FOMB v. AmeriNational Community Services, LLC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1747

Opinion Date: July 17, 2024

Judge: Rikelman

Areas of Law: Contracts, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves the restructuring of Puerto Rico's public debts under Title VI of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA). The dispute centers on whether the final transaction documents or the preliminary documents control the terms of the debt restructuring. The preliminary documents included a Valid Claim Requirement, which stipulated that new bonds would only be issued if valid claims were made. However, the final transaction documents did not include this requirement.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico initially approved the restructuring plan, which included the terms set forth in the preliminary documents. However, the court also noted that the final terms would be subject to the execution and delivery of definitive documents. When the final documents were executed, they did not include the Valid Claim Requirement. The district court later ruled that the final documents, not the preliminary ones, governed the transaction, and overruled objections based on the omission of the Valid Claim Requirement.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the final transaction documents control the terms of the debt restructuring. The court emphasized that the preliminary documents were explicitly provisional and subject to final documentation. The final documents, which did not include the Valid Claim Requirement, were deemed to be the definitive terms of the restructuring. The court also noted that the Requisite Bondholders had approval rights over the final documents and did not object to the absence of the Valid Claim Requirement.

Thus, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, concluding that the final transaction documents govern the debt restructuring, and the Valid Claim Requirement from the preliminary documents does not apply.

Dobbin Plantersville Water Supply Corporation v. Lake

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-50215

Opinion Date: July 16, 2024

Judge: Edith H. Jones

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

Dobbin Plantersville Water Supply Corporation (Dobbin) held a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity (CCN) to provide water service in certain areas of Texas. Dobbin, a recipient of federal loans under 7 U.S.C. § 1926, which grants monopoly protection to loan recipients, faced decertification petitions from developers SIG Magnolia L.P. and Redbird Development L.L.C. The Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUC) granted these petitions, finding that Dobbin was not providing actual water service to the developers' properties. Dobbin then filed a lawsuit in federal court, arguing that the Texas Water Code section allowing decertification was preempted by federal law.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed Dobbin's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the PUC officials, concluding they were not appropriate defendants under § 1983. At the summary judgment stage, the district court dismissed Dobbin's remaining claims with prejudice, primarily on jurisdictional grounds. The court found that Dobbin lacked a cause of action against the developers and that an injunction against the PUC would not redress Dobbin's injuries.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Dobbin lacked standing to seek an injunction against the PUC officials because such relief would not redress its injuries. The court also upheld the dismissal of Dobbin's § 1983 claim against the PUC officials, reiterating that state officials in their official capacities are not "persons" under § 1983. Lastly, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to dismiss Dobbin's claims against the developers with prejudice, as Dobbin lacked a viable cause of action against them.

Jones v. O'Malley

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-30831

Opinion Date: July 12, 2024

Judge: Engelhardt

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Public Benefits

Joshua Jones applied for disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI) on October 1, 2019, citing various medical conditions including disc herniation, diabetes, and high blood pressure. His applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. Jones then requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), which took place on August 5, 2021. The ALJ denied his claims on October 6, 2021. Jones appealed to the Appeals Council, which denied review. Subsequently, he sought judicial review in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, which upheld the Commissioner’s decision.

The district court reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment and adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation to deny Jones’ motion and grant the Commissioner’s motion. The court found that the ALJ had applied the correct legal standards and that substantial evidence supported the decision. Jones then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the ALJ correctly applied Listing 1.15, which became effective on April 2, 2021, rather than the older Listing 1.04, to evaluate Jones’ claims. The court found that applying the new listing to pending claims did not constitute impermissible retroactivity. Additionally, the court determined that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, including the finding that Jones did not meet the criteria for medical equivalency under Listing 1.15. The court also concluded that the ALJ properly considered the impact of Jones’ medical treatments on his ability to maintain employment, finding no evidence that his treatment regimen significantly interrupted his ability to work.

State of Utah v. Su

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-11097

Opinion Date: July 18, 2024

Judge: Willett

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, ERISA, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

A group of plaintiffs, including several states and corporations, challenged a Department of Labor rule that allowed ERISA fiduciaries to consider environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors when making investment decisions if those factors equally serve the financial interests of the plan. This rule was issued following an executive order by President Biden, which counteracted a previous Trump-era rule that prohibited considering non-pecuniary factors in investment decisions.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas upheld the Department of Labor's rule, relying on the Chevron deference doctrine, which allows courts to defer to a federal agency's interpretation of ambiguous statutory language. The district court concluded that the rule was not "manifestly contrary to the statute" after affording the Department the deference due under Chevron.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. During the appeal, the Supreme Court decided Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which overruled Chevron, thus eliminating the deference previously given to agency interpretations. Given this significant change in the legal landscape, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the new Supreme Court decision. The appellate court emphasized the importance of allowing the district court to reassess the merits without the Chevron framework, ensuring that the lower court's independent judgment is applied to the statutory interpretation of ERISA.

