United States v. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-2086

Opinion Date: February 18, 2025

Judge: William Kayatta

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law, White Collar Crime

The case involves the United States government alleging that Regeneron Pharmaceuticals violated the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) by covering copayments for patients prescribed Eylea, a drug used to treat wet age-related macular degeneration. The government contends that this action induced doctors to prescribe Eylea, leading to Medicare claims that were "false or fraudulent" under the False Claims Act (FCA) because they "resulted from" the AKS violation.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts reviewed the case and agreed with Regeneron's interpretation that the phrase "resulting from" in the 2010 amendment to the AKS requires a but-for causation standard. This means that the government must prove that the AKS violation was the actual cause of the Medicare claims. The district court noted the conflict in case law and sought interlocutory review, which was granted.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. The court held that the phrase "resulting from" in the 2010 amendment to the AKS imposes a but-for causation requirement. The court reasoned that the ordinary meaning of "resulting from" requires actual causality, typically in the form of but-for causation, unless there are textual or contextual indications to the contrary. The court found no such indications in the 2010 amendment or its legislative history. Therefore, to establish falsity under the FCA based on an AKS violation, the government must prove that the kickback was a but-for cause of the submitted claim.

Hussein v. Maait

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 22-1506

Opinion Date: February 19, 2025

Judge: Susan L. Carney

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, International Law

Dr. Ahmed Diaa Eldin Ali Hussein, a dual citizen of Egypt and the United States, sought to enforce an Egyptian administrative court ruling and a related ministerial decree in the United States. These rulings purportedly entitled him to compensation for the expropriation of his shares in the SIMO Middle East Paper Company by the Egyptian government in the 1990s. Hussein filed an enforcement action in New York State court against Dr. Mohamed Ahmed Maait, the Egyptian Minister of Finance, in his official capacity.

The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York by Maait, albeit after the 30-day deadline for removal. The District Court found that Egypt was the real party in interest and allowed the late removal under Section 1441(d) of the U.S. Code, which permits enlargement of the removal period for cause. The court then dismissed the suit under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Egypt was immune under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and that no exceptions to this immunity applied.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Egypt was the real party in interest, as Hussein's claims were fundamentally against the Egyptian government and sought compensation from the public treasury. The court also upheld the District Court's finding of cause to extend the removal period, noting the lack of prejudice to Hussein and the procedural challenges faced by Maait in securing U.S. counsel. Finally, the appellate court determined that Hussein had waived any argument regarding exceptions to FSIA immunity by not raising them on appeal. Thus, the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was affirmed.

Consolidation Coal Company v OWCP

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 24-1329

Opinion Date: February 18, 2025

Judge: Michael Scudder

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Public Benefits

Dale Staten, a coal miner for nearly thirty years, retired in 2000 and passed away in January 2017 from respiratory failure after a two-week hospitalization. His widow, Bernadette Staten, filed for survivor benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act. A Department of Labor administrative law judge (ALJ) awarded benefits, concluding that Bernadette qualified for a statutory presumption that Dale died from black lung disease due to his extensive underground mining work and total disability at the time of his death. The Benefits Review Board affirmed the ALJ's decision in a divided ruling.

Consolidation Coal Company (CONSOL), Dale's former employer, challenged the ALJ's award, arguing that the 15-year presumption should only apply to chronic pulmonary conditions, not acute illnesses like Dale's respiratory failure. CONSOL contended that Dale's total disability was due to an acute condition rather than a chronic one. The ALJ had credited Dr. Sanjay Chavda's opinion that Dale was totally disabled at the time of his death, while discounting the opinions of CONSOL's experts, Dr. James Castle and Dr. Robert Farney, who argued that Dale was not disabled based on his medical history before his hospitalization.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the ALJ's award of benefits. The court held that the Black Lung Benefits Act does not require a claimant to prove that a miner's total disability arose from a chronic pulmonary condition to invoke the 15-year presumption. The court found that the ALJ acted within its authority in crediting Dr. Chavda's opinion and concluding that CONSOL failed to rebut the presumption that Dale's death was due to pneumoconiosis. The court denied CONSOL's petition for review and affirmed the judgment of the Benefits Review Board.

