U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit - Justia Case Law Summaries

Crosby v. Colleton County Sheriff's Office

2026-07-31T11:30:35-08:00

A man’s wife called 911 to request a welfare check after her husband threatened to harm himself. The dispatcher relayed to law enforcement that the man had made similar threats in the past, was not acting like himself, and was last known to be at a riverfront house. When the responding officer arrived, he found the man’s vehicle at the property but received no response to repeated knocks and announcements at multiple doors. The officer entered the house several times after announcing himself, ultimately discovering a suicide note and pill bottle. Upon further entry, the officer encountered the man in his bedroom. After a brief exchange in which the man repeatedly ordered the officer to leave, the man retrieved a rifle and advanced toward the officer, ignoring commands to stop. The officer fired, fatally wounding the man. The personal representative of the man’s estate filed suit in South Carolina state court against the responding officer, the county sheriff, and the sheriff’s office, alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment for unlawful entry and excessive force, as well as a claim for failure to train. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all federal claims, holding that the officer’s entries and use of force were objectively reasonable and that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The court also found no basis for municipal liability and remanded the state-law claims to state court. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fourth Circuit held that the officer’s warrantless entries were justified under the emergency aid exception, given the objectively reasonable belief that the man was at risk of serious harm. The court also concluded that the use of deadly force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Accordingly, all federal claims were properly dismissed. View "Crosby v. Colleton County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

Whateley v. Lackey

2026-07-31T11:30:35-08:00

Curtis Whateley, a Virginia resident, applied for a personalized license plate with the characters “FTP&ATF,” intending the message “Fuck the Police & Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms.” The Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) initially issued the plate but subsequently recalled it after a complaint about its vulgarity and perceived encouragement of violence. Whateley appealed the DMV’s decision through its internal administrative process without success and then filed suit against the DMV Commissioner, arguing that the recall violated his First Amendment rights by restricting his political expression. The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia granted the Commissioner’s motion to dismiss, finding that the personalized license plate was government speech, not subject to ordinary First Amendment protections. The district court relied primarily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., which held that specialty license plate designs in Texas constituted government speech. The court acknowledged differences between Texas's specialty plates and Virginia's personalized character combinations but determined that Walker supported treating Virginia’s plates as government speech. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the personalized character combinations on Virginia’s vanity plates constitute private speech rather than government speech. The court applied the factors outlined in Walker and subsequent Supreme Court cases, finding that the history, public perception, and extent of government control over the messages indicated private expression. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that Virginia’s regulation of personalized plate messages is subject to First Amendment scrutiny. View "Whateley v. Lackey" on Justia Law

Vapor Technology Association v. Wooten

2026-07-30T10:30:32-08:00

Several vape industry businesses and a vape user challenged a North Carolina law that restricts the sale of vape products lacking approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). North Carolina’s statute, enacted in 2024, requires manufacturers to certify annually to the North Carolina Department of Revenue that their vape products either have FDA approval, were on the market by August 8, 2016 with a timely FDA application, or are exempt due to superficial changes. Products not listed in the resulting state directory cannot be sold in North Carolina, and violations can result in fines, product seizure, or lawsuits for deceptive trade practices. Before reaching the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the plaintiffs sued North Carolina officials in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, arguing that the state law was preempted by federal law and violated the Equal Protection Clause. They sought a preliminary injunction to block enforcement of the law, relying only on the preemption argument. The district court denied the motion, finding that the plaintiffs had standing due to the threat of economic harm but were unlikely to succeed on the merits because the federal Tobacco Control Act did not preempt North Carolina’s regulation of vape product sales. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the commercial plaintiffs had standing due to the risk of substantial economic harm from enforcement of the law. On the merits, the court concluded that North Carolina’s law was not preempted by the relevant federal statutes. The state law was found to regulate sales, an area expressly preserved for state regulation by the federal Tobacco Control Act’s savings clause, and did not amount to impermissible enforcement of the FDA’s exclusive authority under federal law. The denial of a preliminary injunction was therefore affirmed. View "Vapor Technology Association v. Wooten" on Justia Law

Harris Investment Holdings, LLC v. BFJ of USA, LLC

2026-07-30T10:30:32-08:00

A Georgia limited liability company purchased property in Greensboro, North Carolina, next to a gas station and convenience store owned by the defendants. After environmental testing revealed hazardous chemicals in the soil and groundwater on the company’s property, the company installed a vapor barrier and sought to recover the associated costs from the gas station owner and its members under both CERCLA and North Carolina law. The evidence showed that both properties had a long history of commercial and automotive use, with various underground storage tanks having been installed, removed, or closed in place over several decades. Notably, a waste-oil tank installed in the 1950s was closed in 1996 after evidence of petroleum and other contaminants was found in the soil. The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. The court held that the plaintiff had not produced sufficient evidence that the contamination on its property was caused by releases from the defendants’ property, and that any released substances were covered by CERCLA’s petroleum exclusion. The court also excluded the plaintiff’s expert’s later declaration referencing chromium contamination, finding it was untimely new opinion testimony. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment. The Fourth Circuit clarified that the petroleum exclusion in CERCLA covers unadulterated petroleum and its fractions, but not petroleum contaminated with hazardous substances not normally found in such products. The appellate court found that evidence regarding the leaking waste-oil tank raised a factual question as to whether a contaminant outside the petroleum exclusion was released. The Fourth Circuit vacated the summary judgment and the exclusion of certain evidence, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Harris Investment Holdings, LLC v. BFJ of USA, LLC" on Justia Law

US v. Jaqu

2026-07-27T11:01:34-08:00

The defendant was convicted by a jury of multiple drug-trafficking and firearm offenses following a three-day trial, during which he was represented by court-appointed counsel. After the trial and before sentencing, the defendant filed a notice expressing his desire to remove his counsel and represent himself at sentencing. At a subsequent hearing, despite being advised against self-representation, the defendant maintained his wish to proceed pro se for sentencing. The sentencing hearing had not yet been scheduled at the time of his request. The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina denied the defendant’s request to represent himself at sentencing, finding it untimely because it was made several months after the jury verdict and after objections to the presentence report had been filed. The court relied on precedent that allows for denial of self-representation requests made after the commencement of trial and appointed new counsel to represent the defendant at sentencing. The defendant was ultimately sentenced with an enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act, and he appealed, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation was violated. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in denying the defendant’s request to represent himself at sentencing on the basis of untimeliness. The appellate court clarified that a request to proceed pro se at sentencing, made after trial but before sentencing, is not untimely if sentencing has not yet been scheduled and the request does not disrupt proceedings. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for resentencing, instructing the district court to conduct a proper Faretta hearing to determine whether the waiver of counsel is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The court did not address arguments related to the Armed Career Criminal Act enhancement. View "US v. Jaqu" on Justia Law

US v. Melvin

2026-07-27T11:01:34-08:00

The defendant pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The Probation Office prepared a presentence report that identified four prior convictions as potential predicates for a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which imposes a mandatory minimum sentence if a defendant has at least three qualifying convictions. The defendant timely objected to three of the four proposed predicates. At sentencing, the district court sustained two of the defendant’s objections, leaving only two qualifying convictions. In response, the government, for the first time at the sentencing hearing, proposed a new predicate conviction that had not been raised earlier. Over defense counsel’s objection, the district court allowed a continuance for consideration of the new predicate, ultimately agreed with the government, and applied the ACCA enhancement, resulting in a 188-month sentence. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina ruled in favor of the government’s late proposal for a new predicate offense, despite the defendant’s objections that the government had not complied with procedural rules. The defendant appealed the sentence. During the appeal, the government initially responded to the merits of the defendant’s claims rather than invoking an appeal waiver. Only after new briefing did the government attempt to assert the appeal waiver, but the appellate court found this procedural argument had been forfeited due to the government’s earlier actions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred by allowing the government to introduce a new ACCA predicate after the deadline for objections in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(f) without a showing of good cause. The court found the procedural error was not harmless because it resulted in a substantially longer sentence. The Fourth Circuit vacated the defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing without the ACCA enhancement. View "US v. Melvin" on Justia Law

Fuentes v. Citizenship and Immigration Services

2026-07-24T10:30:33-08:00

Two naturalized U.S. citizens, who previously obtained lawful status through the Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) program after state courts found parental abuse, neglect, or abandonment, sought to confer immigration benefits to their noncitizen mothers. Both mothers’ applications were denied by United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), invoking an exclusion clause in the SIJ statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(II), and an implementing regulation prohibiting parents of SIJ recipients from receiving immigration benefits based on parentage. The plaintiffs challenged both USCIS’s interpretation of the exclusion clause and the constitutionality of the clause, arguing it violated equal protection. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, reviewing cross-motions for summary judgment, ruled in favor of USCIS. The court held that the regulation was consistent with the plain text of the exclusion clause and rejected the equal protection claim, concluding that plaintiffs lacked a direct constitutional injury and, in the alternative, that the exclusion survived rational basis review. Plaintiffs appealed, maintaining their APA and equal protection challenges. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that the exclusion clause’s plain text establishes a permanent bar, preventing any parent of an SIJ recipient from receiving immigration benefits based solely on parentage, regardless of whether the parent was abusive or not. The court also held that USCIS’s regulation is consistent with the statute. On the equal protection claim, the Fourth Circuit found differential treatment but determined that the exclusion clause survives rational basis review, as it is rationally related to protecting children from harm. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Fuentes v. Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law

Suri v. Trump

2026-07-23T12:30:21-08:00

An Indian national entered the United States on a J-1 exchange visa for a postdoctoral fellowship at Georgetown University. He and his wife, a U.S. citizen of Palestinian descent, lived in Virginia and publicly opposed the war in Gaza. Following their social media activity and associations, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) detained him under a new program targeting foreign nationals thought to support designated terror groups based on online speech. After his arrest, he was quickly transferred between several detention facilities in Virginia, Louisiana, and Texas, often without notice to his family or counsel, and was held under allegedly punitive and harmful conditions. He filed a habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which was where he lived, was first detained, and initially held. The government moved to dismiss, arguing that the court lacked habeas jurisdiction because he was no longer detained in Virginia. The district court denied the motion, finding it had jurisdiction under the “unknown custodian” exception and the exception articulated in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in *Rumsfeld v. Padilla*, since the petitioner’s location and custodian were unknown due to government actions. The district court also declined to transfer venue and enjoined the government from removing the petitioner while his habeas case was pending, later ordering his release on bail. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s orders. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court had habeas jurisdiction under both the unknown custodian exception and the exception for government conduct thwarting access to the courts. The court further held that no provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, including 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g), 1252(b)(9), or 1252(a)(5), stripped the district court of jurisdiction over the habeas petition. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying transfer or by invoking the All Writs Act to preserve its jurisdiction. View "Suri v. Trump" on Justia Law

US v. Jones

2026-07-21T11:01:16-08:00

Federal authorities investigated a large gun trafficking operation spanning West Virginia and Pennsylvania, involving straw purchasers who bought firearms in West Virginia to resell them in Pennsylvania. Bisheem Jones was identified as a leader, directing participants, organizing purchases, compensating straw purchasers, and facilitating resale. The scheme involved at least nineteen people and more than one hundred thirty firearms, with many later recovered by law enforcement in Pennsylvania. A federal grand jury in the Southern District of West Virginia indicted Jones for conspiracy to travel interstate to deal firearms without a license, conspiracy to commit promotional money laundering, aiding and abetting interstate travel to deal firearms, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. After a five-day jury trial, Jones was convicted on all counts except the felon-in-possession charge. He moved for acquittal, arguing insufficient evidence for the promotional money laundering conspiracy, but the District Court denied the motion. At sentencing, several enhancements were applied under the Sentencing Guidelines, including for obliterated serial numbers, number of firearms, and gun trafficking. Jones was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed Jones’s appeal. The court found insufficient evidence for the promotional money laundering conspiracy conviction, concluding the government had not shown an agreement between Jones and another participant to funnel illicit proceeds back into the gun trafficking business. The court vacated that conviction, ordered entry of acquittal on that count, and remanded for resentencing. The court affirmed the District Court’s application of sentencing enhancements relating to obliterated serial numbers, gun trafficking, and the number of firearms, finding no clear error. The remaining convictions for firearm-related conspiracies and aiding and abetting were affirmed. View "US v. Jones" on Justia Law

US v. Ellis

2026-07-20T10:31:40-08:00

The case involves Tamarcus Ellis, who was tried and convicted for conspiracy to traffic methamphetamine and actual drug trafficking in Greensboro, North Carolina. During his four-day trial in federal court, a government witness, Malcolm Russell, appeared intimidated while testifying. The U.S. Marshals Service reported that individuals in the gallery were making audible noises and gestures perceived as signaling disagreement with Russell’s testimony. Based on this, the district court partially closed the courtroom for approximately one hour during Russell’s testimony, excluding most members of the public but allowing Ellis’ family and defense counsel’s family to remain. After Ellis was convicted and sentenced to 480 months’ imprisonment by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, he appealed. Ellis argued that the partial closure violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, asserting this was structural error requiring automatic reversal and a new trial. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court acknowledged that the closure was not trivial and implicated the Sixth Amendment’s Public Trial Clause. It applied the modified Waller test for partial courtroom closures, which requires a “substantial reason” for the closure, that the closure be no broader than necessary, consideration of reasonable alternatives, and adequate findings by the trial court. The Fourth Circuit found that the district court had a substantial reason to partially close the courtroom to prevent witness intimidation, tailored the closure appropriately, considered alternatives, and made sufficient findings on the record. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit held that the partial closure did not violate Ellis’ Sixth Amendment right to a public trial and affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "US v. Ellis" on Justia Law

Covington Specialty Insurance Company v. Omega Restaurant & Bar, LLC

2026-07-20T10:31:39-08:00

Omega Restaurant & Bar, LLC operated a nightclub in Virginia Beach and used images of professional models in its online advertising without their consent. The models sued Omega in Virginia state court, alleging misappropriation of their likenesses and damage to their professional reputations. After the models amended their complaint, Omega removed the lawsuit to federal court and sought defense and indemnification from its commercial insurer, Covington Specialty Insurance Company, pursuant to its policy. Covington initially agreed to defend Omega under a reservation of rights, but then filed a lawsuit in federal court seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Omega for the models’ claims. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia heard Covington’s declaratory relief action. In March 2022, Omega and the models settled the underlying lawsuit, entering a consent judgment, which included dismissal of the models’ claims with prejudice and assignment of Omega’s rights under the insurance policy to the models. The district court, apparently unaware of this settlement, proceeded to grant summary judgment in favor of Covington in March 2023, holding that the insurance policy did not cover the models’ claims and Covington owed no duty to defend or indemnify Omega. Omega’s subsequent motion to alter or amend the judgment was denied, and Omega appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. On appeal, Covington argued for the first time that the declaratory relief action was moot due to the settlement and consent judgment in the underlying lawsuit. Because the mootness issue had not been addressed by the district court, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine whether a live case or controversy remains under Article III. The Fourth Circuit did not reach the merits of Omega’s appeal. View "Covington Specialty Insurance Company v. Omega Restaurant & Bar, LLC" on Justia Law

In re: The Boeing Company

2026-07-20T10:31:39-08:00

A group of shareholders alleged that a major aerospace manufacturer and several of its former executives made repeated misrepresentations regarding the company’s commitment to safety following two fatal airplane crashes involving one of its aircraft models. The shareholders claimed that these false and misleading statements artificially inflated or maintained the company’s stock price. When a subsequent in-flight safety incident and other disclosures revealed ongoing safety and quality issues, the company’s stock price declined, causing significant losses for the shareholders. The lead plaintiffs, representing a proposed class, sought to recover these losses through a class action lawsuit. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia oversaw the initial proceedings. It denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding the allegations sufficiently detailed, and subsequently certified a class. The district court concluded that the plaintiffs’ proposed damages methodology, which was based on an “out-of-pocket” measure, satisfied the requirements established by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend. The court found that this methodology fit the plaintiffs’ theory of liability and that class-wide issues predominated over individual questions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed whether class certification was proper. The Fourth Circuit found that the plaintiffs did not provide a sufficiently specific damages methodology at the class certification stage, as required by Comcast. The court held that simply describing a general measure of damages was inadequate, and that the plaintiffs needed to commit to a particular methodology and demonstrate its consistency with their liability theory. Because the district court did not conduct the rigorous analysis required and relied on inadequate proof, the Fourth Circuit reversed the class certification order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re: The Boeing Company" on Justia Law

Near v. Enerco Group, Inc.

