Table of Contents
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Garland v. Cargill
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Supreme Court
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Camoin v. Nelnet, Inc.
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
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Erie Insurance Exchange v. Maryland Insurance Administration
Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law, Insurance Law
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
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Global Innovative Concepts, LLC v. State of Florida, Division of Emergency Management
Civil Procedure, Contracts, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
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Johnson v. Robinette
Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
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City of Baton Rouge v. PNK
Civil Procedure, Gaming Law, Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
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Hall v. Trochessett
Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
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Mi Familia Vota v. Ogg
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
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Strickland v. Wilkie
Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
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Bruneau v. Michigan Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy
Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
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Nessel v. Enbridge Energy, LP
Civil Procedure, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
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Tennessee v. Department of Education
Civil Rights, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
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United States v. Giannini
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
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USA v. Black
Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
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Bacon v. Woodward
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
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Breeze Aviation Group v. National Mediation Board
Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law
US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
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United States v. Buntyn
Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
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Attorney General v. Wynn
Gaming Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
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Food & Water Watch v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
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Musgrave v. Warner
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
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United States v. Smith
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
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PERLICK v. DVA
Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law
US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
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Talley Amusements v. The 32nd District Agricultural Association
Contracts, Government & Administrative Law, Government Contracts
California Courts of Appeal
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City of Aspen v. Burlingame Ranch II
Construction Law, Contracts, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law
Colorado Supreme Court
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City of Golden v. City of Aurora
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law
Colorado Supreme Court
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In re Surface Water Use Permit Applications
Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
Supreme Court of Hawaii
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State v. Fay
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
Supreme Court of Hawaii
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Bankers Trust Company v. City Of Des Moines
Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury
Iowa Supreme Court
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Myers v. City of Cedar Falls
Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury
Iowa Supreme Court
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Freiner v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Health and Human Services
Civil Procedure, Family Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
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Jones v. Department of Child Protection Services
Civil Procedure, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law
Supreme Court of Mississippi
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In re A.G.
Government & Administrative Law, Juvenile Law
New Hampshire Supreme Court
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People v Thomas
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
New York Court of Appeals
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In re The State of Texas
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
Supreme Court of Texas
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Public Utility Commission v. Luminant Energy Co. LLC
Government & Administrative Law, Utilities Law
Supreme Court of Texas
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Public Utility Commission v. RWE Renewables Americas, LLC
Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law, Utilities Law
Supreme Court of Texas
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Texas Tech University System v. Martinez
Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law
Supreme Court of Texas
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State v. City of Sunnyside
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law, Landlord - Tenant, Real Estate & Property Law
Washington Supreme Court
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Government & Administrative Law Opinions
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Garland v. Cargill
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Court: US Supreme Court
Docket:
22-976
Opinion Date: June 14, 2024
Judge:
Clarence Thomas
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The case revolves around the legality of bump stocks, accessories that allow semi-automatic rifles to fire at a rate similar to machine guns. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) had long held that semi-automatic rifles equipped with bump stocks were not machine guns under the statute. However, following a mass shooting in Las Vegas, Nevada, where the shooter used bump stocks, the ATF reversed its position and issued a rule classifying bump stocks as machine guns.
The case was first heard in the District Court, where Michael Cargill, who had surrendered two bump stocks to the ATF under protest, challenged the rule. Cargill argued that the ATF lacked statutory authority to classify bump stocks as machine guns because they did not meet the definition of a machine gun under §5845(b). The District Court ruled in favor of the ATF, concluding that a bump stock fits the statutory definition of a machine gun.
The case was then taken to the Court of Appeals, which initially affirmed the District Court's decision but later reversed it after rehearing en banc. The majority of the Court of Appeals agreed that §5845(b) was ambiguous as to whether a semi-automatic rifle equipped with a bump stock fits the statutory definition of a machine gun. They concluded that the rule of lenity required resolving that ambiguity in Cargill's favor.
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court held that a semi-automatic rifle equipped with a bump stock is not a machine gun because it cannot fire more than one shot by a single function of the trigger. Furthermore, even if it could, it would not do so automatically. Therefore, the ATF exceeded its statutory authority by issuing a rule that classifies bump stocks as machine guns.
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Camoin v. Nelnet, Inc.
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Docket:
23-1808
Opinion Date: June 18, 2024
Judge:
RICHARDSON
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law
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In 2007, Jon Oberg filed a lawsuit under the False Claims Act against various student-loan companies, including Nelnet, Inc., Nelnet Education Loan Funding, Inc., Brazos Higher Education Services Corporation, and Brazos Higher Education Authority, Inc. Oberg alleged that the companies submitted false claims to the Department of Education to inflate their loan portfolios eligible for interest subsidies. The parties agreed to a protective order for discovery, and the companies filed a joint motion for leave to file confidential summary judgment materials under seal. The magistrate judge granted in part the motion to file under seal. The parties eventually settled, and the magistrate judge dismissed the actions against the companies with prejudice.
On March 31, 2023, Michael Camoin—a documentary filmmaker who covers the student-loan industry—filed a pro se letter in the district court requesting access to the materials that Oberg filed under seal in connection to his opposition to summary judgment. Nelnet and Brazos eventually filed a joint brief opposing Camoin’s request. On July 3, 2023, the magistrate judge denied Camoin’s motion. The judge found that Camoin has “no common law or First Amendment right to access the sought documents and portions of documents” because “a document must play a relevant and useful part in the adjudication process for either the First Amendment or common law rights of public access to attach.”
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the magistrate judge’s order and remanded for consideration of whether maintaining the seal on the requested documents is “necessitated by a compelling government interest[] and . . . narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” The court held that Camoin has a presumptive First Amendment right to access Oberg’s summary judgment motion and the documents attached to that motion. The court found that the public has an interest in ensuring basic fairness and deterring official misconduct not only in the outcome of certain proceedings, but also in the very proceedings themselves. The court concluded that irrespective of whether a district court ever resolves a summary judgment motion, the public has a presumptive First Amendment right to access documents submitted in connection with it.
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Erie Insurance Exchange v. Maryland Insurance Administration
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Docket:
23-1958
Opinion Date: June 18, 2024
Judge:
HEYTENS
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law, Insurance Law
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The case involves Erie Insurance Company and its affiliates (collectively, Erie) and the Maryland Insurance Administration (MIA). In 2021, the MIA initiated two separate administrative investigations into Erie following complaints alleging racial and geographic discrimination. The first investigation broadly examined Erie’s market conduct, while the second focused on the specific allegations in the individual complaints. In 2023, the MIA issued four public determination letters stating that Erie had violated state insurance laws. These letters referenced documents obtained during the market conduct investigation, which had not yet concluded. Erie requested and was granted administrative hearings on all four determination letters.