Waukegan Potawatomi Casino, LLC v City of Waukegan

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 24-1751

Opinion Date: February 14, 2025

Judge: Thomas L. Kirsch II

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law, Native American Law

Waukegan Potawatomi Casino, LLC (WPC) alleged that its Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the City of Waukegan did not advance its casino proposal for licensing consideration. WPC claimed it experienced intentional discrimination during the application process as a "class of one." The City of Waukegan certified three other applicants but not WPC, which alleged that the process was rigged to benefit another applicant, Lakeside Casino, LLC. WPC pointed to the relationship between the City's mayor and a founding partner of Lakeside, as well as the City's handling of supplemental information from applicants, as evidence of discrimination.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment for the City. The court concluded that WPC, as an arm of a sovereign Native American tribe, could not maintain a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Additionally, the court found that WPC's class-of-one equal protection claim failed because WPC was not similarly situated to the other applicants and there were multiple conceivable rational bases for the City's conduct.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that WPC could not carry its heavy burden as a class-of-one plaintiff. The court noted that there were several rational bases for the City's decision, including differences in the casino proposals and the applicants' experience. The court also found that WPC failed to identify a similarly situated comparator who was treated more favorably. The court concluded that the City's conduct throughout the review process, including its handling of supplemental information, had rational justifications. Thus, WPC's class-of-one claim failed under both prongs of the analysis.

State of Missouri v. Trump

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 24-2351

Opinion Date: February 18, 2025

Judge: L. Steven Grasz

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

Seven states challenged a rule by the Department of Education that modified an existing income contingent repayment (ICR) plan for federal student loans, known as the Saving on a Valuable Education (SAVE) plan. This plan altered payment thresholds, stopped interest accrual, and forgave loan balances after as little as ten years of repayment. The states argued that the Secretary of Education exceeded statutory authority by forgiving loans through an ICR plan.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri found that the states were likely to succeed on their claim and issued a preliminary injunction against the rule’s early loan forgiveness provisions. Both parties appealed: the federal officials sought to vacate the preliminary injunction, while the states requested a broader injunction.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the states were likely to succeed in their claim that the Secretary’s authority to promulgate ICR plans does not include loan forgiveness at the end of the payment period. The court held that the statute requires ICR plans to be designed for borrowers to repay their loan balances in full through payments that can fluctuate based on income during the payment term. The court determined that the Secretary had exceeded this authority by designing a plan where loans are largely forgiven rather than repaid.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the entry of the preliminary injunction but concluded that the district court erred by not enjoining the entire rule. The court remanded the case with instructions to modify the injunction to cover the entire SAVE Rule and the revived forgiveness provisions under the previous REPAYE plan.

State of Tennessee v. EEOC

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 24-2249

Opinion Date: February 20, 2025

Judge: Steven Colloton

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

Tennessee and sixteen other states challenged a regulation by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) under the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, which mandates reasonable accommodations for pregnancy-related conditions, including abortion. The states argued that the regulation unlawfully required them to accommodate employees seeking abortions, conflicting with their policies. They sought an injunction and a declaratory judgment against the rule, claiming it was arbitrary, exceeded EEOC's authority, violated the First Amendment and federalism principles, and was unconstitutional under Article II.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas dismissed the case, ruling that the states lacked standing as they did not demonstrate an imminent injury or that the alleged injuries were redressable. The court found the risk of enforcement speculative and compliance costs not directly traceable to the rule. The court also dismissed the states' motion for a preliminary injunction as moot and for failing to show irreparable harm.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the states had standing as they were the direct objects of the EEOC's regulation, which imposed new obligations on them. The court found that the states were injured by the regulatory burden itself and that setting aside the rule would remedy this injury. The court concluded that the states' need to comply with the rule constituted an injury in fact, caused by the EEOC's action, and redressable by a favorable judicial decision. The case was remanded for further proceedings without addressing the merits of the claims.

