finding that a genuine dispute remained as to whether the AED’s failure, in violation of FAA regulations, could be considered an “unexpected or unusual event.” The court also held that the Montreal Convention expressly preempts Arzu’s breach of contract claim. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10606/25-10606-2026-05-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Arzu v. American Airlines" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A 14-year-old passenger, Kevin Greenidge, died from cardiac arrest aboard an American Airlines international flight from Honduras to Florida. Kevin, who suffered from multiple health conditions, began experiencing breathing difficulties soon after takeoff. Despite the crew’s efforts and the assistance of two medical professionals on board, Kevin did not survive. During the resuscitation attempt, there was a dispute about whether the aircraft’s automated external defibrillator (AED) functioned properly, as several witnesses reported it failed to deliver a shock, despite internal device data indicating otherwise.

Following Kevin’s death, his aunt, Melissa Arzu, acting individually and as administrator of his estate, filed suit against American Airlines in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. She alleged liability and loss of consortium under the Montreal Convention and breach of contract under Texas law. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of American Airlines on all claims, finding that the alleged deviations from airline policy and medical response did not constitute an “accident” under Article 17 of the Montreal Convention.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed summary judgment on the claims based on the crew’s allegedly ineffective medical response, holding that such a response does not amount to an “accident” under Article 17 without unusual circumstances or willful inaction. However, the court reversed summary judgment on the claims premised on the AED malfunction, finding that a genuine dispute remained as to whether the AED’s failure, in violation of FAA regulations, could be considered an “unexpected or unusual event.” The court also held that the Montreal Convention expressly preempts Arzu’s breach of contract claim.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James Graves</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Personal Injury"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60649/24-60649-2026-05-14.html</id>
        	<title>Starbucks v. NLRB</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-14T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-14T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60649/24-60649-2026-05-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In this case, employees at two Starbucks locations in upstate New York initiated unionization efforts. At the Latham store, a shift supervisor and union organizer named James Schenk was terminated following several infractions, including using extreme profanity about a coworker in a group chat, failing to complete all tasks during a shift, and opening a letter addressed to Starbucks. At the Stuyvesant store, the district manager significantly increased her presence during the union campaign, which employees argued created an impression of surveillance.

An Administrative Law Judge found that Starbucks did not violate the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by terminating Schenk at the Latham store, but determined that the district manager&#039;s actions at the Stuyvesant store did unlawfully create the impression of surveillance. The National Labor Relations Board agreed regarding the Stuyvesant store but reversed the ALJ as to the Latham store, concluding that Schenk would not have been disciplined or terminated but for his union activity. Starbucks petitioned for review, and the Board sought enforcement of its order in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Board failed to adequately consider contradictory evidence, including whether Schenk&#039;s misconduct was sufficiently distinct from other employees&#039; behavior and whether his opening of official mail was treated differently for a legitimate reason. The court found the Board’s reasoning insufficient and vacated the Board’s decision regarding Schenk’s termination, remanding the case for further proceedings. The petition for review was granted, and the case was remanded to the Board for further consideration consistent with the court’s opinion. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60649/24-60649-2026-05-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Starbucks v. NLRB" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In this case, employees at two Starbucks locations in upstate New York initiated unionization efforts. At the Latham store, a shift supervisor and union organizer named James Schenk was terminated following several infractions, including using extreme profanity about a coworker in a group chat, failing to complete all tasks during a shift, and opening a letter addressed to Starbucks. At the Stuyvesant store, the district manager significantly increased her presence during the union campaign, which employees argued created an impression of surveillance.

An Administrative Law Judge found that Starbucks did not violate the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by terminating Schenk at the Latham store, but determined that the district manager&#039;s actions at the Stuyvesant store did unlawfully create the impression of surveillance. The National Labor Relations Board agreed regarding the Stuyvesant store but reversed the ALJ as to the Latham store, concluding that Schenk would not have been disciplined or terminated but for his union activity. Starbucks petitioned for review, and the Board sought enforcement of its order in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Board failed to adequately consider contradictory evidence, including whether Schenk&#039;s misconduct was sufficiently distinct from other employees&#039; behavior and whether his opening of official mail was treated differently for a legitimate reason. The court found the Board’s reasoning insufficient and vacated the Board’s decision regarding Schenk’s termination, remanding the case for further proceedings. The petition for review was granted, and the case was remanded to the Board for further consideration consistent with the court’s opinion.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James Graves</case:judge>
													<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30392/25-30392-2026-05-08.html</id>
        	<title>Hayes v. GStek</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-08T09:30:27-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-08T09:30:27-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30392/25-30392-2026-05-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Albert Hayes worked as an IT systems administrator for GStek, Inc., a contractor providing services for the U.S. Army at Fort Polk. After the COVID-19 pandemic, Hayes was required to return to in-person work. He subsequently received diagnoses of Autism, Major Depressive Disorder, and Social Anxiety Disorder. Hayes requested permission to telework as a reasonable accommodation for his disabilities. The Army, which controlled conditions for contractors at Fort Polk, determined that full-time telework was not in its best interests and denied the request. GStek allowed Hayes to telework two to three days per week, but after a mental health crisis and continued absenteeism, Hayes was terminated.

Hayes pursued administrative remedies against the Army under the Rehabilitation Act, but his claims were dismissed because he was not an Army employee and had not timely pursued administrative procedures. He did not appeal that dismissal. Hayes then filed a charge of discrimination against GStek with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and, after receiving a right-to-sue notice, sued GStek in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, bringing claims for failure-to-accommodate, disability discrimination, and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court granted GStek’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that Hayes received a reasonable accommodation, was not a qualified individual under the ADA, and failed to establish prima facie cases for discrimination or retaliation.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that in-person attendance was an essential function of Hayes’s job and telework was not a reasonable accommodation under the circumstances. Hayes was not a qualified individual because he could not perform the essential functions of his position, even with accommodations. As a result, his claims for failure-to-accommodate, discrimination, and retaliation under the ADA all failed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30392/25-30392-2026-05-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Hayes v. GStek" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Albert Hayes worked as an IT systems administrator for GStek, Inc., a contractor providing services for the U.S. Army at Fort Polk. After the COVID-19 pandemic, Hayes was required to return to in-person work. He subsequently received diagnoses of Autism, Major Depressive Disorder, and Social Anxiety Disorder. Hayes requested permission to telework as a reasonable accommodation for his disabilities. The Army, which controlled conditions for contractors at Fort Polk, determined that full-time telework was not in its best interests and denied the request. GStek allowed Hayes to telework two to three days per week, but after a mental health crisis and continued absenteeism, Hayes was terminated.

Hayes pursued administrative remedies against the Army under the Rehabilitation Act, but his claims were dismissed because he was not an Army employee and had not timely pursued administrative procedures. He did not appeal that dismissal. Hayes then filed a charge of discrimination against GStek with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and, after receiving a right-to-sue notice, sued GStek in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, bringing claims for failure-to-accommodate, disability discrimination, and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court granted GStek’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that Hayes received a reasonable accommodation, was not a qualified individual under the ADA, and failed to establish prima facie cases for discrimination or retaliation.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that in-person attendance was an essential function of Hayes’s job and telework was not a reasonable accommodation under the circumstances. Hayes was not a qualified individual because he could not perform the essential functions of his position, even with accommodations. As a result, his claims for failure-to-accommodate, discrimination, and retaliation under the ADA all failed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Edith Jones</case:judge>
													<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20243/25-20243-2026-05-08.html</id>
        	<title>Trojan Battery v. Golf Carts of Cypress</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-08T09:30:26-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-08T09:30:26-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20243/25-20243-2026-05-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Trojan Battery, a well-established manufacturer of golf cart batteries with valuable trademark rights in the “TROJAN” name and related marks, sued Golf Carts of Cypress and Trojan EV. The defendants, owned by the same individual, began selling golf carts under the “TROJAN-EV” brand, which led to alleged confusion among dealers and customers about the origin or affiliation of the products. Trojan Battery sent a cease-and-desist letter, but the defendants continued their use of the TROJAN-EV mark. The evidence showed that both companies operated within the golf industry, used similar advertising channels, and targeted the same customer base.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas held a bench trial. The district court found the defendants liable for trademark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act and Texas law, based on a likelihood of confusion between the marks. The court awarded Trojan Battery the defendants’ profits as a remedy and issued a permanent injunction against further infringement. The district court also rejected the defendants’ post-trial motions and denied their request to amend the findings of fact and conclusions of law. Defendants appealed these rulings.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s liability judgment and the award of profits, finding no clear error in the determination that there was a likelihood of confusion and that disgorgement of profits was warranted. However, the appellate court vacated the permanent injunction, holding that it was overbroad because it extended beyond the golf cart and battery markets, where confusion was likely, to unrelated products and markets. The case was remanded for the district court to narrow the scope of the injunction. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20243/25-20243-2026-05-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Trojan Battery v. Golf Carts of Cypress" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Trojan Battery, a well-established manufacturer of golf cart batteries with valuable trademark rights in the “TROJAN” name and related marks, sued Golf Carts of Cypress and Trojan EV. The defendants, owned by the same individual, began selling golf carts under the “TROJAN-EV” brand, which led to alleged confusion among dealers and customers about the origin or affiliation of the products. Trojan Battery sent a cease-and-desist letter, but the defendants continued their use of the TROJAN-EV mark. The evidence showed that both companies operated within the golf industry, used similar advertising channels, and targeted the same customer base.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas held a bench trial. The district court found the defendants liable for trademark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act and Texas law, based on a likelihood of confusion between the marks. The court awarded Trojan Battery the defendants’ profits as a remedy and issued a permanent injunction against further infringement. The district court also rejected the defendants’ post-trial motions and denied their request to amend the findings of fact and conclusions of law. Defendants appealed these rulings.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s liability judgment and the award of profits, finding no clear error in the determination that there was a likelihood of confusion and that disgorgement of profits was warranted. However, the appellate court vacated the permanent injunction, holding that it was overbroad because it extended beyond the golf cart and battery markets, where confusion was likely, to unrelated products and markets. The case was remanded for the district court to narrow the scope of the injunction.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Carl Stewart</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Trademark"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60040/25-60040-2026-05-07.html</id>
        	<title>Prado-Majano v. Blanche</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-07T15:30:27-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-07T15:30:27-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60040/25-60040-2026-05-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case concerns an asylum seeker from El Salvador who entered the United States without authorization in 2022. He sought asylum, testifying that he had been forced into the MS-13 gang, later allowed to leave but forcibly tattooed, and had suffered torture and threats in El Salvador due to his gang affiliation. An Immigration Judge denied his requests for relief and ordered removal. During his appeal, the Department of Homeland Security inadvertently disclosed his personal information online. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the removal order but remanded the case for further proceedings on his eligibility for deferral of removal. His counsel later withdrew all applications for relief, claiming he was a Mexican citizen, and he was ordered removed to Mexico or, alternatively, El Salvador. Proceeding without counsel, he appealed again, contesting the withdrawal of his applications, but the Board dismissed his appeal.

He subsequently filed a motion to reopen his proceedings, arguing that new evidence—specifically, the high-profile arrest and extradition of his father-in-law, a former MS-13 leader—constituted changed country conditions increasing his risk if returned to El Salvador. He also requested equitable tolling of the filing deadline, citing ineffective assistance of counsel, his pro se status, and other obstacles.

The Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to reopen as untimely, finding no evidence of materially changed country conditions, only a change in personal circumstances. The Board also found no basis for equitable tolling, as he failed to demonstrate that counsel’s ineffectiveness prevented timely filing. The petitioner then sought review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

The Fifth Circuit held that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying both the exception for changed country conditions and equitable tolling. The court denied the petition for review. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60040/25-60040-2026-05-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Prado-Majano v. Blanche" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case concerns an asylum seeker from El Salvador who entered the United States without authorization in 2022. He sought asylum, testifying that he had been forced into the MS-13 gang, later allowed to leave but forcibly tattooed, and had suffered torture and threats in El Salvador due to his gang affiliation. An Immigration Judge denied his requests for relief and ordered removal. During his appeal, the Department of Homeland Security inadvertently disclosed his personal information online. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the removal order but remanded the case for further proceedings on his eligibility for deferral of removal. His counsel later withdrew all applications for relief, claiming he was a Mexican citizen, and he was ordered removed to Mexico or, alternatively, El Salvador. Proceeding without counsel, he appealed again, contesting the withdrawal of his applications, but the Board dismissed his appeal.

He subsequently filed a motion to reopen his proceedings, arguing that new evidence—specifically, the high-profile arrest and extradition of his father-in-law, a former MS-13 leader—constituted changed country conditions increasing his risk if returned to El Salvador. He also requested equitable tolling of the filing deadline, citing ineffective assistance of counsel, his pro se status, and other obstacles.

The Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to reopen as untimely, finding no evidence of materially changed country conditions, only a change in personal circumstances. The Board also found no basis for equitable tolling, as he failed to demonstrate that counsel’s ineffectiveness prevented timely filing. The petitioner then sought review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

The Fifth Circuit held that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying both the exception for changed country conditions and equitable tolling. The court denied the petition for review.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kurt Engelhardt</case:judge>
													<category term="Immigration Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40410/25-40410-2026-05-07.html</id>
        	<title>Bonin v. Sabine River Authority</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-07T15:30:27-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-07T15:30:27-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40410/25-40410-2026-05-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A catastrophic storm in March 2016 caused unprecedented rainfall in the Sabine River basin, leading the operators of the Toledo Bend Dam—jointly managed by the Sabine River Authority of Texas and the Sabine River Authority, State of Louisiana—to open nine spillway gates. This action released significant amounts of water into the Sabine River over several weeks. Downriver landowners experienced extensive flooding and property damage. More than 700 landowners brought suit, alleging that the dam operators’ actions constituted a compensable taking of their property under the Fifth Amendment.

The case began in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, where the defendants raised several defenses, including sovereign immunity, which was litigated and ultimately denied. Discovery disputes arose over the admissibility and timeliness of the plaintiffs’ expert affidavits and reports, which were found to rely heavily on an untested graduate thesis. The magistrate judge struck the challenged affidavits as untimely, and the plaintiffs did not object. Later, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding the plaintiffs had not produced sufficient admissible evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the dam’s operation caused the flooding, nor that a taking had occurred. The court also found the necessity doctrine might shield the defendants but did not decide the case on that ground.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the lower court’s decisions. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the untimely expert affidavits. Affirming summary judgment, the Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiffs had failed to present sufficient evidence of causation—specifically, that the dam’s operation, rather than the unprecedented storm itself, caused additional flooding beyond what would have occurred without the dam. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40410/25-40410-2026-05-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Bonin v. Sabine River Authority" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A catastrophic storm in March 2016 caused unprecedented rainfall in the Sabine River basin, leading the operators of the Toledo Bend Dam—jointly managed by the Sabine River Authority of Texas and the Sabine River Authority, State of Louisiana—to open nine spillway gates. This action released significant amounts of water into the Sabine River over several weeks. Downriver landowners experienced extensive flooding and property damage. More than 700 landowners brought suit, alleging that the dam operators’ actions constituted a compensable taking of their property under the Fifth Amendment.

The case began in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, where the defendants raised several defenses, including sovereign immunity, which was litigated and ultimately denied. Discovery disputes arose over the admissibility and timeliness of the plaintiffs’ expert affidavits and reports, which were found to rely heavily on an untested graduate thesis. The magistrate judge struck the challenged affidavits as untimely, and the plaintiffs did not object. Later, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding the plaintiffs had not produced sufficient admissible evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the dam’s operation caused the flooding, nor that a taking had occurred. The court also found the necessity doctrine might shield the defendants but did not decide the case on that ground.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the lower court’s decisions. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the untimely expert affidavits. Affirming summary judgment, the Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiffs had failed to present sufficient evidence of causation—specifically, that the dam’s operation, rather than the unprecedented storm itself, caused additional flooding beyond what would have occurred without the dam. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leslie Southwick</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Real Estate &amp; Property Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50194/25-50194-2026-05-07.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Vacchino</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-07T09:30:27-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-07T09:30:27-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50194/25-50194-2026-05-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A sixteen-year-old girl disappeared from Floresville, Texas in October 2023. Police discovered that she had communicated online with Jayden Douglas Richard Vacchino before her disappearance. The communications revealed Vacchino’s intention to take her from Texas to Louisiana for sexual purposes. Investigators found evidence that Vacchino’s phone was near the victim’s house on the night she went missing, and security footage confirmed his car in the area. Two days later, authorities located Vacchino and the victim together in Shreveport, Louisiana, where he was arrested.

Vacchino pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas to transporting a minor interstate with intent to engage in criminal sexual conduct under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). At the sentencing hearing, the district court did not explicitly adopt the presentence report but imposed a sentence of 260 months in prison, 15 years of supervised release, a $100 special assessment, and a $25,000 fine. The court recommended sex counseling treatment during incarceration and stated it would impose “standard conditions” of supervised release “plus the sex offender conditions.” The written judgment, however, included additional special conditions from the presentence report and omitted the specific recommendation for sex counseling treatment.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed several discrepancies between the oral sentence and the written judgment. The court held that mandatory supervised release condition 10, which required notification of economic changes, conflicted with the oral pronouncement and must be vacated. The court affirmed the other challenged conditions, finding that they either reflected the district court’s intent or clarified ambiguities. The Fifth Circuit also ordered correction of the written judgment to include the oral recommendation for sex counseling treatment. The judgment was thus vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50194/25-50194-2026-05-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Vacchino" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A sixteen-year-old girl disappeared from Floresville, Texas in October 2023. Police discovered that she had communicated online with Jayden Douglas Richard Vacchino before her disappearance. The communications revealed Vacchino’s intention to take her from Texas to Louisiana for sexual purposes. Investigators found evidence that Vacchino’s phone was near the victim’s house on the night she went missing, and security footage confirmed his car in the area. Two days later, authorities located Vacchino and the victim together in Shreveport, Louisiana, where he was arrested.