Erie then filed a lawsuit against the MIA and its commissioner in federal district court, alleging due process violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and violations of Maryland state law. Erie sought a declaration that the determination letters were unlawful, an injunction preventing the defendants from disseminating the letters, and a requirement for the defendants to publicly withdraw them. The district court dismissed Erie's complaint, citing the principles of abstention outlined in Younger v. Harris, which generally discourages federal courts from interfering with ongoing state proceedings.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Erie had an adequate opportunity to raise its constitutional claims in the administrative hearings and subsequent state court review, as required for Younger abstention. The court also rejected Erie's argument that this case fell within an exception to Younger abstention due to extraordinary circumstances or unusual situations. The court concluded that Erie had not demonstrated that the MIA's actions were motivated by bias or that the administrative proceedings would not afford Erie constitutionally adequate process.
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Global Innovative Concepts, LLC v. State of Florida, Division of Emergency Management
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Docket:
23-2053
Opinion Date: June 18, 2024
Judge:
HEYTENS
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Contracts, Government & Administrative Law
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The case involves a dispute between the Florida Division of Emergency Management (the Division) and a private company, Essential Diagnostics, LLC, over a contract for the purchase of COVID-19 test kits. The Division contracted with Essential Diagnostics to buy 200,000 COVID-19 test kits for $2.2 million. However, Essential claimed that the Division ordered 600,000 tests but only paid for 200,000. The Division, on the other hand, insisted that it only ever agreed to buy 200,000 tests and that it paid for them in full. Essential assigned its rights under the contract to Global Integrated Concepts, which sued the Division in Florida state court. However, the state court dismissed the complaint. Subsequently, Global and two other parties involved in the transaction sued the Division in federal district court in North Carolina, seeking to recover the same $4.4 million Global sought as damages in its state court suit.
The Division moved to dismiss the suit on the grounds of sovereign immunity. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the Division waived its sovereign immunity by contracting with the plaintiffs. The Division appealed this decision.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court found that the district court erred in concluding that the Division waived its sovereign immunity by contracting with the plaintiffs. The court clarified that the rules governing waiver of federal-law sovereign immunity in federal court come from federal law, not state law. The court concluded that the district court failed to distinguish between the defenses and immunities a State might enjoy under state law and the constitutionally protected sovereign immunity that States enjoy from suit in federal court. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal.
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Johnson v. Robinette
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Docket:
22-7305
Opinion Date: June 14, 2024
Judge:
TRAXLER
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The case involves Earl Johnson, a former inmate of the Maryland Correctional Training Center, who alleged that corrections officer Chad Zimmerman sexually harassed and abused him during strip searches, in violation of his Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights. Johnson also sued Zimmerman’s supervisor, Lt. Richard Robinette, alleging supervisory and bystander liability. The district court dismissed Johnson’s claims against Robinette due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies but held that Johnson’s claims against Zimmerman were exempt from this requirement. The court also granted summary judgment to Zimmerman and Robinette on the merits of Johnson’s claims.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in concluding that Johnson’s claims against Robinette were subject to exhaustion requirements. However, the court affirmed the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment to both defendants. The court found that the strip searches, including those involving momentary touchings of Johnson’s genitalia or buttocks, did not rise to the level of an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. The court also found that Johnson failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that Zimmerman had the requisite malicious intent to sexually abuse him, sexually arouse him or himself, or otherwise gratify sexual desire. Furthermore, the court found that Johnson’s evidence fell short of establishing supervisory or bystander liability against Robinette.
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City of Baton Rouge v. PNK
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Docket:
23-30696
Opinion Date: June 18, 2024
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Gaming Law, Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law
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The case involves two casino operators, PNK (Baton Rouge) Partnership, PNK Development 8 LLC, PNK Development 9 LLC, and Centroplex Centre Convention Hotel, LLC, who incentivize their patrons with rewards, including complimentary hotel stays. The City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge Department of Finance and Linda Hunt, its director, discovered through an audit that the operators had not remitted state and local taxes associated with these complimentary stays for several years. The City argued that the operators needed to pay these taxes, while the operators presented various arguments as to why they did not. The City filed a lawsuit in state court, which the operators removed to federal court on diversity jurisdiction grounds.
The operators' removal of the case to federal court was challenged by the City, which argued that the tax abstention doctrine (TAD) warranted abstention in this case. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana agreed with the City, finding that all five TAD factors favored abstention: Louisiana's wide regulatory latitude over its taxation structure, the lack of heightened federal court scrutiny required by the operators' due process rights invocation, the potential for the operators to seek an improved competitive position in the federal court system, the greater familiarity of Louisiana courts with the state's tax regime and legislative intent, and the constraints on remedies available in federal court due to the Tax Injunction Act.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The Appeals Court found that the District Court had correctly applied the TAD and had not abused its discretion in deciding to abstain. The Appeals Court agreed that all five TAD factors favored abstention and that any doubt about the propriety of removal should be resolved in favor of remand.
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Hall v. Trochessett
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Docket:
23-40362
Opinion Date: June 20, 2024
Judge:
Doughty
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law
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Randal Hall filed a civil rights case against Officer Travis Trochesset and the City of League City, Texas, alleging constitutional violations following his arrest for interference with a police investigation. The incident began when Hall's wife was involved in a minor car accident. The other driver reported the incident as a hit-and-run, leading to an investigation by Officer Trochesset. When Trochesset arrived at the Halls' home to gather information, Hall, who was not present, instructed his wife over the phone not to provide the requested information to Trochesset. As a result, Trochesset obtained an arrest warrant for Hall for interfering with public duties.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed Hall's suit, ruling in favor of Trochesset and the City of League City. Hall appealed the decision.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that probable cause existed for Hall's arrest, as Hall had interfered with Trochesset's investigation. The court also applied the independent intermediary doctrine, which states that an officer who presents all relevant facts to an impartial intermediary (in this case, a justice of the peace) is not liable if the intermediary's independent decision leads to an arrest. The court found that Trochesset had not withheld any relevant information from the justice of the peace. Furthermore, the court ruled that Hall failed to establish that Trochesset violated the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments. The court also dismissed Hall's claim against the City of League City, as there was no constitutional violation by Trochesset, and Hall failed to identify an official policy or custom that led to the alleged violation. The court rejected Hall's argument to discontinue the application of the qualified immunity doctrine, stating that it is bound by the Fifth Circuit rule of orderliness to follow established precedent.
