Arbitration & Mediation - Justia Case Law Summaries

Quinn, Racusin & Gazzola Chartered v. Pavich Law Group, P.C.

2026-09-03T09:32:31-08:00

Four law firms jointly represented a client in a federal court case against Iraq, resulting in a substantial judgment in favor of their client. Prior to seeking attorneys’ fees, the firms executed an Agreement Concerning Attorneys’ Fees (ACAF), which provided for a forty-six percent contingency fee and included an arbitration clause. Disputes arose regarding the allocation of the fee, particularly after some firms allegedly negotiated a side agreement to increase their shares. One firm, believing its share was subject to future negotiation, did not seek fees in arbitration and was awarded none by the arbitrator. After the arbitration, Quinn, Racusin & Gazzola Chartered (QRG) moved in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to vacate the arbitrator’s final award, arguing the ACAF was invalid due to fraudulent inducement and duress, and that the arbitrator had exceeded the scope of authority under the agreement. Appellees disputed these claims and sought confirmation of the award. The Superior Court determined that QRG had not established fraud or duress and found the arbitration clause broad enough to encompass both the fee allocation dispute and related tort claims. The court denied QRG’s motion to vacate and confirmed the arbitration award. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed de novo the legal conclusions regarding fraud, duress, and the scope of the arbitration clause. The court held that QRG failed to demonstrate fraudulent inducement or duress in execution of the arbitration clause. It further held that the arbitrator acted within the scope of the ACAF’s arbitration clause, which covered the fee allocation dispute and related tort claims. The Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment confirming the arbitrator’s final award. View "Quinn, Racusin & Gazzola Chartered v. Pavich Law Group, P.C." on Justia Law

Transportation Conslt v. Certain Undwr

2026-09-03T09:30:10-08:00

Transportation Consultants, Inc. owned property in Louisiana insured under a surplus lines commercial property policy issued by a group of domestic and foreign insurers. The policy contained an arbitration clause and a provision stating it should be construed as separate contracts between the insured and each underwriter. Following Hurricane Ida, a dispute arose regarding coverage, prompting Transportation Consultants to file suit against all insurers in Louisiana state court. The insurers removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, relying on the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards to assert federal jurisdiction. The district court initially granted the insurers' motion to compel arbitration and stayed the litigation. After the Louisiana Supreme Court decided Police Jury of Calcasieu Parish v. Indian Harbor Insurance Co., the plaintiff moved for reconsideration. The district court then reversed its earlier decision as to the domestic insurers, finding that Louisiana law prohibits arbitration clauses in insurance contracts between Louisiana parties, and lifted the stay as to the domestic insurers. The order compelling arbitration and staying litigation against the foreign insurers remained. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that, following its precedent in Town of Vinton v. Indian Harbor Insurance Co. and Crescent City Surgical Operating Co. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., the arbitration clauses in contracts with the domestic insurers are unenforceable under Louisiana law and equitable estoppel cannot be used to compel arbitration. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of arbitration as to the domestic insurers but vacated the lifting of the stay. The case was remanded for the district court to reconsider, in light of updated precedent and additional briefing, whether litigation against the domestic insurers should be stayed pending completion of arbitration with the foreign insurers. View "Transportation Conslt v. Certain Undwr" on Justia Law

Joyner v. Frontier Airlines

2026-09-01T08:00:59-08:00

Three individuals employed as customer service agents for a ground services provider and an airline at Denver International Airport brought a class action lawsuit asserting violations of Colorado’s wage laws. Their complaint alleged that the employers improperly deducted time for lunch breaks not taken, forced work during rest breaks, failed to pay overtime, and withheld commissions. Each employee’s contract contained a mandatory arbitration clause, which the employers sought to enforce under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and Colorado law. The employees responded that, as transportation workers, their contracts were exempt from the FAA, and further argued that Colorado law voided such arbitration agreements for wage claims. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied the motions to compel arbitration. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court focused narrowly on the specific duties of the three employees, rather than considering the work typically performed by the broader class of customer service agents. It found that the employees “actually and routinely” handled passenger luggage and played a “gatekeeping” role with respect to cargo. On this basis, the court concluded they were transportation workers exempt from the FAA. The district court did not address the request to compel arbitration under Colorado law. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred by defining the relevant class of workers too narrowly—focusing only on the specific employees, rather than the typical duties of the class as a whole, as required by Supreme Court precedent (including Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon). The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order denying the motions to compel arbitration and remanded for further proceedings to properly determine the attributes of the class of workers under the correct legal standard. View "Joyner v. Frontier Airlines" on Justia Law

Walker v. Uber Technologies, Inc.

2026-08-28T07:01:06-08:00

Cheryl Walker used her Uber account to order a guest ride for her husband, Carroll Walker. Carroll had never downloaded the Uber app or created an account, and he consistently stated that he does not read or reply to text messages. On the relevant occasion, Cheryl ordered a ride for Carroll, and Uber sent Carroll a text message with ride details and a hyperlink to its Terms of Use, which included an arbitration provision. Carroll did not see the message. During the ride, an accident occurred, allegedly due to the driver’s distraction by Uber’s app, resulting in severe injuries to Carroll. In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Cheryl Walker sued Uber on Carroll’s behalf, asserting negligence and products liability claims. Uber moved to compel arbitration, arguing Carroll was bound to arbitrate either because he had notice of the Terms via Uber’s text message or as a third-party beneficiary of Cheryl’s contract with Uber. The district court denied Uber’s motion, finding Uber failed to establish that Carroll was on inquiry notice of the Terms and concluding that Carroll was not bound as a third-party beneficiary or estopped from refusing arbitration. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of Uber’s motion to compel arbitration de novo, applying D.C. contract law. The Court held that Uber had not shown Carroll agreed to be bound by its Terms of Use, as Carroll lacked actual or inquiry notice of the Terms. The Court further determined that Carroll was not bound by Cheryl’s contract as a third-party beneficiary or by equitable estoppel, since Carroll was not seeking to enforce Cheryl’s contract and his claims were independent of it. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Walker v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

Metroplex Communications, Inc. v Meta Platforms, Inc.

2026-08-27T13:00:07-08:00

Metroplex Communications, Inc., which operates several local news outlets in Illinois, earns revenue by selling advertising space. Meta Platforms, Inc., the owner of Facebook, also sells ads and competes for the same local advertisers. Metroplex, representing a putative class of small businesses that compete with Meta for advertisers, alleged that Meta engaged in unlawful, anticompetitive practices by misrepresenting the reach and effectiveness of its Facebook advertisements, thereby drawing advertisers away from other platforms. The suit is based on claims under the Lanham Act and the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, seeking disgorgement of profits Meta allegedly earned through misleading conduct. Although Metroplex had purchased Facebook ads in the past, its lawsuit was brought in its capacity as a competitor, not as an ad purchaser. Meta moved to compel arbitration in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, arguing that Metroplex’s prior ad purchases subjected it to an arbitration clause in Meta’s Commercial Terms. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that Metroplex’s claims arose from its status as a competitor and not from its own ad purchases or contractual relationship as an ad buyer. The court found the claims to be outside the scope of the arbitration clause. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the scope of the arbitration clause de novo, applying Illinois law. The court held that Metroplex’s unfair competition claims were not sufficiently connected to Metroplex’s ad purchases or Meta’s Commercial Terms to fall within the arbitration agreement. The claims centered on alleged anticompetitive conduct and public misrepresentations, unrelated to Metroplex’s own limited use of Meta’s ad services. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of Meta’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that the arbitration clause did not apply to Metroplex’s claims as a competitor. View "Metroplex Communications, Inc. v Meta Platforms, Inc." on Justia Law

Srivastava v. BMW of North America

2026-08-27T11:01:25-08:00

A plaintiff leased a new vehicle from a dealership and soon experienced significant problems, including charging failures, starting difficulties, and an event involving fire risk. Despite attempts at repair by the dealership and authorized facilities, the vehicle remained inoperable. The plaintiff’s lease included an arbitration provision broadly defining disputes to include claims concerning the vehicle’s condition and warranties. The plaintiff sued the vehicle manufacturer under California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act for a range of statutory violations related to the vehicle’s defects and warranty service. The Santa Clara County Superior Court denied the manufacturer’s motion to compel arbitration. The trial court reasoned that the manufacturer could not enforce the arbitration agreement as a third party beneficiary under the rationale of Ford Motor Warranty Cases, because the plaintiff’s statutory claims arose from the manufacturer’s obligations under the Song-Beverly Act, not from the lease itself. The court also rejected the manufacturer’s equitable estoppel argument, and, finding no enforceable arbitration agreement between the parties, declined to address issues of unconscionability or delegation. The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the matter. It held that the manufacturer was in fact a third party beneficiary of the arbitration provision, as the lease explicitly defined the manufacturer as a party entitled to enforce arbitration and covered disputes involving the vehicle’s condition and warranties. The court distinguished the California Supreme Court’s decision in Ford Motor Warranty Cases, finding it inapplicable where the manufacturer is named in the lease. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case for the trial court to decide whether the arbitration provision’s delegation clause is unconscionable. The appellate court expressed no opinion on unconscionability, leaving that issue for the trial court. View "Srivastava v. BMW of North America" on Justia Law

Hickenbottom v. Medical Solutions

2026-08-26T12:01:06-08:00

A healthcare staffing company hired an employee as a travel nurse, requiring him to sign multiple agreements containing arbitration provisions with varying language. When the employee later accepted a temporary assignment at a hospital, he signed an additional agreement incorporating the employer’s most recent arbitration policy. After his assignment ended, the employee filed a class action lawsuit alleging wage and hour violations against the company. The company responded by filing a motion in the Superior Court of San Diego County to compel arbitration, relying on the arbitration provision from the employee handbook. The employee opposed, arguing that the handbook’s provision was superseded by the newer arbitration agreement incorporated into his most recent assignment. The court denied the motion, finding that the company had relied on the wrong agreement. The company then filed a second motion to compel arbitration, this time based on the updated agreement, but failed to provide the affidavit or explanation required by California Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 for renewed motions. The employee objected, contending that the second motion sought the same relief as the first and was subject to section 1008(b), which the company had not satisfied. The Superior Court agreed, ruled it lacked jurisdiction to consider the renewed motion, and denied it. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed whether the trial court properly applied section 1008(b) and whether the second motion was a renewed motion for the same relief. The appellate court held that the company’s second motion sought identical relief as the first—compelling arbitration of the same claims—regardless of which agreement formed the basis. Because the company failed to comply with section 1008(b), the trial court lacked jurisdiction, and the order denying the renewed motion was not appealable. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. View "Hickenbottom v. Medical Solutions" on Justia Law

Salvatora v. XTO Energy Inc

2026-08-24T09:00:04-08:00

Six landowners in Western Pennsylvania, believing that XTO Energy, Inc. was underpaying royalties owed under oil and gas leases, brought a class action in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. None of the named plaintiffs’ leases included arbitration clauses, but the proposed class definitions were broad enough to cover leaseholders whose leases did contain arbitration clauses. The plaintiffs sought damages on behalf of themselves and similarly situated landowners. After the suit was filed, the District Court oversaw extensive class discovery and certified classes that included some members whose leases had arbitration clauses. XTO did not assert arbitration as a defense in its answers or move to compel arbitration before class certification or before the expiration of the class opt-out period. It only moved to compel arbitration against those unnamed class members with arbitration clauses after the opt-out period closed. Relying in part on the then-controlling district court decision in Valli v. Avis Budget Rental Car Group, LLC, a Magistrate Judge found that XTO had waived its right to arbitrate by demonstrating a preference for litigation over arbitration, and the District Court adopted that ruling. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s waiver determination de novo as to legal conclusions and for clear error as to factual findings. The Third Circuit held that, under its intervening precedential decision in Valli v. Avis Budget Group, Inc., a defendant does not waive its right to compel arbitration against unnamed class members with arbitration clauses in their leases merely by litigating prior to class certification, where none of the named plaintiffs are subject to arbitration. The court found XTO’s conduct did not constitute an implied waiver. The Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s order denying XTO’s motion to compel arbitration and remanded for further proceedings. View "Salvatora v. XTO Energy Inc" on Justia Law

Parkin v. Avis Rent a Car System LLC

2026-08-24T09:00:04-08:00

Two foreign nationals from the United Kingdom rented vehicles from a car rental company during separate visits to the United States. Each used a third-party website to reserve vehicles and selected a package that included supplemental liability insurance. Upon arriving at the rental location, they signed rental forms and received a “rental jacket” that contained additional terms, including a statement that supplemental liability insurance would be provided via an excess automobile policy and an arbitration clause requiring most disputes to be resolved through arbitration. Later, the customers believed the company did not actually secure the promised insurance policy but intended to pay claims from its own funds. They filed a putative class action in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, asserting breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, and a violation of Florida’s consumer protection law. The District Court dismissed the fraud and statutory claims but allowed the contract claim to proceed. The defendants, Budget and its parent company, reserved their right to arbitrate and pursued discovery. After deposing the plaintiffs, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing the plaintiffs were aware of the arbitration clause when they received the rental jackets. The District Court denied the motion, finding that by litigating into discovery before moving to compel arbitration, the defendants had impliedly waived their right to arbitrate. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the waiver determination de novo. The Third Circuit held that the defendants did not impliedly waive their right to arbitrate. Because factual development was necessary to determine arbitrability under a prior circuit decision, the defendants’ conduct—reserving their arbitration right and moving to compel after depositions—was not inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate. The Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s order and remanded for further proceedings on the motion to compel arbitration. View "Parkin v. Avis Rent a Car System LLC" on Justia Law

Ivy Fund Manager, LLC v. CDH Real Estate Investment Management Company, Ltd.

2026-08-21T05:30:58-08:00

A real estate investment firm based in China and another firm based in Singapore entered into a joint venture in 2021 to develop and operate a property near Auburn University. The Chinese firm held an 80% interest, while the Singaporean firm held a 20% interest and managed the venture, with full access to the joint venture’s bank accounts. The Chinese firm alleged that the manager firm made unauthorized transfers from the joint venture’s accounts, ultimately taking over $1 million. Despite partial repayment and assurances, a significant amount remained outstanding. The Chinese firm filed suit in the Lee Circuit Court, Alabama, asserting claims including declaratory judgment, fraudulent misrepresentation, conversion, and fraudulent suppression. The Singaporean firm failed to timely respond to the complaint, leading to requests for default judgment. After some delay, the manager filed an answer and engaged in discovery, but disputes arose over depositions and compliance with court orders. The trial court repeatedly addressed motions for default judgment and issues of discovery noncompliance, particularly regarding the failure of the manager’s CEO to appear for deposition. The manager later moved to compel arbitration, citing joint venture agreements containing arbitration clauses; however, the trial court ultimately entered a default judgment on liability for the Chinese firm, reserving damages, and deemed the motion to compel arbitration moot. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama considered whether it had jurisdiction, given that the lower court’s judgment did not resolve damages. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the order was interlocutory and not appealable because it did not determine damages. The court concluded that the default judgment’s interlocutory nature was not altered by the ruling on the arbitration motion, and accordingly, dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment. View "Ivy Fund Manager, LLC v. CDH Real Estate Investment Management Company, Ltd." on Justia Law

Mitchell v. Lilac Solutions, Inc.

2026-08-20T12:02:35-08:00

Four former employees brought claims against their previous employer, a lithium extraction technology company, and several of its managers, alleging wrongful termination, discrimination, exposure to harmful chemicals, and sexual harassment. Each employee had signed an agreement to arbitrate disputes arising out of employment. Despite this, after the lawsuit was filed, the defendants engaged in extensive litigation activity: they filed answers and cross-complaints asserting arbitration rights, initiated and responded to significant discovery, and made multiple procedural motions. Notably, they did not immediately move to compel arbitration, instead doing so only after the plaintiffs filed an anti-SLAPP motion. The Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, denied the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, finding that the defendants had waived their right to arbitrate by substantially invoking the litigation process and taking steps inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate. The court relied on factors from prior California appellate decisions, focusing on the defendants’ conduct in court and their use of discovery tools not typically available in arbitration. The court did not find it necessary to decide whether the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act (EFAA) applied, as its waiver finding was dispositive. On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that the trial court’s waiver analysis was consistent with the California Supreme Court’s decision in Quach v. California Commerce Club, Inc., which clarified that waiver of the right to arbitrate focuses solely on the party’s conduct and intent, not on prejudice to the opposing party. The appellate court found substantial evidence that the defendants intentionally relinquished their arbitration rights by actively litigating in court prior to seeking arbitration, and thus affirmed the denial of the motion to compel arbitration. View "Mitchell v. Lilac Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

5-Star General Store v. American Express Company

2026-08-19T12:30:03-08:00

A group of small merchants, including a store in Rhode Island, entered into arbitration agreements with a credit card company, which required arbitration of disputes before the American Arbitration Association (AAA). In August 2023, these merchants initiated thousands of arbitration proceedings against the company, challenging certain “swipe-fee” policies that they argued harmed small businesses. A dispute arose over the filing fees that the credit card company owed to the AAA. The AAA administrator determined the applicable fees and repeatedly warned both parties that the arbitrations would be administratively closed if the fees were not paid. The merchants paid their share of the fees, but the credit card company refused to pay, contesting the fee amount. As a result, in late February 2024, the AAA administratively closed the arbitrations. Subsequently, the merchants filed a class action in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, arguing that the company’s refusal to pay arbitration fees constituted a default and waiver of its right to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The credit card company moved to stay the litigation and compel arbitration. The District Court denied the motion, finding that the company had defaulted and waived its arbitration rights by failing to pay the required fees, and rejected the company’s argument that the merchants had acted with unclean hands. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court had the authority to decide whether the company’s conduct amounted to waiver or default under the FAA, and that the company’s deliberate refusal to pay arbitration fees, despite repeated warnings, constituted waiver and default. The First Circuit also found no error in the district court’s rejection of the unclean hands defense. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to stay and compel arbitration. View "5-Star General Store v. American Express Company" on Justia Law

DING V. STRUCTURE THERAPEUTICS, INC.

