Bufkin v. Collins

Court: U.S. Supreme Court

Docket: 23-713

Opinion Date: March 5, 2025

Judge: Clarence Thomas

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Military Law, Public Benefits

Petitioners, veterans Joshua Bufkin and Norman Thornton, applied for service-connected PTSD disability benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Bufkin's claim was denied due to insufficient evidence linking his PTSD to his military service. Thornton, who already received benefits, sought an increased disability rating, which the VA denied. Both cases were reviewed de novo by the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, which upheld the VA's decisions. Bufkin and Thornton then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, arguing that the evidence was in "approximate balance" and they were entitled to the benefit of the doubt.

The Veterans Court affirmed the Board's decisions, finding no clear error in the approximate-balance determinations. Petitioners appealed to the Federal Circuit, challenging the Veterans Court's interpretation of 38 U.S.C. §7261(b)(1). They argued that the Veterans Court should review the entire record de novo to determine if the evidence was in approximate balance. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the Veterans Court's decisions.

The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the VA's determination of whether evidence is in "approximate balance" is predominantly a factual determination, subject to clear-error review. The Court clarified that the Veterans Court must review the VA's application of the benefit-of-the-doubt rule using the same standards as other determinations: de novo for legal issues and clear error for factual issues. The judgment of the Federal Circuit was affirmed.

City and County of San Francisco v. EPA

Court: U.S. Supreme Court

Docket: 23-753

Opinion Date: March 4, 2025

Judge: Samuel Alito

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

The City and County of San Francisco operates two combined wastewater treatment facilities that process both wastewater and stormwater. During heavy precipitation, these facilities may discharge untreated water into the Pacific Ocean or San Francisco Bay. In 2019, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a renewal permit for San Francisco's Oceanside facility, adding two "end-result" requirements. These requirements prohibited discharges that contribute to violations of water quality standards and discharges that create pollution, contamination, or nuisance as defined by California law. San Francisco challenged these provisions, arguing they exceeded the EPA's statutory authority.

The California Regional Water Quality Control Board and the EPA approved the final Oceanside NPDES permit. San Francisco appealed to the EPA's Environmental Appeals Board, which rejected the challenge. The City then petitioned for review in the Ninth Circuit, which denied the petition. The Ninth Circuit held that the Clean Water Act (CWA) authorizes the EPA to impose any limitations necessary to ensure water quality standards are met in receiving waters.

The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that Section 1311(b)(1)(C) of the CWA does not authorize the EPA to include "end-result" provisions in NPDES permits. The Court reasoned that determining the specific steps a permittee must take to meet water quality standards is the EPA's responsibility, and Congress has provided the necessary tools for the EPA to make such determinations. The Court reversed and remanded the Ninth Circuit's decision, emphasizing that the EPA must set specific rules for permittees to follow rather than imposing broad end-result requirements.

Safe Haven Home Care, Inc. v. United States Department of Health and Human

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 23-1231

Opinion Date: March 6, 2025

Judge: Gerard Lynch

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

The case involves the U.S. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) approving the New York State Department of Health’s (NYSDOH) application to distribute $361.25 million to certain managed care organizations. These organizations were to direct the funds to the top one-third of revenue-generating licensed home care services agencies (LHCSAs) in New York’s four rate regions, provided they agreed to use the funding in a specified manner. The plaintiffs, who are LHCSAs that did not meet the revenue threshold, argued that the approval was unlawful under federal law and regulations because the class of eligible agencies was improperly defined and the application was not assessed for actuarial soundness before approval.

The district court dismissed the amended complaint against the State Appellees for failing to adequately allege a cause of action under Ex parte Young and granted summary judgment to the Federal Appellees. The court concluded that the approval of the State’s application did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and denied the plaintiffs’ motion to admit extra-record evidence.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the district court’s decision. The court held that CMS’s approval of NYSDOH’s application complied with federal law. It found that the provider class was properly defined under 42 C.F.R. § 438.6(c)(2)(ii)(B) and that CMS was not required to assess actuarial soundness during the pre-approval process. The court also concluded that CMS did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in approving the application and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the extra-record evidence. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Jean-Paul Weg LLC v. Director of the New Jersey Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 23-2922

Opinion Date: February 28, 2025

Judge: Luis Felipe Restrepo

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

A New York wine retailer, Jean Paul Weg LLC, and its owner, Lars Neubohn, challenged New Jersey's regulations that require wine retailers to have a physical presence in the state and to purchase their products from New Jersey licensed wholesalers. These regulations prevent the retailer from directly shipping wine to New Jersey customers. The plaintiffs argued that these requirements violate the Commerce Clause by discriminating against out-of-state economic interests.

