Nam v. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 23-229

Opinion Date: September 11, 2024

Judge: Chin

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

A former chauffeur, Hyunhuy Nam, filed a lawsuit against the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations, alleging violations of federal, state, and city wage-and-hour and anti-discrimination laws. Nam, a South Korean citizen and U.S. permanent resident, was employed by the Mission as a chauffeur. His duties included driving high-level officials, adhering to diplomatic protocols, and maintaining confidentiality of classified information. Nam was required to undergo a high-level security clearance and sign annual confidentiality agreements. He was eventually terminated at age 61, after his contract was extended due to his wife's job loss during the pandemic.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied the Mission's motion to dismiss, holding that Nam's employment fell within the "commercial activity" exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The court later granted Nam's motion for partial summary judgment, awarding him damages and interest on his wage-and-hour claims, while the remaining claims were set for trial. The Mission appealed, arguing that it was immune under the FSIA.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Nam without resolving factual disputes regarding the nature of his employment. The court emphasized that the district court should have considered whether Nam's employment was governmental or commercial in nature, taking into account the context of his duties and the security measures involved. The appellate court instructed the district court to weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts, and, if necessary, conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the applicability of the FSIA's commercial activity exception.

Mayfield v. Department of Labor

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-50724

Opinion Date: September 11, 2024

Judge: Jennifer Walker Elrod

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

Robert Mayfield, a small-business owner operating thirteen fast-food restaurants in Austin, Texas, challenged the Department of Labor's (DOL) 2019 Minimum Salary Rule. This rule raised the minimum salary required to qualify for the White Collar Exemption under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) from $455 per week to $684 per week. Mayfield argued that the DOL exceeded its statutory authority by imposing any salary requirement and that such a requirement violated the nondelegation doctrine.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of the DOL, finding that the 2019 Minimum Salary Rule was within the DOL's authority to define and delimit the terms of the White Collar Exemption. The court also held that this delegation of authority did not violate the nondelegation doctrine.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fifth Circuit held that the DOL's authority to define and delimit the terms of the White Collar Exemption included the power to set a minimum salary level. The court found that this power was explicitly delegated by Congress and was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The court also determined that the major questions doctrine did not apply, as the economic and political significance of the rule did not meet the threshold for invoking the doctrine. Additionally, the court concluded that the FLSA's purpose and the text of the exemption itself provided sufficient guidance to satisfy the nondelegation doctrine's requirements.

U.S. v. Nelson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-50449

Opinion Date: September 6, 2024

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

Christopher Dallas Nelson pleaded guilty to one count of possession of child pornography. The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) revealed that Nelson possessed 3,699 images, including 196 images of his seven-year-old daughter and 25 images of his five-year-old daughter. Nelson admitted to downloading child pornography and taking images of his older daughter but denied producing images of his younger daughter. He also attempted to obstruct justice by hiding a laptop and cellphone containing evidence. Nelson's total offense level under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines was 43, and he filed objections to the PSR.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas sentenced Nelson to 240 months in prison, a $250,000 fine, additional restitution and special assessments totaling $10,100, and supervised release for life. The court imposed mandatory and standard conditions of supervised release and added discretionary special conditions barring Nelson’s access to the Internet. Nelson objected to these special conditions, and the court’s written judgment contained less severe versions of the Internet-related conditions. Nelson timely appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of a sentencing reduction for acceptance of responsibility, finding no abuse of discretion. The court also found that the written judgment conflicted with the oral pronouncement regarding Internet restrictions, holding that the oral pronouncement controls. Finally, the court held that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a lifetime Internet ban without exceptions, as it was not narrowly tailored. The court affirmed Nelson’s sentence except for the special conditions of supervised release, vacated the Internet-related conditions, and remanded for further proceedings.

Chamber of Commerce v. Securities and Exchange Commission

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-5409

Opinion Date: September 10, 2024

Judge: GIBBONS

Areas of Law: Business Law, Government & Administrative Law, Securities Law

The United States Chamber of Commerce, Business Roundtable, and the Tennessee Chamber of Commerce and Industry sued the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and its Chairman, alleging that the SEC’s partial rescission of a prior regulation did not comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The regulation in question involved proxy voting advice businesses (PVABs) and their role in the proxy voting process for public companies. The plaintiffs argued that the SEC’s actions were procedurally and substantively deficient under the APA.

