Table of Contents
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Rivera-Velazquez v. Regan
Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law
US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
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USA v. Cora-Alicea
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
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Scott v. Baltimore County, Maryland
Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
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Kerchen v. University of Michigan
Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
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Lowther v. Children Youth and Family Department
Civil Rights, Family Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
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Concert Investor, LLC v. Small Business Administration
Business Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
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El Puente v. United States Army Corps of Engineers
Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
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Seed v. EPA
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
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PERCIAVALLE v. MCDONOUGH
Government & Administrative Law, Military Law
US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
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City of Valdez v. Regulatory Commission of Alaska
Civil Procedure, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law
Alaska Supreme Court
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Northland Investment Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority
Government & Administrative Law, Landlord - Tenant, Real Estate & Property Law
Connecticut Supreme Court
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Randolph v. Aidan, LLC
Government & Administrative Law, Landlord - Tenant, Personal Injury, Real Estate & Property Law
Iowa Supreme Court
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Terrace Hill Society Foundation v. Terrace Hill Commission
Contracts, Government & Administrative Law
Iowa Supreme Court
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Hines v. Caldwell
Family Law, Government & Administrative Law
Supreme Court of Mississippi
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Midsouth Association of Independent Schools v. Parents for Public Schools
Constitutional Law, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law
Supreme Court of Mississippi
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Missoula County v. Department of Corrections
Civil Procedure, Contracts, Government & Administrative Law
Montana Supreme Court
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Joshua M. v. State
Family Law, Government & Administrative Law
Nebraska Supreme Court
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Cole v. Town of Conway
Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury
New Hampshire Supreme Court
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CITY OF DENTON v. GRIM
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law
Supreme Court of Texas
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Montalla, LLC v. Commonwealth
Contracts, Government & Administrative Law
Supreme Court of Virginia
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Kent v. Sullivan
Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
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Paletta v. Phillips
Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
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Government & Administrative Law Opinions
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Rivera-Velazquez v. Regan
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Docket:
22-1356
Opinion Date: May 9, 2024
Judge:
Barron
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law
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The case involves Carlos M. Rivera-Velázquez, an employee of the Caribbean Environmental Protection Division (CEPD), a component of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Rivera, a military veteran with a service-connected disability, was hired by the CEPD in 2001. Throughout his tenure, he expressed interest in being promoted to a GS-13 position. In 2006, the CEPD was reorganized, and Teresita Rodríguez became Rivera's supervisor. After Rivera returned from a tour of duty in Afghanistan in 2010, Rodríguez began checking on his well-being. In 2012, Rivera was diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). In 2014, Nancy Rodríguez became the chief of the Multimedia Permits and Compliance Branch and Rivera's supervisor. Rivera filed several formal and informal complaints about his treatment by his supervisors, alleging discrimination and harassment.
In the lower courts, Rivera filed formal complaints with the EPA Office of Civil Rights (OCR) in 2011, 2017, and 2018, alleging discrimination and retaliation. He also filed claims of "harassment" under EPA Order 4711 in 2017 and 2018. The OCR and the EPA Order 4711 investigations found no merit to Rivera's complaints. Rivera then filed a complaint in the District Court in 2019, alleging employment discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The District Court granted summary judgment to the Administrator of the EPA on Rivera's claims.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The court found that Rivera failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act or retaliation under Title VII. The court concluded that Rivera failed to show that his supervisors regarded him as having a disability, that he was subjected to an adverse action, or that there was a causal connection between his protected conduct and the alleged adverse actions.