Vacchino pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas to transporting a minor interstate with intent to engage in criminal sexual conduct under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). At the sentencing hearing, the district court did not explicitly adopt the presentence report but imposed a sentence of 260 months in prison, 15 years of supervised release, a $100 special assessment, and a $25,000 fine. The court recommended sex counseling treatment during incarceration and stated it would impose “standard conditions” of supervised release “plus the sex offender conditions.” The written judgment, however, included additional special conditions from the presentence report and omitted the specific recommendation for sex counseling treatment.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed several discrepancies between the oral sentence and the written judgment. The court held that mandatory supervised release condition 10, which required notification of economic changes, conflicted with the oral pronouncement and must be vacated. The court affirmed the other challenged conditions, finding that they either reflected the district court’s intent or clarified ambiguities. The Fifth Circuit also ordered correction of the written judgment to include the oral recommendation for sex counseling treatment. The judgment was thus vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Patrick Higginbotham</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30554/24-30554-2026-05-05.html</id>
        	<title>Hill v. Jackson Offshore Holdings</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-05T15:30:26-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-05T15:30:26-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30554/24-30554-2026-05-05.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A seaman was severely injured while working on an offshore supply vessel operated by his employer. Following his injury, the employer provided both mandatory and supplemental benefits, including housing and transportation. Six months after the incident, the employer’s executives presented the seaman with an agreement offering continued supplemental benefits in exchange for his commitment to arbitrate any future claims against the company. The agreement included a delegation clause stating that any disputes about the validity, interpretation, or application of the agreement would be resolved by an arbitrator. The seaman signed, acknowledging he had the opportunity to consult an attorney but later alleged he felt pressured and feared losing benefits if he did not sign.

The seaman filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging negligence and seeking a declaration that the agreement and its arbitration provisions were invalid due to fraud, duress, and his medical condition. The employer moved to compel arbitration and to stay the litigation, arguing that the delegation clause required an arbitrator to decide issues of enforceability. The district court denied the motion without prejudice and allowed limited discovery on the enforceability of the agreement, concluding it must decide if a valid arbitration agreement existed.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred by failing to enforce the delegation clause. The appellate court found the seaman’s arguments challenged the agreement as a whole, not the delegation clause specifically. Under Supreme Court precedent, such challenges must be resolved by an arbitrator when a valid delegation clause exists and is not directly challenged. The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and compelled arbitration, remanding for further proceedings consistent with this holding. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30554/24-30554-2026-05-05.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Hill v. Jackson Offshore Holdings" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A seaman was severely injured while working on an offshore supply vessel operated by his employer. Following his injury, the employer provided both mandatory and supplemental benefits, including housing and transportation. Six months after the incident, the employer’s executives presented the seaman with an agreement offering continued supplemental benefits in exchange for his commitment to arbitrate any future claims against the company. The agreement included a delegation clause stating that any disputes about the validity, interpretation, or application of the agreement would be resolved by an arbitrator. The seaman signed, acknowledging he had the opportunity to consult an attorney but later alleged he felt pressured and feared losing benefits if he did not sign.

The seaman filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging negligence and seeking a declaration that the agreement and its arbitration provisions were invalid due to fraud, duress, and his medical condition. The employer moved to compel arbitration and to stay the litigation, arguing that the delegation clause required an arbitrator to decide issues of enforceability. The district court denied the motion without prejudice and allowed limited discovery on the enforceability of the agreement, concluding it must decide if a valid arbitration agreement existed.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred by failing to enforce the delegation clause. The appellate court found the seaman’s arguments challenged the agreement as a whole, not the delegation clause specifically. Under Supreme Court precedent, such challenges must be resolved by an arbitrator when a valid delegation clause exists and is not directly challenged. The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and compelled arbitration, remanding for further proceedings consistent with this holding.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Priscilla Richman</case:judge>
													<category term="Arbitration &amp; Mediation"/>
							<category term="Admiralty &amp; Maritime Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-30203/26-30203-2026-05-01.html</id>
        	<title>Louisiana v. FDA</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-01T15:30:27-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-01T15:30:27-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-30203/26-30203-2026-05-01.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		After the Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization returned abortion regulation to the states, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) changed its rules to allow the abortion drug mifepristone to be prescribed online and sent by mail, eliminating the prior requirement for in-person doctor visits. The State of Louisiana, joined by an individual plaintiff, challenged this 2023 regulation (the “2023 REMS”) under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), arguing that the FDA’s decision was not supported by sufficient data and resulted in illegal abortions and increased Medicaid costs within the state.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana found that Louisiana had standing, was likely to succeed on the merits, and was suffering irreparable harm. However, the district court declined to stay the regulation, reasoning that the balance of equities and public interest favored denying immediate relief. Instead, the district court stayed the litigation to allow the FDA to complete its ongoing review of mifepristone’s safety protocols, which the FDA admitted had previously lacked adequate consideration.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether a stay of the 2023 REMS pending appeal was warranted under 5 U.S.C. § 705. The Fifth Circuit concluded that Louisiana was strongly likely to succeed on the merits because the FDA’s removal of the in-person dispensing requirement was arbitrary and capricious, relied on insufficient data, and was inadequately explained. The court further found that Louisiana faced ongoing irreparable harm to its sovereign interests and financial losses. The appellate court determined that neither the FDA’s nor the manufacturers’ interests outweighed Louisiana’s injuries or the public interest, and that a stay of the regulation was appropriate. The court therefore granted Louisiana’s motion for a stay pending appeal. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/26-30203/26-30203-2026-05-01.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Louisiana v. FDA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                After the Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization returned abortion regulation to the states, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) changed its rules to allow the abortion drug mifepristone to be prescribed online and sent by mail, eliminating the prior requirement for in-person doctor visits. The State of Louisiana, joined by an individual plaintiff, challenged this 2023 regulation (the “2023 REMS”) under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), arguing that the FDA’s decision was not supported by sufficient data and resulted in illegal abortions and increased Medicaid costs within the state.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana found that Louisiana had standing, was likely to succeed on the merits, and was suffering irreparable harm. However, the district court declined to stay the regulation, reasoning that the balance of equities and public interest favored denying immediate relief. Instead, the district court stayed the litigation to allow the FDA to complete its ongoing review of mifepristone’s safety protocols, which the FDA admitted had previously lacked adequate consideration.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether a stay of the 2023 REMS pending appeal was warranted under 5 U.S.C. § 705. The Fifth Circuit concluded that Louisiana was strongly likely to succeed on the merits because the FDA’s removal of the in-person dispensing requirement was arbitrary and capricious, relied on insufficient data, and was inadequately explained. The court further found that Louisiana faced ongoing irreparable harm to its sovereign interests and financial losses. The appellate court determined that neither the FDA’s nor the manufacturers’ interests outweighed Louisiana’s injuries or the public interest, and that a stay of the regulation was appropriate. The court therefore granted Louisiana’s motion for a stay pending appeal.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stuart Kyle Duncan</case:judge>
													<category term="Drugs &amp; Biotech"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40368/25-40368-2026-04-29.html</id>
        	<title>Palmer v. Tata Consulting Services</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-29T21:01:17-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-29T21:01:17-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40368/25-40368-2026-04-29.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A private auditor, hired to review an international consulting company’s immigration practices, alleged that the company engaged in widespread visa fraud. He claimed that, to reduce costs and circumvent stricter requirements, the company wrongfully applied for less expensive visas (L-1A and B-1) for employees who should have received H-1B visas, and then assigned those workers to roles requiring H-1B status. The complaint also asserted that the company underpaid visa-dependent workers, in violation of federal wage regulations, resulting in reduced payroll tax withholding.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas reviewed these claims after the government declined to intervene. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the company had no obligation under the False Claims Act (FCA) to pay higher visa fees for visas it never applied for, nor any obligation to withhold additional taxes on wages it never paid. The court reasoned that any duty to pay arose only if the company actually applied for, and was granted, the more expensive visas, or if it paid higher wages to its employees.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Fifth Circuit held that, under the FCA, reverse false claim liability requires a present, established duty to pay money to the government—not a contingent or potential obligation. The court found that federal regulations did not impose an immediate duty on the company to pay higher visa fees or to withhold more in taxes without first applying for the appropriate visas or paying higher wages. Because the complaint did not allege the existence of such an obligation, it failed to state a claim under the FCA. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40368/25-40368-2026-04-29.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Palmer v. Tata Consulting Services" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A private auditor, hired to review an international consulting company’s immigration practices, alleged that the company engaged in widespread visa fraud. He claimed that, to reduce costs and circumvent stricter requirements, the company wrongfully applied for less expensive visas (L-1A and B-1) for employees who should have received H-1B visas, and then assigned those workers to roles requiring H-1B status. The complaint also asserted that the company underpaid visa-dependent workers, in violation of federal wage regulations, resulting in reduced payroll tax withholding.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas reviewed these claims after the government declined to intervene. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the company had no obligation under the False Claims Act (FCA) to pay higher visa fees for visas it never applied for, nor any obligation to withhold additional taxes on wages it never paid. The court reasoned that any duty to pay arose only if the company actually applied for, and was granted, the more expensive visas, or if it paid higher wages to its employees.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Fifth Circuit held that, under the FCA, reverse false claim liability requires a present, established duty to pay money to the government—not a contingent or potential obligation. The court found that federal regulations did not impose an immediate duty on the company to pay higher visa fees or to withhold more in taxes without first applying for the appropriate visas or paying higher wages. Because the complaint did not allege the existence of such an obligation, it failed to state a claim under the FCA. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Cory Wilson</case:judge>
													<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
							<category term="Immigration Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-50149/24-50149-2026-04-24.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. State of Texas</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-26T21:00:27-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-26T21:00:27-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-50149/24-50149-2026-04-24.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In this case, Texas enacted Senate Bill 4 (S.B. 4) in 2023 to address a significant increase in illegal immigration across its southern border. The law criminalizes certain acts of unlawful entry and reentry, tracking federal immigration statutes, and allows for state judges to order the return of individuals found in violation. Before the law took effect, two nonprofit organizations that provide legal services to immigrants and El Paso County filed suit, seeking to have S.B. 4 declared unlawful and its enforcement enjoined. The nonprofits claimed the law would frustrate their missions and require them to divert resources, while El Paso County alleged it would incur increased costs and suffer a loss of public trust.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas issued a preliminary injunction, finding that S.B. 4 was likely preempted by federal law and that the plaintiffs had standing to sue, based on the alleged frustration of their missions, resource diversion, and reputational harm. Texas appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. A divided panel initially affirmed the injunction, heavily relying on Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman to find organizational standing. However, the Supreme Court subsequently decided FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, which narrowed the circumstances under which organizations can claim standing based on resource diversion.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. The court concluded that voluntarily incurring costs, merely adjusting to new laws, or alleging reputational harm do not constitute cognizable injuries. As a result, the Fifth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction, declining to address the merits of the preemption claim. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-50149/24-50149-2026-04-24.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. State of Texas" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In this case, Texas enacted Senate Bill 4 (S.B. 4) in 2023 to address a significant increase in illegal immigration across its southern border. The law criminalizes certain acts of unlawful entry and reentry, tracking federal immigration statutes, and allows for state judges to order the return of individuals found in violation. Before the law took effect, two nonprofit organizations that provide legal services to immigrants and El Paso County filed suit, seeking to have S.B. 4 declared unlawful and its enforcement enjoined. The nonprofits claimed the law would frustrate their missions and require them to divert resources, while El Paso County alleged it would incur increased costs and suffer a loss of public trust.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas issued a preliminary injunction, finding that S.B. 4 was likely preempted by federal law and that the plaintiffs had standing to sue, based on the alleged frustration of their missions, resource diversion, and reputational harm. Texas appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. A divided panel initially affirmed the injunction, heavily relying on Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman to find organizational standing. However, the Supreme Court subsequently decided FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, which narrowed the circumstances under which organizations can claim standing based on resource diversion.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. The court concluded that voluntarily incurring costs, merely adjusting to new laws, or alleging reputational harm do not constitute cognizable injuries. As a result, the Fifth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction, declining to address the merits of the preemption claim.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-24</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Immigration Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20495/24-20495-2026-04-22.html</id>
        	<title>Martin v. Burgess</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-22T09:30:53-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-22T09:30:53-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20495/24-20495-2026-04-22.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Scott Martin operated a business in Harris County, Texas, gathering contact information of criminal defendants from public court records and selling it to private attorneys. His business relied primarily on access to bail bond orders, which contained defendants’ addresses and other contact details. In June 2023, the then-presiding judge of the Harris County Criminal Courts at Law issued an administrative order instructing the district clerk to keep the contents of certain bond orders in misdemeanor cases confidential, making only the title, filing date, and page enumeration available to the public. This significantly reduced the information Martin could access, leading to substantial business losses. Martin unsuccessfully sought reconsideration of the order and then filed suit, asserting constitutional and statutory claims and seeking injunctive relief and damages.

The case was heard by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The defendants, including the district clerk and judges, moved to dismiss, arguing the order did not violate any constitutional right and that they were immune from suit. The district court, after a hearing, granted the motion to dismiss. The court determined that under Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corp., Martin’s First Amendment claim failed because the order merely restricted access to government information, not speech. It also found no plausible claim under the Sixth Amendment or Texas law, and concluded Martin had no property interest in the information.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that restricting access to the information in government possession does not violate the First Amendment, and Martin’s other constitutional and state law arguments lacked merit. The court also rejected Martin’s ultra vires claim, finding the judge acted within her statutory authority. Thus, the dismissal was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20495/24-20495-2026-04-22.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Martin v. Burgess" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Scott Martin operated a business in Harris County, Texas, gathering contact information of criminal defendants from public court records and selling it to private attorneys. His business relied primarily on access to bail bond orders, which contained defendants’ addresses and other contact details. In June 2023, the then-presiding judge of the Harris County Criminal Courts at Law issued an administrative order instructing the district clerk to keep the contents of certain bond orders in misdemeanor cases confidential, making only the title, filing date, and page enumeration available to the public. This significantly reduced the information Martin could access, leading to substantial business losses. Martin unsuccessfully sought reconsideration of the order and then filed suit, asserting constitutional and statutory claims and seeking injunctive relief and damages.

The case was heard by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The defendants, including the district clerk and judges, moved to dismiss, arguing the order did not violate any constitutional right and that they were immune from suit. The district court, after a hearing, granted the motion to dismiss. The court determined that under Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corp., Martin’s First Amendment claim failed because the order merely restricted access to government information, not speech. It also found no plausible claim under the Sixth Amendment or Texas law, and concluded Martin had no property interest in the information.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that restricting access to the information in government possession does not violate the First Amendment, and Martin’s other constitutional and state law arguments lacked merit. The court also rejected Martin’s ultra vires claim, finding the judge acted within her statutory authority. Thus, the dismissal was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-22</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Edith Clement</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40599/24-40599-2026-04-21.html</id>
        	<title>Davis v. Warren</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-21T21:01:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-21T21:01:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40599/24-40599-2026-04-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In February 2019, Daryl Davis was stopped by Tyler Police Department officers as part of a drug sting. During the traffic stop, officers accused Davis of swallowing crack cocaine to destroy evidence, used force against him, and arrested him for tampering with evidence and interfering with public duties. Davis contended that the stop was pretextual, that he was falsely accused, subjected to excessive force, unlawfully detained, and that officers refused to order a drug test that would have disproven their accusation. He further alleged ongoing constitutional violations following his arrest, including malicious prosecution and unlawful searches and seizures during pretrial supervision, and claimed that city and county officials ignored his complaints to cover up broader unconstitutional policing.

A magistrate judge in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas screened Davis’s pro se complaint, found it untimely and lacking in sufficient factual allegations, and ordered him to amend. After Davis amended, the magistrate judge recommended dismissal for failure to state a claim, finding the claims time-barred under Texas’s two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 actions and insufficiently specific as to officials’ failure to act. The district court adopted this recommendation, dismissing the claims without prejudice except for those based on officials’ inaction, which were dismissed with prejudice. Davis appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Davis’s unlawful arrest, excessive force, and malicious prosecution claims, concluding they were time-barred or failed as a matter of law. The court also agreed that Davis had not sufficiently pleaded claims based on officials’ failure to act, but held those should have been dismissed without prejudice. The court vacated that portion of the judgment and remanded, directing the district court to allow Davis to amend his complaint and consider appointing counsel. The court expressed no opinion on the merits of any future pleadings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40599/24-40599-2026-04-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Davis v. Warren" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In February 2019, Daryl Davis was stopped by Tyler Police Department officers as part of a drug sting. During the traffic stop, officers accused Davis of swallowing crack cocaine to destroy evidence, used force against him, and arrested him for tampering with evidence and interfering with public duties. Davis contended that the stop was pretextual, that he was falsely accused, subjected to excessive force, unlawfully detained, and that officers refused to order a drug test that would have disproven their accusation. He further alleged ongoing constitutional violations following his arrest, including malicious prosecution and unlawful searches and seizures during pretrial supervision, and claimed that city and county officials ignored his complaints to cover up broader unconstitutional policing.

