Alam & Sarker, LLC v. US

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1990

Opinion Date: August 27, 2024

Judge: Selya

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Public Benefits

The case involves Alam & Sarker, LLC, a convenience store in New Bedford, Massachusetts, which was disqualified from participating in the federal Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) by the United States Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service (FNS). The FNS's decision was based on data indicating irregular SNAP transactions at the store, including a high number of back-to-back transactions and unusually large purchases, which suggested trafficking in SNAP benefits.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment in favor of the FNS. The court found that the transaction data provided sufficient evidence of trafficking and that the store failed to rebut this inference with significantly probative evidence. The Market's opposition, which included customer statements and inventory records, was deemed insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the FNS's reliance on SNAP transaction data was appropriate and that the Market did not provide adequate evidence to counter the strong inference of trafficking. The court also rejected the Market's procedural due process claim, noting that the de novo hearing in the district court cured any potential procedural deficiencies at the administrative level. The court concluded that the Market received all the process that was due and upheld the permanent disqualification from SNAP.

Mullane v. Department of Justice

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Dockets: 23-1094, 23-1104

Opinion Date: August 23, 2024

Judge: MONTECALVO

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

Jonathan Mullane, a law student intern at the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) in 2018, was terminated from his position due to ex parte communications with a law clerk regarding a pro se case he had filed. Subsequently, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rescinded an internship offer to him. Mullane requested documents related to his termination from both the DOJ and SEC under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the Privacy Act. He claimed that the agencies did not conduct adequate searches and improperly withheld documents. The agencies moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted their motions in full.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment in favor of the DOJ and SEC, dismissing Mullane's claims. Mullane appealed the district court's decision regarding the DOJ, arguing that the DOJ's search for documents was inadequate and that the district court erred in holding that the Privacy Act imposes a jurisdictional exhaustion requirement. Mullane also challenged the district court's denial of his requests for pre-dismissal discovery.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the DOJ conducted an adequate search for documents under FOIA, as the search was reasonably calculated to discover the requested documents. The court also found that Mullane had waived any argument against the district court's conclusion that the Privacy Act's exhaustion requirements are jurisdictional. Consequently, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the DOJ, dismissing Mullane's FOIA and Privacy Act claims.

Henry v. Essex County

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 23-1987

Opinion Date: August 29, 2024

Judge: Thomas L. Ambro

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

Judith Maureen Henry was mistakenly arrested on a warrant intended for another woman with the same name who had skipped parole in Pennsylvania. The warrant included Henry's home address and driver’s license photo. Henry was detained for over two weeks, despite her repeated claims of innocence and requests for fingerprint comparison. She was eventually released after Pennsylvania officials confirmed her fingerprints did not match those of the actual parole violator.

The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey reviewed the case and denied a motion to dismiss filed by six deputy United States Marshals. The Marshals argued for qualified immunity, claimed that Henry could not pursue her claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, and contended that her complaint failed to state a claim. The District Court rejected these arguments, citing a need for further factual development.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the District Court’s decision. The Third Circuit held that Henry’s claims presented a new context under Bivens, as her arrest was based on a valid warrant and her mistaken-identity arrest was constitutionally valid. The court found that the Marshals’ actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment and that Henry’s other claims, including those for failure to investigate her innocence and failure to present her to a magistrate, also presented a new context. The court concluded that separation of powers concerns precluded extending Bivens to this new context. Additionally, Henry’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act were dismissed, as she failed to provide sufficient factual allegations of discriminatory animus and the Westfall Act barred her NJCRA claim. The Third Circuit remanded the case for dismissal of Henry’s claims against the Marshals.

United States ex rel. Doe v. Credit Suisse AG

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-1054

Opinion Date: August 29, 2024

Judge: Floyd

Areas of Law: Banking, Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law

A former employee of Credit Suisse, John Doe, filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) alleging that the bank failed to disclose ongoing criminal conduct to the United States, thereby avoiding additional penalties. This followed Credit Suisse's 2014 guilty plea to conspiracy charges for aiding U.S. taxpayers in filing false tax returns, which included a $1.3 billion fine. Doe claimed that Credit Suisse continued its illegal activities post-plea, thus defrauding the government.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted the government's motion to dismiss the case. The government argued that Doe's allegations did not state a valid claim under the FCA and that continuing the litigation would strain resources and interfere with ongoing obligations under the plea agreement. The district court dismissed the action without holding an in-person hearing, relying instead on written submissions from both parties.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the "hearing" requirement under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) of the FCA can be satisfied through written submissions and does not necessitate a formal, in-person hearing. The court found that Doe did not present a colorable claim that his constitutional rights were violated by the dismissal. The court emphasized that the government has broad discretion to dismiss qui tam actions and that the district court properly considered the government's valid reasons for dismissal, including resource conservation and the protection of privileged information. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court's dismissal was appropriate and affirmed the judgment.