2026-07-17T11:00:41-08:00

A man died from burn injuries after his clothing ignited while he was working near a portable propane tank top heater manufactured by Enerco Group, Inc. The decedent’s estate, represented by Jesse Near, filed a wrongful death suit alleging that the heater was defectively designed because it lacked an adequate guard or feasible alternative design to prevent clothing ignition when someone came close to the heater. The plaintiff did not assert a separate failure-to-warn claim. However, the sufficiency of the product warnings was central to the dispute, as Enerco maintained that adequate warnings rendered the product nondefective under South Carolina law. The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina addressed three key issues: it denied the plaintiff’s motion to certify to the Supreme Court of South Carolina the question of whether adequate warnings preclude a design defect claim; it excluded the plaintiff’s expert witness on the adequacy of warnings, finding her methodology unreliable; and, after treating the warnings as adequate as a matter of law (because there was no admissible evidence to the contrary), it granted summary judgment to Enerco, holding that under South Carolina law, adequate warnings preclude a design defect claim. The district court relied on the Fourth Circuit’s prior decision in Hickerson v. Yamaha Motor Corp., which interpreted South Carolina law to that effect. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the exclusion of the plaintiff’s expert witness, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the expert’s opinions unreliable. However, the Fourth Circuit found that South Carolina law was unsettled on whether adequate warnings categorically preclude a design defect claim, especially in light of subsequent developments in South Carolina case law. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit certified this specific legal question to the Supreme Court of South Carolina and deferred ruling on the summary judgment issue until the Supreme Court responds. View "Near v. Enerco Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Wood v. Straughn

2026-07-17T11:00:41-08:00

A West Virginia defendant was indicted in 2018 on multiple sexual offense charges involving a seven-year-old girl. Prior to trial, the court granted the defendant’s motions to exclude a video interview of the victim and records from her therapy sessions, limiting both the State and the defense from introducing certain hearsay evidence. During opening statements at the first trial, defense counsel referenced specific statements made by the victim in the excluded materials, suggesting an alternative perpetrator. The State objected after the opening statements, arguing that the defense had violated pretrial evidentiary rulings. The trial court found that the defense’s actions had gone “far afield” of its orders and, over the defendant’s objection, granted the State’s motion for a mistrial. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds, arguing that the mistrial was not required by “manifest necessity.” The trial court denied the motion, finding that the defense had created the necessity for a mistrial. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia later affirmed, holding that the defendant’s right against double jeopardy was not violated because defense counsel’s conduct in opening statement created a manifest necessity for the mistrial. The defendant subsequently filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, which granted relief, concluding that the defense had not violated any pretrial orders and that manifest necessity was lacking. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. The Fourth Circuit held that, under the highly deferential standard of review required by AEDPA, the state court’s conclusion that manifest necessity justified the mistrial was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The case was remanded with instructions to deny the habeas petition. View "Wood v. Straughn" on Justia Law

Cisneros v. Blanche

2026-07-17T11:00:40-08:00

A Salvadoran national first entered the United States without inspection in 1985 and later received Temporary Protected Status (TPS). When TPS for El Salvador ended in 1992, the individual became a beneficiary of Deferred Enforced Departure (DED), a form of discretionary executive relief that defers removal but is not rooted in statute. In 1994, with DED-based travel authorization, the individual left and reentered the country; upon return, a passport was stamped “Admitted,” with a notation referencing DED. After several similar trips and ultimately adjusting to lawful permanent resident status in 2006, the individual was later convicted of offenses that rendered her removable. Removal proceedings began in 2016 in Arlington, Virginia. At a hearing before an Immigration Judge, the individual conceded removability but sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), which requires seven years of continuous residence after being “admitted in any status.” The Immigration Judge found that entry under DED in 1994 did not qualify as admission “in any status,” concluding that DED is not an immigration status under the statute. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed this decision. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether entry under DED constituted admission “in any status” for purposes of cancellation of removal under § 1229b(a). The court held that “status” under the Immigration and Nationality Act means membership in a class defined by statute, and that DED, as an exercise of executive forbearance, is not a statutory status. Thus, the court concluded that the individual was not “admitted in any status” upon her return under DED, making her ineligible for cancellation of removal. The Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review. View "Cisneros v. Blanche" on Justia Law

Flores-Turcios v. Blanche

2026-07-16T10:30:26-08:00

The petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, entered the United States without inspection in 2016 and was detained. He conceded removability but applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), seeking voluntary departure in the alternative. He asserted that he feared persecution due to his membership in two social groups: Guatemalan adolescents and/or youths, and Guatemalan adolescents and/or youths who resist gang recruitment based on personal belief. He testified that MS-13 gang members assaulted and threatened him, demanding recurring payments, and attempted to recruit him when he could not pay. He claimed he did not report these incidents to the police because he believed they were corrupt or powerless. An Immigration Judge credited his testimony but found that the proposed social groups were not legally cognizable and that his membership in those groups was not a central reason for his targeting. The judge also determined there was no past torture, insufficient likelihood of torture upon return, and no official acquiescence, denying all requested relief but remanding for voluntary departure. The Board of Immigration Appeals adopted the Immigration Judge’s decision and wrote separately, finding the gang targeted the petitioner for economic reasons, not due to his membership in the proposed social groups, and found no clear error in denying CAT protection. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the Board’s and Immigration Judge’s decisions, applying substantial evidence review to factual findings and de novo review to legal conclusions. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding that the gang’s motive was economic and not based on the petitioner’s youth or resistance to recruitment. The court also found no evidence compelling a contrary conclusion regarding CAT protection. The petition for review was denied. View "Flores-Turcios v. Blanche" on Justia Law

Golden Corral Corp. v. Illinois Union Insurance Co.

2026-07-15T10:30:39-08:00

Golden Corral, a buffet restaurant chain, held a commercial property insurance policy issued by Illinois Union Insurance Company, covering losses from physical damage to its property. When state and local governments, including North Carolina, mandated closure of indoor dining facilities in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Golden Corral suspended its restaurant operations, resulting in significant lost revenue and reduced income from franchisees. Golden Corral submitted a claim to Illinois Union for coverage of these losses, which Illinois Union denied. After the denial, Golden Corral filed suit in North Carolina state court, seeking a declaration that its pandemic-related losses were covered under the policy. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, where Golden Corral amended its complaint to add claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Illinois Union moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that COVID-19 did not cause physical loss or damage as required for coverage. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the case with prejudice, a decision affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Over three years later, Golden Corral sought relief from final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), citing a subsequent North Carolina Supreme Court decision in North State Deli v. Cincinnati Insurance Co. that found similar losses covered. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the Rule 60(b)(6) motion for abuse of discretion. The court held that a change in state decisional law alone does not constitute "extraordinary circumstances" warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(6), especially when the later case involved different parties, policies, and injuries. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to deny relief. View "Golden Corral Corp. v. Illinois Union Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Burey v. Blanche

2026-07-14T11:00:38-08:00

A Jamaican citizen who entered the United States on a work visa married a U.S. citizen and later experienced domestic violence from his spouse, who was eventually arrested. After his visa expired, removal proceedings were initiated, and an immigration judge ordered his removal. Under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), survivors of domestic violence have a one-year deadline to file a motion to reopen removal proceedings. On the last day of this period, the petitioner’s counsel attempted to file the motion electronically, but the system rejected it. When he tried to file in person, a court clerk refused to accept the paper copy, insisting it be filed electronically. After continued unsuccessful attempts, the motion was finally mailed and accepted, but after the deadline. The Immigration Judge denied the motion to reopen, finding it untimely and concluding that the petitioner did not provide sufficient proof he was prevented from timely filing. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, with the majority agreeing that the record did not support the claim of impeded filing and that no exception to the deadline applied. One BIA member dissented, noting clear evidence of repeated filing attempts thwarted by the court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed both the Immigration Judge and BIA decisions. Applying de novo review to legal and constitutional questions and substantial evidence review to factual findings, the Fourth Circuit held that the record compelled the conclusion that the petitioner was prevented from timely filing. The court found this defect rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair and prejudiced the petitioner’s case, thus violating his Fifth Amendment due process rights. The court granted the petition for review, reversed the BIA’s denial, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Burey v. Blanche" on Justia Law

US v. Snyder

2026-07-14T11:00:38-08:00

Stephen Snyder, a veteran Maryland attorney, was charged with attempted extortion and Travel Act violations after threatening to launch a damaging media campaign against a hospital unless it paid him $25 million in a personal consultancy deal. Snyder had represented patients in medical malpractice cases against the hospital and, during negotiations, repeatedly demanded the payment, suggesting it would "bury" incriminating findings about the hospital’s transplant program. Despite declining health and cognitive concerns, Snyder insisted on representing himself at trial, supported by standby counsel. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland held two Faretta hearings, where Snyder’s competency and voluntary waiver of counsel were confirmed. Throughout pretrial and trial, Snyder’s health issues became evident, and the court repeatedly advised against self-representation, but Snyder persisted. During the nine-day trial, the court addressed issues including limiting testimony from a witness bound by a nondisclosure agreement, denying Snyder’s request for a reliance-on-counsel jury instruction, and refusing to voir dire the jury after Snyder’s contempt arrest. The jury convicted Snyder on all counts. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings. It held that Snyder’s concession of competence to stand trial precluded his argument for reversal based on self-representation, reaffirming that a defendant competent to stand trial is competent to waive counsel. The court found no abuse of discretion in the denial of the reliance-on-counsel instruction, the limitation of testimony due to the nondisclosure agreement, or the refusal to voir dire the jury regarding publicity about Snyder’s contempt. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in full. View "US v. Snyder" on Justia Law

Lusk v. Merchant

2026-07-14T11:00:37-08:00

The plaintiff, a resident of Salem, South Carolina, frequently visited her local post office. During one visit, after experiencing poor service, she was confronted and physically attacked by a postal employee, resulting in significant injuries. The Postmaster, rather than assisting her or calling for help, allegedly exacerbated the situation by physically handling her and preventing her from seeking help. The plaintiff claimed the employee had a history of aggressive behavior known to postal management. The plaintiff initially filed suit in South Carolina state court against the individual employees and the United States. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, which, after the government substituted itself for the individual defendants under the Westfall Act and moved to dismiss, dismissed all claims. The district court determined the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) did not waive sovereign immunity for most claims, including those arising from assault and battery, and that the claims for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention were barred by the discretionary function exception. The court also dismissed the Bivens constitutional claims and the FOIA claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of most claims, holding that the FTCA’s intentional tort exception precludes claims against the government for injuries arising from assault and battery by a postal employee, even if pleaded as negligence. However, the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded as to a narrow aspect of the negligence claim against the Postmaster, holding that under the Supreme Court’s decision in Sheridan v. United States, a claim may proceed if the government employee negligently created the risk of harm, independent of the tortfeasor’s employment status. The Fourth Circuit otherwise affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Lusk v. Merchant" on Justia Law

van Faassen v. Lindberg

2026-07-14T11:00:37-08:00

A Dutch life insurance company, through its trustees, sought to enforce an arbitral award against its former owners after they failed to maintain the company’s required solvency capital ratio, as agreed. When the capital ratio fell below the stipulated threshold, the company initiated urgent arbitration proceedings in the Netherlands, resulting in an award ordering the owners to restore the ratio and imposing a substantial penalty for noncompliance. Despite confirmations of the award by Dutch courts—including the Court of Rotterdam, the Court of Appeal of the Hague, and the Supreme Court of the Netherlands—the owners did not comply, leading to the company's liquidation. The trustees filed a petition in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, seeking to confirm the arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the New York Convention, as well as to recognize the Dutch court’s judgment under the North Carolina Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act. The district court found the arbitration award enforceable, holding the FAA’s three-year statute of limitations was “permissive,” not “mandatory,” and also concluded the Dutch judgment was recognizable as a foreign-country judgment under North Carolina law. The court entered judgment, confirming the award under federal law and did not rule on the alternative state-law claim. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the three-year statute of limitations in 9 U.S.C. § 207 is mandatory, not permissive, and reversed the district court’s order confirming the foreign arbitral award under the FAA due to untimeliness. However, the appellate court agreed that the Dutch court judgment qualifies for recognition under the North Carolina Act and remanded the case for further proceedings on the petitioners’ motion to enforce that judgment under state law. View "van Faassen v. Lindberg" on Justia Law

US v. Ball

2026-07-14T11:00:37-08:00

Kirsten Ball, a licensed physician, was indicted in April 2023 for conspiracy to distribute oxycodone and twenty counts of distribution of oxycodone, based on her practice of prescribing unusually large quantities of the drug from her home office between 2005 and 2022. The government presented evidence that her prescribing practices deviated from accepted medical standards, which Ball did not dispute. Her appeal focused on whether the jury instructions at trial properly conveyed the correct mens rea standard required for conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ruan v. United States. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia conducted a five-day jury trial, after which Ball was convicted of conspiracy and all but one distribution count. The parties had jointly proposed jury instructions that required proof Ball knew she was acting outside the “course of her professional practice.” The district court revised these instructions, removing the possessive pronoun “her” to avoid confusion about idiosyncratic medical practice. Ball’s counsel objected to the change, arguing it was inconsistent with the Ruan decision, which clarified the subjective mental state required for conviction. Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied a de novo standard to the jury instructions. The court held that the instructions, read as a whole, accurately reflected the law: the government must prove both that Ball’s prescriptions were objectively unauthorized under professional standards and that she subjectively knew or intended her conduct to be unauthorized. The court determined that the charge sufficiently required the jury to find this subjective knowledge, distinguishing the instructions from those found insufficient in prior Fourth Circuit cases. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Ball’s convictions. View "US v. Ball" on Justia Law

US v. Cardozo

2026-07-13T10:30:28-08:00

A traveler arriving in the United States from Bolivia was subject to inspection by U.S. Customs and Border Protection at Washington Dulles International Airport. The officer requested that the traveler unlock his two iPhones, which he did. Within approximately two minutes, the officer accessed the photo galleries, including hidden folders, and discovered sexually explicit images of prepubescent girls. The traveler was subsequently arrested and indicted by a federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on multiple counts relating to child pornography. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his phones, arguing that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, during which the officer explained her suspicions. The court denied the motion to suppress, finding that either individualized suspicion was present or, alternatively, that the officer acted in good faith. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to all counts, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling. He was sentenced to 18 years in prison and 25 years of supervised release. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed whether manual searches of cell phones at the border are “routine” and thus exempt from the requirement of individualized suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Circuit held that manual searches of cell phones at the border are routine border searches and do not require individualized suspicion, distinguishing such searches from forensic searches, which are nonroutine and require some level of individualized suspicion. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress. View "US v. Cardozo" on Justia Law

Lee v. West Virginia University Medical Corp.

2026-07-10T10:30:54-08:00

Dr. Mark Lee, age 59 at hiring, was appointed Chair of the Department of Neurosurgery at West Virginia University’s School of Medicine and also employed as a pediatric neurosurgeon by University Health Associates. By spring 2020, senior administrators raised concerns about Lee’s performance, including absenteeism and lack of engagement. In March 2021, Lee was offered a new position requiring him to step down as Chair, which he ultimately declined. Discussions about his removal continued, during which Lee was allegedly told the university sought a younger Chair. After Lee’s attorney raised age discrimination concerns in July and August 2021, Lee was informed he would be removed as Chair effective September 1, 2021, rather than the previously discussed later date. Lee subsequently resigned in January 2022 and pursued claims for age discrimination, retaliation, and breach of contract. The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia dismissed claims against WVU defendants on sovereign immunity grounds and granted summary judgment to University Health Associates on all remaining claims. The district court found Lee’s age discrimination claim lacked direct and circumstantial evidence, noting Lee’s replacement and the decisionmaker were of similar age. Lee’s retaliation claims failed because the removal process began before his complaints, and the decision to accelerate his removal was attributed to his conduct at a July meeting rather than his protected activity. The breach-of-contract claims were rejected based on the employment agreement’s terms and integration clause. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo. The Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for University Health Associates on Lee’s age discrimination, retaliation (removal and constructive discharge), and breach-of-contract claims. However, it vacated the judgment on Lee’s claim that the acceleration of his removal constituted unlawful retaliation, finding genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings on that claim. View "Lee v. West Virginia University Medical Corp." on Justia Law

Dmarcian, Inc. v. DMARC Advisor BV

2026-07-10T10:30:53-08:00

An American software company based in North Carolina and a Dutch company entered into a business relationship that later soured. The American company alleged that the Dutch company stole its brand name, software code, and customer base. The Dutch company operated a website nearly identical to the American company’s, using its name, logo, and marketing materials, and targeted American customers, even convincing at least one U.S. company to switch providers. Disputes between the parties also led to reciprocal lawsuits in both the United States and the Netherlands, with overlapping subject matter. The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina initially issued a preliminary injunction against the Dutch company, finding the American company was likely to succeed on its copyright, trademark, trade secret, and tortious interference claims. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic International, Inc. altered the standard for the extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act, the district court modified its injunction to comply with the new “conduct-focused” approach and dismissed the copyright claim. The district court also ordered the Dutch company to correct statements made to the Dutch court and later held the company in civil contempt for failing to comply fully, imposing a monetary sanction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. Applying the Supreme Court’s new guidance from Abitron, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the second amended preliminary injunction, holding that the Dutch company’s conduct constituted infringing use in U.S. commerce under the Lanham Act, and that the Defend Trade Secrets Act’s express extraterritorial provision was satisfied by acts in furtherance of misappropriation occurring in the United States. The court dismissed the appeals from the correction and contempt orders for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Dmarcian, Inc. v. DMARC Advisor BV" on Justia Law