USA v. Conyers

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-20227

Opinion Date: July 16, 2024

Judge: Duncan

Areas of Law: Contracts, Government & Administrative Law, Government Contracts

The case involves the estate of Bud Conyers seeking a relator’s share of the proceeds from a settlement between the United States and military contractor Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR) under the False Claims Act (FCA). Conyers, a former KBR truck driver, had filed a qui tam suit alleging various fraudulent activities by KBR, including the use of mortuary trailers for supplies, kickbacks for defective trucks, and billing for prostitutes. The government later intervened in Conyers’s suit but pursued different claims involving KBR employees Mazon, Seamans, and Martin, who were involved in separate kickback schemes.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas awarded Conyers’s estate approximately $1.1 million, finding a “factual overlap” between Conyers’s allegations and the settled claims, particularly with Martin’s kickback scheme involving trucks. The court reasoned that Conyers’s allegations had put the government on notice of fraud in trucking contracts, which arguably led to the investigation of Martin. The district court also ordered the government to pay Conyers’s attorney’s fees.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that under the FCA, a relator is entitled to a share only of the settlement of the claim he brought, not additional claims added by the government. The court found no relevant factual overlap between Conyers’s claims and the settled claims involving Mazon, Seamans, and Martin. The court also rejected the district court’s reasoning that Conyers’s allegations spurred the investigation into Martin’s misconduct, noting that the FCA does not entitle a relator to recover from new claims discovered by the government. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Conyers’s estate was not entitled to any share of the settlement proceeds and reversed the award of attorney’s fees.

AMERICAN APPAREL & FOOTWEAR ASSOCIATION, INC. V. BADEN

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-35114

Opinion Date: July 15, 2024

Judge: Ezra

Areas of Law: Consumer Law, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves trade associations representing manufacturers of children's products challenging Oregon's Toxic-Free Kids Act (TFKA) and its implementing regulations. The TFKA requires the Oregon Health Authority (OHA) to maintain a list of high priority chemicals of concern for children's health and imposes reporting and removal requirements for these chemicals. The trade associations argued that these state requirements are preempted by the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA) and the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA).

The United States District Court for the District of Oregon partially dismissed the trade associations' claims and granted partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The district court concluded that the federal Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) had not exercised independent judgment or expertise to trigger the express preemption provisions of the FHSA or CPSA for all 73 chemicals listed by the OHA. Therefore, the trade associations' facial challenges failed because they could not show that the Oregon statute and its regulations were invalid in all their applications.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the FHSA and CPSA did not expressly preempt the TFKA and its regulations because the CPSC had not promulgated regulations for all the chemicals at issue. The court also found that the CPSA did not impliedly preempt the TFKA through principles of conflict preemption. The court concluded that the state law did not interfere with the federal regulatory scheme and upheld the district court's judgment. The decision was affirmed.

BELL V. WILLIAMS

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-16580

Opinion Date: July 18, 2024

Judge: Hamilton

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

Vincent Bell, a pretrial detainee with an amputated right leg, alleged that deputies used excessive force during a cell extraction and transfer at the San Francisco Jail. Bell claimed that Sergeant Yvette Williams did not provide him with a wheelchair or other mobility device, forcing him to hop on one leg until he fell. Deputies then carried him by his arms and leg, causing him pain and minor injuries. Bell sued under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California held a jury trial. The jury found in favor of Bell on his excessive force claim against Williams and his ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against the City and County of San Francisco. However, the jury did not find that Williams caused Bell physical or emotional harm. The jury awarded Bell $504,000 in compensatory damages against the City but not against Williams. The district court denied the defendants' post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the jury's verdict on Bell's Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim and his ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, finding substantial evidence supported these claims. However, the court reversed the district court's decision on Bell's Monell theory of liability, concluding that Bell did not present substantial evidence showing that the City's training was the product of deliberate indifference to a known risk. The court also vacated the jury's compensatory damages award, deeming it grossly excessive, and remanded for a remittitur or a new trial on damages.

DEFENSE FOR CHILDREN INTERNATIONAL-PALESTINE V. BIDEN

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 24-704

Opinion Date: July 15, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

The plaintiffs, including Palestinian NGOs, Gaza residents, and Palestinian-Americans, sought to enjoin the U.S. President and senior officials from providing military, diplomatic, and financial support to Israel in its operations in Gaza. They alleged that the U.S. violated its obligations under the Genocide Convention by being complicit in genocide through its support of Israel. The plaintiffs requested wide-ranging injunctive and declaratory relief to stop U.S. assistance to Israel and to influence Israel to cease its military actions in Gaza.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the complaint, ruling that the claims raised non-justiciable political questions. The court found that the issues were fundamentally political and not suitable for judicial resolution, as they involved decisions constitutionally committed to the political branches of government.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs' claims presented non-justiciable political questions under the political question doctrine. The court emphasized that decisions regarding military and diplomatic support to foreign nations are constitutionally committed to the executive and legislative branches, not the judiciary. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that framing their claims as violations of legal duties circumvented the political question doctrine. The court concluded that the judiciary does not have the authority to make decisions on national security and foreign policy matters, which are the prerogatives of the political branches. The request for declaratory relief was also found to be non-justiciable for the same reasons. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint.

GONZALES & GONZALES BONDS & INSURANCE AGENCY, INC.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-16552

Opinion Date: July 18, 2024

Judge: Bea

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law

The case involves several companies that post immigration surety bonds challenging a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) rule. The rule, promulgated by Acting Secretary Chad Wolf in 2020, allowed DHS to refuse business from certain surety firms. The plaintiffs argued that Wolf was not duly appointed and thus lacked the authority to issue the rule. In 2021, Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas, who was duly appointed, ratified the rule.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The court found that Wolf was not properly serving as Acting Secretary when he promulgated the rule and that Mayorkas's ratification was barred by the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA). The district court vacated the rule, agreeing with the plaintiffs that the rule was improperly promulgated.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the FVRA did not bar Mayorkas from ratifying the rule and that the ratification cured any defects in the rule’s promulgation. The court explained that the Ratification Bar in the FVRA applies only to nondelegable functions or duties, which are those required by statute or regulation to be performed by the applicable officer and only that officer. Since the promulgation of the rule was a delegable duty, the ratification by Mayorkas was valid.