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee granted summary judgment in favor of the SEC. The court found that the SEC’s decision to rescind certain conditions of the 2020 Rule was not arbitrary and capricious. The court also held that the SEC had provided a reasonable explanation for its change in policy and had adequately considered the economic consequences of the rescission as required by the Exchange Act. Additionally, the court determined that the 31-day comment period provided by the SEC was legally permissible under the APA.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Sixth Circuit held that the SEC’s 2022 Rescission was not arbitrary and capricious because the SEC had acknowledged its change in position, provided good reasons for the change, and explained why it believed the new rule struck a better policy balance. The court also found that the SEC had adequately assessed the economic implications of the rescission, relying on data from the 2020 Rule and providing a qualitative analysis of the costs and benefits. Finally, the court concluded that the 31-day comment period was sufficient to provide a meaningful opportunity for public comment, as required by the APA.

Josephson v. Ganzel

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-5293

Opinion Date: September 10, 2024

Judge: MATHIS

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

A psychiatrist employed at a public university's medical school participated in a panel discussion on childhood gender dysphoria, expressing views that were unpopular with his colleagues and supervisors. Following his remarks, he was demoted and his contract was not renewed after over fifteen years of employment. He sued several university officials, alleging First Amendment retaliation.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment, which argued for Eleventh Amendment immunity and qualified immunity. The court found material fact disputes regarding whether the defendants retaliated against the plaintiff for his protected speech.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiff's speech was protected under the First Amendment as it addressed a matter of public concern and was not made pursuant to his official duties. The court also found that the plaintiff's interest in speaking on the topic outweighed the university's interest in maintaining workplace efficiency. The court determined that the adverse actions taken against the plaintiff, including his demotion and contract nonrenewal, were motivated by his protected speech.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment, concluding that the defendants were not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity or qualified immunity. The court held that the plaintiff's rights were clearly established and that a reasonable university official would have understood that retaliating against him for his speech was unlawful. The court also denied the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction as moot.

Patel v. Garland

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-3461

Opinion Date: September 10, 2024

Judge: Siler

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law

The petitioner, Nayanaben Patel, entered the United States in March 2000 under unclear circumstances. She applied for adjustment of status based on her husband's legal status but lied about her manner of entry. She later admitted to lying but provided conflicting testimonies. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied her application for adjustment of status and ordered her removal to India, citing factual inconsistencies. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision.

The IJ's decision was discretionary and protected by statute from judicial review. The petitioner did not raise any colorable constitutional claims that would allow for judicial review. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the IJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence, including the petitioner's multiple contradictory statements and lack of credible evidence regarding her manner of entry.

The Sixth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the IJ's discretionary decision under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), which bars judicial review of any judgment regarding the granting of relief under sections 1182(i) and 1255. The court also found that the petitioner did not exhaust her administrative remedies regarding her claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and judicial bias, and that her judicial bias claim was not a constitutional issue but rather a factual dispute.

The court denied the petition for review, emphasizing that the IJ's decision was within his discretion and supported by the evidence. The court also noted a significant error in the IJ's understanding of the difference between a visa and an I-94 form but concluded that this error did not affect the overall decision.

Hotchkiss v. Cedar Rapids Community School District

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2708

Opinion Date: September 6, 2024

Judge: James B. Loken

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

Russell Hotchkiss, a resident of Linn County, Iowa, began sending emails to the Cedar Rapids Community School District officials in September 2021, criticizing their COVID-19 masking and vaccination policies. His communications included threats of criminal charges against board members, particularly targeting Jennifer Borcherding, a board member. Hotchkiss attended board meetings in November and December 2021, where he voiced his opposition aggressively. Following these incidents, the District issued a no-trespass notice to Hotchkiss on January 10, 2022, barring him from District premises due to his disruptive and threatening behavior.

Hotchkiss filed a lawsuit on May 17, 2023, claiming First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a violation of the Iowa Open Meetings Act. He sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the no-trespass order. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa denied his motion, concluding that Hotchkiss failed to demonstrate irreparable harm. The court noted that Hotchkiss had not attempted to return to District premises, had moved his child to another school district, and had not communicated with the District since the notice was issued.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction, agreeing that Hotchkiss did not show a likelihood of irreparable harm. The court emphasized that speculative harm does not justify a preliminary injunction and noted Hotchkiss's delay in seeking relief and lack of recent attempts to exercise his First Amendment rights. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction based on the failure to demonstrate irreparable harm.

