U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - Justia Case Law Summaries

20230930-DK-BUTTERFLY-1,INC. v. HBC Invs. LLC

2026-07-07T07:00:11-08:00

A company that had succeeded Bed Bath & Beyond after bankruptcy sued two investment entities, asserting that they owed the company profits made from short-term trading of its stock. Before the bankruptcy, Bed Bath & Beyond had sold derivative securities to the investment entities, giving them the right to acquire large amounts of its stock at a discount. However, the contracts for these derivatives included “blocker” provisions, which stated that the investment entities could not acquire more than 9.99% of the company’s stock at any time. The investment entities repeatedly exercised their rights under these contracts, buying and selling shares while maintaining their holdings below the 10% threshold. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed the case after the successor company filed suit, arguing that the contractual blockers were illusory and that, in substance, the investment entities effectively had the right to acquire more than 10% of the stock, triggering liability under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that the blockers were valid and shielded the defendants from section 16(b) liability. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The court held that effective and enforceable contractual blockers, which cap an investor's beneficial ownership below 10% and are not sham provisions, prevent section 16(b) liability for short-swing profits. The court found no plausible allegations that the blockers were illusory or that the investment entities ever exceeded the 10% threshold. The Court of Appeals also rejected arguments that the parties’ contractual arrangements were part of a scheme to evade regulatory obligations. The judgment of the district court was affirmed in full. View "20230930-DK-BUTTERFLY-1,INC. v. HBC Invs. LLC" on Justia Law

The New York and Presbyterian Hospital v. New York State Nurses Association

2026-07-07T07:00:08-08:00

A hospital and a union representing registered nurses entered into a collective bargaining agreement, which required the hospital to staff its Cardio-Thoracic Intensive Care Unit according to a specific grid. When the hospital failed to maintain the agreed-upon staffing levels, the union filed a grievance on behalf of the affected nurses. The dispute proceeded to arbitration, where the arbitrator found that the hospital had breached the agreement and issued a monetary award to compensate nurses who worked on significantly understaffed shifts. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed cross-motions from both parties—one to vacate and one to confirm the arbitral award. The district court denied the hospital’s motion to vacate and granted the union’s motion to confirm the award, concluding that the arbitrator had acted within her authority under the agreement. The hospital appealed this decision, contending that the monetary relief was not authorized by the contract and that it constituted a punitive award in violation of public policy. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s confirmation of the arbitral award. The court held that the arbitrator did not exceed her authority under the agreement, as the agreement’s remedial authority clause permitted the issuance of monetary relief and did not expressly prohibit such remedies. The court further found that the award was compensatory, not punitive, as it was intended to make the nurses whole for extra work performed, and was not designed to punish the hospital. The court concluded that the award did not violate any explicit public policy and that the arbitrator’s remedy was properly derived from the terms of the agreement. View "The New York and Presbyterian Hospital v. New York State Nurses Association" on Justia Law

United States v. Salvador

2026-07-07T07:00:03-08:00

A noncitizen defendant, a member of the MS-13 gang, pleaded guilty to assault in aid of racketeering after providing advice and supplies to junior gang members involved in a shooting. He was charged as part of a multi-defendant racketeering indictment covering violent crimes from 2016 to 2018. The defendant was sentenced to 210 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. One special condition of his supervised release required him to “cooperate with and abide by all instructions of immigration authorities.” The defendant did not object to this special condition during sentencing. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York imposed the sentence and adopted the presentence report’s recommendations, including the special conditions of supervised release. The defendant filed an appeal challenging only the “Immigration Authorities Condition,” arguing that it was procedurally unreasonable, unconstitutionally vague, and impermissibly delegated judicial authority to non-judicial officers. The government argued the appeal was barred by a waiver in the plea agreement, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined that the waiver did not cover conditions of supervised release and denied the motion to dismiss. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case for plain error. The court held that the challenge was ripe, was not waived but forfeited, and that the district court’s reasons for imposing the condition were self-evident in the record. The court further held that the condition was not unconstitutionally vague and did not unlawfully delegate sentencing authority. The judgment of the district court, including the challenged special condition, was affirmed. View "United States v. Salvador" on Justia Law

Chapdelaine v. Desjardin

2026-07-02T06:30:03-08:00

The case involves a dispute arising from a 2018 arrest of the plaintiff, Darlene Chapdelaine, by Connecticut State Troopers Robert L. Desjardin and Jason N. Deojay. The arrest followed a 911 call alleging that Chapdelaine, intoxicated, physically assaulted an elderly housemate. The troopers responded, and after a confrontation, arrested Chapdelaine for assault, disorderly conduct, and interfering with/resisting arrest. Subsequent criminal charges against Chapdelaine were dismissed after she completed a one-day diversionary program, following nearly five years of pending proceedings. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut initially granted summary judgment in favor of Desjardin and Deojay on Chapdelaine’s false arrest and false imprisonment claims, finding that the officers had at least arguable probable cause. The malicious prosecution claims were dismissed without prejudice pending resolution of criminal charges, and later dismissed with prejudice after the charges were dismissed via a diversionary program, which the court held was not a favorable termination. The district court also excluded evidence of Desjardin’s disciplinary record under Rule 403, finding its probative value outweighed by potential confusion and prejudice. At trial, the jury found for Desjardin and Deojay on all claims, including excessive force, and the court denied Chapdelaine’s post-verdict motions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed all district court rulings. The Second Circuit held that dismissal of criminal charges contingent upon completion of a diversionary program did not constitute a favorable termination for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the exclusion of disciplinary evidence and concluded the jury’s verdict was supported by sufficient evidence. The judgment was affirmed in its entirety. View "Chapdelaine v. Desjardin" on Justia Law

Association of Contracting Plumbers v. City of New York

2026-06-30T07:00:04-08:00

New York City and New York State passed laws that effectively prohibit the use of fossil-fuel-powered appliances in new buildings as part of broader efforts to address pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. These measures ban, for example, installing gas stoves or other fossil-fuel-based heating or cooking appliances in new construction. Trade associations, contractor and builder groups, and unions whose members would be affected by these prohibitions sued, arguing that the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), a federal law that sets efficiency standards for certain appliances, expressly preempts these state and local laws. In the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the plaintiffs challenging the New York City law lost when the court granted the City’s motion to dismiss, finding that EPCA did not preempt the local law. In a separate case in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, plaintiffs challenging the State law were denied relief at the summary judgment stage against the remaining state defendant, with the court again holding that EPCA’s preemption provision did not apply. In both cases, the plaintiffs appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed both appeals together. The court held that EPCA’s express preemption provision only preempts state and local “energy conservation standards” for covered appliances and a limited class of related regulations. The challenged New York laws, which prohibit the use of certain types of appliances but do not set standards for the amount of energy those appliances use, do not fall within the scope of EPCA’s preemption. Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgments of the district courts, allowing the state and city laws to stand. View "Association of Contracting Plumbers v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Miller v. McDonald

2026-06-30T06:30:03-08:00

In this case, several Amish parents, Amish community schools, and a representative of Amish schools in New York challenged New York's school immunization law, which, since 2019, no longer provides a religious exemption to the vaccination requirement for students attending public, private, or parochial schools. The plaintiffs allege that their faith prohibits vaccination, and their schools were fined for failing to comply with the immunization law. The plaintiffs asserted that the law violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and their parental free-exercise rights recognized in Wisconsin v. Yoder. The United States District Court for the Western District of New York dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint, finding they failed to plausibly allege a constitutional violation. The court relied on Second Circuit precedent holding that the repeal of religious exemptions for school vaccination laws, while maintaining medical exemptions, does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The district court also denied the request for a preliminary injunction as moot. The plaintiffs appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit initially affirmed the dismissal. After the Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit’s judgment and remanded for reconsideration in light of Mahmoud v. Taylor, the Second Circuit reviewed supplemental briefing and recent authorities. The Second Circuit again affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that New York's immunization law is neutral and generally applicable, and thus constitutional under rational basis review. The court also held that the law does not impose a burden “of the same character” as the parental free-exercise burdens addressed in Yoder and Mahmoud, so strict scrutiny does not apply. The Second Circuit concluded that plaintiffs failed to state a viable Free Exercise or Yoder-type claim, and affirmed the dismissal of their suit. View "Miller v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Besicorp v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

2026-06-29T07:00:03-08:00

Several related corporate taxpayers engaged in transactions that the Internal Revenue Service determined were tax shelter schemes intended to avoid federal taxes. After audits, the IRS found that each taxpayer owed substantial deficiencies, penalties, and interest. The United States Tax Court previously adjudicated the liabilities for all six taxpayers, either through contested proceedings or stipulated decisions, and those determinations are now final and not at issue in this appeal. When the IRS sought to collect the assessed amounts by filing tax liens and issuing notices of intent to levy, each taxpayer requested a collection due process (CDP) hearing with the IRS Appeals Office, as provided by statute. At each CDP hearing, the Appeals Officer sustained the IRS’s liens and proposed levies, indicating that all necessary legal and procedural requirements had been met. The taxpayers challenged these determinations in the Tax Court, arguing that the Appeals Officer failed to verify that the penalties had received written supervisory approval as required by 26 U.S.C. § 6751(b)(1). The Tax Court, following its decision in Warner Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner, held that when penalties had already been conclusively determined in prior proceedings, the Appeals Officer was not required to verify compliance with the supervisory approval requirement during the CDP process, and granted summary judgment for the Commissioner. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the verification obligation imposed by 26 U.S.C. § 6330(c)(1) on Appeals Officers in CDP hearings includes the requirement to verify written supervisory approval for penalties under § 6751(b)(1), regardless of whether the penalties were previously adjudicated. The court concluded that failure to perform this verification invalidates the Appeals Officer’s determination that the liens and proposed levies were proper, although it does not affect the underlying tax liabilities or penalties themselves. The Second Circuit reversed the Tax Court’s orders on this issue and remanded for further proceedings. View "Besicorp v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Huey v. Anavex Life Sciences Corporation

2026-06-26T06:30:03-08:00

An investor in a publicly traded biopharmaceutical company filed a proposed class action against the company and its CEO, alleging securities fraud. The plaintiff claimed that the company misled investors by suggesting that the FDA had approved their methodology for measuring a drug’s efficacy in clinical trials. The alleged misrepresentation was made in a press release that communicated the FDA’s input on the study’s endpoints, but, according to the plaintiff, failed to disclose that the FDA found the methodology unacceptable. When the company later announced it would not use the disputed methodology, the share price initially increased. A decline in the share price occurred over the next two days, during which the stock moved in line with the general market. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the complaint with prejudice, holding that the plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead loss causation, an essential element of a securities fraud claim. The court noted that the share price rose on the day of the corrective disclosure and only declined later, in tandem with the broader market. The district court also denied the plaintiff’s request to amend the complaint, reasoning that amendment would be futile. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court's dismissal de novo. The appellate court agreed that the plaintiff did not plausibly allege loss causation. It explained that when a stock price does not fall immediately after a corrective disclosure, and a later decline coincides with general market losses, a plaintiff must provide a plausible explanation linking the loss to the alleged fraud. Because the plaintiff failed to do so, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and denial of leave to amend. View "Huey v. Anavex Life Sciences Corporation" on Justia Law

United States v. Parks

2026-06-24T06:00:03-08:00

In this case, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of kidnapping resulting in death and one count of witness tampering by killing, all related to violent events in 2015. The evidence showed that the defendant, a gang member involved in illegal gun trafficking, kidnapped two individuals as collateral when a third party failed to pay for firearms. He threatened their lives if payment was not made, and when the deadline passed, the defendant fatally shot both victims. Later that same day, the defendant also killed a witness, allegedly to prevent him from reporting the kidnappings and murders to law enforcement. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut presided over the trial. The jury was instructed that to convict on the kidnapping resulting in death charges, it needed to find only that the defendant’s conduct was the “but-for” cause of the deaths, not that the deaths were a reasonably foreseeable (proximate) result of the kidnapping. The defendant moved for acquittal or a new trial, arguing insufficient evidence and challenging the jury instructions, particularly the omission of a proximate cause requirement. The district court denied the motions, prompting this appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The main issue was whether the “death results” enhancement for kidnapping requires proof of proximate cause or only but-for cause. The Second Circuit held that the statutory language does not require proximate cause; but-for causation is sufficient. The court also found the evidence sufficient for all counts and determined that any error in the instructions would be harmless given the overwhelming evidence. The defendant’s convictions and sentences were affirmed. View "United States v. Parks" on Justia Law

United States v. Parks

2026-06-22T07:00:03-08:00

In this case, the defendant was convicted on two counts of kidnapping resulting in death and one count of witness tampering by killing, based on events in which he held two victims as collateral at gunpoint after a third party left his home with guns without paying. When the guns or payment were not returned by a deadline, the defendant forced the victims to accompany him and, according to eyewitness and forensic evidence, shot and killed both. Later, he killed a third individual, an eyewitness, to prevent him from cooperating with federal law enforcement. The evidence included testimony from multiple witnesses present at the scene, forensic corroboration, and statements made by the defendant implicating himself in the crimes. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut presided over the trial. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts, and the court imposed three consecutive life sentences. The defendant moved for acquittal or a new trial, arguing errors in the sufficiency of the evidence and the jury instructions, particularly challenging the instruction that the kidnapping needed to be only a “but-for” cause of death rather than a proximate cause. The district court denied these motions. Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s instructions and the sufficiency of the evidence. The appellate court held that, under the relevant federal kidnapping statute, the government need only prove that the kidnapping was a but-for cause of death rather than requiring proximate causation. The court found that the trial evidence overwhelmingly supported the convictions and that any alleged instructional error would have been harmless. The court also upheld the sufficiency of evidence for the witness tampering count. The convictions and sentences were affirmed in full. View "United States v. Parks" on Justia Law

Levin v. City of Buffalo

2026-06-18T06:30:03-08:00

The case involves Maxim Levin and Vodka Properties LLC, who owned a residential building in Buffalo, New York, that was demolished by the City of Buffalo in 2019 under emergency procedures. The City justified the emergency demolition by citing illegal drug activity on the property, including a recent overdose death, and the building’s vacant and allegedly structurally compromised condition. Plaintiffs contested whether these circumstances actually warranted an immediate demolition without a pre-deprivation hearing and argued that their constitutional rights were violated. A magistrate judge in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York recommended denying summary judgment on some constitutional claims, finding disputed facts about the condition of the property and notice provided. The district court, however, dismissed certain claims, including procedural due process, based on its finding that adequate notice was given and that the individual City employees (except the City itself) were entitled to qualified immunity. The court also dismissed claims against the demolition company for lack of state action and dismissed claims against the City, concluding there was no municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that summary judgment was improper on the procedural due process, unlawful taking, and unreasonable seizure claims, because there were unresolved factual questions about whether the property’s condition justified emergency demolition. The appellate court further determined that Commissioner James Comerford, Jr. was the City’s final policymaker regarding demolition decisions, so Monell liability was improperly dismissed. The court reversed the grant of qualified immunity for the Commissioner due to factual disputes but affirmed summary judgment for the other individual employees and the demolition company. The court affirmed dismissal of the substantive due process and state law claims. The judgment was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Levin v. City of Buffalo" on Justia Law

United States v. Liounis

2026-06-16T09:00:10-08:00

The defendant was convicted in 2014 of multiple counts of fraud and sentenced to nearly 24 years in prison and ordered to pay approximately $3.8 million in restitution. Years later, the government sought to enforce the restitution order by pursuing a writ of garnishment against funds expected from a September 11th Victims Compensation Fund award, which were to be received by a law firm on the defendant’s behalf. After being notified of the garnishment, the defendant, acting pro se, objected and requested, among other things, that proceedings be transferred to the federal district where he resided, as provided for under the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied his objections, including the transfer request. The court held that the September 11th funds were not exempt from garnishment, that the defendant was not entitled to a hearing since his objections were meritless, and that transfer of venue was not mandatory but discretionary. The district court relied on its interpretation of the statute and on prior case law, concluding it retained authority to deny transfer requests for good cause. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the statutory language of the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act makes transfer of a garnishment proceeding mandatory when timely requested by the debtor. The court found that the district court erred by treating transfer as discretionary, and further held that failure to transfer is not subject to harmless error review. Accordingly, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for the district court to consider a renewed motion to transfer the proceedings to the district in which the defendant currently resides. View "United States v. Liounis" on Justia Law

