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	<title>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - Justia Case Law Summaries</title>
	<link rel="self" href="https://law.justia.com/summaryfeed/ca10/"/>
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	<id>https://law.justia.com/summaryfeed/ca10/</id>
	<updated>2026-07-09T00:17:41-08:00</updated>
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	        <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-7068/25-7068-2026-07-07.html</id>
        	<title>Lakey v. Bryant</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-07T07:02:14-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-07T07:02:14-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-7068/25-7068-2026-07-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		After Jared Lakey was observed behaving erratically and unclothed in a residential neighborhood in Wilson, Oklahoma, police officers from Wilson responded and used their tasers on him fifty-three times within nine minutes. A Carter County deputy, acting under a Mutual Aid Policy that required assistance to smaller police departments, arrived and used a chokehold restraint on Mr. Lakey. This resulted in Mr. Lakey’s death. The administrators of Mr. Lakey’s estate brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations by the individual officers as well as municipal liability against the Carter County Sheriff, Chris Bryant. The claims against Sheriff Bryant included maintaining an informal custom of permitting excessive force, enacting the Mutual Aid Policy (which plaintiffs argued created an increased risk of excessive force), and failing to train officers for mutual aid responses.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma addressed several pretrial matters. It denied a motion for spoliation sanctions based on Sheriff Bryant’s destruction of a cell phone containing potentially relevant text messages, finding no prejudice to the plaintiffs and concluding the destruction was negligent, not intentional. The court granted summary judgment in Sheriff Bryant’s favor on the claim that he maintained an informal custom of excessive force, finding insufficient evidence of a pattern of misconduct. It also granted him qualified immunity in his individual capacity on claims regarding the Mutual Aid Policy, though it permitted official capacity claims concerning the policy and training to proceed to trial.

At trial, the district court excluded evidence that the deputy who applied the chokehold was not criminally charged. The jury found the Wilson officers liable for excessive force but found in favor of Sheriff Bryant on the municipal policy and training claims. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings, holding that Sheriff Bryant was entitled to qualified immunity on individual claims, that summary judgment on the custom-of-excessive-force claim was proper, that any evidentiary error was harmless, and that denial of spoliation sanctions was not reversible error. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-7068/25-7068-2026-07-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Lakey v. Bryant" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                After Jared Lakey was observed behaving erratically and unclothed in a residential neighborhood in Wilson, Oklahoma, police officers from Wilson responded and used their tasers on him fifty-three times within nine minutes. A Carter County deputy, acting under a Mutual Aid Policy that required assistance to smaller police departments, arrived and used a chokehold restraint on Mr. Lakey. This resulted in Mr. Lakey’s death. The administrators of Mr. Lakey’s estate brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations by the individual officers as well as municipal liability against the Carter County Sheriff, Chris Bryant. The claims against Sheriff Bryant included maintaining an informal custom of permitting excessive force, enacting the Mutual Aid Policy (which plaintiffs argued created an increased risk of excessive force), and failing to train officers for mutual aid responses.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma addressed several pretrial matters. It denied a motion for spoliation sanctions based on Sheriff Bryant’s destruction of a cell phone containing potentially relevant text messages, finding no prejudice to the plaintiffs and concluding the destruction was negligent, not intentional. The court granted summary judgment in Sheriff Bryant’s favor on the claim that he maintained an informal custom of excessive force, finding insufficient evidence of a pattern of misconduct. It also granted him qualified immunity in his individual capacity on claims regarding the Mutual Aid Policy, though it permitted official capacity claims concerning the policy and training to proceed to trial.

At trial, the district court excluded evidence that the deputy who applied the chokehold was not criminally charged. The jury found the Wilson officers liable for excessive force but found in favor of Sheriff Bryant on the municipal policy and training claims. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings, holding that Sheriff Bryant was entitled to qualified immunity on individual claims, that summary judgment on the custom-of-excessive-force claim was proper, that any evidentiary error was harmless, and that denial of spoliation sanctions was not reversible error.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Carolyn McHugh</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1328/24-1328-2026-07-06.html</id>
        	<title>Colorado Montana Wyoming State Area Conference of the NAACP v. Smith</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-06T10:31:41-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-06T10:31:41-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1328/24-1328-2026-07-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Following the 2020 presidential election, three individuals—Shawn Smith, Ashley Epp, and Holly Kasun—formed an unincorporated association called the United States Election Integrity Plan (USEIP) to investigate what they believed was widespread election fraud in Colorado. In 2021, USEIP organized volunteers to go door-to-door canvassing, asking voters questions about their voting history and, in some instances, about whom they voted for. The Colorado Montana Wyoming State Area Conference of the NAACP, the League of Women Voters of Colorado, and Mi Familia Vota (collectively, the Voter Organizations) filed suit against USEIP and its founders, alleging that these canvassing activities constituted voter intimidation.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted summary judgment for USEIP, holding that unincorporated associations could not be sued under the statutes invoked: Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. The district court then held a bench trial against the individual defendants. After the plaintiffs presented their case, the district court granted judgment on partial findings for the individuals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c), finding insufficient evidence that any defendant engaged in voter intimidation. The court denied the defendants’ subsequent motion for attorney’s fees.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of USEIP, holding that unincorporated associations can be sued under both Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act and § 1985. The appellate court found that the district court’s exclusion of USEIP significantly narrowed the scope of relevant evidence at trial, affecting the plaintiffs’ substantial rights. The Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for a new trial against all defendants. The related appeal regarding attorney’s fees was dismissed as moot. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1328/24-1328-2026-07-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Colorado Montana Wyoming State Area Conference of the NAACP v. Smith" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Following the 2020 presidential election, three individuals—Shawn Smith, Ashley Epp, and Holly Kasun—formed an unincorporated association called the United States Election Integrity Plan (USEIP) to investigate what they believed was widespread election fraud in Colorado. In 2021, USEIP organized volunteers to go door-to-door canvassing, asking voters questions about their voting history and, in some instances, about whom they voted for. The Colorado Montana Wyoming State Area Conference of the NAACP, the League of Women Voters of Colorado, and Mi Familia Vota (collectively, the Voter Organizations) filed suit against USEIP and its founders, alleging that these canvassing activities constituted voter intimidation.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted summary judgment for USEIP, holding that unincorporated associations could not be sued under the statutes invoked: Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. The district court then held a bench trial against the individual defendants. After the plaintiffs presented their case, the district court granted judgment on partial findings for the individuals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c), finding insufficient evidence that any defendant engaged in voter intimidation. The court denied the defendants’ subsequent motion for attorney’s fees.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of USEIP, holding that unincorporated associations can be sued under both Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act and § 1985. The appellate court found that the district court’s exclusion of USEIP significantly narrowed the scope of relevant evidence at trial, affecting the plaintiffs’ substantial rights. The Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for a new trial against all defendants. The related appeal regarding attorney’s fees was dismissed as moot.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Federico</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Election Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-3046/25-3046-2026-07-06.html</id>
        	<title>Mehl v. BP Energy Company</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-06T08:01:58-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-06T08:01:58-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-3046/25-3046-2026-07-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A group of Kansas residential natural gas consumers, who purchase gas from local distributors, sued several interstate wholesalers. They alleged that during Winter Storm Uri, the wholesalers manipulated the market and sold natural gas to local distributors at exorbitant prices, leading to unprecedented increases in retail gas prices. The plaintiffs claimed these actions violated the Kansas Consumer Protection Act (KCPA) by forcing local distributors into the high-priced spot market and passing the excessive costs on to consumers. The plaintiffs contended that even though the alleged misconduct occurred in the wholesale market, it had a direct and significant impact on retail customers.

The United States District Court for the District of Kansas consolidated five class actions and reviewed the claims. The district court granted the defendants’ joint motion to dismiss, finding that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has exclusive jurisdiction over interstate wholesale natural gas rates under the Natural Gas Act (NGA), and that the plaintiffs’ state-law claims were preempted. The court concluded that the challenged conduct concerned wholesale transactions, which are subject to comprehensive federal regulation.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the NGA field-preempts the plaintiffs’ KCPA claims because the claims are aimed directly at, and challenge, transactions and practices in the interstate wholesale natural gas market, an area reserved for federal oversight. The Tenth Circuit distinguished this case from Supreme Court precedent where state-law claims were not preempted, emphasizing that these plaintiffs’ claims targeted wholesale sales rather than background marketplace conditions. The court concluded that the exclusive jurisdiction of FERC over wholesale sales foreclosed state-law consumer protection claims based on those transactions. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-3046/25-3046-2026-07-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Mehl v. BP Energy Company" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A group of Kansas residential natural gas consumers, who purchase gas from local distributors, sued several interstate wholesalers. They alleged that during Winter Storm Uri, the wholesalers manipulated the market and sold natural gas to local distributors at exorbitant prices, leading to unprecedented increases in retail gas prices. The plaintiffs claimed these actions violated the Kansas Consumer Protection Act (KCPA) by forcing local distributors into the high-priced spot market and passing the excessive costs on to consumers. The plaintiffs contended that even though the alleged misconduct occurred in the wholesale market, it had a direct and significant impact on retail customers.

The United States District Court for the District of Kansas consolidated five class actions and reviewed the claims. The district court granted the defendants’ joint motion to dismiss, finding that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has exclusive jurisdiction over interstate wholesale natural gas rates under the Natural Gas Act (NGA), and that the plaintiffs’ state-law claims were preempted. The court concluded that the challenged conduct concerned wholesale transactions, which are subject to comprehensive federal regulation.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the NGA field-preempts the plaintiffs’ KCPA claims because the claims are aimed directly at, and challenge, transactions and practices in the interstate wholesale natural gas market, an area reserved for federal oversight. The Tenth Circuit distinguished this case from Supreme Court precedent where state-law claims were not preempted, emphasizing that these plaintiffs’ claims targeted wholesale sales rather than background marketplace conditions. The court concluded that the exclusive jurisdiction of FERC over wholesale sales foreclosed state-law consumer protection claims based on those transactions.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Harris Hartz</case:judge>
													<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Consumer Law"/>
							<category term="Energy, Oil &amp; Gas Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-5057/25-5057-2026-07-01.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Sago</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-01T12:31:52-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-01T12:31:52-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-5057/25-5057-2026-07-01.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Kyle Quentin Sago shot and killed Daniel Morgan, who was unarmed, after returning to Morgan’s residence in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Sago admitted to the shooting during his testimony at trial, stating he acted out of fear. Initially, Sago entered into a plea agreement to plead guilty to second-degree murder, but the district court rejected the plea after determining the facts met the requirements for premeditated first-degree murder. Sago subsequently withdrew his guilty plea and proceeded to trial, where he was charged with multiple counts, including first-degree murder, felon in possession of ammunition, and causing death with a firearm. At trial, Sago’s counsel conceded Sago was the shooter and focused on contesting premeditation, seeking a conviction for second-degree rather than first-degree murder. Sago testified, admitted to the shooting and prior felonies, and the jury convicted him on all counts.

After sentencing, Sago appealed directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which affirmed his convictions and sentence. The appellate court found no error in the district court’s refusal to instruct on imperfect self-defense and determined there was sufficient evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. Sago then filed a motion in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied his motion, holding that his counsel did not fail to subject the prosecution’s case to adversarial testing and that Sago did not meet the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the denial of Sago’s § 2255 motion. The court held that neither structural error under McCoy v. Louisiana nor presumed prejudice under United States v. Cronic applied because Sago did not object contemporaneously to his counsel’s strategy and counsel did not entirely fail to contest guilt. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of Sago’s motion. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-5057/25-5057-2026-07-01.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Sago" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Kyle Quentin Sago shot and killed Daniel Morgan, who was unarmed, after returning to Morgan’s residence in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Sago admitted to the shooting during his testimony at trial, stating he acted out of fear. Initially, Sago entered into a plea agreement to plead guilty to second-degree murder, but the district court rejected the plea after determining the facts met the requirements for premeditated first-degree murder. Sago subsequently withdrew his guilty plea and proceeded to trial, where he was charged with multiple counts, including first-degree murder, felon in possession of ammunition, and causing death with a firearm. At trial, Sago’s counsel conceded Sago was the shooter and focused on contesting premeditation, seeking a conviction for second-degree rather than first-degree murder. Sago testified, admitted to the shooting and prior felonies, and the jury convicted him on all counts.

After sentencing, Sago appealed directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which affirmed his convictions and sentence. The appellate court found no error in the district court’s refusal to instruct on imperfect self-defense and determined there was sufficient evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. Sago then filed a motion in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied his motion, holding that his counsel did not fail to subject the prosecution’s case to adversarial testing and that Sago did not meet the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the denial of Sago’s § 2255 motion. The court held that neither structural error under McCoy v. Louisiana nor presumed prejudice under United States v. Cronic applied because Sago did not object contemporaneously to his counsel’s strategy and counsel did not entirely fail to contest guilt. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of Sago’s motion.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Federico</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/26-6019/26-6019-2026-06-30.html</id>
        	<title>Quiroz v. Mullin</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-30T15:31:51-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-30T15:31:51-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/26-6019/26-6019-2026-06-30.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Rigoberto Santillan Quiroz, a noncitizen who entered the United States in 2006 and has since established deep family and community ties, was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in November 2025 after a traffic stop. He was not charged with a crime, and there was no suggestion that he posed a flight risk or danger to the community. ICE initiated removal proceedings against him, asserting that his detention was mandatory under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), which it interpreted to preclude any opportunity for a bond hearing.

In the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, Santillan Quiroz filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing that his detention was governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), under which he would be eligible for a bond hearing. A magistrate judge recommended granting the petition, but the district court rejected that recommendation and denied relief, finding Santillan Quiroz ineligible for release or a bond hearing under the government’s interpretation of the statute.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the statutory framework and the government’s recent shift in interpreting § 1225(b)(2)(A) as mandating detention of noncitizens found in the interior of the country who have not been admitted. The Tenth Circuit held that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to noncitizens seeking admission at the border, not to those detained in the interior. The court concluded that Santillan Quiroz is subject to detention under § 1226(a) and is therefore eligible for a bond hearing. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the habeas petition and remanded with instructions to order the government to provide Santillan Quiroz a bond hearing or release him within seven days. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/26-6019/26-6019-2026-06-30.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Quiroz v. Mullin" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Rigoberto Santillan Quiroz, a noncitizen who entered the United States in 2006 and has since established deep family and community ties, was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in November 2025 after a traffic stop. He was not charged with a crime, and there was no suggestion that he posed a flight risk or danger to the community. ICE initiated removal proceedings against him, asserting that his detention was mandatory under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), which it interpreted to preclude any opportunity for a bond hearing.

In the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, Santillan Quiroz filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing that his detention was governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), under which he would be eligible for a bond hearing. A magistrate judge recommended granting the petition, but the district court rejected that recommendation and denied relief, finding Santillan Quiroz ineligible for release or a bond hearing under the government’s interpretation of the statute.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the statutory framework and the government’s recent shift in interpreting § 1225(b)(2)(A) as mandating detention of noncitizens found in the interior of the country who have not been admitted. The Tenth Circuit held that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to noncitizens seeking admission at the border, not to those detained in the interior. The court concluded that Santillan Quiroz is subject to detention under § 1226(a) and is therefore eligible for a bond hearing. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the habeas petition and remanded with instructions to order the government to provide Santillan Quiroz a bond hearing or release him within seven days.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Federico</case:judge>
													<category term="Immigration Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-4124/25-4124-2026-06-30.html</id>
        	<title>Utah Political Watch v. Musselman</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-30T08:32:44-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-30T08:32:44-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-4124/25-4124-2026-06-30.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A journalist with over twenty-five years of experience covering the Utah Legislature previously received media credentials while working for established news organizations. After founding an independent news outlet, he applied for a media credential under a new policy that categorically excluded bloggers, independent media, and freelance journalists from receiving credentials. This exclusion prevented him from accessing restricted areas and events within the Capitol that were available only to credentialed journalists, limiting his ability to gather news directly from legislative press conferences and availabilities.

The plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah against legislative officials, alleging that the credentialing policy was unconstitutional as both facial and as-applied viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment, along with claims of retaliation, prior restraint, and vagueness. The district court dismissed all claims, including denying a preliminary injunction as moot. The court reasoned, in part, that there was no protected speech implicated by the policy and that the plaintiff’s continued reporting without a credential undercut the retaliation claim.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that the district court erred in dismissing both the facial and as-applied viewpoint discrimination claims. The appellate court found that the plaintiff plausibly alleged denial of access based on his viewpoint and that the exclusion from a government-created forum for journalists implicated protected speech. The court remanded those claims for further proceedings. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the retaliation, prior restraint, and vagueness claims, finding no plausible allegation of chilling effect and determining the policy did not regulate expression sufficiently to support a prior restraint or vagueness challenge. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-4124/25-4124-2026-06-30.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Utah Political Watch v. Musselman" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A journalist with over twenty-five years of experience covering the Utah Legislature previously received media credentials while working for established news organizations. After founding an independent news outlet, he applied for a media credential under a new policy that categorically excluded bloggers, independent media, and freelance journalists from receiving credentials. This exclusion prevented him from accessing restricted areas and events within the Capitol that were available only to credentialed journalists, limiting his ability to gather news directly from legislative press conferences and availabilities.

The plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah against legislative officials, alleging that the credentialing policy was unconstitutional as both facial and as-applied viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment, along with claims of retaliation, prior restraint, and vagueness. The district court dismissed all claims, including denying a preliminary injunction as moot. The court reasoned, in part, that there was no protected speech implicated by the policy and that the plaintiff’s continued reporting without a credential undercut the retaliation claim.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that the district court erred in dismissing both the facial and as-applied viewpoint discrimination claims. The appellate court found that the plaintiff plausibly alleged denial of access based on his viewpoint and that the exclusion from a government-created forum for journalists implicated protected speech. The court remanded those claims for further proceedings. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the retaliation, prior restraint, and vagueness claims, finding no plausible allegation of chilling effect and determining the policy did not regulate expression sufficiently to support a prior restraint or vagueness challenge.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Timothy Tymkovich</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-5027/25-5027-2026-06-30.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Lynn</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-30T08:32:44-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-30T08:32:44-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-5027/25-5027-2026-06-30.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant was involved in a shooting at a homeless encampment in Tulsa, Oklahoma, resulting in the death of one individual and serious injury to another. The incident followed a dispute regarding stolen property, with witnesses testifying that the defendant fired shots into tents after a confrontation. The police recovered shell casings and matched them to a firearm later found in the possession of another individual, which was confirmed to belong to the defendant. Witness testimony indicated the defendant claimed he was shot at first, but no firearm was found at the scene associated with the victims.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma presided over the trial, where a jury convicted the defendant of first-degree murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, and carrying and discharging a firearm during a crime of violence. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment plus ten years. On appeal, the defendant challenged the admission of a tribal database screenshot to prove Indian status, the inclusion of certain language in the self-defense instruction, and the court’s refusal to instruct the jury that the government must disprove imperfect self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s admission of the tribal database record and its self-defense instruction, finding no abuse of discretion or legal error. However, it held that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury that the government must disprove imperfect self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt, violating due process. The court remanded with instructions to vacate the murder conviction (Count One) and ordered further proceedings, while affirming the remaining convictions. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-5027/25-5027-2026-06-30.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Lynn" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant was involved in a shooting at a homeless encampment in Tulsa, Oklahoma, resulting in the death of one individual and serious injury to another. The incident followed a dispute regarding stolen property, with witnesses testifying that the defendant fired shots into tents after a confrontation. The police recovered shell casings and matched them to a firearm later found in the possession of another individual, which was confirmed to belong to the defendant. Witness testimony indicated the defendant claimed he was shot at first, but no firearm was found at the scene associated with the victims.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma presided over the trial, where a jury convicted the defendant of first-degree murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, and carrying and discharging a firearm during a crime of violence. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment plus ten years. On appeal, the defendant challenged the admission of a tribal database screenshot to prove Indian status, the inclusion of certain language in the self-defense instruction, and the court’s refusal to instruct the jury that the government must disprove imperfect self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s admission of the tribal database record and its self-defense instruction, finding no abuse of discretion or legal error. However, it held that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury that the government must disprove imperfect self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt, violating due process. The court remanded with instructions to vacate the murder conviction (Count One) and ordered further proceedings, while affirming the remaining convictions.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Paul Kelly</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-8026/25-8026-2026-06-26.html</id>
        	<title>Western Watersheds Project v. Forest Service</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-26T08:32:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-26T08:32:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-8026/25-8026-2026-06-26.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several conservation groups challenged a 2020 amendment to the management plan for Thunder Basin National Grassland, alleging that the United States Forest Service violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The State of Wyoming intervened in the case. After the case was transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, the district court upheld the agency’s plan amendment, ruling that it complied with both statutes.

The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit found that the Forest Service’s amendment did not comply with NEPA, specifically because the agency issued an unduly narrow Purpose and Need statement, failed to consider a reasonable range of alternatives, and did not take the required “hard look” at environmental consequences. The Tenth Circuit did not reach the ESA claims. Instead of determining the appropriate remedy itself, the Tenth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to decide whether the plan amendment should be vacated or remanded without vacatur, instructing the district court to apply the two-part Allied-Signal test.

On remand, the district court considered additional briefing and ordered remand to the Forest Service without vacatur of the 2020 Plan Amendment, finding that both Allied-Signal factors favored this approach. The plaintiffs then sought appellate review of the district court’s refusal to order vacatur. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s remand order because it was not a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and no exception to the administrative remand rule applied. The appeal was therefore dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-8026/25-8026-2026-06-26.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Western Watersheds Project v. Forest Service" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several conservation groups challenged a 2020 amendment to the management plan for Thunder Basin National Grassland, alleging that the United States Forest Service violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The State of Wyoming intervened in the case. After the case was transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, the district court upheld the agency’s plan amendment, ruling that it complied with both statutes.

The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit found that the Forest Service’s amendment did not comply with NEPA, specifically because the agency issued an unduly narrow Purpose and Need statement, failed to consider a reasonable range of alternatives, and did not take the required “hard look” at environmental consequences. The Tenth Circuit did not reach the ESA claims. Instead of determining the appropriate remedy itself, the Tenth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to decide whether the plan amendment should be vacated or remanded without vacatur, instructing the district court to apply the two-part Allied-Signal test.

On remand, the district court considered additional briefing and ordered remand to the Forest Service without vacatur of the 2020 Plan Amendment, finding that both Allied-Signal factors favored this approach. The plaintiffs then sought appellate review of the district court’s refusal to order vacatur. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s remand order because it was not a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and no exception to the administrative remand rule applied. The appeal was therefore dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Scott Matheson</case:judge>
													<category term="Environmental Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-4106/23-4106-2026-06-23.html</id>
        	<title>Garfield County v. Biden</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-23T11:03:00-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-23T11:03:00-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-4106/23-4106-2026-06-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		President Biden expanded the Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monuments in Utah, designating over 3.23 million acres under the Antiquities Act and identifying more than 500 items for protection. Plaintiffs—including the State of Utah, two counties, individuals, and an organization—objected to the scope of these expansions. They argued that the President exceeded his authority by designating items and reserving land that, in their view, did not qualify under the Act’s requirements for “historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest,” and by not limiting the land to “the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management” of those objects.

Reviewing the case, the United States District Court for the District of Utah dismissed the claims. It held that sovereign immunity barred review of the President’s actions, found some plaintiffs lacked standing, and concluded that challenges to agency management plans were not ripe because those plans were not final agency actions.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in concluding that sovereign immunity barred all review of the President’s actions under the ultra vires doctrine, since the Antiquities Act imposes discernable statutory limits on presidential authority. The court found that plaintiffs could bring ultra vires claims alleging that the President exceeded specific statutory limits, and remanded for the district court to consider whether the President’s actions were indeed ultra vires. The Tenth Circuit also vacated and remanded the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ Administrative Procedure Act claims due to subsequent agency action, but affirmed the dismissal of claims by individual plaintiffs and one organization for lack of standing. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-4106/23-4106-2026-06-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Garfield County v. Biden" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                President Biden expanded the Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monuments in Utah, designating over 3.23 million acres under the Antiquities Act and identifying more than 500 items for protection. Plaintiffs—including the State of Utah, two counties, individuals, and an organization—objected to the scope of these expansions. They argued that the President exceeded his authority by designating items and reserving land that, in their view, did not qualify under the Act’s requirements for “historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest,” and by not limiting the land to “the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management” of those objects.

Reviewing the case, the United States District Court for the District of Utah dismissed the claims. It held that sovereign immunity barred review of the President’s actions, found some plaintiffs lacked standing, and concluded that challenges to agency management plans were not ripe because those plans were not final agency actions.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in concluding that sovereign immunity barred all review of the President’s actions under the ultra vires doctrine, since the Antiquities Act imposes discernable statutory limits on presidential authority. The court found that plaintiffs could bring ultra vires claims alleging that the President exceeded specific statutory limits, and remanded for the district court to consider whether the President’s actions were indeed ultra vires. The Tenth Circuit also vacated and remanded the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ Administrative Procedure Act claims due to subsequent agency action, but affirmed the dismissal of claims by individual plaintiffs and one organization for lack of standing.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Joel Carson</case:judge>
													<category term="Environmental Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-1217/23-1217-2026-06-23.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Milliron</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-23T09:02:24-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-23T09:02:24-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-1217/23-1217-2026-06-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case concerns a woman who had a long-term affair with her employer, a dentist who was later investigated for the murder of his wife while on safari in Zambia. The woman had received substantial financial support from the dentist over several years, including after the wife’s death. She was present at events and conversations indicating she knew details about the crime, including an incident where the dentist openly confessed the murder to her in a public setting.

After the murder, law enforcement began investigating the dentist. The woman testified before a federal grand jury investigating the incident. During her testimony, she was questioned about the financial gifts she received and whether the dentist had proclaimed his innocence to her regarding the FBI investigation. She responded that she did not know why the dentist was so generous and that he “probably” proclaimed his innocence, though she claimed not to recall specifics.

A grand jury indicted the woman on five counts of perjury, one count of accessory after the fact to foreign murder, and one count of obstruction of justice, based on her grand jury testimony. After a joint trial with the dentist, a jury in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado convicted her on two counts of perjury, accessory after the fact, and obstruction. Her post-trial motions were denied, and she was sentenced to 204 months’ imprisonment.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit vacated one perjury conviction, finding insufficient evidence that her statements about not knowing the dentist’s motives were knowingly false. The court affirmed her remaining convictions, holding that lying to a grand jury to protect another can constitute accessory after the fact, and that obstruction of justice is not a lesser-included offense of perjury. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-1217/23-1217-2026-06-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Milliron" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case concerns a woman who had a long-term affair with her employer, a dentist who was later investigated for the murder of his wife while on safari in Zambia. The woman had received substantial financial support from the dentist over several years, including after the wife’s death. She was present at events and conversations indicating she knew details about the crime, including an incident where the dentist openly confessed the murder to her in a public setting.

After the murder, law enforcement began investigating the dentist. The woman testified before a federal grand jury investigating the incident. During her testimony, she was questioned about the financial gifts she received and whether the dentist had proclaimed his innocence to her regarding the FBI investigation. She responded that she did not know why the dentist was so generous and that he “probably” proclaimed his innocence, though she claimed not to recall specifics.

A grand jury indicted the woman on five counts of perjury, one count of accessory after the fact to foreign murder, and one count of obstruction of justice, based on her grand jury testimony. After a joint trial with the dentist, a jury in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado convicted her on two counts of perjury, accessory after the fact, and obstruction. Her post-trial motions were denied, and she was sentenced to 204 months’ imprisonment.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit vacated one perjury conviction, finding insufficient evidence that her statements about not knowing the dentist’s motives were knowingly false. The court affirmed her remaining convictions, holding that lying to a grand jury to protect another can constitute accessory after the fact, and that obstruction of justice is not a lesser-included offense of perjury. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Gregory Alan Phillips</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-8046/25-8046-2026-06-10.html</id>
        	<title>Jarvis v. Liggett</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-10T08:33:04-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-10T08:33:04-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-8046/25-8046-2026-06-10.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at a small Wyoming jail, experienced severe dental pain and underwent three emergency room visits during his two-month incarceration. Medical professionals prescribed pain medication and instructed him to seek dental care within specific timeframes, and also recommended daily oral rinses. The jail, lacking on-site medical staff, required officers to schedule appointments or transport inmates for care. After each emergency visit, discharge instructions were handed to incoming staff, and eventually, a dental appointment was scheduled for August, though the plaintiff was released before it occurred. The plaintiff repeatedly requested timely dental care and rinses, but officers only partially provided the prescribed treatments.

In the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, the plaintiff sued jail officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on qualified immunity grounds. It found insufficient evidence that the named officers had a duty to schedule dental appointments under jail policy or that they intentionally delayed care. The court also concluded that failure to provide oral rinses did not constitute deliberate indifference, and even if a constitutional violation occurred, the officers did not violate clearly established law.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the officers were not responsible for scheduling the dental appointments under jail policy, reasonably believed others were handling scheduling, and responded to the plaintiff’s pain with medication and emergency room visits. The court also found that failure to provide oral rinses did not rise to deliberate indifference, as there was no evidence the officer recognized a substantial risk from their absence. Furthermore, it concluded that no clearly established law required different conduct under these circumstances. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-8046/25-8046-2026-06-10.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Jarvis v. Liggett" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at a small Wyoming jail, experienced severe dental pain and underwent three emergency room visits during his two-month incarceration. Medical professionals prescribed pain medication and instructed him to seek dental care within specific timeframes, and also recommended daily oral rinses. The jail, lacking on-site medical staff, required officers to schedule appointments or transport inmates for care. After each emergency visit, discharge instructions were handed to incoming staff, and eventually, a dental appointment was scheduled for August, though the plaintiff was released before it occurred. The plaintiff repeatedly requested timely dental care and rinses, but officers only partially provided the prescribed treatments.

In the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, the plaintiff sued jail officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on qualified immunity grounds. It found insufficient evidence that the named officers had a duty to schedule dental appointments under jail policy or that they intentionally delayed care. The court also concluded that failure to provide oral rinses did not constitute deliberate indifference, and even if a constitutional violation occurred, the officers did not violate clearly established law.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the officers were not responsible for scheduling the dental appointments under jail policy, reasonably believed others were handling scheduling, and responded to the plaintiff’s pain with medication and emergency room visits. The court also found that failure to provide oral rinses did not rise to deliberate indifference, as there was no evidence the officer recognized a substantial risk from their absence. Furthermore, it concluded that no clearly established law required different conduct under these circumstances. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-10</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Carolyn McHugh</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-1224/25-1224-2026-06-10.html</id>
        	<title>Estate of Ward v. Lucero</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-10T08:33:04-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-10T08:33:04-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-1224/25-1224-2026-06-10.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Deputies from the Pueblo County Sheriff’s Office responded to a 911 call at a local middle school, where they encountered Richard Ward in a car with his mother, Kristy Ward Stamp. During questioning, Mr. Ward placed anti-anxiety medication in his mouth, which led Deputy McWhorter to attempt to remove him from the vehicle. A brief struggle ensued, after which Deputy McWhorter shot Mr. Ward three times, resulting in his death. Following the shooting, Ms. Ward Stamp was ordered to remain in the car, her phone and vehicle were seized, she was detained, patted down, handcuffed, moved between police vehicles, transported to a sheriff’s facility, and held in an interview room for several hours.

Mr. Ward’s estate and Ms. Ward Stamp filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against the deputies, alleging violations of their rights under the Fourth Amendment, specifically excessive force against Mr. Ward and unlawful arrest and seizure of Ms. Ward Stamp and her property. The officers moved for summary judgment, invoking qualified immunity. The district court denied qualified immunity, finding that a reasonable jury could determine that Mr. Ward did not resist or pose a threat when force was used, and that there was no probable cause to detain Ms. Ward Stamp or seize her property.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the officers’ interlocutory appeal. It affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to the extent the appeal raised abstract legal questions but dismissed the remainder of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, because the officers’ arguments relied on disputed facts rather than accepting the district court’s factual findings. The Tenth Circuit held it lacked jurisdiction to review factual disputes at this stage and that the district court properly applied the qualified immunity framework. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-1224/25-1224-2026-06-10.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Estate of Ward v. Lucero" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Deputies from the Pueblo County Sheriff’s Office responded to a 911 call at a local middle school, where they encountered Richard Ward in a car with his mother, Kristy Ward Stamp. During questioning, Mr. Ward placed anti-anxiety medication in his mouth, which led Deputy McWhorter to attempt to remove him from the vehicle. A brief struggle ensued, after which Deputy McWhorter shot Mr. Ward three times, resulting in his death. Following the shooting, Ms. Ward Stamp was ordered to remain in the car, her phone and vehicle were seized, she was detained, patted down, handcuffed, moved between police vehicles, transported to a sheriff’s facility, and held in an interview room for several hours.

Mr. Ward’s estate and Ms. Ward Stamp filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against the deputies, alleging violations of their rights under the Fourth Amendment, specifically excessive force against Mr. Ward and unlawful arrest and seizure of Ms. Ward Stamp and her property. The officers moved for summary judgment, invoking qualified immunity. The district court denied qualified immunity, finding that a reasonable jury could determine that Mr. Ward did not resist or pose a threat when force was used, and that there was no probable cause to detain Ms. Ward Stamp or seize her property.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the officers’ interlocutory appeal. It affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to the extent the appeal raised abstract legal questions but dismissed the remainder of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, because the officers’ arguments relied on disputed facts rather than accepting the district court’s factual findings. The Tenth Circuit held it lacked jurisdiction to review factual disputes at this stage and that the district court properly applied the qualified immunity framework.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-10</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Veronica Rossman</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-5088/24-5088-2026-06-09.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Smith</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-09T09:06:49-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-09T09:06:49-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-5088/24-5088-2026-06-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A young girl, identified as H.M., moved in with her uncle and aunt in Oklahoma in 2014. Both caretakers, the uncle (a member of the Cherokee Nation) and his wife (a non-Indian), became the subject of concern when, in 2019, H.M., then nine years old, fled their home. She was found malnourished, unwashed, and exhibiting signs of physical and emotional abuse, including weight loss and injuries. Subsequent investigation revealed a long period of severe abuse and neglect.