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USA v. Cora-Alicea
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Docket:
23-1927
Opinion Date: May 6, 2024
Judge:
Restrepo
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The case revolves around Victor Cora-Alicea, who was involved in a drug trafficking operation led by Ramone Velazquez. Cora-Alicea, who had no supervisory responsibilities and was merely tasked with bagging drugs, was arrested and pleaded guilty to violations of drug trafficking laws. His sentencing was calculated based on a base offense level of 31, with reductions for his safety-valve eligibility, minor role, and acceptance of responsibility, resulting in a total offense level of 24. His criminal history category I was based on a nonexistent criminal record. The District Court set his Guidelines range at 51–63 months. Cora-Alicea requested a mitigation-based variance from the range, arguing that his life history, personal characteristics, and an anticipated change to the Guidelines for people with zero criminal history points justified a variance to approximately 24 months’ imprisonment.
The District Court sentenced Cora-Alicea to 45 months on each count, to be served concurrently, followed by a total of three years on supervised release. The court took into consideration his zero-point status but ignored Cora-Alicea’s other bases for a variance. Cora-Alicea appealed the District Court’s judgment, arguing that the court procedurally erred at sentencing by dismissing the majority of his personal mitigation evidence offered in support of a variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) on the ground that it was “already taken into account” by the downward adjustments under the Guidelines.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that the District Court had erred in its interpretation of the Guidelines. The court noted that the safety-valve provision, minor-role, and acceptance-of-responsibility adjustments considered in Cora-Alicea’s sentencing had nothing to do with the myriad of mitigating circumstances he raised under § 3553(a). The court concluded that the District Court's erroneous legal conclusion preempted any weighing of the mitigation evidence against the Guidelines range or the other sentencing factors. As a result, the court vacated Cora-Alicea’s sentence and remanded his case to the District Court for resentencing.
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Scott v. Baltimore County, Maryland
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Docket:
23-1731
Opinion Date: May 8, 2024
Judge:
Heytens
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law
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The case involves a group of incarcerated individuals who were sent from a detention center to work at a recycling facility operated by Baltimore County, Maryland. The workers alleged that they were employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Maryland state laws, and thus entitled to minimum wage and overtime pay. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county, concluding that no reasonable adjudicator could view the incarcerated workers as "employees" under the FLSA.
The district court's decision was based on the fact that the workers were part of a work detail program run by the Department of Corrections (DOC), which the court found had a rehabilitative, rather than pecuniary, interest in the workers' labor. The court also found that the workers did not deal at arms' length with their putative employer, as they were not free to negotiate the terms of their employment and were under the control of the DOC.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court clarified that there is no categorical rule that incarcerated workers cannot be covered by the FLSA when they work outside their detention facility’s walls and for someone other than their immediate detainer. The court also held that the district court applied the wrong legal standards in granting summary judgment to the county. The court emphasized that the question under the FLSA is whether the principal or primary purpose for using incarcerated workers at the recycling center during the time frame at issue was for “rehabilitation and job training.” The case was remanded for a fresh look at the facts under these clarified standards.
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Kerchen v. University of Michigan
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Docket:
23-1718
Opinion Date: May 6, 2024
Judge:
Clay
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law
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The case involves the family of Todd Kerchen, who died from a lethal dose of fentanyl. The family filed a complaint against the University of Michigan and Dr. James Woods, alleging violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Michigan state law. The family claimed that the fentanyl that killed Todd originated from a University of Michigan pharmacology lab where Christian Raphalides, the person who allegedly provided the drug to Todd, worked. The lab was overseen by Dr. Woods. The family argued that the lab's lax policies surrounding the use of controlled substances led to Todd's death.
The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and ordered limited discovery on whether the action was barred by the statutes of limitations applicable to the plaintiffs' claims. The defendants appealed this decision.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The court found that the University of Michigan and Dr. Woods in his official capacity were entitled to sovereign immunity, barring all claims against them. The court also found that Dr. Woods in his individual capacity was entitled to qualified immunity, barring the § 1983 claim against him. Furthermore, the court found that the wrongful death claim against Dr. Woods in his individual capacity should be dismissed as it was barred by governmental immunity. The court dismissed the remainder of the defendants' appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
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Lowther v. Children Youth and Family Department
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Docket:
23-2056
Opinion Date: May 7, 2024
Judge:
McHUGH
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Family Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The case involves Dr. Adam Lowther and his wife, Jessica Lowther, who sued various state officials on behalf of themselves and their children, alleging constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act. The claims arose from the warrantless entry into their home, the arrest of Dr. Lowther, and the removal of their children by officials from New Mexico’s Children, Youth, and Family Department (CYFD) and the Bernalillo County Sheriff’s Department (BCSD). The actions of the officials were based on an anonymous report alleging that Dr. Lowther was sexually abusing his four-year-old daughter.