United States v. Robinson

2026-06-16T09:00:05-08:00

After returning to the United States from international travel in 2022, the defendant was subjected to a customs inspection at JFK Airport. During this inspection, authorities searched his cellphone and discovered evidence of child sexual abuse material. Based on these initial findings, the government obtained a warrant to conduct a more thorough forensic search, which uncovered additional images and videos of child pornography. The defendant was subsequently charged with related offenses. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the cellphone evidence, ruling that the initial search lacked probable cause or a warrant and that the government could not rely on the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The government filed an interlocutory appeal and timely submitted a notice of appeal. However, the defendant moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the statutory certification required by 18 U.S.C. § 3731 was invalid because it was signed by an interim United States Attorney who, at the time, was allegedly not lawfully appointed. The defendant claimed this defect deprived the appellate court of jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and assumed, for argument’s sake, that the original certification was invalid. The court determined that subsequent certifications—one by the same United States Attorney after proper appointment by the district court and another by the Attorney General—were sufficient, even though they were filed after the appeal period expired. The court held that late certification does not eliminate jurisdiction, but permits discretionary dismissal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a). Exercising its discretion, the Second Circuit denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss and concluded that it had appellate jurisdiction under § 3731, confining its decision to this jurisdictional issue. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

U.S. v. Bankman-Fried

2026-06-12T14:00:07-08:00

The case concerns actions taken by the former CEO of a prominent cryptocurrency exchange and a related trading firm. The defendant, who exercised substantial control over both entities, was accused of misappropriating billions of dollars of customer funds. These funds, which customers believed would be safely held and used only for authorized transactions, were instead funneled to the trading firm and used for various unauthorized purposes, including investments, political contributions, and purchases of real estate. The collapse of cryptocurrency markets in 2022, followed by a rapid loss of customer confidence and mass withdrawals, ultimately led to the bankruptcy of both the exchange and the trading firm. After the bankruptcy, the defendant was indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on several counts of fraud and conspiracy. The government’s case was supported by testimony from the defendant’s close associates, who described how the defendant orchestrated the transfer and misuse of customer funds, and by business records and communications. The defendant argued that he believed all customers would ultimately be repaid and that he acted in good faith. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, and the district court sentenced him to 25 years in prison, imposed a three-year term of supervised release, and ordered a forfeiture of approximately $11 billion. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the defendant challenged the district court’s evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, discovery-related decisions, and the forfeiture order. The Second Circuit held that the district court did not err in its evidentiary rulings, instructions, or discovery decisions, and that the forfeiture was authorized and not constitutionally excessive. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "U.S. v. Bankman-Fried" on Justia Law

United States v. Simmons

2026-06-01T08:00:13-08:00

While under supervised release for a prior fraud conviction, the defendant was charged in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York with multiple violations of the terms of his release, including fraudulently obtaining a loan, unauthorized travel, and prohibited communication with felons. On the scheduled date for his violation of supervised release (VOSR) hearing, the defendant failed to appear, despite having been informed of the time and place and contacted by his counsel. The district court delayed the proceedings to allow for his arrival, then, after continued absence, issued a warrant for his arrest and proceeded with the hearing in his absence. The court found overwhelming evidence of violations, based on records and counsel’s concessions, but did not immediately impose a sentence. Over a year later, the defendant was arrested in Florida and returned to New York, where he pleaded guilty to failing to appear for the VOSR hearing. The district court then held a combined sentencing, imposing concurrent sentences for the supervised release violations and a separate, consecutive sentence for the failure to appear, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b)(2) as requiring the sentences to be consecutive. The defendant appealed, arguing that the court erred by conducting the VOSR hearing in absentia, by imposing consecutive sentences based on a mistaken interpretation of the statute, and by upholding the constitutionality of supervised release revocation proceedings. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to be present at the VOSR hearing, and any error in proceeding without him was harmless. The court concluded that it was not plain error for the district court to impose consecutive sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b)(2), given the unsettled nature of the law. The court also reaffirmed the constitutionality of supervised release revocation proceedings. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Simmons" on Justia Law

United States v. The M/Y Amadea

2026-06-01T08:00:08-08:00

The United States government brought a civil forfeiture action against a luxury superyacht, alleging that it was beneficially owned by a Russian national subject to U.S. sanctions. Two claimants, an individual and his company, asserted that they—not the sanctioned individual—owned the yacht, both legally and beneficially. The government, however, argued that these claimants were mere straw owners holding title on behalf of the sanctioned individual and therefore lacked constitutional standing to contest the forfeiture. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held an evidentiary hearing to resolve factual disputes regarding the claimants’ standing. The court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the claimants had relinquished all meaningful ownership and control over the yacht through a memorandum of agreement executed in September 2021. As a result, the court concluded that the claimants were only bare title holders, acting as straw owners, and lacked Article III standing to object to the forfeiture. The court granted the government’s motion to strike the claim and entered default and final judgments of forfeiture when no other claims were filed. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the claimants’ legal title alone did not establish standing where the evidence showed they retained no substantive ownership interest after the September 2021 agreement. The court also upheld the district court’s exclusion of a hearsay declaration and concluded there was no procedural error in the conduct of the evidentiary hearing. The judgment of forfeiture was affirmed. View "United States v. The M/Y Amadea" on Justia Law

United States v. Ross

2026-05-29T06:00:03-08:00

In 2003, the defendant pleaded guilty in Vermont state court to a charge of domestic assault under a state statute, specifically for “willfully or recklessly causing bodily injury to a family or household member.” Many years later, police found a firearm in her car during a traffic stop. Based on her prior domestic assault conviction, she was charged in federal court under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits firearm possession by anyone convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” The defendant did not dispute her prior conviction but argued that the Vermont statute did not meet the federal definition because it did not require, as an element, “the use or attempted use of physical force.” The United States District Court for the District of Vermont denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment, finding that her prior conviction qualified as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal this legal issue. She was sentenced to time served and one year of supervised release, and appealed the conviction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the Vermont domestic assault statute is divisible into three separate offenses. The court found that the specific offense for which the defendant was convicted—willfully or recklessly causing bodily injury—requires proof of the use of physical force under federal law. Relying on United States Supreme Court precedent, the court concluded that such a conviction qualifies as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "United States v. Ross" on Justia Law

The Satanic Temple, Inc. v. Newsweek Digital LLC

2026-05-28T07:00:12-08:00

A national news organization published an article in 2021 detailing internal conflicts within a religious group, including a quote from a former member alleging that reports of sexual abuse were “being covered up in ways that were more than anecdotal.” The religious group, which has a large national membership, sued the news organization and the article’s author for defamation, contending that the article’s statements were false and published with actual malice. The author, based in Washington state, conducted all her research and reporting outside New York, though the news organization is headquartered in New York. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the claims against the article’s author for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding she had no relevant contacts with New York. The court also dismissed most of the claims against the news organization, allowing only the statement about covering up sexual abuse to proceed. At summary judgment, the district court applied New York’s anti-SLAPP statute, which requires a heightened showing of actual malice for defamation cases involving matters of public interest, and ruled for the news organization, holding the religious group had not shown a triable issue as to actual malice. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed both rulings. It held that New York courts did not have personal jurisdiction over the author under the state’s long-arm statute because she did not engage in any journalistic activity in New York related to the article. The appellate court also held that New York’s anti-SLAPP law applied, requiring the religious group to prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, and found the group had failed to raise a genuine issue of fact on that element. The judgments for the defendants were affirmed. View "The Satanic Temple, Inc. v. Newsweek Digital LLC" on Justia Law

Smith v. The Gap, Inc.

2026-05-28T07:00:08-08:00

Gap, a major clothing retailer, launched an initiative in August 2021 to expand plus-size clothing options in its Old Navy stores. The company overestimated customer demand for these larger sizes, resulting in excess inventory that had to be sold at discounts. By early 2022, Gap reduced its in-store plus-size offerings and eventually limited extended sizing to online sales. In May 2022, Gap disclosed that these missteps negatively affected its financial results for the first quarter of the year. Investors who purchased Gap stock between November 24, 2021, and July 11, 2022, filed a putative securities class action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. They alleged that Gap and two senior executives violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by failing to disclose problems with the initiative in various statements to investors. The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), concluding that the plaintiffs did not identify any false or misleading statements or adequately plead that the defendants acted with scienter (intent or recklessness). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the challenged statements—including risk disclosures, earnings call remarks, and press releases—were not false or misleading in context and did not obligate Gap to disclose the problems with the initiative. The court found that the statements at issue were either generic industry risks, unactionable opinions or puffery, or did not give rise to a duty to disclose additional information. The appellate court also concluded that the plaintiffs failed to allege facts supporting a strong inference of scienter and, accordingly, their control-person liability claims under Section 20(a) were properly dismissed. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Smith v. The Gap, Inc." on Justia Law

Colwell v. Sig Sauer, Inc.

2026-05-28T07:00:03-08:00

A police sergeant suffered a gunshot injury to his leg when his department-issued Sig Sauer P320 pistol discharged while he was conducting a training exercise. He did not know what caused the trigger to move, but testified that the pistol was holstered and his hand was not on the gun at the time. Emergency responders’ documentation, however, suggested the gun discharged while he was still holstering it. The injured officer and his spouse brought strict products liability and negligence claims against the manufacturer, alleging that the P320 was defectively designed because it lacked an external safety, making it prone to accidental discharges. The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York excluded the causation opinions of the plaintiffs’ experts, finding their analysis unreliable because they did not explain how the accident happened or how an external safety would have prevented it. The district court then granted summary judgment for the manufacturer, concluding New York law required expert testimony to establish proximate causation in a case involving the operation of a complex product like a firearm, and the plaintiffs could not meet that burden without admissible expert causation opinions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the experts’ causation opinions, as they were not sufficiently grounded in the facts of the accident. However, the Second Circuit ruled that the district court erred in granting summary judgment. The appellate court held that, under New York law, expert testimony on causation is not always required if a jury can determine causation based on its own judgment, the characteristics of the product, and the evidence presented. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Colwell v. Sig Sauer, Inc." on Justia Law

Ryniker v. Sumec Textile Co.

2026-05-27T08:30:03-08:00

Décor Holdings, Inc. and its affiliates, sellers of decorative fabric, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in February 2019. Sumec Textile Company Limited, a Chinese manufacturer, was listed as a major unsecured creditor. After filing an insurance claim with Sinosure (China Export & Credit Insurance Corporation) for Décor’s unpaid debt, Sumec authorized Sinosure to collect the full amount owed. Sinosure then hired Brown & Joseph, LLC (B&J), a U.S. collection agency, which filed Sumec’s proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceeding, listing itself as the recipient of notices to the creditor. In August 2020, Bryan Ryniker, as litigation administrator, commenced an adversary proceeding against Sumec to recover alleged preferential payments. Service of process was made on B&J as Sumec’s agent. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York entered a default judgment against Sumec, finding service on B&J sufficient. Sumec moved to vacate, claiming B&J lacked authority to accept service. The bankruptcy court denied the motion, relying on the agency relationship. On appeal, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York vacated the default judgment, ruling that Sumec had not expressly or impliedly authorized B&J to accept service of process. On remand, the bankruptcy court dismissed the adversary proceeding with prejudice. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the dismissal. It held that the record established Sumec had conferred actual authority on Sinosure and B&J, both to file the proof of claim and to act to collect the full amount owed, implicitly authorizing B&J to accept service of process in the adversary proceeding. The Second Circuit vacated both the district court’s and bankruptcy court’s orders, reinstated the default judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ryniker v. Sumec Textile Co." on Justia Law

Sufiyan v. Blanche

2026-05-26T06:30:03-08:00

A native and citizen of Sri Lanka sought protection in the United States, claiming that he would face persecution and torture if returned to his home country. He described being forcibly detained by members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a designated terrorist organization, compelled to serve as a translator during their interrogation of another captive, and subsequently detained and beaten by the Sri Lankan army under suspicion of LTTE affiliation. After living in Sri Lanka without incident for several years, he traveled to and from the United States, ultimately seeking asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied all forms of relief, ruling that the applicant was barred from asylum and withholding due to his provision of material support to the LTTE, and finding his asylum application untimely. The IJ also determined that the applicant had not demonstrated past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, and that his CAT claims failed for lack of corroboration and insufficient likelihood of torture upon return. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, relying exclusively on the material support bar for asylum and withholding claims, and upholding the denial of CAT deferral on the merits, without assessing whether the applicant would otherwise qualify for asylum or withholding but for the bar. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the BIA erred by not determining whether the applicant would be entitled to asylum or statutory withholding of removal if the material support bar did not apply, as such findings are necessary for the applicant to pursue a discretionary waiver from the Department of Homeland Security. The court granted the petition in part and remanded for this determination. The petition for review of the denial of CAT relief was denied. View "Sufiyan v. Blanche" on Justia Law

Bellin v. McDonald

2026-05-21T06:01:25-08:00

A Medicaid recipient in her late 80s, suffering from serious health conditions, applied in 2019 for 24-hour at-home personal care services through New York’s Medicaid program. The state, which provides varying levels of in-home care to eligible Medicaid recipients, partners with private managed long-term care plans (MLTCPs) to assess needs and offer care plans. The plaintiff was initially offered only eight hours of daily care by all MLTCPs she applied to, though she believed she required around-the-clock assistance. Under New York’s regulations, individuals cannot immediately appeal the initial level of care offered; they must first enroll in the plan, request an increase, and only appeal if that request is denied. The plaintiff followed this process and ultimately received 24-hour care after subsequent assessments, but with a delay and a gap in retroactive reimbursement for services. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment to the defendants—the State's Health Commissioner and the MLTCP—holding that the plaintiff did not have a cognizable property interest in a particular level of care, and therefore no due process rights were implicated. The court also denied class certification. The plaintiff appealed these decisions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Second Circuit disagreed with the District Court’s conclusion regarding the existence of a property interest. It held that New York’s laws, regulations, and practices substantially restrict discretion in determining eligibility for 24-hour personal care services, thereby creating a property interest for qualifying Medicaid recipients and triggering due process protections. However, the court determined that New York’s current appeals procedures, though delayed, are constitutionally adequate because the delay is modest, expedited procedures exist for urgent cases, and the overall private interests at stake are sufficiently protected. On this alternative ground, the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants. View "Bellin v. McDonald" on Justia Law

United States of America v. Amazon.com, Inc.

2026-05-20T06:30:22-08:00

The case involves allegations by two relators, acting on behalf of the United States, that Amazon.com, Inc. and Amazon.com Services, LLC facilitated and conspired with foreign manufacturers to submit false records to the U.S. government. The relators claimed that these manufacturers, who sold fur products via Amazon’s platform, provided false information on Customs Declarations to avoid paying mandatory tariffs and inspection fees on imported fur products. According to the complaint, Amazon was not the importer of record, but the relators alleged that Amazon either knew or should have known about the fraudulent conduct due to discrepancies in documentation and the absence of required forms, and that Amazon nonetheless continued to market, store, and deliver the products. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed the relators’ second amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court dismissed the claims, concluding that the relators failed to adequately allege that Amazon had the requisite knowledge or causation necessary for liability under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (the “reverse false claims” provision of the False Claims Act), and failed to plead the essential elements of a conspiracy claim under § 3729(a)(1)(C), including an agreement to violate the statute and overt acts in furtherance of such a conspiracy. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Second Circuit held that the relators did not plausibly allege that Amazon had actual knowledge, deliberate ignorance, or reckless disregard regarding the foreign manufacturers’ false claims, as required by the statute. The court also determined the relators had not alleged facts showing an agreement or overt act necessary to support a conspiracy claim. Thus, the district court’s judgment dismissing the complaint in its entirety was affirmed. View "United States of America v. Amazon.com, Inc." on Justia Law

United States v. Parasmo

2026-05-19T06:00:13-08:00

A licensed medical doctor in New York was charged with unlawfully distributing controlled substances, specifically opioids, to multiple patients between 2014 and 2015. Evidence at trial showed the doctor continued prescribing large quantities of oxycodone and hydrocodone even after learning that patients were addicted, diverting medications, or abusing other substances. The doctor was repeatedly warned by insurers, pharmacies, and the state medical society about overprescribing. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York presided over the case. After a jury trial, the doctor was convicted on thirty-two counts of unlawful distribution of controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Ruan v. United States, the defendant argued the jury instructions were erroneous and sought acquittal or a new trial, but the district court denied these motions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed three main issues: whether the district court’s jury instructions improperly used an objective rather than subjective standard of intent, whether expert testimony and evidence about New York’s medical standards were improperly admitted, and whether the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Second Circuit agreed the jury instruction on intent was erroneous under the new Ruan standard but held the error was harmless given overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s subjective intent. The court also found the evidentiary rulings proper, as the expert testimony assisted the jury without usurping its function. The ineffective assistance claim was deemed more appropriate for collateral review and not addressed on direct appeal. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Parasmo" on Justia Law

K.W. v. The City of New York

2026-05-19T06:00:04-08:00

A father, K.W., lost custody of his newborn son, K.A., when New York City’s Administration for Children’s Services removed the infant from his care without a court order, citing concerns about the mother’s history of neglect toward her other children. At the time, K.W. had not been accused of any abuse or neglect, and K.A. had been living with him since birth. The following day, the agency obtained a family court order for continued removal, but the petition did not cite any wrongdoing by K.W. and omitted key facts about his involvement as K.A.’s caretaker. As a result, K.W. was denied custody and granted only limited visitation for nearly three years, despite no allegations of unfitness. Both K.W. and K.A. suffered emotional harm from the prolonged separation. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted a motion to dismiss all of the plaintiffs’ claims, ruling that they had not successfully stated a claim and that the defendant caseworker was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court also dismissed the claims against the Children’s Aid Society and its caseworker. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the plaintiffs stated viable claims on behalf of K.A. for unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment and for violation of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court concluded that qualified immunity did not protect the individual caseworker, Moody, for these claims. However, the court affirmed dismissal of K.W.’s individual procedural due process claim as time-barred, and upheld dismissal of all claims against the Children’s Aid Society and its caseworker. The Second Circuit reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded the surviving claims for further proceedings. View "K.W. v. The City of New York" on Justia Law