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and remanded the case for further proceedings. The main holding was that the ratification by a duly appointed Secretary cured any defects in the rule’s initial promulgation by an improperly appointed Acting Secretary.

State of Oklahoma v. HHS

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 24-6063

Opinion Date: July 15, 2024

Judge: BACHARACH

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

The case involves a congressional program that awards grants for family-planning projects, with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) setting eligibility requirements. Oklahoma, a grant recipient, expressed concerns about these requirements, citing state laws prohibiting counseling and referrals for abortions. HHS proposed that Oklahoma provide neutral information about family-planning options, including abortion, through a national call-in number. Oklahoma rejected this proposal, leading HHS to terminate the grant. Oklahoma challenged the termination and sought a preliminary injunction.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma denied Oklahoma's motion for a preliminary injunction, determining that Oklahoma was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its claims. Oklahoma then appealed the decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. Oklahoma argued that it would likely succeed on the merits for three reasons: (1) Congress's spending power did not allow it to delegate eligibility requirements to HHS, (2) HHS's requirements violated the Weldon Amendment, and (3) HHS acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The Tenth Circuit rejected these arguments, holding that:

1. The spending power allowed Congress to delegate eligibility requirements to HHS, and Title X was unambiguous in conditioning eligibility on satisfaction of HHS's requirements.
2. The Weldon Amendment, which prohibits discrimination against health-care entities for declining to provide referrals for abortions, was not violated because HHS's proposal to use a national call-in number did not constitute a referral for the purpose of an abortion.
3. HHS did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in terminating Oklahoma's grant, as the eligibility requirements fell within HHS's statutory authority, and Oklahoma did not demonstrate a likely violation of HHS's regulations.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction, concluding that Oklahoma had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims.

United States v. Lesh

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-1074

Opinion Date: July 16, 2024

Judge: TYMKOVICH

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

David Lesh, a social media content creator and owner of an outdoor apparel brand, posted photos on Instagram of himself snowmobiling at Keystone Resort, Colorado, during its closure due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The United States charged him with using an over-snow vehicle on National Forest Service (NFS) land off a designated route and conducting unauthorized work activity on NFS land. A magistrate judge convicted him of both counts after a bench trial.

The magistrate judge found Lesh guilty of using an over-snow vehicle on NFS land off a designated route, taking judicial notice of a publicly available map indicating that Keystone Resort was not designated for snowmobile use. Lesh's argument that the map's undated nature failed to provide sufficient notice was not preserved for appeal. The district court affirmed the magistrate judge's decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Lesh's conviction for using an over-snow vehicle on NFS land off a designated route, finding that Lesh had waived his challenge to the judicial notice of the map. However, the court reversed his conviction for unauthorized work activity under 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(c). The court held that the regulation was impermissibly vague as applied to Lesh's conduct, as it did not provide fair warning that posting images on social media could constitute a federal crime. The court also found insufficient evidence to prove that Lesh's primary purpose in posting the photos was to sell goods or services, as required by the regulation. The court concluded that Lesh was not deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, as the maximum penalty he faced did not exceed six months of imprisonment.

Johnson v. City of Atlanta

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-11359

Opinion Date: July 12, 2024

Judge: BRANCH

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

Charles Johnson, Jr. was arrested by Officer Garrett Rolfe for driving while intoxicated. Johnson alleged that Rolfe used excessive force during the arrest, resulting in a broken collarbone. Johnson sued Rolfe and the City of Atlanta under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Georgia state law, claiming excessive force and battery. Johnson's complaint stated that he was respectful and did not resist arrest, but Rolfe threw him to the ground, causing his injury.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia reviewed the case. The City moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing it failed to state a claim for Monell liability. Rolfe moved for judgment on the pleadings, submitting body camera and dashcam footage showing Johnson resisting arrest. The district court considered the video evidence, determining it was central to Johnson's claims and its authenticity was not disputed. The court found that Rolfe did not use excessive force and was entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and official immunity on the state law claims. Consequently, the court dismissed the Monell claim against the City, as there was no underlying constitutional violation.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the video evidence was properly considered under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. The court found that Rolfe's use of force was objectively reasonable given the circumstances, including Johnson's resistance and the dangerous location of the arrest. Therefore, Rolfe was entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and official immunity on the state law claims. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Monell claim against the City, as no constitutional violation occurred.

Columbia Gulf Transmission, LLC v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 22-1151

Opinion Date: July 12, 2024

Judge: Wilkins

Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law

Range Resources-Appalachia, LLC (Range) and Columbia Gulf Transmission, LLC (Columbia Gulf) filed administrative complaints against Texas Eastern Transmission, LP (Texas Eastern) with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Range, a natural gas producer, has long-term agreements with Texas Eastern and Columbia Gulf to transport gas through the Adair Interconnect. During two periods in 2019 and 2021, Texas Eastern's pipeline pressure was too low to move gas into Columbia Gulf's system, causing significant financial losses for Range. Petitioners sought FERC's intervention to require Texas Eastern to maintain higher pipeline pressures.

