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	<title>Aviation - Justia Case Law Summaries</title>
	<link rel="self" href="https://law.justia.com/summaryfeed/aviation/"/>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://aviationopinions.justia.com/"/>
	<id>https://law.justia.com/summaryfeed/aviation/</id>
	<updated>2026-07-09T00:17:40-08:00</updated>
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		<name>Justia Inc</name>
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	<rights>Copyright 2026 Justia Inc</rights>
	        <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/25-1150/25-1150-2026-05-29.html</id>
        	<title>ModernWest Longmont, LLC v. FAA</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-29T06:31:52-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-29T06:31:52-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/25-1150/25-1150-2026-05-29.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A property development company sought to build mixed-use housing developments near a public-use airport operated by the City of Longmont, Colorado. The proposed developments were located under the airport’s approach and departure paths. The company received preliminary approvals from the City for its projects and obtained “Determinations of No Hazard” from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which found the developments would not obstruct flight paths. However, the FAA sent letters to the City warning that approving the developments would violate a grant assurance tied to the airport’s federal funding, specifically regarding land use compatibility. The City subsequently denied the company’s proposal, citing multiple reasons, including the FAA’s letters, concerns from state authorities, its own findings of incompatibility, and public opposition.

After the City’s decision, the developer asked the FAA to withdraw its letters, but the FAA declined. The company then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to order the FAA to vacate and withdraw these letters, arguing that the FAA’s actions directly caused its injury by influencing the City’s denial.

The D.C. Circuit dismissed the petition for lack of standing. The court held that the developer failed to demonstrate that vacating the FAA’s letters would likely result in the City approving the developments, as the City had provided multiple independent reasons for its denial beyond the FAA’s communications. The court also found that the company did not comply with the court’s procedural rule requiring petitioners to argue and provide evidence of standing in their opening brief. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/25-1150/25-1150-2026-05-29.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "ModernWest Longmont, LLC v. FAA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A property development company sought to build mixed-use housing developments near a public-use airport operated by the City of Longmont, Colorado. The proposed developments were located under the airport’s approach and departure paths. The company received preliminary approvals from the City for its projects and obtained “Determinations of No Hazard” from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which found the developments would not obstruct flight paths. However, the FAA sent letters to the City warning that approving the developments would violate a grant assurance tied to the airport’s federal funding, specifically regarding land use compatibility. The City subsequently denied the company’s proposal, citing multiple reasons, including the FAA’s letters, concerns from state authorities, its own findings of incompatibility, and public opposition.

After the City’s decision, the developer asked the FAA to withdraw its letters, but the FAA declined. The company then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to order the FAA to vacate and withdraw these letters, arguing that the FAA’s actions directly caused its injury by influencing the City’s denial.

The D.C. Circuit dismissed the petition for lack of standing. The court held that the developer failed to demonstrate that vacating the FAA’s letters would likely result in the City approving the developments, as the City had provided multiple independent reasons for its denial beyond the FAA’s communications. The court also found that the company did not comply with the court’s procedural rule requiring petitioners to argue and provide evidence of standing in their opening brief. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Harry Edwards</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Real Estate &amp; Property Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
							<category term="Zoning, Planning &amp; Land Use"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/24-10913/24-10913-2026-05-26.html</id>
        	<title>Declan Flight, Inc. v. Textron eAviation, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-26T10:04:34-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-26T10:04:34-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/24-10913/24-10913-2026-05-26.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Two American companies, Declan Flight, Inc. and Right Rudder Aviation, LLC (RRA), developed successful sales and distribution relationships with Pipistrel, a Slovenian aircraft manufacturer, through contracts signed in 2020 and 2021. Their contracts contained forum-selection clauses specifying Slovenia as the forum for disputes. In 2022, Textron, Inc., a large U.S. aerospace company, acquired Pipistrel through its subsidiary Textron eAviation, Inc. Shortly after the acquisition, Textron and eAviation orchestrated the termination of Declan’s and RRA’s contracts. RRA also lost a separate sales contract with Mesa Airlines after Textron and eAviation allegedly interfered with that business relationship.

Declan and RRA sued Textron and eAviation in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, alleging tortious interference with the Pipistrel contracts and with the Mesa Airlines contract. The district court dismissed the claims related to the Pipistrel contracts (Counts I and II) for forum non conveniens, holding that the forum-selection clauses could be enforced by Textron and eAviation—nonsignatories—under the federal doctrine of equitable estoppel, thus requiring litigation to proceed in Slovenia. The district court also found that personal jurisdiction existed for the Mesa Airlines claim (Count III), but dismissed it for failure to state a claim.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of Counts I and II. The court held that the applicability of the forum-selection clauses is governed by Slovenian law, not federal common law, and that Slovenian law does not permit nonsignatories to invoke these clauses. Thus, the district court erred in applying the modified forum non conveniens rule from Atlantic Marine. The Eleventh Circuit also reversed the finding of personal jurisdiction over Textron and eAviation as to Count III, remanding all claims for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/24-10913/24-10913-2026-05-26.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Declan Flight, Inc. v. Textron eAviation, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Two American companies, Declan Flight, Inc. and Right Rudder Aviation, LLC (RRA), developed successful sales and distribution relationships with Pipistrel, a Slovenian aircraft manufacturer, through contracts signed in 2020 and 2021. Their contracts contained forum-selection clauses specifying Slovenia as the forum for disputes. In 2022, Textron, Inc., a large U.S. aerospace company, acquired Pipistrel through its subsidiary Textron eAviation, Inc. Shortly after the acquisition, Textron and eAviation orchestrated the termination of Declan’s and RRA’s contracts. RRA also lost a separate sales contract with Mesa Airlines after Textron and eAviation allegedly interfered with that business relationship.

Declan and RRA sued Textron and eAviation in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, alleging tortious interference with the Pipistrel contracts and with the Mesa Airlines contract. The district court dismissed the claims related to the Pipistrel contracts (Counts I and II) for forum non conveniens, holding that the forum-selection clauses could be enforced by Textron and eAviation—nonsignatories—under the federal doctrine of equitable estoppel, thus requiring litigation to proceed in Slovenia. The district court also found that personal jurisdiction existed for the Mesa Airlines claim (Count III), but dismissed it for failure to state a claim.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of Counts I and II. The court held that the applicability of the forum-selection clauses is governed by Slovenian law, not federal common law, and that Slovenian law does not permit nonsignatories to invoke these clauses. Thus, the district court erred in applying the modified forum non conveniens rule from Atlantic Marine. The Eleventh Circuit also reversed the finding of personal jurisdiction over Textron and eAviation as to Count III, remanding all claims for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Barbara Lagoa</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10606/25-10606-2026-05-14.html</id>
        	<title>Arzu v. American Airlines</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-14T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-14T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10606/25-10606-2026-05-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A 14-year-old passenger, Kevin Greenidge, died from cardiac arrest aboard an American Airlines international flight from Honduras to Florida. Kevin, who suffered from multiple health conditions, began experiencing breathing difficulties soon after takeoff. Despite the crew’s efforts and the assistance of two medical professionals on board, Kevin did not survive. During the resuscitation attempt, there was a dispute about whether the aircraft’s automated external defibrillator (AED) functioned properly, as several witnesses reported it failed to deliver a shock, despite internal device data indicating otherwise.

Following Kevin’s death, his aunt, Melissa Arzu, acting individually and as administrator of his estate, filed suit against American Airlines in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. She alleged liability and loss of consortium under the Montreal Convention and breach of contract under Texas law. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of American Airlines on all claims, finding that the alleged deviations from airline policy and medical response did not constitute an “accident” under Article 17 of the Montreal Convention.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed summary judgment on the claims based on the crew’s allegedly ineffective medical response, holding that such a response does not amount to an “accident” under Article 17 without unusual circumstances or willful inaction. However, the court reversed summary judgment on the claims premised on the AED malfunction, finding that a genuine dispute remained as to whether the AED’s failure, in violation of FAA regulations, could be considered an “unexpected or unusual event.” The court also held that the Montreal Convention expressly preempts Arzu’s breach of contract claim. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-10606/25-10606-2026-05-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Arzu v. American Airlines" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A 14-year-old passenger, Kevin Greenidge, died from cardiac arrest aboard an American Airlines international flight from Honduras to Florida. Kevin, who suffered from multiple health conditions, began experiencing breathing difficulties soon after takeoff. Despite the crew’s efforts and the assistance of two medical professionals on board, Kevin did not survive. During the resuscitation attempt, there was a dispute about whether the aircraft’s automated external defibrillator (AED) functioned properly, as several witnesses reported it failed to deliver a shock, despite internal device data indicating otherwise.

Following Kevin’s death, his aunt, Melissa Arzu, acting individually and as administrator of his estate, filed suit against American Airlines in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. She alleged liability and loss of consortium under the Montreal Convention and breach of contract under Texas law. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of American Airlines on all claims, finding that the alleged deviations from airline policy and medical response did not constitute an “accident” under Article 17 of the Montreal Convention.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed summary judgment on the claims based on the crew’s allegedly ineffective medical response, holding that such a response does not amount to an “accident” under Article 17 without unusual circumstances or willful inaction. However, the court reversed summary judgment on the claims premised on the AED malfunction, finding that a genuine dispute remained as to whether the AED’s failure, in violation of FAA regulations, could be considered an “unexpected or unusual event.” The court also held that the Montreal Convention expressly preempts Arzu’s breach of contract claim.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James Graves</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Personal Injury"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/texas/supreme-court/2026/24-0883.html</id>
        	<title>IN RE BELL HELICOPTER SERVICES INC.</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-24T06:22:48-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-24T06:22:48-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/texas/supreme-court/2026/24-0883.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A helicopter manufactured in 1997 by Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. was involved in a fatal crash in 2017 after an engine cowling came loose and struck the tail rotor. The pilot, working for a later owner, died in the accident. The pilot’s family brought suit against Bell, alleging that the flight manual was defective for failing to include an explicit warning about the dangers of flying with an unsecured engine cowling, even though the manual included a checklist item stating the cowling should be “Secured.” The physical cowling and its fasteners were original to the aircraft and had not been replaced or modified.

Bell asserted that the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), an 18-year statute of repose, barred the suit. The plaintiffs responded that the repose period had been reset because Bell periodically revised the flight manual in the years before the crash. The 270th District Court of Harris County denied Bell’s summary judgment motion without explanation. Bell then sought mandamus relief from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, which denied the petition without a substantive opinion.

The Supreme Court of Texas held that GARA’s 18-year clock is only reset when a “new” part or component, including a substantive revision to the flight manual, is added or replaced and is alleged to have caused the accident. Because the engine-cowling instruction in the manual, which was the alleged defect, had not been revised since 1997, and no relevant “new” part was implicated, the rolling provision of GARA did not apply. The court conditionally granted Bell’s petition for writ of mandamus and directed the district court to grant summary judgment for Bell, holding that GARA bars the suit and that mandamus relief was appropriate to prevent litigation Congress has expressly foreclosed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/texas/supreme-court/2026/24-0883.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "IN RE BELL HELICOPTER SERVICES INC." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A helicopter manufactured in 1997 by Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. was involved in a fatal crash in 2017 after an engine cowling came loose and struck the tail rotor. The pilot, working for a later owner, died in the accident. The pilot’s family brought suit against Bell, alleging that the flight manual was defective for failing to include an explicit warning about the dangers of flying with an unsecured engine cowling, even though the manual included a checklist item stating the cowling should be “Secured.” The physical cowling and its fasteners were original to the aircraft and had not been replaced or modified.

Bell asserted that the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), an 18-year statute of repose, barred the suit. The plaintiffs responded that the repose period had been reset because Bell periodically revised the flight manual in the years before the crash. The 270th District Court of Harris County denied Bell’s summary judgment motion without explanation. Bell then sought mandamus relief from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, which denied the petition without a substantive opinion.

The Supreme Court of Texas held that GARA’s 18-year clock is only reset when a “new” part or component, including a substantive revision to the flight manual, is added or replaced and is alleged to have caused the accident. Because the engine-cowling instruction in the manual, which was the alleged defect, had not been revised since 1997, and no relevant “new” part was implicated, the rolling provision of GARA did not apply. The court conditionally granted Bell’s petition for writ of mandamus and directed the district court to grant summary judgment for Bell, holding that GARA bars the suit and that mandamus relief was appropriate to prevent litigation Congress has expressly foreclosed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-24</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Texas</case:state>
						<case:court>Supreme Court of Texas</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jimmy Blacklock</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Personal Injury"/>
							<category term="Products Liability"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="Supreme Court of Texas"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-6086/24-6086-2026-04-21.html</id>
        	<title>MCAULIFFE V. ROBINSON HELICOPTER COMPANY</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-21T08:31:41-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-21T08:31:41-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-6086/24-6086-2026-04-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case concerns a fatal helicopter crash during a sightseeing tour in Hawaii, resulting in the deaths of all aboard, including the plaintiffs’ daughter. The helicopter, manufactured by Robinson Helicopter Company in 2000, had its main rotor hub and blades replaced with new, identical parts from Robinson in December 2018, which was over eighteen years after the helicopter’s initial delivery. The plaintiffs alleged that defects in the replaced rotor hub and blades caused the crash, and brought claims for negligence, strict products liability, and failure to warn.

The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii heard the case first. Robinson invoked the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), which generally bars actions against manufacturers eighteen years after delivery of the aircraft. The plaintiffs argued for exceptions under GARA’s “rolling provision”—which restarts the repose period for newly replaced parts—and the “fraud exception”—which removes the bar if the manufacturer concealed or misrepresented material information to the FAA. The district court granted summary judgment for Robinson, holding that the rolling provision did not apply because the replacement parts were not substantively altered from the originals, and that the plaintiffs failed to plead fraud with the necessary specificity. The court also denied the plaintiffs’ motion to further amend their complaint.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in requiring a “substantive alteration” for the rolling provision to apply, as GARA only requires that a new part replaces an old one. The Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment in part and remanded for a new causation analysis regarding the replaced parts. However, the court affirmed the lower court’s determinations that the plaintiffs failed to meet the requirements for the fraud exception and that denying leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-6086/24-6086-2026-04-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "MCAULIFFE V. ROBINSON HELICOPTER COMPANY" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case concerns a fatal helicopter crash during a sightseeing tour in Hawaii, resulting in the deaths of all aboard, including the plaintiffs’ daughter. The helicopter, manufactured by Robinson Helicopter Company in 2000, had its main rotor hub and blades replaced with new, identical parts from Robinson in December 2018, which was over eighteen years after the helicopter’s initial delivery. The plaintiffs alleged that defects in the replaced rotor hub and blades caused the crash, and brought claims for negligence, strict products liability, and failure to warn.

The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii heard the case first. Robinson invoked the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), which generally bars actions against manufacturers eighteen years after delivery of the aircraft. The plaintiffs argued for exceptions under GARA’s “rolling provision”—which restarts the repose period for newly replaced parts—and the “fraud exception”—which removes the bar if the manufacturer concealed or misrepresented material information to the FAA. The district court granted summary judgment for Robinson, holding that the rolling provision did not apply because the replacement parts were not substantively altered from the originals, and that the plaintiffs failed to plead fraud with the necessary specificity. The court also denied the plaintiffs’ motion to further amend their complaint.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in requiring a “substantive alteration” for the rolling provision to apply, as GARA only requires that a new part replaces an old one. The Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment in part and remanded for a new causation analysis regarding the replaced parts. However, the court affirmed the lower court’s determinations that the plaintiffs failed to meet the requirements for the fraud exception and that denying leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Margaret McKeown</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Personal Injury"/>
							<category term="Products Liability"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/23-1150/23-1150-2026-04-14.html</id>
        	<title>Khalid v. TSA</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-14T06:56:32-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-14T06:56:32-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/23-1150/23-1150-2026-04-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A United States citizen of Pakistani descent challenged his continued placement on the federal No Fly List, which prohibits individuals from boarding flights in U.S. airspace. After enhanced screening and questioning by the FBI in 2012 and being prevented from boarding a flight in 2019, he sought redress through the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP). He received an unclassified summary stating that his listing was based on concerns about his associations and candor regarding activities in Pakistan. He contested these grounds, denied any terrorist associations, and argued that his inclusion was erroneous.

While his DHS TRIP redress was pending, he filed suit in the United States District Court, which ultimately concluded it lacked jurisdiction, as exclusive review of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Administrator’s order rested with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The district court transferred his claims to the appellate court.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the TSA Administrator’s order, applying a “substantial evidence” and “arbitrary and capricious” standard, and reviewed constitutional claims de novo. The court dismissed the petitioner’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act claim for lack of standing, finding insufficient concrete plans to travel for religious purposes. It denied his other claims, holding that there is no fundamental right to air travel under substantive due process, and that the DHS TRIP process provides constitutionally adequate procedural protections. The court found that the Administrator’s order was supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary or capricious. The court also rejected the argument that the major questions doctrine applied, finding TSA’s statutory authority adequate. The petition was dismissed in part and otherwise denied. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/23-1150/23-1150-2026-04-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Khalid v. TSA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A United States citizen of Pakistani descent challenged his continued placement on the federal No Fly List, which prohibits individuals from boarding flights in U.S. airspace. After enhanced screening and questioning by the FBI in 2012 and being prevented from boarding a flight in 2019, he sought redress through the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP). He received an unclassified summary stating that his listing was based on concerns about his associations and candor regarding activities in Pakistan. He contested these grounds, denied any terrorist associations, and argued that his inclusion was erroneous.

While his DHS TRIP redress was pending, he filed suit in the United States District Court, which ultimately concluded it lacked jurisdiction, as exclusive review of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Administrator’s order rested with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The district court transferred his claims to the appellate court.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the TSA Administrator’s order, applying a “substantial evidence” and “arbitrary and capricious” standard, and reviewed constitutional claims de novo. The court dismissed the petitioner’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act claim for lack of standing, finding insufficient concrete plans to travel for religious purposes. It denied his other claims, holding that there is no fundamental right to air travel under substantive due process, and that the DHS TRIP process provides constitutionally adequate procedural protections. The court found that the Administrator’s order was supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary or capricious. The court also rejected the argument that the major questions doctrine applied, finding TSA’s statutory authority adequate. The petition was dismissed in part and otherwise denied.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Cornelia T. L. Pillard</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2026/250902.html</id>
        	<title>Cupp v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-02T05:25:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-02T05:25:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2026/250902.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A man traveling with his family, including his thirteen-year-old daughter, on Delta Air Lines was reported by a flight attendant for suspected human trafficking or sexual abuse after comforting his distressed daughter during turbulence. The flight attendant relayed her suspicions to the flight captain, who then involved the airport station manager, resulting in a call to law enforcement. Upon landing, police detained and questioned the man and his daughter but found no probable cause for arrest. The incident caused the man significant emotional distress and exacerbated his pre-existing PTSD.

He subsequently filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of the City of Newport News against the flight attendant, Delta, and Endeavor Air, alleging negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference with parental rights, and false imprisonment. The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia and moved to dismiss, claiming immunity under Virginia Code § 63.2-1512. The district court agreed, holding that the defendants were immune because the report, even if made only to law enforcement and not to social services, was made in good faith and without malicious intent. The man appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was uncertain whether the immunity statute applied in this context and certified the legal question to the Supreme Court of Virginia.

The Supreme Court of Virginia, upon review of the certified question, held that Virginia Code § 63.2-1512 does not provide immunity to a nonmandatory reporter who, in good faith, reports suspected child abuse to law enforcement without also contacting a Department of Social Services employee or the designated hotline. The Court reasoned that the statutory language is clear and limits immunity to specific categories, which do not include complaints made solely to law enforcement by nonmandatory reporters. The answer to the certified question was “no.” &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2026/250902.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Cupp v. Delta Air Lines, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A man traveling with his family, including his thirteen-year-old daughter, on Delta Air Lines was reported by a flight attendant for suspected human trafficking or sexual abuse after comforting his distressed daughter during turbulence. The flight attendant relayed her suspicions to the flight captain, who then involved the airport station manager, resulting in a call to law enforcement. Upon landing, police detained and questioned the man and his daughter but found no probable cause for arrest. The incident caused the man significant emotional distress and exacerbated his pre-existing PTSD.

He subsequently filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of the City of Newport News against the flight attendant, Delta, and Endeavor Air, alleging negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference with parental rights, and false imprisonment. The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia and moved to dismiss, claiming immunity under Virginia Code § 63.2-1512. The district court agreed, holding that the defendants were immune because the report, even if made only to law enforcement and not to social services, was made in good faith and without malicious intent. The man appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was uncertain whether the immunity statute applied in this context and certified the legal question to the Supreme Court of Virginia.

The Supreme Court of Virginia, upon review of the certified question, held that Virginia Code § 63.2-1512 does not provide immunity to a nonmandatory reporter who, in good faith, reports suspected child abuse to law enforcement without also contacting a Department of Social Services employee or the designated hotline. The Court reasoned that the statutory language is clear and limits immunity to specific categories, which do not include complaints made solely to law enforcement by nonmandatory reporters. The answer to the certified question was “no.”
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Virginia</case:state>
						<case:court>Supreme Court of Virginia</case:court>
							<case:judge>Wesley G. Russell Jr.</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Personal Injury"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="Supreme Court of Virginia"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11253/25-11253-2026-03-31.html</id>
        	<title>In re Ryan</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-31T10:02:38-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-31T10:02:38-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11253/25-11253-2026-03-31.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Following two fatal airplane crashes involving Boeing 737 MAX aircraft in 2018 and 2019, which resulted in significant loss of life, the Department of Justice investigated Boeing for misleading the Federal Aviation Administration about changes to flight control systems. The Department initially entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) with Boeing, requiring the company to pay a substantial fine and undertake remedial measures. After Boeing was alleged to have breached the DPA, the Department negotiated a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) in 2025, again requiring compliance and penalties. Family members of crash victims challenged both the DPA and NPA, asserting violations of their rights under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA).

The families first moved in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas to set aside the DPA, arguing they were denied timely notice and the right to confer as crime victims. The district court found the Department had not acted in bad faith but had committed a legal error in initially failing to recognize the families as crime victims. The court concluded, however, that it lacked authority to review or alter the terms of the DPA. When the Department later moved to dismiss the charges based on the NPA, the families objected, but the district court granted the motion, finding the Department had provided sufficient reasons and had not acted with bad faith.

The families petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for writs of mandamus. The Fifth Circuit held that the challenge to the DPA was moot because it was no longer in effect after Boeing’s breach. As to the NPA, the court found the Department had satisfied the CVRA’s requirements to confer with and treat the families fairly. The court also ruled it lacked jurisdiction under the CVRA to conduct a substantive review of the district court’s dismissal of charges. The petitions for writ of mandamus were denied. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11253/25-11253-2026-03-31.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re Ryan" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Following two fatal airplane crashes involving Boeing 737 MAX aircraft in 2018 and 2019, which resulted in significant loss of life, the Department of Justice investigated Boeing for misleading the Federal Aviation Administration about changes to flight control systems. The Department initially entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) with Boeing, requiring the company to pay a substantial fine and undertake remedial measures. After Boeing was alleged to have breached the DPA, the Department negotiated a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) in 2025, again requiring compliance and penalties. Family members of crash victims challenged both the DPA and NPA, asserting violations of their rights under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA).

The families first moved in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas to set aside the DPA, arguing they were denied timely notice and the right to confer as crime victims. The district court found the Department had not acted in bad faith but had committed a legal error in initially failing to recognize the families as crime victims. The court concluded, however, that it lacked authority to review or alter the terms of the DPA. When the Department later moved to dismiss the charges based on the NPA, the families objected, but the district court granted the motion, finding the Department had provided sufficient reasons and had not acted with bad faith.

The families petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for writs of mandamus. The Fifth Circuit held that the challenge to the DPA was moot because it was no longer in effect after Boeing’s breach. As to the NPA, the court found the Department had satisfied the CVRA’s requirements to confer with and treat the families fairly. The court also ruled it lacked jurisdiction under the CVRA to conduct a substantive review of the district court’s dismissal of charges. The petitions for writ of mandamus were denied.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-31</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60188/25-60188-2026-03-23.html</id>
        	<title>Hardwick v. FAA</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-23T10:01:24-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-23T10:01:24-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60188/25-60188-2026-03-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A professional pilot was asked to operate a Cessna Citation 550 aircraft whose tail number had recently been changed by its owner from N550ME to N550MK. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approved the new registration and issued new documents, but denied a new airworthiness certificate because the aircraft required further inspection. Believing the registration had reverted to the old number due to the denial, the owner had the physical tail number altered back to N550ME using tape, while the aircraft carried documents for both the old and new registrations. The pilot, after being told about “paperwork issues” and noticing the taped number, proceeded to fly the aircraft on two flights without confirming the correct registration and without a valid airworthiness certificate for the current registered tail number. After the first flight, FAA inspectors issued a written notice warning that further operation would violate federal regulations; the pilot disregarded this and completed the return flight.

The FAA suspended the pilot’s license for 150 days, citing violations of various regulations requiring proper display of the registered tail number and possession of a valid airworthiness certificate. The pilot appealed the suspension to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), where an Administrative Law Judge affirmed the FAA’s order after a hearing. The full NTSB then affirmed the ALJ’s decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case, applying a deferential standard to the agency’s findings and sanction. The court held that the NTSB’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious. The court concluded that the pilot’s reliance on the owner’s explanation was unreasonable and that the penalty was not excessive, even if the violations were administrative. The court also found no improper disparity in sanctioning compared to another pilot. The petition for review was denied, and the suspension was upheld. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-60188/25-60188-2026-03-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Hardwick v. FAA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A professional pilot was asked to operate a Cessna Citation 550 aircraft whose tail number had recently been changed by its owner from N550ME to N550MK. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approved the new registration and issued new documents, but denied a new airworthiness certificate because the aircraft required further inspection. Believing the registration had reverted to the old number due to the denial, the owner had the physical tail number altered back to N550ME using tape, while the aircraft carried documents for both the old and new registrations. The pilot, after being told about “paperwork issues” and noticing the taped number, proceeded to fly the aircraft on two flights without confirming the correct registration and without a valid airworthiness certificate for the current registered tail number. After the first flight, FAA inspectors issued a written notice warning that further operation would violate federal regulations; the pilot disregarded this and completed the return flight.

The FAA suspended the pilot’s license for 150 days, citing violations of various regulations requiring proper display of the registered tail number and possession of a valid airworthiness certificate. The pilot appealed the suspension to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), where an Administrative Law Judge affirmed the FAA’s order after a hearing. The full NTSB then affirmed the ALJ’s decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case, applying a deferential standard to the agency’s findings and sanction. The court held that the NTSB’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious. The court concluded that the pilot’s reliance on the owner’s explanation was unreasonable and that the penalty was not excessive, even if the violations were administrative. The court also found no improper disparity in sanctioning compared to another pilot. The petition for review was denied, and the suspension was upheld.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Patrick Higginbotham</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/north-carolina/supreme-court/2026/270pa24.html</id>
        	<title>Byrd v. Avco Corp</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-20T07:36:26-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-20T07:36:26-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/north-carolina/supreme-court/2026/270pa24.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several individuals died in a 2015 small aircraft accident in Georgia, including the pilot and three passengers. The plaintiffs, representing the victims and their estates, brought claims in 2017 against Avco Corporation and its division, Lycoming Engines, which manufactured the aircraft’s engine, as well as against companies that performed maintenance on the engine. The claims included strict liability, negligence, fraud, breach of warranties, and other theories. Over time, all defendants except Avco were voluntarily dismissed from the suit.

The Superior Court in Buncombe County was assigned the case as exceptional. In 2022, the court granted Avco summary judgment on all claims except negligent failure to warn, finding a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Avco had misrepresented or withheld information from the Federal Aviation Administration, which could trigger an exception to the statute of repose under the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA). Avco moved for reconsideration, which the trial court denied in 2024, reaffirming that the question of whether Avco knowingly concealed required information should go to the jury.

Avco appealed this interlocutory order to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, presumably for lack of appellate jurisdiction over an interlocutory order. Avco then sought review in the Supreme Court of North Carolina.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal. The Supreme Court clarified that an interlocutory order denying a statute of repose defense, such as GARA, affects a substantial right because it grants immunity from suit—not merely from liability—and thus is immediately appealable. The Court overruled contrary Court of Appeals precedent and reversed and remanded for the Court of Appeals to address the merits of Avco’s claim to statutory immunity. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/north-carolina/supreme-court/2026/270pa24.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Byrd v. Avco Corp" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several individuals died in a 2015 small aircraft accident in Georgia, including the pilot and three passengers. The plaintiffs, representing the victims and their estates, brought claims in 2017 against Avco Corporation and its division, Lycoming Engines, which manufactured the aircraft’s engine, as well as against companies that performed maintenance on the engine. The claims included strict liability, negligence, fraud, breach of warranties, and other theories. Over time, all defendants except Avco were voluntarily dismissed from the suit.

The Superior Court in Buncombe County was assigned the case as exceptional. In 2022, the court granted Avco summary judgment on all claims except negligent failure to warn, finding a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Avco had misrepresented or withheld information from the Federal Aviation Administration, which could trigger an exception to the statute of repose under the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA). Avco moved for reconsideration, which the trial court denied in 2024, reaffirming that the question of whether Avco knowingly concealed required information should go to the jury.

Avco appealed this interlocutory order to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, presumably for lack of appellate jurisdiction over an interlocutory order. Avco then sought review in the Supreme Court of North Carolina.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal. The Supreme Court clarified that an interlocutory order denying a statute of repose defense, such as GARA, affects a substantial right because it grants immunity from suit—not merely from liability—and thus is immediately appealable. The Court overruled contrary Court of Appeals precedent and reversed and remanded for the Court of Appeals to address the merits of Avco’s claim to statutory immunity.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-20</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>North Carolina</case:state>
						<case:court>North Carolina Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Phil Berger Jr.</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="North Carolina Supreme Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-9528/24-9528-2026-03-03.html</id>
        	<title>Adams v. FAA</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-03T09:02:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-03T09:02:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-9528/24-9528-2026-03-03.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A commercial air tour operator, who had previously conducted flights over Bandelier National Monument under interim authority, challenged a final order issued by the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Park Service. This order established an Air Tour Management Plan (ATMP) for Bandelier National Monument, prohibiting all commercial air tours over the site. The agencies’ process included public comment, environmental assessment, and extensive consultation with Native American tribes, who strongly objected to air tours due to cultural and privacy concerns. The operator argued that his flights were minimally intrusive, carefully routed, and brief, and that banning them would negatively impact safety and his business.

The agencies initially considered various alternatives, including allowing limited air tours or maintaining previous operations, but ultimately concluded that any commercial air tour flights would create unacceptable impacts to Bandelier’s natural and cultural resources and visitor experience. The agencies’ environmental assessment under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) found no significant impacts for NEPA purposes, but their record of decision emphasized significant adverse impacts to tribal cultural resources under the National Parks Air Tour Management Act (NPATMA).

Upon petition for review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard and de novo for statutory interpretation, as required by recent Supreme Court precedent. The court held that NPATMA and NEPA use different significance standards, and that the agency’s path to finding significant adverse impacts under NPATMA was reasonably discernible in the record. The court also rejected the petitioner’s additional statutory and constitutional challenges, finding them either unexhausted or inadequately briefed. The Tenth Circuit denied the petition for review. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-9528/24-9528-2026-03-03.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Adams v. FAA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A commercial air tour operator, who had previously conducted flights over Bandelier National Monument under interim authority, challenged a final order issued by the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Park Service. This order established an Air Tour Management Plan (ATMP) for Bandelier National Monument, prohibiting all commercial air tours over the site. The agencies’ process included public comment, environmental assessment, and extensive consultation with Native American tribes, who strongly objected to air tours due to cultural and privacy concerns. The operator argued that his flights were minimally intrusive, carefully routed, and brief, and that banning them would negatively impact safety and his business.