Christian v. James

2026-05-18T06:30:03-08:00

The plaintiffs challenged two provisions of New York’s Concealed Carry Improvement Act (CCIA): one that criminalizes carrying firearms on private property open to the public unless the owner has explicitly permitted it (the Private Property Provision), and another that prohibits firearm possession in “sensitive locations,” specifically public parks (the Public Parks Provision). Plaintiffs argued that these provisions violate the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. The Private Property Provision was challenged as applied to places open to the public, while the Public Parks Provision was subject to a facial challenge, with plaintiffs later attempting, unsuccessfully, to add an as-applied challenge concerning rural parks. The United States District Court for the Western District of New York permanently enjoined the State from enforcing the Private Property Provision as applied to private property open to the public, finding it unconstitutional because it was not consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation. The district court, however, granted summary judgment to the State on the Public Parks Provision, concluding that it was facially constitutional since historical analogues supported restrictions on firearms in public parks. The district court declined to consider plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge to the parks provision, ruling that this argument had not been properly raised. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed both appeals. It affirmed the permanent injunction against the Private Property Provision, holding that the State failed to show that the restriction is consistent with the historical tradition of regulating firearms, as required by New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen. The court also affirmed the judgment in favor of the State on the Public Parks Provision, finding it constitutional as applied to urban parks, and declined to consider the as-applied challenge regarding rural parks since it had not been raised below. View "Christian v. James" on Justia Law

Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Department of Justice

2026-05-14T07:30:03-08:00

Union Plaintiffs, comprised of two labor organizations, challenged the federal government's termination of approximately $400 million in funding to Columbia University and its demand for significant reforms at the institution. Columbia University was not a party in the lawsuit. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to restore funding, prevent enforcement of the government’s reform demands, protect future grants and contracts, and recover damages. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissed the case for lack of standing. After this dismissal, the plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. While the appeal was pending, Columbia and the government reached an agreement whereby most of the disputed funding was restored and Columbia agreed to implement certain reforms. Following this, the plaintiffs withdrew their requests for prospective equitable relief and damages, citing changed circumstances. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed a joint motion from both parties to dismiss the appeal, vacate the district court’s order, and remand with instructions to dismiss the case as moot. The court held that the case was moot for reasons not fairly attributable to the plaintiffs and granted the joint motion in full. The court dismissed the appeal as moot, vacated the district court’s order, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case as moot, emphasizing that vacatur was appropriate due to circumstances beyond the plaintiffs’ control and the agreement between the parties. View "Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

Banco San Juan Internacional, Inc. v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of N.Y., Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv.

2026-05-13T07:00:09-08:00

A Puerto Rican international banking entity, which operated under an offshore charter and was regulated by Puerto Rico’s Office of the Commissioner of Financial Institutions, maintained a master account with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. In 2019, following a federal investigation into potential anti-money laundering violations involving a Venezuelan client, the entity’s offices were raided and its account was temporarily suspended. After the investigation concluded with a fine and compliance improvements, the account was restored under stricter risk-mitigation terms. However, in 2022 and 2023, the Federal Reserve Bank determined the entity had not met required compliance standards and ultimately terminated the master account, citing serious risk concerns related to money laundering and deficiencies in compliance programs. The entity sued in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking to compel reinstatement of its account and damages. It claimed a statutory entitlement to a master account under the Federal Reserve Act, as amended by the Monetary Control Act, and brought claims under the Administrative Procedure Act, Mandamus Act, Declaratory Judgment Act, the Fifth Amendment, and New York contract law, among others. The district court denied preliminary relief and dismissed all claims, holding that the relevant statutes did not create a nondiscretionary entitlement to a master account and finding failures in both standing and the plausibility of the claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. It held that the Federal Reserve Act does not grant depository institutions a statutory or nondiscretionary right to a master account; instead, regional Reserve Banks retain discretion over account access. The court further found that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, failed to plausibly allege contract or constitutional claims, and that amendment of the complaint would be futile. The district court’s judgment was affirmed in all respects. View "Banco San Juan Internacional, Inc. v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of N.Y., Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv." on Justia Law

Article 13 LLC v. LaSalle NationalBank Ass'n

2026-05-13T07:00:03-08:00

A junior mortgage holder sought to quiet title against a senior mortgage on a Brooklyn property, arguing that the senior mortgage had become unenforceable under New York’s six-year statute of limitations. The senior mortgage had been accelerated by the filing of a foreclosure action in 2007, which was later discontinued without prejudice. The junior mortgage was subsequently assigned to the plaintiff, who argued that the limitations period had expired, thus barring any further foreclosure by the senior lienholder. The validity of the original 2007 foreclosure action, specifically whether it properly accelerated the debt, was disputed. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment, citing a disputed issue of material fact regarding the standing of the entity that initiated the 2007 foreclosure. Shortly after this ruling, New York enacted the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA), which, among other provisions, bars the defense that a prior acceleration was invalid in quiet title actions unless a court previously expressly determined invalidity. The district court, upon reconsideration, held FAPA applied retroactively and did not violate constitutional due process protections, and granted summary judgment to the junior mortgage holder. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified questions to the New York Court of Appeals, which held that FAPA applies retroactively and that such application does not violate the New York Constitution’s due process guarantees. The Second Circuit then addressed whether retroactive application of FAPA violates substantive or procedural due process, the Contracts Clause, or the Takings Clause under the U.S. Constitution. The Second Circuit held that FAPA’s retroactive application does not violate any of these federal constitutional provisions and affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Article 13 LLC v. LaSalle NationalBank Ass'n" on Justia Law

United States v. Dralle

2026-05-12T06:30:12-08:00

Federal authorities investigated a man after discovering that his co-defendant, who had been involved in two separate shooting incidents, had purchased a firearm for him. The defendant was charged with illegal receipt of a trafficked firearm based on this transaction. He pleaded guilty to that charge and was released pending sentencing, but while on bail, he was alleged to have participated in an assault and attempted robbery at a gas station, leading to the revocation of his bail. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut held a sentencing hearing, during which it imposed a sentence of 30 months’ imprisonment—substantially above the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 12 to 18 months. The district court based its decision in part on the defendant’s alleged uncharged conduct while on bail and on the violent conduct of the co-defendant, specifically the two shootings. The district court reasoned that these incidents provided relevant context for the nature and circumstances of the defendant’s offense, even though there was no evidence that the defendant participated in or was aware of the co-defendant’s shootings, and no finding was made regarding the reliability or proof of the uncharged conduct by the defendant. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the district court plainly erred by considering the co-defendant’s prior violent activities in sentencing the defendant. The Second Circuit found there was no basis to attribute the co-defendant’s shootings to the defendant under any sentencing factor, as they were not part of a joint undertaking or conspiracy and were not shown to be relevant to the defendant’s conduct. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for a full resentencing, instructing the district court not to consider the co-defendant’s unrelated violent acts and clarifying the process for addressing any alleged uncharged conduct by the defendant. View "United States v. Dralle" on Justia Law

United States v. Jimenez

2026-05-12T06:30:04-08:00

The case involves an individual who, in January 2020, sold fentanyl-laced heroin to an undercover police detective using his phone to arrange the sales. That same month, he shot someone in the knee and, after his arrest, was found with crack cocaine, heroin, and marijuana. He was indicted on five counts, including possession of ammunition after a felony conviction and drug-related offenses. He ultimately pled guilty to the ammunition charge under a plea agreement that included an express waiver of appeal for sentences within a specified range. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York sentenced him to 105 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release, imposing several special conditions. Three of those conditions—electronic device searches upon reasonable suspicion, mandatory community service when unemployed, and participation in an outpatient mental health counseling program—were challenged by the defendant. In a prior appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated these three conditions due to insufficient explanation and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the District Court elaborated on the reasons for imposing the conditions and reimposed them with some modifications. In the current appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the procedural and substantive reasonableness of these special conditions. The court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when imposing the challenged conditions, as they were sufficiently individualized and reasonably related to the relevant sentencing factors. The court also held that the defendant’s challenge to his term of imprisonment was barred by the appeal waiver in the plea agreement. Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court. View "United States v. Jimenez" on Justia Law

Brown v. James

2026-05-07T06:30:03-08:00

The case involves an altercation in the lobby of an apartment building, where Darryl Brown, an off-duty corrections officer, shot and killed Vonde Cabbagestalk, his daughter’s boyfriend. During a heated argument, Brown drew his firearm. Witness testimony established that Cabbagestalk became physically aggressive and swung at Brown, after which Brown pulled out his gun and held it at his waist. Cabbagestalk made a threatening remark and attempted to swipe at the gun, at which point Brown fired, resulting in Cabbagestalk’s death. Brown was tried in the New York Supreme Court, Bronx County, and convicted of first-degree manslaughter. The trial judge declined to instruct the jury on the justification (self-defense) defense, finding the evidence insufficient to warrant the charge. On direct appeal, a divided Appellate Division, First Department, vacated the conviction, reasoning that the evidence could support Brown’s belief that he needed to use deadly force. However, the New York Court of Appeals unanimously reversed and reinstated the conviction, holding that Brown’s act of drawing his gun made him the initial aggressor under New York law, disqualifying him from the justification defense. The court found no evidence that Brown withdrew from the encounter or that Cabbagestalk threatened deadly force before Brown drew his weapon. Brown sought federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, arguing that denial of a justification instruction violated his federal due process rights. The district court denied relief, agreeing with the New York Court of Appeals. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that Brown was not entitled to a justification instruction under New York law and, consequently, there was no constitutional violation justifying habeas relief. View "Brown v. James" on Justia Law

Delshah 60 Ninth, LLC v. Free People of PA LLC

2026-05-05T10:00:11-08:00

A dispute arose between a commercial landlord and tenant after government emergency orders during the COVID-19 pandemic required non-essential businesses in New York City to close. The tenant, operating a retail clothing store in Manhattan, stopped paying rent, arguing that the lease excused rent payments when government actions prevented it from operating its business. The landlord disagreed, terminated the lease for nonpayment, and sought damages for breach of contract. The tenant vacated the premises and counterclaimed, alleging the landlord wrongfully terminated the lease and wrongfully kept two payments made after termination. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the landlord, finding that the government’s orders did not constitute a “taking” under the lease because the tenant was not fully deprived of the use or occupancy of the premises. The district court also rejected the tenant’s counterclaims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, holding that the notice-and-cure provision applied and that the unjust enrichment claim was duplicative. The court awarded damages to the landlord, though the landlord cross-appealed, asserting the award was insufficient. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court misinterpreted the lease’s takings provision, which excused the tenant from paying rent when it was unable to operate its business due to government orders. The appellate court reversed the summary judgment for the landlord on its breach of contract claim and concluded the tenant was entitled to summary judgment on both its own breach of contract counterclaim and its claim that the landlord improperly terminated the lease. The court further vacated the judgment on the unjust enrichment counterclaim and remanded for further proceedings. The landlord’s cross-appeal on damages was dismissed as moot. View "Delshah 60 Ninth, LLC v. Free People of PA LLC" on Justia Law

In Re: Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation

2026-05-04T07:00:11-08:00

A group of branded gasoline retailers, known as the Old Jericho Plaintiffs, operated gas stations and accepted Visa and Mastercard payment cards during a specified period. Following a long-running federal antitrust class action alleging that Visa and Mastercard imposed unlawfully high interchange fees, a $5.6 billion settlement was reached in 2019 with a class defined as all entities accepting Visa- or Mastercard-branded cards in the United States from January 1, 2004, to January 24, 2019. The Old Jericho Plaintiffs did not opt out of this settlement. However, after the opt-out period ended, they filed a separate class action asserting state-law antitrust claims for damages based on the same alleged conduct, contending that their suppliers were the direct payors of the fees and thus should be the proper class members. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York determined that the Old Jericho Plaintiffs were members of the original settlement class and that the settlement agreement barred their new claims. The district court found the term “accepted” in the settlement ambiguous but, after reviewing extrinsic evidence—such as contracts and how transactions were conducted—concluded that the retailers themselves, not their suppliers, “accepted” payment cards within the meaning of the agreement. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Second Circuit held that its prior decision in Fikes Wholesale, Inc. v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. did not require class membership to be determined solely by identifying the “direct payor.” The court found no clear error in the district court’s factual determination that the Old Jericho Plaintiffs were intended to be class members. Additionally, it held that the claims brought by these plaintiffs were validly released in the settlement because they rested on the same factual predicate as the released claims and the plaintiffs had been adequately represented. View "In Re: Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

Provencher v. Bimbo Foods Bakeries Distribution LLC

2026-05-04T07:00:04-08:00

Two Vermont residents who worked as delivery drivers for a baked goods company sued the company, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) because they were not paid overtime despite regularly working more than 40 hours per week. The company classified them as independent contractors, not employees, and both the drivers and the company are located in different states: the drivers in Vermont, and the company is incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania. The drivers brought the lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, both on their own behalf and on behalf of other similarly situated delivery drivers. After the case was filed, the plaintiffs asked the district court to allow notification of potential collective action members not just in Vermont, but also in Connecticut and New York. The company objected, arguing that the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over claims by out-of-state drivers. The district court disagreed, concluding that it did have personal jurisdiction over the company regarding claims by non-Vermont drivers, and permitted notification to potential plaintiffs in all three states. The district court then certified the personal jurisdiction issue for interlocutory appeal and stayed its decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court. The appellate court held that, unless Congress has provided otherwise (which it has not in the FLSA), a federal district court’s personal jurisdiction over a defendant for out-of-state plaintiffs’ claims is limited by the same rules that bind state courts. Because there was no showing that the claims by Connecticut and New York drivers arose out of the company's contacts with Vermont, the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over those claims. The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Provencher v. Bimbo Foods Bakeries Distribution LLC" on Justia Law

In re Complaint of Verplanck Fire District

2026-04-30T08:30:03-08:00

A volunteer firefighter with a fire district in New York suffered a serious foot injury while aboard the district’s firefighting vessel responding to a reported boat fire on the Hudson River. He was injured when he tried to prevent a collision between his vessel and a police boat. After the accident, he received compensation under New York’s Volunteer Firefighters’ Benefit Law, which provides workers’ compensation-like benefits for volunteers injured in the line of duty. Despite receiving these benefits, he filed claims in federal court against the fire district, alleging negligence and unseaworthiness under federal maritime law. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment to the fire district, finding that the firefighter was not entitled to bring claims under the Jones Act or under the Supreme Court’s precedent in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, and that the exclusive remedy provision of New York’s Volunteer Firefighters’ Benefit Law barred his general maritime law negligence claim. The firefighter appealed, contesting the denial of his Sieracki unseaworthiness and general maritime negligence claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that the firefighter was not entitled to the warranty of seaworthiness extended to so-called "Sieracki seamen." It also concluded that New York’s exclusive remedy provision could not bar his federal negligence claim under general maritime law, given the significant federal interest in uniform maritime remedies. The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the firefighter met the requirements for Sieracki seaman status and to allow his general maritime negligence claim to proceed. View "In re Complaint of Verplanck Fire District" on Justia Law

Cunha v. Freden

2026-04-29T10:00:24-08:00

A noncitizen from Brazil who entered the United States without inspection around 2005 and has lived in the country since then was arrested in 2025 by immigration authorities while driving to work. He had a pending asylum application since 2016, had been granted work authorization, owned a home, operated a small business, and had no criminal history. Following his arrest, the government initiated removal proceedings against him and detained him, asserting that he was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) while his removal proceedings were pending. The United States Department of Homeland Security placed him in removal proceedings in immigration court, where an immigration judge concluded that he was subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and thus ineligible for release on bond under § 1226(a). The petitioner then filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York, arguing that his detention should be governed by § 1226(a), which allows for release on bond. The district court agreed, ordered the government to provide a bond hearing or release him, and, after a bond hearing was held, he was released because the immigration judge found he was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed whether the petitioner’s detention was governed by § 1225(b)(2)(A) (mandatory detention) or § 1226(a) (discretionary detention with bond eligibility). The Second Circuit held that § 1226(a) governs the detention of noncitizens like the petitioner—those present in the United States after entering without inspection and not apprehended at or near the border. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of habeas corpus, concluding that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply in these circumstances, and that the petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing. View "Cunha v. Freden" on Justia Law

Griffin v. LaManna

2026-04-29T10:00:18-08:00

A New York state prisoner, convicted of several serious offenses and serving a life sentence without parole, filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his convictions. The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied his petition on the merits and declined to issue a certificate of appealability. The petitioner missed the deadline to appeal that denial and subsequently moved for an extension of time to appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5), arguing that his attorney’s staff absences and communication issues with the petitioner constituted “excusable neglect.” The district court denied this motion, finding the reasons provided were, at most, ordinary attorney error, and again denied a certificate of appealability. The petitioner then appealed the district court’s denial of his Rule 4(a)(5) motion to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The government argued, and the court agreed, that before the appeal could proceed, the petitioner was required to obtain a certificate of appealability because the order denying his extension motion was a “final order” under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). The petitioner challenged this requirement, but the Second Circuit concluded that its prior precedent remained binding and that the Supreme Court’s decision in Harbison v. Bell did not remove the certificate requirement for orders that conclude the habeas proceeding. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a certificate of appealability is required to appeal the denial of a Rule 4(a)(5) motion in this context, and it declined to issue such a certificate because no reasonable jurist would find it debatable whether the district court abused its discretion. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Griffin v. LaManna" on Justia Law

Adidas America, Inc. v. Thom Browne, Inc.