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Mi Familia Vota v. Ogg
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Docket:
22-50732
Opinion Date: June 20, 2024
Judge:
Southwick
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The case involves a group of civil rights organizations, voters, and an election official who sought to challenge recent amendments to Texas's election code, alleging that these amendments violated the United States Constitution and several federal statutes. The defendant was the District Attorney for Harris County, sued in her official capacity. The district court denied the District Attorney's motion to dismiss, holding that she was not immune from the plaintiffs' constitutional claims and that the plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims against her.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal and that the district court should have dismissed the plaintiffs' constitutional claims as barred by sovereign immunity. The court did not reach the issue of standing. The court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
The court's decision was based on the principle of sovereign immunity, which generally protects state officials from being sued in their official capacities. However, there is an exception to this rule, known as the Ex parte Young exception, which allows federal courts to enjoin state officials from enforcing unconstitutional state statutes. The court found that the District Attorney did not have a sufficient connection to the enforcement of the challenged laws to fall within this exception. Therefore, the court concluded that the District Attorney was immune from the plaintiffs' constitutional claims.
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Strickland v. Wilkie
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Docket:
23-60191
Opinion Date: June 18, 2024
Judge:
Southwick
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law
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The case revolves around Deborah Strickland, an employee of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), who was suspended for 15 days without pay following a series of incidents involving her supervisor. Strickland appealed her suspension to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), claiming disability discrimination. The MSPB refused to consider the entire disciplinary decision after determining one part of the decision was correct. Strickland then appealed to the district court, which affirmed the MSPB's decision.
The district court upheld the MSPB's decision and dismissed Strickland's Rehabilitation Act claims. Strickland then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Court of Appeals found that the MSPB erred in refusing to review the VA's entire disciplinary decision and that both the MSPB and the VA erred by failing to analyze the non-exhaustive factors articulated in Douglas v. Veterans Admin. The Court of Appeals vacated the district court's and the MSPB's orders, reversed the district court in part, and remanded to the district court with instructions to remand to the MSPB for additional proceedings consistent with its opinion.
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Bruneau v. Michigan Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Docket:
23-1761
Opinion Date: June 20, 2024
Judge:
SUTTON
Areas of Law:
Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law
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The case involves eight landowners who sued Midland and Gladwin Counties in Michigan, alleging a taking under the federal and state constitutions following the failure of the Edenville Dam, which resulted in flooding of several cities downstream. The dam, built in 1924, had a history of flood control issues. In 2018, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission revoked the existing owner's license and transferred regulatory authority over the dam to the Michigan Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy. In compliance with Michigan law, the counties assembled a task force to manage the lake above the dam and filed a petition in 2019 to maintain the lake levels. In May 2020, several days of historic rainfall raised the water level three feet above its previous maximum, triggering the dam's failure and causing extensive damage to properties downstream.
The district court granted summary judgment to the counties, concluding that their efforts to maintain the water levels did not show that they intended to flood the downstream properties and "take" their land. The landowners appealed this decision.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the counties' petition to maintain the lake depth at the same level that had existed for roughly a century did not show that they intended to flood the downstream properties. The court also noted that the counties played no part in regulating or controlling the dam's infrastructure. Furthermore, the court pointed out that the dam's failure was caused by soil vulnerabilities, not inadequate spillways, as determined by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's independent forensic team. Therefore, the court concluded that no taking occurred as a matter of federal or state law.
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Nessel v. Enbridge Energy, LP
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Docket:
23-1671
Opinion Date: June 17, 2024
Judge:
GRIFFIN
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The case involves the Michigan Attorney General's attempt to shut down Enbridge’s Line 5 Pipeline, which runs underwater across the Straits of Mackinac between Michigan’s Lower and Upper Peninsulas. The Attorney General filed the case in Michigan state court in 2019, alleging violations of three state laws. Enbridge responded by moving for summary disposition, arguing that the complaint failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The state court held oral argument on those dispositive motions, focusing on preemption issues, including whether the Attorney General’s claims were preempted by either the Pipeline Safety Act or the federal Submerged Lands Act.
In 2020, Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer issued a notice of revocation of the 1953 easement, calling for Line 5 to be shut down by May 2021, and simultaneously filed a complaint in state court to enforce the notice. Enbridge timely removed the Governor’s case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. The district court denied the Governor’s motion to remand, holding that it had federal-question jurisdiction. The Governor subsequently voluntarily dismissed her case.
Enbridge removed the Attorney General’s case to federal court in December 2021, citing the district court’s order denying the motion to remand in the Governor’s case. The Attorney General moved to remand this case to state court on grounds of untimely removal and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion on both grounds, excusing Enbridge’s untimely removal based on equitable principles and estopping the Attorney General from challenging subject-matter jurisdiction.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, holding that Enbridge failed to timely remove the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), and there are no equitable exceptions to the statute’s deadlines for removal. The case was remanded to Michigan state court.
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Tennessee v. Department of Education
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Docket:
22-5807
Opinion Date: June 14, 2024
Judge:
NALBANDIAN
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law
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A group of twenty states sued the U.S. Department of Education and other federal entities, challenging the Department's interpretation of Title IX to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in education programs receiving federal financial assistance. The states argued that the Department's interpretation, issued without undergoing the notice-and-comment process required for legislative rules under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), was procedurally and substantively unlawful.
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee granted the states a preliminary injunction, halting the enforcement of the Department's interpretation. The Department appealed, arguing that the states lacked standing, the interpretation was unreviewable, and the district court abused its discretion in issuing the injunction.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the states had standing to sue, the Department's interpretation was reviewable, and the states were likely to succeed on their claim that the interpretation was a legislative rule that should have undergone the notice-and-comment process. The court also found that the states would likely suffer irreparable harm without the injunction, the balance of equities tipped in their favor, and the public interest favored the injunction.
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United States v. Giannini
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Docket:
22-3139
Opinion Date: June 18, 2024
Judge:
KIRSCH
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
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Mario Giannini and Robert Czernek were involved in a series of fraudulent schemes in Bloomingdale Township, Illinois. Giannini worked for Bulldog Earth Movers, a contractor owned by his girlfriend, Debra Fazio. Czernek, the Township's Highway Commissioner, approved inflated invoices from Bulldog, and the excess funds were split between Czernek and Bulldog. Giannini, Czernek, and Fazio were indicted on counts of wire and honest services fraud. Czernek cooperated with the government and pleaded guilty, while Giannini and Fazio proceeded to trial. However, Fazio was acquitted on all counts after the government's case-in-chief.
