Anderson v. State of Iowa

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 22-0759

Opinion Date: February 9, 2024

Judge: May

Areas of Law: Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury, Trusts & Estates

In Iowa, a ten-year-old boy was treated at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics (UIHC) for a dislodged feeding tube and died the next day. The boy's mother filed administrative tort claims on behalf of the child's estate prior to being appointed as the estate's administrator. The child's parents also individually claimed loss of consortium. The claims were dismissed by the district court, which ruled that the mother lacked authority to file a claim on behalf of the estate prior to her official appointment, and that the parents had not properly filed individual administrative tort claims.

The Supreme Court of Iowa held that the district court was correct to dismiss the parents' individual claims as no individual administrative tort claims were filed. However, the court determined the district court had erred in dismissing the estate's claims, arguing that the mother's administrative tort claims were valid despite her not being appointed as the estate's administrator at the time of filing. The court explained that a representative may act to protect an estate's interests before being officially appointed and can ratify pre-appointment acts, granting them the same effect as acts that would occur after appointment. The court also confirmed that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to permit the plaintiffs' new evidence. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

Jorgensen v. Smith

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 22-0576

Opinion Date: February 9, 2024

Judge: May

Areas of Law: Health Law, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury

In this case, Charlene and Michael Jorgensen sued Dr. Adam Smith, his professional corporation (Adam Smith, M.D., P.C.), and Tri-State Specialists, L.L.P., a clinic that employed Dr. Smith, after Charlene underwent surgeries in 2016 and 2018 that they allege were botched by Dr. Smith. They specifically claim that Tri-State was negligent in retaining Dr. Smith despite knowledge of his unfitness to practice surgery. The Supreme Court of Iowa considered whether the Jorgensens were required to produce a "certificate of merit affidavit" containing an expert’s opinion that the clinic had breached the applicable standard of care by retaining Dr. Smith, under Iowa Code section 147.140 (2018). The court found that this requirement did not apply to the Jorgensens' claim of negligent retention. While Tri-State is considered a "health care provider" as per the definition in the Iowa Code, the language of the statute requiring a certificate of merit refers to negligence in the practice of a profession, occupation, or in patient care. The court concluded that in the context of section 147.140, the term "occupation" does not encompass the activities of entities such as Tri-State. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's decision denying Tri-State's motion for summary judgment.

MCMILLIN, M.D. V. SANCHEZ

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-SC-0272-DG

Opinion Date: February 15, 2024

Judge: Conley

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury

In this medical malpractice case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky analyzed KRS 411.167, a law requiring claimants to file a certificate of merit alongside their complaint. The plaintiff, Mario Sanchez, had filed a suit against doctors and the medical facility, but without a certificate of merit. The trial court dismissed the case because Sanchez failed to comply with KRS 411.167. Sanchez appealed, arguing that the certificate requirement only applied to parties representing themselves, and that his responses to the defendant's discovery requests effectively complied with the statute. The Court of Appeals disagreed with Sanchez's interpretation but remanded the case back to the trial court to determine if Sanchez's failure to file a certificate of merit was due to excusable neglect under CR 6.02.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed that KRS 411.167 applies to all claimants, whether represented by counsel or not, and rejected Sanchez's argument that he technically and substantively complied with the statute. The court ruled that strict compliance with the statute was required, rendering the statute effectively meaningless if only substantial compliance was necessary. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision to remand the case back to the trial court, stating that Sanchez's failure to adequately request relief under CR 6.02 at the trial court level should not benefit him now. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision to dismiss the lawsuit with prejudice due to Sanchez's failure to file a certificate of merit.

MCWHORTER V. BAPTIST HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, INC.

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-SC-0354-DG

Opinion Date: February 15, 2024

Judge: Conley

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury

In 2019, Keith McWhorter and his wife, Carol, filed a lawsuit against Baptist Healthcare System, Inc., alleging medical negligence and loss of consortium. The defendant argued that the plaintiffs failed to file a certificate of merit as required by Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 411.167, a law enacted to reduce meritless lawsuits against medical providers. The trial court dismissed the case with prejudice due to this omission. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing they had complied with the requirements of KRS 411.167(7) and that the defendant had waived the certificate of merit argument by not including it in their initial answer. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal.

Upon review, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that none of the issues the plaintiffs raised were properly preserved for appellate review, as they did not call these errors to the attention of the trial court. However, the court did note that had the claim of compliance under KRS 411.167(7) been properly before the court, they would have held that a plaintiff must file this information with the complaint. As a result, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, dismissing the case with prejudice.

Peng v. Meeks

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 UT 5

Opinion Date: February 15, 2024

Judge: Hagen

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury

In the medical malpractice case concerning the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from Lillian Birt, her daughter Jenafer Meeks sued the treating doctors, Wei Peng and Christina G. Richards, both individually and on behalf of Ms. Birt's heirs and estate. The children of Ms. Birt had decided to discontinue her life support based on the misinformation they received from the doctors about her condition. The doctors inaccurately portrayed her condition as terminal, leading the children to believe that the treatment was only prolonging her life unnaturally. However, Ms. Birt's condition was not terminal, and there was a high probability of her recovery if the treatment had continued.

In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, the doctors appealed on two issues. Firstly, they argued that the trial court's jury instruction 23 was incorrect as it did not explicitly state that Ms. Meeks had the burden to prove the standard of care. Secondly, they contended that the lower court erred in denying their motion for judgment as a matter of law on the survival claim due to lack of evidence that Ms. Birt experienced pain and suffering in the hours between the doctors' negligence and her death.

The Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly instructed the jury that Ms. Meeks had the burden to prove the standard of care, as the instruction implicitly required the jury to determine the standard of care as part of proving a breach of it. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the doctors that Ms. Meeks failed to provide evidence of Ms. Birt's experience of pain, suffering, or inconvenience during the period between the doctors' negligence and her death. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the lower court.