United States v. Wable

2026-07-10T10:30:53-08:00

While serving a term of supervised release for prior, unrelated convictions, an individual was found by probation officers to have acquired several weapons, including a loaded assault-style rifle. During subsequent proceedings, the individual attempted to persuade a young man to falsely claim ownership of the rifle at a revocation hearing, offering payment and making threats against the young man’s mother. The young man later recanted and disclosed the threats and payment. As a result, a jury convicted the individual of unlawful possession of a firearm and of witness tampering. The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia received a presentence investigation report that set the base offense level at twenty-six under the Sentencing Guidelines, citing the type of firearm and the defendant’s two prior controlled substance felony convictions—one federal and one under West Virginia law. The defendant objected pro se to considering the state conviction as a qualifying offense, and also argued for a downward departure based on alleged mistreatment while in pretrial detention. At sentencing, the district court adopted the presentence report in full, imposed enhancements for obstruction, and, after weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and considering arguments from both sides, denied a downward departure. The court imposed concurrent sentences of 120 months for the firearm offense and 180 months for witness tampering, citing the seriousness of the conduct and the defendant’s lengthy, violent criminal history. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the sentence. It held that the district court did not plainly err in treating the West Virginia conviction as a qualifying controlled substance offense for Guidelines purposes and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in addressing the defendant’s sentencing arguments. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Wable" on Justia Law

Dmarcian, Inc. v. Millen

2026-07-10T10:30:53-08:00

A North Carolina software company initiated a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina against its former business partner, a Dutch entity, after their business relationship dissolved. The plaintiff alleged copyright and trademark infringement, misappropriation of trade secrets, and various state law violations. Shortly after the complaint, the plaintiff obtained a preliminary injunction limiting the defendant’s business activities. Meanwhile, the defendant commenced related litigation in the Netherlands. During those Dutch proceedings, the defendant’s American attorney, Pressly Millen, submitted an affidavit that the plaintiff claimed misrepresented the scope and timing of the U.S. litigation. The Dutch court initially denied the plaintiff’s request to stay the Dutch proceedings, partly relying on representations from the defendant’s counsel. The plaintiff returned to the North Carolina court, seeking an order requiring the defendant to correct these alleged misrepresentations in the Dutch court. The district court ordered the defendant to submit both its order and a corrective statement to the Dutch court. The defendant submitted the order but did not file the separate corrective statement. Later, the Dutch court stayed its proceedings. The plaintiff then moved for contempt sanctions in the North Carolina court against the defendant and its attorneys for failing to comply fully with the correction order. Following a show cause hearing, the district court held the defendant and Millen in civil contempt, sanctioning Millen by suspending his ability to practice in the district, though not holding him jointly liable for monetary sanctions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that it had jurisdiction to review the contempt order against Millen, a nonparty. The appellate court held that the district court abused its discretion by imposing civil contempt sanctions on Millen without clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff was harmed by Millen’s failure to submit the separate statement. The court vacated the civil contempt adjudication and sanction against Millen. View "Dmarcian, Inc. v. Millen" on Justia Law

Ramos v. Blanche

2026-07-09T11:00:38-08:00

A Honduran citizen, who was a lawful permanent resident in the United States, was convicted in Virginia of embezzling over $46,000 in scrap metal from his employer. After serving his sentence, the Department of Homeland Security detained him and charged him as removable, alleging that his conviction was for an aggravated felony involving fraud or deceit under federal immigration law. His wife and daughter, also lawful residents, sought to help him avoid removal by filing a family visa petition, but the immigration process was delayed. An immigration judge denied further continuances for the visa process and concluded that the embezzlement conviction involved fraud or deceit, ordering removal to Honduras. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed both the denial of the continuance and the finding that the conviction was for an aggravated felony. Although the government mistakenly deported the petitioner during his appeal, they brought him back and assured the court of procedural safeguards. The Board's decision resulted in the petitioner’s removal, and he sought review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo, applying the categorical approach to determine whether Virginia’s embezzlement statute necessarily involves fraud or deceit. The court concluded that the statute does not categorically require fraudulent or deceitful conduct, as its elements criminalize wrongful taking but do not always require misrepresentation, trickery, or intentional concealment. Therefore, the conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony under the charged theory. The Fourth Circuit granted the petition, vacated the final order of removal, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ramos v. Blanche" on Justia Law

US v. Gil

2026-07-09T11:00:38-08:00

A noncitizen, originally from El Salvador, unlawfully entered the United States in 2003. In 2018, he was convicted of serious crimes, after which he was placed in removal proceedings while still incarcerated. During those proceedings, he conceded removability but sought deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, fearing for his life if returned to El Salvador. The immigration judge denied his application, finding his testimony not credible and ordering his removal. He was informed of his right to appeal by a set deadline. The noncitizen informed his attorney he wished to appeal, but due to delays in receiving and returning a fee waiver form, the notice of appeal was filed after the deadline. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely, and the noncitizen was removed. After unlawfully reentering the United States and being convicted of new state felonies, he was indicted for illegal reentry under federal law. He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that his prior removal order was invalid due to ineffective assistance of counsel, as his attorney failed to timely file the notice of appeal. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied the motion, holding that he had not exhausted available administrative remedies, specifically by failing to properly present his ineffective-assistance claim to the Board in accordance with procedural requirements set forth in Matter of Lozada. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that, under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d), a noncitizen must exhaust administrative remedies before collaterally attacking a removal order. It found that the appellant did not substantially comply with Lozada’s requirements for raising an ineffective-assistance claim before the Board, and thus failed to exhaust his remedies. Accordingly, the denial of the motion to dismiss was affirmed. View "US v. Gil" on Justia Law

US v. Giannone

2026-07-09T11:00:38-08:00

Federal agents investigated an online community involved in trafficking personal information, focusing on an individual who, after arrest, became a confidential informant. The informant communicated with a user known as Pit Boss 2600 (also CIA INTEL), who offered to sell debit card information. Undercover agents deposited money into Pit Boss 2600’s bank account, which was later withdrawn by Jonathan Giannone, the account holder. The government matched statements made by Pit Boss 2600 in online chats to Giannone’s travel records to establish his identity as the perpetrator. Giannone was indicted and, after a jury trial, convicted of three counts of wire fraud and two counts of aggravated identity theft. Following his conviction in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, Giannone filed a series of FOIA requests and later pursued a writ of coram nobis, asserting that the government had withheld exculpatory evidence that would have materially affected his trial. The district court denied the petition, finding it untimely because Giannone delayed over eight years after receiving the relevant documents before seeking relief, and also finding no error of a fundamental character justifying the writ. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that Giannone failed to provide a valid reason for his delay in seeking relief and that, even considering his claims cumulatively, the identified withheld evidence was not material enough to undermine confidence in the verdict. The court concluded that Giannone did not meet the stringent requirements for coram nobis relief, as he failed to show either timely pursuit of his claims or an error of the most fundamental character, and thus affirmed the denial of his petition. View "US v. Giannone" on Justia Law

Jackson v. Bush

2026-07-09T11:00:37-08:00

While incarcerated at a maximum-security prison, Dashaun Simmons was fatally stabbed by another inmate, Jonathon Dominick, after a corrections officer, Gerald Bush, released Dominick and another inmate from their cells without proper verification of their authorization to leave. Simmons had a history of being attacked in various facilities and had reported threats and assaults at the current prison, though not specifically to Bush. On the day of the incident, Bush, unfamiliar with the inmates in this particular unit, relied on inmate statements rather than consulting the official list or a supervisor. After the stabbing, officers Cheryl Youngquist and Dontai Parks responded, with Youngquist initially failing to recognize the urgency but then calling for medical help, and Parks transporting Simmons to the medical team. Simmons died from his injuries. In the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, Simmons’s estate brought suit against several prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment due to deliberate indifference to Simmons’s safety and medical needs. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity because there was no evidence of deliberate indifference or violation of clearly established law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the officers’ conduct did not violate the Eighth Amendment. The court found insufficient evidence that any defendant subjectively knew of and disregarded a substantial risk to Simmons’s safety or medical needs. The court also noted that mere violation of prison policy did not amount to constitutional deliberate indifference, and that, absent evidence of actual or constructive knowledge of a specific risk, qualified immunity applied. The judgment for the officers was therefore affirmed. View "Jackson v. Bush" on Justia Law

US v. Carson

2026-07-08T10:30:41-08:00

Officers responding to reports of suspected drug activity at a public housing development in Asheville, North Carolina, began surveilling individuals frequenting the area. One individual, Jermaine Derrick Carson, Jr., was observed as a passenger in a vehicle whose driver had a suspended license. Weeks later, during a joint law enforcement operation targeting crime near downtown bars, officers recognized the same vehicle at a gas station and initiated a traffic stop before it returned to the housing complex. During the stop, officers detected the odor of marijuana and observed drug paraphernalia in the car. Carson was frisked and found to possess a loaded firearm. After Carson was indicted for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, he moved to suppress the firearm, arguing that the traffic stop was unlawfully prolonged and that the frisk lacked reasonable suspicion. A magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing, during which officers testified and body camera footage was reviewed. The magistrate judge recommended denial of the suppression motion, finding the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle after the detection of marijuana and that the frisk was lawful. The district court adopted the recommendation, denied the motion, and subsequently accepted Carson’s conditional guilty plea, sentencing him to 24 months imprisonment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision, applying de novo review for legal questions and clear error for factual findings. The court held that the officers had independent reasonable suspicion—specifically, the detection of marijuana odor—which justified the extension of the stop and the search. Additionally, the frisk was permissible due to reasonable suspicion of illegal drugs in the vehicle. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Carson’s suppression motion. View "US v. Carson" on Justia Law

Deal v. City of Monroe

2026-07-08T10:30:40-08:00

Kenneth Deal was appointed to the City of Monroe, North Carolina’s board of adjustment, a quasi-judicial municipal body responsible for handling certain appeals and permits. After completing one three-year term, he was reappointed to a second term. However, during this second term, the City Council voted to remove him from the board without cause or prior notice. Deal was not present at the meeting where the removal occurred, nor was he informed that his removal would be considered. Deal filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, alleging that the City violated his procedural due process rights when it deprived him of his board seat without notice or an opportunity to be heard. He sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and requested a declaratory judgment to void his removal. Deal moved for partial summary judgment on liability, while the City sought summary judgment on all claims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, concluding that Deal did not have a constitutionally protected property interest in his board seat because the City Council retained discretion to remove board members at any time, with or without cause. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Deal lacked a constitutionally protected property interest in his seat. The court reasoned that because the City had broad discretion under its code and state law to appoint, remove, or even abolish the board, Deal’s interest in his seat did not amount to a legitimate claim of entitlement protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The court rejected Deal’s reliance on state cases and found that local discretion was dispositive, affirming the district court’s judgment. View "Deal v. City of Monroe" on Justia Law

South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. Weaver

2026-07-08T10:30:40-08:00

A South Carolina budget provision, known as the “Proviso,” prohibits public schools from using state funds to teach certain concepts related to race and sex. Several Black students, the South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP (SC NAACP), and author Ibram Kendi challenged the Proviso, alleging it led to the removal of an Advanced Placement African American Studies (AP AAS) course and one of Kendi’s books from school libraries. The students and SC NAACP asserted that eliminating the AP AAS course infringed upon students’ First Amendment right to receive information, while Kendi claimed the book’s removal constituted viewpoint discrimination. Plaintiffs further alleged that the Proviso was void for vagueness and violated the Equal Protection Clause. The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina dismissed the complaint for lack of Article III standing. The court concluded that the individual students did not allege a concrete injury as they had not actually enrolled in AP AAS, and found that even a student who had enrolled failed to establish that her injury was traceable to the Proviso rather than an unrelated curriculum review. The district court also held that Kendi’s injury was not redressable because the school district cited an alternative, unchallenged rationale for removing his book. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. It affirmed dismissal with respect to a student who had graduated and another who had not taken concrete steps to enroll in AP AAS. However, it held that SC NAACP adequately alleged standing for at least one member with an ongoing injury, and Kendi sufficiently alleged standing for his viewpoint discrimination claim. The court vacated dismissal of other claims and remanded for the district court to address unresolved standing and merits questions. View "South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. Weaver" on Justia Law

Kuiper v. Mena

2026-07-08T10:30:40-08:00

During the Salvadoran civil war in March 1982, Mario Adalberto Reyes Mena, then a colonel in the Salvadoran Security Forces, allegedly ordered the ambush and killing of four Dutch journalists, including Jan Kuiper. The journalists were reporting on the conflict and had published material critical of the Salvadoran government. According to findings by a United Nations Truth Commission and a U.S. military investigation, the ambush was premeditated and orchestrated by Reyes Mena, with the intention of silencing unfavorable media coverage. Years later, Reyes Mena was indicted and convicted in absentia in El Salvador for these killings, while residing in Virginia. Gert Kuiper, Jan Kuiper’s brother, subsequently filed a civil action against Reyes Mena in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, pursuant to the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991. He sought declaratory and monetary relief for the extrajudicial killing of his brother. Reyes Mena moved to dismiss the case, asserting conduct-based foreign official immunity under international common law. The district court denied the motion, holding that foreign official immunity does not extend to violations of jus cogens norms, such as extrajudicial killings, even if performed in an official capacity. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of immunity on interlocutory appeal. The Fourth Circuit held that, under both international and domestic law, foreign officials are not entitled to conduct-based foreign official immunity for violations of jus cogens norms, including extrajudicial killings, regardless of whether such acts were performed in an official capacity. The court affirmed the district court’s order denying Reyes Mena immunity and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kuiper v. Mena" on Justia Law

Steen v. Dismukes

2026-07-08T10:30:39-08:00

George Steen, a foster parent, was convicted by a North Carolina jury of sexually abusing a young foster child, M.S., who had lived with Steen and his wife for several years. The prosecution relied heavily on M.S.’s detailed descriptions of the alleged abuse, arguing such knowledge was unlikely unless M.S. had experienced the acts. The defense countered by attempting to show M.S.’s reputation for untruthfulness and identifying alternative sources for his sexual knowledge, including prior experiences with his biological family and other incidents. Despite this, the jury found Steen guilty on three counts of sexual offenses against a child. Following his conviction, Steen sought relief in the North Carolina state courts, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, as articulated in Strickland v. Washington. He focused on his attorney’s failure to uncover and present specific social services records, counselor’s notes, and medical records that, he claimed, further supported his theory that M.S. fabricated the allegations and had other sources of sexual knowledge. The state trial court denied relief, finding Steen failed to demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, assuming deficient performance but holding Steen could not show prejudice because the additional records were cumulative of evidence already before the jury. Steen then filed for federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. That court denied relief but erroneously deferred to the trial court’s analysis of deficient performance rather than the appellate court’s reasoning on prejudice. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit clarified that only the last reasoned decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals was entitled to deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Fourth Circuit held that this court had reasonably found no prejudice, and thus affirmed the denial of habeas relief. View "Steen v. Dismukes" on Justia Law

Martinez v. Blanche

2026-07-08T10:30:39-08:00

A Salvadoran national entered the United States without authorization in 2016 and was later placed in removal proceedings. He sought relief from removal by applying for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming a history of violent encounters with the Zetas cartel and presenting evidence of threats and violence against himself and his family. He also admitted to a 2023 conviction for assault and battery against a family member in Virginia. An Immigration Judge (IJ) heard testimony from the petitioner and expert witnesses and reviewed documentary evidence. The IJ found the petitioner not credible, citing implausible elements in his testimony and inconsistencies with other evidence. The IJ denied all forms of relief, concluding that the petitioner was ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal due to his conviction for a “particularly serious crime” and that he failed to establish a sufficient likelihood of torture to warrant CAT protection. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision in full. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions. The court held that the IJ and BIA failed to apply the proper legal standard in determining whether the Virginia conviction was a “particularly serious crime,” specifically by not conducting the required two-step analysis in the correct order. This error required vacatur and remand for further proceedings. However, the court found the adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence and that the denial of CAT relief was not an abuse of discretion. The petition was therefore granted in part, denied in part, and the BIA’s order was vacated and remanded. View "Martinez v. Blanche" on Justia Law

Doe 1 v. Office of the Director of National Intelligence

2026-07-08T10:30:38-08:00

Nineteen career employees of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, who had temporarily held positions related to diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility (DEIA), were notified of their impending termination following two executive orders issued by President Trump that directed federal agencies to eliminate all DEIA-related offices and positions. These terminations were implemented in the context of reduction in force (RIF) actions, with the agencies complying with memoranda from the Office of Personnel Management instructing the immediate elimination of such roles. The agencies made clear they would not provide the employees with opportunities for reassignment or the ability to appeal their terminations, procedures to which the employees claimed entitlement under the agencies’ internal Termination Regulation. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia first denied a temporary restraining order on the basis that the employees had not yet invoked their rights to reassignment or appeal. After the employees attempted to exercise these rights and were denied, the district court granted a preliminary injunction requiring the agencies to follow their own Termination Regulation, specifically the provisions allowing for reassignment and internal appeal, finding the employees were likely to succeed on their due process claims and would suffer irreparable harm without relief. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the employees had a property interest in the reassignment and appeal rights provided by the Termination Regulation and that denial of these rights without due process likely violated the Fifth Amendment. The Fourth Circuit also found no error in the district court’s findings regarding irreparable harm, the balance of equities, or the public interest, and concluded the scope of the injunction was appropriate. View "Doe 1 v. Office of the Director of National Intelligence" on Justia Law