2026-08-19T08:01:25-08:00

A former Chief Financial Officer of a clinical drug development company was terminated shortly after experiencing a domestic violence incident and requesting limited accommodations at work. She alleged that her supervisor sidelined her, assigned her diminished responsibilities, and ultimately terminated her for reasons related to her gender and experience as a domestic violence victim. After her termination, she initially filed an arbitration demand asserting discrimination and harassment based on national origin and her status as a domestic violence victim. During discovery in the arbitration process, she uncovered evidence suggesting her mistreatment was motivated by sex. She then withdrew from arbitration and filed suit in state court, asserting sex discrimination and hostile work environment claims. The employer removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California and moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the Federal Arbitration Act and related federal law preempted any state procedural rules allowing withdrawal from arbitration. The district court ruled that, although state procedural rules were preempted, the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA) gave the plaintiff the right to invalidate the arbitration agreement and proceed in court based on plausible allegations of sexual harassment. The district court found that the plaintiff did not know of her sexual harassment claim when she initiated arbitration and had not waived her rights under the EFAA. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration. The court held that the EFAA allows plaintiffs to elect to proceed in court once they discover a sexual harassment claim, even if they initially pursued other claims in arbitration, so long as they did not intentionally relinquish a known right. The court further found the plaintiff plausibly alleged a sex-based hostile work environment claim under California law and thus under the EFAA. View "DING V. STRUCTURE THERAPEUTICS, INC." on Justia Law

Village of Schaumburg v Permasteelisa North America

2026-08-18T12:30:47-08:00

The Village of Schaumburg owns a hotel and convention center that it alleges has defective exterior walls. In February 2022, it initiated a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, against several parties for fraud, breach of warranty, and products liability. In November 2022, the Village added Permasteelisa North America, a subcontractor, as a defendant. About eight months later, the Village sought to compel arbitration of its dispute with Permasteelisa, even though it had not previously requested arbitration in its complaint or before filing suit, and the arbitration clause was contained in a contract between Permasteelisa and the general contractor, not the Village directly. The District Court concluded that by filing a lawsuit and then delaying its request for arbitration, the Village presumptively waived any right to arbitrate it might have had. The Village argued that the lawsuit was filed to avoid the statute of limitations expiring, but the District Court responded that the Village should have requested arbitration at the outset or, at the latest, soon after Permasteelisa’s motion to dismiss was filed. The court found that the combination of filing suit and substantial delay amounted to waiver of any right to arbitrate and denied the Village’s motion to compel arbitration. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the District Court’s decision for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that the District Court did not err in concluding that the Village waived any right to arbitrate by acting inconsistently with that right through both initiating litigation and delaying the arbitration request. The Seventh Circuit also rejected the argument that a contractual anti-waiver clause could override federal procedural rules governing litigation conduct. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "Village of Schaumburg v Permasteelisa North America" on Justia Law

Moore v Club Exploria, LLC

2026-08-18T12:30:47-08:00

The plaintiff received two pre-recorded telemarketing calls from a vacation property company, which he alleged were made without his consent in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. The company had used third-party vendors to conduct a large-scale telemarketing campaign, targeting individuals whose phone numbers had been obtained from opt-in websites. The plaintiff, on behalf of himself and a proposed class, filed suit against the company in April 2019, asserting that these calls violated federal law. In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the defendant engaged in extensive litigation over the course of four years. It filed answers with affirmative defenses, participated in class-related discovery, and litigated several motions, including opposing class certification and filing for summary judgment. Notably, the defendant did not assert arbitration as a defense until after the class was certified and significant litigation had occurred. When it finally raised arbitration—claiming that many class members had agreed to arbitrate through opt-in websites—the district court refused to allow the late amendment to add this defense, finding that it was too late and that the right to arbitrate had been waived. The district court later denied the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, granted summary judgment to the plaintiff and the class, and ordered further settlement negotiations. Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit clarified the appropriate standard of review for orders denying motions to compel arbitration, holding that legal rulings with precedential effect are reviewed de novo, while the ultimate waiver determination is reviewed for clear error. The court further held that a defendant’s conduct prior to class certification is relevant in assessing waiver of the right to arbitrate. Finding no clear error in the district court’s conclusion that the defendant waived its arbitration rights by failing to timely assert them, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment. View "Moore v Club Exploria, LLC" on Justia Law

DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LTD. V. ANTRIX CORP. LTD.

2026-08-12T08:01:30-08:00

Devas Multimedia Private Limited, an Indian corporation, along with several related entities, sought to confirm a $562.5 million international arbitral award against Antrix Corporation Limited, a company wholly owned by India. The award stemmed from a 2005 agreement between Devas and Antrix, under which Antrix was to provide satellite capacity to Devas in exchange for fees. In 2011, Antrix terminated the agreement following a policy decision by the Indian government. Devas initiated arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce, which resulted in an award in Devas’s favor. Devas then petitioned to confirm the award under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”) in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. The district court confirmed the award, finding it had subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) arbitration exception and the New York Convention, and personal jurisdiction under the FSIA. The court also rejected Antrix’s argument that the case should be dismissed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Antrix appealed, and the Ninth Circuit initially ruled in Antrix’s favor on personal jurisdiction grounds. However, the Supreme Court in CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp., 605 U.S. 223 (2025), reversed, holding that the FSIA does not require a minimum contacts analysis beyond its statutory provisions, and remanded for consideration of alternative arguments. On remand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the FSIA’s arbitration exception supplied subject matter jurisdiction, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Antrix was reasonable and comported with the Fifth Amendment, and that forum non conveniens does not apply to actions to confirm foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in part, and reversed and vacated in part on issues related to the standing of certain intervenors, remanding for further proceedings. View "DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LTD. V. ANTRIX CORP. LTD." on Justia Law

Trimble v. Entrata, Inc.

2026-08-11T10:30:42-08:00

A software company operated an online payment portal used by residents, including the plaintiff, to pay rent for Maryland apartments. Each time the plaintiff paid rent through the portal, she was charged a convenience fee. To complete a transaction, users were required to check a box agreeing to the portal’s hyperlinked terms and conditions, which included an arbitration provision, a clause allowing unilateral changes to the agreement, and a notice provision stating that notices would be posted on the portal. The plaintiff, on behalf of herself and similarly situated individuals, filed a class action, alleging that the company unlawfully acted as an unlicensed collection agency by collecting these fees. After the action was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, the company moved to compel arbitration based on the terms and conditions. The plaintiff opposed, arguing that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable under Maryland law because the company’s ability to unilaterally change the terms without advance notice rendered its promise to arbitrate illusory. The district court agreed, finding that the contract was a browsewrap agreement and that the modification and notice clauses allowed the company to change terms at will without meaningful notice or an opportunity for users to opt out before changes became binding. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that, under Maryland law, the arbitration agreement was unenforceable for lack of consideration because the company’s promise to arbitrate was illusory. The court reasoned that the change-in-terms clause gave the company unfettered discretion to modify the agreement at any time, without advance notice, thus failing to bind the company meaningfully. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Trimble v. Entrata, Inc." on Justia Law

MAPP v. Floor and Decor

2026-08-06T09:30:53-08:00

A national flooring retailer contracted with a Louisiana-based construction management company for the construction of a retail store in Metairie, Louisiana. The relationship soured after the retailer terminated the agreement, allegedly due to delays. Shortly after termination, the construction company disputed that it had breached the contract and demanded payment for work performed. The retailer did not respond to the payment demand. The construction company filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana under the Louisiana Private Works Act, seeking recovery for the work performed. The retailer moved to compel arbitration based on the agreement’s dispute resolution provision and also sought to transfer the case. The district court granted the transfer to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana and denied the motion to compel arbitration without prejudice. When the motion to compel arbitration was renewed in the new court, the district court denied it again, concluding the retailer had not followed the prerequisite steps outlined in the contract’s dispute resolution process. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit conducted de novo review. The appellate court determined that the arbitration clause in the contract, which gave the retailer sole discretion to elect arbitration, was a contract of adhesion under Louisiana law. Applying state contract principles and relevant Louisiana Supreme Court precedent, the court found that the lack of mutuality and the imbalance in bargaining power rendered the clause unenforceable. The court held that the arbitration provision was adhesionary and thus invalid, and affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration. View "MAPP v. Floor and Decor" on Justia Law

Quinn, Racusin & Gazzola Chartered v. Pavich Law Group, P.C.

2026-08-06T06:33:50-08:00

The dispute involved four law firms that jointly represented Wye Oak Technology, Inc. in litigation against the Republic of Iraq. After a federal district court awarded Wye Oak over $120 million, Wye Oak’s board approved paying a forty-six percent contingency fee to the law firms, with the specific allocation among them to be determined later. The firms executed an Agreement Concerning Attorneys’ Fees (ACAF), which included an arbitration clause. Quinn, Racusin & Gazzola Chartered (QRG) later claimed that it was excluded from a prior side agreement between two other firms and alleged it was pressured into accepting the arbitration provision under duress. Following disputes over fee allocation and related tort claims, Pavich Law Group and Whiteford, Taylor & Preston initiated arbitration. The arbitrator awarded QRG zero percent of the contingency fee, while the other firms received varying portions. QRG challenged the award in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, arguing that the ACAF was invalid due to fraudulent inducement and duress, and that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority by ruling on issues outside the scope of the arbitration clause. The Superior Court rejected QRG’s arguments, determined that the arbitration clause was broad enough to cover the disputes, and confirmed the arbitrator’s award. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court held that QRG failed to demonstrate fraudulent inducement or duress regarding the agreement to arbitrate. It also found that the arbitrator acted within the scope of the ACAF’s arbitration clause, which covered both fee allocation and related tort claims. The Court further concluded that the vacatur of the underlying federal judgment did not void the ACAF, as some monetization of the judgment had occurred. The judgment confirming the arbitration award was affirmed. View "Quinn, Racusin & Gazzola Chartered v. Pavich Law Group, P.C." on Justia Law

East Orange Educational Support Professionals' Association v. East Orange Board of Education

2026-08-05T06:09:54-08:00

Custodians employed by a school district were represented by a union and worked under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that provided for extra pay—specifically, one and a half times their salary in addition to their regular pay—when schools were closed due to emergencies. During the COVID-19 pandemic, after a state of emergency was declared and schools were closed to students, the Board initially paid custodians 250% of their regular salary for in-person work. However, following an amendment to N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(1), the Board adjusted compensation, ceasing the additional 150% pay and instead paid custodians as if schools were “open,” in line with the statute’s direction. The unions filed grievances alleging violations of the CBA regarding the cessation of extra pay. An arbitrator found in favor of the custodians, concluding the schools were “closed” within the meaning of the CBA and that the extra compensation should continue. The Chancery Division confirmed the arbitration award, determining the arbitrator’s decision was “reasonably debatable.” The Appellate Division reversed, finding the statutory language clear and holding the custodians should be compensated as if schools were “open,” not “closed,” thus vacating the arbitration award for custodial employees. The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case. It held that the arbitrator’s decision was directly contrary to the plain and express mandate of N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-9(e)(1), which requires compensation under the CBA “as if the school facilities remained open for any purpose.” The Court found the arbitrator’s award was not “reasonably debatable” and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision to vacate the arbitration award for custodial employees. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "East Orange Educational Support Professionals' Association v. East Orange Board of Education" on Justia Law

Prospect Capital Management LP v. Stratera Holdings LLC

2026-08-04T09:00:11-08:00

This case involves a dispute among business partners regarding the calculation and distribution of administrative fees earned from the sale of shares in a jointly managed investment fund. Prospect Capital Management L.P. (“Prospect”) acted as the fund administrator, while Stratera Holdings, LLC (“Stratera”) and Destra Capital Managers LLC (“Destra”) were entitled to share in fees depending on how fund shares were issued, including through a dividend reinvestment program (“DRIP”). After a change in sub-wholesaler, ambiguity arose in the contract language about whether certain DRIP shares—specifically, those issued by Stratera’s predecessor, Provasi—should be included in fee calculations. Prospect excluded these shares, reducing the amount paid to Stratera and Destra. Stratera and Destra initiated arbitration under the contract’s dispute resolution clause. The arbitration panel’s initial “Interim Award” found that Prospect had breached the contract by excluding DRIP shares for which Destra served as sub-wholesaler, but the award’s language left unclear whether this ruling applied to DRIP shares issued earlier by Provasi. When the parties could not agree on the scope of the award, the panel issued a revised interim award clarifying that fees were owed for DRIP shares issued by both Provasi and Destra. Prospect then petitioned the United States District Court for the District of Delaware to vacate the revised award, arguing that the arbitrators had unlawfully revisited a final decision in violation of the functus officio doctrine. The District Court rejected this claim, finding that the ambiguity exception to functus officio permitted the arbitrators’ clarification. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s order. The court held that the ambiguity exception to the functus officio doctrine applied because the interim award was susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Therefore, the panel acted within its authority in clarifying its award. View "Prospect Capital Management LP v. Stratera Holdings LLC" on Justia Law

Morales v. Super. Ct.

2026-08-03T10:03:29-08:00

Sylvia Morales was employed by San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E) for nearly two decades before being terminated. She filed a lawsuit alleging wrongful termination, asserting violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and the California Family Rights Act (CFRA), including claims of disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, failure to engage in an interactive process, and retaliation. Morales’s claims relied on statutory protections and a common law Tameny claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, not on any alleged breach of her employment agreement. After Morales filed her complaint, SDG&E moved to compel arbitration based on provisions in documents Morales had signed at hiring. The Superior Court of San Diego County granted the motion, concluding that the employment agreement’s arbitration clause covered all claims arising from Morales’s employment. The court reasoned that because the agreement described the employment as at-will, any claim based on exceptions to at-will employment constituted a dispute regarding an aspect of the agreement and thus was subject to arbitration. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One reviewed the case. Applying principles of contract interpretation, the court focused on the language of the arbitration provision in the September 12, 2005 agreement, which limited arbitration to disputes regarding any aspect of the agreement or any act violating the agreement. The court held that Morales’s statutory and public policy claims did not arise from the employment agreement nor did they allege violation of its terms; thus, the arbitration provision did not apply. The court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order compelling arbitration and to deny SDG&E’s motion. The main holding is that the agreement’s arbitration provision does not compel arbitration of Morales’s FEHA, CFRA, or Tameny claims. View "Morales v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

SHENZHEN ZEHUIJIN INVESTMENT CENTER V. YINGKUI

2026-08-03T08:01:12-08:00

In 2017, an investment entity loaned approximately 160 million Chinese yuan to an individual, who failed to repay the loan. The lender obtained an arbitral award against the borrower from the Beijing Arbitration Commission for around 150 million yuan. A Singaporean court later ordered the borrower to pay the award, but he still did not comply. The lender, knowing the borrower had been living in California for about two years, sought to enforce the foreign arbitral award in the United States under the Federal Arbitration Act by filing a petition in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. Attempts to serve process directly on the borrower at his California residence were unsuccessful. Eventually, the petition was left with another adult at the residence, mailed, and emailed to the borrower, who later acknowledged receiving notice. The borrower moved to dismiss the case in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, arguing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) that the court lacked personal jurisdiction because his domicile was China and the underlying dispute had no connection to California. He did not raise a defense under Rule 12(b)(5) for insufficient service of process. The district court found that it had general personal jurisdiction over the borrower based on his physical presence in California and confirmed the arbitral award. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that presence-based personal jurisdiction be conditioned on service of process on the defendant’s person; other means of service are sufficient if the defendant is physically present in the forum state. The court declined to address the sufficiency of service of process because the borrower had waived this argument by not raising it in district court. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment. View "SHENZHEN ZEHUIJIN INVESTMENT CENTER V. YINGKUI" on Justia Law

Big Iron Auction Co. v. Harder Capital

2026-07-31T05:07:33-08:00

A Nebraska auction company and its former independent sales representative (ISR) entered into a written agreement containing restrictive covenants, including a noncompete clause, and an arbitration provision governed by the Federal Arbitration Act. The ISR terminated the relationship and began working for a competitor, allegedly violating the noncompete clause. The auction company sued for breach of contract, injunctive relief, and tortious interference, seeking a temporary injunction to prevent the ISR’s competitive activities. The District Court for Hall County compelled arbitration for the breach of contract and tortious interference claims but retained jurisdiction to decide the request for injunctive relief, ultimately granting a temporary injunction against the ISR. While the arbitration was pending, the ISR sought to dissolve the injunction and later moved for damages, costs, and attorney fees under Nebraska’s injunction undertaking statute after the arbitrator ruled the restrictive covenants unenforceable and awarded certain damages to the ISR. The arbitrator also found that additional damages based on the invalidation of the restrictive covenants were speculative and not recoverable. The District Court confirmed the arbitral award and denied the ISR’s subsequent motion for additional damages, reasoning that the arbitral award was preclusive as to all damages except attorney fees and expenses. The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that, due to the scope of the arbitration and the confirmation of the arbitrator’s award, the ISR could not recover further damages for the wrongful injunction that overlapped with claims already addressed in arbitration. However, the Court held that attorney fees and expenses related to resisting the issuance and seeking dissolution of the wrongful injunction were not foreclosed by the arbitration and should be awarded. The Supreme Court modified the lower court’s judgment to include $11,000 in such fees and otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "Big Iron Auction Co. v. Harder Capital" on Justia Law

Saberin v. Alation, Inc.

2026-07-30T13:33:01-08:00

The plaintiff, a remote engineer working for a California-based software company, was living and working in Utah when he was arrested in Florida during a vacation. After his release from detention, the employer terminated his employment, allegedly based on information about the arrest, which did not lead to a conviction. The plaintiff claimed that this termination violated California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and Labor Code section 432.7, both of which prohibit employment decisions based on arrests not resulting in conviction. The case was initially filed in San Mateo County Superior Court but was stayed for binding arbitration due to provisions in the plaintiff’s employment documents. During arbitration, the parties disputed whether California law applied to the plaintiff’s claims, since he worked outside California and the termination decision was made in Illinois. The arbitrator concluded that California law could not apply extraterritorially to the plaintiff, as his principal place of work was Utah and the relevant employment actions occurred outside California. The parties stipulated that no other state’s law provided a cause of action for unlawful termination based on an arrest without conviction, and the arbitrator issued an award for the employer. The plaintiff petitioned the Superior Court to vacate the arbitration award, arguing that the arbitrator’s analysis was not properly tailored to the statutes at issue and that connections to California were sufficient. The court denied the petition, finding that the arbitrator correctly applied California’s standards for extraterritoriality. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, affirmed the denial. The court held that neither FEHA section 12952 nor Labor Code section 432.7 applied extraterritorially under these facts, as the plaintiff and his arrest had no connection to California and the termination decision was made outside the state. View "Saberin v. Alation, Inc." on Justia Law

POVER V. THE CAPITAL GROUP COMPANIES, INC.

