Table of Contents
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New York State Telecommunications Association, Inc. v. James
Communications Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
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Keystone-Conemaugh Projects LLC v. EPA
Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
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Montemuro v. Jim Thorpe Area School District
Civil Rights, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
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United States v. Lee
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
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Sierra Club v. Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality
Civil Procedure, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
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Heeter v. Bowers
Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
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Sanchez-Perez v. Garland
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
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Sabo v. Erickson
Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
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Stop Illinois Health Care Fraud, LLC v. Sayeed
Government & Administrative Law, Health Law
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
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ASSURANCE WIRELESS USA, L.P. V. ALICE REYNOLDS
Communications Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
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Diamond S.J. Enterprise, Inc. v. City of San Jose
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
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SAN LUIS OBISPO MOTHERS FOR PEACE V. UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Civil Procedure, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
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Bradford v. U.S. Department of Labor
Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law
US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
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Cronick v. Pryor
Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
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Johnson v. City of Cheyenne
Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
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United States v. Hill
Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
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USA v. Ferguson
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
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John Does 1-7 v. Taliban
Government & Administrative Law, International Law
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
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UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY V. FRANKLIN
Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law
Arkansas Supreme Court
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City of San Jose v. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn.
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
California Courts of Appeal
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Sutter's Place, Inc. v. California Gambling Control Commission
Gaming Law, Government & Administrative Law
California Courts of Appeal
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Symons Emergency Specialties v. City of Riverside
Antitrust & Trade Regulation, Business Law, Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law
California Courts of Appeal
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Kirkwood Institute, Inc. v. Sand
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law
Iowa Supreme Court
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BROOME VS. RIALS
Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use
Louisiana Supreme Court
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Mack v. District Attorney for the Bristol District
Government & Administrative Law
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
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Phoenix Capital v. Board of Oil & Gas
Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law
Montana Supreme Court
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State ex rel. Ottinger v. B&B Wrecking & Excavating, Inc.
Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law
Supreme Court of Ohio
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City of Pawtucket v. Department of Revenue
Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law
Rhode Island Supreme Court
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Fuller Mill Realty, LLC v. Department of Revenue
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law
Rhode Island Supreme Court
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United States of America v. Clemons
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
South Carolina Supreme Court
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Avera St. Mary’s Hospital V. Sully County
Government & Administrative Law, Health Law
South Dakota Supreme Court
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EX PARTE MCMILLAN
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
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Andrade v. City of Milwaukee Board of Fire and Police Commissioners
Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law
Wisconsin Supreme Court
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Richardson v. State of Wyoming, Ex Rel. Wyoming Department of Health
Government & Administrative Law, Health Law
Wyoming Supreme Court
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Government & Administrative Law Opinions
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New York State Telecommunications Association, Inc. v. James
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Docket:
21-1975
Opinion Date: April 26, 2024
Judge:
NATHAN
Areas of Law:
Communications Law, Government & Administrative Law
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In 2021, New York enacted the Affordable Broadband Act (ABA), which required internet service providers to offer broadband internet to qualifying households at reduced prices. A group of trade organizations representing internet service providers sued, arguing that the ABA was preempted by federal law. The district court agreed with the plaintiffs and granted a preliminary injunction barring New York from enforcing the ABA. The parties later requested that the district court enter a stipulated final judgment and permanent injunction.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed with the lower court's decision. The appellate court concluded that the ABA was not field-preempted by the Communications Act of 1934 (as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996), because the Act does not establish a framework of rate regulation that is sufficiently comprehensive to imply that Congress intended to exclude the states from entering the field. The court also concluded that the ABA was not conflict-preempted by the Federal Communications Commission’s 2018 order classifying broadband as an information service. The court reasoned that the order stripped the agency of its authority to regulate the rates charged for broadband internet, and a federal agency cannot exclude states from regulating in an area where the agency itself lacks regulatory authority. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and vacated the permanent injunction.
