Reflections on the Movement in California to Repeal the State’s Ban on Affirmative Action

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR

Illinois law dean and professor Vikram David Amar offers three observations on a measure recently approved by the California legislature that would, if approved by the voters, repeal Proposition 209, the voter initiative that has prohibited affirmative action by the state and its subdivisions since its passage in 1996. Amar praises the California legislature for seeking to repeal Prop 209 and for seeking to do so using the proper procedures, and he suggests that if Prop 209 is repealed, legal rationales for the use of race should be based not only on the value of diversity (as they have been for some time now), but also on the need to remedy past wrongs against Black Americans.

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Barnes v. Routh Crabtree Olsen PC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 16-35418

Opinion Date: June 30, 2020

Judge: Chhabria

Areas of Law: Banking, Consumer Law, Real Estate & Property Law

A judicial foreclosure proceeding is not a form of debt collection when the proceeding does not include a request for a deficiency judgment or some other effort to recover the remaining debt. If a foreclosure plaintiff seeks not only to foreclose on the property but also to recover the remainder of the debt through a deficiency judgment, then the plaintiff is attempting to collect a debt within the meaning of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). But if the plaintiff is simply enforcing a security interest by retaking or forcing a sale of the property, without regard to any additional debt that may be owed, then the FDCPA does not apply. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act over a judicial foreclosure proceeding in Oregon. The panel held that plaintiff pleaded no conduct by the defendants beyond the filing of a foreclosure complaint and actions to effectuate that proceeding.

Brown v. Berry-Pratt, as successor administrator of the Estate of Pauline Brown

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1180348

Opinion Date: June 30, 2020

Judge: Mitchell

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law, Trusts & Estates

Leah Brown, Robert Allen Brown ("Allen"), and Cheryl Woddail ("Cheryl") were heirs of Pauline Brown ("Brown"), who died without a will. Leah, Allen, and Cheryl appealed a circuit court judgment authorizing Ellen Berry-Pratt, the administrator of Brown's estate, to sell certain real property owned by Brown at the time of her death. Because Leah, Allen, and Cheryl did not establish the circuit court erred by entering its judgment in favor of Berry-Pratt, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.

Crook v. Allstate Indemnity Company, et al.

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1180996

Opinion Date: June 26, 2020

Judge: Mendheim

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts, Insurance Law, Real Estate & Property Law

Kevin Crook appealed summary judgment entered in favor of Allstate Indemnity Company ("Allstate Indemnity"), Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate Insurance"), and The Barker Agency (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the defendants"). Crook owns lake-front property in Tuscaloosa County. The property consists of a house, a bathhouse, a garage, a deck, and a boat dock. In 2006, Crook, through The Barker Agency, obtained property insurance on the house and other structures from Allstate Indemnity. Allstate Indemnity issued a policy to Crook ("the policy") and provided uninterrupted insurance coverage of Crook's house from 2006 through 2015. On February 12, 2015, Allstate Indemnity conducted an inspection of the property for underwriting purposes. After the inspection, on February 23, 2015, The Barker Agency sent Crook a letter with the results, finding no "issues that impact [Crook's] current coverage, and you do not need to do anything further. ...our inspection... focused only on identifying certain types of hazards or conditions that might impact your future insurance coverage. It may not have identified some other hazards of conditions on your property." In April 2015, a storm damaged the deck and the boat dock. Ultimately, Crook sued defendants for breach of contract, bad-faith failure to pay a claim, negligent/wanton procurement of insurance, and estoppel, all relating to the policy's coverage of the storm damage. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court found no reversible error in the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants and affirmed.

Daniels v. Hawthorne-Midway Lily Flagg, LLC

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1190208

Opinion Date: June 26, 2020

Judge: Michael F. Bolin

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury, Real Estate & Property Law

In December 2016, Geraldine Daniels was residing at the Hawthorne at Lily-Flagg apartment complex, which was owned by Hawthorne-Midway Lily Flagg, LLC ("Hawthorne-Midway"), and managed by Hawthorne Residential Partners, LLC, and its community manager, Tracy Wiley. Daniels sued Hawthorne-Midway and Wiley for damages resulting from injuries she suffered when she fell while stepping off a sidewalk at the complex. Daniels appealed summary judgment entered in favor of Hawthorne-Midway and Wiley. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed: Daniels did not demonstrate any genuine issue of material fact that prevented Hawthorne-Midway and Wiley from being entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Ex parte Nancy Beamon.