Roberts v. Engelke

2026-07-08T10:30:38-08:00

An inmate at Red Onion State Prison in Virginia, who is a Sunni Muslim, requested accommodations to observe both the Ramadan fast and to maintain a diet prepared according to Jewish Kashrut law, as he sincerely believed both were religious requirements. The prison had an Orthodox Jewish Kosher Diet (OJKD) and a Common Fare menu, but in 2020 could not provide a version of the OJKD that also allowed for Ramadan fasting on short notice. The inmate was offered a choice between maintaining the OJKD without fasting or switching to the Common Fare menu to fast, but with restrictions on switching back. He tried to fast by saving OJKD meals for sunset, but this led to food poisoning. By 2021, the prison had created a Ramadan-compliant OJKD. The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia granted summary judgment to the prison officials on all claims. The court held that the officials were protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity for damages in their official capacities and found that damages were not available under RLUIPA. The court also found the request for injunctive relief moot after the policy change. The remaining claims for damages under the Constitution were dismissed on qualified immunity grounds, as the court determined the rights were not clearly established or that there was no constitutional violation. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of a discovery motion and agreed that injunctive and declaratory relief were moot, and that summary judgment was proper on the Establishment Clause and Equal Protection claims. However, the Fourth Circuit held that the inmate’s right to a religious diet consistent with his sincerely held beliefs was clearly established and that the district court erred by failing to apply the proper standard to his Free Exercise claim. The court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for the district court to consider whether the failure to accommodate in 2020 was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests under the Turner standard. View "Roberts v. Engelke" on Justia Law

US v. Williams

2026-07-08T10:30:38-08:00

Police officers responded to an anonymous 911 call reporting that individuals inside a white Mercedes sedan parked near the pool area of an apartment complex might be selling or possessing narcotics. The officers received this information through their department’s computer-aided dispatch system. Upon arrival, the officers stopped their marked police vehicles in the roadway, positioning themselves such that one car was partially in front of the Mercedes and another behind. They exited their vehicles, approached the Mercedes, and immediately smelled marijuana. Williams, the defendant, admitted to smoking marijuana, after which he and the other occupants were directed to exit the vehicle. In the ensuing search, officers found a handgun, and Williams admitted ownership. The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied Williams’ motion to suppress the evidence found during the search. The district court found that Williams was not seized when the officers stopped their cars, reasoning that there was physical room for him to leave and a reasonable person would have felt free to do so. The court further concluded that the officers had reasonable suspicion to seize Williams after smelling marijuana and that the search was supported by probable cause. Williams was subsequently convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm after a bench trial. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Williams was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when the officers blocked his vehicle with their marked patrol cars, as a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave under the circumstances. The court further held that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to justify this seizure based solely on the anonymous tip and the fact the encounter occurred in a high-crime area. The court reversed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion, vacated Williams’ conviction, and remanded for further proceedings. View "US v. Williams" on Justia Law

US v. Covington

2026-07-02T10:30:51-08:00

W.W., an incarcerated person, died after experiencing a severe medical crisis while in Bureau of Prisons custody. Shronda Covington was the highest-ranking official on duty at the time and had the authority to call a physician or send W.W. to the hospital; evidence showed that she was informed of W.W.’s distress but allegedly failed to intervene. Tonya Farley, a BOP nurse, examined W.W., observed troubling symptoms, but instead of seeking appropriate medical attention, contacted a psychologist and submitted a report stating no signs of acute distress. Both Covington and Farley later made statements to investigators that were allegedly false regarding their actions during the crisis. After an investigation, Covington and Farley were charged in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Covington was convicted by a jury of violating 18 U.S.C. § 242 (willfully depriving W.W. of his constitutional rights, with the jury finding bodily injury but not death resulted), as well as making false statements under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Farley was convicted of making false statements under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 but acquitted of the Section 242 charge and another false report charge. Both defendants were sentenced to terms of incarceration and home detention. Farley contested the inclusion of her acquitted conduct in calculating her Guidelines range. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Section 242’s “bodily injury results from” language requires proof of both but-for and proximate causation. The district court erred by not instructing the jury on proximate cause for Covington’s Section 242 conviction, so that conviction and both defendants’ sentences were vacated and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed both defendants’ convictions for making false statements under Section 1001, rejecting all other challenges. View "US v. Covington" on Justia Law

Langford v. Stonebreaker

2026-07-02T10:30:50-08:00

After a robbery at a Chinese restaurant owner’s home in South Carolina, three masked men assaulted the family and stole their earnings. The victims could not identify the attackers, and no forensic evidence was left behind. Weeks later, a tip led investigators to three suspects, including K.C. Langford, who was arrested and indicted along with two co-defendants. Langford’s trial was delayed for nearly two years, partly due to difficulties in securing an interpreter for the victims and because one co-defendant, Alvin, initially refused to testify after being pressured by Langford and another defendant. The trial eventually proceeded, with Alvin testifying against Langford. Langford was convicted of criminal conspiracy, armed robbery, first-degree burglary, and kidnapping. After conviction, Langford appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court, which affirmed his convictions. The court found that although the prosecutor’s control over the trial docket violated the state constitution, Langford suffered no prejudice from it. Applying the Barker v. Wingo framework, the court determined the nearly two-year delay did not violate Langford’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, considering the reasons for the delay and lack of prejudice to Langford’s defense. Langford’s postconviction relief application in the Court of Common Pleas was denied, as the court found no ineffective assistance of counsel regarding a hearsay issue in the trial. The South Carolina Court of Appeals denied certiorari. Langford’s co-defendant, Bryan, received postconviction relief in a separate proceeding. Langford then sought federal habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, which granted the writ on claims of speedy trial violation and ineffective assistance of counsel. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the South Carolina courts’ decisions were not unreasonable applications of clearly established federal law nor based on unreasonable factual determinations. The Fourth Circuit ordered reversal of the district court’s grant of habeas corpus. View "Langford v. Stonebreaker" on Justia Law

King v. Blackwood

2026-07-02T10:30:50-08:00

Maurice King, an inmate convicted on federal drug charges and awaiting sentencing, was housed in a segregation unit at the Orange County Detention Center. On the evening of March 4, 2020, King was assaulted by other inmates in his cell. Surveillance footage showed multiple inmates entering and leaving his cell before and after the attack. Officers Berry and Linster, responsible for security rounds, failed to visually inspect King’s cell during their rounds, despite hearing noises of distress, including moaning and labored breathing. After listening to concerning sounds over the cell intercom and suspecting King had been assaulted, the officers delayed checking on him for approximately twenty minutes to avoid additional paperwork associated with an early security round. When they finally entered, King was found seriously injured and later died at the hospital. King’s estate sued several parties, including Orange County, the Sheriff, and detention officers, asserting federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference, along with state-law claims. The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, adopting in part the magistrate judge’s recommendations, denied summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds for Officers Berry and Linster. The court found sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the officers consciously disregarded a substantial risk to King’s health. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the denial of qualified immunity. The Fourth Circuit held that, accepting the district court’s factual findings, a reasonable jury could determine that Officers Berry and Linster violated clearly established constitutional law by intentionally delaying medical attention for King after suspecting he had been assaulted. The court affirmed the denial of qualified immunity for those officers, dismissed the appeals related to Monell and bond claims for lack of appellate jurisdiction, and limited its review to the qualified immunity issue. View "King v. Blackwood" on Justia Law

Doe v. Office of the Director of National Intelligence

2026-07-02T10:30:50-08:00

Nineteen career intelligence officers employed by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence were informed that their positions would be terminated. These officers had been temporarily assigned to roles related to diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility (DEIA). Their terminations were the result of new executive orders issued at the start of President Trump’s second term, which directed federal agencies to eliminate DEIA programs and related positions. The Office of Personnel Management issued memoranda implementing these directives, instructing agencies to place DEIA employees on administrative leave and to conduct reductions in force (RIFs) targeting DEIA positions. The agencies provided no indication that the terminations were based on misconduct or poor performance. The officers sought relief in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, arguing that the agencies violated their Fifth Amendment due process rights by refusing to follow internal regulations that guaranteed them opportunities for reassignment and internal appeal when facing RIF terminations. The district court first denied a temporary restraining order but later granted a preliminary injunction after the agencies refused to provide the procedural rights specified in their own regulations. The court found the officers were likely to succeed on their claims, would suffer irreparable harm without relief, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored the injunction. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the preliminary injunction under an abuse of discretion standard. The court held that the district court acted within its discretion, finding the officers had a property interest in the specific procedural rights guaranteed by agency regulation. The court affirmed that the agencies were required to adhere to their own procedures regarding reassignment and internal appeal before effecting the officers’ terminations, upholding the preliminary injunction. View "Doe v. Office of the Director of National Intelligence" on Justia Law

Rhoads v. Riddell

2026-07-02T10:30:50-08:00

A woman was detained in a county detention center for thirty days in 2019. During her detention, she developed a painful and visibly swollen abscess on the side of her head. She repeatedly reported her symptoms and submitted grievances, seeking medical help, but did not receive adequate treatment. Correctional officers escorted her to solitary confinement after she protested her lack of medical care, making her unable to access the grievance system. She continued to experience severe symptoms, ultimately requiring emergency hospitalization and surgery after being found unconscious. The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina initially granted summary judgment to five correctional officers, finding they were entitled to qualified immunity because there was insufficient evidence of their subjective knowledge and disregard of a risk to the detainee’s health. Upon a motion for reconsideration, the district court found disputed material facts regarding two supervisory officers’ knowledge of her condition and their actions, determining these disputes precluded summary judgment on qualified immunity. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of summary judgment de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that, in June 2019, a pretrial detainee’s right to adequate medical care and freedom from deliberate indifference to serious medical needs was clearly established in the circuit. The court found that supervisory correctional officers could not ignore repeated warnings and visible signs of severe medical need, nor could they rely indefinitely on medical personnel’s decisions when evidence of inadequate care was apparent. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, concluding that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage because the law provided fair warning that their conduct could violate the detainee’s constitutional rights. View "Rhoads v. Riddell" on Justia Law

Riley v. Blanche

2026-07-02T10:30:49-08:00

A man born and raised in Jamaica entered the United States as a teenager on a temporary visa and later overstayed. After being convicted of drug and firearm offenses, he was taken into custody by the Department of Homeland Security and ordered removed to Jamaica. He sought deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming that a powerful Jamaican drug dealer with ties to local authorities had already killed two of his cousins and would likely kill him if he returned. His mother and sister, still in Jamaica, corroborated these fears through affidavits describing threats and police indifference. The Immigration Judge (IJ) found the man’s testimony credible, determined he faced a particularized risk of torture with the acquiescence of Jamaican authorities, and granted deferral of removal under the CAT. On appeal by the government, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reversed, concluding that the threat was too speculative and the evidence insufficient to show government acquiescence. The man petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for review. Initially, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the petition as untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed the untimeliness but clarified that the filing deadline was not jurisdictional and could be waived. Because the government waived the timing objection, the Supreme Court remanded the case. Upon remand, the government raised a new jurisdictional argument. The Fourth Circuit allowed the petitioner to amend his petition to include review of his original removal order, curing any potential jurisdictional defect. The court then reviewed the merits and held that the BIA improperly applied a de novo review rather than the required clear-error standard to the IJ’s factual findings. The Fourth Circuit granted the amended petition, vacated the BIA’s order, and remanded for proceedings consistent with the correct standard of review. View "Riley v. Blanche" on Justia Law

US v. Holley

2026-07-01T10:30:24-08:00

Brad Acy Holley, who was serving a 127-month federal sentence after pleading guilty to methamphetamine conspiracy, suffered from significant health issues, including polycystic kidney disease and end-stage renal disease requiring dialysis. Following his declining health and ongoing treatments in a federal medical facility, Holley sought compassionate release, arguing that his condition constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction. He also asserted that he was not receiving necessary specialized medical care in prison, particularly a kidney transplant, and requested appointment of counsel and an expert witness to assist with his motion. The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia denied Holley’s requests, finding that his medical condition, while serious, was being adequately managed in prison and did not qualify as a terminal illness or otherwise meet the threshold for extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release. The court also declined to appoint counsel or an expert, determining that neither was warranted under the circumstances. Holley appealed these decisions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying compassionate release, finding the court properly relied on Holley’s individualized medical records rather than generalized statistics, and reasonably concluded Holley was not suffering from a terminal illness with an end-of-life trajectory. The Fourth Circuit also held that Holley was not legally entitled to appointed counsel or an expert witness for his compassionate release motion, as there were no exceptional circumstances justifying such appointments. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "US v. Holley" on Justia Law

Morgan v. City of Charlotte

2026-06-29T11:01:25-08:00

Bobby Morgan, who suffers from bipolar and schizoaffective disorders, was involved in an altercation with his neighbors, during which he threatened to shoot them and displayed what appeared to be a functional pistol. After retreating to his home, Bobby fired his gun multiple times, prompting a police standoff. Despite attempts to deescalate, Bobby continued firing—later revealed to be with a prop gun that could only shoot blanks but appeared real. Officers responded with gunfire, striking Bobby three times. Bobby survived after receiving medical care. Felicia Morgan, his mother and legal guardian, sued the City of Charlotte and several officers, alleging excessive force under the Fourth Amendment and failure to reasonably accommodate Bobby’s disabilities in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina granted summary judgment to the defendants. The court found that from the perspective of a reasonable officer, Bobby posed an imminent threat of serious physical harm due to his erratic and repeated firing of a realistic-looking gun in a residential area. The court also determined that the officers acted reasonably in attempting to accommodate Bobby’s mental conditions, given the exigent circumstances and the risks posed to officers and civilians. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the claims de novo, applying the objective reasonableness standard for excessive force and the requirement of reasonable accommodation under the ADA. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the officers’ use of force was justified given the threat Bobby posed and that the City and its officers acted reasonably under the circumstances. The Court concluded that unfortunate events do not automatically create legal liability when officers reasonably perceive an imminent threat and take appropriate action. View "Morgan v. City of Charlotte" on Justia Law

FS Medical Supplies, LLC v. Tanner Pharma UK Limited

2026-06-25T10:30:26-08:00

During the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, a limited liability company (LLC), FS Medical Supplies, entered into a contract to supply personal protective equipment and related products to TannerGAP, Inc. and Tanner Pharma UK Limited for distribution. FS Medical later discovered that the Tanner entities had contracted directly with one of its suppliers, prompting FS Medical to sue for breach of contract. Initially, FS Medical brought suit in California state court, but the defendants removed the case to federal court, where it was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. FS Medical then filed two actions in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, asserting diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3). FS Medical alleged that its members were citizens of Texas and California, and later acknowledged that one member was a citizen of China. The defendants included both U.S. citizens domiciled in North Carolina and a United Kingdom corporation. After limited discovery and amendment of the complaint, the district court, following a magistrate judge’s recommendation, dismissed the actions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the presence of both domestic and foreign members in the plaintiff LLC destroyed diversity jurisdiction. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that, under § 1332(a)(3), complete diversity requires at least one U.S. citizen on each side of the action. Because FS Medical, as an LLC, had both domestic and foreign members at the time the complaints were filed, and because there were foreign defendants as well, the suit was not between “citizens of different States.” The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal and declined to grant relief under North Carolina’s savings statute, finding it lacked jurisdiction to do so. View "FS Medical Supplies, LLC v. Tanner Pharma UK Limited" on Justia Law

US v. Bendann

2026-06-25T10:30:26-08:00

A middle-school teacher at an all-boys preparatory school in Baltimore developed a close relationship with a minor student, serving as his advisor, coach, and frequent driver. Over time, this relationship escalated into grooming and sexual exploitation, including coercing the student into running naked, engaging in sexually explicit acts that were filmed, and threats to expose the student through social media. The teacher continued the abusive conduct over several years, leveraging explicit images to maintain control and compliance, even after the student graduated. The case came to light after other students reported suspicious behavior, leading to a police investigation and a search of the teacher’s home and electronic devices. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland oversaw pretrial proceedings and the trial itself. The defendant moved to suppress evidence from his iPhone, arguing that law enforcement had unlawfully obtained his passcode, and requested a competency evaluation due to reported suicidal ideation. The district court denied both requests, finding the passcode was entered voluntarily and that the defendant was competent to stand trial. After a six-day trial, the jury convicted the defendant on all counts, including child exploitation, possession of child sexual abuse material, and cyberstalking. The court sentenced him to 35 years’ imprisonment and lifetime supervised release, rejecting arguments regarding the admissibility of victim-impact statements at sentencing. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a competency evaluation, properly found the defendant’s entry of the iPhone passcode voluntary and not the result of interrogation, and correctly handled the Jencks Act material issue. It also found no error in allowing the victim’s parents to present impact statements at sentencing. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentence. View "US v. Bendann" on Justia Law