FERC dismissed the complaints, finding that Texas Eastern had no minimum delivery pressure obligation. FERC also denied rehearing requests, stating that the complaints did not sufficiently demonstrate a violation of any pressure obligations. Petitioners argued that Texas Eastern failed to comply with its tariff and the Adair Interconnection Agreement, but FERC found these arguments procedurally and substantively insufficient. Additionally, FERC concluded that Texas Eastern's force majeure declaration in 2021 was irrelevant to the issue of reservation charge credits, as Columbia Gulf's refusal to accept gas was outside Texas Eastern's control.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld FERC's dismissal, agreeing that the complaints did not adequately plead violations of the Texas Eastern Tariff or the Adair Interconnection Agreement. The court also found that FERC did not need to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issues of equal service and the force majeure declaration, as the written record was sufficient. The court denied the petitions for review, affirming FERC's orders.

Healthy Gulf v. FERC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 23-1069

Opinion Date: July 16, 2024

Judge: Garcia

Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

Healthy Gulf and other environmental groups challenged the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) decision to authorize the construction and operation of liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities in southwestern Louisiana. They argued that FERC did not properly address certain requirements under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Natural Gas Act (NGA). Specifically, they contended that FERC inadequately explained its failure to determine the environmental significance of the project's greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and failed to adequately assess the cumulative effects of the project's nitrogen dioxide (NO2) emissions. However, they acknowledged that FERC did consider alternatives to the project.

The Commission had issued a final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) and authorized the project, finding it environmentally acceptable and consistent with the public interest. Petitioners requested a rehearing, which was deemed denied by operation of law when FERC did not respond timely. They then sought review from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that FERC inadequately explained its failure to determine the significance of the project's GHG emissions and failed to properly assess the cumulative effects of the project's NO2 emissions. The court noted that FERC's reliance on the Significant Impact Levels (SILs) to assess cumulative effects was insufficient and that FERC did not adequately consider the significance of GHG emissions using available methodologies. However, the court upheld FERC's consideration of alternatives to the project, finding that FERC had provided sufficient reasoning for rejecting the proposed alternatives.

The court granted the petitions in part, denied them in part, and remanded the case to FERC for further consideration without vacating the authorization order. The court instructed FERC to provide a more thorough explanation of its GHG emissions analysis and to properly assess the cumulative effects of NO2 emissions.

International Dark-Sky Association, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 22-1337

Opinion Date: July 12, 2024

Judge: RAO

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

Space Exploration Holdings (SpaceX) applied for a license from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to operate 29,988 low-altitude non-geostationary orbit satellites for its second-generation Starlink system. The FCC conditionally approved the license for 7,500 satellites, citing the public interest in improving broadband access. The approval was contingent on SpaceX obtaining a favorable finding from the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) regarding compliance with power flux-density limits to prevent signal interference.

DISH Network Corporation and the International Dark-Sky Association opposed the license. DISH argued that SpaceX's satellites would cause unacceptable interference and that the FCC unlawfully delegated its authority to the ITU. The FCC dismissed DISH's evidence, relying on SpaceX's self-certification and the ITU's eventual verification. The FCC also granted an interim waiver allowing SpaceX to begin operations before the ITU's finding, citing public interest. The International Dark-Sky Association argued that the FCC failed to conduct an environmental review as required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The FCC concluded that its regulations did not require such a review and denied the request.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the FCC's decision to license SpaceX's satellites was lawful and reasonably explained. The court found that the FCC was not required to independently verify SpaceX's self-certification and that the interim waiver was justified by public interest considerations. The court also determined that the FCC did not unlawfully delegate its authority to the ITU, as the ITU's role was limited to fact gathering and compliance verification. Regarding the environmental review, the court held that the FCC reasonably concluded that SpaceX's mitigation efforts and the FAA's environmental assessment of rocket launches were sufficient to avoid significant environmental impacts.

The court affirmed the FCC's order licensing SpaceX's Gen2 Starlink satellites.

Kowal v. DOJ

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 22-5231

Opinion Date: July 16, 2024

Judge: Rao

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law

Barbara Kowal, a paralegal for a federal public defender, filed FOIA requests with the ATF, FBI, and DEA seeking records related to Daniel Troya, who was sentenced to death for a gang-related murder. The agencies conducted searches and produced some documents but withheld others, citing various FOIA exemptions. Dissatisfied, Kowal filed two lawsuits claiming the searches were inadequate and the records were wrongfully withheld.

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the agencies in both cases. The court found that the agencies conducted adequate searches and properly invoked FOIA exemptions to withhold certain records. Kowal appealed these decisions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's rulings. The appellate court held that the agencies' searches were reasonable and tailored to Kowal's specific requests. The court also found that the agencies properly justified their withholdings under FOIA Exemptions 3, 6, 7(C), 7(D), and 7(E). The court noted that the agencies provided sufficient affidavits explaining the applicability of these exemptions and that Kowal failed to demonstrate any significant public interest that would outweigh the privacy and security concerns protected by the exemptions.

In conclusion, the appellate court affirmed the district court's grants of summary judgment, holding that the agencies conducted adequate searches and properly withheld records under the cited FOIA exemptions.

Wye Oak Technology, Inc. v. Republic of Iraq

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 23-7009

Opinion Date: July 16, 2024

Judge: Patricia Ann Millett

Areas of Law: Contracts, Government & Administrative Law

In late 2003, Wye Oak Technology, Inc., a small American company, entered into a contract with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense to rebuild Iraq’s military. Wye Oak performed under the contract for nearly five months, but Iraq refused to pay and instead gave the money to another party. When Wye Oak’s owner traveled to Iraq to resolve the payment issue, he was killed by unidentified assailants. Wye Oak eventually ceased operations in Iraq and later sued Iraq in a U.S. federal district court for breach of contract.