A federal grand jury in the Northern District of Oklahoma indicted both caretakers on charges of child abuse and child neglect under Oklahoma law, with federal jurisdiction arising under statutes applicable to Indian country. The uncle was charged under the Major Crimes Act, while the aunt was charged via the Assimilative Crimes Act and the General Crimes Act. Both were also charged with aiding and abetting each other. After a joint jury trial, both were found guilty of child abuse and child neglect. The aunt unsuccessfully moved post-trial to dismiss the indictment for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for a new trial. At sentencing, the uncle received 180 months and the aunt 240 months in prison, based on sentencing calculations that did not apply a particular federal sentencing guideline.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in calculating the uncle’s advisory sentencing range because it failed to apply the most analogous federal guideline—aggravated assault under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2—to the Oklahoma child abuse conviction. This was deemed procedural error warranting resentencing. The Tenth Circuit vacated the uncle’s sentence and remanded for resentencing, but affirmed all other convictions and the aunt’s sentence, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions, jurisdictional rulings, or the handling of sentencing evidence. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-5088/24-5088-2026-06-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A young girl, identified as H.M., moved in with her uncle and aunt in Oklahoma in 2014. Both caretakers, the uncle (a member of the Cherokee Nation) and his wife (a non-Indian), became the subject of concern when, in 2019, H.M., then nine years old, fled their home. She was found malnourished, unwashed, and exhibiting signs of physical and emotional abuse, including weight loss and injuries. Subsequent investigation revealed a long period of severe abuse and neglect.

A federal grand jury in the Northern District of Oklahoma indicted both caretakers on charges of child abuse and child neglect under Oklahoma law, with federal jurisdiction arising under statutes applicable to Indian country. The uncle was charged under the Major Crimes Act, while the aunt was charged via the Assimilative Crimes Act and the General Crimes Act. Both were also charged with aiding and abetting each other. After a joint jury trial, both were found guilty of child abuse and child neglect. The aunt unsuccessfully moved post-trial to dismiss the indictment for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for a new trial. At sentencing, the uncle received 180 months and the aunt 240 months in prison, based on sentencing calculations that did not apply a particular federal sentencing guideline.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in calculating the uncle’s advisory sentencing range because it failed to apply the most analogous federal guideline—aggravated assault under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2—to the Oklahoma child abuse conviction. This was deemed procedural error warranting resentencing. The Tenth Circuit vacated the uncle’s sentence and remanded for resentencing, but affirmed all other convictions and the aunt’s sentence, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions, jurisdictional rulings, or the handling of sentencing evidence.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Veronica Rossman</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Native American Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-3020/25-3020-2026-06-08.html</id>
        	<title>Jefferson v. Moore</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-08T08:01:37-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-08T08:01:37-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-3020/25-3020-2026-06-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		An incarcerated individual alleged that he was subjected to excessive force and denied equal protection by officers at a Kansas correctional facility during a medical emergency, and that his internal grievances were not properly addressed. After unsuccessful attempts to resolve his complaints through the prison’s grievance process, he filed a pro se lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas against several correctional officers and a nurse-staffing company, raising Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims.

Following standard procedure, the district court ordered a Martinez report to assess the factual and legal basis of the claims. After screening, the court allowed the case to proceed. Six defendants jointly moved for judgment on the pleadings or, alternatively, for summary judgment, arguing Eleventh Amendment and qualified immunity. The district court denied their motion without prejudice, citing two reasons: the motion exceeded local page limits for Rule 12 motions, and a summary judgment motion was premature before discovery and formalization of claims and defenses. The magistrate judge had also stayed discovery pending resolution of immunity defenses. Rather than resubmitting their motion, the defendants filed an interlocutory appeal, asking the appellate court to compel the district court to consider their motion immediately.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It concluded it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the collateral-order doctrine did not apply to the district court’s procedural denial. The appellate court found that the district court’s actions did not conclusively deny immunity but only required compliance with non-onerous procedural rules. Since no substantial public interest was threatened and discovery remained stayed, immediate appeal was not warranted. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-3020/25-3020-2026-06-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Jefferson v. Moore" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                An incarcerated individual alleged that he was subjected to excessive force and denied equal protection by officers at a Kansas correctional facility during a medical emergency, and that his internal grievances were not properly addressed. After unsuccessful attempts to resolve his complaints through the prison’s grievance process, he filed a pro se lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas against several correctional officers and a nurse-staffing company, raising Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims.

Following standard procedure, the district court ordered a Martinez report to assess the factual and legal basis of the claims. After screening, the court allowed the case to proceed. Six defendants jointly moved for judgment on the pleadings or, alternatively, for summary judgment, arguing Eleventh Amendment and qualified immunity. The district court denied their motion without prejudice, citing two reasons: the motion exceeded local page limits for Rule 12 motions, and a summary judgment motion was premature before discovery and formalization of claims and defenses. The magistrate judge had also stayed discovery pending resolution of immunity defenses. Rather than resubmitting their motion, the defendants filed an interlocutory appeal, asking the appellate court to compel the district court to consider their motion immediately.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It concluded it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the collateral-order doctrine did not apply to the district court’s procedural denial. The appellate court found that the district court’s actions did not conclusively deny immunity but only required compliance with non-onerous procedural rules. Since no substantial public interest was threatened and discovery remained stayed, immediate appeal was not warranted. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Harris Hartz</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-2117/25-2117-2026-06-08.html</id>
        	<title>New Mexico Trappers Association v. Torrez</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-08T08:01:36-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-08T08:01:36-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-2117/25-2117-2026-06-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several non-profit organizations focused on trappers’ rights challenged a New Mexico statute that broadly prohibits the use of traps, snares, or wildlife poison to capture, injure, or kill animals on public land. The statute includes an exception allowing enrolled members of federally recognized Indian nations, tribes, or pueblos to trap for religious or ceremonial purposes under rules that have not yet been promulgated. The plaintiffs did not contest the general prohibition on trapping, but argued that the exception violates constitutional and statutory rights, specifically invoking the Equal Protection and Establishment Clauses of both the U.S. and New Mexico Constitutions, as well as the New Mexico Civil Rights Act.

The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico dismissed the plaintiffs’ federal and state constitutional claims without prejudice, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The court found their economic, recreational, aesthetic, and psychological injuries were not redressable because striking the exception would not lift the general ban on trapping. It also determined that their alleged stigmatic injury was not judicially cognizable and, in any event, their claims were not ripe because the rules implementing the exception had not been issued. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state statutory claim.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish standing. First, their alleged injuries from not being allowed to trap were not redressable, as invalidating the exception would not affect the underlying prohibition. Second, their claims of psychological and stigmatic injury were not ripe for review, as the exception had not been implemented, and any harm was too abstract and generalized to support standing. The appellate court also found no error in the district court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-2117/25-2117-2026-06-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "New Mexico Trappers Association v. Torrez" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several non-profit organizations focused on trappers’ rights challenged a New Mexico statute that broadly prohibits the use of traps, snares, or wildlife poison to capture, injure, or kill animals on public land. The statute includes an exception allowing enrolled members of federally recognized Indian nations, tribes, or pueblos to trap for religious or ceremonial purposes under rules that have not yet been promulgated. The plaintiffs did not contest the general prohibition on trapping, but argued that the exception violates constitutional and statutory rights, specifically invoking the Equal Protection and Establishment Clauses of both the U.S. and New Mexico Constitutions, as well as the New Mexico Civil Rights Act.

The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico dismissed the plaintiffs’ federal and state constitutional claims without prejudice, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The court found their economic, recreational, aesthetic, and psychological injuries were not redressable because striking the exception would not lift the general ban on trapping. It also determined that their alleged stigmatic injury was not judicially cognizable and, in any event, their claims were not ripe because the rules implementing the exception had not been issued. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state statutory claim.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish standing. First, their alleged injuries from not being allowed to trap were not redressable, as invalidating the exception would not affect the underlying prohibition. Second, their claims of psychological and stigmatic injury were not ripe for review, as the exception had not been implemented, and any harm was too abstract and generalized to support standing. The appellate court also found no error in the district court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Paul Kelly</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-9552/25-9552-2026-06-01.html</id>
        	<title>Bonilla-Espinoza v. Blanche</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-01T09:32:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-01T09:32:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-9552/25-9552-2026-06-01.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States in February 2023 after he and his family experienced multiple detentions and beatings by Salvadoran police, allegedly due to suspicions of collaborating with illicit groups. After his mother and sisters were detained, and later upon learning that his partner had also been detained, the petitioner sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States.

An immigration judge denied the requested relief, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed that decision in July 2024. The petitioner, initially pro se, later retained counsel and, after learning of his partner’s detention, filed a motion to reopen proceedings with the BIA in January 2025. He argued that new evidence warranted reopening and sought equitable tolling of the 90-day deadline for such motions, citing diligence in seeking counsel and resource constraints while detained. The BIA denied the motion as untimely, finding the petitioner did not show the requisite diligence or extraordinary circumstances to justify equitable tolling and that much of the new evidence was not previously unavailable.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s denial for abuse of discretion. The court held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion, as its decision adequately addressed the petitioner’s arguments and applied the correct legal standard for equitable tolling. The court found that the petitioner did not sufficiently demonstrate either due diligence or extraordinary circumstances that prevented timely filing. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit denied the petition for review. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-9552/25-9552-2026-06-01.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Bonilla-Espinoza v. Blanche" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States in February 2023 after he and his family experienced multiple detentions and beatings by Salvadoran police, allegedly due to suspicions of collaborating with illicit groups. After his mother and sisters were detained, and later upon learning that his partner had also been detained, the petitioner sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States.

An immigration judge denied the requested relief, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed that decision in July 2024. The petitioner, initially pro se, later retained counsel and, after learning of his partner’s detention, filed a motion to reopen proceedings with the BIA in January 2025. He argued that new evidence warranted reopening and sought equitable tolling of the 90-day deadline for such motions, citing diligence in seeking counsel and resource constraints while detained. The BIA denied the motion as untimely, finding the petitioner did not show the requisite diligence or extraordinary circumstances to justify equitable tolling and that much of the new evidence was not previously unavailable.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s denial for abuse of discretion. The court held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion, as its decision adequately addressed the petitioner’s arguments and applied the correct legal standard for equitable tolling. The court found that the petitioner did not sufficiently demonstrate either due diligence or extraordinary circumstances that prevented timely filing. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit denied the petition for review.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Harris Hartz</case:judge>
													<category term="Immigration Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-1281/25-1281-2026-05-27.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Ulibarri</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-27T09:08:10-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-27T09:08:10-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-1281/25-1281-2026-05-27.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A Colorado dentist operated his practice using an abusive trust-based tax scheme promoted by a third party. Over seven years, he funneled earnings through a series of sham trusts to disguise income and claim personal expenses as tax deductions. The scheme involved assigning most of his business to a trust, which distributed income through family and charitable trusts, ultimately allowing him to retain control over his earnings without paying taxes. Despite repeated warnings from professionals, the defendant persisted. He continued the scheme even after being notified of a criminal investigation, resulting in over $1.6 million in tax losses to the government.

A federal grand jury indicted him for six counts of tax evasion, one for each year from 2017 to 2022. He pleaded guilty to all counts in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. At sentencing, the court calculated the total loss—including uncharged conduct from 2016 and 2023—and determined the base offense level under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The court added a two-level enhancement for the use of sophisticated means and considered mitigating factors such as acceptance of responsibility and zero-point offender status. The advisory guidelines range was set at 33–41 months, and the court imposed a sentence at the top end: 41 months’ imprisonment, supervised release, restitution, and a fine.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the sentence for procedural and substantive reasonableness under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. The court held that including the 2023 tax loss and applying the sophisticated means enhancement were proper under the Guidelines. It also found the sentence substantively reasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors and affirmed the district court’s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-1281/25-1281-2026-05-27.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Ulibarri" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A Colorado dentist operated his practice using an abusive trust-based tax scheme promoted by a third party. Over seven years, he funneled earnings through a series of sham trusts to disguise income and claim personal expenses as tax deductions. The scheme involved assigning most of his business to a trust, which distributed income through family and charitable trusts, ultimately allowing him to retain control over his earnings without paying taxes. Despite repeated warnings from professionals, the defendant persisted. He continued the scheme even after being notified of a criminal investigation, resulting in over $1.6 million in tax losses to the government.

A federal grand jury indicted him for six counts of tax evasion, one for each year from 2017 to 2022. He pleaded guilty to all counts in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. At sentencing, the court calculated the total loss—including uncharged conduct from 2016 and 2023—and determined the base offense level under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The court added a two-level enhancement for the use of sophisticated means and considered mitigating factors such as acceptance of responsibility and zero-point offender status. The advisory guidelines range was set at 33–41 months, and the court imposed a sentence at the top end: 41 months’ imprisonment, supervised release, restitution, and a fine.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the sentence for procedural and substantive reasonableness under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. The court held that including the 2023 tax loss and applying the sophisticated means enhancement were proper under the Guidelines. It also found the sentence substantively reasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors and affirmed the district court’s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Paul Kelly</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Tax Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1377/24-1377-2026-05-19.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Crow</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-19T08:02:47-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-19T08:02:47-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1377/24-1377-2026-05-19.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves a criminal prosecution for sexual abuse of a minor on a military base. The defendant admitted to sexual activity but claimed he was asleep during the acts, raising a sexsomnia defense. The central dispute at trial concerned the defendant’s state of mind, specifically whether he was awake or asleep. Both sides presented expert witnesses. The defense expert, Dr. Kushida, opined that the victim’s account was consistent with sexsomnia, while the government’s expert, Dr. Bornemann, countered that the described actions were too complex to have occurred during sleep. During trial, Dr. Kushida also offered new opinions about the absence of malingering—suggesting the defendant was not faking symptoms for personal gain—which had not been disclosed before trial.

The case was previously tried in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. At trial, after Dr. Kushida introduced the new malingering opinions, the government sought to have Dr. Bornemann rebut them. The defense objected to the adequacy and timing of the government’s disclosure regarding Dr. Bornemann’s new rebuttal opinions. The district court overruled the objection, allowed Dr. Bornemann’s testimony, and permitted a brief pre-cross-examination interview. The jury convicted the defendant on the counts related to sexual encounters in the girl’s bedroom.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the government was required under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 to provide pretrial notice of the rebuttal opinions offered by Dr. Bornemann. The court held that the government’s duty to disclose rebuttal expert testimony is triggered only when the defense has timely disclosed the opinions being rebutted. Because the defense had not disclosed Dr. Kushida’s malingering opinions prior to trial, the government was not required to provide pretrial notice of Dr. Bornemann’s rebuttal. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the convictions. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1377/24-1377-2026-05-19.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Crow" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves a criminal prosecution for sexual abuse of a minor on a military base. The defendant admitted to sexual activity but claimed he was asleep during the acts, raising a sexsomnia defense. The central dispute at trial concerned the defendant’s state of mind, specifically whether he was awake or asleep. Both sides presented expert witnesses. The defense expert, Dr. Kushida, opined that the victim’s account was consistent with sexsomnia, while the government’s expert, Dr. Bornemann, countered that the described actions were too complex to have occurred during sleep. During trial, Dr. Kushida also offered new opinions about the absence of malingering—suggesting the defendant was not faking symptoms for personal gain—which had not been disclosed before trial.

The case was previously tried in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. At trial, after Dr. Kushida introduced the new malingering opinions, the government sought to have Dr. Bornemann rebut them. The defense objected to the adequacy and timing of the government’s disclosure regarding Dr. Bornemann’s new rebuttal opinions. The district court overruled the objection, allowed Dr. Bornemann’s testimony, and permitted a brief pre-cross-examination interview. The jury convicted the defendant on the counts related to sexual encounters in the girl’s bedroom.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the government was required under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 to provide pretrial notice of the rebuttal opinions offered by Dr. Bornemann. The court held that the government’s duty to disclose rebuttal expert testimony is triggered only when the defense has timely disclosed the opinions being rebutted. Because the defense had not disclosed Dr. Kushida’s malingering opinions prior to trial, the government was not required to provide pretrial notice of Dr. Bornemann’s rebuttal. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the convictions.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-19</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Robert Bacharach</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-5052/24-5052-2026-05-18.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Thompson</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-18T08:34:27-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-18T08:34:27-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-5052/24-5052-2026-05-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A man drove his ten-year-old daughter from Oklahoma to Texas so she could participate in a gymnastics competition. While staying in a hotel together, he sexually abused her in the bathtub and later in bed. After the girl disclosed the abuse to her peers, three others—two of her half-sisters and her uncle, all minors at the time of their respective incidents—came forward with their own accounts of sexual abuse or inappropriate conduct by the same man. The evidence included testimony about prior incidents and hidden cameras used by the defendant to record his daughters.

A federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma charged the defendant with three crimes: transporting a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), aggravated sexual abuse of a minor in Indian Country under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1152, and 2241(c), and coercion and enticement of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). After a jury trial, he was convicted on all three counts and sentenced to life imprisonment for each, to run concurrently. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for transportation of a minor and aggravated sexual abuse, arguing specifically that the government failed to prove that his “dominant purpose” in transporting his daughter was sexual activity and failed to establish his non-Indian status.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that, under § 2423(a), the government must prove only that the defendant transported the minor “with intent” that she engage in illegal sexual activity, not that this was his dominant purpose, and found the evidence sufficient. The court also held that unchallenged testimonial evidence from family members was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a non-Indian. The convictions were affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-5052/24-5052-2026-05-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Thompson" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A man drove his ten-year-old daughter from Oklahoma to Texas so she could participate in a gymnastics competition. While staying in a hotel together, he sexually abused her in the bathtub and later in bed. After the girl disclosed the abuse to her peers, three others—two of her half-sisters and her uncle, all minors at the time of their respective incidents—came forward with their own accounts of sexual abuse or inappropriate conduct by the same man. The evidence included testimony about prior incidents and hidden cameras used by the defendant to record his daughters.

A federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma charged the defendant with three crimes: transporting a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), aggravated sexual abuse of a minor in Indian Country under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1152, and 2241(c), and coercion and enticement of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). After a jury trial, he was convicted on all three counts and sentenced to life imprisonment for each, to run concurrently. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for transportation of a minor and aggravated sexual abuse, arguing specifically that the government failed to prove that his “dominant purpose” in transporting his daughter was sexual activity and failed to establish his non-Indian status.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that, under § 2423(a), the government must prove only that the defendant transported the minor “with intent” that she engage in illegal sexual activity, not that this was his dominant purpose, and found the evidence sufficient. The court also held that unchallenged testimonial evidence from family members was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a non-Indian. The convictions were affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Allison Eid</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-6073/25-6073-2026-05-15.html</id>
        	<title>Universitas Education v. Phoenix Charitable Trust</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-15T08:34:03-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-15T08:34:03-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-6073/25-6073-2026-05-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A company was the beneficiary of life insurance policies held in a trust formed by Daniel Carpenter. After the insurer paid proceeds to the trust, the beneficiary sought to recover the full amount and alleged that Carpenter hid assets through hundreds of shell companies. Carpenter was convicted of fraud, and the beneficiary obtained a judgment in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, later registering the judgment in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. That court entered judgment against several Carpenter entities, including a limited liability company that owned another company incorporated in Oklahoma. A receiver was authorized to preserve the assets of the debtor company. 

An entity called Phoenix Charitable Trust, apparently linked to Carpenter, entered the Oklahoma proceedings as an “interested party” through its counsel, who had represented Carpenter and related entities in other courts. Phoenix objected to several orders issued by the district court: an award of attorney fees and costs against Carpenter, an order authorizing the sale of the Oklahoma company’s insurance portfolio, and an order denying Phoenix’s motion to vacate a prior injunction against Carpenter and his entities.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered whether Phoenix had standing to challenge these orders. The court found that Phoenix failed to demonstrate it was injured by the attorney fees order or the sale-of-assets order, as required for Article III standing. Regarding the injunction, the court concluded that Phoenix lacked prudential standing because it was asserting the rights of others rather than its own. The Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of standing and did not reach the merits of Phoenix’s challenges. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-6073/25-6073-2026-05-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Universitas Education v. Phoenix Charitable Trust" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A company was the beneficiary of life insurance policies held in a trust formed by Daniel Carpenter. After the insurer paid proceeds to the trust, the beneficiary sought to recover the full amount and alleged that Carpenter hid assets through hundreds of shell companies. Carpenter was convicted of fraud, and the beneficiary obtained a judgment in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, later registering the judgment in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. That court entered judgment against several Carpenter entities, including a limited liability company that owned another company incorporated in Oklahoma. A receiver was authorized to preserve the assets of the debtor company. 

An entity called Phoenix Charitable Trust, apparently linked to Carpenter, entered the Oklahoma proceedings as an “interested party” through its counsel, who had represented Carpenter and related entities in other courts. Phoenix objected to several orders issued by the district court: an award of attorney fees and costs against Carpenter, an order authorizing the sale of the Oklahoma company’s insurance portfolio, and an order denying Phoenix’s motion to vacate a prior injunction against Carpenter and his entities.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered whether Phoenix had standing to challenge these orders. The court found that Phoenix failed to demonstrate it was injured by the attorney fees order or the sale-of-assets order, as required for Article III standing. Regarding the injunction, the court concluded that Phoenix lacked prudential standing because it was asserting the rights of others rather than its own. The Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of standing and did not reach the merits of Phoenix’s challenges.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Harris Hartz</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Trusts &amp; Estates"/>
							<category term="Insurance Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-1068/25-1068-2026-05-11.html</id>
        	<title>Young v. Colorado Department of Corrections</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-11T09:03:49-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-11T09:03:49-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-1068/25-1068-2026-05-11.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A White male employee of the Colorado Department of Corrections was required to attend a racial sensitivity training program that addressed the historical mistreatment of racial minorities. He found the training offensive, alleging that it created a discriminatory and hostile work environment against White employees. The employee claimed that the training included materials and recommendations—such as a glossary and videos—that generalized about the role of all White people in perpetuating racial injustice. He also alleged that, following the training, there was an ongoing commitment to similar programs, that employees were required to endorse the training’s ideology, that supervisors used the training in disciplinary decisions, that the training compromised workplace security, and that the Department failed to investigate his complaints.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed the employee’s complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. The district court found that, even accepting the allegations as true, the facts pleaded did not plausibly show a workplace that was sufficiently hostile under the legal standard required for a hostile work environment claim. The court declined to liberally construe the complaint because it was drafted by counsel.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo, assuming for argument’s sake that the complaint should be liberally construed. The appellate court held that the employee did not plausibly allege facts sufficient to show that the workplace was permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, or insult that was severe or pervasive enough to create an abusive working environment. The court also affirmed dismissal of the constructive discharge claim and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the case with prejudice, as the plaintiff failed to address the deficiencies after multiple opportunities to amend. The judgment was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-1068/25-1068-2026-05-11.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Young v. Colorado Department of Corrections" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A White male employee of the Colorado Department of Corrections was required to attend a racial sensitivity training program that addressed the historical mistreatment of racial minorities. He found the training offensive, alleging that it created a discriminatory and hostile work environment against White employees. The employee claimed that the training included materials and recommendations—such as a glossary and videos—that generalized about the role of all White people in perpetuating racial injustice. He also alleged that, following the training, there was an ongoing commitment to similar programs, that employees were required to endorse the training’s ideology, that supervisors used the training in disciplinary decisions, that the training compromised workplace security, and that the Department failed to investigate his complaints.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed the employee’s complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. The district court found that, even accepting the allegations as true, the facts pleaded did not plausibly show a workplace that was sufficiently hostile under the legal standard required for a hostile work environment claim. The court declined to liberally construe the complaint because it was drafted by counsel.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo, assuming for argument’s sake that the complaint should be liberally construed. The appellate court held that the employee did not plausibly allege facts sufficient to show that the workplace was permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, or insult that was severe or pervasive enough to create an abusive working environment. The court also affirmed dismissal of the constructive discharge claim and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the case with prejudice, as the plaintiff failed to address the deficiencies after multiple opportunities to amend. The judgment was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Robert Bacharach</case:judge>
													<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-1034/25-1034-2026-05-11.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Coad</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-11T08:04:27-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-11T08:04:27-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-1034/25-1034-2026-05-11.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case concerns a defendant with a longstanding history of mental illness and violent behavior, who was indicted in federal court for mailing threatening communications to a former prosecutor. The defendant’s mental health history included diagnoses such as psychosis and bipolar disorder, and he had been incarcerated for nearly two decades. After the indictment, both parties questioned the defendant’s competence to stand trial due to his mental condition.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado first found the defendant incompetent and committed him to the custody of the Attorney General for hospitalization and treatment in an attempt to restore competency under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d). Medical staff at the hospital later reported that competency appeared to have been restored with medication, but after release from the hospital, the defendant ceased taking his prescribed drugs. Before a formal competency-restoration hearing could be held, both parties again concluded that the defendant was incompetent. After a hearing, the district court found the defendant incompetent and unrestorable for trial. The government then moved to hospitalize him for a dangerousness evaluation under 18 U.S.C. § 4246, which the defendant opposed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. The appellate court affirmed the portion of the order hospitalizing the defendant for a precertification dangerousness evaluation under § 4246(a), holding that once a defendant is found incompetent and unrestorable, the district court may order temporary hospitalization for evaluation of dangerousness. However, the appellate court reversed the district court’s order for a formal examination and report under § 4246(b), holding that only the court in the district of the evaluating hospital has authority for such an order. The case was remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-1034/25-1034-2026-05-11.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Coad" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case concerns a defendant with a longstanding history of mental illness and violent behavior, who was indicted in federal court for mailing threatening communications to a former prosecutor. The defendant’s mental health history included diagnoses such as psychosis and bipolar disorder, and he had been incarcerated for nearly two decades. After the indictment, both parties questioned the defendant’s competence to stand trial due to his mental condition.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado first found the defendant incompetent and committed him to the custody of the Attorney General for hospitalization and treatment in an attempt to restore competency under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d). Medical staff at the hospital later reported that competency appeared to have been restored with medication, but after release from the hospital, the defendant ceased taking his prescribed drugs. Before a formal competency-restoration hearing could be held, both parties again concluded that the defendant was incompetent. After a hearing, the district court found the defendant incompetent and unrestorable for trial. The government then moved to hospitalize him for a dangerousness evaluation under 18 U.S.C. § 4246, which the defendant opposed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. The appellate court affirmed the portion of the order hospitalizing the defendant for a precertification dangerousness evaluation under § 4246(a), holding that once a defendant is found incompetent and unrestorable, the district court may order temporary hospitalization for evaluation of dangerousness. However, the appellate court reversed the district court’s order for a formal examination and report under § 4246(b), holding that only the court in the district of the evaluating hospital has authority for such an order. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Gregory Alan Phillips</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-6028/25-6028-2026-05-06.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Dias</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-06T09:07:24-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-06T09:07:24-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-6028/25-6028-2026-05-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In this case, the defendant was discovered inside a stranger’s apartment in Oklahoma City. After being confronted by the resident, a physical altercation ensued and the defendant fled. The resident claimed that the defendant pulled a gun and fired at him as he was chased outside. Although no firearm was recovered, police found a recently fired shell casing at the scene. Video evidence and witness testimony corroborated the sequence of events. The defendant was subsequently arrested after a foot chase, and a grand jury indicted him for possessing ammunition as a felon.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma presided over the trial. The government sought to introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm under Rule 404(b), which the defendant opposed. The district court admitted the evidence over objection, provided a limiting instruction, and the jury found the defendant guilty. The presentence report calculated a guideline range of 63 to 78 months; however, the district court imposed an above-guidelines sentence of 120 months, citing the seriousness and repetitive nature of the defendant’s conduct.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the admission of the prior conviction was an abuse of discretion because knowledge was not at issue under the circumstances, but found the error harmless due to the strength of the evidence. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, the sentence was substantively reasonable, and the argument that the statute was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment was foreclosed by binding precedent. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-6028/25-6028-2026-05-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Dias" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In this case, the defendant was discovered inside a stranger’s apartment in Oklahoma City. After being confronted by the resident, a physical altercation ensued and the defendant fled. The resident claimed that the defendant pulled a gun and fired at him as he was chased outside. Although no firearm was recovered, police found a recently fired shell casing at the scene. Video evidence and witness testimony corroborated the sequence of events. The defendant was subsequently arrested after a foot chase, and a grand jury indicted him for possessing ammunition as a felon.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma presided over the trial. The government sought to introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm under Rule 404(b), which the defendant opposed. The district court admitted the evidence over objection, provided a limiting instruction, and the jury found the defendant guilty. The presentence report calculated a guideline range of 63 to 78 months; however, the district court imposed an above-guidelines sentence of 120 months, citing the seriousness and repetitive nature of the defendant’s conduct.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the admission of the prior conviction was an abuse of discretion because knowledge was not at issue under the circumstances, but found the error harmless due to the strength of the evidence. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, the sentence was substantively reasonable, and the argument that the statute was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment was foreclosed by binding precedent. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Carolyn McHugh</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-5026/25-5026-2026-05-06.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. McCarthy</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-06T09:07:23-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-06T09:07:23-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-5026/25-5026-2026-05-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Brandon and Rachel McCarthy operated an online business, Lone Goose Bakery, selling unprocessed poppy seeds coated in opium latex. These seeds, not processed to food-grade standards, retained opium alkaloids, including morphine, codeine, and thebaine. The McCarthys primarily sold to individual consumers and provided publications with guidance and recipes for brewing poppy-seed tea, which can contain significant amounts of these controlled substances and poses substantial health risks. At least one customer died from an overdose after consuming tea made from their seeds.

A grand jury in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma returned a superseding indictment against the McCarthys, charging them with multiple counts, some for distributing or possessing controlled substances and others for distributing or possessing “precursors” for controlled substances. The defendants moved to dismiss all charges, arguing that the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) excludes poppy seeds, that any ambiguity should be resolved in their favor, and that the law was unconstitutionally vague if read to prohibit their conduct. The district court granted the motion, including as to counts based on the theory that the unprocessed seeds were precursors for manufacturing controlled substances.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that, while poppy seeds are excluded from the controlled substances schedule, the CSA prohibits the knowing distribution or possession of materials intended to be used to manufacture controlled substances. The court held that unprocessed poppy seeds coated with opium latex constitute a “material” that may be used to manufacture a controlled substance when intended for extraction of opiates. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the related charges and remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-5026/25-5026-2026-05-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. McCarthy" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Brandon and Rachel McCarthy operated an online business, Lone Goose Bakery, selling unprocessed poppy seeds coated in opium latex. These seeds, not processed to food-grade standards, retained opium alkaloids, including morphine, codeine, and thebaine. The McCarthys primarily sold to individual consumers and provided publications with guidance and recipes for brewing poppy-seed tea, which can contain significant amounts of these controlled substances and poses substantial health risks. At least one customer died from an overdose after consuming tea made from their seeds.

A grand jury in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma returned a superseding indictment against the McCarthys, charging them with multiple counts, some for distributing or possessing controlled substances and others for distributing or possessing “precursors” for controlled substances. The defendants moved to dismiss all charges, arguing that the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) excludes poppy seeds, that any ambiguity should be resolved in their favor, and that the law was unconstitutionally vague if read to prohibit their conduct. The district court granted the motion, including as to counts based on the theory that the unprocessed seeds were precursors for manufacturing controlled substances.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that, while poppy seeds are excluded from the controlled substances schedule, the CSA prohibits the knowing distribution or possession of materials intended to be used to manufacture controlled substances. The court held that unprocessed poppy seeds coated with opium latex constitute a “material” that may be used to manufacture a controlled substance when intended for extraction of opiates. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the related charges and remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Harris Hartz</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-3142/25-3142-2026-05-05.html</id>
        	<title>Rider v. Oxy USA</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-05T09:07:17-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-05T09:07:17-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-3142/25-3142-2026-05-05.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several individuals who own royalty interests in the Kansas Hugoton Gas Field brought a putative class action against two energy companies. Their claims are based on an alleged breach of a 2008 class action settlement agreement, which had resolved earlier disputes about underpayment of royalties by one of the companies. The 2008 settlement required limits on certain deductions from royalty payments and specified that its terms would bind successors, assigns, and related entities. In 2014, one defendant acquired assets from the other and continued making royalty payments. Plaintiffs allege the acquiring company violated the settlement by taking improper deductions after the acquisition.

The plaintiffs initially sought to enforce the settlement in Kansas state court, but the District Court of Stevens County determined the judgment had become dormant and unenforceable. Plaintiffs appealed that ruling, and while the appeal was pending, they filed this federal class action complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. The district court denied defendants’ motions to dismiss but later denied class certification. The district court found that the proposed class was not ascertainable because identifying class members would require individualized title review and that other Rule 23 requirements were not satisfied.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The appellate court clarified that, under its recent precedent, class ascertainability does not require administrative feasibility—only an objectively and clearly defined class. The court found the proposed class ascertainable, that common questions predominated, and that the plaintiffs satisfied all Rule 23 requirements. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of class certification and remanded with instructions to certify the putative class. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-3142/25-3142-2026-05-05.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Rider v. Oxy USA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several individuals who own royalty interests in the Kansas Hugoton Gas Field brought a putative class action against two energy companies. Their claims are based on an alleged breach of a 2008 class action settlement agreement, which had resolved earlier disputes about underpayment of royalties by one of the companies. The 2008 settlement required limits on certain deductions from royalty payments and specified that its terms would bind successors, assigns, and related entities. In 2014, one defendant acquired assets from the other and continued making royalty payments. Plaintiffs allege the acquiring company violated the settlement by taking improper deductions after the acquisition.