Griffith v. El Paso County, Colorado

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-1135

Opinion Date: February 19, 2025

Judge: Veronica Rossman

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

A transgender woman, Darlene Griffith, filed a civil rights lawsuit regarding her pretrial confinement at the El Paso County Jail in Colorado. She alleged that the jail's policies, which assigned housing based on genitalia and denied her access to female clothing and products, violated her constitutional rights and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court dismissed her complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), leading to this appeal.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed Ms. Griffith’s complaint, concluding that she failed to state a plausible claim for relief. The court applied rational-basis review to her Equal Protection claim, finding that transgender individuals are not a protected class under existing precedent. The court also dismissed her ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as she did not properly name the county as a defendant according to state law requirements.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that remand was required for some of Ms. Griffith’s claims. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings on her Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim against Sheriff Elder in his official capacity, her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment cross-gender search claims against Sheriff Elder in his official capacity, and her Fourth Amendment abusive search claim against Deputy Mustapick. The court vacated the district court’s order dismissing Ms. Griffith’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims under Rule 12(b)(6) because those claims were dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), and that ruling was unchallenged on appeal. The court otherwise affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the remaining claims.

Bittner v. State of Alaska

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-18944

Opinion Date: February 14, 2025

Judge: Jude Pate

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

A resident of Alaska filed a lawsuit challenging amendments to the State’s predator control program. The resident claimed that after the changes were implemented, she observed a noticeable decrease in the brown bear population at Katmai National Park, where she frequently visited to view bears. She argued that the Board of Game violated its constitutional and statutory duties by not providing adequate notice and opportunities for public input before adopting the changes, which expanded the program to target bears.

The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, dismissed the complaint, concluding that the resident lacked standing and was not entitled to a declaratory judgment on the validity of the regulatory change. The court also awarded attorney’s fees to the Board of Game and the Commissioner of the Department of Fish & Game.

The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and held that the resident had standing because she demonstrated an injury to her interest in viewing bears at Katmai National Park, which was sufficient to show standing. The court also concluded that she was entitled to a declaratory judgment on the validity of the regulation. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of her complaint, vacated the associated award of attorney’s fees, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Office of Public Advocacy v. Superior Court, First Judicial District

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-18741

Opinion Date: February 14, 2025

Judge: Susan Carney

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

An assistant public defender resigned unexpectedly, leading the Public Defender Agency to propose a temporary reassignment plan for her cases until a permanent replacement could be hired. The superior court rejected this plan, as it did not assign specific attorneys to the cases. The court ordered the Agency to inform affected clients that they would need to waive their rights to effective assistance of counsel until a permanent attorney was assigned, or the Agency would withdraw. The Agency managed to assign specific attorneys to all but one case, from which it withdrew as ordered. The court then appointed the Office of Public Advocacy (OPA) to represent that client. OPA moved to withdraw, arguing that its appointment was unauthorized under AS 44.21.410 and that the superior court exceeded its authority. The superior court denied the motion, leading OPA to file an original application for relief with the court of appeals, which certified the application to the Alaska Supreme Court.

The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the superior court did not err by intervening in the affected cases. The court determined that the Agency's lack of capacity to provide effective representation constituted a conflict of interest under the Rules of Professional Conduct and the state and federal constitutions. The court concluded that when the Agency has a conflict due to lack of capacity, AS 44.21.410(a)(4) requires that OPA be assigned to represent the affected clients. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's order appointing OPA to represent the client, explaining that the superior court had a duty to ensure the client's right to effective assistance of counsel and that a lack of capacity can amount to a conflict of interest requiring OPA's appointment.

Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S282013

Opinion Date: February 20, 2025

Judge: Leondra Kruger

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

Michael Ayala, a correctional officer for California’s Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), was injured in a planned attack by inmates. He filed a workers’ compensation claim, asserting that his injuries were due to CDCR’s serious and willful misconduct in failing to address a credible threat of inmate violence. A workers’ compensation administrative law judge (WCJ) initially rejected this claim, but the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (Board) found in favor of Ayala, concluding that he was entitled to a 50 percent increase in compensation under Labor Code section 4553 due to CDCR’s serious and willful misconduct.

The CDCR did not dispute the finding of serious and willful misconduct but argued that the 50 percent increase should be calculated based on the temporary disability (TD) benefits Ayala would have received under the workers’ compensation law, not the more generous industrial disability leave (IDL) and enhanced industrial disability leave (EIDL) benefits he received under the Government Code. The WCJ agreed with CDCR, but the Board reversed, including IDL and EIDL benefits in the calculation of the increased compensation.