The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, including the Director of the New Jersey Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control and the Attorney General of New Jersey. The District Court found that New Jersey's regulations were justified by legitimate local purposes, such as ensuring alcohol sold to New Jersey consumers passes through the state's three-tier system and facilitating inspections to ensure compliance with regulations.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Third Circuit held that New Jersey's regulations, while discriminatory in effect, were justified on legitimate nonprotectionist grounds. The court found that the physical presence requirement facilitates inspections and investigations, while the wholesaler purchase requirement helps quickly identify sources of contamination and facilitates product recalls. Additionally, the court determined that these regulations are essential features of New Jersey's three-tier system of alcohol regulation, which is "unquestionably legitimate" under the Twenty-first Amendment. Therefore, the challenged regulations were upheld as constitutional.

Space Exploration Technologies Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 24-40315

Opinion Date: March 5, 2025

Judge: Irma Ramirez

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

Space Exploration Technologies Corp. (SpaceX) operates a space launch business and a global satellite-based internet service called Starlink. In June 2022, a group of SpaceX employees sent an open letter demanding certain actions from the company and solicited support through a survey. SpaceX discharged four employees involved in the letter's distribution for violating company policies. Additional employees were later discharged for lying during a leak investigation and for unrelated performance issues. These employees filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in November 2022, alleging violations of the National Labor Relations Act.

The NLRB Regional Director found merit in the claims and issued an order consolidating the employees' cases with a hearing set for March 2024. SpaceX sued the NLRB in the Southern District of Texas (SDTX) in January 2024, challenging the NLRB's structure as unconstitutional and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The NLRB moved to transfer the case to the Central District of California (CDCA), arguing improper venue. The SDTX granted the transfer motion in February 2024. SpaceX petitioned for an emergency writ of mandamus to vacate the transfer order, which was initially stayed but later denied.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. SpaceX argued that the district court effectively denied its motion for a preliminary injunction by failing to rule on it by May 2, 2024. The Fifth Circuit found that SpaceX did not demonstrate the "serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence" required for an immediate appeal. The court noted that participating in the administrative proceeding did not constitute irreparable harm and that the district court did not act unreasonably in waiting to resolve procedural challenges. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit dismissed SpaceX's appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Morgan v BOP

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2731

Opinion Date: February 28, 2025

Judge: Amy St. Eve

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

Jack William Morgan, a Messianic Jew, purchased a turkey log from the commissary at the Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) Thomson in May 2021, which led to the suspension of his kosher diet approval for thirty days by the institutional chaplain. Morgan claimed this forced him to choose between starvation and violating his religious beliefs, and he chose starvation. After exhausting administrative remedies, he sued the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and the prison warden, Andrew Ciolli, seeking changes to dietary policies and monetary damages under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Morgan has since been transferred to a different BOP facility.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Morgan’s complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. The court found that Morgan did not provide sufficient factual allegations to show that the BOP’s dietary policies substantially burdened his religious exercise. Additionally, the court noted that the BOP is immune from suits for damages under RFRA and that Morgan’s complaint did not include allegations about Ciolli’s conduct.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and focused on two threshold issues: subject-matter jurisdiction and sovereign immunity. The court determined that Morgan did not adequately allege standing to pursue his claim for injunctive relief, as his threat of future injury was too speculative. Furthermore, the court held that federal sovereign immunity barred Morgan’s claim for monetary damages, as RFRA does not waive the federal government’s sovereign immunity against damages suits. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal but modified the judgment to reflect a jurisdictional dismissal.