A magistrate judge in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas screened Davis’s pro se complaint, found it untimely and lacking in sufficient factual allegations, and ordered him to amend. After Davis amended, the magistrate judge recommended dismissal for failure to state a claim, finding the claims time-barred under Texas’s two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 actions and insufficiently specific as to officials’ failure to act. The district court adopted this recommendation, dismissing the claims without prejudice except for those based on officials’ inaction, which were dismissed with prejudice. Davis appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Davis’s unlawful arrest, excessive force, and malicious prosecution claims, concluding they were time-barred or failed as a matter of law. The court also agreed that Davis had not sufficiently pleaded claims based on officials’ failure to act, but held those should have been dismissed without prejudice. The court vacated that portion of the judgment and remanded, directing the district court to allow Davis to amend his complaint and consider appointing counsel. The court expressed no opinion on the merits of any future pleadings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Don Willett</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50695/25-50695-2026-04-21.html</id>
        	<title>Nathan v. Alamo Heights ISD</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-21T21:01:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-21T21:01:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50695/25-50695-2026-04-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A group of parents and religious leaders in Texas, representing a diversity of religious beliefs, challenged the enactment of a Texas law (S.B. 10) requiring public elementary and secondary schools to display a large poster of the Ten Commandments in every classroom. The law specified the text, size, and location of the display, allowed for both private donations and district-purchased displays, and was set to go into effect in September 2025. The plaintiffs argued that being compelled to send their children to schools with such displays violated the Establishment Clause by effectively endorsing religion, and the Free Exercise Clause by undermining their rights to direct their children’s religious upbringing and coercing their children to honor or revere the Commandments.

The case was originally heard in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. After a hearing, the district court denied the school districts’ motion to dismiss and granted a preliminary injunction, blocking enforcement of S.B. 10. The court held the law unconstitutional under both the Establishment Clause—applying the “secular purpose” prong from Stone v. Graham and Lemon v. Kurtzman—and the Free Exercise Clause, finding that the law likely coerced religious observance and interfered with parental rights. The court’s opinion was also influenced by a since-vacated Fifth Circuit panel decision in a related Louisiana case.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that S.B. 10 did not violate either the Establishment or Free Exercise Clause. The court concluded that Stone and Lemon no longer apply; the proper inquiry is whether the law bears hallmarks of a founding-era religious establishment, such as compelled worship, religious taxes, or government control over doctrine. The court found S.B. 10 lacked these features and that mere display of religious text did not amount to unconstitutional coercion. The court reversed the district court’s judgment, vacated the injunction, and dismissed all claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50695/25-50695-2026-04-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Nathan v. Alamo Heights ISD" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A group of parents and religious leaders in Texas, representing a diversity of religious beliefs, challenged the enactment of a Texas law (S.B. 10) requiring public elementary and secondary schools to display a large poster of the Ten Commandments in every classroom. The law specified the text, size, and location of the display, allowed for both private donations and district-purchased displays, and was set to go into effect in September 2025. The plaintiffs argued that being compelled to send their children to schools with such displays violated the Establishment Clause by effectively endorsing religion, and the Free Exercise Clause by undermining their rights to direct their children’s religious upbringing and coercing their children to honor or revere the Commandments.

The case was originally heard in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. After a hearing, the district court denied the school districts’ motion to dismiss and granted a preliminary injunction, blocking enforcement of S.B. 10. The court held the law unconstitutional under both the Establishment Clause—applying the “secular purpose” prong from Stone v. Graham and Lemon v. Kurtzman—and the Free Exercise Clause, finding that the law likely coerced religious observance and interfered with parental rights. The court’s opinion was also influenced by a since-vacated Fifth Circuit panel decision in a related Louisiana case.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that S.B. 10 did not violate either the Establishment or Free Exercise Clause. The court concluded that Stone and Lemon no longer apply; the proper inquiry is whether the law bears hallmarks of a founding-era religious establishment, such as compelled worship, religious taxes, or government control over doctrine. The court found S.B. 10 lacked these features and that mere display of religious text did not amount to unconstitutional coercion. The court reversed the district court’s judgment, vacated the injunction, and dismissed all claims.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stuart Kyle Duncan</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Education Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60500/24-60500-2026-04-17.html</id>
        	<title>Starbucks v. NLRB</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-19T21:00:47-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-19T21:00:47-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60500/24-60500-2026-04-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case concerns events at a Starbucks location in La Quinta, California, where employees began a union organizing campaign in December 2021. Two shift supervisors, Andrea Hernandez and Jazmine Cardenas, actively supported the unionization effort. After the union won the election to represent employees, the union filed charges alleging Starbucks engaged in unlawful conduct during the organizing campaign. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) issued a complaint alleging that Starbucks had improperly restricted employees’ union discussions. To prepare its defense, Starbucks obtained Board-issued subpoenas directed to the two supervisors, seeking broad materials related to union activities.

An administrative law judge (ALJ) found the subpoenas overbroad and granted petitions to revoke them, but allowed Starbucks to pursue narrower requests. The ALJ ultimately dismissed the underlying unfair labor practice complaint, with the NLRB affirming that decision. Separately, the Board initiated another unfair labor practice proceeding, alleging that Starbucks’ act of obtaining the subpoenas itself interfered with employees’ rights under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. The ALJ concluded Starbucks’ subpoenas violated Section 8(a)(1), using the standard from National Telephone Directory Corp., which balances confidentiality interests against an employer’s need for information. The Board adopted this reasoning and ordered Starbucks to cease the conduct and post a notice.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The Fifth Circuit held that the Board applied the wrong legal standard by relying on National Telephone’s discovery rule, rather than the required “totality of the circumstances” test for coerciveness under Section 8(a)(1). The court vacated the Board’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, clarifying that the proper inquiry is whether the employer’s conduct would tend to be coercive under all the circumstances. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60500/24-60500-2026-04-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Starbucks v. NLRB" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case concerns events at a Starbucks location in La Quinta, California, where employees began a union organizing campaign in December 2021. Two shift supervisors, Andrea Hernandez and Jazmine Cardenas, actively supported the unionization effort. After the union won the election to represent employees, the union filed charges alleging Starbucks engaged in unlawful conduct during the organizing campaign. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) issued a complaint alleging that Starbucks had improperly restricted employees’ union discussions. To prepare its defense, Starbucks obtained Board-issued subpoenas directed to the two supervisors, seeking broad materials related to union activities.

An administrative law judge (ALJ) found the subpoenas overbroad and granted petitions to revoke them, but allowed Starbucks to pursue narrower requests. The ALJ ultimately dismissed the underlying unfair labor practice complaint, with the NLRB affirming that decision. Separately, the Board initiated another unfair labor practice proceeding, alleging that Starbucks’ act of obtaining the subpoenas itself interfered with employees’ rights under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. The ALJ concluded Starbucks’ subpoenas violated Section 8(a)(1), using the standard from National Telephone Directory Corp., which balances confidentiality interests against an employer’s need for information. The Board adopted this reasoning and ordered Starbucks to cease the conduct and post a notice.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The Fifth Circuit held that the Board applied the wrong legal standard by relying on National Telephone’s discovery rule, rather than the required “totality of the circumstances” test for coerciveness under Section 8(a)(1). The court vacated the Board’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, clarifying that the proper inquiry is whether the employer’s conduct would tend to be coercive under all the circumstances.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60198/25-60198-2026-04-15.html</id>
        	<title>Cuevas Machine v. Calgon Carbon</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-15T15:30:28-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-15T15:30:28-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60198/25-60198-2026-04-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Cuevas Machine Company entered into a subcontract with O’Neal Constructors for fabrication and machining work at a filtration plant owned by Calgon Carbon Corporation in Mississippi. Under the subcontract, Cuevas was to be paid after Calgon paid O’Neal. Despite nonpayment from O’Neal, Cuevas continued its work. In October 2023, Cuevas recorded two construction liens totaling over $1.2 million against Calgon’s property, but the lien documents did not explicitly state the last date labor, services, or materials were supplied—a statutory requirement. Instead, Cuevas attached invoices to the liens, which included dates, but it was unclear whether these dates satisfied the statutory requirement.

After Cuevas filed suit to foreclose on the liens in Mississippi state court, Calgon removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi and moved to dismiss. The district court granted Calgon’s motion, dismissing Cuevas’s complaint with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court concluded, making an Erie guess, that the liens were unenforceable because they did not clearly specify the required “last date” in the manner demanded by Mississippi law, and found that the attached invoices did not sufficiently cure this defect.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. Finding Mississippi law ambiguous on whether attachments that do not plainly state the “last date” can satisfy the statutory requirement, the Fifth Circuit certified the following question to the Mississippi Supreme Court: whether attaching invoices that do not explicitly state the “last date labor, services or materials were supplied” satisfies the requirement under Miss. Code Ann. § 85-7-405(1)(b) that a lien “specify the date the claim was due.” The Fifth Circuit did not decide the merits, instead certifying the question for authoritative resolution. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60198/25-60198-2026-04-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Cuevas Machine v. Calgon Carbon" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Cuevas Machine Company entered into a subcontract with O’Neal Constructors for fabrication and machining work at a filtration plant owned by Calgon Carbon Corporation in Mississippi. Under the subcontract, Cuevas was to be paid after Calgon paid O’Neal. Despite nonpayment from O’Neal, Cuevas continued its work. In October 2023, Cuevas recorded two construction liens totaling over $1.2 million against Calgon’s property, but the lien documents did not explicitly state the last date labor, services, or materials were supplied—a statutory requirement. Instead, Cuevas attached invoices to the liens, which included dates, but it was unclear whether these dates satisfied the statutory requirement.

After Cuevas filed suit to foreclose on the liens in Mississippi state court, Calgon removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi and moved to dismiss. The district court granted Calgon’s motion, dismissing Cuevas’s complaint with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court concluded, making an Erie guess, that the liens were unenforceable because they did not clearly specify the required “last date” in the manner demanded by Mississippi law, and found that the attached invoices did not sufficiently cure this defect.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. Finding Mississippi law ambiguous on whether attachments that do not plainly state the “last date” can satisfy the statutory requirement, the Fifth Circuit certified the following question to the Mississippi Supreme Court: whether attaching invoices that do not explicitly state the “last date labor, services or materials were supplied” satisfies the requirement under Miss. Code Ann. § 85-7-405(1)(b) that a lien “specify the date the claim was due.” The Fifth Circuit did not decide the merits, instead certifying the question for authoritative resolution.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Cory Wilson</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Construction Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Real Estate &amp; Property Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30016/25-30016-2026-04-13.html</id>
        	<title>Alexander v. Arceneaux</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-13T15:30:27-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-13T15:30:27-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30016/25-30016-2026-04-13.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case concerns a search of Albert Alexander’s residence by Lafayette Police Department officers, who had a warrant to search for firearms. Upon executing the warrant, the officers found only pellet rifles, but also observed a large quantity of electronics and appliances—many in unopened boxes or wrapped—inside the house. These observations, combined with prior tips from Alexander’s granddaughter and her girlfriend that stolen goods were stored there, led the officers to seize the items on suspicion they were stolen. The seized property was not listed in the original search warrant.

After being charged with possession of stolen property and later acquitted at trial, Alexander filed a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. He alleged that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by seizing items not listed in the warrant during the first search. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court granted summary judgment, finding that the officers’ seizure of the electronics and appliances was justified under the plain view doctrine, as their incriminating nature was immediately apparent given the circumstances and information available to the officers.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment because, under the totality of the circumstances—including the tips received, officers’ observations, and their experience—the officers had probable cause to believe the items were stolen, satisfying the plain view exception. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30016/25-30016-2026-04-13.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Alexander v. Arceneaux" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case concerns a search of Albert Alexander’s residence by Lafayette Police Department officers, who had a warrant to search for firearms. Upon executing the warrant, the officers found only pellet rifles, but also observed a large quantity of electronics and appliances—many in unopened boxes or wrapped—inside the house. These observations, combined with prior tips from Alexander’s granddaughter and her girlfriend that stolen goods were stored there, led the officers to seize the items on suspicion they were stolen. The seized property was not listed in the original search warrant.

After being charged with possession of stolen property and later acquitted at trial, Alexander filed a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. He alleged that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by seizing items not listed in the warrant during the first search. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court granted summary judgment, finding that the officers’ seizure of the electronics and appliances was justified under the plain view doctrine, as their incriminating nature was immediately apparent given the circumstances and information available to the officers.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment because, under the totality of the circumstances—including the tips received, officers’ observations, and their experience—the officers had probable cause to believe the items were stolen, satisfying the plain view exception. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-13</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Edith Clement</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-10760/24-10760-2026-04-10.html</id>
        	<title>McNutt v. Dept of Justice</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-10T15:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-10T15:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-10760/24-10760-2026-04-10.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several individuals, all enthusiasts of distilling spirits, and a non-profit organization devoted to legalizing at-home hobby distilling, sought to challenge longstanding federal laws prohibiting the operation of home distilleries. The plaintiffs, who had experience with lawful alcohol production for fuel or other beverages, expressed clear intent to distill spirits for personal consumption at or near their residences. They faced explicit warnings from federal authorities that such activity was illegal and punishable by substantial penalties, and that no permits would be issued for home-based distillation of consumable spirits.

After contacting the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB) and receiving confirmation that home distilling would not be permitted, the plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas against the TTB and the U.S. Department of Justice. The district court dismissed several individual plaintiffs for lack of standing but allowed the claims of one individual and the non-profit organization to proceed. On the merits, the district court determined that federal statutes barring home distilling for beverage purposes violated the Constitution’s Commerce, Taxation, and Necessary and Proper clauses. The government appealed, and the dismissed plaintiffs cross-appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that all individual plaintiffs and the non-profit organization had standing to sue. On the merits, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the statutory prohibition on home distilleries and associated criminal penalties exceeded Congress’s constitutional authority under both the Taxation Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, as the prohibitions were not “plainly adapted” to raising revenue and represented an improper federal intrusion into matters reserved to the states. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and injunction against enforcement of the statutes, as modified. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-10760/24-10760-2026-04-10.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "McNutt v. Dept of Justice" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several individuals, all enthusiasts of distilling spirits, and a non-profit organization devoted to legalizing at-home hobby distilling, sought to challenge longstanding federal laws prohibiting the operation of home distilleries. The plaintiffs, who had experience with lawful alcohol production for fuel or other beverages, expressed clear intent to distill spirits for personal consumption at or near their residences. They faced explicit warnings from federal authorities that such activity was illegal and punishable by substantial penalties, and that no permits would be issued for home-based distillation of consumable spirits.

After contacting the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB) and receiving confirmation that home distilling would not be permitted, the plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas against the TTB and the U.S. Department of Justice. The district court dismissed several individual plaintiffs for lack of standing but allowed the claims of one individual and the non-profit organization to proceed. On the merits, the district court determined that federal statutes barring home distilling for beverage purposes violated the Constitution’s Commerce, Taxation, and Necessary and Proper clauses. The government appealed, and the dismissed plaintiffs cross-appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that all individual plaintiffs and the non-profit organization had standing to sue. On the merits, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the statutory prohibition on home distilleries and associated criminal penalties exceeded Congress’s constitutional authority under both the Taxation Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, as the prohibitions were not “plainly adapted” to raising revenue and represented an improper federal intrusion into matters reserved to the states. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and injunction against enforcement of the statutes, as modified.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-10</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Edith Jones</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40788/25-40788-2026-04-07.html</id>
        	<title>In Re: Google</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-07T15:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-07T15:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40788/25-40788-2026-04-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Branch Metrics, Inc. brought an antitrust action against Google, LLC, alleging violations of the Sherman Act based on documents uncovered in earlier litigation brought by the United States against Google. Branch Metrics claimed Google maintained monopoly power in online search and search advertising markets, using exclusive agreements that caused anticompetitive harm. The suit was filed in the Eastern District of Texas, although most relevant witnesses and evidence were located in California.

Google responded by requesting a transfer of venue to the Northern District of California under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), arguing that it was clearly more convenient for parties and witnesses and that the sources of proof were located there. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas permitted venue discovery but ultimately denied Google’s motion to transfer. The court found that certain private interest factors slightly favored transfer, while one public interest factor—administrative difficulties stemming from court congestion—weighed against transfer, and the rest of the factors were neutral.

On mandamus review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the district court misapplied the law by placing undue weight on the court congestion factor, which Fifth Circuit precedent considers speculative and non-dispositive. The appellate court held that the district court erred by allowing that single factor to override all other factors, contrary to circuit authority. The Fifth Circuit also rejected Branch Metrics’ argument that the Clayton Act insulated its choice of venue from transfer. The court granted Google’s petition for a writ of mandamus and ordered the case transferred to the Northern District of California. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40788/25-40788-2026-04-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In Re: Google" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Branch Metrics, Inc. brought an antitrust action against Google, LLC, alleging violations of the Sherman Act based on documents uncovered in earlier litigation brought by the United States against Google. Branch Metrics claimed Google maintained monopoly power in online search and search advertising markets, using exclusive agreements that caused anticompetitive harm. The suit was filed in the Eastern District of Texas, although most relevant witnesses and evidence were located in California.

Google responded by requesting a transfer of venue to the Northern District of California under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), arguing that it was clearly more convenient for parties and witnesses and that the sources of proof were located there. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas permitted venue discovery but ultimately denied Google’s motion to transfer. The court found that certain private interest factors slightly favored transfer, while one public interest factor—administrative difficulties stemming from court congestion—weighed against transfer, and the rest of the factors were neutral.