2026-07-30T08:01:23-08:00

A former employee brought suit against her previous employer and associated fiduciaries, alleging that they mismanaged the employer's retirement savings plan, which is a defined contribution plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). She claimed that the fiduciaries retained underperforming investment options in the plan’s menu to generate transaction fees, in violation of their duties of prudence and loyalty, and sought plan-wide monetary and equitable relief on behalf of the plan. Previously, the United States District Court for the Central District of California reviewed the case. The defendants moved to compel arbitration, relying on provisions in the plan requiring arbitration of disputes and waiving participants’ rights to bring claims on a “class, collective, or representative basis.” The plaintiff argued that this waiver impermissibly precluded her from enforcing statutory rights under ERISA, which allow participants to sue on behalf of the plan for plan-wide relief. The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration, finding the waiver unenforceable under the effective-vindication doctrine and holding that the waiver provision was expressly non-severable, thus requiring the claims to proceed in court. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration. The Ninth Circuit held that the plan’s waiver provision was unenforceable because it prevented the plaintiff from asserting her right under ERISA to bring representative claims for plan-wide relief—a right that ERISA expressly provides. The court further held that, under the plan’s own terms, once the waiver was found unenforceable, any representative claim must be adjudicated in court, not arbitration. Thus, the plaintiff’s breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims would proceed before the district court. View "POVER V. THE CAPITAL GROUP COMPANIES, INC." on Justia Law

Neils Point, LLC v. Grady

2026-07-28T07:08:50-08:00

Neils Point, LLC owns a farm property in Harpswell, Maine, which it leased to Joseph and Laura Grady for agricultural use. The Gradys resided on the property and operated the farm under successive lease agreements, culminating in a 2017 extension titled “Commercial Agricultural Lease Agreement.” This lease specified that it was not a residential rental, set rent as a percentage of the farm’s net proceeds, and required arbitration for disputes. Neils Point alleged that the Gradys breached the lease by miscalculating rent, failing to pay on time, and not using the land as productive cropland. After Neils Point initiated arbitration in 2024, the Gradys responded by admitting the dispute was subject to arbitration and made their own arbitration demand under the lease. The arbitration hearing was held in July 2025, with both parties participating fully and without objection to either the process or the arbitrability of the dispute. The arbitrator found in favor of Neils Point, concluding that the Gradys breached the lease by improperly deducting expenses, failing to pay rent, and not maintaining the farm’s productivity. Damages were awarded, and the Gradys were ordered to vacate the property. The Cumberland County Superior Court confirmed the arbitration award and denied the Gradys’ subsequent motion to vacate, in which they argued for the first time that the arbitration provision was void because the lease was residential and the arbitrator exceeded his authority. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the Gradys’ participation in arbitration without objection waived their right to challenge the validity of the arbitration clause or the arbitrator’s authority. The Court further held that the arbitrator’s construction of the lease was rational, and thus confirmation of the award was proper. View "Neils Point, LLC v. Grady" on Justia Law

Goforth v. Transform Holdco, LLC

2026-07-28T07:01:08-08:00

Matthew Goforth, through MG Management Co., LLC, entered a dealer agreement with Sears Authorized Home Stores that included a broad non-compete provision, extending restrictions to his spouse, Malinda Goforth. After Matt decided not to renew the agreement, Sears suspected the Goforths would open a competing business and initiated arbitration, seeking to enforce the non-compete. The Goforths opposed enforcement, asserting the provision was unreasonable. The arbitrator initially denied emergency injunctive relief but later, upon learning that Matt and Malinda were opening Goforth Home & Lawn, granted interim relief enforcing the non-compete and added Malinda and her company as parties. A final arbitration award enforced the non-compete, but an appellate arbitrator later held the provision unenforceable while affirming attorneys’ fees to Sears. Subsequently, the Goforths initiated a second arbitration alleging antitrust violations, but the arbitrator determined their antitrust claims were compulsory counterclaims that should have been brought in the first arbitration. Following Sears’s bankruptcy, the Goforths brought an action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri against Sears’s owners, Transform Holdco, LLC and affiliates, asserting the same antitrust claims. Transform moved for summary judgment, arguing the claims were compulsory counterclaims barred by their failure to raise them in the initial arbitration. The district court agreed, holding the claims accrued upon Sears’s initiation of the first arbitration and were thus subject to compulsory counterclaim rules. The court granted summary judgment for Transform and did not address alternative grounds or the Goforths’ partial summary judgment motion. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Eighth Circuit held that the Goforths’ antitrust claims accrued when Sears initiated the first arbitration, making them compulsory counterclaims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13. The court also held that Malinda and her company were bound by the agreement’s arbitration provision. View "Goforth v. Transform Holdco, LLC" on Justia Law

Titan Consortium 1, LLC v. Argentine Republic

2026-07-21T08:02:42-08:00

Spanish investment companies alleged that Argentina unlawfully expropriated their airline investments, violating a bilateral treaty. After Argentina took over private airlines, the investors initiated arbitration at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The ICSID tribunal awarded over $320 million to the investors, and an internal appellate committee later affirmed the award and added more than $1 million in costs. The investors then assigned their rights to Titan Consortium 1, LLC, which sought enforcement of the award in the United States four years after the initial award. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed Titan’s petition to enforce the arbitral award. Argentina moved to dismiss, arguing the petition was untimely under a three-year statute of limitations. The district court denied the motion, holding that the twelve-year statute of limitations for enforcement of money judgments under D.C. Code § 15-101 applied. It granted summary judgment for Titan, enforcing the award. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed Argentina’s appeal, which challenged only the timeliness ruling. The court considered which statute of limitations applies to enforcement actions under 22 U.S.C. § 1650a, the statute implementing the Washington Convention. The court held that D.C. Code § 15-101’s twelve-year limitations period for enforcement of money judgments is the closest analogue and applies to petitions enforcing ICSID awards under § 1650a. It rejected Argentina’s arguments for a three-year limitations period under federal or D.C. arbitration statutes, noting the differences in statutory text and enforcement procedures. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding Titan’s enforcement action was timely. View "Titan Consortium 1, LLC v. Argentine Republic" on Justia Law

Elmar Hotel Management, LLC v Unite Here Local 1

2026-07-17T13:00:47-08:00

Several related companies, along with an individual, operated the Inn of Chicago. After purchasing the property, they assumed an existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with a labor union. When the City of Chicago approached them to use the Inn to house displaced migrants, the operation resumed, but the employers did not use union members for typical hotel functions. Instead, these tasks were handled by an outside staffing agency and later by another company managed by the same people. The labor union learned of this arrangement, filed grievances alleging violations of the CBA, and submitted the dispute to arbitration. The union also filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board, which was consolidated with the arbitration. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, reviewed the arbitration award. The arbitrator had found that the Inn was operating as a “hotel” within the meaning of the CBA while housing migrants, that the related companies and individual were a “single employer” under the CBA, and that they violated both the CBA and the National Labor Relations Act by failing to use union employees and failing to provide notice or bargain with the union. The district court confirmed the arbitration award, rejecting the employers’ arguments regarding arbitrability, notice, and authority. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s confirmation of the arbitration award. The court held that the employers were bound by the arbitration because they participated without reserving objections, and the arbitrator’s findings drew from the CBA and issues submitted by the parties. The court found no due process or public policy violation and affirmed the district court’s confirmation of the award. View "Elmar Hotel Management, LLC v Unite Here Local 1" on Justia Law

Wilkins v. Cruise, LLC

2026-07-14T11:32:49-08:00

A plaintiff was injured while riding in an autonomous vehicle operated by a ride-hailing company. At the time of the incident, the plaintiff was employed by the defendant company, but was using the service as a customer rather than in the scope of employment. The plaintiff sued the ride-hailing company and two related entities, including the vehicle manufacturer. The defendants sought to compel arbitration, arguing that the plaintiff had agreed to arbitration both through an employment agreement and through acceptance of the Terms of Service when signing up for the ride-hailing service as a user. The defendants relied on the sign-in process in the mobile app, which included conspicuous notice and hyperlinks to the Terms of Service containing an arbitration provision. The San Francisco City and County Superior Court denied the motion to compel arbitration. The trial court found the defendants failed to show that the plaintiff agreed to the arbitration provision in the Terms of Service, relying on a recent appellate case. The court also ruled that even if the Terms of Service were enforceable, they did not cover the related entities, and denied arbitration to prevent inconsistent rulings under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, subdivision (c). The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the sign-in wrap agreement used by the ride-hailing service provided sufficiently conspicuous notice of the Terms of Service, including the arbitration provision. It further held that the related entities were not “third parties” for purposes of section 1281.2, subdivision (c), due to the plaintiff’s own allegations of agency and joint venture among the defendants. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded with instructions to grant the motion to compel arbitration. View "Wilkins v. Cruise, LLC" on Justia Law

van Faassen v. Lindberg

2026-07-14T11:00:37-08:00

A Dutch life insurance company, through its trustees, sought to enforce an arbitral award against its former owners after they failed to maintain the company’s required solvency capital ratio, as agreed. When the capital ratio fell below the stipulated threshold, the company initiated urgent arbitration proceedings in the Netherlands, resulting in an award ordering the owners to restore the ratio and imposing a substantial penalty for noncompliance. Despite confirmations of the award by Dutch courts—including the Court of Rotterdam, the Court of Appeal of the Hague, and the Supreme Court of the Netherlands—the owners did not comply, leading to the company's liquidation. The trustees filed a petition in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, seeking to confirm the arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the New York Convention, as well as to recognize the Dutch court’s judgment under the North Carolina Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act. The district court found the arbitration award enforceable, holding the FAA’s three-year statute of limitations was “permissive,” not “mandatory,” and also concluded the Dutch judgment was recognizable as a foreign-country judgment under North Carolina law. The court entered judgment, confirming the award under federal law and did not rule on the alternative state-law claim. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the three-year statute of limitations in 9 U.S.C. § 207 is mandatory, not permissive, and reversed the district court’s order confirming the foreign arbitral award under the FAA due to untimeliness. However, the appellate court agreed that the Dutch court judgment qualifies for recognition under the North Carolina Act and remanded the case for further proceedings on the petitioners’ motion to enforce that judgment under state law. View "van Faassen v. Lindberg" on Justia Law

1199 SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST v. CHINESE-AMERICAN PLANNING COUNCIL HOME ATTENDANT PROGRAM

2026-07-10T06:30:06-08:00

A union representing over 100,000 current and former home healthcare workers in New York City entered into collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) with more than 40 employers. In 2015, the union and employers amended their CBAs with a Memorandum of Agreement (2015 MOA), mandating arbitration of statutory wage-and-hour claims, including those under the Fair Labor Standards Act and New York Labor Law. The union subsequently initiated a class arbitration in 2019 for wage claims dating back to 2008. The arbitrator found for the union, ordering employers to create a $30 million fund for affected workers and established a rapid payout process. The union sought, and the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York confirmed, the arbitration awards, making them binding on virtually all covered workers, except for nine individuals named in ongoing state litigation. Prior to the arbitration, several former employees who had left their jobs before the 2015 MOA was executed sued their employers in New York State courts, asserting similar wage claims. State courts uniformly held that these individuals, no longer union members or bargaining unit employees at the time of the 2015 MOA, could not be retroactively bound to arbitrate their claims. Despite this, the district court denied intervention by these former employees in the confirmation proceedings, concluding they lacked standing and were adequately represented by the union. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court, not the arbitrator, must decide whether the union and employers clearly agreed to arbitrate these statutory claims. The Circuit Court found that the union and employers did not agree to mandatory arbitration for former employees’ accrued statutory claims until the 2015 MOA, and the union could not lawfully waive the rights of individuals who had already left employment. The Court vacated the district court’s orders as to the appellants and remanded for further proceedings, ruling these individuals are not bound by the arbitration awards and may pursue their claims in state court. View "1199 SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST v. CHINESE-AMERICAN PLANNING COUNCIL HOME ATTENDANT PROGRAM" on Justia Law

RV Holdings 4 v. Standard Fiber

2026-07-09T06:58:15-08:00

The underlying dispute arose from a business relationship between Standard Fiber, LLC and entities associated with Ridgeview, involving management fee arrangements over several years. In 2006, Standard Fiber and Ridgeview Capital, LLC entered a Management Services Agreement (2006 MSA) with a set fee structure. While payments continued after the 2006 MSA expired, the parties disagreed on what terms governed post-2008 payments. Standard Fiber asserted that subsequent agreements, including a 2014 agreement to pay $25,000 per month, controlled. Ridgeview denied the existence or effect of any later agreements, instead claiming entitlement to fees under the original MSA or an alleged oral 50/50 fee-splitting agreement. Ridgeview sued in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, seeking unpaid management fees under the 50/50 oral agreement. The court compelled arbitration pursuant to the parties’ operating agreement, and the arbitration proceeded before a JAMS arbitrator. Ridgeview’s arbitration demand asserted claims for fees under the 2006 MSA and the 50/50 Agreement, but did not seek relief for breach of the 2014 fee agreement. During the arbitration, Standard Fiber referenced the 2014 Agreement as a defense, but Ridgeview did not advance it as a basis for affirmative recovery. The arbitrator ultimately found against Ridgeview on its submitted claims but awarded damages to Ridgeview based on breach of the 2014 Agreement. Standard Fiber moved the district court to modify or vacate the arbitration award, arguing the arbitrator exceeded her authority by granting relief on an unsubmitted claim. The district court confirmed the award, concluding it was rationally related to the parties’ submissions. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah held that an arbitrator may only award relief on claims actually submitted for decision. Because Ridgeview did not submit a claim for breach of the 2014 Agreement, the arbitrator exceeded her authority. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s confirmation of the award and remanded for modification to exclude any amount based on the 2014 Agreement. View "RV Holdings 4 v. Standard Fiber" on Justia Law

COMBS V. NETFLIX, INC.

2026-07-08T10:31:55-08:00

The plaintiff accepted a job at the defendant company in May 2017, signing an employment agreement that included an arbitration clause covering all employment-related disputes. Over several years, the plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to a sexually charged work environment and specific instances of sexual harassment. She repeatedly complained internally to supervisors and management from 2017 through 2021, but claims her concerns were ignored and that no corrective action was taken. The plaintiff further alleges she experienced retaliation, humiliation, and targeted harassment following her complaints, culminating in her termination by the defendant in December 2021, allegedly in retaliation for reporting the workplace environment. After her termination, the plaintiff filed an administrative complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing in August 2023 and received a right-to-sue letter. In July 2024, she initiated a lawsuit in California state court raising claims of discrimination, harassment, and hostile work environment. The defendant removed the case to the United States District Court for the Central District of California based on diversity jurisdiction and moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the employment agreement. The district court granted the motion, finding that the dispute between the parties arose and the plaintiff’s claims accrued before the effective date of the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA), which was March 3, 2022. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s order de novo. The court held that the EFAA applies only to disputes or claims that arise or accrue on or after March 3, 2022. Because the plaintiff’s dispute with the defendant arose and her claims accrued before that date, the statutory exception to arbitration in the EFAA did not apply. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order compelling arbitration. View "COMBS V. NETFLIX, INC." on Justia Law

Cross v. Albright

2026-07-08T07:19:50-08:00

Two neighboring landowners, who are related by marriage, became involved in multiple property disputes, including disagreements over joint ownership and access to ditches and land. To resolve these disputes, one party filed two complaints in the District Court of Fremont County: one seeking an easement for ditch access and another seeking partition of jointly owned land. The parties also had related petitions pending before the Board of Control. During litigation, they participated in mediation and signed an email outlining terms of a purported global settlement agreement, which included provisions for access to ditches, maintenance rights, restrictions on visible storage, and the drafting of a formal settlement by one party’s attorney. After mediation, as the parties attempted to formalize the agreement, new disagreements arose regarding how to implement the access and storage restriction provisions. Each party filed a motion to enforce their interpretation of the settlement; one sought a recordable easement and restrictive covenant, while the other argued those terms exceeded the agreement. The District Court of Fremont County held a hearing to consider the motions, reviewed the parties’ filings and affidavits, and ultimately found that the agreement lacked essential terms, particularly regarding implementation of ditch access and the visual storage restriction. The court determined there was no meeting of the minds and denied both motions to enforce, as well as a request for sanctions. The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the appeal. It held that the district court did not violate due process, as the issue of contract formation was properly considered and the parties had notice and opportunity to argue their positions. The Supreme Court agreed with the district court’s finding that no enforceable settlement agreement existed due to lack of mutual assent on material terms. It further held that Cross was not entitled to attorney’s fees, as there was no enforceable contract providing for such fees. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order. View "Cross v. Albright" on Justia Law

Decloedt v. Radnet Management

2026-07-07T14:36:03-08:00

The plaintiff brought suit against multiple former employers and individual defendants, alleging eleven causes of action under California state law, including sexual harassment and hostile work environment claims under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The plaintiff asserted that he was subjected to severe and pervasive harassment based on his sexual orientation by a coworker, who repeatedly made derogatory remarks about his homosexuality and engaged in threatening and unwanted physical conduct. The plaintiff further alleged that he reported this behavior to supervisors and human resources, but no corrective action was taken, and that the harassment adversely affected his emotional well-being. The defendants moved to compel arbitration, relying on an arbitration agreement signed at the start of the plaintiff’s employment and arguing that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) required arbitration of all employment-related claims. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the motion to compel arbitration, finding that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a sexual harassment claim under FEHA, which triggered the exemption provided by the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA). The defendants timely appealed from the denial of the motion to compel arbitration. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the trial court’s order de novo. The court held that harassment based on sexual orientation qualifies as sexual harassment under FEHA. It further found that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded facts showing severe or pervasive harassment, thus invoking the EFAA’s exemption from compelled arbitration under the FAA. The court affirmed the trial court’s order denying the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, awarding costs on appeal to the plaintiff. View "Decloedt v. Radnet Management" on Justia Law

The New York and Presbyterian Hospital v. New York State Nurses Association

2026-07-07T07:00:08-08:00

A hospital and a union representing registered nurses entered into a collective bargaining agreement, which required the hospital to staff its Cardio-Thoracic Intensive Care Unit according to a specific grid. When the hospital failed to maintain the agreed-upon staffing levels, the union filed a grievance on behalf of the affected nurses. The dispute proceeded to arbitration, where the arbitrator found that the hospital had breached the agreement and issued a monetary award to compensate nurses who worked on significantly understaffed shifts. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed cross-motions from both parties—one to vacate and one to confirm the arbitral award. The district court denied the hospital’s motion to vacate and granted the union’s motion to confirm the award, concluding that the arbitrator had acted within her authority under the agreement. The hospital appealed this decision, contending that the monetary relief was not authorized by the contract and that it constituted a punitive award in violation of public policy. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s confirmation of the arbitral award. The court held that the arbitrator did not exceed her authority under the agreement, as the agreement’s remedial authority clause permitted the issuance of monetary relief and did not expressly prohibit such remedies. The court further found that the award was compensatory, not punitive, as it was intended to make the nurses whole for extra work performed, and was not designed to punish the hospital. The court concluded that the award did not violate any explicit public policy and that the arbitrator’s remedy was properly derived from the terms of the agreement. View "The New York and Presbyterian Hospital v. New York State Nurses Association" on Justia Law

Compeer Financial, ACA v. Corp. Amer. Lending, Inc.