Center for Biological Diversity v. Environmental Protection Agency

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-9565

Opinion Date: March 4, 2025

Judge: Nancy Moritz

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Center for Biological Diversity and 350 Colorado challenged the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rule that partially approved Colorado’s plan to reduce ozone pollution. The Clean Air Act required Colorado to lower ozone levels by July 2021, but the state failed to meet this deadline. Petitioners argued that the EPA’s approval of Colorado’s plan violated the Clean Air Act in three ways: by approving the plan after the deadline, by including state-only emissions reductions, and by violating the anti-backsliding provision.

The EPA approved Colorado’s reasonable-further-progress demonstration and motor-vehicle-emissions budget, determining that the state showed emissions reductions of at least three percent per year from 2018 to 2020. The EPA also found that the SIP’s projected emissions reductions were based on creditable, federally enforceable measures and complied with the anti-backsliding mandate. Petitioners argued that the EPA’s approval was unlawful because the state failed to attain the required ozone levels by the deadline and included non-federally enforceable control measures in its calculations.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the EPA did not act unlawfully in approving Colorado’s reasonable-further-progress demonstration after the state missed its attainment deadline. The court found that reasonable-further-progress demonstrations are distinct from attainment demonstrations and that the EPA’s approval was based on compliance with reasonable-further-progress requirements. The court also held that the EPA’s approval of Colorado’s motor-vehicle-emissions budget was lawful, as it was consistent with reasonable-further-progress requirements. Additionally, the court found that the EPA’s approval did not violate the anti-backsliding provision, as the SIP revisions would not increase emissions and would not hinder attainment.

The court denied the petition for review, upholding the EPA’s approval of Colorado’s plan.

Fiorisce, LLC v. Colorado Technical University

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 24-1047

Opinion Date: March 4, 2025

Judge: Scott Matheson

Areas of Law: Business Law, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law, Securities Law

Fiorisce, LLC, a limited liability company, filed a qui tam lawsuit against Colorado Technical University (CTU) under the False Claims Act (FCA), alleging that CTU misrepresented compliance with federal credit hour requirements to fraudulently obtain federal student aid funds. Fiorisce claimed that CTU's online learning platform, Intellipath, provided insufficient educational content and falsified learning hour calculations to meet federal standards. Fiorisce's principal, a former CTU faculty member, created the company to protect their identity while exposing the alleged fraud.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the case. CTU moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the FCA’s public disclosure bar precluded the suit because the allegations were substantially similar to previously disclosed information. The district court denied CTU’s motion, finding that Fiorisce’s specific claims about misrepresentation of credit hours and the use of Intellipath were not substantially the same as prior disclosures. The court also suggested that Fiorisce might qualify as an original source of the information.

CTU appealed the district court’s denial of its motion to dismiss to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, seeking interlocutory review under the collateral order doctrine. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the collateral order doctrine did not apply, as the public disclosure bar did not confer a right to avoid trial and could be effectively reviewed after final judgment. The court emphasized that expanding the collateral order doctrine to include such denials would undermine the final judgment rule and dismissed CTU’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Magnetsafety.org v. Consumer Product Safety Commission

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-9578

Opinion Date: March 3, 2025

Judge: Nancy Moritz

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Consumer Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves the Consumer Product Safety Commission's (CPSC) second attempt to regulate small, high-powered magnets that pose serious health risks to children when ingested. These magnets, used in various consumer products like jewelry and puzzles, can cause severe internal injuries or death if swallowed. The CPSC's first attempt to regulate these magnets was struck down by the Tenth Circuit in 2016 due to inadequate data supporting the rule. The CPSC then revised its approach and issued a new rule, which is now being challenged by industry groups.

The industry groups petitioned for review of the CPSC's new rule, arguing that the CPSC's cost-benefit analysis was flawed and that the rule was promulgated by an unconstitutionally structured agency. They contended that the CPSC's data on magnet ingestions was unreliable, that the CPSC failed to consider the impact of its own enforcement efforts, and that the rule was underinclusive and arbitrary. They also argued that existing voluntary standards were sufficient to address the risks posed by the magnets.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the CPSC's rule was supported by substantial evidence, noting that the CPSC had adequately addressed the shortcomings identified in the previous case and had conducted a thorough cost-benefit analysis. The court also held that the CPSC's structure, which includes removal protections for its commissioners, was constitutional, reaffirming its previous decision in Leachco, Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Commission.