On mandamus review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the district court misapplied the law by placing undue weight on the court congestion factor, which Fifth Circuit precedent considers speculative and non-dispositive. The appellate court held that the district court erred by allowing that single factor to override all other factors, contrary to circuit authority. The Fifth Circuit also rejected Branch Metrics’ argument that the Clayton Act insulated its choice of venue from transfer. The court granted Google’s petition for a writ of mandamus and ordered the case transferred to the Northern District of California.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James C. Ho</case:judge>
													<category term="Antitrust &amp; Trade Regulation"/>
							<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10489/25-10489-2026-04-02.html</id>
        	<title>Porch.com v. Gallagher Re</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-02T15:30:42-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-02T15:30:42-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10489/25-10489-2026-04-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Porch.com is the parent company of Homeowners of America Insurance Company (HOA), which entered into an agreement with Gallagher Reinsurance (Gallagher) to serve as its reinsurance broker. Gallagher brokered a reinsurance deal for HOA involving Whiterock as the insurer and Vesttoo as a financier, with the understanding that China Construction Bank (CCB) would provide a letter of credit as collateral. Instead, HOA was only given a letter from Yu Po Finance stating a letter of credit would be forthcoming, which was never issued. Gallagher continued to assure HOA that the collateral was valid, leading HOA to authorize a substantial withdrawal by Vesttoo. When it was later revealed that Vesttoo’s collateral was invalid and CCB had never issued the promised letter of credit, HOA suffered financial harm, including increased costs for replacement reinsurance and regulatory intervention.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas heard Porch’s breach-of-contract claims against Gallagher, alleging violations of several sections of their agreement. The district court dismissed all of Porch’s claims with prejudice, finding that Gallagher did not breach the contract and that amending the complaint would be futile.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Porch’s claims under Sections 5 and 11 of the contract, concluding Gallagher had no duty to procure collateral documents from CCB or to comply with Texas insurance laws under the economic sanctions provision. However, the Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Porch’s claim under Section 13, finding that Porch plausibly alleged Gallagher failed to perform administrative services customarily expected of a reinsurance broker after contract placement. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the Section 13 claim. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10489/25-10489-2026-04-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Porch.com v. Gallagher Re" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Porch.com is the parent company of Homeowners of America Insurance Company (HOA), which entered into an agreement with Gallagher Reinsurance (Gallagher) to serve as its reinsurance broker. Gallagher brokered a reinsurance deal for HOA involving Whiterock as the insurer and Vesttoo as a financier, with the understanding that China Construction Bank (CCB) would provide a letter of credit as collateral. Instead, HOA was only given a letter from Yu Po Finance stating a letter of credit would be forthcoming, which was never issued. Gallagher continued to assure HOA that the collateral was valid, leading HOA to authorize a substantial withdrawal by Vesttoo. When it was later revealed that Vesttoo’s collateral was invalid and CCB had never issued the promised letter of credit, HOA suffered financial harm, including increased costs for replacement reinsurance and regulatory intervention.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas heard Porch’s breach-of-contract claims against Gallagher, alleging violations of several sections of their agreement. The district court dismissed all of Porch’s claims with prejudice, finding that Gallagher did not breach the contract and that amending the complaint would be futile.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Porch’s claims under Sections 5 and 11 of the contract, concluding Gallagher had no duty to procure collateral documents from CCB or to comply with Texas insurance laws under the economic sanctions provision. However, the Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Porch’s claim under Section 13, finding that Porch plausibly alleged Gallagher failed to perform administrative services customarily expected of a reinsurance broker after contract placement. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the Section 13 claim.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stuart Kyle Duncan</case:judge>
													<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Insurance Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60269/25-60269-2026-04-02.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Weaver</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-02T10:02:45-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-02T10:02:45-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60269/25-60269-2026-04-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at a residence in Starkville, Mississippi, after an officer obtained the warrant through an affidavit detailing three controlled drug purchases involving a confidential informant. The affidavit described the procedures followed during the buys, including continuous surveillance of the informant and searches for contraband before and after each transaction. The search resulted in the seizure of drugs, firearms, money, and cellphones, and the resident was arrested. During a subsequent police interview, the resident was read his Miranda rights and signed a form acknowledging this, but the waiver portion of the form was not read aloud or explained.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi granted the defendant’s motion to suppress both the physical evidence from the search and the statements made during the interview. The district court found the supporting affidavit for the search warrant to be “bare bones,” lacking sufficient detail or corroboration, and concluded that the officer’s reliance on the warrant was not objectively reasonable. The court further found that the defendant’s signature on the Miranda form did not amount to a voluntary waiver of his rights, as the waiver section was not explained and the officer’s conduct was considered deceptive.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied because the affidavit was not “wholly conclusory” and contained sufficient factual detail to justify an officer’s reasonable reliance on the warrant. Thus, the suppression of the physical evidence was reversed. Regarding the statements, the appellate court agreed that the express waiver was involuntary but remanded for the district court to determine whether an implied waiver occurred under the totality of the circumstances. The panel retained jurisdiction pending the district court’s further findings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60269/25-60269-2026-04-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Weaver" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at a residence in Starkville, Mississippi, after an officer obtained the warrant through an affidavit detailing three controlled drug purchases involving a confidential informant. The affidavit described the procedures followed during the buys, including continuous surveillance of the informant and searches for contraband before and after each transaction. The search resulted in the seizure of drugs, firearms, money, and cellphones, and the resident was arrested. During a subsequent police interview, the resident was read his Miranda rights and signed a form acknowledging this, but the waiver portion of the form was not read aloud or explained.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi granted the defendant’s motion to suppress both the physical evidence from the search and the statements made during the interview. The district court found the supporting affidavit for the search warrant to be “bare bones,” lacking sufficient detail or corroboration, and concluded that the officer’s reliance on the warrant was not objectively reasonable. The court further found that the defendant’s signature on the Miranda form did not amount to a voluntary waiver of his rights, as the waiver section was not explained and the officer’s conduct was considered deceptive.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied because the affidavit was not “wholly conclusory” and contained sufficient factual detail to justify an officer’s reasonable reliance on the warrant. Thus, the suppression of the physical evidence was reversed. Regarding the statements, the appellate court agreed that the express waiver was involuntary but remanded for the district court to determine whether an implied waiver occurred under the totality of the circumstances. The panel retained jurisdiction pending the district court’s further findings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Edith Jones</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20176/25-20176-2026-03-31.html</id>
        	<title>Briar Capital Working Fund v. Remmert</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-31T10:02:39-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-31T10:02:39-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20176/25-20176-2026-03-31.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		South Coast Supply Company, an oil and gas distribution firm, experienced severe financial distress following a dramatic decline in oil prices in 2014. To mitigate the impact, Robert Remmert, the company’s Chief Operating Officer and Executive Vice President, personally loaned South Coast $800,000. Remmert was repaid a total of $320,628.04 through multiple checks as funds became available. Despite these efforts, the company ultimately filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas.

After the bankruptcy filing, South Coast initiated a preference claim against Remmert to recover the loan repayments, a claim later assigned to Briar Capital Working Fund Capital, L.L.C. following confirmation of the bankruptcy plan. The case was transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district court originally dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded that decision. On remand, a jury trial was held. The jury was asked whether Briar Capital established that Remmert received more through the loan repayments than he would have received in a hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation. The jury found that Briar Capital did not meet its burden.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case after Briar Capital appealed, arguing that the jury’s verdict was unsupported by the evidence. However, because Briar Capital failed to file the necessary motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) or 50(b), the appellate court held that it was without power to review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. The court also found that, even under plain error review, some evidence supported the jury’s verdict. The judgment was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20176/25-20176-2026-03-31.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Briar Capital Working Fund v. Remmert" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                South Coast Supply Company, an oil and gas distribution firm, experienced severe financial distress following a dramatic decline in oil prices in 2014. To mitigate the impact, Robert Remmert, the company’s Chief Operating Officer and Executive Vice President, personally loaned South Coast $800,000. Remmert was repaid a total of $320,628.04 through multiple checks as funds became available. Despite these efforts, the company ultimately filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas.

After the bankruptcy filing, South Coast initiated a preference claim against Remmert to recover the loan repayments, a claim later assigned to Briar Capital Working Fund Capital, L.L.C. following confirmation of the bankruptcy plan. The case was transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district court originally dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded that decision. On remand, a jury trial was held. The jury was asked whether Briar Capital established that Remmert received more through the loan repayments than he would have received in a hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation. The jury found that Briar Capital did not meet its burden.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case after Briar Capital appealed, arguing that the jury’s verdict was unsupported by the evidence. However, because Briar Capital failed to file the necessary motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) or 50(b), the appellate court held that it was without power to review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. The court also found that, even under plain error review, some evidence supported the jury’s verdict. The judgment was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-31</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stuart Kyle Duncan</case:judge>
													<category term="Bankruptcy"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11253/25-11253-2026-03-31.html</id>
        	<title>In re Ryan</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-31T10:02:38-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-31T10:02:38-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11253/25-11253-2026-03-31.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Following two fatal airplane crashes involving Boeing 737 MAX aircraft in 2018 and 2019, which resulted in significant loss of life, the Department of Justice investigated Boeing for misleading the Federal Aviation Administration about changes to flight control systems. The Department initially entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) with Boeing, requiring the company to pay a substantial fine and undertake remedial measures. After Boeing was alleged to have breached the DPA, the Department negotiated a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) in 2025, again requiring compliance and penalties. Family members of crash victims challenged both the DPA and NPA, asserting violations of their rights under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA).

The families first moved in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas to set aside the DPA, arguing they were denied timely notice and the right to confer as crime victims. The district court found the Department had not acted in bad faith but had committed a legal error in initially failing to recognize the families as crime victims. The court concluded, however, that it lacked authority to review or alter the terms of the DPA. When the Department later moved to dismiss the charges based on the NPA, the families objected, but the district court granted the motion, finding the Department had provided sufficient reasons and had not acted with bad faith.

The families petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for writs of mandamus. The Fifth Circuit held that the challenge to the DPA was moot because it was no longer in effect after Boeing’s breach. As to the NPA, the court found the Department had satisfied the CVRA’s requirements to confer with and treat the families fairly. The court also ruled it lacked jurisdiction under the CVRA to conduct a substantive review of the district court’s dismissal of charges. The petitions for writ of mandamus were denied. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11253/25-11253-2026-03-31.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re Ryan" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Following two fatal airplane crashes involving Boeing 737 MAX aircraft in 2018 and 2019, which resulted in significant loss of life, the Department of Justice investigated Boeing for misleading the Federal Aviation Administration about changes to flight control systems. The Department initially entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) with Boeing, requiring the company to pay a substantial fine and undertake remedial measures. After Boeing was alleged to have breached the DPA, the Department negotiated a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) in 2025, again requiring compliance and penalties. Family members of crash victims challenged both the DPA and NPA, asserting violations of their rights under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA).

The families first moved in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas to set aside the DPA, arguing they were denied timely notice and the right to confer as crime victims. The district court found the Department had not acted in bad faith but had committed a legal error in initially failing to recognize the families as crime victims. The court concluded, however, that it lacked authority to review or alter the terms of the DPA. When the Department later moved to dismiss the charges based on the NPA, the families objected, but the district court granted the motion, finding the Department had provided sufficient reasons and had not acted with bad faith.

The families petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for writs of mandamus. The Fifth Circuit held that the challenge to the DPA was moot because it was no longer in effect after Boeing’s breach. As to the NPA, the court found the Department had satisfied the CVRA’s requirements to confer with and treat the families fairly. The court also ruled it lacked jurisdiction under the CVRA to conduct a substantive review of the district court’s dismissal of charges. The petitions for writ of mandamus were denied.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-31</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-30825/23-30825-2026-03-30.html</id>
        	<title>Parker v. Hooper</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-30T15:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-30T15:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-30825/23-30825-2026-03-30.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A class of inmates at the Louisiana State Penitentiary alleged that the prison’s medical care was constitutionally inadequate and that the facility failed to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. The lawsuit began in 2015, and evidence was introduced at trial in 2018. In 2021, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana issued a lengthy opinion finding systemic Eighth Amendment violations and ADA/RA noncompliance. While prison officials began making improvements ahead of a scheduled remedial trial, the district court later issued a Remedial Opinion and Order, prescribing detailed institutional changes and appointing special masters to oversee compliance.

The district court’s Remedial Order required the state to bear the costs of three special masters, directed broad institutional reforms, and did not expressly adhere to the limitations imposed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The court entered final judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, retaining jurisdiction only for compliance procedures. After entry of judgment, the defendants appealed. During the appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the Remedial Order. The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, subsequently reviewed whether it had appellate jurisdiction and the validity of the district court’s orders.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that it had appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 or, alternatively, § 1292(a)(1). The Fifth Circuit found that the district court’s Remedial Order violated the PLRA by failing to apply the statutory needs-narrowness-intrusiveness standard, improperly appointing multiple special masters, and requiring the state to pay their fees. The Fifth Circuit also concluded that the district court erred by disregarding ongoing improvements to prison medical care and by misapplying the standards for injunctive relief under the Eighth Amendment and the ADA/RA. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-30825/23-30825-2026-03-30.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Parker v. Hooper" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A class of inmates at the Louisiana State Penitentiary alleged that the prison’s medical care was constitutionally inadequate and that the facility failed to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. The lawsuit began in 2015, and evidence was introduced at trial in 2018. In 2021, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana issued a lengthy opinion finding systemic Eighth Amendment violations and ADA/RA noncompliance. While prison officials began making improvements ahead of a scheduled remedial trial, the district court later issued a Remedial Opinion and Order, prescribing detailed institutional changes and appointing special masters to oversee compliance.

The district court’s Remedial Order required the state to bear the costs of three special masters, directed broad institutional reforms, and did not expressly adhere to the limitations imposed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The court entered final judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, retaining jurisdiction only for compliance procedures. After entry of judgment, the defendants appealed. During the appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the Remedial Order. The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, subsequently reviewed whether it had appellate jurisdiction and the validity of the district court’s orders.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that it had appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 or, alternatively, § 1292(a)(1). The Fifth Circuit found that the district court’s Remedial Order violated the PLRA by failing to apply the statutory needs-narrowness-intrusiveness standard, improperly appointing multiple special masters, and requiring the state to pay their fees. The Fifth Circuit also concluded that the district court erred by disregarding ongoing improvements to prison medical care and by misapplying the standards for injunctive relief under the Eighth Amendment and the ADA/RA. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Edith Jones</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10545/25-10545-2026-03-27.html</id>
        	<title>Baker v. Coborn</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-27T15:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-27T15:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10545/25-10545-2026-03-27.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Darion Baker and Gregory Dees were driving a stolen car from California with plans to reach Tennessee. In Stratford, Texas, police officers Richard Coborn and Michael McHugh became suspicious of their vehicle, followed them to a gas station, and confirmed the car was stolen. As Baker and Dees returned to their car, the officers approached with weapons drawn and gave commands. Baker put the car in drive, and the officers fired shots—first before the car moved, then as Baker drove away. Baker was fatally shot from behind, while Dees was unharmed.

The plaintiffs, including Baker’s estate and family, sued the officers in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, alleging excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The officers asserted qualified immunity and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted qualified immunity for the shots fired before the car moved and ruled the second round of shots was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. On appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court regarding the first round of shots but disagreed about the second round, finding that a jury could decide whether the second round was objectively unreasonable. The panel remanded for the district court to decide whether the right was clearly established.

On remand, the district court denied qualified immunity for the second round of shots, finding that the violation was clearly established. The officers appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that, when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, Coborn’s conduct during the second round of shots constituted a clearly established violation of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, Coborn was not entitled to qualified immunity for the second round of shots. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10545/25-10545-2026-03-27.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Baker v. Coborn" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Darion Baker and Gregory Dees were driving a stolen car from California with plans to reach Tennessee. In Stratford, Texas, police officers Richard Coborn and Michael McHugh became suspicious of their vehicle, followed them to a gas station, and confirmed the car was stolen. As Baker and Dees returned to their car, the officers approached with weapons drawn and gave commands. Baker put the car in drive, and the officers fired shots—first before the car moved, then as Baker drove away. Baker was fatally shot from behind, while Dees was unharmed.

The plaintiffs, including Baker’s estate and family, sued the officers in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, alleging excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The officers asserted qualified immunity and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted qualified immunity for the shots fired before the car moved and ruled the second round of shots was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. On appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court regarding the first round of shots but disagreed about the second round, finding that a jury could decide whether the second round was objectively unreasonable. The panel remanded for the district court to decide whether the right was clearly established.

On remand, the district court denied qualified immunity for the second round of shots, finding that the violation was clearly established. The officers appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that, when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, Coborn’s conduct during the second round of shots constituted a clearly established violation of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, Coborn was not entitled to qualified immunity for the second round of shots.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30730/24-30730-2026-03-27.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Grace</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-27T15:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-27T15:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30730/24-30730-2026-03-27.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Law enforcement in New Orleans began investigating a suspected methamphetamine dealer in 2020, leading them to Marshall Grace through surveillance methods such as phone records and tracking devices. Officers stopped Grace’s vehicle after observing traffic violations, detected the smell of marijuana, and subsequently searched his vehicle, finding approximately 441 grams of methamphetamine. Grace was arrested and provided a written statement admitting ownership of the drugs and detailing his ongoing involvement in distributing methamphetamine to others, including regular transactions over a two-year period. Electronic evidence from his phones corroborated his admissions and established communication with other dealers.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana presided over Grace’s trial. During jury selection, the government used peremptory strikes to exclude two of five black potential jurors, including one named Edward Davis. Grace challenged the exclusion of Davis under Batson v. Kentucky, arguing it was racially motivated. The district court questioned Davis and ultimately found the government’s reason—Davis having seven sons, one of whom had criminal justice involvement—to be race-neutral and denied Grace’s Batson challenge. The trial concluded with the jury finding Grace guilty on all counts, and the court imposed the statutory minimum sentence. Grace appealed, contesting both the sufficiency of the evidence for his conspiracy conviction and the denial of his Batson challenge.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It held there was sufficient evidence to support the conspiracy conviction, given Grace’s admissions, corroborating testimony, and the quantity of drugs involved. The appellate court also found no clear error in the district court’s denial of the Batson challenge, ruling that Grace failed to show purposeful discrimination by the prosecution. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in full. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30730/24-30730-2026-03-27.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Grace" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Law enforcement in New Orleans began investigating a suspected methamphetamine dealer in 2020, leading them to Marshall Grace through surveillance methods such as phone records and tracking devices. Officers stopped Grace’s vehicle after observing traffic violations, detected the smell of marijuana, and subsequently searched his vehicle, finding approximately 441 grams of methamphetamine. Grace was arrested and provided a written statement admitting ownership of the drugs and detailing his ongoing involvement in distributing methamphetamine to others, including regular transactions over a two-year period. Electronic evidence from his phones corroborated his admissions and established communication with other dealers.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana presided over Grace’s trial. During jury selection, the government used peremptory strikes to exclude two of five black potential jurors, including one named Edward Davis. Grace challenged the exclusion of Davis under Batson v. Kentucky, arguing it was racially motivated. The district court questioned Davis and ultimately found the government’s reason—Davis having seven sons, one of whom had criminal justice involvement—to be race-neutral and denied Grace’s Batson challenge. The trial concluded with the jury finding Grace guilty on all counts, and the court imposed the statutory minimum sentence. Grace appealed, contesting both the sufficiency of the evidence for his conspiracy conviction and the denial of his Batson challenge.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It held there was sufficient evidence to support the conspiracy conviction, given Grace’s admissions, corroborating testimony, and the quantity of drugs involved. The appellate court also found no clear error in the district court’s denial of the Batson challenge, ruling that Grace failed to show purposeful discrimination by the prosecution. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in full.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Carl Stewart</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10886/25-10886-2026-03-27.html</id>
        	<title>Congious v. Shaw</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-27T10:02:41-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-27T10:02:41-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10886/25-10886-2026-03-27.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A woman who was pregnant while detained at the Tarrant County Jail gave birth in her cell two weeks before her due date. The infant was found stuck in her pants and was transported to the hospital, where the child died ten days later. The Medical Director at the jail, a physician who did not provide direct care to inmates in the female infirmary, had issued orders for the treatment of pregnant inmates but relied on other medical staff to carry out those orders. Days before the birth, the woman was seen by an OB/GYN, who noted her communication difficulties and recommended an elective induction of labor at 39–40 weeks, which the Medical Director approved. On the day of the birth, the woman was mentioned in the attachment to a nursing report email regarding abdominal cramps and refusal of breakfast, but not in the body of the email. The Medical Director stated he did not read the attachment before learning the birth had occurred.