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia found Iraq liable after a bench trial and awarded Wye Oak over $120 million in damages. The court initially held that it had jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) based on the commercial exception’s second clause. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated this judgment, ruling that the second clause did not apply and remanded the case to determine if the third clause of the commercial exception applied. On remand, the district court found that Iraq’s breach had direct effects in the United States, thus reentering its damages order.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Iraq’s breach did not cause a direct effect in the United States as required by the FSIA’s commercial exception. The court noted that the contract and its breach were centered in Iraq, and any effects in the United States were too attenuated or involved intervening elements. Consequently, the court held that Iraq was immune from suit, vacated the district court’s judgment, and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss.

ADEE HONEY FARMS v. US

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 22-2105

Opinion Date: July 15, 2024

Judge: Cunningham

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, International Law, International Trade

The case involves a dispute over the distribution of interest associated with antidumping and countervailing duties under the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (CDSOA). Plaintiffs, who are affected domestic producers, argued that the United States Customs and Border Protection (Customs) unlawfully excluded delinquency interest from the distributions they were entitled to receive under the CDSOA. Customs had been distributing only interest charged on antidumping and countervailing duties at liquidation, as specified by 19 U.S.C. § 1677g, and not delinquency interest assessed under 19 U.S.C. § 1505(d).

The United States Court of International Trade (CIT) initially dismissed claims related to distributions made more than two years before the complaints were filed, citing the statute of limitations. The CIT found that the Final Rule published by Customs in 2001 provided adequate notice of its decision to exclude delinquency interest. The CIT also denied plaintiffs' motions for reconsideration, maintaining that the Final Rule sufficiently informed the public of Customs' decision. Finally, the CIT denied plaintiffs' motions for judgment on the agency record, holding that the CDSOA did not require Customs to distribute delinquency interest.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the CIT's decisions. The Federal Circuit held that the Final Rule provided adequate notice of Customs' decision to exclude delinquency interest, thus supporting the CIT's dismissal of claims outside the two-year statutory period. The court also concluded that the CDSOA unambiguously excludes delinquency interest from distributions to affected producers. Therefore, the court affirmed the CIT's judgment in favor of the government, upholding Customs' practice of excluding delinquency interest from CDSOA distributions.

RAVIN v. MCDONOUGH

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 22-2104

Opinion Date: July 18, 2024

Judge: Dyk

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Military Law

Sean Ravin, an attorney, sought fees for representing Curtis D. Skogsbergh, a veteran claiming disability benefits. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) initially granted Skogsbergh a 10% disability rating, later increased to 20%. Skogsbergh, acting pro se, appealed for a higher rating and submitted a claim for total disability based on individual unemployability (TDIU). The VA denied TDIU, and the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) did not address it in their decision. Skogsbergh retained Ravin, who represented him in an appeal to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court), which vacated the Board’s decision for not addressing TDIU.

The Board later remanded the TDIU claim, and the VA granted TDIU with past-due benefits. However, the VA denied Ravin’s attorney fees, leading him to appeal to the Board, which found the fee agreement valid but denied fees, stating the Board’s decision was not final. Ravin appealed to the Veterans Court, which vacated the Board’s decision, finding the Board’s interpretation of finality incorrect but remanding for clarification on whether all fee award requirements were met.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the Veterans Court’s decision was non-final, as it remanded the case for further proceedings. The Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that the remand did not meet the criteria for a final decision and that the Veterans Court was within its authority to remand for clarification.

Cal. Community Choice Assn. v. Public Utilities Com.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A168807(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 15, 2024

Judge: Goldman

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Utilities Law

The case involves the California Community Choice Association (the Association), which represents Community Choice Aggregators (CCAs) that purchase electricity on behalf of residents and businesses. The Association challenged a resolution by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) that set the effective dates for the expansion of two CCAs, Central Coast Community Energy (CCCE) and East Bay Community Energy (EBCE), to January 2025. The Association argued that the PUC exceeded its jurisdiction and failed to follow legal procedures in setting these dates.

The PUC had issued Draft Resolution E-5258, setting January 1, 2025, as the earliest possible effective date for the expansions of CCCE and EBCE. The Association, CCCE, and EBCE opposed this, claiming the PUC overstepped its authority. The PUC adopted the resolution and later denied rehearing requests, modifying some factual findings but maintaining the 2025 effective date. The PUC justified the delay by citing past failures of CCCE and EBCE to meet resource adequacy requirements, which led to cost shifting to customers of investor-owned utilities.

The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the PUC acted within its jurisdiction under Public Utilities Code section 366.2, subdivision (a)(4), which mandates preventing cost shifting between CCA and non-CCA customers. The court held that the PUC's decision to delay the expansions was not arbitrary or capricious and was supported by evidence of past resource adequacy deficiencies by CCCE and EBCE. The court affirmed the PUC's decision and resolution, concluding that the Association's arguments did not demonstrate that the PUC had abused its discretion.

Let Them Choose v. San Diego Unified School District

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D082478(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 18, 2024

Judge: Dato

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In September 2021, the San Diego Unified School District (District) proposed a "Vaccination Roadmap" requiring students to be vaccinated against COVID-19 to attend in-person classes and participate in extracurricular activities. Plaintiffs, including an organization and an individual parent, challenged the District's authority to impose this requirement, arguing that such decisions must be made at the state level. The trial court agreed, ruling that the Roadmap was preempted by state law, and judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiffs.

The District appealed, and the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the local vaccination requirement conflicted with state law and that the state had fully occupied the field of school vaccination mandates. Following this decision, the plaintiffs sought attorney’s fees under California's private attorney general statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. The trial court denied the motions, reasoning that the litigation did not enforce an important right affecting the public and that the District's actions were commendable and did not adversely affect the public interest.

