“Might as Well Carry a Purse with That Mask, Joe”: COVID-19, Toxic Masculinity, and the Sad State of National Politics

JOANNA L. GROSSMAN, LINDA C. MCCLAIN

SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman and Boston University law professor Linda C. McClain comment on COVID-19, toxic masculinity, and the state of national politics today. Grossman and McClain contrast President Trump’s reckless bravado that endangers the lives of Americans with the empathy of Democratic presidential nominee former Vice President Joe Biden’s in asking people to be patriotic by doing their part by wearing masks to protect other Americans.

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Should Department of Justice Lawyers Defy William Barr?

AUSTIN SARAT

Austin Sarat—Associate Provost, Associate Dean of the Faculty, and William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science at Amherst College—comments on an open letter addressed to the 100,000 professionals working in the U.S. Department of Justice and published by Lawyers Defending Democracy. In the letter, more than 600 members of the bar from across the United States call on their DOJ colleagues to refrain from “participating in political misuse of the DOJ in the elction period ahead.” Sarat argues that the letter rightly recognizes that Attorney General Barr’s blatant partisanship endangers the integrity of the DOJ itself and its role in preserving the rule of law.

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Signs for Jesus v. Pembroke, New Hampshire

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 17-1192

Opinion Date: October 7, 2020

Judge: Jeffrey R. Howard

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the Town of Pembroke, New Hampshire and dismissing the complaint filed by Signs for Jesus and Hillside Baptist Church (collectively, the Church) challenging the Town's denial of the Church's application for a permit to install an electronic sign on its property, holding that the Town met its summary judgment burden on all counts. Hillside Baptist Church applied for a permit to install an electronic sign on its property to transmit messages provided by the nonprofit corporation Signs for Jesus. The Pembroke Zoning Board of Adjustment denied the permit, citing a provision in the Pembroke Sign Ordinance that bans the use of electronic signs in the zoning district where the Church was located. The Church later brought this complaint, alleging violations of the state and federal Constitutions, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and certain New Hampshire zoning laws. The district court granted summary judgment for the Town and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Church's state statutory claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err.

Harrell v. Freedom Mortgage Corp.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 19-1379

Opinion Date: October 2, 2020

Judge: Richardson

Areas of Law: Banking, Real Estate & Property Law

After his taxes were paid late from his mortgage escrow account, causing him to incur $895 in penalties, the homeowner-borrower filed a putative class action against the company that serviced his mortgage. Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2601, if a mortgage contract requires the borrower to place property tax payments in escrow, “the servicer” must make those tax payments on time. The right to service a mortgage is subject to purchase and sale. The rights to service the plaintiff’s mortgage had been transferred between the time of the plaintiff’s payment into the escrow account and the tax’s due date. Reversing the district court, the Fourth Circuit concluded that when servicing rights are transferred in the window between the borrower’s payment to escrow and the tax’s due date, RESPA requires taxes to be paid by the entity responsible for servicing the mortgage at the time the tax payment is due. By requiring “the servicer” to make tax payments “as [they] become due,” RESPA connects the servicer’s obligation to a payment’s due date, not the date of payment into escrow by the borrower.

County of Sonoma v. U.S. Bank N.A.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A155837(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 8, 2020

Judge: Sanchez

Areas of Law: Banking, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

Quail's 47,480-square-foot unincorporated Sonoma County property contained two houses, garages, and several outbuildings. In 2013, a building with hazardous and unpermitted electrical wiring, hazardous decking and stairs, unpermitted kitchens and plumbing, broken windows, and lacking power, was destroyed in a fire. Two outbuildings, unlawfully being used as dwellings, were also damaged. One report stated: “The [p]roperty . . . exists as a makeshift, illegal mobile home park and junkyard.” After many unsuccessful attempts to compel Quail to abate the conditions, the county obtained the appointment of a receiver under Health and Safety Code section 17980.7 and Code of Civil Procedure section 564 to oversee abatement work. The banks challenged a superior court order authorizing the receiver to finance its rehabilitation efforts through a loan secured by a “super-priority” lien on the property and a subsequent order authorizing the sale of the property free and clear of U.S. Bank’s lien. The court of appeal affirmed in part. Trial courts enjoy broad discretion in matters subject to a receivership, including the power to issue a receiver’s certificate with priority over pre-existing liens when warranted. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in subordinating U.S. Bank’s lien and confirming the sale of the property free and clear of liens so that the receiver could remediate the nuisance conditions promptly and effectively, but prioritizing the county’s enforcement fees and costs on equal footing with the receiver had no basis in the statutes.