After the incident, the woman, through her guardian, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, alleging the Medical Director denied her adequate medical care in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Following discovery, the Medical Director moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity and arguing he lacked subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm. The district court granted summary judgment for the Medical Director and denied the plaintiff’s cross-motion.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The appellate court held that the Medical Director did not have subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to the detainee and therefore did not act with deliberate indifference. The court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the Medical Director. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10886/25-10886-2026-03-27.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Congious v. Shaw" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A woman who was pregnant while detained at the Tarrant County Jail gave birth in her cell two weeks before her due date. The infant was found stuck in her pants and was transported to the hospital, where the child died ten days later. The Medical Director at the jail, a physician who did not provide direct care to inmates in the female infirmary, had issued orders for the treatment of pregnant inmates but relied on other medical staff to carry out those orders. Days before the birth, the woman was seen by an OB/GYN, who noted her communication difficulties and recommended an elective induction of labor at 39–40 weeks, which the Medical Director approved. On the day of the birth, the woman was mentioned in the attachment to a nursing report email regarding abdominal cramps and refusal of breakfast, but not in the body of the email. The Medical Director stated he did not read the attachment before learning the birth had occurred.

After the incident, the woman, through her guardian, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, alleging the Medical Director denied her adequate medical care in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Following discovery, the Medical Director moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity and arguing he lacked subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm. The district court granted summary judgment for the Medical Director and denied the plaintiff’s cross-motion.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The appellate court held that the Medical Director did not have subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to the detainee and therefore did not act with deliberate indifference. The court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the Medical Director.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11006/25-11006-2026-03-26.html</id>
        	<title>Megatel v. Mansfield</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-26T10:02:41-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-26T10:02:41-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11006/25-11006-2026-03-26.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Two development companies owned land in Johnson County, Texas, within the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the City of Mansfield but outside the city’s corporate boundaries. To develop this land, the companies needed access to retail water services, which, under state law, could be provided only by the Johnson County Special Utility District (“JCSUD”) because it held the exclusive certificate of convenience and necessity (CCN) for the area. However, a contract between JCSUD and the City of Mansfield required JCSUD to secure Mansfield’s written consent, which could be withheld at the City’s discretion, before providing water services within the city’s extraterritorial jurisdiction. The developers’ efforts to obtain water service were unsuccessful, as Mansfield demanded annexation and additional fees, ultimately refusing to formalize an agreement.

After unsuccessful negotiations and attempts to compel service through the Texas Public Utility Commission, the developers sued the City of Mansfield in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. They alleged violations of the Sherman Act and brought state-law claims. The district court, adopting a magistrate judge’s recommendation, dismissed the antitrust claims with prejudice, holding that Mansfield was entitled to state-action antitrust immunity under Texas law, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether Mansfield was entitled to state-action immunity. The Fifth Circuit held that, although Texas law authorizes monopolies for water utilities through CCNs, it does not clearly articulate or authorize the City of Mansfield to act anticompetitively concerning the area in question, since the CCN belonged to JCSUD. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s grant of state-action immunity and remanded the case for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11006/25-11006-2026-03-26.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Megatel v. Mansfield" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Two development companies owned land in Johnson County, Texas, within the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the City of Mansfield but outside the city’s corporate boundaries. To develop this land, the companies needed access to retail water services, which, under state law, could be provided only by the Johnson County Special Utility District (“JCSUD”) because it held the exclusive certificate of convenience and necessity (CCN) for the area. However, a contract between JCSUD and the City of Mansfield required JCSUD to secure Mansfield’s written consent, which could be withheld at the City’s discretion, before providing water services within the city’s extraterritorial jurisdiction. The developers’ efforts to obtain water service were unsuccessful, as Mansfield demanded annexation and additional fees, ultimately refusing to formalize an agreement.

After unsuccessful negotiations and attempts to compel service through the Texas Public Utility Commission, the developers sued the City of Mansfield in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. They alleged violations of the Sherman Act and brought state-law claims. The district court, adopting a magistrate judge’s recommendation, dismissed the antitrust claims with prejudice, holding that Mansfield was entitled to state-action antitrust immunity under Texas law, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether Mansfield was entitled to state-action immunity. The Fifth Circuit held that, although Texas law authorizes monopolies for water utilities through CCNs, it does not clearly articulate or authorize the City of Mansfield to act anticompetitively concerning the area in question, since the CCN belonged to JCSUD. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s grant of state-action immunity and remanded the case for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Antitrust &amp; Trade Regulation"/>
							<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Utilities Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40188/25-40188-2026-03-26.html</id>
        	<title>Hagar v. FBI</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-26T10:02:41-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-26T10:02:41-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40188/25-40188-2026-03-26.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The plaintiff, Michael Hagar, is an individual convicted of cyberstalking and making interstate threats. He submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for a copy of a specific email he sent in 2016, which became part of the FBI’s investigation. Hagar specifically sought the unredacted “To” line of recipients and the email’s complete header information, which includes technical metadata such as server paths and timestamps. The FBI initially provided the email with recipient information redacted, citing privacy exemptions, and declined to produce the header metadata, arguing it would require the creation of a new record.

Following his FOIA request, Hagar filed a pro se lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. The magistrate judge terminated Hagar’s initial summary judgment motion as premature, set a schedule for further briefing, and allowed the FBI to move for summary judgment. After the FBI sent Hagar an unredacted copy of the email, the magistrate judge recommended granting summary judgment for the FBI, agreeing that the header information would require creation of a new record and, alternatively, was exempt under FOIA. The district court adopted this recommendation, entered judgment for the FBI, and denied Hagar’s post-judgment motions and misconduct claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that because Hagar had received the “To” line information, his claim for that was moot. The court further held that FOIA does not require agencies to create new records to satisfy requests, and thus the FBI was not obligated to produce the header information. The court affirmed the district court’s rulings, including denial of post-judgment motions, and dismissed Hagar’s judicial misconduct claims as meritless. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40188/25-40188-2026-03-26.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Hagar v. FBI" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The plaintiff, Michael Hagar, is an individual convicted of cyberstalking and making interstate threats. He submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for a copy of a specific email he sent in 2016, which became part of the FBI’s investigation. Hagar specifically sought the unredacted “To” line of recipients and the email’s complete header information, which includes technical metadata such as server paths and timestamps. The FBI initially provided the email with recipient information redacted, citing privacy exemptions, and declined to produce the header metadata, arguing it would require the creation of a new record.

Following his FOIA request, Hagar filed a pro se lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. The magistrate judge terminated Hagar’s initial summary judgment motion as premature, set a schedule for further briefing, and allowed the FBI to move for summary judgment. After the FBI sent Hagar an unredacted copy of the email, the magistrate judge recommended granting summary judgment for the FBI, agreeing that the header information would require creation of a new record and, alternatively, was exempt under FOIA. The district court adopted this recommendation, entered judgment for the FBI, and denied Hagar’s post-judgment motions and misconduct claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that because Hagar had received the “To” line information, his claim for that was moot. The court further held that FOIA does not require agencies to create new records to satisfy requests, and thus the FBI was not obligated to produce the header information. The court affirmed the district court’s rulings, including denial of post-judgment motions, and dismissed Hagar’s judicial misconduct claims as meritless.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-10788/24-10788-2026-03-25.html</id>
        	<title>Securities and Exchange Commission v. Barton</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-25T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-25T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-10788/24-10788-2026-03-25.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Securities and Exchange Commission initiated an enforcement action against Timothy Barton and related entities, alleging violations of federal securities laws. The district court subsequently appointed a receiver to manage properties allegedly acquired with funds from Barton’s fraudulent activities. Certain properties and entities, including TC Hall, LLC (owner of the Hall Street property), Goldmark Hospitality LLC (owner of Amerigold Suites), BM318, LLC, and JMJ Development, LLC, were placed within the receivership because they had received or benefitted from assets traceable to the alleged misconduct.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas oversaw the receivership and issued several orders approving property sales and settlements. Barton previously appealed the appointment of the receivership and its scope. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in an earlier decision (SEC v. Barton, 79 F.4th 573 (5th Cir. 2023)), vacated and remanded for reconsideration; on remand, the district court narrowed and reappointed the receivership. The Fifth Circuit later affirmed the new receivership order in SEC v. Barton, 135 F.4th 206 (5th Cir. 2025). While appeals were pending, the district court issued orders related to the sale of Amerigold Suites, settlements involving JMJ and BM318, and the sale of the Hall Street property.

In the current appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review the cancelled Amerigold Suites sale and the two settlement agreements, dismissing those portions of the appeal. The court found jurisdiction to review the approval of the Hall Street property sale and affirmed the district court’s order, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the sale, which complied with statutory requirements and was in the best interest of the receivership estate. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-10788/24-10788-2026-03-25.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Securities and Exchange Commission v. Barton" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Securities and Exchange Commission initiated an enforcement action against Timothy Barton and related entities, alleging violations of federal securities laws. The district court subsequently appointed a receiver to manage properties allegedly acquired with funds from Barton’s fraudulent activities. Certain properties and entities, including TC Hall, LLC (owner of the Hall Street property), Goldmark Hospitality LLC (owner of Amerigold Suites), BM318, LLC, and JMJ Development, LLC, were placed within the receivership because they had received or benefitted from assets traceable to the alleged misconduct.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas oversaw the receivership and issued several orders approving property sales and settlements. Barton previously appealed the appointment of the receivership and its scope. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in an earlier decision (SEC v. Barton, 79 F.4th 573 (5th Cir. 2023)), vacated and remanded for reconsideration; on remand, the district court narrowed and reappointed the receivership. The Fifth Circuit later affirmed the new receivership order in SEC v. Barton, 135 F.4th 206 (5th Cir. 2025). While appeals were pending, the district court issued orders related to the sale of Amerigold Suites, settlements involving JMJ and BM318, and the sale of the Hall Street property.

In the current appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review the cancelled Amerigold Suites sale and the two settlement agreements, dismissing those portions of the appeal. The court found jurisdiction to review the approval of the Hall Street property sale and affirmed the district court’s order, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the sale, which complied with statutory requirements and was in the best interest of the receivership estate.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-25</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Carl Stewart</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60188/25-60188-2026-03-23.html</id>
        	<title>Hardwick v. FAA</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-23T10:01:24-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-23T10:01:24-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60188/25-60188-2026-03-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A professional pilot was asked to operate a Cessna Citation 550 aircraft whose tail number had recently been changed by its owner from N550ME to N550MK. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approved the new registration and issued new documents, but denied a new airworthiness certificate because the aircraft required further inspection. Believing the registration had reverted to the old number due to the denial, the owner had the physical tail number altered back to N550ME using tape, while the aircraft carried documents for both the old and new registrations. The pilot, after being told about “paperwork issues” and noticing the taped number, proceeded to fly the aircraft on two flights without confirming the correct registration and without a valid airworthiness certificate for the current registered tail number. After the first flight, FAA inspectors issued a written notice warning that further operation would violate federal regulations; the pilot disregarded this and completed the return flight.

The FAA suspended the pilot’s license for 150 days, citing violations of various regulations requiring proper display of the registered tail number and possession of a valid airworthiness certificate. The pilot appealed the suspension to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), where an Administrative Law Judge affirmed the FAA’s order after a hearing. The full NTSB then affirmed the ALJ’s decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case, applying a deferential standard to the agency’s findings and sanction. The court held that the NTSB’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious. The court concluded that the pilot’s reliance on the owner’s explanation was unreasonable and that the penalty was not excessive, even if the violations were administrative. The court also found no improper disparity in sanctioning compared to another pilot. The petition for review was denied, and the suspension was upheld. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60188/25-60188-2026-03-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Hardwick v. FAA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A professional pilot was asked to operate a Cessna Citation 550 aircraft whose tail number had recently been changed by its owner from N550ME to N550MK. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approved the new registration and issued new documents, but denied a new airworthiness certificate because the aircraft required further inspection. Believing the registration had reverted to the old number due to the denial, the owner had the physical tail number altered back to N550ME using tape, while the aircraft carried documents for both the old and new registrations. The pilot, after being told about “paperwork issues” and noticing the taped number, proceeded to fly the aircraft on two flights without confirming the correct registration and without a valid airworthiness certificate for the current registered tail number. After the first flight, FAA inspectors issued a written notice warning that further operation would violate federal regulations; the pilot disregarded this and completed the return flight.

The FAA suspended the pilot’s license for 150 days, citing violations of various regulations requiring proper display of the registered tail number and possession of a valid airworthiness certificate. The pilot appealed the suspension to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), where an Administrative Law Judge affirmed the FAA’s order after a hearing. The full NTSB then affirmed the ALJ’s decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case, applying a deferential standard to the agency’s findings and sanction. The court held that the NTSB’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious. The court concluded that the pilot’s reliance on the owner’s explanation was unreasonable and that the penalty was not excessive, even if the violations were administrative. The court also found no improper disparity in sanctioning compared to another pilot. The petition for review was denied, and the suspension was upheld.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Patrick Higginbotham</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60040/24-60040-2026-03-20.html</id>
        	<title>Intuit v. Federal Trade Commission</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-20T15:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-20T15:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60040/24-60040-2026-03-20.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Intuit, Inc., the seller of TurboTax tax-preparation software, advertised its “Free Edition” as available at no cost for “simple tax returns.” However, the majority of taxpayers did not qualify due to various exclusions, and those individuals were prompted during the tax preparation process to upgrade to paid products. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) brought an administrative complaint in 2022, alleging that these advertisements were deceptive under Section 5 of the FTC Act. After an initial federal court suit for a preliminary injunction was denied, the FTC pursued the matter through its internal adjudicative process instead.

An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that Intuit’s advertisements were likely to mislead a significant minority of consumers. The FTC Commissioners affirmed this decision, issuing a broad cease-and-desist order that barred Intuit from advertising “any goods or services” as free unless it met stringent requirements. This order was not limited to tax-preparation products. Intuit petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for review, asserting, among other arguments, that the FTC’s adjudication of deceptive advertising claims through an ALJ, rather than an Article III court, was unconstitutional.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that deceptive advertising claims under Section 5 of the FTC Act are akin to traditional actions at law or equity, such as fraud and deceit, and thus involve private rights. According to recent Supreme Court precedent in SEC v. Jarkesy, such claims must be adjudicated in Article III courts, not by agency ALJs. The Fifth Circuit granted Intuit’s petition, vacated the FTC’s order, and remanded the case to the agency for further proceedings consistent with its holding. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60040/24-60040-2026-03-20.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Intuit v. Federal Trade Commission" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Intuit, Inc., the seller of TurboTax tax-preparation software, advertised its “Free Edition” as available at no cost for “simple tax returns.” However, the majority of taxpayers did not qualify due to various exclusions, and those individuals were prompted during the tax preparation process to upgrade to paid products. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) brought an administrative complaint in 2022, alleging that these advertisements were deceptive under Section 5 of the FTC Act. After an initial federal court suit for a preliminary injunction was denied, the FTC pursued the matter through its internal adjudicative process instead.