The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that they were entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 claims and that the state law claims failed for similar reasons. The Lowthers appealed the decision.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the officials had reasonable suspicion that the children had been abused and were in imminent danger, which justified the warrantless entry into the Lowthers' home and the removal of the children. The court also held that the officials had probable cause to arrest Dr. Lowther. Therefore, the officials were entitled to qualified immunity, and the Lowthers' claims were dismissed.
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Concert Investor, LLC v. Small Business Administration
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Docket:
22-5253
Opinion Date: May 3, 2024
Judge:
CHILDS
Areas of Law:
Business Law, Government & Administrative Law
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A small business, Concert Investor LLC, applied for a Shuttered Venue Operators Grant from the Small Business Administration (SBA) after its revenue fell 94% due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The company, which helps mount concert tours for performing artists, applied for a grant of nearly $5 million, or 44.6% of its 2019 revenue. Concert Investor asserted eligibility for a Grant as a “live performing arts organization operator,” claiming that it “produces” live music concerts. However, the SBA denied the application, stating that Concert Investor did not meet the principal business activity standard for the entity type under which it had applied.
Concert Investor appealed the SBA's decision in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia under the Administrative Procedure Act. The SBA rescinded its denial during the lawsuit, but later issued a final denial, stating that Concert Investor did not create, perform, or present live performances, nor did it organize or host live concerts. The district court denied Concert Investor’s motion for summary judgment and granted the SBA’s, agreeing with the SBA that substantial evidence showed that Concert Investor was not a producer.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment order de novo and vacated the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the SBA. The court found that the SBA's definition of a "producer" was too narrow and inconsistent with the statutory language. The court also found that the SBA failed to consider relevant record evidence supporting Concert Investor’s eligibility for a Grant. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
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El Puente v. United States Army Corps of Engineers
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Docket:
23-5189
Opinion Date: May 3, 2024
Judge:
PAN
Areas of Law:
Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers planned to dredge San Juan Harbor to facilitate the movement of large ships. The Corps published an Environmental Assessment, concluding that the project would not significantly impact the environment. The National Marine Fisheries Service also determined that the project was not likely to adversely affect certain threatened and endangered species, including seven types of coral. Three environmental groups sued the agencies, asserting that they had failed to adequately consider the project’s environmental toll. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant agencies.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the Corps and the Service did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in carrying out their responsibilities to evaluate environmental concerns. The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that the Corps failed to adequately consider the breadth of the project’s impacts, erred in analyzing how the project would affect minority and low-income communities, and failed to use the best available science in assessing the project’s detrimental effect on corals. The court also found that the Corps's decision not to translate all materials into Spanish and not to extend the comment period for the Environmental Assessment when Hurricanes Irma and Maria struck Puerto Rico was not arbitrary or capricious.
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Seed v. EPA
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Docket:
22-5321
Opinion Date: May 7, 2024
Judge:
ROGERS
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law
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Dr. Jennifer Seed, a former employee of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), filed a lawsuit against the EPA and the United States, alleging age discrimination. Seed claimed that she was involuntarily demoted to a junior position as older managers were replaced with younger employees. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the EPA, concluding that Seed had not provided sufficient evidence to support her claim of age discrimination.