The agencies initially considered various alternatives, including allowing limited air tours or maintaining previous operations, but ultimately concluded that any commercial air tour flights would create unacceptable impacts to Bandelier’s natural and cultural resources and visitor experience. The agencies’ environmental assessment under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) found no significant impacts for NEPA purposes, but their record of decision emphasized significant adverse impacts to tribal cultural resources under the National Parks Air Tour Management Act (NPATMA).

Upon petition for review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard and de novo for statutory interpretation, as required by recent Supreme Court precedent. The court held that NPATMA and NEPA use different significance standards, and that the agency’s path to finding significant adverse impacts under NPATMA was reasonably discernible in the record. The court also rejected the petitioner’s additional statutory and constitutional challenges, finding them either unexhausted or inadequately briefed. The Tenth Circuit denied the petition for review.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Veronica Rossman</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Environmental Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Native American Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/24-1348/24-1348-2026-02-27.html</id>
        	<title>Paul v. FAA</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-27T07:34:59-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-27T07:34:59-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/24-1348/24-1348-2026-02-27.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A pilot employed by a cargo airline was on a personal trip abroad when his employer, Amerijet International, selected him for a random drug test and requested that he appear for testing in Seattle on the same day. The pilot was unable to comply due to his location and a medical issue. The airline determined that he had refused the test, reported this to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and subsequently terminated his employment. The FAA corresponded with the pilot, initially investigating the matter and ultimately informing him that, while it was not taking enforcement action against his certificates, he would be subject to return-to-duty requirements because of the refusal determination, and the test refusal would be reported to the Pilot Records Database.

The pilot challenged these consequences, arguing that the FAA had not independently reviewed the employer’s determination that he refused the test. The FAA responded that test-refusal determinations were made solely by the employer, not by the agency, and that the FAA did not review such determinations. The case came before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on the pilot’s petition for review of the FAA’s actions.

The Court of Appeals held that the FAA’s internal guidance, specifically its Drug and Alcohol Compliance and Enforcement Surveillance Handbook, plausibly requires the FAA to independently review an employer’s test-refusal determination. The court interpreted the Handbook to require such review, partly to avoid serious constitutional concerns that would arise if the FAA entirely delegated this authority to private employers without oversight. Because the FAA conceded that it did not conduct any review, the court found the agency’s actions to be arbitrary and capricious for departing from its own procedures. The court granted the petition in part, remanding the case to the FAA for further review consistent with its opinion. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/24-1348/24-1348-2026-02-27.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Paul v. FAA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A pilot employed by a cargo airline was on a personal trip abroad when his employer, Amerijet International, selected him for a random drug test and requested that he appear for testing in Seattle on the same day. The pilot was unable to comply due to his location and a medical issue. The airline determined that he had refused the test, reported this to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and subsequently terminated his employment. The FAA corresponded with the pilot, initially investigating the matter and ultimately informing him that, while it was not taking enforcement action against his certificates, he would be subject to return-to-duty requirements because of the refusal determination, and the test refusal would be reported to the Pilot Records Database.

The pilot challenged these consequences, arguing that the FAA had not independently reviewed the employer’s determination that he refused the test. The FAA responded that test-refusal determinations were made solely by the employer, not by the agency, and that the FAA did not review such determinations. The case came before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on the pilot’s petition for review of the FAA’s actions.

The Court of Appeals held that the FAA’s internal guidance, specifically its Drug and Alcohol Compliance and Enforcement Surveillance Handbook, plausibly requires the FAA to independently review an employer’s test-refusal determination. The court interpreted the Handbook to require such review, partly to avoid serious constitutional concerns that would arise if the FAA entirely delegated this authority to private employers without oversight. Because the FAA conceded that it did not conduct any review, the court found the agency’s actions to be arbitrary and capricious for departing from its own procedures. The court granted the petition in part, remanding the case to the FAA for further review consistent with its opinion.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Bradley Garcia</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/23-1155/23-1155-2026-01-20.html</id>
        	<title>Spokane Airport Board v. TSA</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-20T07:30:46-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-20T07:30:46-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/23-1155/23-1155-2026-01-20.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		This case concerns the Transportation Security Administration’s issuance of an emergency amendment that required certain airport operators to incorporate specific cybersecurity measures and controls into their airport security programs. The amendment, issued in March 2023, responded to increasing cyber threats to the aviation sector, including ransomware and foreign cyberattacks. Under the amendment, airports were required to identify critical systems, submit a cybersecurity implementation plan, and assess their effectiveness annually. The Spokane Airport Board, which operates Spokane International Airport, objected to the amendment on both procedural and substantive grounds.

After the amendment was issued, the Spokane Airport Board petitioned the TSA for reconsideration, raising various objections. The TSA denied these petitions, upholding the emergency amendment. Spokane then filed a timely petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, as provided by statute.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the TSA’s order under the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act, specifically considering whether it was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review arguments not properly raised before the TSA, as required by statute. The court found that the objections Spokane did properly exhaust were meritless. It concluded that the TSA possesses broad statutory authority to regulate aviation security—including cybersecurity—in response to threats. The court also found that the emergency amendment was consistent with TSA regulations and was not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the court denied Spokane’s petition for review, leaving the TSA’s emergency cybersecurity amendment in effect. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/23-1155/23-1155-2026-01-20.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Spokane Airport Board v. TSA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                This case concerns the Transportation Security Administration’s issuance of an emergency amendment that required certain airport operators to incorporate specific cybersecurity measures and controls into their airport security programs. The amendment, issued in March 2023, responded to increasing cyber threats to the aviation sector, including ransomware and foreign cyberattacks. Under the amendment, airports were required to identify critical systems, submit a cybersecurity implementation plan, and assess their effectiveness annually. The Spokane Airport Board, which operates Spokane International Airport, objected to the amendment on both procedural and substantive grounds.

After the amendment was issued, the Spokane Airport Board petitioned the TSA for reconsideration, raising various objections. The TSA denied these petitions, upholding the emergency amendment. Spokane then filed a timely petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, as provided by statute.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the TSA’s order under the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act, specifically considering whether it was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review arguments not properly raised before the TSA, as required by statute. The court found that the objections Spokane did properly exhaust were meritless. It concluded that the TSA possesses broad statutory authority to regulate aviation security—including cybersecurity—in response to threats. The court also found that the emergency amendment was consistent with TSA regulations and was not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the court denied Spokane’s petition for review, leaving the TSA’s emergency cybersecurity amendment in effect.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-20</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Neomi Rao</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/24-3426/24-3426-2025-12-22.html</id>
        	<title>Panting v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2025-12-22T08:30:21-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-22T08:30:21-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/24-3426/24-3426-2025-12-22.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Ronald B. Panting, an independent contractor serving as a Designated Pilot Examiner (DPE) for the FAA, was conducting a pilot certification checkride for Michael Trubilla in a plane rented from the LeMay Aero Club, a government-affiliated organization. Both men died when the plane crashed during the checkride. Five days prior to the accident, Ronald signed a covenant not to sue the government for injuries sustained while participating in Aero Club activities, applicable to himself and his estate. His spouse, Lynne D. Panting, sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging negligent maintenance of the aircraft.

The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska denied the government’s motion for summary judgment, ruling the covenant not to sue was void as against public policy under Nebraska law. The court did not address Lynne’s alternative argument that the covenant did not apply to Ronald’s activities as a DPE on the day of the crash. Following a bench trial, the district court found the government negligent and entered judgment for Lynne, awarding damages. The government appealed, challenging the district court’s decision regarding the covenant’s validity.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the denial of summary judgment because the enforceability of the covenant was a purely legal issue. Applying Nebraska law, the appellate court determined the covenant was neither clearly repugnant to public policy nor the product of disparate bargaining power, and that the Aero Club did not provide a public or essential service. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for consideration of whether the covenant covered Ronald’s activities as a DPE, and for further proceedings as appropriate. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/24-3426/24-3426-2025-12-22.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Panting v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Ronald B. Panting, an independent contractor serving as a Designated Pilot Examiner (DPE) for the FAA, was conducting a pilot certification checkride for Michael Trubilla in a plane rented from the LeMay Aero Club, a government-affiliated organization. Both men died when the plane crashed during the checkride. Five days prior to the accident, Ronald signed a covenant not to sue the government for injuries sustained while participating in Aero Club activities, applicable to himself and his estate. His spouse, Lynne D. Panting, sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging negligent maintenance of the aircraft.

The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska denied the government’s motion for summary judgment, ruling the covenant not to sue was void as against public policy under Nebraska law. The court did not address Lynne’s alternative argument that the covenant did not apply to Ronald’s activities as a DPE on the day of the crash. Following a bench trial, the district court found the government negligent and entered judgment for Lynne, awarding damages. The government appealed, challenging the district court’s decision regarding the covenant’s validity.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the denial of summary judgment because the enforceability of the covenant was a purely legal issue. Applying Nebraska law, the appellate court determined the covenant was neither clearly repugnant to public policy nor the product of disparate bargaining power, and that the Aero Club did not provide a public or essential service. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for consideration of whether the covenant covered Ronald’s activities as a DPE, and for further proceedings as appropriate.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-22</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>William D. Benton</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Personal Injury"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/nebraska/supreme-court/2025/s-24-628.html</id>
        	<title>U.S. Specialty Ins. Co. v. D S Avionics</title>
        	<updated>2025-11-07T06:35:39-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-11-07T06:35:39-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nebraska/supreme-court/2025/s-24-628.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		D S Avionics Unlimited LLC owned a 1964 Piper PA-30 aircraft, which was insured under a policy issued by U.S. Specialty Insurance Company for the period between June 27, 2014, and June 27, 2015. In November 2014, DSA delivered the aircraft to a mechanic for maintenance at an Omaha airport. After a dispute between the mechanic and the airport owner, the mechanic was locked out of the hangar, and the aircraft was moved outside. When DSA attempted to retrieve the aircraft, a truck blocked its removal, and the airport owner refused to move it until storage fees were paid. The aircraft subsequently disappeared from view, and the airport owner informed authorities and the insurer that he was holding the aircraft pending payment. DSA reported the aircraft stolen and submitted a claim to USSIC, which was denied.

USSIC filed suit in the District Court for Douglas County, Nebraska, seeking a declaration of noncoverage. DSA counterclaimed for breach of contract and bad faith. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court ruled in favor of USSIC, finding that DSA’s claim was not covered because there was no “accident” under the policy and that the Conversion Exclusion applied. The court also found that DSA failed to prove damages and that USSIC had an arguable basis for denial. DSA appealed, and the matter was moved to the Nebraska Supreme Court’s docket.

The Nebraska Supreme Court held that DSA’s claim was within the policy’s coverage for “direct physical loss” caused by an “accident,” as defined by the policy. The court found that the airport owner’s actions constituted an “accident” from DSA’s perspective and that the Conversion Exclusion did not apply, as conceded by USSIC. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings regarding USSIC’s alleged bad faith and any damages due to DSA. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/nebraska/supreme-court/2025/s-24-628.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "U.S. Specialty Ins. Co. v. D S Avionics" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                D S Avionics Unlimited LLC owned a 1964 Piper PA-30 aircraft, which was insured under a policy issued by U.S. Specialty Insurance Company for the period between June 27, 2014, and June 27, 2015. In November 2014, DSA delivered the aircraft to a mechanic for maintenance at an Omaha airport. After a dispute between the mechanic and the airport owner, the mechanic was locked out of the hangar, and the aircraft was moved outside. When DSA attempted to retrieve the aircraft, a truck blocked its removal, and the airport owner refused to move it until storage fees were paid. The aircraft subsequently disappeared from view, and the airport owner informed authorities and the insurer that he was holding the aircraft pending payment. DSA reported the aircraft stolen and submitted a claim to USSIC, which was denied.

USSIC filed suit in the District Court for Douglas County, Nebraska, seeking a declaration of noncoverage. DSA counterclaimed for breach of contract and bad faith. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court ruled in favor of USSIC, finding that DSA’s claim was not covered because there was no “accident” under the policy and that the Conversion Exclusion applied. The court also found that DSA failed to prove damages and that USSIC had an arguable basis for denial. DSA appealed, and the matter was moved to the Nebraska Supreme Court’s docket.

The Nebraska Supreme Court held that DSA’s claim was within the policy’s coverage for “direct physical loss” caused by an “accident,” as defined by the policy. The court found that the airport owner’s actions constituted an “accident” from DSA’s perspective and that the Conversion Exclusion did not apply, as conceded by USSIC. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings regarding USSIC’s alleged bad faith and any damages due to DSA.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-11-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Nebraska</case:state>
						<case:court>Nebraska Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jeffrey Funke</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Insurance Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="Nebraska Supreme Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/24-1065/24-1065-2025-09-04.html</id>
        	<title>Badger Helicopters Inc. v. FAA</title>
        	<updated>2025-09-04T07:30:23-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-09-04T07:30:23-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/24-1065/24-1065-2025-09-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several commercial air tour operators challenged federal regulations that banned all commercial air tours over Mount Rushmore National Memorial and Badlands National Park. The dispute arose after the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Park Service, in response to statutory requirements and litigation, issued air tour management plans (ATMPs) in 2023 that prohibited such tours, citing negative impacts on visitor experience, wildlife, and tribal cultural resources. The operators argued that the agencies’ actions were arbitrary and capricious, violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and failed to consider reasonable alternatives or aviation safety.

Previously, the agencies had attempted to negotiate voluntary agreements with the tour operators, as permitted by the Air Tour Management Act. However, after one operator declined to participate, the agencies shifted to developing ATMPs. This change was influenced by a writ of mandamus issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in In re Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, which compelled the agencies to bring certain parks into compliance with the Act. The agencies then considered several alternatives before ultimately banning all commercial air tours in the final plans.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the petitions for review filed by the tour operators. The court held that the agencies’ decision to end voluntary agreement negotiations and proceed with ATMPs was not arbitrary or capricious. It further found that the agencies complied with NEPA’s procedural requirements, used reasonable data, considered an adequate range of alternatives, and sufficiently addressed aviation safety concerns. The court concluded that the agencies’ decisions were reasonable and reasonably explained, and therefore denied the petitions to vacate the air tour management plans. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/24-1065/24-1065-2025-09-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Badger Helicopters Inc. v. FAA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several commercial air tour operators challenged federal regulations that banned all commercial air tours over Mount Rushmore National Memorial and Badlands National Park. The dispute arose after the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Park Service, in response to statutory requirements and litigation, issued air tour management plans (ATMPs) in 2023 that prohibited such tours, citing negative impacts on visitor experience, wildlife, and tribal cultural resources. The operators argued that the agencies’ actions were arbitrary and capricious, violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and failed to consider reasonable alternatives or aviation safety.

Previously, the agencies had attempted to negotiate voluntary agreements with the tour operators, as permitted by the Air Tour Management Act. However, after one operator declined to participate, the agencies shifted to developing ATMPs. This change was influenced by a writ of mandamus issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in In re Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, which compelled the agencies to bring certain parks into compliance with the Act. The agencies then considered several alternatives before ultimately banning all commercial air tours in the final plans.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the petitions for review filed by the tour operators. The court held that the agencies’ decision to end voluntary agreement negotiations and proceed with ATMPs was not arbitrary or capricious. It further found that the agencies complied with NEPA’s procedural requirements, used reasonable data, considered an adequate range of alternatives, and sufficiently addressed aviation safety concerns. The court concluded that the agencies’ decisions were reasonable and reasonably explained, and therefore denied the petitions to vacate the air tour management plans.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-09-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>L. Steven Grasz</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Environmental Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-6561/23-6561-2025-07-21.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Adamu</title>
        	<updated>2025-07-21T06:30:11-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-07-21T06:30:11-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-6561/23-6561-2025-07-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Defendants Jibril Adamu and Jean-Claude Okongo Landji were involved in an international narcotics trafficking conspiracy, using a private aircraft to transport cocaine from South America to Africa and Europe. Landji owned an aviation charter business and Adamu was his co-pilot. They were arrested in Croatia in 2018 after flying a test shipment of cocaine. Their cell phones, containing incriminating evidence, were seized. Both defendants were extradited to the United States and charged with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York convicted both defendants following a jury trial. They were sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. The defendants appealed, arguing that the government lacked jurisdiction under 21 U.S.C. § 959, violated their Sixth Amendment rights by using privileged information, and erred in admitting data extracted from their cell phones.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that 21 U.S.C. § 959 applies extraterritorially, affirming the government’s jurisdiction. It also found no Sixth Amendment violation, as the district court correctly determined that the government did not use privileged information in its prosecution. The court concluded that the cell phone data was properly authenticated and its admission did not violate the Confrontation Clause. The court noted that any potential error in admitting the cell phone data was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding the convictions and sentences of both defendants. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-6561/23-6561-2025-07-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Adamu" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Defendants Jibril Adamu and Jean-Claude Okongo Landji were involved in an international narcotics trafficking conspiracy, using a private aircraft to transport cocaine from South America to Africa and Europe. Landji owned an aviation charter business and Adamu was his co-pilot. They were arrested in Croatia in 2018 after flying a test shipment of cocaine. Their cell phones, containing incriminating evidence, were seized. Both defendants were extradited to the United States and charged with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York convicted both defendants following a jury trial. They were sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. The defendants appealed, arguing that the government lacked jurisdiction under 21 U.S.C. § 959, violated their Sixth Amendment rights by using privileged information, and erred in admitting data extracted from their cell phones.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that 21 U.S.C. § 959 applies extraterritorially, affirming the government’s jurisdiction. It also found no Sixth Amendment violation, as the district court correctly determined that the government did not use privileged information in its prosecution. The court concluded that the cell phone data was properly authenticated and its admission did not violate the Confrontation Clause. The court noted that any potential error in admitting the cell phone data was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding the convictions and sentences of both defendants.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-07-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Barrington Parker, Jr.</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/23-2376/23-2376-2025-07-15.html</id>
        	<title>Axalta Coating Systems LLC v. Federal Aviation Administration</title>
        	<updated>2025-07-15T09:00:14-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-07-15T09:00:14-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/23-2376/23-2376-2025-07-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Axalta Coating Systems LLC (&quot;Axalta&quot;) provided a can of flammable paint to FedEx for air shipment. The paint spilled during transit due to a loose lid. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) filed an administrative complaint alleging Axalta failed to package the paint according to the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR). An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found Axalta in violation and imposed a $1,900 penalty, which the FAA Administrator affirmed. Axalta petitioned for review, arguing the administrative adjudication violated the Seventh Amendment&#039;s jury trial guarantee, referencing the Supreme Court&#039;s decision in SEC v. Jarkesy.

The ALJ denied Axalta&#039;s motion to dismiss the complaint and a motion to disqualify the ALJ. After a hearing, the ALJ concluded Axalta violated 49 C.F.R. § 171.2(e) and 49 C.F.R. § 173.24(b)(1), assessing a $1,900 penalty. Axalta appealed, and the FAA cross-appealed for a higher penalty. The Administrator affirmed the ALJ&#039;s decision. Axalta then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for review.

The Third Circuit held that the administrative adjudication did not violate the Seventh Amendment. The court distinguished the case from Jarkesy, noting that the HMR&#039;s technical standards were not derived from common law, unlike the securities fraud provisions in Jarkesy. The court concluded that the FAA&#039;s enforcement action was a public right that could be adjudicated administratively without a jury. The court also rejected Axalta&#039;s additional arguments, including claims of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, improper ALJ appointment, statute of limitations issues, and due process violations. The petition for review was denied. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/23-2376/23-2376-2025-07-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Axalta Coating Systems LLC v. Federal Aviation Administration" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Axalta Coating Systems LLC (&quot;Axalta&quot;) provided a can of flammable paint to FedEx for air shipment. The paint spilled during transit due to a loose lid. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) filed an administrative complaint alleging Axalta failed to package the paint according to the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR). An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found Axalta in violation and imposed a $1,900 penalty, which the FAA Administrator affirmed. Axalta petitioned for review, arguing the administrative adjudication violated the Seventh Amendment&#039;s jury trial guarantee, referencing the Supreme Court&#039;s decision in SEC v. Jarkesy.

The ALJ denied Axalta&#039;s motion to dismiss the complaint and a motion to disqualify the ALJ. After a hearing, the ALJ concluded Axalta violated 49 C.F.R. § 171.2(e) and 49 C.F.R. § 173.24(b)(1), assessing a $1,900 penalty. Axalta appealed, and the FAA cross-appealed for a higher penalty. The Administrator affirmed the ALJ&#039;s decision. Axalta then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for review.

The Third Circuit held that the administrative adjudication did not violate the Seventh Amendment. The court distinguished the case from Jarkesy, noting that the HMR&#039;s technical standards were not derived from common law, unlike the securities fraud provisions in Jarkesy. The court concluded that the FAA&#039;s enforcement action was a public right that could be adjudicated administratively without a jury. The court also rejected Axalta&#039;s additional arguments, including claims of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, improper ALJ appointment, statute of limitations issues, and due process violations. The petition for review was denied.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-07-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Michael Chagares</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/24-1105/24-1105-2025-06-27.html</id>
        	<title>Solondz v. FAA</title>
        	<updated>2025-06-27T07:02:02-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-06-27T07:02:02-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/24-1105/24-1105-2025-06-27.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Michael Solondz, a commercial airline pilot, was diagnosed with anxiety and prescribed mirtazapine after experiencing side effects from another medication. Mirtazapine effectively managed his anxiety without significant side effects. Solondz sought medical clearance from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to resume flying, but the FAA categorically disallows pilots from flying while taking mirtazapine, despite allowing conditional approvals for other antidepressants.

The FAA denied Solondz&#039;s request for a Special Issuance medical certificate multiple times, citing his use of mirtazapine, anxiety, sleep apnea, optic neuritis, and a history of atrial fibrillation. Solondz provided evidence that his conditions were well-managed and that mirtazapine did not cause significant side effects. The FAA&#039;s final denial letter reiterated these reasons and added a concern about a potential malignant melanoma diagnosis, which Solondz disputed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the FAA failed to provide a reasonable explanation for categorically disallowing pilots taking mirtazapine from obtaining medical certification. The court noted that the FAA&#039;s process for conditionally approving other antidepressants involves a six-month waiting period and individualized medical assessments, which could also apply to mirtazapine.

The court vacated the FAA&#039;s final denial letter and remanded the case for further explanation. The court emphasized that the FAA must articulate a clear rationale for its policy and avoid offering explanations that contradict the evidence. The petition for review was granted, and the case was remanded to the FAA for further proceedings consistent with the court&#039;s opinion. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/24-1105/24-1105-2025-06-27.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Solondz v. FAA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Michael Solondz, a commercial airline pilot, was diagnosed with anxiety and prescribed mirtazapine after experiencing side effects from another medication. Mirtazapine effectively managed his anxiety without significant side effects. Solondz sought medical clearance from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to resume flying, but the FAA categorically disallows pilots from flying while taking mirtazapine, despite allowing conditional approvals for other antidepressants.

The FAA denied Solondz&#039;s request for a Special Issuance medical certificate multiple times, citing his use of mirtazapine, anxiety, sleep apnea, optic neuritis, and a history of atrial fibrillation. Solondz provided evidence that his conditions were well-managed and that mirtazapine did not cause significant side effects. The FAA&#039;s final denial letter reiterated these reasons and added a concern about a potential malignant melanoma diagnosis, which Solondz disputed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the FAA failed to provide a reasonable explanation for categorically disallowing pilots taking mirtazapine from obtaining medical certification. The court noted that the FAA&#039;s process for conditionally approving other antidepressants involves a six-month waiting period and individualized medical assessments, which could also apply to mirtazapine.

The court vacated the FAA&#039;s final denial letter and remanded the case for further explanation. The court emphasized that the FAA must articulate a clear rationale for its policy and avoid offering explanations that contradict the evidence. The petition for review was granted, and the case was remanded to the FAA for further proceedings consistent with the court&#039;s opinion.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-06-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Cornelia T. L. Pillard</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/oklahoma/supreme-court/2025/121752.html</id>
        	<title>Lunn v. Continental Motors, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2025-04-29T12:12:12-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-04-29T12:12:12-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/oklahoma/supreme-court/2025/121752.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		William D. Lunn, individually and as the representative of the estates of his three deceased children, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Continental Motors, Inc. (CMI) in October 2009, alleging a design defect caused an airplane crash that killed his children. In September 2012, CMI made an unapportioned offer of judgment for $300,000, which Lunn rejected. After a lengthy litigation process, a jury found in favor of CMI. Lunn moved for a new trial, which the district court granted in February 2021. CMI appealed, arguing the claims were barred by the statute of repose under the General Aviation Revitalization Act. The Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) reversed the district court&#039;s decision.

CMI then sought attorney&#039;s fees, claiming entitlement under the offer of judgment statute since the judgment was less than their offer. The district court denied the motion, ruling the unapportioned offer invalid. CMI appealed this decision. COCA affirmed the district court&#039;s ruling, referencing prior cases that required offers of judgment to be apportioned among plaintiffs to be valid.

The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case to address whether an offer of judgment under 12 O.S.2021, § 1101.1(A) must be apportioned among multiple plaintiffs. The court held that such offers must indeed be apportioned to allow each plaintiff to independently evaluate the settlement offer. The court emphasized that unapportioned offers create confusion and hinder the plaintiffs&#039; ability to assess the offer&#039;s value relative to their claims. Consequently, the court vacated COCA&#039;s opinion and affirmed the district court&#039;s judgment, ruling CMI&#039;s unapportioned offer invalid. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/oklahoma/supreme-court/2025/121752.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Lunn v. Continental Motors, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                William D. Lunn, individually and as the representative of the estates of his three deceased children, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Continental Motors, Inc. (CMI) in October 2009, alleging a design defect caused an airplane crash that killed his children. In September 2012, CMI made an unapportioned offer of judgment for $300,000, which Lunn rejected. After a lengthy litigation process, a jury found in favor of CMI. Lunn moved for a new trial, which the district court granted in February 2021. CMI appealed, arguing the claims were barred by the statute of repose under the General Aviation Revitalization Act. The Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) reversed the district court&#039;s decision.

CMI then sought attorney&#039;s fees, claiming entitlement under the offer of judgment statute since the judgment was less than their offer. The district court denied the motion, ruling the unapportioned offer invalid. CMI appealed this decision. COCA affirmed the district court&#039;s ruling, referencing prior cases that required offers of judgment to be apportioned among plaintiffs to be valid.

The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case to address whether an offer of judgment under 12 O.S.2021, § 1101.1(A) must be apportioned among multiple plaintiffs. The court held that such offers must indeed be apportioned to allow each plaintiff to independently evaluate the settlement offer. The court emphasized that unapportioned offers create confusion and hinder the plaintiffs&#039; ability to assess the offer&#039;s value relative to their claims. Consequently, the court vacated COCA&#039;s opinion and affirmed the district court&#039;s judgment, ruling CMI&#039;s unapportioned offer invalid.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-04-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Oklahoma</case:state>
						<case:court>Oklahoma Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>James R. Winchester</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Personal Injury"/>
							<category term="Products Liability"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="Oklahoma Supreme Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-5074/23-5074-2024-12-17.html</id>
        	<title>Bradshaw v. American Airlines</title>
        	<updated>2024-12-17T08:30:56-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-12-17T08:30:56-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-5074/23-5074-2024-12-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Deborah Bradshaw and Chrystal Antao sued American Airlines and Mesa Airlines, alleging injuries and damages from the airlines&#039; negligent handling of an in-flight emergency. During a June 2020 flight, the aircraft experienced a malfunction that led to a loss of cabin pressure, requiring an emergency descent. The plaintiffs claimed the pilot failed to properly inform passengers of the threat and descended too rapidly, while American Airlines failed to provide medical personnel upon landing.

The case was initially filed in the District Court of Tulsa County, Oklahoma, and later removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma on diversity grounds. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the airlines, concluding that federal law preempted Oklahoma&#039;s common-carrier standard of care in aviation safety. The court allowed the plaintiffs to pursue a state negligence claim using the federal &quot;reckless-or-careless manner&quot; standard but found no evidence that the airlines violated this standard.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court&#039;s decision, holding that the Federal Aviation Act and related regulations preempt state law in the field of aviation safety. The court agreed that the federal &quot;careless or reckless manner&quot; standard of care applies, preempting Oklahoma&#039;s common-carrier standard. The court found no genuine issue of material fact regarding a violation of federal regulations by the airlines and upheld the summary judgment in favor of the defendants. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-5074/23-5074-2024-12-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Bradshaw v. American Airlines" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Deborah Bradshaw and Chrystal Antao sued American Airlines and Mesa Airlines, alleging injuries and damages from the airlines&#039; negligent handling of an in-flight emergency. During a June 2020 flight, the aircraft experienced a malfunction that led to a loss of cabin pressure, requiring an emergency descent. The plaintiffs claimed the pilot failed to properly inform passengers of the threat and descended too rapidly, while American Airlines failed to provide medical personnel upon landing.

The case was initially filed in the District Court of Tulsa County, Oklahoma, and later removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma on diversity grounds. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the airlines, concluding that federal law preempted Oklahoma&#039;s common-carrier standard of care in aviation safety. The court allowed the plaintiffs to pursue a state negligence claim using the federal &quot;reckless-or-careless manner&quot; standard but found no evidence that the airlines violated this standard.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court&#039;s decision, holding that the Federal Aviation Act and related regulations preempt state law in the field of aviation safety. The court agreed that the federal &quot;careless or reckless manner&quot; standard of care applies, preempting Oklahoma&#039;s common-carrier standard. The court found no genuine issue of material fact regarding a violation of federal regulations by the airlines and upheld the summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-12-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Gregory Alan Phillips</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Personal Injury"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/23-2094/23-2094-2024-09-25.html</id>
        	<title>Bonnet v. Whitaker</title>
        	<updated>2024-09-25T13:30:04-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-09-25T13:30:04-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/23-2094/23-2094-2024-09-25.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Two pilots, Luis F. Bonnet and Carlos R. Benítez Maldonado, were employed by Benítez Aviation, Inc. (BAI), which managed a Cessna aircraft. In April and May 2019, Bonnet and Benítez piloted several flights without the required certificates for commercial operations. The FAA suspended their Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certificates for 270 days, alleging they operated the flights as air carriers or commercial operators without proper certification. The pilots received their regular salaries but no additional compensation for these flights.

The FAA issued a Notice of Proposed Certificate Action, which the pilots appealed to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). An administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the FAA&#039;s suspension order, finding that the flights were conducted for compensation and hire, thus requiring compliance with Part 135 regulations. The NTSB affirmed the ALJ&#039;s decision, concluding that the flights were subject to air carrier or commercial operator requirements and that the pilots violated multiple FAA regulations. The NTSB also found that the ALJ did not exhibit bias and that the 270-day suspension was appropriate.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that substantial evidence supported the NTSB&#039;s findings that the flights were operated as common carriers for compensation, thus requiring Part 135 certification. The court also found that the pilots were responsible for ensuring compliance with FAA regulations, regardless of BAI&#039;s role in booking the flights. The court upheld the NTSB&#039;s decision, including the 270-day suspension of the pilots&#039; certificates, finding it justified based on the pilots&#039; regulatory violations and the potential risk to passenger safety. The petition for review was denied. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/23-2094/23-2094-2024-09-25.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Bonnet v. Whitaker" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Two pilots, Luis F. Bonnet and Carlos R. Benítez Maldonado, were employed by Benítez Aviation, Inc. (BAI), which managed a Cessna aircraft. In April and May 2019, Bonnet and Benítez piloted several flights without the required certificates for commercial operations. The FAA suspended their Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certificates for 270 days, alleging they operated the flights as air carriers or commercial operators without proper certification. The pilots received their regular salaries but no additional compensation for these flights.