2026-04-29T10:00:14-08:00

Adidas America, Inc. brought a lawsuit against Thom Browne, Inc., alleging trademark infringement, trademark dilution, and unfair competition, based on Thom Browne’s use of certain stripe motifs on its apparel. Adidas’s claims focused on Thom Browne’s Four-Bar Signature and Grosgrain designs, which adidas argued infringed on its well-known Three-Stripe Mark, particularly in a new line of activewear. At trial, the jury heard extensive evidence, including testimony from sixteen witnesses and more than four hundred exhibits, and ultimately found Thom Browne not liable on all counts. Subsequently, during related litigation in the United Kingdom, adidas discovered that Thom Browne had failed to disclose several relevant emails during discovery in the U.S. action. These emails contained internal discussions among Thom Browne employees acknowledging the potential for confusion between Thom Browne’s stripe designs and adidas’s mark. Adidas moved in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for relief from the final judgment under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2) (newly discovered evidence) and 60(b)(3) (misconduct), arguing that the emails warranted a new trial. The district court denied the motion, finding that the emails probably would not have changed the verdict and that Thom Browne’s discovery violation was, at most, negligent rather than intentional misconduct. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The Second Circuit held that adidas failed to demonstrate that the newly discovered emails probably would have altered the outcome at trial, as required under Rule 60(b)(2). The court further held that “misconduct” under Rule 60(b)(3) does not include merely negligent discovery violations; only intentional or reckless conduct could justify such relief. Therefore, adidas was not entitled to a new trial. View "Adidas America, Inc. v. Thom Browne, Inc." on Justia Law

Richardson v. Townsquare Media, Inc.

2026-04-23T06:30:04-08:00

A professional videographer recorded a video in 2015 showing Michael Jordan breaking up a fight. Years later, a hip-hop news website operated by a media company republished the entire video, embedding it from a social media post, and used a screenshot from the video as the background of the article’s headline. The same website also published two articles embedding a separate interview video that the videographer had recorded with rapper Melle Mel, which had been posted on YouTube. Both articles included screenshots from the interview as part of their headlines. The videographer sued the media company for copyright infringement in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings for the defendant, finding that the use of the Jordan Video was fair use, the screenshots were de minimis and not actionable, and the embedding of the Melle Mel Video was permitted under YouTube’s Terms of Service. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court found that the district court erred in determining, at the pleading stage, that the media company’s use of the entire Jordan Video was fair use, since it could substitute for the original and potentially harm the market for the video. The appellate court also found that the screenshots’ use was not de minimis because they were clearly recognizable and prominently displayed. However, the appellate court agreed with the district court that embedding the Melle Mel Video from YouTube was permitted by the license granted under YouTube’s Terms of Service. The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment as to the Jordan Video and both sets of screenshots, affirmed as to the Melle Mel Video, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Richardson v. Townsquare Media, Inc." on Justia Law

Powell v. Ocwen Fin. Corp.

2026-04-22T06:30:04-08:00

A group of trustees managing an ERISA-regulated pension plan invested in six classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs), some issued as notes under indenture agreements and others as trust certificates. The trustees alleged that companies servicing the underlying mortgages mismanaged the loans, acted in self-interest, and failed to protect investors’ interests, in violation of their fiduciary duties under ERISA. The investments included three classes of notes and three classes of trust certificates, each backed by pools of residential mortgages. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York considered cross-motions for summary judgment on whether the underlying mortgages constituted plan assets under ERISA. The district court ruled that only the RMBSs themselves, not the mortgages behind them, were plan assets as defined by the Department of Labor’s regulation. Consequently, it granted summary judgment to all defendants, holding that the servicers did not owe ERISA fiduciary duties regarding the mortgages, and denied the trustees’ cross-motion. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. The Second Circuit agreed that the notes issued under indenture agreements were not equity interests and did not confer plan asset status on the underlying mortgages. However, it found that the trust certificates were beneficial interests in the trusts and thus qualified as equity interests under the Department of Labor’s regulation. As a result, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment in part (regarding the notes), vacated in part (regarding the trust certificates), and remanded for further proceedings, including determination of whether the servicers acted as fiduciaries with respect to the trust certificates. View "Powell v. Ocwen Fin. Corp." on Justia Law

United States of America v. Ullah

2026-04-21T06:30:12-08:00

The case concerns a defendant who, in December 2017, detonated a homemade pipe bomb in a crowded pedestrian tunnel connecting the Times Square subway station and the Port Authority Bus Terminal in Manhattan. The defendant, motivated by propaganda from a foreign terrorist organization, constructed the device using materials from his workplace and filled it with metal screws to act as shrapnel. On the morning of the attack, he strapped the bomb to his body, rode the subway into Manhattan, and triggered the device during rush hour, injuring himself and several bystanders. The attack caused both physical and psychological harm to victims and created a significant risk to public safety. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presided over the trial. After a jury convicted the defendant on six counts—including providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization, committing a terrorist attack on mass transportation, and using a destructive device during a crime of violence—the court denied the defendant’s motions for acquittal and imposed sentences including multiple life terms plus an additional thirty years. The defendant appealed his convictions on three counts and challenged the reasonableness of his sentence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found insufficient evidence to support the conviction for providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization, as the defendant acted independently and not under the direction or control of that organization. Consequently, the court reversed the conviction on that count. The court affirmed the convictions for committing a terrorist attack against mass transportation and for using a destructive device during a crime of violence, finding the evidence sufficient and any possible legal errors harmless. The court also upheld the reasonableness of the sentence. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these rulings. View "United States of America v. Ullah" on Justia Law

United States v. Brown

2026-04-21T06:30:04-08:00

The defendant engaged in a scheme from 2017 through 2020 in which he impersonated an attorney to obtain personally identifiable information from prisoners. Using this information, he filed unauthorized tax returns in the names of at least nine prisoners, receiving $136,672 in fraudulent refunds from the Internal Revenue Service. At the time of his arrest, the defendant was already under community supervision for a similar offense and had a significant criminal history, including prior convictions for fraud-related and other offenses. A grand jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York indicted the defendant on multiple fraud and theft charges. He pleaded guilty to fourteen counts of making false claims and one count of theft of government funds. The district court sentenced him to forty-six months in prison, three years of supervised release, and ordered forfeiture and restitution. The supervised release included standard and special conditions, one of which allowed for electronic monitoring of all devices capable of accessing the internet, unannounced examinations of such devices, and monitoring of any work-related devices as permitted by his employer. The defendant did not object to these conditions at sentencing but challenged them on appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not err in imposing the special condition of electronic monitoring. The appellate court found the condition was reasonable in light of the nature of the offenses and the defendant’s history, was not overbroad, and did not amount to an impermissible occupational restriction under the Sentencing Guidelines. The court concluded that the monitoring requirements did not prohibit the defendant from pursuing any occupation and were necessary to protect the public. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

United States v. Pence

2026-04-10T06:30:05-08:00

Christopher Pence was investigated after arranging, through the dark web, for the murder of Francesco and Christina Cordero, with whom he and his wife had a contentious relationship following the adoption of the Corderos' children. Pence provided the purported hitman with the Corderos' personal information and paid over $16,000 in Bitcoin. The FBI traced the online activity and cryptocurrency transaction to Pence’s Utah residence, but acknowledged that others in the household could have accessed the devices involved. After obtaining a search warrant, law enforcement executed an early morning raid on Pence’s home, subsequently separating him from his family and inviting him to speak voluntarily in an FBI vehicle parked outside. Following these events, Pence was questioned by agents in the vehicle without being handcuffed or physically restrained and was told he was not under arrest and did not have to answer questions. After a period of rapport-building, agents confronted him with evidence of his involvement in the murder-for-hire scheme, prompting Pence to confess before receiving Miranda warnings. Over two hours into the encounter, agents read Pence his rights, after which he continued to speak. Pence moved to suppress his pre-Miranda statements in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, arguing he was in custody during the interrogation. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion, finding Pence was not in custody and thus Miranda warnings were not required at the time of his confession. Pence subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in Pence’s position would not have believed he was in custody. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Pence" on Justia Law

United States of America v. Mejia

2026-04-09T06:30:23-08:00

The case concerns a noncitizen, a native and citizen of Ecuador, who entered the United States without authorization around 1999. In 2009, he was convicted of reckless assault of a child and sentenced to three years in prison. During removal proceedings in 2010, the immigration judge advised him that his conviction made him ineligible for voluntary departure and offered removal instead. The noncitizen, after confirming his understanding of his rights and waiving his right to counsel and appeal, was removed to Ecuador in 2011. He later reentered the United States without permission and was arrested in 2021. In 2022, he was charged with aggravated illegal reentry. In the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the defendant moved to dismiss the criminal information, arguing that recent Supreme Court precedent established he had, in fact, been eligible for voluntary departure at his 2010 hearing, and that the immigration judge’s erroneous advice rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair. The District Court, relying on prior Second Circuit precedent from United States v. Sosa, excused the defendant’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies and granted the motion to dismiss, finding his waiver of appeal was not knowing and intelligent due to the immigration judge’s mistake. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Palomar-Santiago made clear that all three requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)—exhaustion of administrative remedies, deprivation of opportunity for judicial review, and fundamental unfairness—are mandatory and cannot be excused by courts. Because the defendant failed to exhaust administrative remedies and was not deprived of the opportunity for judicial review, he was barred from collaterally attacking his removal order. The Second Circuit reversed the District Court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States of America v. Mejia" on Justia Law

Campbell v. Broome County

2026-04-09T06:30:16-08:00

The plaintiff, David John Campbell, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Broome County, the City of Binghamton, various officials and employees, and an unnamed New York State Police Trooper. He alleged that his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated in a series of incidents beginning in May 2022, related to his efforts to maintain or regain possession of firearms that he claimed he was licensed to possess. Specifically, Campbell described interactions with local law enforcement concerning the surrender and non-return or damage of his firearms, a traffic stop that he claimed was undocumented, and two police entries into his home in January 2023, during which firearms and other items were allegedly seized. The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed Campbell’s amended complaint sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), finding the allegations factually frivolous. The district court also ruled, in the alternative, that the complaint failed to allege the personal involvement of certain individual defendants and did not contain sufficient facts to support municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services. The court denied Campbell leave to further amend his complaint. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed most of the district court’s dismissal, agreeing that the majority of Campbell’s claims were frivolous, that there were insufficient allegations of personal involvement for most individual defendants, and that the municipalities could not be held liable. However, the Second Circuit vacated and remanded the dismissal of Campbell’s Fourth Amendment claim against Officer Nicholas Mushalla, finding that the allegations regarding Mushalla’s search of Campbell’s home and seizure of property on January 13, 2023, were sufficient to state a claim. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. View "Campbell v. Broome County" on Justia Law

United States v. Goklu

2026-04-07T06:00:19-08:00

The defendant operated a business exchanging bitcoin for cash, advertising his services online and charging commission fees. Over several months, undercover DEA agents arranged multiple transactions with the defendant, exchanging large amounts of bitcoin for cash. During these exchanges, the agent initially claimed the bitcoin came from an online business but later said it was from drug sales. Despite this disclosure, the defendant continued the exchanges. Ultimately, he was arrested after arranging another large transaction. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York indicted the defendant on charges of money laundering and operating an unlicensed money transmitting business. During jury selection, the defense objected to the seating of a juror who expressed positive views toward law enforcement and negative views about financial crimes. The court denied the challenge for cause, empaneling the juror. The jury convicted the defendant on both counts. At sentencing, the court included all transactions with the undercover agent in calculating the offense level and imposed a term of imprisonment and supervised release. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed several issues. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by empaneling the challenged juror, given the juror’s assurances of impartiality. The court further held that exchanging bitcoin for cash constitutes “money transmitting” under 18 U.S.C. § 1960 and its implementing regulations, and that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. Additionally, the court found no error in the district court’s supplemental jury instruction clarifying that such exchanges qualify as transfers of funds. Finally, the court dismissed the defendant’s sentencing challenges as moot because he had completed his prison term and raised no issues regarding supervised release. The judgment of the district court was otherwise affirmed. View "United States v. Goklu" on Justia Law

Schneiderman v. American Chemical Society

2026-04-06T06:30:16-08:00

A New York citizen brought suit in federal court against a federally chartered corporation headquartered in Washington, D.C., alleging disability discrimination under New York law. The plaintiff invoked diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, arguing that the defendant should be considered a citizen of the District of Columbia based on its principal place of business, even though it was not incorporated under the laws of any state. In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, the defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that federally chartered corporations are not citizens of any state for diversity purposes absent unusual circumstances. The plaintiff initially argued for a judge-made expansion of diversity jurisdiction but later abandoned this theory in favor of a statutory argument based on § 1332(c)(1). The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that diversity jurisdiction was not established because the statute does not extend state citizenship to federally chartered corporations. The court also denied the plaintiff’s post-judgment motions for reconsideration and to reopen the case to pursue possible federal claims. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that § 1332(c)(1) applies only to corporations incorporated by a state or foreign state, not to federally chartered corporations. The court reasoned that the statute’s principal-place-of-business provision does not operate independently of the state-of-incorporation provision, and Congress did not intend to expand diversity jurisdiction to reach federally chartered corporations generally. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and its refusal to reconsider or reopen the case. View "Schneiderman v. American Chemical Society" on Justia Law

In re: Kwok

2026-04-06T06:30:05-08:00

The case centers on the bankruptcy proceedings of Ho Wan Kwok, who filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection after a creditor, Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. (“PAX”), obtained a $116 million judgment against him in New York. One of the key assets at issue was a mega-yacht, the Lady May, which Kwok claimed not to own. The yacht was registered to HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC (“HK”), an entity whose only member was Kwok’s daughter, Mei Guo. HK had no business operations, employees, or assets other than the Lady May, a smaller boat, and an escrow account funded by another entity controlled by Kwok. Disputes arose regarding whether HK was simply Kwok’s alter ego, used to shield assets from creditors. In prior proceedings, the New York State Supreme Court found that Kwok controlled and enjoyed the Lady May, despite formal ownership being in HK’s name, and held Kwok in contempt for violating a court order. After Kwok filed for bankruptcy, HK sought to assert its ownership of the yacht in the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court appointed a Chapter 11 trustee, who counterclaimed that HK was Kwok’s alter ego and that its assets belonged to the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment for the trustee. Mei Guo and HK appealed, but the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision, finding no genuine issue of material fact regarding HK’s status as Kwok’s alter ego. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the Chapter 11 trustee had standing under section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code to bring a reverse veil-piercing claim on behalf of the estate’s creditors. The court further found that, under Delaware law, the only reasonable conclusion was that HK was Kwok’s alter ego, and its assets properly belonged to the bankruptcy estate. View "In re: Kwok" on Justia Law

Vidal v. Venettozzi

2026-04-01T07:00:07-08:00

An incarcerated individual at Green Haven Correctional Facility was disciplined following an incident in which he was accused of assaulting correctional officers after a dispute involving his legal materials. The individual maintained that he was authorized to possess the materials and alleged he was physically assaulted by officers. He was charged with violent conduct and, after a disciplinary hearing, was sentenced to 270 days in the special housing unit (SHU), ultimately serving at least 180 days. At his disciplinary hearing, the individual was denied the opportunity to call certain witnesses and present documentary evidence, which he claimed violated his due process rights. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed the case after the individual, representing himself, brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several Department of Corrections officials. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the individual’s SHU confinement did not implicate a protected liberty interest under the standard set by Sandin v. Conner, and therefore no due process protections were required. The court did not address other arguments, including qualified immunity or personal involvement of certain defendants. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed with the district court. It held that the duration of the disciplinary confinement—whether measured as 180 days served, 270 days imposed, or longer—constitutes an atypical and significant hardship in relation to ordinary prison life. Therefore, the confinement implicated a protected liberty interest and triggered due process protections. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, leaving other issues for the district court to address. View "Vidal v. Venettozzi" on Justia Law