The district court's decision was based on its finding that Seed had not provided direct evidence of discriminatory intent that would entitle her to a trial, nor had she provided indirect evidence that would give rise to an inference of discrimination. The court also found that Seed had not shown that she was treated less favorably than younger employees after her reassignment or that her treatment was based on her age.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dismissed Seed's appeal, ruling that the court lacked jurisdiction to address the merits of her reassignment claims because she lacked standing under Article III of the United States Constitution. The court found that Seed had not demonstrated that a favorable court decision would likely redress her claimed injuries. The court therefore remanded the case to the district court with instructions to vacate the grant of summary judgment and to dismiss the reassignment claim for lack of standing.
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PERCIAVALLE v. MCDONOUGH
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Docket:
23-1117
Opinion Date: May 9, 2024
Judge:
Taranto
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law, Military Law
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In 2006, veteran Robert Fleming began applying for disability benefits for service-connected injuries. In 2016, he entered into a contingent-fee agreement with James Perciavalle for representation before the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The VA awarded Fleming past-due benefits in 2017, but ruled that Perciavalle was statutorily barred from receiving fees on the non-SMC portion of the award. The VA found the pre-Act version of 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1) applicable based on the date on which Fleming had filed a particular notice of disagreement with the regional office regarding his PTSD benefits.
The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed the fee denial, agreeing with the regional office that the pre-Act version of the fee provision, not the post-Act version, applies here. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) affirmed the Board’s decision.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded the decision of the Veterans Court. The Federal Circuit concluded that the Veterans Court relied on an incorrect legal standard in determining which version of § 5904(c)(1) applies. The Federal Circuit also concluded that the post-Act version is the applicable one, based on the material facts that are not in dispute. The Federal Circuit found that as long as a notice of disagreement was filed on or after June 20, 2007, in the same “case” in which counsel is seeking fees, the post-Act version of 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1) applies.
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City of Valdez v. Regulatory Commission of Alaska
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Court: Alaska Supreme Court
Docket:
s-27
Opinion Date: May 3, 2024
Judge:
PATE
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The City of Valdez in Alaska appealed two orders by the Regulatory Commission of Alaska (RCA) related to the transfer of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) from BP Pipelines (Alaska) Inc. (BPPA) to Harvest Alaska, LLC. The first order (Order 6) approved confidential treatment of certain financial statements submitted by the oil company and its affiliates. The second order (Order 17) approved the transfer of a required certificate and the authority to operate the pipeline. The Superior Court dismissed Valdez’s appeals, concluding that Valdez lacked standing, failed to exhaust available administrative remedies, and the case was moot. The court also ordered Valdez to pay a portion of the attorney’s fees of the oil company and other companies involved in the proceedings.
The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reversed the dismissal of the appeal of Order 6, affirmed the dismissal of the appeal of Order 17, and vacated the award of attorney’s fees. The court found that Valdez had standing to appeal both orders, the appeals were not moot, and Valdez had exhausted administrative remedies with respect to Order 6 but not Order 17. The court remanded the case for further proceedings.
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Northland Investment Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority
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Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
Docket:
SC20769
Opinion Date: May 7, 2024
Judge:
McDONALD
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law, Landlord - Tenant, Real Estate & Property Law
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The case involves Northland Investment Corporation (N Co.), a landlord of multiunit residential buildings, and the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA). N Co. sought a declaratory ruling from PURA that it could use ratio utility billing (RUB) to recoup utility costs from tenants in buildings without individual meters. Under RUB, N Co. would bill tenants for their proportionate share of utility usage, calculated based on factors like unit square footage and number of occupants. PURA concluded that RUB violated the statute because it prohibited charging a tenant for utilities they did not exclusively use. However, PURA suggested N Co. could use the "building in" methodology, incorporating estimated utility costs into fixed rent.