The district court had previously denied Giannini's motion for a mistrial based on the government's late disclosure of investigating agents' notes regarding an inculpatory statement he made to Czernek. Giannini also argued that the court erred in allowing the prosecutors to discuss Fazio's conduct in closing arguments, despite her acquittal.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial, as the late disclosure of the agents' notes did not sufficiently prejudice Giannini. The court also found no error in allowing the prosecutors to discuss Fazio's conduct, as it was highly relevant to the charges against Giannini. The court concluded that even if it was error to allow the comments, it was harmless given the overwhelming evidence against Giannini.
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USA v. Black
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Docket:
22-2659
Opinion Date: June 20, 2024
Judge:
Kirsch
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law
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The case involves Roland Black, who was convicted of attempting to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance, specifically furanyl fentanyl. Law enforcement intercepted a package addressed to Black, believing it contained narcotics. After obtaining a warrant, they found the substance, replaced it with sham narcotics, and delivered the package to Black's residence. Black was arrested after the package was opened and he was found with luminescent powder from the sham narcotics on his hands.
Prior to his trial, Black had unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the indictment and suppress all evidence derived from the seizure of the package. He argued that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to seize the package and requested an evidentiary hearing to resolve related factual disputes. The district court denied these motions, ruling that the totality of the circumstances supported the officers' reasonable suspicion determination.
In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Black appealed his conviction, raising four arguments. He contended that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to seize the package, the jury instruction about his requisite mens rea was erroneous, the jury’s verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence, and the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss based on the court’s treatment of furanyl fentanyl as an analogue of fentanyl.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision. It found that the officers had reasonable suspicion to seize the package, the jury instruction accurately stated the law, the jury’s verdict was supported by more than sufficient evidence, and Black's motion to dismiss argument was foreclosed by precedent.
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Bacon v. Woodward
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Docket:
22-35611
Opinion Date: June 18, 2024
Judge:
Nelson
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
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A group of firefighters from the City of Spokane filed a lawsuit against the city and state officials, alleging that a COVID-19 vaccination mandate violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The mandate, issued by Washington Governor Jay Inslee, required all state agency workers to be fully vaccinated, but the firefighters claimed that their requests for religious exemptions were denied. They were subsequently terminated for failing to get vaccinated. The firefighters also alleged that the city used firefighters from neighboring departments, who were granted religious exemptions by their respective departments, to fill the gaps left by their termination.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington granted judgment on the pleadings to the city and state defendants, dismissing the firefighters' claims. The court held that the city's vaccination requirement survived both strict scrutiny and rational basis review, and that accommodating unvaccinated firefighters would impose an undue hardship.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the firefighters' claims for retrospective and prospective relief were not moot, despite the rescission of the Proclamation. The court found that the city's implementation of the vaccination policy was not generally applicable, as it exempted certain firefighters based on a secular criterion while holding firefighters who objected to vaccination on religious grounds to a higher standard. The court also held that the city's application of the Proclamation was not narrowly tailored to advance the government's compelling interest in stemming the spread of COVID-19. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
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Breeze Aviation Group v. National Mediation Board
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Docket:
23-4079
Opinion Date: June 17, 2024
Judge:
Hartz
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law
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The case revolves around Breeze Aviation Group, Inc. (Breeze), an airline company, and its dispute with the National Mediation Board (NMB) and the Air Line Pilots Association International (ALPA). Breeze challenged the administration of a union-representation election by the NMB, which resulted in the NMB’s certification of ALPA as the representative of pilots employed by Breeze. Breeze argued that the NMB improperly excluded trainee pilots from voting in the union election and improperly refused to extend the cut-off date for voter eligibility to allow more pilot trainees to complete their training and become eligible to vote.
The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. The district court dismissed Breeze's complaint for lack of jurisdiction, stating that federal courts have jurisdiction to review NMB certification of union representation only where the complaining party shows that the certification decision was a gross violation of the Railway Labor Act (RLA) or that it violated the constitutional rights of an employer, employee, or Union. The district court determined that Breeze’s complaint did not make the required showing.
Breeze appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The court found that the NMB had fulfilled its statutory duty to investigate and acted within the broad bounds of its statutory discretion when it designated who could participate in the election, set the rules that governed that election, and held the election itself. The court concluded that Breeze's arguments did not point to any specific requirement in the RLA that the NMB violated, and were more in terms of policy and broad generalities as to what the RLA should provide.
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United States v. Buntyn
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Docket:
23-2007
Opinion Date: June 18, 2024
Judge:
BACHARACH
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
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Anthony Buntyn, an employee of a private company that transported detainees for law enforcement agencies, was charged with willfully violating the detainees' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause due to inhumane conditions of confinement. The conditions developed while Buntyn transported the detainees in a van to various detention facilities. The government alleged that Buntyn had violated the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause through deliberate indifference to intolerable conditions of confinement and that this indifference had resulted in bodily injury to three detainees. The jury found Buntyn guilty of depriving the detainees of humane conditions, acting willfully and with deliberate indifference, and causing bodily injury to one detainee.
Buntyn appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, arguing that the evidence was insufficient for a finding of guilt, that the district court erred in preventing his attorney from using the term malice in closing argument, and that the court coerced the jury to reach a verdict. The Tenth Circuit rejected Buntyn's arguments and affirmed his conviction. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's findings of inhumane conditions, deliberate indifference, and willfulness. The court also found that the district court did not err in prohibiting the use of the term malice in closing argument, and that Buntyn had waived his challenge to the district court's instruction for the jury to continue deliberating.
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Attorney General v. Wynn
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Docket:
22-5328
Opinion Date: June 14, 2024
Judge:
MILLETT
Areas of Law:
Gaming Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The case revolves around Stephen Wynn, a casino owner and real estate developer, who was accused by the Department of Justice (DOJ) of acting as an unregistered foreign agent for the People's Republic of China in 2017. The DOJ alleged that Wynn lobbied then-President Trump and his administration on behalf of China to cancel a certain Chinese businessperson's visa or to otherwise remove that person from the United States. Wynn's lobbying efforts ceased in October 2017, and he never registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).
The DOJ sued Wynn in 2022, seeking to compel him to register as a foreign agent under FARA. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, holding that since Wynn's alleged agency relationship with the Chinese government ended in October 2017, FARA no longer required him to register.
The DOJ appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that under the precedent set by United States v. McGoff, Wynn's obligation to register under FARA expired when he ceased acting as a foreign agent. The court rejected the DOJ's argument that the civil enforcement provision of FARA allowed for an injunction to compel compliance for past violations, stating that the provision only applies to ongoing or imminent violations. Therefore, the court concluded that there was no legal basis for the government to compel Wynn to register now.