The California Supreme Court reviewed the case and agreed with the Court of Appeal, which had reversed the Board’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the term “compensation” under Labor Code section 4553, as defined in section 3207, is limited to benefits provided under the workers’ compensation law. Therefore, the 50 percent increase in compensation for serious and willful misconduct should be calculated based on the TD benefits Ayala was entitled to under the workers’ compensation law, not the IDL and EIDL benefits provided under the Government Code. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was affirmed.

Lin v. Board of Directors of PrimeCare Medical Network

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D084821(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 19, 2025

Judge: Joan Irion

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

A medical doctor, employed by San Bernardino Medical Group and working for OptumCare Medical Group, faced a summary suspension of his clinical privileges by PrimeCare Medical Network, Inc. after a patient complaint. The patient alleged that the doctor hit her hand during an office visit, which the doctor admitted to in his notes, explaining it was to stop her from arguing. The next day, PrimeCare’s Chief Medical Officer (CMO) summarily suspended the doctor’s privileges, citing imminent danger to patient health.

The Corporate Quality Improvement Committee (CQIC) upheld the suspension pending the doctor’s completion of an anger management course. The doctor requested a formal hearing, and PrimeCare’s Judicial Hearing Committee (JHC) found that the summary suspension was not warranted, as the incident was isolated and did not demonstrate imminent danger. The JHC recommended anger management and a chaperone for the doctor but did not find the suspension justified.

PrimeCare’s Board of Directors reviewed the JHC’s decision, arguing it was inconsistent with the applicable burden of proof. The Board conducted an independent review, disagreed with the JHC’s findings, and reinstated the suspension, concluding that the doctor’s actions and subsequent comments posed an imminent threat to patients.

The doctor filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus, which the Superior Court of San Bernardino County granted. The court ruled that the Board exceeded its jurisdiction and committed a prejudicial abuse of discretion by independently reviewing and reversing the JHC’s decision. The court ordered the Board to adopt the JHC’s decision, reinstate the doctor’s privileges, and report the reinstatement to relevant entities.

The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s judgment, agreeing that the Board’s actions were unauthorized and inconsistent with the statutory requirement that peer review be performed by licentiates.

Sandhu v. Bd. of Admin. of CalPERS

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C100028(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 14, 2025

Judge: Laurie M. Earl

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

The case involves Tarlochan Sandhu, who worked for various public agencies as a finance and accounting professional and was a member of CalPERS, receiving retirement benefits upon his retirement in 2011. After retiring, Sandhu was hired by Regional Government Services (RGS) in 2015, which assigned him to work for several cities. RGS considered Sandhu its employee, providing him with benefits and paying him, while the cities paid RGS for his services. CalPERS determined Sandhu was a common law employee of the cities, violating postretirement employment rules, and the trial court upheld this determination.

The Superior Court of Sacramento County reviewed the case, where Sandhu challenged CalPERS’s decision, arguing he was not a common law employee and that the decision was based on underground regulations. The trial court applied its independent judgment, finding the evidence supported CalPERS’s determination that Sandhu was a common law employee of the cities. The court found the cities had the right to control Sandhu’s work, which is the principal test for an employment relationship, and that several secondary factors also supported this conclusion.

The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the common law test for employment applies and that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Sandhu was a common law employee of the cities. The court also found that Sandhu forfeited his argument regarding underground regulations by not properly raising it in the trial court. The judgment was affirmed, and the parties were ordered to bear their own costs on appeal.

Shehyn v. Ventura County Public Works Agency

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B337452(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 20, 2025

Judge: Tari Cody

Areas of Law: Contracts, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The plaintiff, Steve Shehyn, owns a 20-acre avocado orchard in Moorpark, California. He alleged that sediment from the Ventura County Public Works Agency and Ventura County Waterworks District No. 1's (collectively, the District) water delivery system permanently damaged his irrigation pipes and orchard. The plaintiff claimed that the sediment was a direct result of the District's water supply facilities' plan, design, maintenance, and operation.