The Tenth Circuit denied the petition for review, upholding the CPSC's rule regulating small, high-powered magnets. The court concluded that the rule was necessary to address the significant health risks posed by these magnets and that the CPSC had acted within its authority in promulgating the rule.

DOE NO. 1 v. US

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 23-1653

Opinion Date: March 3, 2025

Judge: Kimberly Moore

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

Plaintiff, an intelligence analyst with the FBI, was required to complete the FBI Basic Field Training Course (BFTC), which included in-person training sessions and various tasks and assessments, some of which were scheduled outside working hours. Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging that they were not compensated for all overtime hours worked during the BFTC.

The United States Court of Federal Claims denied the government's motion for summary judgment, holding that the OPM regulation 5 C.F.R. § 551.423(a)(3), which bars overtime compensation for entry-level training, was invalid. The court reasoned that the regulation was inconsistent with the Department of Labor (DOL) regulations and that the government failed to justify the categorical rule against overtime compensation for entry-level training. The court certified the validity of the regulation for interlocutory appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the OPM regulation 5 C.F.R. § 551.423(a)(3) is valid. The court reasoned that the differences between OPM and DOL regulations are justified by the need to accommodate the differences between federal and non-federal employment, particularly considering the Government Employees Training Act (GETA), which generally prohibits overtime pay for training for federal employees. The court concluded that OPM's regulation is a legitimate policy choice consistent with both the FLSA and GETA. The case was remanded to determine whether the OPM regulation is consistent with the FLSA.

MILITARY-VETERANS ADVOCACY v. SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 23-1413

Opinion Date: March 6, 2025

Judge: Kimberly Moore

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Military Law

Military-Veterans Advocacy (MVA) filed a petition for review challenging the validity of two provisions in a Final Rule issued by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The provisions in question are 38 C.F.R. § 1.601(a)(2), which requires users of VA’s Information Technology (IT) systems to potentially pass a background suitability investigation, and 38 C.F.R. § 1.602(c)(1), which permits the VA to inspect the computer hardware and software used to access VA IT systems and their location at any time without notice.

The VA issued the Final Rule on June 24, 2022, after a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and consideration of public comments, including those from MVA. MVA argued that the regulations violated the pro-veteran canon of construction, due process, and were arbitrary and capricious. The VA addressed some of these comments in the Final Rule but maintained the provisions as proposed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the VA has the authority to promulgate the Background Check Provision under 38 U.S.C. §§ 501, 5721–28, which allows the VA to establish and maintain information security programs. The court found that the Background Check Provision was reasonable and based on risk assessments, thus within the VA’s statutory authority.

However, the court found that the Inspection Provision exceeded the VA’s statutory authority. The provision allowed the VA to inspect the location where the hardware and software are used, which could include private areas such as a user’s home. The court determined that this provision was not based on a risk assessment and was overly broad, thus not the product of reasoned decision-making.

The court granted MVA’s petition in part, setting aside 38 C.F.R. § 1.602(c)(1), and denied the petition in part, upholding 38 C.F.R. § 1.601(a)(2).

Vandewater International Inc. v. United States

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 23-1093

Opinion Date: March 6, 2025

Judge: Jimmie V. Reyna

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, International Law

Vandewater International Inc. requested a scope ruling from the U.S. Department of Commerce to determine if its steel branch outlets were subject to an antidumping duty order on "butt-weld pipe fittings" from China. Vandewater argued that its products did not meet the definition of "butt-weld pipe fittings" as they had contoured ends and were used differently. Commerce determined that Vandewater's products were within the scope of the order, leading to an appeal.

The U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) reviewed the case and initially found that the term "butt-weld pipe fittings" was ambiguous, requiring further analysis. The CIT remanded the case to Commerce to conduct a full scope inquiry using the (k)(2) criteria, which include physical characteristics, expectations of purchasers, ultimate use, channels of trade, and manner of advertisement. Commerce reaffirmed its decision that Vandewater's products were within the scope of the order based on these criteria.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the CIT's decision. The court held that the term "butt-weld pipe fittings" was ambiguous and that Commerce's determination using the (k)(2) criteria was supported by substantial evidence. The court also found that the (k)(1) sources were not dispositive in determining whether Vandewater's products were within the scope of the order. Additionally, the court dismissed SCI's challenge to Commerce's suspension of liquidation instructions as moot, as there were no unliquidated entries of Vandewater's products before the relevant date.