The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reversed the trial court's denial of attorney’s fees. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs' lawsuit enforced an important public right by ensuring that the District complied with state law regarding school vaccination requirements. The court emphasized that the litigation conferred a significant benefit on the general public by upholding the state's comprehensive immunization policy. The court also rejected the trial court's rationale that the District's good intentions precluded an award of attorney’s fees, clarifying that the focus should be on the enforcement of public rights, not the subjective merits of the District's actions. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the appropriate amount of attorney’s fees.

City of Hastings v. Sheets

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 317 Neb. 88

Opinion Date: July 12, 2024

Judge: Heavican

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves a dispute between the City of Hastings and a group of appellants referred to as the "chief petitioners." The chief petitioners submitted a referendum petition to repeal a city council measure approving the demolition of a viaduct. The City of Hastings sought a declaratory judgment to determine whether it was required to hold a special referendum election, given that the viaduct was demolished during the pendency of the action.

The District Court for Adams County initially denied the chief petitioners' request for a temporary injunction to prevent the demolition. Subsequently, the viaduct was demolished. The district court then ruled that the case was moot because the viaduct no longer existed, and any referendum would be ineffectual. However, the court also addressed other arguments and ultimately declared that no election or ballot submission should be made.

The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and agreed with the district court's finding that the case was moot. The court noted that the demolition of the viaduct eradicated the parties' legal interests in the dispute, making any referendum on the issue meaningless. The court also considered whether the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applied but concluded that the specific circumstances of the case did not warrant an authoritative adjudication for future guidance.

The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case with directions to dismiss the action due to mootness.

Petition of City of Manchester

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-0696

Opinion Date: July 16, 2024

Judge: BASSETT

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

Eight New Hampshire employers sought a writ of mandamus to compel the New Hampshire Department of Labor (DOL) to hold department-level hearings. These employers had their applications for reimbursement from the Special Fund for Second Injuries denied. The employers argued that they were entitled to a hearing under RSA 281-A:43, I(a). The DOL had denied their requests for such hearings, stating that the disputes were more appropriately heard by the Compensation Appeals Board (CAB).

The employers initially appealed to the CAB and requested department-level hearings from the DOL. The DOL denied these requests, leading the employers to file a petition for original jurisdiction with the New Hampshire Supreme Court. The proceedings before the CAB were stayed pending the Supreme Court's decision.

The New Hampshire Supreme Court reviewed whether the DOL is statutorily required to grant a request for a department-level hearing when an employer’s request for reimbursement from the Fund is denied. The court held that RSA 281-A:43, I(a) grants employers the right to a department-level hearing before an authorized representative of the commissioner when they have been denied reimbursement from the Fund. The court found that the statute's language supports the employers' right to such a hearing and that this interpretation aligns with the statutory scheme's purpose of encouraging employers to hire or retain employees with permanent impairments. Consequently, the court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus, compelling the DOL to hold the requested hearings.

Look Ahead Am. v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Elections

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-2691

Opinion Date: July 18, 2024

Judge: KENNEDY

Areas of Law: Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Stark County Board of Elections considered and voted to purchase Dominion Voting Systems equipment during four meetings. These discussions and decisions occurred in executive sessions, which are closed to the public. Look Ahead America and Merry Lynne Rini filed a complaint alleging that the board violated Ohio’s Open Meetings Act by not limiting its executive-session discussions to matters where premature disclosure would give an unfair competitive or bargaining advantage.

The Stark County Court of Common Pleas upheld the board’s actions, interpreting R.C. 121.22(G)(2) to mean that the premature-disclosure clause applied only to the last-listed reason for entering executive session, not to the purchase of property. The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, agreeing with the trial court’s interpretation.

The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and disagreed with the lower courts. The court held that the premature-disclosure clause in R.C. 121.22(G)(2) applies to all the permissible reasons listed for entering executive session, not just the last one. The court reversed the Fifth District’s judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial applying this interpretation.

State ex rel. Ames v. Three Rivers Local School Dist. Records Comm.

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-2686

Opinion Date: July 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law

Brian M. Ames sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Three Rivers Local School District Records Commission to produce records in response to his public-records request. Ames requested meeting notification rules, meeting minutes, meeting notices, and records retention schedules for the years 2021, 2022, and 2023. The commission provided some documents but not all, leading Ames to file this action.

The commission initially provided Ames with a 2023 meeting-notification policy and unsigned meeting minutes via a website link. After Ames filed his complaint, the commission provided additional documents, including a policy effective in 2021 and 2022, signed minutes for 2022, and records retention schedules for 2021 and 2022. The commission stated that no separate meeting-notification rules for the commission existed, no minutes for 2021 existed, and the 2023 meeting had not yet occurred at the time of the request.

The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and found that the commission had produced all documents in its possession responsive to Ames’s request. The court denied the writ of mandamus as moot, as Ames did not provide evidence to refute the commission’s claims. The court also denied Ames’s requests for statutory damages, attorney fees, and court costs. The court noted that Ames, as a pro se litigant, was not entitled to attorney fees and that he waived his request for court costs by not arguing for them in his merit brief. The court also denied Ames’s motion to strike certain exhibits submitted by the commission.

State ex rel. Black v. Cleveland

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-2688

Opinion Date: July 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

In April 2012, Arnold Black was arrested during a traffic stop by East Cleveland police officers without any legitimate reason. Detective Randy Hicks violently assaulted Black and detained him in a storage room for four days. Black sued Hicks, Chief Ralph Spotts, and the City of East Cleveland for his injuries. In August 2019, a jury awarded Black $20 million in compensatory damages and $15 million in punitive damages against Hicks and Spotts each. The trial court also awarded Black $5.2 million in prejudgment interest.