BLUMBERGER V. TILLEY

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-56032

Opinion Date: September 9, 2024

Judge: Jay S. Bybee

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury

Raizel Blumberger filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Ian Tilley, alleging that he failed to provide proper medical care during childbirth, resulting in her injuries. Dr. Tilley was an employee of Eisner Pediatric and Family Medical Services, a federally funded health center deemed a Public Health Service (PHS) employee for 2018. The Attorney General appeared in state court, stating that Dr. Tilley's status was under consideration. A year later, the Attorney General advised that Dr. Tilley was not a deemed employee, leading Dr. Tilley to remove the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 and 42 U.S.C. § 233(l)(1).

The United States District Court for the Central District of California remanded the case, finding Dr. Tilley's removal untimely under § 1442 and concluding that the Attorney General satisfied its advice obligations under § 233(l)(1). Dr. Tilley appealed, arguing that the Attorney General failed to properly advise the state court of his deemed status, thus making removal appropriate.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court analyzed the timeliness of Dr. Tilley's § 1442 removal under the wrong legal standard and remanded on that basis. The court determined it had jurisdiction to review the district court’s § 233 analysis, despite potential untimeliness. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Attorney General was obligated under § 233(l)(1) to advise the state court that Dr. Tilley had been a deemed employee during the relevant period. The court reversed the district court’s conclusion that the Attorney General’s notice satisfied § 233(l)(1) and held that the government was obligated to remove the case to federal court. The case was vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CORBETT V. TSA

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-55713

Opinion Date: September 10, 2024

Judge: Morgan Christen

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

Jonathan Corbett, an attorney specializing in civil litigation against the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), submitted two Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to TSA. The first request, made on June 13, 2021, sought incident reports and video footage related to a pat-down search of Kelly Joyner. TSA responded by asking Corbett to complete a "Certification of Identity" form, which he did not do, leading TSA to close the request. The second request, submitted on March 6, 2022, sought records regarding an alleged search of an unnamed client. TSA again asked for the form, which Corbett did not provide, and the request was closed.

Corbett filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California after TSA missed its twenty-day deadline to respond to his FOIA requests. TSA issued final responses after the lawsuit was filed, stating that they could neither confirm nor deny the existence of the requested records without the third-party subject’s consent. TSA moved for summary judgment, arguing that Corbett’s claims were moot and that he had failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not appealing within the agency. The district court granted TSA’s motion, construing it as a motion to dismiss, and held that Corbett should have pursued administrative appeals.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that once a FOIA suit is properly initiated based on constructive exhaustion, an agency’s post-lawsuit response does not require dismissal for failure to exhaust. The court emphasized that exhaustion under FOIA is a prudential consideration rather than a jurisdictional one, and district courts have limited discretion to require exhaustion only if an agency shows exceptional circumstances. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Citizens for Constitutional Integrity v. Census Bureau

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 23-5140

Opinion Date: September 10, 2024

Judge: Wilkins

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

A non-profit organization, Citizens for Constitutional Integrity, sued the Census Bureau, the Department of Commerce, and related officials, alleging that the Bureau failed to proportionately reduce the basis of representation for states in the 2020 Census as required by the Fourteenth Amendment's Reduction Clause. Citizens claimed this failure diluted the voting power of its members in New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. The organization sought relief under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and a writ of mandamus.

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the case for lack of standing. The court found that Citizens could not demonstrate that its alleged vote dilution injury was traceable to the Bureau's actions. Specifically, the court noted that Citizens failed to show how the Bureau's failure to apply the Reduction Clause directly caused the loss of congressional representation for the states in question. The court also found the data scientist's declaration provided by Citizens unpersuasive, as it did not adequately account for the number of disenfranchised voters in the relevant states.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal. The appellate court held that Citizens did not establish traceability under Article III standards. The court found that Citizens failed to present a feasible alternative methodology for apportionment that would have resulted in a different allocation of seats for New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. The court also rejected Citizens's argument that it was entitled to a relaxed standing requirement for procedural-rights cases, concluding that the challenge was substantive rather than procedural. Consequently, the court affirmed the District Court's ruling that Citizens lacked standing to pursue its claims.