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Food & Water Watch v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Docket:
22-1214
Opinion Date: June 14, 2024
Judge:
KATSAS
Areas of Law:
Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The case involves a dispute over the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) approval of a project to expand a natural-gas pipeline from western Pennsylvania to the New York metropolitan area. The petitioner, Food & Water Watch, argued that FERC overlooked environmental issues in approving the project. Specifically, they claimed that FERC's Environmental Impact Statement failed to quantify greenhouse-gas emissions from upstream drilling for the extra gas, to quantify ozone emissions from its downstream burning, and to categorize emissions impacts as either significant or insignificant. Additionally, Food & Water Watch argued that FERC did not adequately consider New York State and New York City laws mandating reductions in carbon-dioxide emissions.
The case was reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The lower courts had approved the project, with FERC issuing a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the East 300 Upgrade Project. FERC had prepared a full Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), which estimated the downstream carbon-dioxide emissions but declined to address upstream environmental effects. FERC also declined to characterize downstream emissions as significant or insignificant.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the petitioner's contentions and denied the petitions for review. The court found that FERC had reasonably concluded that there was too much uncertainty regarding the number and location of additional upstream wells. The court also held that FERC had reasonably explained its decision not to give a quantitative estimate of how much ozone would be produced as a result of the project. Finally, the court found that FERC had amply discussed the significance of GHG emissions and that it was not required to label the increased emissions and ensuing costs as either significant or insignificant. The court also found that FERC had reasonably explained why the New York State Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act did not undercut its finding of need for the project.
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Musgrave v. Warner
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Docket:
22-5252
Opinion Date: June 18, 2024
Judge:
PILLARD
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
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A freelance journalist, Shawn Musgrave, sought access to a classified congressional committee report on the CIA's use of detention and interrogation following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. When the committee failed to respond to his request for a copy of the full report, Musgrave filed a lawsuit invoking a common law right of access to the committee report. The district court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the defendants were protected by sovereign immunity and that the Constitution's Speech or Debate Clause prevents compelled disclosure of the report.
The district court also denied Musgrave's request for discovery about the report's purpose and the Committee's communications with the Executive Branch about the report. Musgrave appealed the decision, arguing that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the Speech or Debate Clause.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court held that the Speech or Debate Clause imposes a privilege against Musgrave's requests for discovery and compelled disclosure of the report. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of Musgrave's request for discovery, concluding that the district court's error was not material as Musgrave had not shown that any requested discovery could produce information that would affect the Speech-or-Debate analysis.
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United States v. Smith
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Docket:
22-3033
Opinion Date: June 14, 2024
Judge:
MILLETT
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
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In this case, the defendant, Gerald Smith, was convicted of murder, kidnapping, and drug trafficking charges three decades ago. He was sentenced to multiple life sentences under the then-mandatory sentencing guidelines. In 2018, Congress passed the First Step Act, which allows courts to resentence defendants convicted for certain drug crimes that carry lighter sentences today than at the time of sentencing. In 2019, the Supreme Court held unconstitutionally vague one aspect of the “crime-of-violence” definition set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). Smith sought vacatur of his crime-of-violence convictions and for First Step Act resentencing for other convictions. The district court denied both forms of relief.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Smith's convictions for Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) murder involved the intentional use of force against others, qualifying them as crimes of violence under Section 924(c)’s elements clause. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of resentencing under the First Step Act, as Smith was not eligible for resentencing on most counts, and the district court reasonably explained its denial of resentencing on the eligible counts. The court remanded to the district court for the limited purpose of entering a revised judgment and conviction order that reflects this court’s prior vacatur of Smith’s felony-murder and attempted-armed-robbery convictions.
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PERLICK v. DVA
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Docket:
23-1091
Opinion Date: June 20, 2024
Judge:
BENCIVENGO
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law
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The case involves Dr. Deborah A. Perlick, who was employed by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) as a Research Health Science Specialist. During her tenure, she discovered approximately $78,000 missing from a study's funding and reported this to VA officials. Subsequently, she was terminated from her position. Perlick filed a complaint under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), and the Merit Systems Protection Board (the Board) granted her request for corrective action, awarding her back pay through March 31, 2020. However, Perlick also sought consequential and compensatory damages, including future lost earnings, which the Board denied.
The Board found that Perlick had established her claim of protected whistleblowing disclosures. However, it denied her request for consequential damages, stating that such damages are limited to out-of-pocket costs and do not include non-pecuniary damages. The Board also denied Perlick's request for future lost earnings, arguing that she had no guarantees of future employment beyond the completion date of her final project with the VA.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the Board's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that future lost earnings are recoverable as compensatory damages under the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012. The court found that the Board erred by improperly raising the burden for Perlick to establish these damages, requiring her to "guarantee" future employment to recover future lost earnings. The court instructed the Board to determine under the preponderance of the evidence standard whether Perlick met her burden to prove entitlement to pecuniary compensatory damages in the form of future lost earnings.
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Talley Amusements v. The 32nd District Agricultural Association
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Court: California Courts of Appeal
Docket:
G062646(Fourth Appellate District)
Opinion Date: June 18, 2024
Judge:
Goethals
Areas of Law:
Contracts, Government & Administrative Law, Government Contracts
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The case revolves around a dispute over a public contract for services to be rendered to the state. The plaintiffs, Talley Amusements, Inc. and others, alleged that the 32nd District Agricultural Association and others violated the Public Contract Code section 10339 when they solicited proposals for a master carnival operator contract for the county fair. The plaintiffs claimed that the request for proposal (RFP) was written in such a way that only one carnival operator in the United States could qualify, thereby limiting the bidding process.
The Superior Court of Orange County initially reviewed the case. The court found that section 10339, which prohibits a state agency from drafting an RFP in a way that directly or indirectly limits bidding to any one bidder, did not apply to this particular contract. As a result, the court denied the plaintiffs' request for a temporary injunction under section 10421, which allows a court to issue a temporary injunction preventing further dealings on a public contract awarded in violation of section 10339.
The case was then brought before the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three. The main issue on appeal was whether the competitive bidding requirements of section 10339 apply to a district agricultural association’s RFP on a master carnival contract. After reviewing the matter de novo, the court held that section 10339 did not apply to the contract at issue because it was not a contract for services to be rendered to the state. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court’s order denying injunctive relief under section 10421.
