Kelley v. Richford Health Center, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 23-344

Opinion Date: August 20, 2024

Judge: Raymond Joseph Lohier, Jr.

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Health Law, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury

Bruce Kelley and his spouse, Nancy Kelley, filed a medical malpractice lawsuit in Vermont state court after Bruce Kelley was paralyzed from the waist down while residing at Franklin County Rehabilitation Center (FCRC). They alleged that Dr. Teig Marco, employed by Richford Health Center, Inc. (RHC), negligently treated Kelley, leading to his paralysis. RHC is a federally funded community health center deemed a member of the Public Health Service under the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act (FSHCAA).

The United States intervened and removed the case to federal district court, asserting that RHC and Dr. Marco were covered under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) due to their deemed status. The United States District Court for the District of Vermont held an evidentiary hearing and determined that the FSHCAA did not apply to Dr. Marco’s treatment of Kelley because Kelley was not a patient of RHC, and the treatment did not fall under the specified statutory criteria for nonpatients. Consequently, the District Court remanded the case to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Kelley was not a patient of RHC and that Dr. Marco’s treatment did not meet the criteria for FTCA coverage for nonpatients under the FSHCAA. The court concluded that the treatment did not qualify as after-hours coverage or emergency treatment and that RHC had not sought a particularized determination of coverage from the Department of Health and Human Services. Therefore, the remand to state court was appropriate, and the District Court's order was affirmed.

Jones v. Kent County

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-1866

Opinion Date: August 16, 2024

Judge: Ronald Lee Gilman

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury

Wade Jones was incarcerated at the Kent County Correctional Facility for five days in April 2018. During his incarceration, he experienced severe alcohol withdrawal symptoms. Despite being placed on an alcohol-withdrawal protocol, Jones did not receive timely or adequate medical care. On April 27, 2018, Jones went into cardiac arrest and was later transferred to a hospital, where he died a week later. His estate sued Kent County and several nurses, alleging deliberate indifference to his medical needs.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan held a trial where a jury found that nurses Melissa Furnace, Chad Goetterman, and James Mollo were deliberately indifferent to Jones’s medical condition, which was a proximate cause of his death. The jury awarded Jones’s estate $6.4 million in compensatory damages. The defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, arguing that the jury’s verdict was inconsistent, that no reasonable jury could find proximate cause, that the estate’s counsel engaged in misconduct, and that a juror’s failure to disclose his criminal history warranted a new trial. The district court denied these motions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the defendants had forfeited their inconsistent-verdict argument by not objecting before the jury was discharged. It also found sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of proximate cause, noting that the jury could reasonably conclude that the nurses’ failure to provide timely medical care significantly decreased Jones’s likelihood of survival. The court further held that the estate’s counsel’s emotional display during trial did not constitute contumacious conduct warranting a new trial. Lastly, the court found no basis for a new trial due to juror misconduct, as the juror was never directly asked about his own criminal history during voir dire.

FRANCISCO v AFFILIATED UROLOGISTS

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Docket: CV-23-0152-PR

Opinion Date: August 16, 2024

Judge: Montgomery

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury

David Francisco, a retired endodontist, sought treatment from Dr. Kevin Art of Affiliated Urologists, Ltd. in 2018. Dr. Art performed a urological procedure and prescribed the antibiotic Ciproflaxin (Cipro) without discussing its use with Francisco. The FDA's black box warning for Cipro indicated serious risks, especially for elderly patients with a history of corticosteroid use, which applied to Francisco. After taking Cipro, Francisco experienced severe adverse reactions, including tendon ruptures and peripheral neuropathy.

The Superior Court in Maricopa County dismissed the Franciscos' case for failing to provide a preliminary expert opinion affidavit as required by A.R.S. § 12-2603. The Franciscos argued that the FDA warning itself should establish the standard of care, negating the need for expert testimony. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal, holding that the FDA warning could be sufficient to establish the standard of care without expert testimony.

The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that FDA warnings cannot substitute for expert testimony to establish the standard of care in medical malpractice cases. The Court emphasized that medical judgment is required to determine the appropriate standard of care, which must be established by expert testimony. The Court also rejected the Franciscos' argument that the statutory requirements for expert testimony violated the anti-abrogation clause of the Arizona Constitution, finding that the statutes permissibly regulate medical negligence actions.