Robin v. Crowell

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: F077325(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 8, 2020

Judge: Smith

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

In this quiet title action, plaintiffs, holders of a first deed of trust on certain property, judicially foreclosed, but failed to name defendant, the holder of a second deed of trust on the same property, as a defendant in that action. Plaintiffs subsequently sought to quiet title to correct their mistake and to terminate defendant's lien. The Court of Appeal concluded that the statute of limitations on a judicial action to foreclose the first deed of trust had run, and the lien had been extinguished, prior to the filing of the quiet title action. In this case, the 60-year statute of limitations on which the trial court relied applied only to a nonjudicial trustee's sale; the trial court could not exercise the trustee's power of sale through a quiet title action after the expiration of the statute of limitations on a judicial action to foreclose; and, after the judicial foreclosure sale, there was no trustee holding title to the property who could transfer title through a trustee's sale. Therefore, plaintiffs' action was barred by the statute of limitations. The court reversed and vacated the trial court's judgment and entered a new judgment in favor of defendant.

Skaff v. Rio Nido Roadhouse

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A152462(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 5, 2020

Judge: Sanchez

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Legal Ethics, Real Estate & Property Law

Skaff sued the Roadhouse restaurant and grill, located in Sonoma County, alleging that the Roadhouse and parking lot were inaccessible to wheelchair users. Skaff cited Health and Safety Code section 19955 and the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civ. Code section 51. Under section 19955, public accommodations must comply with California Building Code disability access standards if repairs and alterations were made to an existing facility, triggering accessibility mandates. No evidence was presented that the Roadhouse's owner had undertaken any triggering alterations. The owner nonetheless voluntarily remediated the identified barriers to access. The court entered judgment against Skaff on his Unruh Act claim but ruled in his favor on the section 19955 claim, reasoning that he was the prevailing party under a “catalyst theory” because his lawsuit was the catalyst that caused the renovations. Skaff was awarded $242,672 in attorney fees and costs. The court of appeal reversed the judgment and fee award. A plaintiff cannot prevail on a cause of action in which no violation of law was ever demonstrated or found. Nor is the catalyst theory available when a claim lacks legal merit. That a prelitigation demand may have spurred action that resulted in positive societal benefit is not reason alone to award attorney fees under the Civil Code.

Lingnaw v. Lumpkin

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 47098

Opinion Date: October 8, 2020

Judge: Bevan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

Appellant Derrick Lingnaw, a registered sex offender, sought declaratory relief from the district court asking whether he could legally reside on his property. The district court found Lingnaw’s residence was within five hundred feet of property on which a school was located, as that term was used in Idaho Code section 18-8329(1)(d). The court thus denied Lingnaw’s request to enjoin the Custer County Sheriff, Stuart Lumpkin, from interfering with Lingnaw’s ability to reside on his property. The court also denied Sheriff Lumpkin’s request for attorney fees and costs. On appeal, the parties mainly disputed the district court’s finding that Lingnaw’s residence was within five hundred feet of a school. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling that Lingnaw's property was within five hundred feet of property on which a school was located. Lingnaw raised a question of fact as to whether the building, ruled as a "school," was simply a gymnasium and building leased by the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”); Lingnaw argued the plain meaning of “school” required some form of traditional educational instruction. The trial court found “that the gymnasium, as contemplated by the statute, is a school building utilized by the school for school functions on a regular basis . . . for sporting events and other school activities. And children are coming and going from that building on a regular basis.” Because it was “clear from the evidence” that Lingnaw’s property fell “well within” five hundred feet or the buildings’ property line, the district court found that Lingnaw lived within five hundred feet of a school. To this, the Supreme Court concurred. The district court's judgment was affirmed in all other respects.

Oswald v. Costco

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 47261

Opinion Date: October 5, 2020

Judge: Roger S. Burdick

Areas of Law: Business Law, Personal Injury, Real Estate & Property Law

Plaintiffs John Oswald and Nancy Poore appealed a district court judgment granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Costco Wholesale Corporation ("Costco"). In February 2017, Oswald and Poore were walking on that walkway when an elderly driver drove onto a pedestrian walkway that bisected two perpendicular rows of ADA-accessible parking spaces, striking Oswald and pinning him against a vehicle parked on the opposite side, causing Oswald to suffer significant injuries. Plaintiffs sued Costco alleging: (1) premises liability; (2) negligence and willful wanton conduct; (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress. After the district court resolved a discovery dispute in Costco’s favor, Costco moved for summary judgment. In granting the motion, the district court ruled that Costco had no notice that its walkway was a dangerous condition and, therefore, owed no duty to redesign it or warn pedestrians about it. The district court entered judgment dismissing the Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court determined the district court's decision improperly focused on the duty to maintain safe premises to the exclusion of the duty to use reasonable care. Furthermore, the Court found Plaintiffs put forward sufficient evidence to create a disputed issue of material fact on foreseeability and causation, thereby precluding the award of summary judgment. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

Oklahoma, ex rel. Comm'rs of Land Office v. Stephens & Johnson Operating Co., Inc.