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City of Aspen v. Burlingame Ranch II
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Court: Colorado Supreme Court
Citation:
2024 CO 46
Opinion Date: June 17, 2024
Judge:
Samour
Areas of Law:
Construction Law, Contracts, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law
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The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado was asked to review a case involving a dispute between the City of Aspen and the Burlingame Ranch II Condominium Owners Association, Inc. The dispute centered around alleged construction defects in an affordable housing project overseen by the City of Aspen. The Association claimed that Aspen had breached express and implied warranties, and Aspen argued that the claims were barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), which provides immunity to public entities from claims for injury that lie in tort or could lie in tort.
The lower court agreed with Aspen, ruling that the Association's claims sounded in tort, or could sound in tort, and were thus barred by the CGIA. The Association appealed, and the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court reasoned that the Association's claims could only sound in contract, and thus were not barred by the CGIA. The court relied on the economic loss rule, which generally provides that a party suffering only economic loss from the breach of a contractual duty may not assert a tort claim for such a breach absent an independent duty of care under tort law.
The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reversed the appellate court's decision. The court held that the economic loss rule has no bearing on whether the CGIA bars a plaintiff’s claims. The court clarified that the CGIA bars claims that could arise in both tort and contract, and that the economic loss rule cannot rescue an otherwise CGIA-barred claim. The case was remanded back to the lower court for further proceedings.
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City of Golden v. City of Aurora
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Court: Colorado Supreme Court
Citation:
2024 CO 43
Opinion Date: June 17, 2024
Judge:
Monica M. Márquez
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law
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The case involves a dispute over water rights associated with the Green Mountain Reservoir in Colorado. The City of Golden (Golden) opposed the implementation of an administrative protocol (the Protocol) developed by the United States and other parties, arguing that it would injure its rights upstream of the reservoir. The water court granted the United States' motion for summary judgment, ruling that the Protocol is consistent with the Blue River Decree, a series of decrees and stipulations governing water rights in the area. Golden appealed this decision.
Previously, the water court had ruled that an assessment of injury was not required in this case, as the United States was merely requesting confirmation that the Protocol was consistent with the existing Blue River Decree. The court also rejected Golden's claims that the Protocol contradicted language in the Blue River Decree requiring the "fair" and "equitable" treatment of all parties with interests in the Colorado-Big Thompson Project (CBT), a complex water diversion project.
The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the water court's ruling. It held that the Protocol is consistent with the Blue River Decree and does not violate the prior appropriation doctrine, a principle of water law that gives priority to those who first used the water. The court also rejected Golden's procedural arguments regarding the water court's denial of its motion for reconsideration.
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In re Surface Water Use Permit Applications
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Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii
Docket:
SCOT-21-0000581
Opinion Date: June 20, 2024
Judge:
McKENNA
Areas of Law:
Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
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This case involves a dispute over water use permits and instream flow standards in the Nā Wai 'Ehā region of Maui, Hawaii. The region includes the Waihe'e River, Waiehu Stream, Wailuku River, and Waikapū Stream. Various parties, including MMK Maui, LP, Hui o Nā Wai 'Ehā, the Maui Tomorrow Foundation, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, Mahi Pono, LLC, and Wailuku Water Company, LLC, appealed from the Commission on Water Resource Management's decision regarding water use permits and instream flow standards.
The Commission had designated Nā Wai 'Ehā as a Surface Water Management Area, requiring existing and new water users to file surface water use permit applications. Over 140 applicants filed applications, including MMK, which operates two golf courses in the area, and Mahi Pono, which engages in agricultural operations on former sugar plantation lands.
In 2016, the last remaining sugar plantation on Maui announced its closure. In response, the Hui/MTF filed a petition with the Commission to amend Nā Wai 'Ehā’s Interim Instream Flow Standards. The Commission consolidated the permit and flow standards proceedings. In 2021, the Commission issued a decision amending the flow standards and granting various applicants surface water use permits.
The parties appealed the Commission's decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii. The Supreme Court vacated the Commission’s decision and order with respect to the instream flow standards and the delegation of the Commission’s public trust duties, and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the decision and order in all other respects.
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State v. Fay
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Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii
Docket:
SCWC-22-0000056
Opinion Date: June 17, 2024
Judge:
EDDINS
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The case revolves around a defendant, Melissa Fay, who was prosecuted for driving under the influence and other related charges. She entered a plea agreement, which did not include imprisonment or probation, but agreed to pay a freestanding order of restitution. The District Court of the Second Circuit followed the plea deal and ordered indefinite compliance hearings to monitor Fay's restitution payments. Fay protested, arguing that Hawai'i's restitution enforcement statute, Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 706-644, limits the court's authority.
Fay's appeal was unsuccessful in the Intermediate Court of Appeals, which agreed with the district court's decision. The Intermediate Court of Appeals held that an independent order of restitution empowers a criminal court to retain jurisdiction over a person who owes restitution. The court ruled that setting recurrent proof of compliance hearings fell within a court's general power to enforce its orders.
The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i, however, concluded that the district court exceeded its statutory authority. The Supreme Court held that HRS § 706-644, the specific law relating to restitution enforcement, controls over the court's general powers to enforce judgments. The court ruled that a compliance hearing regarding restitution payments can only be ordered if a defendant is on probation or the defendant "defaults" on payment per HRS § 706-644(1). The Supreme Court vacated the Intermediate Court of Appeals' judgment on appeal.
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Bankers Trust Company v. City Of Des Moines
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Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Docket:
22-2085
Opinion Date: June 14, 2024
Judge:
McDermott
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury
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Sally Splittgerber suffered a fall while walking on a city sidewalk, leading to a personal injury lawsuit against the owner of the adjacent property, the lessee of that property (Bankers Trust), and the City of Des Moines. The plaintiffs alleged that these parties were negligent in maintaining the uneven sidewalk. After settling the claims, Bankers Trust sought contribution from the City for the settlement payment, arguing that the City, not the property owner or lessee, was responsible for maintaining the sidewalk.
The district court, relying on the precedent set in Madden v. City of Iowa City, granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The court held that the City could impose liability on abutting landowners for damages resulting from other types of failures to maintain sidewalks, beyond just snow and ice removal. Bankers Trust appealed this decision, asking the Supreme Court of Iowa to overrule the Madden decision.
The Supreme Court of Iowa agreed with Bankers Trust, stating that the Madden decision was wrongly decided. The court found that the City's attempt to shift costs and liability to abutting landowners for sidewalk maintenance and accidents beyond what the state statute allows was in direct conflict with the legislature's express determination about where such burdens reside. The court noted that the statute only permits cities to require abutting landowners to repair sidewalks if the city first notifies the landowners by certified mail that a repair is necessary, and only permits cities to hold abutting landowners liable for damages if they fail to remove snow and ice from the sidewalk.