Catholic Medical Mission Board v. Bonta

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B315409(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 5, 2025

Judge: Gonzalo Martinez

Areas of Law: Business Law, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Non-Profit Corporations

The case involves two charitable organizations, Catholic Medical Mission Board, Inc. (CMMB) and Food for the Poor, Inc. (FFP), which were issued cease and desist orders and civil penalties by the California Attorney General for allegedly overvaluing in-kind donations and making misleading statements in their solicitations. The Attorney General found that both organizations used inflated domestic market prices for donated medicines, which could not be distributed within the U.S., and misrepresented their program efficiency ratios to donors.

The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case and found that the challenged statutory provisions, sections 12591.1(b) and 12599.6(f)(2) of the Government Code, were unconstitutional as they constituted prior restraints on speech. The court vacated the civil penalties and issued permanent injunctions against the Attorney General, preventing the enforcement of these provisions. The court also reformed section 12591.1(b) by adding language to exclude violations of section 12599.6 from the Attorney General's cease and desist authority.

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the permanent injunctions without requiring the plaintiffs to plead and prove their entitlement to such relief. The appellate court vacated the injunctions and remanded the case to allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaints and prove their entitlement to injunctive relief. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's reformation of section 12591.1(b), allowing the Attorney General to issue cease and desist orders for violations unrelated to speech. The appellate court also vacated the postjudgment orders awarding attorney fees and directed the trial court to reconsider the fees in light of the remand.

Santa Ana Police Officers Assn. v. City of Santa Ana

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G063075(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 28, 2025

Judge: Maurice Sanchez

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

The Santa Ana Police Officers Association (SAPOA) and certain anonymous City of Santa Ana police officers (Doe Officers) sued the City of Santa Ana, alleging wrongful disclosure of confidential personnel records, failure to investigate a complaint about the disclosure, and denial of a request for related communications. The first amended complaint included four causes of action: violation of Penal Code section 832.7 and Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045, negligence, failure to investigate under Penal Code sections 832.5 and 832.7, and violation of the Meyers-Milias Brown Act (MMBA).

The Superior Court of Orange County sustained the City’s demurrer to the first amended complaint without leave to amend, leading to the dismissal of the case. The court found that the Doe Officers could not proceed anonymously without statutory authority or court authorization. It also concluded that the SAPOA lacked standing and that there was no private right of action for the alleged violations of the Penal Code and Evidence Code sections cited.

The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the judgment as to the Doe Officers, agreeing they lacked authorization to proceed anonymously. It also affirmed the trial court’s decision regarding the first, second, and fourth causes of action, finding no private right of action for damages under the cited statutes and that the SAPOA failed to exhaust administrative remedies for the MMBA claim. However, the appellate court reversed the judgment concerning the third cause of action, holding that the SAPOA had standing to seek mandamus relief to compel the City to investigate the complaint and notify the SAPOA of the disposition, as required by Penal Code sections 832.5 and 832.7. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this cause of action.

WARBLER INVESTMENTS, LLC v. CITY OF SOCIAL CIRCLE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A1024

Opinion Date: March 4, 2025

Judge: Andrew Pinson

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

In 2020, Georgia ratified an amendment to its Constitution waiving sovereign immunity for actions seeking declaratory relief from unlawful acts by the State or local governments. This amendment included a procedural requirement that such actions must be brought against and in the name of only the State or the relevant local government, or they would be dismissed. The case at hand questions whether a complaint that does not comply with this naming requirement can be cured by dropping or adding parties to avoid dismissal.