Ramsay v. Bondi

2026-03-27T11:30:05-08:00

The petitioner, a Jamaican national who became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1971, was removed from the country in 2007 following a 1996 conviction under New York law for the attempted sale of a “narcotic drug.” Many years later, based on a recent Second Circuit decision—United States v. Minter—that held the relevant New York statute was broader than its federal counterpart, the petitioner filed a motion to reconsider or reopen his removal order, arguing that the legal basis for his removal no longer applied. He filed this motion within thirty days of the Minter decision. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied the petitioner’s motion, concluding that he had not demonstrated the due diligence necessary to warrant equitable tolling of the filing deadlines for such motions. The BIA reasoned that an earlier Second Circuit case, Harbin v. Sessions, should have prompted the petitioner to file sooner. The BIA interpreted the petitioner’s arguments as asserting that Harbin constituted a fundamental change in the law sufficient to support his motion, and therefore found his delay unreasonable. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the BIA mischaracterized the petitioner’s arguments and misunderstood the legal significance of the Harbin and Minter decisions. The court held that the petitioner’s rights to relief did not arise until Minter, and he was not required to file earlier motions based on law that had not yet changed. The Second Circuit therefore held that the BIA abused its discretion, vacated the BIA’s order, granted the petition for review and motion to stay removal, and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Ramsay v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Petersen Energía v. Argentine Republic

2026-03-27T07:00:06-08:00

Minority shareholders of an Argentine oil and gas company, previously privatized in 1993, became involved in litigation after the Argentine government expropriated a majority stake in the company in 2012. The government’s acquisition of shares was conducted without making a public tender offer to minority shareholders, a process that was explicitly required by the company’s bylaws to protect such shareholders in the event of a takeover. The plaintiffs, consisting of Spanish entities and a New York hedge fund, had acquired significant stakes in the company, and after the expropriation, they claimed that they suffered substantial financial losses due to the government’s failure to comply with the tender offer requirement. The plaintiffs sued in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, asserting breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims under Argentine law against both the Argentine Republic and the company. After extensive litigation, the district court found in favor of the plaintiffs on their breach of contract claims against the Argentine Republic, awarding over $16 billion in damages, but granted summary judgment to the company, finding it had no obligation to enforce the tender offer provision. The court also dismissed the promissory estoppel claims. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs' breach of contract damages claims against the Argentine Republic and the company were not cognizable under Argentine law, reasoning that the bylaws did not create enforceable bilateral obligations between shareholders and that Argentine public law governing expropriation precluded such claims. The court affirmed the dismissal of the promissory estoppel claims and judgment in favor of the company, but reversed the judgment against the Argentine Republic, remanding for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Petersen Energía v. Argentine Republic" on Justia Law

Rivera-Perez v. Stover

2026-03-26T07:00:05-08:00

A federal prisoner challenged the calculation of his earned time credits under the First Step Act by the Bureau of Prisons, arguing that the Bureau’s failure to properly apply these credits prevented his timely transfer from prison to prerelease custody. While the petition was pending, the prisoner was transferred to a residential reentry center, a form of prerelease custody, though he still had a significant number of unused credits. The Bureau had already used some credits to move up the start date of his supervised release, but the remaining credits were not applied. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut determined that, although his original request for transfer to prerelease custody was moot, the petition should be construed more broadly as requesting application of remaining time credits to reduce the length of his supervised release. The district court concluded that the First Step Act required such credits to be used to shorten the prisoner’s supervised release and ordered the Bureau of Prisons to calculate and communicate the remaining credits for that purpose. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and held that the relevant statutory provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C), allows earned time credits only to accelerate a prisoner’s move from incarceration to prerelease custody or to an earlier start of supervised release, but not to reduce the length of a term of supervised release itself. The court found that, once the prisoner was transferred to prerelease custody and his credits were applied to start supervised release early, his petition became moot. The Second Circuit therefore vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case as moot. View "Rivera-Perez v. Stover" on Justia Law

Powell v. Ocwen Fin. Corp.

2026-03-26T06:30:05-08:00

The trustees of an ERISA-regulated pension plan invested in six classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs). Three of these investments were in notes issued by Delaware statutory trusts via indenture agreements, while the other three were in regular-interest certificates issued by trusts governed under New York law and classified as REMICs for tax purposes. The trustees alleged that the mortgage servicers mismanaged the loans and engaged in self-dealing, violating ERISA fiduciary duties. They also claimed that Wells Fargo, as master servicer for some trusts, failed to adequately supervise Ocwen (another servicer) and failed to pursue litigation on behalf of the trusts. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants, holding that, under the Department of Labor’s regulation, only the RMBSs themselves—not the underlying mortgages—were plan assets for ERISA purposes. The court determined that both the notes and the regular-interest certificates were treated as indebtedness without substantial equity features, so the look-through exception did not apply. The trustees’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment was denied. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court agreed that the notes issued by the indenture trusts lacked substantial equity features and thus the underlying mortgages were not plan assets. However, it held that the regular-interest certificates represented beneficial interests in the REMIC trusts; under the controlling regulation, the assets of such a trust in which a plan holds a beneficial interest are themselves plan assets. The case was remanded to the district court to consider whether Ocwen acted as an ERISA fiduciary with respect to the mortgages underlying the REMIC trusts. View "Powell v. Ocwen Fin. Corp." on Justia Law

United States v. Fabian

2026-03-25T06:30:05-08:00

The case concerns a defendant who was convicted of conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine based on his role as a supplier to a lower-level dealer operating in Sunset Park, Brooklyn. The prosecution established that, beginning in late 2013 or early 2014, the defendant supplied large quantities of cocaine and heroin to his co-conspirator, knowing and assisting as the cocaine was converted into crack for resale. Law enforcement began investigating the operation in 2014, conducting controlled purchases and making several arrests of individuals involved in the conspiracy. The defendant was ultimately linked to the conspiracy through surveillance, witness testimony, text messages, and physical evidence such as drug ledgers. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York presided over the trial, where the jury found the defendant guilty of conspiring to distribute at least 280 grams of crack cocaine, but acquitted him of involvement with larger quantities of heroin and powder cocaine. The court denied the defendant’s post-trial motions challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. At sentencing, the court calculated a sentencing range of life imprisonment under the United States Sentencing Guidelines but imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release. The judgement included standard conditions of supervised release that were not orally pronounced at sentencing. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, the district court’s jury instructions were proper, and the sentence imposed was reasonable. However, the Second Circuit found that the district court erred by imposing standard conditions of supervised release without properly notifying the defendant at sentencing. The appellate court affirmed the conviction and sentence, vacated the standard conditions of supervised release, and remanded for further proceedings on that issue. View "United States v. Fabian" on Justia Law

Leadenhall Capital Partners LLP v. Advantage Capital Holdings, LLC

2026-03-23T06:30:06-08:00

Two lender plaintiffs provided a large loan to several special purpose entities (“Borrowers”) under a Loan and Security Agreement, which secured the loan with the Borrowers’ assets. The ultimate parent companies of the Borrowers (“Guarantors”) guaranteed repayment of the loan but did not pledge any of their own assets as collateral. After the lenders received information suggesting the Borrowers’ collateral was insufficient or encumbered, they accelerated the loan and demanded immediate payment of over $609 million. When neither the Borrowers nor the Guarantors could pay, the lenders filed suit for breach of contract and requested a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to freeze the assets of both the Borrowers and the Guarantors, expressing concern that these assets would be dissipated before a judgment could be enforced. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the injunction, including against the Guarantors’ assets. The Guarantors and related parties argued that, under Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., the District Court lacked authority to freeze their assets because the plaintiffs had no lien or equitable interest in them. The District Court found Grupo Mexicano distinguishable and declined to modify the injunction. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the lenders did not have a lien or equitable interest in the Guarantors’ assets, as their claim was for contract damages and not for relief giving rise to an equitable interest in specific property. The court concluded that Grupo Mexicano precluded the freezing of the Guarantors’ assets under these circumstances. The Second Circuit vacated the portion of the District Court’s preliminary injunction restraining the Guarantors’ assets and remanded for further proceedings. The court made no ruling regarding the Borrowers’ assets, as that part of the injunction was not challenged. View "Leadenhall Capital Partners LLP v. Advantage Capital Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

Parker v. Alexander

2026-03-23T06:30:05-08:00

In 2024, a plaintiff filed suit against three individuals, alleging that they sexually assaulted her in 2012. She brought her claims under New York City’s Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Law (VGMVPL), which, as amended in 2022, created a two-year window (from March 2023 to March 2025) for victims of sexual and gender-based violence to revive and pursue civil claims that would otherwise be time-barred. The defendants removed the case to federal court, arguing that the VGMVPL’s revival window was preempted by earlier state statutes—the Child Victims Act (CVA) and the Adult Survivors Act (ASA)—which had established shorter, earlier revival periods for similar claims. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York agreed with the defendants, holding that the state laws preempted the VGMVPL’s revival window. The district court concluded both that the CVA and ASA conflicted with the city law and that the state legislature intended to occupy the field of revival windows for such claims, rendering the city’s extension invalid. The plaintiff appealed this decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that the question of whether the city’s VGMVPL revival window is preempted by the state’s CVA and ASA raises significant issues of New York law, particularly regarding home rule principles and state-local government relations. Recognizing a lack of controlling precedent from the New York Court of Appeals and the importance of the issue, the Second Circuit deferred its decision and certified the following question to the New York Court of Appeals: whether the VGMVPL’s two-year revival window for civil claims is preempted by the CVA and ASA’s earlier revival periods. The decision on the merits is reserved pending guidance from the state’s highest court. View "Parker v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Russell v. Scott

2026-03-19T06:30:06-08:00

A pretrial detainee in the custody of the Vermont Department of Corrections alleged that a corrections officer sexually abused him during a purported search for contraband. The detainee asserted that while he was participating in a medication-assisted treatment program at the correctional facility, the officer grabbed, squeezed, and twisted his genitals after checking his mouth for medication, causing injury. The detainee’s version of events was supported by his own testimony and statements from other detainees who witnessed the incident. He filed administrative grievances and was interviewed by an investigator, who ultimately found the complaint unfounded, but the detainee was cleared of any disciplinary infraction. After his release, the detainee filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, asserting claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as well as state law. The District Court granted summary judgment to the officer on some claims but denied summary judgment on the Fourteenth Amendment sexual abuse claim and a related state-law battery claim, concluding that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable jury could find a constitutional violation based on the detainee’s account. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed only the denial of qualified immunity. The court held that, for sexual abuse claims brought by pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment, the proper standard is whether the officer’s conduct was objectively unreasonable—not whether it constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The court determined that, accepting the detainee’s version, the officer’s actions violated clearly established Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court affirmed the District Court’s denial of qualified immunity, dismissed the remainder of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Russell v. Scott" on Justia Law

Suarez v. Sullivan

2026-03-17T07:00:05-08:00

The plaintiff in this case, while serving a prison sentence, was diagnosed with a serious mental illness. After a period of stability on prescribed antipsychotic medication, his psychiatrist at a correctional facility discontinued the medication upon his refusal and assertion that he did not need it. Over the following weeks, the plaintiff’s mental health deteriorated. He became involved in an altercation with correctional staff, was placed in segregated housing (the Special Housing Unit or SHU), and subsequently subject to further disciplinary housing (“keeplock”). During this time, he experienced hallucinations and anxiety, though he did not report these symptoms to staff. Shortly after his release from custody, the plaintiff, while still suffering from psychosis, committed a violent assault on a family member. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment to the defendants, including employees of the Department of Corrections and the Office of Mental Health, finding no triable issue of fact regarding whether defendants were subjectively aware of or disregarded a serious risk to the plaintiff’s health. The District Court reasoned that, because he did not affirmatively report his hallucinations, the defendants lacked the requisite knowledge for Eighth Amendment liability. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there were genuine disputes of material fact as to whether each defendant knew of a serious risk to the plaintiff’s health and whether they disregarded that risk by their actions or inaction. The Court of Appeals vacated the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on both the conditions of confinement and inadequate medical care claims under the Eighth Amendment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Suarez v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

Jin v. City of New York

2026-03-12T07:00:06-08:00

A woman was arrested by New York City police officers after they responded to a 911 call reporting an assault in progress related to a domestic dispute in Flushing, New York. Upon arrival, the officers spoke with the alleged victim’s son, who showed them injuries on his father’s arm and indicated that the woman had caused them by striking him with an umbrella. The father, standing beside his son, pointed to his injuries and demonstrated how the assault occurred. The officers photographed the injuries, and the woman was subsequently charged with assault and harassment. These charges were later dismissed. The woman then filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, asserting several claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including false arrest, as well as state constitutional claims. The district court granted summary judgment for the officers on all claims except for the false arrest claim. The court denied qualified immunity to the officers on this claim, finding disputed issues of material fact regarding whether there was probable cause to arrest. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity. The appellate court held that the district court erred, concluding that, when viewing the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the officers had arguable probable cause to arrest based on corroborated evidence: the 911 call, physical injuries, and the victim’s demonstration of the assault. The appellate court clarified that police are not required to assess the credibility of domestic violence victims more skeptically than other witnesses simply due to the familial context. The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to grant summary judgment to the officers on the false arrest claim. View "Jin v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Sufiyan v. Bondi

2026-03-12T07:00:05-08:00

The petitioner, a native and citizen of Sri Lanka, sought protection in the United States, claiming he would face persecution and torture if returned. His testimony before the immigration judge described being forcibly detained by members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a designated terrorist group, and compelled under threat to provide translation services during interrogations. After escaping LTTE custody, he was detained and allegedly beaten by the Sri Lankan army, then relocated within Sri Lanka before ultimately coming to the United States. He applied for asylum, withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied all relief, finding that the petitioner provided material support to the LTTE by translating during interrogations, making him ineligible for asylum and withholding. The IJ determined his asylum application was untimely, found his claims of past persecution and fear of future harm insufficiently corroborated, and concluded he had not established entitlement to relief under CAT due to lack of evidence and his ability to relocate safely within Sri Lanka. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s denial based on the material support bar, dismissing his claims for asylum and withholding without addressing their merits, but upheld the IJ’s denial of deferral of removal under CAT on substantive grounds. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the BIA erred by not determining whether the petitioner would be eligible for asylum or withholding of removal under the INA if the material support bar did not apply, as such a determination is necessary for the petitioner to seek a waiver from the Department of Homeland Security. The court granted the petition in part and remanded to the BIA for this determination, while denying review of the agency’s denial of withholding or deferral of removal under CAT. View "Sufiyan v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Sacaza v. City of New York

2026-03-11T06:30:05-08:00

A teenage girl accused Dennis Sacaza of sexually assaulting her while on a crowded Metropolitan Transit Authority bus in Brooklyn. The incident was partially captured on video footage from the bus, which showed the complainant appearing uncomfortable and looking back at Sacaza several times, but did not definitively show any physical contact. After the complainant reported the alleged assault to her school and the police, Detective Michael Friedman conducted an investigation, including interviews, review of the bus footage, and a double-blind photo array, in which the complainant identified Sacaza twice. Sacaza was charged with several offenses, but the criminal case was ultimately dismissed on speedy trial grounds. Sacaza subsequently filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, asserting claims for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and denial of the right to a fair trial under federal and state law. After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing Detective Friedman was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court granted summary judgment on some claims but denied it on the federal false arrest and malicious prosecution claims, finding that questions of fact existed regarding whether there was arguable probable cause to arrest and charge Sacaza, given inconsistencies in the complainant's statements and the bus video. On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of summary judgment de novo. The court held that Detective Friedman was entitled to qualified immunity because, based on the undisputed evidence, a reasonable officer could have believed there was probable cause to arrest and charge Sacaza. The district court’s denial of summary judgment on the federal claims was reversed, and the case was remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Friedman and for further proceedings regarding the state law claims. View "Sacaza v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Miller v. Lamanna

2026-03-09T06:30:06-08:00

A former corrections officer brought suit against several supervisory employees of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, alleging that his rights under the Equal Protection Clause were violated due to race discrimination and retaliation after he complained about such discrimination. He claimed that, while employed at Downstate Correctional Facility, he was denied requests for outside employment that were granted to white colleagues, suspended without pay in circumstances where white officers were suspended with pay, and barred from returning to work after filing discrimination and workplace violence complaints. The defendants disputed these allegations, offering alternative explanations for their actions and contesting whether Miller was similarly situated to the relevant comparators. After extensive discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. In addition to arguing that the summary judgment record did not reveal any material factual disputes, they asserted that, even on the pleadings, Miller failed to state a viable claim. Instead of evaluating the evidence produced during discovery, the district court considered only the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), effectively converting the summary judgment motion into a motion to dismiss. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the district court erred procedurally by disregarding the summary judgment record and resolving the dispute solely under the pleading standard after discovery had closed. The court explained that once discovery is complete and summary judgment is sought, the correct standard requires assessment of the record evidence, not just the pleadings. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, without expressing any view on the merits of the underlying claims or the sufficiency of the evidence. View "Miller v. Lamanna" on Justia Law