The trial court sustained the District's demurrer to the plaintiff's first amended complaint, which included causes of action for breach of contract, negligence, and inverse condemnation. The court allowed the plaintiff to amend the breach of contract and negligence claims but sustained the demurrer without leave to amend for the inverse condemnation claim, citing that the plaintiff "invited" the District's water onto his property. The plaintiff filed a second amended complaint, maintaining the inverse condemnation claim unchanged and indicating his intent to seek a writ of mandamus. The trial court entered judgment for the District after the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his contract and negligence claims without prejudice.

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded his claim for inverse condemnation. The court found that the plaintiff's allegations that the District's water delivery system delivered a disproportionate amount of sediment to his property, causing damage, supported a claim for inverse condemnation. The court disagreed with the trial court's reliance on Williams v. Moulton Niguel Water Dist., stating that the issue of whether the plaintiff "invited" the water goes to the merits of the claim, not its viability at the pleading stage. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enter a new order overruling the demurrer.

Western States Petroleum Ass'n. v. Cal. Air Resources Bd.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B327663(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 13, 2025

Judge: Natalie Stone

Areas of Law: Admiralty & Maritime Law, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

The California Air Resources Board (CARB) adopted a regulation in August 2020 to limit emissions from ocean-going vessels while docked at California ports. The Western States Petroleum Association (WSPA) challenged this regulation, arguing that CARB acted arbitrarily and capriciously by setting unfeasible compliance deadlines for emissions control measures. WSPA also claimed that CARB violated the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) by not timely disclosing a commissioned report on tanker emissions and failed to adequately analyze safety hazards and cumulative environmental impacts under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).

The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied WSPA’s petition for a writ of mandate, finding that CARB had the authority to set emissions standards requiring future technology and that WSPA did not prove the necessary technology would not be developed in time. The court also found that CARB substantially complied with the APA’s notice provisions and did not violate CEQA in its environmental analysis.

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court held that CARB’s determination that compliance with the regulation was feasible did not lack evidentiary support. CARB relied on assurances from technology providers that capture and control systems could be adapted for tankers by the compliance deadlines. The court also found that CARB substantially complied with the APA by making the emissions report available before the end of the comment period, allowing WSPA to provide feedback. Finally, the court held that CARB’s environmental analysis under CEQA was adequate, as it provided a general discussion of potential impacts and appropriately deferred more specific analysis to future site-specific reviews.

Mayfield v. Secretary, Florida Department of State

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2025-0162

Opinion Date: February 13, 2025

Judge: Jamie Rutland Grosshans

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

Debbie Mayfield, a former member of the Florida House of Representatives and Florida Senate, sought to run in a special election for Senate District 19 after the incumbent announced his resignation. Mayfield submitted the necessary paperwork to qualify for the ballot, but the Secretary of State and Director of the Division of Elections refused to place her on the ballot, citing a constitutional provision on term limits.

The Circuit Court did not review the case. Mayfield directly petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for writs of mandamus and quo warranto, arguing that the Secretary misinterpreted his authority and failed to fulfill his statutory duty.

The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case and granted Mayfield's petition for mandamus relief. The court held that Mayfield had a clear legal right to appear on the ballot, as she had met all statutory requirements for qualification. The court found that the Secretary's role in reviewing candidate qualifications is ministerial and does not include the authority to assess a candidate's constitutional eligibility. The court also rejected the Secretary's interpretation of the term-limits provision, concluding that Mayfield's break in service meant she had not served more than eight consecutive years in the Senate. The court ordered the Secretary to place Mayfield on the ballot by a specified deadline and denied the petition for quo warranto as moot.

Bray v. ID Dept of Juvenile Corrections

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 50935

Opinion Date: February 14, 2025

Judge: Gregory W. Moeller

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Juvenile Law, Personal Injury

In 2019, Colby James Bray died while in the custody of the Idaho Department of Juvenile Corrections (IDJC). His parents, Jeffrey and Michelle Bray, acting as personal representatives of his estate, filed a wrongful death suit in federal court one day before the two-year statute of limitations expired. They later voluntarily dismissed the federal case and refiled in state court nearly three years after Colby's death. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the claims were time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The district court granted the motions and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.