The plaintiffs initially sought to enforce the settlement in Kansas state court, but the District Court of Stevens County determined the judgment had become dormant and unenforceable. Plaintiffs appealed that ruling, and while the appeal was pending, they filed this federal class action complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. The district court denied defendants’ motions to dismiss but later denied class certification. The district court found that the proposed class was not ascertainable because identifying class members would require individualized title review and that other Rule 23 requirements were not satisfied.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The appellate court clarified that, under its recent precedent, class ascertainability does not require administrative feasibility—only an objectively and clearly defined class. The court found the proposed class ascertainable, that common questions predominated, and that the plaintiffs satisfied all Rule 23 requirements. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of class certification and remanded with instructions to certify the putative class.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Paul Kelly</case:judge>
													<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Energy, Oil &amp; Gas Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-7069/24-7069-2026-05-05.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Bycroft</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-05T08:02:52-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-05T08:02:52-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-7069/24-7069-2026-05-05.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves a defendant who was charged with producing child pornography and possessing material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor. The charges centered on three videos found in her husband’s online storage account, showing him interacting with a six-year-old girl in a pool at a family gathering. The defendant was not visible in the videos, but a woman’s voice—alleged to be hers—was present. She denied it was her voice, but several witnesses identified it as hers. The government also introduced evidence that, years after the pool incident, the defendant and her husband had made videos in public places surreptitiously filming up women’s skirts. In these later videos, the defendant was visually and audibly identifiable.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma admitted three of these “Peeping Tom” videos as evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), finding them relevant and admissible to prove the defendant’s identity as the camera operator in the pool videos and to show the absence of mistake or accident. The court limited the number of such videos introduced and declined to further edit them, as the defendant did not request specific excision and the entire videos were relevant for the stated purposes. After trial, the defendant was convicted.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting the “other acts” evidence. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court acted within its discretion. The court found the later videos relevant, sufficiently similar, and admissible for the proper purposes of proving identity and absence of mistake or accident, thus affirming the conviction. The appellate court did not address other proposed grounds for admission, as it found the purposes relied upon by the district court adequate. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-7069/24-7069-2026-05-05.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Bycroft" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves a defendant who was charged with producing child pornography and possessing material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor. The charges centered on three videos found in her husband’s online storage account, showing him interacting with a six-year-old girl in a pool at a family gathering. The defendant was not visible in the videos, but a woman’s voice—alleged to be hers—was present. She denied it was her voice, but several witnesses identified it as hers. The government also introduced evidence that, years after the pool incident, the defendant and her husband had made videos in public places surreptitiously filming up women’s skirts. In these later videos, the defendant was visually and audibly identifiable.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma admitted three of these “Peeping Tom” videos as evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), finding them relevant and admissible to prove the defendant’s identity as the camera operator in the pool videos and to show the absence of mistake or accident. The court limited the number of such videos introduced and declined to further edit them, as the defendant did not request specific excision and the entire videos were relevant for the stated purposes. After trial, the defendant was convicted.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting the “other acts” evidence. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court acted within its discretion. The court found the later videos relevant, sufficiently similar, and admissible for the proper purposes of proving identity and absence of mistake or accident, thus affirming the conviction. The appellate court did not address other proposed grounds for admission, as it found the purposes relied upon by the district court adequate.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>David Ebel</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-5086/24-5086-2026-05-05.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Campbell</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-05T08:02:51-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-05T08:02:51-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-5086/24-5086-2026-05-05.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case concerns a defendant who, as a member of the Osage Nation, was previously convicted in Oklahoma state courts of several offenses, all committed in areas recognized as Indian country. In 2013, she was convicted of driving under the influence in Washington County. She was subsequently convicted in Mayes County in 2016 for possessing methamphetamine and a firearm, and again in Tulsa County in 2016 for possession of controlled substances and paraphernalia, as well as impersonation. In each proceeding, she was represented by counsel. Later, she was indicted in federal court for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances after a DEA investigation, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced.

Prior to this appeal, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma calculated her advisory Sentencing Guidelines range by including her three prior state convictions in her Criminal History Category. The defendant objected, arguing that the state courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over her because she is Native American and the offenses occurred in Indian country. The district court overruled her objection, noting the convictions had not been vacated or reversed by any Oklahoma court and were not obtained in violation of her right to counsel. The district court ultimately sentenced her after applying a downward variance.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred in including the prior state convictions in the Criminal History calculation. The Tenth Circuit held that, under federal law and United States Sentencing Guidelines, prior state convictions must be counted unless they have been vacated, reversed, or were obtained in violation of the right to counsel. The court found no exception for convictions alleged to be void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, absent their invalidation by the convicting court. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-5086/24-5086-2026-05-05.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case concerns a defendant who, as a member of the Osage Nation, was previously convicted in Oklahoma state courts of several offenses, all committed in areas recognized as Indian country. In 2013, she was convicted of driving under the influence in Washington County. She was subsequently convicted in Mayes County in 2016 for possessing methamphetamine and a firearm, and again in Tulsa County in 2016 for possession of controlled substances and paraphernalia, as well as impersonation. In each proceeding, she was represented by counsel. Later, she was indicted in federal court for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances after a DEA investigation, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced.

Prior to this appeal, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma calculated her advisory Sentencing Guidelines range by including her three prior state convictions in her Criminal History Category. The defendant objected, arguing that the state courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over her because she is Native American and the offenses occurred in Indian country. The district court overruled her objection, noting the convictions had not been vacated or reversed by any Oklahoma court and were not obtained in violation of her right to counsel. The district court ultimately sentenced her after applying a downward variance.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred in including the prior state convictions in the Criminal History calculation. The Tenth Circuit held that, under federal law and United States Sentencing Guidelines, prior state convictions must be counted unless they have been vacated, reversed, or were obtained in violation of the right to counsel. The court found no exception for convictions alleged to be void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, absent their invalidation by the convicting court. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Michael R. Murphy</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Native American Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-8039/25-8039-2026-05-04.html</id>
        	<title>Smith v. Albany County School District No. 1</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-04T08:33:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-04T08:33:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-8039/25-8039-2026-05-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A high school student in Wyoming was repeatedly suspended and eventually arrested for refusing to comply with her school district’s indoor mask mandate, which was implemented during a local COVID-19 surge. The student and her parents sued the school district, various trustees, the superintendent, and the principal, alleging violations of their federal and state rights. Their federal claims asserted that the mask mandate compelled speech and resulted in unlawful retaliation against the student for protesting, both under the First Amendment, and that she was deprived of her property interest in a public education without due process, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The case was initially filed in Wyoming state court and then removed to the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming. That court first dismissed the federal claims for lack of standing, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient injury. On remand, the district court dismissed the federal claims for failure to state a claim and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the supplemental state-law claims.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiffs did not adequately allege that the mask mandate compelled any specific message and thus failed to state a compelled-speech claim. The court also found that the student’s refusal to wear a mask was not expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment and that her participation in protest activities was not plausibly alleged to be the but-for cause of her discipline, defeating the retaliation claim. Regarding due process, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the student received sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard before her suspensions, satisfying procedural due process. The court also concluded that no substantive due process violation occurred. Finally, the Tenth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to dismiss the state-law claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-8039/25-8039-2026-05-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Smith v. Albany County School District No. 1" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A high school student in Wyoming was repeatedly suspended and eventually arrested for refusing to comply with her school district’s indoor mask mandate, which was implemented during a local COVID-19 surge. The student and her parents sued the school district, various trustees, the superintendent, and the principal, alleging violations of their federal and state rights. Their federal claims asserted that the mask mandate compelled speech and resulted in unlawful retaliation against the student for protesting, both under the First Amendment, and that she was deprived of her property interest in a public education without due process, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The case was initially filed in Wyoming state court and then removed to the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming. That court first dismissed the federal claims for lack of standing, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient injury. On remand, the district court dismissed the federal claims for failure to state a claim and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the supplemental state-law claims.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiffs did not adequately allege that the mask mandate compelled any specific message and thus failed to state a compelled-speech claim. The court also found that the student’s refusal to wear a mask was not expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment and that her participation in protest activities was not plausibly alleged to be the but-for cause of her discipline, defeating the retaliation claim. Regarding due process, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the student received sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard before her suspensions, satisfying procedural due process. The court also concluded that no substantive due process violation occurred. Finally, the Tenth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to dismiss the state-law claims.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Timothy Tymkovich</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Education Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-1142/25-1142-2026-04-27.html</id>
        	<title>Martinez v. City of Aurora, Colorado</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-27T09:06:33-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-27T09:06:33-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-1142/25-1142-2026-04-27.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A resident of an apartment complex in Aurora, Colorado, was attacked by an off-duty police officer, who was then on administrative leave following a prior on-duty shooting. During the incident, the officer confronted the resident, identified himself as a police officer, displayed his badge, and used force to subdue and attempt to arrest her. The resident suffered serious injuries and subsequently brought a federal civil rights lawsuit against both the officer and the City of Aurora under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado initially denied the City’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that the complaint plausibly alleged the officer acted under color of law, even though he was on administrative leave. The district court relied on prior Tenth Circuit precedent that allowed either actual or apparent authority to satisfy the state-action requirement. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Lindke v. Freed, which clarified that only actual authority can satisfy the state-action requirement, the City sought reconsideration. The district court denied reconsideration, this time finding that the complaint sufficiently pleaded the officer had actual authority, partly because he retained his badge and an off-duty policy was allegedly in effect.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case on interlocutory appeal. The court held that, following Lindke v. Freed, a § 1983 plaintiff must plausibly allege the official had actual authority to engage in the specific conduct at issue, and that apparent authority is insufficient. The Tenth Circuit concluded the complaint failed to plausibly allege the officer had actual authority to act as a sworn police officer while on administrative leave, reversing the district court’s denial of reconsideration and remanding for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-1142/25-1142-2026-04-27.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Martinez v. City of Aurora, Colorado" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A resident of an apartment complex in Aurora, Colorado, was attacked by an off-duty police officer, who was then on administrative leave following a prior on-duty shooting. During the incident, the officer confronted the resident, identified himself as a police officer, displayed his badge, and used force to subdue and attempt to arrest her. The resident suffered serious injuries and subsequently brought a federal civil rights lawsuit against both the officer and the City of Aurora under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado initially denied the City’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that the complaint plausibly alleged the officer acted under color of law, even though he was on administrative leave. The district court relied on prior Tenth Circuit precedent that allowed either actual or apparent authority to satisfy the state-action requirement. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Lindke v. Freed, which clarified that only actual authority can satisfy the state-action requirement, the City sought reconsideration. The district court denied reconsideration, this time finding that the complaint sufficiently pleaded the officer had actual authority, partly because he retained his badge and an off-duty policy was allegedly in effect.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case on interlocutory appeal. The court held that, following Lindke v. Freed, a § 1983 plaintiff must plausibly allege the official had actual authority to engage in the specific conduct at issue, and that apparent authority is insufficient. The Tenth Circuit concluded the complaint failed to plausibly allege the officer had actual authority to act as a sworn police officer while on administrative leave, reversing the district court’s denial of reconsideration and remanding for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Veronica Rossman</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-5028/25-5028-2026-04-27.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Petro</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-27T08:03:51-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-27T08:03:51-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-5028/25-5028-2026-04-27.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In August 2023, an adult defendant began communicating over the Whisper social media app with an individual he believed to be an adult, but who was actually thirteen years old. The two exchanged frequent communications, including explicit text, audio, and video messages, and spoke regularly over the course of several weeks. The defendant claimed he thought the other party was an adult, based on her representations, and that any mention of a younger age was part of a roleplay scenario. The communications were discovered when the minor’s classmates alerted school officials, leading to law enforcement intervention and the defendant’s indictment for coercion or enticement of a minor.

The case proceeded to trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma. A jury found the defendant guilty after less than forty minutes of deliberation, and he was sentenced to 140 months in prison. During closing arguments, the prosecutor made remarks suggesting the defendant’s presumption of innocence had been removed by the evidence, and reinforced this with a visual presentation, but the defense did not object at the time. The jury was instructed on the presumption of innocence only at the start of trial, and no specific curative instructions were given after the prosecutor’s statements.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case under plain error analysis, given the lack of objection at trial. The court held that the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument constituted a clear and obvious error that infringed the defendant&#039;s constitutional right to the presumption of innocence. The court found the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights, given the context and timing of the remarks, the absence of overwhelming evidence, and insufficient curative instructions. The conviction was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-5028/25-5028-2026-04-27.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Petro" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In August 2023, an adult defendant began communicating over the Whisper social media app with an individual he believed to be an adult, but who was actually thirteen years old. The two exchanged frequent communications, including explicit text, audio, and video messages, and spoke regularly over the course of several weeks. The defendant claimed he thought the other party was an adult, based on her representations, and that any mention of a younger age was part of a roleplay scenario. The communications were discovered when the minor’s classmates alerted school officials, leading to law enforcement intervention and the defendant’s indictment for coercion or enticement of a minor.

The case proceeded to trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma. A jury found the defendant guilty after less than forty minutes of deliberation, and he was sentenced to 140 months in prison. During closing arguments, the prosecutor made remarks suggesting the defendant’s presumption of innocence had been removed by the evidence, and reinforced this with a visual presentation, but the defense did not object at the time. The jury was instructed on the presumption of innocence only at the start of trial, and no specific curative instructions were given after the prosecutor’s statements.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case under plain error analysis, given the lack of objection at trial. The court held that the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument constituted a clear and obvious error that infringed the defendant&#039;s constitutional right to the presumption of innocence. The court found the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights, given the context and timing of the remarks, the absence of overwhelming evidence, and insufficient curative instructions. The conviction was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Paul Kelly</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-6132/24-6132-2026-04-27.html</id>
        	<title>Devon Energy Production Company v. DOI</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-27T08:03:51-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-27T08:03:51-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-6132/24-6132-2026-04-27.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Devon Energy Production Company, L.P. was engaged in gas production from two New Mexico units under a federal lease, which required payment of royalties to the federal government. State officials, acting under federal authority, audited Devon Energy’s operations and disallowed certain deductions related to the treatment and transportation of natural gas over a four-year period. The charges for these services were bundled, making it difficult to separate deductible from non-deductible costs. A related Devon entity had previously resolved a similar dispute with the government through a settlement agreement, which established formulas for calculating allowable deductions.

The Office of Natural Resources Revenue, a federal agency, reviewed Devon Energy’s objections to the audit and upheld the disallowance, ordering payment of the contested royalties or further documentation. Devon Energy sought review in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, arguing that the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously by not considering the prior settlement agreement. The district court affirmed the agency’s decision, reasoning that the agreement did not cover all disputed royalties.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo, applying the arbitrary-and-capricious standard. The Tenth Circuit found that the agency erred by failing to consider the prior settlement agreement, which may have had significant legal and factual implications for the calculation of deductions. The court also found that the record was insufficient to support the government’s alternative arguments for affirmance, such as the identity of the contracting entity and the expiration of the agreement’s terms. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for the district court to determine the appropriate remedy—whether vacatur of the agency’s decision or a remand to the agency is warranted. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-6132/24-6132-2026-04-27.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Devon Energy Production Company v. DOI" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Devon Energy Production Company, L.P. was engaged in gas production from two New Mexico units under a federal lease, which required payment of royalties to the federal government. State officials, acting under federal authority, audited Devon Energy’s operations and disallowed certain deductions related to the treatment and transportation of natural gas over a four-year period. The charges for these services were bundled, making it difficult to separate deductible from non-deductible costs. A related Devon entity had previously resolved a similar dispute with the government through a settlement agreement, which established formulas for calculating allowable deductions.

The Office of Natural Resources Revenue, a federal agency, reviewed Devon Energy’s objections to the audit and upheld the disallowance, ordering payment of the contested royalties or further documentation. Devon Energy sought review in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, arguing that the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously by not considering the prior settlement agreement. The district court affirmed the agency’s decision, reasoning that the agreement did not cover all disputed royalties.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo, applying the arbitrary-and-capricious standard. The Tenth Circuit found that the agency erred by failing to consider the prior settlement agreement, which may have had significant legal and factual implications for the calculation of deductions. The court also found that the record was insufficient to support the government’s alternative arguments for affirmance, such as the identity of the contracting entity and the expiration of the agreement’s terms. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for the district court to determine the appropriate remedy—whether vacatur of the agency’s decision or a remand to the agency is warranted.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Robert Bacharach</case:judge>
													<category term="Energy, Oil &amp; Gas Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-5078/25-5078-2026-04-24.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Holt</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-24T08:34:05-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-24T08:34:05-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-5078/25-5078-2026-04-24.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Law enforcement suspected an individual of drug trafficking activity from his home in Oklahoma. Investigators used a confidential informant and GPS tracking of a known methamphetamine dealer’s vehicle, which led them to the suspect’s residence. A search of trash from the property revealed syringes and baggies that tested positive for methamphetamine, along with mail addressed to the suspect. Agents learned the suspect was a member of the Cherokee Nation and had a significant criminal history involving drugs. Because the house was in Indian Country and the suspect’s co-resident was a non-Indian, officers sought warrants from both a tribal and a state judge. The tribal judge issued a warrant based on the initial affidavit, while the state judge initially denied a similar application but later granted one after additional information was provided. Officers executed the search under the tribal warrant and found drugs, paraphernalia, and firearms.

In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence found during the search, arguing it was the fruit of an unlawful search, and to compel disclosure of the government’s confidential informant. The district court denied suppression, applying the good-faith exception, and also denied the motion to compel after the government stated it would not use the informant or related evidence at trial.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the search was supported by probable cause and that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied even though the state judge initially denied a similar warrant. The court also found no violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, as the search was not federal in character. Regarding the confidential informant, the appellate court held that the defendant waived his argument about disclosure aiding his suppression hearing, as this was not raised below. The conviction was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-5078/25-5078-2026-04-24.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Holt" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Law enforcement suspected an individual of drug trafficking activity from his home in Oklahoma. Investigators used a confidential informant and GPS tracking of a known methamphetamine dealer’s vehicle, which led them to the suspect’s residence. A search of trash from the property revealed syringes and baggies that tested positive for methamphetamine, along with mail addressed to the suspect. Agents learned the suspect was a member of the Cherokee Nation and had a significant criminal history involving drugs. Because the house was in Indian Country and the suspect’s co-resident was a non-Indian, officers sought warrants from both a tribal and a state judge. The tribal judge issued a warrant based on the initial affidavit, while the state judge initially denied a similar application but later granted one after additional information was provided. Officers executed the search under the tribal warrant and found drugs, paraphernalia, and firearms.

In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence found during the search, arguing it was the fruit of an unlawful search, and to compel disclosure of the government’s confidential informant. The district court denied suppression, applying the good-faith exception, and also denied the motion to compel after the government stated it would not use the informant or related evidence at trial.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the search was supported by probable cause and that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied even though the state judge initially denied a similar warrant. The court also found no violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, as the search was not federal in character. Regarding the confidential informant, the appellate court held that the defendant waived his argument about disclosure aiding his suppression hearing, as this was not raised below. The conviction was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-24</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Timothy Tymkovich</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1209/24-1209-2026-04-23.html</id>
        	<title>National Association for Gun Rights v. Polis</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-23T09:09:14-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-23T09:09:14-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1209/24-1209-2026-04-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In June 2023, Colorado enacted a law prohibiting the purchase, sale, transfer, and possession of unserialized firearms, frames, receivers, and firearm parts kits, as well as the manufacture of firearm frames or receivers by most people. Several individuals and two associations representing Colorado gun owners sued, alleging that the statute infringes their Second Amendment rights. The individual plaintiffs had previously purchased or owned firearm parts kits and intended to continue similar activities but for the new law. The associations represent gun owners in Colorado and were acting on behalf of similarly situated members.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. It determined that one individual plaintiff had standing to challenge the possession prohibition, but found that the claims relating to future acquisition were not ripe due to an overlapping federal regulation, and that claims challenging the manufacturing prohibition lacked standing because the plaintiffs’ conduct was not covered by that provision. The court denied the preliminary injunction, concluding that the possession prohibition was a presumptively constitutional condition on the commercial sale of firearms that did not implicate the plain text of the Second Amendment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the plaintiff had standing to challenge both the possession and acquisition prohibitions, but not the manufacturing prohibition. The court found that the district court erred in treating the possession prohibition as a condition on commercial sales, since the law regulated possession regardless of how the item was acquired. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction as to the possession prohibition, holding that this provision regulates possession, not just commercial sales. The court remanded for further proceedings, directing the district court to address the merits of the acquisition prohibition claim in the first instance. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1209/24-1209-2026-04-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "National Association for Gun Rights v. Polis" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In June 2023, Colorado enacted a law prohibiting the purchase, sale, transfer, and possession of unserialized firearms, frames, receivers, and firearm parts kits, as well as the manufacture of firearm frames or receivers by most people. Several individuals and two associations representing Colorado gun owners sued, alleging that the statute infringes their Second Amendment rights. The individual plaintiffs had previously purchased or owned firearm parts kits and intended to continue similar activities but for the new law. The associations represent gun owners in Colorado and were acting on behalf of similarly situated members.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. It determined that one individual plaintiff had standing to challenge the possession prohibition, but found that the claims relating to future acquisition were not ripe due to an overlapping federal regulation, and that claims challenging the manufacturing prohibition lacked standing because the plaintiffs’ conduct was not covered by that provision. The court denied the preliminary injunction, concluding that the possession prohibition was a presumptively constitutional condition on the commercial sale of firearms that did not implicate the plain text of the Second Amendment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the plaintiff had standing to challenge both the possession and acquisition prohibitions, but not the manufacturing prohibition. The court found that the district court erred in treating the possession prohibition as a condition on commercial sales, since the law regulated possession regardless of how the item was acquired. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction as to the possession prohibition, holding that this provision regulates possession, not just commercial sales. The court remanded for further proceedings, directing the district court to address the merits of the acquisition prohibition claim in the first instance.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Joel Carson</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-1410/23-1410-2026-04-21.html</id>
        	<title>Liberty Global v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-21T21:07:12-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-21T21:07:12-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-1410/23-1410-2026-04-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A United States corporation, serving as the parent of a group of multinational affiliates, devised a series of four transactions in 2018, codenamed “Project Soy,” to exploit a mismatch in the international tax provisions of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. The transactions, planned with the help of tax professionals, were designed to generate artificial earnings and profits, allowing the corporation to avoid global intangible low-taxed income (GILTI) and capital gain taxes on substantial profits from its interest in a foreign subsidiary. The final transaction in the sequence involved the sale of that interest to a related foreign company, with the corporation claiming a large deduction under 26 U.S.C. § 245A.

After the Internal Revenue Service issued a regulation to close the exploited loophole, the corporation filed its 2018 tax return in compliance, but subsequently amended the return, arguing the regulation was invalid and claiming a far larger deduction. Before the IRS completed its review, the corporation sued for a tax refund in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. The district court first ruled the regulation was procedurally invalid, then addressed whether the codified economic substance doctrine in 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o) applied. The corporation admitted the first three steps of Project Soy lacked economic substance but argued the doctrine was irrelevant to its transactions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The court held that the economic substance doctrine codified in § 7701(o) applies to transactions designed solely to obtain tax benefits unintended by Congress, even if the transactions comply with the literal terms of the tax code. The court rejected the argument that certain types of “basic business transactions” are categorically exempt. The judgment of the district court, denying the claimed deduction, was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-1410/23-1410-2026-04-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Liberty Global v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A United States corporation, serving as the parent of a group of multinational affiliates, devised a series of four transactions in 2018, codenamed “Project Soy,” to exploit a mismatch in the international tax provisions of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. The transactions, planned with the help of tax professionals, were designed to generate artificial earnings and profits, allowing the corporation to avoid global intangible low-taxed income (GILTI) and capital gain taxes on substantial profits from its interest in a foreign subsidiary. The final transaction in the sequence involved the sale of that interest to a related foreign company, with the corporation claiming a large deduction under 26 U.S.C. § 245A.

After the Internal Revenue Service issued a regulation to close the exploited loophole, the corporation filed its 2018 tax return in compliance, but subsequently amended the return, arguing the regulation was invalid and claiming a far larger deduction. Before the IRS completed its review, the corporation sued for a tax refund in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. The district court first ruled the regulation was procedurally invalid, then addressed whether the codified economic substance doctrine in 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o) applied. The corporation admitted the first three steps of Project Soy lacked economic substance but argued the doctrine was irrelevant to its transactions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The court held that the economic substance doctrine codified in § 7701(o) applies to transactions designed solely to obtain tax benefits unintended by Congress, even if the transactions comply with the literal terms of the tax code. The court rejected the argument that certain types of “basic business transactions” are categorically exempt. The judgment of the district court, denying the claimed deduction, was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Michael R. Murphy</case:judge>
													<category term="Tax Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-5035/24-5035-2026-04-21.html</id>
        	<title>Bond v. Sheriff of Ottawa County</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-21T11:03:09-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-21T11:03:09-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-5035/24-5035-2026-04-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A young man, Terral Ellis II, voluntarily surrendered to the Ottawa County Jail in Oklahoma on an outstanding warrant and was held as a pretrial detainee. Over the course of twelve days, he developed serious medical symptoms, including severe back pain, seizures, and increasing inability to walk or care for himself. Despite repeated complaints from Ellis and visible distress—including pleas for medical help, requests for water, and reports of numbness and discoloration in his legs—jail staff largely failed to provide timely or adequate medical care. The jail nurse and staff often dismissed or mocked Ellis’s complaints, and did not follow jail policies for medical monitoring or emergency care. EMS was called once but did not transport him to the hospital. The next day, as his condition worsened, staff again delayed action. Ellis died from septic shock due to acute bronchopneumonia after finally being taken to a hospital.

The Estate of Terral Ellis sued the Sheriff of Ottawa County in his official capacity in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, alleging violation of Ellis’s constitutional right to adequate medical care under the Fourteenth Amendment. After trial, the jury found in favor of the Estate, awarding $33 million in compensatory damages. The district court denied the Sheriff’s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law, new trial, remittitur, and reconsideration, and awarded attorneys’ fees and costs to the Estate.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court in full. The main holding was that the evidence supported the jury’s finding that Ottawa County, through the Sheriff’s office, acted with deliberate indifference to Ellis’s serious medical needs as a result of gross deficiencies in policies, training, and supervision. The Tenth Circuit also upheld the jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, the damages award, and the attorneys’ fees award. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-5035/24-5035-2026-04-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Bond v. Sheriff of Ottawa County" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A young man, Terral Ellis II, voluntarily surrendered to the Ottawa County Jail in Oklahoma on an outstanding warrant and was held as a pretrial detainee. Over the course of twelve days, he developed serious medical symptoms, including severe back pain, seizures, and increasing inability to walk or care for himself. Despite repeated complaints from Ellis and visible distress—including pleas for medical help, requests for water, and reports of numbness and discoloration in his legs—jail staff largely failed to provide timely or adequate medical care. The jail nurse and staff often dismissed or mocked Ellis’s complaints, and did not follow jail policies for medical monitoring or emergency care. EMS was called once but did not transport him to the hospital. The next day, as his condition worsened, staff again delayed action. Ellis died from septic shock due to acute bronchopneumonia after finally being taken to a hospital.

The Estate of Terral Ellis sued the Sheriff of Ottawa County in his official capacity in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, alleging violation of Ellis’s constitutional right to adequate medical care under the Fourteenth Amendment. After trial, the jury found in favor of the Estate, awarding $33 million in compensatory damages. The district court denied the Sheriff’s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law, new trial, remittitur, and reconsideration, and awarded attorneys’ fees and costs to the Estate.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court in full. The main holding was that the evidence supported the jury’s finding that Ottawa County, through the Sheriff’s office, acted with deliberate indifference to Ellis’s serious medical needs as a result of gross deficiencies in policies, training, and supervision. The Tenth Circuit also upheld the jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, the damages award, and the attorneys’ fees award.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Veronica Rossman</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1371/24-1371-2026-04-21.html</id>
        	<title>Packard v. City and County of Denver</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-21T10:34:01-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-21T10:34:01-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1371/24-1371-2026-04-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		During demonstrations in Denver protesting police brutality following George Floyd’s death, a police officer shot a pepperball at a protestor, Elisabeth Epps, who was alone, unarmed, and not acting aggressively. The officer fired without warning as Epps crossed a street while recording police on her phone. The pepperball caused physical injury, but Epps complied with police instructions after being shot. The incident was captured on multiple video sources.

Epps brought a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging that the officer’s conduct violated her First and Fourth Amendment rights. Her claims were part of a larger action involving other protestors and the City and County of Denver. The officer moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity and for a separate trial (bifurcation), but both motions were denied by the district court. At trial, the jury found the officer liable for violating Epps’s Fourth Amendment rights but not her First Amendment rights, awarding her compensatory and punitive damages. The court later reduced the punitive damages, which Epps accepted.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity, concluding that Epps’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated under clearly established law because she was not committing a serious crime, posed no threat, and was not fleeing. The appellate court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to bifurcate the trial, and it found sufficient evidence to support punitive damages based on the officer’s conduct and statements. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the verdict and all rulings against the officer. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1371/24-1371-2026-04-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Packard v. City and County of Denver" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                During demonstrations in Denver protesting police brutality following George Floyd’s death, a police officer shot a pepperball at a protestor, Elisabeth Epps, who was alone, unarmed, and not acting aggressively. The officer fired without warning as Epps crossed a street while recording police on her phone. The pepperball caused physical injury, but Epps complied with police instructions after being shot. The incident was captured on multiple video sources.

Epps brought a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging that the officer’s conduct violated her First and Fourth Amendment rights. Her claims were part of a larger action involving other protestors and the City and County of Denver. The officer moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity and for a separate trial (bifurcation), but both motions were denied by the district court. At trial, the jury found the officer liable for violating Epps’s Fourth Amendment rights but not her First Amendment rights, awarding her compensatory and punitive damages. The court later reduced the punitive damages, which Epps accepted.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity, concluding that Epps’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated under clearly established law because she was not committing a serious crime, posed no threat, and was not fleeing. The appellate court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to bifurcate the trial, and it found sufficient evidence to support punitive damages based on the officer’s conduct and statements. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the verdict and all rulings against the officer.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>David Ebel</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-6221/24-6221-2026-04-21.html</id>
        	<title>Comanche Nation v. Ware</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-21T09:07:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-21T09:07:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-6221/24-6221-2026-04-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The dispute arose after the Fort Sill Apache Tribe opened the Warm Springs Casino near Lawton, Oklahoma, in 2022. The Comanche Nation, which operates casinos in the same region, experienced increased competition and claimed that the Warm Springs Casino was opened in violation of federal law. The Comanche Nation sought injunctive relief to halt the casino’s operations and monetary damages against several officials of the Fort Sill Apache Tribe, both in their individual and official capacities.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma heard the officials’ motion to dismiss, in which the officials argued that tribal sovereign immunity barred the claims against them. The district court denied the officials&#039; motion to dismiss, finding that the officials were not protected by tribal immunity on the claims at issue and that the Tribe was not a required party for the purposes of the lawsuit. The district court’s order also explicitly denied tribal immunity as a defense to the official-capacity Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, and implicitly rejected tribal immunity for the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) claim.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of tribal immunity under the collateral-order doctrine. The Tenth Circuit held that IGRA abrogates tribal sovereign immunity for claims brought by an Indian tribe to enjoin class III gaming conducted in violation of a tribal-state compact on Indian lands, allowing the Comanche Nation’s official-capacity IGRA claim to proceed. However, the Tenth Circuit concluded that tribal immunity barred the official-capacity RICO claims because the requirements of the Ex Parte Young exception were not met. The court further held that the officials were not entitled to tribal immunity on the individual-capacity RICO claims. The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-6221/24-6221-2026-04-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Comanche Nation v. Ware" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The dispute arose after the Fort Sill Apache Tribe opened the Warm Springs Casino near Lawton, Oklahoma, in 2022. The Comanche Nation, which operates casinos in the same region, experienced increased competition and claimed that the Warm Springs Casino was opened in violation of federal law. The Comanche Nation sought injunctive relief to halt the casino’s operations and monetary damages against several officials of the Fort Sill Apache Tribe, both in their individual and official capacities.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma heard the officials’ motion to dismiss, in which the officials argued that tribal sovereign immunity barred the claims against them. The district court denied the officials&#039; motion to dismiss, finding that the officials were not protected by tribal immunity on the claims at issue and that the Tribe was not a required party for the purposes of the lawsuit. The district court’s order also explicitly denied tribal immunity as a defense to the official-capacity Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, and implicitly rejected tribal immunity for the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) claim.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of tribal immunity under the collateral-order doctrine. The Tenth Circuit held that IGRA abrogates tribal sovereign immunity for claims brought by an Indian tribe to enjoin class III gaming conducted in violation of a tribal-state compact on Indian lands, allowing the Comanche Nation’s official-capacity IGRA claim to proceed. However, the Tenth Circuit concluded that tribal immunity barred the official-capacity RICO claims because the requirements of the Ex Parte Young exception were not met. The court further held that the officials were not entitled to tribal immunity on the individual-capacity RICO claims. The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Timothy Tymkovich</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Entertainment &amp; Sports Law"/>
							<category term="Native American Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-7061/24-7061-2026-04-21.html</id>
        	<title>Womble v. Chrisman</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-21T08:34:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-21T08:34:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-7061/24-7061-2026-04-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		An Oklahoma state prisoner filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that two correctional officials at his former facility subjected him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The key facts arose after a large influx of inmates in May 2014 led to overcrowding in the prison’s A-South housing unit. As a result, the plaintiff and other inmates faced reduced food portions, occasionally spoiled or contaminated meals, and frequent substitutions due to budget constraints. Additionally, overcrowding led to unsanitary and insufficient toilet and shower facilities, causing inmates to wait extended periods for access, endure overflowing and malfunctioning toilets, and suffer exposure to human waste. The plaintiff asserted that these conditions caused him physical and emotional harm.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding insufficient evidence to support either the inadequate nutrition or the inadequate facilities claims. The court also awarded costs to the defendants. The plaintiff appealed both the merits and the cost award.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed both appeals. The court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on the inadequate nutrition claim, holding that, although some food rationing occurred, the plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence of a substantial risk of serious harm or that the officials were deliberately indifferent to his health. However, the Tenth Circuit reversed the summary judgment on the inadequate facilities claim. It held that the plaintiff presented enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the conditions in the A-South unit—specifically, exposure to human waste and inadequate access to toilets—were objectively serious and that the defendants were subjectively aware of and disregarded these conditions. The court vacated the cost award and remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-7061/24-7061-2026-04-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Womble v. Chrisman" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                An Oklahoma state prisoner filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that two correctional officials at his former facility subjected him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The key facts arose after a large influx of inmates in May 2014 led to overcrowding in the prison’s A-South housing unit. As a result, the plaintiff and other inmates faced reduced food portions, occasionally spoiled or contaminated meals, and frequent substitutions due to budget constraints. Additionally, overcrowding led to unsanitary and insufficient toilet and shower facilities, causing inmates to wait extended periods for access, endure overflowing and malfunctioning toilets, and suffer exposure to human waste. The plaintiff asserted that these conditions caused him physical and emotional harm.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding insufficient evidence to support either the inadequate nutrition or the inadequate facilities claims. The court also awarded costs to the defendants. The plaintiff appealed both the merits and the cost award.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed both appeals. The court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on the inadequate nutrition claim, holding that, although some food rationing occurred, the plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence of a substantial risk of serious harm or that the officials were deliberately indifferent to his health. However, the Tenth Circuit reversed the summary judgment on the inadequate facilities claim. It held that the plaintiff presented enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the conditions in the A-South unit—specifically, exposure to human waste and inadequate access to toilets—were objectively serious and that the defendants were subjectively aware of and disregarded these conditions. The court vacated the cost award and remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Scott Matheson</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-2009/25-2009-2026-04-21.html</id>
        	<title>Sanchez v. Torrez</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-21T08:34:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-21T08:34:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-2009/25-2009-2026-04-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several New Mexico landowners, holding title to non-navigable streambeds, asserted that they once had the right to exclude the public from walking or wading in these streambeds. They alleged that a recent decision by the New Mexico Supreme Court eliminated this right, amounting to a judicial taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The relevant background includes longstanding provisions in New Mexico law declaring all natural waters in the state to be public, subsequent proclamations and statutes requiring permission to access private streambeds, and a 2022 New Mexico Supreme Court decision which clarified that the public had a right to walk and wade in the beds of public water crossing private land, so long as such use was reasonably necessary and minimally invasive.