2026-07-06T07:30:57-08:00

Compeer, a group of federally chartered farm credit associations, entered into a master participation agreement with Corporate America Lending, Inc. (CAL), under which Compeer paid CAL $58 million in exchange for the right to receive all payments due on a set of agricultural loans CAL had originated to Famoso Hills Ranch in California. Under the agreement, CAL was to promptly remit any payments or proceeds received on these loans to Compeer. When Famoso refinanced its loans and paid off the balance to CAL, CAL failed to notify Compeer or transfer the payoff proceeds as required and instead concealed receipt of the funds and withheld them as a negotiation tactic, eventually claiming a right to offset based on alleged damages suffered. Arbitration proceedings commenced, resulting in an award in favor of Compeer, finding it was unconditionally entitled to the payoff proceeds and that CAL had no legal basis to withhold them. The arbitration panel found for Compeer on its claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment. Compeer moved in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota to confirm the award and appoint a receiver to secure the funds. The district court confirmed the arbitration award, finding it final and enforceable, and appointed a receiver due to CAL’s repeated noncompliance and attempts to dissipate the funds. CAL appealed, arguing the award was nonfinal, violated public policy, and the receivership was improper due to a forum-selection clause and lack of necessity. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The court held that the arbitration award was final and confirmable, the public policy exception to vacatur under the Federal Arbitration Act did not require setting aside the award given the alternative equitable bases for Compeer’s recovery, and the district court acted within its discretion in appointing a receiver due to CAL’s conduct and the inadequacy of alternative remedies. View "Compeer Financial, ACA v. Corp. Amer. Lending, Inc." on Justia Law

Phan v. Knight Sacramento SU Inc.

2026-07-02T10:03:11-08:00

The plaintiff was intermittently employed by two car dealerships operated by the defendant corporations from 2022 to 2024. During her employment, she signed several arbitration agreements, including standalone agreements, with both dealerships. These agreements required binding arbitration of “any claims” arising from not only employment but also any other interaction or relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants or their defined third-party beneficiaries. The agreements precluded class actions and included a severance clause for invalid terms. In 2024, the plaintiff filed wage and hour claims both individually and on behalf of a class of current and former employees, seeking a jury trial. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on the agreements, or alternatively, to sever any invalid terms and enforce the remainder. The Superior Court of Sacramento County denied the motion, relying on Cook v. University of Southern California, and found the agreements procedurally and substantively unconscionable, with unconscionable terms permeating the agreements. The court declined to sever the terms and refused to enforce the agreements. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District reviewed the appeal. The court affirmed the trial court’s order, holding that the arbitration agreements were substantively unconscionable due to their overly broad scope extending beyond employment-related claims and lack of mutuality, as they required the plaintiff to arbitrate all claims against third parties without reciprocal obligation from those parties. The court found no sufficient justification for the breadth or the nonmutual terms. It also concluded that the unconscionable terms tainted the central purpose of the agreements, so severance was not appropriate. The judgment was affirmed. View "Phan v. Knight Sacramento SU Inc." on Justia Law

J.C. Cannistraro, LLC v. Columbia Construction Co.

2026-06-29T04:09:06-08:00

A general contractor and a subcontractor entered into agreements for the construction and renovation of a facility. The subcontracts required disputes to be resolved by arbitration pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration Association. The subcontractor performed work and submitted invoices, but the general contractor, while timely rejecting the invoices and providing reasons, failed to include the good faith certification required by the Massachusetts prompt pay act. The contractor later paid the invoices after an arbitrator determined that the invoices were deemed approved due to the lack of timely certification. Subsequently, the contractor filed a counterclaim in arbitration seeking recoupment of those payments, arguing the invoices were not fair and reasonable. The subcontractor initially brought suit in the Massachusetts Superior Court, which was then compelled to arbitration per the contract. During arbitration, the arbitrator found that the contractor’s failure to timely certify its rejection of the invoices resulted in the invoices being deemed approved and ordered payment to the subcontractor. After payment, the arbitrator allowed the contractor’s counterclaim for recoupment. Following evidentiary proceedings, the arbitrator ruled in favor of the contractor, awarding partial recoupment. The subcontractor moved in the Superior Court to vacate this award, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his authority. Relying on J.C. Cannistraro, LLC v. Columbia Construction Co., the Superior Court judge vacated the recoupment portion of the arbitration award, finding that the contractor had asserted defenses before paying the invoices, contrary to precedent. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the matter on direct appellate review. It held that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority because the award was not prohibited by law nor did it violate public policy. The court determined that the prompt pay act did not expressly prohibit recoupment in these circumstances and that the arbitrator’s actions were within the broad scope granted by the parties’ agreement and the arbitration rules. The judgment vacating the arbitration award was reversed and the matter remanded for confirmation of the arbitration award. View "J.C. Cannistraro, LLC v. Columbia Construction Co." on Justia Law

Betanco v. Living Spaces Furniture, LLC

2026-06-25T12:32:55-08:00

The plaintiff worked as a delivery driver for a furniture distribution company, transporting goods from California warehouses to customers. The furniture was sourced both within and outside California, including from Mexico, and arrived at the distribution centers before being delivered to customers. The plaintiff signed an independent contractor agreement with a delivery-service provider that included an arbitration clause, and subsequently filed two lawsuits against the furniture company and the delivery company: a class action alleging wage and hour violations, and a separate action under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) for civil penalties. The Alameda County Superior Court reviewed the defendants’ omnibus motion to compel arbitration of all claims and to dismiss the plaintiff’s representative PAGA claims. The trial court found that, although the arbitration agreement was valid and enforceable and the defendants had not waived their right to arbitrate, the plaintiff qualified as a “transportation worker” under section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and was thus exempt from FAA coverage. As a result, state law governed the enforcement of the arbitration agreement. The court ordered certain claims (reimbursement of expenses, wage statement claims, and unfair competition) to arbitration, but allowed wage claims to proceed in court under Labor Code section 229. It denied the motion to dismiss the representative PAGA claims, citing California Supreme Court precedent, and stayed both actions pending arbitration of individual claims. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed these consolidated appeals. The court held that the plaintiff is a transportation worker exempt from the FAA because he played a direct and active role in the interstate movement of goods, even though his deliveries were intrastate and retail in nature. The court affirmed that the plaintiff has standing to pursue non-individual PAGA claims in court, following Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. The order by the trial court was affirmed. View "Betanco v. Living Spaces Furniture, LLC" on Justia Law

COCOM V. ABM AVIATION, INC.

2026-06-23T08:01:19-08:00

Robert Cocom, a former airport janitor, brought a putative class action against his previous employer, ABM Aviation, Inc., alleging wage and hour violations. When he was hired, Cocom signed a Mutual Arbitration Agreement (MAA) requiring employment-related disputes to be resolved through arbitration. The MAA included waivers of class, collective, and representative actions, as well as a provision stating that arbitration awards would not have preclusive or precedential effect in other proceedings. Cocom’s lawsuit was originally filed in state court but was removed to federal court by ABM, which then moved to compel arbitration and strike the class claims. The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied ABM’s motion, finding the arbitration agreement both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The court relied heavily on the California Court of Appeal’s decision in Cook v. University of Southern California, interpreting the MAA as having an overly broad scope, indefinite duration, and lack of mutuality, and concluding that certain waivers violated California law. Finding multiple provisions unconscionable, the district court declined to sever them and refused to enforce the MAA. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the MAA’s provisions were distinguishable from those in Cook, noting that the MAA was limited to employment-related disputes, thereby avoiding the overbreadth, indefinite duration, and mutuality issues identified in Cook. The Ninth Circuit also found that any potentially unconscionable waivers (such as those related to representative actions or public injunctive relief) were severable. The main holding was that the MAA was not substantively unconscionable and should be enforced, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "COCOM V. ABM AVIATION, INC." on Justia Law

USA v. Ma

2026-06-15T09:30:31-08:00

The United States initiated a lawsuit against Dr. Dongxin Ma and Ma Acupuncture Center, P.C., alleging violations of the False Claims Act. The government claimed that the defendants submitted inflated reimbursement requests for acupuncture services provided to veterans, resulting in improper payments from the Department of Veterans Affairs. The United States sought substantial damages and civil penalties, while the defendants denied liability and asserted they acted in good faith. Following mediation, the parties reached significant agreement regarding the terms of settlement. The mediation resulted in an oral agreement that included payment by the defendants of $2.3 million over 42 months, an initial $100,000 payment, dismissal and release of civil claims by the government, reasonable efforts by Dr. Ma to sell certain property, and the government’s right to place liens if obligations were not met. The United States filed a notice of settlement and submitted a written agreement containing additional standard terms. The defendants, later represented by new counsel, contested the validity of the settlement, arguing that the written agreement included material terms not discussed at mediation and that Dr. Ma had not authorized settlement above $1 million. The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas held an evidentiary hearing, ultimately concluding that the parties had orally agreed to all material terms at mediation and that the additional terms in the written agreement were immaterial. The court amended its judgment to enforce only the material terms agreed orally. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion and affirmed. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in enforcing the oral settlement agreement, finding that all material terms were agreed to at mediation and that additional terms in the written agreement were not material. The court also found that the defendants had forfeited certain arguments on appeal. View "USA v. Ma" on Justia Law

Venezuela US SRL v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

2026-06-12T07:02:00-08:00

A Barbados-based company acquired an 18 percent share in a Venezuelan oil company, alongside two state-owned shareholders. When dividends were distributed in 2008 and 2009, the state-owned entities received their share, but the Barbados-based company did not. In 2013, the company initiated arbitration proceedings against Venezuela in The Hague, seeking damages for not receiving its dividends. The arbitral tribunal, after a jurisdictional and merits phase, eventually awarded the company $59 million plus costs, fees, and interest. During the proceedings, a dispute arose about which government and legal counsel represented Venezuela, given the contested presidency between Nicolás Maduro and Juan Guaidó. The company sought to enforce the arbitration award in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Venezuela argued that enforcement would violate U.S. public policy by contradicting the U.S. President’s official recognition of the Guaidó government, as the tribunal had allowed the Maduro regime to change legal counsel during the arbitration. The district court rejected Venezuela’s argument, concluding that the President’s recognition power was not a cognizable public policy under the New York Convention, and even if it were, enforcement would not violate it. The court granted the company’s petition to enforce the award. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that none of the exceptions in the New York Convention, including the public policy exception, applied to prevent recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award. The court found that enforcing the award did not undermine the President’s exclusive recognition power or express any view on the legitimacy of either Venezuelan government, and thus did not violate fundamental U.S. public policy. View "Venezuela US SRL v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela" on Justia Law

Millette v. Burger

2026-06-12T01:21:55-08:00

A group of plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, alleging misuse, misappropriation, and conflicts of interest related to an investment in Mockingbird Cannabis LLC, a medical marijuana manufacturer. The case was initially assigned to Judge Debra Gibbs. Before the defendants were served, one defendant, Millette, filed motions to compel arbitration, to dismiss the case, and to stay proceedings. The plaintiffs responded and also sought leave to file an amended complaint that expanded the number of parties and clarified their claims. Subsequently, without a hearing, a specially appointed judge, Barry Ford, granted the plaintiffs’ motion to amend. Millette questioned Judge Ford’s authority to act in the case, arguing that Ford’s appointment was limited to cases pending as of a prior administrative order dated February 21, 2024, and this case was filed after that date. Millette opposed the reassignment and sought appellate review, raising the issue of the judge’s authority to issue orders in this matter. The Supreme Court of Mississippi considered whether Judge Ford was properly authorized to act in the case. The Court examined the language of the appointment order and relevant statutory provisions, concluding that Judge Ford’s authority was limited to cases pending as of February 21, 2024, and did not extend to this case, which was filed later. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the actions taken by Judge Ford and remanded the case to proceed before the originally assigned circuit-court judge. The Court further held that remaining issues raised on appeal were moot in light of this disposition. View "Millette v. Burger" on Justia Law

ORR V. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, RIVERSIDE

2026-06-09T08:32:53-08:00

A former seasonal employee of a package delivery company filed suit against her employer, alleging violations of California labor laws, including wage-related claims and a Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) claim. She had signed an arbitration agreement as a condition of employment, which included a class action waiver and a delegation clause assigning threshold arbitrability issues to an arbitrator. The agreement specified that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) would govern unless it did not apply, in which case state law would control. After her work schedule was repeatedly changed or canceled with little notice, she was not given further work despite her inquiries and subsequently initiated legal action on behalf of herself and proposed classes. After the case was removed from state court, the United States District Court for the Central District of California granted the employer’s motion to compel arbitration of the individual claims and stayed class claims. The district court declined to decide whether the FAA or the California Arbitration Act (CAA) governed the agreement, reasoning that the result would be the same under either statute. The court also denied the employee’s motion for clarification, maintaining that the question of which law applied and whether the FAA’s “contracts of employment” exclusion was relevant could be resolved by the arbitrator rather than the court. On mandamus review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court committed clear legal error by failing to determine whether the FAA or state law governed the arbitration agreement before compelling arbitration. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that, under New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, the court—not an arbitrator—must decide whether the FAA applies, including any statutory exclusions. The Ninth Circuit granted the writ of mandamus, directing the district court to vacate its prior order and to determine the statutory basis for its authority to compel arbitration before referring the parties to arbitration. View "ORR V. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, RIVERSIDE" on Justia Law

Unite Here Local 1 v Magnificent Mile Hotel Management, LLC

2026-06-05T13:00:46-08:00

An employee at a hotel was terminated after he displayed a knife in the workplace, prompting another employee to feel threatened. The worker’s union filed a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement, which specified that arbitration disputes would be resolved by an arbitrator chosen at random from a list of nine individuals. The union used a random selection website to designate an arbitrator, but the hotel objected, arguing the selected arbitrator was already handling another dispute between the parties and that the usual practice was to mutually agree on an arbitrator or strike names from the list. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, first ordered the hotel to proceed with arbitration using the contractually specified method. The arbitrator chosen by the union determined that the employee’s conduct warranted a suspension without pay but did not justify termination, ordering the employee’s reinstatement with back pay minus ten days’ wages. When the hotel refused to comply, the district court, upon the union’s motion, ordered the hotel to abide by the arbitrator’s ruling. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the collective bargaining agreement’s method of selecting an arbitrator must be followed unless there was a demonstrable lapse in the process, which was not present here. The court also held that the arbitrator’s factual findings regarding the absence of workplace violence were binding and that Illinois public policy did not prohibit the remedy imposed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment confirming the arbitrator’s award, finding no error in either the selection of the arbitrator or the substance of his decision. View "Unite Here Local 1 v Magnificent Mile Hotel Management, LLC" on Justia Law

LAS VEGAS POLICE PROTECTIVE ASSOC. VS. CITY OF LAS VEGAS

2026-06-03T10:08:09-08:00

Several municipal court and deputy city marshals, represented by a police association, alleged that the City miscalculated their longevity pay, resulting in underpayment. The collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the police association and the City required a four-step grievance process culminating in arbitration for disputes about the CBA’s application or interpretation. The marshals submitted grievances claiming underpayment since 2013. The City argued that these grievances were untimely, as they were filed years after the alleged underpayment was or should have been discovered, and insisted on a bifurcated arbitration process to resolve timeliness before addressing the merits of the longevity pay issue. Additional grievances were filed and rejected by the City as untimely. The police association filed two complaints in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, seeking declaratory relief: one to have the City pay alleged backpay and another to require the City to comply with the CBA’s arbitration provision and submit timeliness disputes to arbitration. The parties consolidated these actions, and the City moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, accepting the City's interpretation that it could unilaterally reject grievances as untimely and dictate the arbitration format, and it ruled on the merits of the longevity pay dispute. The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. It held that, unless a contract specifies otherwise, procedural questions such as timeliness and the format of arbitration are reserved for the arbitrator, not a party or the court. The City was not entitled to unilaterally decide the timeliness of grievances or require a bifurcated arbitration process. Further, since the longevity pay dispute was arbitrable, the district court should not have ruled on its merits. The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case. View "LAS VEGAS POLICE PROTECTIVE ASSOC. VS. CITY OF LAS VEGAS" on Justia Law

Khalsa v. Ridnour

2026-06-01T13:36:01-08:00

Two neighbors in Bonner County, Idaho, own adjacent properties—one is lakefront and the other sits directly behind it without lake access. After years of disputes over easements relating to beach, lake, and parking access, the parties entered litigation. During trial, the district court mediated a settlement, which was read into the record and later formalized as a Stipulated Agreement and Order. This agreement outlined the parties’ rights to use the properties and set procedures for mediation and arbitration if further disputes arose. After signing the agreement and a minor modification by the district court, further conflicts emerged, especially regarding the construction and location of one party’s patio, use of a parking easement, a maintenance corridor, and a sprinkler system. Pursuant to the agreement, the unresolved issues were submitted to arbitration. The arbitrator ruled in favor of the lakefront property owner on all issues, finding that the other party had not complied with the agreement. The dissatisfied party then moved in the District Court of the First Judicial District to vacate the arbitration award, alleging bias and that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority. The district court denied the motion, finding the arbitrator had acted within the scope of his authority. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the district court’s denial. The Court held that the arbitrator’s decisions were within the authority granted by the parties’ agreement and the Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act. The Court found no evidence of bias and concluded the arbitrator had not rewritten or exceeded the terms of the agreement, but rather interpreted and applied it as authorized. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to vacate the arbitration award and granted attorney fees on appeal to the prevailing party under Idaho Code section 12-121. View "Khalsa v. Ridnour" on Justia Law