An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that Intuit’s advertisements were likely to mislead a significant minority of consumers. The FTC Commissioners affirmed this decision, issuing a broad cease-and-desist order that barred Intuit from advertising “any goods or services” as free unless it met stringent requirements. This order was not limited to tax-preparation products. Intuit petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for review, asserting, among other arguments, that the FTC’s adjudication of deceptive advertising claims through an ALJ, rather than an Article III court, was unconstitutional.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that deceptive advertising claims under Section 5 of the FTC Act are akin to traditional actions at law or equity, such as fraud and deceit, and thus involve private rights. According to recent Supreme Court precedent in SEC v. Jarkesy, such claims must be adjudicated in Article III courts, not by agency ALJs. The Fifth Circuit granted Intuit’s petition, vacated the FTC’s order, and remanded the case to the agency for further proceedings consistent with its holding.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-20</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Edith Jones</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Consumer Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-51021/25-51021-2026-03-19.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Burger</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-19T15:30:34-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-19T15:30:34-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-51021/25-51021-2026-03-19.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		An 18-year-old high school senior from Texas was indicted by a federal grand jury for transmitting threats in interstate commerce, based on statements he made while using the online gaming platform Roblox. The statements, made in a virtual “Church” experience, referenced possessing firearms, preparing munitions, and intentions to commit violence at a Christian event. Other Roblox users, located in Pennsylvania and Nevada, reported these statements to the FBI, believing them to be serious threats rather than mere role-play or trolling. The government alleged the defendant&#039;s remarks corresponded to a real concert scheduled in Austin and supported its case with evidence from the defendant’s internet history and statements captured by a keylogger.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed the indictment before trial, concluding no reasonable juror could find that the defendant’s statements constituted “true threats” outside the protection of the First Amendment. The court found the context—a role-playing video game environment filled with extreme and offensive avatars—undermined the seriousness of the statements, and excluded evidence of the defendant’s conduct outside Roblox as irrelevant. The district court released the defendant without conditions, later imposing some conditions after a government request.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the question of whether the statements were “true threats” is a factual issue that should ordinarily be decided by a jury at trial, not by the judge on a pretrial motion. The court found that disputed facts and contextual uncertainties required a trial on the merits, and that the district court erred by resolving these issues prematurely. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the indictment and remanded for further proceedings. The appeal regarding the defendant’s release was dismissed as moot. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-51021/25-51021-2026-03-19.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Burger" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                An 18-year-old high school senior from Texas was indicted by a federal grand jury for transmitting threats in interstate commerce, based on statements he made while using the online gaming platform Roblox. The statements, made in a virtual “Church” experience, referenced possessing firearms, preparing munitions, and intentions to commit violence at a Christian event. Other Roblox users, located in Pennsylvania and Nevada, reported these statements to the FBI, believing them to be serious threats rather than mere role-play or trolling. The government alleged the defendant&#039;s remarks corresponded to a real concert scheduled in Austin and supported its case with evidence from the defendant’s internet history and statements captured by a keylogger.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed the indictment before trial, concluding no reasonable juror could find that the defendant’s statements constituted “true threats” outside the protection of the First Amendment. The court found the context—a role-playing video game environment filled with extreme and offensive avatars—undermined the seriousness of the statements, and excluded evidence of the defendant’s conduct outside Roblox as irrelevant. The district court released the defendant without conditions, later imposing some conditions after a government request.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the question of whether the statements were “true threats” is a factual issue that should ordinarily be decided by a jury at trial, not by the judge on a pretrial motion. The court found that disputed facts and contextual uncertainties required a trial on the merits, and that the district court erred by resolving these issues prematurely. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the indictment and remanded for further proceedings. The appeal regarding the defendant’s release was dismissed as moot.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-19</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
													<category term="Communications Law"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Internet Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30494/24-30494-2026-03-19.html</id>
        	<title>Ford v. Mckesson</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-19T10:02:28-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-19T10:02:28-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30494/24-30494-2026-03-19.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A police officer suffered severe injuries during a protest in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, when a demonstrator threw a heavy object that struck him in the face. The protest was organized in response to police conduct and was led by a prominent activist who had previously participated in similar events that sometimes turned violent. On the day of the incident, the leader was observed directing protestors, including leading them onto a highway and not discouraging violent behavior as the situation escalated. The officer’s injuries were significant, resulting in lasting physical and psychological harm and the end of his law enforcement career.

The officer sued the activist, Black Lives Matter, and related entities in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, alleging negligence and other tort claims. The district court dismissed most of the claims with prejudice, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed as to the negligence claim against the activist. The Supreme Court of the United States vacated that decision, remanding for clarification of Louisiana negligence law. The Supreme Court of Louisiana confirmed that state law recognizes a duty not to negligently precipitate third-party crimes under the circumstances alleged. After further proceedings, the district court again granted summary judgment for the activist, finding no duty, lack of causation, and First Amendment protection.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment. The court held that there is sufficient evidence for a jury to consider whether the activist’s leadership and actions breached a duty of care and were a cause-in-fact of the officer’s injuries, and that such a claim is not foreclosed by the First Amendment. The case was remanded for trial. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-30494/24-30494-2026-03-19.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Ford v. Mckesson" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A police officer suffered severe injuries during a protest in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, when a demonstrator threw a heavy object that struck him in the face. The protest was organized in response to police conduct and was led by a prominent activist who had previously participated in similar events that sometimes turned violent. On the day of the incident, the leader was observed directing protestors, including leading them onto a highway and not discouraging violent behavior as the situation escalated. The officer’s injuries were significant, resulting in lasting physical and psychological harm and the end of his law enforcement career.

The officer sued the activist, Black Lives Matter, and related entities in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, alleging negligence and other tort claims. The district court dismissed most of the claims with prejudice, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed as to the negligence claim against the activist. The Supreme Court of the United States vacated that decision, remanding for clarification of Louisiana negligence law. The Supreme Court of Louisiana confirmed that state law recognizes a duty not to negligently precipitate third-party crimes under the circumstances alleged. After further proceedings, the district court again granted summary judgment for the activist, finding no duty, lack of causation, and First Amendment protection.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment. The court held that there is sufficient evidence for a jury to consider whether the activist’s leadership and actions breached a duty of care and were a cause-in-fact of the officer’s injuries, and that such a claim is not foreclosed by the First Amendment. The case was remanded for trial.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-19</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Edith Jones</case:judge>
													<category term="Personal Injury"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20550/24-20550-2026-03-18.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Mendoza</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-18T15:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-18T15:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20550/24-20550-2026-03-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Arturo Mendoza created and uploaded fourteen images of morphed child pornography using Adobe Photoshop and cloud storage services. The images depicted adult sexual activity with the faces of two minor girls, ages twelve and six, photoshopped onto adult women’s bodies. Mendoza was indicted and pleaded guilty to one count of transporting child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1), (b)(1). At sentencing, the presentence report recommended certain financial conditions related to restitution and a location-monitoring condition for supervised release.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas adopted the presentence report and sentenced Mendoza to 120 months’ imprisonment, an above-Guidelines sentence, followed by ten years of supervised release. The district court left restitution open for ninety days but never entered an order for restitution, as no hearing was requested or held. The written judgment included special conditions: a location-monitoring requirement (with unclear duration and a home-detention component), and financial-disclosure and credit-approval conditions. Mendoza appealed, challenging these supervised release conditions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred by imposing a home-detention component in the written judgment when only standalone location monitoring was pronounced orally, and by failing to specify the duration of the location-monitoring condition, violating due process. Additionally, the appellate court held that the financial-disclosure and credit-approval conditions were imposed in error because restitution was never ordered and the record did not support these restrictions. The Fifth Circuit vacated all three challenged conditions and remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion, specifically for correction of the location-monitoring condition and for further proceedings regarding the financial conditions. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20550/24-20550-2026-03-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Mendoza" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Arturo Mendoza created and uploaded fourteen images of morphed child pornography using Adobe Photoshop and cloud storage services. The images depicted adult sexual activity with the faces of two minor girls, ages twelve and six, photoshopped onto adult women’s bodies. Mendoza was indicted and pleaded guilty to one count of transporting child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1), (b)(1). At sentencing, the presentence report recommended certain financial conditions related to restitution and a location-monitoring condition for supervised release.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas adopted the presentence report and sentenced Mendoza to 120 months’ imprisonment, an above-Guidelines sentence, followed by ten years of supervised release. The district court left restitution open for ninety days but never entered an order for restitution, as no hearing was requested or held. The written judgment included special conditions: a location-monitoring requirement (with unclear duration and a home-detention component), and financial-disclosure and credit-approval conditions. Mendoza appealed, challenging these supervised release conditions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred by imposing a home-detention component in the written judgment when only standalone location monitoring was pronounced orally, and by failing to specify the duration of the location-monitoring condition, violating due process. Additionally, the appellate court held that the financial-disclosure and credit-approval conditions were imposed in error because restitution was never ordered and the record did not support these restrictions. The Fifth Circuit vacated all three challenged conditions and remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion, specifically for correction of the location-monitoring condition and for further proceedings regarding the financial conditions.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jennifer Elrod</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20119/25-20119-2026-03-18.html</id>
        	<title>GuangDong Midea v. Unsecured Creditors</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-18T15:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-18T15:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20119/25-20119-2026-03-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Corelle, a company that sold Instapot multifunction cookers, entered into a 2016 master supply agreement (MSA) with Midea, the manufacturer. Under this arrangement, individual purchase orders (POs) were used for each transaction, detailing specific terms such as price and quantity. Each PO typically included Corelle’s own terms, including indemnity provisions. In 2023, Corelle filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and, as part of its reorganization plan, sold its appliances business and assigned the MSA to the buyer. However, Corelle sought to retain its indemnification rights for products purchased under completed POs made before the assignment.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Midea’s objection to this arrangement, finding that the POs were severable contracts distinct from the MSA. This meant the indemnification rights related to completed POs remained with Corelle. Midea appealed, contending that the MSA and all related POs formed a single, indivisible contract that should have been assigned in its entirety. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision, emphasizing that the structure of the MSA and the parties’ course of dealing supported the divisibility of the POs from the MSA.

On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the standards applied by the lower courts, the interpretation of the contracts, and the application of 11 U.S.C. § 365(f). The appellate court held that the bankruptcy court did not err in finding the POs were divisible from the MSA, that Corelle’s retention of indemnification rights did not violate bankruptcy law, and that the lower courts applied the correct standards of review. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20119/25-20119-2026-03-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "GuangDong Midea v. Unsecured Creditors" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Corelle, a company that sold Instapot multifunction cookers, entered into a 2016 master supply agreement (MSA) with Midea, the manufacturer. Under this arrangement, individual purchase orders (POs) were used for each transaction, detailing specific terms such as price and quantity. Each PO typically included Corelle’s own terms, including indemnity provisions. In 2023, Corelle filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and, as part of its reorganization plan, sold its appliances business and assigned the MSA to the buyer. However, Corelle sought to retain its indemnification rights for products purchased under completed POs made before the assignment.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Midea’s objection to this arrangement, finding that the POs were severable contracts distinct from the MSA. This meant the indemnification rights related to completed POs remained with Corelle. Midea appealed, contending that the MSA and all related POs formed a single, indivisible contract that should have been assigned in its entirety. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision, emphasizing that the structure of the MSA and the parties’ course of dealing supported the divisibility of the POs from the MSA.

On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the standards applied by the lower courts, the interpretation of the contracts, and the application of 11 U.S.C. § 365(f). The appellate court held that the bankruptcy court did not err in finding the POs were divisible from the MSA, that Corelle’s retention of indemnification rights did not violate bankruptcy law, and that the lower courts applied the correct standards of review. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stuart Kyle Duncan</case:judge>
													<category term="Bankruptcy"/>
							<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Commercial Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60163/25-60163-2026-03-17.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Porter</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-17T15:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-17T15:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60163/25-60163-2026-03-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Police in Gautier, Mississippi, used an automatic license plate reader (LPR) system to identify a vehicle associated with Elijah Porter, who was wanted on an outstanding warrant for aggravated assault. Officer Hoggard received an LPR alert, confirmed the vehicle’s connection to Porter through a computer check, and conducted a traffic stop. During the stop, Hoggard detained Porter and, while interacting with him, observed the barrel and slide of a firearm, as well as a silver automatic conversion switch, protruding from under the driver’s seat. The officer later retrieved the firearm—a Glock pistol equipped with a machinegun conversion switch—during an inventory search of the vehicle.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi denied Porter’s motions to suppress both the LPR-derived vehicle location data and the firearm, ruling that use of the LPR data did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, that the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, and that the plain view and inevitable discovery doctrines applied to the firearm. The court also rejected Porter’s argument that 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), which prohibits possession of a machinegun, was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. Porter waived a jury trial and was found guilty in a bench trial.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. It held that use of the LPR system to identify Porter’s vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment because there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in movements on public roads or in license plate information, and the LPR data was not as comprehensive as cell-site location data. The court further held that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, the firearm was lawfully seized under the plain view doctrine, and Fifth Circuit precedent foreclosed Porter’s Second Amendment challenge to § 922(o). The conviction was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60163/25-60163-2026-03-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Porter" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Police in Gautier, Mississippi, used an automatic license plate reader (LPR) system to identify a vehicle associated with Elijah Porter, who was wanted on an outstanding warrant for aggravated assault. Officer Hoggard received an LPR alert, confirmed the vehicle’s connection to Porter through a computer check, and conducted a traffic stop. During the stop, Hoggard detained Porter and, while interacting with him, observed the barrel and slide of a firearm, as well as a silver automatic conversion switch, protruding from under the driver’s seat. The officer later retrieved the firearm—a Glock pistol equipped with a machinegun conversion switch—during an inventory search of the vehicle.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi denied Porter’s motions to suppress both the LPR-derived vehicle location data and the firearm, ruling that use of the LPR data did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, that the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, and that the plain view and inevitable discovery doctrines applied to the firearm. The court also rejected Porter’s argument that 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), which prohibits possession of a machinegun, was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. Porter waived a jury trial and was found guilty in a bench trial.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. It held that use of the LPR system to identify Porter’s vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment because there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in movements on public roads or in license plate information, and the LPR data was not as comprehensive as cell-site location data. The court further held that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, the firearm was lawfully seized under the plain view doctrine, and Fifth Circuit precedent foreclosed Porter’s Second Amendment challenge to § 922(o). The conviction was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10434/25-10434-2026-03-17.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Hamilton</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-17T15:30:28-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-17T15:30:28-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10434/25-10434-2026-03-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant, employed as a daycare worker, took and distributed a sexually explicit photograph of an infant in her care. She pleaded guilty to one count of production and attempted production of child pornography under a plea agreement that included a waiver of her right to appeal, except in certain circumstances. At sentencing, the government advocated for the statutory maximum sentence and, in doing so, referenced the defendant’s sex as making her conduct more shocking and suggested that a lengthy sentence would prevent her from having children in the future. The district court ultimately imposed the statutory maximum sentence but did not mention the defendant’s sex as a reason for the sentence.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas accepted the guilty plea and sentenced the defendant to 360 months in prison, 10 years of supervised release, and restitution. The defendant did not object to the prosecutor’s comments regarding her sex at the sentencing hearing. She appealed, arguing that the government’s statements violated her Fifth Amendment right to equal protection and that the appeal waiver in her plea agreement did not bar her appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and applied the plain-error standard, as the defendant had not objected to the statements in the district court. The appellate court concluded that the district court did not rely on the prosecutor’s references to the defendant’s sex when imposing sentence. Because the defendant could not show that the government’s statements affected her substantial rights or that a structural error had occurred, the Fifth Circuit held that there was no reversible error. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10434/25-10434-2026-03-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Hamilton" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant, employed as a daycare worker, took and distributed a sexually explicit photograph of an infant in her care. She pleaded guilty to one count of production and attempted production of child pornography under a plea agreement that included a waiver of her right to appeal, except in certain circumstances. At sentencing, the government advocated for the statutory maximum sentence and, in doing so, referenced the defendant’s sex as making her conduct more shocking and suggested that a lengthy sentence would prevent her from having children in the future. The district court ultimately imposed the statutory maximum sentence but did not mention the defendant’s sex as a reason for the sentence.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas accepted the guilty plea and sentenced the defendant to 360 months in prison, 10 years of supervised release, and restitution. The defendant did not object to the prosecutor’s comments regarding her sex at the sentencing hearing. She appealed, arguing that the government’s statements violated her Fifth Amendment right to equal protection and that the appeal waiver in her plea agreement did not bar her appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and applied the plain-error standard, as the defendant had not objected to the statements in the district court. The appellate court concluded that the district court did not rely on the prosecutor’s references to the defendant’s sex when imposing sentence. Because the defendant could not show that the government’s statements affected her substantial rights or that a structural error had occurred, the Fifth Circuit held that there was no reversible error. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40673/24-40673-2026-03-16.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Garcia</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-16T15:30:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-16T15:30:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40673/24-40673-2026-03-16.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In this case, a witness in Laredo, Texas, reported hearing multiple gunshots fired from a black Cadillac SUV with a missing right rear taillight. Police responded, gathered shell casings, and located a gray Cadillac SRX matching the description, which had been previously stopped by police several days earlier with Jesus Eloy Garcia as one of the passengers. Based on the witness’s account, investigative findings, and past police encounters, law enforcement issued a “be-on-the-lookout” (BOLO) alert identifying the vehicle, its distinguishing features, and possible occupants. Later that day, officers located the Cadillac with three occupants, including Garcia, and conducted an investigatory stop. During the stop, Garcia was questioned, and bodycam footage was recorded.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Garcia’s motion to suppress the bodycam evidence, ruling that the investigatory stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. Garcia subsequently pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm but reserved his right to appeal the denial of the suppression motion. He argued on appeal that the stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion and that the BOLO lacked the necessary specificity, so the evidence derived from the stop should be excluded.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the investigatory stop was supported by reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances. The court found that the BOLO contained sufficient detail, was based on multiple sources, and provided an adequate basis for the stop. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, rejecting Garcia’s arguments and upholding the denial of the motion to suppress. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40673/24-40673-2026-03-16.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Garcia" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In this case, a witness in Laredo, Texas, reported hearing multiple gunshots fired from a black Cadillac SUV with a missing right rear taillight. Police responded, gathered shell casings, and located a gray Cadillac SRX matching the description, which had been previously stopped by police several days earlier with Jesus Eloy Garcia as one of the passengers. Based on the witness’s account, investigative findings, and past police encounters, law enforcement issued a “be-on-the-lookout” (BOLO) alert identifying the vehicle, its distinguishing features, and possible occupants. Later that day, officers located the Cadillac with three occupants, including Garcia, and conducted an investigatory stop. During the stop, Garcia was questioned, and bodycam footage was recorded.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Garcia’s motion to suppress the bodycam evidence, ruling that the investigatory stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. Garcia subsequently pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm but reserved his right to appeal the denial of the suppression motion. He argued on appeal that the stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion and that the BOLO lacked the necessary specificity, so the evidence derived from the stop should be excluded.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the investigatory stop was supported by reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances. The court found that the BOLO contained sufficient detail, was based on multiple sources, and provided an adequate basis for the stop. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, rejecting Garcia’s arguments and upholding the denial of the motion to suppress.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jennifer Elrod</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20018/25-20018-2026-03-16.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Villafana-Mondragon</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-16T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-16T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20018/25-20018-2026-03-16.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant pled guilty to illegally reentering the United States after a felony conviction. His Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) recommended two discretionary conditions of supervised release: that he report to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) upon release and, if allowed to return to the United States, report to probation within 72 hours, and that he seek proper work authorization from ICE before working. Neither the defendant nor the government objected to these conditions before or during sentencing.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas conducted the sentencing. At the hearing, the court confirmed that both parties had reviewed the PSR and that no objections had been filed. The court specifically asked defense counsel if she had reviewed with the defendant the fact that no objections were made, and counsel confirmed this. The court then orally adopted the PSR and its appendix, which included the supervised-release conditions, and imposed the sentence. The written judgment reflected these conditions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The defendant argued that the district court failed to adequately pronounce the conditions and did not properly verify, as required by United States v. Diggles and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(1)(A), that he had reviewed the PSR with counsel. The appellate court found that the district court’s oral adoption of the PSR satisfied Diggles and that the record showed the defendant had ample opportunity to review the PSR with counsel. The court also determined that the verification requirement of Rule 32 was met and that there was no plain error. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the sentence. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20018/25-20018-2026-03-16.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Villafana-Mondragon" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant pled guilty to illegally reentering the United States after a felony conviction. His Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) recommended two discretionary conditions of supervised release: that he report to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) upon release and, if allowed to return to the United States, report to probation within 72 hours, and that he seek proper work authorization from ICE before working. Neither the defendant nor the government objected to these conditions before or during sentencing.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas conducted the sentencing. At the hearing, the court confirmed that both parties had reviewed the PSR and that no objections had been filed. The court specifically asked defense counsel if she had reviewed with the defendant the fact that no objections were made, and counsel confirmed this. The court then orally adopted the PSR and its appendix, which included the supervised-release conditions, and imposed the sentence. The written judgment reflected these conditions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The defendant argued that the district court failed to adequately pronounce the conditions and did not properly verify, as required by United States v. Diggles and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(1)(A), that he had reviewed the PSR with counsel. The appellate court found that the district court’s oral adoption of the PSR satisfied Diggles and that the record showed the defendant had ample opportunity to review the PSR with counsel. The court also determined that the verification requirement of Rule 32 was met and that there was no plain error. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the sentence.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stuart Kyle Duncan</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Immigration Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-10860/24-10860-2026-03-16.html</id>
        	<title>Clouse v. Southern Methodist University</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-16T10:00:55-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-16T10:00:55-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-10860/24-10860-2026-03-16.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A group of former student-athletes filed suit against a university, alleging that between 2012 and 2015, they sustained serious hip injuries while participating on the university&#039;s women&#039;s rowing team. They claimed that the injuries were caused by deficient coaching, athletic training, and medical care, which they argued were influenced by systemic gender-based disparities. The athletes pursued claims under Title IX for gender discrimination and under Texas law for negligence. The university moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claims were barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas agreed with the university as to eight plaintiffs, granting summary judgment and finding their claims time-barred. For a ninth plaintiff, the district court partially granted and partially denied summary judgment, allowing some claims for compensatory damages to proceed. The plaintiffs appealed the ruling for the eight time-barred claims, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the claims were indeed barred by the statute of limitations.