The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico dismissed the landowners’ complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing because their injuries were not traceable to enforcement by the named state officials, but rather to the New Mexico Supreme Court&#039;s decision. The district court also concluded that the claims were barred by sovereign immunity, reasoning that any relief would require payments from the state treasury.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the landowners did have standing, as they faced a credible threat of enforcement by the state officials, and their injuries were traceable to those officials and redressable through prospective relief. The Tenth Circuit also determined that sovereign immunity did not bar the claims and that no abstention or jurisdictional doctrine prevented adjudication.

Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on alternative grounds, holding that the landowners failed to state a claim for a Fifth Amendment taking. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated an established property right to exclude the public from the streambeds, but rather that the New Mexico Supreme Court had merely clarified the scope of the public’s preexisting easement. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-2009/25-2009-2026-04-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Sanchez v. Torrez" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several New Mexico landowners, holding title to non-navigable streambeds, asserted that they once had the right to exclude the public from walking or wading in these streambeds. They alleged that a recent decision by the New Mexico Supreme Court eliminated this right, amounting to a judicial taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The relevant background includes longstanding provisions in New Mexico law declaring all natural waters in the state to be public, subsequent proclamations and statutes requiring permission to access private streambeds, and a 2022 New Mexico Supreme Court decision which clarified that the public had a right to walk and wade in the beds of public water crossing private land, so long as such use was reasonably necessary and minimally invasive.

The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico dismissed the landowners’ complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing because their injuries were not traceable to enforcement by the named state officials, but rather to the New Mexico Supreme Court&#039;s decision. The district court also concluded that the claims were barred by sovereign immunity, reasoning that any relief would require payments from the state treasury.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the landowners did have standing, as they faced a credible threat of enforcement by the state officials, and their injuries were traceable to those officials and redressable through prospective relief. The Tenth Circuit also determined that sovereign immunity did not bar the claims and that no abstention or jurisdictional doctrine prevented adjudication.

Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on alternative grounds, holding that the landowners failed to state a claim for a Fifth Amendment taking. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated an established property right to exclude the public from the streambeds, but rather that the New Mexico Supreme Court had merely clarified the scope of the public’s preexisting easement.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Carolyn McHugh</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Real Estate &amp; Property Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-5046/25-5046-2026-04-21.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Carpena</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-21T08:34:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-21T08:34:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-5046/25-5046-2026-04-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A man who entered the United States illegally as a teenager from Mexico was later abused and threatened by an older woman, an American citizen, who orchestrated his entry. According to the man, he was held by her associates upon arrival, threatened with harm if he disobeyed, and subjected to years of physical, emotional, and psychological abuse while living with her in Oklahoma. He had some contact with family, but the woman restricted his movements and threatened to harm him or his family if he did not comply. After being arrested and deported in 2013, he was allegedly kidnapped by the same associates, beaten, and brought back to the U.S., where the abuse continued for another decade. In 2023, he escaped, obtained a protective order, and sought counseling, but the woman allegedly continued to harass and threaten him and his family.

Following his arrest in 2024 after a domestic incident, he was indicted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma for Unlawful Reentry of a Removed Alien under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He moved for a jury instruction on the defense of duress, arguing that he was forced to remain in the U.S. under threat of harm. The district court denied his motion, finding insufficient evidence that he lacked reasonable opportunity to escape or that he made a prompt, bona fide effort to surrender to authorities once free from coercion. He entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial of the duress instruction.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion. The court held that the defendant failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant a duress instruction, as he had reasonable opportunities to escape and did not promptly surrender to authorities once he was no longer under immediate threat. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-5046/25-5046-2026-04-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Carpena" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A man who entered the United States illegally as a teenager from Mexico was later abused and threatened by an older woman, an American citizen, who orchestrated his entry. According to the man, he was held by her associates upon arrival, threatened with harm if he disobeyed, and subjected to years of physical, emotional, and psychological abuse while living with her in Oklahoma. He had some contact with family, but the woman restricted his movements and threatened to harm him or his family if he did not comply. After being arrested and deported in 2013, he was allegedly kidnapped by the same associates, beaten, and brought back to the U.S., where the abuse continued for another decade. In 2023, he escaped, obtained a protective order, and sought counseling, but the woman allegedly continued to harass and threaten him and his family.

Following his arrest in 2024 after a domestic incident, he was indicted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma for Unlawful Reentry of a Removed Alien under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He moved for a jury instruction on the defense of duress, arguing that he was forced to remain in the U.S. under threat of harm. The district court denied his motion, finding insufficient evidence that he lacked reasonable opportunity to escape or that he made a prompt, bona fide effort to surrender to authorities once free from coercion. He entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial of the duress instruction.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion. The court held that the defendant failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant a duress instruction, as he had reasonable opportunities to escape and did not promptly surrender to authorities once he was no longer under immediate threat. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Scott Matheson</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Immigration Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-5014/25-5014-2026-04-21.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. King</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-21T07:35:33-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-21T07:35:33-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-5014/25-5014-2026-04-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Between 2017 and 2021, a man sexually abused a minor, the daughter of his girlfriend, in various locations within Indian country in Oklahoma. The abuse came to light after the victim reported it to a school counselor, triggering investigations by state, tribal, and federal authorities. The locations of the abuse included areas within the Cherokee and Muscogee (Creek) Reservations.

Initially, the State of Oklahoma charged the defendant in state court as a non-Indian, and the Cherokee Nation filed charges against him in tribal court as an Indian for the same conduct. The defendant sought dismissal of the state prosecution, claiming Indian status, and, in the tribal prosecution, claimed he was not an Indian. Subsequently, a federal grand jury indicted him on four counts: two under 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (as a non-Indian defendant with an Indian victim), and two under 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (as an Indian defendant). The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment as multiplicitous or to require the government to elect the theory of prosecution. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma denied these motions and allowed the case to proceed to trial, instructing the jury to convict under only one statutory regime, not both.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was an Indian and that the defendant was a non-Indian at the time of the offenses. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting alternative charges to go to the jury, so long as the instructions prevented multiplicitous convictions. The court affirmed the defendant’s convictions. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-5014/25-5014-2026-04-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. King" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Between 2017 and 2021, a man sexually abused a minor, the daughter of his girlfriend, in various locations within Indian country in Oklahoma. The abuse came to light after the victim reported it to a school counselor, triggering investigations by state, tribal, and federal authorities. The locations of the abuse included areas within the Cherokee and Muscogee (Creek) Reservations.

Initially, the State of Oklahoma charged the defendant in state court as a non-Indian, and the Cherokee Nation filed charges against him in tribal court as an Indian for the same conduct. The defendant sought dismissal of the state prosecution, claiming Indian status, and, in the tribal prosecution, claimed he was not an Indian. Subsequently, a federal grand jury indicted him on four counts: two under 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (as a non-Indian defendant with an Indian victim), and two under 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (as an Indian defendant). The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment as multiplicitous or to require the government to elect the theory of prosecution. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma denied these motions and allowed the case to proceed to trial, instructing the jury to convict under only one statutory regime, not both.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was an Indian and that the defendant was a non-Indian at the time of the offenses. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting alternative charges to go to the jury, so long as the instructions prevented multiplicitous convictions. The court affirmed the defendant’s convictions.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Scott Matheson</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Native American Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-8024/25-8024-2026-04-15.html</id>
        	<title>Four B Properties v. The Nature Conservancy</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-15T09:07:14-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-15T09:07:14-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-8024/25-8024-2026-04-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A property owner, Gary Binning, purchased land in Wyoming that was subject to a conservation easement held by The Nature Conservancy (TNC). This easement restricted the types of structures that could be built on the property, allowing only one single-family residential structure per parcel. Binning sought to build a guest house in addition to a main house, but TNC denied his request, citing the easement’s terms. This dispute led to litigation, and the Wyoming Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the easement did not permit construction of any guest house or secondary residential structure.

Following this decision, Binning met with TNC’s Wyoming state director, Hayley Mortimer, who, according to Binning, suggested during an informal lunch meeting that he could build a structure accommodating overnight guests as long as it was not called a “guest house” and did not include a kitchen. Binning later sought approval for new building plans, but TNC rejected them, and Mortimer’s subsequent written communication did not confirm any such oral promise. Binning then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, asserting a claim of promissory estoppel based on Mortimer’s alleged statements.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of TNC, finding that Binning failed to establish the required elements of promissory estoppel under Wyoming law: a clear and definite promise, reasonable reliance, and that enforcement was necessary to avoid injustice. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed, holding that Mortimer’s alleged statements were not sufficiently clear and definite to constitute a promise, any reliance by Binning was unreasonable under the circumstances, and no injustice would result from refusing enforcement. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-8024/25-8024-2026-04-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Four B Properties v. The Nature Conservancy" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A property owner, Gary Binning, purchased land in Wyoming that was subject to a conservation easement held by The Nature Conservancy (TNC). This easement restricted the types of structures that could be built on the property, allowing only one single-family residential structure per parcel. Binning sought to build a guest house in addition to a main house, but TNC denied his request, citing the easement’s terms. This dispute led to litigation, and the Wyoming Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the easement did not permit construction of any guest house or secondary residential structure.

Following this decision, Binning met with TNC’s Wyoming state director, Hayley Mortimer, who, according to Binning, suggested during an informal lunch meeting that he could build a structure accommodating overnight guests as long as it was not called a “guest house” and did not include a kitchen. Binning later sought approval for new building plans, but TNC rejected them, and Mortimer’s subsequent written communication did not confirm any such oral promise. Binning then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, asserting a claim of promissory estoppel based on Mortimer’s alleged statements.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of TNC, finding that Binning failed to establish the required elements of promissory estoppel under Wyoming law: a clear and definite promise, reasonable reliance, and that enforcement was necessary to avoid injustice. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed, holding that Mortimer’s alleged statements were not sufficiently clear and definite to constitute a promise, any reliance by Binning was unreasonable under the circumstances, and no injustice would result from refusing enforcement. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Federico</case:judge>
													<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Real Estate &amp; Property Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-2007/25-2007-2026-04-15.html</id>
        	<title>Vasquez-Garcia v. Centurion</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-15T08:02:54-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-15T08:02:54-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-2007/25-2007-2026-04-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A prisoner with serious pre-existing medical conditions, including diabetes, alleged that while incarcerated in a New Mexico correctional facility, state officials and private contractors responsible for her medical and dietary care repeatedly failed to provide necessary treatment. She described a series of escalating health complications, including kidney disease and partial blindness, and asserted that medical staff’s failures continued until her release. After being released, she was diagnosed with stage five renal failure.

After her release, she filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico against multiple corporate and individual defendants, asserting violations of her Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights due to deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs. The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that her claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations. The district court agreed, finding that her claims accrued outside the limitations period because she knew or should have known of her injuries earlier, and dismissed the action with prejudice against all defendants, including some who had not been served.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred by not properly applying the Rule 12(b)(6) standard and by misapplying the accrual law for injury. The appellate court found that, based on the complaint, it was plausible the plaintiff did not know or could not have known the facts underlying her deliberate indifference claim until after her release. The court also held that the continuing violations doctrine could apply, as the alleged inadequate care was ongoing through the plaintiff’s incarceration. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-2007/25-2007-2026-04-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Vasquez-Garcia v. Centurion" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A prisoner with serious pre-existing medical conditions, including diabetes, alleged that while incarcerated in a New Mexico correctional facility, state officials and private contractors responsible for her medical and dietary care repeatedly failed to provide necessary treatment. She described a series of escalating health complications, including kidney disease and partial blindness, and asserted that medical staff’s failures continued until her release. After being released, she was diagnosed with stage five renal failure.

After her release, she filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico against multiple corporate and individual defendants, asserting violations of her Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights due to deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs. The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that her claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations. The district court agreed, finding that her claims accrued outside the limitations period because she knew or should have known of her injuries earlier, and dismissed the action with prejudice against all defendants, including some who had not been served.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred by not properly applying the Rule 12(b)(6) standard and by misapplying the accrual law for injury. The appellate court found that, based on the complaint, it was plausible the plaintiff did not know or could not have known the facts underlying her deliberate indifference claim until after her release. The court also held that the continuing violations doctrine could apply, as the alleged inadequate care was ongoing through the plaintiff’s incarceration. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Federico</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-3019/25-3019-2026-04-13.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Thompson</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-13T12:36:17-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-13T12:36:17-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-3019/25-3019-2026-04-13.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involved a man who entered the on-base military residence of his estranged wife while holding a firearm, intending to retrieve his young daughter. Upon finding his wife and another service member together, he threatened the service member with the gun, ordering him to leave the house. The situation escalated, resulting in a police response and the man’s subsequent detention with his daughter and mother. He was charged with three felonies: two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon (against the service member and his wife) and one count of domestic violence, all within the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

The United States District Court for the District of Kansas presided over the trial. The jury convicted the defendant of assault with a dangerous weapon against the service member but acquitted him of the other charges. The defendant filed a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence suggesting the government’s key witnesses had lied about their relationship. The district court denied this motion, concluding that the defendant had not exercised reasonable diligence in discovering the evidence before trial. At sentencing, the district court imposed a 24-month sentence and two years of supervised release, citing the defendant’s status as a police officer as an aggravating factor.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial, as the defendant failed to show reasonable diligence in uncovering the new evidence. However, the appellate court found that the district court plainly erred by relying on the defendant’s occupation as a police officer to justify a harsher sentence. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of a new trial, vacated the sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing without consideration of the defendant’s professional status. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-3019/25-3019-2026-04-13.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Thompson" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involved a man who entered the on-base military residence of his estranged wife while holding a firearm, intending to retrieve his young daughter. Upon finding his wife and another service member together, he threatened the service member with the gun, ordering him to leave the house. The situation escalated, resulting in a police response and the man’s subsequent detention with his daughter and mother. He was charged with three felonies: two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon (against the service member and his wife) and one count of domestic violence, all within the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

The United States District Court for the District of Kansas presided over the trial. The jury convicted the defendant of assault with a dangerous weapon against the service member but acquitted him of the other charges. The defendant filed a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence suggesting the government’s key witnesses had lied about their relationship. The district court denied this motion, concluding that the defendant had not exercised reasonable diligence in discovering the evidence before trial. At sentencing, the district court imposed a 24-month sentence and two years of supervised release, citing the defendant’s status as a police officer as an aggravating factor.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial, as the defendant failed to show reasonable diligence in uncovering the new evidence. However, the appellate court found that the district court plainly erred by relying on the defendant’s occupation as a police officer to justify a harsher sentence. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of a new trial, vacated the sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing without consideration of the defendant’s professional status.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-13</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Allison Eid</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1451/24-1451-2026-04-08.html</id>
        	<title>Mukhtar v. Lambrecht</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-08T11:01:57-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-08T11:01:57-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1451/24-1451-2026-04-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The plaintiff, admitted to the United States as a refugee in 2010, later applied for lawful permanent resident status. Her application was denied by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) due to deficiencies in her medical documentation, specifically the absence of an updated and complete medical examination addressing her mental health history in light of prior arrests and findings of incompetency. Despite submitting additional forms over several years, the agency found these documents insufficient. The plaintiff then filed suit, seeking an order to set aside USCIS’s denial and to compel a new decision on her application.

Before the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, the government reopened the plaintiff’s application on its own initiative, sent a new Request for Evidence (RFE), and ultimately issued a new denial after the plaintiff failed to respond with the required documentation. USCIS moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the action was moot because it had already provided the relief requested: reconsideration and a new decision. The district court agreed, finding the case moot since all relief sought in the complaint had been granted, and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). The court also determined that the plaintiff’s arguments regarding the new denial were not properly before it, as the complaint had not been amended to challenge that decision.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the case was moot once USCIS granted the plaintiff’s request for reconsideration and issued a new decision. The court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that USCIS acted without authority or that the case was capable of repetition yet evading review. The Tenth Circuit concluded that no exception to mootness applied and affirmed the dismissal. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1451/24-1451-2026-04-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Mukhtar v. Lambrecht" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The plaintiff, admitted to the United States as a refugee in 2010, later applied for lawful permanent resident status. Her application was denied by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) due to deficiencies in her medical documentation, specifically the absence of an updated and complete medical examination addressing her mental health history in light of prior arrests and findings of incompetency. Despite submitting additional forms over several years, the agency found these documents insufficient. The plaintiff then filed suit, seeking an order to set aside USCIS’s denial and to compel a new decision on her application.

Before the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, the government reopened the plaintiff’s application on its own initiative, sent a new Request for Evidence (RFE), and ultimately issued a new denial after the plaintiff failed to respond with the required documentation. USCIS moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the action was moot because it had already provided the relief requested: reconsideration and a new decision. The district court agreed, finding the case moot since all relief sought in the complaint had been granted, and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). The court also determined that the plaintiff’s arguments regarding the new denial were not properly before it, as the complaint had not been amended to challenge that decision.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the case was moot once USCIS granted the plaintiff’s request for reconsideration and issued a new decision. The court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that USCIS acted without authority or that the case was capable of repetition yet evading review. The Tenth Circuit concluded that no exception to mootness applied and affirmed the dismissal.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Joel Carson</case:judge>
													<category term="Immigration Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-6061/25-6061-2026-04-07.html</id>
        	<title>Dominguez v. Weiser Security Services</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-07T08:02:27-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-07T08:02:27-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-6061/25-6061-2026-04-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The plaintiff, who worked as a security supervisor for a company contracted to provide services at an industrial facility, was terminated from his position in June 2020. The employer cited alleged performance issues, including failures related to COVID-19 protocols and training, as the basis for the discharge. Shortly before his termination, the plaintiff had reported his direct supervisor for alleged favoritism toward female employees. The plaintiff argued that his termination was in retaliation for this report, rather than for the stated reasons.

After the plaintiff’s termination, he filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, claiming unlawful retaliation. The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma granted summary judgment to the employer. It found that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that the decisionmaker responsible for his termination knew about the protected activity, or that a supervisor with retaliatory animus influenced the decisionmaker (a “cat’s paw” theory). The district court concluded that, without such evidence, there was no causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Tenth Circuit held that, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must show that the decisionmaker had knowledge of the protected activity or that an individual with retaliatory intent influenced the decision. The court found that the plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence to show either scenario. The court also clarified that evidence suggesting pretext for the employer’s reasons does not substitute for the required showing of knowledge or causation. Thus, summary judgment for the employer was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-6061/25-6061-2026-04-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Dominguez v. Weiser Security Services" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The plaintiff, who worked as a security supervisor for a company contracted to provide services at an industrial facility, was terminated from his position in June 2020. The employer cited alleged performance issues, including failures related to COVID-19 protocols and training, as the basis for the discharge. Shortly before his termination, the plaintiff had reported his direct supervisor for alleged favoritism toward female employees. The plaintiff argued that his termination was in retaliation for this report, rather than for the stated reasons.

After the plaintiff’s termination, he filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, claiming unlawful retaliation. The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma granted summary judgment to the employer. It found that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that the decisionmaker responsible for his termination knew about the protected activity, or that a supervisor with retaliatory animus influenced the decisionmaker (a “cat’s paw” theory). The district court concluded that, without such evidence, there was no causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Tenth Circuit held that, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must show that the decisionmaker had knowledge of the protected activity or that an individual with retaliatory intent influenced the decision. The court found that the plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence to show either scenario. The court also clarified that evidence suggesting pretext for the employer’s reasons does not substitute for the required showing of knowledge or causation. Thus, summary judgment for the employer was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Timothy Tymkovich</case:judge>
													<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-1006/25-1006-2026-04-07.html</id>
        	<title>Citizens for Constitutional Integrity v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-07T07:32:35-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-07T07:32:35-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-1006/25-1006-2026-04-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A mining company sought to expand its underground coal mine situated beneath Indian lands. To proceed, it needed approval for a revised permit, a new federal lease, and a modification of its operations plan. The Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement and the Bureau of Land Management jointly conducted an environmental assessment, solicited public comments, and ultimately granted the necessary authorizations for expansion.

Two advocacy groups opposed the expansion, citing potential impacts on water resources and basing their challenges on the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. They previously sued, raising claims under the rescinded Stream Protection Rule, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected those claims. The groups later amended their complaint to invoke different provisions of the Act, specifically Sections 1270 and 1276. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied their petition for judicial review, concluding the claims were substantially similar to those previously rejected and finding the agency had fulfilled its nondiscretionary duties.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the advocacy groups could not obtain relief under Section 1270 because they failed to provide adequate notice of the alleged violations and had advanced claims implicating discretionary, not mandatory, agency actions. The court also found that Section 1276 did not authorize judicial review for the groups because they had not participated in the permit-review process as required by the statute. The court clarified that commenting on an environmental assessment was not a substitute for objecting to the permit application itself. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the petition for judicial review. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-1006/25-1006-2026-04-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Citizens for Constitutional Integrity v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A mining company sought to expand its underground coal mine situated beneath Indian lands. To proceed, it needed approval for a revised permit, a new federal lease, and a modification of its operations plan. The Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement and the Bureau of Land Management jointly conducted an environmental assessment, solicited public comments, and ultimately granted the necessary authorizations for expansion.

Two advocacy groups opposed the expansion, citing potential impacts on water resources and basing their challenges on the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. They previously sued, raising claims under the rescinded Stream Protection Rule, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected those claims. The groups later amended their complaint to invoke different provisions of the Act, specifically Sections 1270 and 1276. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied their petition for judicial review, concluding the claims were substantially similar to those previously rejected and finding the agency had fulfilled its nondiscretionary duties.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the advocacy groups could not obtain relief under Section 1270 because they failed to provide adequate notice of the alleged violations and had advanced claims implicating discretionary, not mandatory, agency actions. The court also found that Section 1276 did not authorize judicial review for the groups because they had not participated in the permit-review process as required by the statute. The court clarified that commenting on an environmental assessment was not a substitute for objecting to the permit application itself. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the petition for judicial review.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Robert Bacharach</case:judge>
													<category term="Environmental Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1424/24-1424-2026-04-06.html</id>
        	<title>Morphew v. Chaffee County</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-06T11:32:41-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-06T11:32:41-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1424/24-1424-2026-04-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		After his wife disappeared in May 2020, the plaintiff became the primary suspect in her case. Significant evidence was collected, and law enforcement focused on the possibility that he had staged the scene to make it appear as an abduction. Despite his consistent claims of innocence and multiple meetings with investigators, prosecutors charged him with first-degree murder in May 2021, even though his wife&#039;s body had not been found. Before trial, the defense discovered that prosecutors had withheld exculpatory evidence, leading the State to dismiss charges without prejudice. The plaintiff then filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against various officials involved in his arrest and prosecution, alleging fabrication of evidence, conspiracy, malicious prosecution, and related claims.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the complaint, the lengthy arrest affidavit, and the parties&#039; arguments. It granted the defendants&#039; motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), finding that the plaintiff’s allegations failed to plausibly allege an absence of probable cause for his arrest and prosecution. The court noted the presence of extensive inculpatory facts and determined that the complaint did not sufficiently link individual defendants to the alleged misconduct. Certain claims were also dismissed as conclusory, and some defendants were found to have immunity. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s federal claims for malicious prosecution, fabrication of evidence under the Fourth Amendment, Franks violations, conspiracy, failure to intervene, and municipal liability all required plausible allegations that probable cause was lacking, which the complaint did not provide. The court also found the Fourteenth Amendment claims for fabrication of evidence and reckless investigation deficient due to lack of causal allegations. The judgment of dismissal was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1424/24-1424-2026-04-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Morphew v. Chaffee County" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                After his wife disappeared in May 2020, the plaintiff became the primary suspect in her case. Significant evidence was collected, and law enforcement focused on the possibility that he had staged the scene to make it appear as an abduction. Despite his consistent claims of innocence and multiple meetings with investigators, prosecutors charged him with first-degree murder in May 2021, even though his wife&#039;s body had not been found. Before trial, the defense discovered that prosecutors had withheld exculpatory evidence, leading the State to dismiss charges without prejudice. The plaintiff then filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against various officials involved in his arrest and prosecution, alleging fabrication of evidence, conspiracy, malicious prosecution, and related claims.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the complaint, the lengthy arrest affidavit, and the parties&#039; arguments. It granted the defendants&#039; motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), finding that the plaintiff’s allegations failed to plausibly allege an absence of probable cause for his arrest and prosecution. The court noted the presence of extensive inculpatory facts and determined that the complaint did not sufficiently link individual defendants to the alleged misconduct. Certain claims were also dismissed as conclusory, and some defendants were found to have immunity. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s federal claims for malicious prosecution, fabrication of evidence under the Fourth Amendment, Franks violations, conspiracy, failure to intervene, and municipal liability all required plausible allegations that probable cause was lacking, which the complaint did not provide. The court also found the Fourteenth Amendment claims for fabrication of evidence and reckless investigation deficient due to lack of causal allegations. The judgment of dismissal was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Veronica Rossman</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1333/24-1333-2026-04-06.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Tew</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-06T10:05:09-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-06T10:05:09-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1333/24-1333-2026-04-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A married couple, Michael and Kimberley, became involved in a fraudulent scheme targeting Michael’s employer, National Air Cargo, a company seeking financial stability after bankruptcy. Michael, initially hired as a contractor and later promoted to CFO, began abusing his position by submitting false invoices, with the help of an internal accomplice, resulting in over $5 million in fraudulent payments. Kimberley, who suffered significant gambling and cryptocurrency losses, played an active role by motivating and coercing the accomplice and leveraging her relationship with Michael. The scheme was uncovered after creditors contacted National, leading to internal investigations and the eventual involvement of federal authorities.

After the criminal conduct was exposed, the United States District Court for the District of Colorado became involved. Michael was initially arrested and entered into proffer agreements with the government, as did Kimberley. Both provided statements incriminating the other. The government indicted Michael, Kimberley, and their accomplice, Yioulos, on charges including conspiracy, wire fraud, money laundering, and tax fraud. The couple’s legal representation shifted multiple times, with periods of joint and separate counsel, and both filed motions seeking severance of their trials based on antagonistic defenses. The district court denied these motions, finding either no sufficient prejudice or that the motions were untimely.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the Apple cloud search warrant used to obtain Kimberley’s personal data was sufficiently particular and if the district court erred in denying severance. The court found the search warrant lacked sufficient particularity, but concluded the good faith exception applied, so suppression was not warranted. The court also held that neither defendant was entitled to severance, as their motions were untimely and the legal standards for severance were not met. The Tenth Circuit affirmed both convictions and sentences. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1333/24-1333-2026-04-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Tew" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A married couple, Michael and Kimberley, became involved in a fraudulent scheme targeting Michael’s employer, National Air Cargo, a company seeking financial stability after bankruptcy. Michael, initially hired as a contractor and later promoted to CFO, began abusing his position by submitting false invoices, with the help of an internal accomplice, resulting in over $5 million in fraudulent payments. Kimberley, who suffered significant gambling and cryptocurrency losses, played an active role by motivating and coercing the accomplice and leveraging her relationship with Michael. The scheme was uncovered after creditors contacted National, leading to internal investigations and the eventual involvement of federal authorities.

After the criminal conduct was exposed, the United States District Court for the District of Colorado became involved. Michael was initially arrested and entered into proffer agreements with the government, as did Kimberley. Both provided statements incriminating the other. The government indicted Michael, Kimberley, and their accomplice, Yioulos, on charges including conspiracy, wire fraud, money laundering, and tax fraud. The couple’s legal representation shifted multiple times, with periods of joint and separate counsel, and both filed motions seeking severance of their trials based on antagonistic defenses. The district court denied these motions, finding either no sufficient prejudice or that the motions were untimely.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the Apple cloud search warrant used to obtain Kimberley’s personal data was sufficiently particular and if the district court erred in denying severance. The court found the search warrant lacked sufficient particularity, but concluded the good faith exception applied, so suppression was not warranted. The court also held that neither defendant was entitled to severance, as their motions were untimely and the legal standards for severance were not met. The Tenth Circuit affirmed both convictions and sentences.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Federico</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Tax Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-2145/24-2145-2026-04-03.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Jimenez-Marquez</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-03T08:31:39-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-03T08:31:39-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-2145/24-2145-2026-04-03.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Law enforcement officers in Albuquerque arrested the defendant in February 2022 after observing him exit the driver&#039;s seat of a truck reported stolen. The truck contained two passengers, one of whom fled. A search uncovered an unopened vacuum-sealed bundle of methamphetamine weighing 445 grams and an unloaded revolver beneath the driver&#039;s seat. An assault rifle with a loaded magazine was found in the passenger seat, and a Ziploc bag containing 84 grams of methamphetamine was located in the back-seat area. The defendant later admitted to moving from the back seat. Evidence at trial included expert testimony regarding the function of the firearms, the value and distribution quantity of the drugs, and the common practice of drug traffickers possessing firearms for protection. Text messages demonstrated the defendant sought firearms after being robbed of drugs and a gun.

The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico convicted the defendant of multiple offenses, but only the conviction for possessing firearms in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) was at issue in this appeal. The defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction and that the “in furtherance of” language in the statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court held that, under its precedent, there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find that the defendant possessed firearms in furtherance of his drug-trafficking offense. The court also concluded that the statutory language was not unconstitutionally vague as applied. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction, rejecting both the sufficiency and vagueness challenges. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-2145/24-2145-2026-04-03.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Jimenez-Marquez" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Law enforcement officers in Albuquerque arrested the defendant in February 2022 after observing him exit the driver&#039;s seat of a truck reported stolen. The truck contained two passengers, one of whom fled. A search uncovered an unopened vacuum-sealed bundle of methamphetamine weighing 445 grams and an unloaded revolver beneath the driver&#039;s seat. An assault rifle with a loaded magazine was found in the passenger seat, and a Ziploc bag containing 84 grams of methamphetamine was located in the back-seat area. The defendant later admitted to moving from the back seat. Evidence at trial included expert testimony regarding the function of the firearms, the value and distribution quantity of the drugs, and the common practice of drug traffickers possessing firearms for protection. Text messages demonstrated the defendant sought firearms after being robbed of drugs and a gun.

The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico convicted the defendant of multiple offenses, but only the conviction for possessing firearms in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) was at issue in this appeal. The defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction and that the “in furtherance of” language in the statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court held that, under its precedent, there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find that the defendant possessed firearms in furtherance of his drug-trafficking offense. The court also concluded that the statutory language was not unconstitutionally vague as applied. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction, rejecting both the sufficiency and vagueness challenges.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Harris Hartz</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-3175/23-3175-2026-04-02.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Otuonye</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-02T07:32:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-02T07:32:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-3175/23-3175-2026-04-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant, a pharmacist and owner of a retail pharmacy, was implicated in a federal investigation after concerns arose about the prescribing patterns of a local physician whose patients often filled prescriptions at the defendant’s pharmacy. The government alleged that the defendant improperly filled prescriptions for controlled substances and fraudulently billed Medicaid and Medicare by instituting a policy requiring customers to fill three non-controlled prescriptions for every controlled substance prescription (the “3:1 Policy”), thereby submitting claims for prescriptions that were not medically necessary.

Following indictment, the United States District Court for the District of Kansas presided over the defendant’s trial. The jury convicted the defendant on two counts related to the unlawful distribution of controlled substances and two counts of healthcare fraud. On direct appeal, the convictions were affirmed. After the Supreme Court clarified the intent requirement for drug distribution offenses in Ruan v. United States, the defendant filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to a jury instruction about the scienter requirement for distributing controlled substances. The district court vacated the distribution counts but denied relief on the healthcare fraud counts, finding no prejudice as to those.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the challenged jury instruction affected the convictions for healthcare fraud. The court held that the instruction at issue pertained only to the distribution counts and did not impact the fraud counts, which were based on separate conduct and legal standards. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of relief on the healthcare fraud counts, concluding that any error in the jury instruction did not prejudice the defendant regarding those convictions. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-3175/23-3175-2026-04-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Otuonye" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant, a pharmacist and owner of a retail pharmacy, was implicated in a federal investigation after concerns arose about the prescribing patterns of a local physician whose patients often filled prescriptions at the defendant’s pharmacy. The government alleged that the defendant improperly filled prescriptions for controlled substances and fraudulently billed Medicaid and Medicare by instituting a policy requiring customers to fill three non-controlled prescriptions for every controlled substance prescription (the “3:1 Policy”), thereby submitting claims for prescriptions that were not medically necessary.