Miller v. Miller

2026-06-01T13:35:57-08:00

Elizabeth Miller filed for divorce from Mark Miller after a lengthy marriage in which Mark was a successful physician and Elizabeth was primarily a homemaker caring for their eight children. Following resolution of custody issues, the parties agreed to submit the remaining financial disputes to binding arbitration, with Elizabeth waiving her claim to spousal support. The arbitrator ultimately awarded Elizabeth 60% of the marital assets and retroactive child support, and required Mark to pay her remaining attorney fees. After the arbitrator amended the award to comply with Idaho law by removing post-majority child expenses, Mark challenged the validity of the arbitration award. The Magistrate Court of Ada County denied Mark’s requests to vacate or modify the award, finding that it had authority to refer the divorce action to arbitration under Idaho’s Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA), and confirming the arbitrator’s award. Mark appealed to the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, arguing that Idaho Code section 32-715 gave the court exclusive jurisdiction over divorce matters, and that the arbitrator exceeded authority by awarding retroactive child support and an unequal asset division. The District Court rejected Mark’s jurisdictional challenge and affirmed the arbitration award, except for vacating the arbitrator’s award of attorney fees. The court awarded Elizabeth partial attorney fees on appeal, finding Mark had pursued the jurisdictional argument unreasonably. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the District Court’s ruling. The Court held that Idaho’s UAA authorizes courts to refer divorce actions to arbitration when the parties agree, and that nothing in Idaho Code section 32-715 prohibits this. The Court also determined the arbitrator had not exceeded the scope of authority. The Supreme Court upheld the award of partial attorney fees to Elizabeth for the district court appeal, and remanded the case for consideration of appellate attorney fees under Idaho Code section 32-704(3). View "Miller v. Miller" on Justia Law

Credit Acceptance Corporation v. Stanley

2026-06-01T11:47:08-08:00

The case involves a dispute between a finance company and two individuals who purchased a used vehicle using a retail installment contract containing an arbitration clause. After defaulting on payments, the individuals surrendered the vehicle for repossession, but the resale did not cover the remaining debt. The finance company filed a civil action in the Circuit Court of Jackson County to recover the outstanding balance. The individuals initially responded without counsel, contesting the debt, and later, after several years, obtained legal counsel and filed an amended answer with counterclaims alleging violations of various state and federal laws. Over the course of litigation, the finance company served limited discovery and moved for summary judgment based on unanswered requests for admission. The individuals’ amended answer and counterclaims expanded the complexity of the dispute, seeking damages and equitable relief. Shortly after, the finance company moved to compel arbitration of all claims, relying on the contract’s arbitration clause. The Circuit Court denied the motion, finding that the finance company had waived its right to arbitrate due to substantial litigation activity and the passage of time before asserting arbitration. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the circuit court’s denial de novo, applying state contract principles and the Federal Arbitration Act. The Court held that the finance company did not impliedly waive its contractual arbitration rights, emphasizing that the arbitration clause expressly allowed arbitration to be invoked before or after a lawsuit or counterclaims. The Court concluded that the litigation activity was limited and not inconsistent with the right to arbitrate, especially given the late and substantial expansion of the dispute by the counterclaims. The circuit court’s order was reversed, and the case remanded with instructions to permit arbitration and stay further proceedings pending its outcome. View "Credit Acceptance Corporation v. Stanley" on Justia Law

Global Voice Group SA v. Republic of Guinea

2026-05-29T06:31:52-08:00

A telecommunications and financial services company based in Seychelles contracted with a Guinean regulatory authority to help develop Guinea’s telecommunications industry. The agreement included an arbitration clause. Disputes arose regarding unpaid invoices and alleged contractual obligations, leading the company to seek arbitration against both the regulatory authority and the Republic of Guinea. The arbitral tribunal determined that Guinea was both a party and beneficiary to the agreement and awarded damages to the company. Attempts to annul the award in French courts were unsuccessful, resulting in a final judgment against Guinea and the regulatory authority. The company then sued Guinea in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking confirmation of the arbitral award and recognition of the foreign court judgment. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed both claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that Guinea was immune from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The court concluded that Guinea was not a party to the arbitration agreement and had not waived its sovereign immunity. It did not distinguish between the award-confirmation and judgment-recognition claims in its analysis. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court incorrectly failed to apply the analytical framework established in TIG Insurance v. Republic of Argentina when considering the award-confirmation claim, which requires determining whether the arbitration agreement legally binds the sovereign, regardless of formal party status. The appellate court vacated the dismissal of the award-confirmation claim and remanded for further proceedings. Separately, relying on Amaplat Mauritius Ltd. v. Zimbabwe Mining Development Corp., it affirmed the dismissal of the judgment-recognition claim, holding that neither the FSIA’s arbitration nor waiver exceptions provide jurisdiction for such claims. View "Global Voice Group SA v. Republic of Guinea" on Justia Law

Hubbard v. Nexion Health at Clinton, Inc.

2026-05-29T01:21:59-08:00

Benard Hubbard II electronically signed an admissions packet and a stand-alone arbitration agreement for his father’s admission to Woodlands Rehabilitation and Healthcare Center in Clinton, Mississippi. At the time, Hubbard Sr. was competent and able to communicate with staff. Two years later, Hubbard Sr. filed a medical-negligence claim against the facility’s parent company, a physician, and a medical practice. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on the agreement signed by Hubbard II. At the hearing, both parties acknowledged that Hubbard II did not have power of attorney or formal authority and that the arbitration agreement was separate from the admission itself. Hubbard II submitted an affidavit stating he signed without consulting or receiving authority from his father, and no evidence was presented to refute this. The Hinds County Circuit Court granted the motion to compel arbitration, expressing concern about Hubbard II contesting the agreement but failing to specify any factual basis for its decision or address the defendants’ request for additional discovery. The defendants subsequently conceded in the Supreme Court of Mississippi that the factual record was insufficient to affirm the trial court’s order and requested a remand for further findings. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the trial court’s decision de novo and found that the record lacked evidence establishing Hubbard II’s authority to bind his father to arbitration. The court also determined that the defendants had abandoned their motion for additional discovery by failing to secure a trial court ruling. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order compelling arbitration and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Hubbard v. Nexion Health at Clinton, Inc." on Justia Law

Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock

2026-05-28T06:45:10-08:00

Angelo Brock operated as a franchisee distributing baked goods for a large national baking company in Colorado. He picked up products from a local warehouse and delivered them to stores within the state, never leaving Colorado or directly interacting with vehicles that crossed state lines. In 2022, Brock and other distributors alleged in federal court that the baking company underpaid them, violating federal and state laws. The company moved to compel arbitration, citing an agreement Brock had signed requiring disputes to be arbitrated, and invoked the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The United States District Court denied the company's motion to compel arbitration. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed this denial. The Tenth Circuit focused on Section 1 of the FAA, which exempts “contracts of employment” for workers “engaged in interstate commerce.” The appellate court found that even though Brock’s deliveries were confined to Colorado and he did not interact with interstate vehicles, his role as part of the continuous interstate distribution of goods qualified him for the exemption. The court determined that Brock was part of a class of workers engaged in interstate commerce, placing his contract outside the FAA’s compulsory arbitration requirements. The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed whether the FAA’s exemption for “workers engaged in interstate commerce” applies to workers who do not cross state lines or interact with vehicles that do. The Court held that a worker transporting goods on an intrastate segment of an interstate journey can fall under the FAA’s Section 1 exemption, even without leaving the state or handling vehicles engaged in interstate transit. The judgment of the Tenth Circuit was affirmed. View "Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock" on Justia Law

Kostandian v. American Honda Motor Co.

2026-05-27T14:01:46-08:00

A lessee filed a lawsuit against a vehicle manufacturer and an authorized dealership, alleging that his leased vehicle had multiple defects that could not be repaired after several attempts. The lessee claimed he revoked acceptance of the vehicle due to these defects, but the defendants refused to provide the remedies he sought. Both the lease agreement and the manufacturer’s warranty booklet contained arbitration provisions, including opt-out clauses, and the lessee signed documents confirming receipt of these materials. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. The court found that the defendants did not establish the existence of enforceable arbitration agreements. Specifically, it determined there was insufficient evidence that the dealership, Standard Motor, was doing business as the named lessor in the lease. The court also concluded that the manufacturer, American Honda Motor Co., could not enforce the arbitration provision, and that the warranty booklet’s arbitration agreement was unenforceable due to concerns about consumer assent. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. It held that the defendants met their initial burden by presenting copies of the arbitration agreements and reciting the relevant terms. The court emphasized that the lessee’s own pleadings constituted a judicial admission that Standard Motor was doing business as the named lessor, and the lessee did not dispute the authenticity or existence of the arbitration agreements. The court also found the lessee failed to present evidence disputing the existence of an arbitration agreement in the warranty booklet. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and remanded with instructions to grant the motion to compel arbitration. View "Kostandian v. American Honda Motor Co." on Justia Law

Hinkes v Reddy

2026-05-22T12:31:36-08:00

Sarah Hinkes brought a lawsuit against her employer and two individual employees, alleging discrimination in violation of federal statutes. The dispute was stayed pending arbitration, as required under federal law. After the arbitrator ruled in favor of the employer, Hinkes sought to have the arbitration award set aside in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The district judge confirmed the award, and Hinkes appealed that decision. On appeal, subject-matter jurisdiction was challenged due to lack of diversity between the parties, as both Hinkes and one defendant, Ravi Reddy, were citizens of Illinois. Although Hinkes attempted to argue that Reddy should be disregarded because she was not seeking relief against him, the court noted that Reddy remained a party to the action. Hinkes later asked for the appeal to be dismissed, but Sunera Technologies, the employer, argued for federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331. The Seventh Circuit identified that the original suit arose under federal law, and, following recent precedent from Kinsella v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, LLC and Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties, concluded that federal-question jurisdiction continued to support the district court’s confirmation of the arbitration award. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Hinkes’s challenges to the arbitration award, which centered on procedural objections and alleged misconduct under 9 U.S.C. §10(a)(3). The court determined that Hinkes had not shown arbitrator misconduct warranting vacatur, as the arbitrator did not improperly refuse to hear evidence and was not bound by federal evidentiary or discovery rules. Finding no misbehavior or prejudice, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s confirmation of the arbitration award. View "Hinkes v Reddy" on Justia Law

Sessoms v. USHealth Advisors, LLC

2026-05-21T11:30:39-08:00

In this case, the plaintiff, acting individually and on behalf of a proposed class, alleged that the defendant, a health insurance marketing company, violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by sending her a prerecorded telemarketing call without her prior express consent. The defendant argued that the plaintiff had given such consent when she used a third-party “lead generation” website operated by a non-party, where she filled out a form seeking insurance quotes. The online process included an agreement (the “Terms of Use”) with an arbitration clause covering disputes related to the website’s use and consent to be contacted by marketing partners, although the defendant was not named in the agreement. After the plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, the defendant moved to compel arbitration, arguing that it could enforce the arbitration clause as a third-party beneficiary under Delaware law. The district court denied the motion, holding that, although the defendant benefited from the agreement, it was not a third-party beneficiary because the benefit was not central to the contract’s purpose. The court also determined that, under Fourth Circuit precedent, the court—not an arbitrator—must decide whether a non-signatory like the defendant can enforce the arbitration agreement. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of arbitration de novo. The Fourth Circuit agreed that the district court, not an arbitrator, was the proper forum to decide the defendant’s standing to enforce the arbitration clause. However, the court disagreed with the district court’s interpretation of Delaware law, concluding that the benefit to the defendant was material to the agreement’s purpose, making the defendant a third-party beneficiary. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to compel arbitration and stay the federal court proceedings. View "Sessoms v. USHealth Advisors, LLC" on Justia Law

OLSON V. FCA US, LLC

2026-05-21T08:01:11-08:00

Jeffrey Olson leased a Jeep Grand Cherokee from a car dealership under a lease agreement that included an arbitration provision and a delegation clause, which assigned questions about the scope of arbitration to an arbitrator. FCA US, LLC, the manufacturer of the Jeep, was not a signatory to the lease agreement. Olson later became the named plaintiff in a federal class-action lawsuit against FCA, alleging defects in the vehicle’s headrest system. FCA, not being a party to the lease, sought to compel Olson to arbitrate the dispute based on the arbitration agreement between Olson and the dealership. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied FCA’s motion to compel arbitration. The district court found that FCA, as a non-signatory to the lease agreement, could not enforce the arbitration provision or its delegation clause against Olson. The court concluded that the arbitration agreement applied only to Olson and the dealership (including its employees, agents, successors, or assigns), and FCA did not qualify under any of those categories. Additionally, the court rejected FCA’s argument that it could use equitable estoppel to compel arbitration, holding that none of Olson’s claims were sufficiently intertwined with the lease agreement to justify such an exception under California law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that FCA could not compel Olson to arbitrate because FCA was not a party to the arbitration agreement and no applicable exception—such as equitable estoppel—applied. The court clarified that, under both federal and California law, only parties to an arbitration agreement (or those qualifying under specific, limited exceptions) may enforce it. The court also rejected FCA’s reliance on Supreme Court precedent, finding it inapplicable to non-signatories in these circumstances. View "OLSON V. FCA US, LLC" on Justia Law

District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Dep't v. District of Columbia Public Employee Relations Board

2026-05-21T06:43:50-08:00

An off-duty police officer in the District of Columbia shot and seriously injured a man outside a residence in Maryland after suspecting an attempted vehicle break-in. The officer did not call 911 as trained, confronted the individual, and used deadly force, although no weapon or evidence of crime was found on the victim. Following internal reviews, the police department sought to terminate the officer. His union invoked arbitration, as allowed by the collective bargaining agreement. An arbitrator determined that the officer’s conduct was reckless, violated departmental policies, and met the definition of reckless endangerment under Maryland law. However, the arbitrator concluded that termination was not warranted and reduced the discipline to a 45-day suspension, referencing a prior similar case involving another officer. The District of Columbia Public Employee Relations Board (PERB) sustained this sanction. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia affirmed PERB’s decision. On a prior appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals remanded the case, directing PERB to further explain its reasoning regarding whether the arbitral award was contrary to law or public policy. After PERB again upheld the arbitrator’s decision on remand and the Superior Court affirmed, the case returned to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. The court reviewed whether the arbitral award was “on its face contrary to law and public policy.” The court held that the award was not contrary to law because the arbitrator did not purport to apply and misapply the Douglas factors, nor was the penalty so disproportionate as to be illegal. The court further held that the award was not contrary to public policy, noting the absence of a statutory or regulatory mandate requiring termination under these circumstances and emphasizing the narrow grounds for overturning arbitral awards on public policy. The court affirmed the judgment upholding PERB’s decision. View "District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Dep't v. District of Columbia Public Employee Relations Board" on Justia Law

JACKSON v. STEVENSON

2026-05-19T04:14:17-08:00

The dispute arose from a real estate development joint venture between two groups of entities owned by Jackson and Stevenson, governed by operating agreements containing mandatory arbitration clauses. After Jackson’s entities initiated a buy-sell process to terminate the venture, Stevenson’s entities elected to purchase Jackson’s interest. Shortly after, Jackson terminated a consulting agreement. Stevenson’s entities sought arbitration, naming Jackson’s entities as respondents and later including RICSHA, a company owned by Jackson but not a signatory to the operating agreements. They alleged that Jackson’s entities and RICSHA conspired to deprive the venture of valuable assets prior to the buyout. The arbitrator ordered RICSHA to be joined in the proceedings and ultimately issued an award in favor of Stevenson’s entities against both the Jackson entities and RICSHA. The Superior Court confirmed the arbitration award against all respondents, finding that the arbitrator did not exceed his powers by including RICSHA, and denied RICSHA’s motion to vacate. The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed, holding that the arbitrator permissibly applied principles of equitable estoppel to compel RICSHA to arbitrate and that judicial review of the arbitrator’s ruling was limited under the Federal Arbitration Act. The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case on certiorari and concluded that the lower courts erred by deferring to the arbitrator on the threshold question of whether RICSHA, a nonsignatory, could be compelled to arbitrate. The Court held that under Georgia law and the Federal Arbitration Act, equitable estoppel does not apply to compel a nonsignatory defendant to arbitrate claims brought by signatory plaintiffs, absent direct benefits from the agreement. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacated the arbitration award against RICSHA, and remanded for further proceedings. View "JACKSON v. STEVENSON" on Justia Law

Jackson v. Protas, Spivok & Collins LLC

2026-05-18T10:30:34-08:00

Donte Jackson received a $30,000 loan from WebBank, which was later sold to Velocity Investments, LLC. After Jackson defaulted on the loan, Velocity, represented by the law firm Protas, Spivok & Collins LLC (PSC), sued Jackson in Maryland state court to collect the debt. Velocity eventually dismissed the state court suit with prejudice. Subsequently, Jackson brought a class action lawsuit against both Velocity and PSC, alleging that their practice of suing on time-barred debts was unlawful. In the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, both Velocity and PSC moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause in Jackson’s original promissory note. The district court found that Velocity, as a subsequent holder of the note, was a party to the arbitration agreement but had waived its right to arbitrate by filing suit in state court. The court ruled that PSC was not a party to the agreement, as it did not fit the contractual definition of an entity “servicing” the note, which the court interpreted in accordance with Maryland law. Only PSC appealed the denial of its motion to compel arbitration. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s ruling de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that PSC, as the law firm representing Velocity, was not a party to the arbitration agreement because it did not “service” the note in the relevant contractual sense, which involves collecting and maintaining a payment schedule for the loan. The court concluded that the arbitration agreement covered only creditors and loan servicers, not lawyers. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of PSC’s motion to compel arbitration. View "Jackson v. Protas, Spivok & Collins LLC" on Justia Law