Following summary judgment, the university sought to recover litigation costs as the prevailing party under Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 1920. The district court found the university to be a prevailing party and awarded the majority of the costs requested, after reducing the amount. The plaintiffs appealed the cost award. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the university was properly designated the prevailing party, that none of the factors in Pacheco v. Mineta weighed against awarding costs, and that the university had met its burden to show the necessity and amount of costs sought. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s award of costs. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-10860/24-10860-2026-03-16.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Clouse v. Southern Methodist University" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A group of former student-athletes filed suit against a university, alleging that between 2012 and 2015, they sustained serious hip injuries while participating on the university&#039;s women&#039;s rowing team. They claimed that the injuries were caused by deficient coaching, athletic training, and medical care, which they argued were influenced by systemic gender-based disparities. The athletes pursued claims under Title IX for gender discrimination and under Texas law for negligence. The university moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claims were barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas agreed with the university as to eight plaintiffs, granting summary judgment and finding their claims time-barred. For a ninth plaintiff, the district court partially granted and partially denied summary judgment, allowing some claims for compensatory damages to proceed. The plaintiffs appealed the ruling for the eight time-barred claims, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the claims were indeed barred by the statute of limitations.

Following summary judgment, the university sought to recover litigation costs as the prevailing party under Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 1920. The district court found the university to be a prevailing party and awarded the majority of the costs requested, after reducing the amount. The plaintiffs appealed the cost award. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the university was properly designated the prevailing party, that none of the factors in Pacheco v. Mineta weighed against awarding costs, and that the university had met its burden to show the necessity and amount of costs sought. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s award of costs.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Personal Injury"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40126/25-40126-2026-03-13.html</id>
        	<title>Cambric v. City of Corpus Christi</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-13T15:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-13T15:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40126/25-40126-2026-03-13.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The plaintiff owned a building in Corpus Christi, Texas, with significant cultural and historical importance, particularly within the Black community. Over several years, the City’s Code Enforcement Division cited the property for structural deficiencies and ultimately recommended its demolition. Despite the plaintiff’s efforts to preserve the building for historic purposes, the Building Standards Board voted to recommend demolition at a hearing that the plaintiff and her counsel could not attend. After the City temporarily suspended the demolition order, it imposed conditions on the plaintiff to secure the property, which the City later deemed unmet. The City then gave the plaintiff 30 days to demolish the building or face further action.

The plaintiff filed suit in Texas state court against the City and two City employees, alleging that selective enforcement of building codes violated her rights under the Equal Protection Clause, asserting a “class of one” theory under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, finding that the plaintiff had not sufficiently pleaded a substantive constitutional violation and thus did not reach the question of municipal liability.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed only the claim against the City, as the plaintiff did not pursue claims against the individual defendants. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The court held that the plaintiff’s allegations did not establish a municipal policy, custom, or pattern of selective enforcement sufficient to state a claim for municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services. The court found that a single cited instance of allegedly selective enforcement was insufficient to plead an official policy or custom. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the action. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-40126/25-40126-2026-03-13.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Cambric v. City of Corpus Christi" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The plaintiff owned a building in Corpus Christi, Texas, with significant cultural and historical importance, particularly within the Black community. Over several years, the City’s Code Enforcement Division cited the property for structural deficiencies and ultimately recommended its demolition. Despite the plaintiff’s efforts to preserve the building for historic purposes, the Building Standards Board voted to recommend demolition at a hearing that the plaintiff and her counsel could not attend. After the City temporarily suspended the demolition order, it imposed conditions on the plaintiff to secure the property, which the City later deemed unmet. The City then gave the plaintiff 30 days to demolish the building or face further action.

The plaintiff filed suit in Texas state court against the City and two City employees, alleging that selective enforcement of building codes violated her rights under the Equal Protection Clause, asserting a “class of one” theory under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, finding that the plaintiff had not sufficiently pleaded a substantive constitutional violation and thus did not reach the question of municipal liability.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed only the claim against the City, as the plaintiff did not pursue claims against the individual defendants. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The court held that the plaintiff’s allegations did not establish a municipal policy, custom, or pattern of selective enforcement sufficient to state a claim for municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services. The court found that a single cited instance of allegedly selective enforcement was insufficient to plead an official policy or custom. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the action.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-13</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30266/25-30266-2026-03-12.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Lanaute</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-12T10:03:40-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-12T10:03:40-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30266/25-30266-2026-03-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant entered a bank in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and gave a cashier a note demanding money and threatening harm to everyone present. Believing he was armed, the cashier complied, handing over approximately $20,000. The defendant was later arrested and pled guilty to bank robbery under federal law. In the presentence report, the probation officer recommended a career-offender sentencing enhancement based on two prior Louisiana convictions: one for armed robbery and another for attempted armed robbery.

At sentencing, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana agreed with the presentence report&#039;s assessment and found that the defendant qualified as a career offender under the United States Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1(a). As a result, the defendant’s offense level and criminal history category were increased, resulting in a recommended guideline range of 151 to 188 months. The district court sentenced the defendant to 151 months in prison and three years of supervised release. The defendant objected, arguing that Louisiana armed robbery does not categorically qualify as a “crime of violence” for purposes of the Guidelines.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s determination de novo. The appellate court concluded that Louisiana’s armed robbery statute requires the intentional use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force, and not merely reckless or negligent conduct. The court found that the defendant failed to show any realistic probability that Louisiana would apply its statute to unintentional acts. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit held that Louisiana armed robbery constitutes a “crime of violence” under the force clause of the Sentencing Guidelines and affirmed the district court’s sentence. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30266/25-30266-2026-03-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Lanaute" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant entered a bank in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and gave a cashier a note demanding money and threatening harm to everyone present. Believing he was armed, the cashier complied, handing over approximately $20,000. The defendant was later arrested and pled guilty to bank robbery under federal law. In the presentence report, the probation officer recommended a career-offender sentencing enhancement based on two prior Louisiana convictions: one for armed robbery and another for attempted armed robbery.

At sentencing, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana agreed with the presentence report&#039;s assessment and found that the defendant qualified as a career offender under the United States Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1(a). As a result, the defendant’s offense level and criminal history category were increased, resulting in a recommended guideline range of 151 to 188 months. The district court sentenced the defendant to 151 months in prison and three years of supervised release. The defendant objected, arguing that Louisiana armed robbery does not categorically qualify as a “crime of violence” for purposes of the Guidelines.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s determination de novo. The appellate court concluded that Louisiana’s armed robbery statute requires the intentional use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force, and not merely reckless or negligent conduct. The court found that the defendant failed to show any realistic probability that Louisiana would apply its statute to unintentional acts. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit held that Louisiana armed robbery constitutes a “crime of violence” under the force clause of the Sentencing Guidelines and affirmed the district court’s sentence.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stuart Kyle Duncan</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20477/24-20477-2026-03-10.html</id>
        	<title>Storey Minerals v. EP Energy E&amp;P</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-10T15:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-10T15:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20477/24-20477-2026-03-10.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several landowners in South Texas leased mineral rights to a company that later filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. During the bankruptcy proceedings, the company, responding to a collapse in oil prices during the COVID-19 pandemic, temporarily halted production on wells within the leased premises for about 40 days before resuming operations. The bankruptcy court subsequently confirmed the company’s reorganization plan, which included a set deadline for filing administrative expense claims.

The landowners, asserting that the company’s temporary cessation of production had automatically terminated their leases under the leases’ terms and Texas law, filed a motion in bankruptcy court seeking administrative expense priority for damages related to alleged post-termination trespass. They also sought to have a state court adjudicate whether the leases had terminated and whether trespass damages were owed, arguing that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction or should abstain from deciding these underlying state-law issues. The bankruptcy court determined that it had core jurisdiction to decide the administrative expense claim, which included resolving the validity of the underlying lease-termination and trespass claims. The court found that the temporary cessation did not terminate the leases, denied the administrative expense claim, and declined to abstain. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning jurisdiction, abstention, and the application of Texas law.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the bankruptcy court properly exercised jurisdiction over the administrative expense claim, which necessarily included resolving the underlying state-law lease-termination and trespass issues. The Fifth Circuit further held that, under the express terms of the leases and Texas law, the temporary cessation of production did not result in automatic termination, as production was resumed well within the contractual 120-day period. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower courts’ rulings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20477/24-20477-2026-03-10.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Storey Minerals v. EP Energy E&amp;P" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several landowners in South Texas leased mineral rights to a company that later filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. During the bankruptcy proceedings, the company, responding to a collapse in oil prices during the COVID-19 pandemic, temporarily halted production on wells within the leased premises for about 40 days before resuming operations. The bankruptcy court subsequently confirmed the company’s reorganization plan, which included a set deadline for filing administrative expense claims.

The landowners, asserting that the company’s temporary cessation of production had automatically terminated their leases under the leases’ terms and Texas law, filed a motion in bankruptcy court seeking administrative expense priority for damages related to alleged post-termination trespass. They also sought to have a state court adjudicate whether the leases had terminated and whether trespass damages were owed, arguing that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction or should abstain from deciding these underlying state-law issues. The bankruptcy court determined that it had core jurisdiction to decide the administrative expense claim, which included resolving the validity of the underlying lease-termination and trespass claims. The court found that the temporary cessation did not terminate the leases, denied the administrative expense claim, and declined to abstain. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning jurisdiction, abstention, and the application of Texas law.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the bankruptcy court properly exercised jurisdiction over the administrative expense claim, which necessarily included resolving the underlying state-law lease-termination and trespass issues. The Fifth Circuit further held that, under the express terms of the leases and Texas law, the temporary cessation of production did not result in automatic termination, as production was resumed well within the contractual 120-day period. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower courts’ rulings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-10</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kurt Engelhardt</case:judge>
													<category term="Bankruptcy"/>
							<category term="Energy, Oil &amp; Gas Law"/>
							<category term="Real Estate &amp; Property Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10977/25-10977-2026-03-10.html</id>
        	<title>Deras v. Johnson &amp; Johnson</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-10T10:02:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-10T10:02:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10977/25-10977-2026-03-10.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case centers on a plaintiff who filed a Fair Labor Standards Act suit for unpaid wages and recordkeeping violations against his former employer. The plaintiff’s attorney, who neither resides nor holds an office near the courthouse, failed to appoint local counsel within the required timeframe due to a calendaring error. Pursuant to the district court’s local rule, a notice was issued warning that failure to comply could result in dismissal. After the deadline passed without compliance, the district court dismissed the case without prejudice, citing failure to prosecute or comply with court rules.

Following the dismissal, the plaintiff promptly moved to reopen the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), arguing that his attorney’s oversight constituted excusable neglect, and appointed local counsel. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that the plaintiff had not shown that dismissal without prejudice amounted to dismissal with prejudice, and cited prior Fifth Circuit cases as support. The plaintiff filed a second motion, distinguishing his case from the cited cases and again seeking relief, but the district court denied this motion as well, applying the same reasoning.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the denial of the Rule 60(b) motions for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that the district court erred by imposing a requirement that the plaintiff show dismissal without prejudice functioned as a dismissal with prejudice before granting relief under Rule 60(b). The Fifth Circuit clarified that neither Campbell v. Wilkinson nor Jones v. Meridian Security Insurance Company established such a standard for Rule 60(b) motions. The appellate court vacated the district court’s denials of the plaintiff’s motions and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the district court to consider the proper factors for excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1). &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10977/25-10977-2026-03-10.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Deras v. Johnson &amp; Johnson" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case centers on a plaintiff who filed a Fair Labor Standards Act suit for unpaid wages and recordkeeping violations against his former employer. The plaintiff’s attorney, who neither resides nor holds an office near the courthouse, failed to appoint local counsel within the required timeframe due to a calendaring error. Pursuant to the district court’s local rule, a notice was issued warning that failure to comply could result in dismissal. After the deadline passed without compliance, the district court dismissed the case without prejudice, citing failure to prosecute or comply with court rules.