Bugliotti v. The Republic of Argentina

2026-03-09T06:30:05-08:00

A group of bondholders sought to recover principal payments owed on defaulted Argentine sovereign bonds. These investors had previously participated in Argentina’s Tax Credit Program, depositing their bonds with an Argentine trustee, Caja de Valores S.A., in exchange for certificates representing principal and interest. After the Republic failed to pay the principal at maturity, the bondholders initially sued in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. That court dismissed the case primarily on the ground that, under Argentine law, only the trustee had authority to sue on the bonds, and the Second Circuit affirmed. The bondholders then obtained authorization from an Argentine court to sue and filed a new complaint in New York. The district court again dismissed their claims, mainly for two reasons. First, it found all claims were barred by New York’s six-year statute of limitations for contract actions, holding that the state’s “savings statute” (N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 205(a)) did not apply because the prior dismissal was for lack of personal jurisdiction. It also concluded that tolling provisions in New York’s COVID-era executive orders did not apply absent an equitable showing. Second, the court held that collateral estoppel barred the bondholders from relitigating issues related to standing and jurisdiction previously decided. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It agreed that the savings statute did not apply but held that the COVID-era executive orders tolled the limitations period automatically, without any equitable showing. This made some claims timely (those on the AR16 Bonds) but not others (those on the GD65 Bonds). The Second Circuit further ruled that collateral estoppel did not preclude the bondholders from litigating whether they had authority to sue, and that—under Argentine law, with the new court authorization—they now had such authority. The judgment was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bugliotti v. The Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law

Garcia v. Department of Labor

2026-03-05T07:30:06-08:00

A resident of Puerto Rico suffered work-related injuries in 1994, resulting in permanent total disability. His employer and its insurance carrier were ordered to provide medical care under Section 7 of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, as extended by the Defense Base Act. In 2019, a Puerto Rico-licensed physician recommended medical cannabis-infused edibles to treat the petitioner’s chronic pain. The petitioner sought reimbursement for these products from the employer’s insurance carrier, which denied the request. The petitioner then asked the United States Department of Labor’s Office of Administrative Law Judges to order reimbursement, arguing that medical cannabis was a reasonable and necessary treatment. The Administrative Law Judge denied the request, finding that marijuana’s classification as a Schedule I substance under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) meant it could not have an accepted medical use under federal law. On appeal, the Department of Labor Benefits Review Board affirmed this decision by a 2-1 vote, agreeing that reimbursement was barred by the CSA and rejecting arguments that recent federal appropriations riders or executive actions altered the federal legal status of marijuana. On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that because marijuana remains a Schedule I substance under the CSA, it cannot be considered a reasonable and necessary medical expense for purposes of reimbursement under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. The court found that neither appropriations riders nor recent executive or legislative actions had changed marijuana’s federal classification or its legal status under the Act. Therefore, the court denied the petition for review. View "Garcia v. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

United States v. Aryeetey

2026-03-03T07:00:05-08:00

In this case, the defendant was observed by New York City police officers driving without a seatbelt. When officers attempted to pull him over, he fled, eventually crashing into a parked car. After the crash, he fled on foot and was seen throwing a green bag over a fence into a construction lot across from a school. Inside the bag, officers later found a loaded firearm with a defaced serial number. The defendant’s photo identification and cell phone were found in the car. He was arrested about a month later during a scheduled meeting with probation. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presided over the initial criminal proceedings, where the defendant was indicted, and a jury found him guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Prior to trial, the government missed the court-ordered deadline for expert disclosures under Rule 16 but provided the DNA evidence report to the defense as soon as it was available. The district court found the government negligent but not in bad faith and offered the defendant a continuance, which he declined in favor of a one-day delay before trial. The jury convicted the defendant, and the court imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 78 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion by allowing the DNA evidence despite the late disclosure and whether the sentence was substantively unreasonable. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence with a continuance, nor was the sentence unreasonable. The court affirmed the conviction and sentence in all respects. View "United States v. Aryeetey" on Justia Law

Safdieh v. Comm'r

2026-02-27T07:00:06-08:00

The case involves an individual who was assessed $50,000 in penalties by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for failing to report control of a foreign business during the tax years 2005 through 2009, as required by section 6038 of the Internal Revenue Code. The penalties were $10,000 for each year of the alleged reporting violation. When the individual did not pay, the IRS filed a notice of federal tax lien, which the taxpayer challenged through a Collection Due Process hearing before the IRS Independent Office of Appeals. After that challenge was unsuccessful, the taxpayer petitioned the United States Tax Court for relief. The United States Tax Court granted summary judgment in favor of the taxpayer. The Tax Court concluded that Congress had not granted the Commissioner statutory authority to collect the section 6038(b) penalty through administrative assessment, which is the process the IRS typically uses to record tax liabilities and activate collection powers such as liens and levies. The Tax Court ruled that, instead, the Commissioner would have to bring a lawsuit in federal district court to collect this penalty. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case on appeal. The Second Circuit disagreed with the Tax Court’s interpretation and held that the Commissioner does have authority to assess penalties under section 6038(b) through the administrative process. The appellate court found that the history, purpose, and structure of the statute support the conclusion that the penalty is assessable, and that requiring the Commissioner to proceed only through district court would complicate and frustrate congressional intent. Accordingly, the Second Circuit vacated the Tax Court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Safdieh v. Comm'r" on Justia Law

United States v. Jimenez

2026-02-25T07:00:05-08:00

In January 2020, William Jimenez sold fentanyl-laced heroin to an undercover New York City police detective, arranging the transactions by phone. During the same period, Jimenez shot another individual and was arrested soon after. A search revealed drugs and ammunition in his possession and vehicle. He was indicted on several counts, including possessing ammunition after a felony conviction, firearm discharge related to drug trafficking, and multiple counts of distributing controlled substances. Jimenez ultimately pled guilty to possessing ammunition after a felony conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), pursuant to a plea agreement that included an appeal waiver for sentences within a stipulated Guidelines range. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York sentenced Jimenez to 105 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release, imposing seven special conditions, three of which he later challenged. On a prior appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated and remanded the case, requiring the District Court to provide individualized justifications for the challenged special conditions. On remand, the District Court reimposed the conditions with further explanation. Jimenez appealed again, contesting the special conditions and seeking resentencing based on a change in the law affecting his Guidelines calculation. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. It held that the special conditions—electronic device searches, community service requirements during unemployment, and outpatient mental health counseling—were procedurally and substantively reasonable, supported by the record, and tailored to Jimenez’s history and circumstances. The Court also held that Jimenez’s appeal waiver barred his challenge to the term of imprisonment, even in light of an intervening change in the law. The judgment of the District Court was therefore affirmed. View "United States v. Jimenez" on Justia Law

Broadcast Music, Inc. v. North American Concert Promoters Association

2026-02-24T08:00:05-08:00

A major music performing rights organization, which licenses the public performance of musical works to concert promoters, was unable to reach agreement with a national association of concert promoters on the rates and revenue base for blanket licenses covering live performances. For the first time in their relationship, the rights organization petitioned the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to set the licensing terms, as permitted under an antitrust consent decree applicable to the organization due to its significant market share. The promoters’ association, whose members include the two largest concert promoters in the United States, has historically secured blanket licenses from multiple performing rights organizations to avoid copyright infringement. The district court accepted the organization’s proposed rates for a retroactive period and set a new, higher rate for a more recent period. It also broadened the definition of “gross revenues” for calculating royalties, including new categories such as revenues from ticket service fees, VIP packages, and box suites, which had not traditionally been included. The promoters’ association appealed these decisions, arguing that both the rates and the expanded revenue base were unreasonable. The rights organization cross-appealed the denial of prejudgment interest on retroactive payments. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions. It held that the district court imposed unreasonable rates, in part because it adopted an unprecedented and administratively burdensome revenue base without justification and relied too heavily on benchmark agreements that were not sufficiently comparable to prior agreements with the association. The court also found no economic changes justifying a significant rate increase. While it found no abuse of discretion in denying prejudgment interest, it vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Broadcast Music, Inc. v. North American Concert Promoters Association" on Justia Law

In Re: Ex Parte Application of SBK ART LLC

2026-02-20T07:00:07-08:00

SBK ART LLC, a special purpose vehicle formerly owned by Sberbank and holding a substantial interest in a Croatian company called Fortenova Grupa, became subject to international sanctions after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Following Sberbank’s sale of SBK to an Emirati investor, Fortenova continued to treat SBK as a sanctioned entity, citing uncertainty about the change of control. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, acting as Fortenova’s counsel, issued a memorandum (the “Akin Opinion”) questioning the legitimacy of the sale and compliance with EU sanctions. This opinion was allegedly shared with the EU Council, which imposed sanctions on SBK. Subsequently, SBK was excluded from corporate governance decisions and lost its interest in Fortenova, prompting SBK to initiate litigation in the General Court of the European Union and the Civil Court of Malta, and to contemplate further proceedings in the Netherlands. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, after referral to a Magistrate Judge, granted SBK’s petition under 28 U.S.C. §1782 for discovery from Akin, but limited it to non-privileged materials relating to the sale, the Akin Opinion, and governance changes, within a defined timeframe. The District Judge adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendations, overruling Akin’s objections, particularly those based on the Second Circuit’s prior decision in Kiobel by Samkalden v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed whether the District Court abused its discretion by granting discovery from Akin even though the documents sought were not discoverable from Akin’s client in the relevant foreign jurisdictions. The Second Circuit held that Section 1782 does not impose a foreign-discoverability requirement, distinguishing Kiobel and affirming the District Court’s order. Any objections regarding privilege or undue burden must be resolved under ordinary discovery rules. The District Court’s order was affirmed. View "In Re: Ex Parte Application of SBK ART LLC" on Justia Law

CFHC v. CoreLogic Rental Prop. Sols.

2026-02-20T07:00:06-08:00

A mother and the Connecticut Fair Housing Center sued a company that provides tenant screening reports, alleging that its practices contributed to the denial of a housing application for the mother’s disabled son. The apartment manager used the defendant’s screening platform to review applicants’ criminal histories, and the son’s application was denied based on a flagged shoplifting charge. The mother later had the charge dismissed. She also sought a copy of her son’s screening report from the defendant, but was told she needed to provide a power of attorney. She instead submitted documentation of her conservatorship, but the defendant rejected it as facially invalid due to a missing court seal. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut held a bench trial. It found that the Fair Housing Act (FHA) did not apply to the defendant because it was not the decision-maker on housing applications; only the housing provider made those determinations. The district court also found the defendant’s requirement for a valid conservatorship certificate reasonable and not discriminatory toward handicapped individuals. However, the district court found the defendant liable under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) for a period when it insisted on a power of attorney, making it impossible for the mother to obtain her son’s consumer file. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that the Connecticut Fair Housing Center lacked standing because its diversion of resources to address the defendant’s actions did not constitute a concrete injury. The court also held that, although the FHA does not exclude certain defendants, the defendant here was not the proximate cause of the housing denial, and the mother failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate-impact discrimination. Furthermore, because she never provided a facially valid conservatorship certificate, she could not show that the defendant’s documentation requirements prevented her from obtaining the report. The court vacated, affirmed, and reversed in part, dismissing the Center’s claims, affirming no FHA liability, and reversing FCRA liability. View "CFHC v. CoreLogic Rental Prop. Sols." on Justia Law

Mar-Can Transp. Co. v. Loc. 854 Pension Fund

2026-02-18T08:00:06-08:00

In this case, a school bus company’s employees voted in 2020 to change their union representation, shifting from a Teamsters local to an Amalgamated Transit Workers local. As a result, the company was required under federal law to withdraw from the multiemployer pension plan affiliated with the old union and begin contributing to a new plan aligned with the new union. This withdrawal triggered several obligations under ERISA, including the company’s duty to pay “withdrawal liability” to the old plan and the old plan’s obligation to transfer certain assets and liabilities to the new plan relating to the employees who switched unions. After the old pension fund assessed withdrawal liability of approximately $1.8 million, the company argued that, under 29 U.S.C. § 1415(c), this liability should be reduced by the difference between the liabilities and assets transferred to the new plan. The old plan disagreed, interpreting the statute differently and contending that no reduction should occur. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment to the company, holding that the statute required a $1.8 million reduction in withdrawal liability. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the District Court’s interpretation of the statute de novo. The Second Circuit found that the phrase “unfunded vested benefits” in Section 1415(c) is ambiguous, but, after examining the statute’s structure and purpose, concluded that the District Court’s interpretation was correct. The court held that “unfunded vested benefits allocable to the employer” under Section 1415(c) refers to the entire amount of liabilities transferred to the new plan, not reduced by transferred assets. As a result, the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment, approving the $1.8 million withdrawal liability reduction and dismissing the company’s cross-appeal as moot. View "Mar-Can Transp. Co. v. Loc. 854 Pension Fund" on Justia Law

U.S. v. Cardenas

2026-02-18T08:00:05-08:00

A patrol-level police officer in Colombia was convicted after a jury trial of conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States. The officer did not dispute that he participated in communications about a proposed cocaine export scheme, but argued that he lacked criminal intent because he believed he was assisting the Colombian National Police in arranging a seizure of the cocaine, rather than joining a drug-trafficking conspiracy. His defense at trial centered on his understanding that he was participating in an anti-narcotics operation and not an illegal export scheme. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presided over the jury trial. The prosecution presented evidence of the officer’s participation in meetings and communications with a DEA informant posing as a drug trafficker. The defense sought to introduce evidence that the officer’s colleague, who recruited him into the scheme, had previously assisted the Colombian National Police's anti-narcotics unit in successful drug seizures. The district court excluded this evidence, accepting the government’s argument that it constituted impermissible propensity evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). The officer was convicted and sentenced to 165 months in prison, followed by five years of supervised release. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the district court erred in excluding the challenged evidence. The appellate court found the evidence relevant to corroborate the officer’s account of conversations with his colleague, directly impacting his state of mind, and determined that it was not barred by Rule 404(b). The court further held that the exclusion was not harmless, as the officer’s defense turned on criminal intent and the evidence could have affected the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, the Second Circuit vacated the conviction and remanded for further proceedings. View "U.S. v. Cardenas" on Justia Law

Reidy Contracting Group, LLC v. Mt. Hawley Insurance Company

2026-02-12T08:00:05-08:00

A ceiling collapse at a construction site in New York injured three employees of a subcontractor, Vanquish Contracting Corporation. The general contractor, Reidy Contracting Group, LLC, had required Vanquish to procure insurance coverage that would protect Reidy as an additional insured. Vanquish obtained an excess liability policy from Mt. Hawley Insurance Company, which incorporated the terms of an underlying policy issued by Endurance American Specialty Insurance Company. After the accident, the injured Vanquish employees sued Reidy. Reidy sought defense and indemnification from Mt. Hawley, but Mt. Hawley denied coverage, arguing that Reidy was not an additional insured and that the Employers Liability Exclusion in the policy barred coverage. The United States District Court for the Western District of New York reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court found that Reidy was an additional insured under the policy and that the Employers Liability Exclusion did not bar coverage. The court reasoned that, based on the policy’s language and the Separation of Insureds clause, “the insured” in the exclusion referred to the party seeking coverage—here, Reidy, which did not employ the injured workers. Alternatively, the court found the exclusion ambiguous and construed it against Mt. Hawley as the drafter. The court also held that Mt. Hawley was precluded from contesting Reidy’s status as an additional insured because it failed to timely raise this argument as required by New York law. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Reidy qualifies as an additional insured and that the Employers Liability Exclusion is ambiguous; thus, the ambiguity must be resolved in favor of coverage for Reidy. The judgment granting summary judgment to Reidy and Merchants Mutual Insurance Company was affirmed. View "Reidy Contracting Group, LLC v. Mt. Hawley Insurance Company" on Justia Law

McGucken v. Shutterstock, Inc.