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Keystone-Conemaugh Projects LLC v. EPA
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Docket:
22-3026
Opinion Date: May 2, 2024
Judge:
SCIRICA
Areas of Law:
Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The case involves a dispute over the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) decision to implement a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) to regulate emissions in Pennsylvania. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania had initially submitted a State Implementation Plan (SIP) to the EPA for approval, as required by the Clean Air Act. The EPA initially approved the plan, but the approval was later vacated by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which directed the EPA to either approve a new state-made plan or formulate a new federal plan within two years. The EPA decided to create its own plan, which was challenged by the Commonwealth and one of the three coal power companies affected by the plan.
The petitioners argued that the EPA exceeded its statutory authority when it promulgated the plan and that the plan was arbitrary and capricious because the EPA failed to show its work. However, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that the EPA acted in accordance with the Clean Air Act and denied the petition for review. The court held that the EPA properly exercised its authority under the Clean Air Act by partially disapproving the 2016 SIP and promulgating the FIP. The court also held that the contents of the FIP were not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of the EPA’s discretion.
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Montemuro v. Jim Thorpe Area School District
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Docket:
22-1866
Opinion Date: May 1, 2024
Judge:
Jordan
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law
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Paul Montemuro was elected as the President of the Jim Thorpe Area School Board. However, a week later, the Board elected someone else without giving Montemuro any prior notice. Montemuro sued the Board members who voted against him and the Jim Thorpe Area School District, alleging that they had deprived him of his property without due process, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants claimed qualified immunity.
The District Court held that Montemuro had a clearly established property right in his employment and had been deprived of that right without due process. The defendants appealed this decision, arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The Court found that Pennsylvania law clearly established that Montemuro had a property interest in his job as the Board President. The Court also accepted Montemuro's allegation that he was removed from office without notice. Therefore, the Court concluded that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because they had violated Montemuro's clearly established right to due process.
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United States v. Lee
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Docket:
21-4299
Opinion Date: April 30, 2024
Judge:
Rushing
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The case involves Austin Kyle Lee, who was found guilty of several federal drug and firearm offenses. After serving over four years in a New York prison for selling cocaine, Lee was released in late 2015 and moved to North Carolina, where he resumed selling drugs. A search of his residences revealed distribution quantities of a fentanyl–heroin mixture, cocaine, and marijuana; handguns and ammunition; packaging material; and over $200,000 in cash. A federal grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging Lee with multiple offenses, including conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin, five kilograms or more of cocaine, and a quantity of marijuana, among others.
The district court found Lee guilty on all counts. The court also found additional facts that increased Lee’s mandatory minimum sentence for those crimes. Lee appealed, arguing that this judicial factfinding violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. The Government agreed but contended that the district court’s procedural error was harmless because proof of the relevant facts was overwhelming and uncontroverted.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court agreed with the Government that any procedural error in the district court’s determination that the serious drug felony enhancement applied to increase Lee’s statutory sentencing range was harmless. The court noted that Lee conceded that, under existing law, the judge could decide the fact of his prior conviction without a jury. Furthermore, the Government’s proof of the other two elements—concerning the duration and recency of his incarceration for that offense—was overwhelming and uncontroverted.
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Sierra Club v. Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Docket:
23-60234
Opinion Date: April 29, 2024
Judge:
Engelhardt
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The case involves a challenge by the Sierra Club to the pre-construction permits issued by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) to Commonwealth LNG, LLC for its planned liquefied natural gas (LNG) export facility. The Sierra Club argued that the facility’s emissions would exceed National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) and that LDEQ failed to require Commonwealth to use the best available control technology (BACT) to limit those emissions.
Before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, LDEQ argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, asserting that the claim arose under state law, not federal law. However, the court found that it had jurisdiction to review the petition because when LDEQ issued the permit, it was acting pursuant to federal law, not merely state law.
On the merits, the court found that LDEQ did not act arbitrarily in its use of significant impact levels (SILs) to calculate which pollutants will have an insignificant effect on the NAAQS. The court also found that LDEQ did not act arbitrarily in its use of AP-42 emission factors to determine potential emissions from an LNG facility that has not yet been built. Furthermore, the court held that LDEQ did not violate its public trustee duty under Louisiana law, which requires LDEQ to evaluate and avoid adverse environmental impacts to the maximum extent possible.
The court denied Sierra Club’s petition for review and affirmed LDEQ’s permitting decision.