Warbler Investments, LLC sued the City of Social Circle, its mayor, and three City Council members in their individual capacities, alleging unlawful rezoning of Warbler's property and violations of the Open Records Act. The defendants moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that the complaint violated the naming requirement of the Georgia Constitution. Warbler then moved to amend the complaint to drop the individual defendants, which the trial court allowed. However, after the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in State v. SASS Group, LLC, which mandated dismissal of cases not complying with the naming requirement, the City renewed its motion to dismiss. The trial court granted the motion, dismissing the case despite the amendment.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and concluded that the procedural defect of not complying with the naming requirement could be cured by amending the complaint to drop or add parties. The court held that the waiver of sovereign immunity was not affected by the initial failure to comply with the naming requirement, and the amended complaint, which complied with the requirement, should not be dismissed. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded.

Hogan v. Lincoln Medical Partners

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2025 ME 22

Opinion Date: March 4, 2025

Judge: Andrew Horton

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Health Law, Personal Injury, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In November 2021, Lincoln Medical administered a COVID-19 vaccine to the five-year-old child of Jeremiah Hogan and Siara Jean Harrington at a school clinic without obtaining parental consent. Hogan filed a notice of claim in the Superior Court against the doctor, Lincoln Medical Partners, and MaineHealth, Inc., alleging various torts including professional negligence, battery, and false imprisonment on behalf of the child, and emotional distress and tortious interference with parental rights on behalf of the parents.

The Superior Court appointed a chair for the prelitigation screening panel, and Lincoln Medical moved to dismiss the notice of claim, citing immunity under the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act. The court granted the motion to dismiss, interpreting the PREP Act to provide immunity to the defendants with no applicable exceptions. Hogan appealed the decision.

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The court held that the PREP Act provides broad immunity to covered persons, including individuals and corporations, from suits related to the administration of covered countermeasures, such as the COVID-19 vaccine. The court found that the federal statute preempts state law that would otherwise allow Hogan to sue, as the claims were directly related to the administration of the vaccine. The court concluded that the defendants were immune from Hogan’s claims under the PREP Act, and the state tort claims were preempted by federal law.

Minor Doe 601 v. Best Academy

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A22-1236

Opinion Date: February 26, 2025

Judge: Paul Thissen

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

A minor, through his mother, filed a lawsuit against Best Academy after his teacher, Aaron Hjermstad, sexually assaulted him. Hjermstad had a history of sexual abuse allegations from his previous employment, which Best Academy did not uncover during their hiring process. The school did not obtain reference letters or contact references, which were part of their hiring protocol.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Best Academy, reasoning that hiring decisions are always protected by the discretionary-function exception to municipal tort liability under Minnesota Statutes section 466.03, subdivision 6. The court of appeals affirmed this decision, applying the same reasoning.

The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that a municipality’s hiring decision is not categorically a policy-level decision involving weighing competing economic, social, political, and financial considerations. The court emphasized that the discretionary-function exception should be interpreted narrowly and that municipalities bear the burden of proving that their conduct involved such considerations. The court found that Best Academy did not provide evidence that its decision not to investigate Hjermstad’s background was based on balancing policy considerations. The court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.

Webster v. University of Mississippi Medical Center Grenada

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2023-CA-00687-SCT

Opinion Date: February 27, 2025

Judge: David Sullivan

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury

Shanta Webster filed a complaint in the Grenada County Circuit Court against the University of Mississippi Medical Center-Grenada (UMMC-Grenada) and Drs. Aimee Watts and Kimberly Farmer, alleging medical negligence in the performance of a hysterectomy and post-operative care. Webster served the complaint to Dr. Watts, Dr. Farmer, and Dodie McElmurry, the CEO of UMMC-Grenada. The defendants requested an extension to answer the complaint and later claimed immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA). Webster argued that service of process was proper under Rule 4(d)(8) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Grenada County Circuit Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that service of process was improper because it was not made to the Attorney General as required by Rule 4(d)(5) for state institutions. Webster appealed the dismissal, maintaining that UMMC-Grenada is a community hospital and that service on the CEO was sufficient.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case de novo and upheld the trial court's decision. The court found that UMMC-Grenada is not a separate entity but a part of UMMC, a state institution. Therefore, service of process should have been made to the Attorney General under Rule 4(d)(5). Webster failed to serve the Attorney General within the 120-day period required by Rule 4(h), rendering the service invalid. Additionally, the court noted that Drs. Watts and Farmer, acting within the scope of their employment, were immune from personal liability under the MTCA.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the trial court's order of dismissal, concluding that proper service of process was not effected, and the individual defendants were immune from liability.