The FAA issued a Notice of Proposed Certificate Action, which the pilots appealed to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). An administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the FAA&#039;s suspension order, finding that the flights were conducted for compensation and hire, thus requiring compliance with Part 135 regulations. The NTSB affirmed the ALJ&#039;s decision, concluding that the flights were subject to air carrier or commercial operator requirements and that the pilots violated multiple FAA regulations. The NTSB also found that the ALJ did not exhibit bias and that the 270-day suspension was appropriate.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that substantial evidence supported the NTSB&#039;s findings that the flights were operated as common carriers for compensation, thus requiring Part 135 certification. The court also found that the pilots were responsible for ensuring compliance with FAA regulations, regardless of BAI&#039;s role in booking the flights. The court upheld the NTSB&#039;s decision, including the 270-day suspension of the pilots&#039; certificates, finding it justified based on the pilots&#039; regulatory violations and the potential risk to passenger safety. The petition for review was denied.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-09-25</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>SELYA</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-30632/23-30632-2024-08-26.html</id>
        	<title>Hardy v. Scandinavian Airline System</title>
        	<updated>2024-08-26T15:30:15-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-08-26T15:30:15-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-30632/23-30632-2024-08-26.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Susan Hardy, a resident of Louisiana, flew from Newark, New Jersey, to Oslo, Norway, on Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS). Upon disembarking in Oslo, she fell and fractured her leg. Hardy sued SAS in the Eastern District of Louisiana, claiming that Article 33 of the Montreal Convention provided both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over SAS. The district court dismissed her case, ruling that the Montreal Convention only granted subject matter jurisdiction and not personal jurisdiction. Additionally, the court found that SAS’s waiver of service did not establish personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2).

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed Hardy’s complaint without prejudice. The court concluded that Article 33 of the Montreal Convention did not create personal jurisdiction over SAS. It also rejected Hardy’s argument that SAS’s waiver of service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) established personal jurisdiction, reasoning that SAS did not have sufficient contacts with Louisiana to warrant such jurisdiction.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Article 33 of the Montreal Convention does not independently create personal jurisdiction over a defendant airline, as it only prescribes venue. However, the court found that the district court erred in its analysis under Rule 4(k)(2). The correct analysis should have considered SAS’s contacts with the United States as a whole, not just Louisiana. The Fifth Circuit concluded that SAS had sufficient minimum contacts with the United States to establish personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2). Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-30632/23-30632-2024-08-26.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Hardy v. Scandinavian Airline System" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Susan Hardy, a resident of Louisiana, flew from Newark, New Jersey, to Oslo, Norway, on Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS). Upon disembarking in Oslo, she fell and fractured her leg. Hardy sued SAS in the Eastern District of Louisiana, claiming that Article 33 of the Montreal Convention provided both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over SAS. The district court dismissed her case, ruling that the Montreal Convention only granted subject matter jurisdiction and not personal jurisdiction. Additionally, the court found that SAS’s waiver of service did not establish personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2).

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed Hardy’s complaint without prejudice. The court concluded that Article 33 of the Montreal Convention did not create personal jurisdiction over SAS. It also rejected Hardy’s argument that SAS’s waiver of service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) established personal jurisdiction, reasoning that SAS did not have sufficient contacts with Louisiana to warrant such jurisdiction.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Article 33 of the Montreal Convention does not independently create personal jurisdiction over a defendant airline, as it only prescribes venue. However, the court found that the district court erred in its analysis under Rule 4(k)(2). The correct analysis should have considered SAS’s contacts with the United States as a whole, not just Louisiana. The Fifth Circuit concluded that SAS had sufficient minimum contacts with the United States to establish personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2). Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-08-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry E. Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/22-4020/22-4020-2024-08-07.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Yanjun Xu</title>
        	<updated>2024-08-07T12:00:33-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-08-07T12:00:33-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/22-4020/22-4020-2024-08-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Yanjun Xu, a Chinese citizen and member of China’s Ministry of State Security, was convicted of conspiracy to commit economic espionage and conspiracy to steal trade secrets from multiple aviation companies over a five-year period. Xu was also convicted of attempted economic espionage by theft or fraud and attempted theft of composite fan-blade technology from GE Aviation. He was sentenced to a combined 240 months’ imprisonment. Xu appealed, seeking to vacate the judgment and remand for a new trial, arguing that the district court erred in failing to dismiss Counts 1 and 2 as duplicitous and abused its discretion in admitting expert testimony in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b). Alternatively, Xu sought to have his sentence vacated, arguing it was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio denied Xu’s motion to dismiss the indictment, finding that the conspiracy counts were not duplicitous as they alleged a single overarching conspiracy. The court also admitted expert testimony from James Olson, a retired CIA officer, who testified about espionage techniques and tradecraft, which Xu argued violated Rule 704(b). The court overruled Xu’s objections, finding that Olson’s testimony did not directly opine on Xu’s intent but rather described common practices in espionage.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the indictment was not duplicitous as it charged a single conspiracy with multiple overt acts. The court also found that Olson’s testimony did not violate Rule 704(b) and that any potential error was cured by the district court’s limiting instructions to the jury. Additionally, the appellate court found Xu’s sentence to be procedurally and substantively reasonable, noting that the district court properly calculated the intended loss and considered the § 3553(a) factors. The court concluded that Xu’s sentence was within the Guidelines range and not disparate compared to similarly situated defendants. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/22-4020/22-4020-2024-08-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Yanjun Xu" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Yanjun Xu, a Chinese citizen and member of China’s Ministry of State Security, was convicted of conspiracy to commit economic espionage and conspiracy to steal trade secrets from multiple aviation companies over a five-year period. Xu was also convicted of attempted economic espionage by theft or fraud and attempted theft of composite fan-blade technology from GE Aviation. He was sentenced to a combined 240 months’ imprisonment. Xu appealed, seeking to vacate the judgment and remand for a new trial, arguing that the district court erred in failing to dismiss Counts 1 and 2 as duplicitous and abused its discretion in admitting expert testimony in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b). Alternatively, Xu sought to have his sentence vacated, arguing it was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio denied Xu’s motion to dismiss the indictment, finding that the conspiracy counts were not duplicitous as they alleged a single overarching conspiracy. The court also admitted expert testimony from James Olson, a retired CIA officer, who testified about espionage techniques and tradecraft, which Xu argued violated Rule 704(b). The court overruled Xu’s objections, finding that Olson’s testimony did not directly opine on Xu’s intent but rather described common practices in espionage.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the indictment was not duplicitous as it charged a single conspiracy with multiple overt acts. The court also found that Olson’s testimony did not violate Rule 704(b) and that any potential error was cured by the district court’s limiting instructions to the jury. Additionally, the appellate court found Xu’s sentence to be procedurally and substantively reasonable, noting that the district court properly calculated the intended loss and considered the § 3553(a) factors. The court concluded that Xu’s sentence was within the Guidelines range and not disparate compared to similarly situated defendants.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-08-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Davis</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/23-2359/23-2359-2024-08-06.html</id>
        	<title>Buehler v. Boeing Company</title>
        	<updated>2024-08-06T13:00:18-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-08-06T13:00:18-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/23-2359/23-2359-2024-08-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves the crash of Lion Air Flight JT 610, a Boeing 737 MAX, which took off from Jakarta, Indonesia, and crashed into the Java Sea on October 29, 2018, killing all on board. The plaintiffs are family members and representatives of the estates of two passengers, Liu Chandra and Andrea Manfredi. They filed lawsuits against Boeing and other defendants, seeking damages under various legal theories, including the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), state law, and other federal statutes.

The Chandra case was initially filed in Illinois state court and then removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The Manfredi case was filed directly in the same federal court. Both sets of plaintiffs demanded a jury trial and asserted claims under DOHSA, state law, and other federal statutes. Boeing filed motions to limit the plaintiffs&#039; claims to DOHSA and to preclude a jury trial. The district court ruled in favor of Boeing, holding that DOHSA was the exclusive remedy and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a jury trial. The court dismissed all non-DOHSA claims and certified the jury trial issue for interlocutory appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court&#039;s rulings, holding that DOHSA preempts all other claims and mandates a bench trial. The court reasoned that DOHSA&#039;s language and legislative history indicate that claims under the statute must be brought in admiralty, which does not carry the right to a jury trial. The court also noted that Congress has not amended DOHSA to allow for jury trials in federal court, despite longstanding judicial interpretations to the contrary. Therefore, the plaintiffs&#039; claims must proceed without a jury. The court&#039;s decision was to affirm the district court&#039;s rulings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/23-2359/23-2359-2024-08-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Buehler v. Boeing Company" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves the crash of Lion Air Flight JT 610, a Boeing 737 MAX, which took off from Jakarta, Indonesia, and crashed into the Java Sea on October 29, 2018, killing all on board. The plaintiffs are family members and representatives of the estates of two passengers, Liu Chandra and Andrea Manfredi. They filed lawsuits against Boeing and other defendants, seeking damages under various legal theories, including the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), state law, and other federal statutes.

The Chandra case was initially filed in Illinois state court and then removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The Manfredi case was filed directly in the same federal court. Both sets of plaintiffs demanded a jury trial and asserted claims under DOHSA, state law, and other federal statutes. Boeing filed motions to limit the plaintiffs&#039; claims to DOHSA and to preclude a jury trial. The district court ruled in favor of Boeing, holding that DOHSA was the exclusive remedy and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a jury trial. The court dismissed all non-DOHSA claims and certified the jury trial issue for interlocutory appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court&#039;s rulings, holding that DOHSA preempts all other claims and mandates a bench trial. The court reasoned that DOHSA&#039;s language and legislative history indicate that claims under the statute must be brought in admiralty, which does not carry the right to a jury trial. The court also noted that Congress has not amended DOHSA to allow for jury trials in federal court, despite longstanding judicial interpretations to the contrary. Therefore, the plaintiffs&#039; claims must proceed without a jury. The court&#039;s decision was to affirm the district court&#039;s rulings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-08-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>RIPPLE</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Admiralty &amp; Maritime Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/23-1707/23-1707-2024-07-26.html</id>
        	<title>We CBD, LLC v. Planet Nine Private Air, LLC</title>
        	<updated>2024-07-26T10:30:24-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-07-26T10:30:24-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/23-1707/23-1707-2024-07-26.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The plaintiffs, We CBD, LLC, and We C Manage, LLC, sought to transport hemp by air from Oregon to Switzerland in October 2020. They engaged Ed Clark, a charter broker, who then contacted Planet Nine Private Air, LLC, to arrange the transport. Planet Nine was informed that the cargo was legal hemp. The flight was scheduled to depart on November 8, 2020, but upon landing for refueling in Charlotte, North Carolina, U.S. Customs officials detained the plane and seized the cargo, suspecting it to be illegal marijuana. Subsequent tests confirmed high THC levels, leading to the destruction of the cargo.

The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the Western District of North Carolina, alleging state law claims against Planet Nine for the destruction of their cargo. Planet Nine moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs&#039; claims were preempted by the Montreal Convention, an international treaty governing air transport. The district court agreed, ruling that the Montreal Convention preempted the plaintiffs&#039; state law claims because the events causing the damage occurred during the carriage by air.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court&#039;s decision. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs&#039; claims were indeed preempted by the Montreal Convention. The court reasoned that the critical events, including the plane&#039;s detention and the cargo&#039;s seizure and testing, occurred during the carriage by air. The court also noted that the public authority defense under the Montreal Convention applied, as the destruction of the cargo was carried out by U.S. Customs in connection with its transit. Thus, the plaintiffs&#039; state law claims were preempted, and the summary judgment in favor of Planet Nine was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/23-1707/23-1707-2024-07-26.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "We CBD, LLC v. Planet Nine Private Air, LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The plaintiffs, We CBD, LLC, and We C Manage, LLC, sought to transport hemp by air from Oregon to Switzerland in October 2020. They engaged Ed Clark, a charter broker, who then contacted Planet Nine Private Air, LLC, to arrange the transport. Planet Nine was informed that the cargo was legal hemp. The flight was scheduled to depart on November 8, 2020, but upon landing for refueling in Charlotte, North Carolina, U.S. Customs officials detained the plane and seized the cargo, suspecting it to be illegal marijuana. Subsequent tests confirmed high THC levels, leading to the destruction of the cargo.

The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the Western District of North Carolina, alleging state law claims against Planet Nine for the destruction of their cargo. Planet Nine moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs&#039; claims were preempted by the Montreal Convention, an international treaty governing air transport. The district court agreed, ruling that the Montreal Convention preempted the plaintiffs&#039; state law claims because the events causing the damage occurred during the carriage by air.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court&#039;s decision. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs&#039; claims were indeed preempted by the Montreal Convention. The court reasoned that the critical events, including the plane&#039;s detention and the cargo&#039;s seizure and testing, occurred during the carriage by air. The court also noted that the public authority defense under the Montreal Convention applied, as the destruction of the cargo was carried out by U.S. Customs in connection with its transit. Thus, the plaintiffs&#039; state law claims were preempted, and the summary judgment in favor of Planet Nine was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-07-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>KING</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-10284/23-10284-2024-07-22.html</id>
        	<title>Kovac v. Wray</title>
        	<updated>2024-07-22T15:30:15-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-07-22T15:30:15-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-10284/23-10284-2024-07-22.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The plaintiffs, five Muslim U.S. citizens, allege they have been placed on the Terrorist Screening Dataset, commonly known as the &quot;terrorist watchlist.&quot; This list includes the No-Fly List, which prevents individuals from boarding flights, and the Selectee List, which subjects individuals to enhanced security screening. Four plaintiffs claim they are on the Selectee List due to repeated enhanced screenings, while one plaintiff, Adis Kovac, claims he is on both the No-Fly List and the Selectee List. Each plaintiff sought redress through the Department of Homeland Security’s Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP), but only Kovac received confirmation of his No-Fly List status.

The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas against various federal agency heads, alleging violations of their constitutional rights and unlawful agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court dismissed several claims, including due process and equal protection claims, and later dismissed Kovac’s No-Fly List claims as moot after he was removed from the list. The remaining APA claims were addressed at summary judgment, where the district court ruled that the agencies had statutory authority to maintain the watchlist and that the TRIP procedures were not arbitrary and capricious.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the relevant federal agencies have clear statutory authority to create, maintain, and use the watchlist for screening airline passengers. The court found that the statutory framework, including the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, the Homeland Security Act, and subsequent legislation, provided unambiguous authority for the watchlist. The court did not address whether the major questions doctrine applied, as the statutory authority was clear. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the watchlist’s use in contexts unrelated to airport security. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-10284/23-10284-2024-07-22.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Kovac v. Wray" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The plaintiffs, five Muslim U.S. citizens, allege they have been placed on the Terrorist Screening Dataset, commonly known as the &quot;terrorist watchlist.&quot; This list includes the No-Fly List, which prevents individuals from boarding flights, and the Selectee List, which subjects individuals to enhanced security screening. Four plaintiffs claim they are on the Selectee List due to repeated enhanced screenings, while one plaintiff, Adis Kovac, claims he is on both the No-Fly List and the Selectee List. Each plaintiff sought redress through the Department of Homeland Security’s Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP), but only Kovac received confirmation of his No-Fly List status.

The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas against various federal agency heads, alleging violations of their constitutional rights and unlawful agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court dismissed several claims, including due process and equal protection claims, and later dismissed Kovac’s No-Fly List claims as moot after he was removed from the list. The remaining APA claims were addressed at summary judgment, where the district court ruled that the agencies had statutory authority to maintain the watchlist and that the TRIP procedures were not arbitrary and capricious.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the relevant federal agencies have clear statutory authority to create, maintain, and use the watchlist for screening airline passengers. The court found that the statutory framework, including the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, the Homeland Security Act, and subsequent legislation, provided unambiguous authority for the watchlist. The court did not address whether the major questions doctrine applied, as the statutory authority was clear. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the watchlist’s use in contexts unrelated to airport security.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-07-22</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leslie Southwick</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/23-1239/23-1239-2024-06-04.html</id>
        	<title>Palmer v. FAA</title>
        	<updated>2024-06-04T06:32:21-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-06-04T06:32:21-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/23-1239/23-1239-2024-06-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves Trenton Palmer, an experienced private pilot, who was charged by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for flying his plane at an altitude of less than 100 feet above ground level and within 500 feet of people, a house, and other structures. The FAA claimed that Palmer violated a regulation establishing minimum safe altitudes. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found Palmer guilty of the violation, and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) affirmed the decision. Palmer appealed, arguing that the ALJ committed multiple prejudicial errors and that the complaint against him should have been dismissed.

Previously, the ALJ had denied Palmer&#039;s motion to dismiss the FAA’s complaint on the ground that the complaint failed to give fair notice of the charges. The ALJ found that Palmer violated Sections 91.119(a), (c), and 91.13(a) of the FAA regulations. The ALJ mitigated Palmer’s suspension from 120 days to 60 days. Palmer appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Board and the FAA cross-appealed the ALJ’s mitigation of Palmer’s suspension. On de novo review, the Board affirmed the ALJ’s order and reversed the ALJ’s mitigation of the Administrator’s sanction because the Administrator’s selected sanction was supported by a reasonable explanation and there were no mitigating circumstances.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the decision from the NTSB. The court found that Palmer&#039;s arguments on appeal as to the Section 91.119 violations turn on whether he proved his defense that the low flight was necessary for takeoff or landing. The court rejected Palmer&#039;s claim of inadequate notice as legally unsupported and facially implausible. The court also found no error in the ALJ’s reliance on expert witness testimony and the Board’s subsequent affirmance. The court denied Palmer’s petition for review. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/23-1239/23-1239-2024-06-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Palmer v. FAA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves Trenton Palmer, an experienced private pilot, who was charged by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for flying his plane at an altitude of less than 100 feet above ground level and within 500 feet of people, a house, and other structures. The FAA claimed that Palmer violated a regulation establishing minimum safe altitudes. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found Palmer guilty of the violation, and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) affirmed the decision. Palmer appealed, arguing that the ALJ committed multiple prejudicial errors and that the complaint against him should have been dismissed.

Previously, the ALJ had denied Palmer&#039;s motion to dismiss the FAA’s complaint on the ground that the complaint failed to give fair notice of the charges. The ALJ found that Palmer violated Sections 91.119(a), (c), and 91.13(a) of the FAA regulations. The ALJ mitigated Palmer’s suspension from 120 days to 60 days. Palmer appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Board and the FAA cross-appealed the ALJ’s mitigation of Palmer’s suspension. On de novo review, the Board affirmed the ALJ’s order and reversed the ALJ’s mitigation of the Administrator’s sanction because the Administrator’s selected sanction was supported by a reasonable explanation and there were no mitigating circumstances.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the decision from the NTSB. The court found that Palmer&#039;s arguments on appeal as to the Section 91.119 violations turn on whether he proved his defense that the low flight was necessary for takeoff or landing. The court rejected Palmer&#039;s claim of inadequate notice as legally unsupported and facially implausible. The court also found no error in the ALJ’s reliance on expert witness testimony and the Board’s subsequent affirmance. The court denied Palmer’s petition for review.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-06-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Henderson</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/alaska/supreme-court/2024/s-18526.html</id>
        	<title>Jespersen v. Tri-City Air and Alaska Insurance Guaranty Company</title>
        	<updated>2024-05-03T10:06:15-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-05-03T10:06:15-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/alaska/supreme-court/2024/s-18526.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A pilot, who was injured in an airplane crash in 1985, sought medical benefits for a 2016 spinal surgery and subsequent treatment, as well as for diabetes treatment related to his spinal treatment. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board denied his claim, concluding that the 1985 injury was not a substantial factor in the pilot’s spinal problems. The Board also excluded the testimony of the pilot’s biomechanics expert due to non-compliance with Board regulations. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board’s decision, finding substantial evidence in the record to support the Board’s decision and that the Board had not abused its discretion in its procedural rulings.

The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the Commission’s decision. The court found that substantial evidence supported the Board&#039;s decision that the 1985 injury was not a substantial factor in the pilot&#039;s spinal problems. The court also found that the Board did not abuse its discretion by excluding the testimony of the pilot&#039;s biomechanics expert due to non-compliance with Board regulations. The court further held that the Board did not have an obligation to secure the testimony of a particular witness, and that the pilot&#039;s failure to secure a witness&#039;s testimony did not create an obligation for the Board to do so. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/alaska/supreme-court/2024/s-18526.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Jespersen v. Tri-City Air and Alaska Insurance Guaranty Company" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A pilot, who was injured in an airplane crash in 1985, sought medical benefits for a 2016 spinal surgery and subsequent treatment, as well as for diabetes treatment related to his spinal treatment. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board denied his claim, concluding that the 1985 injury was not a substantial factor in the pilot’s spinal problems. The Board also excluded the testimony of the pilot’s biomechanics expert due to non-compliance with Board regulations. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board’s decision, finding substantial evidence in the record to support the Board’s decision and that the Board had not abused its discretion in its procedural rulings.

The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the Commission’s decision. The court found that substantial evidence supported the Board&#039;s decision that the 1985 injury was not a substantial factor in the pilot&#039;s spinal problems. The court also found that the Board did not abuse its discretion by excluding the testimony of the pilot&#039;s biomechanics expert due to non-compliance with Board regulations. The court further held that the Board did not have an obligation to secure the testimony of a particular witness, and that the pilot&#039;s failure to secure a witness&#039;s testimony did not create an obligation for the Board to do so.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-05-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Alaska</case:state>
						<case:court>Alaska Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>PATE</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
							<category term="Personal Injury"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="Alaska Supreme Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/22-1944/22-1944-2024-04-26.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Santonastaso</title>
        	<updated>2024-04-26T12:00:04-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-04-26T12:00:04-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/22-1944/22-1944-2024-04-26.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant, Antonio Santonastaso, was convicted of making a false statement to federal investigators and attempted witness tampering. The charges stemmed from a 2018 investigation by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) into allegations that Santonastaso was flying a helicopter without the necessary certifications. During the investigation, Santonastaso falsely claimed that he had the requisite certifications to fly and that his previous involvement in a 2000 helicopter theft was part of an undercover operation. 

The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, where Santonastaso was found guilty. He appealed the decision, arguing that the government&#039;s evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt and that the district court erred by not giving a materiality instruction based on the Supreme Court&#039;s decision in Maslenjak v. United States.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the lower court&#039;s decision. The court found that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find Santonastaso guilty of making a false statement to federal investigators and attempted witness tampering. The court also ruled that the district court did not commit instructional error in rejecting Santonastaso&#039;s proposed materiality instruction. The court held that the law-of-the-circuit doctrine foreclosed the application of the Maslenjak materiality standard to § 1001(a) prosecutions, and that the district court&#039;s instruction correctly stated the controlling law on materiality. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/22-1944/22-1944-2024-04-26.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Santonastaso" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant, Antonio Santonastaso, was convicted of making a false statement to federal investigators and attempted witness tampering. The charges stemmed from a 2018 investigation by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) into allegations that Santonastaso was flying a helicopter without the necessary certifications. During the investigation, Santonastaso falsely claimed that he had the requisite certifications to fly and that his previous involvement in a 2000 helicopter theft was part of an undercover operation. 

The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, where Santonastaso was found guilty. He appealed the decision, arguing that the government&#039;s evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt and that the district court erred by not giving a materiality instruction based on the Supreme Court&#039;s decision in Maslenjak v. United States.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the lower court&#039;s decision. The court found that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find Santonastaso guilty of making a false statement to federal investigators and attempted witness tampering. The court also ruled that the district court did not commit instructional error in rejecting Santonastaso&#039;s proposed materiality instruction. The court held that the law-of-the-circuit doctrine foreclosed the application of the Maslenjak materiality standard to § 1001(a) prosecutions, and that the district court&#039;s instruction correctly stated the controlling law on materiality.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-04-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>MONTECALVO</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-70129/22-70129-2024-04-22.html</id>
        	<title>FEJES V. FAA</title>
        	<updated>2024-04-22T08:01:25-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-04-22T08:01:25-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-70129/22-70129-2024-04-22.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves James Fejes, a pilot who held a certificate issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) under 49 U.S.C. § 44703. Fejes used his aircraft to transport and distribute marijuana to retail stores within Alaska, an activity that is legal under state law but illegal under federal law. After an investigation, the FAA revoked Fejes&#039;s pilot certificate under 49 U.S.C. § 44710(b)(2), which mandates revocation when a pilot knowingly uses an aircraft for an activity punishable by more than a year&#039;s imprisonment under a federal or state controlled substance law.

Fejes appealed the FAA&#039;s decision to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who affirmed the revocation. He then appealed the ALJ&#039;s decision to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which also affirmed the ALJ. Throughout the agency proceedings, Fejes admitted that he piloted an aircraft to distribute marijuana within Alaska, but argued that his conduct fell outside of § 44710(b)(2)&#039;s reach.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Fejes&#039;s petition for review of the NTSB&#039;s order affirming the FAA&#039;s revocation of his pilot certificate. The court rejected Fejes&#039;s argument that the FAA lacked jurisdiction to revoke his pilot certificate because Congress cannot authorize an administrative agency to regulate purely intrastate commerce like marijuana delivery within Alaska. The court held that airspace is a channel of commerce squarely within congressional authority, and therefore, Congress can regulate Fejes&#039;s conduct. The court also rejected Fejes&#039;s argument that his conduct was exempt under FAA regulation 14 C.F.R. § 91.19, and that the FAA misinterpreted § 44710(b)(2). The court concluded that the FAA&#039;s revocation of Fejes&#039;s pilot certificate was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-70129/22-70129-2024-04-22.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "FEJES V. FAA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves James Fejes, a pilot who held a certificate issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) under 49 U.S.C. § 44703. Fejes used his aircraft to transport and distribute marijuana to retail stores within Alaska, an activity that is legal under state law but illegal under federal law. After an investigation, the FAA revoked Fejes&#039;s pilot certificate under 49 U.S.C. § 44710(b)(2), which mandates revocation when a pilot knowingly uses an aircraft for an activity punishable by more than a year&#039;s imprisonment under a federal or state controlled substance law.

Fejes appealed the FAA&#039;s decision to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who affirmed the revocation. He then appealed the ALJ&#039;s decision to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which also affirmed the ALJ. Throughout the agency proceedings, Fejes admitted that he piloted an aircraft to distribute marijuana within Alaska, but argued that his conduct fell outside of § 44710(b)(2)&#039;s reach.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Fejes&#039;s petition for review of the NTSB&#039;s order affirming the FAA&#039;s revocation of his pilot certificate. The court rejected Fejes&#039;s argument that the FAA lacked jurisdiction to revoke his pilot certificate because Congress cannot authorize an administrative agency to regulate purely intrastate commerce like marijuana delivery within Alaska. The court held that airspace is a channel of commerce squarely within congressional authority, and therefore, Congress can regulate Fejes&#039;s conduct. The court also rejected Fejes&#039;s argument that his conduct was exempt under FAA regulation 14 C.F.R. § 91.19, and that the FAA misinterpreted § 44710(b)(2). The court concluded that the FAA&#039;s revocation of Fejes&#039;s pilot certificate was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-04-22</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>NELSON</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Drugs &amp; Biotech"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/utah/supreme-court/2024/20210938.html</id>
        	<title>Salt Lake Co v. Tax Commission</title>
        	<updated>2024-04-19T07:35:36-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-04-19T07:35:36-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/utah/supreme-court/2024/20210938.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves Salt Lake County&#039;s challenge to the constitutionality of the Aircraft Valuation Law, which provides a preferred method for determining the fair market value of aircraft for tax purposes. The County argued that the application of the law to Delta Air Lines&#039; aircraft resulted in an assessment below fair market value, violating the Utah Constitution. The County also contended that the law, on its face, violated the Utah Constitution by divesting the Utah State Tax Commission of its power to assess airline property.

The Utah State Tax Commission had previously upheld the 2017 assessment of Delta&#039;s property, which was calculated according to the Aircraft Valuation Law. The Commission found that the County did not provide clear and convincing evidence that the legislature&#039;s preferred method of valuation did not reasonably reflect fair market value. 

The Supreme Court of the State of Utah rejected the County&#039;s arguments. The court held that the County failed to fully utilize the statutory safety valve, which allows the Commission to use an alternative valuation method if the preferred method does not reasonably reflect fair market value. The court also rejected the County&#039;s facial challenge to the Aircraft Valuation Law, concluding that the County did not show that the law prohibits the legislature from prescribing a preferred method for valuing aircraft. Therefore, the court affirmed the Commission&#039;s decision. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/utah/supreme-court/2024/20210938.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Salt Lake Co v. Tax Commission" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves Salt Lake County&#039;s challenge to the constitutionality of the Aircraft Valuation Law, which provides a preferred method for determining the fair market value of aircraft for tax purposes. The County argued that the application of the law to Delta Air Lines&#039; aircraft resulted in an assessment below fair market value, violating the Utah Constitution. The County also contended that the law, on its face, violated the Utah Constitution by divesting the Utah State Tax Commission of its power to assess airline property.

The Utah State Tax Commission had previously upheld the 2017 assessment of Delta&#039;s property, which was calculated according to the Aircraft Valuation Law. The Commission found that the County did not provide clear and convincing evidence that the legislature&#039;s preferred method of valuation did not reasonably reflect fair market value. 

The Supreme Court of the State of Utah rejected the County&#039;s arguments. The court held that the County failed to fully utilize the statutory safety valve, which allows the Commission to use an alternative valuation method if the preferred method does not reasonably reflect fair market value. The court also rejected the County&#039;s facial challenge to the Aircraft Valuation Law, concluding that the County did not show that the law prohibits the legislature from prescribing a preferred method for valuing aircraft. Therefore, the court affirmed the Commission&#039;s decision.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-04-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Utah</case:state>
						<case:court>Utah Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Hagen</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Tax Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="Utah Supreme Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/21-2214/21-2214-2024-03-20.html</id>
        	<title>Daulatzai v. Maryland</title>
        	<updated>2024-03-20T11:00:47-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-03-20T11:00:47-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/21-2214/21-2214-2024-03-20.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In this case, the plaintiff, Anila Daulatzai, was removed from a Southwest Airlines flight after the captain received information about her dog allergy and the presence of two dogs on board. Daulatzai insisted on remaining in her seat despite the captain’s decision, leading to her physical removal by Maryland Transportation Authority police officers. She was later charged with various offenses, including disorderly conduct and resisting arrest.

Daulatzai filed an action against Southwest Airlines and the State of Maryland, alleging various grounds to challenge her removal from the plane and her arrest. The district court dismissed Daulatzai’s complaint for failure to state a plausible claim upon which relief could be granted. Daulatzai appealed that judgment and, while her appeal was pending, she also filed a motion in the district court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), seeking to file a fourth version of her complaint with the district court. 

The court denied her request, finding that her efforts were pursued in bad faith, that her repeated failures to cure defects in her pleadings had been prejudicial to the defendants, and that the fourth complaint would, in any event, be futile. Daulatzai appealed that ruling as well.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s decision, finding that Daulatzai had failed to establish any of the grounds for relief under Rule 60(b) and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Daulatzai leave to file her proposed third amended complaint. The court also found that Daulatzai had waived her challenge to the district court’s dismissal of her second amended complaint by failing to preserve it below.
 &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/21-2214/21-2214-2024-03-20.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Daulatzai v. Maryland" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In this case, the plaintiff, Anila Daulatzai, was removed from a Southwest Airlines flight after the captain received information about her dog allergy and the presence of two dogs on board. Daulatzai insisted on remaining in her seat despite the captain’s decision, leading to her physical removal by Maryland Transportation Authority police officers. She was later charged with various offenses, including disorderly conduct and resisting arrest.