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Heeter v. Bowers
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Docket:
23-3296
Opinion Date: April 29, 2024
Judge:
Bloomekatz
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law
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This case involves a lawsuit filed by the family of Bill Heeter against Officer Kenneth Bowers and the Columbus Police Department. The family alleges that Officer Bowers used excessive force and violated Mr. Heeter's constitutional rights when he shot and killed Mr. Heeter during a police response to a suicide threat. The family also alleges that Officer Bowers violated Mr. Heeter's right to adequate medical care by failing to administer first aid after the shooting.
The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, where the defendants claimed immunity from the lawsuit. The district court granted the defendants immunity from some claims but denied others. The two constitutional claims against Officer Bowers that survived qualified immunity in the district court are the central focus of this appeal.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of state-law immunity and qualified immunity as to Officer Bowers in his individual capacity, allowing the Heeters’ constitutional and state-law claims against him to proceed to trial. However, the court held that the City was entitled to summary judgment on the state-law claims because of an Ohio municipal immunity statute. The court reversed solely on the issue of municipal immunity for the City, and otherwise affirmed the district court's decision.
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Sanchez-Perez v. Garland
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Docket:
23-3004
Opinion Date: April 30, 2024
Judge:
Karen Nelson Moore
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law
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The case involves Jose Yanel Sanchez-Perez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, who entered the United States in 1998. In 2009, Sanchez-Perez pleaded guilty to committing misdemeanor domestic assault under Tennessee law. The following day, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him. In 2015, an immigration judge found Sanchez-Perez ineligible for cancellation of removal because he failed to establish that he had been continuously present in the United States for ten years prior to receiving the notice to appear. However, the judge also found that Sanchez-Perez was not statutorily barred from seeking cancellation of removal due to his 2009 domestic-violence conviction.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Sanchez-Perez’s appeal and agreed with the immigration judge’s findings that Sanchez-Perez lacked the requisite continuous physical presence and thus was not eligible for cancellation of removal. In 2018, the immigration judge found that Sanchez-Perez’s 2009 conviction is categorically a crime of violence, and thus Sanchez-Perez was statutorily barred from obtaining cancellation of removal. The BIA dismissed Sanchez-Perez’s appeal from this decision.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA erred in determining that Sanchez-Perez’s 2009 conviction was categorically a crime of violence, and thus Sanchez-Perez was statutorily barred from obtaining cancellation of removal. The court noted that the Tennessee statute at issue criminalizes conduct that does not require the use or threatened use of violent physical force. Therefore, the court granted Sanchez-Perez’s petition for review, vacated the BIA’s order, and remanded the case to the BIA for proceedings consistent with its opinion.
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Sabo v. Erickson
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Docket:
21-3332
Opinion Date: April 30, 2024
Judge:
Jackson-Akiwumi
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law
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The case revolves around John Sabo, who was sentenced to a probation term that exceeded the maximum limit set by Wisconsin law. After his probation should have ended, he was imprisoned for violating its conditions. Sabo sued two groups of defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Sheri Hicks and Debra Haley, officials from the Wisconsin Department of Corrections who failed to correct his unlawful probation term, and Megan Erickson and Barb Hanson, the probation officers who enforced it. Sabo alleged that all four defendants violated his right of due process and showed deliberate indifference to his unjustified imprisonment.
The district court dismissed all claims against Hicks and Haley, and most against Erickson and Hanson, before entering summary judgment for Erickson and Hanson on the deliberate indifference and unreasonable seizure claims. Sabo appealed the dismissal of his claims against Hicks and Haley.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that Sabo's complaint stated claims of deliberate indifference against Hicks and Haley. The court held that assuming all facts and inferences in Sabo’s favor, the record did not compel a finding of qualified immunity for Hicks and Haley. Therefore, the court vacated the district court’s dismissal of those claims. However, the court affirmed the district court's decision in all other respects, including the summary judgment for Erickson and Hanson on the deliberate indifference and unreasonable seizure claims.