Following indictment, the United States District Court for the District of Kansas presided over the defendant’s trial. The jury convicted the defendant on two counts related to the unlawful distribution of controlled substances and two counts of healthcare fraud. On direct appeal, the convictions were affirmed. After the Supreme Court clarified the intent requirement for drug distribution offenses in Ruan v. United States, the defendant filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to a jury instruction about the scienter requirement for distributing controlled substances. The district court vacated the distribution counts but denied relief on the healthcare fraud counts, finding no prejudice as to those.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the challenged jury instruction affected the convictions for healthcare fraud. The court held that the instruction at issue pertained only to the distribution counts and did not impact the fraud counts, which were based on separate conduct and legal standards. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of relief on the healthcare fraud counts, concluding that any error in the jury instruction did not prejudice the defendant regarding those convictions.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Harris Hartz</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-5058/24-5058-2026-03-30.html</id>
        	<title>Manning v. City of Tulsa</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-30T10:05:03-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-30T10:05:03-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-5058/24-5058-2026-03-30.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A Tulsa police officer, while responding to a call in September 2016, encountered Terence Crutcher, an unarmed Black man who was behaving erratically. Officer Shelby initially passed Crutcher but stopped after seeing an abandoned SUV in the road. As Shelby investigated the vehicle, Crutcher approached with his hands raised. Shelby, joined by another officer, issued commands to Crutcher, who was slow to comply but largely kept his hands up. As Crutcher reached the SUV, Shelby shot him, and another officer simultaneously deployed a Taser. Crutcher died from the gunshot wound.

The administrator of Crutcher’s estate filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, alleging excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Shelby, as well as claims against the City of Tulsa under state law and Monell v. Department of Social Services for municipal liability. The district court dismissed the Monell claims for failure to state a plausible claim of municipal liability. Subsequently, it granted summary judgment to Shelby on the basis of qualified immunity, concluding that the constitutional right at issue was not clearly established. With no remaining federal claims, the district court dismissed the state-law claim without prejudice.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed these decisions. The Tenth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment to Shelby, holding that the district court erred by not viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the estate and by defining the clearly established right too narrowly. The court found that, under long-standing precedent, using deadly force against an unarmed, nonthreatening individual is clearly established as unconstitutional. However, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Monell claims, concluding that the estate failed to plausibly allege municipal liability. The case was remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-5058/24-5058-2026-03-30.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Manning v. City of Tulsa" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A Tulsa police officer, while responding to a call in September 2016, encountered Terence Crutcher, an unarmed Black man who was behaving erratically. Officer Shelby initially passed Crutcher but stopped after seeing an abandoned SUV in the road. As Shelby investigated the vehicle, Crutcher approached with his hands raised. Shelby, joined by another officer, issued commands to Crutcher, who was slow to comply but largely kept his hands up. As Crutcher reached the SUV, Shelby shot him, and another officer simultaneously deployed a Taser. Crutcher died from the gunshot wound.

The administrator of Crutcher’s estate filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, alleging excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Shelby, as well as claims against the City of Tulsa under state law and Monell v. Department of Social Services for municipal liability. The district court dismissed the Monell claims for failure to state a plausible claim of municipal liability. Subsequently, it granted summary judgment to Shelby on the basis of qualified immunity, concluding that the constitutional right at issue was not clearly established. With no remaining federal claims, the district court dismissed the state-law claim without prejudice.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed these decisions. The Tenth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment to Shelby, holding that the district court erred by not viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the estate and by defining the clearly established right too narrowly. The court found that, under long-standing precedent, using deadly force against an unarmed, nonthreatening individual is clearly established as unconstitutional. However, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Monell claims, concluding that the estate failed to plausibly allege municipal liability. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Nancy Moritz</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-9516/24-9516-2026-03-24.html</id>
        	<title>Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, v. FERC</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-24T08:03:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-24T08:03:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-9516/24-9516-2026-03-24.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several rural electricity distribution cooperatives entered into long-term, all-requirements contracts with a generation-and-transmission cooperative, requiring them to purchase nearly all of their electric service from the cooperative through 2050. Some of these distribution cooperatives later sought to terminate their memberships and contracts early. In response, the generation-and-transmission cooperative proposed a methodology for calculating an exit fee and submitted it to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for approval.

FERC initiated hearing procedures to determine a just and reasonable exit-fee methodology. In those proceedings, both the cooperative and FERC’s Trial Staff presented different approaches: the cooperative advocated a lost-revenues approach, while Trial Staff proposed a balance-sheet approach. An administrative law judge found that the cooperative’s methodology was not just and reasonable, but that the balance-sheet approach, with modifications, was. The cooperative sought review from FERC, which agreed with the administrative law judge, rejecting the lost-revenues approach and directing the cooperative to adopt the modified balance-sheet methodology.

The cooperative then sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, arguing that FERC’s adopted methodology was arbitrary and capricious. The Tenth Circuit reviewed FERC’s orders under the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court held that FERC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in rejecting the lost-revenues approach, adopting the balance-sheet approach, implementing a transmission-crediting mechanism, or applying the methodology to certain members despite existing contracts. The Tenth Circuit concluded that FERC engaged in reasoned decisionmaking, supported by substantial evidence, and denied the petitions for review. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-9516/24-9516-2026-03-24.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, v. FERC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several rural electricity distribution cooperatives entered into long-term, all-requirements contracts with a generation-and-transmission cooperative, requiring them to purchase nearly all of their electric service from the cooperative through 2050. Some of these distribution cooperatives later sought to terminate their memberships and contracts early. In response, the generation-and-transmission cooperative proposed a methodology for calculating an exit fee and submitted it to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for approval.

FERC initiated hearing procedures to determine a just and reasonable exit-fee methodology. In those proceedings, both the cooperative and FERC’s Trial Staff presented different approaches: the cooperative advocated a lost-revenues approach, while Trial Staff proposed a balance-sheet approach. An administrative law judge found that the cooperative’s methodology was not just and reasonable, but that the balance-sheet approach, with modifications, was. The cooperative sought review from FERC, which agreed with the administrative law judge, rejecting the lost-revenues approach and directing the cooperative to adopt the modified balance-sheet methodology.

The cooperative then sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, arguing that FERC’s adopted methodology was arbitrary and capricious. The Tenth Circuit reviewed FERC’s orders under the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court held that FERC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in rejecting the lost-revenues approach, adopting the balance-sheet approach, implementing a transmission-crediting mechanism, or applying the methodology to certain members despite existing contracts. The Tenth Circuit concluded that FERC engaged in reasoned decisionmaking, supported by substantial evidence, and denied the petitions for review.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-24</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Gregory Alan Phillips</case:judge>
													<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Utilities Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1510/24-1510-2026-03-17.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Williams</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-17T08:03:10-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-17T08:03:10-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1510/24-1510-2026-03-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Police stopped a car driven by a man with his girlfriend as a passenger due to traffic violations. The car was registered to the girlfriend, who was cooperative and provided valid documentation. The officers learned the driver was a recently released felon with gang ties and outstanding warrants, while the girlfriend had no criminal history or warrants. After arresting and handcuffing the driver, officers removed the girlfriend from the car, patted her down, and detained her. The officers then conducted a “protective sweep” of the car, discovering a loaded handgun and ammunition under the driver’s seat.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence found during the sweep. The district court concluded that the officers had reasonable suspicion that the girlfriend-passenger was armed and dangerous, relying on her romantic relationship with the driver, who was associated with a gang and being arrested.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of suppression de novo. The Tenth Circuit held that the protective sweep of the car was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The court emphasized that reasonable suspicion must be based on the totality of the circumstances and cannot rely solely on a passenger’s association with a suspect. Here, the girlfriend was calm, cooperative, and not suspected of any crime. The court found that her romantic relationship with the driver did not justify a finding that she was armed and dangerous. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of suppression, vacated the conviction, and remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1510/24-1510-2026-03-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Police stopped a car driven by a man with his girlfriend as a passenger due to traffic violations. The car was registered to the girlfriend, who was cooperative and provided valid documentation. The officers learned the driver was a recently released felon with gang ties and outstanding warrants, while the girlfriend had no criminal history or warrants. After arresting and handcuffing the driver, officers removed the girlfriend from the car, patted her down, and detained her. The officers then conducted a “protective sweep” of the car, discovering a loaded handgun and ammunition under the driver’s seat.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence found during the sweep. The district court concluded that the officers had reasonable suspicion that the girlfriend-passenger was armed and dangerous, relying on her romantic relationship with the driver, who was associated with a gang and being arrested.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of suppression de novo. The Tenth Circuit held that the protective sweep of the car was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The court emphasized that reasonable suspicion must be based on the totality of the circumstances and cannot rely solely on a passenger’s association with a suspect. Here, the girlfriend was calm, cooperative, and not suspected of any crime. The court found that her romantic relationship with the driver did not justify a finding that she was armed and dangerous. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of suppression, vacated the conviction, and remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Gregory Alan Phillips</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-2125/24-2125-2026-03-17.html</id>
        	<title>Salcido v. City of Las Vegas</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-17T08:03:09-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-17T08:03:09-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-2125/24-2125-2026-03-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		During a prolonged standoff in Las Vegas, New Mexico, Alejandro Alirez shot Cristal Cervantes and her grandfather inside their home while livestreaming the incident on Facebook. Law enforcement officers from multiple agencies responded after being alerted that Alirez, believed to be armed and mentally ill, was acting erratically at the residence. Upon the deputies’ arrival and their attempt to make contact, gunshots were fired almost immediately, with Cristal and her grandfather ultimately killed during the ordeal. Law enforcement officers established a perimeter and called for tactical support, but Cristal was found unresponsive after Alirez surrendered hours later.

The plaintiffs, including Cristal’s personal representative and her mother, brought suit against various law enforcement agencies and officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New Mexico state law, alleging failure to intervene and negligence. The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico granted summary judgment for all defendants, concluding that qualified immunity barred the § 1983 claims and that the plaintiffs could not prevail on their state-law claims, including negligent investigation, negligent training, and loss of consortium.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Tenth Circuit held that the law enforcement officers did not affirmatively act to create or increase the danger to Cristal, a necessary element for liability under the substantive due process “danger-creation” exception, and thus the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Additionally, the court found that the officers’ inability to intervene was caused by the immediate deadly threat posed by Alirez, precluding liability under New Mexico law for negligent investigation or related torts. The disposition of the case was affirmed in favor of the defendants. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-2125/24-2125-2026-03-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Salcido v. City of Las Vegas" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                During a prolonged standoff in Las Vegas, New Mexico, Alejandro Alirez shot Cristal Cervantes and her grandfather inside their home while livestreaming the incident on Facebook. Law enforcement officers from multiple agencies responded after being alerted that Alirez, believed to be armed and mentally ill, was acting erratically at the residence. Upon the deputies’ arrival and their attempt to make contact, gunshots were fired almost immediately, with Cristal and her grandfather ultimately killed during the ordeal. Law enforcement officers established a perimeter and called for tactical support, but Cristal was found unresponsive after Alirez surrendered hours later.

The plaintiffs, including Cristal’s personal representative and her mother, brought suit against various law enforcement agencies and officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New Mexico state law, alleging failure to intervene and negligence. The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico granted summary judgment for all defendants, concluding that qualified immunity barred the § 1983 claims and that the plaintiffs could not prevail on their state-law claims, including negligent investigation, negligent training, and loss of consortium.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Tenth Circuit held that the law enforcement officers did not affirmatively act to create or increase the danger to Cristal, a necessary element for liability under the substantive due process “danger-creation” exception, and thus the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Additionally, the court found that the officers’ inability to intervene was caused by the immediate deadly threat posed by Alirez, precluding liability under New Mexico law for negligent investigation or related torts. The disposition of the case was affirmed in favor of the defendants.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Nancy Moritz</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-4073/24-4073-2026-03-17.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Aguayo-Montes</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-17T08:03:09-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-17T08:03:09-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-4073/24-4073-2026-03-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A noncitizen defendant, who had lived in Colorado since childhood and was granted relief under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, was arrested and charged with possessing heroin with intent to distribute after police found 16 pounds of heroin during a stop in Utah. The defendant was concerned about the potential immigration consequences of a guilty plea and repeatedly asked his retained counsel for advice. Counsel told him he could not advise on immigration matters and that the defendant should not worry about deportation until after he was in prison, suggesting he could seek immigration counsel at that time. The plea agreement stated only that the defendant “may” be removed from the United States if not a citizen. Relying on this advice, the defendant pleaded guilty.

After sentencing, the defendant filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, arguing that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to properly advise him of the automatic immigration consequences of his plea, as required by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). The district court denied the motion, finding that the defendant was sufficiently advised of a risk of deportation and that this met constitutional requirements. The court did not reach the question of prejudice.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed. The court held that, under Padilla, when the immigration consequences of a conviction are clear—as they are for a federal controlled substance offense—counsel must provide clear advice that deportation will be “automatic,” “presumptively mandatory,” or “practically inevitable.” The court found the defendant’s counsel failed to do so and provided misleading advice. The Tenth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings on whether the defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-4073/24-4073-2026-03-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Aguayo-Montes" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A noncitizen defendant, who had lived in Colorado since childhood and was granted relief under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, was arrested and charged with possessing heroin with intent to distribute after police found 16 pounds of heroin during a stop in Utah. The defendant was concerned about the potential immigration consequences of a guilty plea and repeatedly asked his retained counsel for advice. Counsel told him he could not advise on immigration matters and that the defendant should not worry about deportation until after he was in prison, suggesting he could seek immigration counsel at that time. The plea agreement stated only that the defendant “may” be removed from the United States if not a citizen. Relying on this advice, the defendant pleaded guilty.

After sentencing, the defendant filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, arguing that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to properly advise him of the automatic immigration consequences of his plea, as required by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). The district court denied the motion, finding that the defendant was sufficiently advised of a risk of deportation and that this met constitutional requirements. The court did not reach the question of prejudice.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed. The court held that, under Padilla, when the immigration consequences of a conviction are clear—as they are for a federal controlled substance offense—counsel must provide clear advice that deportation will be “automatic,” “presumptively mandatory,” or “practically inevitable.” The court found the defendant’s counsel failed to do so and provided misleading advice. The Tenth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings on whether the defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Nancy Moritz</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Immigration Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-5097/25-5097-2026-03-17.html</id>
        	<title>Jiang v. City of Tulsa</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-17T06:33:02-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-17T06:33:02-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-5097/25-5097-2026-03-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The plaintiff, a senior engineer at a city water-treatment plant, applied for a superintendent position. Despite holding a Ph.D. in engineering and having extensive technical experience, he lacked significant leadership experience. The city’s hiring process initially required a bachelor’s degree in a relevant field, but the city selected a younger, white candidate without a degree who had substantial leadership experience. The plaintiff, a middle-aged man from China, filed a grievance, and the city’s civil-service commission determined that the city had violated its written hiring policies by certifying candidates without the required degree. In response, the city revised the job description, removing the degree requirement and allowing work experience to substitute for education, then repeated the hiring process, ultimately selecting the same candidate.

The plaintiff pursued claims in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, alleging race and age discrimination under Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act, as well as retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment to the city on all remaining claims, finding that the plaintiff failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext and did not establish a prima facie case of retaliation.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiff did not submit evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the city’s stated preference for leadership experience was pretext for unlawful discrimination. The court found no sufficient evidence of procedural irregularities or subjectivity to support an inference of pretext, nor an overwhelming disparity in qualifications. The Tenth Circuit further held that the plaintiff failed to show pretext for retaliation, as the city’s explanation for changing the job requirements was not contradicted. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-5097/25-5097-2026-03-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Jiang v. City of Tulsa" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The plaintiff, a senior engineer at a city water-treatment plant, applied for a superintendent position. Despite holding a Ph.D. in engineering and having extensive technical experience, he lacked significant leadership experience. The city’s hiring process initially required a bachelor’s degree in a relevant field, but the city selected a younger, white candidate without a degree who had substantial leadership experience. The plaintiff, a middle-aged man from China, filed a grievance, and the city’s civil-service commission determined that the city had violated its written hiring policies by certifying candidates without the required degree. In response, the city revised the job description, removing the degree requirement and allowing work experience to substitute for education, then repeated the hiring process, ultimately selecting the same candidate.

The plaintiff pursued claims in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, alleging race and age discrimination under Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act, as well as retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment to the city on all remaining claims, finding that the plaintiff failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext and did not establish a prima facie case of retaliation.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiff did not submit evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the city’s stated preference for leadership experience was pretext for unlawful discrimination. The court found no sufficient evidence of procedural irregularities or subjectivity to support an inference of pretext, nor an overwhelming disparity in qualifications. The Tenth Circuit further held that the plaintiff failed to show pretext for retaliation, as the city’s explanation for changing the job requirements was not contradicted. The district court’s judgment was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Gregory Alan Phillips</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-2173/24-2173-2026-03-11.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Zamora-Guerra</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-11T08:33:33-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-11T08:33:33-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-2173/24-2173-2026-03-11.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Border Patrol officers apprehended the defendant, a Mexican citizen, near Sunland Park, New Mexico. He admitted to being in the United States without authorization. The government charged him with illegal reentry after removal, under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b). The defendant had previously been deported multiple times since 2008 and had three prior convictions for illegal reentry between 2011 and 2014. He also had a conviction for animal cruelty after killing a young horse in 2013 and a history of law enforcement encounters involving allegations such as domestic violence and substance offenses, though not all resulted in convictions.

The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico presided over the case. The defendant entered a fast-track plea agreement, resulting in a calculated sentencing guideline range of four to ten months, or without the fast-track plea, eight to fourteen months. Before sentencing, the district court indicated a possible upward variance. During the hearing, the government sought a high-end sentence, and the defendant asked for twelve to eighteen months, but no more than twenty-four months. The district court rejected the plea agreement, allowed the defendant to proceed, and ultimately imposed a twenty-four-month sentence, citing the defendant’s repeated illegal entries, criminal history, and the animal cruelty conviction. The district court gave a detailed explanation referencing the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.

On appeal, before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the defendant challenged the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, arguing the district court lacked compelling justification for the upward variance and that the sentence created unwarranted disparities. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion, found the detailed explanation sufficient, and concluded the upward variance was justified in light of the defendant’s history and the § 3553(a) factors. The court affirmed the sentence. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-2173/24-2173-2026-03-11.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Zamora-Guerra" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Border Patrol officers apprehended the defendant, a Mexican citizen, near Sunland Park, New Mexico. He admitted to being in the United States without authorization. The government charged him with illegal reentry after removal, under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b). The defendant had previously been deported multiple times since 2008 and had three prior convictions for illegal reentry between 2011 and 2014. He also had a conviction for animal cruelty after killing a young horse in 2013 and a history of law enforcement encounters involving allegations such as domestic violence and substance offenses, though not all resulted in convictions.

The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico presided over the case. The defendant entered a fast-track plea agreement, resulting in a calculated sentencing guideline range of four to ten months, or without the fast-track plea, eight to fourteen months. Before sentencing, the district court indicated a possible upward variance. During the hearing, the government sought a high-end sentence, and the defendant asked for twelve to eighteen months, but no more than twenty-four months. The district court rejected the plea agreement, allowed the defendant to proceed, and ultimately imposed a twenty-four-month sentence, citing the defendant’s repeated illegal entries, criminal history, and the animal cruelty conviction. The district court gave a detailed explanation referencing the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.

On appeal, before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the defendant challenged the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, arguing the district court lacked compelling justification for the upward variance and that the sentence created unwarranted disparities. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion, found the detailed explanation sufficient, and concluded the upward variance was justified in light of the defendant’s history and the § 3553(a) factors. The court affirmed the sentence.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Joel Carson</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Immigration Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-6176/23-6176-2026-03-11.html</id>
        	<title>Wahpekeche v. Pettigrew</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-11T07:32:35-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-11T07:32:35-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-6176/23-6176-2026-03-11.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The petitioner was convicted in Oklahoma state court of several serious crimes, including first-degree rape of a child under fourteen, forcible sodomy, lewd or indecent acts to a minor, rape by instrumentation, and commission of a lewd act in front of a minor. He asserted membership in the Kickapoo Tribe and claimed the crimes occurred in Indian country, which would affect the state court’s jurisdiction. The specific area in question was formerly part of the Citizen Potawatomi reservation.

After conviction, the petitioner challenged the state court’s jurisdiction in the Oklahoma state courts, raising various arguments about the land’s status. He also brought claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, denial of due process, and violations of federal law. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected his jurisdictional arguments and other claims. He then sought habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that Congress had clearly disestablished the Citizen Potawatomi reservation in 1891, citing statutory language and Supreme Court precedent. The court found that the petitioner had waived arguments regarding the land as a dependent Indian community or an Indian allotment by failing to properly preserve those claims. Additionally, the court determined that the petitioner’s other claims (including those alleging violations of the Indian Child Welfare Act, ineffective assistance, improper questioning, and due process violations) were procedurally barred as they had not been properly exhausted in state court and did not meet the requirements for overcoming an anticipatory procedural bar. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-6176/23-6176-2026-03-11.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Wahpekeche v. Pettigrew" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The petitioner was convicted in Oklahoma state court of several serious crimes, including first-degree rape of a child under fourteen, forcible sodomy, lewd or indecent acts to a minor, rape by instrumentation, and commission of a lewd act in front of a minor. He asserted membership in the Kickapoo Tribe and claimed the crimes occurred in Indian country, which would affect the state court’s jurisdiction. The specific area in question was formerly part of the Citizen Potawatomi reservation.

After conviction, the petitioner challenged the state court’s jurisdiction in the Oklahoma state courts, raising various arguments about the land’s status. He also brought claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, denial of due process, and violations of federal law. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected his jurisdictional arguments and other claims. He then sought habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that Congress had clearly disestablished the Citizen Potawatomi reservation in 1891, citing statutory language and Supreme Court precedent. The court found that the petitioner had waived arguments regarding the land as a dependent Indian community or an Indian allotment by failing to properly preserve those claims. Additionally, the court determined that the petitioner’s other claims (including those alleging violations of the Indian Child Welfare Act, ineffective assistance, improper questioning, and due process violations) were procedurally barred as they had not been properly exhausted in state court and did not meet the requirements for overcoming an anticipatory procedural bar. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Robert Bacharach</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Native American Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-6006/25-6006-2026-03-11.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Wofford</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-11T07:32:35-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-11T07:32:35-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-6006/25-6006-2026-03-11.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A bank robbery occurred at City National Bank in Oklahoma City on November 7, 2022. During the incident, two eyewitnesses—a teller and a customer—testified that the robber brandished what appeared to be a real firearm, describing it as a “Glock” or “Glock-like handgun.” Surveillance video supported their accounts, but law enforcement did not recover the weapon. The defendant, Akin Wofford, was charged with armed bank robbery and with possessing and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence.

The case was tried in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. At trial, the government relied on eyewitness testimony and video evidence to prove the existence of a firearm. The jury was instructed, without objection, that the government did not need to produce the actual weapon and that “witness identification of the weapon as a firearm is sufficient.” The jury convicted the defendant on both counts.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the defendant argued that the jury instruction on Count Two violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by relieving the government of its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed and brandished a “firearm.” The Tenth Circuit reviewed the claim for plain error because no objection was raised at trial. The court held that, when read as a whole, the instructions did not misstate the law or mislead the jury, and that the challenged instruction did not direct the jury to automatically accept witness testimony as sufficient. The Tenth Circuit concluded there was no plain error and affirmed the conviction in full. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-6006/25-6006-2026-03-11.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Wofford" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A bank robbery occurred at City National Bank in Oklahoma City on November 7, 2022. During the incident, two eyewitnesses—a teller and a customer—testified that the robber brandished what appeared to be a real firearm, describing it as a “Glock” or “Glock-like handgun.” Surveillance video supported their accounts, but law enforcement did not recover the weapon. The defendant, Akin Wofford, was charged with armed bank robbery and with possessing and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence.

The case was tried in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. At trial, the government relied on eyewitness testimony and video evidence to prove the existence of a firearm. The jury was instructed, without objection, that the government did not need to produce the actual weapon and that “witness identification of the weapon as a firearm is sufficient.” The jury convicted the defendant on both counts.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the defendant argued that the jury instruction on Count Two violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by relieving the government of its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed and brandished a “firearm.” The Tenth Circuit reviewed the claim for plain error because no objection was raised at trial. The court held that, when read as a whole, the instructions did not misstate the law or mislead the jury, and that the challenged instruction did not direct the jury to automatically accept witness testimony as sufficient. The Tenth Circuit concluded there was no plain error and affirmed the conviction in full.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kathryn Vratil</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1431/24-1431-2026-03-10.html</id>
        	<title>Dekovic v. Rubio</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-10T10:08:04-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-10T10:08:04-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1431/24-1431-2026-03-10.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A lawful permanent resident mother filed an I-130 visa petition for her unmarried son, who was under twenty-one at the time, seeking to classify him as a minor child of a lawful permanent resident (F2A category). After the petition was approved and the son’s visa became available, but before a visa was issued, the mother became a naturalized U.S. citizen. She notified the National Visa Center, which then reclassified her son from the F2A preference category to the F1 category (adult child of a U.S. citizen), rather than as an immediate relative. This reclassification resulted in the loss of his current visa availability and placed him in a much longer waitlist, significantly delaying his ability to immigrate.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado found that the National Visa Center’s reclassification was a final agency action subject to judicial review, but ruled in favor of the government on the merits. The district court held that the relevant statutory provision required the child’s chronological age, not a statutory age calculation, to determine eligibility for immediate-relative status upon the parent’s naturalization.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It agreed with other circuit courts that the statutory language should be read in the context of the overall immigration scheme and the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA). The court held that, for a child who was a statutory minor under the F2A category on the date of the parent’s naturalization, eligibility for reclassification as an immediate relative is based on the statutory age as defined by the CSPA, not solely on chronological age. Thus, beneficiaries in this situation retain their eligibility for immediate-relative status. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the finding of final agency action but reversed the judgment in favor of the government and remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1431/24-1431-2026-03-10.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Dekovic v. Rubio" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A lawful permanent resident mother filed an I-130 visa petition for her unmarried son, who was under twenty-one at the time, seeking to classify him as a minor child of a lawful permanent resident (F2A category). After the petition was approved and the son’s visa became available, but before a visa was issued, the mother became a naturalized U.S. citizen. She notified the National Visa Center, which then reclassified her son from the F2A preference category to the F1 category (adult child of a U.S. citizen), rather than as an immediate relative. This reclassification resulted in the loss of his current visa availability and placed him in a much longer waitlist, significantly delaying his ability to immigrate.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado found that the National Visa Center’s reclassification was a final agency action subject to judicial review, but ruled in favor of the government on the merits. The district court held that the relevant statutory provision required the child’s chronological age, not a statutory age calculation, to determine eligibility for immediate-relative status upon the parent’s naturalization.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It agreed with other circuit courts that the statutory language should be read in the context of the overall immigration scheme and the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA). The court held that, for a child who was a statutory minor under the F2A category on the date of the parent’s naturalization, eligibility for reclassification as an immediate relative is based on the statutory age as defined by the CSPA, not solely on chronological age. Thus, beneficiaries in this situation retain their eligibility for immediate-relative status. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the finding of final agency action but reversed the judgment in favor of the government and remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-10</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Carolyn McHugh</case:judge>
													<category term="Immigration Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1473/24-1473-2026-03-10.html</id>
        	<title>Gays Against Groomers v. Garcia</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-10T08:33:17-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-10T08:33:17-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1473/24-1473-2026-03-10.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A group of individuals and organizations challenged rules of decorum established by certain Colorado state legislators during public hearings on legislation concerning transgender rights. The rules prohibited misgendering and deadnaming—referring to transgender individuals in ways inconsistent with their gender identity or using names they no longer use. The plaintiffs asserted that these rules violated their First Amendment rights by restricting their speech during legislative hearings and by removing certain comments from the official legislative record.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the case after the legislators, sued in both their official and individual capacities, moved to dismiss. The legislators argued that they were protected by legislative immunity, that the plaintiffs’ claims failed on the merits, and that the requests for relief were moot. The district court granted the legislators’ motion to dismiss, holding that the rules and their enforcement were within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity and thus subject to absolute legislative immunity. The court also found the matter moot regarding prospective relief, concluding it was speculative whether the plaintiffs would face the same situation again.

Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Tenth Circuit held that the case was not moot because the plaintiffs continued to seek relief and the legislators confirmed that the challenged rules would remain in effect. However, the Tenth Circuit found that legislative immunity applied, protecting legislators from suit for actions taken in their legislative capacity, regardless of whether the relief sought was prospective or retrospective, or whether the suit was brought against them in their individual or official capacities. The court did not reach the merits of the constitutional claims due to the application of legislative immunity and affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1473/24-1473-2026-03-10.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Gays Against Groomers v. Garcia" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A group of individuals and organizations challenged rules of decorum established by certain Colorado state legislators during public hearings on legislation concerning transgender rights. The rules prohibited misgendering and deadnaming—referring to transgender individuals in ways inconsistent with their gender identity or using names they no longer use. The plaintiffs asserted that these rules violated their First Amendment rights by restricting their speech during legislative hearings and by removing certain comments from the official legislative record.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the case after the legislators, sued in both their official and individual capacities, moved to dismiss. The legislators argued that they were protected by legislative immunity, that the plaintiffs’ claims failed on the merits, and that the requests for relief were moot. The district court granted the legislators’ motion to dismiss, holding that the rules and their enforcement were within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity and thus subject to absolute legislative immunity. The court also found the matter moot regarding prospective relief, concluding it was speculative whether the plaintiffs would face the same situation again.

Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Tenth Circuit held that the case was not moot because the plaintiffs continued to seek relief and the legislators confirmed that the challenged rules would remain in effect. However, the Tenth Circuit found that legislative immunity applied, protecting legislators from suit for actions taken in their legislative capacity, regardless of whether the relief sought was prospective or retrospective, or whether the suit was brought against them in their individual or official capacities. The court did not reach the merits of the constitutional claims due to the application of legislative immunity and affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-10</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Federico</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1331/24-1331-2026-03-09.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Becker</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-09T07:33:24-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-09T07:33:24-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1331/24-1331-2026-03-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		After a road-rage incident in which a firearm was allegedly discharged, law enforcement investigated and tied the suspect to a residence using law enforcement databases, vehicle registration information, and visual surveillance. The police observed a vehicle matching the description from the incident parked at a house on West Iliff Lane, saw the suspect washing the car in the driveway, and watched him enter and exit the house. These observations occurred several weeks after the incident. Officers obtained a search warrant for the house and vehicle based on an affidavit summarizing the investigation and linking the suspect to the location. Execution of the warrant resulted in the discovery of firearms, ammunition, and controlled substances, leading to charges for drug offenses and possession of a firearm by a felon.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the search warrant was supported by probable cause. The defendant pleaded guilty but preserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the defendant argued that the affidavit supporting the warrant failed to establish a sufficient nexus between the alleged offense and the residence and challenged the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) under the Second Amendment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concluded that the affidavit provided a substantial basis for finding probable cause, as law enforcement’s observations and the suspect’s connection to the residence justified the search. The court also held that the Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) was foreclosed by binding Tenth Circuit precedent. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1331/24-1331-2026-03-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Becker" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                After a road-rage incident in which a firearm was allegedly discharged, law enforcement investigated and tied the suspect to a residence using law enforcement databases, vehicle registration information, and visual surveillance. The police observed a vehicle matching the description from the incident parked at a house on West Iliff Lane, saw the suspect washing the car in the driveway, and watched him enter and exit the house. These observations occurred several weeks after the incident. Officers obtained a search warrant for the house and vehicle based on an affidavit summarizing the investigation and linking the suspect to the location. Execution of the warrant resulted in the discovery of firearms, ammunition, and controlled substances, leading to charges for drug offenses and possession of a firearm by a felon.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the search warrant was supported by probable cause. The defendant pleaded guilty but preserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the defendant argued that the affidavit supporting the warrant failed to establish a sufficient nexus between the alleged offense and the residence and challenged the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) under the Second Amendment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concluded that the affidavit provided a substantial basis for finding probable cause, as law enforcement’s observations and the suspect’s connection to the residence justified the search. The court also held that the Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) was foreclosed by binding Tenth Circuit precedent. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Harris Hartz</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-2146/24-2146-2026-03-06.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Aguilar</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-06T09:03:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-06T09:03:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-2146/24-2146-2026-03-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A man was indicted and tried for three counts of abusive sexual contact involving his niece, who was twelve years old at the time and lived with her grandmother, sisters, and several uncles, including the defendant. The charges stemmed from two incidents in which the niece reported that her uncle had touched her inappropriately on multiple parts of her body. At trial, the niece testified in detail about the first incident, describing how the defendant entered her room, massaged her back, and then touched her buttocks, breasts (over her bra), and genital area (over her clothes). She also described a second incident, but the defendant was acquitted of the charge relating to that event.

A federal grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging the defendant with three counts, but the jury convicted him only on two counts—one for touching the genitalia and one for touching the breasts during the first incident. The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico denied the defendant’s post-trial motions for judgment of acquittal and to merge the two convictions, finding sufficient evidence for the convictions and holding that each touching constituted a separate offense under the statute.

Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed de novo the questions of multiplicity under the Double Jeopardy Clause and sufficiency of the evidence. The court held that the convictions were not multiplicitous because the relevant statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2244(a)(3) and 2246(3), defines abusive sexual contact as a separate-act offense, allowing for separate punishment for each intentional touching of an enumerated body part. The court also determined that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict, as a rational juror could find the requisite sexual intent based on the victim’s testimony. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-2146/24-2146-2026-03-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Aguilar" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A man was indicted and tried for three counts of abusive sexual contact involving his niece, who was twelve years old at the time and lived with her grandmother, sisters, and several uncles, including the defendant. The charges stemmed from two incidents in which the niece reported that her uncle had touched her inappropriately on multiple parts of her body. At trial, the niece testified in detail about the first incident, describing how the defendant entered her room, massaged her back, and then touched her buttocks, breasts (over her bra), and genital area (over her clothes). She also described a second incident, but the defendant was acquitted of the charge relating to that event.