Daulatzai filed an action against Southwest Airlines and the State of Maryland, alleging various grounds to challenge her removal from the plane and her arrest. The district court dismissed Daulatzai’s complaint for failure to state a plausible claim upon which relief could be granted. Daulatzai appealed that judgment and, while her appeal was pending, she also filed a motion in the district court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), seeking to file a fourth version of her complaint with the district court. 

The court denied her request, finding that her efforts were pursued in bad faith, that her repeated failures to cure defects in her pleadings had been prejudicial to the defendants, and that the fourth complaint would, in any event, be futile. Daulatzai appealed that ruling as well.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s decision, finding that Daulatzai had failed to establish any of the grounds for relief under Rule 60(b) and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Daulatzai leave to file her proposed third amended complaint. The court also found that Daulatzai had waived her challenge to the district court’s dismissal of her second amended complaint by failing to preserve it below.

            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-03-20</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>NIEMEYER</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/oklahoma/supreme-court/2024/121.html</id>
        	<title>SCHIEWE v. CESSNA AIRCRAFT CO</title>
        	<updated>2024-03-12T10:36:01-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-03-12T10:36:01-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/oklahoma/supreme-court/2024/121.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		This case involves Jade P. Schiewe and Zachary Pfaff, who filed a lawsuit against the Cessna Aircraft Company, alleging negligence after a plane crash in September 2010. The plaintiffs were flying a Cessna 172RG when a fire erupted in the cockpit, leading to a crash landing. They claimed that Cessna was negligent in not updating its service manual to include a new part and its installation instructions. Cessna, however, filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the plaintiffs&#039; claims were barred by the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), an act that limits liability for aircraft manufacturers 18 years after the delivery of the aircraft to its first purchaser.

The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma affirmed the lower court&#039;s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Cessna. The court held that the service manual was created by Cessna in its capacity as a manufacturer, and thus, was included within the limitation period provided in GARA. The court further found that Cessna had not added or omitted anything to the service manual that was a proximate cause of the accident, and thus, the GARA statute of repose did not restart. Therefore, the plaintiffs&#039; claims were barred by GARA as the statute of repose had expired. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/oklahoma/supreme-court/2024/121.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "SCHIEWE v. CESSNA AIRCRAFT CO" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                This case involves Jade P. Schiewe and Zachary Pfaff, who filed a lawsuit against the Cessna Aircraft Company, alleging negligence after a plane crash in September 2010. The plaintiffs were flying a Cessna 172RG when a fire erupted in the cockpit, leading to a crash landing. They claimed that Cessna was negligent in not updating its service manual to include a new part and its installation instructions. Cessna, however, filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the plaintiffs&#039; claims were barred by the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), an act that limits liability for aircraft manufacturers 18 years after the delivery of the aircraft to its first purchaser.

The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma affirmed the lower court&#039;s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Cessna. The court held that the service manual was created by Cessna in its capacity as a manufacturer, and thus, was included within the limitation period provided in GARA. The court further found that Cessna had not added or omitted anything to the service manual that was a proximate cause of the accident, and thus, the GARA statute of repose did not restart. Therefore, the plaintiffs&#039; claims were barred by GARA as the statute of repose had expired.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-03-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Oklahoma</case:state>
						<case:court>Oklahoma Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Darby</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Personal Injury"/>
							<category term="Products Liability"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="Oklahoma Supreme Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/22-60603/22-60603-2024-02-23.html</id>
        	<title>Pace v. Cirrus Design Corp</title>
        	<updated>2024-02-23T10:31:18-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-02-23T10:31:18-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/22-60603/22-60603-2024-02-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In this case, Glen Pace, a Mississippi resident, appealed the dismissal of his claims against multiple corporate defendants over personal injuries he suffered in a Texas airplane crash. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi dismissed the claims against the out-of-state defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction and held that the two Mississippi defendants were improperly joined, which allowed removal to federal court. 

Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The appellate court agreed that Pace failed to state a claim against either in-state defendant, and thus, they were improperly joined. As for the out-of-state defendants, the court found that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over them. The court reasoned that the aircraft crash, any equipment failure, and the injuries all occurred in Texas, and Pace&#039;s subsequent medical treatment and damages in Mississippi did not constitute an actual injury felt in the state for the purpose of establishing personal jurisdiction. The court held that Pace&#039;s injuries from the crash occurred in Texas and his subsequent medical treatment in Mississippi were &quot;consequences stemming from the actual tort injury,&quot; which do not confer personal jurisdiction. 

The court also denied Pace&#039;s request for jurisdictional discovery, stating that Pace failed to present specific facts or reasonable particularity regarding jurisdictional facts. The court stressed that its decision should not be interpreted as implying a view on the merits of Pace’s claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/22-60603/22-60603-2024-02-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Pace v. Cirrus Design Corp" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In this case, Glen Pace, a Mississippi resident, appealed the dismissal of his claims against multiple corporate defendants over personal injuries he suffered in a Texas airplane crash. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi dismissed the claims against the out-of-state defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction and held that the two Mississippi defendants were improperly joined, which allowed removal to federal court. 

Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The appellate court agreed that Pace failed to state a claim against either in-state defendant, and thus, they were improperly joined. As for the out-of-state defendants, the court found that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over them. The court reasoned that the aircraft crash, any equipment failure, and the injuries all occurred in Texas, and Pace&#039;s subsequent medical treatment and damages in Mississippi did not constitute an actual injury felt in the state for the purpose of establishing personal jurisdiction. The court held that Pace&#039;s injuries from the crash occurred in Texas and his subsequent medical treatment in Mississippi were &quot;consequences stemming from the actual tort injury,&quot; which do not confer personal jurisdiction. 

The court also denied Pace&#039;s request for jurisdictional discovery, stating that Pace failed to present specific facts or reasonable particularity regarding jurisdictional facts. The court stressed that its decision should not be interpreted as implying a view on the merits of Pace’s claims.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-02-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Southwick</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Personal Injury"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/alaska/supreme-court/2024/s-18462.html</id>
        	<title>Thompson v. United Services Automobile Association</title>
        	<updated>2024-01-26T10:31:02-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-01-26T10:31:02-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/alaska/supreme-court/2024/s-18462.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In this case, a woman was severely injured while moving an inoperable airplane owned by her husband. She sought recovery from her husband&#039;s homeowner&#039;s insurance policy. The insurance policy, however, excluded injuries &quot;arising out of&quot; the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of an aircraft. The woman argued that the policy should cover her injury because, in her view, the aircraft had become mere &quot;parts&quot; after her husband removed the wings, elevators, and tail rudder. The lower court disagreed and concluded that her injuries were not covered by the policy. The woman appealed this decision. 

The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska agreed with the lower court’s interpretation of the homeowner&#039;s insurance policy exclusion. The court maintained that regardless of whether the airplane was considered an aircraft or a collection of airplane “parts” when it injured the woman, the injury arose out of the husband’s ownership of the airplane. This interpretation was supported by the clear language of the policy which excluded coverage for bodily injury arising out of ownership or maintenance of an aircraft. As a result, the court affirmed the lower court’s decision.
 &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/alaska/supreme-court/2024/s-18462.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Thompson v. United Services Automobile Association" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In this case, a woman was severely injured while moving an inoperable airplane owned by her husband. She sought recovery from her husband&#039;s homeowner&#039;s insurance policy. The insurance policy, however, excluded injuries &quot;arising out of&quot; the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of an aircraft. The woman argued that the policy should cover her injury because, in her view, the aircraft had become mere &quot;parts&quot; after her husband removed the wings, elevators, and tail rudder. The lower court disagreed and concluded that her injuries were not covered by the policy. The woman appealed this decision. 

The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska agreed with the lower court’s interpretation of the homeowner&#039;s insurance policy exclusion. The court maintained that regardless of whether the airplane was considered an aircraft or a collection of airplane “parts” when it injured the woman, the injury arose out of the husband’s ownership of the airplane. This interpretation was supported by the clear language of the policy which excluded coverage for bodily injury arising out of ownership or maintenance of an aircraft. As a result, the court affirmed the lower court’s decision.

            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-01-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Alaska</case:state>
						<case:court>Alaska Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>HENDERSON</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Insurance Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="Alaska Supreme Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/22-1965/22-1965-2024-01-04.html</id>
        	<title>Trenton Threatened Skies Inc v. FAA</title>
        	<updated>2024-01-04T10:00:19-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-01-04T10:00:19-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/22-1965/22-1965-2024-01-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A group of petitioners, including several municipalities, private individuals, and organizations, challenged the Federal Aviation Administration&#039;s (FAA) approval of a new terminal for the Trenton-Mercer Airport. The petitioners alleged that the FAA’s decision violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by failing to fully consider the environmental impact of the new terminal, among other things. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that the FAA had adequately considered the environmental impact of the new terminal and had not violated NEPA. The court found that the FAA reasonably concluded that the new terminal would not induce additional air traffic, and therefore, would not result in increased noise or air pollution. The court also found that the FAA had conducted a reasonable environmental justice analysis and did not need to perform a health risk assessment. The Court of Appeals denied the petitioners&#039; request to review the FAA&#039;s decision. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/22-1965/22-1965-2024-01-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Trenton Threatened Skies Inc v. FAA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A group of petitioners, including several municipalities, private individuals, and organizations, challenged the Federal Aviation Administration&#039;s (FAA) approval of a new terminal for the Trenton-Mercer Airport. The petitioners alleged that the FAA’s decision violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by failing to fully consider the environmental impact of the new terminal, among other things. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that the FAA had adequately considered the environmental impact of the new terminal and had not violated NEPA. The court found that the FAA reasonably concluded that the new terminal would not induce additional air traffic, and therefore, would not result in increased noise or air pollution. The court also found that the FAA had conducted a reasonable environmental justice analysis and did not need to perform a health risk assessment. The Court of Appeals denied the petitioners&#039; request to review the FAA&#039;s decision.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-01-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>SMITH</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Environmental Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-9506/23-9506-2023-12-20.html</id>
        	<title>McWhorter v. FAA</title>
        	<updated>2023-12-20T12:33:19-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-12-20T12:33:19-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-9506/23-9506-2023-12-20.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In a case brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Bruce McWhorter, a mechanic, had his certification revoked by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) after it was discovered that he had not replaced certain components of an aircraft&#039;s engine despite claiming to have performed a major overhaul. McWhorter appealed the decision to an administrative law judge who affirmed the FAA&#039;s decision. McWhorter then sought to appeal this decision to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), but failed to serve the FAA with his notice of appeal in a timely manner. The NTSB dismissed McWhorter&#039;s appeal on these grounds. McWhorter subsequently petitioned for a review of the NTSB’s dismissal, but did so 111 days after the NTSB issued its final order, exceeding the 60-day limit prescribed by law.

The court clarified that the 60-day limit for seeking appellate review stipulated in 49 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1) is not a jurisdictional requirement, but rather a claim-processing rule. This means that a petitioner’s failure to comply with this time limit does not affect the court’s jurisdiction to hear the appeal. However, the court found that McWhorter had not established reasonable grounds for the delay in filing his petition for review, as required by the same statute for petitions filed after the 60-day limit. The court determined that the primary blame for the delay was on McWhorter, not on any confusion created by the FAA or the NTSB. Therefore, the court denied McWhorter&#039;s petition as untimely. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-9506/23-9506-2023-12-20.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "McWhorter v. FAA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In a case brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Bruce McWhorter, a mechanic, had his certification revoked by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) after it was discovered that he had not replaced certain components of an aircraft&#039;s engine despite claiming to have performed a major overhaul. McWhorter appealed the decision to an administrative law judge who affirmed the FAA&#039;s decision. McWhorter then sought to appeal this decision to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), but failed to serve the FAA with his notice of appeal in a timely manner. The NTSB dismissed McWhorter&#039;s appeal on these grounds. McWhorter subsequently petitioned for a review of the NTSB’s dismissal, but did so 111 days after the NTSB issued its final order, exceeding the 60-day limit prescribed by law.

The court clarified that the 60-day limit for seeking appellate review stipulated in 49 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1) is not a jurisdictional requirement, but rather a claim-processing rule. This means that a petitioner’s failure to comply with this time limit does not affect the court’s jurisdiction to hear the appeal. However, the court found that McWhorter had not established reasonable grounds for the delay in filing his petition for review, as required by the same statute for petitions filed after the 60-day limit. The court determined that the primary blame for the delay was on McWhorter, not on any confusion created by the FAA or the NTSB. Therefore, the court denied McWhorter&#039;s petition as untimely.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-12-20</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>McHUGH</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/22-1521/22-1521-2023-11-30.html</id>
        	<title>Milton, MA v. FAA</title>
        	<updated>2023-12-01T11:00:05-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-12-01T11:00:05-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/22-1521/22-1521-2023-11-30.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In this case, the Town of Milton, Massachusetts, petitioned for a judicial review of the Federal Aviation Administration&#039;s (FAA) final order authorizing a new flight procedure at Boston&#039;s Logan International Airport. The new procedure, aimed at increasing safety and efficiency, covers a narrower swath of airspace over the Town of Milton. The Town argued that the FAA&#039;s environmental analysis of the noise impacts failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). However, the United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit dismissed the Town&#039;s petition, ruling that the Town does not have standing to challenge the FAA&#039;s final order. The court concluded that the harms the Town asserted, including the impact of noise on its residents and the time and money spent addressing these issues, were not legally cognizable harms to the Town itself. The court agreed with other courts of appeals that have dismissed municipal NEPA challenges to FAA orders for lack of Article III standing because those challenges failed to show cognizable injury to the municipalities themselves. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/22-1521/22-1521-2023-11-30.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Milton, MA v. FAA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In this case, the Town of Milton, Massachusetts, petitioned for a judicial review of the Federal Aviation Administration&#039;s (FAA) final order authorizing a new flight procedure at Boston&#039;s Logan International Airport. The new procedure, aimed at increasing safety and efficiency, covers a narrower swath of airspace over the Town of Milton. The Town argued that the FAA&#039;s environmental analysis of the noise impacts failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). However, the United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit dismissed the Town&#039;s petition, ruling that the Town does not have standing to challenge the FAA&#039;s final order. The court concluded that the harms the Town asserted, including the impact of noise on its residents and the time and money spent addressing these issues, were not legally cognizable harms to the Town itself. The court agreed with other courts of appeals that have dismissed municipal NEPA challenges to FAA orders for lack of Article III standing because those challenges failed to show cognizable injury to the municipalities themselves.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-11-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>SELYA</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Environmental Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/texas/supreme-court/2023/23-0388.html</id>
        	<title>SANDERS v. THE BOEING COMPANY (U.S. Fifth Circuit 22-20317)</title>
        	<updated>2023-12-01T08:09:15-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-12-01T08:09:15-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/texas/supreme-court/2023/23-0388.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Supreme Court of Texas, in this case, addressed two questions relating to the interpretation of Section 16.064(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The questions pertained to the application of this statute when a case is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, but the court could have had jurisdiction had the claimants properly pleaded the jurisdictional facts and when the subsequent action is to be filed within 60 days after the dismissal becomes final.

The first question was whether Section 16.064(a) applies when the prior court dismissed the action because of lack of jurisdiction, but the court would have had jurisdiction if the claimants had properly pleaded the jurisdictional facts. The Supreme Court of Texas answered in the affirmative, concluding that the statute applies even if the prior court could have had jurisdiction, as long as it dismissed the action due to a perceived lack of jurisdiction.

The second question was whether the subsequent action was filed within sixty days after the dismissal became final. The Supreme Court of Texas also answered this question in the affirmative, holding that a dismissal or other disposition becomes final under Section 16.064(a)(2) when the parties have exhausted their appellate remedies and the courts&#039; power to alter the dismissal has ended.

The factual background of the case involved two flight attendants who alleged that they were injured when a smoke detector on a flight malfunctioned. They initially filed a suit against The Boeing Company in a federal district court in Houston, then refiled their claims in a federal district court in Dallas. After the Dallas district court dismissed the case due to a lack of jurisdiction (based on inadequate pleading of diversity jurisdiction), the flight attendants appealed. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, and the flight attendants subsequently refiled their claims in state court. Boeing then moved to dismiss the action based on the two-year statute of limitations. The Houston district court granted the motion and dismissed the suit, leading to the certified questions. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/texas/supreme-court/2023/23-0388.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "SANDERS v. THE BOEING COMPANY (U.S. Fifth Circuit 22-20317)" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Supreme Court of Texas, in this case, addressed two questions relating to the interpretation of Section 16.064(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The questions pertained to the application of this statute when a case is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, but the court could have had jurisdiction had the claimants properly pleaded the jurisdictional facts and when the subsequent action is to be filed within 60 days after the dismissal becomes final.

The first question was whether Section 16.064(a) applies when the prior court dismissed the action because of lack of jurisdiction, but the court would have had jurisdiction if the claimants had properly pleaded the jurisdictional facts. The Supreme Court of Texas answered in the affirmative, concluding that the statute applies even if the prior court could have had jurisdiction, as long as it dismissed the action due to a perceived lack of jurisdiction.

The second question was whether the subsequent action was filed within sixty days after the dismissal became final. The Supreme Court of Texas also answered this question in the affirmative, holding that a dismissal or other disposition becomes final under Section 16.064(a)(2) when the parties have exhausted their appellate remedies and the courts&#039; power to alter the dismissal has ended.

The factual background of the case involved two flight attendants who alleged that they were injured when a smoke detector on a flight malfunctioned. They initially filed a suit against The Boeing Company in a federal district court in Houston, then refiled their claims in a federal district court in Dallas. After the Dallas district court dismissed the case due to a lack of jurisdiction (based on inadequate pleading of diversity jurisdiction), the flight attendants appealed. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, and the flight attendants subsequently refiled their claims in state court. Boeing then moved to dismiss the action based on the two-year statute of limitations. The Houston district court granted the motion and dismissed the suit, leading to the certified questions.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-12-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Texas</case:state>
						<case:court>Supreme Court of Texas</case:court>
							<case:judge>BOYD</case:judge>
													<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="Supreme Court of Texas"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/20-2951/20-2951-2023-11-21.html</id>
        	<title>Jones et al. v. Goodrich Pump &amp; Engine Control Systems, Inc. et al.</title>
        	<updated>2023-11-21T08:30:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-11-21T08:30:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/20-2951/20-2951-2023-11-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		After two United States Army pilots tragically perished in a helicopter crash, their surviving family members sued various companies responsible for the making of the helicopter. The family members alleged that manufacturing and/or defective operating instructions and warnings caused the pilots’ deaths. The companies countered that the family members’ asserted state law claims were barred by a number of preemption doctrines. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the companies, finding that there was implied field preemption under the Federal Aviation Act (the “FAAct” or “Act”).
 
The Second Circuit vacated. The court explained that it believes that field preemption is always a matter of congressional intent, and Congress’s removal of military aircraft from the FAAct’s reach indicates that it did not wish to include them in the FAAct’s preempted field. Rather, Congress intended for the Department of Defense (“DoD”) to have autonomy over its own aircraft. While it is possible that the family members’ claims may be barred by the military contractor defense, another preemption doctrine, see generally Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988)—this determination requires a fact-intensive analysis to be handled by the district court in the first instance. Further, the court wrote that aside from any issues of preemption by the military contractor defense, the family members offered sufficient evidence under Georgia law for their strict liability manufacturing defect claim to survive summary judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/20-2951/20-2951-2023-11-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Jones et al. v. Goodrich Pump &amp; Engine Control Systems, Inc. et al." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                After two United States Army pilots tragically perished in a helicopter crash, their surviving family members sued various companies responsible for the making of the helicopter. The family members alleged that manufacturing and/or defective operating instructions and warnings caused the pilots’ deaths. The companies countered that the family members’ asserted state law claims were barred by a number of preemption doctrines. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the companies, finding that there was implied field preemption under the Federal Aviation Act (the “FAAct” or “Act”).
 
The Second Circuit vacated. The court explained that it believes that field preemption is always a matter of congressional intent, and Congress’s removal of military aircraft from the FAAct’s reach indicates that it did not wish to include them in the FAAct’s preempted field. Rather, Congress intended for the Department of Defense (“DoD”) to have autonomy over its own aircraft. While it is possible that the family members’ claims may be barred by the military contractor defense, another preemption doctrine, see generally Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988)—this determination requires a fact-intensive analysis to be handled by the district court in the first instance. Further, the court wrote that aside from any issues of preemption by the military contractor defense, the family members offered sufficient evidence under Georgia law for their strict liability manufacturing defect claim to survive summary judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Second Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s summary judgment against Plaintiffs on the grounds that their state law tort claims. The court agreed with Plaintiffs that the Federal Aviation Act’s preempted field does not include military aircrafts like the one to which their suit pertains.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-11-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>EUNICE C. LEE</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>20-2951</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/22-10686/22-10686-2023-10-13.html</id>
        	<title>Abdallah v. Mesa Air Group</title>
        	<updated>2023-10-13T09:31:21-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-10-13T09:31:21-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/22-10686/22-10686-2023-10-13.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		On a Mesa Airlines flight, a flight attendant grew concerned about two passengers. She alerted the pilot, who, despite the reassurance of security officers, delayed takeoff until the flight was canceled. The passengers were told the delay was for maintenance issues, and all passengers, including the two in question, were rebooked onto a new flight. After learning the real reason behind the cancellation, Passenger Plaintiffs sued Mesa under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The airline countered that it had immunity under 49 U.S.C. Section 44902(b). The district court granted Mesa’s motion for summary judgment. At issue is whether such conduct constitutes disparate treatment under Section 1981, whether a Section 1981 claim can exist without a “breach” of contract, and whether Section 44902(b) grants immunity to airlines for allegedly discriminatory decisions. 
 
The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court explained that the right to be free from discrimination in “the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms and conditions” means that one has the right to be free from discrimination in the discretionary “benefits, privileges, terms and conditions” of a contract, too. Defendants cannot claim that flying at the originally scheduled time is not a “benefit” of the contract at all. Further, the court explained that a hand wave, refusing to leave one’s assigned seat, boarding late, sleeping, and using the restroom are far from occurrences so obviously suspicious that no one could conclude that race was not a but-for factor for the airline’s actions. The court wrote that because “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for” Plaintiffs, the dispute is genuine. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/22-10686/22-10686-2023-10-13.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Abdallah v. Mesa Air Group" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                On a Mesa Airlines flight, a flight attendant grew concerned about two passengers. She alerted the pilot, who, despite the reassurance of security officers, delayed takeoff until the flight was canceled. The passengers were told the delay was for maintenance issues, and all passengers, including the two in question, were rebooked onto a new flight. After learning the real reason behind the cancellation, Passenger Plaintiffs sued Mesa under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The airline countered that it had immunity under 49 U.S.C. Section 44902(b). The district court granted Mesa’s motion for summary judgment. At issue is whether such conduct constitutes disparate treatment under Section 1981, whether a Section 1981 claim can exist without a “breach” of contract, and whether Section 44902(b) grants immunity to airlines for allegedly discriminatory decisions. 
 
The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court explained that the right to be free from discrimination in “the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms and conditions” means that one has the right to be free from discrimination in the discretionary “benefits, privileges, terms and conditions” of a contract, too. Defendants cannot claim that flying at the originally scheduled time is not a “benefit” of the contract at all. Further, the court explained that a hand wave, refusing to leave one’s assigned seat, boarding late, sleeping, and using the restroom are far from occurrences so obviously suspicious that no one could conclude that race was not a but-for factor for the airline’s actions. The court wrote that because “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for” Plaintiffs, the dispute is genuine.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment to Mesa Airlines in Plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 alleging racial and national-origin discrimination.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-10-13</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry E. Smith</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-10686</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/21-14476/21-14476-2023-10-12.html</id>
        	<title>John S. Lowman, IV, et al v. Federal Aviation Administration, et al</title>
        	<updated>2023-10-12T10:32:04-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-10-12T10:32:04-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/21-14476/21-14476-2023-10-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Petitioners, a group of five individuals, filed this petition for review, claiming that the FAA violated the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) during its Phase II approval process. Petitioners assert that the FAA violated NEPA by (1) segmenting its review of a single Airport development project into multiple, smaller projects to make the project’s environmental effect appear less significant, (2) failing to consider the project’s cumulative effects, and (3) failing to analyze all air quality impacts. The FAA responds that, as an initial matter, Petitioners cannot bring this petition for review because they lack standing and did not exhaust their administrative remedies. Alternatively, the FAA contends that it did not violate NEPA, and the petition for review should be denied.
 
The Eleventh Circuit denied the petition. The court held that Petitioners have standing and did not fail to exhaust their administrative remedies. Petitioners, however, fall short on the merits because it is clear that the FAA satisfied NEPA’s requirements. The court explained that Petitioners are unhappy that the FAA greenlighted Phase II (as well as the Airport developments preceding Phase II). However, the court does not vacate agency decisions over mere policy disagreements. Accordingly, the court held that the FAA did what it was supposed to do, and its review processes were not arbitrary and capricious. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/21-14476/21-14476-2023-10-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "John S. Lowman, IV, et al v. Federal Aviation Administration, et al" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Petitioners, a group of five individuals, filed this petition for review, claiming that the FAA violated the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) during its Phase II approval process. Petitioners assert that the FAA violated NEPA by (1) segmenting its review of a single Airport development project into multiple, smaller projects to make the project’s environmental effect appear less significant, (2) failing to consider the project’s cumulative effects, and (3) failing to analyze all air quality impacts. The FAA responds that, as an initial matter, Petitioners cannot bring this petition for review because they lack standing and did not exhaust their administrative remedies. Alternatively, the FAA contends that it did not violate NEPA, and the petition for review should be denied.
 
The Eleventh Circuit denied the petition. The court held that Petitioners have standing and did not fail to exhaust their administrative remedies. Petitioners, however, fall short on the merits because it is clear that the FAA satisfied NEPA’s requirements. The court explained that Petitioners are unhappy that the FAA greenlighted Phase II (as well as the Airport developments preceding Phase II). However, the court does not vacate agency decisions over mere policy disagreements. Accordingly, the court held that the FAA did what it was supposed to do, and its review processes were not arbitrary and capricious.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Eleventh Circuit denied Petitioners petition claiming that the FAA violated the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). The court concluded that Petitioners have standing and did not fail to exhaust their administrative remedies, however they fall short on the merits because it is clear that the FAA satisfied NEPA’s requirements.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-10-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>BRANCH</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-14476</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-15677/22-15677-2023-08-29.html</id>
        	<title>AIRLINES FOR AMERICA V. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO</title>
        	<updated>2023-08-29T08:30:49-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-08-29T08:30:49-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-15677/22-15677-2023-08-29.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The City and County of San Francisco (the City) owns and operates San Francisco International Airport (SFO or the Airport). Airlines for America (A4A) represents airlines that contract with the City to use SFO. In 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the City enacted the Healthy Airport Ordinance (HAO), requiring the airlines that use SFO to provide employees with certain health insurance benefits. A4A filed this action in the Northern District of California, alleging that the City, in enacting the HAO, acted as a government regulator and not a market participant, and therefore the HAO is preempted by multiple federal statutes. The district court agreed to the parties’ suggestion to bifurcate the case to first address the City’s market participation defense. The district court held that the City was a market participant and granted its motion for summary judgment. A4A appealed.
 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The court concluded that two civil penalty provisions of the HAO carry the force of law and thus render the City a regulator rather than a market participant. The court wrote that because these civil penalty provisions result in the City acting as a regulator, it need not determine whether the City otherwise would be a regulator under the Cardinal Towing two-part test set forth in LAX, 873 F.3d at 1080 &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-15677/22-15677-2023-08-29.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "AIRLINES FOR AMERICA V. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The City and County of San Francisco (the City) owns and operates San Francisco International Airport (SFO or the Airport). Airlines for America (A4A) represents airlines that contract with the City to use SFO. In 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the City enacted the Healthy Airport Ordinance (HAO), requiring the airlines that use SFO to provide employees with certain health insurance benefits. A4A filed this action in the Northern District of California, alleging that the City, in enacting the HAO, acted as a government regulator and not a market participant, and therefore the HAO is preempted by multiple federal statutes. The district court agreed to the parties’ suggestion to bifurcate the case to first address the City’s market participation defense. The district court held that the City was a market participant and granted its motion for summary judgment. A4A appealed.
 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The court concluded that two civil penalty provisions of the HAO carry the force of law and thus render the City a regulator rather than a market participant. The court wrote that because these civil penalty provisions result in the City acting as a regulator, it need not determine whether the City otherwise would be a regulator under the Cardinal Towing two-part test set forth in LAX, 873 F.3d at 1080
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City and County of San Francisco in an action challenging the City’s Healthy Airport Ordinance, which requires airlines that contract with the City to use San Francisco International Airport to provide employees with certain health insurance benefits.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-08-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Callahan</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-15677</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
							<category term="Government Contracts"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/22-5013/22-5013-2023-08-21.html</id>
        	<title>Meitav Dash Provident Funds and Pension Ltd., et al. v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, et al.</title>
        	<updated>2023-08-21T10:02:50-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-08-21T10:02:50-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/22-5013/22-5013-2023-08-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		This appeal centered on claims for securities fraud against Spirit AeroSystems, Inc., and four of its executives. Spirit produced components for jetliners, including Boeing’s 737 MAX. But Boeing stopped producing the 737 MAX, and Spirit’s sales tumbled. At about the same time, Spirit acknowledged an unexpected loss from inadequate accounting controls. After learning about Spirit’s downturn in sales and the inadequacies in accounting controls, some investors sued Spirit and four executives for securities fraud. The district court dismissed the suit, and the investors appealed. &quot;For claims involving securities fraud, pleaders bear a stiff burden when alleging scienter.&quot; In the Tenth Circuit&#039;s view, the investors did not satisfy that
burden, so it affirmed the dismissal. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/22-5013/22-5013-2023-08-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Meitav Dash Provident Funds and Pension Ltd., et al. v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, et al." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                This appeal centered on claims for securities fraud against Spirit AeroSystems, Inc., and four of its executives. Spirit produced components for jetliners, including Boeing’s 737 MAX. But Boeing stopped producing the 737 MAX, and Spirit’s sales tumbled. At about the same time, Spirit acknowledged an unexpected loss from inadequate accounting controls. After learning about Spirit’s downturn in sales and the inadequacies in accounting controls, some investors sued Spirit and four executives for securities fraud. The district court dismissed the suit, and the investors appealed. &quot;For claims involving securities fraud, pleaders bear a stiff burden when alleging scienter.&quot; In the Tenth Circuit&#039;s view, the investors did not satisfy that
burden, so it affirmed the dismissal.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                &quot;For claims involving securities fraud, pleaders bear a stiff burden when alleging scienter.&quot;
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-08-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Robert Edwin Bacharach</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-5013</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/22-12316/22-12316-2023-08-18.html</id>
        	<title>Perry Hodges, et al. v. USA</title>
        	<updated>2023-08-18T12:01:42-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-08-18T12:01:42-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/22-12316/22-12316-2023-08-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling entering judgment in favor of the US in a negligence suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).  The Seneca was piloted by Nisha Sejwal, with Ralph Knight accompanying her. The Cessna was piloted by Jorge Sanchez, with Carlo Scarpati, a student pilot, also on board. Both planes were “VFR” aircraft operating under standard visual flight rules. The Seneca was departing from, and the Cessna was arriving at, the Tamiami Airport (now known as the Miami Executive Airport) when the collision occurred. The representatives of the pilots’ estates filed suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), alleging negligence on the part of Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) air traffic controllers at the Tamiami Airport. Following a bench trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the United States, and the Plaintiffs appealed.
 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs contend that language in the district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law “suggests” that it improperly considered evidence of comparative negligence—an affirmative defense under Florida law—in making its ultimate finding that the controllers were not negligent. In particular, they point to the district court’s statements that there was (1) conflicting evidence about how the planes approached each other prior to the collision and (2) evidence that both planes were equipped with TIS devices and that the Seneca’s TIS device was functioning earlier in the day prior to the collision. The court concluded that the district court did not improperly consider evidence of comparative negligence but rather based its decision on Plaintiffs’ failure to prove the elements of their negligence claim. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/22-12316/22-12316-2023-08-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Perry Hodges, et al. v. USA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling entering judgment in favor of the US in a negligence suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).  The Seneca was piloted by Nisha Sejwal, with Ralph Knight accompanying her. The Cessna was piloted by Jorge Sanchez, with Carlo Scarpati, a student pilot, also on board. Both planes were “VFR” aircraft operating under standard visual flight rules. The Seneca was departing from, and the Cessna was arriving at, the Tamiami Airport (now known as the Miami Executive Airport) when the collision occurred. The representatives of the pilots’ estates filed suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), alleging negligence on the part of Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) air traffic controllers at the Tamiami Airport. Following a bench trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the United States, and the Plaintiffs appealed.
 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs contend that language in the district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law “suggests” that it improperly considered evidence of comparative negligence—an affirmative defense under Florida law—in making its ultimate finding that the controllers were not negligent. In particular, they point to the district court’s statements that there was (1) conflicting evidence about how the planes approached each other prior to the collision and (2) evidence that both planes were equipped with TIS devices and that the Seneca’s TIS device was functioning earlier in the day prior to the collision. The court concluded that the district court did not improperly consider evidence of comparative negligence but rather based its decision on Plaintiffs’ failure to prove the elements of their negligence claim.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling entering judgment in favor of the US in a negligence suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-08-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>BRANCH</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-12316</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Personal Injury"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/22-3053/22-3053-2023-08-09.html</id>
        	<title>Jadair International, Inc. v. American National Property &amp; Casualty Co.</title>
        	<updated>2023-08-09T08:30:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-08-09T08:30:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/22-3053/22-3053-2023-08-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Schmutzler, the owner and president of Jadair, was a pilot with decades of experience.  Schmutzler applied to American National for an insurance policy on its Cessna airplane in 2019. The application listed Schmutzler as the Cessna’s only authorized pilot; Schmutzler indicated that he was a licensed pilot with an FAA medical certificate. The application included “Minimum Pilot Requirements,” which stated that “there is no coverage in flight unless the aircraft is being operated by the pilot(s) designated on this document who has/have at least the certificates, ratings, and pilot experience indicated, and who … is/are properly qualified for the flight involved.” Schmutzler initialed this provision. The Cessna crashed in May 2020, killing Schmutzler, who was piloting the plane. The crash was caused by a mechanical failure.  