Anderson v. Hutson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-30633

Opinion Date: August 26, 2024

Judge: Dana M. Douglas

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves a long-standing litigation concerning the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office and the conditions at Orleans Parish Prison. Plaintiffs, including detainees and the United States, argued that the jail provided constitutionally inadequate housing and medical care. In 2013, a district court approved a consent decree to address these issues, which included a plan to construct a mental health annex, known as Phase III. Despite years of delays, the district court ordered the construction to proceed. No party appealed these orders at the time.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana oversaw the case initially. In 2016, the parties entered a stipulated order to develop a plan for appropriate housing for prisoners with mental health issues. The Compliance Director later proposed the construction of Phase III, which was agreed upon by the former Sheriff and the City. However, the City later sought to explore alternatives, leading to further court orders in 2019 to proceed with Phase III. The City’s subsequent motion to halt the project was denied, and this decision was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Anderson v. City of New Orleans.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is currently reviewing the case. The new Sheriff, Susan Hutson, moved to terminate all orders concerning Phase III, arguing that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) prohibits the construction of a new jail facility. The district court denied this motion, and the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that it could review the denial of the motion but not the underlying orders, as the Sheriff’s motion was not a proper procedural mechanism under the PLRA to challenge the 2019 Orders and Stipulated Order. The appeal was dismissed, and the construction of Phase III continues.

Arnesen v. Raimondo

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 24-60055

Opinion Date: August 23, 2024

Judge: Stephen Andrew Higginson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

Commercial fishers challenged the constitutionality of the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council's actions, specifically targeting the approval and implementation of Amendment 54, which significantly reduced the greater amberjack catch limit. The plaintiffs argued that the Council members were improperly appointed under the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution and were unconstitutionally insulated from removal. They sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction to set aside the Final Rule implementing the catch limit and to prevent further development of annual catch limits for the greater amberjack fishery.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi consolidated the cases and granted summary judgment to the government. The court found that six of the Council’s seventeen members were improperly appointed as inferior officers. However, it concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief because the constitutional violation was not the proximate cause of their injuries. The decision to implement Amendment 54 was made by the NMFS Assistant Administrator, not the Council. Additionally, the court noted that the remaining eleven Council members were properly appointed and constituted a quorum.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and remanded it to the district court. The appellate court instructed the lower court to determine whether it had jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs' request to declare Amendment 54 void and to enjoin the Council from developing further catch limits. The district court was also directed to address whether the NMFS Assistant Administrator’s review and approval of the Final Rule functioned as a ratification of the Council’s actions. The appellate court emphasized the need for a thorough district court analysis of the ratification issue before addressing the validity of the Council members' appointments and the plaintiffs' entitlement to relief.

Restaurant Law Center v. Department of Labor

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-50562

Opinion Date: August 23, 2024

Judge: Jennifer Walker Elrod

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

The case involves the Restaurant Law Center and the Texas Restaurant Association challenging a final rule by the Department of Labor (DOL) that restricts when employers can claim a "tip credit" for "tipped employees" under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The tip credit allows employers to pay tipped employees a lower hourly wage, assuming tips will make up the difference to meet the minimum wage. The DOL's final rule imposes limits on the amount of non-tip-producing work a tipped employee can perform while still allowing the employer to claim the tip credit.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, stating they would not suffer irreparable harm. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision, finding that the plaintiffs had shown irreparable harm and remanded the case for further consideration. On remand, the district court evaluated the merits and granted summary judgment in favor of the DOL, holding that the final rule was a permissible interpretation of the FLSA under Chevron deference and was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the final rule was contrary to the clear statutory text of the FLSA and was arbitrary and capricious. The court held that the FLSA's definition of a "tipped employee" does not support the DOL's restrictions on non-tip-producing work. The court concluded that the final rule improperly focused on the pursuit of tips rather than the duties of the occupation itself. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the DOL, rendered summary judgment for the plaintiffs, and vacated the final rule.

Terrell v. Allgrunn

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-30723

Opinion Date: August 27, 2024

Judge: Smith

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

Curtis Terrell, after consuming a significant amount of alcohol, pain pills, and methamphetamine, began running erratically in a residential neighborhood. His wife, Angela Terrell, called 911, requesting an ambulance. Officer Jason Allgrunn arrived and arrested Mr. Terrell. When Mrs. Terrell began filming the incident, she was also arrested. The Terrells filed multiple federal and state claims against Allgrunn and other officers involved.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana denied summary judgment to the defendants on all claims, rejecting their qualified immunity defense. The defendants appealed this decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment for the defendants on the Terrells' false arrest claims, finding that Officer Allgrunn had probable cause to arrest both Mr. and Mrs. Terrell. The court also reversed the denial of summary judgment on Mrs. Terrell's excessive force claim, concluding that there was no clearly established law prohibiting the officer's conduct. However, the court dismissed the appeal regarding Mr. Terrell's excessive force claim for lack of jurisdiction, as there were genuine disputes of material fact about what occurred when Mr. Terrell was out of the video frame.