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1181060

Opinion Date: June 26, 2020

Judge: Alisa Kelli Wise

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law, Trusts & Estates

Nancy Beamon, personal representative of the estate of Lois P. Arnott, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus requesting that the Alabama Supreme Court order the Washington Circuit Court to dismiss the complaint filed against her by Bruce Allen Arnott. Donovan Arnott, Jr., was married to Lois Arnott. The two were residents of Lee County, Georgia. Bruce was the son of Donovan and Lois. Lois had two children from a prior marriage, Beamon and John Edward Terry. Donovan adopted Beamon but did not adopt Terry. Donovan died testate in 2014. In his will, Donovan left a house and two lots located in Clarke County to Lois. Donovan devised a remainder fee-simple interest in the "Atchison" tract to Bruce; a reminder fee-simple interest in the Smith tract to Beamon; and a remainder fee-simple interest in the "Taylor" tract to Terry. Lois died testate in 2017. In his complaint, Bruce alleged Lois, as the life tenant to the Atchison tract, had timber on the land clear cut in 2016, and took no steps to replant trees as was required by the terms of Donovan's will. Bruce argued the obligation of timber regeneration passed to Lois' estate. Bruce alleged though the estate promised to compensate him (as the remainder person), but made no payment. The Alabama Supreme Court granted Beamon's petition for mandamus relief: Bruce's claim was, in actuality, a claim against Lois's estate and that he was suing Beamon in her capacity as the executor of Lois's estate. However, Beamon, in her capacity as the executor of Lois's estate, had no authority to defend a suit in Alabama because the letters testamentary appointing her were issued by the Georgia court. Therefore, the circuit court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over claims against Beamon in her capacity as the executor of Lois's estate. Accordingly, it erred when it denied Beamon's motion to dismiss the claims against her.

Stiff v. Equivest Financial, LLC

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1181051

Opinion Date: June 26, 2020

Judge: Mitchell

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law

Mark Stiff's property was sold at a tax sale that took place inside the Bessemer courthouse instead of "in front of the door of the courthouse" as required by section 40-10-15, Ala. Code 1975. He argued that the sale was void because of that irregularity. To that, the Alabama Supreme Court agreed and therefore reversed the circuit court's judgment refusing to set aside the tax sale. "The tax-sale statutes include a clear list of procedures designed to protect the rights of property owners and the public. The requirement that a tax sale be held in a uniform public location encourages fairness and transparency, and it supports the legitimacy of the tax-sale system as a whole. If the 'in front of the door of the courthouse' requirement is no longer important to Alabamians, it is up to the legislature (not the courts) to remove it."

Adams v. Bank of America

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A156712(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 30, 2020

Judge: Jackson

Areas of Law: Banking, Real Estate & Property Law

In 2006, Adams obtained a loan secured by a deed of trust against Vallejo residential property. Adams obtained a loan from an individual, Gallegos, secured by a separate deed of trust recorded against the same property. Adams defaulted on the junior loan, resulting in foreclosure and a trustee’s sale in 2008. Gallegos was the purchaser. The property was still subject to the senior loan; Adams remained the "Borrower,” named on the deed of trust. In 2017, Adams filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy. After her discharge, Adams filed a complaint, alleging “Violations of the Homeowners’ Bill of Rights” (HBOR), based on her 2016-2017 negotiations for a loan modification. She claimed that the defendants recorded notices of default and of trustee’s sale on the senior loan and failed to provide her with a single point of contact while her application was pending. The court granted the defendants judgment on the pleadings. The court of appeal reversed. While the complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action under the HBOR the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Adams leave to amend. The facts alleged in the complaint together with matters that are subject to judicial notice do not establish that the property is Adams’s principal residence as required under HBOR but there is a reasonable possibility that amendment of the complaint would cure this defect.