The court overruled the Madden decision, reversed the district court's summary judgment ruling, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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Myers v. City of Cedar Falls
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Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Docket:
22-0917
Opinion Date: June 14, 2024
Judge:
WATERMAN
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury
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The plaintiff, Ron Myers, suffered a leg injury after slipping on a diving board at a city pool in Cedar Falls, Iowa. He sued the City of Cedar Falls, alleging that the diving board lacked a slip-resistant surface required by state regulations. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was immune from liability under Iowa Code section 670.4(1)(l), which grants immunity to operators of municipal swimming pools unless there is a "knowing" violation of regulations. The district court granted the City's motion, concluding that Myers failed to establish a "knowing" violation of the regulations.
Myers appealed the decision, and the case was transferred to the court of appeals. The court of appeals reversed the district court's decision, finding that there were factual questions about the condition of the diving board that precluded summary judgment. The City then sought further review from the Supreme Court of Iowa.
The Supreme Court of Iowa accepted the City's invitation to overrule a previous decision, Sanon v. City of Pella, which had interpreted the "criminal offense" exception to immunity for operators of municipal swimming pools under Iowa Code section 670.4(1)(l) to include violations of agency regulations. The court found that Sanon was "egregiously wrong" and had caused ongoing problems. The court held that the legislature did not make violating swimming pool regulations a criminal offense, and therefore, the City was immune from liability under Iowa Code section 670.4(1)(l). The court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the district court's summary judgment.
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Freiner v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Health and Human Services
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Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Docket:
SJC-13514
Opinion Date: June 14, 2024
Judge:
Wendlandt
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Family Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law
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The case involves a dispute over the eligibility of a married individual, Costa Tingos, for Medicaid long-term care benefits. Costa and his wife, Mary, had been married for over 50 years, but had kept their finances largely separate due to Costa's history of gambling and financial mismanagement. When Costa moved into a nursing home, he applied for Medicaid benefits. However, Mary refused to provide information about her income and assets, which was necessary to determine Costa's eligibility. Costa argued that Mary's refusal to cooperate should not affect his eligibility.
The case was initially heard by the Massachusetts Medicaid program, MassHealth, which denied Costa's application. Costa appealed to the MassHealth board of hearings, which also denied his appeal. Costa then sought judicial review in the Superior Court, which vacated the board's decision and remanded the case back to the board. After two more rounds of hearings and appeals, the Superior Court affirmed the board's decision to deny Costa's application.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the decision of the Superior Court. The court held that the board's interpretation of the phrase "refuses to cooperate" in the relevant regulation was reasonable. The court found that Mary's refusal to disclose her financial information did not constitute a refusal to cooperate within the meaning of the regulation, given the couple's long history of cooperation in other aspects of their marriage. The court also rejected Costa's argument that the board's decision was arbitrary and capricious.
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Jones v. Department of Child Protection Services
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Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi
Citation:
2022-SA-01234-SCT
Opinion Date: June 13, 2024
Judge:
MAXWELL
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law
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Felissa Jones, the mother of an elementary school student, reported to the Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services (MDCPS) that her son had suffered abuse and neglect by staff at his school. MDCPS responded that it does not investigate reports of abuse at school. Jones then sued MDCPS, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief related to MDCPS’s policy that the agency does not investigate allegations of abuse in out-of-home settings such as schools.
The Hinds County Chancery Court denied Jones's motion for a judgment in her favor on the pleadings and granted MDCPS's motion for a judgment on the pleadings, dismissing Jones's complaint. The court ruled that Jones's request for declaratory relief related to MDCPS’s former intake policy was moot because the policy was no longer in effect. It also ruled that the current intake policy does not violate the relevant statutes, but instead conforms to the statutory mandate to refer allegations of child abuse in out-of-home settings to local law enforcement.
In the Supreme Court of Mississippi, Jones appealed the lower court's decisions. The court affirmed the lower court's rulings, stating that MDCPS does not have a duty to investigate reports of abuse in out-of-home settings, such as schools, because children who are mistreated by school staff do not fall under the youth court’s limited jurisdiction. The court also found that Jones's claim for declaratory relief from the amended policy had no merit because the policy tracks the relevant statutes.
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In re A.G.
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Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court
Docket:
2024-0062
Opinion Date: June 14, 2024
Judge:
COUNTWAY
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law, Juvenile Law
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The appellant, A.G., was arraigned on four juvenile delinquency petitions for attempted robbery, attempted first degree assault, reckless conduct, and falsifying physical evidence when he was 17 years old. The Circuit Court found probable cause and determined that A.G. met the standard for secure detention, placing him at the Youth Detention Services Unit (YDSU). The State later filed a petition to certify A.G. as an adult and transfer the case to superior court, which remains pending. As A.G. was about to turn 18, a hearing was held to address his placement. The court ruled that A.G. would be transferred to the Hillsborough County House of Corrections (HOC) upon his eighteenth birthday.
A.G. appealed this decision, arguing that the circuit court lacks authority to order his detention at the HOC. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire agreed, stating that the circuit court is a court of limited jurisdiction with powers conferred upon it by statute. The court found no statutory authority for the circuit court to detain A.G. at the HOC, as he has neither been adjudicated delinquent nor certified as an adult.
The State argued that the circuit court could continue A.G.’s detention at YDSU, even after his eighteenth birthday, while awaiting action on the petition to certify him as an adult. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that the term "minor" in the relevant statute continues to apply to A.G. after his eighteenth birthday. The court reversed the trial court’s order transferring A.G. to the HOC and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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People v Thomas
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Court: New York Court of Appeals
Citation:
2024 NY Slip Op 03319
Opinion Date: June 18, 2024
Judge:
Cannataro
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The defendant, Kevin L. Thomas, was on lifetime parole for prior narcotics offenses. An off-duty police officer, familiar with Thomas, observed him driving outside his county of residence, which was a violation of his parole conditions. The officer contacted an on-duty officer who initiated a traffic stop after observing Thomas commit a traffic infraction. During the stop, Thomas provided inconsistent responses and refused to consent to a search of his vehicle. The police contacted Thomas's parole officer, who arrived at the scene and conducted a warrantless search of Thomas's vehicle, discovering a large quantity of heroin.
The County Court denied Thomas's motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the initial stop was justified and that the police had a founded suspicion of criminality justifying the continued detention of Thomas to contact his parole officer. The court also found that the parole officer's search was rationally and reasonably related to his parole duties. Thomas was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision, with two Justices dissenting, arguing that Thomas was detained beyond what was reasonable under the circumstances.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision, stating that the lower courts applied an incorrect legal standard in analyzing whether the traffic stop was unreasonably prolonged. The court held that the proper standard for detaining an individual beyond the time reasonably required to complete a traffic stop is reasonable suspicion. The court found that the traffic stop was justified at its inception, but the courts below evaluated whether the traffic stop was prolonged beyond the time reasonably required for its completion under the founded suspicion standard, a lesser standard than the reasonable suspicion necessary to prolong a traffic stop. The case was remitted to the County Court for further proceedings under the correct standard.