OAK GROVE TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. US

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 22-1556

Opinion Date: September 11, 2024

Judge: Stark

Areas of Law: Contracts, Government & Administrative Law, Government Contracts

The case involves a bid protest action initiated by Oak Grove Technologies, LLC against the United States Department of the Army's award of a contract to F3EA, Inc. The contract, known as SOF RAPTOR IV, was for procuring training services for special forces. Oak Grove, a competing bidder, alleged that the bidding process was flawed and that F3EA had an unfair advantage due to an organizational conflict of interest involving the chairperson of the Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB), RM.

The Court of Federal Claims reviewed the case and agreed with Oak Grove, finding that the Army's evaluation process was flawed. The court enjoined the Army from proceeding with the contract award to F3EA and ordered the Army to either restart the procurement process or reopen it to accept revised proposals. The court also sanctioned the government for failing to include material evidence in the administrative record, which delayed the proceedings and increased costs for Oak Grove.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the judgment and injunction issued by the Court of Federal Claims. The appellate court held that Oak Grove had waived its argument that the Army was required to hold discussions with bidders, that F3EA was not required to include teaming agreements in its proposal, and that the Army's investigation into RM's alleged misconduct was adequate. The court also found that the Court of Federal Claims erred in determining that Lukos, another bidder, was financially irresponsible and ineligible for the contract. However, the appellate court affirmed the sanctions imposed on the government for failing to compile a complete administrative record. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion.

Clarke v. Gordon

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G062856(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 12, 2024

Judge: Goethals

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

George Loy Clarke challenged the California Department of Motor Vehicles' (DMV) decision to suspend his driver’s license following his arrest for driving under the influence (DUI). Clarke argued that the DMV's administrative hearing violated due process and that his refusal to submit to a breath or blood test should be excused. The DMV had conducted an administrative per se (APS) hearing, which led to the suspension of Clarke’s license.

The Superior Court of Orange County initially denied Clarke’s petition for a writ of mandate, which sought to overturn the DMV’s decision. Clarke’s first APS hearing resulted in a suspension, but the trial court later granted his petition for a writ of mandate, remanding the case for a new hearing. At the second hearing, Clarke contested the allegations of refusal to submit to a chemical test. Despite his objections, the hearing officer (HO) admitted the DMV’s evidence and ultimately reimposed the suspension.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the DMV’s practice of having a single employee act as both advocate and adjudicator during the APS hearing violated due process, as established in California DUI Lawyers Assn. v. Department of Motor Vehicles and Knudsen v. Department of Motor Vehicles. The court concluded that the HO in Clarke’s case failed to separate her roles adequately, resulting in a due process violation. This constituted structural error, necessitating a reversal of the trial court’s denial of Clarke’s petition.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case, directing the lower court to grant Clarke’s petition for a writ of mandate. The court also denied requests for judicial notice and to augment the record, leaving those issues to be addressed in a potential new APS hearing.

Cole v. Super. Ct.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A169804(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 12, 2024

Judge: Tucher

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

Deari Cole was committed to a developmental center under California's Welfare and Institutions Code section 6500, which allows for the commitment of individuals with developmental disabilities who pose a danger to themselves or others. Near the end of his commitment period, a petition to extend his commitment was filed, but it was too late for a trial to occur before the original commitment expired. Cole was held pending trial and subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandate or habeas corpus, arguing that equal protection principles required his release pending trial.

The Contra Costa County Superior Court initially found Cole incompetent to stand trial on charges including felony possession of a firearm and second-degree burglary. He was committed to the Porterville Developmental Center for one year. Two days before this commitment was set to expire, the People filed a petition to extend it, and the court ordered Cole held pending trial on the recommitment petition. Cole's petition for writ of mandate and/or habeas corpus was summarily denied by the Court of Appeal, but the California Supreme Court directed the appellate court to issue an order to show cause.

The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and rejected Cole's equal protection argument. The court held that the statutory scheme under section 6500, which allows for continued confinement pending a hearing on a recommitment petition, did not violate equal protection principles. The court reasoned that the differences between individuals with developmental disabilities and those with mental health disorders justified the disparate treatment. The court concluded that the legislative distinctions were reasonable and factually based, and thus, Cole's continued confinement pending trial was constitutionally permissible. The petition was ultimately dismissed as moot.