Sociedad Concesionaria Metropolitana de Salud S.A. v. Webuild S.P.A

2026-05-18T09:00:12-08:00

A Chilean company contracted with an Italian construction firm to design and build a hospital in Santiago, Chile, with disputes to be resolved by arbitration in Chile. The Italian firm later underwent a restructuring proceeding in Italy, during which it spun off its operating business and merged into another Italian company, Webuild S.p.A., which acquired most of its assets. After the contract was terminated due to project delays, arbitration in Chile resulted in an award in favor of the Chilean company and against the original Italian firm. The Chilean courts reduced but otherwise affirmed the arbitral award, and further appeal was denied. Seeking to enforce the arbitral award in the United States, the Chilean company brought an action in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware against Webuild, claiming it was the successor in interest to the award debtor. The company asked the District Court to assert quasi in rem jurisdiction by attaching Webuild’s shares in a Delaware subsidiary. The District Court granted Webuild’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, holding that there were insufficient contacts between the forum, Webuild, and the underlying controversy. The District Court also held that, even if an exception to the minimum contacts requirement applied, it would not permit jurisdiction here because no court had yet determined that Webuild was indeed liable for the arbitral debt. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that, under the Supreme Court’s decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, a court may exercise traditional quasi in rem jurisdiction to enforce a foreign arbitral award in an action to collect on an already adjudicated debt, without requiring minimum contacts. The appellate court vacated the District Court’s dismissal and remanded for a determination of whether Webuild is the successor in interest to the original award debtor. View "Sociedad Concesionaria Metropolitana de Salud S.A. v. Webuild S.P.A" on Justia Law

Dept. of Human Resources v. Cal. Correctional Peace Officers

2026-05-15T11:03:25-08:00

A correctional officer who also served as a union representative at a state prison was disciplined after posting materials related to her own prior disciplinary action on a union bulletin board. The materials, which included the surnames of other officers, were visible to inmate workers and were perceived by prison management as potentially fostering a “code of silence” among correctional staff. The officer was suspended for 60 workdays for this posting. She appealed the discipline to the State Personnel Board (SPB), arguing her posting was protected speech regarding the Department’s disciplinary practices. Separately, her union filed a grievance, claiming the suspension violated the memorandum of understanding (MOU) and the Ralph C. Dills Act, which prohibit retaliation for protected union activities. The SPB ultimately upheld the suspension, determining that the posting constituted inexcusable neglect of duty and failure of good behavior, and justified the imposed penalty. The question of whether the discipline was retaliatory under the Dills Act was reserved for arbitration. The arbitrator later found in favor of the union, concluding the Department had retaliated against the officer for protected union activity and failed to prove it would have imposed the same discipline absent that activity. The arbitrator ordered the Department to rescind the discipline and make the officer whole, including backpay. The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the trial court’s decision that had struck the arbitrator’s remedy of rescinding the discipline and making the officer whole. The appellate court held that the arbitrator did not exceed her powers by issuing this award and that no explicit public policy or constitutional provision barred the arbitrator’s remedial authority under the MOU and Dills Act. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment and directed entry of a new judgment confirming the arbitration award in its entirety. View "Dept. of Human Resources v. Cal. Correctional Peace Officers" on Justia Law

Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties

2026-05-14T14:55:54-08:00

The case concerns an employee who worked at a Los Angeles hotel and was terminated in March 2020, allegedly due to COVID-19-related staffing issues. The employee sued the hotel and its affiliates in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging federal and state law discrimination claims. However, before starting work, the employee had signed an arbitration agreement covering disputes related to employment or termination. The hotel moved to stay the court proceedings and compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), and the District Court stayed the case pending arbitration. Arbitration proceeded, resulting in an award against the employee on all claims, as well as sanctions for misconduct. After the arbitrator’s award, the hotel moved to confirm the award in the District Court under §9 of the FAA, while the employee sought to vacate it under §10. The employee argued that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to confirm or vacate the award because the post-arbitration motions did not independently satisfy the requirements for federal-question or diversity jurisdiction. The District Court disagreed, held that it retained jurisdiction, and confirmed the arbitral award. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, distinguishing the case from Supreme Court precedent involving freestanding FAA motions, and holding that the District Court’s original jurisdiction over the employee’s federal claims extended to the post-arbitration proceedings. The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the Second Circuit’s judgment. It held that when a federal court has original jurisdiction over claims and stays those claims pending arbitration under §3 of the FAA, the court retains jurisdiction to confirm or vacate the resulting arbitral award under §9 and §10. The Court reasoned that nothing in the FAA divests the court of jurisdiction over the original claims while arbitration is pending, and that post-arbitration motions are integral to the resolution of those stayed claims. View "Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties" on Justia Law

Cole v. Southeast Iowa Orthopaedics and Sports Medicine

2026-05-08T06:03:53-08:00

A resident of a skilled nursing facility signed an arbitration agreement upon admission. Twelve days later, the resident died. The resident’s husband, acting both individually and as executor of her estate, brought suit in Iowa District Court for Henry County against the nursing facility and several related entities, as well as additional healthcare providers. He alleged negligence, gross negligence, wrongful death, and dependent adult abuse. Nearly a year into the litigation, the nursing facility defendants moved to compel arbitration based on the agreement signed by the decedent. The Iowa District Court for Henry County granted the motion to compel arbitration. The court reasoned that, under the existing Iowa precedent, waiver of the right to arbitrate requires both conduct inconsistent with that right and prejudice to the opposing party—a two-part test established in prior Iowa Supreme Court cases. Applying this standard, the district court found limited prejudice to the plaintiff because discovery had not been extensive and the trial date was still far off. The plaintiff was granted interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed the case for correction of errors at law. The court determined that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) governed because the agreement involved interstate commerce, and that the FAA preempts Iowa's arbitration-specific waiver rule, which requires a showing of prejudice. Instead, the court held that the generally applicable contract law standard for waiver applies: the voluntary or intentional relinquishment of a known right. Applying this standard, the Supreme Court of Iowa concluded that the nursing facility had impliedly waived its contractual right to arbitration by participating in litigation and discovery for months after being aware of the arbitration agreement, and by delaying a motion to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Cole v. Southeast Iowa Orthopaedics and Sports Medicine" on Justia Law

Hill v. Jackson Offshore Holdings

2026-05-05T15:30:26-08:00

A seaman was severely injured while working on an offshore supply vessel operated by his employer. Following his injury, the employer provided both mandatory and supplemental benefits, including housing and transportation. Six months after the incident, the employer’s executives presented the seaman with an agreement offering continued supplemental benefits in exchange for his commitment to arbitrate any future claims against the company. The agreement included a delegation clause stating that any disputes about the validity, interpretation, or application of the agreement would be resolved by an arbitrator. The seaman signed, acknowledging he had the opportunity to consult an attorney but later alleged he felt pressured and feared losing benefits if he did not sign. The seaman filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging negligence and seeking a declaration that the agreement and its arbitration provisions were invalid due to fraud, duress, and his medical condition. The employer moved to compel arbitration and to stay the litigation, arguing that the delegation clause required an arbitrator to decide issues of enforceability. The district court denied the motion without prejudice and allowed limited discovery on the enforceability of the agreement, concluding it must decide if a valid arbitration agreement existed. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred by failing to enforce the delegation clause. The appellate court found the seaman’s arguments challenged the agreement as a whole, not the delegation clause specifically. Under Supreme Court precedent, such challenges must be resolved by an arbitrator when a valid delegation clause exists and is not directly challenged. The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and compelled arbitration, remanding for further proceedings consistent with this holding. View "Hill v. Jackson Offshore Holdings" on Justia Law

Toothman v. Redwood Toxicology Laboratory

2026-05-05T12:31:49-08:00

Robert Toothman was initially employed by Apex Life Sciences, LLC, a temporary employment agency, which placed him at Redwood Toxicology Laboratory, Inc. During his employment with Apex, Toothman signed an arbitration agreement that required him to arbitrate employment disputes with Apex and its defined affiliates, subsidiaries, and parent companies. In April 2018, Toothman’s employment with Apex ended, after which he was hired directly by Redwood and worked there until June 2022. Toothman and Redwood did not sign an arbitration agreement. Several months after leaving Redwood, Toothman filed a class action alleging Labor Code violations based solely on his direct employment with Redwood, not his prior period as an Apex employee. The Sonoma County Superior Court reviewed Redwood’s motion to compel arbitration and to dismiss the class claims. Redwood argued that it was either a party to the Apex arbitration agreement as an affiliate, a third-party beneficiary, or entitled to enforce the agreement under equitable estoppel. Redwood also claimed that Toothman’s class claims should be dismissed based on the arbitration agreement. The trial court denied Redwood’s motion, finding that Redwood was not a signatory to the arbitration agreement, was not an affiliate as defined by the agreement, and could not compel arbitration under any alternative theory. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the trial court’s order de novo. It held that Redwood was not a party to the arbitration agreement and did not qualify as an affiliate or third-party beneficiary. The court further determined that Toothman’s claims were not sufficiently intertwined with the arbitration agreement to justify equitable estoppel. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order denying Redwood’s motion to compel arbitration and to dismiss the class claims. View "Toothman v. Redwood Toxicology Laboratory" on Justia Law

Tejon v. Zeus Networks, LLC

2026-05-01T13:03:29-08:00

Roger Tejon subscribed to a video streaming service operated by Zeus Networks, LLC, through its online platform using an Apple device. To register, Tejon chose between an annual or monthly plan by clicking one of two large, red buttons on a “Choose your plan” page. Below these buttons, in small, gray text was a hyperlinked “Terms of Service,” which included a mandatory arbitration clause, but there was no requirement that Tejon click on this link to complete his subscription. Tejon later alleged that Zeus shared his viewing history and personally identifiable information with a social media company without his consent and sued Zeus for violating the Video Privacy Protection Act. Zeus moved to compel arbitration, arguing that Tejon had consented to the arbitration clause by signing up for an account. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied this motion. The district court found that the terms of service hyperlink was not conspicuous enough to put a reasonably prudent user on inquiry notice of the arbitration provision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial de novo. The Eleventh Circuit held that the design of Zeus’s subscription page did not provide sufficient inquiry notice of the arbitration agreement to bind Tejon. The court explained that the hyperlink to the terms was small, in gray font, and located beneath prominent action buttons, making it easy to overlook. The court further noted that the page did not explicitly state that clicking the subscription button would bind the user to arbitration. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration. View "Tejon v. Zeus Networks, LLC" on Justia Law

Vela v. Harbor Rail Services of California, Inc.

2026-05-01T11:33:41-08:00

An employee worked as a railcar repairman for a company that performs inspections and repairs on freight cars at a train yard. He was hired with an agreement that required all employment-related disputes to be resolved through arbitration and included a waiver of class and representative actions, except for certain claims that cannot be waived by law. After his employment ended, the employee sued for various wage and hour violations under California law, asserting claims on his own behalf and on behalf of a proposed class of other employees. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case after the employer moved to compel arbitration of the individual claims and to dismiss the class claims. The court ordered further proceedings to clarify whether the arbitration agreement was part of a contract of employment and whether the employee fell within a federal exemption for certain transportation workers. After additional evidence was submitted, the court granted the employer’s motion, compelling arbitration of individual claims and dismissing the class claims, finding the employee was not exempt from arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the order dismissing and striking the class claims. The court held that the FAA applied to the arbitration agreement because the employee was neither a “railroad employee” nor a transportation worker directly involved in the interstate transportation of goods under the FAA’s section 1 exemption. The court found that repairing out-of-service railcars did not constitute direct engagement in interstate commerce. The court also held that, because the FAA applied, the waiver of class claims was enforceable under federal law, thus preempting contrary state law. The appeal as to the order compelling arbitration was treated as a petition for writ of mandate and was denied. View "Vela v. Harbor Rail Services of California, Inc." on Justia Law

Bernal v Kohl's Corporation

2026-05-01T09:04:03-08:00

A group of consumers residing in California purchased products online from a national retailer’s website between 2020 and 2022. To complete their purchases, they were required to agree to the retailer’s Terms and Conditions, which included an arbitration clause mandating that any disputes be resolved through arbitration before the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and that certain pre-arbitration steps be followed. When the consumers later believed that the retailer had engaged in false and deceptive marketing, they followed the pre-arbitration process as outlined, served notices of dispute, attempted mediation, and, after those efforts failed, filed demands for arbitration with the AAA and paid all required fees. After the consumers initiated arbitration, the AAA notified the parties that the retailer had not filed its arbitration agreement with the AAA as required by AAA rules. The AAA requested compliance, but the retailer refused to register its agreement. As a result, the AAA, following its Consumer Arbitration Rules, terminated the arbitration proceedings and closed the consumers’ cases. The consumers then filed a petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin seeking to compel arbitration, arguing that the retailer’s refusal to register the agreement and pay related fees constituted a refusal to arbitrate under the Federal Arbitration Act. The district court denied the petition, relying on precedent which holds that, when arbitration proceeds and ends in accordance with the agreed rules—even if terminated by the arbitral forum for procedural reasons—a court may not intervene to compel further arbitration. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that because the parties’ agreement delegated procedural questions to the AAA and the AAA exercised its discretion under its rules in terminating the proceedings, there was no refusal to arbitrate that would justify judicial intervention under the Act. View "Bernal v Kohl's Corporation" on Justia Law

Schlacks v. Chheda

2026-04-29T07:01:20-08:00

Two brothers, who are co-founders, directors, and major shareholders of a company, were involved in a business arrangement with a venture capital investor who was also a director and significant shareholder in the same company. The parties executed two option agreements and a partnership agreement related to the creation of a venture capital fund, which was to be capitalized with company shares. The brothers signed option agreements giving a corporate entity managed by the investor the right to acquire a portion of their shares. These agreements were twice amended, with the second amendment doubling the shares to be transferred—an action the brothers allege was done without their knowledge. Separately, a partnership agreement established the venture fund as a limited partnership under Delaware law, with all partners being corporate entities associated with the brothers and/or the investor. The partnership agreement included an arbitration clause governed by JAMS rules. When the investor’s entity tried to exercise its right to purchase shares, the brothers refused, disputing the validity of the second amendment. The investor and his entities initiated arbitration under the partnership agreement, prompting the brothers to sue for injunctions to stop arbitration. The defendants responded by moving to compel arbitration. The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied all motions, including the motion to compel arbitration. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the denial de novo. It held that the district court properly decided the question of arbitrability because the brothers, as non-signatories to the partnership agreement, were not bound by its arbitration clause. The appellate court further found that principles of equitable estoppel and agency law under Delaware law did not require the brothers to arbitrate, as they had not directly benefited from the agreement nor acted as agents of the signatories. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. View "Schlacks v. Chheda" on Justia Law

Stoker v. Blue Origin, LLC

2026-04-24T12:11:14-08:00

A senior director was employed by a space exploration company from 2020 until his termination in 2022. Upon hiring, he signed an employee agreement containing a broad arbitration provision requiring most disputes with the company and its affiliates to be resolved by arbitration, with some exceptions. After his termination, the employee filed a lawsuit alleging, among other claims, sexual/gender discrimination, sexual/gender harassment, retaliation, wrongful termination, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The company moved to compel arbitration under the agreement, while the employee argued that the arbitration provision was both unconscionable and unenforceable under federal law. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the motion and found that the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA) applied, concluding that the employee’s allegations sufficiently stated discrimination based on gender. On this basis, the court denied the company’s motion to compel arbitration, without reaching the issue of whether the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. The company filed a timely appeal from the denial of its motion. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the order de novo. The appellate court concluded that the arbitration agreement was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Procedural unconscionability was established because the agreement was a contract of adhesion, presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis with no real opportunity for negotiation. Substantive unconscionability resulted from the agreement’s overbroad coverage, lack of mutuality, waiver of the right to a jury trial, and waiver of representative actions, including those under the Private Attorneys General Act. The court found that severance was not an appropriate remedy because the unconscionable provisions were pervasive and central to the agreement. The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration. View "Stoker v. Blue Origin, LLC" on Justia Law

Santana v. Studebaker Health Care Center

2026-04-22T18:09:29-08:00

An employee began working at a skilled nursing facility, which was later acquired by a new employer. As part of the onboarding process, the employer required the employee to sign three related agreements to arbitrate most employment disputes, except certain representative actions under the California Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). After ending his employment, the employee filed a class action lawsuit for various wage-and-hour violations, including a PAGA claim. The agreements also contained class action waivers and a confidentiality agreement. The employer moved to compel arbitration of the employee’s individual claims, including his individual PAGA claim, and to enforce the class action waiver. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the motion, ruling that conflicting and ambiguous terms among the three arbitration agreements and other documents meant there was no enforceable agreement to arbitrate. The court also ruled, in the alternative, that the agreement was unconscionable due to both procedural and substantive defects, including an unenforceable waiver of the right to bring a PAGA action and certain provisions in the confidentiality agreement. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the order denying arbitration. The court held that the agreements, although containing some ambiguities and minor inconsistencies, reflected a clear mutual intent to arbitrate employment-related disputes. The court found the agreements were not so uncertain as to be unenforceable, and any conflicting provisions could be severed. The court further determined that, while the agreements reflected some procedural unconscionability as contracts of adhesion, they did not contain substantively unconscionable terms. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and directed that arbitration be compelled. View "Santana v. Studebaker Health Care Center" on Justia Law

Chemaly v. Lampert

2026-04-22T08:34:06-08:00

A seaman who worked aboard a Cayman Islands-flagged yacht suffered a right shoulder injury while helping recover an underwater scooter at the direction of his captain. After the incident, the seaman alleged he was denied pain medication, reassigned to night shifts to hide his injury from guests, and eventually repatriated to his home country without his belongings. He sued the yacht’s beneficial owner, the captain, the vessel’s record owner, his nominal employer, the yacht’s manager, and the insurer, asserting various claims including negligence under the Jones Act, unseaworthiness, failure to provide maintenance and cure, failure to treat, negligence, conversion, and breach of insurance contract. The defendants (except the insurer) removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida under the New York Convention, citing an arbitration provision in the seaman’s employment agreement requiring disputes to be arbitrated in the Cayman Islands. The district court compelled arbitration as to the Jones Act, maintenance and cure, and failure to treat claims against the yacht owner, the beneficial owner, and the employer, but remanded the remaining claims to state court. The insurer later settled. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision compelling arbitration for the Jones Act, maintenance and cure, and failure to treat claims against the nominal employer, and for the maintenance and cure and failure to treat claims against the yacht owner and beneficial owner. However, it reversed the order to the extent it compelled arbitration of the Jones Act claim against the yacht owner and beneficial owner, finding insufficient allegations of concerted misconduct to warrant estoppel. The court dismissed the cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction as to the remanded claims. The main holding is that arbitration must be compelled for the relevant claims as to the nominal employer, and for maintenance and cure and failure to treat as to the yacht owner and beneficial owner, but not for the Jones Act claim against the latter two. View "Chemaly v. Lampert" on Justia Law

Joyce v. Forest River, Inc.