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In re The State of Texas
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Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Docket:
24-0325
Opinion Date: June 14, 2024
Judge:
BLACKLOCK
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The case revolves around a program proposed by Harris County, Texas, known as "Uplift Harris." The program aimed to provide $500 monthly cash payments to 1,928 Harris County residents for 18 months, with recipients chosen by lottery from applicants with income below 200% of the federal poverty line living in certain zip codes. The State of Texas challenged the program, arguing that it violated the Texas Constitution’s prohibition on gratuitous payments to individuals.
The State sued the County, seeking an injunction to block the implementation of the program. The district court denied the State's request for a temporary injunction, leading the State to appeal this decision and request a stay of payments under the Uplift Harris program while the appeal was ongoing. The court of appeals denied this request, prompting the State to seek mandamus relief in the Supreme Court of Texas.
The Supreme Court of Texas granted the State's motion for temporary relief, prohibiting all payments under the Uplift Harris program pending further order of the court. The court found that the State had raised serious doubt about the constitutionality of the program, and that potential violation of the Texas Constitution could not be remedied if payments were to commence while the underlying appeal proceeded. The court also noted that once the funds were distributed to individuals, they could not feasibly be recouped if it was later determined they were paid in violation of the Texas Constitution. The court concluded that temporarily preventing the expenditure of these funds while the State's appeal proceeded ensured public funds were not irrecoverably spent in violation of the Texas Constitution. The State's appeal of the denial of a temporary injunction remains pending in the court of appeals.
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Public Utility Commission v. Luminant Energy Co. LLC
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Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Docket:
23-0231
Opinion Date: June 14, 2024
Judge:
HECHT
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law, Utilities Law
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The case revolves around the actions of the Public Utility Commission of Texas (Commission) during Winter Storm Uri, when the Texas electric grid was on the brink of collapse. The Commission issued two orders that effectively raised the market price of electricity to the regulatory ceiling of $9,000/MWh to incentivize generators to add supply and large industrial users to reduce their demand. This led to some market participants going bankrupt and subsequent litigation.
The court of appeals held that the Commission’s orders exceeded its authority under Chapter 39 of the Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA) because the statute prohibits price-setting. The court of appeals did not address whether the Commission complied with the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) procedural rulemaking requirements.
The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals' decision. It held that the Commission’s orders did not exceed its authority under PURA. The court also found that the Commission substantially complied with the APA’s procedural rulemaking requirements, an issue the court of appeals did not address. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and rendered judgment affirming the orders.
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Public Utility Commission v. RWE Renewables Americas, LLC
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Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Docket:
23-0555
Opinion Date: June 14, 2024
Judge:
LEHRMANN
Areas of Law:
Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law, Utilities Law
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The case revolves around the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUC) and two market participants, RWE Renewables Americas, LLC and TX Hereford Wind, LLC. Following Winter Storm Uri, the Legislature amended the Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA) to require that protocols adopted by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) must be approved by the PUC before they take effect. ERCOT then adopted a revision to its protocols, which was approved by the PUC, setting the price of electricity at the regulatory maximum under Energy Emergency Alert Level 3 conditions. RWE challenged the PUC's approval order in the Third Court of Appeals, arguing that the order was both substantively and procedurally invalid.
The Third Court of Appeals held that the PUC's order was both substantively invalid—because the PUC exceeded its statutory authority by setting the price of electricity—and procedurally invalid—because the PUC failed to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act’s rulemaking procedures in issuing the order.
The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the PUC’s approval order is not a “competition rule[] adopted by the commission” subject to the judicial-review process for PUC rules. The court found that PURA envisions a separate process for ERCOT-adopted protocols, and the statutory requirement that the PUC approve those adopted protocols does not transform PUC approval orders into PUC rules eligible for direct review by a court of appeals. Therefore, the Third Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over this proceeding. The Supreme Court of Texas vacated the court of appeals’ judgment and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
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Texas Tech University System v. Martinez
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Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Docket:
22-0843
Opinion Date: June 14, 2024
Judge:
HUDDLE
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law
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The case revolves around Pureza “Didit” Martinez, who was terminated from her position at the Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center at the age of 72. She filed a lawsuit alleging age discrimination against the Health Sciences Center, the Texas Tech University System, and the Texas Tech University System’s Board of Regents. The Texas Tech University System and the Board of Regents argued that they were not Martinez's employer and thus retained sovereign immunity.
Previously, the trial court denied the plea to the jurisdiction filed by the Texas Tech University System and the Board of Regents, and the court of appeals affirmed this decision. The defendants argued that Martinez failed to plead allegations that could make them liable for age discrimination under the Labor Code, essentially denying being Martinez’s employer.
The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The court found that Martinez's petition did not allege facts demonstrating that the Texas Tech University System or the Board of Regents employed Martinez directly or that either one controlled access to and interfered with her employment. Therefore, the court concluded that Martinez failed to allege a waiver of sovereign immunity, and the plea to the jurisdiction of the Texas Tech University System and the Board of Regents should have been granted. However, the court remanded the case to the trial court to give Martinez an opportunity to replead, as her petition did not foreclose a valid claim against those defendants.
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State v. City of Sunnyside
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Court: Washington Supreme Court
Docket:
101,205-5
Opinion Date: June 20, 2024
Judge:
Montoya-Lewis
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law, Landlord - Tenant, Real Estate & Property Law
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The Washington State Attorney General filed a lawsuit against the city of Sunnyside and several of its officials, alleging that the city's crime-free rental housing program (CFRHP) was being used to evict tenants without due process and that these evictions disproportionately impacted Latinx renters, women-headed households, and families with minor children. The city argued that the Attorney General lacked the authority to bring this suit, as the scope of the Attorney General's authority under RCW 43.10.030(1) limits their ability to act to matters that impact more people than those affected by the CFRHP. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington reversed and remanded the case. The court held that the Attorney General did have the authority to bring the suit, as the case involved matters of public concern in which the state had an interest. The court also found that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether the city's enforcement of the CFRHP had a disparate impact on protected classes, and whether the individual respondents were entitled to qualified immunity. However, the court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the Attorney General's claims under the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act, finding that the respondents were not landlords and therefore the Act did not apply to them.
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