Bayramoglu v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C084299(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 1, 2020

Judge: Cole Blease

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law

Plaintiffs Sukru and Gulay Bayramoglu, like many others, sought to modify their home loan in the midst of the 2008 financial crisis. They eventually succeeded in doing so in late 2011, obtaining a lower interest rate and a lower monthly payment from their loan servicer, Nationstar Mortgage LLC (Nationstar). According to plaintiffs, Nationstar, among other things, unlawfully inserted an inflated loan balance, rather than their actual loan balance, in the loan modification agreement. And for that and other reasons, plaintiffs filed suit against Nationstar. The trial court rejected plaintiffs’ claims and granted Nationstar’s motion for summary judgment. According to the court, because plaintiffs had served “factually devoid” responses to Nationstar’s discovery, these responses tended to show that plaintiffs did not possess and could not reasonably obtain needed evidence to support most of their claims. And because, the court further found, plaintiffs never presented evidence to overcome this finding, it granted Nationstar’s motion. On appeal, plaintiffs contended the trial court wrongly found their discovery responses were factually devoid and, even if they were factually devoid, the court nonetheless should have found triable issues of fact precluded summary judgment. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the first part of plaintiffs' argument. The trial court found plaintiffs’ interrogatory responses were factually devoid because plaintiffs, rather than directly state responsive facts, told Nationstar that the answers to its interrogatories could be found in certain identified documents. "Although these responses may have been improper and warranted a motion to compel further responses, they were not the equivalent of factually devoid discovery responses." The trial court's decision was reversed to the extent it was grounded on that reasoning.

Hill RHF Housing Partners, LP v. City of Los Angeles

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Dockets: B295181(Second Appellate District) , B295315(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 29, 2020

Judge: Victoria Gerrard Chaney

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law

Hill, Olive, and Mesa, appealed the trial court's denial of petitions for writ of mandate and related declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the City of Los Angeles's June 2017 establishment of the Downtown Center Business Improvement District (DCBID) and the San Pedro Historic Waterfront Business Improvement District (SPBID) (collectively, the BIDs). Because the Court of Appeal agreed with the City and the BIDs that Hill, Olive, and Mesa were required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention and that they failed to do so, the court affirmed the trial court's judgments on that ground and declined to reach Hill, Olive, and Mesa's arguments on the merits.

Jackson v. Household Finance Corp.

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC18-357

Opinion Date: July 2, 2020

Judge: Lawson

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court approved the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in this foreclosure case, holding that the proper predicate for admission of records into evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule can be laid by a qualified witness testifying to the foundational elements of the exception. Household Finance Corp III (HFC) field a foreclosure complaint against Petitioners, alleging that Petitioners defaulted under the terms of the note and mortgage. During trial, HFC moved certain documents, including the original note, mortgage, and loan payment history, into evidence. Counsel for Petitioners objected on grounds of hearsay, claiming that the witness testifying as to the foundational elements of the business records exception to the hearsay rule failed to lay a foundation upon which to testify as to the records or to authenticate he documents based on personal knowledge. The trial judge overruled the objection and admitted the records into evidence. The trial court entered final judgment of mortgage foreclosure for HFC. The Second District affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the testimony of a qualified witness confirming the presence of each foundation requirement of the business records exception constitutes a sufficient predicate for the admission of records under the business records exception to the hearsay rule.

Kalima v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii

Docket: SCAP-18-0000068

Opinion Date: June 30, 2020

Judge: Nakayama

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the circuit court's final judgment granting and apportioning monetary damages to Native Hawaiian beneficiaries after ruling that the State breached its duties as trustee of the Hawaiian Home Lands Trust (Trust), holding that the Fair Market Rental Value (FMRV) model is an adequate method for approximating actual damages. Plaintiffs were a group of Native Hawaiian Trust beneficiaries who claimed that they incurred damages while on the waitlist to receive homestead land due to breaches of trust duties by the State. In 2009, the circuit court ruled that the State breached its duties as trustee of the Trust. In 2018, the circuit court entered a final judgment adopting a FMRV model by which it could estimate the actual loss each individual beneficiary incurred. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the circuit court's judgment, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err by adopting the FMRV model; (2) incorrectly ruled that a beneficiary's damages did not begin to accrue until six years after the State received a beneficiary's homestead application; and (3) did not err in finding that the State breached its trust duties by failing to recover lands that were withdrawn from the Trust prior to statehood.