PURA's decision was appealed to the trial court, which remanded the case back to PURA for further consideration of whether its decision on RUB conflicted with its conclusion on the "building in" approach. PURA reaffirmed its prior ruling, and N Co. appealed again to the trial court, which dismissed the appeal. N Co. then appealed from the trial court's judgment.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut upheld the trial court's decision, agreeing with PURA's determination that the statute prohibits N Co.'s proposed use of RUB to recoup building-wide utility costs by billing tenants for their estimated proportionate share of the total cost. The court concluded that the "building in" approach was acceptable as it allowed for consistent and predictable payments each month and placed the risk of higher-than-anticipated utility usage on the landlord.
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Randolph v. Aidan, LLC
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Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Docket:
23-0917
Opinion Date: May 3, 2024
Judge:
May
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law, Landlord - Tenant, Personal Injury, Real Estate & Property Law
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The case revolves around Lori Randolph, who was injured after falling down stairs in a rental property owned by Aidan, LLC. Randolph sued Aidan, alleging negligence in failing to provide safe stairs. Aidan, in turn, filed a third-party claim against Sioux City, asserting that a city employee had inspected the property and declared it compliant with the municipal code. Aidan claimed that the city was negligent in hiring, retaining, or supervising the unqualified inspector, and thus, should indemnify Aidan for any damages owed to Randolph. Sioux City moved to dismiss Aidan’s claim, arguing it was immune under Iowa Code section 670.4(1)(j).
The district court denied Sioux City's motion to dismiss Aidan's claim. Sioux City and Randolph requested interlocutory review, which was granted. The Supreme Court of Iowa was tasked with reviewing the denial of Sioux City's motion for the correction of errors at law.
The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the district court's decision. The court held that Sioux City was immune from Aidan's claim under Iowa Code section 670.4(1)(j). The court reasoned that Aidan's claim for negligent hiring was "based upon" the negligence of Sioux City's employee in inspecting the stairs. Therefore, the claim fell within the scope of the immunity provided by section 670.4(1)(j). The court remanded the case for further proceedings, including the dismissal of Aidan's claim against Sioux City.
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Terrace Hill Society Foundation v. Terrace Hill Commission
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Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Docket:
22-1995
Opinion Date: May 3, 2024
Judge:
McDonald
Areas of Law:
Contracts, Government & Administrative Law
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The case involves a dispute between the Terrace Hill Society Foundation (THSF) and the Terrace Hill Commission (the Commission) over the ownership and control of a collection of property and historical artifacts displayed at the Governor's official residence, Terrace Hill. THSF filed a petition seeking a declaration that it was the sole owner of the collection and an injunction granting it the right to access, itemize, insure, maintain, and preserve the collection. The Commission and its chairperson, Kristin Hurd, moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that it was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity and that Hurd could not provide the requested relief.
The district court denied the motion to dismiss with respect to the Commission, finding that the factual allegations in the petition, when viewed in the light most favorable to THSF, were sufficient to overcome the State's immunity from suit. The court reasoned that the Commission had willingly accepted possession of THSF's property and retained it after the expiration of a 1996 agreement between the parties. However, the court granted the motion to dismiss with respect to Hurd and dismissed the claims against her without prejudice.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the State can impliedly or constructively waive its immunity from suit when it voluntarily creates certain legal relationships that subject it to liability. The court found that THSF's amended petition alleged sufficient facts to plead a voluntary bailment, a legal relationship sounding in contract, which impliedly waived the State's sovereign immunity. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the claims against Hurd without prejudice, rejecting her argument that the claims should have been dismissed with prejudice. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
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Hines v. Caldwell
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Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi
Citation:
2023-IA-00813-SCT
Opinion Date: May 2, 2024
Judge:
Beam
Areas of Law:
Family Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The case revolves around a custody dispute involving a minor child, J.B., born in March 2021. J.B. was placed in the custody of foster parents, John and Amy Caldwell, by the Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services (CPS) in June 2021. In October 2022, J.B.'s maternal great aunt, Wanda Hines, expressed interest in adopting J.B. Subsequently, the foster parents filed a petition for adoption in March 2023. In response, the relatives filed a motion to intervene and dismiss the adoption proceeding. CPS also filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the foster parents violated their foster contract by pursuing an adoption action. The chancellor granted the relatives' motion to intervene and appointed a guardian ad litem to make a recommendation regarding the child’s best interest.