American National denied coverage because Schmutzler did not have a current and valid FAA medical certificate at the time of the accident; his previous certificate had expired. The district court granted American National summary and declaratory judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The policy unambiguously excludes coverage for any accident involving the Cessna where the pilot lacks a current FAA medical certificate. That requirement is an exclusion of coverage, not a failed condition of coverage. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/22-3053/22-3053-2023-08-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Jadair International, Inc. v. American National Property &amp; Casualty Co." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Schmutzler, the owner and president of Jadair, was a pilot with decades of experience.  Schmutzler applied to American National for an insurance policy on its Cessna airplane in 2019. The application listed Schmutzler as the Cessna’s only authorized pilot; Schmutzler indicated that he was a licensed pilot with an FAA medical certificate. The application included “Minimum Pilot Requirements,” which stated that “there is no coverage in flight unless the aircraft is being operated by the pilot(s) designated on this document who has/have at least the certificates, ratings, and pilot experience indicated, and who … is/are properly qualified for the flight involved.” Schmutzler initialed this provision. The Cessna crashed in May 2020, killing Schmutzler, who was piloting the plane. The crash was caused by a mechanical failure.  

American National denied coverage because Schmutzler did not have a current and valid FAA medical certificate at the time of the accident; his previous certificate had expired. The district court granted American National summary and declaratory judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The policy unambiguously excludes coverage for any accident involving the Cessna where the pilot lacks a current FAA medical certificate. That requirement is an exclusion of coverage, not a failed condition of coverage.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Seventh Circuit affirms an insurer&#039;s denial of coverage for a plane crash; the pilot did not have the FAA medical certificate required by the policy.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-08-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Lee</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-3053</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Insurance Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/22-3138/22-3138-2023-08-04.html</id>
        	<title>Amy McNaught v. Billy Nolen</title>
        	<updated>2023-08-04T07:01:33-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-08-04T07:01:33-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/22-3138/22-3138-2023-08-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Petitioner is a pilot and flight instructor. After she failed to produce her pilot logbooks and training records upon request by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the FAA suspended Petitioner’s pilot certificate. Petitioner appealed the suspension to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) but, days later, complied with the records request. The FAA then terminated her suspension, which lasted 14 days in total and reinstated her certificate. Nonetheless, an NTSB administrative law judge held a hearing on Petitioner’s appeal and concluded that the suspension was reasonable. Petitioner appealed the decision to the full NTSB, but it dismissed the matter as moot. Petitioner petitioned for a review of the NTSB’s final order under 49 U.S.C. Sections 44709(f) and 46110.
 
The Eighth Circuit concluded that Petitioner lacked Article III standing and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that the first problem with Petitioner’s theory of future injury is that she has not shown with particularity how her brief suspension for noncompliance with a records request would harm her job prospects. Further, the court wrote that even assuming the 14-day suspension would be damaging to her job prospects, Petitioner’s claims are not y “real and immediate.” Moreover, the court explained that the record here lacks any facts showing that Petitioner’s suspension would harm her reputation in the estimation of the pilot community. Instead, Petitioner relied on vague, blanket statements of reputational harm. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/22-3138/22-3138-2023-08-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Amy McNaught v. Billy Nolen" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Petitioner is a pilot and flight instructor. After she failed to produce her pilot logbooks and training records upon request by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the FAA suspended Petitioner’s pilot certificate. Petitioner appealed the suspension to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) but, days later, complied with the records request. The FAA then terminated her suspension, which lasted 14 days in total and reinstated her certificate. Nonetheless, an NTSB administrative law judge held a hearing on Petitioner’s appeal and concluded that the suspension was reasonable. Petitioner appealed the decision to the full NTSB, but it dismissed the matter as moot. Petitioner petitioned for a review of the NTSB’s final order under 49 U.S.C. Sections 44709(f) and 46110.
 
The Eighth Circuit concluded that Petitioner lacked Article III standing and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that the first problem with Petitioner’s theory of future injury is that she has not shown with particularity how her brief suspension for noncompliance with a records request would harm her job prospects. Further, the court wrote that even assuming the 14-day suspension would be damaging to her job prospects, Petitioner’s claims are not y “real and immediate.” Moreover, the court explained that the record here lacks any facts showing that Petitioner’s suspension would harm her reputation in the estimation of the pilot community. Instead, Petitioner relied on vague, blanket statements of reputational harm.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Eighth Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petition for review of the NTSB’s final order under 49 U.S.C. Sections 44709(f) and 46110. The court concluded that Petitioner lacks Article III standing.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-08-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>SHEPHERD</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-3138</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2023/g062374.html</id>
        	<title>Longobardo v. Avco Corporation</title>
        	<updated>2023-07-11T10:06:17-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-07-11T10:06:17-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2023/g062374.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Defendant Avco Corporation, a manufacturer of airplane components, appealed the denial of its summary judgment motion, which was based on the statute of repose enacted by Congress as part of the General Aviation Revitalization Act (GARA). Defendant contended a denial of summary judgment in this context constituted an appealable collateral order under California’s collateral order doctrine. To this, the Court of Appeal concluded it did not and dismissed the appeal. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2023/g062374.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Longobardo v. Avco Corporation" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Defendant Avco Corporation, a manufacturer of airplane components, appealed the denial of its summary judgment motion, which was based on the statute of repose enacted by Congress as part of the General Aviation Revitalization Act (GARA). Defendant contended a denial of summary judgment in this context constituted an appealable collateral order under California’s collateral order doctrine. To this, the Court of Appeal concluded it did not and dismissed the appeal.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Defendant appealed the denial of its summary judgment motion, which was based on the statute of repose enacted by Congress as part of the General Aviation Revitalization Act (GARA).
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-07-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>California</case:state>
						<case:court>California Courts of Appeal</case:court>
							<case:judge>Delaney</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>G062374</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
										<category term="California Courts of Appeal"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/22-10848/22-10848-2023-07-10.html</id>
        	<title>Harold Rutila, IV v. TRAN</title>
        	<updated>2023-07-10T15:30:16-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-07-10T15:30:16-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/22-10848/22-10848-2023-07-10.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Plaintiff attended a Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) air traffic controller training program at the FAA Academy. Because he failed the final performance assessment, Plaintiff was not retained as a permanent air traffic controller. Several months later, Plaintiff submitted ten requests under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) to the FAA seeking various categories of records. Dissatisfied with the FAA’s responses to his requests, Plaintiff brought two suits against the FAA and its parent agency, the Department of Transportation (“DOT”; collectively with the FAA, “Appellees”), seeking injunctive relief compelling the release and disclosure of the requested agency records. The district court later consolidated the two lawsuits. Appellees moved to dismiss most of Plaintiff’s claims, and the district court dismissed seven of Plaintiff’s requests for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff appealed the district court’s judgment with respect to three of his requests.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it is undisputed that the FAA does not maintain screenshots of individuals’ Active Directory Account profiles, NextGen Toolbox profiles, or Windows Explorer directories and folder structures. Therefore, for the FAA to produce the requested records, it would have to open the relevant software, display the requested data, and take a screenshot of the displayed information. The court explained that his inquiry would not merely require Appellees to produce information they retain and use, albeit in a slightly altered format; it would instead require Appellees to produce a new record— a screenshot—of information it does not store. FOIA imposes no such obligations on agencies. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/22-10848/22-10848-2023-07-10.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Harold Rutila, IV v. TRAN" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Plaintiff attended a Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) air traffic controller training program at the FAA Academy. Because he failed the final performance assessment, Plaintiff was not retained as a permanent air traffic controller. Several months later, Plaintiff submitted ten requests under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) to the FAA seeking various categories of records. Dissatisfied with the FAA’s responses to his requests, Plaintiff brought two suits against the FAA and its parent agency, the Department of Transportation (“DOT”; collectively with the FAA, “Appellees”), seeking injunctive relief compelling the release and disclosure of the requested agency records. The district court later consolidated the two lawsuits. Appellees moved to dismiss most of Plaintiff’s claims, and the district court dismissed seven of Plaintiff’s requests for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff appealed the district court’s judgment with respect to three of his requests.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it is undisputed that the FAA does not maintain screenshots of individuals’ Active Directory Account profiles, NextGen Toolbox profiles, or Windows Explorer directories and folder structures. Therefore, for the FAA to produce the requested records, it would have to open the relevant software, display the requested data, and take a screenshot of the displayed information. The court explained that his inquiry would not merely require Appellees to produce information they retain and use, albeit in a slightly altered format; it would instead require Appellees to produce a new record— a screenshot—of information it does not store. FOIA imposes no such obligations on agencies.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for the Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation Administration in an action arising from several unsuccessful requests by Plaintiff  to the FAA for records under the Freedom of Information Act.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-07-10</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Per Curiam</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-10848</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/21-5257/21-5257-2023-06-30.html</id>
        	<title>Flyers Rights Education Fund, Inc. v. FAA</title>
        	<updated>2023-06-30T07:04:44-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-06-30T07:04:44-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/21-5257/21-5257-2023-06-30.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		On October 29, 2018, 189 people boarded a Boeing 737 MAX airplane in Jakarta, Indonesia. A few minutes after takeoff, the plane crashed. No one survived. Five months later, 157 people aboard a 737 MAX in Ethiopia suffered the same fate. The Federal Aviation Administration then grounded the 737 MAX, prompting modifications by Boeing that eventually led the agency to recertify the plane. In this Freedom of Information Act suit, Flyers Rights Education Fund and its president seek documents that the FAA relied upon during the recertification process. Congress exempted from FOIA’s reach “commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential,” and the district court determined that is precisely what the FAA withheld.
 
The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that when an agency incorporates exempt information into its own comments, it will often be able to release at least part of those comments without revealing the exempt information. Here, however, the FAA explained that these documents “contained FAA comments to Boeing’s project deliverables, which in themselves would reveal technical data and Boeing’s proprietary methods of compliance.” Notably, the FAA released two other documents containing its comments in redacted form. That fact, coupled with the FAA’s nonconclusory affidavits and Vaughn index, demonstrates that it understands the difference between comments that reveal Boeing’s confidential information and comments that do not. Accordingly, even as to these two withheld documents, the FAA has demonstrated that it complied with its segregability obligations. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/21-5257/21-5257-2023-06-30.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Flyers Rights Education Fund, Inc. v. FAA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                On October 29, 2018, 189 people boarded a Boeing 737 MAX airplane in Jakarta, Indonesia. A few minutes after takeoff, the plane crashed. No one survived. Five months later, 157 people aboard a 737 MAX in Ethiopia suffered the same fate. The Federal Aviation Administration then grounded the 737 MAX, prompting modifications by Boeing that eventually led the agency to recertify the plane. In this Freedom of Information Act suit, Flyers Rights Education Fund and its president seek documents that the FAA relied upon during the recertification process. Congress exempted from FOIA’s reach “commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential,” and the district court determined that is precisely what the FAA withheld.
 
The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that when an agency incorporates exempt information into its own comments, it will often be able to release at least part of those comments without revealing the exempt information. Here, however, the FAA explained that these documents “contained FAA comments to Boeing’s project deliverables, which in themselves would reveal technical data and Boeing’s proprietary methods of compliance.” Notably, the FAA released two other documents containing its comments in redacted form. That fact, coupled with the FAA’s nonconclusory affidavits and Vaughn index, demonstrates that it understands the difference between comments that reveal Boeing’s confidential information and comments that do not. Accordingly, even as to these two withheld documents, the FAA has demonstrated that it complied with its segregability obligations.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling sustaining the Federal Aviation Administration’s decision to withhold or redact information requested by Flyers Rights Education Fund based on FOIA Exemption 4.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-06-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>TATEL</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-5257</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2023/h049994.html</id>
        	<title>Mohler v. County of Santa Clara</title>
        	<updated>2023-06-08T15:01:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-06-08T15:01:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2023/h049994.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Since 1961, Santa Clara County has owned and operated Reid-Hillview Airport, a reliever airport for the San Jose International Airport. Reid-Hillview serves all aviation other than commercial passenger flights and air carrier aviation, supports emergency responses for Bay Area hospitals, and houses Cal Fire and Civil Air Patrol operations. Although the County is required to operate the airport until 2030, in 2018 the Board of Supervisors voted to engage with the City of San Jose in a joint planning process concerning possible alternative uses of Reid-Hillview after 2031. Mohler claims that, in furtherance of this plan, the County intentionally has allowed the airport to fall into disrepair. 

Mohler sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the county has committed waste by failing to perform basic maintenance; has failed to repair hangars, rendering one nonfunctional and allowing rust to drip onto planes; and has failed to renew soon-to-expire leases for fixed base operators (which provide support operations such as flight training, aircraft maintenance or repair, and aircraft rental), threatening significant revenue losses. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Code of Civil Procedure 526a’s prohibition against waste requires more than a mistaken exercise of judgment or discretion. Mohler failed to show that the County has any duty to maintain the airport and failed to allege “dangerous conditions.” &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2023/h049994.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Mohler v. County of Santa Clara" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Since 1961, Santa Clara County has owned and operated Reid-Hillview Airport, a reliever airport for the San Jose International Airport. Reid-Hillview serves all aviation other than commercial passenger flights and air carrier aviation, supports emergency responses for Bay Area hospitals, and houses Cal Fire and Civil Air Patrol operations. Although the County is required to operate the airport until 2030, in 2018 the Board of Supervisors voted to engage with the City of San Jose in a joint planning process concerning possible alternative uses of Reid-Hillview after 2031. Mohler claims that, in furtherance of this plan, the County intentionally has allowed the airport to fall into disrepair. 

Mohler sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the county has committed waste by failing to perform basic maintenance; has failed to repair hangars, rendering one nonfunctional and allowing rust to drip onto planes; and has failed to renew soon-to-expire leases for fixed base operators (which provide support operations such as flight training, aircraft maintenance or repair, and aircraft rental), threatening significant revenue losses. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Code of Civil Procedure 526a’s prohibition against waste requires more than a mistaken exercise of judgment or discretion. Mohler failed to show that the County has any duty to maintain the airport and failed to allege “dangerous conditions.”
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Court of appeal affirms the dismissal of a suit challenging Santa Clara County&#039;s failure to maintain Reid-Hillview Airport.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-06-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>California</case:state>
						<case:court>California Courts of Appeal</case:court>
							<case:judge>Bamattre-Manoukian</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>H049994</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
										<category term="California Courts of Appeal"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/21-60312/21-60312-2023-05-10.html</id>
        	<title>Jackson Muni Airport v. Harkins</title>
        	<updated>2023-05-10T09:30:15-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-05-10T09:30:15-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/21-60312/21-60312-2023-05-10.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Jackson-Medgar Wiley Evers International Airport is a major airport located in Jackson, Mississippi. Since 1960, the airport has been operated by the Jackson Municipal Airport Authority, whose five commissioners are selected by the city government. In 2016, the Mississippi legislature passed, and the governor signed into law SB 2162, which abolishes the Jackson Municipal Airport Authority and replaces it with a regional authority composed of nine commissioners, only two of whom are selected by Jackson city government.
 
A Jackson citizen filed a suit seeking to enjoin the law. The mayor, the city council, the Jackson Municipal Airport Authority, its board of commissioners, and the commissioners in their individual capacities intervened in that lawsuit. The intervenors contend that SB 2162 violates the Equal Protection rights of the citizens of Jackson by eliminating the locally controlled Jackson Municipal Airport Authority for racially discriminatory reasons. The intervenors served subpoenas on eight nonparty state legislators who participated in SB 2162’s drafting and passage. The Legislators refused to comply with Request #3 in the subpoena, which sought documents and communications related to SB 2162, asserting that any responsive discovery would either be irrelevant or protected by legislative privilege. The magistrate judge, and later the district court, rejected this position.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the Legislators to produce a privilege log. But the district court erred in broadly holding that legislative privilege was automatically waived for any documents that have been shared with third parties. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/21-60312/21-60312-2023-05-10.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Jackson Muni Airport v. Harkins" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Jackson-Medgar Wiley Evers International Airport is a major airport located in Jackson, Mississippi. Since 1960, the airport has been operated by the Jackson Municipal Airport Authority, whose five commissioners are selected by the city government. In 2016, the Mississippi legislature passed, and the governor signed into law SB 2162, which abolishes the Jackson Municipal Airport Authority and replaces it with a regional authority composed of nine commissioners, only two of whom are selected by Jackson city government.
 
A Jackson citizen filed a suit seeking to enjoin the law. The mayor, the city council, the Jackson Municipal Airport Authority, its board of commissioners, and the commissioners in their individual capacities intervened in that lawsuit. The intervenors contend that SB 2162 violates the Equal Protection rights of the citizens of Jackson by eliminating the locally controlled Jackson Municipal Airport Authority for racially discriminatory reasons. The intervenors served subpoenas on eight nonparty state legislators who participated in SB 2162’s drafting and passage. The Legislators refused to comply with Request #3 in the subpoena, which sought documents and communications related to SB 2162, asserting that any responsive discovery would either be irrelevant or protected by legislative privilege. The magistrate judge, and later the district court, rejected this position.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the Legislators to produce a privilege log. But the district court erred in broadly holding that legislative privilege was automatically waived for any documents that have been shared with third parties.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling in ordering the Legislators to produce a privilege log. However, the court held that the district court erred in broadly holding that legislative privilege was automatically waived for any documents that have been shared with third parties.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-05-10</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jennifer Walker Elrod</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-60312</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2023/b323487.html</id>
        	<title>Air 7, LLC v. County of Ventura</title>
        	<updated>2023-04-19T08:01:40-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-04-19T08:01:40-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2023/b323487.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Air 7, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, and its owner, the Peter J. Koral Trust, owned a Gulfstream G-550 jet aircraft. Air 7’s headquarters were located at the Camarillo Airport in Ventura County. The owner was a resident of California. The County of Ventura (the “County”) imposed a tax on the aircraft that was permanently removed from California before the tax lien date of January 1 for the tax year 2017. Air 7 sued the County for a refund of the taxes, statutory interest, and penalties the County had imposed. The trial court found the aircraft was not permanently removed from Ventura County on the tax lien date because it had not established situs elsewhere. The trial court entered judgment for the County.
 
The Second Appellate District reversed. The court explained that the aircraft was removed from California with the intent that removal be permanent, and the aircraft never returned to California during the 2017 tax year. Accordingly, the court concluded the aircraft was not “situated” or “habitually situated” in California. The tax imposed on the aircraft violates California law irrespective of whether the aircraft was situated and taxed in another state. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2023/b323487.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Air 7, LLC v. County of Ventura" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Air 7, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, and its owner, the Peter J. Koral Trust, owned a Gulfstream G-550 jet aircraft. Air 7’s headquarters were located at the Camarillo Airport in Ventura County. The owner was a resident of California. The County of Ventura (the “County”) imposed a tax on the aircraft that was permanently removed from California before the tax lien date of January 1 for the tax year 2017. Air 7 sued the County for a refund of the taxes, statutory interest, and penalties the County had imposed. The trial court found the aircraft was not permanently removed from Ventura County on the tax lien date because it had not established situs elsewhere. The trial court entered judgment for the County.
 
The Second Appellate District reversed. The court explained that the aircraft was removed from California with the intent that removal be permanent, and the aircraft never returned to California during the 2017 tax year. Accordingly, the court concluded the aircraft was not “situated” or “habitually situated” in California. The tax imposed on the aircraft violates California law irrespective of whether the aircraft was situated and taxed in another state.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s judgment in favor of Ventura County following Plaintiff’s claims that the County’s imposition of a tax on the aircraft violates California law irrespective of whether the aircraft was situated and taxed in another state. The court held that the County improperly imposed a property tax on the aircraft.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-04-19</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>California</case:state>
						<case:court>California Courts of Appeal</case:court>
							<case:judge>BALTODANO</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>B323487</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Real Estate &amp; Property Law"/>
							<category term="Tax Law"/>
										<category term="California Courts of Appeal"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/22-2045/22-2045-2023-04-18.html</id>
        	<title>Erin Osmon v. US</title>
        	<updated>2023-04-18T11:00:46-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-04-18T11:00:46-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/22-2045/22-2045-2023-04-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Plaintiff sued the federal government under the FTCA, alleging one count of battery. A magistrate judge recommended dismissing Plaintiff’s suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in a detailed memorandum devoted solely to whether the FTCA waives sovereign immunity for the type of claim Plaintiff brought. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation. The district court concluded it need not review the recommendation de novo because Plaintiff failed to object with sufficient specificity and, in any event, “the Magistrate Judge’s proposed conclusions of law are correct and are consistent with current case law.
 
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the district court erred in concluding Plaintiff did not adequately preserve her claim for review. The court explained that a party wishing to avail itself of its right to de novo review must be “sufficiently specific to focus the district court’s attention on the factual and legal issues that are truly in dispute.” The court concluded that Plaintiff cleared that bar.
 
Further, the court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that the FTCA permits people who allege they were assaulted by TSA screeners to sue the federal government. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/22-2045/22-2045-2023-04-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Erin Osmon v. US" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Plaintiff sued the federal government under the FTCA, alleging one count of battery. A magistrate judge recommended dismissing Plaintiff’s suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in a detailed memorandum devoted solely to whether the FTCA waives sovereign immunity for the type of claim Plaintiff brought. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation. The district court concluded it need not review the recommendation de novo because Plaintiff failed to object with sufficient specificity and, in any event, “the Magistrate Judge’s proposed conclusions of law are correct and are consistent with current case law.
 
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the district court erred in concluding Plaintiff did not adequately preserve her claim for review. The court explained that a party wishing to avail itself of its right to de novo review must be “sufficiently specific to focus the district court’s attention on the factual and legal issues that are truly in dispute.” The court concluded that Plaintiff cleared that bar.
 
Further, the court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that the FTCA permits people who allege they were assaulted by TSA screeners to sue the federal government.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment adopting a magistrate judge’s recommendation dismissing Plaintiff’s battery suit against the federal government under the FTCA. The court held that the FTCA permits people who allege they were assaulted by TSA screeners to sue the federal government.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-04-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>TOBY HEYTENS</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-2045</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Personal Injury"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/22-5125/22-5125-2023-04-18.html</id>
        	<title>Air Excursions LLC v. Janet Yellen</title>
        	<updated>2023-04-18T06:31:22-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-04-18T06:31:22-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/22-5125/22-5125-2023-04-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Air Excursions, LLC provides air transportation services in Alaska and the Pacific Northwest. It claims that the United States Department of Treasury (Treasury) erroneously disbursed pandemic relief funds to a competitor airline and challenges that disbursement as unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 
 
The DC Circuit vacated the district court’s order dismissing the complaint on the merits and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the competitor standing doctrine supplies the link between increased competition and tangible injury but does not, by itself, supply the link between the challenged conduct and increased competition. The latter must be apparent from the nature of the challenged action itself—as in U.S. Telecom Association—or from the well-pleaded allegations of Plaintiff’s complaint. The court concluded that the complaint failed to establish that Air Excursions has suffered a competitive injury satisfying Article III’s injury in fact requirement. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/22-5125/22-5125-2023-04-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Air Excursions LLC v. Janet Yellen" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Air Excursions, LLC provides air transportation services in Alaska and the Pacific Northwest. It claims that the United States Department of Treasury (Treasury) erroneously disbursed pandemic relief funds to a competitor airline and challenges that disbursement as unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 
 
The DC Circuit vacated the district court’s order dismissing the complaint on the merits and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the competitor standing doctrine supplies the link between increased competition and tangible injury but does not, by itself, supply the link between the challenged conduct and increased competition. The latter must be apparent from the nature of the challenged action itself—as in U.S. Telecom Association—or from the well-pleaded allegations of Plaintiff’s complaint. The court concluded that the complaint failed to establish that Air Excursions has suffered a competitive injury satisfying Article III’s injury in fact requirement.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The DC Circuit vacated the district court’s order dismissing Air Excursions’ Administrative Procedure Act complaint against the United States Department of Treasury. The court held that the complaint failed to establish that Air Excursions suffered a competitive injury. The court remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-04-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>HENDERSON</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-5125</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/22-10740/22-10740-2023-04-13.html</id>
        	<title>Aspen American Insurance Company v. Landstar Ranger, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2023-04-13T06:01:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-04-13T06:01:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/22-10740/22-10740-2023-04-13.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Tessco Technologies Inc. hired Landstar Ranger, Inc. as a transportation broker to secure a motor carrier to transport an expensive load of Tessco’s cargo to a purchaser across state lines. But Landstar mistakenly turned the shipment over to a thief posing as a Landstar-registered carrier, who ran off with Tessco’s shipment. Tessco’s insurer, Aspen American Insurance Company, sued Landstar, claiming Landstar was negligent under Florida law in its selection of the carrier. The district court dismissed Aspen’s negligence claims against Landstar, concluding those claims were expressly preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (“FAAAA”). 
 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that just as the phrase “with respect to the transportation of property” “massively limits” the preemption provision, the court reads the phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” to impose a meaningful limit on the exception to the preemption provision. Second, the court found that the phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” has an operative effect only by requiring a direct connection between the state law and motor vehicles. The court reasoned that the specifics of Aspen’s complaint make us even more confident that Aspen’s claims are not “with respect to motor vehicles” within the meaning of the safety exception. Aspen’s complaint says nothing at all about motor vehicles. And Aspen’s negligence and gross negligence counts challenge only Landstar’s “selection of the motor carrier.” The complaint does not purport to enforce any standard or regulation on the ownership, maintenance, or operation of “a vehicle, machine, tractor, trailer, or semitrailer propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used on a highway in transportation.” &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/22-10740/22-10740-2023-04-13.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Aspen American Insurance Company v. Landstar Ranger, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Tessco Technologies Inc. hired Landstar Ranger, Inc. as a transportation broker to secure a motor carrier to transport an expensive load of Tessco’s cargo to a purchaser across state lines. But Landstar mistakenly turned the shipment over to a thief posing as a Landstar-registered carrier, who ran off with Tessco’s shipment. Tessco’s insurer, Aspen American Insurance Company, sued Landstar, claiming Landstar was negligent under Florida law in its selection of the carrier. The district court dismissed Aspen’s negligence claims against Landstar, concluding those claims were expressly preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (“FAAAA”). 
 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that just as the phrase “with respect to the transportation of property” “massively limits” the preemption provision, the court reads the phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” to impose a meaningful limit on the exception to the preemption provision. Second, the court found that the phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” has an operative effect only by requiring a direct connection between the state law and motor vehicles. The court reasoned that the specifics of Aspen’s complaint make us even more confident that Aspen’s claims are not “with respect to motor vehicles” within the meaning of the safety exception. Aspen’s complaint says nothing at all about motor vehicles. And Aspen’s negligence and gross negligence counts challenge only Landstar’s “selection of the motor carrier.” The complaint does not purport to enforce any standard or regulation on the ownership, maintenance, or operation of “a vehicle, machine, tractor, trailer, or semitrailer propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used on a highway in transportation.”
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling dismissing Aspen American Insurance Company’s negligence claims against Landstar, concluding those claims were expressly preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-04-13</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>BRASHER</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-10740</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Insurance Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/21-71170/21-71170-2023-03-29.html</id>
        	<title>CITY OF LOS ANGELES V. FAA, ET AL</title>
        	<updated>2023-03-29T09:03:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-03-29T09:03:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/21-71170/21-71170-2023-03-29.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The passenger terminal at the Bob Hope “Hollywood Burbank” Airport is more than fifty years old and violates safety standards set by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). So the Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority, which owns and operates the Airport, reached an agreement with the City of Burbank to build a new terminal. In 2016, Burbank voters approved that agreement as required by local law. But before FAA could sign off on the project, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. Sections 4321 et seq., required the agency to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). In May 2021, the FAA issued a Final EIS (FEIS) and Record of Decision (ROD) that let the Authority start constructing the replacement terminal, and shortly after, the City of Los Angeles petitioned for review.
 
The Ninth Circuit granted the petition in part and remanded for FAA to redo the deficient parts of its analysis. The panel held that contrary to Los Angeles’s argument—that the FAA improperly eliminated certain alternatives because they were not approved pursuant to Measure B—the FAA properly eliminated the new airport, remote landside facility, and southeast terminal alternatives based on rational considerations that were independent of Measure B. In addition, the panel held that even if the Measure B criteria foreclosed consideration of alternatives other than the Project, that would not be enough to establish an irreversible commitment to the Project. The panel considered the rest of Los Angeles’s objections to the FAA’s impact analysis and found them meritless. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/21-71170/21-71170-2023-03-29.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "CITY OF LOS ANGELES V. FAA, ET AL" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The passenger terminal at the Bob Hope “Hollywood Burbank” Airport is more than fifty years old and violates safety standards set by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). So the Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority, which owns and operates the Airport, reached an agreement with the City of Burbank to build a new terminal. In 2016, Burbank voters approved that agreement as required by local law. But before FAA could sign off on the project, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. Sections 4321 et seq., required the agency to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). In May 2021, the FAA issued a Final EIS (FEIS) and Record of Decision (ROD) that let the Authority start constructing the replacement terminal, and shortly after, the City of Los Angeles petitioned for review.
 