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Stop Illinois Health Care Fraud, LLC v. Sayeed
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Docket:
22-3295
Opinion Date: May 2, 2024
Judge:
SCUDDER
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law, Health Law
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The case involves Asif Sayeed and three associated healthcare companies who were found liable for violating the Anti-Kickback Statute and False Claims Act, resulting in a nearly $6 million judgment. Sayeed owned a healthcare management company, Management Principles, Inc. (MPI), which managed two smaller companies that provided home-based medical services to Medicare recipients in Illinois. Sayeed's companies received a significant amount of their business from the Healthcare Consortium of Illinois. In December 2010, Sayeed devised a scheme to bypass the Consortium’s referral process by directly soliciting its clients for additional services. MPI signed a Management Services Agreement with the Consortium, which gave MPI full access to its clients’ healthcare data. MPI used this information to identify and directly solicit Medicare-eligible seniors who might want or need additional healthcare services.
The district court held a bench trial in July 2019 and found that Sayeed and his companies had not violated the Anti-Kickback Statute or False Claims Act because they had paid the Consortium with the intent to obtain information, not patient referrals. The plaintiff appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the decision, concluding that the defendants' conduct qualified as a form of indirect referral giving rise to an unlawful kickback scheme.
On remand, the district court found the defendants liable under both the Anti-Kickback Statute and False Claims Act. The court imposed $5,940,972.16 in damages, which it calculated by trebling the value of the Medicare claims it deemed false and then adding a per-claim penalty of $5,500. The defendants appealed, challenging both the damages award and the underlying finding of liability. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of liability but reversed in part to permit the district court to clarify which Medicare claims, all or some, resulted from the defendants’ illegal kickback scheme.
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ASSURANCE WIRELESS USA, L.P. V. ALICE REYNOLDS
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Docket:
23-15490
Opinion Date: April 26, 2024
Judge:
NELSON
Areas of Law:
Communications Law, Government & Administrative Law
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A group of telecommunications carriers, including Assurance Wireless USA, L.P., MetroPCS California, LLC, Sprint Spectrum LLC, T-Mobile USA, Inc., and T-Mobile West LLC, sued the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) over a rule change. The CPUC had altered the mechanism for charging telecommunications providers to fund California’s universal service program. Previously, the program was funded based on revenue, but due to declining revenues, the CPUC issued a rule imposing surcharges on telecommunications carriers based on the number of active accounts, or access lines, rather than revenue.
The carriers sought a preliminary injunction against the access line rule, arguing that it was preempted by the Telecommunications Act, which requires providers of interstate telecommunications services to contribute to the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) universal service mechanisms on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis. The carriers argued that the access line rule was inconsistent with the FCC's rule and was inequitable and discriminatory.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the preliminary injunction. The court found that the carriers were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their express preemption claims. It held that the access line rule was not inconsistent with the FCC's rule and was not inequitable or discriminatory.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the carriers were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims. It held that the access line rule was not inconsistent with the FCC's rule and was not inequitable or discriminatory. The court concluded that the carriers had failed to show that the access line rule burdened the FCC's universal service programs or that it unfairly advantaged or disadvantaged any provider.
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Diamond S.J. Enterprise, Inc. v. City of San Jose
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Docket:
20-15085
Opinion Date: April 30, 2024
Judge:
Nguyen
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law
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Diamond S.J. Enterprise, Inc., which operates a nightclub in San Jose, California, had its license suspended for thirty days by the city following a shooting outside the club. The city held an administrative hearing and found that Diamond had operated its venue in a way that caused the shooting and created a public nuisance, violating San Jose's entertainment business licensing provisions. Diamond filed a complaint in federal court, alleging First Amendment and due process violations.
The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, which dismissed Diamond's claims and granted summary judgment for the City of San Jose. The district court ruled that the challenged provisions did not implicate First Amendment rights and that the city had satisfied due process requirements.
The case was then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Diamond's facial attack on the city's public entertainment business licensing provisions failed because the provisions did not give city officials unbridled discretion that created a risk of censorship. The court also held that Diamond failed to state a procedural due process claim, as the licensing scheme provided Diamond with notice, an opportunity to be heard, the ability to present and respond to evidence, and a pre-deprivation appeal, followed by post-deprivation review by the California Superior Court.