The Brays appealed, arguing that Idaho Code section 5-234 and 28 U.S.C. section 1367(d) tolled the statute of limitations. The district court had concluded that section 5-234 did not toll the time for filing the state complaint and that section 1367(d) did not apply to IDJC due to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court also awarded costs and attorney fees to the defendants.

The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's ruling that section 5-234 did not toll the statute of limitations. It also agreed that the claims against Meacham and the Individual Defendants were time-barred under section 1367(d) because the Brays did not file within 30 days after the federal court dismissed those claims. However, the court found that section 1367(d) did toll the time for filing the complaint against IDJC, but IDJC was immune from the claims under Idaho Code section 6-904B(5). The court upheld the district court's award of attorney fees and costs to the defendants and awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal to the respondents.

Diercks v. Scott County, Iowa

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 23-1729

Opinion Date: February 14, 2025

Judge: Susan Christensen

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

A vacancy on the Scott County Board of Supervisors occurred when Tony Knobbe resigned to become the Scott County Treasurer. A committee of county officials decided to fill the vacancy by appointment and kept certain applications confidential during the process. The committee referred to applicants by numbers and only revealed the name of the appointed individual. After the appointment, two individuals submitted open records requests for the confidential names and applications, which Scott County denied, citing Iowa Code section 22.7(18).

The individuals filed a petition in the Iowa District Court for Scott County, which granted summary judgment in favor of Scott County, determining that the applications were exempt from disclosure under Iowa Code section 22.7(18). The district court relied on the precedent set in City of Sioux City v. Greater Sioux City Press Club, which held that employment applications could be kept confidential.

The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The court held that the applications for the vacant county board of supervisors position were not confidential under section 22.7(18). The court reasoned that the applicants were not promised confidentiality beforehand, and the public nature of the appointment process meant it was not reasonable to believe that people would be deterred from applying if their applications were disclosed. The court ordered that the names and applications be disclosed and awarded costs and reasonable attorney fees to the plaintiffs. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

Register of Deeds for Norfolk County v. County Director for Norfolk County

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13669

Opinion Date: February 14, 2025

Judge: Scott L. Kafker

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

The plaintiff, the register of deeds for Norfolk County, filed a lawsuit against the county commissioners for Norfolk County, seeking declaratory, mandamus, and injunctive relief regarding funding and personnel matters within the registry of deeds. The dispute centered on hiring a new chief information officer and the funding for that position. While this litigation was ongoing, the plaintiff requested the county director to transfer funds within the registry's budget to cover legal fees for the personnel litigation. The county director denied these requests, prompting the plaintiff to file a second lawsuit for declaratory, mandamus, and injunctive relief.

In the Superior Court, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment regarding the budget transfers, and the defendants cross-moved for summary judgment. The judge granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, ruling that under G. L. c. 35, § 32, the plaintiff had the authority to transfer funds within a main group of the budget based on his opinion of public necessity and convenience. The defendants appealed this decision.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The court held that the statutory language of G. L. c. 35, § 32, clearly grants the authorized official the discretion to transfer funds within a main group based on their opinion of public necessity and convenience. The court found that the plaintiff's opinion was sufficient justification for the transfers and that the defendants' interference was unlawful. The court ordered that any outstanding amounts that should have been transferred be specifically authorized by the defendants and that the defendants refrain from hindering lawful transfers within the Contractual Services main group in the future.

Protect the Gallatin v. Gallatin Co.

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 MT 34

Opinion Date: February 18, 2025

Judge: Ingrid Gayle Gustafson

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves Protect the Gallatin River (PTGR) appealing a decision by the Gallatin County Floodplain Administrator to issue a floodplain permit for the Riverbend Glamping Getaway project proposed by Jeff and Jirina Pfeil. The project includes developing a campground with non-permanent structures on an island in the Gallatin River. PTGR argued that the public's right to participate was violated and that the Floodplain Administrator's decision was erroneous.

The Eighteenth Judicial District Court of Gallatin County reviewed the case and issued an order on November 13, 2023, resolving competing summary judgment motions. The court denied PTGR's motions for partial summary judgment, granted summary judgment in favor of Gallatin County and the Pfeils regarding PTGR's complaint, and addressed other related claims. PTGR then appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana.