The City of East Cleveland and Spotts appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The Ohio Supreme Court declined jurisdiction over their discretionary appeal, and the United States Supreme Court denied the city’s petition for a writ of certiorari. Despite these rulings, the city failed to satisfy the judgment or take steps to appropriate the necessary funds.

The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and granted Black’s request for a writ of mandamus. The court held that Black had a clear legal right to enforcement of the civil judgment and that the city had a legal duty to pay the judgment, including pre- and postjudgment interest. The court ordered the city to satisfy the judgment or take the necessary steps to appropriate the funds as described in R.C. 2744.06(A). The court rejected the city’s argument that a pending trial-court motion could reduce the amount owed, noting that Black had established the exact amount of money owed with sufficient evidence.

State ex rel. Curtis v. Turner

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-2682

Opinion Date: July 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

Marc D. Curtis, an inmate at the North Central Correctional Complex, requested records from the Cleveland Municipal Court Clerk, Earle B. Turner, related to his criminal case. Curtis sought documents including arrest warrants, DNA search warrants, and cellphone search warrants. The clerk provided some documents but withheld others, citing that Curtis, as an inmate, could not access certain records without a judge's approval per R.C. 149.43(B)(8). Curtis filed a mandamus complaint to compel the clerk to produce the remaining records or confirm their nonexistence.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals denied Curtis's writ of mandamus. The court relied on an affidavit from Ronald Tabor, the clerk’s assistant director, who stated that the clerk did not possess the requested records. The court found this affidavit sufficient to establish that the records were not in the clerk’s possession and noted that respondents are not required to create or provide access to nonexistent records.

The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the Eighth District's judgment. The court held that Curtis failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that the clerk possessed the requested records. The court also denied Curtis's motion to take judicial notice of new documents and granted the clerk's motion to strike certain personal information from the record. The court concluded that the clerk had adequately demonstrated that the requested records were not in his possession, and Curtis did not rebut this evidence.

State ex rel. Scott v. Toledo Corr. Inst.

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-2694

Opinion Date: July 18, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

The relator, Jumaane Scott, filed an action requesting a writ of mandamus to compel the Toledo Correctional Institution (TCI) to produce public records. Scott claimed that between April and July 2023, he made four separate requests for public records, including body-camera footage from three different correction officers and a vegetarian diet menu. He alleged that TCI staff denied his requests or failed to respond. Scott sought the production of these records, statutory damages, and court costs.

The case was initially reviewed by the Supreme Court of Ohio. TCI filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied, leading to the issuance of an alternative writ. TCI conceded most of Scott’s factual allegations but argued that the requested body-camera footage did not exist. TCI’s evidence included an affidavit from Derek Burkhart, the warden’s assistant, stating that the footage was not saved and therefore did not exist. Scott did not provide contrary evidence to rebut this claim.

The Supreme Court of Ohio denied Scott’s request for a writ of mandamus, finding that the body-camera footage did not exist and that TCI had no obligation to produce nonexistent records. The court also denied Scott’s request for the vegetarian diet menu because his petition did not explicitly seek relief for that request. Additionally, the court denied Scott’s requests for statutory damages and court costs, concluding that Scott failed to demonstrate that TCI did not meet its obligations under the Public Records Act or acted in bad faith.

In summary, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that TCI had no duty to produce nonexistent records and that Scott was not entitled to statutory damages or court costs. The court denied the writ of mandamus and all associated requests for relief.

State ex rel. Ware v. Pierce

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-2663

Opinion Date: July 16, 2024

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law

Kimani E. Ware filed a mandamus action under Ohio’s Public Records Act, seeking an order compelling John Pierce to produce certain public records and requesting statutory damages. Pierce is employed by Aramark Correctional Services, a private company providing food services to the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction’s (ODRC) facilities. Ware had requested a copy of the food menu and calorie counts for meals served at Trumbull Correctional Institution (TCI), but Pierce responded that such information was either not available or could be obtained from dieticians.

The case was initially reviewed by the Supreme Court of Ohio. Ware’s application for default judgment was denied, and an alternative writ was granted, requiring both parties to submit evidence and briefs. Pierce argued that he was not a public official and thus had no duty to respond to Ware’s requests under the Public Records Act. The court ordered the parties to provide additional evidence and briefs, which they did.

The Supreme Court of Ohio held that Ware failed to meet his burden of proving that Aramark, Pierce’s employer, was the functional equivalent of a public office. The court applied the functional-equivalency test, which considers factors such as whether the entity performs a governmental function, the level of government funding, the extent of government involvement or regulation, and whether the entity was created by the government. The court found insufficient evidence to determine that Aramark was the functional equivalent of a public office. Consequently, Pierce had no duty to provide the requested records, and Ware’s request for a writ of mandamus was denied.

AUUE, Inc. v. Borough of Jefferson Hills

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 28 WAP 2022

Opinion Date: July 16, 2024

Judge: Brobson

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

AUUE, Inc. applied for a zoning permit to develop a medical center, including a hospital, medical clinic, and professional offices, on five parcels of land in Jefferson Hills Borough. The Borough's Zoning Officer issued a use permit, recognizing that the proposed use was allowed by right in the Office Park District (O-P District), but conditioned the permit on AUUE obtaining further approvals before any development could commence. Residents of Jefferson Hills appealed, arguing that the application violated several provisions of the Borough’s Zoning Ordinance.