S.F. Apartment Assn. v. City & County of S.F.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A166228(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 11, 2024

Judge: Desautels

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Landlord - Tenant, Real Estate & Property Law

In 2022, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors passed an ordinance extending the notice period for landlords pursuing at-fault evictions. The San Francisco Apartment Association and Small Property Owners of San Francisco Institute sought a writ of mandate to prevent the City and County of San Francisco from enforcing the ordinance, arguing it was preempted by state law. The trial court partially granted the petition, finding the ordinance preempted only for nonpayment of rent evictions. Both parties appealed.

The San Francisco Superior Court initially ruled that the ordinance conflicted with state law only regarding nonpayment of rent, citing a split in authority on notice periods for other fault-based evictions. The court referenced Tri County Apartment Association v. City of Mountain View, which invalidated extended notice periods, and Rental Housing Association of Northern Alameda County v. City of Oakland, which allowed them. The trial court felt bound by Rental Housing and limited its ruling to nonpayment of rent.

The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that the entire ordinance was preempted by state law. The court found that the ordinance was procedural, not substantive, as it extended the state-mandated three-day notice period to a minimum of 13 days, conflicting with the Unlawful Detainer Act's timelines. The court determined that state law fully occupies the field of landlord-tenant notification timelines, making the local ordinance invalid.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment in part, ruling that the entire ordinance was preempted by state law, and directed the superior court to issue a writ of mandate preventing the City and County of San Francisco from enforcing the ordinance. The plaintiffs were awarded their costs on appeal.

Sunflower Alliance v. California Department of Conservation

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A167698(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 6, 2024

Judge: BURNS

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

Reabold California LLC applied to convert a former oil well into a Class II injection well in the Brentwood Oil Field, Contra Costa County. The well, drilled in 1963, had been inactive for over 20 years. The conversion involved minor alterations, such as removing the well plug and installing injection equipment. The project aimed to inject produced water back into the aquifer, eliminating the need for water disposal trips. The Environmental Protection Agency had exempted the aquifer from the Safe Drinking Water Act in 1982, making it eligible for such injection projects.

The California Department of Conservation’s Division of Geologic Energy Management (CalGEM) approved the project, invoking a Class 1 categorical exemption under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) for minor alterations involving negligible or no expansion of use. Sunflower Alliance challenged this exemption, arguing that converting the well to an injection well constituted a significant change in use. The Contra Costa County Superior Court agreed with Sunflower, ruling that the change in use was not negligible and directing CalGEM to set aside its approval and notice of exemption.

The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the conversion project fell within the Class 1 exemption because the environmental risks associated with injecting water were negligible. The court emphasized that the project involved only minor physical alterations and that the injected water would be confined within the aquifer, posing no significant environmental harm. The court directed the lower court to deny Sunflower’s petition and ordered CalGEM to reinstate its project approval and notice of exemption.

Gluba v. State Objection Panel

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 24-1426

Opinion Date: September 11, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

Three Libertarian Party candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives were disqualified from the 2024 general election ballot by the State Objection Panel for failing to comply with Iowa's statutory nomination requirements. The candidates, Nicholas Gluba, Charles Aldrich, and Marco Battaglia, were nominated at a party convention after no Libertarian candidates filed for the primary election. However, the party did not follow the required process for selecting delegates to the convention, which included holding precinct caucuses and county conventions on separate days and notifying county auditors of the delegates.

The Iowa District Court for Polk County upheld the Panel's decision, finding that the Libertarian Party did not comply with Iowa Code section 43.94, which mandates that county convention delegates' terms begin the day after their election at precinct caucuses. The court ruled that strict compliance with this law was necessary, and the party's failure to follow the process invalidated the nominations. The court also rejected arguments that the objectors lacked standing and that the Panel's decision violated the candidates' First Amendment rights.

The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling. The court held that the statutory requirements for nominating candidates by convention must be strictly followed and that the Libertarian Party's failure to comply with these requirements justified the disqualification of the candidates. The court also found that the objectors had standing to challenge the nominations and that the Panel's decision did not violate the candidates' First Amendment rights. The court emphasized that the election laws are designed to ensure a fair and orderly process for candidate nominations.

ADVANCED BENEFIT CONCEPTS, INC. VS. BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF ALABAMA

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Docket: 2023-CC-01291

Opinion Date: September 6, 2024

Judge: Jefferson D. Hughes, III

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts, Government & Administrative Law

Advanced Benefit Concepts, Inc. (ABC) filed a breach of contract lawsuit against Access Health, Inc., Preferred Care Services, Inc., and Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama (collectively, Access Health). ABC alleged that Access Health failed to pay fees owed under an agreement where ABC helped Access Health secure a contract with the State of Louisiana’s Office of Group Benefits (OGB). Access Health countered that the contract was null and void because ABC did not register as a lobbyist as required by the Louisiana Executive Branch Lobbying Act.