McMaster v. Department of Labor

2026-06-24T10:31:20-08:00

South Carolina has administered its own workplace safety program under federal law for decades. In July 2016, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) issued an interim final rule requiring states with their own plans to increase monetary penalties in line with federal levels. South Carolina did not adjust its penalties, and OSHA’s annual monitoring reports repeatedly noted this issue without finding formal noncompliance until 2022. That year, OSHA formally found South Carolina noncompliant and recommended legislative changes to bring the state into alignment with federal standards. Previously, in 2022, South Carolina officials challenged only OSHA’s 2022 inflation adjustment in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. The district court held that the 2022 adjustment was not a final agency action and dismissed the claim. In 2023, South Carolina brought a new suit in the same court, this time challenging the 2016 interim final rule under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The Department of Labor moved to dismiss, arguing the claims were untimely under the APA’s six-year statute of limitations. The district court agreed, finding that any injury occurred when the 2016 rule was promulgated and dismissed the APA claims as time-barred. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed whether the APA claims were timely. The court held that a claim accrues when the plaintiff is injured by a final agency action, which, in this case, was when the 2016 rule was published. The court determined that South Carolina could have filed suit as early as 2016 and was therefore outside the six-year limitations period. The court also noted that South Carolina may still raise its substantive arguments if an enforcement action is initiated. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "McMaster v. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

Ingram v. Hamilton

2026-06-24T10:31:20-08:00

A maximum security prison in Virginia faced a surge in near-fatal drug overdoses among inmates in May and June 2023. In response, prison officials implemented a policy requiring every inmate who accessed the no-contact video visitation rooms to undergo a strip search both before and after each visit. Marcus Ingram, an inmate who used these rooms to call his wife, was subjected to 26 strip searches in a single month as a result. The policy was based on uncorroborated tips from inmates suggesting that contraband was being circulated through these rooms, despite no evidence of any actual contraband being found in connection with the video visitation rooms. Ingram filed a pro se lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia against the prison warden and the officer who conducted most of the searches. He alleged violations of his Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights, along with a claim of supervisory liability against the warden. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the basis of qualified immunity, holding that the searches were reasonable due to the drug problem and that there was no evidence of harassment or intimidation. The court also dismissed the supervisory liability claim as there was no underlying constitutional violation. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit assumed without deciding that some of the strip searches may have violated the Fourth Amendment. However, it held that the right at issue was not clearly established at the time, as neither controlling precedent nor a consensus of persuasive authority made the unconstitutionality of the policy beyond debate. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to the defendants. View "Ingram v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

Gordon v. Heath

2026-06-24T10:31:19-08:00

Two Black officers, Don Gordon and Terrell Jones, were assigned to a Maryland State Police multi-agency drug task force. They allege they were consistently excluded from meetings and communications where overtime and desirable assignments were distributed to white officers. This exclusion resulted in lost work opportunities and compensation. The situation escalated when a supervisor, Corporal Oros, sent a racially and sexually offensive image involving George Floyd to the group shortly after Floyd’s death, and Sergeant Heath, a co-leader of the unit, took no corrective action. The officers assert that these actions and inactions created a racially hostile work environment, leading to feelings of mistrust and concern for their safety on the job. After filing charges with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and receiving right-to-sue letters, Gordon and Jones brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. The district court dismissed their race discrimination claims but permitted the Title VII hostile work environment claim against the Maryland State Police and the § 1981 hostile work environment claims against Sergeant Heath and Corporal Oros (in their individual capacities) to proceed. The district court denied qualified immunity to Sergeant Heath at the pleading stage. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed Sergeant Heath’s interlocutory appeal concerning qualified immunity. The court held that the plaintiffs’ complaint plausibly alleged Sergeant Heath’s participation in and tacit authorization of a racially hostile work environment. The court further ruled that the right to be free from such a racially hostile work environment was clearly established at the time of the events described. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Sergeant Heath. View "Gordon v. Heath" on Justia Law

Aljizzani v. Middle East Broadcasting Networks, Inc.

2026-06-17T10:30:44-08:00

Two journalists, both of Iraqi national origin, worked for a Virginia-based media company operating Arabic-language broadcasts targeting the Middle East and North Africa. The company maintained a mandatory Code of Ethics and social media policy requiring its journalists to remain neutral both in their reporting and in personal social media posts. Both journalists violated these policies by posting political content on social media, and after refusing direct orders to remove the posts, each was terminated. They alleged that the company enforced its policies more harshly against Iraqi journalists than non-Iraqi journalists and that their terminations were discriminatory under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Each journalist filed a separate lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, asserting claims of national origin discrimination. Both district courts granted the employer’s motions to dismiss, finding that the complaints failed to allege sufficient facts to plausibly support a claim of discrimination. Specifically, the courts found that neither plaintiff identified non-Iraqi employees who engaged in similarly insubordinate conduct—such as violating the same policies after direct warnings—yet were treated more favorably. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed both cases de novo. The court affirmed the district courts’ decisions, holding that the plaintiffs’ complaints did not state plausible claims for relief under Title VII. The court found that the facts alleged showed the plaintiffs were terminated for insubordination and repeated policy violations, not because of their national origin, and that the comparator allegations were too generalized to support an inference of discrimination. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying one plaintiff leave to amend, as no request for leave was made and amendment would have been futile. The judgments of dismissal were affirmed. View "Aljizzani v. Middle East Broadcasting Networks, Inc." on Justia Law

US v. Melaku

2026-06-17T10:30:44-08:00

The defendant engaged in a series of shootings at military-related sites in Northern Virginia in late 2010, and was apprehended in June 2011 at Arlington National Cemetery, carrying materials linked to his offenses. He later pleaded guilty to three charges: injuring government property, using a firearm during a crime of violence, and attempting to injure a veteran’s memorial. As part of a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, he accepted a twenty-five year sentence and waived his right to appeal within statutory limits. After being found competent despite a schizophrenia diagnosis, he was sentenced accordingly and did not initially appeal. Years later, the defendant sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit previously vacated his firearm conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and remanded for resentencing on the remaining counts. On remand, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held a new competency hearing and discussed whether to postpone sentencing to monitor medical compliance. Ultimately, the court declined a lengthy postponement due to statutory and constitutional concerns, resentenced the defendant to consecutive maximum terms totaling 240 months, and ordered a pre-release hearing to plan for his transition. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed four challenges to the resentencing. Two claims were deemed forfeited for not being raised at sentencing, and the remaining two failed under the abuse-of-discretion standard. The court held that the defendant did not demonstrate a plain error under Tapia v. United States regarding the imposition of a sentence to promote rehabilitation or medical compliance. The court further found the sentence to be both procedurally and substantively reasonable, and rejected arguments regarding the district court’s authority to order a pre-release hearing. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "US v. Melaku" on Justia Law

Bacardi and Company Limited v. Squires

2026-06-16T10:30:30-08:00

The dispute centers on the HAVANA CLUB trademark, originally registered in the United States in 1976 by a Cuban state-owned company, Cubaexport. Due to changes in U.S. law, renewal of the trademark registration required a specific license from the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) after 1998. In December 2005, Cubaexport submitted its renewal application and payment to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) without the required OFAC license. OFAC later notified the PTO that the payment was unauthorized, leading to the PTO’s refund of the fee and refusal to renew the registration. Cubaexport unsuccessfully litigated against OFAC and, in 2015, reapplied for the license, which OFAC granted retroactively in 2016, authorizing the 2005 payment. After the PTO Director accepted Cubaexport’s renewal filing based on the retroactive OFAC license, Bacardi sued the PTO and its Director in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Bacardi argued the PTO lacked statutory authority to renew the expired registration and acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The district court initially dismissed the case, finding judicial review precluded by the Lanham Act, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded. On remand, Cubaexport intervened, and after cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted judgment for the defendants, finding the OFAC license validated the payment and that any deficiency was cured during the petition process. Reviewing the district court’s summary judgment de novo, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the PTO Director acted within statutory authority, as the retroactive OFAC license validated the 2005 payment, satisfying the renewal requirements. The court also held the Director’s explanation for the renewal was reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Bacardi and Company Limited v. Squires" on Justia Law

Overby v. Anheuser-Busch, LLC

2026-06-15T11:00:26-08:00

Hourly workers at a brewing company’s Williamsburg, Virginia facility alleged that the company failed to pay them for various pre- and post-shift activities, including donning and doffing personal protective equipment, complying with COVID-19 protocols, attending shift-handoff meetings, and handling tools. The company used an electronic badge system for entry but compensated employees based on scheduled shift hours, not actual time on site. Different employees performed these tasks at different times and locations, with some tasks done at home, some during shift hours, and some on the premises outside shift hours. The company committed to pay for all hours actually worked, provided employees notified management about extra time worked. The plaintiffs filed suit under the Virginia Wage Payment Act, the Virginia Overtime Wage Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act, seeking class certification for wage and hour claims. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia certified the class, finding that common questions predominated, such as whether the company’s policy resulted in uncompensated mandatory work. The district court’s class definition included all hourly employees at the facility within the relevant timeframe, and it denied the company’s motion to decertify the FLSA collective action. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court erred by certifying the class without adequately considering significant variations among employees regarding their pre- and post-shift activities, the timing and location of those activities, and the applicable legal standards over time. The appellate court found that the class definition was overly broad and failed to account for differences among employees. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit vacated the class certification order and remanded for further proceedings, allowing the district court to consider narrower subclasses or to deny certification entirely. The appeal regarding the FLSA collective action was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Overby v. Anheuser-Busch, LLC" on Justia Law

Dan River Basin Association v. Virginia Department of Environmental Quality

2026-06-11T10:30:37-08:00

A group of environmental organizations challenged the decision by the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (VDEQ) to grant a water quality certification for the Southgate Project, a proposed pipeline crossing parts of Virginia and North Carolina. The organizations argued that the certification was improperly issued because VDEQ failed to adequately address the pipeline developer’s past record of environmental violations and did not include all necessary conditions to ensure compliance with water quality standards. VDEQ had previously approved the developer’s erosion and sediment control plans, received public comments, and ultimately issued the certification after addressing those comments. After VDEQ issued the certification, the petitioners sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and filed a motion to stay the certification pending judicial review, pointing to the imminent start of pipeline construction. Their main contentions were that VDEQ did not rationally justify its prediction that the pipeline would not violate water quality standards, especially given the developer’s history of noncompliance, and that the certification failed to explicitly require compliance with certain state environmental plans and agreements. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered the motion for a stay and denied it. The court found that the petitioners had not made a strong showing that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. The court noted that VDEQ provided a detailed explanation for its decision, including differences between the current project and past projects, and incorporated relevant environmental plans by reference in the certification. The court also determined that the remaining factors supporting a stay did not outweigh the petitioners’ failure to demonstrate likely success on the merits. The motion for a stay pending review was therefore denied. View "Dan River Basin Association v. Virginia Department of Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

Sierra Club v. North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality

2026-06-11T10:30:36-08:00

A proposed pipeline project, known as the Southgate Project, is planned to traverse portions of North Carolina and Virginia. This project is an extension of an existing pipeline system, and its construction has generated substantial environmental and legal concerns. The Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, sought a water quality certification from the North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality (NCDEQ), which is required under the Clean Water Act for such projects. After considering public comments, a public hearing, and a report from its hearing officer, NCDEQ issued the necessary certification in November 2025, finding that the project, if conducted according to specified conditions, would comply with state water quality standards. Previously, in 2020, NCDEQ had denied a water quality certification for the project, but that decision was vacated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 2021. After the main pipeline was completed in 2024 and project plans were revised to reduce its length in North Carolina, NCDEQ reviewed and ultimately granted the new application. Environmental groups then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for review of NCDEQ’s decision, and, as construction appeared imminent, sought a stay to prevent the project from proceeding while the case was pending. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied the motion for a stay, applying the traditional four-factor test for such relief. The court held that the petitioners did not make a strong showing that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their challenges to NCDEQ’s decision, particularly given the deference owed to the agency’s expertise under the Administrative Procedure Act. As a result, the motion for preliminary relief was denied, though the underlying merits of the challenge remain for later determination. View "Sierra Club v. North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

United States v. Chollet

2026-06-09T10:30:39-08:00

Three individuals—two tax attorneys, who were partners in a Missouri law firm, and an insurance broker from North Carolina—created and marketed a “Gain Elimination Plan” (GEP) to clients across various states, including North Carolina. The plan purported to enable clients to reduce taxable income by paying business expenses to limited partnerships largely owned by charities. In practice, the government established that these partnerships never actually existed, no services were provided, and the deductions claimed were based on fabricated transactions. The attorneys and the broker helped clients file tax returns with false deductions, resulting in over $22 million in unpaid taxes. The insurance broker also supplied false information to obtain life insurance policies for the plan, sharing commissions with the attorneys. One of the attorneys used the plan to reduce her own reported income, and the attorneys prepared tax returns for the broker that underreported his income. A jury in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina convicted all three defendants of conspiracy to defraud the government and multiple counts related to the preparation and filing of false tax returns. The district court sentenced them to imprisonment, supervised release, and restitution. The defendants appealed, challenging the prosecution’s authorization, venue, evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and sufficiency of the evidence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences. The court held that the prosecution was properly authorized under the Appointments Clause and relevant statutes, venue in the Western District of North Carolina was proper because conduct elements of the offenses occurred there, and the “literal truth” defense did not apply to false totals derived from fabricated deductions. The appellate court also found no reversible error regarding evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, or the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conspiracy and false return charges. View "United States v. Chollet" on Justia Law

US v. Watson

2026-06-08T11:01:14-08:00

After pleading guilty to two felony charges, an individual was sentenced to prison and a term of supervised release. Upon his release, he violated several conditions of his supervision almost immediately. As a result, the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina revoked his supervised release, sentencing him to 41 months in prison followed by a lifetime of supervised release, with a specific condition of nearly 21 months (629 days) of home detention. Following the revocation hearing, the defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the home detention term exceeded what the law allows when combined with his prison sentence. He pointed to 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(19), which states that home detention “may be imposed only as an alternative to incarceration,” and argued that since the statutory maximum for incarceration under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) is 48 months, only 7 additional months of home detention could be imposed. The district court denied this motion, reasoning that home detention is distinct from incarceration and thus did not need to be included in the statutory calculation. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s ruling. The Fourth Circuit held that under § 3563(b)(19), home detention may only be imposed as a direct substitute for incarceration, on a one-for-one basis, and that the combined total of incarceration and home detention cannot exceed the statutory maximum term of incarceration (48 months in this case). Because the district court imposed a total combined sentence of approximately 62 months (41 months imprisonment plus nearly 21 months home detention), the sentence exceeded statutory limits. The Fourth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing in accordance with this interpretation. View "US v. Watson" on Justia Law

Sligo Creek Center v. Health and Human Services

2026-06-05T10:30:43-08:00

After two employees and a former resident at a Medicare-participating nursing home in Maryland were diagnosed with active tuberculosis in 2015, county health officials determined that the facility was at high risk for transmission. The officials directed the facility’s staff to take responsibility for testing and follow-up for residents. The facility carried out skin tests and chest x-rays, identifying several residents with latent tuberculosis, but did not proceed to evaluate or treat those residents for latent TB, nor did it document reasons for not treating them. Over a year later, a state health agency investigated and concluded that the facility failed to ensure proper follow-up and documentation, violating federal infection control regulations. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) agreed, found that the noncompliance created “immediate jeopardy,” and imposed a per-day civil monetary penalty. The facility challenged the findings and penalty before an administrative law judge, who rejected its arguments and upheld both the finding of noncompliance and the penalty. The Departmental Appeals Board affirmed the administrative law judge’s decision. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether the Seventh Amendment entitled the facility to a jury trial in HHS’s administrative proceedings for monetary penalties. The court held that there is no Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in this context because the enforcement action at issue involves “public rights,” not common law claims. The court reasoned that Congress created novel statutory obligations for Medicare-participating facilities, not merely reclassified common law causes of action, and that these obligations are enforced through an administrative scheme distinct from common law torts or contract actions. The court also found that HHS’s actions were neither arbitrary nor capricious and that its decision was supported by substantial evidence. The petition for review was denied. View "Sligo Creek Center v. Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

Uddin v. Blanche

2026-06-05T10:30:42-08:00

A lawful permanent resident from Bangladesh, who also held Canadian citizenship, resided in New Jersey where he was indicted in 2018 for distributing, storing, and possessing sexually explicit images of children in violation of New Jersey law. He pleaded guilty in 2019 to knowingly storing or maintaining at least 25 items depicting the sexual exploitation or abuse of a child using a file-sharing program that made the files available to others. Following his conviction and requirement to register as a sex offender, he was detained by U.S. immigration authorities and charged with removability under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) on the grounds of an aggravated felony and as having committed a crime of child abuse. An immigration judge in Richmond, Virginia, concluded that his conviction categorically matched a crime of child abuse under the INA, making him removable. The judge also denied his applications for cancellation of removal and adjustment of status as a matter of discretion. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the finding of removability and adopted the immigration judge’s discretionary denials. The petitioner then sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit held that the New Jersey statute, as it existed at the time of the conduct, qualifies categorically as a crime of child abuse under the INA because knowingly storing child sexual abuse material on a peer-to-peer file-sharing program creates a reasonable probability of harm to a child. The court denied review of the removability finding. Regarding the discretionary denial of cancellation of removal and adjustment of status, the Fourth Circuit determined it lacked jurisdiction to review those determinations, as they were discretionary merits decisions and did not present questions of law. The petition was therefore denied in part and dismissed in part. View "Uddin v. Blanche" on Justia Law

US v. Goode

2026-06-05T10:30:42-08:00

The defendant pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina to charges including conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. As part of his plea agreement, he waived his right to appeal his conviction or sentence except for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct. At sentencing, the district court found that three prior North Carolina convictions—including second-degree murder—qualified as violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), resulting in an enhanced sentence of 360 months’ imprisonment. The defendant withdrew all objections to the presentence report at sentencing and was sentenced accordingly. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the defendant argued that his North Carolina second-degree murder conviction did not qualify as a violent felony under the ACCA, and also that his firearm conviction was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. The government moved to dismiss only the Second Amendment challenge based on the appeal waiver, and argued the merits regarding the ACCA issue. The court dismissed the Second Amendment challenge, but deferred ruling on the ACCA claim. The government later attempted to invoke the appeal waiver against the ACCA challenge, but the court found this argument forfeited as the government had already argued the merits without raising the waiver. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the government forfeited its right to enforce the appeal waiver by failing to timely assert it. On the merits, the court held that North Carolina’s second-degree murder statute categorically qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA, as it requires malice amounting to extreme recklessness akin to knowledge and always involves the use of physical force. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "US v. Goode" on Justia Law

Deque Systems Inc. v. Browserstack, Inc.