2026-04-17T10:34:00-08:00

In June 2020, an individual purchased a recreational vehicle manufactured by two companies. The vehicle quickly developed problems, prompting the owner to seek repairs on multiple occasions and to notify the manufacturers of ongoing defects. Over the course of about two years, the vehicle underwent several repair attempts by both manufacturers and their authorized agents. After further repair offers were declined by the owner, statutory defect notices were sent, and additional repairs were made. The owner eventually sought relief under Florida’s Lemon Law, alleging that the manufacturers failed to adequately repair the defects. The dispute was submitted to arbitration pursuant to Florida Statute § 681.1095. The arbitration board concluded that the owner did not meet the burden of eligibility for a refund under the Lemon Law and only ordered limited repairs. The owner then appealed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. That court granted summary judgment for both manufacturers, holding that the owner failed to establish entitlement to relief because the statutory presumptions for repairs or days out-of-service were not met, and deemed as admitted the manufacturers’ statements of material facts due to procedural deficiencies in the owner’s filings. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that the district court erred by treating the statutory presumptions in Florida’s Lemon Law as mandatory requirements for relief. The court clarified that these presumptions are not prerequisites but rather examples of when a “reasonable number of attempts” has been made. Applying the correct standard, the appellate court affirmed summary judgment for one manufacturer because the owner failed to satisfy initial notice and repair requirements. However, as to the other manufacturer, it found genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether a reasonable number of attempts had been made and therefore reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Joyce v. Forest River, Inc." on Justia Law

LENNAR COMM. NEV., LLC VS. WHALEN

2026-04-16T09:11:38-08:00

Pamela Whalen was injured when she tripped over a utility box in a community owned and maintained by Lennar Communities Nevada, LLC, and Greystone Nevada, LLC. Before the accident, Pamela had signed an amendment to a Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA) to buy a home from Lennar, which included an arbitration clause. The injury occurred during a tour of the community, not on the property she purchased. Following the accident, Pamela sued Lennar for negligence. After Pamela filed her complaint, Lennar responded with an answer and demanded a jury trial. Both parties engaged in extensive discovery over 17 months, including multiple disclosures, written discovery, and three medical examinations of Pamela at Lennar’s request. Lennar did not assert its right to arbitrate until after this lengthy discovery process. When Pamela declined to stipulate to arbitration, Lennar filed a motion to compel arbitration based on the PSA. The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, denied Lennar’s motion, determining that the dispute fell outside the scope of the arbitration clause. The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the case. The court held that the district court erred in interpreting the scope of the arbitration clause, as the PSA delegated questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator. However, the Supreme Court held that Lennar had waived its right to arbitrate by actively litigating the case for 17 months before seeking arbitration. The court found this conduct inconsistent with the right to arbitrate and prejudicial to Pamela, especially given the discovery obtained that might not have been available in arbitration. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration, albeit on the grounds of waiver rather than contract interpretation. View "LENNAR COMM. NEV., LLC VS. WHALEN" on Justia Law

Carter v SP Plus Corp.

2026-04-15T13:30:42-08:00

Rashaan Carter brought a lawsuit against SP Plus Corporation, his employer, alleging violations of state and federal minimum wage laws. During Carter’s onboarding, the employer claimed that he had agreed to arbitrate all claims by electronically checking a box and providing an electronic signature. However, Carter later submitted an affidavit stating that an employee from SP Plus’s human resources staff completed and signed the forms on his behalf, without explaining the documents or allowing Carter to view or decline them. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois initially granted SP Plus's motion to stay the litigation in favor of arbitration, relying on the onboarding records. After Carter presented his affidavit challenging the validity of his assent to arbitration, the district judge reconsidered, lifted the stay, and denied SP Plus’s motion. The district court explained that, based on the record, it could not find that a valid arbitration agreement had been formed. The judge also noted that neither party had been given the required notice or an opportunity for a hearing to determine whether Carter had personally agreed to arbitration. SP Plus appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, arguing that the order was appealable and that the district court should have compelled arbitration. The Seventh Circuit held that, because SP Plus failed to request an evidentiary hearing or present evidence to dispute Carter’s affidavit in the district court, it forfeited any right to such a hearing. The appellate court further concluded that the district court’s order was a final denial of the request to compel arbitration and found no clear error in the district court’s determination that Carter did not agree to arbitrate. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. View "Carter v SP Plus Corp." on Justia Law

Geneva Enterprises, LLC v. Chavez

2026-04-10T10:30:29-08:00

A group of former employees initiated a mass arbitration against their previous employers, alleging violations of the Virginia Wage Payment Act and, for one claimant, the Fair Labor Standards Act. The employers contended that not all claimants were bound by arbitration agreements and that procedural requirements for arbitration had not been met, leading them to refuse payment of required arbitration initiation fees. In response, the employers filed suit in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, seeking to enjoin the arbitrations and obtain a declaratory judgment on the arbitration agreements’ scope. The employees removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, where they also filed a petition to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied the employers’ request to enjoin the arbitrations and granted a stay of the court proceedings pending arbitration. The district court did not compel arbitration outright, reasoning that the matters had already been referred to arbitration. When the employers continued to refuse payment of arbitration fees, the employees returned to the district court seeking an order to lift the stay, compel arbitration, and require the employers to pay the fees. The court again declined, maintaining its previous order referring the case to arbitration and keeping the stay in place. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the employees’ interlocutory appeal challenging the district court’s denial of their renewed motion. The Fourth Circuit held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction under section 16 of the Federal Arbitration Act because the district court’s order was either an order granting a stay pending arbitration or directing arbitration to proceed—neither of which is appealable at this stage. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Geneva Enterprises, LLC v. Chavez" on Justia Law

JUVENILE JUSTICE PROB. OFFICERS ASSOC. VS. CLARK CNTY.

2026-04-10T06:06:23-08:00

A union member employed by a county juvenile justice agency was terminated after it was discovered that he had failed to disclose instances of prior disciplinary actions related to his behavior with residents at a previous job in another county. During a background check required by the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA), the county learned that the employee had misrepresented the circumstances of his departure from his earlier position, specifically omitting that he resigned while under investigation for inappropriate conduct. Based on PREA regulations, which mandate termination for material omissions regarding such misconduct, the county dismissed the employee. Following his termination, the union initiated a grievance on his behalf under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the county, which allows for arbitration of certain employment disputes. When the county denied the grievance, the union sought arbitration. The county then moved in the Eighth Judicial District Court to stay arbitration, arguing that terminations pursuant to PREA regulations were not subject to arbitration under the CBA. The district court agreed, determining that the arbitration clause was narrow and applied only to disciplinary actions defined as “corrective actions” intended to help an employee overcome deficiencies related to behavior or performance, not to terminations required by federal regulation. The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the matter and affirmed the district court’s order granting the motion to stay arbitration. The court held that the arbitration clause in the CBA was narrow and could not be interpreted to cover the termination at issue, as the action was implemented pursuant to federal regulation, not as a corrective measure for employee improvement. The Supreme Court of Nevada did not address the merits of the termination, only its arbitrability under the CBA. View "JUVENILE JUSTICE PROB. OFFICERS ASSOC. VS. CLARK CNTY." on Justia Law

OLSON V. FCA US, LLC

2026-04-07T08:01:11-08:00

The plaintiff entered into a lease agreement with a car dealership to lease a Jeep Grand Cherokee. The lease included an arbitration agreement containing a delegation clause, which specified that disputes about the scope of the arbitration agreement would be decided in arbitration. Later, the plaintiff filed a federal class action lawsuit against the vehicle’s manufacturer, alleging defects in the headrest. The manufacturer, however, was not a party to the lease agreement and did not claim to be an employee, agent, successor, or assign of the dealership. After the lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, the manufacturer moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the delegation clause required an arbitrator—not the court—to decide whether the manufacturer could enforce the arbitration agreement. In the alternative, the manufacturer asserted that either the plain language of the agreement or the doctrine of equitable estoppel entitled it to compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion, finding that the manufacturer could not enforce the arbitration agreement because it was not a party to the contract and none of the exceptions allowing enforcement by a non-signatory applied. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration. The appellate court held that, absent a relevant exception, a non-party to an arbitration agreement cannot enforce the agreement’s terms against a signatory. It found that the language of the arbitration agreement did not cover disputes with the manufacturer, and under California law, the manufacturer could not use equitable estoppel to compel arbitration because the plaintiff’s claims were not founded in or intertwined with the lease agreement. The court’s disposition was to affirm the district court’s order. View "OLSON V. FCA US, LLC" on Justia Law

United Mexican States v. Lion Mexico Consolidated L.P.

2026-04-07T07:02:31-08:00

A Canadian investment company provided loans to Mexican companies owned by a businessman, securing these loans with mortgages and promissory notes. When the Mexican companies defaulted, the investor attempted to recover its funds through negotiations and litigation in Mexico. The investor alleged that a fraudulent scheme, orchestrated by the businessman, led to a forged settlement used in Mexican court to void the loans. After Mexican courts did not provide relief, the investor initiated arbitration against Mexico under NAFTA, claiming Mexico failed to provide the protections required for foreign investments. The arbitral tribunal, seated in Washington, D.C., found that only the mortgages—not the promissory notes—qualified as protected “investments” under NAFTA. The tribunal concluded that Mexico had breached its obligations under Article 1105(1) by failing to provide fair and equitable treatment to the investor’s qualifying investments, awarding $47 million in compensation to the investor. Mexico then petitioned the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to vacate the award, arguing the arbitrators exceeded their authority and disregarded the law. The district court rejected these arguments, confirming the award. Separately, the businessman sought to intervene in the proceedings, claiming his interests were harmed, but the district court denied intervention. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the arbitral tribunal did not exceed its powers, as it at least arguably interpreted the relevant treaty provisions, and did not act in manifest disregard of the law. The appellate court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the businessman’s motion to intervene, finding Mexico adequately represented his interests. The court affirmed the district court’s order in full. View "United Mexican States v. Lion Mexico Consolidated L.P." on Justia Law

O'DELL V. AYA HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC.

2026-04-01T08:01:06-08:00

Former employees of a travel-nursing agency brought a putative class action against the agency, alleging wage-related violations. Each employee had signed an arbitration agreement with the agency that contained a delegation clause requiring an arbitrator—not a court—to decide on the validity of the agreement. Four initial plaintiffs had their disputes sent to arbitration: two arbitrators found the agreements valid, while two found them invalid due to unconscionable fee and venue provisions. After these initial arbitrations, the United States District Court for the Southern District of California confirmed three out of four arbitral awards. At this stage, an additional 255 employees joined the action as opt-in plaintiffs under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The agency moved to compel arbitration for these additional plaintiffs under their individual agreements. However, a different district judge raised the issue of whether non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel barred the enforcement of the arbitration agreements. After briefing, the district court denied the agency’s motion, concluding that the two arbitral awards finding the agreements invalid precluded arbitration for all 255 employees, effectively rendering their agreements unenforceable. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the application of non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel to preclude the enforcement of arbitration agreements is incompatible with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The court reasoned that such an approach undermined the principle of individualized arbitration and the parties’ consent, which are fundamental to the FAA. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the FAA does not permit using non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel to invalidate arbitration agreements and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "O'DELL V. AYA HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC." on Justia Law

Harris v W6LS, Inc.

2026-03-31T10:04:44-08:00

Two Illinois residents obtained online loans of $600 each from a lender operating under the laws of the Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians, with interest rates approaching 500% per year. The loan agreements included an arbitration clause, which delegated to the arbitrator all questions including the enforceability and formation of the agreement, specifying that such issues would be determined under “tribal law and applicable federal law.” At the time the loans were issued, the referenced tribal law did not exist. After receiving the loans, the borrowers filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging violations of Illinois consumer-protection statutes and federal laws. The defendants moved to compel arbitration under the terms of the loan agreements. The district court denied the motion, finding that the arbitration and delegation provisions were unenforceable because they effectively forced the plaintiffs to waive their substantive rights under Illinois law, applying the “prospective waiver” doctrine. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial de novo. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no mutual assent to the arbitration and delegation provisions. The court determined that, at the time of contracting, the specified tribal law did not exist, and federal law does not supply substantive contract-formation rules. Because the contract’s governing law provision referred to a body of law that was nonexistent and subject to unilateral creation by the defendants’ affiliate, there was no meeting of the minds as to an essential term. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the absence of mutual assent rendered the arbitration and delegation provisions unenforceable and affirmed the district court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration. View "Harris v W6LS, Inc." on Justia Law

Mallette v. Revette

2026-03-27T01:17:52-08:00

Mitchell Glenn Revette sought medical care from Dr. Andrew Mallette at The Surgical Clinic Associates, P.A. for abdominal pain and underwent surgery for diverticulitis in June 2021. He later returned for a follow-up surgery in January 2022, after which he died due to complications related to respiratory depression. His wife, Nitkia Revette, brought a wrongful death and medical negligence lawsuit on behalf of his estate, alleging that negligent anesthesia and pain management led to his death. The defendants, Dr. Mallette and the Clinic, moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement included in an intake packet mailed to Mitchell. The agreement was signed "Mitchell Revette," but during a hearing in the Hinds County Circuit Court, Nitkia testified that she signed her husband’s name without his knowledge or presence, and she stated she had no authority to sign for him. The Clinic’s staff testified that patients were required to sign such agreements personally. The circuit court found that Mitchell did not sign the arbitration agreement and that Nitkia lacked authority to bind him, thus ruling the agreement unenforceable and denying the motion to compel arbitration. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the circuit court’s findings, applying a deferential standard to factual determinations and de novo review to the denial of arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision, holding that substantial evidence supported the findings that Nitkia lacked both actual and apparent authority to sign for Mitchell and that there was no basis for binding the estate via direct-benefits estoppel. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Mallette v. Revette" on Justia Law

BLC Lexington SNF, LLC v. Bonnie Town

2026-03-26T13:30:37-08:00

Linda Elam, after suffering significant medical issues including a stroke and complications from cancer treatment, was admitted to a nursing home operated by BLC Lexington SNF, LLC for rehabilitation. Her sister, Bonnie Townsend, acting under a power of attorney, handled the admission process and signed both the admission and an optional arbitration agreement as Elam’s representative. Following further health decline, Elam died, and her estate alleged that her death resulted from negligent care at the facility. After the estate filed suit in Kentucky state court against BLC Lexington and a former administrator, BLC Lexington responded in federal court, seeking to compel arbitration based on the agreement Townsend signed. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky compelled arbitration for nearly all claims except wrongful death claims by nonsignatories. An arbitrator, after a week-long hearing, ruled in favor of BLC Lexington on all claims, finding Townsend had not met her burden of proof. The district court then confirmed the arbitration award, denying Townsend’s motions for reconsideration and to vacate the award. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Townsend argued that compelling arbitration was improper because she did not sign as attorney-in-fact, that the arbitration agreement was indefinite, and that post-arbitration relief was warranted due to alleged arbitrator misconduct and the application of an incorrect legal standard. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions, holding that the arbitration agreement was enforceable under Kentucky law, Townsend had acted as Elam’s representative, and no intervening change in law or arbitrator misconduct justified vacating the award. The court also found the arbitrator applied the correct evidentiary standard. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "BLC Lexington SNF, LLC v. Bonnie Town" on Justia Law

O'Leary v. Jones

2026-03-24T11:01:59-08:00

This case arose from a contractual dispute involving a commercial lease. Michael Scheinker, who later passed away and was succeeded by Jennifer O’Leary, leased property to Green America Inc. Walter Jones III signed the lease on behalf of Green America and also signed a guarantee clause, making him personally responsible for obligations under the lease, including attorney fees. After disputes developed, Green America initiated litigation against Scheinker. Scheinker successfully compelled arbitration, where he asserted claims against Green America and Jones. The arbitrator issued an award in Scheinker’s favor, finding Jones liable as guarantor. Scheinker then sought to confirm the arbitration award in the Superior Court of Riverside County. The Superior Court confirmed the arbitration award against Green America but denied the petition as to Jones, citing lack of personal jurisdiction since Jones had not been joined as a party before the matter was sent to arbitration. The court also expressly declined to rule on Jones’s request to vacate the arbitration award. Afterward, Jones moved for attorney’s fees and costs, arguing he was the prevailing party under Civil Code section 1717. The Superior Court denied attorney’s fees, reasoning that no party prevailed on the contract because the merits of enforceability as to Jones had not been resolved. The court did not separately address Jones’s request for costs. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. It held that the Superior Court acted within its discretion in denying Jones’s motion for attorney’s fees, finding that Jones had obtained only an interim victory and the substantive contract issues remained unresolved. However, the appellate court found that Jones was entitled to reasonable court costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, as he was a defendant in whose favor a dismissal was entered. The order was affirmed as to attorney’s fees and remanded for the award of costs to Jones. View "O'Leary v. Jones" on Justia Law

Miller v. Miller

2026-03-24T07:03:39-08:00

A married couple with eight children began divorce proceedings after a long marriage during which the husband was a successful ophthalmologist and the wife primarily cared for the children at home. During the proceedings, the wife initially sought spousal support, child support, and an equitable division of property, while the husband sought joint custody and an equitable property division. The parties agreed, through counsel and with court approval, to divide the husband's income and a business account temporarily, avoiding a child support calculation at that stage. Once custody was resolved, the parties entered into two successive arbitration agreements, under which the wife waived spousal support in exchange for arbitration of all remaining issues, including property division and child support. The arbitrator awarded the wife 60% of the marital assets and retroactive child support. After the arbitration, the husband challenged the award in the Magistrate Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to refer divorce matters to arbitration and that the arbitrator exceeded authority by awarding retroactive child support and an unequal asset division. The magistrate court rejected these arguments and confirmed the award. On appeal, the District Court affirmed the magistrate court, holding that Idaho law permits arbitration of divorce issues and that the arbitrator acted within the scope of the agreement. The district court did, however, vacate part of the attorney fee award based on the arbitration award, but affirmed an award of appellate attorney fees to the wife, finding the husband's jurisdictional challenge was unreasonable. The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision. The main holding is that Idaho law permits courts to refer divorce actions to binding arbitration if the parties agree, and such referral does not divest the court of jurisdiction. The court also held that the arbitrator did not exceed authority in awarding retroactive child support and an unequal division of property. The case was remanded for consideration of appellate attorney fees under Idaho Code section 32-704(3). View "Miller v. Miller" on Justia Law

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local Union 29 v. Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp

2026-03-23T10:00:38-08:00

Energy Harbor Nuclear Corporation operated a power plant in Pennsylvania, where its employees were represented by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 29. After a 2021 dispute over health care benefit contributions, an arbitrator found that Energy Harbor had underpaid and ordered it to make additional contributions for 2021. Later, the parties entered into a new collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) on October 1, 2021, which included a broad arbitration clause and a merger clause voiding prior agreements not incorporated into the new CBA. When the union later alleged that Energy Harbor similarly underpaid contributions for 2022, it filed a grievance, contending that Energy Harbor failed to adjust 2022 contributions as required by the prior arbitration award. The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania reviewed the matter after the union sought to compel arbitration. The District Court, adopting a magistrate judge’s recommendation, held that the broad arbitration clause in the new CBA covered the dispute regarding the 2022 contributions. The court reasoned that because the grievance referenced the contribution-increase provision of the CBA, the dispute was subject to arbitration, and found no evidence that the parties intended to exclude such claims from arbitration. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. The Third Circuit held that, although the arbitration clause was broad, the union’s grievance regarding 2022 contributions did not arise under the new CBA but instead relied on the prior arbitration award, which was not incorporated into the new agreement. The court concluded that the dispute had “nothing to do with” the rights under the CBA because there was no evidence of a required increase in Energy Harbor’s health care plan costs from 2021 to 2022. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to grant summary judgment for Energy Harbor. View "International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local Union 29 v. Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp" on Justia Law

Fetch! Pet Care, Inc. v. Atomic Pawz Inc.