2026-02-10T07:30:05-08:00

A professional photographer discovered that between 2018 and 2022, hundreds of his photographs were uploaded to an online stock photo platform operated by a large digital content marketplace, without his permission. Three contributors to the platform were responsible for uploading these images, and the platform subsequently licensed many of them to customers, generating revenue shared with the uploaders. After being notified by the photographer’s attorney, the platform removed the images and terminated the contributor accounts, but the photographer filed suit alleging both copyright infringement and violations related to the removal and alteration of copyright management information (CMI). The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment to the platform on all claims. The court concluded that the platform qualified for safe harbor immunity under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) for the copyright infringement claims. For the CMI claims, the court found that the photographer failed to present evidence of the platform's required scienter (knowledge or intent) to sustain a violation under 17 U.S.C. § 1202. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision regarding the CMI claims, agreeing that there was no evidence the platform acted with the necessary scienter under § 1202(a) or (b). However, the appellate court vacated the grant of summary judgment on the copyright infringement claims. It held that factual disputes remained as to whether the infringing activity occurred “by reason of the storage at the direction of a user” and whether the platform had the “right and ability to control” the infringing activity, both critical to safe harbor eligibility under the DMCA. The case was remanded for further proceedings on these factual questions. View "McGucken v. Shutterstock, Inc." on Justia Law

Lanesborough 2000, LLC v. Nextres, LLC

2026-02-06T09:00:22-08:00

Lanesborough 2000, LLC and Nextres, LLC entered into a loan agreement for the funding of a self-storage facility in Corning, New York. The deal included an arbitration agreement that required disputes to be resolved by binding arbitration. Lanesborough alleged that Nextres breached the agreement by failing to disburse loan funds as promised. An arbitrator found in favor of Lanesborough, awarding consequential damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees based on Nextres’s bad faith conduct. The arbitration agreement contained a waiver of the “right to appeal,” but did not specify its scope. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York partially confirmed the arbitrator’s awards. It confirmed the awards of consequential damages, declaratory relief, and attorney’s fees, finding that the fee award was permissible because it was based on a finding of bad faith. The District Court also granted Lanesborough’s requests for injunctive relief by ordering Nextres to comply with the loan agreement and enjoining Nextres from pursuing foreclosure actions, including a pending state court foreclosure against a related party. The District Court awarded Lanesborough post-award prejudgment interest and stayed enforcement of its judgment pending appeal. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit first held that the parties’ contractual waiver of the “right to appeal” was ambiguous and not sufficiently clear or unequivocal to preclude appellate review. On the merits, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s confirmation of the arbitrator’s awards and its grant of post-award prejudgment interest. However, it vacated the district court’s injunction barring the state-court foreclosure action because the lower court had not considered whether the injunction was consistent with the Anti-Injunction Act. The case was remanded for further proceedings on that issue. View "Lanesborough 2000, LLC v. Nextres, LLC" on Justia Law

Care One, LLC v. NLRB

2026-02-05T08:00:08-08:00

Several health care facilities and their affiliates faced administrative complaints from the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in 2012 for alleged unfair labor practices. The proceedings were assigned to Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Kenneth Chu, who developed the factual record over multiple hearings. During this period, the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Noel Canning invalidated certain NLRB Board appointments, calling into question ALJ Chu’s own appointment. The Board later “ratified” prior actions, including Chu’s appointment, after regaining a lawful quorum. Administrative proceedings were delayed for several years due to interlocutory appeals and COVID-19, and ultimately resumed in 2023. Shortly before resumption, the plaintiffs sought to halt the proceedings, arguing the ALJ was unlawfully appointed and protected from removal in a manner unconstitutional under the separation of powers. The plaintiffs initially sought relief in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, which denied a temporary restraining order and transferred the case to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. There, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, again raising constitutional arguments regarding the ALJ’s appointment and removal protections. The District of Connecticut denied the injunction, finding the plaintiffs had not shown a clear likelihood of success on the merits. Proceedings before ALJ Chu concluded in May 2024, after which Chu retired and the NLRB Board assumed de novo review of the case. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the appeal. It assumed jurisdiction but declined to address the likelihood of success on the merits, instead affirming the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction on the ground that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate irreparable harm. The court held that, because all proceedings before the challenged ALJ had concluded and the Board (now lawfully constituted) would conduct de novo review, there was no risk of irreparable injury warranting injunctive relief. The order was affirmed. View "Care One, LLC v. NLRB" on Justia Law

United States v. Woods

2026-02-05T08:00:07-08:00

In January 2023, Jones J. Woods was charged with depredation against federal property after throwing rocks at windows of the United States Attorney’s Office in Buffalo, New York. Woods exhibited erratic behavior during court appearances in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York, prompting a psychiatric evaluation. In June 2023, the court found him incompetent to stand trial and ordered hospitalization for up to four months to determine if competency could be restored. After delays, Woods was hospitalized in January 2024, but after four months, he remained in custody at FMC Devens. In August 2024, following an evaluation, a Magistrate Judge found no substantial probability Woods would be restored to competency and ordered an additional 45 days of hospitalization, also directing an evaluation of dangerousness. Woods appealed the Magistrate Judge’s order to the United States District Court for the Western District of New York, which affirmed the order in September 2024. Meanwhile, the government filed a certificate of dangerousness, staying Woods’s release and initiating civil commitment proceedings in the District of Massachusetts. Woods challenged the validity of the extension of his hospitalization, arguing the district court lacked authority under the relevant statutes once the initial four-month period had expired and no restoration of competency was likely. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Woods’s appeal was moot as to the dangerousness evaluation, since it had been completed and relief was not available. However, the appeal was not moot regarding the 45-day extension of hospitalization, as vacatur could affect ongoing civil commitment proceedings. On the merits, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s authority under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(2)(B) to order continued custodial hospitalization for a reasonable period after the initial four months if charges were not yet disposed of, even when restoration of competency was deemed unlikely. The remainder of Woods’s appeal was dismissed as moot. View "United States v. Woods" on Justia Law

Duke v. Luxottica U.S. Holdings Corp.

2026-02-05T08:00:05-08:00

Janet Duke, after retiring from Luxottica U.S. Holdings Corp., elected to receive pension benefits through a joint and survivor annuity (JSA), calculated using actuarial assumptions set by her employer’s defined benefit pension plan. Duke alleged that her plan used outdated assumptions—specifically, a 7% interest rate and life expectancy tables from 1971—to convert single life annuities (SLA) into JSA benefits, resulting in lower monthly payments for her and similarly situated retirees. She claimed this systematic practice violated ERISA’s requirements for actuarial equivalence and compliance, thereby potentially harming the plan’s participants and the plan itself. In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Duke filed a putative class action seeking relief under ERISA Sections 502(a)(2) and 502(a)(3), including plan reformation and monetary repayments to the plan. The district court initially found Duke lacked standing for Section 502(a)(2) claims but later reversed itself and held that she did have standing for both plan reformation and monetary payments. The court compelled individual arbitration of her Section 502(a)(3) claims under a dispute resolution agreement but held that the “effective vindication” doctrine prevented mandatory arbitration of her Section 502(a)(2) claims. Defendants’ motion for a mandatory stay of litigation pending arbitration was denied. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings. It held that Duke has Article III standing to pursue plan reformation under Section 502(a)(2) because her alleged injury—reduced benefits due to outdated assumptions—could be redressed by reformation of the plan. However, Duke lacks standing to seek monetary payments to the plan, as such relief would not redress any personal injury she suffered. The Second Circuit also held that the effective vindication doctrine precludes mandatory individual arbitration of her Section 502(a)(2) claim and affirmed the district court’s discretionary denial of a mandatory stay. The order was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Duke v. Luxottica U.S. Holdings Corp." on Justia Law

United States v. Boria

2026-02-04T08:00:06-08:00

Steve Boria was indicted for leading a gang involved in distributing narcotics and committing violent acts. He distributed crack cocaine and was involved in a firearm discharge. After most co-defendants pleaded guilty, Boria opted to plead guilty as well. On the night before his plea hearing, he took medications for sleeping problems and bipolar disorder. During the plea colloquy before the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the magistrate judge inquired about his medication use, confirmed he felt clearheaded, and verified his understanding of the proceedings. Both defense counsel and the government had no objections to Boria’s competence. Boria responded cogently to the court’s questions and the court found his plea voluntary and knowing, subsequently sentencing him to fifteen years. Boria’s counsel failed to file a timely notice of appeal after sentencing. The district court found this constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, vacated the judgment, and re-entered it to allow Boria to appeal. Boria then timely appealed the amended judgment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not violate Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 or Boria’s constitutional rights. The appellate court found the district court’s inquiry sufficient to ensure Boria’s understanding and voluntariness of the plea, as Boria’s conduct during the hearing raised no concerns regarding his competency. Additionally, the Second Circuit determined that Boria failed to show plain error, as there was no reasonable probability he would not have pleaded guilty but for the alleged procedural error. Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Boria" on Justia Law

GEICO v. Patel

2026-02-03T11:42:44-08:00

GEICO and its subsidiaries brought a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against Dr. Bhargav Patel and his medical practice, alleging that the defendants engaged in a scheme to defraud GEICO by manipulating New York’s no-fault automobile insurance system. GEICO claimed that from 2019 to 2023, defendants submitted approximately $3.4 million in reimbursement claims for treatments that were unnecessary, experimental, excessive, illusory, or not provided at all. These claims allegedly resulted from a fraudulent scheme involving kickbacks for patient referrals and the provision of services by unlicensed individuals or contractors. After GEICO initiated its federal action, the defendants responded by filing over 600 collection actions in New York state courts and arbitration tribunals, seeking recovery for disputed or denied claims totaling more than $2 million. GEICO, facing the prospect of fragmented litigation and the risk of inconsistent judgments, sought a preliminary injunction from the district court to stay all pending state and arbitration proceedings and to prevent the defendants from filing new collection actions until the federal court resolved the RICO claims. The district court granted the injunction, finding that GEICO had demonstrated irreparable harm, serious questions going to the merits, and a balance of hardships tipping in GEICO’s favor. The court also determined it had authority under the “in aid of jurisdiction” exception to the Anti-Injunction Act to enjoin the parallel proceedings. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion and found none. The appellate court held that the preliminary injunction was justified by the real risk of irreparable harm to GEICO posed by inconsistent judgments and the inability to fully adjudicate the alleged fraudulent scheme in piecemeal state actions. The Second Circuit further held, consistent with its recent precedent in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Tri-Borough NY Medical Practice, P.C., that the injunction did not violate the Anti-Injunction Act because it was expressly authorized under RICO. The court affirmed the district court’s order. View "GEICO v. Patel" on Justia Law

Nat'l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Universal Smart Conts., LLC

2026-02-03T11:42:44-08:00

An employee of a New York City tour company was terminated in 2012, allegedly for attempting to unionize. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) began investigating the termination, and in 2013, its adjudicative body found the discharge violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), ordering the company to reinstate the employee and compensate him for lost earnings. After a brief reinstatement and a second termination, further proceedings led to a backpay judgment against the company and several affiliates, including some of the current appellants. When the judgment debtors failed to pay, the NLRB issued administrative subpoenas seeking documents to determine whether the appellants could be held liable for the judgment. The appellants did not comply with these subpoenas. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed the NLRB’s application to enforce the subpoenas. The court rejected the appellants’ arguments concerning lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and improper venue, holding that the NLRA authorized nationwide service of process and that the inquiry was conducted in the Southern District of New York. The court denied the appellants’ motion to transfer the case to the Southern District of Texas and awarded attorneys’ fees and costs to the NLRB, later specifying the amount. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the district court had subject-matter and personal jurisdiction to enforce the subpoenas, and that venue was proper. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to transfer the case or by awarding fees and costs based on the appellants’ repeated evasion of service and failure to comply. However, the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s subsequent order fixing the amount of fees and costs, as no timely notice of appeal was filed for that order. The judgment was thus affirmed in part and dismissed in part. View "Nat'l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Universal Smart Conts., LLC" on Justia Law

B.B. v. Hochul

2026-02-02T07:30:03-08:00

Fourteen children who were removed from their biological parents by New York City officials are the plaintiffs in this case. After their removal, relatives sought certification to become foster or adoptive parents for these children, but their applications were denied due to criminal history or reports of child abuse or mistreatment. The children allege that New York’s certification scheme violates their substantive due process rights to family integrity and freedom from harm, and that procedural due process was violated because they were not given notice or an opportunity to challenge the denial of a relative’s application. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the complaint. It ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing, reasoning that most of the children did not have a cognizable injury since they were living with relatives, and others could not trace their separation from relatives to the defendants. The district court also found that the plaintiffs were asserting the rights of third-party relatives rather than their own, and that prudential standing barred their claims. The court did not address the procedural due process claims directly. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs have standing to pursue both substantive and procedural due process claims. The court found that denial of certified placement with a relative constituted a concrete and particularized injury, traceable to the defendants, and redressable by a favorable ruling. The court also determined that the plaintiffs were asserting their own rights, not those of their relatives, and rejected the district court’s prudential standing analysis. However, some claims were deemed moot: two plaintiffs are now in the care of a relative foster parent and another has aged out of foster care. Only one plaintiff has standing to challenge the adoption certification rules. The Second Circuit reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "B.B. v. Hochul" on Justia Law

Matusak v. Daminski

2026-01-29T07:30:03-08:00

On February 1, 2018, Christopher Matusak was arrested in Scottsville, New York, after fleeing from police. Deputies from the Monroe County Sheriff’s Office, including Matthew Daminski, Stephen Murphy, and Sergeant Brian Unterborn, apprehended him using various forms of force, such as fist and knee strikes, pepper spray, and a taser, before handcuffing him. Matusak sustained injuries requiring hospitalization. He subsequently filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the deputies violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by using excessive force during his arrest. The United States District Court for the Western District of New York presided over a jury trial. The jury determined that Deputy Daminski did not use excessive force, but found that Murphy and Unterborn did, awarding Matusak $200,000 in compensatory damages. However, the jury also found that, although Matusak did not actually pose a threat to officer safety, Murphy and Unterborn reasonably believed he did, and that Matusak was resisting their attempts to handcuff him. Based on the jury’s special verdicts, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law to Murphy and Unterborn, holding that they were entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established that their conduct was unlawful under the circumstances. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Murphy and Unterborn were entitled to qualified immunity, reasoning that no clearly established law prohibited the use of significant force against an arrestee who was resisting and whom the officers reasonably, though mistakenly, believed posed a threat to officer safety. As it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe their actions were lawful, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Matusak v. Daminski" on Justia Law

United States v. McAdam

2026-01-28T07:30:03-08:00

The defendant pleaded guilty to traveling with the intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct, specifically traveling from Vermont to New York to have sexual intercourse with someone he believed to be a 15-year-old girl. The case involved extensive online communications, with the defendant sending explicit images and discussing plans that included showing pornography to the minor. At sentencing, the district court imposed fifteen years of supervised release with various standard and special conditions, some of which were not explicitly discussed or justified at the sentencing hearing. Following his conviction in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, the defendant appealed four discretionary conditions of supervised release. Two of these conditions (providing financial information to probation and submitting to suspicion-based searches), were added as “standard conditions” under a local standing order (General Order #23), but were not discussed in the presentence report or at the hearing. The remaining two challenged conditions prohibited access to adult pornography and imposed strict internet monitoring, including a provision allowing probation to limit the defendant to one internet-capable device. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the district court erred by imposing the financial disclosure and suspicion-based search conditions without making an individualized assessment or providing reasons for their necessity, as required for special conditions of supervised release. These conditions were therefore vacated. The court affirmed the prohibitions on access to pornography and the general internet monitoring condition, but struck the provision allowing the probation office to limit the defendant to a single device, as this constituted an improper delegation of judicial authority. The case was remanded to the District of Vermont, which now has jurisdiction, for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "United States v. McAdam" on Justia Law

United States v. Bulloch

2026-01-27T08:00:06-08:00

During the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, an individual orchestrated a scheme to acquire large quantities of personal protective equipment (PPE), specifically masks, using investor funds. The purpose was to resell these materials at a markup, capitalizing on shortages and increased demand. The defendant managed the financial transactions, facilitated agreements with buyers (including an undercover FBI agent), and arranged for proceeds to be distributed among the participants. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York presided over the jury trial, where the defendant was convicted of conspiring to violate the Defense Production Act by accumulating designated scarce materials for resale above prevailing market prices. The defendant objected to the jury instruction defining "accumulate," arguing it should mean "to gather, collect, or accrue over a period of time," and moved to dismiss the charges on grounds of statutory vagueness, but the Magistrate Judge denied these motions. Upon appeal, the District Judge affirmed the conviction, holding that the statute was unambiguous and that "accumulate" did not require a temporal element. On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered whether the term "accumulate" as used in Section 4512 of the Defense Production Act requires the government to prove that accumulation occurred over a period of time or involved withholding materials from the market. The court held that "accumulate" must be interpreted in accordance with its ordinary meaning—“to gather, collect, or accrue”—and does not require a prolonged period or withholding. The statutory text was found unambiguous, and the court rejected the defendant’s proposed interpretation and vagueness challenge. Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment of conviction. View "United States v. Bulloch" on Justia Law

Lettieri v. Town of Colesville

2026-01-21T08:00:07-08:00

The individual in this case is a litigant who had previously been subject to a filing sanction by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The sanction required that, before submitting any future appeal or other proceedings in that court, the individual must first obtain leave of the court to file such materials. The current matter involved the individual’s attempt to initiate further proceedings related to a case involving a municipality. Previously, the United States District Court for the Western District of New York had been involved in the underlying litigation. Following actions in that court, the matter was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Subsequently, the Second Circuit imposed a leave-to-file sanction on the individual due to his filing history. After this sanction was imposed, the individual attempted to file a motion to recall the mandate in his ongoing case without first obtaining leave from the court, as required by the sanction order. Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit clarified that its prior leave-to-file sanction applies broadly. This includes not only new cases but also filings in ongoing and previously filed cases. The court denied the individual’s motion for leave to file and found the motion to recall the mandate moot. The main holding is that a litigant subject to a leave-to-file sanction must obtain permission from the court before submitting any new filings in any case, including those initiated before the sanction was imposed. View "Lettieri v. Town of Colesville" on Justia Law