2026-06-05T10:30:42-08:00

Deque Systems Inc., a company specializing in web accessibility software, developed and registered multiple versions of its DevTools and Rules Help Pages products. To access these, users agreed not to copy, reverse-engineer, or otherwise misuse the software or its documentation. In 2021, BrowserStack, a competing firm, sought to develop its own accessibility testing tools. More than 100 BrowserStack employees created accounts with Deque—agreeing to Deque’s terms—and later, BrowserStack released an Accessibility Toolkit, which Deque alleged was developed by unlawfully copying and reverse-engineering DevTools and the Rules Help Pages. Deque filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, claiming copyright infringement, false advertising, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment, and sought injunctive relief, damages, and other remedies. During discovery, Deque repeatedly failed to properly disclose its damages calculations and supporting evidence by the deadlines set in the court’s scheduling order. Despite several opportunities to supplement its disclosures and a late attempt to introduce expert testimony, Deque did not timely provide the required information. BrowserStack moved to exclude Deque’s damages evidence and for summary judgment. The district court granted these motions, finding that Deque’s noncompliance with disclosure rules was neither substantially justified nor harmless, and that Deque presented no evidence supporting injunctive or other relief. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding all evidence of Deque’s damages under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) due to repeated and unjustified failures to comply with disclosure requirements. The court also held that summary judgment for BrowserStack was warranted because Deque could not establish entitlement to injunctive, declaratory, or monetary relief. View "Deque Systems Inc. v. Browserstack, Inc." on Justia Law

Shaw v. Foreman

2026-06-04T11:00:32-08:00

While incarcerated at Sussex 1 State Prison in Virginia, the plaintiff was accused of indecent exposure in July 2017. He consistently denied the charge and urged prison officials to review video footage from a RapidEye camera, which he claimed would show he was elsewhere when the incident occurred. The officials did not review the footage, stating it was of poor quality and not helpful, and ultimately found the plaintiff guilty after a delayed hearing. As a result of this conviction, and considering his prior offenses, the plaintiff’s security classification was increased and he was transferred to a higher-security facility. He requested that the video footage be preserved, but the prison officials failed to do so. The plaintiff filed suit, alleging procedural due process and First Amendment retaliation claims. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia initially dismissed the due process claim and granted summary judgment on the retaliation claim. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, noting the importance of the missing video evidence to the plaintiff’s case and remanded for further proceedings. During discovery on remand, it became clear that the video footage had not been preserved, leading the plaintiff to move for spoliation sanctions. The magistrate judge began considering the sanctions motion, but the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims before ruling on the sanctions issue. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by granting summary judgment before addressing the plaintiff’s motion for sanctions related to the missing video footage. Because the footage was central to the claims, the appellate court vacated the district court’s decision and remanded with instructions to fully consider the sanctions motion. View "Shaw v. Foreman" on Justia Law

Jonathan R. v. Morrisey

2026-06-04T11:00:32-08:00

A group of children in West Virginia’s foster care system filed a class action lawsuit against state officials, alleging systemic failures by the state agencies responsible for their care. The plaintiffs claimed the state’s practices resulted in widespread abuses, neglect, inadequate placements, understaffing, and failure to provide necessary physical and mental health services. They alleged violations of their constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as statutory violations under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. The class action encompassed approximately 6,800 foster children, with additional subclasses for kinship placements, children with disabilities, and those aging out of the system. The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia initially dismissed the case on abstention and mootness grounds, but that decision was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Jonathan R. ex rel. Dixon v. Justice. Upon remand, the district court certified the General Class and ADA Subclass, denied certification of other subclasses, and proceeded with discovery. In February 2025, the district court, acting sua sponte and without notice or briefing, dismissed the case with prejudice for lack of standing, finding that it lacked power under Article III to grant the requested injunctive and declaratory relief and concluding the plaintiffs’ injuries were not redressable. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. It held that federal courts have the authority and duty to remedy systemic constitutional violations, including through comprehensive injunctive relief and declaratory judgments in institutional reform cases. The court found that the plaintiffs’ injuries were sufficiently concrete and ongoing, and that the requested relief was likely to redress those injuries. The district court’s dismissal was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. The Fourth Circuit declined to reassign the case to a new judge and found West Virginia’s cross-appeal on class decertification unreviewable at this stage. View "Jonathan R. v. Morrisey" on Justia Law

United States ex rel. Kyer v. Thomas Health System, Inc.

2026-06-04T11:00:32-08:00

A nurse formerly employed at a West Virginia hospital system brought a qui tam action on behalf of the United States under the False Claims Act. She alleged that the hospital system, its affiliated entities, and a former executive submitted claims to the federal government that were prohibited by the Stark Law and the Anti-Kickback Statute. Specifically, she claimed that the defendants’ compensation and financial arrangements with physicians created unlawful incentives for referrals, resulting in the submission of false claims to Medicare between 2013 and 2022. The complaint included detailed tables of claims and described physician compensation structures, as well as financial transfers between entities within the health system. The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia reviewed the case after the government declined to intervene. The court dismissed the amended complaint for failure to plead fraud with the particularity required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court found that the complaint did not sufficiently allege the necessary elements of a False Claims Act violation, including a plausible connection between physician compensation and prohibited referrals, or that any claims submitted were actually false under the Stark Law or the Anti-Kickback Statute. The district court also denied the plaintiff’s post-judgment motions to vacate the judgment and for leave to amend the complaint, finding that additional amendment would prejudice the defendants after years of litigation and access to substantial discovery. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal and denial of leave to amend. The Fourth Circuit held that the complaint did not plead fraud with the required particularity, failed to plausibly allege violations of the Stark Law or the Anti-Kickback Statute, and did not present facts sufficient to support claims of conspiracy or reverse false claims. The court found no abuse of discretion in denying post-judgment relief. View "United States ex rel. Kyer v. Thomas Health System, Inc." on Justia Law

West Virginia Rivers Coalition, Inc. v. The Chemours Company FC, LLC

2026-06-03T10:30:30-08:00

The case centers on the operations of a chemical manufacturing facility in Parkersburg, West Virginia, owned by The Chemours Company. Chemours used hexafluoropropylene oxide dimer acid (HFPO-DA), a member of the PFAS class of chemicals, as a processing aid in polymer production. The company discharged wastewater containing HFPO-DA into the Ohio River under a Clean Water Act (CWA) permit that established specific effluent limits. However, from 2022 onward, Chemours exceeded these limits on multiple occasions. Local water testing showed that HFPO-DA concentrations sometimes surpassed newer, not-yet-enforceable federal health standards but did not exceed West Virginia’s own goals. Chemours entered into an administrative consent order with the EPA to address permit compliance. The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia reviewed a citizen suit brought by West Virginia Rivers Coalition, Inc., seeking a preliminary injunction against Chemours for ongoing permit violations. The district court found that the Coalition had Article III associational standing through a member who avoided boating in the Ohio River due to Chemours’ discharges. The court granted the preliminary injunction, enjoining Chemours from exceeding permit limits and requiring remedial measures. Chemours appealed, challenging both the standing determination and the irreparable harm finding. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit examined both issues. The court agreed that the Coalition had established a substantial likelihood of standing at this stage. However, it found that the district court committed legal errors in its irreparable harm analysis, including incorrectly presuming harm from permit violations and conflating harm to the public with harm to the plaintiff. The Fourth Circuit also found clear error in the factual findings regarding irreparable harm. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction granted by the district court. View "West Virginia Rivers Coalition, Inc. v. The Chemours Company FC, LLC" on Justia Law

Mebane v. GKN Driveline North America, Inc.

2026-06-02T11:01:23-08:00

A former employee brought a class-action lawsuit against his previous employer, alleging that the company’s practices concerning rounding employees’ time entries and automatically deducting meal breaks resulted in violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act. The employer operated manufacturing facilities in North Carolina and used policies that rounded employee work time and deducted unpaid meal breaks regardless of whether an employee actually took the break. Plaintiffs argued these policies led to unpaid overtime and wages. The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina initially certified two classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and conditionally certified a collective action under the FLSA. However, after further developments and evidence showing that individualized inquiries would be necessary to determine whether employees were harmed by the time-rounding and meal-deduction policies, and that not all employees suffered wage loss, the district court decertified the classes and collective action. Subsequently, the named plaintiffs settled their individual claims with the employer, and the district court dismissed all remaining substantive claims with prejudice. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was asked to review the district court’s order decertifying the classes and collective action. The court held that because the plaintiff voluntarily settled his individual claims before filing the appeal, he lacked standing to challenge the district court’s decertification order. The court reasoned that once the individual claims underlying the request for class certification are settled or dismissed voluntarily, the plaintiff no longer retains a concrete interest sufficient to satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Mebane v. GKN Driveline North America, Inc." on Justia Law

Alvarado-Paz v. Blanche

2026-06-01T11:01:11-08:00

A woman and her minor child fled El Salvador for the United States after the woman’s father threatened to kill her, following a long history of severe domestic violence within the family. The woman’s mother was murdered by the father’s foster brother, allegedly at the father’s direction. After the murder, the woman and her siblings reported their suspicions to Salvadoran authorities, but law enforcement did not pursue the accused or investigate the family’s allegations. The woman and her child then received threats from masked men, which she believed were connected to her father. Fearing for their lives, they entered the United States without inspection and applied for asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and for relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). An Immigration Judge (IJ) found the woman credible but denied all relief, concluding she had not established persecution on account of a protected ground—rejecting her claims based on political opinion and proposed particular social groups (PSGs), and also finding no government acquiescence for purposes of CAT protection. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed her appeal, agreeing with the IJ that she had not demonstrated the required nexus between her persecution and any protected ground, and declined to consider some PSG claims, believing they had not been raised before the IJ. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the BIA committed reversible error by failing to consider the merits of her claim based on the PSG “Salvadoran women,” as this group had been properly raised before the IJ. The court granted the petition in part, vacated the removal order, and remanded for further proceedings on that issue. However, the court denied the petition regarding all other claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. View "Alvarado-Paz v. Blanche" on Justia Law

US v. Gentner

2026-05-28T10:31:24-08:00

Two executives of a Charlotte-based software company, serving as Chief Executive Officer and Chief Operating Officer, were responsible for the company’s financial affairs, including filing required IRS forms and paying over trust-fund taxes withheld from employees’ wages. Over multiple years, the company failed to pay over these taxes, despite repeated IRS interventions, warnings from advisors, and assurances from the executives that steps were being taken to resolve their liabilities. Despite participation in an IRS Voluntary Disclosure Program and substantial company revenues, the executives continued to pay themselves significant salaries while the unpaid trust-fund tax debt accumulated, ultimately exceeding $500,000. After the company ceased operations, the IRS imposed personal liability and penalties on both executives, who also failed to use available funds to pay overdue taxes. A federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina indicted both executives in January 2023 for five counts of willful failure to pay over trust-fund taxes, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7202. After a joint jury trial in March 2024, both were convicted on these counts, though acquitted of filing false tax returns and tax evasion. Their post-trial motions for acquittal and a new trial—based on insufficiency of the evidence and the alleged weight of evidence favoring their cooperation with the IRS—were denied by the district court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the convictions and denial of the new trial motion. The court applied an abuse of discretion standard to the jury instruction and Rule 33 new trial issues, and reviewed legal questions de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the jury to review the indictment, providing instructions regarding willfulness and the good faith defense, or denying a new trial, finding that the evidence of willful failure to pay over taxes was overwhelming. The criminal judgments were affirmed. View "US v. Gentner" on Justia Law

US v. Revels

2026-05-27T10:31:06-08:00

Jonathan Revels was involved in a fatal altercation during which he shot and killed Jason Hunt with a revolver. Evidence showed Revels possessed three firearms at various times during the incident: two shotguns and the revolver used in the shooting. He was charged in federal court with a single count of possessing a firearm after a felony conviction, specifically referencing the two shotguns in the indictment, but not the revolver. A jury convicted Revels of this charge, and he was sentenced to 120 months in prison. While an earlier appeal affirmed the conviction, it remanded for resentencing due to a material fact misrepresented by the government at the original sentencing. After the remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, but before resentencing, Revels was convicted in state court of voluntary manslaughter for the killing of Hunt. At resentencing, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina applied a cross-reference in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that enhances sentences if a firearm cited in the offense of conviction was used in connection with another offense, here applying the voluntary manslaughter guideline. The district court imposed a sentence of 84 months. Revels appealed, arguing that the government had not proved the statutory requirements for the enhancement, and that his sentence was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated Revels’ sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court held that the district court did not make sufficient factual findings to support the application of the cross-reference provision in the Sentencing Guidelines, specifically failing to identify which firearm formed the basis for the enhancement or to explain how it was used in connection with the homicide. The court did not decide whether the enhancement could apply, leaving that for the district court on remand. View "US v. Revels" on Justia Law

Messer v. Garrison Investment Group, LP

2026-05-26T11:01:01-08:00

A group of former employees of a company that operated a manufacturing facility in Virginia sued the company after it announced it would close and began terminating employees. They alleged violations of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act) due to insufficient notice of the plant closure, and violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) relating to the improper termination of a severance plan. The employees initially named an investment group and several related parties as defendants, claiming they were alter egos or successors of the company and should be jointly liable. However, before trial, the employees voluntarily dismissed the investment group and related parties without prejudice, focusing instead on the liability of the company itself. The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia granted summary judgment in part, including dismissing claims by employees who signed releases, and ultimately entered a money judgment against the company after a bench trial. The employees were unable to collect on this judgment due to the company's insolvency. They then filed a new lawsuit against the investment group and various related parties, seeking to enforce the prior judgment on alter ego and veil piercing theories and claiming federal jurisdiction under the WARN Act and ERISA. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court's dismissal of the new lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Fourth Circuit held that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to enforce a prior federal judgment against parties not found liable in the original action, absent independent allegations of new federal statutory violations. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, concluding that neither federal question jurisdiction nor ancillary jurisdiction applied because the plaintiffs did not allege new violations of the WARN Act or ERISA. View "Messer v. Garrison Investment Group, LP" on Justia Law

US v. Scott

2026-05-22T10:31:06-08:00

The defendant pleaded guilty to a federal offense that prohibits possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. During sentencing, his presentence report recommended an enhanced base offense level because of a prior 2008 conviction under Virginia Code § 18.2-53.1 for using a firearm in the commission of a felony, specifically robbery. This enhancement was based on the conclusion that the prior conviction constituted a “crime of violence” as defined by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The defendant, through counsel, objected, arguing that his prior conviction did not meet the Guidelines’ definition of a crime of violence, and the parties’ written and oral arguments focused primarily on whether the elements clause or the enumerated offense clause of the Guidelines applied. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia overruled the defendant’s objection and applied the enhancement, basing its conclusion on the elements clause. The court’s reasoning mirrored the elements clause language, and its supporting citations were to cases addressing that clause or similar provisions. The resulting advisory Guidelines range was higher, and the defendant received a 33-month sentence. On appeal, he argued that the court erred in finding his prior conviction qualified as a crime of violence. The government defended the application of the elements clause and also raised arguments under the enumerated offense clause and harmless error doctrine. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in concluding the prior Virginia conviction satisfied the elements clause, adopting circuit precedent holding that Virginia robbery does not categorically require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another. The Fourth Circuit found the government had not demonstrated harmless error and declined to affirm based on the enumerated offense clause. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "US v. Scott" on Justia Law