The Supreme Court of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the Floodplain Administrator did not violate PTGR's right to participate, as the public was given a reasonable opportunity to comment, and the decision not to re-open public comment was not arbitrary or capricious. The court also found that the Floodplain Administrator's participation in the appeal process before the Commission was appropriate and lawful, as it did not involve post hoc rationalizations. Finally, the court held that the Floodplain Administrator's decision complied with the Gallatin County Floodplain Regulations and was not an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's summary judgment orders.

Matter of New York Civ. Liberties Union v City of Rochester

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2025 NY Slip Op 01010

Opinion Date: February 20, 2025

Judge: Anthony Cannataro

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

In 2020, the New York legislature repealed Civil Rights Law § 50-a, which had exempted law enforcement disciplinary records from public disclosure under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL). The New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) subsequently requested records of all civilian complaints against Rochester police officers from the City of Rochester and the Rochester Police Department, regardless of whether the complaints were substantiated. When the respondents did not promptly produce the documents, NYCLU initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding to compel disclosure.

The Supreme Court ordered the production of many records but allowed the respondents to withhold records related to unsubstantiated complaints under the personal privacy exemption in Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (b). The Appellate Division modified this decision, ruling that the personal privacy exemption did not permit categorical withholding of all such records. Instead, the respondents were directed to review each record individually to determine if there was a specific justification for redaction or withholding based on personal privacy grounds.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that FOIL's personal privacy exemption does not allow for a blanket exemption of all records related to unsubstantiated complaints against law enforcement officers. Each record must be evaluated individually to determine if disclosing it would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. If redactions can prevent such an invasion, the agency must disclose the record with the necessary redactions. The court emphasized that the 2020 amendments to FOIL aimed to increase transparency in the law enforcement disciplinary process, and categorical exemptions would undermine this objective.

Matter of NYP Holdings, Inc. v New York City Police Dept.

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2025 NY Slip Op 01009

Opinion Date: February 20, 2025

Judge: Caitlin J. Halligan

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

NYP Holdings, Inc. and a New York Post reporter submitted 144 Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) requests to the New York Police Department (NYPD) for disciplinary records related to specific police officers. The NYPD denied the requests for all but one officer, leading the Post to commence an article 78 proceeding to compel disclosure. The Police Benevolent Association (PBA) intervened, arguing that records created before the repeal of Civil Rights Law § 50-a were not subject to disclosure under FOIL.

The Supreme Court granted the Post's petition, rejecting the NYPD's claim that compliance would be too burdensome and refusing to consider the PBA's retroactivity argument. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the repeal of section 50-a applied retroactively to records created before the repeal. The court emphasized that the repeal was remedial legislation intended to increase public trust and accountability in law enforcement.

The Court of Appeals reviewed the case, focusing on whether law enforcement disciplinary records created while section 50-a was in effect could be disclosed in response to FOIL requests submitted after the repeal. The court concluded that the Legislature intended for the repeal to have retroactive effect, noting that FOIL's presumption of disclosure applies to all records held by an agency, regardless of when they were created. The court also highlighted the legislative intent to enhance public trust and accountability following the repeal of section 50-a.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's order, holding that the repeal of section 50-a applies retroactively, allowing the disclosure of law enforcement disciplinary records created before the repeal.

Puffy’s LLC v. State of South Dakota

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: LLC v. DEP€™T OF HEALTH, 2025 S.D. 10

Opinion Date: February 19, 2025

Judge: Patricia DeVaney

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

Puffy’s, LLC was first on a waiting list to receive a state registration certificate from the South Dakota Department of Health (Department) to operate a medical cannabis dispensary in Rapid City. After the Department failed to issue the certificate, Puffy’s filed a mandamus action in circuit court to compel the Department to issue the certificate. The circuit court granted the writ of mandamus, and the Department appealed, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction and abused its discretion in granting the writ.

The circuit court found that it had jurisdiction because Puffy’s had no administrative remedy to exhaust, as the Department had not taken final action that could be appealed. The court also ruled that the matter was not moot because the Department had not issued the certificate. On the merits, the court concluded that the Department had a clear duty to issue the certificate to Puffy’s under ARSD 44:90:03:16, which mandates that a voided certificate must be awarded to the next applicant on the waiting list. The court found that Puffy’s had no other remedy and was entitled to the writ.