Additionally, the court reversed the denial of summary judgment on the Terrells' malicious prosecution and First Amendment retaliation claims, citing the presence of probable cause. The court also reversed the denial of summary judgment for Officers Henderson and Banta on the failure-to-intervene claims, as there were no violations of clearly established constitutional law.

Finally, the court vacated the district court's denial of summary judgment on the Louisiana state law claims and remanded for reconsideration in light of the appellate court's opinion.

Couzens v. City of Forest Park, Ohio

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-3930

Opinion Date: August 27, 2024

Judge: Bush

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

Victor S. Couzens, the senior pastor of Inspirational Bible Church (IBC), faced a significant decline in church membership and financial troubles following public accusations of an adulterous relationship. In response, church leaders organized a vote to remove him from his position. To enforce this decision, they hired off-duty police officers for the next Sunday service. When Couzens attempted to address the congregation, the officers threatened him with arrest, leading him to leave the church. Couzens subsequently sued the officers, their police chief, and the City of Forest Park, alleging a conspiracy to deny him his constitutional rights.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that while the officers' actions could be seen as a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, their actions were not unreasonable. The court also determined that the free exercise claim failed because the police department's policy did not target religious conduct. Without constitutional violations from individual defendants, the court found no merit in the municipal liability and civil conspiracy claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the officers' actions were objectively reasonable given the circumstances and the evidence they had, including a letter indicating Couzens' removal as pastor. The court also found that Couzens failed to establish a violation of his First Amendment rights, as the officers' actions did not reflect state interference in church governance. Consequently, the court upheld the summary judgment on the constitutional, civil conspiracy, and municipal liability claims.

Tennessee v. Becerra

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 24-5220

Opinion Date: August 26, 2024

Judge: DAVIS

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

In 2021, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued a rule requiring Title X grant recipients to provide neutral, nondirective counseling and referrals for abortions upon patient request. Tennessee, a long-time Title X recipient, recently enacted laws criminalizing most abortions. Consequently, Tennessee limited its counseling and referrals to options legal within the state, leading HHS to discontinue its Title X grant, citing non-compliance with federal regulations. Tennessee sued to challenge this decision and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the grant's termination.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee denied Tennessee's request for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that Tennessee was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its claim and that the balance of the preliminary injunction factors favored HHS. The court found that Tennessee did not demonstrate a strong likelihood of success on its claims under the Spending Clause or the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision and affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that HHS's 2021 Rule was a permissible construction of Title X and that Tennessee had voluntarily and knowingly accepted the grant's terms, including the counseling and referral requirements. The court also found that HHS's actions did not violate the Spending Clause or the APA. The court concluded that Tennessee failed to show irreparable harm and that the public interest favored the correct application of Title X regulations. Therefore, the district court's decision to deny the preliminary injunction was upheld.

CROWE V. OREGON STATE BAR

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-35193

Opinion Date: August 28, 2024

Judge: Friedland

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

An attorney, Daniel Crowe, challenged the requirement to join the Oregon State Bar (OSB), arguing it infringed on his First Amendment right to freedom of association. Crowe objected to statements published by OSB in its magazine, which he felt misrepresented his views. OSB refunded Crowe a portion of his dues used for the publication but did not satisfy his concerns, leading him to file a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages.

The United States District Court for the District of Oregon initially dismissed Crowe's claims, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals partially reversed this decision, allowing the freedom of association claim to proceed. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for OSB, holding that the bar's activities were germane to its regulatory purpose and did not violate Crowe's rights. Crowe appealed again.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that OSB is an arm of the state entitled to sovereign immunity, dismissing claims against OSB and for retrospective relief against its officers. However, the court found that Crowe demonstrated an infringement on his freedom of association because OSB's statements in its magazine could reasonably be imputed to its members, including Crowe, and were not related to the bar's regulatory purpose. The court concluded that this infringement did not survive exacting scrutiny.

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment regarding Crowe's freedom of association claim for prospective equitable relief against individual OSB officers and remanded the case for further proceedings.

MENDOCINO RAILWAY V. AINSWORTH

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-15857

Opinion Date: August 29, 2024

Judge: Consuelo Maria Callahan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Transportation Law

Mendocino Railway, a California corporation, owns and operates a railroad line known as the "Skunk Train" between Fort Bragg and Willits, California. The City of Fort Bragg and the California Coastal Commission sought to regulate the use and maintenance of the Railway's properties within the City, which the Railway resisted, claiming federal preemption under the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA). The City filed a state court action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the Railway to comply with local regulations. The Railway argued that federal law preempted these local regulations. Subsequently, the Railway filed a federal lawsuit seeking a declaration that the City's and Commission's regulatory actions were preempted by federal law and an injunction to prevent interference with its operations.