A federal grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging the defendant with three counts, but the jury convicted him only on two counts—one for touching the genitalia and one for touching the breasts during the first incident. The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico denied the defendant’s post-trial motions for judgment of acquittal and to merge the two convictions, finding sufficient evidence for the convictions and holding that each touching constituted a separate offense under the statute.

Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed de novo the questions of multiplicity under the Double Jeopardy Clause and sufficiency of the evidence. The court held that the convictions were not multiplicitous because the relevant statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2244(a)(3) and 2246(3), defines abusive sexual contact as a separate-act offense, allowing for separate punishment for each intentional touching of an enumerated body part. The court also determined that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict, as a rational juror could find the requisite sexual intent based on the victim’s testimony. The judgment of conviction was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerome Holmes</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-4019/23-4019-2026-03-06.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Sandoval-Flores</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-06T08:02:53-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-06T08:02:53-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-4019/23-4019-2026-03-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves a defendant who, while guarding a cache of drugs and money, opened fire on law enforcement officers, wounding one but not fatally due to protective gear. He was indicted by a federal grand jury on several charges, including attempted murder of federal officers and using a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Under a plea agreement, he pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted murder, one § 924(c) count (with attempted murder as the predicate crime of violence), and a firearm possession charge, waiving most rights to appeal or collaterally attack his conviction. In exchange, the government dropped other charges and agreed not to prosecute his son.

After his conviction, the defendant pursued multiple post-conviction relief motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, all unsuccessful. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Davis, which invalidated the “residual clause” of § 924(c)’s definition of “crime of violence” as unconstitutionally vague, he sought authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit granted authorization, and the District of Utah considered the merits. The district court denied relief, concluding the plea waiver barred relief and, alternatively, that the defendant failed to show the sentencing court relied on the residual clause.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the denial of the § 2255 motion. The court held that the defendant did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the sentencing court relied on the now-invalid residual clause when applying § 924(c). The court further affirmed that attempted murder qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the still-valid “elements clause” of § 924(c). The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of post-conviction relief. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-4019/23-4019-2026-03-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Sandoval-Flores" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves a defendant who, while guarding a cache of drugs and money, opened fire on law enforcement officers, wounding one but not fatally due to protective gear. He was indicted by a federal grand jury on several charges, including attempted murder of federal officers and using a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Under a plea agreement, he pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted murder, one § 924(c) count (with attempted murder as the predicate crime of violence), and a firearm possession charge, waiving most rights to appeal or collaterally attack his conviction. In exchange, the government dropped other charges and agreed not to prosecute his son.

After his conviction, the defendant pursued multiple post-conviction relief motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, all unsuccessful. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Davis, which invalidated the “residual clause” of § 924(c)’s definition of “crime of violence” as unconstitutionally vague, he sought authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit granted authorization, and the District of Utah considered the merits. The district court denied relief, concluding the plea waiver barred relief and, alternatively, that the defendant failed to show the sentencing court relied on the residual clause.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the denial of the § 2255 motion. The court held that the defendant did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the sentencing court relied on the now-invalid residual clause when applying § 924(c). The court further affirmed that attempted murder qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the still-valid “elements clause” of § 924(c). The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of post-conviction relief.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Harris Hartz</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-1143/23-1143-2026-03-04.html</id>
        	<title>Eaves v. Polis</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-04T09:33:09-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-04T09:33:09-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-1143/23-1143-2026-03-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		While incarcerated in a Colorado state prison, the plaintiff, a practicing member of the Sac &amp; Fox faith, brought suit seeking monetary and injunctive relief. He alleged that certain prison regulations and practices violated his rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. His claims focused on being denied possession of sacred items, spiritual cleansing of his cell, use of donated firewood for religious ceremonies, and access to faith grounds during and after the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiff named numerous officials and employees, including the Governor of Colorado, in both their official and individual capacities.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied the Governor’s motion to dismiss the official-capacity claims for injunctive relief, rejecting his assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Governor argued he lacked the required connection to the challenged regulations to qualify for the Ex Parte Young exception. During the appeal, the plaintiff was transferred to another facility within the Colorado Department of Corrections. The Governor raised the issue of mootness due to this transfer.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered whether the claims for injunctive relief against the Governor were moot because of the transfer and whether Eleventh Amendment immunity applied. The court held that the claims were neither constitutionally nor prudentially moot, as the plaintiff’s affidavit showed ongoing exposure to substantially similar conditions at the new facility. The court further held that, under Colorado law and the facts alleged, the Governor had sufficient authority and demonstrated involvement in the challenged practices to satisfy the Ex Parte Young exception. The court therefore affirmed the district court’s denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity and remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-1143/23-1143-2026-03-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Eaves v. Polis" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                While incarcerated in a Colorado state prison, the plaintiff, a practicing member of the Sac &amp; Fox faith, brought suit seeking monetary and injunctive relief. He alleged that certain prison regulations and practices violated his rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. His claims focused on being denied possession of sacred items, spiritual cleansing of his cell, use of donated firewood for religious ceremonies, and access to faith grounds during and after the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiff named numerous officials and employees, including the Governor of Colorado, in both their official and individual capacities.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied the Governor’s motion to dismiss the official-capacity claims for injunctive relief, rejecting his assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Governor argued he lacked the required connection to the challenged regulations to qualify for the Ex Parte Young exception. During the appeal, the plaintiff was transferred to another facility within the Colorado Department of Corrections. The Governor raised the issue of mootness due to this transfer.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered whether the claims for injunctive relief against the Governor were moot because of the transfer and whether Eleventh Amendment immunity applied. The court held that the claims were neither constitutionally nor prudentially moot, as the plaintiff’s affidavit showed ongoing exposure to substantially similar conditions at the new facility. The court further held that, under Colorado law and the facts alleged, the Governor had sufficient authority and demonstrated involvement in the challenged practices to satisfy the Ex Parte Young exception. The court therefore affirmed the district court’s denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity and remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Bobby Baldock</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-7038/25-7038-2026-03-03.html</id>
        	<title>Stepp v. Lockhart</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-03T11:07:53-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-03T11:07:53-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-7038/25-7038-2026-03-03.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A fifth-grade student, J.S., attended a local Oklahoma elementary school where, in August 2022, the administration implemented a policy segregating fifth-grade students into all-boys and all-girls homerooms. J.S. was placed in the boys’ class, taught by Mr. McClain. During the initial weeks, Mr. McClain allegedly targeted J.S. with severe discipline, derogatory language, and inappropriate sexual comments. After J.S. and his parents complained about this treatment and the sex-segregated policy, J.S. was removed from his classroom and placed on a modified schedule, then ultimately withdrawn from the school by his parents, who cited ongoing retaliation and lack of safety. The parents also filed a Title IX complaint, but alleged that the school’s investigation was inadequate and retaliatory actions followed, including public shaming and further mistreatment of J.S.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma granted in part and denied in part various defendants’ motions to dismiss, finding some claims barred by qualified immunity but allowing others to proceed. The court found that school district officials and Mr. McClain could not claim qualified immunity on certain equal protection and retaliation claims, but dismissed some due process and conspiracy claims.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit held that school officials were entitled to qualified immunity on the procedural due process claim but not on the equal protection claim related to sex-based class segregation. Principal Anderson and Mr. Blair were properly denied qualified immunity on retaliation claims, while others were dismissed. Mr. McClain was granted qualified immunity on the substantive due process claim but not on the equal protection claim for alleged sexual harassment. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, dismissed in part for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-7038/25-7038-2026-03-03.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Stepp v. Lockhart" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A fifth-grade student, J.S., attended a local Oklahoma elementary school where, in August 2022, the administration implemented a policy segregating fifth-grade students into all-boys and all-girls homerooms. J.S. was placed in the boys’ class, taught by Mr. McClain. During the initial weeks, Mr. McClain allegedly targeted J.S. with severe discipline, derogatory language, and inappropriate sexual comments. After J.S. and his parents complained about this treatment and the sex-segregated policy, J.S. was removed from his classroom and placed on a modified schedule, then ultimately withdrawn from the school by his parents, who cited ongoing retaliation and lack of safety. The parents also filed a Title IX complaint, but alleged that the school’s investigation was inadequate and retaliatory actions followed, including public shaming and further mistreatment of J.S.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma granted in part and denied in part various defendants’ motions to dismiss, finding some claims barred by qualified immunity but allowing others to proceed. The court found that school district officials and Mr. McClain could not claim qualified immunity on certain equal protection and retaliation claims, but dismissed some due process and conspiracy claims.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit held that school officials were entitled to qualified immunity on the procedural due process claim but not on the equal protection claim related to sex-based class segregation. Principal Anderson and Mr. Blair were properly denied qualified immunity on retaliation claims, while others were dismissed. Mr. McClain was granted qualified immunity on the substantive due process claim but not on the equal protection claim for alleged sexual harassment. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, dismissed in part for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Scott Matheson</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Education Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-9528/24-9528-2026-03-03.html</id>
        	<title>Adams v. FAA</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-03T09:02:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-03T09:02:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-9528/24-9528-2026-03-03.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A commercial air tour operator, who had previously conducted flights over Bandelier National Monument under interim authority, challenged a final order issued by the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Park Service. This order established an Air Tour Management Plan (ATMP) for Bandelier National Monument, prohibiting all commercial air tours over the site. The agencies’ process included public comment, environmental assessment, and extensive consultation with Native American tribes, who strongly objected to air tours due to cultural and privacy concerns. The operator argued that his flights were minimally intrusive, carefully routed, and brief, and that banning them would negatively impact safety and his business.

The agencies initially considered various alternatives, including allowing limited air tours or maintaining previous operations, but ultimately concluded that any commercial air tour flights would create unacceptable impacts to Bandelier’s natural and cultural resources and visitor experience. The agencies’ environmental assessment under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) found no significant impacts for NEPA purposes, but their record of decision emphasized significant adverse impacts to tribal cultural resources under the National Parks Air Tour Management Act (NPATMA).

Upon petition for review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard and de novo for statutory interpretation, as required by recent Supreme Court precedent. The court held that NPATMA and NEPA use different significance standards, and that the agency’s path to finding significant adverse impacts under NPATMA was reasonably discernible in the record. The court also rejected the petitioner’s additional statutory and constitutional challenges, finding them either unexhausted or inadequately briefed. The Tenth Circuit denied the petition for review. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-9528/24-9528-2026-03-03.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Adams v. FAA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A commercial air tour operator, who had previously conducted flights over Bandelier National Monument under interim authority, challenged a final order issued by the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Park Service. This order established an Air Tour Management Plan (ATMP) for Bandelier National Monument, prohibiting all commercial air tours over the site. The agencies’ process included public comment, environmental assessment, and extensive consultation with Native American tribes, who strongly objected to air tours due to cultural and privacy concerns. The operator argued that his flights were minimally intrusive, carefully routed, and brief, and that banning them would negatively impact safety and his business.

The agencies initially considered various alternatives, including allowing limited air tours or maintaining previous operations, but ultimately concluded that any commercial air tour flights would create unacceptable impacts to Bandelier’s natural and cultural resources and visitor experience. The agencies’ environmental assessment under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) found no significant impacts for NEPA purposes, but their record of decision emphasized significant adverse impacts to tribal cultural resources under the National Parks Air Tour Management Act (NPATMA).

Upon petition for review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard and de novo for statutory interpretation, as required by recent Supreme Court precedent. The court held that NPATMA and NEPA use different significance standards, and that the agency’s path to finding significant adverse impacts under NPATMA was reasonably discernible in the record. The court also rejected the petitioner’s additional statutory and constitutional challenges, finding them either unexhausted or inadequately briefed. The Tenth Circuit denied the petition for review.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Veronica Rossman</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Environmental Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Native American Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-2008/25-2008-2026-03-02.html</id>
        	<title>Sousa v. Chipotle Services</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-02T09:32:17-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-02T09:32:17-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-2008/25-2008-2026-03-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The plaintiff, who was in his mid-fifties and had decades of restaurant industry experience, was employed by the defendant as a field leader, overseeing several restaurants. He was recognized as a top performer in 2021, with high scores on cleanliness and safety audits. In early 2022, a severe cockroach infestation was reported at one of his assigned restaurants. The infestation was not previously known to him, and he took steps to address it once notified. However, his supervisor observed persistent pest and cleanliness problems at this and other locations within his responsibility. Additionally, site audits found that several of his restaurants failed to meet cleanliness standards within a single week.

After these incidents, the plaintiff was terminated for failing to maintain company food safety standards and for not reporting critical breaches promptly. He received termination documentation and final warnings simultaneously. The plaintiff later sued under the New Mexico Human Rights Act, alleging that his termination was due to age discrimination. The defendant removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, which granted summary judgment for the employer, holding that the plaintiff had not shown sufficient evidence that the stated reasons for his firing were a pretext for age discrimination.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the plaintiff did not present enough evidence that the employer’s justification was pretextual. The evidence failed to show that younger employees with comparable problems were treated more favorably or that the employer’s stated reasons were false or inconsistent. The court emphasized that it would not second-guess business decisions absent evidence of discrimination. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-2008/25-2008-2026-03-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Sousa v. Chipotle Services" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The plaintiff, who was in his mid-fifties and had decades of restaurant industry experience, was employed by the defendant as a field leader, overseeing several restaurants. He was recognized as a top performer in 2021, with high scores on cleanliness and safety audits. In early 2022, a severe cockroach infestation was reported at one of his assigned restaurants. The infestation was not previously known to him, and he took steps to address it once notified. However, his supervisor observed persistent pest and cleanliness problems at this and other locations within his responsibility. Additionally, site audits found that several of his restaurants failed to meet cleanliness standards within a single week.

After these incidents, the plaintiff was terminated for failing to maintain company food safety standards and for not reporting critical breaches promptly. He received termination documentation and final warnings simultaneously. The plaintiff later sued under the New Mexico Human Rights Act, alleging that his termination was due to age discrimination. The defendant removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, which granted summary judgment for the employer, holding that the plaintiff had not shown sufficient evidence that the stated reasons for his firing were a pretext for age discrimination.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the plaintiff did not present enough evidence that the employer’s justification was pretextual. The evidence failed to show that younger employees with comparable problems were treated more favorably or that the employer’s stated reasons were false or inconsistent. The court emphasized that it would not second-guess business decisions absent evidence of discrimination. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Carolyn McHugh</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-9507/24-9507-2026-02-25.html</id>
        	<title>Garcia-Botello v. Bondi</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-25T14:04:54-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-25T14:04:54-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-9507/24-9507-2026-02-25.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A Mexican citizen entered the United States as a child on a temporary tourist visa in 1998 and remained after his visa expired. In 2009, he suffered a traumatic brain injury in a car accident, resulting in significant cognitive and physical disabilities, including impaired memory, judgment, and behavioral control. Following the accident, he had several encounters with law enforcement, leading to arrests and convictions for various offenses. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him in 2018 for overstaying his visa. He conceded removability but sought protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), arguing that, due to his disabilities, he would likely be institutionalized and tortured if returned to Mexico.

An Immigration Judge (IJ) found him credible but denied CAT relief, concluding that although he might face harm in Mexico, the evidence did not show it would be inflicted with the specific intent to cause severe pain or suffering as required by the CAT. The IJ determined any likely mistreatment would result from neglect, lack of resources, or insufficient training rather than purposeful torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, accepting the IJ’s findings and further concluding that the Mexican government’s inconsistent efforts to address abuses did not amount to acquiescence in torture.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s order. It held that the BIA applied the correct legal standards for specific intent and governmental acquiescence, and that substantial evidence supported the factual findings. The court found no error in the agency’s treatment of the applicant’s and his mother’s testimony or in its assessment of the risk of torture. The court accordingly denied the petition for review. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-9507/24-9507-2026-02-25.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Garcia-Botello v. Bondi" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A Mexican citizen entered the United States as a child on a temporary tourist visa in 1998 and remained after his visa expired. In 2009, he suffered a traumatic brain injury in a car accident, resulting in significant cognitive and physical disabilities, including impaired memory, judgment, and behavioral control. Following the accident, he had several encounters with law enforcement, leading to arrests and convictions for various offenses. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him in 2018 for overstaying his visa. He conceded removability but sought protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), arguing that, due to his disabilities, he would likely be institutionalized and tortured if returned to Mexico.

An Immigration Judge (IJ) found him credible but denied CAT relief, concluding that although he might face harm in Mexico, the evidence did not show it would be inflicted with the specific intent to cause severe pain or suffering as required by the CAT. The IJ determined any likely mistreatment would result from neglect, lack of resources, or insufficient training rather than purposeful torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, accepting the IJ’s findings and further concluding that the Mexican government’s inconsistent efforts to address abuses did not amount to acquiescence in torture.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s order. It held that the BIA applied the correct legal standards for specific intent and governmental acquiescence, and that substantial evidence supported the factual findings. The court found no error in the agency’s treatment of the applicant’s and his mother’s testimony or in its assessment of the risk of torture. The court accordingly denied the petition for review.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-25</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerome Holmes</case:judge>
													<category term="Immigration Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-2179/24-2179-2026-02-25.html</id>
        	<title>Spinelli v. Coherus Biosciences</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-25T11:10:28-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-25T11:10:28-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-2179/24-2179-2026-02-25.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A former oncology account manager for a pharmaceutical company was terminated after refusing to comply with the company’s COVID-19 vaccination mandate. The employee had worked remotely throughout his tenure, and when the mandate was announced, he sought both medical and religious exemptions. In support of his medical exemption, he submitted a doctor’s note referencing permanent nerve damage from a prior vaccine injury and indicating increased risk from COVID-19 vaccination. The company denied both exemption requests and cited business necessity and client demands for vaccination as the reason for his termination.

After receiving authorization from the New Mexico Human Rights Bureau to pursue his claims, the employee filed suit in federal court, alleging discrimination and retaliation under the New Mexico Human Rights Act (NMHRA) due to his medical condition and religion, as well as a claim for common law retaliatory discharge. The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico dismissed most claims without prejudice, concluding he failed to plausibly allege a disability or serious medical condition affecting a major life activity, failed to show a causal link between protected activity and termination, and did not identify a specific public policy violated by his discharge. The court also denied his motion to alter or amend the judgment and declined his request for leave to amend the complaint.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. It held that the employee’s complaint did not sufficiently allege a disability or serious medical condition under the NMHRA because it did not identify a major life activity that was substantially limited. The court also found that the complaint failed to establish a causal connection for retaliation and did not identify a specific public policy to support a common law claim. The Tenth Circuit also found no abuse of discretion in denying the motions for reconsideration and amendment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-2179/24-2179-2026-02-25.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Spinelli v. Coherus Biosciences" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A former oncology account manager for a pharmaceutical company was terminated after refusing to comply with the company’s COVID-19 vaccination mandate. The employee had worked remotely throughout his tenure, and when the mandate was announced, he sought both medical and religious exemptions. In support of his medical exemption, he submitted a doctor’s note referencing permanent nerve damage from a prior vaccine injury and indicating increased risk from COVID-19 vaccination. The company denied both exemption requests and cited business necessity and client demands for vaccination as the reason for his termination.

After receiving authorization from the New Mexico Human Rights Bureau to pursue his claims, the employee filed suit in federal court, alleging discrimination and retaliation under the New Mexico Human Rights Act (NMHRA) due to his medical condition and religion, as well as a claim for common law retaliatory discharge. The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico dismissed most claims without prejudice, concluding he failed to plausibly allege a disability or serious medical condition affecting a major life activity, failed to show a causal link between protected activity and termination, and did not identify a specific public policy violated by his discharge. The court also denied his motion to alter or amend the judgment and declined his request for leave to amend the complaint.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. It held that the employee’s complaint did not sufficiently allege a disability or serious medical condition under the NMHRA because it did not identify a major life activity that was substantially limited. The court also found that the complaint failed to establish a causal connection for retaliation and did not identify a specific public policy to support a common law claim. The Tenth Circuit also found no abuse of discretion in denying the motions for reconsideration and amendment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-25</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Paul Kelly</case:judge>
													<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1201/24-1201-2026-02-24.html</id>
        	<title>Armendariz v. City of Colorado Springs</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-24T09:03:19-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-24T09:03:19-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1201/24-1201-2026-02-24.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A group of activists and the Chinook Center, a nonprofit organization, participated in a housing-rights march in Colorado Springs. After the march, the Colorado Springs Police Department (CSPD) launched an investigation targeting some participants. CSPD obtained three search warrants: two related to Jacqueline Armendariz, a protester accused of obstructing an officer by dropping her bike, and one targeting the Chinook Center’s Facebook account. The first Armendariz warrant authorized a search of her home and seizure of her electronic devices. The second allowed a search of data on those devices, including a broad keyword search. The third warrant authorized obtaining all posts, messages, and events from the Chinook Center’s Facebook account for a seven-day period.

Armendariz and the Chinook Center filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against the City, individual CSPD officers, the FBI, and others, alleging that the warrants were overbroad in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. They also brought state-law claims, and the Chinook Center alleged a violation of the Stored Communications Act. The district court granted motions to dismiss all claims, concluding that the officers were protected by qualified immunity, the plaintiffs failed to allege plausible constitutional violations, and that municipal liability was unsupported.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s ruling that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity regarding the warrant to seize Armendariz’s electronic devices. However, the court reversed the grant of qualified immunity to the officers for the second warrant (searching data on Armendariz’s devices) and the Facebook warrant, holding that the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged these warrants were overbroad in violation of their clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. The court also reversed the dismissal of related claims against the City and remanded for further proceedings. The dismissals of Armendariz&#039;s claims against the FBI and the United States were affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1201/24-1201-2026-02-24.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Armendariz v. City of Colorado Springs" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A group of activists and the Chinook Center, a nonprofit organization, participated in a housing-rights march in Colorado Springs. After the march, the Colorado Springs Police Department (CSPD) launched an investigation targeting some participants. CSPD obtained three search warrants: two related to Jacqueline Armendariz, a protester accused of obstructing an officer by dropping her bike, and one targeting the Chinook Center’s Facebook account. The first Armendariz warrant authorized a search of her home and seizure of her electronic devices. The second allowed a search of data on those devices, including a broad keyword search. The third warrant authorized obtaining all posts, messages, and events from the Chinook Center’s Facebook account for a seven-day period.

Armendariz and the Chinook Center filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against the City, individual CSPD officers, the FBI, and others, alleging that the warrants were overbroad in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. They also brought state-law claims, and the Chinook Center alleged a violation of the Stored Communications Act. The district court granted motions to dismiss all claims, concluding that the officers were protected by qualified immunity, the plaintiffs failed to allege plausible constitutional violations, and that municipal liability was unsupported.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s ruling that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity regarding the warrant to seize Armendariz’s electronic devices. However, the court reversed the grant of qualified immunity to the officers for the second warrant (searching data on Armendariz’s devices) and the Facebook warrant, holding that the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged these warrants were overbroad in violation of their clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. The court also reversed the dismissal of related claims against the City and remanded for further proceedings. The dismissals of Armendariz&#039;s claims against the FBI and the United States were affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-24</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Gregory Alan Phillips</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Communications Law"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-2109/24-2109-2026-02-17.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Beckner</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-17T08:32:34-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-17T08:32:34-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-2109/24-2109-2026-02-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant orchestrated a fraudulent scheme to secure loans and investments, ostensibly to finance a truck stop in Deming, New Mexico. The operation involved multiple domestic and foreign corporations, and the defendant concealed his control and financial interest in the truck stop using aliases and shell companies. Funds obtained through fraud were not used as promised, and the defendant misled lenders and investors regarding his identity and financial history. The scheme also involved directing loan proceeds to offshore accounts beneficially owned by his girlfriend, and leveraging personal relationships to facilitate aspects of the fraud.

The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico presided over a jury trial in which the defendant was convicted of bank fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit bank, mail, and wire fraud. The district court admitted evidence showing the defendant’s control over the scheme, including his direction of a confederate to engage in a sham marriage, his ties and travel to Central American countries, and the distribution of loan proceeds to an offshore company owned by his girlfriend. The court sentenced the defendant to 210 months’ imprisonment, applying enhancements for being a leader of extensive criminal activity and for employing sophisticated means.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the conviction and sentence. The court rejected the defendant’s challenges to the district court’s evidentiary rulings, finding no abuse of discretion in admitting evidence of control, foreign ties, and financial distributions. The court affirmed the application of guideline enhancements for leadership and sophisticated means, and found the sentence substantively reasonable despite disparity with a codefendant, due to greater culpability and aggravating factors. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment and granted the defendant’s request to supplement the record. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-2109/24-2109-2026-02-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Beckner" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant orchestrated a fraudulent scheme to secure loans and investments, ostensibly to finance a truck stop in Deming, New Mexico. The operation involved multiple domestic and foreign corporations, and the defendant concealed his control and financial interest in the truck stop using aliases and shell companies. Funds obtained through fraud were not used as promised, and the defendant misled lenders and investors regarding his identity and financial history. The scheme also involved directing loan proceeds to offshore accounts beneficially owned by his girlfriend, and leveraging personal relationships to facilitate aspects of the fraud.

The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico presided over a jury trial in which the defendant was convicted of bank fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit bank, mail, and wire fraud. The district court admitted evidence showing the defendant’s control over the scheme, including his direction of a confederate to engage in a sham marriage, his ties and travel to Central American countries, and the distribution of loan proceeds to an offshore company owned by his girlfriend. The court sentenced the defendant to 210 months’ imprisonment, applying enhancements for being a leader of extensive criminal activity and for employing sophisticated means.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the conviction and sentence. The court rejected the defendant’s challenges to the district court’s evidentiary rulings, finding no abuse of discretion in admitting evidence of control, foreign ties, and financial distributions. The court affirmed the application of guideline enhancements for leadership and sophisticated means, and found the sentence substantively reasonable despite disparity with a codefendant, due to greater culpability and aggravating factors. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment and granted the defendant’s request to supplement the record.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Harris Hartz</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-1157/25-1157-2026-02-17.html</id>
        	<title>Lingam v. Dish Network Corporation</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-17T08:32:33-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-17T08:32:33-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-1157/25-1157-2026-02-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Two plaintiffs who purchased stock in a publicly traded corporation brought a securities class action against the corporation and several of its executives. Their complaint alleged the company embarked on an unusually risky plan to develop a nationwide 5G wireless network using unproven technologies and made materially false or misleading statements concerning the progress and capabilities of the network, anticipated enterprise customer relationships, projected revenue growth, and market demand. The plaintiffs asserted violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5, claiming the defendants acted with fraudulent intent or recklessness, leading the plaintiffs and other investors to acquire stock at artificially inflated prices.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing the complaint did not allege any actionable misstatements, facts supporting a strong inference of scienter, or loss causation. The district court agreed, finding that the alleged statements were not false when made and that the complaint lacked particularized facts showing the defendants acted with the required scienter under the heightened pleading standards of Rule 9(b) and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). The court dismissed the complaint and entered judgment for the defendants.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs failed to meet the PSLRA’s requirements to plead with particularity both falsity and scienter for each alleged misstatement. The court also affirmed dismissal of the Section 20(a) claim, as it is derivative of the Section 10(b) claim. The judgment of dismissal was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-1157/25-1157-2026-02-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Lingam v. Dish Network Corporation" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Two plaintiffs who purchased stock in a publicly traded corporation brought a securities class action against the corporation and several of its executives. Their complaint alleged the company embarked on an unusually risky plan to develop a nationwide 5G wireless network using unproven technologies and made materially false or misleading statements concerning the progress and capabilities of the network, anticipated enterprise customer relationships, projected revenue growth, and market demand. The plaintiffs asserted violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5, claiming the defendants acted with fraudulent intent or recklessness, leading the plaintiffs and other investors to acquire stock at artificially inflated prices.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing the complaint did not allege any actionable misstatements, facts supporting a strong inference of scienter, or loss causation. The district court agreed, finding that the alleged statements were not false when made and that the complaint lacked particularized facts showing the defendants acted with the required scienter under the heightened pleading standards of Rule 9(b) and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). The court dismissed the complaint and entered judgment for the defendants.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs failed to meet the PSLRA’s requirements to plead with particularity both falsity and scienter for each alleged misstatement. The court also affirmed dismissal of the Section 20(a) claim, as it is derivative of the Section 10(b) claim. The judgment of dismissal was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Scott Matheson</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-9519/24-9519-2026-02-13.html</id>
        	<title>Cedar Springs Hospital v. Occupational Health and Safety</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-13T09:33:45-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-13T09:33:45-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-9519/24-9519-2026-02-13.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		At a psychiatric hospital, employees were exposed to violent behavior from disturbed patients. Following a tip, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) investigated and cited the hospital for failing to implement measures that could have protected staff from workplace violence. These measures included reconfiguring nurses’ stations, providing communication devices, fully implementing existing safety programs, maintaining adequate staffing, securing patient belongings, hiring specialized security staff, and investigating each incident of workplace violence. The hospital did not contest the necessity of some measures but challenged the citation overall.

An administrative law judge with the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission conducted a hearing, upheld the citation, and imposed a fine. The judge’s decision became the final decision of the Review Commission when it declined further review. The hospital then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit for judicial review, arguing that another federal agency, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, had exclusive authority over hospital safety, that the Secretary of Labor should have deferred to other regulatory bodies, and that the Secretary’s methods and notice were insufficient.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the Secretary of Labor had the authority to enforce the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s general duty clause in this context, as the cited agency did not actually regulate employee safety regarding workplace violence. The court found that the Secretary provided fair notice, acted within statutory authority, and permissibly used adjudication rather than rulemaking. The court also concluded that the abatement measures were feasible, supported by substantial evidence, and that the imposed sanctions for failure to preserve video evidence were appropriate. The Tenth Circuit denied the hospital’s petition for review, upholding the citation and penalty. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-9519/24-9519-2026-02-13.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Cedar Springs Hospital v. Occupational Health and Safety" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                At a psychiatric hospital, employees were exposed to violent behavior from disturbed patients. Following a tip, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) investigated and cited the hospital for failing to implement measures that could have protected staff from workplace violence. These measures included reconfiguring nurses’ stations, providing communication devices, fully implementing existing safety programs, maintaining adequate staffing, securing patient belongings, hiring specialized security staff, and investigating each incident of workplace violence. The hospital did not contest the necessity of some measures but challenged the citation overall.

An administrative law judge with the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission conducted a hearing, upheld the citation, and imposed a fine. The judge’s decision became the final decision of the Review Commission when it declined further review. The hospital then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit for judicial review, arguing that another federal agency, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, had exclusive authority over hospital safety, that the Secretary of Labor should have deferred to other regulatory bodies, and that the Secretary’s methods and notice were insufficient.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the Secretary of Labor had the authority to enforce the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s general duty clause in this context, as the cited agency did not actually regulate employee safety regarding workplace violence. The court found that the Secretary provided fair notice, acted within statutory authority, and permissibly used adjudication rather than rulemaking. The court also concluded that the abatement measures were feasible, supported by substantial evidence, and that the imposed sanctions for failure to preserve video evidence were appropriate. The Tenth Circuit denied the hospital’s petition for review, upholding the citation and penalty.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-13</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Robert Bacharach</case:judge>
													<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-9521/24-9521-2026-02-13.html</id>
        	<title>UHS of Delaware v. Occupational Health and Safety Review Commission</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-13T08:32:57-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-13T08:32:57-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-9521/24-9521-2026-02-13.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A management company and the owner of a psychiatric hospital were both penalized after the hospital failed to implement sufficient safety measures to protect employees from workplace violence. The central issue was whether the management company could be held liable under workplace safety laws, specifically whether its relationship with the hospital owner meant it was subject to the same penalties for safety violations.

Previously, the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission evaluated whether the management company was an “employer” for relevant employees by applying a three-part factual test. This test asked whether there was a shared worksite, whether the companies’ operations (particularly regarding safety and health) were integrated, and whether the companies shared responsibility through common management, supervision, or ownership. The Commission answered all three questions affirmatively, finding the management company liable as an employer for some hospital employees.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case, examining whether substantial evidence supported the Commission’s findings. The court found that the hospital was a worksite for the management company because its employees worked there and were exposed to workplace hazards. The companies’ operations were sufficiently integrated on safety matters, evidenced by the management company’s oversight and involvement in safety training and policy enforcement. Finally, both companies were wholly owned subsidiaries of the same parent corporation, satisfying the requirement for shared ownership.

The Tenth Circuit concluded that substantial evidence supported the Commission’s findings and denied the management company’s petition for review. The court’s holding was that, under the agreed-upon three-part test, the management company was properly held liable as an employer for workplace safety violations at the hospital and was subject to the associated penalties. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-9521/24-9521-2026-02-13.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "UHS of Delaware v. Occupational Health and Safety Review Commission" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A management company and the owner of a psychiatric hospital were both penalized after the hospital failed to implement sufficient safety measures to protect employees from workplace violence. The central issue was whether the management company could be held liable under workplace safety laws, specifically whether its relationship with the hospital owner meant it was subject to the same penalties for safety violations.

Previously, the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission evaluated whether the management company was an “employer” for relevant employees by applying a three-part factual test. This test asked whether there was a shared worksite, whether the companies’ operations (particularly regarding safety and health) were integrated, and whether the companies shared responsibility through common management, supervision, or ownership. The Commission answered all three questions affirmatively, finding the management company liable as an employer for some hospital employees.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case, examining whether substantial evidence supported the Commission’s findings. The court found that the hospital was a worksite for the management company because its employees worked there and were exposed to workplace hazards. The companies’ operations were sufficiently integrated on safety matters, evidenced by the management company’s oversight and involvement in safety training and policy enforcement. Finally, both companies were wholly owned subsidiaries of the same parent corporation, satisfying the requirement for shared ownership.

The Tenth Circuit concluded that substantial evidence supported the Commission’s findings and denied the management company’s petition for review. The court’s holding was that, under the agreed-upon three-part test, the management company was properly held liable as an employer for workplace safety violations at the hospital and was subject to the associated penalties.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-13</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Robert Bacharach</case:judge>
													<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-2083/24-2083-2026-02-12.html</id>
        	<title>Spann v. National Conference of Bar Examiners</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-12T09:33:18-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-12T09:33:18-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-2083/24-2083-2026-02-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The plaintiff, who has a disability, took the New Mexico bar exam in February 2020 and was approved for testing accommodations. She alleged that these accommodations were not properly provided during the exam. Subsequently, she initiated legal action, amending her complaint multiple times before any defendant appeared. The third amended complaint asserted claims under Titles II and III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and other federal and state laws.