Kelepolo v. Fernandez

Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii

Docket: SCWC-18-0000138

Opinion Date: June 30, 2020

Judge: Richard W. Pollack

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court granted Defendants' petition for writ of mandamus, holding that the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) manifestly abused its discretion in setting the amount of a supersedeas bond as a condition of staying the enforcement of a judgment and writ of possession pending appeal. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff on its complaint for ejectment against Defendants. While Defendants' appeal was pending, Defendants moved for a stay of proceedings to enforce the judgment. The circuit court granted the request and required Defendants to post a supersedeas bond in the amount of $578,000. Defendants then filed a motion for a stay in the ICA. The ICA granted a stay on the condition that it would be effective upon the ICA's approval of a supersedeas bond in the amount of $250,000 (the stay order). Defendants filed a petition for writ of mandamus from the ICA's stay order, arguing that the amount of the supersedeas bond should not exceed $8,000. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding (1) the ICA not apply relevant factors in setting the bond amount, and (2) the stay order lacked a reasonable timeframe in which Defendants would be required to post the bond.

Lorenzen v. Pearson

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 46692

Opinion Date: July 2, 2020

Judge: Moeller

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law

The Lorenzen Revocable Trust (“Lorenzen”) and David and Cynthia Pearson owned neighboring properties near Hayden Lake in Kootenai County, Idaho. The properties shared a common driveway. The properties were originally part of a 1,400 acre estate. Over the years, parcels were carved off the estate and frequently replatted. Two of those parcels included a cabin owned by Lorenzen and the “Red Barn” property owned by the Pearsons. The Pearsons purchased the Red Barn property in 2013 via quitclaim deed. Although the easement language was not in the Pearsons’ deed, the easements originally granted and reserved in a 1976 deed were recorded with the county and listed as exceptions from coverage in Pearsons’ title insurance policy. From 2013 onward, disputes over the shared driveway began. The disputes culminated in 2016 when Pearsons installed an electronic gate to control access to the shared driveway. In October 2016, Phyllis Lorenzen filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment to define the rights concerning the parties’ easement and access rights, as well as listing other causes of action. Four days later, Lorenzen filed a motion for a preliminary injunction against Pearsons, seeking to enjoin them “from blocking or otherwise interfering with access” via the shared driveway. The district court granted the motion for a preliminary injunction, ordering Pearsons to provide an access code or remote control to the gate and restraining both parties “from blocking or otherwise interfering with access” to their respective properties via the shared driveway. The next month, Phyllis Lorenzen passed away. Pearsons later filed an answer and counterclaim, arguing that Phyllis Lorenzen’s death “ended the express easement” from the 1976 quitclaim deed. They also filed a motion to dissolve the court’s prior preliminary injunction. The district court denied Pearsons’ motions, and the case proceeded to trial with the injunction remaining in effect. In 2018 following a jury trial, the district court issued a decision finding that the easement language in the quitclaim deeds was ambiguous; both parties had express easements granted to them as well as their heirs, successors and assigns. The district court then denied Pearsons’ motion to reconsider from the bench. Pearsons argued on appeal that the district court erred in establishing a legal description of the easement from the Plaintiff’s land survey. They argued this matter required another hearing to present evidence to establish an accurate metes-and-bounds description. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, finding Pearsons failed to provide an alternative metes-and-bounds survey for the district court to consider despite having had months to do so. "Only after their counsel was repeatedly unavailable to the court when it tried to request information or schedule such a hearing, did the district court accept and utilize the only legal description admitted as evidence. Pearsons cannot complain over the results of their inaction now, especially when they failed to object to the admittance of the land survey as evidence at trial."