The district court ruled in favor of Access Health, declaring the contract void due to ABC’s failure to register as a lobbyist. The court granted Access Health’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing ABC’s breach of contract claim. ABC’s exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and prescription were overruled. ABC appealed the decision.

The Louisiana Court of Appeal, First Circuit, reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the Board of Ethics had exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of the contract under the Lobbying Act. The appellate court concluded that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to declare the contract void and reversed the summary judgment.

The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and reversed the appellate court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the district court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the contractual dispute, including the affirmative defense of nullity based on the Lobbying Act. The court emphasized that the Executive Branch Lobbying Act does not deprive the district court of jurisdiction and that the district court can consider whether the contract is an absolute nullity under Louisiana Civil Code article 2030. The case was remanded to the appellate court to consider the exception of prescription and the merits of the summary judgment motion.

Conservation Law Foundation v. Energy Facilities Siting Board

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13521

Opinion Date: September 11, 2024

Judge: WOLOHOJIAN

Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves a proposed electric substation in East Boston by NSTAR Electric Company, doing business as Eversource Energy. The Energy Facilities Siting Board (the board) granted a certificate of environmental impact and public interest to Eversource for the substation. The petitioners, Conservation Law Foundation and GreenRoots, Inc., challenged this decision, arguing that Eversource failed to show "undue delay" by two city agencies, and that the board did not properly consider environmental justice principles, among other issues.

Previously, Eversource's petition to build the substation was approved by the board in 2017, with a project change approved in 2018. The petitioners intervened in the proceedings, and the board issued a decision in November 2022, granting the certificate. The petitioners then filed for judicial review in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and upheld the board's decision. The court found that the board's determination of "undue delay" by the city agencies was supported by substantial evidence. The court also concluded that the board properly considered environmental justice principles, including the equitable distribution of energy benefits and burdens. Additionally, the court found that the board's decision to issue the equivalent of a G. L. c. 91 tidelands license was lawful and supported by substantial evidence. The court affirmed the board's findings on the need for the substation, its compatibility with environmental protection, public health, and safety, and its alignment with the public interest. The decision of the board was affirmed.

Hartnett v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13568

Opinion Date: September 11, 2024

Judge: Wendlandt

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves Susan Hartnett, a public employee who worked for the Commonwealth from 1978 to 1990 and then rejoined public service in 2002, working for the city of Boston. Upon her return, her salary more than doubled compared to her 1990 salary. Hartnett continued working until 2006 and deferred her retirement until 2016. Initially, her pension was calculated without applying the anti-spiking provision of the public employee pension statute, but after an audit, the Boston Retirement System (BRS) applied the provision, reducing her pension.

Hartnett challenged the application of the anti-spiking provision. The Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA) and the Contributory Retirement Appeal Board (CRAB) affirmed BRS's decision. Hartnett then sought judicial review in the Superior Court, which ruled in her favor, concluding that the anti-spiking provision did not apply because the years 1990 and 2002 were not "two consecutive years" under the statute. The agencies appealed, and the case was transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the phrase "two consecutive years" in the anti-spiking provision refers to two back-to-back years without interruption. The court found that the plain meaning of "consecutive" means following one after another without interruption, and this interpretation is consistent with the statutory scheme. The court rejected the agencies' argument that "two consecutive years" should mean two creditable years of service without another intervening year of service. Consequently, the court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment in favor of Hartnett, ruling that the years 1990 and 2002 are not "two consecutive years" under the anti-spiking provision.

EX PARTE CHARETTE

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0522-21

Opinion Date: September 11, 2024

Judge: Slaughter

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

In 2018, Robbie Gail Charette, a Republican candidate for Judge of the County Court-at-Law in Washington County, Texas, was indicted on four misdemeanor charges related to campaign law violations. These charges included misrepresenting the source of a campaign communication, falsely claiming to hold a public office, failing to file a personal financial statement on time, and not maintaining proper records of political expenditures. A special prosecutor pursued these charges without a prior referral from the Texas Ethics Commission (TEC).