The Mendocino County Superior Court overruled the Railway's demurrer, which argued that federal law preempted all local regulations. The Railway's subsequent petitions to the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court were unsuccessful. The Railway then filed an answer in the state court, asserting federal preemption as an affirmative defense. Meanwhile, the Commission intervened in the state court action, seeking a declaration that the Coastal Act and local coastal program applied to the Railway's activities and were not preempted by federal law. The Railway also attempted to remove the state action to federal court, but the district court remanded it back to state court.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's dismissal of the Railway's federal lawsuit under the Colorado River doctrine, which allows federal courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction in favor of parallel state court proceedings. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, finding that the state court proceedings were sufficiently parallel to the federal action and that considerations of avoiding piecemeal litigation, forum shopping, and the order in which the forums obtained jurisdiction supported the dismissal. The court held that the state court could adequately protect the Railway's rights and that the federal preemption issue could be resolved in the state court proceedings.

SALAS V. USA

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-16936

Opinion Date: August 27, 2024

Judge: Koh

Areas of Law: Animal / Dog Law, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

A resident of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States precludes the application of a federal cockfighting prohibition. The plaintiff also sought an injunction to prevent the enforcement of this prohibition. The federal cockfighting prohibition, codified in 7 U.S.C. § 2156 and amended in 2018, made cockfighting illegal in all U.S. jurisdictions, including the CNMI.

The U.S. District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that the federal cockfighting prohibition applied to the CNMI under the Covenant. The district court determined that 7 U.S.C. § 2156 was applicable to Guam and the several states as required by Covenant § 502, and thus also applicable to the CNMI. The court also found that Covenant § 105, which governs laws enacted after January 9, 1978, did not apply to amendments of laws that existed on that date.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Covenant § 502 governs the applicability of 7 U.S.C. § 2156 and its 2018 Amendment to the CNMI. The court found that § 2156 was applicable to Guam and the several states as of January 9, 1978, and thus applicable to the CNMI. The court also held that even if Covenant § 105 were to govern, the federal cockfighting prohibition would still apply to the CNMI because it is applicable to the several states and does not impermissibly intrude upon the internal affairs of the CNMI. The court concluded that the federal interests in regulating interstate commerce, ensuring the humane treatment of animals, and preventing the spread of avian flu outweighed any intrusion into the CNMI’s internal affairs. The judgment was affirmed.

Jacobs v. JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-10963

Opinion Date: August 26, 2024

Judge: Brasher

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Consumer Law, Government & Administrative Law

Bruce Jacobs, a Florida foreclosure attorney, filed a qui tam action against JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., alleging violations of the False Claims Act (FCA). Jacobs claimed that JP Morgan Chase forged mortgage loan promissory notes and submitted false reimbursement claims to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. He asserted that JP Morgan Chase used signature stamps of former Washington Mutual employees to endorse loans improperly, thereby defrauding the government by seeking reimbursement for loan servicing costs.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed Jacobs's initial complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failing to plead fraud with particularity as required by Rule 9(b). The court also noted that Jacobs needed to establish that he was an original source of the information under the FCA’s public disclosure bar. Jacobs amended his complaint, but the district court dismissed it again, this time with prejudice. The court found that Jacobs still failed to meet the Rule 9(b) requirements and that the FCA’s public disclosure bar applied because the allegations had already been disclosed in three online blog articles, and Jacobs was not an original source of the information.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Eleventh Circuit held that the blog articles, which were publicly available before Jacobs filed his lawsuit, qualified as "news media" under the FCA. The court found that the allegations in Jacobs's complaint were substantially the same as those disclosed in the blog articles. Additionally, Jacobs did not qualify as an original source because his information did not materially add to the publicly disclosed allegations. Therefore, the FCA’s public disclosure bar precluded Jacobs's lawsuit.

Beyond Nuclear, Inc. v. NRC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 20-1187

Opinion Date: August 27, 2024

Judge: Rao

Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

Holtec International applied to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for a license to construct and operate a spent nuclear fuel storage facility in New Mexico. The NRC denied multiple requests for intervention and a hearing from various petitioners, including Beyond Nuclear, Sierra Club, and Fasken Land and Minerals. These petitioners argued that the NRC acted unreasonably and contrary to law in denying their requests.