Cohen v. Clark

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 18-2173

Opinion Date: June 30, 2020

Judge: Christensen

Areas of Law: Animal / Dog Law, Contracts, Landlord - Tenant, Real Estate & Property Law

In this case brought by a tenant against her landlord and a neighboring tenant alleging breach of the lease's no-pets provision the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing the case, holding that the landlord's accommodation of an emotional support dog was not reasonable. Plaintiff moved into an apartment building because of its no-pets policy. Afterwards, another tenant requested a reasonable accommodation to have his emotion support animal (ESA), a dog, with him on the apartment premises. The landlord allowed the ESA and tried to accommodate the two tenants, but Plaintiff still suffered from allergic attacks. Plaintiff sued, alleging breach of the lease and interference with the quiet enjoyment of her apartment. The landlord asserted in its defense that its waiver of the no-pets policy was a reasonable accommodation that it was required to grant under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA). The small claims court concluded that the landlord's accommodations were reasonable. The district court dismissed the case. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding (1) the landlord's accommodation of the ESA was not reasonable because Plaintiff had priority in time and the dog's presence posed a direct threat to her health; and (2) Plaintiff was entitled to recover on her claims.

Russell v. Treanor Investments LLC

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 117973

Opinion Date: June 26, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the lower courts determining that a condominium owner's consent was not required before a proposed grocery store could be constructed, holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment. In 1997, the owner of two adjacent properties (the Borders Parcel and the Development Parcel) in Lawrence executed and recorded an Operation and Easement Agreement (OEA) that restricted the building footprints and prohibited either property from being occupied or used for the sale of groceries. Ownership for the two parcels was subsequently split between two entities. In 2010, a condominium was built on the Development Parcel, and Brian Russell bought a unit in the building. In the instant dispute, the owner of the Borders Parcel sought to construct a building that would exceed the OEA's footprint restriction and contain a grocery store. Russell brought this action claiming that the OEA could not be amended without condominium owner consent. The district court granted summary judgment for the parcel owners. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the OEA's language gave the property owners authority to amend the OEA without Russell's consent; and (2) the property owners could amend the OEA to allow for the proposed changes to the Borders Parcel.

Silverwolf v. Colton

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2020 ME 94

Opinion Date: June 30, 2020

Judge: Humphrey

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

In this action for recovery of personal property the Supreme Judicial Court vacated in part the judgment of the district court finding Kathryn Colton in contempt and imposing a jail sentence and ordering her incarceration, holding that the district court violated Colton's right to due process by ordering her to be incarcerated without an opportunity to "show cause" in some fashion. Debbie Silverwolf, a former tenant on Colton's property, brought an action against Colton for recovery of personal property. The court entered judgment in favor of Silverwolf and ordered Colton to return the property. When Colton failed to do so the judge held Colton in contempt and ordered her incarceration. No show cause proceeding was held. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case for a show cause hearing, holding (1) the court did not err in finding Colton in contempt, and the court's factual findings were supported by the evidence; and (2) the court denied Colton the opportunity to show cause, notwithstanding her attempt to make an offer of proof.

Wilmington Trust, National Ass'n v. Berry

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2020 ME 95

Opinion Date: July 2, 2020

Judge: Humphrey

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of Lisa Berry following a bench trial on the complaint for foreclosure filed by Wilmington Trust, National Association, as Trustee for MFRA Trust 2014-2 (Wilmington), holding that the district court did not err. Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the district court did not err by excluding evidence of business records showing Berry's payment history with various loan services because the business records were untrustworthy; (2) Wilmington failed to prove that Berry received a properly served notice of default and mortgagor's right to cure; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Berry.

Dale Exploration, et al. v. Hiepler, et al.