The Ninth Circuit granted the petition in part and remanded for FAA to redo the deficient parts of its analysis. The panel held that contrary to Los Angeles’s argument—that the FAA improperly eliminated certain alternatives because they were not approved pursuant to Measure B—the FAA properly eliminated the new airport, remote landside facility, and southeast terminal alternatives based on rational considerations that were independent of Measure B. In addition, the panel held that even if the Measure B criteria foreclosed consideration of alternatives other than the Project, that would not be enough to establish an irreversible commitment to the Project. The panel considered the rest of Los Angeles’s objections to the FAA’s impact analysis and found them meritless.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Ninth Circuit granted in part the City of Los Angeles’s petition for review challenging the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”)’s issuance of a Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and Record of Decision (ROD) that let the Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority start constructing a replacement terminal at the Bob Hope “Hollywood Burbank” Airport (the “Project”).
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-03-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Higginson</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-71170</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/22-11341/22-11341-2023-03-08.html</id>
        	<title>Professional Airline Flight Control Association v. Spirit Airlines, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2023-03-08T14:02:05-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-03-08T14:02:05-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/22-11341/22-11341-2023-03-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Professional Airline Flight Control Association complained that Spirit is attempting to change its agreement. Spirit responded that its unilateral decision to open a second operations control center is permitted by the parties’ agreement. The district court agreed with Spirit that this dispute is minor and dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. Section 151 et seq., divides labor disputes into two categories: disputes over the interpretation of an existing agreement are “minor” and resolved exclusively through binding arbitration, and disputes over proposed changes to an agreement or over a new agreement are “major” and addressed through bargaining and mediation. During a major dispute, district courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to enjoin violations of the status quo. But district courts ordinarily lack jurisdiction over minor disputes. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/22-11341/22-11341-2023-03-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Professional Airline Flight Control Association v. Spirit Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Professional Airline Flight Control Association complained that Spirit is attempting to change its agreement. Spirit responded that its unilateral decision to open a second operations control center is permitted by the parties’ agreement. The district court agreed with Spirit that this dispute is minor and dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. Section 151 et seq., divides labor disputes into two categories: disputes over the interpretation of an existing agreement are “minor” and resolved exclusively through binding arbitration, and disputes over proposed changes to an agreement or over a new agreement are “major” and addressed through bargaining and mediation. During a major dispute, district courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to enjoin violations of the status quo. But district courts ordinarily lack jurisdiction over minor disputes. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the Professional Airline Flight Control Association’s claims against Spirit Airlines is minor. Accordingly, the court agreed with the district court and affirmed the court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-03-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>WILLIAM PRYOR</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-11341</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/22-1004/22-1004-2023-03-03.html</id>
        	<title>In re: Flyers Rights Education Fund, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2023-03-03T08:03:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-03-03T08:03:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/22-1004/22-1004-2023-03-03.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Flyers Rights and its current president have taken aim at the small size of airline seats. In their view, small seats slow emergency evacuations and cause medical problems like blood clots. They have petitioned for a writ of mandamus ordering the FAA “to commence rulemaking to establish minimum seat size and spacing requirements for commercial aircraft and to issue a final rule by a date certain.”
 
The DC Circuit denied Flyers Rights’ petition. The court held that Flyers Rights lacks a clear and indisputable right to relief. That’s because the FAA Reauthorization Act speaks only of seat-size regulations that “are necessary for the safety of passengers,” and on the record before the court, the necessity of those regulations is neither clear nor indisputable. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/22-1004/22-1004-2023-03-03.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re: Flyers Rights Education Fund, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Flyers Rights and its current president have taken aim at the small size of airline seats. In their view, small seats slow emergency evacuations and cause medical problems like blood clots. They have petitioned for a writ of mandamus ordering the FAA “to commence rulemaking to establish minimum seat size and spacing requirements for commercial aircraft and to issue a final rule by a date certain.”
 
The DC Circuit denied Flyers Rights’ petition. The court held that Flyers Rights lacks a clear and indisputable right to relief. That’s because the FAA Reauthorization Act speaks only of seat-size regulations that “are necessary for the safety of passengers,” and on the record before the court, the necessity of those regulations is neither clear nor indisputable.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The DC Circuit denied Flyers Rights’ petition for a writ of mandamus ordering the FAA “to commence rulemaking to establish minimum seat size and spacing requirements for commercial aircraft and to issue a final rule by a date certain.” The court held that Flyers Rights lacks a clear and indisputable right to relief.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-03-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>WALKER</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-1004</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/22-1109/22-1109-2023-01-25.html</id>
        	<title>Yates v. City of Chicago</title>
        	<updated>2023-01-25T09:30:33-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-01-25T09:30:33-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/22-1109/22-1109-2023-01-25.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		From 1993-2017, Chicago treated O’Hare Airport aviation security officers as law-enforcement personnel, able to make arrests while employed and carry concealed firearms after retirement. The officers were unarmed and reported to the Commissioner of Aviation rather than the Chief of Police. In 2017 Chicago concluded that they are not law enforcement personnel. The Illinois Labor Relations Board sustained the decision. Neither the union nor any of its members contested that decision in state court. Three aviation security officers filed a federal suit, contending that the reclassification violated the Due Process Clause.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. There is no “fundamental right” to be a law enforcement officer. Although the Chicago Code says that the officers “shall be sworn in as special policemen,” the process due for any violation of state or local law or of a collective-bargaining agreement is the opportunity to sue in state court. The union bypassed that opportunity in 2018. A suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 is not a way to supersede that decision. The collective-bargaining agreement does not promise that aviation security officers will remain law enforcement officials and the correct entity to seek review was the union, not individual members. The court upheld a $40,0000 award of costs. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/22-1109/22-1109-2023-01-25.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Yates v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                From 1993-2017, Chicago treated O’Hare Airport aviation security officers as law-enforcement personnel, able to make arrests while employed and carry concealed firearms after retirement. The officers were unarmed and reported to the Commissioner of Aviation rather than the Chief of Police. In 2017 Chicago concluded that they are not law enforcement personnel. The Illinois Labor Relations Board sustained the decision. Neither the union nor any of its members contested that decision in state court. Three aviation security officers filed a federal suit, contending that the reclassification violated the Due Process Clause.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. There is no “fundamental right” to be a law enforcement officer. Although the Chicago Code says that the officers “shall be sworn in as special policemen,” the process due for any violation of state or local law or of a collective-bargaining agreement is the opportunity to sue in state court. The union bypassed that opportunity in 2018. A suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 is not a way to supersede that decision. The collective-bargaining agreement does not promise that aviation security officers will remain law enforcement officials and the correct entity to seek review was the union, not individual members. The court upheld a $40,0000 award of costs.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Seventh Circuit rejects due process claims by aviation security officers that were based on the city&#039;s decision that they are not law enforcement personnel.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-01-25</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Frank Hoover Easterbrook</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-1109</case:docket_number>
																<case:docket_number>21-2953</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/20-60676/20-60676-2023-01-24.html</id>
        	<title>Flt Training Intl v. FAA</title>
        	<updated>2023-01-24T10:31:00-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-01-24T10:31:00-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/20-60676/20-60676-2023-01-24.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		This case concerns rules and regulations issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) governing two types of pilot credentials: airline transport pilot (ATP) certificates, which enable pilots to fly for airlines, and type ratings, which authorize pilots to command complex, “type-rated” aircraft. Flight Training International, Inc. (FTI), a provider of flight training courses, wants to offer a course that uses type-rated aircraft but culminates in the issuance of an ATP certificate without a type rating. A rule (Rule) issued by the FAA in 2020 prohibits it from doing that, so FTI petitioned us to set aside the rule. FTI argued that the rule effectively amends portions of 14 C.F.R. pt. 61, and, therefore, should have been promulgated only after notice and comment in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
 
The Fifth Circuit agreed and granted the petition. The court explained that the Must-Issue Rule is a legislative rule, but it was not promulgated after notice and comment as required by the APA. Because the Rule was issued “without observance of procedure required by law,” FTI’s petition must be granted, and the Rule set aside. In light of this disposition, the court did not reach FTI’s alternative argument that the Rule is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/20-60676/20-60676-2023-01-24.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Flt Training Intl v. FAA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                This case concerns rules and regulations issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) governing two types of pilot credentials: airline transport pilot (ATP) certificates, which enable pilots to fly for airlines, and type ratings, which authorize pilots to command complex, “type-rated” aircraft. Flight Training International, Inc. (FTI), a provider of flight training courses, wants to offer a course that uses type-rated aircraft but culminates in the issuance of an ATP certificate without a type rating. A rule (Rule) issued by the FAA in 2020 prohibits it from doing that, so FTI petitioned us to set aside the rule. FTI argued that the rule effectively amends portions of 14 C.F.R. pt. 61, and, therefore, should have been promulgated only after notice and comment in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
 
The Fifth Circuit agreed and granted the petition. The court explained that the Must-Issue Rule is a legislative rule, but it was not promulgated after notice and comment as required by the APA. Because the Rule was issued “without observance of procedure required by law,” FTI’s petition must be granted, and the Rule set aside. In light of this disposition, the court did not reach FTI’s alternative argument that the Rule is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Fifth Circuit granted Flight Training International, Inc.’s (FTI) petition to set aside the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) rule (Rule) prohibiting FTI from offering a course that uses type-rated aircraft but culminates in the issuance of an ATP certificate without a type rating.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-01-24</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James L. Dennis</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>20-60676</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-73314/20-73314-2022-10-05.html</id>
        	<title>SAVE OUR SKIES LA V. FAA, ET AL</title>
        	<updated>2022-10-31T12:58:19-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-10-31T12:58:19-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-73314/20-73314-2022-10-05.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The two procedures at issue are the HARYS FOUR departure procedure at Van Nuys Airport, and the SLAPP TWO departure procedure at Burbank Airport. Petitioner contends that the FAA failed to sufficiently analyze the procedures, in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), the Administrative Procedure Act, and section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1996.
 
The key issue is the timeliness of Petitioner’s challenges. Petitions for review of FAA orders must be filed within 60 days after the order was issued, or where there are “reasonable grounds” to excuse a delay in filing. 49 U.S.C. Section 46110(a). The Ninth Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part the petition for review brought by an association of nearby residents challenging the FAA orders. The panel held that the statutory “reasonable grounds” exception did not apply. A petitioner’s own mistake cannot excuse its delay in filing. The panel further held that the FAA’s alleged violative conduct did not toll the statute of limitations for filing the petition. Petitioner cannot circumvent the strict time limits imposed by section 46110 simply by invoking the Administrative Procedure Act. The panel concluded that the petition of review of HARYS ONE and SLAPP ONE was untimely, and it dismissed the petition for review insofar as it challenged those orders. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-73314/20-73314-2022-10-05.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "SAVE OUR SKIES LA V. FAA, ET AL" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The two procedures at issue are the HARYS FOUR departure procedure at Van Nuys Airport, and the SLAPP TWO departure procedure at Burbank Airport. Petitioner contends that the FAA failed to sufficiently analyze the procedures, in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), the Administrative Procedure Act, and section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1996.
 
The key issue is the timeliness of Petitioner’s challenges. Petitions for review of FAA orders must be filed within 60 days after the order was issued, or where there are “reasonable grounds” to excuse a delay in filing. 49 U.S.C. Section 46110(a). The Ninth Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part the petition for review brought by an association of nearby residents challenging the FAA orders. The panel held that the statutory “reasonable grounds” exception did not apply. A petitioner’s own mistake cannot excuse its delay in filing. The panel further held that the FAA’s alleged violative conduct did not toll the statute of limitations for filing the petition. Petitioner cannot circumvent the strict time limits imposed by section 46110 simply by invoking the Administrative Procedure Act. The panel concluded that the petition of review of HARYS ONE and SLAPP ONE was untimely, and it dismissed the petition for review insofar as it challenged those orders.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Ninth Circuit denied in part, and dismissed in part, a petition for review brought by an association of nearby residents challenging several Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) orders implementing and revising departure procedures at the Van Nuys and Burbank airports
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-10-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Miller</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>20-73314</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/20-4129/20-4129-2022-08-22.html</id>
        	<title>Day v. SkyWest Airlines</title>
        	<updated>2022-08-22T08:30:58-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-08-22T08:30:58-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/20-4129/20-4129-2022-08-22.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Kelly Day appealed the district court’s dismissal of the diversity action she filed against SkyWest Airlines for personal injuries she allegedly sustained when a SkyWest flight attendant carelessly struck her with a beverage cart. The district court granted SkyWest’s motion to dismiss the action as preempted under the Airline Deregulation Act (“ADA”), which preempted state laws “related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier.” The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concurred with sister circuits that personal-injury claims arising out of an airline employee’s failure to exercise due care were not “related to” a deregulated price, route, or service. Therefore, the Court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Day’s action and remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/20-4129/20-4129-2022-08-22.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Day v. SkyWest Airlines" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Kelly Day appealed the district court’s dismissal of the diversity action she filed against SkyWest Airlines for personal injuries she allegedly sustained when a SkyWest flight attendant carelessly struck her with a beverage cart. The district court granted SkyWest’s motion to dismiss the action as preempted under the Airline Deregulation Act (“ADA”), which preempted state laws “related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier.” The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concurred with sister circuits that personal-injury claims arising out of an airline employee’s failure to exercise due care were not “related to” a deregulated price, route, or service. Therefore, the Court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Day’s action and remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concurred with sister circuits that personal-injury claims arising out of an airline employee’s failure to exercise due care were not “related to” a deregulated price, route, or service.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-08-22</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Michael R. Murphy</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>20-4129</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Personal Injury"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/20-8000/20-8000-2022-07-26.html</id>
        	<title>Frey v. Town of Jackson, WY, et al.</title>
        	<updated>2022-07-26T11:02:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-07-26T11:02:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/20-8000/20-8000-2022-07-26.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		As Plaintiff William Frey proceeded through the Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) checkpoint at Jackson Hole Airport in Teton County, Wyoming, the body scanner alerted TSA screeners to a potentially suspicious area on Plaintiff’s person. When the security screeners informed Plaintiff that they would have to conduct a pat down, Plaintiff became agitated and repeatedly refused to cooperate. So the security screeners summoned a police officer, Defendant Nathan Karnes, who arrested Plaintiff. After being transported to the Teton County Jail for booking, Plaintiff continued his noncooperation, refusing to participate in the booking process and demanding that jail officials allow him to have an attorney present. Jail officials detained Plaintiff for about three hours before releasing him. Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, alleging many violations of his rights. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, denied leave to file a second amended complaint, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims, awarded attorney’s fees to the Municipal Defendants, and sanctioned Plaintiff’s attorneys. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that some of his claims should have survived dismissal, that the district court should have permitted him to add some of his new proposed claims in a second amended complaint, and that the district court should not have awarded any attorney’s fees. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/20-8000/20-8000-2022-07-26.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Frey v. Town of Jackson, WY, et al." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                As Plaintiff William Frey proceeded through the Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) checkpoint at Jackson Hole Airport in Teton County, Wyoming, the body scanner alerted TSA screeners to a potentially suspicious area on Plaintiff’s person. When the security screeners informed Plaintiff that they would have to conduct a pat down, Plaintiff became agitated and repeatedly refused to cooperate. So the security screeners summoned a police officer, Defendant Nathan Karnes, who arrested Plaintiff. After being transported to the Teton County Jail for booking, Plaintiff continued his noncooperation, refusing to participate in the booking process and demanding that jail officials allow him to have an attorney present. Jail officials detained Plaintiff for about three hours before releasing him. Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, alleging many violations of his rights. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, denied leave to file a second amended complaint, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims, awarded attorney’s fees to the Municipal Defendants, and sanctioned Plaintiff’s attorneys. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that some of his claims should have survived dismissal, that the district court should have permitted him to add some of his new proposed claims in a second amended complaint, and that the district court should not have awarded any attorney’s fees. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Litigation arose from a contentious encounter between a passenger attempting to go through the security checkpoint at the Jackson Hole Airport in Teton County, Wyoming.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-07-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Carson</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>20-8000</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2022/a158352.html</id>
        	<title>Ilczyszyn v. Southwest Airlines Co.</title>
        	<updated>2022-06-29T13:00:55-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-06-29T13:00:55-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2022/a158352.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Southwest Airlines passenger Ilczyszyn suffered a massive pulmonary embolism while locked inside an airplane lavatory during the final stages of a flight from Oakland to Orange County. Rather than treating Ilczyszyn’s circumstances as a medical emergency, the flight crew perceived him to be a security threat; he did not receive medical care until after the flight had landed and the other passengers had disembarked. By then, he had gone into cardiac arrest. Although he was resuscitated, he later died in a hospital. 

A jury found that Southwest was negligent but found against the plaintiffs on the issue of causation.  The court of appeal affirmed. The trial court properly found that Southwest was immune from liability under both 49 U.S.C. 44941 (Aviation and Transportation Security Act), and Civil Code section 47(b) for any act or omission occurring after the flight crew decided to treat Ilczyszyn’s medical emergency as a security threat. The court rejected arguments that these statutory immunities apply only to the actual disclosure of a security threat, not to conduct associated with such disclosures, and that the immunity is inapplicable here because the gravamen of their case was based solely on the flight crew’s negligent failure to identify the medical emergency. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2022/a158352.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Ilczyszyn v. Southwest Airlines Co." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Southwest Airlines passenger Ilczyszyn suffered a massive pulmonary embolism while locked inside an airplane lavatory during the final stages of a flight from Oakland to Orange County. Rather than treating Ilczyszyn’s circumstances as a medical emergency, the flight crew perceived him to be a security threat; he did not receive medical care until after the flight had landed and the other passengers had disembarked. By then, he had gone into cardiac arrest. Although he was resuscitated, he later died in a hospital. 

A jury found that Southwest was negligent but found against the plaintiffs on the issue of causation.  The court of appeal affirmed. The trial court properly found that Southwest was immune from liability under both 49 U.S.C. 44941 (Aviation and Transportation Security Act), and Civil Code section 47(b) for any act or omission occurring after the flight crew decided to treat Ilczyszyn’s medical emergency as a security threat. The court rejected arguments that these statutory immunities apply only to the actual disclosure of a security threat, not to conduct associated with such disclosures, and that the immunity is inapplicable here because the gravamen of their case was based solely on the flight crew’s negligent failure to identify the medical emergency.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Court of appeal upholds the rejection of a negligence case against an airline that misidentified a passenger&#039;s medical emergency as a security threat and failed to provide medical care.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-06-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>California</case:state>
						<case:court>California Courts of Appeal</case:court>
							<case:judge>East</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>A158352</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Personal Injury"/>
										<category term="California Courts of Appeal"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/20-1070/20-1070-2022-06-24.html</id>
        	<title>City of Scottsdale, Arizona v. FAA</title>
        	<updated>2022-06-24T06:31:02-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-06-24T06:31:02-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/20-1070/20-1070-2022-06-24.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The city of Scottsdale, Arizona filed a petition challenging the Federal Aviation Administration’s approval of certain east-bound flight paths out of the Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport, claiming the flights resulted in injury to the city because planes flying along those routes produce noise and pollution on property that the city owns. 

The D.C. Circuit denied Scottsdale&#039;s petition, holding that, while this is the type of harm that could confer standing, Scottsdale was unable to identify evidence proving the city suffered actual harm. The City presented no evidence of increased noise or pollution. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/20-1070/20-1070-2022-06-24.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "City of Scottsdale, Arizona v. FAA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The city of Scottsdale, Arizona filed a petition challenging the Federal Aviation Administration’s approval of certain east-bound flight paths out of the Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport, claiming the flights resulted in injury to the city because planes flying along those routes produce noise and pollution on property that the city owns. 

The D.C. Circuit denied Scottsdale&#039;s petition, holding that, while this is the type of harm that could confer standing, Scottsdale was unable to identify evidence proving the city suffered actual harm. The City presented no evidence of increased noise or pollution.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The D.C. Circuit held that the City of Scottsdale did not have standing to challenge a Federal Aviation Administration decision to approve certain east-bound flight paths out of the Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-06-24</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Walker</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>20-1070</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/21-1062/21-1062-2022-05-10.html</id>
        	<title>Ydil Pham v. NTSB</title>
        	<updated>2022-05-10T07:00:36-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-05-10T07:00:36-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/21-1062/21-1062-2022-05-10.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Petitioner is an experienced airline pilot. When he was interviewing for a new position, he was asked to take a urine test. Unable to provide an adequate sample, Petitioner left the site. Under FAA guidelines, walking out before providing a drug test sample is considered a refusal. The potential employer reported Petitioner&#039;s refusal to the FAA. The FAA sought to revoke Petitioner&#039;s pilot and medical certifications. However, at a hearing in front of the National Safety Transportation Board, the Board agreed with the FAA in sustaining the refusal, but reduced Petitioner&#039;s sanction to a 180-suspension. 

The D.C. Circuit denied Petitioner&#039;s petition for review, finding that by walking out before providing a sufficient urine sample, Petitioner&#039;s conduct was properly considered a refusal. In so holding, the court noted that the trial court credited the FAA witnesses while questioning the veracity of Petitioner&#039;s testimony.

The D.C. Circuit also granted the FAA&#039;s cross-petition, finding that the Board was required to defer to the FAA under these circumstances. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/21-1062/21-1062-2022-05-10.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Ydil Pham v. NTSB" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Petitioner is an experienced airline pilot. When he was interviewing for a new position, he was asked to take a urine test. Unable to provide an adequate sample, Petitioner left the site. Under FAA guidelines, walking out before providing a drug test sample is considered a refusal. The potential employer reported Petitioner&#039;s refusal to the FAA. The FAA sought to revoke Petitioner&#039;s pilot and medical certifications. However, at a hearing in front of the National Safety Transportation Board, the Board agreed with the FAA in sustaining the refusal, but reduced Petitioner&#039;s sanction to a 180-suspension. 

The D.C. Circuit denied Petitioner&#039;s petition for review, finding that by walking out before providing a sufficient urine sample, Petitioner&#039;s conduct was properly considered a refusal. In so holding, the court noted that the trial court credited the FAA witnesses while questioning the veracity of Petitioner&#039;s testimony.

The D.C. Circuit also granted the FAA&#039;s cross-petition, finding that the Board was required to defer to the FAA under these circumstances.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The D.C. Circuit denied an airline pilot&#039;s petition to invalidate a National Transportation Safety Board opinion finding that he refused a drug test., which led to the suspension of his certifications. The D.C. Circuit granted the FAA&#039;s cross-petition to reverse the Board&#039;s decision to reduce the pilot&#039;s sanction.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-05-10</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Judith Ann Wilson Rogers</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-1062</case:docket_number>
																<case:docket_number>21-1083</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1561/21-1561-2022-03-10.html</id>
        	<title>Fleming v. Cirrus Design Corp.</title>
        	<updated>2022-03-10T08:00:37-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-03-10T08:00:37-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1561/21-1561-2022-03-10.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Cirrus petitioned for inter partes review of a patent that describes ballistic parachute systems that use a rocket to deploy a parachute, slowing the fall of a crashing aircraft.  The Patent Trial and Appeal Board determined that the challenged claims are unpatentable as obvious over a combination of Cirrus Design’s Pilot Operation Handbook (POH) and the James patent.  The POH describes the operation of a ballistic parachute system installed on the Cirrus SR22 airplane. The James patent, titled “Semiautonomous Flight Director,” describes a “device for programming industry-standard autopilots” to allow “for the safe operation of any aircraft by an unskilled pilot.  The Board determined that proposed amended claims lacked written description.  

The Federal Circuit affirmed. The determination that the ordinarily skilled artisan would program James’s autonomous system to perform the claimed flight maneuvers suggested by POH is the result of a faithful application of precedent on obviousness, including a directive to consider the creativity of the ordinarily skilled artisan.  That the prior art cautioned pilots not to use autopilot in some emergency situations on some aircraft does not mean that the skilled artisan would have been dissuaded from doing so in all emergency situations on all aircraft. Substantial evidence supports the finding of lack of written description. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1561/21-1561-2022-03-10.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Fleming v. Cirrus Design Corp." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Cirrus petitioned for inter partes review of a patent that describes ballistic parachute systems that use a rocket to deploy a parachute, slowing the fall of a crashing aircraft.  The Patent Trial and Appeal Board determined that the challenged claims are unpatentable as obvious over a combination of Cirrus Design’s Pilot Operation Handbook (POH) and the James patent.  The POH describes the operation of a ballistic parachute system installed on the Cirrus SR22 airplane. The James patent, titled “Semiautonomous Flight Director,” describes a “device for programming industry-standard autopilots” to allow “for the safe operation of any aircraft by an unskilled pilot.  The Board determined that proposed amended claims lacked written description.  

The Federal Circuit affirmed. The determination that the ordinarily skilled artisan would program James’s autonomous system to perform the claimed flight maneuvers suggested by POH is the result of a faithful application of precedent on obviousness, including a directive to consider the creativity of the ordinarily skilled artisan.  That the prior art cautioned pilots not to use autopilot in some emergency situations on some aircraft does not mean that the skilled artisan would have been dissuaded from doing so in all emergency situations on all aircraft. Substantial evidence supports the finding of lack of written description.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit affirms obviousness findings for a patent that describes ballistic parachute systems that use a rocket to deploy a parachute, slowing the fall of a crashing aircraft.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-03-10</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stoll</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-1561</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/19-11330/19-11330-2022-02-03.html</id>
        	<title>Cavalieri v. Avior Airlines C.A.</title>
        	<updated>2022-02-03T11:31:22-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-02-03T11:31:22-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/19-11330/19-11330-2022-02-03.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Plaintiffs purchased tickets for Defendant’s commercial flights from Miami to Venezuela. Plaintiffs allege that their ticket prices reflected the “fully-paid contract” and that Defendant failed to sufficiently disclose any other fees required for passage. When checking in for their flights at the airport, however, Defendant informed Plaintiffs that they had to pay an additional $80 “Exit Fee” before being allowed to board their flights. Plaintiffs filed a breach of contract putative class action.

The district court dismissed the suit, concluding that the Airline Deregulation Act preempted Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim because it related to the price of the airline ticket and the Act’s preemption provision identifies actions relating to price as preempted.  The Eleventh Circuit reversed, first holding that the Plaintiffs plausibly alleged facts that would establish diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim seeks merely to enforce the parties’ private agreements regarding the cost of passage and does not invoke state laws or regulations to alter the agreed-upon price. The statute, 49 U.S.C. 41713(b)(1), provides: “[A] State . . . may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier..” The suit falls within the category of cases protected from preemption by Supreme Court precedent. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/19-11330/19-11330-2022-02-03.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Cavalieri v. Avior Airlines C.A." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Plaintiffs purchased tickets for Defendant’s commercial flights from Miami to Venezuela. Plaintiffs allege that their ticket prices reflected the “fully-paid contract” and that Defendant failed to sufficiently disclose any other fees required for passage. When checking in for their flights at the airport, however, Defendant informed Plaintiffs that they had to pay an additional $80 “Exit Fee” before being allowed to board their flights. Plaintiffs filed a breach of contract putative class action.

The district court dismissed the suit, concluding that the Airline Deregulation Act preempted Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim because it related to the price of the airline ticket and the Act’s preemption provision identifies actions relating to price as preempted.  The Eleventh Circuit reversed, first holding that the Plaintiffs plausibly alleged facts that would establish diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim seeks merely to enforce the parties’ private agreements regarding the cost of passage and does not invoke state laws or regulations to alter the agreed-upon price. The statute, 49 U.S.C. 41713(b)(1), provides: “[A] State . . . may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier..” The suit falls within the category of cases protected from preemption by Supreme Court precedent.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Passengers&#039; suit, alleging breach of contract based on an airline imposing an &quot;exit fee&quot; in addition to the ticket price, is not preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-02-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Per Curiam</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>19-11330</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/20-1443/20-1443-2021-12-28.html</id>
        	<title>Erwin v. Federal Aviation Administration</title>
        	<updated>2021-12-28T08:32:33-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2021-12-28T08:32:33-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/20-1443/20-1443-2021-12-28.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The DC Circuit remanded to the FAA for it to consider the evidence petitioner provided and to make the explicit &quot;why and wherefore&quot; of its action. In this case, after petitioner, a commercial airline pilot with a diagnosed alcohol dependence, tested positive for alcohol, the FAA withdrew his medical certification required for flight. Petitioner requested reconsideration of the FAA&#039;s decision with documentation to demonstrate that the positive test was due to unknowing exposure to alcohol. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/20-1443/20-1443-2021-12-28.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Erwin v. Federal Aviation Administration" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The DC Circuit remanded to the FAA for it to consider the evidence petitioner provided and to make the explicit &quot;why and wherefore&quot; of its action. In this case, after petitioner, a commercial airline pilot with a diagnosed alcohol dependence, tested positive for alcohol, the FAA withdrew his medical certification required for flight. Petitioner requested reconsideration of the FAA&#039;s decision with documentation to demonstrate that the positive test was due to unknowing exposure to alcohol.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                In a petition challenging the FAA&#039;s withdrawal of petitioner&#039;s medical certification required for flight, the DC Circuit remanded to the FAA for it to consider the evidence petitioner provided and to make the explicit &quot;why and wherefore&quot; of its action.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2021-12-28</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Karen LeCraft Henderson</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>20-1443</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/21-40720/21-40720-2021-12-22.html</id>
        	<title>Earl v. Boeing Company</title>
        	<updated>2021-12-22T16:30:18-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2021-12-22T16:30:18-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/21-40720/21-40720-2021-12-22.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Fifth Circuit granted defendants&#039; motion for a stay of discovery in this class action lawsuit while the court reviews their appeal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). Boeing and Southwest were sued for allegedly conspiring to conceal design defects in Boeing&#039;s 737 MAX 8 aircraft and thus defrauding airline ticket purchasers. After considering the Nken factors, the court concluded that Boeing and Southwest have made a strong showing that the court is likely to reverse the class-certification decision because they raised substantial predominance questions regarding damages. Furthermore, defendants have also made a strong showing regarding irreparable harm; plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that they or any other parties will be irreparably injured by delaying further discovery until the conclusion of the Rule 23(f) appeal; and the public interest supports staying district court proceedings to avoid potentially wasteful and unnecessary litigation costs where, as here, defendants have shown a substantial likelihood of success on appeal. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/21-40720/21-40720-2021-12-22.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Earl v. Boeing Company" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Fifth Circuit granted defendants&#039; motion for a stay of discovery in this class action lawsuit while the court reviews their appeal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). Boeing and Southwest were sued for allegedly conspiring to conceal design defects in Boeing&#039;s 737 MAX 8 aircraft and thus defrauding airline ticket purchasers. After considering the Nken factors, the court concluded that Boeing and Southwest have made a strong showing that the court is likely to reverse the class-certification decision because they raised substantial predominance questions regarding damages. Furthermore, defendants have also made a strong showing regarding irreparable harm; plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that they or any other parties will be irreparably injured by delaying further discovery until the conclusion of the Rule 23(f) appeal; and the public interest supports staying district court proceedings to avoid potentially wasteful and unnecessary litigation costs where, as here, defendants have shown a substantial likelihood of success on appeal.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Fifth Circuit granted defendants&#039; motion for a stay of discovery in this class action lawsuit while the court reviews their appeal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f).
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2021-12-22</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Andrew S. Oldham</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-40720</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/20-5202/20-5202-2021-12-21.html</id>
        	<title>Jibril v. Mayorkas</title>
        	<updated>2021-12-21T07:31:21-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2021-12-21T07:31:21-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/20-5202/20-5202-2021-12-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Plaintiffs filed suit against the Government, alleging violations of their Fourth and Fifth Amendments and the Administrative Procedure Act, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs&#039; action stemmed from extensive and intrusive security screenings at domestic and international airports, and their belief that they were on a terrorist watchlist maintained by the U.S. Government. The district court granted the Government&#039;s motion to dismiss with prejudice on the ground that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing.