The Zoning Hearing Board (ZHB) overturned the Zoning Officer’s decision, concluding that the proposed medical center was not permitted by right in the O-P District and that the Zoning Officer exceeded his authority by issuing a permit without ensuring full compliance with the Ordinance. The ZHB identified several violations in the application, including improper use of accessory parking lots and lack of direct access to a collector or arterial road.

The Commonwealth Court reversed the ZHB’s decision, holding that the Zoning Officer had the authority to issue a use permit recognizing the proposed use as allowed by right in the O-P District. The court found that the ZHB should have limited its review to whether the proposed use was permitted by right, rather than considering overall compliance with the Ordinance.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s decision. It held that the Zoning Officer had the authority to issue a use permit for the limited purpose of recognizing that the proposed use was allowed by right in the O-P District. The ZHB was required to limit its review to this issue and was not permitted to overturn the Zoning Officer’s decision based on other potential violations of the Ordinance.

Shirley v. PA Legislative Reference Bureau

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 85 & 87 MAP 2022

Opinion Date: July 18, 2024

Judge: Dougherty

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) developing a rulemaking package to join the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), aimed at reducing CO2 emissions from power plants. The RGGI Regulation faced opposition from the Pennsylvania Legislative Reference Bureau (LRB) and other state officials, leading to litigation. Three nonprofit environmental organizations (Nonprofits) sought to intervene in the litigation to defend the RGGI Regulation, citing environmental and health concerns.

The Commonwealth Court initially denied the Nonprofits' application to intervene, ruling that their interests were adequately represented by DEP. The court also granted a preliminary injunction against the RGGI Regulation. Nonprofits appealed both the denial of intervention and the preliminary injunction.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case. It found that the Nonprofits had established a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the outcome of the litigation, based on the testimony of their members regarding the adverse health and environmental impacts of CO2 emissions. The court determined that DEP did not adequately represent the Nonprofits' interests, particularly because DEP had not invoked the Environmental Rights Amendment (ERA) in its defense of the RGGI Regulation.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Commonwealth Court's decision denying the Nonprofits' application to intervene, allowing them to participate as parties in the ongoing litigation. However, the appeal from the preliminary injunction was dismissed as moot because the Commonwealth Court had already issued a permanent injunction against the RGGI Regulation, superseding the preliminary injunction.

Stadium Casino RE, LLC v. Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 20 MM 2023

Opinion Date: July 17, 2024

Judge: Donohue

Areas of Law: Gaming Law, Government & Administrative Law

Stadium Casino RE, LLC ("Stadium") contested the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board's ("Board") decision to award a Category 4 slot machine license to SC Gaming OpCo, LLC and Ira Lubert (collectively "SC Gaming"). Stadium argued that Lubert's bid was invalid because it was funded by individuals not authorized to participate in the auction, and that the Board should have awarded the right to apply for the license to Stadium as the second-highest bidder or conducted another auction.

The Commonwealth Court initially reviewed the case, where Stadium sought declarations that Lubert's bid was invalid and that the Board lacked authority to consider SC Gaming's application. Stadium also sought an injunction to stop the Board from considering SC Gaming's application and requested a mandamus order to allow Stadium to apply for the license or to conduct another auction. The Board and SC Gaming filed preliminary objections, which the Commonwealth Court overruled, ordering them to file answers. Meanwhile, the Board proceeded with SC Gaming's licensing application, allowing Stadium to intervene but denying its discovery requests. The Board ultimately granted SC Gaming's application and issued an adjudication supporting its decision.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case, focusing on whether the Board exceeded its statutory authority and failed to comply with mandatory directives in the Gaming Act. The Court found that the Board had the authority to conduct the auction and licensing proceedings and that Section 1305.2(c) of the Gaming Act did not impose jurisdictional limitations on the Board's ability to act. The Court held that the Board's procedures and findings, including the determination that SC Gaming was wholly owned by Lubert, were within its discretion and supported by the evidence. Consequently, the Court affirmed the Board's decision to award the license to SC Gaming and dismissed the action pending in the Commonwealth Court as moot.

Labrum v. Utah State Bar

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 UT 24

Opinion Date: July 18, 2024

Judge: Durrant

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Linzi Labrum, the petitioner, sought a waiver of rules 14-704(c)(2) and 14-704(c)(3) of the Utah Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice. These rules require graduates of non-ABA-accredited law schools to practice law in another state for ten years before becoming eligible to take the Utah bar exam. Labrum graduated from Concord Law School, an online, non-ABA-accredited institution, and was admitted to practice law in California in 2021. She has since worked in Utah as a law clerk, mediator, and supervised pro bono attorney.

The Utah State Bar denied Labrum's application to take the Utah bar exam, citing her insufficient years of practice. Labrum petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for a waiver, arguing that her education and experience met the rules' purposes and that her circumstances were extraordinary.

The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that Labrum satisfied the burden of proof established in Kelly v. Utah State Bar. The court found that Concord's education, while not on par with ABA-accredited schools, was sufficient when combined with Labrum's practical experience. Her work in Utah, including her roles as a law clerk, mediator, and pro bono attorney, demonstrated her competence and ethical standards. The court also noted the significant changes in the accreditation of online law schools and the strong recommendations from Utah legal practitioners who supervised her work.

The court concluded that Labrum's case was extraordinary due to the unique challenges she faced, her commitment to serving an underserved area in Utah, and the substantial support from the legal community. The Utah Supreme Court granted her petition for waiver, allowing her to take the Utah bar exam.