The DeSoto County Chancery Court granted the foster parents durable legal and physical custody of J.B. in a temporary order until the final hearing on the merits of their adoption petition and dismissed CPS without a hearing. The relatives and CPS appealed this decision.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the chancery court's decision, ruling that the chancellor erred by awarding permanent relief without a hearing. The court held that divesting and dismissing CPS from the case is permanent relief, which cannot be done without a hearing, even under the guise of a temporary order. The court also noted that durable legal custody is not an appropriate award after a termination of parental rights. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
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Midsouth Association of Independent Schools v. Parents for Public Schools
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Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi
Citation:
2022-SA-01129-SCT
Opinion Date: May 2, 2024
Judge:
Chamberlin
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The case revolves around two Senate Bills—2780 and 3064—passed by the Mississippi Legislature in 2022. Senate Bill 2780 established the Independent Schools Infrastructure Grant Program (ISIGP), which allowed independent schools to apply for reimbursable grants for infrastructure projects funded by the Coronavirus State Fiscal Recovery Funds under the federal American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA). Senate Bill 3064 allocated $10 million from the Coronavirus State Fiscal Recovery Fund to ISIGP. Parents for Public Schools (PPS), a nonprofit organization advocating for public schools, filed a complaint alleging that ISIGP violated the Mississippi Constitution by appropriating public funds to private schools. PPS sought injunctive and declaratory relief, asserting associational standing on behalf of its members.
The Chancery Court of Hinds County found that PPS had established associational standing. It also found that Senate Bills 2780 and 3064 violated the Mississippi Constitution by appropriating public funds to private schools. The court denied a motion to intervene by the Midsouth Association of Independent Schools (MAIS), which sought to challenge the constitutionality of the relevant section of the Mississippi Constitution under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi, however, found that PPS lacked standing to bring the lawsuit. The court determined that PPS failed to demonstrate an adverse impact different from that of the general public. The court noted that the funds at issue were federal, not state, funds earmarked for specific infrastructure needs, and were not commingled with state funds. The court also found that PPS's challenge to general government spending was too attenuated to bestow standing. As a result, the court vacated the judgment of the Hinds County Chancery Court and rendered judgment dismissing PPS's complaint.
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Missoula County v. Department of Corrections
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Court: Montana Supreme Court
Citation:
2024 MT 98
Opinion Date: May 7, 2024
Judge:
Rice
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Contracts, Government & Administrative Law
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The case involves a dispute between Missoula County and the Montana Department of Corrections (DOC) over the reimbursement rate for housing DOC inmates in county detention centers. The County and the DOC had entered into a contract in 2015, setting a reimbursement rate of $88.73 per day for each inmate. However, in 2015, the Montana Legislature capped the reimbursement rate at $69 per day. The County filed a lawsuit in 2020, alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment.
The District Court granted summary judgment to the DOC, concluding that the County's contract claims were time-barred by a one-year statute of limitations. It also found that the County's tort claim for breach of the covenant of good faith was not supported by a special relationship and that the County could not recover under a theory of unjust enrichment.
The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the District Court's decision. It held that the one-year statute of limitations applied to the County's contract claims, rejecting the County's argument that an eight-year limitation period should apply. The court also agreed with the lower court that the County's tort claim for breach of the covenant of good faith was not supported by a special relationship. Finally, the court concluded that the County could not recover under a theory of unjust enrichment, as the County had not demonstrated that the DOC had reaped an inequitable gain.