The DC Circuit concluded that because plaintiffs plausibly allege that they will travel again soon and that they will again endure the alleged illegalities, they have established an imminent threat of future injury and have standing to pursue most of their claims for prospective relief. The court could easily infer from the family&#039;s travel history that they will soon fly again, particularly if they secure the relief they now seek. Furthermore, plaintiffs&#039; uncontested factual allegations, combined with the reasonable inferences the court drew from them, plausibly indicate that the family likely appeared on a terrorist watchlist in 2018. The court also concluded that plaintiffs plausibly allege that the treatment they endured went well beyond what typical travelers reasonably expect during airport screenings. Finally, plaintiffs&#039; factual allegations lead to the reasonable inference that the family&#039;s watchlist status remains the same today. 

However, the court held that plaintiffs lack standing to pursue prospective relief relating to certain actions taken by Government agents who detained them during their travel in 2018. In this case, plaintiffs claim that these actions violated established federal policies, but they lack standing because they have not plausibly alleged any impending or substantial risk of future harm. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/20-5202/20-5202-2021-12-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Jibril v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Plaintiffs filed suit against the Government, alleging violations of their Fourth and Fifth Amendments and the Administrative Procedure Act, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs&#039; action stemmed from extensive and intrusive security screenings at domestic and international airports, and their belief that they were on a terrorist watchlist maintained by the U.S. Government. The district court granted the Government&#039;s motion to dismiss with prejudice on the ground that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing.

The DC Circuit concluded that because plaintiffs plausibly allege that they will travel again soon and that they will again endure the alleged illegalities, they have established an imminent threat of future injury and have standing to pursue most of their claims for prospective relief. The court could easily infer from the family&#039;s travel history that they will soon fly again, particularly if they secure the relief they now seek. Furthermore, plaintiffs&#039; uncontested factual allegations, combined with the reasonable inferences the court drew from them, plausibly indicate that the family likely appeared on a terrorist watchlist in 2018. The court also concluded that plaintiffs plausibly allege that the treatment they endured went well beyond what typical travelers reasonably expect during airport screenings. Finally, plaintiffs&#039; factual allegations lead to the reasonable inference that the family&#039;s watchlist status remains the same today. 

However, the court held that plaintiffs lack standing to pursue prospective relief relating to certain actions taken by Government agents who detained them during their travel in 2018. In this case, plaintiffs claim that these actions violated established federal policies, but they lack standing because they have not plausibly alleged any impending or substantial risk of future harm. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The DC Circuit concluded that because plaintiffs plausibly allege that they will travel again soon and that they will again endure the alleged illegalities, they have established an imminent threat of future injury and have standing to pursue most of their claims for prospective relief.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2021-12-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Harry Thomas Edwards</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>20-5202</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/20-1222/20-1222-2021-12-14.html</id>
        	<title>United Airlines, Inc. v. Transportation Security Administration</title>
        	<updated>2021-12-14T07:32:22-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2021-12-14T07:32:22-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/20-1222/20-1222-2021-12-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		United sought refunds, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 44940(g), from the TSA for payments it made to the TSA related to fees charged to airline passengers, and collected by airlines, that fund aviation security measures and are to be remitted monthly to the TSA. United contends that it erroneously remitted the security fees in two circumstances: (1) tickets associated with passengers who purchased their tickets from other airlines but who were later involuntarily transferred to United flights and (2) tickets for which, because of currency exchange rate fluctuations, the recorded and remitted fee amount deviated from the fee amount statutorily required. 

The DC Circuit upheld the TSA&#039;s decision denying United&#039;s refund request regarding the second set of tickets, but found that the TSA&#039;s denial of a refund for the first set arbitrary and capricious. The court concluded that the TSA&#039;s denial was arbitrary and capricious with respect to the involuntary transfer tickets where the court is confronted with a factual dispute with important implications for United&#039;s refund. On the one hand, United claims that it never transfers security fees—a practice that appears correct in view of the allocation of liability under 49 U.S.C. 44940—but failed to raise or support this assertion until oral argument. On the other hand, the TSA maintains that airlines might transfer security fees but does little to support this assertion in its denial letter, at least beyond bare conclusions and unsupported hypotheticals. The court vacated the TSA&#039;s decision with respect to the IT tickets and remanded to the TSA for reconsideration of the denial. The court otherwise affirmed the TSA&#039;s decision. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/20-1222/20-1222-2021-12-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United Airlines, Inc. v. Transportation Security Administration" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                United sought refunds, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 44940(g), from the TSA for payments it made to the TSA related to fees charged to airline passengers, and collected by airlines, that fund aviation security measures and are to be remitted monthly to the TSA. United contends that it erroneously remitted the security fees in two circumstances: (1) tickets associated with passengers who purchased their tickets from other airlines but who were later involuntarily transferred to United flights and (2) tickets for which, because of currency exchange rate fluctuations, the recorded and remitted fee amount deviated from the fee amount statutorily required. 

The DC Circuit upheld the TSA&#039;s decision denying United&#039;s refund request regarding the second set of tickets, but found that the TSA&#039;s denial of a refund for the first set arbitrary and capricious. The court concluded that the TSA&#039;s denial was arbitrary and capricious with respect to the involuntary transfer tickets where the court is confronted with a factual dispute with important implications for United&#039;s refund. On the one hand, United claims that it never transfers security fees—a practice that appears correct in view of the allocation of liability under 49 U.S.C. 44940—but failed to raise or support this assertion until oral argument. On the other hand, the TSA maintains that airlines might transfer security fees but does little to support this assertion in its denial letter, at least beyond bare conclusions and unsupported hypotheticals. The court vacated the TSA&#039;s decision with respect to the IT tickets and remanded to the TSA for reconsideration of the denial. The court otherwise affirmed the TSA&#039;s decision.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The DC Circuit upheld the TSA&#039;s decision denying United&#039;s refund request regarding the second set of tickets at issue, but found that the TSA&#039;s denial of a refund for the first set at issue was arbitrary and capricious.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2021-12-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Henderson</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>20-1222</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/21-1074/21-1074-2021-12-10.html</id>
        	<title>Corbett v. Transportation Security Administration</title>
        	<updated>2021-12-10T07:31:11-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2021-12-10T07:31:11-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/21-1074/21-1074-2021-12-10.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Petitioner sought review of the TSA&#039;s Mask Directives, issued in response to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, claiming that the TSA has no authority to issue the directives. Petitioner argued that TSA&#039;s authority under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act does not empower TSA to require face masks to prevent the spread of COVID-19. 

The DC Circuit found no merit in petitioner&#039;s claim and denied the petition for review. The court concluded that the COVID-19 global pandemic poses one of the greatest threats to the operational viability of the transportation system and the lives of those on it seen in decades. TSA, which is tasked with maintaining transportation safety and security, plainly has the authority to address such threats under both sections 114(f) and (g) of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. The court stated that the Mask Directives are reasonable and permissible regulations adopted by TSA to promote safety and security in the transportation system against threats posed by COVID-19. The Mask Directives are not ultra vires, and the court deferred to the agency&#039;s interpretation of the Act. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/21-1074/21-1074-2021-12-10.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Corbett v. Transportation Security Administration" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Petitioner sought review of the TSA&#039;s Mask Directives, issued in response to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, claiming that the TSA has no authority to issue the directives. Petitioner argued that TSA&#039;s authority under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act does not empower TSA to require face masks to prevent the spread of COVID-19. 

The DC Circuit found no merit in petitioner&#039;s claim and denied the petition for review. The court concluded that the COVID-19 global pandemic poses one of the greatest threats to the operational viability of the transportation system and the lives of those on it seen in decades. TSA, which is tasked with maintaining transportation safety and security, plainly has the authority to address such threats under both sections 114(f) and (g) of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. The court stated that the Mask Directives are reasonable and permissible regulations adopted by TSA to promote safety and security in the transportation system against threats posed by COVID-19. The Mask Directives are not ultra vires, and the court deferred to the agency&#039;s interpretation of the Act.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The COVID-19 global pandemic poses one of the greatest threats to the operational viability of the transportation system and the lives of those on it seen in decades; TSA, which is tasked with maintaining transportation safety and security, plainly has the authority to address such threats under both sections 114(f) and (g) of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2021-12-10</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Harry Thomas Edwards</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-1074</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-70272/20-70272-2021-11-18.html</id>
        	<title>Center for Community Action and Environmental Justice v. Federal Aviation Administration</title>
        	<updated>2021-11-18T10:05:03-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2021-11-18T10:05:03-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-70272/20-70272-2021-11-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		To comply with the National Environmental Policy Act, the FAA issued an Environmental Assessment (EA) for the construction and operation of an air cargo facility at the San Bernardino International Airport.   The Record of Decision found no significant environmental impact. Objectors asserted that the FAA did not conform its study areas to the FAA’s Order 1050.1F Desk Reference. 

The Ninth Circuit rejected a petition for review. The FAA’s nonadherence to the Desk Reference could not alone serve as the basis for holding that the FAA did not take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences. Rejecting an argument that the FAA should have expanded its assessment to include more than 80 projects, the court held that the record showed that the FAA did consider the fact that the additional projects would result in massive average daily trips in the first year of operations.   

The court rejected California’s argument that the FAA needed to create an environmental impact statement because a California Environmental Impact Report found that the proposed Project could result in significant impacts on air quality, greenhouse gas, and noise. The South Coast Air Quality Management District’s own assessment was that the Project will comply with federal and state air quality standards.  The court also rejected California’s noise concerns.  Objectors failed to show arbitrariness or capriciousness in the EA’s truck trip calculation method and provided no reason to believe that the Project threatened to violate federal ozone standards. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-70272/20-70272-2021-11-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Center for Community Action and Environmental Justice v. Federal Aviation Administration" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                To comply with the National Environmental Policy Act, the FAA issued an Environmental Assessment (EA) for the construction and operation of an air cargo facility at the San Bernardino International Airport.   The Record of Decision found no significant environmental impact. Objectors asserted that the FAA did not conform its study areas to the FAA’s Order 1050.1F Desk Reference. 

The Ninth Circuit rejected a petition for review. The FAA’s nonadherence to the Desk Reference could not alone serve as the basis for holding that the FAA did not take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences. Rejecting an argument that the FAA should have expanded its assessment to include more than 80 projects, the court held that the record showed that the FAA did consider the fact that the additional projects would result in massive average daily trips in the first year of operations.   

The court rejected California’s argument that the FAA needed to create an environmental impact statement because a California Environmental Impact Report found that the proposed Project could result in significant impacts on air quality, greenhouse gas, and noise. The South Coast Air Quality Management District’s own assessment was that the Project will comply with federal and state air quality standards.  The court also rejected California’s noise concerns.  Objectors failed to show arbitrariness or capriciousness in the EA’s truck trip calculation method and provided no reason to believe that the Project threatened to violate federal ozone standards.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Ninth Circuit rejects challenges to an environmental assessment for the construction and operation of an air cargo facility at the San Bernardino International Airport.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2021-11-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Eugene E. Siler</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>20-70272</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Environmental Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/20-3193/20-3193-2021-09-13.html</id>
        	<title>Dodson International Parts v. Williams International Company</title>
        	<updated>2021-09-13T08:30:28-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2021-09-13T08:30:28-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/20-3193/20-3193-2021-09-13.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Williams International Company LLC designed, manufactured, and serviced small jet engines. Dodson International Parts, Inc., sold new and used aircraft and aircraft parts. After purchasing two used jet engines that had been manufactured by Williams, Dodson contracted with Williams to inspect the engines and prepare an estimate of repair costs, intending to resell the repaired engines. Williams determined that the engines were so badly damaged that they could not be rendered fit for flying, but it refused to return one of the engines because Dodson had not paid its bill in full. Dodson sued Williams in federal court alleging federal antitrust and state-law tort claims. Williams moved to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), relying on an arbitration clause on the original invoices. The district court granted the motion, and the arbitrator resolved all of Dodson’s claims in favor of Williams. Dodson then moved to reconsider the order compelling arbitration and to vacate the arbitrator’s award. The court denied both motions and, construing Williams’s opposition to the motion for vacatur as a request to confirm the award, confirmed the award. Dodson appealed, challenging the district court’s order compelling arbitration and its order confirming the award and denying the motions for reconsideration and vacatur. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding: (1) the claims in Dodson’s federal-court complaint were encompassed by the arbitration clause; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Dodson’s untimely motion to reconsider; and (3) that Dodson failed to establish any grounds for vacatur of the arbitrator’s award or for denial of confirmation of the award. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/20-3193/20-3193-2021-09-13.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Dodson International Parts v. Williams International Company" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Williams International Company LLC designed, manufactured, and serviced small jet engines. Dodson International Parts, Inc., sold new and used aircraft and aircraft parts. After purchasing two used jet engines that had been manufactured by Williams, Dodson contracted with Williams to inspect the engines and prepare an estimate of repair costs, intending to resell the repaired engines. Williams determined that the engines were so badly damaged that they could not be rendered fit for flying, but it refused to return one of the engines because Dodson had not paid its bill in full. Dodson sued Williams in federal court alleging federal antitrust and state-law tort claims. Williams moved to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), relying on an arbitration clause on the original invoices. The district court granted the motion, and the arbitrator resolved all of Dodson’s claims in favor of Williams. Dodson then moved to reconsider the order compelling arbitration and to vacate the arbitrator’s award. The court denied both motions and, construing Williams’s opposition to the motion for vacatur as a request to confirm the award, confirmed the award. Dodson appealed, challenging the district court’s order compelling arbitration and its order confirming the award and denying the motions for reconsideration and vacatur. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding: (1) the claims in Dodson’s federal-court complaint were encompassed by the arbitration clause; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Dodson’s untimely motion to reconsider; and (3) that Dodson failed to establish any grounds for vacatur of the arbitrator’s award or for denial of confirmation of the award.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Tenth Circuit found no reversible error in a district court’s order compelling arbitration, confirming the award. and denying motions for reconsideration and vacatur.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2021-09-13</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Harris L. Hartz</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>20-3193</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Arbitration &amp; Mediation"/>
							<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/18-50722/18-50722-2021-08-04.html</id>
        	<title>Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Sullivan</title>
        	<updated>2021-08-04T15:30:14-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2021-08-04T15:30:14-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/18-50722/18-50722-2021-08-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Texas Workers&#039; Compensation Act (TWCA), Tex. Lab. Code 401.007–419.007, regulates the prices that insurers must pay to providers for various medical services utilized by their beneficiaries, including air transport services. However, those price restrictions conflict with the federal Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), which makes clear that the states &quot;may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision . . . related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that may provide air transportation under this subpart.&quot; 49 U.S.C. 41713(b)(1). 

The Fifth Circuit joined its sister circuits, which have unanimously held that the ADA preempts state price caps on air ambulance reimbursements, and that those state price caps are not saved by the McCarran–Ferguson Act. The court disagreed with the Texas Supreme Court, which has reached contrary conclusions by a divided vote. Therefore, in this case, the court affirmed the judgment and held that the TWCA regulations concerning the reimbursement of air ambulance providers like Air Evac are preempted by the ADA, and are not saved by the McCarran–Ferguson Act. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/18-50722/18-50722-2021-08-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Sullivan" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Texas Workers&#039; Compensation Act (TWCA), Tex. Lab. Code 401.007–419.007, regulates the prices that insurers must pay to providers for various medical services utilized by their beneficiaries, including air transport services. However, those price restrictions conflict with the federal Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), which makes clear that the states &quot;may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision . . . related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that may provide air transportation under this subpart.&quot; 49 U.S.C. 41713(b)(1). 

The Fifth Circuit joined its sister circuits, which have unanimously held that the ADA preempts state price caps on air ambulance reimbursements, and that those state price caps are not saved by the McCarran–Ferguson Act. The court disagreed with the Texas Supreme Court, which has reached contrary conclusions by a divided vote. Therefore, in this case, the court affirmed the judgment and held that the TWCA regulations concerning the reimbursement of air ambulance providers like Air Evac are preempted by the ADA, and are not saved by the McCarran–Ferguson Act.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Texas Workers&#039; Compensation Act regulations concerning the reimbursement of air ambulance providers like Air Evac are preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act, and are not saved by the McCarran–Ferguson Act.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2021-08-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James C. Ho</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>18-50722</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Insurance Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/21-1034/21-1034-2021-07-15.html</id>
        	<title>Bishop v. Air Line Pilots Association, International</title>
        	<updated>2021-07-15T12:30:17-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2021-07-15T12:30:17-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/21-1034/21-1034-2021-07-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The plaintiffs, pilot instructors for United Airlines, filed a class action against the Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA), their recognized agent for the purpose of collective bargaining, alleging that ALPA had violated its duty of fair representation under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151, by adopting a retroactive pay provision that discriminated against pilot instructors. 

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. To establish a violation of the duty of fair representation, the plaintiffs were required to provide evidence from which a jury could conclude that ALPA’s sole motive in adopting the retroactive pay provision was an illicit one. While the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, could be read to support the proposition that ALPA’s adoption of the formula was motivated in part by animus toward the pilot instructor minority, the question is whether the evidence establishes that ALPA was motivated solely by a desire to discriminate against pilot instructors. There was evidence that some of the motivation for adopting the formula was a desire for a simple formula that could be easily defended. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/21-1034/21-1034-2021-07-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Bishop v. Air Line Pilots Association, International" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The plaintiffs, pilot instructors for United Airlines, filed a class action against the Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA), their recognized agent for the purpose of collective bargaining, alleging that ALPA had violated its duty of fair representation under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151, by adopting a retroactive pay provision that discriminated against pilot instructors. 

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. To establish a violation of the duty of fair representation, the plaintiffs were required to provide evidence from which a jury could conclude that ALPA’s sole motive in adopting the retroactive pay provision was an illicit one. While the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, could be read to support the proposition that ALPA’s adoption of the formula was motivated in part by animus toward the pilot instructor minority, the question is whether the evidence establishes that ALPA was motivated solely by a desire to discriminate against pilot instructors. There was evidence that some of the motivation for adopting the formula was a desire for a simple formula that could be easily defended.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Seventh Circuit rejects a claim of violation of the duty of fair representation; a contract provision that distinguished between pilot instructors and line pilots for calculation of retroactive pay was not motivated solely by animus.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2021-07-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kenneth Francis Ripple</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-1034</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-72084/20-72084-2021-07-01.html</id>
        	<title>Regency Air, LLC v. Dickson</title>
        	<updated>2021-07-01T09:00:23-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2021-07-01T09:00:23-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-72084/20-72084-2021-07-01.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Ninth Circuit denied Regency Air&#039;s petition for review challenging the FAA&#039;s decision affirming an ALJ&#039;s  finding that Regency Air violated regulations requiring air carriers to test each employee for drug and alcohol misuse if performing a safety-sensitive function like plane maintenance.

The panel concluded that Regency Air had adequate notice of the dispositive allegations against it, and thus it should have enrolled the first employee in its testing program but failed to do so. The panel also concluded that 14 C.F.R 120.35 and 120.39 are not unconstitutional as applied to the second employee where the employee&#039;s concurrent employment, while not addressed in the regulations, unambiguously falls within the regulations&#039; plain text. The panel explained that the FAA chose to promulgate a general rule: if an employee works on an air carrier&#039;s planes, the air carrier must enroll the employee in its testing program. The FAA also identified only one narrow exception to this rule, inapplicable here. The panel further concluded that 49 C.F.R. 40.25 is not unconstitutionally vague as to whether Regency Air had to request the second employee&#039;s past testing records as an employee. The panel stated that, when an employer hires and becomes obligated to test an employee, it must request past testing records despite the employee&#039;s past work on the employer&#039;s planes in the scope of other employment. Finally, the panel concluded that the FAA acted within its discretion and established policy in seeking and imposing sanctions against Regency Air. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-72084/20-72084-2021-07-01.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Regency Air, LLC v. Dickson" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Ninth Circuit denied Regency Air&#039;s petition for review challenging the FAA&#039;s decision affirming an ALJ&#039;s  finding that Regency Air violated regulations requiring air carriers to test each employee for drug and alcohol misuse if performing a safety-sensitive function like plane maintenance.

The panel concluded that Regency Air had adequate notice of the dispositive allegations against it, and thus it should have enrolled the first employee in its testing program but failed to do so. The panel also concluded that 14 C.F.R 120.35 and 120.39 are not unconstitutional as applied to the second employee where the employee&#039;s concurrent employment, while not addressed in the regulations, unambiguously falls within the regulations&#039; plain text. The panel explained that the FAA chose to promulgate a general rule: if an employee works on an air carrier&#039;s planes, the air carrier must enroll the employee in its testing program. The FAA also identified only one narrow exception to this rule, inapplicable here. The panel further concluded that 49 C.F.R. 40.25 is not unconstitutionally vague as to whether Regency Air had to request the second employee&#039;s past testing records as an employee. The panel stated that, when an employer hires and becomes obligated to test an employee, it must request past testing records despite the employee&#039;s past work on the employer&#039;s planes in the scope of other employment. Finally, the panel concluded that the FAA acted within its discretion and established policy in seeking and imposing sanctions against Regency Air.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Ninth Circuit denied Regency Air&#039;s petition for review challenging the FAA&#039;s decision affirming an ALJ&#039;s finding that Regency Air violated regulations requiring air carriers to test each employee for drug and alcohol misuse if performing a safety-sensitive function like plane maintenance.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2021-07-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Ryan D. Nelson</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>20-72084</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/19-1248/19-1248-2021-05-21.html</id>
        	<title>Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. United States Department of Transportation</title>
        	<updated>2021-05-21T07:00:56-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2021-05-21T07:00:56-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/19-1248/19-1248-2021-05-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Until 2016, the FAA maintained a formal “slot control” system at Newark International Airport, requiring each airline to request a “slot” for each takeoff or landing.  The FAA currently announces caps on takeoffs and landings for a given scheduling season. Each airline tells the FAA what flights it wants to operate during the upcoming season. The FAA may either approve an airline’s plan or request that it make changes in order to reduce congestion. An airline is not legally barred from operating unapproved flights/

In 2010, the Department of Justice (DoJ) conditioned a merger on United’s transferring 36 slots to Southwest Airlines, a low-fare carrier, new to Newark. For five years, the DoJ resisted United’s attempts to acquire more slots.  In 2015 the DoJ sued United for attempted monopolization but United remained Newark&#039;s dominant carrier. In 2019 Southwest announced it would pull out of Newark; 16 of its slots were in “peak hours.”  Spirit Airlines requested five.  The DoJ and the Port Authority cautioned the FAA against retiring Southwest’s slots, to preserve competition.

The D.C. Circuit vacated the FAA’s decision to retire the slots. The decision was final because it prevented Spirit from operating as many peak-period flights as it would otherwise have done in Summer 2020 and was arbitrary and capricious because the agency disregarded warnings about the effect of its decision on competition at Newark. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/19-1248/19-1248-2021-05-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. United States Department of Transportation" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Until 2016, the FAA maintained a formal “slot control” system at Newark International Airport, requiring each airline to request a “slot” for each takeoff or landing.  The FAA currently announces caps on takeoffs and landings for a given scheduling season. Each airline tells the FAA what flights it wants to operate during the upcoming season. The FAA may either approve an airline’s plan or request that it make changes in order to reduce congestion. An airline is not legally barred from operating unapproved flights/

In 2010, the Department of Justice (DoJ) conditioned a merger on United’s transferring 36 slots to Southwest Airlines, a low-fare carrier, new to Newark. For five years, the DoJ resisted United’s attempts to acquire more slots.  In 2015 the DoJ sued United for attempted monopolization but United remained Newark&#039;s dominant carrier. In 2019 Southwest announced it would pull out of Newark; 16 of its slots were in “peak hours.”  Spirit Airlines requested five.  The DoJ and the Port Authority cautioned the FAA against retiring Southwest’s slots, to preserve competition.

The D.C. Circuit vacated the FAA’s decision to retire the slots. The decision was final because it prevented Spirit from operating as many peak-period flights as it would otherwise have done in Summer 2020 and was arbitrary and capricious because the agency disregarded warnings about the effect of its decision on competition at Newark.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                D.C. Circuit vacates an FAA decision that &quot;retired&quot; certain slots for landings and takeoffs at Newark International Airport.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2021-05-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Douglas Howard Ginsburg</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>19-1248</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Antitrust &amp; Trade Regulation"/>
							<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-55106/20-55106-2021-04-28.html</id>
        	<title>California Trucking Ass&#039;n v. Bonta</title>
        	<updated>2021-04-28T09:03:46-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2021-04-28T09:03:46-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-55106/20-55106-2021-04-28.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court&#039;s order preliminarily enjoining enforcement, against any motor carrier doing business in California, of California&#039;s Assembly Bill 5, which codified the judge-made &quot;ABC test&quot; for classifying workers as either employees or independent contractors. 

After determining that CTA has standing to bring suit, the panel held that application of AB-5 to motor carriers is not preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAA), because AB-5 is a generally applicable labor law that affects a motor carrier&#039;s relationship with its workforce and does not bind, compel, or otherwise freeze into place the prices, routes, or services of motor carriers. In this case, because CTA is unlikely to succeed on the merits, the district court erred by enjoining the state from enforcing AB5 against motor carriers operating in California. The panel explained that, by failing to follow precedent regarding labor laws of general applicability, the district court committed a legal error to which the panel cannot defer, even at the preliminary-injunction stage. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/20-55106/20-55106-2021-04-28.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "California Trucking Ass&#039;n v. Bonta" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court&#039;s order preliminarily enjoining enforcement, against any motor carrier doing business in California, of California&#039;s Assembly Bill 5, which codified the judge-made &quot;ABC test&quot; for classifying workers as either employees or independent contractors. 

After determining that CTA has standing to bring suit, the panel held that application of AB-5 to motor carriers is not preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAA), because AB-5 is a generally applicable labor law that affects a motor carrier&#039;s relationship with its workforce and does not bind, compel, or otherwise freeze into place the prices, routes, or services of motor carriers. In this case, because CTA is unlikely to succeed on the merits, the district court erred by enjoining the state from enforcing AB5 against motor carriers operating in California. The panel explained that, by failing to follow precedent regarding labor laws of general applicability, the district court committed a legal error to which the panel cannot defer, even at the preliminary-injunction stage.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Application of Assembly Bill 5, which codified the judge-made &quot;ABC test&quot; for classifying workers as either employees or independent contractors, to motor carriers is not preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2021-04-28</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Sandra Segal Ikuta</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>20-55106</case:docket_number>
																<case:docket_number>20-55107</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/19-1343/19-1343-2021-03-17.html</id>
        	<title>Guardian Flight LLC v. Godfread</title>
        	<updated>2021-03-17T07:30:21-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2021-03-17T07:30:21-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/19-1343/19-1343-2021-03-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		At issue in this case are two provisions of North Dakota Senate Bill 2231. The first prohibits air ambulance providers from directly billing out-of-network insured patients for any amount not paid for by their insurers (the payment provision). The second prohibits air ambulance providers or their agents from selling subscription agreements (the subscription provision).

Guardian Flight filed a declaratory judgment action claiming that both provisions are preempted under the Airlines Deregulation Act (ADA). Defendants responded that, even if preempted, the provisions were saved under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The district court concluded that although the ADA preempted both provisions, the McCarran-Ferguson Act saved the subscription provision. 

The Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court&#039;s ADA preemption analysis and concluded that the ADA preempts both the payment provision and the subscription provision. However, the court held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not apply because the provisions were not enacted &quot;for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance.&quot; Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/19-1343/19-1343-2021-03-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Guardian Flight LLC v. Godfread" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                At issue in this case are two provisions of North Dakota Senate Bill 2231. The first prohibits air ambulance providers from directly billing out-of-network insured patients for any amount not paid for by their insurers (the payment provision). The second prohibits air ambulance providers or their agents from selling subscription agreements (the subscription provision).

Guardian Flight filed a declaratory judgment action claiming that both provisions are preempted under the Airlines Deregulation Act (ADA). Defendants responded that, even if preempted, the provisions were saved under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The district court concluded that although the ADA preempted both provisions, the McCarran-Ferguson Act saved the subscription provision. 

The Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court&#039;s ADA preemption analysis and concluded that the ADA preempts both the payment provision and the subscription provision. However, the court held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not apply because the provisions were not enacted &quot;for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance.&quot; Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court&#039;s Airlines Deregulation Act (ADA) preemption analysis; however, the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not apply because the provisions were not enacted &quot;for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance.&quot;
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2021-03-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Roger Leland Wollman</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>19-1343</case:docket_number>
																<case:docket_number>19-1381</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/missouri/supreme-court/2021/sc98409.html</id>
        	<title>APLUX, LLC v. Director of Revenue</title>
        	<updated>2021-03-02T11:02:27-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2021-03-02T11:02:27-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/missouri/supreme-court/2021/sc98409.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the administrative hearing commission (AHC) finding no use tax liability for APLUX LLC and Paul and Ann Lux Associates L.P. on the out-of-state purchase of two aircraft, holding that APLUX was not entitled to resale exemption on the purchase of either aircraft.

After purchase, both aircraft - referred to as &quot;the TBM&quot; and &quot;the Excel&quot; - were brought to Missouri. APLUX asserted that it leased, on a non-exclusive basis, the TBM to its parent company, Luxco, Inc., and the Excel concurrently to both Luxco and Aero Charter, Inc. The AHC held that each lease agreement constituted a &quot;sale&quot; for purposes of the tax resale exemption set out in Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.018. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that a &quot;sale&quot; to Luxco did not occur, and therefore, APLUX was not entitled to a resale exemption based on the Luxco agreement. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/missouri/supreme-court/2021/sc98409.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "APLUX, LLC v. Director of Revenue" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the administrative hearing commission (AHC) finding no use tax liability for APLUX LLC and Paul and Ann Lux Associates L.P. on the out-of-state purchase of two aircraft, holding that APLUX was not entitled to resale exemption on the purchase of either aircraft.

After purchase, both aircraft - referred to as &quot;the TBM&quot; and &quot;the Excel&quot; - were brought to Missouri. APLUX asserted that it leased, on a non-exclusive basis, the TBM to its parent company, Luxco, Inc., and the Excel concurrently to both Luxco and Aero Charter, Inc. The AHC held that each lease agreement constituted a &quot;sale&quot; for purposes of the tax resale exemption set out in Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.018. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that a &quot;sale&quot; to Luxco did not occur, and therefore, APLUX was not entitled to a resale exemption based on the Luxco agreement.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the administrative hearing commission&#039;s decision finding no use tax liability for APLUX LLC and Paul and Ann Lux Associates L.P. on the out-of-state purchase of two aircraft, holding that APLUX was not entitled to resale exemption on the purchase of either aircraft.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2021-03-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Missouri</case:state>
						<case:court>Supreme Court of Missouri</case:court>
							<case:judge>Laura Denvir Stith</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>SC98409</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Tax Law"/>
										<category term="Supreme Court of Missouri"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2020/b304240.html</id>
        	<title>People v. Superior Court (Cal Cartage Transportation Express, LLC)</title>
        	<updated>2020-11-19T13:00:40-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2020-11-19T13:00:40-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2020/b304240.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Court of Appeal held that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) does not preempt application of California&#039;s ABC test, originally set forth in Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903, and eventually codified by Assembly Bill 2257 (AB 2257), to determine whether a federally licensed interstate motor carrier has correctly classified its truck drivers as independent contractors.

The court held that defendants have not demonstrated, as they must under People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 772, 785-87, that application of the ABC test prohibits motor carriers from using independent contractors or otherwise directly affects motor carriers&#039; prices, routes, or services. Furthermore, nothing in Pac Anchor nor the FAAAA&#039;s legislative history suggests Congress intended to preempt a worker-classification test applicable to all employers in the state. The court granted a peremptory writ of mandate directing respondent court to vacate its order granting in part defendants&#039; motion in limine, and enter a new order denying that motion because the statutory amendments implemented by AB 2257 are not preempted by the FAAAA. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2020/b304240.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "People v. Superior Court (Cal Cartage Transportation Express, LLC)" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Court of Appeal held that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) does not preempt application of California&#039;s ABC test, originally set forth in Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903, and eventually codified by Assembly Bill 2257 (AB 2257), to determine whether a federally licensed interstate motor carrier has correctly classified its truck drivers as independent contractors.