United States v. Belloisi

2026-01-16T07:30:06-08:00

Customs officers at JFK Airport conducted a random search of an aircraft arriving from Jamaica and discovered ten packages of cocaine hidden in the avionics compartment. After removing the drugs, officers replaced them with four “sham bricks,” one containing a transponder to signal movement. Paul Belloisi, an aircraft mechanic, drove to the plane in a maintenance vehicle, entered the avionics compartment, triggered the transponder, and exited empty-handed. Evidence at trial showed Belloisi was not assigned to the plane, possessed a jacket lined with slits likely for smuggling small items, and had suspicious communications with an individual named “Lester.” Belloisi claimed he was attempting to fix the air conditioning, but other testimony contradicted this account. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York presided over Belloisi’s jury trial, where he was convicted of conspiracy to possess a controlled substance with intent to distribute, conspiracy to import a controlled substance, and importation of a controlled substance. The trial court denied his post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal and sentenced him to 108 months in prison. Belloisi appealed, contending the evidence was insufficient to show he knew the smuggled items were controlled substances rather than other contraband. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case under the standard that a conviction must be supported by evidence sufficient for a rational juror to find each element beyond a reasonable doubt. The Second Circuit held that the government failed to prove that Belloisi possessed knowledge that the items in the compartment were controlled substances, rather than other contraband. Accordingly, the court reversed the convictions and remanded the case for entry of a judgment of acquittal. View "United States v. Belloisi" on Justia Law

Yerkyn v. Yakovlevich

2026-01-16T07:30:05-08:00

A businessman from Kazakhstan alleged that he was wrongfully detained and psychologically coerced by the country’s National Security Committee into signing unfavorable business agreements, including waivers of legal claims and a forced transfer of valuable company shares. The business at issue, CAPEC, operated in Kazakhstan’s energy sector and held significant assets, some of which were allegedly misappropriated by fellow shareholders and transferred through U.S. financial institutions. The plaintiff claimed these actions harmed him economically, including the loss of potential U.S.-based legal claims. Following unsuccessful litigation in Kazakhstan, the plaintiff initiated suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, seeking to invalidate the coerced agreements and recover damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), the Alien Tort Statute, and other state and federal laws. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that the plaintiff, as a permanent resident alien, could not establish diversity jurisdiction against foreign defendants, that the alleged torts occurred outside the U.S., and that the plaintiff failed to allege a domestic injury required for civil RICO claims. The court denied leave to amend, determining that any amendment would be futile. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the matter de novo, affirming the district court’s judgment. The Second Circuit held that claims against the National Security Committee were barred by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, as its conduct was sovereign rather than commercial. For the individual defendants, the court found that the plaintiff failed to allege a domestic injury under RICO, as the harm and racketeering activity occurred primarily in Kazakhstan. The court further concluded that amendment of the complaint would have been futile. The judgment was affirmed. View "Yerkyn v. Yakovlevich" on Justia Law

Alta Partners, LLC v. Getty Images Holdings, Inc.

2026-01-15T07:30:04-08:00

Getty Images Holdings, Inc. became a publicly traded company after merging with CC Neuberger Principal Holdings II, a special purpose acquisition company. Alta Partners, LLC and CRCM Institutional Master Fund (BVI) Ltd., along with CRCM SPAC Opportunity Fund LP, acquired warrants to purchase Getty stock. The warrants’ exercise was governed by a warrant agreement requiring both an effective registration statement and a current prospectus for the underlying shares. After the merger, Getty filed two relevant registration statements: a Form S-4 and a Form S-1. Alta and CRCM attempted to exercise their warrants in August 2022, when Getty’s stock price was significantly higher than the warrant strike price, but Getty refused, claiming the contractual conditions for exercise were unmet. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed breach of contract claims brought by Alta and CRCM. The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, finding as a matter of law that the conditions of the warrant agreement had been satisfied. Specifically, it held the Form S-4 was an effective registration statement for the warrant shares and the accompanying prospectus was current at the time the plaintiffs attempted to exercise their warrants. The court awarded damages based on the stock price at the time of the breach but limited Alta’s recovery, denying damages for warrants purchased after Getty’s refusal to honor the redemption. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that Getty breached the warrant agreement because the required registration statement and prospectus conditions were met on the relevant dates. The court concluded that damages should be calculated using the market price of the shares at the time of breach and upheld the limitation on Alta’s damages for post-breach warrant purchases. The affirmance applies to all aspects of the district court’s rulings challenged on appeal. View "Alta Partners, LLC v. Getty Images Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

United States v. Harris

2026-01-14T08:00:05-08:00

Federal law enforcement agents investigated the defendant after he sold crack cocaine to a confidential informant in three controlled buys in Suffolk County, New York. Based on these transactions, agents executed a search warrant at his residence and seized drugs, firearms, packaging materials, and cash. The defendant pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York to possession with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, and possession of firearms in connection with drug trafficking. At sentencing, the district court considered the defendant’s background and criminal history and imposed a sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release. The court orally pronounced certain mandatory and special conditions of supervised release, but did not recite or specifically incorporate by reference the full set of standard conditions recommended by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines or the Probation Department. The written judgment included thirteen standard conditions and several special conditions, some of which expanded on or added new requirements not mentioned orally. Nearly three years after judgment, the defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal. Although the appeal was untimely under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b), the government did not timely raise the issue, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined the objection was forfeited. The court reviewed the merits of the appeal and held that the district court erred by imposing the standard conditions and certain special conditions without proper oral pronouncement or clear judicial determination. The Second Circuit remanded the case with instructions to vacate the thirteen standard conditions and three special conditions (mental health treatment, substance abuse treatment, and search condition), allowing the district court to conduct further proceedings and potentially reimpose these conditions in compliance with procedural requirements. The judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

United States v. Saab

2026-01-14T07:00:05-08:00

The defendant was born and raised in Lebanon and was recruited into Hizballah, a designated foreign terrorist organization, in 1996. He received various forms of military-type training, including weapons, explosives, and surveillance, and participated in operations against Israeli targets. After moving to the United States in 2000, he continued his involvement with Hizballah by traveling back to Lebanon for further training and assignments. In 2004 and 2005, he received advanced explosives and surveillance training, including field exercises and site surveillance in Istanbul and New York City, where he documented potential targets for Hizballah. His activities with Hizballah ceased in spring 2005. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York indicted the defendant in 2019 on multiple counts, including receiving military-type training from Hizballah (Count Three). After a jury trial, he was found guilty on Count Three and two other counts, and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment for Count Three, with a sentencing enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines for terrorism-related offenses. Neither the parties nor the district court recognized that the relevant statute (18 U.S.C. § 2339D) was enacted in December 2004, or that certain enhancements and waivers only applied to post-March 2006 conduct. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that although the district court erred by not instructing the jury to consider only post-enactment conduct, there was no reasonable probability the jury would have acquitted due to substantial evidence of post-enactment conduct. The court also concluded that the retroactive application of the statute of limitations waiver was permissible because the original limitation period had not expired. However, the court vacated the sentence, finding plain error in the application of the terrorism enhancement and remanded for resentencing. The convictions were affirmed, but the sentence was vacated and remanded. View "United States v. Saab" on Justia Law

United States of America v. Reyes

2026-01-07T07:00:06-08:00

Juan and Catherine Reyes, both United States citizens, maintained a jointly-held foreign bank account in Switzerland that contained over two million dollars, representing the majority of their assets and a significant source of their income. Despite being asked by both their accountant and the IRS about foreign accounts, the Reyeses did not disclose their interest in the account on tax forms for 2010, 2011, and 2012, nor did they file the required Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR). After the IRS discovered the omission and assessed civil penalties for willful failure to file FBARs for those years, the Reyeses did not pay, resulting in the United States initiating suit to convert those penalties into a money judgment. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the United States, finding that the Reyeses' conduct was at least reckless and therefore "willful" under 31 U.S.C. § 5321. The court imposed enhanced penalties and also applied a six percent late payment penalty under 31 U.S.C. § 3717(e)(2) and relevant Treasury regulations. The Reyeses contested both the determination of willfulness and the application of the late payment penalty, arguing that recklessness should not suffice for willfulness and that the penalty rate should be discretionary. Reviewing the case de novo, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that "willful" as used in 31 U.S.C. § 5321 encompasses reckless conduct, aligning its interpretation with that of other circuits and Supreme Court precedent. It further determined that the undisputed evidence established the Reyeses acted recklessly and that summary judgment was appropriate. The appellate court also concluded that the six percent late payment penalty imposed by the district court was mandatory under controlling Treasury Department regulations. The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court in all respects. View "United States of America v. Reyes" on Justia Law

J.M. v. Sessions

2025-12-23T07:30:05-08:00

C.B., a 34-year-old man with developmental and psychiatric disabilities, died while residing at the Valley Ridge Center for Intensive Treatment, a secure state-run facility operated by the New York State Office for People with Developmental Disabilities. Although C.B. was admitted voluntarily, the facility imposed substantial restrictions on his liberty, including limits on leaving the premises and accessing medical care. In the days leading up to his death from cardiomyopathy, C.B. exhibited clear symptoms of heart failure and repeatedly asked staff for help, but his pleas were allegedly ignored or inadequately addressed by his caretakers. J.M., C.B.’s mother and administrator of his estate, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, alleging violations of C.B.’s substantive due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state law claims for negligence and medical malpractice. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the federal claim, holding that C.B., as a voluntarily admitted resident, had no constitutional right to adequate medical care, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The court also denied J.M.’s motion to amend her complaint to add a new defendant, finding lack of diligence. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that C.B. was entitled to substantive due process protections regardless of his voluntary admission status. The court clarified that when the state exercises sufficient control over a resident’s life such that the individual cannot care for himself, due process guarantees apply, consistent with Youngberg v. Romeo, Society for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, and DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services. The Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "J.M. v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Silva v. Schmidt Baking Distribution, LLC

2025-12-22T07:30:06-08:00

Two commercial truck drivers, residents of Connecticut, began working as delivery drivers for a baked goods company through a staffing agency, classified as W-2 employees. After several months, the company required them to create corporations and enter into “Distributor Agreements” in their capacities as presidents of those corporations to continue working. These agreements included mandatory arbitration clauses and disclaimed an employee-employer relationship. Despite the new contractual arrangement, the drivers’ daily responsibilities remained unchanged, consisting of picking up baked goods from the company’s warehouse and delivering them to retail outlets. Seeking relief under Connecticut wage and overtime laws, the drivers initiated a putative class action in Connecticut Superior Court. The baked goods company removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, invoking diversity jurisdiction. The company then moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the contractual arbitration clauses. The drivers opposed, arguing that the agreements were “contracts of employment” exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) under § 1, that they were not bound in their individual capacities, and that the clauses were unenforceable. The District Court ruled in favor of the company, granting the motion to compel arbitration, and held that the agreements were not “contracts of employment” under § 1 of the FAA. On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the District Court’s order de novo. The Second Circuit held that the agreements, though signed by corporate entities created at the company’s request, were “contracts of employment” within the meaning of § 1 of the FAA, as they were contracts for the performance of work by workers. Consequently, the court vacated the District Court’s order compelling arbitration and remanded for further proceedings. View "Silva v. Schmidt Baking Distribution, LLC" on Justia Law

United States v. Gunn

2025-12-19T08:00:07-08:00

The case centers on a defendant who participated in a series of armed robberies targeting narcotics traffickers. Two particular robberies, one in Elmont and another in the Bronx, resulted in the deaths of two individuals. The defendant was involved in planning the Elmont robbery, though not present during it, and actively participated in the Bronx robbery. A superseding indictment charged him with conspiracy and attempt to commit Hobbs Act robbery, as well as conspiracy to distribute large quantities of marijuana. Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the defendant was acquitted of attempted robbery in the Elmont incident but convicted on the other charges, including conspiracy and attempt related to the Bronx robbery, and conspiracy to distribute marijuana. The district court initially imposed lengthy sentences on all counts, running them concurrently. The defendant later challenged his convictions under two firearm-related counts after Supreme Court decisions clarified the definition of a “crime of violence.” The government agreed, and those convictions were vacated. At resentencing, the district court imposed consecutive sentences of 180 months each for conspiracy and attempt to commit Hobbs Act robbery, and a concurrent 60-month sentence for the drug conspiracy. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the defendant argued the district court erred by imposing consecutive sentences on the two Hobbs Act charges because they related to the same underlying robbery, and the aggregate exceeded the statutory maximum for a single Hobbs Act offense. The Second Circuit held that conspiracy and attempt are distinct offenses under the Hobbs Act, and Congress permits consecutive sentences for such convictions, even if the total exceeds the maximum for one offense. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment and rejected additional challenges to sentencing calculations and procedures. View "United States v. Gunn" on Justia Law

Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc.

2025-12-19T08:00:05-08:00

A public hospital in New York contracted with a new parking management company to provide valet services, replacing a previous vendor whose employees were represented by a union and were covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). After winning the contract, the new company considered retaining the existing unionized valet attendants but ultimately did not hire any of them, despite initially recruiting them. Instead, the company posted job listings for the same roles and hired other workers, leaving the former unionized employees without jobs. Evidence suggested that the new company’s refusal to hire was motivated by the employees’ union affiliation. After the union filed an unfair labor practice charge, the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) filed a petition with the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, seeking a temporary injunction under § 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act. The requested injunction would have required the company to reinstate the discharged employees, recognize the union, and bargain in good faith. The district court denied the petition in a brief text order, finding no cognizable irreparable harm and noting the delay in seeking relief. Meanwhile, an Administrative Law Judge found that the company violated the Act by refusing to hire the unionized employees and failing to recognize and bargain with the union. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial. The Second Circuit held that the district court’s order violated Rule 52(a)(2) by failing to provide adequate findings and conclusions. The Second Circuit further found that the Regional Director had met all four prongs required for a § 10(j) injunction: likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest. The court reversed the district court’s order and remanded for entry of the requested injunction. View "Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc." on Justia Law

Smart Study Co., LTD v. Shenzhenshixindajixieyouxiangongsi

2025-12-18T07:30:05-08:00

A South Korean entertainment company that owns trademarks for the popular “Baby Shark” song and related products brought a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against dozens of China-based businesses. The company alleged these businesses manufactured or sold counterfeit Baby Shark merchandise, violating trademark, copyright, and unfair competition laws. Seeking to stop the alleged counterfeiting, the company obtained temporary and preliminary injunctions and moved to serve the defendants by email, arguing that this method was appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3). After the plaintiff served process by email, most defendants did not respond, leading to default judgments against many of them. However, two defendants appeared and challenged the court’s jurisdiction, arguing that service by email violated the Hague Service Convention, to which both the United States and China are parties. The district court agreed, finding that the Convention did not permit service by email on parties in China, and dismissed the claims against these defendants without prejudice for improper service. The plaintiff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the Hague Service Convention does not allow email service on defendants located in China, as China has expressly objected to alternative methods such as those in Article 10 of the Convention. The court further held that neither Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(2) nor any purported emergency exception permitted email service in these circumstances. The court also upheld the denial of a default judgment, finding no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the dismissal of the claims against the two China-based defendants for lack of proper service was affirmed. View "Smart Study Co., LTD v. Shenzhenshixindajixieyouxiangongsi" on Justia Law

VDARE Foundation, Inc. v. James

2025-12-17T07:30:05-08:00

A nonprofit organization that publishes content critical of United States immigration policy was issued a subpoena by the New York Attorney General’s office seeking documents related to its governance, finances, and relationships with vendors and contractors. The organization alleged that the subpoena was motivated by a desire to suppress its viewpoints and thus violated its rights under the First Amendment and the New York State Constitution. The Attorney General, however, maintained that the investigation was prompted by concerns about possible self-dealing and regulatory noncompliance. After the subpoena was issued, the nonprofit partially responded but maintained objections. It then filed a federal lawsuit seeking damages and an injunction against enforcement of the subpoena, claiming the subpoena was retaliatory and unconstitutional. Shortly thereafter, the Attorney General initiated a special proceeding in New York State Supreme Court to compel compliance. The organization moved to dismiss or stay the state proceeding, raising constitutional arguments. The state court ruled against the nonprofit, ordering compliance with the subpoena (with some redactions allowed), and the New York Appellate Division, First Department affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals dismissed a further appeal. The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied the nonprofit’s request for a preliminary injunction and dismissed the federal claims, holding that they were precluded by the earlier state court judgment under the doctrine of res judicata. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the state court’s decision was final and on the merits, involved the same parties and subject matter, and therefore barred the federal claims. The court also dismissed as moot the appeal of the denial of preliminary injunctive relief. View "VDARE Foundation, Inc. v. James" on Justia Law