The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico dismissed all claims. Specifically, it dismissed claims against the National Conference of Bar Examiners (the National Conference) for lack of personal jurisdiction, and permitted amendment of the complaint only to allow a Title III ADA claim against the New Mexico Board of Bar Examiners (the State Board). The district court later dismissed the Title III claim against the State Board on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity grounds. It also granted summary judgment to the State Board on the Rehabilitation Act claim, finding the Board did not receive federal funds, and denied the plaintiff’s requests for additional discovery as insufficient under Rule 56(d).

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the plaintiff had not properly preserved her entitlement to jurisdictional discovery regarding the National Conference, nor did she adequately request or specify discovery that could alter the personal jurisdiction determination. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying additional discovery on the Rehabilitation Act claim, as the plaintiff failed to meet procedural requirements. Finally, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the State Board was protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity from Title III ADA claims and that the plaintiff failed to show any waiver or valid abrogation of immunity. The judgment below was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-2083/24-2083-2026-02-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Spann v. National Conference of Bar Examiners" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The plaintiff, who has a disability, took the New Mexico bar exam in February 2020 and was approved for testing accommodations. She alleged that these accommodations were not properly provided during the exam. Subsequently, she initiated legal action, amending her complaint multiple times before any defendant appeared. The third amended complaint asserted claims under Titles II and III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and other federal and state laws.

The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico dismissed all claims. Specifically, it dismissed claims against the National Conference of Bar Examiners (the National Conference) for lack of personal jurisdiction, and permitted amendment of the complaint only to allow a Title III ADA claim against the New Mexico Board of Bar Examiners (the State Board). The district court later dismissed the Title III claim against the State Board on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity grounds. It also granted summary judgment to the State Board on the Rehabilitation Act claim, finding the Board did not receive federal funds, and denied the plaintiff’s requests for additional discovery as insufficient under Rule 56(d).

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the plaintiff had not properly preserved her entitlement to jurisdictional discovery regarding the National Conference, nor did she adequately request or specify discovery that could alter the personal jurisdiction determination. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying additional discovery on the Rehabilitation Act claim, as the plaintiff failed to meet procedural requirements. Finally, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the State Board was protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity from Title III ADA claims and that the plaintiff failed to show any waiver or valid abrogation of immunity. The judgment below was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Harris Hartz</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Public Benefits"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-3264/23-3264-2026-01-29.html</id>
        	<title>Shaw v. Smith</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-29T11:03:25-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-29T11:03:25-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-3264/23-3264-2026-01-29.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A group of individuals traveling through Kansas were stopped by Kansas Highway Patrol (KHP) troopers while driving on interstate highways, primarily I-70. In each instance, the drivers and passengers were from out of state, often driving to or from Colorado, and were stopped for alleged traffic violations. After the initial traffic stop was concluded, troopers used a tactic known as the “Kansas Two-Step”—they would briefly disengage, then reinitiate conversation in an attempt to gain consent for further questioning or searches. These stops often led to extended detentions and searches, but no contraband was discovered. The troopers testified that they considered the drivers’ out-of-state status, travel to or from Colorado, and other factors in developing reasonable suspicion.

The individuals sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, alleging violations of their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures and their constitutional right to travel. Some plaintiffs also brought damages claims, resulting in jury verdicts in their favor. For their claims for injunctive relief, the district court conducted a bench trial and found that KHP had a pattern and practice of targeting out-of-state drivers and using the Two-Step in a manner violating the Fourth Amendment. The court granted a permanent injunction, requiring changes in KHP’s training, documentation, consent procedures, and supervision.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the plaintiffs had standing for injunctive relief and whether the district court abused its discretion in issuing the injunction. The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had standing because there was a substantial risk they would be stopped again and that KHP had a pattern of unconstitutional conduct. However, the Tenth Circuit found that the injunction was overly broad regarding the use of a driver’s state of origin and the Two-Step tactic. The court affirmed the injunction in part, reversed it in part, and remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-3264/23-3264-2026-01-29.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Shaw v. Smith" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A group of individuals traveling through Kansas were stopped by Kansas Highway Patrol (KHP) troopers while driving on interstate highways, primarily I-70. In each instance, the drivers and passengers were from out of state, often driving to or from Colorado, and were stopped for alleged traffic violations. After the initial traffic stop was concluded, troopers used a tactic known as the “Kansas Two-Step”—they would briefly disengage, then reinitiate conversation in an attempt to gain consent for further questioning or searches. These stops often led to extended detentions and searches, but no contraband was discovered. The troopers testified that they considered the drivers’ out-of-state status, travel to or from Colorado, and other factors in developing reasonable suspicion.

The individuals sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, alleging violations of their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures and their constitutional right to travel. Some plaintiffs also brought damages claims, resulting in jury verdicts in their favor. For their claims for injunctive relief, the district court conducted a bench trial and found that KHP had a pattern and practice of targeting out-of-state drivers and using the Two-Step in a manner violating the Fourth Amendment. The court granted a permanent injunction, requiring changes in KHP’s training, documentation, consent procedures, and supervision.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the plaintiffs had standing for injunctive relief and whether the district court abused its discretion in issuing the injunction. The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had standing because there was a substantial risk they would be stopped again and that KHP had a pattern of unconstitutional conduct. However, the Tenth Circuit found that the injunction was overly broad regarding the use of a driver’s state of origin and the Two-Step tactic. The court affirmed the injunction in part, reversed it in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Federico</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-9566/24-9566-2026-01-27.html</id>
        	<title>Bonilla-Espinoza v. Bondi</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-27T09:01:22-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-27T09:01:22-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-9566/24-9566-2026-01-27.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A citizen of El Salvador entered the United States near El Paso, Texas, in February 2023 without proper documentation. He was detained and placed in removal proceedings, where he conceded removability but sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). He alleged that he had been detained and abused by Salvadoran authorities on several occasions, including being beaten and subjected to harsh conditions, and pointed to his and his mother’s limited involvement in a human rights organization as evidence that he was targeted for political reasons. He also described a general pattern of young men in his neighborhood being suspected of gang affiliation by police.

An Immigration Judge (IJ) found that, while the petitioner’s testimony was at times lacking in detail, he was not found to be non-credible. However, the IJ concluded that the petitioner failed to establish a nexus between his alleged persecution and any protected ground such as political opinion or membership in a particular social group. The IJ also determined that the mistreatment described did not rise to the level of torture under the CAT and that internal relocation within El Salvador might be possible. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, agreeing that the petitioner had not met the requirements for asylum, withholding, or CAT relief, and rejected claims of an unfair hearing.

On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied the petition. The court held that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s determination that the petitioner had not shown persecution on account of a protected ground, nor that he was more likely than not to face torture if returned. The court also found no due process violation, determining that the IJ adequately developed the record and that there was insufficient evidence of prejudicial translation errors. The petition for review was denied. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-9566/24-9566-2026-01-27.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Bonilla-Espinoza v. Bondi" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A citizen of El Salvador entered the United States near El Paso, Texas, in February 2023 without proper documentation. He was detained and placed in removal proceedings, where he conceded removability but sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). He alleged that he had been detained and abused by Salvadoran authorities on several occasions, including being beaten and subjected to harsh conditions, and pointed to his and his mother’s limited involvement in a human rights organization as evidence that he was targeted for political reasons. He also described a general pattern of young men in his neighborhood being suspected of gang affiliation by police.

An Immigration Judge (IJ) found that, while the petitioner’s testimony was at times lacking in detail, he was not found to be non-credible. However, the IJ concluded that the petitioner failed to establish a nexus between his alleged persecution and any protected ground such as political opinion or membership in a particular social group. The IJ also determined that the mistreatment described did not rise to the level of torture under the CAT and that internal relocation within El Salvador might be possible. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, agreeing that the petitioner had not met the requirements for asylum, withholding, or CAT relief, and rejected claims of an unfair hearing.

On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied the petition. The court held that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s determination that the petitioner had not shown persecution on account of a protected ground, nor that he was more likely than not to face torture if returned. The court also found no due process violation, determining that the IJ adequately developed the record and that there was insufficient evidence of prejudicial translation errors. The petition for review was denied.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Harris Hartz</case:judge>
													<category term="Immigration Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-6227/24-6227-2026-01-26.html</id>
        	<title>Chieftain Royalty Company v. Enervest Energy Institutional Fund XIII-A</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-26T08:31:20-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-26T08:31:20-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-6227/24-6227-2026-01-26.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A group of oil-and-gas royalty owners in Oklahoma, represented by Chieftain Royalty Company, sued EnerVest Energy’s predecessor in 2011 for allegedly underpaying royalties. After EnerVest acquired the wells, the parties reached a $52 million settlement in 2015 to be paid to the class after expenses and attorneys’ fees. Class counsel sought 40% of the fund as fees, plus expenses and an incentive award for the class representative. Two class members objected to the fee and incentive awards.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma approved the settlement, awarding 33.33% of the fund for attorneys’ fees and a 0.5% incentive award. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the settlement but reversed the fee and incentive awards, holding that Oklahoma law applied and required a lodestar analysis (not solely a percentage-of-the-fund), and that incentive awards must be based on time spent on case-related services. Following remand and a clarifying decision from the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Strack v. Continental Resources, Inc., the district court reapplied the statutory factors, found a 33.33% fee reasonable (supported by a 2.15 lodestar multiplier), and adjusted the incentive award based on the representative’s service. A subsequent Tenth Circuit appeal led to vacatur of the fee award on procedural notice grounds, then the district court reinstated the same fee after proper notice.

On this third appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that Oklahoma law does not impose a hard ceiling on percentage fees or lodestar multipliers. The district court properly applied Oklahoma’s statutory factors, conducted a thorough reasonableness analysis, and did not abuse its discretion by awarding 33.33% of the fund ($17,333,333.33) as attorneys’ fees. The fee award was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-6227/24-6227-2026-01-26.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Chieftain Royalty Company v. Enervest Energy Institutional Fund XIII-A" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A group of oil-and-gas royalty owners in Oklahoma, represented by Chieftain Royalty Company, sued EnerVest Energy’s predecessor in 2011 for allegedly underpaying royalties. After EnerVest acquired the wells, the parties reached a $52 million settlement in 2015 to be paid to the class after expenses and attorneys’ fees. Class counsel sought 40% of the fund as fees, plus expenses and an incentive award for the class representative. Two class members objected to the fee and incentive awards.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma approved the settlement, awarding 33.33% of the fund for attorneys’ fees and a 0.5% incentive award. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the settlement but reversed the fee and incentive awards, holding that Oklahoma law applied and required a lodestar analysis (not solely a percentage-of-the-fund), and that incentive awards must be based on time spent on case-related services. Following remand and a clarifying decision from the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Strack v. Continental Resources, Inc., the district court reapplied the statutory factors, found a 33.33% fee reasonable (supported by a 2.15 lodestar multiplier), and adjusted the incentive award based on the representative’s service. A subsequent Tenth Circuit appeal led to vacatur of the fee award on procedural notice grounds, then the district court reinstated the same fee after proper notice.

On this third appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that Oklahoma law does not impose a hard ceiling on percentage fees or lodestar multipliers. The district court properly applied Oklahoma’s statutory factors, conducted a thorough reasonableness analysis, and did not abuse its discretion by awarding 33.33% of the fund ($17,333,333.33) as attorneys’ fees. The fee award was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Timothy Tymkovich</case:judge>
													<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Energy, Oil &amp; Gas Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-6120/23-6120-2026-01-23.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Singer</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-23T10:04:52-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-23T10:04:52-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-6120/23-6120-2026-01-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Christopher Singer, a previously convicted felon, was investigated in connection with a drive-by shooting in Oklahoma City. Police found spent and live ammunition in his possession, leading to federal charges for being a felon in possession of ammunition. Singer pleaded guilty to this charge. At sentencing, the United States Probation Office presented a report noting Singer’s three prior Oklahoma state convictions: two for assault and battery with a dangerous weapon under Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 645, and one for robbery with a firearm.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma reviewed Singer’s objections to the presentence investigation report. Singer argued that his prior convictions under § 645 should not be classified as categorical crimes of violence for purposes of the United States Sentencing Guidelines or as violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), because the statute could apply to assaults against unborn victims, which federal law does not include in its definitions of “crime of violence.” The district court, relying on prior Tenth Circuit precedent in United States v. Taylor, overruled Singer’s objection, determined the convictions qualified under both the Guidelines and ACCA, and sentenced Singer to 180 months, the mandatory minimum under ACCA.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the sentencing determination de novo. The court concluded that Oklahoma’s § 645 does criminalize assault and battery with a dangerous weapon against unborn persons. Guided by its own precedent, notably United States v. Adams, the Tenth Circuit held that because federal law excludes crimes against unborn persons from its definition of “crime of violence,” Singer’s prior convictions under § 645 do not categorically qualify as such under the Guidelines or ACCA. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s sentencing decision and remanded for resentencing consistent with this ruling. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-6120/23-6120-2026-01-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Singer" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Christopher Singer, a previously convicted felon, was investigated in connection with a drive-by shooting in Oklahoma City. Police found spent and live ammunition in his possession, leading to federal charges for being a felon in possession of ammunition. Singer pleaded guilty to this charge. At sentencing, the United States Probation Office presented a report noting Singer’s three prior Oklahoma state convictions: two for assault and battery with a dangerous weapon under Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 645, and one for robbery with a firearm.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma reviewed Singer’s objections to the presentence investigation report. Singer argued that his prior convictions under § 645 should not be classified as categorical crimes of violence for purposes of the United States Sentencing Guidelines or as violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), because the statute could apply to assaults against unborn victims, which federal law does not include in its definitions of “crime of violence.” The district court, relying on prior Tenth Circuit precedent in United States v. Taylor, overruled Singer’s objection, determined the convictions qualified under both the Guidelines and ACCA, and sentenced Singer to 180 months, the mandatory minimum under ACCA.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the sentencing determination de novo. The court concluded that Oklahoma’s § 645 does criminalize assault and battery with a dangerous weapon against unborn persons. Guided by its own precedent, notably United States v. Adams, the Tenth Circuit held that because federal law excludes crimes against unborn persons from its definition of “crime of violence,” Singer’s prior convictions under § 645 do not categorically qualify as such under the Guidelines or ACCA. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s sentencing decision and remanded for resentencing consistent with this ruling.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Allison Eid</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-4076/24-4076-2026-01-21.html</id>
        	<title>Moxie Pest Control (Utah) v. Nielsen</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-21T14:31:34-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-21T14:31:34-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-4076/24-4076-2026-01-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A group of affiliated pest-control companies discovered that employees of a competing firm, Aptive Environmental, LLC, had bribed members of their organization to obtain confidential sales data stored in a password-protected system. The misappropriated data was allegedly used by Aptive to recruit sales representatives for the competitive summer sales season, an activity crucial to both businesses’ revenue. Upon learning of these actions, the companies sued Aptive and several individual employees, asserting claims under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), and Utah’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA).

The United States District Court for the District of Utah initially dismissed the CFAA claim, concluding that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently pleaded the statutory loss requirement, specifically a loss from technological harm. The court denied motions to compel broad discovery into damages, limiting disclosures but allowing the possibility of further tailored discovery. On summary judgment, the district court found that the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence of causation linking Aptive’s alleged misappropriation to unjust enrichment, granting judgment for Aptive on the RICO, DTSA, and UTSA claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed these decisions. It held that the district court erred in dismissing the CFAA claim, clarifying that the statute does not require loss from technological harm and that investigative costs can qualify as statutory losses. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of broad discovery, finding no abuse of discretion. Regarding summary judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the outcome for the RICO claim due to lack of causation evidence but reversed in part for the DTSA and UTSA claims, holding that reasonable royalties and injunctive relief do not require the same proof of causation as unjust enrichment. The CFAA, DTSA, and UTSA claims were remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-4076/24-4076-2026-01-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Moxie Pest Control (Utah) v. Nielsen" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A group of affiliated pest-control companies discovered that employees of a competing firm, Aptive Environmental, LLC, had bribed members of their organization to obtain confidential sales data stored in a password-protected system. The misappropriated data was allegedly used by Aptive to recruit sales representatives for the competitive summer sales season, an activity crucial to both businesses’ revenue. Upon learning of these actions, the companies sued Aptive and several individual employees, asserting claims under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), and Utah’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA).

The United States District Court for the District of Utah initially dismissed the CFAA claim, concluding that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently pleaded the statutory loss requirement, specifically a loss from technological harm. The court denied motions to compel broad discovery into damages, limiting disclosures but allowing the possibility of further tailored discovery. On summary judgment, the district court found that the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence of causation linking Aptive’s alleged misappropriation to unjust enrichment, granting judgment for Aptive on the RICO, DTSA, and UTSA claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed these decisions. It held that the district court erred in dismissing the CFAA claim, clarifying that the statute does not require loss from technological harm and that investigative costs can qualify as statutory losses. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of broad discovery, finding no abuse of discretion. Regarding summary judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the outcome for the RICO claim due to lack of causation evidence but reversed in part for the DTSA and UTSA claims, holding that reasonable royalties and injunctive relief do not require the same proof of causation as unjust enrichment. The CFAA, DTSA, and UTSA claims were remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Nancy Moritz</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-3147/24-3147-2026-01-21.html</id>
        	<title>Coones v. Board of County Commissioners</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-21T09:01:40-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-21T09:01:40-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-3147/24-3147-2026-01-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A Kansas man was convicted in 2009 for the murder of a woman, Kathleen, but was acquitted of killing her husband, Carl. After spending twelve years in prison, he was exonerated when evidence emerged showing Kathleen had killed both herself and her husband, framing him for the crime. The exonerated man died shortly after his release. His widow, as executor of his estate, filed a federal civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations by the police during the investigation that led to his conviction. Specifically, the claims against the two lead detectives included fabrication and suppression of evidence (Count I) and malicious prosecution (Count II).

The United States District Court for the District of Kansas denied the detectives’ motion for summary judgment on both counts, rejecting their assertion of qualified immunity. The district court found that a jury could conclude the detectives withheld material exculpatory evidence, failed to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence, and fabricated inculpatory evidence. The court also found that a reasonable jury could determine the detectives acted at least recklessly, and that clear legal precedent established the officers’ obligations. The district court further denied summary judgment to the Unified Government (the detectives’ employer) on municipal liability claims, because those claims depended on the detectives’ alleged constitutional violations.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed only the legal questions related to qualified immunity. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on both counts, concluding the estate’s claims were supported by controlling law and sufficient factual allegations. The Tenth Circuit dismissed the Unified Government’s appeal for lack of pendent appellate jurisdiction, since it did not independently resolve the underlying constitutional claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-3147/24-3147-2026-01-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Coones v. Board of County Commissioners" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A Kansas man was convicted in 2009 for the murder of a woman, Kathleen, but was acquitted of killing her husband, Carl. After spending twelve years in prison, he was exonerated when evidence emerged showing Kathleen had killed both herself and her husband, framing him for the crime. The exonerated man died shortly after his release. His widow, as executor of his estate, filed a federal civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations by the police during the investigation that led to his conviction. Specifically, the claims against the two lead detectives included fabrication and suppression of evidence (Count I) and malicious prosecution (Count II).

The United States District Court for the District of Kansas denied the detectives’ motion for summary judgment on both counts, rejecting their assertion of qualified immunity. The district court found that a jury could conclude the detectives withheld material exculpatory evidence, failed to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence, and fabricated inculpatory evidence. The court also found that a reasonable jury could determine the detectives acted at least recklessly, and that clear legal precedent established the officers’ obligations. The district court further denied summary judgment to the Unified Government (the detectives’ employer) on municipal liability claims, because those claims depended on the detectives’ alleged constitutional violations.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed only the legal questions related to qualified immunity. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on both counts, concluding the estate’s claims were supported by controlling law and sufficient factual allegations. The Tenth Circuit dismissed the Unified Government’s appeal for lack of pendent appellate jurisdiction, since it did not independently resolve the underlying constitutional claims.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Carolyn McHugh</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-7003/24-7003-2026-01-16.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Mullins</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-16T08:00:52-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-16T08:00:52-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-7003/24-7003-2026-01-16.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In 2002, an individual disappeared from her home in Ada, Oklahoma, and her ex-boyfriend quickly became a suspect. Evidence implicating him included his presence at her home, strange phone calls to her family, and physical injuries. Law enforcement discovered blood in his car and house, and, after consulting with his attorney, he led officers to the woman’s body, which was buried and showed signs of gunshot wounds. He subsequently pleaded guilty to murder in Oklahoma state court and was sentenced to life without parole.

Many years later, following the Supreme Court’s ruling in McGirt v. Oklahoma, which clarified that certain areas in Oklahoma are Indian country and subject to federal—not state—jurisdiction for major crimes involving Native Americans, the state court vacated his conviction. As a member of a federally recognized tribe and with the crime occurring within the Chickasaw Nation Reservation, only the federal government could prosecute him. A federal grand jury indicted him for murder in Indian country and for causing death while violating federal firearm statutes. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma dismissed one firearm count as time-barred, and a jury convicted him on the remaining counts.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered three main arguments: (1) alleged failures in the jury selection process under the Jury Selection and Service Act, (2) denial of a motion to suppress statements about the location of the victim’s body, and (3) denial of a motion to compel disclosure of communications between the government and former defense counsel. The Tenth Circuit held that the defendant failed to comply with the procedural requirements for challenging jury selection, that Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence did not apply to his statements to law enforcement, and that any error in denying document disclosure was harmless. The convictions were affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-7003/24-7003-2026-01-16.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Mullins" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In 2002, an individual disappeared from her home in Ada, Oklahoma, and her ex-boyfriend quickly became a suspect. Evidence implicating him included his presence at her home, strange phone calls to her family, and physical injuries. Law enforcement discovered blood in his car and house, and, after consulting with his attorney, he led officers to the woman’s body, which was buried and showed signs of gunshot wounds. He subsequently pleaded guilty to murder in Oklahoma state court and was sentenced to life without parole.

Many years later, following the Supreme Court’s ruling in McGirt v. Oklahoma, which clarified that certain areas in Oklahoma are Indian country and subject to federal—not state—jurisdiction for major crimes involving Native Americans, the state court vacated his conviction. As a member of a federally recognized tribe and with the crime occurring within the Chickasaw Nation Reservation, only the federal government could prosecute him. A federal grand jury indicted him for murder in Indian country and for causing death while violating federal firearm statutes. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma dismissed one firearm count as time-barred, and a jury convicted him on the remaining counts.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered three main arguments: (1) alleged failures in the jury selection process under the Jury Selection and Service Act, (2) denial of a motion to suppress statements about the location of the victim’s body, and (3) denial of a motion to compel disclosure of communications between the government and former defense counsel. The Tenth Circuit held that the defendant failed to comply with the procedural requirements for challenging jury selection, that Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence did not apply to his statements to law enforcement, and that any error in denying document disclosure was harmless. The convictions were affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Gregory Alan Phillips</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Native American Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-8070/24-8070-2026-01-13.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Griffin</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-13T08:31:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-13T08:31:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-8070/24-8070-2026-01-13.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant was charged in federal court with possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). He pleaded guilty. At sentencing, a dispute arose over whether he was subject to a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence based on a prior conviction under California Penal Code § 311.11, which criminalizes possession of images depicting a minor “personally engaging in or simulating sexual conduct.” The defendant argued that the California statute was broader than the federal definition of child pornography and therefore should not trigger the federal mandatory minimum.

The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming agreed with the government and found that the prior California conviction qualified as a predicate offense, applying the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence required by 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2). The defendant appealed this decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s application of the mandatory minimum sentence de novo. Employing the categorical approach, the appellate court examined whether the elements of the California offense categorically matched the federal generic offense of possession of child pornography. The Tenth Circuit concluded that California Penal Code § 311.11, as interpreted by the California Supreme Court, criminalizes conduct such as “any touching” with sexual intent, which can include nonexplicit, nonsexual images far removed from the federal definition of child pornography. Because the California statute sweeps more broadly than the federal generic offense, the prior conviction does not qualify as a predicate offense under § 2252A(b)(2).

The Tenth Circuit held that the mandatory minimum sentence was improperly applied and therefore vacated the defendant’s sentence, remanding the case for resentencing. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-8070/24-8070-2026-01-13.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Griffin" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant was charged in federal court with possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). He pleaded guilty. At sentencing, a dispute arose over whether he was subject to a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence based on a prior conviction under California Penal Code § 311.11, which criminalizes possession of images depicting a minor “personally engaging in or simulating sexual conduct.” The defendant argued that the California statute was broader than the federal definition of child pornography and therefore should not trigger the federal mandatory minimum.

The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming agreed with the government and found that the prior California conviction qualified as a predicate offense, applying the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence required by 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2). The defendant appealed this decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s application of the mandatory minimum sentence de novo. Employing the categorical approach, the appellate court examined whether the elements of the California offense categorically matched the federal generic offense of possession of child pornography. The Tenth Circuit concluded that California Penal Code § 311.11, as interpreted by the California Supreme Court, criminalizes conduct such as “any touching” with sexual intent, which can include nonexplicit, nonsexual images far removed from the federal definition of child pornography. Because the California statute sweeps more broadly than the federal generic offense, the prior conviction does not qualify as a predicate offense under § 2252A(b)(2).

The Tenth Circuit held that the mandatory minimum sentence was improperly applied and therefore vacated the defendant’s sentence, remanding the case for resentencing.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-13</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Timothy Tymkovich</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-2128/24-2128-2026-01-12.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Ruiz</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-12T10:03:25-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-12T10:03:25-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-2128/24-2128-2026-01-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Two cousins alleged that the defendant lured them into his trailer with candy and sexually abused them when they were young children. As a result, he was charged with two counts of engaging in a sexual act with a minor under twelve years old, allegedly occurring on the Jicarilla Apache Reservation. The indictment specified that the victims were Indian and that the defendant was a non-Indian, as required for federal jurisdiction under the applicable statutes.

The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico presided over the trial. The government sought to prove the defendant’s non-Indian status primarily through the testimony of two law enforcement witnesses, who based their conclusions on reviews of various databases and documents. No direct genealogical or enrollment evidence was introduced. At the close of the government’s case, the defendant moved for acquittal under Rule 29, arguing that the government had failed to prove his non-Indian status. The district court denied the motion, relying on the witnesses’ testimonies. The jury convicted the defendant on one count, and he was sentenced to thirty years in prison.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the government had presented sufficient evidence that the defendant was a non-Indian. Applying de novo review, the court found that the government’s evidence was inadequate to establish non-Indian status beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by circuit precedent. The court held that, because non-Indian status is an essential element of the charged crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1152 in the Tenth Circuit, the conviction could not stand without such proof. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit vacated the conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-2128/24-2128-2026-01-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Ruiz" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Two cousins alleged that the defendant lured them into his trailer with candy and sexually abused them when they were young children. As a result, he was charged with two counts of engaging in a sexual act with a minor under twelve years old, allegedly occurring on the Jicarilla Apache Reservation. The indictment specified that the victims were Indian and that the defendant was a non-Indian, as required for federal jurisdiction under the applicable statutes.

The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico presided over the trial. The government sought to prove the defendant’s non-Indian status primarily through the testimony of two law enforcement witnesses, who based their conclusions on reviews of various databases and documents. No direct genealogical or enrollment evidence was introduced. At the close of the government’s case, the defendant moved for acquittal under Rule 29, arguing that the government had failed to prove his non-Indian status. The district court denied the motion, relying on the witnesses’ testimonies. The jury convicted the defendant on one count, and he was sentenced to thirty years in prison.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the government had presented sufficient evidence that the defendant was a non-Indian. Applying de novo review, the court found that the government’s evidence was inadequate to establish non-Indian status beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by circuit precedent. The court held that, because non-Indian status is an essential element of the charged crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1152 in the Tenth Circuit, the conviction could not stand without such proof. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit vacated the conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Timothy Tymkovich</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Native American Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-4071/24-4071-2026-01-12.html</id>
        	<title>Mukantagara v. Noem</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-12T08:31:24-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-12T08:31:24-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-4071/24-4071-2026-01-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Agnes Mukantagara and her son, Ebenezer Shyaka, were admitted to the United States as refugees in 2005. Two years later, USCIS paused Mukantagara’s refugee status and revoked her travel documents due to suspicions that she had participated in the Rwandan genocide. After an investigation, USCIS concluded in 2016 that Mukantagara had participated in the genocide and terminated her refugee status under 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(4). This determination also affected her son’s status, and both were placed into removal proceedings. During those proceedings, the immigration court found Mukantagara credible and granted her asylum, rejecting the government’s allegations, but denied asylum to Shyaka, finding he no longer qualified as her dependent due to his age.

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) remanded the immigration court’s grant of asylum to Mukantagara and affirmed the denial for Shyaka. On remand, the immigration court again granted asylum to Mukantagara. Shyaka pursued further review before the Tenth Circuit, and both the BIA and the Tenth Circuit abated their respective appeals pending the outcome of the present litigation. Subsequently, Mukantagara and her son filed suit against USCIS in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, challenging the termination of refugee status under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, relying on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which bars judicial review of discretionary immigration agency actions.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not apply to the first step of the refugee termination process under § 1157(c)(4), which involves a nondiscretionary eligibility determination. Therefore, the district court retains jurisdiction to review USCIS’s eligibility determination. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-4071/24-4071-2026-01-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Mukantagara v. Noem" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Agnes Mukantagara and her son, Ebenezer Shyaka, were admitted to the United States as refugees in 2005. Two years later, USCIS paused Mukantagara’s refugee status and revoked her travel documents due to suspicions that she had participated in the Rwandan genocide. After an investigation, USCIS concluded in 2016 that Mukantagara had participated in the genocide and terminated her refugee status under 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(4). This determination also affected her son’s status, and both were placed into removal proceedings. During those proceedings, the immigration court found Mukantagara credible and granted her asylum, rejecting the government’s allegations, but denied asylum to Shyaka, finding he no longer qualified as her dependent due to his age.

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) remanded the immigration court’s grant of asylum to Mukantagara and affirmed the denial for Shyaka. On remand, the immigration court again granted asylum to Mukantagara. Shyaka pursued further review before the Tenth Circuit, and both the BIA and the Tenth Circuit abated their respective appeals pending the outcome of the present litigation. Subsequently, Mukantagara and her son filed suit against USCIS in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, challenging the termination of refugee status under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, relying on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which bars judicial review of discretionary immigration agency actions.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not apply to the first step of the refugee termination process under § 1157(c)(4), which involves a nondiscretionary eligibility determination. Therefore, the district court retains jurisdiction to review USCIS’s eligibility determination. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Gregory Alan Phillips</case:judge>
													<category term="Immigration Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-3138/24-3138-2026-01-09.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Eckstein</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-09T08:00:52-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-09T08:00:52-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-3138/24-3138-2026-01-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant faced fourteen serious federal charges, including multiple counts related to methamphetamine distribution and a firearms offense, which exposed him to the possibility of life imprisonment and asset forfeiture. He, his attorney, and the government negotiated a plea agreement under which the defendant would plead guilty to a single count of methamphetamine distribution in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges. However, at the scheduled change-of-plea hearing, the defendant hesitated and expressed a need for further information before deciding to enter a guilty plea. His attorney, citing a breakdown in their relationship, requested to withdraw from the case.

The United States District Court for the District of Kansas held an ex parte discussion with the defendant and his attorney to address the attorney’s request. During this conversation, the court explained possible consequences if the attorney withdrew, including potential delays and the government’s ability to withdraw its plea offer. The defendant ultimately decided to proceed with the plea agreement. The district court then conducted the plea colloquy but failed to explicitly inform the defendant of his right to appointed counsel if he could not afford one, as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(D). The defendant did not object to this omission at the time.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered whether the district court improperly participated in plea negotiations and whether the failure to explicitly advise the defendant of his right to appointed counsel warranted reversal. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not participate in plea negotiations by merely advising the defendant about the status of the plea offer and available options regarding representation. The court further held that the omission regarding the right to appointed counsel did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights because he had previously been informed of this right and demonstrated an understanding of it. The conviction was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-3138/24-3138-2026-01-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Eckstein" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant faced fourteen serious federal charges, including multiple counts related to methamphetamine distribution and a firearms offense, which exposed him to the possibility of life imprisonment and asset forfeiture. He, his attorney, and the government negotiated a plea agreement under which the defendant would plead guilty to a single count of methamphetamine distribution in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges. However, at the scheduled change-of-plea hearing, the defendant hesitated and expressed a need for further information before deciding to enter a guilty plea. His attorney, citing a breakdown in their relationship, requested to withdraw from the case.

The United States District Court for the District of Kansas held an ex parte discussion with the defendant and his attorney to address the attorney’s request. During this conversation, the court explained possible consequences if the attorney withdrew, including potential delays and the government’s ability to withdraw its plea offer. The defendant ultimately decided to proceed with the plea agreement. The district court then conducted the plea colloquy but failed to explicitly inform the defendant of his right to appointed counsel if he could not afford one, as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(D). The defendant did not object to this omission at the time.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered whether the district court improperly participated in plea negotiations and whether the failure to explicitly advise the defendant of his right to appointed counsel warranted reversal. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not participate in plea negotiations by merely advising the defendant about the status of the plea offer and available options regarding representation. The court further held that the omission regarding the right to appointed counsel did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights because he had previously been informed of this right and demonstrated an understanding of it. The conviction was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Robert Bacharach</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-6216/23-6216-2026-01-08.html</id>
        	<title>Bruner v. Cassidy</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-08T09:32:36-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-08T09:32:36-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-6216/23-6216-2026-01-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Early in the morning, a security guard at a hotel in Oklahoma City called 911 to report an unauthorized individual, Dawawn McCoy, refusing to leave a guest’s room and appearing unable to walk. Sergeant Cassidy of the Oklahoma City Police Department responded, found McCoy noncompliant and apparently under the influence, and requested medical evaluation. After medical personnel determined McCoy did not need immediate attention and he refused care, police were instructed to arrest him for trespassing. Cassidy called for additional officers, and together the officers attempted to handcuff McCoy, who resisted physically by pulling his hands in and kicking. The officers used pepper spray and a taser to subdue him. Once handcuffed, McCoy was rolled onto his stomach and restrained further. For approximately ninety seconds, according to the district court’s findings, McCoy had stopped resisting but officers continued to apply force by holding a knee on his back and pressing his legs upward. McCoy stopped responding verbally and showed signs of medical distress. Officers later attempted resuscitation and administered Narcan, but McCoy died six days later in the hospital.