2026-03-20T11:30:36-08:00

Fetch! Pet Care, Inc., a nationwide franchisor of pet-care services, alleged that a group of former franchisees coordinated to exit their franchise agreements and start competing businesses, allegedly misappropriating Fetch!’s branding, client lists, intellectual property, and trade secrets. The franchisees contended that the newer “2.0” franchise model imposed high fees, delivered poor support, and led to high attrition, while some “1.0” franchisees claimed they were forced out of the system unexpectedly, leaving them no choice but to start their own businesses. A franchisee association was formed, and many franchisees sent rescission notices and pursued arbitration. Fetch! responded by filing suit for breach of contract, trademark infringement, and misappropriation of trade secrets, and sought injunctive relief to prevent the franchisees from operating competing businesses or using its intellectual property. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held evidentiary hearings and granted Fetch!’s motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in part, ordering defendants to stop using Fetch!’s trademarks and cease communication with current Fetch! franchisees, but denied broader injunctive relief. The court reasoned that a full injunction could harm ongoing arbitration proceedings and found sufficient evidence to invoke the doctrine of unclean hands against Fetch!, based on allegedly deceptive conduct in selling franchises. Fetch! timely appealed the district court’s order. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s application of the unclean hands doctrine for abuse of discretion and affirmed. The appellate court held that the district court acted within its discretion in denying broad injunctive relief based on Fetch!’s bad faith and deceptive marketing practices as an underlying cause of franchisee conduct. The court clarified standards for irreparable harm and affirmed the partial denial of preliminary injunction, relying on the doctrine of unclean hands rather than other defenses. View "Fetch! Pet Care, Inc. v. Atomic Pawz Inc." on Justia Law

USAA Savings Bank v Goff

2026-03-19T12:31:01-08:00

USAA Savings Bank closed Michael Goff’s credit card account, providing him with inconsistent explanations for its actions. Goff pursued arbitration under the arbitration agreement contained in his credit card contract, seeking actual and punitive damages. The agreement allowed the arbitrator to award punitive damages but explicitly required a post-award review of such damages, with procedural protections and a written, reasoned explanation, before any punitive damages award could become final. An arbitrator held an evidentiary hearing and determined that USAA had violated the Equal Credit Opportunity Act by failing to provide Goff with adequate notice upon closing his account. Despite finding that Goff suffered no actual damages, the arbitrator awarded $10,000 in punitive damages and over $77,000 in attorney’s fees. USAA requested the post-award review mandated by the agreement, but the arbitrator declined, citing American Arbitration Association rules, and finalized the award without conducting the review. USAA filed a motion in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking to vacate the arbitral award on the ground that the arbitrator had exceeded her authority by disregarding the post-award review requirement. The district court acknowledged the arbitrator’s error but confirmed the award, concluding it nonetheless “drew from the essence of the arbitration agreement.” USAA appealed, and Goff sought sanctions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the arbitrator exceeded her authority by ignoring the arbitration agreement’s clear requirement for a post-award review of punitive damages. The court determined there was no “possible interpretive route” to support the arbitrator’s action, vacated the district court’s judgment, denied Goff’s motion for sanctions, and remanded with instructions to refer the matter back to the original arbitrator for proceedings consistent with the agreement. View "USAA Savings Bank v Goff" on Justia Law

SANDLER V. MODERNIZING MEDICINE, INC.

2026-03-19T08:01:21-08:00

An individual brought suit against her employer, a Delaware corporation, alleging various claims of discrimination based on age and disability under state and federal law. The employment contract between the parties included an arbitration provision, specifying that all employment-related disputes were to be resolved through binding arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), in accordance with procedures outlined in the California Arbitration Act. The contract also incorporated JAMS rules, which assign the arbitrator authority to resolve issues regarding the validity and enforceability of the arbitration agreement itself. The United States District Court for the Southern District of California reviewed the employer’s motion to compel arbitration. The court recognized that the arbitration agreement, by incorporating the JAMS rules, delegated questions about the agreement's validity to an arbitrator. However, relying on California state court decisions, the district court determined that the presence of a severability clause—allowing a court or other competent body to sever invalid provisions—negated a “clear and unmistakable” delegation to the arbitrator. Consequently, the district court concluded it was responsible for determining validity and found the arbitration agreement unconscionable, denying the motion to compel arbitration. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s judgment de novo. The appellate court held that the contract’s delegation clause, by clearly incorporating JAMS rules, unmistakably reserved the issue of the arbitration agreement’s validity for the arbitrator. The existence of a severability clause did not undermine this delegation. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration, vacated its unconscionability judgment, and remanded with instructions to compel arbitration and stay the case pending arbitration. View "SANDLER V. MODERNIZING MEDICINE, INC." on Justia Law

Goldman Sachs Bank USA v. Brown

2026-03-18T10:30:28-08:00

Two individuals, each of whom held credit card debt with Goldman Sachs, filed for bankruptcy—one under Chapter 13 and the other under Chapter 7—in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia. After receiving notice of the bankruptcy filings, Goldman Sachs allegedly continued collection efforts on the debts, including repeated communications warning of adverse credit reporting. The debtors claimed these actions violated the automatic stay imposed by the Bankruptcy Code. They commenced an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k), seeking damages and injunctive relief, and proposed to represent a class of similarly situated individuals. Goldman Sachs responded by moving to compel arbitration of the debtors’ claims based on an arbitration clause in the credit card agreements, and sought to stay the adversary proceeding. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia denied Goldman Sachs’ motion, finding that the claim for a willful violation of the automatic stay was a core bankruptcy matter, and that enforcing arbitration would irreconcilably conflict with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia affirmed, holding that arbitration would undermine the bankruptcy court’s authority to enforce the automatic stay and disrupt the centralized resolution of bankruptcy-related disputes. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The Fourth Circuit held that compelling arbitration of a statutory and constitutionally core claim for violation of the automatic stay would conflict with the underlying purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, including centralization of claims, uniform enforcement, the debtor’s “fresh start,” and the specialized expertise of bankruptcy courts. The court concluded that under these circumstances, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to compel arbitration. View "Goldman Sachs Bank USA v. Brown" on Justia Law

Wright v. WellQuest Elk Grove

2026-03-18T10:02:01-08:00

A woman with dementia was admitted to a memory care facility, where her family warned staff about her tendency to wander and need for supervision. Three days after admission, she was found unattended in a courtyard on a 102-degree day, suffering from severe burns and heatstroke, ultimately dying days later. Her family, acting as successors in interest and individually, sued the facility for elder neglect, negligence, fraud, wrongful death, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Upon admission, her niece had signed an arbitration agreement on her behalf, which the family argued should not bind their individual claims or override their right to a jury trial. The Superior Court of Sacramento County considered the facility’s motion to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings. The court found a valid arbitration agreement existed for the decedent’s survivor claims but ruled that the agreement did not bind the family members' individual claims, as they were not parties to the agreement. The court also declined to compel arbitration of the survivor claims under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, subdivision (c), citing the risk of conflicting rulings if the family’s claims proceeded in court while survivor claims were arbitrated. The court further held that the agreement’s reference to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) did not expressly incorporate the FAA’s procedural provisions to preempt California law. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. It held that the arbitration agreement did not clearly and unmistakably delegate threshold issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator, and that the FAA’s procedural provisions were not expressly adopted by the agreement. Therefore, California law applied, and the trial court properly exercised its discretion to deny arbitration to avoid inconsistent rulings. The judgment was affirmed, and costs were awarded to the plaintiffs. View "Wright v. WellQuest Elk Grove" on Justia Law

Abdisalam v. Strategic Delivery Solutions, LLC

2026-03-17T13:00:04-08:00

Abdulkadir Abdisalam worked as a courier delivering medical supplies for a company that classified its couriers as independent contractors. To work for the company, Abdisalam was required to form his own corporation, Abdul Courier, LLC, which then entered into a contract with the company. This contract included an arbitration provision requiring disputes to be arbitrated. Abdisalam signed the contract as the owner of his corporation, not in his individual capacity. After several years of providing courier services, Abdisalam alleged that the company misclassified him and others as independent contractors and failed to pay them proper wages, in violation of Massachusetts law. He filed a lawsuit on behalf of himself and a proposed class of couriers seeking remedies under Massachusetts statutes. The company removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts and filed a motion to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provision in its contract with Abdul Courier, LLC. The district court denied the motion, finding that Abdisalam, having signed only as the owner of the LLC and not in his personal capacity, was not bound by the contract’s arbitration clause. The court also rejected the company’s arguments that Abdisalam should be compelled to arbitrate under theories of direct benefits estoppel, intertwined claims estoppel, or as a successor in interest. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The First Circuit held that, under Massachusetts law, it was for the court—not an arbitrator—to decide whether Abdisalam was bound by the arbitration agreement. The court further held that Abdisalam, as a nonsignatory to the agreement in his personal capacity, was not bound by its arbitration provision, and none of the equitable estoppel or successor theories advanced by the defendant provided a basis to compel arbitration. View "Abdisalam v. Strategic Delivery Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

Ex parte Smith

2026-03-06T06:30:59-08:00

Brian Smith, through several companies he formed, was engaged in purchasing and developing property around Lake Martin. In March 2025, Smith and his companies initiated arbitration proceedings with the American Arbitration Association, asserting claims such as fraud and breach of contract against various individuals and entities involved in the land transactions. These respondents, who were involved in the transactions as real estate agents, agencies, a closing agency, and a consultant, had not signed the contracts containing the arbitration provisions at issue. In response, the individuals and entities named in the arbitration, now plaintiffs, filed a declaratory-judgment action in the Tallapoosa Circuit Court. They sought a judgment declaring there was no valid and enforceable agreement requiring them to arbitrate disputes with Smith and his companies and requested a stay of the arbitration. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on provisions in the relevant land-sale contracts, arguing that even as nonsignatories, the plaintiffs were bound by the arbitration clauses due to equitable estoppel or because they were third-party beneficiaries. The defendants further contended that the question of arbitrability—whether the claims against the plaintiffs should be arbitrated—was itself a matter for the arbitrator, not the court, to decide. The circuit court disagreed, stayed the arbitration, and decided it would determine whether a valid arbitration agreement existed. The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the matter and held that, under its precedent, when an arbitration provision contains a delegation clause or incorporates the AAA rules, the question of whether claims against nonsignatories are subject to arbitration must be decided by the arbitrator. The Court concluded the circuit court erred in staying the arbitration and in failing to compel arbitration. The Court reversed the circuit court’s order and remanded the case for entry of an order compelling arbitration. The petition for writ of mandamus was dismissed as moot. View "Ex parte Smith" on Justia Law

VEGAS AQUA, LLC VS. JUPITOR CORP.

2026-03-05T11:08:41-08:00

A business agreement was made in early 2020 for the rental of a yacht for an event. The agreement involved a payment of $18,280, which was to cover a deposit and a down payment toward the rental fee. The event was canceled due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the party that made the payment requested a refund. The yacht provider did not return the funds. The party seeking the refund sued under several theories, including unjust enrichment and breach of contract. After mandatory arbitration resulted in an award for the plaintiff, the defendant requested a trial de novo, and the matter proceeded under Nevada’s Short Trial Program. A short trial judge rendered a proposed judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant objected to this proposed judgment, but the short trial judge, after consulting with the Alternative Dispute Resolution Office, ruled on the objection and later denied the defendant’s NRCP 59 motion to alter or amend the judgment, or for a new trial. The district court then entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, apparently approving the short trial judge’s proposed judgment. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada considered whether a short trial judge has authority to adjudicate objections to a proposed judgment and post-judgment NRCP 59 motions. The court held that under the plain language of NSTR 3(d), only the district court—not a short trial judge—may review and adjudicate objections to proposed judgments and NRCP 59 motions. The court found that the short trial judge exceeded her authority by ruling on these matters. The Supreme Court of Nevada vacated the district court’s judgment and the short trial judge’s post-judgment orders, remanding the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "VEGAS AQUA, LLC VS. JUPITOR CORP." on Justia Law

Perruzzi v. The Campbell's Company

2026-03-04T12:30:06-08:00

Two individuals each owned companies that distributed snack foods for a larger food company. Years earlier, they had joined a class action lawsuit claiming that the company misclassified them as independent contractors rather than employees. That class action ended in a settlement, which included an optional provision: class members could agree to arbitrate future disputes in exchange for an additional payment. Both individuals opted into that provision and accepted the payment, thereby agreeing to resolve future disputes through arbitration. Several years later, the two individuals brought a new lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, again asserting claims related to alleged misclassification and seeking damages. The defendant company moved to stay the case and compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), citing the prior agreement. The plaintiffs opposed, arguing that they were exempt from the FAA as transportation workers under Section 1. The district court rejected that exemption argument, but did not order arbitration. Instead, it stayed and administratively closed the case without entering judgment, stating it was not compelling arbitration but was closing its doors to further proceedings. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s handling. The court held that, although the district court did not expressly deny the motion to compel arbitration, its actions amounted to a denial, and thus appellate jurisdiction existed under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B). The First Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings, directing the district court to determine whether the motion to compel arbitration should be granted or denied and to explain its reasoning. The court also clarified that, under the parties’ agreement, any compelled arbitration must proceed on an individual, not class, basis. View "Perruzzi v. The Campbell's Company" on Justia Law

Bouvet v. Illinois Union Insurance Company

2026-03-04T12:00:41-08:00

This case arises from multi-district litigation involving claims that certain aqueous film-forming foam products caused injuries, and that Illinois Union Insurance Company issued excess liability policies to BASF Corporation, which allegedly designed and sold components of those products. Plaintiffs, who originally filed their cases in Wisconsin state court, assert that Illinois Union is directly liable under Wisconsin law for BASF’s conduct. After removal to federal court, the cases were consolidated for pretrial proceedings in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina under the multi-district litigation statute. The District Court for the District of South Carolina, managing the consolidated proceedings, had entered case management orders requiring motions either to be signed by lead counsel or, if not, to be preceded by a motion for leave of court. Illinois Union sought leave to file a motion to stay the proceedings against it pending arbitration, contending that its insurance policies required arbitration of the dispute. The district court denied Illinois Union’s motion for leave, first citing a failure to consult with lead counsel as required, but then acknowledging that consultation had ultimately occurred. The decisive reason for denial was that lead counsel did not consent to Illinois Union’s motion, and the district court ruled that, absent such consent, the motion could not be filed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. It held that, while district courts have broad discretion to manage multi-district litigation, they may not exercise this authority in a way that prevents a party from asserting its statutory right under the Federal Arbitration Act to seek a stay of litigation pending arbitration. Because the district court’s order effectively barred Illinois Union from filing its stay motion based on lack of lead counsel’s consent, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bouvet v. Illinois Union Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Sorokunov v. NetApp, Inc.

2026-03-03T12:31:39-08:00

A former employee brought suit against his prior employer, alleging that the employer’s compensation plan for commissions violated several provisions of the California Labor Code. The employee claimed that the employer’s use of a “windfall” provision, which limited commission payments when revenue goals were substantially exceeded, resulted in retroactive reductions to earned commissions. The employer invoked this provision after the employee and others exceeded their sales goals, causing the employee’s final commission payment to be lower than anticipated. The employee resigned and later sought civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), as well as damages for alleged unpaid wages and other Labor Code violations. The Superior Court of Alameda County compelled arbitration of the employee’s individual claims but allowed the PAGA claims to proceed in court. During arbitration, the arbitrator found in favor of the employer on all individual claims, concluding that the compensation plan’s “windfall” provision did not violate the Labor Code sections at issue. The arbitrator determined that the commissions in question were not subject to the statutory requirements argued by the employee, and that the plan did not involve unlawful wage recapture or secret underpayment. The trial court confirmed the arbitration award, denied the employee’s motion for summary adjudication on the PAGA claim, and subsequently granted the employer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the arbitration resolved the issue of whether the employee was an “aggrieved employee” with standing under PAGA. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The court held that the arbitration agreement was not illusory, that the arbitrator’s findings precluded the employee from maintaining PAGA standing, and that the employer’s commission plan did not violate the cited Labor Code provisions. The judgment in favor of the employer was affirmed. View "Sorokunov v. NetApp, Inc." on Justia Law