The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (Board) found the petitioners' contentions inadmissible and denied their petitions to intervene. The NRC affirmed the Board’s decisions. Beyond Nuclear, Environmental Petitioners (including Sierra Club), and Fasken each petitioned for review of the orders denying intervention. The case was held in abeyance until the NRC issued Holtec a license, after which the case was removed from abeyance for review by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the petitions and found that the NRC reasonably declined to admit the petitioners' factual contentions and complied with statutory and regulatory requirements. The court held that Beyond Nuclear did not raise a genuine dispute of law or fact regarding the NRC’s authority to consider Holtec’s application. The court also found that Environmental Petitioners failed to demonstrate any genuine disputes of material fact or law in their contentions related to statutory authority, alleged misrepresentations by Holtec, and compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Additionally, the court determined that Fasken’s late-filed contentions were procedurally defective, untimely, and immaterial.

The court denied all the petitions for review, affirming the NRC’s decisions to deny the requests for intervention.

Pacific Gas and Electric Company v. FERC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 23-1041

Opinion Date: August 23, 2024

Judge: Rao

Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law

Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) and the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission (SFPUC) have a longstanding dispute over PG&E's obligation to wheel energy to SFPUC's customers. SFPUC generates power and sells it to end users in San Francisco but relies on PG&E to distribute this energy. The disagreement centers on which consumers are entitled to wheeled service under a grandfathering clause in PG&E's 2015 Tariff, which incorporates a statutory provision allowing wheeling for consumers served by SFPUC as of October 24, 1992.

Initially, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) rejected SFPUC's class-based approach, which argued that PG&E should wheel energy to the same types of customers served in 1992. FERC's 2019 order was vacated by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which remanded the case for FERC to provide a reasoned analysis of the statutory requirements. On remand, FERC adopted a class-based interpretation, allowing wheeling to all customers of the same class served in 1992, not just specific end users.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed FERC's orders and found them contrary to law. The court held that the plain meaning of "ultimate consumer" in the statutory provision refers to specific end users, not classes of consumers. The court emphasized that the statutory text does not support a class-based interpretation and that such an interpretation would undermine the primary restriction against FERC-ordered wheeling. Consequently, the court vacated FERC's orders and remanded the case for FERC to apply the plain meaning of the statute and determine which of SFPUC's consumers qualify for wheeled service under the 2015 Tariff.

United Parcel Service, Inc. v. PRC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 22-1029

Opinion Date: August 23, 2024

Judge: Garcia

Areas of Law: Business Law, Commercial Law, Government & Administrative Law

United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) challenged the Postal Regulatory Commission's (Commission) handling of the United States Postal Service's (Postal Service) pricing of competitive products, arguing that the Postal Service underprices these products by not accounting for "peak-season" costs incurred during the holiday season. UPS claimed that these costs, driven by increased demand for package deliveries, should be attributed to competitive products rather than being treated as institutional costs.

The Commission denied UPS's petition to initiate rulemaking proceedings and its subsequent motion for reconsideration. The Commission found that UPS's methodology for calculating peak-season costs was flawed and did not produce reliable estimates. It also concluded that the existing cost-attribution framework already accounted for the costs caused by competitive products during the peak season. The Commission explained that the Postal Service's costing models, which use an incremental-cost approach, appropriately attribute costs to competitive products and that the remaining costs are correctly treated as institutional costs.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the Commission's decision, finding that the Commission's rejection of UPS's methodology was reasonable and well-explained. The court noted that the Commission had addressed UPS's concerns about the Postal Service's costing models and had initiated further proceedings to explore potential updates to the models. The court also rejected UPS's argument that the Commission failed to consider whether peak-season costs are institutional costs uniquely associated with competitive products, noting that this issue was not properly presented in this case.

The court denied UPS's petition for review, affirming the Commission's orders.

DOJAQUEZ v. MCDONOUGH

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 23-1045

Opinion Date: August 27, 2024

Judge: Todd Michael Hughes

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Military Law

Kenneth Dojaquez, an attorney, appealed a decision regarding his entitlement to additional attorney's fees under 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d)(3). Dojaquez represented a veteran, Billy Wayne Slaughter, who was awarded an increased disability rating by the Board of Veterans' Appeals. The agency assigned an effective date of August 1, 2012, for the increased rating in a decision dated March 2, 2019, but did not notify Slaughter of this decision until April 26, 2019. Dojaquez argued that his attorney's fees should be calculated up to the notification date, not the decision date.

The Board of Veterans' Appeals concluded that Dojaquez was only entitled to attorney's fees through March 2, 2019, the date of the agency's decision. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed this decision, relying on the interpretation of 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d)(1) and established case law, specifically Snyder v. Nicholson, which defined the end date for calculating past-due benefits as the date of the award decision, not the notification date.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the "date of the final decision" under 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d)(3) refers to the date of the agency's decision assigning an effective date, not the date the veteran was notified of the decision. This interpretation ensures that attorney's fees are calculated based on past-due benefits up to the date of the award decision, consistent with the statutory language and previous case law. The court rejected Dojaquez's argument that the notification date should be used, as it would conflict with the statutory scheme and potentially allow attorneys to receive more than 20% of the claimant's past-due benefits.