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Joshua M. v. State
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Court: Nebraska Supreme Court
Citation:
316 Neb. 446
Opinion Date: May 3, 2024
Areas of Law:
Family Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The Nebraska Supreme Court ruled that the State of Nebraska and the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) are immune from a lawsuit brought by three siblings who were physically and sexually abused in a foster home. The siblings, Joshua M., Sydnie M., and Abigail S., were placed in the foster home by DHHS in 1996. They alleged that DHHS was negligent in recommending and supervising their placement and in failing to remove them from the home when DHHS knew or should have known they were being abused. The court found that the siblings' claims fell within the State Tort Claims Act's exemption for claims arising out of assault or battery, and thus were barred by the State's sovereign immunity. The court also found that DHHS did not breach its duty of care to the siblings. The court affirmed the judgment in favor of DHHS and remanded the case with directions to dismiss the claims against DHHS. The court also affirmed a judgment against the siblings' former foster parent in the amount of $2.9 million.
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Cole v. Town of Conway
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Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court
Docket:
2022-0648
Opinion Date: May 3, 2024
Judge:
MARCONI
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury
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The plaintiff, Charles W. Cole, was walking on a brick sidewalk in North Conway Village, a village of the Town of Conway, when he tripped and fell due to holes in the sidewalk caused by missing or broken bricks. The plaintiff alleged that the Town of Conway was aware of the sidewalk's disrepair prior to his injury and had received written notice of the damaged bricks and holes. The plaintiff filed a negligence lawsuit against the Town of Conway in superior court.
The Town of Conway moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that it was entitled to statutory immunity as the plaintiff had failed to allege with particularity how the Town had received written notice of the sidewalk's condition. The plaintiff objected, arguing that the complaint contained sufficient particularity and that the Town was barred from claiming statutory immunity because it was insured against the risk through Primex. The trial court granted the Town's motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiff had failed to plead with sufficient particularity that the Town had received notice of the holes in the sidewalk, and that Primex's pooled risk management program did not constitute an insurance policy within the meaning of the relevant statute. The trial court also denied the plaintiff's motion for leave to amend his complaint.
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court agreed with the trial court that Primex's pooled risk management program did not constitute "insurance" within the meaning of the relevant statute, and thus the Town was not barred from claiming statutory immunity. However, the court reversed the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's motion for leave to amend his complaint, finding that the plaintiff's proposed amendments could potentially satisfy the particularity requirement of the statute. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
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CITY OF DENTON v. GRIM
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Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Docket:
22-1023
Opinion Date: May 3, 2024
Judge:
Blacklock
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law
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The case involves two plaintiffs, Michael Grim and Jim Maynard, who were employees of the Denton Municipal Electric (DME), a local electric utility owned by the City of Denton. The plaintiffs supported the construction of a controversial new power plant, the Denton Energy Center (DEC). Keely Briggs, a member of the Denton city council, opposed the new plant and leaked internal city documents about the project to a local newspaper. The plaintiffs reported Briggs's leak of confidential vendor information, alleging it violated the Public Information Act and the Open Meetings Act. They claimed that this report triggered the protections of the Whistleblower Act. The plaintiffs were later fired, which they alleged was retaliation for their report about Briggs.
The case was initially heard in the district court, where the city argued that the Whistleblower Act did not apply because the plaintiffs did not report a violation of law "by the employing governmental entity or another public employee." The court was not convinced, and the case proceeded to a jury trial, which resulted in a $4 million judgment for the plaintiffs. The city appealed, raising several issues, including the legal question of whether the Whistleblower Act applied in this case. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision.
The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that the Whistleblower Act did not protect the plaintiffs because they reported a violation of law by a lone city council member, not by the employing governmental entity or another public employee. The court found that the lone city council member lacked any authority to act on behalf of the city, and her actions could not be imputed to the city. Therefore, her violation of law was not a "violation of law by the employing governmental entity." The court concluded that the plaintiffs did not allege a viable claim under the Whistleblower Act, and rendered judgment for the city.