Clark County Department of Family Services v. District Court

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 10

Opinion Date: March 6, 2025

Judge: Douglas Herndon

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

Nikos Sharp was charged with several criminal offenses related to child abuse or neglect following an investigation by the Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS). Sharp sought information from DFS reports involving the alleged victim, E.S., which included the identities of individuals who reported the abuse. The district court ordered DFS to disclose this information despite DFS's objections.

The district court reviewed the reports in camera and initially released redacted versions to Sharp. Sharp then requested unredacted versions, including the identities of the reporters. The district court granted this request, and DFS's motion for reconsideration was denied. DFS subsequently sought relief through an original writ petition.

The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and held that NRS 432B.290(4) provides a limited privilege for reporter identities, protecting them if DFS determines that disclosure would harm an investigation or the life or safety of any person. The court found that this limited privilege did not apply in this case because DFS had not made such a determination. Consequently, the district court did not err in ordering the disclosure of the reporter identities. The Supreme Court of Nevada denied the petition, affirming the district court's decision.

Zent v. NDDHHS

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 ND 50

Opinion Date: March 6, 2025

Judge: Jerod Tufte

Areas of Law: Education Law, Government & Administrative Law

Nathan Zent, who has spastic quadriplegic cerebral palsy, has been a student at Dickinson State University (DSU) since 2015, pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in English with a Political Science Minor. Zent, who uses a motorized wheelchair and an iPad with text-to-speech assistive technology, received vocational rehabilitation (VR) services from the North Dakota Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) from 2015 until May 2023. His individualized plan for employment (IPE) identified an employment outcome of journalist or writer, which DHHS supported until 2022. However, DHHS discontinued Zent’s services, citing concerns about his ability to achieve competitive integrated employment due to his need for significant support.

The Division of Vocational Rehabilitation of DHHS decided to discontinue Zent’s VR services, and an administrative law judge (ALJ) affirmed this decision. Zent appealed to the district court of Stark County, which also affirmed the ALJ’s decision. Zent then appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court, arguing that DHHS’s decision was based on an erroneous interpretation of the statutes and regulations governing VR services and that the ALJ applied the incorrect standard of proof.

The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that DHHS did not misapply the statutes and regulations governing VR services in determining that Zent’s chosen employment outcome of journalist or writer was inconsistent with the goal of competitive integrated employment. The court also concluded that the ALJ correctly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard, as the clear and convincing standard only applies to eligibility determinations for VR services, not to determinations regarding specific employment outcomes.

OKLAHOMA GAS AND ELECTRIC CO. v. STATE

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 OK 15

Opinion Date: March 4, 2025

Judge: Richard Darby

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Utilities Law

In the spring of 2018, People's Electric Cooperative and Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company (OG&E) submitted competing bids to provide retail electric service to the Tall Oak Woodford Cryo Plant in Coal County, Oklahoma. The Plant is located in People's certified territory, which grants them exclusive rights to provide electricity under the Retail Electric Supplier Certified Territory Act (RESCTA). OG&E's proposal relied on the Large Load exception to RESCTA, which allows a supplier to extend its service into another supplier's territory for large-load customers. OG&E used third-party transmission facilities to provide service to the Plant without extending its own distribution lines.

The Oklahoma Corporation Commission enjoined OG&E from serving the Plant, finding that OG&E was not "extending its service" as authorized by RESCTA. The Commission determined that a retail electric supplier may not use third-party transmission lines to extend its service into another supplier's certified territory under the Large Load exception. OG&E appealed the decision.

The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and upheld the Commission's determination. The Court held that Article 9, Section 20 of the Oklahoma Constitution requires a limited review of the Commission's order. The Court affirmed the Commission's interpretation that the Large Load exception does not permit a supplier to use third-party transmission lines to extend its service into another supplier's certified territory. The Court's decision applies prospectively only and does not affect existing retail electric services and facilities established under the Large Load exception.