SMITH v. MCDONOUGH

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 23-1378

Opinion Date: August 28, 2024

Judge: Todd Michael Hughes

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Military Law

Thomas Smith, a veteran, sought specially adapted housing (SAH) benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to build a home spa for his service-connected low back disability. Before receiving a response, he constructed the spa. His initial request was denied, and he did not appeal. Later, he sought reimbursement for the spa's construction costs, which was also denied by the VA and the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. Smith appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims but died before the case was decided. His daughter, Karen Hicks, sought to substitute herself in the appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims denied Hicks's motion for substitution, stating she was not entitled to pursue her father's claim. The court found that Hicks had not obtained a determination from the VA that she was an eligible accrued-benefits claimant, a prerequisite for substitution under the court's precedent in Breedlove v. Shinseki.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. Hicks argued that the Veterans Court should have made the determination of her eligibility for substitution without requiring a VA determination. She also contended that she should be allowed to pursue the claim under 38 C.F.R. § 36.4406, which governs SAH benefits, and under the equitable doctrine of nunc pro tunc. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court's decision, holding that the court did not err in requiring a VA determination for substitution eligibility and that Hicks did not meet the regulatory requirements for reimbursement. The court also upheld the application of the nunc pro tunc doctrine, which did not apply as Smith died before the case was submitted for decision.

In re Tellez

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S277072

Opinion Date: August 26, 2024

Judge: Evans

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

Victor Raul Tellez was charged with three counts of lewd or lascivious acts upon a child and faced a maximum prison term of 12 years. On the advice of his attorney, he accepted a plea deal, pleading guilty to one count and receiving a three-year prison sentence. Tellez was not informed that his conviction would make him eligible for civil commitment as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). After completing his prison term, the District Attorney initiated SVPA proceedings for his involuntary commitment to a state hospital.

Tellez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San Diego County Superior Court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for not being advised of the SVPA consequences. The superior court denied his petition, and the Court of Appeal also denied it, stating that prevailing norms did not require such advisement and that Tellez had not demonstrated prejudice. Tellez then petitioned the California Supreme Court for review.

The California Supreme Court held that Tellez did not sufficiently demonstrate he was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to advise him of the SVPA consequences. The court noted that Tellez provided insufficient evidence that he would not have accepted the plea deal had he been informed of the SVPA consequences. Therefore, the court did not address whether his counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient. However, recognizing the significant liberty deprivation involved in SVPA commitments, the court exercised its supervisory powers to require trial courts to inform defendants of potential SVPA consequences when pleading guilty or no contest to a qualifying offense. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was affirmed on the ground that Tellez had not demonstrated prejudice.

Kaupiko v. Board of Land and Natural Resources

Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii

Docket: SCAP-22-0000557

Opinion Date: August 28, 2024

Judge: RECKTENWALD

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves the environmental review of commercial aquarium fishing permits in Hawai'i. In 2017, the Hawai'i Supreme Court ruled that the permitting process for commercial aquarium collection must undergo environmental review under the Hawai'i Environmental Policy Act (HEPA). Following this ruling, the Environmental Court voided all existing permits and enjoined the Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) from issuing new permits without completing HEPA review. The Pet Industry Joint Advisory Council (PIJAC) then prepared an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to continue commercial aquarium fishing in the West Hawai'i Reef Fishery Management Area (WHRFMA).

The Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR) initially rejected the EIS, citing fourteen reasons. PIJAC revised the EIS and, after a public comment period, submitted it again. BLNR's vote on the revised EIS resulted in a 3-3 tie, leading to the EIS being "deemed accepted" by operation of law. Plaintiffs sued BLNR in the Environmental Court for the First Circuit, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The court ruled against the plaintiffs, finding that the EIS adequately disclosed facts for the agency to make an informed decision. Plaintiffs appealed, and the State cross-appealed the denial of its motion to dismiss.

The Hawai'i Supreme Court held that the State is a proper defendant in the case and should defend the EIS. The court also determined that the "rule of reason" should be used in conjunction with HEPA’s content requirements to evaluate an EIS. The court found that the EIS was legally sufficient as it met HEPA’s content requirements and provided enough information for BLNR to make an informed decision. Consequently, the court affirmed the Environmental Court’s denial of the State’s motion to dismiss and its grant of summary judgment for PIJAC.

O'Halloran v. Secretary of State

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Docket: 166424

Opinion Date: August 28, 2024

Judge: BOLDEN

Areas of Law: Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves two groups of plaintiffs challenging several provisions in a 2022 manual issued by the Secretary of State, which provided instructions for election challengers and poll watchers. The plaintiffs argued that the provisions conflicted with the Michigan Election Law or required formal rulemaking under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The Court of Claims consolidated the cases and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on several points, finding that certain provisions of the manual were invalid under Michigan law.