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SAN LUIS OBISPO MOTHERS FOR PEACE V. UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Docket:
23-852
Opinion Date: April 29, 2024
Judge:
Callahan
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
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In 2022, the California Legislature directed Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) to extend operations at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, despite PG&E's previous plans to cease operations. However, the deadline for a federal license renewal application for continued operation had already passed. PG&E requested an exemption from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to this deadline, which the NRC granted. The NRC found that the exemption was authorized by law, would not pose an undue risk to public health and safety, and that special circumstances were present. The NRC also concluded that the exemption met the eligibility criteria for a categorical exclusion, meaning no additional environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act was required.
Three non-profit organizations, San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace, Friends of the Earth, and the Environmental Working Group, petitioned for review of the NRC's decision. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals first addressed whether it had jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from an NRC exemption decision. The court held that it did have jurisdiction, as the substance of the exemption was ancillary or incidental to a licensing proceeding. The court also concluded that the petitioners had Article III standing to bring the case, as they alleged a non-speculative potential harm from age-related safety and environmental risks, demonstrated that Diablo Canyon would likely continue operations beyond its initial 40-year license term, and alleged members’ proximity to the facility.
On the merits, the court held that the NRC’s decision to grant the exemption was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. The court also held that the NRC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in invoking the National Environmental Policy Act categorical exclusion when issuing the exemption decision. The court concluded that the NRC was not required to provide a hearing or meet other procedural requirements before issuing the exemption decision because the exemption was not a licensing proceeding. The court denied the petition for review.
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Bradford v. U.S. Department of Labor
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Docket:
22-1023
Opinion Date: April 30, 2024
Judge:
Jerome A. Holmes
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law
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The case involves Duke Bradford, Arkansas Valley Adventure (AVA), and the Colorado River Outfitters Association (CROA) who appealed against the District of Colorado’s order denying their motion to preliminarily enjoin a Department of Labor (DOL) rule. The rule required federal contractors to pay their employees a $15.00 minimum hourly wage. The DOL promulgated the rule pursuant to a directive in Executive Order (EO) 14,026, issued by President Biden. The EO imposed the minimum wage requirement on most federal contractors and rescinded an exemption for recreational services outfitters operating on federal lands.
The appellants argued that the district court erred in concluding that the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (FPASA) authorizes the minimum wage rule as applied to recreational services permittees because the government does not procure any services from them or supply anything to them. They also argued that the DOL acted arbitrarily and capriciously in promulgating the minimum wage rule without exempting recreational service permittees.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court concluded that the appellants have not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits that the DOL’s rule was issued without statutory authority. The court held that FPASA likely authorizes the minimum wage rule because the DOL’s rule permissibly regulates the supply of nonpersonal services and advances the statutory objectives of economy and efficiency. The court also held that the appellants have not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits that the DOL’s rule is arbitrary and capricious.
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Cronick v. Pryor
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Docket:
23-1238
Opinion Date: April 30, 2024
Judge:
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The case revolves around an incident where Colorado Springs Police Officers Robert McCafferty and Christopher Pryor responded to a 911-call placed by Sasha Cronick reporting a drug overdose. During the incident, Officer Pryor questioned Cronick, which escalated into an argument, leading to her arrest for failure to desist and disperse in violation of Colorado Springs Code § 9.2.103. Cronick filed a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the officers violated her constitutional rights. The officers asserted qualified immunity, but the district court denied their claim.
The district court found several disputes of fact, including whether Officer Pryor issued an order for Cronick to leave the scene, whether Cronick was obstructing the scene, and whether Officer Pryor grabbed Cronick's arm to escort her away or after she had already turned to walk away. The court concluded that these disputes prevented it from finding that the officers had probable cause to arrest Cronick.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court concluded that a reasonable officer under these circumstances would not have arguable probable cause to arrest Cronick for failure to desist or disperse. The court also found that the officers did not have probable cause to conduct a search incident to arrest. The officers failed to articulate specific facts that led them to believe Cronick posed a threat and offered nothing beyond conclusory references to safety. Therefore, the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity because they violated Cronick's clearly established constitutional rights.