The trial court denied Charette's pretrial habeas application, which argued that the prosecution was unauthorized without prior TEC proceedings. The court found no legislative language granting the TEC exclusive authority to enforce the violations and ruled that district attorneys could independently investigate and prosecute election-related crimes. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals upheld this decision, stating that the district court had jurisdiction over the misdemeanors and that any alleged deprivation of civil due process rights by the TEC did not affect this jurisdiction.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the TEC has exclusive jurisdiction over the offenses listed in Chapter 571 of the Texas Government Code. The court held that the TEC must make an initial determination on alleged violations before any criminal charges can be brought. Since no TEC proceedings occurred in Charette's case, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the charges. Consequently, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and ordered the dismissal of the indictments against Charette.

City of Sammamish v. Titcomb

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 101,894-1

Opinion Date: September 12, 2024

Judge: JOHNSON

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The City of Sammamish passed an ordinance to condemn property rights in George Davis Creek, which runs through the petitioners' property, for stormwater management and fish passage protection. The city aimed to address storm drainage issues, improve traffic safety, provide flood protection, and remove barriers to fish passage. The petitioners argued that the city lacked authority to condemn their property for fish passage purposes, citing the salmon recovery act (SRA) and a previous case, Cowlitz County v. Martin.

The Superior Court denied the city's motion for condemnation, agreeing with the petitioners that the city had no authority to condemn private property for fish passage purposes. The city appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, holding that the city had statutory authority under RCW 8.12.030 to condemn property for stormwater management. The court distinguished this case from Cowlitz County, noting that the project in question had multiple purposes, including stormwater management, which is explicitly authorized by the statute.

The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case to determine the scope of the city's statutory condemnation authority. The court held that RCW 8.12.030 grants cities the authority to condemn property for stormwater management and other public uses. The inclusion of fish passage as one of the project's purposes did not divest the city of its authority to condemn property for stormwater management. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Greene v. D.C. Child & Family Services Agency

Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Docket: 21-CV-0448

Opinion Date: September 12, 2024

Judge: BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

Christian Greene, the Ombudsman for the District of Columbia Child & Family Services Agency (CFSA), was terminated from her position and subsequently filed a lawsuit against the District, claiming her termination violated the District of Columbia Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA). Greene argued that her termination was in retaliation for her disclosures about CFSA's non-compliance with the Foster Youth Statements of Rights and Responsibilities Amendment Act of 2012 (FYAA).

The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of CFSA, concluding that Greene's disclosures were merely policy disagreements about the role of the Ombudsman and not protected under the WPA. The court did not address whether Greene reasonably believed her disclosures revealed unlawful activity or whether there was a causal connection between her disclosures and her termination.

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that Greene's disclosures were indeed protected under the WPA. The court held that Greene reasonably believed her disclosures revealed violations of the FYAA, which required CFSA to report on the outcomes of investigations and ensure compliance with relevant laws. The court noted that Greene's belief was genuine and reasonable, given the evidence she provided and the context of her role.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. The trial court was instructed to determine whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Greene's WPA-protected disclosures were a cause of her termination.

May v. River East at Grandview

Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Docket: 21-CV-0612

Opinion Date: September 12, 2024

Judge: BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY

Areas of Law: Bankruptcy, Consumer Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

Nine Black, female, low- to moderate-income first-time homebuyers purchased condominium units at the RiverEast at Grandview Condominium complex through the District of Columbia’s Housing Purchase Assistance Program. Shortly after moving in, they encountered severe habitability issues, including foundation problems, sewage, and mold. Their attempts to resolve these issues were unsuccessful, leading them to file a thirteen-count lawsuit against the developers, the District of Columbia Department of Housing and Community Development (DHCD), and the RiverEast at Grandview Condominium Owner’s Association. The developers later filed for bankruptcy, and the plaintiffs were forced to evacuate their units.

The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted motions to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims against the District and the Association for failure to state a claim. The court found that DHCD, as a District agency, was non sui juris and thus incapable of being sued. It also concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act (CPPA) because the District could not be considered a “merchant” under the statute. The court dismissed other claims, including violations of the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA), breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and negligence.

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the CPPA claim, holding that the District could be considered a merchant under the statute. The case was remanded for further consideration of whether the District’s trade practices were unfair or deceptive. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the DCHRA, breach of contract, IIED, and negligence claims, finding that the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege facts to support these claims. The court also upheld the trial court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ request to amend their complaint.