The Court of Claims found that the manual's requirements for election-challenger credentials, the communication restrictions between challengers and election inspectors, the categorization of challenges as permissible or impermissible, and the prohibition of electronic devices in absent voter ballot processing facilities violated the Michigan Election Law. The court ordered the Secretary of State to either rescind or revise the manual to comply with its opinion. The defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision.

The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and issued a mixed ruling. The court held that the Secretary of State has the authority to require a uniform form for election-challenger credentials and that this requirement does not conflict with the Michigan Election Law. The court also upheld the manual's communication restrictions, except for the requirement that challengers at absent voter ballot processing facilities must raise issues to a challenger liaison who is not an election inspector. The court found that the categorization of challenges as permissible or impermissible was generally lawful but invalidated the provision allowing a challenger liaison to deem a challenge impermissible based on their assessment of its validity. The court declared the challenge to the prohibition of electronic devices moot due to subsequent statutory amendments and vacated the lower court's opinions on that issue.

Department of Transportation v. Bloomsbury Estates, LLC

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 250PA21-2

Opinion Date: August 23, 2024

Judge: Riggs

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The case involves a dispute over the distribution of compensation following an eminent domain action by the Department of Transportation (DOT) against Bloomsbury Estates, LLC (the Developer) and Bloomsbury Estates Condominium Homeowners Association, Inc. (the Association). The DOT took a portion of the property, which included development rights held by the Developer under a condominium declaration. The Developer and the Association disagreed on how to apportion the compensation for the taking.

In the Superior Court of Wake County, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Developer, distributing the majority of the compensation to the Developer based on the valuation of development rights. The Association argued that unresolved issues in separate litigation regarding the validity of the development rights should affect the distribution. The trial court, however, concluded that the validity of the development rights had been settled in a separate action and was not subject to relitigation in the eminent domain proceeding.

The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the unresolved issues in the separate litigation were material to the distribution of the compensation and that a jury should determine the credibility of the appraisers' valuations.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment. The Supreme Court concluded that all issues related to the title and interests in the property had been resolved in the N.C.G.S. § 136-108 hearing, and the trial court properly used the appraisals to determine the distribution of the compensation. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, affirming the trial court's distribution of the compensation.

Kinsley v. Ace Speedway Racing, Ltd

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 280PA22

Opinion Date: August 23, 2024

Judge: Dietz

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, Governor Roy Cooper of North Carolina issued an executive order limiting attendance at outdoor venues to twenty-five people. Robert Turner, who operated Ace Speedway in Alamance County, publicly opposed these restrictions and kept the racetrack open. This led to a series of events where Governor Cooper allegedly pressured local officials to enforce the order against Ace Speedway, culminating in the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) issuing an abatement order to shut down the racetrack as a health hazard.

The Superior Court of Alamance County initially issued a preliminary injunction against Ace Speedway, prohibiting it from holding events until it complied with the abatement order. Ace Speedway and its operators counterclaimed, alleging constitutional violations, including the right to earn a living and selective enforcement. The trial court denied the State’s motion to dismiss these counterclaims, and the State appealed. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, allowing the case to proceed.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Court held that Ace Speedway sufficiently alleged colorable claims under the North Carolina Constitution. The allegations suggested that the State's actions were not for a proper governmental purpose but to retaliate against Turner for his public criticism, thus violating the right to earn a living. Additionally, the selective enforcement claim was deemed colorable because Ace Speedway alleged it was targeted while other similar venues were not, based on Turner’s exercise of his First Amendment rights. The Court concluded that these claims were sufficient to overcome the State’s sovereign immunity at this stage.

In re Application of Moraine Wind, L.L.C.

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-3224

Opinion Date: August 27, 2024

Judge: DEWINE

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Utilities Law

Moraine Wind, L.L.C. and other out-of-state wind farms applied to the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) for certification as eligible Ohio renewable-energy-resource-generating facilities. Carbon Solutions Group, L.L.C. (CSG), whose clients include Ohio-based renewable-energy suppliers, opposed the applications. PUCO approved the applications in September 2023. CSG filed an application for rehearing, which PUCO purported to grant for the limited purpose of further consideration, effectively extending the statutory deadline for a decision.

CSG appealed PUCO's decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio, arguing that PUCO's failure to grant or deny the rehearing application within 30 days resulted in a denial by operation of law, as per R.C. 4903.10. PUCO moved to dismiss the appeal, claiming the court lacked jurisdiction because the rehearing application was still pending.