US v. Starkey

2026-05-22T10:31:06-08:00

Jaron Starkey pleaded guilty to a federal drug-trafficking offense and was sentenced to 300 months in prison. His sentence was enhanced under the career-offender provision of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, based on two prior felony drug-distribution convictions in Delaware from 2012 and 2019. Starkey challenged the use of these convictions as predicates for the enhancement, contending that the Delaware statutes under which he was convicted criminalized attempted drug distribution, which, according to Fourth Circuit precedent prior to a 2023 Guidelines amendment, would not qualify as “controlled substance offenses” under the Sentencing Guidelines. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia rejected Starkey’s argument and applied the career-offender enhancement, concluding that his prior Delaware convictions qualified as predicate offenses under the Guidelines. Starkey appealed this determination. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fourth Circuit held that the Delaware statutes under which Starkey was convicted define “delivery” to include “attempted transfers,” but this does not mean they criminalize attempted delivery as an inchoate offense. Instead, the offense of delivery encompasses completed acts that may include attempted transfers, which are distinct from mere attempts prosecuted under separate attempt statutes. The court found that Delaware law does not prosecute inchoate attempted deliveries under its drug-distribution statutes. Therefore, Starkey’s prior convictions properly qualified as controlled substance offenses for the career-offender enhancement. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "US v. Starkey" on Justia Law

McPherson v. Patton

2026-05-21T11:30:39-08:00

Two brothers were convicted in 1995 by a Maryland state jury of conspiracy to murder, following the fatal shooting of Anthony Wooden in Baltimore. The police investigation, led by two detectives, included interviews with several witnesses. Among them was Marcus King, a thirteen-year-old with learning disabilities, who initially denied involvement but, after an unrecorded and allegedly coercive police interrogation, gave a recorded statement implicating himself and the brothers. At the subsequent trial, King recanted his statement, claiming police coercion. The main evidence against the brothers was the testimony of King and another witness, Diane Bailey, whose credibility was also questioned. After serving more than twenty years in prison, the brothers sought relief through the State’s Conviction Integrity Unit, which led to a joint petition with the State for a writ of actual innocence. A Maryland court granted the writ, vacating the convictions. The brothers then filed a civil rights suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland against the detectives involved, alleging constitutional violations, including fabrication and suppression of evidence. The district court dismissed all claims except those against two detectives, Patton and Barlow. On their motion for summary judgment, the district court excluded King’s prior trial testimony as inadmissible hearsay and granted summary judgment for the detectives, finding insufficient evidence of fabrication or suppression. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in excluding King’s trial testimony, finding the prosecutor’s motive in the original trial sufficiently similar to the detectives’ interests in the civil case for admissibility under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1). The Fourth Circuit concluded that the brothers presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact on their fabrication claim but not on the suppression claim, and therefore vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "McPherson v. Patton" on Justia Law

Sessoms v. USHealth Advisors, LLC

2026-05-21T11:30:39-08:00

In this case, the plaintiff, acting individually and on behalf of a proposed class, alleged that the defendant, a health insurance marketing company, violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by sending her a prerecorded telemarketing call without her prior express consent. The defendant argued that the plaintiff had given such consent when she used a third-party “lead generation” website operated by a non-party, where she filled out a form seeking insurance quotes. The online process included an agreement (the “Terms of Use”) with an arbitration clause covering disputes related to the website’s use and consent to be contacted by marketing partners, although the defendant was not named in the agreement. After the plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, the defendant moved to compel arbitration, arguing that it could enforce the arbitration clause as a third-party beneficiary under Delaware law. The district court denied the motion, holding that, although the defendant benefited from the agreement, it was not a third-party beneficiary because the benefit was not central to the contract’s purpose. The court also determined that, under Fourth Circuit precedent, the court—not an arbitrator—must decide whether a non-signatory like the defendant can enforce the arbitration agreement. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of arbitration de novo. The Fourth Circuit agreed that the district court, not an arbitrator, was the proper forum to decide the defendant’s standing to enforce the arbitration clause. However, the court disagreed with the district court’s interpretation of Delaware law, concluding that the benefit to the defendant was material to the agreement’s purpose, making the defendant a third-party beneficiary. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to compel arbitration and stay the federal court proceedings. View "Sessoms v. USHealth Advisors, LLC" on Justia Law

Brunenkant v. Suburban Hospital, Inc.

2026-05-21T11:30:35-08:00

The plaintiff, a lawyer, visited Suburban Hospital in Maryland in October 2015 with abdominal pain and other symptoms. He was diagnosed with gallbladder disease and underwent surgery performed by Dr. Daee, who was presented to him as a hospital agent or employee. Complications from that surgery led to a second operation at a different hospital a month later, where alleged medical malpractice was discovered. During subsequent litigation, the plaintiff learned in May 2022 that Dr. Daee was not a hospital employee but an independent contractor, and that the hospital may have misrepresented this relationship. The plaintiff first filed a medical malpractice action against the hospital and Dr. Daee in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland in 2020. In 2022, after discovering new information, he tried to amend his complaint to add fraud and conspiracy claims, but the district court denied this request. He then filed a separate lawsuit in May 2023, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation and conspiracy to commit fraud regarding the hospital’s representations about Dr. Daee’s status. The hospital moved to dismiss, arguing the claims were barred by Maryland’s five-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice under the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act. The district court agreed and dismissed the complaint. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court held that the district court applied the incorrect statute of limitations. It determined that the plaintiff’s fraud and conspiracy claims were not traditional malpractice claims and should be governed by Maryland’s general three-year statute of limitations for civil actions, not the five-year period for medical malpractice. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal order and remanded the case for further proceedings, without deciding whether the claims were timely under the correct statute. View "Brunenkant v. Suburban Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law

Rodriguez-Solis v. Blanche

2026-05-21T11:30:35-08:00

The petitioner, a Honduran national, entered the United States in 2010 and was served with a notice of removal for lacking lawful admission or parole. After her first master calendar hearing, she requested and received a transfer to North Carolina. She subsequently retained counsel, who conceded removability and submitted an asylum application. Over several years, her removal proceedings were administratively closed and later reopened at the government’s request, leading to repeated postponements and delays, mostly due to procedural matters and circumstances beyond her control, such as pregnancy and exposure to COVID-19. Just weeks before a key hearing and associated filing deadline, her longtime attorney withdrew, citing lack of cooperation, and the immigration judge allowed this withdrawal without findings or explanation. Following the attorney’s withdrawal, the petitioner sought additional time to secure new counsel, explaining she had only learned of the withdrawal about a month before the hearing and was unable to find an attorney to prepare her case. Despite her objections and the fact this was her first such request, the immigration judge denied her request for a continuance and proceeded with the merits hearing, during which she represented herself. The judge found her testimony not credible and ordered her removal to Honduras. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the judge’s decision, concluding she had “sufficient time to retain counsel” and did not establish a violation of her statutory or due process rights. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision and held that the immigration judge violated the petitioner’s statutory right to counsel under the Immigration and Nationality Act by not granting her a reasonable and realistic opportunity to obtain new representation after her attorney’s withdrawal. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the final order of removal, and remanded to the Board to determine whether this violation prejudiced the petitioner. View "Rodriguez-Solis v. Blanche" on Justia Law

Jackson v. Protas, Spivok & Collins LLC

2026-05-18T10:30:34-08:00

Donte Jackson received a $30,000 loan from WebBank, which was later sold to Velocity Investments, LLC. After Jackson defaulted on the loan, Velocity, represented by the law firm Protas, Spivok & Collins LLC (PSC), sued Jackson in Maryland state court to collect the debt. Velocity eventually dismissed the state court suit with prejudice. Subsequently, Jackson brought a class action lawsuit against both Velocity and PSC, alleging that their practice of suing on time-barred debts was unlawful. In the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, both Velocity and PSC moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause in Jackson’s original promissory note. The district court found that Velocity, as a subsequent holder of the note, was a party to the arbitration agreement but had waived its right to arbitrate by filing suit in state court. The court ruled that PSC was not a party to the agreement, as it did not fit the contractual definition of an entity “servicing” the note, which the court interpreted in accordance with Maryland law. Only PSC appealed the denial of its motion to compel arbitration. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s ruling de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that PSC, as the law firm representing Velocity, was not a party to the arbitration agreement because it did not “service” the note in the relevant contractual sense, which involves collecting and maintaining a payment schedule for the loan. The court concluded that the arbitration agreement covered only creditors and loan servicers, not lawyers. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of PSC’s motion to compel arbitration. View "Jackson v. Protas, Spivok & Collins LLC" on Justia Law

US v. Straite

2026-05-18T10:30:33-08:00

In this case, the defendant participated in two incidents at a North Carolina bank: an armed robbery in which employees were assaulted with firearms, and a subsequent attempted armed robbery where the group was foiled when the bank manager recognized them and secured the building. The defendant was convicted by a jury of both armed bank robbery and attempted armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d), as well as for brandishing firearms during these crimes in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Following his conviction and sentence, which were affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 2014, the defendant filed several postconviction motions in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. These were denied. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability limited to the question of whether the defendant’s conviction for attempted armed bank robbery qualified as a “crime of violence” for purposes of supporting his related conviction under Section 924(c). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed de novo whether attempted armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) categorically constitutes a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). The court held that because Section 2113(d) requires either assaulting another person or putting another’s life in jeopardy by use of a dangerous weapon or device during the course of an attempted bank robbery, the offense necessarily entails the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. The court also found that the statute requires intentional, rather than merely reckless, conduct. Therefore, the court affirmed that attempted armed bank robbery under Section 2113(d) is categorically a crime of violence and affirmed the district court’s decision. View "US v. Straite" on Justia Law

LaRosa v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

2026-05-18T10:30:33-08:00

Catherine LaRosa and her late husband filed joint tax returns for several years. Following IRS assessments for underpayment for the years 1981–1983, and overpayment for 1984–1985, the parties reached a settlement in which both owed each other money. The LaRosas paid the IRS the net amount, including interest and penalties, but later sought a refund, arguing the IRS had miscalculated the interest. In 1994, the IRS issued a refund after recalculating the interest, but later determined that the refund was incorrect and sued to recover it. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted summary judgment to the government, ordering repayment, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The LaRosas did not repay the refund for over twenty years. In 2019, the government attempted to foreclose on the LaRosas’ home to collect the judgment. At this point, LaRosa sought “innocent spouse” equitable relief from the IRS under 26 U.S.C. § 6015(f)(1), which allows the IRS to relieve a taxpayer from liability for any unpaid tax in certain circumstances. The IRS refused to process her request, asserting that no amount was currently owed and that Section 6015(f) did not authorize relief for erroneous refunds. LaRosa then sought review in the United States Tax Court, which granted summary judgment to the IRS, holding that the erroneous refund did not create an “unpaid tax” or “deficiency” eligible for relief under Section 6015(f). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that an erroneous refund of underpayment interest does create a liability for “unpaid tax” eligible for equitable relief under Section 6015(f)(1). The court vacated the Tax Court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The holding was limited to underpayment interest and did not address other issues, which were left for the Tax Court to consider on remand. View "LaRosa v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Retail Energy Advancement League v. Brown

2026-05-15T10:30:35-08:00

Maryland enacted legislation regulating how retail electricity suppliers may market “green power” to consumers, seeking to address concerns that consumers were misled by claims about renewable energy. The statute prohibits suppliers from using terms such as “clean,” “green,” or “100% renewable” unless at least 51% of the energy is backed by renewable energy credits (RECs) from within a specific regional grid (the PJM region). Additionally, suppliers are required to include disclosures explaining the nature of RECs and their relationship to renewable electricity, with the exact disclosure language later specified by the Maryland Public Service Commission (PSC). Retail Energy Advancement League and Green Mountain Energy Company brought a facial First Amendment challenge against these provisions and sought a preliminary injunction in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. The district court denied the injunction, applying intermediate scrutiny to the speech restriction and concluding that the plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail on the merits. The court also found that the statute’s disclosure requirements likely survived constitutional review. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that the plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success in showing the speech restriction was unconstitutional even under intermediate scrutiny, because the restriction did not materially advance Maryland’s asserted interest in preventing consumer deception and was not adequately tailored. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction as to the speech restriction and ordered an injunction against enforcement of that provision. However, regarding the compelled disclosure requirement, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case for the district court to review the constitutionality of the new PSC-promulgated disclosure language in the first instance. View "Retail Energy Advancement League v. Brown" on Justia Law

In re: Express Scripts, Inc.

2026-05-15T10:30:35-08:00

A large group of cities, towns, and counties in West Virginia sued a pharmacy benefit manager, alleging that it contributed to the oversupply of opioids in their communities, thus creating a public nuisance. The local governments sought an injunction requiring the defendant to fund the abatement of the ongoing public nuisance and to compensate them for the costs of rectifying it. This proposed “abatement fund” was described as covering not just eliminating the oversupply itself, but also providing addiction treatment, education, and community rehabilitation. The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia denied the defendant’s demand for a jury trial, determining that the Seventh Amendment did not confer a right to a jury trial because this was a governmental public nuisance action seeking only abatement, which the court characterized as an equitable remedy. The district court also ordered a bifurcated bench trial on the public-nuisance claim, with a potential statewide abatement phase, and denied the defendant’s motions for reconsideration or for interlocutory appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case on a petition for a writ of mandamus. The Fourth Circuit held that the Seventh Amendment entitles the defendant to a jury trial because the relief sought by the local governments included a classic legal remedy—compensation for downstream harms resulting from the alleged public nuisance, such as addiction treatment and community rehabilitation. The court explained that, at the time of the Founding, only courts of law—not equity—could award such monetary relief for the consequences of a public nuisance. Therefore, the defendant was entitled to a jury trial on the public-nuisance claim, and the petition for mandamus was granted in part. View "In re: Express Scripts, Inc." on Justia Law

Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. United States Department of the Army

2026-05-14T10:30:35-08:00

Two children from the Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska were forcibly taken from their homes in the late 1800s and placed in a federal Indian boarding school on a United States Army base. Both died at the school, allegedly because of abusive conditions, and were buried on the grounds without the consent of their families or the tribe, contrary to their tribal and religious customs. Decades later, the Army relocated the remains, along with others, to the Carlisle Barracks Post Cemetery, again without consent. The Winnebago Tribe sought the return of the boys’ remains for proper reburial, invoking the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA). The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the Tribe’s action for failure to state a claim. The court reasoned that NAGPRA’s repatriation requirement only applies to Native American remains that are part of a federal agency’s or museum’s “holdings or collections,” and concluded that remains interred in a cemetery do not qualify. The court found that the relevant statutory and regulatory language, as well as the legislative history, supported this interpretation. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court’s interpretation. The Fourth Circuit held that, under the ordinary meaning of “holdings or collections,” as well as the applicable statutory context and regulatory definitions, the remains of the two boys, purposefully accumulated and held by the Army in the cemetery, are covered by NAGPRA’s repatriation requirement. The court emphasized that its holding does not extend to consensually buried remains or require agencies to inventory unknown remains. The judgment of the district court was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. United States Department of the Army" on Justia Law

Hall v. Fleming

2026-05-13T10:30:24-08:00

A Virginia college student applied for a state tuition grant program that provides financial assistance to residents attending accredited private, nonprofit colleges in Virginia. The program disqualifies students whose primary major falls under “religious training or theological education,” as classified by certain federal instructional codes. After enrolling at Liberty University as a Music Education major and being notified of her eligibility for the grant, she changed her major first to “Youth Ministries” and later to “Music & Worship”—both considered religious vocational programs under the state’s rules. As a result, she was found ineligible for the grant for two academic years. The student filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging that the grant program’s exclusion of her religious vocational major violated her First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. The defendant, the director of the state higher education council, moved to dismiss, arguing that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Locke v. Davey directly controlled and foreclosed her claim. The district court agreed, finding her situation essentially identical to the plaintiff’s in Locke, and concluded that subsequent Supreme Court decisions—Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, and Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin—had not overruled Locke. The court dismissed her claim with prejudice. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that Locke v. Davey remains binding precedent, and that the Supreme Court’s more recent decisions reaffirmed rather than abrogated it. The Fourth Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s dismissal, upholding the constitutionality of the grant program’s exclusion of religious vocational majors. View "Hall v. Fleming" on Justia Law

Lewis v. Circle K Stores Inc.