The court held that defendants have not demonstrated, as they must under People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 772, 785-87, that application of the ABC test prohibits motor carriers from using independent contractors or otherwise directly affects motor carriers&#039; prices, routes, or services. Furthermore, nothing in Pac Anchor nor the FAAAA&#039;s legislative history suggests Congress intended to preempt a worker-classification test applicable to all employers in the state. The court granted a peremptory writ of mandate directing respondent court to vacate its order granting in part defendants&#039; motion in limine, and enter a new order denying that motion because the statutory amendments implemented by AB 2257 are not preempted by the FAAAA.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) does not preempt application of California&#039;s ABC test to determine whether a federally licensed interstate motor carrier has correctly classified its truck drivers as independent contractors.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2020-11-19</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>California</case:state>
						<case:court>California Courts of Appeal</case:court>
							<case:judge>Currey</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>B304240</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="California Courts of Appeal"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/19-15981/19-15981-2020-09-28.html</id>
        	<title>Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2020-09-28T09:01:34-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2020-09-28T09:01:34-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/19-15981/19-15981-2020-09-28.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		After plaintiff suffered serious injuries when he was struck by a semi-tractor trailer, he filed suit against C.H. Robinson, the freight broker that arranged for the trailer to transport goods for Costco. Plaintiff alleged that C.H. Robinson negligently selected an unsafe motor carrier.

The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that plaintiff&#039;s claim is &quot;related to&quot; C.H. Robinson&#039;s services, but held that the district court erred in determining that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994&#039;s (FAAAA) safety exception does not apply. The panel explained that, in enacting that exception, Congress intended to preserve the States’ broad power over safety, a power that includes the ability to regulate conduct not only through legislative and administrative enactments, but also though common-law damages awards. The panel also held that plaintiff&#039;s claim has the requisite &quot;connection with&quot; motor vehicles because it arises out of a motor vehicle accident. Therefore, the negligence claims against brokers, to the extent that they arise out of motor vehicle accidents, have the requisite &quot;connection with&quot; motor vehicles, and thus the safety exception applies to plaintiff&#039;s claims against C.H. Robinson. The panel reversed and remanded. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/19-15981/19-15981-2020-09-28.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                After plaintiff suffered serious injuries when he was struck by a semi-tractor trailer, he filed suit against C.H. Robinson, the freight broker that arranged for the trailer to transport goods for Costco. Plaintiff alleged that C.H. Robinson negligently selected an unsafe motor carrier.

The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that plaintiff&#039;s claim is &quot;related to&quot; C.H. Robinson&#039;s services, but held that the district court erred in determining that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994&#039;s (FAAAA) safety exception does not apply. The panel explained that, in enacting that exception, Congress intended to preserve the States’ broad power over safety, a power that includes the ability to regulate conduct not only through legislative and administrative enactments, but also though common-law damages awards. The panel also held that plaintiff&#039;s claim has the requisite &quot;connection with&quot; motor vehicles because it arises out of a motor vehicle accident. Therefore, the negligence claims against brokers, to the extent that they arise out of motor vehicle accidents, have the requisite &quot;connection with&quot; motor vehicles, and thus the safety exception applies to plaintiff&#039;s claims against C.H. Robinson. The panel reversed and remanded.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that plaintiff&#039;s claim is &quot;related to&quot; C.H. Robinson&#039;s services, but held that the district court erred in determining that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994&#039;s safety exception does not apply; plaintiff&#039;s claim has the requisite &quot;connection with&quot; motor vehicles because it arises out of a motor vehicle accident.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2020-09-28</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jacqueline H. Nguyen</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>19-15981</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/19-118/19-118-2020-09-17.html</id>
        	<title>Panjiva, Inc. v. United States Customs and Border Protection</title>
        	<updated>2020-09-17T06:30:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2020-09-17T06:30:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/19-118/19-118-2020-09-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Plaintiff filed suit alleging that Section 431 of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which requires all vessels arriving in the United States to maintain a manifest on which is recorded information about the just-completed voyage and an account of what is on board, requires aircraft entering the United States to make available for public disclosure such manifests detailing the journey and cargo aboard. 

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s dismissal in part of plaintiffs&#039; complaint. The court considered the different tools of statutory interpretation and held that section 431(c)(1) continues to require the government to make available for public disclosure manifests only of vessels, meaning &quot;water craft or other contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation in water, but...not...aircraft.&quot; The court considered plaintiffs&#039; remaining arguments on appeal and concluded that they are without merit. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/19-118/19-118-2020-09-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Panjiva, Inc. v. United States Customs and Border Protection" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Plaintiff filed suit alleging that Section 431 of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which requires all vessels arriving in the United States to maintain a manifest on which is recorded information about the just-completed voyage and an account of what is on board, requires aircraft entering the United States to make available for public disclosure such manifests detailing the journey and cargo aboard. 

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s dismissal in part of plaintiffs&#039; complaint. The court considered the different tools of statutory interpretation and held that section 431(c)(1) continues to require the government to make available for public disclosure manifests only of vessels, meaning &quot;water craft or other contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation in water, but...not...aircraft.&quot; The court considered plaintiffs&#039; remaining arguments on appeal and concluded that they are without merit.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Section 431(c)(1) of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 continues to require the government to make available for public disclosure manifests only of vessels, meaning &quot;water craft or other contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation in water, but...not...aircraft.&quot;
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2020-09-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Robert David Sack</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>19-118</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Admiralty &amp; Maritime Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/18-2360/18-2360-2020-08-11.html</id>
        	<title>Howard County v. Federal Aviation Administration</title>
        	<updated>2020-08-11T10:30:23-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2020-08-11T10:30:23-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/18-2360/18-2360-2020-08-11.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Fourth Circuit dismissed the County&#039;s petition to vacate or set aside the FAA&#039;s modified air-traffic procedure, or series of flight routes, that governs westbound departing aircraft at Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport (TERPZ-6). The court agreed with the FAA that the petition is untimely under 49 U.S.C. 46110(a) because it was filed well over sixty days after the issuance of the agency&#039;s relevant order. In this case, the County unreasonably waited 110 days to demand voluntary relief from the FAA as a first resort, and six months for the agency to come to the table. Therefore, the County&#039;s belated effort to engage the FAA in a voluntary fix to the noise impacts associated with TERPZ-6, together with the FAA&#039;s belated offer to pursue such a fix, provides no grounds for not filing by the 60th day. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/18-2360/18-2360-2020-08-11.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Howard County v. Federal Aviation Administration" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Fourth Circuit dismissed the County&#039;s petition to vacate or set aside the FAA&#039;s modified air-traffic procedure, or series of flight routes, that governs westbound departing aircraft at Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport (TERPZ-6). The court agreed with the FAA that the petition is untimely under 49 U.S.C. 46110(a) because it was filed well over sixty days after the issuance of the agency&#039;s relevant order. In this case, the County unreasonably waited 110 days to demand voluntary relief from the FAA as a first resort, and six months for the agency to come to the table. Therefore, the County&#039;s belated effort to engage the FAA in a voluntary fix to the noise impacts associated with TERPZ-6, together with the FAA&#039;s belated offer to pursue such a fix, provides no grounds for not filing by the 60th day.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Fourth Circuit dismissed the County&#039;s petition to vacate or set aside the FAA&#039;s modified air-traffic procedure as untimely under 49 U.S.C. 46110(a).
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2020-08-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Albert Diaz</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>18-2360</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/18-70306/18-70306-2020-07-15.html</id>
        	<title>Sky-Med, Inc. v. Federal Aviation Administration</title>
        	<updated>2020-07-15T09:03:18-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2020-07-15T09:03:18-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/18-70306/18-70306-2020-07-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The FAA filed an enforcement action against Pacific before an ALJ, which was then appealed to the Administrator. The ALJ and Administrator held that they had the power to adjudicate the action because the FAA initially sent Pacific two separate notices alleging that Pacific was liable for civil penalties for different violations, with each notice seeking less than $50,000. 

Because the FAA ultimately pursued those penalties through a single complaint seeking more than $50,000, the Ninth Circuit held that the only tribunal with jurisdiction to adjudicate the complaint was a federal district court under 49 U.S.C. 46301(d)(4). The panel explained that its conclusion is not altered by the fact that the ALJ and Administrator ultimately imposed a total penalty of less than $50,000, because a higher amount was in controversy even though not ultimately awarded. Accordingly, the court vacated the Administrator&#039;s decision and remanded with instructions to dismiss. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/18-70306/18-70306-2020-07-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Sky-Med, Inc. v. Federal Aviation Administration" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The FAA filed an enforcement action against Pacific before an ALJ, which was then appealed to the Administrator. The ALJ and Administrator held that they had the power to adjudicate the action because the FAA initially sent Pacific two separate notices alleging that Pacific was liable for civil penalties for different violations, with each notice seeking less than $50,000. 

Because the FAA ultimately pursued those penalties through a single complaint seeking more than $50,000, the Ninth Circuit held that the only tribunal with jurisdiction to adjudicate the complaint was a federal district court under 49 U.S.C. 46301(d)(4). The panel explained that its conclusion is not altered by the fact that the ALJ and Administrator ultimately imposed a total penalty of less than $50,000, because a higher amount was in controversy even though not ultimately awarded. Accordingly, the court vacated the Administrator&#039;s decision and remanded with instructions to dismiss.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Because the FAA ultimately pursued penalties through a single complaint seeking more than $50,000, the Ninth Circuit held that the only tribunal with jurisdiction to adjudicate the complaint was a federal district court under 49 U.S.C. 46301(d)(4).
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2020-07-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Per Curiam</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>18-70306</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/18-1022/18-1022-2020-07-07.html</id>
        	<title>Louie v. Dickson</title>
        	<updated>2020-07-07T08:01:26-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2020-07-07T08:01:26-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/18-1022/18-1022-2020-07-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The DC Circuit dismissed petitions for review of several Federal Aviation Administration actions related to the proposed expansion of the Paulding Northwest Atlanta Airport. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction because none of petitioners&#039; challenges involves an ongoing case or controversy. In this case, petitioners lack standing to pursue their challenge to the FAA&#039;s decision to withdraw its concurrence in GDOT&#039;s written reevaluation, because petitioners&#039; injuries are not fairly traceable to the challenged action. Furthermore, petitioners&#039; remaining challenges concerning the FAA&#039;s concurrence in GDOT&#039;s written re-evaluation, the FAA&#039;s denial of reconsideration of that concurrence, and the FAA&#039;s withdrawal of the airport expansion from the then-pending commercial service environmental assessment are all moot. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/18-1022/18-1022-2020-07-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Louie v. Dickson" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The DC Circuit dismissed petitions for review of several Federal Aviation Administration actions related to the proposed expansion of the Paulding Northwest Atlanta Airport. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction because none of petitioners&#039; challenges involves an ongoing case or controversy. In this case, petitioners lack standing to pursue their challenge to the FAA&#039;s decision to withdraw its concurrence in GDOT&#039;s written reevaluation, because petitioners&#039; injuries are not fairly traceable to the challenged action. Furthermore, petitioners&#039; remaining challenges concerning the FAA&#039;s concurrence in GDOT&#039;s written re-evaluation, the FAA&#039;s denial of reconsideration of that concurrence, and the FAA&#039;s withdrawal of the airport expansion from the then-pending commercial service environmental assessment are all moot.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The DC Circuit dismissed, based on lack of jurisdiction, petitions for review of several Federal Aviation Administration actions related to the proposed expansion of the Paulding Northwest Atlanta Airport.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2020-07-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Srikanth Srinivasan</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>18-1022</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/18-5145/18-5145-2020-06-16.html</id>
        	<title>American Great Lakes Ports Ass&#039;n v. Schultz</title>
        	<updated>2020-06-16T07:30:51-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2020-06-16T07:30:51-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/18-5145/18-5145-2020-06-16.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Great Lakes Pilotage Act requires foreign vessels and American vessels participating in foreign trade to hire an American or Canadian maritime pilot to assist in navigating the difficult waters of the Great Lakes. Shippers challenged the pilot rates for the 2016 commercial shipping season under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Shippers claimed that the  2016 Rule set an artificially inflated pilot rate that caused significant harm to the industry.

The DC Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s decision upholding parts of the 2016 Rule setting higher compensation targets for the pilots. The court also affirmed the district court&#039;s holding that several parts of the rule are unsupported by the administrative record. The court held that, although remand without vacatur is the exception rather than the rule, the district court acted within its discretion here, given the disruption likely to occur from reallocating rates paid several years ago. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/18-5145/18-5145-2020-06-16.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "American Great Lakes Ports Ass&#039;n v. Schultz" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Great Lakes Pilotage Act requires foreign vessels and American vessels participating in foreign trade to hire an American or Canadian maritime pilot to assist in navigating the difficult waters of the Great Lakes. Shippers challenged the pilot rates for the 2016 commercial shipping season under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Shippers claimed that the  2016 Rule set an artificially inflated pilot rate that caused significant harm to the industry.

The DC Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s decision upholding parts of the 2016 Rule setting higher compensation targets for the pilots. The court also affirmed the district court&#039;s holding that several parts of the rule are unsupported by the administrative record. The court held that, although remand without vacatur is the exception rather than the rule, the district court acted within its discretion here, given the disruption likely to occur from reallocating rates paid several years ago.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The DC Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s decision upholding parts of the 2016 Rule setting higher compensation targets for the pilots; the court also affirmed the district court&#039;s holding that several parts of the rule are unsupported by the administrative record.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2020-06-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Rao</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>18-5145</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/19-3001/19-3001-2020-06-10.html</id>
        	<title>Brian Hughes v. Southwest Airlines Co.</title>
        	<updated>2020-06-10T14:00:17-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2020-06-10T14:00:17-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/19-3001/19-3001-2020-06-10.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Hughes bought a ticket from Southwest to fly to Chicago. Just before the flight was to board, Southwest canceled it.  Hughes, who chose an alternate flight through Omaha, claims that the cancellation was because Southwest ran out of de-icer and that no other airlines had a similar problem.  He claims he incurred additional costs for lodging and similar expenses.  The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his breach of contract claim.  There was no breach; the contract allows the airline to cancel and either reschedule the passenger or refund the fare.  There is no implied duty to avoid cancellation. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/19-3001/19-3001-2020-06-10.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Brian Hughes v. Southwest Airlines Co." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Hughes bought a ticket from Southwest to fly to Chicago. Just before the flight was to board, Southwest canceled it.  Hughes, who chose an alternate flight through Omaha, claims that the cancellation was because Southwest ran out of de-icer and that no other airlines had a similar problem.  He claims he incurred additional costs for lodging and similar expenses.  The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his breach of contract claim.  There was no breach; the contract allows the airline to cancel and either reschedule the passenger or refund the fare.  There is no implied duty to avoid cancellation.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Cancellation of a flight, regardless of the underlying cause, did not constitute a breach of contract.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2020-06-10</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Joel Martin Flaum</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>19-3001</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Transportation Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/19-1901/19-1901-2020-05-15.html</id>
        	<title>Taylor v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2020-05-15T07:31:10-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2020-05-15T07:31:10-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/19-1901/19-1901-2020-05-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In 1999, the Taylors purchased land near a New Mexico Air Force base to raise calves. The Air Force began flying training missions over the land, sometimes “no more than 20 feet . . . off the deck.”  In 2008, the Taylors granted Wind Energy an exclusive five-year option for an easement on the Taylors’ property, for “wind resource evaluation, wind energy development, energy transmission and related wind energy development uses.” In 2012, Air Force employees suggested to Wind Energy that the FAA would not issue a “No Hazard” designation for the air space above the Taylors’ land, which would be “fatal to the construction of planned wind turbines.” Wind Energy exercised its contractual right to terminate the agreement. 

The Taylors sued, claiming that the Air Force’s informal advice to Wind Energy caused a regulatory taking of their property interest in their contract and that the flyovers effected a physical taking. The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.  Wind Energy’s termination was not a breach of the agreement so the Taylors had no property right in the continuation of that agreement nor did they have any investment-backed expectations. Any advice given by Air Force employees did not amount to an FAA denial. The Taylors did not provide factual allegations of how the flights “directly, immediately, and substantially interfere” with their quiet enjoyment and use of the land &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/19-1901/19-1901-2020-05-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Taylor v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In 1999, the Taylors purchased land near a New Mexico Air Force base to raise calves. The Air Force began flying training missions over the land, sometimes “no more than 20 feet . . . off the deck.”  In 2008, the Taylors granted Wind Energy an exclusive five-year option for an easement on the Taylors’ property, for “wind resource evaluation, wind energy development, energy transmission and related wind energy development uses.” In 2012, Air Force employees suggested to Wind Energy that the FAA would not issue a “No Hazard” designation for the air space above the Taylors’ land, which would be “fatal to the construction of planned wind turbines.” Wind Energy exercised its contractual right to terminate the agreement. 

The Taylors sued, claiming that the Air Force’s informal advice to Wind Energy caused a regulatory taking of their property interest in their contract and that the flyovers effected a physical taking. The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.  Wind Energy’s termination was not a breach of the agreement so the Taylors had no property right in the continuation of that agreement nor did they have any investment-backed expectations. Any advice given by Air Force employees did not amount to an FAA denial. The Taylors did not provide factual allegations of how the flights “directly, immediately, and substantially interfere” with their quiet enjoyment and use of the land
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit rejects &quot;takings&quot; claims concerning Air Force flyovers at a cattle ranch and advice given by Air Force employees concerning the possible development of wind energy facilities at the ranch.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2020-05-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Gary Taranto</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>19-1901</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Real Estate &amp; Property Law"/>
							<category term="Zoning, Planning &amp; Land Use"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/19-1071/19-1071-2020-05-05.html</id>
        	<title>Flyers Rights Education Fund v. Department of Transportation</title>
        	<updated>2020-05-05T06:30:32-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2020-05-05T06:30:32-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/19-1071/19-1071-2020-05-05.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		FlyersRights claimed that airlines were not giving passengers sufficient notice of their right to compensation for delays in flights and urged the Department to issue regulations requiring the airlines to print written summaries of passengers&#039; rights on all international airline tickets, including information about how passengers suffering from flight delays might be compensated.

The DC Circuit held that FlyersRights has at least one member with independent standing to sue the Department and therefore FlyersRights has associational standing to sue on behalf of its members. On the merits, the court denied FlyersRights&#039; petition for review of the Department&#039;s denial of its request for rulemaking as arbitrary and in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The court held that the Department adequately explained why it denied the request for rulemaking, and the Department&#039;s finding that there was insufficient evidence of consumer confusion to warrant a rulemaking was also supported. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/19-1071/19-1071-2020-05-05.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Flyers Rights Education Fund v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                FlyersRights claimed that airlines were not giving passengers sufficient notice of their right to compensation for delays in flights and urged the Department to issue regulations requiring the airlines to print written summaries of passengers&#039; rights on all international airline tickets, including information about how passengers suffering from flight delays might be compensated.

The DC Circuit held that FlyersRights has at least one member with independent standing to sue the Department and therefore FlyersRights has associational standing to sue on behalf of its members. On the merits, the court denied FlyersRights&#039; petition for review of the Department&#039;s denial of its request for rulemaking as arbitrary and in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The court held that the Department adequately explained why it denied the request for rulemaking, and the Department&#039;s finding that there was insufficient evidence of consumer confusion to warrant a rulemaking was also supported.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Department adequately explained why it denied the request for rulemaking, and the Department&#039;s finding that there was insufficient evidence of consumer confusion to warrant a rulemaking was also supported.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2020-05-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Arthur Raymond Randolph</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>19-1071</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/19-1044/19-1044-2020-05-01.html</id>
        	<title>In re: Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility</title>
        	<updated>2020-05-01T07:00:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2020-05-01T07:00:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/19-1044/19-1044-2020-05-01.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		This case arose out of the FAA and NPS&#039;s efforts to regulate commercial sightseeing flights over national parks. The Air Tour Management Act of 2000 directs the FAA and NPS to &quot;make every effort&quot; to establish rules governing such flights within two years of the first application.

After determining that it has jurisdiction over this mandamus petition under the All Writs Act, the DC Circuit held that petitioners had associational standing to seek relief. In this case, petitioners&#039; members showed cognizable aesthetic and recreational injury that could be redressed by mandamus relief. On the merits, the court granted a writ of mandate compelling the FAA and NPS to regulate air tours at seven parks where they have injured members. The court analyzed the six TRAC factors and concluded that mandamus relief was warranted here where the agencies have failed to comply with their statutory mandate for the past nineteen years. The court ordered the agencies to produce a schedule within 120 days of the issuance of this opinion for bringing all twenty-three parks into compliance. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/19-1044/19-1044-2020-05-01.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re: Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                This case arose out of the FAA and NPS&#039;s efforts to regulate commercial sightseeing flights over national parks. The Air Tour Management Act of 2000 directs the FAA and NPS to &quot;make every effort&quot; to establish rules governing such flights within two years of the first application.

After determining that it has jurisdiction over this mandamus petition under the All Writs Act, the DC Circuit held that petitioners had associational standing to seek relief. In this case, petitioners&#039; members showed cognizable aesthetic and recreational injury that could be redressed by mandamus relief. On the merits, the court granted a writ of mandate compelling the FAA and NPS to regulate air tours at seven parks where they have injured members. The court analyzed the six TRAC factors and concluded that mandamus relief was warranted here where the agencies have failed to comply with their statutory mandate for the past nineteen years. The court ordered the agencies to produce a schedule within 120 days of the issuance of this opinion for bringing all twenty-three parks into compliance.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Writ of mandate compelling the FAA and NPS to regulate air tours at seven parks where they have injured members granted.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2020-05-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Thomas Beall Griffith</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>19-1044</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/18-5370/18-5370-2020-04-21.html</id>
        	<title>Stewart v. McPherson</title>
        	<updated>2020-04-21T07:30:56-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2020-04-21T07:30:56-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/18-5370/18-5370-2020-04-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Plaintiff filed suit challenging the Navy Secretary&#039;s refusal to grant him a waiver of statutory requirements that govern his eligibility for incentive pay. After determining that plaintiff has abandoned his substantive challenge to the waiver denial, the DC Circuit held that the question of whether the Secretary complied with the process outlined in the applicable regulation is judicially reviewable. 

On the merits of plaintiff&#039;s procedural claim, the court held that nothing in Instruction 7220.87 obligates the Secretary to seek updated endorsements, and plaintiff gave the court no reason to conclude that the Secretary abused his discretion by relying on the old endorsements or by considering plaintiff&#039;s performance data. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court&#039;s grant of summary judgment to the Secretary. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/18-5370/18-5370-2020-04-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Stewart v. McPherson" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Plaintiff filed suit challenging the Navy Secretary&#039;s refusal to grant him a waiver of statutory requirements that govern his eligibility for incentive pay. After determining that plaintiff has abandoned his substantive challenge to the waiver denial, the DC Circuit held that the question of whether the Secretary complied with the process outlined in the applicable regulation is judicially reviewable. 

On the merits of plaintiff&#039;s procedural claim, the court held that nothing in Instruction 7220.87 obligates the Secretary to seek updated endorsements, and plaintiff gave the court no reason to conclude that the Secretary abused his discretion by relying on the old endorsements or by considering plaintiff&#039;s performance data. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court&#039;s grant of summary judgment to the Secretary.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Nothing in Instruction 7220.87 obligates the Secretary to seek updated endorsements, and plaintiff gave the court no reason to conclude that the Secretary abused his discretion by relying on the old endorsements or by considering plaintiff&#039;s performance data.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2020-04-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Per Curiam</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>18-5370</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/18-1173/18-1173-2020-03-10.html</id>
        	<title>Maryland v. Federal Aviation Administration</title>
        	<updated>2020-03-10T07:01:27-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2020-03-10T07:01:27-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/18-1173/18-1173-2020-03-10.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The DC Circuit dismissed the State&#039;s petition challenging the FAA&#039;s amended flight paths to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport as untimely. Although the State acknowledged that its petition was filed well after the statutory sixty-day review window, it claimed reasonable grounds for the delay.

The court held, however, that the State&#039;s delay was extreme and it lacked reasonable grounds for missing the statutory deadline. The court explained that the key distinction between this case and City of Phoenix v. Huerta, 869 F.3d 963 (D.C. Cir. 2017), is the FAA&#039;s near constant engagement with petitioner City of Phoenix throughout the period between the new flight paths&#039; implementation and the City&#039;s late petition. In this case, throughout the more than two and one-half years during which the State delayed filing its petitioner, its communications with the FAA were almost entirely self-initiated, sporadic and primarily through the Working Group. The court also denied the State&#039;s motion to amend as moot. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/18-1173/18-1173-2020-03-10.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Maryland v. Federal Aviation Administration" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The DC Circuit dismissed the State&#039;s petition challenging the FAA&#039;s amended flight paths to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport as untimely. Although the State acknowledged that its petition was filed well after the statutory sixty-day review window, it claimed reasonable grounds for the delay.

The court held, however, that the State&#039;s delay was extreme and it lacked reasonable grounds for missing the statutory deadline. The court explained that the key distinction between this case and City of Phoenix v. Huerta, 869 F.3d 963 (D.C. Cir. 2017), is the FAA&#039;s near constant engagement with petitioner City of Phoenix throughout the period between the new flight paths&#039; implementation and the City&#039;s late petition. In this case, throughout the more than two and one-half years during which the State delayed filing its petitioner, its communications with the FAA were almost entirely self-initiated, sporadic and primarily through the Working Group. The court also denied the State&#039;s motion to amend as moot.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The DC Circuit dismissed the State&#039;s petition challenging the FAA&#039;s amended flight paths to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport as untimely.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2020-03-10</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Henderson</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>18-1173</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2020/27930.html</id>
        	<title>Skydive Myrtle Beach v. Horry Cty.</title>
        	<updated>2020-01-22T07:04:22-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2020-01-22T07:04:22-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2020/27930.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Horry County, South Carolina filed an action in magistrates court to eject Skydive Myrtle Beach, Inc., from a hangar at the Grand Strand Airport in North Myrtle Beach. The magistrates court found Skydive did not have any right to occupy the hangar. The circuit court affirmed the ejection. Skydive appealed to the court of appeals, which dismissed the appeal on the ground it was moot. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Skydive&#039;s petition for a writ of certiorari and reversed, finding the appeal was not moot. However, on the merits, the Supreme Court agreed with the magistrates court and the circuit court that Skydive had no right to occupy the hangar. Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2020/27930.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Skydive Myrtle Beach v. Horry Cty." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Horry County, South Carolina filed an action in magistrates court to eject Skydive Myrtle Beach, Inc., from a hangar at the Grand Strand Airport in North Myrtle Beach. The magistrates court found Skydive did not have any right to occupy the hangar. The circuit court affirmed the ejection. Skydive appealed to the court of appeals, which dismissed the appeal on the ground it was moot. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Skydive&#039;s petition for a writ of certiorari and reversed, finding the appeal was not moot. However, on the merits, the Supreme Court agreed with the magistrates court and the circuit court that Skydive had no right to occupy the hangar. Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2020-01-22</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>South Carolina</case:state>
						<case:court>South Carolina Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Few</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>27930</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Landlord - Tenant"/>
										<category term="South Carolina Supreme Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/18-7193/18-7193-2020-01-10.html</id>
        	<title>Smith v. Malaysia Airlines Berhad</title>
        	<updated>2020-01-10T07:32:59-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2020-01-10T07:32:59-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/18-7193/18-7193-2020-01-10.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		This appeal arose out of the unexplained disappearance of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370 somewhere over the Southern Indian Ocean in the early hours of March 8, 2014. Representatives of many of the passengers filed suit in United States, alleging claims under the Montreal Convention against Malaysia&#039;s national airline at the time of the flight, its current national airline, and the airliners&#039; insurers, as well as claims against Boeing, which manufactured the aircraft in Washington state. After the lawsuits were centralized into a multidistrict litigation in the district court, the district court granted appellees&#039; motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds.

The DC Circuit held that the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion in dismissing the lawsuits for forum non conveniens. In this case, the district court carefully weighed the relevant public and private interest factors and reasonably concluded that Malaysia is a more convenient forum to try the claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/18-7193/18-7193-2020-01-10.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Smith v. Malaysia Airlines Berhad" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                This appeal arose out of the unexplained disappearance of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370 somewhere over the Southern Indian Ocean in the early hours of March 8, 2014. Representatives of many of the passengers filed suit in United States, alleging claims under the Montreal Convention against Malaysia&#039;s national airline at the time of the flight, its current national airline, and the airliners&#039; insurers, as well as claims against Boeing, which manufactured the aircraft in Washington state. After the lawsuits were centralized into a multidistrict litigation in the district court, the district court granted appellees&#039; motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds.

The DC Circuit held that the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion in dismissing the lawsuits for forum non conveniens. In this case, the district court carefully weighed the relevant public and private interest factors and reasonably concluded that Malaysia is a more convenient forum to try the claims.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The district court did not clearly abuse its discretion in dismissing lawsuits, brought by representatives of the passengers of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370 that disappeared somewhere over the Southern Indian Ocean, based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2020-01-10</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Rao</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>18-7193</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/18-1086/18-1086-2019-11-21.html</id>
        	<title>Atlas Air, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters</title>
        	<updated>2019-11-21T07:30:04-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2019-11-21T07:30:04-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/18-1086/18-1086-2019-11-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Second Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s judgment compelling arbitration of grievances raised by airlines in a dispute with the collective bargaining representatives of their pilots. 

The court held that the district court properly granted the employers&#039; motion for summary judgment and to compel arbitration. The court held that the management grievances did not involve a major dispute; rejected the Union&#039;s argument that the case raised issues of representation that would fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Mediation Board; and held that the district court did not err in exercising jurisdiction over the dispute. The court also held that Atlas&#039;s motion to compel arbitration of its management grievance was timely. 

Finally, the court rejected the Union&#039;s three arguments with respect to the arbitrability of the employers&#039; management grievances. In this case, Southern was entitled to file a management grievance with the Southern Board regarding the interpretation of Section 1.B.3 of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA); the district court correctly determined that it lacked authority to decide whether the merger provisions of the Atlas CBA were prompted by the announced operational merger of Atlas and Southern; and nothing in the process of interpreting the provisions of the two collective bargaining agreements purports to bind Atlas or Southern pilots to the terms of another existing CBA. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/18-1086/18-1086-2019-11-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Atlas Air, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Second Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s judgment compelling arbitration of grievances raised by airlines in a dispute with the collective bargaining representatives of their pilots. 

The court held that the district court properly granted the employers&#039; motion for summary judgment and to compel arbitration. The court held that the management grievances did not involve a major dispute; rejected the Union&#039;s argument that the case raised issues of representation that would fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Mediation Board; and held that the district court did not err in exercising jurisdiction over the dispute. The court also held that Atlas&#039;s motion to compel arbitration of its management grievance was timely. 

Finally, the court rejected the Union&#039;s three arguments with respect to the arbitrability of the employers&#039; management grievances. In this case, Southern was entitled to file a management grievance with the Southern Board regarding the interpretation of Section 1.B.3 of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA); the district court correctly determined that it lacked authority to decide whether the merger provisions of the Atlas CBA were prompted by the announced operational merger of Atlas and Southern; and nothing in the process of interpreting the provisions of the two collective bargaining agreements purports to bind Atlas or Southern pilots to the terms of another existing CBA.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The district court properly granted the employers&#039; motion for summary judgment and to compel arbitration of grievances raised by airlines in a dispute with the collective bargaining representatives of their pilots.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2019-11-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Chin</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>18-1086</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Arbitration &amp; Mediation"/>
							<category term="Aviation"/>
							<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
    </feed>