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 OK 84

Opinion Date: October 6, 2020

Judge: James R. Winchester

Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

Appellant operating company, Stephens & Johnson Operating Company (Operator), requested an award of attorney fees and costs in this case brought under the Oklahoma Surface Damages Act. Operator claimed it was entitled to the fees and costs as the prevailing party in the underlying suit since the State of Oklahoma ex rel. the Commissioners of the Land Office (Surface Owner) did not recover a jury verdict greater than the appraisers' award. The Oklahoma Supreme Court found the statutes in question did not provide for fees and costs to the prevailing party but instead imposed specific conditions which were not satisfied in this case.

Purcell v. Parker

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 OK 83

Opinion Date: October 6, 2020

Judge: Yvonne Kauger

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

Petitioners and respondents owned real property in McClain County, Oklahoma, containing and abutting Colbert Lake (the Lake). Petitioners also owned real property containing Colbert Creek, which was the sole source of water that fed the Lake. Respondents sought a permit from the Oklahoma Water Resources Board (OWRB), to sell water from the Lake to oil companies for use in fracking operations. The only notice that the OWRB provided to petitioners of the respondents' permit application was by publication in newspapers. The permits were issued, and petitioners subsequently filed suit at the district court, arguing that they were not given proper and sufficient notice of the permit proceedings. The district court dismissed the lawsuit in a certified interlocutory order, and petitioners appealed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the proper, constitutionally required notice to landowners in such proceedings. The Court held that the notice given was inadequate, therefore judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for for further proceedings.

Alpine Haven Property Owners' Assn, Inc. v. Deptula

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 VT 88

Opinion Date: October 2, 2020

Judge: Paul L. Reiber

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

Homeowner Edward Deptula appealed pro se a judgment in favor of plaintiff Alpine Haven Property Owners’ Association, Inc. (AHPOA) and third-party defendants Estate of Robert Gensburg and Gensburg & Greaves, PLLC (collectively Gensburg) in a long-running dispute over homeowner fees. AHPOA’s billing was based either on voluntary membership in AHPOA, or a homeowner’s obligation by deed and/or equity to pay for certain services that AHPOA provided. AHPOA owns and maintains a 4.5-mile road network within Alpine Haven, which almost all owners need to access their properties. AHPOA is also responsible for the streetlights, snowplowing, and garbage disposal within Alpine Haven. Deptula purchased a chalet lot in 1972. He has repeatedly refused to pay AHPOA’s annual assessments and those of AHPOA’s predecessor-in-interest and assignor, Leisure Properties. This has led to numerous collection actions. On appeal of this latest challenge to the assessments, Deptula raised numerous arguments, but finding no reversible error in the judgment in favor of AHPOA, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed.

Khan et al. v. v. Alpine Haven Property Owners' Assn., Inc.

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 VT 90

Opinion Date: October 2, 2020

Judge: Paul L. Reiber

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

In prior proceedings, the Vermont Supreme Court remanded this case involving Alpine Haven, a residential development in the Towns of Montgomery and Westfield, Vermont. The case was remanded to the trial court for a determination of the basis upon which the Alpine Haven Property Owners Association, Inc. (AHPOA) could bill plaintiffs for services that AHPOA provided. The trial court determined that those plaintiffs who owned “Chalet Lots” were required by their deeds to pay AHPOA a reasonable fee for road maintenance, snowplowing, and garbage removal; those plaintiffs who owned “Large Lots” were required by statute and equitable principles to contribute to AHPOA’s road maintenance costs. The court concluded plaintiffs failed to show any material factual dispute regarding the reasonableness or accuracy of AHPOA’s fees. It thus ordered plaintiffs to pay AHPOA’s annual assessments between 2011 and 2018. Plaintiffs challenged this decision on appeal. But finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.

431 East Palisade Avenue Real Estate LLC v. City of Englewood

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 19-3621

Opinion Date: October 8, 2020

Judge: Julio M. Fuentes

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

Palisade sought to build a 150-bed for-profit assisted living facility, which would provide supportive services to memory care patients 0n a 4.96-acre parcel located partially in the city and partially in the borough. The city opposes its construction because the property is in a “one-family residence” zoning district. Palisade argued that the zoning ordinance discriminated on its face against individuals with disabilities by not permitting assisted living facilities as of right in the single-family district and by explicitly allowing them in only one zoning district. The district court granted Palisade a preliminary injunction. The Third Circuit vacated. The zoning ordinance, by failing to include “assisted living facilities” among its permitted uses in the single-family district, but explicitly allowing them in a different district, does not facially discriminate against the disabled in violation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. 3604. Failure to permit a land use as of right is not tantamount to an express prohibition. There is no indication that disabled status, rather than the building size or the commercial character of the development, is the dispositive trait, singled out for different treatment. The court noted that Palisade did not seek a variance.