The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision. It held that the circuit court had jurisdiction because there was no administrative remedy available for Puffy’s to exhaust. The court also agreed that the matter was not moot. On the merits, the Supreme Court found that the Department had a clear duty to issue the certificate to Puffy’s under the plain language of ARSD 44:90:03:16, which does not require additional application or fees from waitlisted applicants. The court concluded that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting the writ of mandamus without an evidentiary hearing, as the case turned on legal interpretation rather than factual disputes.

PORT ARTHUR COMMUNITY ACTION NETWORK v. TEXAS COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Docket: 24-0116

Opinion Date: February 14, 2025

Judge: Jimmy Blacklock

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves the interpretation of the phrase “has proven to be operational” in the definition of “best available control technology” (BACT) under Texas law. The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) is responsible for issuing permits for facilities like power plants, ensuring they use BACT, which must be technically practicable and economically reasonable. The dispute centers on whether BACT requires a pollution control method to be currently operating under a TCEQ permit or if it can refer to methods deemed capable of operating in the future.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified this question to the Supreme Court of Texas. The underlying litigation about the permitting of a power plant is not pending in the Texas Supreme Court, but the court has jurisdiction to answer the certified question under the Texas Constitution.

The Supreme Court of Texas held that the phrase “has proven to be operational” requires that the pollution control method must have already been demonstrated to be operational through experience and research. It does not require the method to be currently operating under a TCEQ permit, nor does it allow for methods that are only deemed capable of operating in the future. The court emphasized that the statutory requirement for BACT includes considerations of technical practicability and economic reasonableness, and the administrative rule must be interpreted based on its plain text. The court rejected the notion that previously issued permits determine BACT for other facilities, stating that each facility’s proposal must be evaluated on its own merits based on real-world experience and research.

In re Appeal of M.R.

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 VT 6

Opinion Date: February 14, 2025

Judge: Harold Eaton

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

M.R., a minor, was substantiated by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) for sexual abuse of another minor. DCF sent the notice of substantiation to M.R.'s father, who requested an administrative review but did not participate in it. The review upheld the substantiation, and M.R.'s father did not appeal further. M.R. later sought a second review from the Human Services Board after the appeal period had expired, claiming he was unaware of the substantiation and the review. The Board dismissed his appeal as untimely.

The Human Services Board found that M.R.'s appeal was not filed within the required 30-day period after the administrative review decision. M.R. argued that he was entitled to personal notice under the statute, that the lack of direct notice deprived him of due process, and that there was good cause for his delay in filing the appeal. The Board rejected these arguments and dismissed the appeal.

The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Board's decision. The Court held that the statutory requirement to send notice to the minor's parents or guardian was sufficient and did not violate due process. The Court found that the procedures in place were reasonably calculated to apprise the minor and their parents of the substantiation decision and their rights to request reviews. The Court also held that there was no good cause for M.R.'s untimely appeal, as the failure to appeal was due to factors within his father's control. Therefore, the Board's dismissal of the appeal as untimely was upheld.

John Does v. Seattle Police Dep't

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 102,182-8

Opinion Date: February 13, 2025

Judge: Raquel Montoya-Lewis

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

Several members of the public requested records from the Seattle Police Department (SPD) regarding officers who attended the January 6, 2021, rally in Washington, DC. The officers involved filed a lawsuit to prevent the release of their identities, arguing that their identities should be exempt from disclosure based on statutory and constitutional privacy rights. They sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the release of their identities within those public records.

The King County Superior Court denied the officers' motion for a preliminary injunction, determining that the officers failed to show that the information in the public records was likely exempt from disclosure. The court also denied the officers' motion to proceed under pseudonyms. The officers appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the denial of the preliminary injunction, concluding that the First Amendment prohibited the disclosure of the officers' identities. The Court of Appeals did not evaluate whether the disclosure would violate the officers' statutory right to privacy under the Public Records Act (PRA).

The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and held that the officers did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits that their identities were exempt based on either a statutory or constitutional right to privacy. The court concluded that the officers did not have a privacy interest in their identities as public employees who attended a highly publicized event. The court also held that the officers did not show a need to litigate under pseudonyms. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.