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Johnson v. City of Cheyenne
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Docket:
22-8015
Opinion Date: April 26, 2024
Judge:
Holmes
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law
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In 1989, Andrew Johnson was convicted of aggravated burglary and sexual assault. In 2013, a Wyoming state court declared Johnson innocent based on DNA evidence and vacated his convictions. Johnson then filed a lawsuit against Officer Alan Spencer, the Estate of Detective George Stanford, and the City of Cheyenne, Wyoming, alleging that they fabricated evidence, failed to produce exculpatory evidence, and failed to maintain adequate policing policies. The district court dismissed Johnson's claims, and he appealed.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Johnson failed to plausibly allege a fabrication-of-evidence claim against Officer Spencer. Regarding Johnson's claim based on the alleged failure to produce exculpatory evidence, the court determined that Johnson failed to show that his constitutional rights were violated, and thus, Officer Spencer and Detective Stanford were entitled to qualified immunity. The court also concluded that the district court properly dismissed the claims against the City of Cheyenne because Johnson did not demonstrate that any City of Cheyenne law enforcement officer violated his constitutional rights.
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United States v. Hill
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Docket:
23-10934
Opinion Date: April 29, 2024
Judge:
Rosenbaum
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The case involves Victor Hill, the former Sheriff of Clayton County, Georgia, who was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 242 for using his position to deprive detainees in his custody of their constitutional rights. Hill ordered individual detainees, who were neither violent nor uncontrollable, into a restraint chair for at least four hours, with their hands cuffed behind their backs and without bathroom breaks. Each detainee suffered injuries, such as “open and bleeding” wounds, lasting scars, or nerve damage.
Hill was convicted by a jury in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. He appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, arguing that he lacked fair warning that his conduct was unconstitutional, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and that the district court improperly handled allegations of juror misconduct.
The Eleventh Circuit rejected Hill's arguments and affirmed his conviction. The court found that case law provided Hill with fair warning that his actions violated constitutional rights. The court also found that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that Hill's conduct had no legitimate nonpunitive purpose, was willful, and caused the detainees’ injuries. Lastly, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in investigating and responding to alleged juror misconduct.
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USA v. Ferguson
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Docket:
22-12013
Opinion Date: April 30, 2024
Judge:
Lagoa
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
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B'Quan Ferguson was convicted for possession of a firearm by a felon, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The conviction followed an incident where local police officers in Savannah, Georgia, recognized Ferguson as the subject of an ongoing investigation. The officers found a pistol in Ferguson's vehicle, and a DNA test confirmed that Ferguson's DNA was present on the pistol. Ferguson was subsequently charged with one count of possession of a firearm by a felon.
Previously, Ferguson had been convicted under Georgia law for threatening physical harm to a witness, which was considered a "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). This prior conviction led to Ferguson being classified as an armed career criminal, which mandated a minimum sentence of 15 years. Ferguson objected to this classification, arguing that his Georgia conviction for threatening a witness did not qualify as a violent felony for ACCA enhancement purposes. The district court overruled Ferguson's objection and sentenced him to 180 months' imprisonment.
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Ferguson argued that his prior Georgia conviction did not qualify as a "violent felony" under ACCA. The court disagreed, concluding that the Georgia statute under which Ferguson was convicted was divisible and that a conviction for threatening physical harm under the statute qualifies as a violent felony under ACCA. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding Ferguson's sentence.
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John Does 1-7 v. Taliban
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Docket:
22-7134
Opinion Date: April 26, 2024
Judge:
MILLETT
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law, International Law
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In 2020, seven victims of a 2016 terrorist bombing in Afghanistan obtained multi-million-dollar default judgments against the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and the Haqqani Network. Following the Taliban’s 2021 takeover of Afghanistan, the victims, suing as John Doe plaintiffs, sought to attach assets held by the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (commonly known as the “World Bank”). The plaintiffs argued that these assets belonged to the Afghan government or the central bank of Afghanistan, and that the Taliban had become the de facto Afghan government and the Afghan central bank its “instrumentality.”