Following the dismissal, the plaintiff promptly moved to reopen the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), arguing that his attorney’s oversight constituted excusable neglect, and appointed local counsel. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that the plaintiff had not shown that dismissal without prejudice amounted to dismissal with prejudice, and cited prior Fifth Circuit cases as support. The plaintiff filed a second motion, distinguishing his case from the cited cases and again seeking relief, but the district court denied this motion as well, applying the same reasoning.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the denial of the Rule 60(b) motions for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that the district court erred by imposing a requirement that the plaintiff show dismissal without prejudice functioned as a dismissal with prejudice before granting relief under Rule 60(b). The Fifth Circuit clarified that neither Campbell v. Wilkinson nor Jones v. Meridian Security Insurance Company established such a standard for Rule 60(b) motions. The appellate court vacated the district court’s denials of the plaintiff’s motions and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the district court to consider the proper factors for excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1).
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-10</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jacques Wiener</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-70014/25-70014-2026-03-09.html</id>
        	<title>Ayestas v. Harris County</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-09T15:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-09T15:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-70014/25-70014-2026-03-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In 1995, a woman was murdered in Houston, and Carlos Ayestas was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. Years later, Ayestas’s counsel discovered an internal memorandum from the prosecution recommending the death penalty in part because Ayestas was not a U.S. citizen. This memorandum had not been disclosed during Ayestas’s trial. Ayestas then sought to amend his federal habeas petition to add Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment selective-prosecution claims, arguing that the prosecution’s decision was improperly influenced by his non-citizen status.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Ayestas’s motion to amend, finding it constituted a “second or successive habeas corpus application” barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) because the claims could have been discovered earlier with due diligence. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions clarified the law on what constitutes a “second or successive” application, prompting Ayestas to seek relief under Rule 60(b). The district court granted this motion, allowed discovery on Ayestas’s selective-prosecution claims, and ordered the Harris County District Attorney’s Office (HCDA) to produce decades of charging memoranda and the full prosecutorial file.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the discovery order was immediately appealable by the HCDA under the collateral-order doctrine. The Fifth Circuit determined the district court lacked jurisdiction over Ayestas’s selective-prosecution claims because both his 2015 motion to amend and his later Rule 60(b) motion constituted successive habeas applications barred by § 2244(b). The court concluded that Ayestas had not shown the claims were based on a new rule of constitutional law or that the underlying facts could not have been discovered earlier with due diligence. The Fifth Circuit vacated the discovery order and dismissed the selective-prosecution claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-70014/25-70014-2026-03-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Ayestas v. Harris County" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In 1995, a woman was murdered in Houston, and Carlos Ayestas was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. Years later, Ayestas’s counsel discovered an internal memorandum from the prosecution recommending the death penalty in part because Ayestas was not a U.S. citizen. This memorandum had not been disclosed during Ayestas’s trial. Ayestas then sought to amend his federal habeas petition to add Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment selective-prosecution claims, arguing that the prosecution’s decision was improperly influenced by his non-citizen status.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Ayestas’s motion to amend, finding it constituted a “second or successive habeas corpus application” barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) because the claims could have been discovered earlier with due diligence. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions clarified the law on what constitutes a “second or successive” application, prompting Ayestas to seek relief under Rule 60(b). The district court granted this motion, allowed discovery on Ayestas’s selective-prosecution claims, and ordered the Harris County District Attorney’s Office (HCDA) to produce decades of charging memoranda and the full prosecutorial file.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the discovery order was immediately appealable by the HCDA under the collateral-order doctrine. The Fifth Circuit determined the district court lacked jurisdiction over Ayestas’s selective-prosecution claims because both his 2015 motion to amend and his later Rule 60(b) motion constituted successive habeas applications barred by § 2244(b). The court concluded that Ayestas had not shown the claims were based on a new rule of constitutional law or that the underlying facts could not have been discovered earlier with due diligence. The Fifth Circuit vacated the discovery order and dismissed the selective-prosecution claims.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20125/25-20125-2026-03-09.html</id>
        	<title>Barber v. Rounds</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-09T15:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-09T15:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20125/25-20125-2026-03-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A teacher at a Texas junior high school, who is a practicing Christian, regularly engaged in prayer and Bible study with other teachers before the school day. In September 2023, she invited staff to join her in prayer at the school flagpole prior to a student-led prayer event. The school principal responded by stating that district policy prohibited employees from praying “with or in the presence of students” and clarified that even if students were not directly involved, teachers could not pray where students might see them, even before official school hours. When the teacher and colleagues prayed near the flagpole, the principal stopped them, reiterating the prohibition on visible religious conduct.

The teacher filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, alleging violations of her First Amendment free speech and free exercise rights, as well as Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process claims, and state law claims. The district court denied the principal’s motion to dismiss on the grounds of qualified immunity regarding the First Amendment and equal protection claims, but granted dismissal of the due process claim. The court held that the complaint plausibly alleged a categorical, visibility-based restriction on teacher prayer, and that Kennedy v. Bremerton School District had clearly established the unconstitutionality of such conduct.

On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the denial of qualified immunity de novo. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity for the free speech and free exercise claims, holding that a categorical ban on visible private prayer by teachers, merely because students might observe, violated clearly established First Amendment rights. However, the appellate court reversed as to the equal protection claim, finding that the teacher had not alleged facts showing the principal individually treated her differently than similarly situated employees. The disposition was affirmed in part and reversed in part. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20125/25-20125-2026-03-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Barber v. Rounds" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A teacher at a Texas junior high school, who is a practicing Christian, regularly engaged in prayer and Bible study with other teachers before the school day. In September 2023, she invited staff to join her in prayer at the school flagpole prior to a student-led prayer event. The school principal responded by stating that district policy prohibited employees from praying “with or in the presence of students” and clarified that even if students were not directly involved, teachers could not pray where students might see them, even before official school hours. When the teacher and colleagues prayed near the flagpole, the principal stopped them, reiterating the prohibition on visible religious conduct.

The teacher filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, alleging violations of her First Amendment free speech and free exercise rights, as well as Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process claims, and state law claims. The district court denied the principal’s motion to dismiss on the grounds of qualified immunity regarding the First Amendment and equal protection claims, but granted dismissal of the due process claim. The court held that the complaint plausibly alleged a categorical, visibility-based restriction on teacher prayer, and that Kennedy v. Bremerton School District had clearly established the unconstitutionality of such conduct.

On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the denial of qualified immunity de novo. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity for the free speech and free exercise claims, holding that a categorical ban on visible private prayer by teachers, merely because students might observe, violated clearly established First Amendment rights. However, the appellate court reversed as to the equal protection claim, finding that the teacher had not alleged facts showing the principal individually treated her differently than similarly situated employees. The disposition was affirmed in part and reversed in part.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Cory Wilson</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40632/24-40632-2026-03-09.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Ponce</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-09T10:01:38-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-09T10:01:38-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40632/24-40632-2026-03-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves an early-morning stop of Juan Jose Ponce at a border checkpoint in Sarita, Texas, where a Border Patrol agent, Carlos Garcia, questioned him and observed unusual features in his vehicle. Ponce was driving an SUV with a roof rack but was transporting a ladder inside the car, which Garcia found atypical. Ponce appeared nervous and wore a surgical mask despite traveling alone. Upon request, Ponce consented to unlocking and opening the back hatch of his SUV for Garcia to look inside. During this inspection, Garcia noticed a speaker box with loose screws, which—based on his experience—suggested it might conceal contraband or a person. Garcia opened the speaker box and found a woman unlawfully in the United States. Ponce was indicted for transporting an undocumented person.

Proceedings began in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, where Ponce moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search of the speaker box exceeded his consent and lacked probable cause. The district court held a hearing where both Ponce and Garcia testified. The court found Ponce’s consent to be valid, voluntary, and extending to containers within the vehicle. Even if consent did not reach the speaker box, the court determined Garcia obtained probable cause during his inspection. The district court denied the suppression motion, and Ponce entered a conditional guilty plea while preserving his right to appeal.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the lower court’s findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that, based on the totality of the circumstances, Garcia obtained probable cause to search the speaker box during the consensual inspection. The court affirmed that Garcia’s actions were consistent with the Fourth Amendment, and upheld the denial of Ponce’s motion to suppress. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-40632/24-40632-2026-03-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Ponce" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves an early-morning stop of Juan Jose Ponce at a border checkpoint in Sarita, Texas, where a Border Patrol agent, Carlos Garcia, questioned him and observed unusual features in his vehicle. Ponce was driving an SUV with a roof rack but was transporting a ladder inside the car, which Garcia found atypical. Ponce appeared nervous and wore a surgical mask despite traveling alone. Upon request, Ponce consented to unlocking and opening the back hatch of his SUV for Garcia to look inside. During this inspection, Garcia noticed a speaker box with loose screws, which—based on his experience—suggested it might conceal contraband or a person. Garcia opened the speaker box and found a woman unlawfully in the United States. Ponce was indicted for transporting an undocumented person.

Proceedings began in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, where Ponce moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search of the speaker box exceeded his consent and lacked probable cause. The district court held a hearing where both Ponce and Garcia testified. The court found Ponce’s consent to be valid, voluntary, and extending to containers within the vehicle. Even if consent did not reach the speaker box, the court determined Garcia obtained probable cause during his inspection. The district court denied the suppression motion, and Ponce entered a conditional guilty plea while preserving his right to appeal.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the lower court’s findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that, based on the totality of the circumstances, Garcia obtained probable cause to search the speaker box during the consensual inspection. The court affirmed that Garcia’s actions were consistent with the Fourth Amendment, and upheld the denial of Ponce’s motion to suppress.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Immigration Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-10713/24-10713-2026-03-09.html</id>
        	<title>Ferguson v. Lockheed Martin</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-09T10:01:38-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-09T10:01:38-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-10713/24-10713-2026-03-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		An employee of a major defense contractor, serving in a senior internal audit role, claimed to have discovered fraudulent activity involving government contracts for military aircraft. The contractor, which assembles aircraft using parts supplied by numerous subcontractors, is subject to detailed regulatory requirements intended to ensure fair pricing, including the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA), the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). The plaintiff alleged that the contractor systematically ignored and concealed fraudulent inflation of cost and pricing data by its subcontractors, resulting in overbilling the government.

The plaintiff brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), which allows private individuals to sue on behalf of the government. Previously, another relator had filed a separate FCA action against the same contractor, alleging a different fraudulent scheme: obtaining parts in bulk at a discount but charging the government full price. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the plaintiff’s suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ruling that the FCA’s “first-to-file” bar applied because the earlier action covered the same essential elements of fraud.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The appellate court found that the two complaints alleged distinct fraudulent schemes: one involving bulk pricing manipulation, and the other involving the submission of inflated subcontractor cost data. The Fifth Circuit held that the first-to-file bar under the FCA did not apply because the plaintiff’s complaint was based on a different mechanism of fraud, not merely additional details or locations of the same scheme. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-10713/24-10713-2026-03-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Ferguson v. Lockheed Martin" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                An employee of a major defense contractor, serving in a senior internal audit role, claimed to have discovered fraudulent activity involving government contracts for military aircraft. The contractor, which assembles aircraft using parts supplied by numerous subcontractors, is subject to detailed regulatory requirements intended to ensure fair pricing, including the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA), the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). The plaintiff alleged that the contractor systematically ignored and concealed fraudulent inflation of cost and pricing data by its subcontractors, resulting in overbilling the government.

The plaintiff brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), which allows private individuals to sue on behalf of the government. Previously, another relator had filed a separate FCA action against the same contractor, alleging a different fraudulent scheme: obtaining parts in bulk at a discount but charging the government full price. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the plaintiff’s suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ruling that the FCA’s “first-to-file” bar applied because the earlier action covered the same essential elements of fraud.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The appellate court found that the two complaints alleged distinct fraudulent schemes: one involving bulk pricing manipulation, and the other involving the submission of inflated subcontractor cost data. The Fifth Circuit held that the first-to-file bar under the FCA did not apply because the plaintiff’s complaint was based on a different mechanism of fraud, not merely additional details or locations of the same scheme. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James Graves</case:judge>
													<category term="Aerospace/Defense"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Government Contracts"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30259/25-30259-2026-03-09.html</id>
        	<title>Savage v. LaSalle Management</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-09T10:01:38-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-09T10:01:38-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30259/25-30259-2026-03-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The plaintiff brought employment discrimination and retaliation claims against the defendants, his former employers, alleging violations of federal and state law. After initiating the lawsuit in July 2021, the plaintiff failed over several years to respond to the defendants’ discovery requests, despite multiple court orders and continuances. The plaintiff’s attorney repeatedly missed deadlines, did not answer interrogatories or produce documents, and failed to pay court-ordered attorney’s fees. Even after the court vacated its scheduling order, delayed the trial multiple times, and assessed additional attorney’s fees, the plaintiff’s counsel did not advance the case, leading to three continuances and a case that remained undeveloped.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana responded to the plaintiff’s ongoing lack of participation by granting the defendants’ motion to exclude all evidence when the fourth trial date approached with no discovery completed. The plaintiff’s counsel did not attend the status conference regarding the exclusion motion despite acknowledging notice. With no admissible evidence remaining, the court then granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the case with prejudice.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed both the exclusion of evidence and the dismissal with prejudice for abuse of discretion. The court held that the district court correctly applied the standard four-factor test for exclusion of evidence as a discovery sanction and was not required to apply a heightened standard for litigation-ending sanctions. The court further found that a clear record of delay existed, lesser sanctions had proven futile, and the defendants were prejudiced by the plaintiff’s failures. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment dismissing the case with prejudice. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30259/25-30259-2026-03-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Savage v. LaSalle Management" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The plaintiff brought employment discrimination and retaliation claims against the defendants, his former employers, alleging violations of federal and state law. After initiating the lawsuit in July 2021, the plaintiff failed over several years to respond to the defendants’ discovery requests, despite multiple court orders and continuances. The plaintiff’s attorney repeatedly missed deadlines, did not answer interrogatories or produce documents, and failed to pay court-ordered attorney’s fees. Even after the court vacated its scheduling order, delayed the trial multiple times, and assessed additional attorney’s fees, the plaintiff’s counsel did not advance the case, leading to three continuances and a case that remained undeveloped.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana responded to the plaintiff’s ongoing lack of participation by granting the defendants’ motion to exclude all evidence when the fourth trial date approached with no discovery completed. The plaintiff’s counsel did not attend the status conference regarding the exclusion motion despite acknowledging notice. With no admissible evidence remaining, the court then granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the case with prejudice.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed both the exclusion of evidence and the dismissal with prejudice for abuse of discretion. The court held that the district court correctly applied the standard four-factor test for exclusion of evidence as a discovery sanction and was not required to apply a heightened standard for litigation-ending sanctions. The court further found that a clear record of delay existed, lesser sanctions had proven futile, and the defendants were prejudiced by the plaintiff’s failures. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment dismissing the case with prejudice.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-10708/24-10708-2026-03-09.html</id>
        	<title>Sambrano v. United Airlines</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-09T10:01:37-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-09T10:01:37-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-10708/24-10708-2026-03-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several employees of United Airlines challenged the company&#039;s COVID-19 vaccine mandate, alleging that United failed to provide reasonable religious and medical accommodations, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). United required all U.S. employees to be vaccinated by specific deadlines unless granted a religious or medical exemption. Employees seeking a religious accommodation needed to provide a personal statement of belief and a third-party attestation; those seeking a medical exemption had to submit supporting medical documentation. United initially planned to place all exempted employees on unpaid leave but later revised its policy for non-customer-facing employees, allowing them to work with masking and testing requirements, while customer-facing employees remained on indefinite unpaid leave.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas considered and partially granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. The district court rejected a class seeking injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2) and a subclass of employees subject to masking and testing requirements, finding that the proposed classes lacked commonality and predominance due to the individualized nature of harm and the need for separate inquiries into the circumstances of each member. The court certified a modified subclass under Rule 23(b)(3) consisting of religious-accommodation seekers who were placed on unpaid leave but excluded those with medical accommodations from the subclass.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the class certification order under an abuse of discretion standard. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the broader classes and subclasses due to the individualized nature of the claims and in certifying the subclass of religious-accommodation seekers placed on unpaid leave. The court found that common questions predominated and that a class action was a superior method of adjudication for that subclass. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-10708/24-10708-2026-03-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Sambrano v. United Airlines" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several employees of United Airlines challenged the company&#039;s COVID-19 vaccine mandate, alleging that United failed to provide reasonable religious and medical accommodations, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). United required all U.S. employees to be vaccinated by specific deadlines unless granted a religious or medical exemption. Employees seeking a religious accommodation needed to provide a personal statement of belief and a third-party attestation; those seeking a medical exemption had to submit supporting medical documentation. United initially planned to place all exempted employees on unpaid leave but later revised its policy for non-customer-facing employees, allowing them to work with masking and testing requirements, while customer-facing employees remained on indefinite unpaid leave.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas considered and partially granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. The district court rejected a class seeking injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2) and a subclass of employees subject to masking and testing requirements, finding that the proposed classes lacked commonality and predominance due to the individualized nature of harm and the need for separate inquiries into the circumstances of each member. The court certified a modified subclass under Rule 23(b)(3) consisting of religious-accommodation seekers who were placed on unpaid leave but excluded those with medical accommodations from the subclass.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the class certification order under an abuse of discretion standard. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the broader classes and subclasses due to the individualized nature of the claims and in certifying the subclass of religious-accommodation seekers placed on unpaid leave. The court found that common questions predominated and that a class action was a superior method of adjudication for that subclass.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kurt Engelhardt</case:judge>
													<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20131/25-20131-2026-03-06.html</id>
        	<title>Renteria v. Grieg Star AS</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-06T16:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-06T16:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20131/25-20131-2026-03-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A maritime worker was injured while unloading cargo from a vessel managed by Grieg Star AS. The worker, employed by a stevedoring company, fell ten feet when she stepped onto plastic sheeting covering a gap between rolls of cargo in the ship’s hold. The cargo, consisting of large rolls of kraft liner board, had been loaded by longshoremen overseas, and plastic sheeting was used to cover gaps between layers. The injured worker had been assigned to roll up this sheeting during the final phase of unloading. She was aware of the gaps but alleged that the plastic concealed them and appeared to provide fall protection.

After the accident, the worker filed a suit in Texas state court against Grieg Star, alleging vessel negligence under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, specifically violations of the turnover and active control duties. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Following discovery, Grieg Star moved for summary judgment, arguing there was no genuine dispute of material fact and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of Grieg Star. The worker appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. It held that the alleged hazard was open and obvious to the worker, so the vessel owed no turnover duty to warn. The court also found that Grieg Star did not exercise active control over the stevedoring operations or the area where the injury occurred, as the stevedore had responsibility for the hold at the time. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Grieg Star. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20131/25-20131-2026-03-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Renteria v. Grieg Star AS" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A maritime worker was injured while unloading cargo from a vessel managed by Grieg Star AS. The worker, employed by a stevedoring company, fell ten feet when she stepped onto plastic sheeting covering a gap between rolls of cargo in the ship’s hold. The cargo, consisting of large rolls of kraft liner board, had been loaded by longshoremen overseas, and plastic sheeting was used to cover gaps between layers. The injured worker had been assigned to roll up this sheeting during the final phase of unloading. She was aware of the gaps but alleged that the plastic concealed them and appeared to provide fall protection.

After the accident, the worker filed a suit in Texas state court against Grieg Star, alleging vessel negligence under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, specifically violations of the turnover and active control duties. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Following discovery, Grieg Star moved for summary judgment, arguing there was no genuine dispute of material fact and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of Grieg Star. The worker appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. It held that the alleged hazard was open and obvious to the worker, so the vessel owed no turnover duty to warn. The court also found that Grieg Star did not exercise active control over the stevedoring operations or the area where the injury occurred, as the stevedore had responsibility for the hold at the time. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Grieg Star.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Robert Summerhays</case:judge>
													<category term="Admiralty &amp; Maritime Law"/>
											</entry>
    </feed>