The Arizona Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the Superior Court's dismissal of the case.

Evans v. Wright

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 50094

Opinion Date: August 19, 2024

Judge: Meyer

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury

Roberta Evans underwent a total hip replacement surgery performed by Dr. Mark B. Wright at St. Luke’s Magic Valley Regional Medical Center. Post-surgery, Evans experienced persistent pain and discomfort, which led her to seek a second opinion. Another doctor confirmed that her hip bone socket was abnormally anteverted, and subsequent revision surgery revealed a periprosthetic joint infection. Evans filed a lawsuit against Dr. Wright and St. Luke’s, alleging negligence in their follow-up care and treatment.

The District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of Idaho dismissed Evans’s case, ruling that her claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations under Idaho Code section 5-219(4). The court found that Evans’s surgical complications were objectively ascertainable by March 4, 2019, indicating that some damage was present. Her motion for reconsideration was denied.

The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Evans’s medical malpractice claim was time-barred, as the statute of limitations began when her symptoms indicated some damage, which was before April 6, 2019. The court also found that the district court did not err in dismissing Evans’s complaint and that her equitable estoppel argument was without merit. The court denied attorney fees to both parties but awarded costs to Dr. Wright and St. Luke’s as the prevailing parties.

Ackman v. Mercy Health W. Hosp., Inc.

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-3159

Opinion Date: August 22, 2024

Judge: Deters

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury

The administrator of a deceased woman’s estate filed a complaint alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death against a doctor, the doctor’s employer, a hospital, and Medicare. The doctor and his employer included the affirmative defenses of insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process in their answer. Over two years later, they moved for summary judgment, arguing that the case had not commenced timely because the doctor had not been served with the complaint. The administrator opposed, claiming the doctor waived his defense by participating in the litigation. The trial court granted summary judgment, and the First District Court of Appeals affirmed.

The administrator appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, urging it to overrule its decision in Gliozzo v. Univ. Urologists of Cleveland, Inc., which held that active participation in litigation does not waive the defense of insufficiency of service of process if properly raised and preserved. The Supreme Court of Ohio declined to overrule Gliozzo, reaffirming that the defense is not waived by participation in litigation if it is properly raised and preserved. The court emphasized that the burden of perfecting service lies with the plaintiff and that the rules of civil procedure govern the conduct of all parties equally.

The Supreme Court of Ohio held that Dr. Ahmad properly preserved his insufficiency-of-service-of-process defense and that the administrator never perfected service of the complaint on him. Consequently, the trial court correctly dismissed the claims against Dr. Ahmad and his employer. The judgment of the First District Court of Appeals was affirmed.

Blouin v. Koster

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 22-282

Opinion Date: August 20, 2024

Judge: LONG

Areas of Law: Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury

The plaintiffs, Jason Blouin and Heather Blouin, filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against several healthcare providers, alleging negligence in the births of their children, X.B. and D.B., who were born with cystic fibrosis. Heather Blouin received prenatal care from University OB-GYN, but was not offered genetic screening or counseling. X.B. was born in 2009 and later exhibited symptoms of cystic fibrosis, but was not diagnosed until 2013. D.B. was born in 2012 and was diagnosed with cystic fibrosis shortly after birth. The plaintiffs claimed that the healthcare providers' failure to diagnose and inform them of the genetic risks led to the births of X.B. and D.B. with cystic fibrosis.

The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the pediatric defendants, ruling that they did not owe a duty of care to the parents. The court also granted partial summary judgment in favor of the obstetric defendants, dismissing the wrongful-life claims based on the Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision in Ho-Rath v. Corning Incorporated, which held that no duty is owed to a child born with defects due to negligence in genetic counseling.

The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The Court held that the pediatric defendants did not owe a duty to the parents to diagnose X.B. with cystic fibrosis for the purpose of informing their reproductive decisions. The Court also upheld the dismissal of the wrongful-life claims, reiterating that life with impairments does not constitute a legally recognized injury under Ho-Rath III. The Court concluded that the trial justice correctly applied the law and that the plaintiffs' claims failed as a matter of law.