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Montalla, LLC v. Commonwealth
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Court: Supreme Court of Virginia
Docket:
230365
Opinion Date: May 9, 2024
Judge:
RUSSELL
Areas of Law:
Contracts, Government & Administrative Law
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The case involves Montalla, LLC ("Montalla") and the Commonwealth of Virginia, Department of Transportation ("VDOT"), and the Comptroller of Virginia (collectively the "Commonwealth"). Montalla filed a five-count complaint against the Commonwealth related to several contracts VDOT had entered into for construction inspection services. The circuit court dismissed the entire complaint, ruling that sovereign immunity barred all five counts. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, concluding that Counts I-III of the complaint were barred by sovereign immunity and that Counts IV-V were barred by the entry of a settlement agreement entered into by the pertinent parties.
The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that the first three counts of the complaint were barred by sovereign immunity and that the last two counts were barred by the entry of a settlement agreement. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the settlement agreement was enforceable and that Montalla had not sufficiently alleged duress or repudiation to set it aside.
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity did not bar Montalla's claims based on valid contracts. The Court also held that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the settlement agreement, including the release of claims contained therein, was enforceable at this stage of the proceedings. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion.
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Kent v. Sullivan
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Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
Docket:
22-0428
Opinion Date: May 9, 2024
Judge:
Wooton
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law
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The case involves a dispute between Christopher Sullivan, the respondent, and several police officers and cities, the petitioners. Sullivan filed a complaint against the petitioners following a confrontation with the police officers that led to his arrest on various charges. Sullivan asserted twenty-three state law causes of action against the petitioners. In response, the petitioners filed motions to dismiss Sullivan's complaint, alleging varying theories of immunity. The Circuit Court of Jefferson County partially granted the petitioners' motions to dismiss. The court determined that the police officers were not entitled to "qualified immunity" and that the cities and their respective police departments and police chiefs were entitled to "qualified immunity" from Sullivan's negligence claims. The court also determined that Sullivan was entitled to allege claims of negligence and intentional torts from the same facts.
The petitioners appealed the Circuit Court's decision to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. The Supreme Court found that the Circuit Court erred by basing its immunity decisions on common law qualified immunity principles, which are only applicable to the State, its agencies, officials, and employees, rather than applying the provisions of the West Virginia Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act, which govern immunity for the claims asserted against the petitioners as they are undisputedly political subdivisions and employees of political subdivisions. The Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.
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Paletta v. Phillips
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Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
Docket:
22-0380
Opinion Date: May 7, 2024
Judge:
ARMSTEAD
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law
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The case involves Tony Paletta, the petitioner, and Nelson Phillips, III, Nathan Phillips, Robert Nelson Phillips, II, and the West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Highways, the respondents. The petitioner and the Phillips respondents own adjacent land in Harrison County, West Virginia. A road, Harrison County Route 36/5 (CR 36/5), crosses the Phillips respondents' property and provides access to the petitioner's property. The road was never improved by the West Virginia Division of Highways (WVDOH) but appears on WVDOH maps for Harrison County beginning in 1937. After the Phillips respondents impeded the petitioner's access by way of CR 36/5, the petitioner brought suit in circuit court seeking an order requiring the Phillips respondents to remove the gates/fences and allow him access to his property, using CR 36/5.
The Circuit Court of Harrison County granted summary judgment in favor of the Phillips respondents, finding that CR 36/5 was not a public road. The court based its decision on several factors, including the lack of specific description of the road, the WVDOH's admission that the road no longer exists in an identifiable form, and the lack of plans by the WVDOH to make any improvements to CR 36/5.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the lower court's decision, finding that the circuit court erred in concluding that CR 36/5 is not a public road and in granting summary judgment in favor of the Phillips respondents. The court held that the burden of showing that a public road was abandoned falls on the party asserting the abandonment. In this case, the Phillips respondents failed to demonstrate that CR 36/5 was discontinued or abandoned. The court concluded that CR 36/5 was properly made a part of the state road system in 1933 and was never properly abandoned, discontinued, vacated, or closed by the WVDOH in the manner prescribed by West Virginia law. Therefore, the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion.
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