The Supreme Court of Ohio held that PUCO's order granting rehearing for further consideration did not constitute a substantive grant of rehearing. The court emphasized that R.C. 4903.10 requires PUCO to grant or deny an application for rehearing within 30 days, and failure to do so results in a denial by operation of law. The court found that PUCO's practice of extending the deadline was not supported by statute and undermined the legislative intent for timely judicial review. Consequently, the court denied PUCO's motion to dismiss, affirming that CSG's application for rehearing was denied by operation of law, and the appeal was timely filed.

IN RE DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS AND BROWN

Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Docket: 24-0426

Opinion Date: August 23, 2024

Judge: YOUNG

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

Dallas County sued state officials in Travis County, alleging that the Texas Health and Human Services Commission (HHSC) failed to take custody of criminal defendants adjudicated incompetent to stand trial, imposing costs on the County. The district court denied the State’s plea to the jurisdiction, leading to an appeal in the Third Court of Appeals. However, due to legislative changes, this appeal is set to be transferred to the newly created Fifteenth Court of Appeals, which will have exclusive jurisdiction over certain state-related cases.

The Third Court of Appeals could not resolve the appeal before its mandatory transfer to the Fifteenth Court. Dallas County preferred to remain in the Third Court and petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas to bar the transfer and declare the legislation creating the Fifteenth Court unconstitutional. The County argued that the Fifteenth Court’s statewide jurisdiction, its jurisdictional scope, and the appointment process for its justices were unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that it had jurisdiction over Dallas County’s petition. The Court concluded that the creation of the Fifteenth Court was constitutional. It found that the Texas Constitution allows the legislature substantial discretion in creating courts and defining their jurisdiction. The Court also held that the appointment process for the Fifteenth Court’s justices, who will be appointed initially and then elected in the next general election, was constitutional. Consequently, the Court denied Dallas County’s request for relief, meaning the appeal must be transferred to the Fifteenth Court as scheduled.

Skoric v. Department of Labor

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 VT 55

Opinion Date: August 23, 2024

Judge: Waples

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

The petitioner worked part-time as a bus fueler and washer at Marble Valley Regional Transit (MVRT) for approximately four years. He passed a preemployment drug screen and signed an acknowledgment of MVRT’s drug and alcohol policy, which included random drug testing and termination for a positive drug test. In December 2022, he tested positive for marijuana during a random drug test and was terminated in January 2023 for violating U.S. Department of Transportation and Federal Transit Administration (FTA) regulations. The petitioner had a medical marijuana card issued in early 2020.

The petitioner applied for unemployment benefits, which were denied by a claims adjudicator on the grounds of misconduct. He appealed to an administrative law judge (ALJ), who affirmed the denial but reduced the disqualification period to six weeks, recognizing the medical use of cannabis. The petitioner then filed a document with the Employment Security Board, seeking a declaratory ruling on the applicability of the misconduct disqualification provision to off-duty medical cannabis use. The Board treated this as an appeal and affirmed the ALJ’s decision, stating that the petitioner’s actions constituted misconduct under MVRT’s drug policy.

The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Board’s decision. The Court held that the Board properly declined to issue a declaratory ruling because the petitioner had an available remedy through a direct appeal. The Court emphasized that declaratory rulings are not a substitute for timely appeals of agency decisions. The petitioner’s appeal of the Board’s decision was dismissed as untimely, and the Court affirmed the Board’s order declining to issue a declaratory ruling.

In re Recall of Weyrich

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 102,594-7

Opinion Date: August 29, 2024

Judge: Barbara Madsen

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

Cody Hart filed a petition to recall Skagit County Prosecuting Attorney Richard A. Weyrich, Skagit County Auditor Sandra F. Perkins, and Skagit County Sheriff Donald L. McDermott. Hart alleged that the officials vacated their offices by failing to file their official bonds before their new term began on January 1, 2023, among other charges. The petition was certified and transmitted by the Skagit County auditor, and Deputy Solicitor General Karl Smith was appointed to prepare the ballot synopses. The Skagit County Superior Court found the charges legally and factually insufficient to support a recall and denied Hart’s motion to amend the ballot synopses.

The Skagit County Superior Court approved the ballot synopses but found the charges against all three officials legally and factually insufficient. The court determined that the officials had obtained their bonds before the new term began, and their failure to file the bonds on time did not demonstrate intent to violate the law. Additionally, the court found that the officials' actions did not constitute misfeasance, malfeasance, or a violation of their oath of office. Hart then appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.

The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that the charges were legally and factually insufficient, as Hart failed to show intent to violate the law or willful failure to secure a bond. The court also found that the officials' actions did not amount to misfeasance, malfeasance, or a violation of their oath of office. The court concluded that the officials' prior bonds were sufficient until their new bonds were filed, and their actions did not warrant removal from office. The court denied Hart’s various motions, including those for expedited declaratory judgment and recusal of the Chief Justice.