2026-05-13T10:30:24-08:00

Jonathan Lewis was injured when he slipped and fell on a painted line in the parking lot of a convenience store in South Carolina. The fall occurred after a store employee had cleaned the area using water and a powdered concrete cleaner, but no warning signs, cones, or safety vests were present, despite company policy. Lewis injured his right leg, undergoing surgery and incurring significant medical expenses. He had a prior history of injury to the same tendon, but the circumstances of the fall were undisputed: he slipped immediately after stepping on the wet surface as he exited the store. Lewis filed a premises liability suit against the store, alleging negligence in failing to warn about or remedy the hazardous condition. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to the store. It held: first, that the wet and cleaned surface was an “open and obvious” hazard, removing the store’s duty to warn; second, that there was no evidence the store could have foreseen the specific risk; and third, that Lewis failed to offer expert testimony establishing causation for his injury. The district court also denied Lewis’s Daubert and spoliation motions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding that genuine disputes of material fact remained regarding whether the hazard was “open and obvious” and whether expert testimony was required to establish causation. The court vacated the district court’s Daubert and spoliation rulings, remanding for further proceedings. The main holding is that, under South Carolina law, questions of breach and causation in slip-and-fall cases with these facts are for the jury, and expert testimony is not always required for causation in such cases. View "Lewis v. Circle K Stores Inc." on Justia Law

US v. Mhana

2026-05-12T10:30:32-08:00

Rami Mhana operated businesses that purchased fraudulently obtained Apple iPhones and other electronics at below-market prices, paying in cash and often shipping these goods overseas in bulk. His suppliers included individuals who acquired electronics using stolen personal information to make purchases from major retailers and wireless carriers. Mhana did not verify his suppliers’ identities or the legitimacy of the goods, nor did he provide receipts. He also paid third-party services to unlock phones, enabling their use on any network. The government’s investigation began after a ruptured overseas shipment revealed the scheme, ultimately leading to the discovery of thousands of fraudulent transactions. A federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina indicted Mhana on multiple counts, including transportation of stolen goods, conspiracy, and money laundering. Following a six-day trial, the jury convicted him on all charges. The indictment included a forfeiture notice, and the jury found a nexus between certain property and Mhana’s crimes. The district court initially granted a preliminary order of forfeiture but, at sentencing, declined to enter a final forfeiture judgment, citing concerns about double payment with restitution. The district court entered final judgment, prompting Mhana to appeal his convictions and the government to cross-appeal the forfeiture ruling. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed Mhana’s convictions, finding no reversible error in the district court’s evidentiary rulings, and determined that any assumed errors were harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. However, the appellate court reversed the district court’s denial of forfeiture, holding that forfeiture is mandatory under federal law when the statutory prerequisites are satisfied, even if restitution is also imposed, and remanded the case for entry of a forfeiture judgment. View "US v. Mhana" on Justia Law

US v. Davis

2026-05-12T10:30:32-08:00

The defendant was arrested in March 2021 for unlawfully possessing a firearm as a convicted felon after a police encounter outside a convenience store. During the arrest, he resisted and threatened officers, and was found in possession of a loaded ghost gun and distributable amounts of fentanyl. He was charged with possession of ammunition as a convicted felon and possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, ultimately pleading guilty to the ammunition charge. At sentencing, the court weighed the seriousness of his offense and history, including his mental health issues and young age, and imposed a within-Guidelines sentence of 70 months' imprisonment. After sentencing, a retroactive amendment to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Amendment 821) reduced the impact of "status points," lowering the defendant's criminal history category and decreasing his advisory Guidelines range from 57-71 months to 51-63 months. In March 2024, he moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), citing rehabilitation efforts while incarcerated. The government opposed, documenting three disciplinary violations by the defendant in prison, including threatening prison staff. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found the defendant eligible for a reduction but denied the motion, concluding that the relevant § 3553(a) factors and his disciplinary record weighed against a reduction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the denial for abuse of discretion. The court held that a sentence reduction motion does not trigger a plenary resentencing or require a detailed explanation for retaining a sentence above the amended Guidelines range. The district court’s acknowledgment and consideration of relevant factors sufficed. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, finding no abuse of discretion and that the presumption of judicial consideration was not rebutted. View "US v. Davis" on Justia Law

American Acceptance Corporation of SC v. Gietz

2026-05-12T10:30:32-08:00

AAC, a company that finances motorcycle purchases and holds security interests in the vehicles, acquired installment contracts for two motorcycles owned by individuals involved in a criminal case. After one owner, Brock, was killed during a gang shootout, and the other, Andrzejewski, was arrested and charged in connection with the incident, the Lexington County Sheriff’s Department seized both motorcycles as evidence. AAC was not notified of the seizures or the motorcycles’ location and learned about the events through news reports. AAC contacted the Sheriff’s Department seeking information and access to the motorcycles but was told that the vehicles would not be returned until the criminal proceedings concluded. AAC initially filed claim and delivery actions in the Lexington County Circuit Court, but the court dismissed these actions for improper service, noting it would not order release of evidence during a pending murder case. AAC then brought suit in the Lexington County Court of Common Pleas under state law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging procedural due process violations. The Sheriff’s Department removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, which dismissed AAC’s federal claim, holding that the seizure was lawful and that AAC’s property interests must yield to the state’s duty to preserve evidence for criminal proceedings. The district court remanded the state law claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that when property is seized in connection with a criminal investigation, the Fourth Amendment defines the process that is due, and compliance with its requirements satisfies procedural due process. The court found the seizures lawful and determined that no additional process was required for AAC as a lienholder. The court affirmed the district court’s order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss. View "American Acceptance Corporation of SC v. Gietz" on Justia Law

Mullen v. Town of Sunset Beach

2026-05-07T11:30:21-08:00

A woman sued a North Carolina town, alleging that a police officer employed by the town had sexually assaulted her while on duty. She claimed that the officer coerced her into sexual acts during visits to her home, sometimes in exchange for leniency regarding traffic violations. The officer had previously passed a background check, though some concerns were raised about his temperament and integrity, and a domestic violence complaint had been filed against him but was dismissed. The police department had no specific written policy prohibiting sexual misconduct, but did have general rules regarding officer conduct. During the officer’s employment, he was disciplined for minor infractions, but no complaints of sexual misconduct were received. The plaintiff reported the alleged assault more than a year after the officer resigned. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina granted summary judgment to the town. The court found there was insufficient evidence to show that the town’s police department was deliberately indifferent to the risk of sexual assault by its officers, or that any failure in its policies, training, or supervision caused the plaintiff’s injuries. The court also granted summary judgment on state law claims for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, concluding there was no evidence that the town knew or should have known that the officer was unfit for employment. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to establish municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because there was no evidence of a pattern of similar constitutional violations or deliberate indifference by policymakers. The court also affirmed the dismissal of state law claims, finding no evidence that the town was negligent in hiring, supervising, or retaining the officer. View "Mullen v. Town of Sunset Beach" on Justia Law

Diahn v. Blanche

2026-05-05T10:30:29-08:00

A man born in Cote d’Ivoire to Liberian refugee parents entered the United States as a child but did not acquire lawful permanent resident status. After being convicted of certain crimes in Pennsylvania, he faced removal proceedings to Liberia, a country he had never visited and where he feared persecution due to his bisexual identity and lack of family connections. Throughout his removal proceedings, he was incarcerated and unrepresented, which limited his understanding of the legal process and his ability to submit evidence supporting his claims for relief, including asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. During his hearings, the Immigration Judge (IJ) provided confusing instructions about where to submit evidence, leading the petitioner to send supporting documents to the wrong court. He was not properly informed of his right to present witnesses and was not clearly instructed on the legal standards for his claims. The IJ denied all relief and ordered his removal, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (the Board) dismissed his appeal, holding that he had either waived certain claims or failed to meet legal requirements. The Board also denied his motions to reopen, finding them untimely and concluding that equitable tolling was unwarranted. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the IJs and the Board failed in their statutory duty to develop the record, especially given the petitioner’s pro se and detained status. The court found that the petitioner was prejudiced by the lack of guidance and opportunity to present evidence and witnesses and that procedural deficiencies amounted to a denial of a fundamentally fair hearing. The Fourth Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the Board’s order, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Diahn v. Blanche" on Justia Law

US v. Hatchet Speed

2026-05-05T10:30:28-08:00

A former software developer and naval reservist from Virginia, the defendant became the subject of a federal investigation after participating in the events of January 6, 2021, for which he was later pardoned. In the following months, he purchased several firearms and accessories, including devices labeled as “solvent traps” from an online retailer. These devices, although purportedly for cleaning firearms, were constructed in a manner similar to silencers, with features such as threaded ends and internal baffles. The defendant discussed with an undercover FBI employee how these devices could be converted into silencers, despite not possessing the necessary tools for such modification. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia heard the case after a federal grand jury indicted the defendant for possessing unregistered silencers in violation of the National Firearms Act (NFA). The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, contending that the statutory definition of a silencer was unconstitutionally vague and that his conviction would violate the Second Amendment. The district court denied these motions and, after a mistrial, the second jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to 36 months in prison. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court’s jury instructions accurately reflected the statutory definition of a silencer, which does not require operability or exclude dual-use devices. The court found sufficient evidence for the conviction, as the devices’ design and the defendant’s statements supported their classification as silencers. The court also determined the NFA was not unconstitutionally vague as applied. Finally, the court concluded that, even if silencers are protected by the Second Amendment, the NFA’s shall-issue registration regime is presumptively constitutional and the defendant had not shown otherwise. The conviction was affirmed. View "US v. Hatchet Speed" on Justia Law

Malone v. United States Patent & Trademark Office

2026-05-05T10:30:28-08:00

A volunteer affiliated with a nonprofit focused on innovation requested documents under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). The request sought information related to an adversary proceeding before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), particularly concerning the panel of judges assigned, changes to the panel, and drafts of the written decision. The proceeding involved a motion for recusal due to a judge’s stock ownership and subsequent reassignment of panel members. The FOIA request specifically targeted documents reflecting the identities and opinions of involved judges, membership of the Circulation Judge Pool, legal bases for judge participation, and information about stock holdings. The PTO produced about 1,500 pages of documents but withheld drafts of decisions and related communications, citing FOIA Exemption 5, which covers predecisional and deliberative documents. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment and ruled in favor of the PTO, finding that the withheld documents were both predecisional and deliberative. The court rejected arguments that the communications constituted unlawful ex parte communications or government misconduct, determining there was no basis under FOIA to compel disclosure. The court also concluded that the plaintiff’s broader claims were not appropriately raised in a FOIA action. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the PTO properly withheld the drafts and related communications under Exemption 5, finding them categorically predecisional and deliberative. The court further determined that intra-agency circulation of draft opinions among judges did not constitute ex parte communications and that FOIA does not provide a government misconduct exception for Exemption 5. View "Malone v. United States Patent & Trademark Office" on Justia Law

ColonialWebb Contractors Company v. Hill Phoenix, Inc.

2026-05-04T10:30:28-08:00

This case concerns a dispute between two companies regarding contracts for the purchase of industrial refrigeration equipment. In late 2020, ColonialWebb Contractors Company placed purchase orders with Hill Phoenix, Inc. for projects in Colorado and Michigan. Dissatisfied with the equipment received, ColonialWebb filed two nearly identical breach of contract lawsuits against Hill Phoenix in a Virginia state court. The complaints were filed on the same day and assigned consecutive docket numbers. However, ColonialWebb did not promptly serve either complaint. When Hill Phoenix eventually learned of both cases, it mistakenly believed they were duplicate filings of the same action due to receiving two copies of what appeared to be the same complaint, differing only in docket number. Believing only one action existed, Hill Phoenix filed a single notice of removal to federal court, referencing both cases and requesting consolidation. The clerk’s office for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia opened a single federal case, effectively consolidating the two actions. ColonialWebb responded with a motion to remand, arguing that a forum selection clause required the disputes to be litigated exclusively in Virginia state court. While ColonialWebb mentioned improper consolidation, its remand motion was based solely on the forum selection clause. The district court, acting on its own initiative, remanded the matter to state court, finding that the consolidation of the state cases was improper but not addressing the merits of the forum selection clause argument. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s remand order. It held that the district court erred by remanding the case sua sponte for a procedural defect that was not raised by timely motion, as required by statute. The Fourth Circuit reversed the remand order and returned the matter to the district court for further proceedings. View "ColonialWebb Contractors Company v. Hill Phoenix, Inc." on Justia Law

Poppleton Now Community Association, Inc. v. La Cite Development, LLC

2026-05-04T10:30:28-08:00

The case concerns efforts by the City of Baltimore to redevelop 13.8 acres in the Poppleton neighborhood through an agreement with a private developer. To facilitate the project, the city used eminent domain to acquire hundreds of properties, which were then transferred to the developer at an allegedly favorable price. Over the years, the project was beset by delays and amendments, resulting in only minimal development and leaving much of the area vacant and in disrepair. Plaintiffs, consisting of neighboring property owners and a community organization, claimed the city’s actions reduced their property values and exposed them to environmental nuisances. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims. It found they lacked Article III standing for their Fifth Amendment takings claim because their own properties were not subject to eminent domain, and held that their private nuisance claim failed to state a claim under Maryland law. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ injuries, stemming from the taking of their neighbors’ properties, did not give them standing to challenge the use of eminent domain, and that their allegations of nuisance were insufficiently specific or actionable under state law. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed that both claims must be dismissed but for different reasons. The court held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing for the takings claim because they alleged concrete injury through diminished property values. However, it concluded the takings claim failed on the merits since the plaintiffs did not own any property actually taken. The court also ruled that, because all federal claims were dismissed at an early stage, the district court should have declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state law nuisance claim and dismissed it without prejudice. The declaratory judgment request failed as all substantive claims were dismissed. The Fourth Circuit vacated in part and remanded with instructions. View "Poppleton Now Community Association, Inc. v. La Cite Development, LLC" on Justia Law

Spurlock v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.

2026-05-04T10:30:28-08:00

Three individuals suffering from opioid use disorder (OUD) alleged that while incarcerated in facilities where a private medical contractor provided care, they were denied medically accepted screening and treatment for their condition. They claimed that the medical contractor excluded opioid dependence screening and treatment from its otherwise comprehensive services, forcing affected individuals to undergo withdrawal, even when arriving with a valid prescription for medication-assisted treatment. The plaintiffs asserted that these policies were motivated by cost-saving considerations and persisted even after the contractor was aware of the prevailing medical standards and associated constitutional risks. The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia reviewed the case, which was filed as a class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs sought to certify two classes: one requesting injunctive relief to require the contractor to provide proper screening and treatment, and another seeking damages for past deprivation of such care. The district court certified both classes after narrowing their definitions to ensure ascertainability and found that the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 were met. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., the defendant, challenged the certification, particularly arguing against the validity, typicality, and commonality of the classes, as well as the predominance and superiority requirements for the damages class. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine, in the first instance, whether the named plaintiffs had standing to represent the class seeking injunctive relief, given that standing was first raised on appeal and required fact-specific findings. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s certification of the damages class, finding no abuse of discretion in its conclusions regarding ascertainability, the Rule 23(a) requirements, predominance, and superiority. View "Spurlock v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

United States v. Lefemine

2026-05-01T11:01:07-08:00

Steven Clark Lefemine participated in an anti-abortion protest at a reproductive healthcare facility in Columbia, South Carolina, where he intentionally blocked the entrance by sitting in front of the doorway, preventing patients and staff from entering. After refusing requests to move, the police were called, and Lefemine was arrested. He was initially charged with trespassing under state law, for which he was fined, and subsequently indicted by a federal grand jury for violating the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE Act) under 18 U.S.C. § 248. In the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, Lefemine was first charged under a provision of the FACE Act carrying a maximum penalty of one year in prison. However, the government amended the penalty sheet—an auxiliary document to the indictment—to reflect a lower maximum penalty: six months’ imprisonment and/or a fine of $10,000. The indictment was also amended to conform to this reduced penalty. Lefemine’s counsel acknowledged and consented to these amendments. The district court denied Lefemine’s request for a jury trial, finding that the charged offense was a “petty” offense not subject to the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, and proceeded with a bench trial that resulted in Lefemine’s conviction. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Lefemine argued that he was entitled to a jury trial both because of the original indictment and because Congress intended all FACE Act violations to require a jury trial. The Fourth Circuit held that the amendments did not require resubmission to a grand jury and that the maximum penalty Lefemine faced rendered the offense “petty” under Supreme Court precedent. The court affirmed that the first-time, nonviolent exception under the FACE Act does not require a jury trial, joining the Second, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, and affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Lefemine" on Justia Law

US v. Williamson

2026-04-30T10:31:31-08:00

A defendant was charged with distributing fentanyl and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. During jury selection, one of the prospective jurors, a retired police chief with decades of law enforcement experience, disclosed his background in policing and drug task force work, but did not reveal that he had previously been the target of a federal investigation into corruption involving local officials. When asked if he or his family had been involved in any controversy or litigation with a federal agency, the juror answered “no.” The defendant was convicted on all counts. After trial, defense counsel discovered the juror’s undisclosed involvement as a target in a prior federal investigation. The defendant moved for a new trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, arguing that the juror’s dishonesty during voir dire deprived him of an impartial jury. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, found that the juror had given dishonest answers to material questions, but concluded that there was no evidence of actual bias or that the juror should have been struck for cause if he had answered truthfully. The court denied the motion for a new trial. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not commit manifest error in finding no actual bias and did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the juror’s prior experience did not require exclusion under any per se rule of implied or inferred bias. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that under the standard of review, the defendant was not deprived of a trial by an impartial jury. View "US v. Williamson" on Justia Law