In the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, LaQuita Bruner, as administrator of McCoy’s estate, brought suit against the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force and deliberate indifference to medical needs. The district court granted summary judgment for the officers on the deliberate indifference claim but denied it as to the excessive force claim, finding that a reasonable jury could conclude excessive force was used after McCoy was subdued.

On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on the excessive force claim. The court held that, based on the facts found by the district court, the officers’ continued use of force after McCoy was subdued was objectively unreasonable and violated clearly established Fourth Amendment law. The case was remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-6216/23-6216-2026-01-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Bruner v. Cassidy" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Early in the morning, a security guard at a hotel in Oklahoma City called 911 to report an unauthorized individual, Dawawn McCoy, refusing to leave a guest’s room and appearing unable to walk. Sergeant Cassidy of the Oklahoma City Police Department responded, found McCoy noncompliant and apparently under the influence, and requested medical evaluation. After medical personnel determined McCoy did not need immediate attention and he refused care, police were instructed to arrest him for trespassing. Cassidy called for additional officers, and together the officers attempted to handcuff McCoy, who resisted physically by pulling his hands in and kicking. The officers used pepper spray and a taser to subdue him. Once handcuffed, McCoy was rolled onto his stomach and restrained further. For approximately ninety seconds, according to the district court’s findings, McCoy had stopped resisting but officers continued to apply force by holding a knee on his back and pressing his legs upward. McCoy stopped responding verbally and showed signs of medical distress. Officers later attempted resuscitation and administered Narcan, but McCoy died six days later in the hospital.

In the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, LaQuita Bruner, as administrator of McCoy’s estate, brought suit against the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force and deliberate indifference to medical needs. The district court granted summary judgment for the officers on the deliberate indifference claim but denied it as to the excessive force claim, finding that a reasonable jury could conclude excessive force was used after McCoy was subdued.

On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on the excessive force claim. The court held that, based on the facts found by the district court, the officers’ continued use of force after McCoy was subdued was objectively unreasonable and violated clearly established Fourth Amendment law. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>David Ebel</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-3112/24-3112-2026-01-06.html</id>
        	<title>Kesters Merchandising Display International v. SurfaceQuest</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-06T12:01:23-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-06T12:01:23-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-3112/24-3112-2026-01-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Kesters Merchandising Display International, Inc. and SurfaceQuest, Inc. are competing manufacturers in the architectural materials industry. Kesters produces MicroLite, a lightweight, seamless material. Around 2014, the parties collaborated to market samples of MicroLite wrapped in SurfaceQuest film, with Kesters supplying photographs and product guides. Subsequently, SurfaceQuest began independently selling and marketing its own lightweight beam wrapped in its film, utilizing photographs of MicroLite in promotional materials. Kesters alleged that SurfaceQuest misrepresented MicroLite as its own in various advertisements and communications with customers.

The United States District Court for the District of Kansas presided over the initial lawsuit. Kesters claimed false advertising under the Lanham Act, arguing that SurfaceQuest’s use of MicroLite images and representations damaged its business. Both parties moved for summary judgment on the Lanham Act claim. The district court granted summary judgment to SurfaceQuest, finding that Kesters had neither established a presumption of injury nor presented evidence of actual injury resulting from the alleged false advertising.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo under the summary judgment standard. The appellate court determined that injury could not be presumed because Kesters failed to show that only two significant competitors existed in the relevant market or to provide evidence of cross-elasticity of demand. Furthermore, Kesters did not present evidence of actual injury, such as a causal connection between SurfaceQuest’s advertising and lost business opportunities. As a result, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to SurfaceQuest and the denial of Kesters’ motion for summary judgment, holding that Kesters did not provide evidence supporting the required element of injury for its Lanham Act claim. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-3112/24-3112-2026-01-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Kesters Merchandising Display International v. SurfaceQuest" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Kesters Merchandising Display International, Inc. and SurfaceQuest, Inc. are competing manufacturers in the architectural materials industry. Kesters produces MicroLite, a lightweight, seamless material. Around 2014, the parties collaborated to market samples of MicroLite wrapped in SurfaceQuest film, with Kesters supplying photographs and product guides. Subsequently, SurfaceQuest began independently selling and marketing its own lightweight beam wrapped in its film, utilizing photographs of MicroLite in promotional materials. Kesters alleged that SurfaceQuest misrepresented MicroLite as its own in various advertisements and communications with customers.

The United States District Court for the District of Kansas presided over the initial lawsuit. Kesters claimed false advertising under the Lanham Act, arguing that SurfaceQuest’s use of MicroLite images and representations damaged its business. Both parties moved for summary judgment on the Lanham Act claim. The district court granted summary judgment to SurfaceQuest, finding that Kesters had neither established a presumption of injury nor presented evidence of actual injury resulting from the alleged false advertising.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo under the summary judgment standard. The appellate court determined that injury could not be presumed because Kesters failed to show that only two significant competitors existed in the relevant market or to provide evidence of cross-elasticity of demand. Furthermore, Kesters did not present evidence of actual injury, such as a causal connection between SurfaceQuest’s advertising and lost business opportunities. As a result, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to SurfaceQuest and the denial of Kesters’ motion for summary judgment, holding that Kesters did not provide evidence supporting the required element of injury for its Lanham Act claim.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Robert Bacharach</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-1315/23-1315-2026-01-06.html</id>
        	<title>Montgomery v. Cruz</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-06T09:31:32-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-06T09:31:32-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-1315/23-1315-2026-01-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		During a shopping trip at Walmart, William Montgomery was stopped by a store employee and subsequently by Officer Armando Cruz, who suspected shoplifting after Montgomery declined to show a receipt. Officer Cruz directed Montgomery to raise his hands, handcuffed him, and proceeded to search his pockets. Without conducting a pat-down, Officer Cruz reached into Montgomery’s pockets, removing a prescription bottle and a wallet, and looked for Montgomery’s driver’s license. Montgomery was detained briefly, but Walmart employees determined he had paid for the items and he was released.

Montgomery filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging that Officer Cruz violated his Fourth Amendment rights by searching his pockets and wallet without proper justification. Officer Cruz moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, arguing that his actions did not violate clearly established law. The district court denied the motion for summary judgment, finding that factual disputes existed regarding whether Officer Cruz had patted Montgomery down before reaching into his pockets and whether Montgomery had consented to the search of his wallet.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the denial of summary judgment de novo. The court held that, accepting the district court’s factual conclusions, Officer Cruz’s search of Montgomery’s pockets without a pat-down or arrest constituted a clearly established violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court further concluded that the subsequent search of Montgomery’s wallet was not justified by consent, as any statement made by Montgomery after the illegal search could not retroactively legitimize the search. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Officer Cruz. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-1315/23-1315-2026-01-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Montgomery v. Cruz" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                During a shopping trip at Walmart, William Montgomery was stopped by a store employee and subsequently by Officer Armando Cruz, who suspected shoplifting after Montgomery declined to show a receipt. Officer Cruz directed Montgomery to raise his hands, handcuffed him, and proceeded to search his pockets. Without conducting a pat-down, Officer Cruz reached into Montgomery’s pockets, removing a prescription bottle and a wallet, and looked for Montgomery’s driver’s license. Montgomery was detained briefly, but Walmart employees determined he had paid for the items and he was released.

Montgomery filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging that Officer Cruz violated his Fourth Amendment rights by searching his pockets and wallet without proper justification. Officer Cruz moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, arguing that his actions did not violate clearly established law. The district court denied the motion for summary judgment, finding that factual disputes existed regarding whether Officer Cruz had patted Montgomery down before reaching into his pockets and whether Montgomery had consented to the search of his wallet.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the denial of summary judgment de novo. The court held that, accepting the district court’s factual conclusions, Officer Cruz’s search of Montgomery’s pockets without a pat-down or arrest constituted a clearly established violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court further concluded that the subsequent search of Montgomery’s wallet was not justified by consent, as any statement made by Montgomery after the illegal search could not retroactively legitimize the search. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Officer Cruz.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Robert Bacharach</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-4039/24-4039-2025-12-31.html</id>
        	<title>North Brevard County Hospital District v. C.R. Bard, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2025-12-31T12:31:26-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-31T12:31:26-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-4039/24-4039-2025-12-31.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A hospital district alleged that a medical device manufacturer used its dominant market share in tip-location systems (TLS) for catheters to manipulate the market for peripherally inserted central catheters (PICCs). Bard, the manufacturer, sells PICCs with a proprietary stylet that is necessary to integrate with Bard’s TLS. The hospital claimed this arrangement effectively forced hospitals to buy Bard’s PICCs to use the TLS, resulting in higher prices, and brought suit under the Sherman Act and Clayton Act for unlawful tying and monopolization. The hospital sought class certification for clinics and hospitals that had purchased Bard PICCs.

Initially, the United States District Court for the District of Utah granted Bard’s motion for judgment on the pleadings regarding the tying claim, holding that the hospital lacked antitrust standing since it purchased only the tied product (PICCs) and not the tying product (TLS). The court concluded the hospital did not show it was compelled to buy Bard’s PICCs as a result of owning Bard’s TLS. The court allowed the monopolization claim to proceed, but later denied class certification, finding the proposed class did not meet certification requirements. After the Tenth Circuit denied interlocutory review of the class certification denial, the hospital voluntarily dismissed its remaining claim to facilitate an appeal from final judgment.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the tying claim, holding that the hospital was not an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws and therefore lacked antitrust standing. The court found that purchasers of the tying product or competitors are generally better positioned to challenge tying arrangements. The Tenth Circuit also dismissed the appeal from denial of class certification, ruling it lacked jurisdiction under circuit and Supreme Court precedent when the underlying claim was voluntarily dismissed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-4039/24-4039-2025-12-31.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "North Brevard County Hospital District v. C.R. Bard, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A hospital district alleged that a medical device manufacturer used its dominant market share in tip-location systems (TLS) for catheters to manipulate the market for peripherally inserted central catheters (PICCs). Bard, the manufacturer, sells PICCs with a proprietary stylet that is necessary to integrate with Bard’s TLS. The hospital claimed this arrangement effectively forced hospitals to buy Bard’s PICCs to use the TLS, resulting in higher prices, and brought suit under the Sherman Act and Clayton Act for unlawful tying and monopolization. The hospital sought class certification for clinics and hospitals that had purchased Bard PICCs.

Initially, the United States District Court for the District of Utah granted Bard’s motion for judgment on the pleadings regarding the tying claim, holding that the hospital lacked antitrust standing since it purchased only the tied product (PICCs) and not the tying product (TLS). The court concluded the hospital did not show it was compelled to buy Bard’s PICCs as a result of owning Bard’s TLS. The court allowed the monopolization claim to proceed, but later denied class certification, finding the proposed class did not meet certification requirements. After the Tenth Circuit denied interlocutory review of the class certification denial, the hospital voluntarily dismissed its remaining claim to facilitate an appeal from final judgment.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the tying claim, holding that the hospital was not an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws and therefore lacked antitrust standing. The court found that purchasers of the tying product or competitors are generally better positioned to challenge tying arrangements. The Tenth Circuit also dismissed the appeal from denial of class certification, ruling it lacked jurisdiction under circuit and Supreme Court precedent when the underlying claim was voluntarily dismissed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-31</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Federico</case:judge>
													<category term="Antitrust &amp; Trade Regulation"/>
							<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-3128/23-3128-2025-12-31.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Poterbin</title>
        	<updated>2025-12-31T08:00:50-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-31T08:00:50-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-3128/23-3128-2025-12-31.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A group of individuals was involved in drug-related activities at a house in Kansas City, Kansas, with Brandon West operating as a seller and user of methamphetamine supplied by his cousin David Carr, who sourced the drugs from James Poterbin. On April 18, 2019, after a drug purchase went awry and money was lost, West contacted Carr and Poterbin, believing that Mariah Vieni had stolen drug proceeds. Vieni’s boyfriend, D.B., was held at the house and, upon Carr and Poterbin’s arrival, was subjected to violence including beating, stabbing, and being shot. The incident led to federal charges against several participants, including Poterbin.

The United States District Court for the District of Kansas tried Poterbin alongside Carr. The jury convicted Poterbin on all counts: conspiracy to distribute and possess methamphetamine, kidnapping, and using a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. The district court sentenced him to a total of 480 months&#039; imprisonment and five years of supervised release. Poterbin challenged his convictions and sentence on appeal, raising arguments about the admission of certain evidence, sufficiency of the evidence, and procedural reasonableness of his sentence, among other issues.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that any error in admitting evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) regarding Poterbin’s post-conspiracy drug sales was harmless, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt and limiting instructions provided to the jury. The court found sufficient evidence supporting all convictions, rejected arguments regarding the credibility of witnesses, and determined that the district court’s application of sentencing enhancements did not amount to plain error. The court dismissed Poterbin’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims without prejudice, allowing them to be raised in a collateral proceeding. Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Poterbin’s convictions and sentence. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-3128/23-3128-2025-12-31.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Poterbin" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A group of individuals was involved in drug-related activities at a house in Kansas City, Kansas, with Brandon West operating as a seller and user of methamphetamine supplied by his cousin David Carr, who sourced the drugs from James Poterbin. On April 18, 2019, after a drug purchase went awry and money was lost, West contacted Carr and Poterbin, believing that Mariah Vieni had stolen drug proceeds. Vieni’s boyfriend, D.B., was held at the house and, upon Carr and Poterbin’s arrival, was subjected to violence including beating, stabbing, and being shot. The incident led to federal charges against several participants, including Poterbin.

The United States District Court for the District of Kansas tried Poterbin alongside Carr. The jury convicted Poterbin on all counts: conspiracy to distribute and possess methamphetamine, kidnapping, and using a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. The district court sentenced him to a total of 480 months&#039; imprisonment and five years of supervised release. Poterbin challenged his convictions and sentence on appeal, raising arguments about the admission of certain evidence, sufficiency of the evidence, and procedural reasonableness of his sentence, among other issues.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that any error in admitting evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) regarding Poterbin’s post-conspiracy drug sales was harmless, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt and limiting instructions provided to the jury. The court found sufficient evidence supporting all convictions, rejected arguments regarding the credibility of witnesses, and determined that the district court’s application of sentencing enhancements did not amount to plain error. The court dismissed Poterbin’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims without prejudice, allowing them to be raised in a collateral proceeding. Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Poterbin’s convictions and sentence.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-31</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>David Ebel</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-3041/24-3041-2025-12-30.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Department of Health &amp; Environment</title>
        	<updated>2025-12-30T11:33:46-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-30T11:33:46-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-3041/24-3041-2025-12-30.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A member of the United States Army National Guard, Stacy Gonzales, worked as a local disease intervention specialist at the Finney County Health Department in Kansas. Her position was funded primarily through Aid-to-Local grants distributed by the Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE), which set substantive job expectations and supervised both state and local disease intervention specialists. Gonzales’s salary and benefits were determined and paid by Finney County, but her day-to-day work, training, and performance evaluations involved significant oversight from KDHE. When KDHE decided not to renew the Aid-to-Local grant in 2010 due to perceived performance deficiencies, Finney County was forced to terminate Gonzales’s position, resulting in her unemployment.

The United States filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, alleging that KDHE had violated the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) by discriminating against Gonzales based on her military service obligations. Both sides moved for summary judgment on the threshold issue of whether Kansas, through KDHE, was Gonzales’s “employer” under USERRA. The district court granted summary judgment to Kansas, concluding that KDHE was not Gonzales’s employer because it did not have direct authority to hire, fire, supervise, or determine her salary or benefits.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that the definition of “employer” under USERRA includes entities that exercise control over employment opportunities, not limited to direct authority over hiring, firing, or pay. The court found sufficient evidence that KDHE retained significant control over Gonzales’s employment opportunities to preclude summary judgment. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-3041/24-3041-2025-12-30.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Department of Health &amp; Environment" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A member of the United States Army National Guard, Stacy Gonzales, worked as a local disease intervention specialist at the Finney County Health Department in Kansas. Her position was funded primarily through Aid-to-Local grants distributed by the Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE), which set substantive job expectations and supervised both state and local disease intervention specialists. Gonzales’s salary and benefits were determined and paid by Finney County, but her day-to-day work, training, and performance evaluations involved significant oversight from KDHE. When KDHE decided not to renew the Aid-to-Local grant in 2010 due to perceived performance deficiencies, Finney County was forced to terminate Gonzales’s position, resulting in her unemployment.

The United States filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, alleging that KDHE had violated the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) by discriminating against Gonzales based on her military service obligations. Both sides moved for summary judgment on the threshold issue of whether Kansas, through KDHE, was Gonzales’s “employer” under USERRA. The district court granted summary judgment to Kansas, concluding that KDHE was not Gonzales’s employer because it did not have direct authority to hire, fire, supervise, or determine her salary or benefits.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that the definition of “employer” under USERRA includes entities that exercise control over employment opportunities, not limited to direct authority over hiring, firing, or pay. The court found sufficient evidence that KDHE retained significant control over Gonzales’s employment opportunities to preclude summary judgment. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Michael R. Murphy</case:judge>
													<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1359/24-1359-2025-12-30.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Raban</title>
        	<updated>2025-12-30T09:00:36-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-30T09:00:36-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1359/24-1359-2025-12-30.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Police officers stopped a motorist for driving without a front license plate and failing to use a turn signal in a high-crime area of Denver known for gang activity. The driver, Antoan Raban, was identified as a member of the Tre Tre Crips gang and was driving in rival Bloods gang territory. During the stop, a known Crips gang member, Deshay Armstrong, parked nearby, watched the officers, and called Raban’s phone. Raban did not have identification, and a records check revealed violent and weapons-related convictions. Officers called for backup, removed Raban from his car to fingerprint him, frisked him, and found no weapons. While preparing to take fingerprints, an officer conducted a protective sweep of Raban’s car and discovered a loaded pistol and ammunition.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied Raban’s motion to suppress, finding that under the totality of the circumstances—including the high-crime area, Raban’s gang affiliation, Armstrong’s presence, and Raban’s ankle monitor—the officers had reasonable suspicion that Raban was dangerous. Initially, the district court questioned whether the officers genuinely intended to return Raban to his car but later reconsidered and found it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe Raban might be released with a citation and allowed to reenter his vehicle.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. It held that the officers had reasonable suspicion that Raban was presently dangerous and that he might regain access to a weapon in his car if released. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion and upheld Raban’s conviction, holding that the protective sweep was lawful under the Fourth Amendment given the circumstances. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1359/24-1359-2025-12-30.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Raban" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Police officers stopped a motorist for driving without a front license plate and failing to use a turn signal in a high-crime area of Denver known for gang activity. The driver, Antoan Raban, was identified as a member of the Tre Tre Crips gang and was driving in rival Bloods gang territory. During the stop, a known Crips gang member, Deshay Armstrong, parked nearby, watched the officers, and called Raban’s phone. Raban did not have identification, and a records check revealed violent and weapons-related convictions. Officers called for backup, removed Raban from his car to fingerprint him, frisked him, and found no weapons. While preparing to take fingerprints, an officer conducted a protective sweep of Raban’s car and discovered a loaded pistol and ammunition.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied Raban’s motion to suppress, finding that under the totality of the circumstances—including the high-crime area, Raban’s gang affiliation, Armstrong’s presence, and Raban’s ankle monitor—the officers had reasonable suspicion that Raban was dangerous. Initially, the district court questioned whether the officers genuinely intended to return Raban to his car but later reconsidered and found it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe Raban might be released with a citation and allowed to reenter his vehicle.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. It held that the officers had reasonable suspicion that Raban was presently dangerous and that he might regain access to a weapon in his car if released. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion and upheld Raban’s conviction, holding that the protective sweep was lawful under the Fourth Amendment given the circumstances.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Gregory Alan Phillips</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-7077/24-7077-2025-12-24.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Cole</title>
        	<updated>2025-12-24T08:32:58-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-24T08:32:58-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-7077/24-7077-2025-12-24.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case centers on Brett Dewayne Cole, who was charged with three counts stemming from allegations of sexual abuse against his stepdaughter, K.Z., a member of the Choctaw tribe. In May 2019, K.Z., then ten years old, disclosed to school personnel and a nurse examiner that Cole had sexually assaulted her on multiple occasions at their family home, including acts of touching and oral and anal penetration. Cole denied any inappropriate conduct. During trial, the government sought to introduce testimony from three witnesses—Cole’s half-sister, half-brother, and stepcousin—about prior instances in which Cole allegedly molested them as children, with these incidents occurring when Cole himself was a juvenile.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma presided over Cole’s case. At the first trial in January 2023, evidence of Cole’s prior acts as a juvenile was admitted over his belated objection, but the jury failed to reach a verdict and a mistrial was declared. In a second trial held in March 2023, similar evidence was presented, and the jury convicted Cole on all counts. Cole appealed, arguing that Federal Rule of Evidence 414 did not permit admission of the prior acts because he was a juvenile at the time, and that the evidence’s prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that acts of child molestation committed as a juvenile qualify as “crimes” under Rule 414 and are admissible. It further found that the district court properly balanced the probative value against any prejudicial impact and did not abuse its discretion. The Tenth Circuit affirmed Cole’s conviction. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-7077/24-7077-2025-12-24.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Cole" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case centers on Brett Dewayne Cole, who was charged with three counts stemming from allegations of sexual abuse against his stepdaughter, K.Z., a member of the Choctaw tribe. In May 2019, K.Z., then ten years old, disclosed to school personnel and a nurse examiner that Cole had sexually assaulted her on multiple occasions at their family home, including acts of touching and oral and anal penetration. Cole denied any inappropriate conduct. During trial, the government sought to introduce testimony from three witnesses—Cole’s half-sister, half-brother, and stepcousin—about prior instances in which Cole allegedly molested them as children, with these incidents occurring when Cole himself was a juvenile.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma presided over Cole’s case. At the first trial in January 2023, evidence of Cole’s prior acts as a juvenile was admitted over his belated objection, but the jury failed to reach a verdict and a mistrial was declared. In a second trial held in March 2023, similar evidence was presented, and the jury convicted Cole on all counts. Cole appealed, arguing that Federal Rule of Evidence 414 did not permit admission of the prior acts because he was a juvenile at the time, and that the evidence’s prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that acts of child molestation committed as a juvenile qualify as “crimes” under Rule 414 and are admissible. It further found that the district court properly balanced the probative value against any prejudicial impact and did not abuse its discretion. The Tenth Circuit affirmed Cole’s conviction.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-24</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>David Ebel</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Juvenile Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-6000/25-6000-2025-12-23.html</id>
        	<title>Lancaster v. Cartmell</title>
        	<updated>2025-12-23T09:02:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-23T09:02:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-6000/25-6000-2025-12-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Max and Peggy Lancaster transferred approximately $3.8 million in property to a family LLC owned by their adult children, receiving a promissory note and other loan-related documents in exchange. They subsequently applied for Medicaid benefits in Oklahoma but were found ineligible due to their financial resources exceeding Medicaid’s asset limit. The Lancasters challenged this determination in federal court, arguing that the Oklahoma Department of Human Services and the Oklahoma Health Care Authority violated 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) of the Medicaid Act, which requires prompt provision of benefits to eligible individuals. They sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending that the Agencies’ asset calculation was erroneous and deprived them of a federally protected right.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma granted the Agencies’ motion to dismiss. The court found that the promissory note received from the LLC was a countable resource under state law and not a bona fide loan. As a result, the court concluded the Lancasters were not eligible for Medicaid benefits because their assets exceeded the threshold set by law. The Lancasters appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic, which clarified the standard for determining whether provisions of the Medicaid Act confer individually enforceable rights under § 1983. The Tenth Circuit held that, under Medina, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) does not clearly and unambiguously confer a private right enforceable via § 1983. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Lancasters’ claims, holding that there is no individually enforceable right under § 1396a(a)(8) for the purposes of this lawsuit. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-6000/25-6000-2025-12-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Lancaster v. Cartmell" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Max and Peggy Lancaster transferred approximately $3.8 million in property to a family LLC owned by their adult children, receiving a promissory note and other loan-related documents in exchange. They subsequently applied for Medicaid benefits in Oklahoma but were found ineligible due to their financial resources exceeding Medicaid’s asset limit. The Lancasters challenged this determination in federal court, arguing that the Oklahoma Department of Human Services and the Oklahoma Health Care Authority violated 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) of the Medicaid Act, which requires prompt provision of benefits to eligible individuals. They sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending that the Agencies’ asset calculation was erroneous and deprived them of a federally protected right.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma granted the Agencies’ motion to dismiss. The court found that the promissory note received from the LLC was a countable resource under state law and not a bona fide loan. As a result, the court concluded the Lancasters were not eligible for Medicaid benefits because their assets exceeded the threshold set by law. The Lancasters appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic, which clarified the standard for determining whether provisions of the Medicaid Act confer individually enforceable rights under § 1983. The Tenth Circuit held that, under Medina, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) does not clearly and unambiguously confer a private right enforceable via § 1983. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Lancasters’ claims, holding that there is no individually enforceable right under § 1396a(a)(8) for the purposes of this lawsuit.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Timothy Tymkovich</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-3154/24-3154-2025-12-22.html</id>
        	<title>Berberich v. Kansas City Southern Railway Company</title>
        	<updated>2025-12-22T08:01:25-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-22T08:01:25-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-3154/24-3154-2025-12-22.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The plaintiff was employed as a conductor for a railway company and alleged that he was wrongfully terminated in retaliation for engaging in activity protected by the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA). Specifically, he claimed that in January 2019 he refused to allow the train’s engineer to perform a task—lining a switch—due to safety concerns, opting instead to perform the procedure himself. The plaintiff asserted that this refusal was in defiance of a purported “standing order” directing engineers to line switches to expedite train movements. He argued that allowing engineers to leave the controls unattended while lining switches created a hazardous condition.

Following his termination for a separate incident in February 2019, the plaintiff pursued complaints through several forums. First, he challenged his dismissal before a Public Law Board, which found that he had violated safety rules but ordered reinstatement without backpay due to disproportionate punishment. He also filed a complaint with OSHA, asserting retaliation for reporting safety concerns and insisting on safe practices. An administrative law judge (ALJ) subsequently dismissed this complaint, finding no credible evidence of a standing order, no proof that the plaintiff had refused to work as required by the statute, and no evidence of a hazardous safety condition at the relevant time.

The plaintiff then brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, which granted summary judgment to the railway company. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, but on different grounds. The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to establish that he engaged in protected activity under 49 U.S.C. § 20109(b)(1)(B) because he did not refuse to work and was not confronting an imminent hazardous condition. Therefore, he could not make a prima facie case of retaliation under the FRSA. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-3154/24-3154-2025-12-22.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Berberich v. Kansas City Southern Railway Company" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The plaintiff was employed as a conductor for a railway company and alleged that he was wrongfully terminated in retaliation for engaging in activity protected by the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA). Specifically, he claimed that in January 2019 he refused to allow the train’s engineer to perform a task—lining a switch—due to safety concerns, opting instead to perform the procedure himself. The plaintiff asserted that this refusal was in defiance of a purported “standing order” directing engineers to line switches to expedite train movements. He argued that allowing engineers to leave the controls unattended while lining switches created a hazardous condition.

Following his termination for a separate incident in February 2019, the plaintiff pursued complaints through several forums. First, he challenged his dismissal before a Public Law Board, which found that he had violated safety rules but ordered reinstatement without backpay due to disproportionate punishment. He also filed a complaint with OSHA, asserting retaliation for reporting safety concerns and insisting on safe practices. An administrative law judge (ALJ) subsequently dismissed this complaint, finding no credible evidence of a standing order, no proof that the plaintiff had refused to work as required by the statute, and no evidence of a hazardous safety condition at the relevant time.

The plaintiff then brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, which granted summary judgment to the railway company. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, but on different grounds. The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to establish that he engaged in protected activity under 49 U.S.C. § 20109(b)(1)(B) because he did not refuse to work and was not confronting an imminent hazardous condition. Therefore, he could not make a prima facie case of retaliation under the FRSA. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-22</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Harris Hartz</case:judge>
													<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-4094/24-4094-2025-12-22.html</id>
        	<title>Standard Insurances v. IRS</title>
        	<updated>2025-12-22T08:01:25-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-22T08:01:25-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-4094/24-4094-2025-12-22.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several Utah-based companies and individuals, including Standard Insurances and related entities, challenged actions taken by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) following an audit. Standard Insurances, a micro-captive insurance company, had provided insurance to its affiliated companies, seeking certain federal tax benefits under 26 U.S.C. § 831(b). After an audit initiated in 2022, the IRS determined that Standard was not a legitimate micro-captive insurance company, issued deficiency notices, and adjusted the tax liabilities of Standard and its insureds. The IRS concluded that Standard’s transactions lacked economic substance and were not genuine insurance transactions, resulting in increased taxable income for Standard and decreased deductions for the insured entities.

Following the issuance of deficiency notices, Standard petitioned the United States Tax Court for redetermination of its tax liabilities and made advance payments. While those proceedings remained pending, Standard filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the claims were barred by the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA) and the Tax Anti-Injunction Act (AIA), which prohibit suits in federal court that restrain the assessment or collection of federal taxes.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Tenth Circuit held that Standard’s claims sought relief that would restrain the IRS’s assessment and collection of taxes, and thus were barred by the DJA and AIA. The court found that none of the judicially created exceptions to these statutes applied, as Standard had an available remedy in tax court and could pursue further review if necessary. The court rejected Standard’s arguments that its claims were not subject to the statutory bars and concluded that federal court jurisdiction was precluded in this instance. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-4094/24-4094-2025-12-22.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Standard Insurances v. IRS" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several Utah-based companies and individuals, including Standard Insurances and related entities, challenged actions taken by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) following an audit. Standard Insurances, a micro-captive insurance company, had provided insurance to its affiliated companies, seeking certain federal tax benefits under 26 U.S.C. § 831(b). After an audit initiated in 2022, the IRS determined that Standard was not a legitimate micro-captive insurance company, issued deficiency notices, and adjusted the tax liabilities of Standard and its insureds. The IRS concluded that Standard’s transactions lacked economic substance and were not genuine insurance transactions, resulting in increased taxable income for Standard and decreased deductions for the insured entities.

Following the issuance of deficiency notices, Standard petitioned the United States Tax Court for redetermination of its tax liabilities and made advance payments. While those proceedings remained pending, Standard filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the claims were barred by the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA) and the Tax Anti-Injunction Act (AIA), which prohibit suits in federal court that restrain the assessment or collection of federal taxes.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Tenth Circuit held that Standard’s claims sought relief that would restrain the IRS’s assessment and collection of taxes, and thus were barred by the DJA and AIA. The court found that none of the judicially created exceptions to these statutes applied, as Standard had an available remedy in tax court and could pursue further review if necessary. The court rejected Standard’s arguments that its claims were not subject to the statutory bars and concluded that federal court jurisdiction was precluded in this instance.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-22</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Timothy Tymkovich</case:judge>
													<category term="Tax Law"/>
											</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-7044/24-7044-2025-12-16.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Holt</title>
        	<updated>2025-12-16T11:32:56-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-16T11:32:56-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-7044/24-7044-2025-12-16.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In this case, the defendant was involved in a violent incident that began as a fistfight between two groups at an apartment complex in Oklahoma and escalated into a gunfight. The defendant, who was present with an AK-47, fired more than twenty rounds into a crowd after shots were fired by others, resulting in the death of a bystander, Larintino Scales. Evidence at trial included various eyewitness accounts, forensic analysis, and expert testimony regarding bullet trajectories. The defendant was charged with several offenses, including voluntary manslaughter and being a felon in possession of a firearm.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma presided over the trial. The jury convicted the defendant of voluntary manslaughter and felon in possession, but acquitted him of other charges. The district court denied a pretrial motion alleging bad-faith destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence, allowed expert testimony on bullet trajectories, and overruled objections to the prosecutor’s closing argument regarding self-defense. The court departed upward from the Sentencing Guidelines, imposing the statutory maximum sentence of fifteen years.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the defendant’s challenges to his conviction and sentence. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the late-discovered bullet fragment lacked potentially exculpatory value. Any error in the admission of the government’s expert testimony was found to be harmless, and the expert was deemed qualified. The prosecutor’s closing statements were not found to misstate the law of self-defense. Finally, the appellate court concluded the sentence was substantively reasonable, as the district court adequately considered relevant sentencing factors and the seriousness of the offense. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-7044/24-7044-2025-12-16.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Holt" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In this case, the defendant was involved in a violent incident that began as a fistfight between two groups at an apartment complex in Oklahoma and escalated into a gunfight. The defendant, who was present with an AK-47, fired more than twenty rounds into a crowd after shots were fired by others, resulting in the death of a bystander, Larintino Scales. Evidence at trial included various eyewitness accounts, forensic analysis, and expert testimony regarding bullet trajectories. The defendant was charged with several offenses, including voluntary manslaughter and being a felon in possession of a firearm.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma presided over the trial. The jury convicted the defendant of voluntary manslaughter and felon in possession, but acquitted him of other charges. The district court denied a pretrial motion alleging bad-faith destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence, allowed expert testimony on bullet trajectories, and overruled objections to the prosecutor’s closing argument regarding self-defense. The court departed upward from the Sentencing Guidelines, imposing the statutory maximum sentence of fifteen years.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the defendant’s challenges to his conviction and sentence. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the late-discovered bullet fragment lacked potentially exculpatory value. Any error in the admission of the government’s expert testimony was found to be harmless, and the expert was deemed qualified. The prosecutor’s closing statements were not found to misstate the law of self-defense. Finally, the appellate court concluded the sentence was substantively reasonable, as the district court adequately considered relevant sentencing factors and the seriousness of the offense. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Nancy Moritz</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
											</entry>
    </feed>