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 ND 140

Opinion Date: June 29, 2020

Judge: Jerod E. Tufte

Areas of Law: Contracts, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Real Estate & Property Law

Mark Hiepler, as the trustee of the Orville G. Hiepler and Florence L. Hiepler Family Trust (“Trust”), appealed a judgment ordering him to transfer certain Trust property to Bill Seerup, and appealed an order denying his motion to dismiss. In April 2007, Orville and Florence Hiepler deeded 150 net mineral acres in Williams County to Seerup in exchange for $15,609. The mineral deed did not refer to the Trust or Orville and Florence Hiepler’s role as co-trustees. When the deed was executed, Orville individually owned only 7.3636 mineral acres. The remaining 142.6 mineral acres were owned by the Trust. Nine days after receiving the mineral deed from Orville and Florence Hiepler, Seerup conveyed 135 mineral acres to Hurley Oil Properties, Inc. In 2014, Dale Exploration, LLC, filed suit to quiet title to the 150 net mineral acres conveyed in the mineral deed from Orville and Florence Hiepler to Seerup. Seerup and Hurley Oil also brought a claim for breach of contract against Orville and Florence Hiepler, individually and as co-trustees, requesting specific performance or, alternatively, money damages if specific performance was not ordered. In 2017, the district court dismissed Dale Exploration’s claims on summary judgment, finding there was no evidence that Dale Exploration had an interest in the property. A bench trial was held on the remaining issues. The court found the Hieplers own the mineral interests in fee simple as trustees, not as individuals. The court also found the Hieplers breached the mineral deed to Seerup and the proper remedy was damages, not specific performance. The court awarded damages in the amount of $20,147.96. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed that judgment and remanded for further proceedings on whether money damages were adequate in light of specific performance. Orville died after the Supreme Court's judgment and mandate were issued. Orville and Mark responded to a proposed order drafted by Seerup and Hurley Oil, arguing the pleasings did not adequately assert specific performance. Specific performance of the mineral deed was ultimately granted. Mark Hiepler argues the district court erred in ordering him to convey the property to Seerup because the court did not have jurisdiction to enter a judgment against the Trust, the claims abated upon Orville Hiepler’s death, and he could not be substituted as a party for Orville Hiepler. Finding no error in the district court's judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed.

Vicente v. Pinto's Auto & Truck Repair, LLC

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 19-181

Opinion Date: June 26, 2020

Judge: Paul A. Suttell

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in favor of Defendant, Pinto's Auto & truck Repair, LLC, in this action alleging that Defendant's repairs to Plaintiff's 2004 Freightliner Columbia were faulty, holding that the hearing justice properly granted summary judgment in Defendant's favor. The hearing justice granted summary judgment for Defendant because Plaintiff did not produce the required expert testimony to demonstrate that there was a genuine issue of material fact in dispute regarding Defendant's allegedly negligent failure to observe industry standard, negligent service and installation, and failure to deliver a properly serviced truck. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was proper where Plaintiff produced no admissible evidence that Defendant negligently repaired the Freightliner, breached any contract it had with Plaintiff by failing to deliver a properly serviced truck, or alternatively, was unjustly enriched by accepting Plaintiff's money without completing proper repairs.

Haedge v. Central Texas Cattlemen's Ass'n

Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Docket: 19-0595

Opinion Date: June 26, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Business Law, Contracts, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the order of the trial court that Petitioners pay $7,000 from a supersedeas bond over losing the underlying appeal and ordering Petitioners to pay $114,280 from the bond, holding that the court of appeals erred in calculating the amount. When Petitioners were ousted from land upon which their cattle grazed, they brought this action challenging the ouster. The trial court granted summary judgment in part for Respondents then, after a trial, rendered judgment that Petitioners take nothing. The trial court allowed Petitioners to suspend the judgment by posting a supersedeas bond, which meant Petitioners could keep their cattle on the leased land during the appeal. The trial court ruled that Respondent was entitled to $7,000 from the bond. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Respondent should recover $114,280 from the bond, basing its calculation on the expense Petitioners would have incurred if the judgment had not been superseded. At issue was how "loss or damage" is calculated on release of a supersedeas bond under Tex. R. App. 24.2(a)(3). The Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's order, holding that the proper measure is the actual loss Respondent suffered because the judgment was superseded.