The district court granted the World Bank’s and Fund’s motions to quash the plaintiffs' writs of execution. The court found the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) inapplicable in this case. It expressed doubt that the funds the plaintiffs sought to recover belonged to Afghanistan, and it could not recognize an ownership claim by the Taliban to Afghan assets since the United States had not recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. The plaintiffs failed to show that the assets at issue fell under the TRIA, and so they had not shown that an exception to the Fund and the World Bank’s immunity applied. On that basis, the district court found that it lacked jurisdiction in the case and granted the motions to quash.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the TRIA does not abrogate the World Bank’s and Fund’s jurisdictional immunity under the International Organizations Immunities Act and Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. The court concluded that the TRIA applies only to foreign states and international organizations once jurisdiction has been established over them. Because the TRIA leaves the World Bank’s and Fund’s jurisdictional immunity intact, the district court could not entertain the plaintiffs' garnishment action.
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UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY V. FRANKLIN
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Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Citation:
2024 Ark. 74
Opinion Date: May 2, 2024
Judge:
Webb
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law
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This case involves a dispute between Union Pacific Railroad Company and its employee, Randy G. Franklin. Franklin, a long-time employee of Union Pacific, brought a gun to work and stored it in his locked vehicle, which was parked in Union Pacific's parking lot. This action was in compliance with Arkansas law, but violated Union Pacific's company policy that bans employees from carrying firearms onto its property. As a result, Union Pacific terminated Franklin's employment, which was later reduced to a lengthy suspension by an arbitration panel.
Union Pacific filed a declaratory-judgment action in federal court, seeking a declaration that Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-5-117, which allows employees to store firearms in their vehicles on their employer's property, is preempted by the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) when applied to Union Pacific parking lots in Arkansas. Franklin counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory judgment that Union Pacific must allow him to bring his firearm onto railroad property, as long as the firearm is legally possessed for a lawful purpose and stored out of sight in his locked car.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas certified a question to the Supreme Court of Arkansas: whether the prohibitions in Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-5-117 are severable from the liability-immunity provisions in section 16-120-802(a) such that section 11-5-117 would still apply when the liability-immunity provisions of section 16-120-802(a) cannot apply.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas answered the certified question in the affirmative. The court found that section 11-5-117, which protects the rights of employees to store firearms in their vehicles on their employer's property, is not dependent on the liability-immunity provisions of section 16-120-802. Therefore, even if the latter is preempted by FELA, section 11-5-117 is not likewise preempted. The court concluded that regardless of whether FELA preempts section 16-120-802(a), section 11-5-117 still applies.
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City of San Jose v. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn.
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Court: California Courts of Appeal
Docket:
H050889(Sixth Appellate District)
Opinion Date: April 29, 2024
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The case involves the City of San José and the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association (HJTA). The city had a significant unfunded liability in its pension plans for city employees. To address this shortfall, the city council adopted a resolution authorizing the issuance and sale of bonds, provided they result in savings for the city. The HJTA argued that this action violated the constitutional debt limitation, which prohibits cities from incurring any indebtedness or liability exceeding the income and revenue provided for a given year without the assent of two-thirds of the voters.
The trial court upheld the city's actions, ruling that the bond issuance falls under the obligation imposed by law exception to the debt limitation. The HJTA appealed this decision, arguing that the city's actions violate the constitutional debt limitation and lack statutory authority.
The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, affirmed the judgment, but for different reasons than the trial court. The appellate court concluded that the city has not incurred any indebtedness or liability exceeding its annual income and revenue because the city's actions do not trigger the constitutional debt limitation. The court also found that the city has the authority under state law to issue the bonds.
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Sutter's Place, Inc. v. California Gambling Control Commission
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Court: California Courts of Appeal
Docket:
A168427(First Appellate District)
Opinion Date: April 30, 2024
Judge:
Streeter
Areas of Law:
Gaming Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The case involves Sutter’s Place, Inc., a cardroom operator in San Jose, California, and the California Gambling Control Commission. Sutter’s Place sought to increase the number of gambling tables in its cardroom from 49 to 64. The request was based on a local ballot measure, Measure H, which was approved by San Jose voters. However, the Commission denied the application, arguing that Measure H did not comply with the requirements of the Gambling Control Act (GCA), specifically a provision governing the text of local ballot measures authorizing expansions of gambling. The Commission's decision was upheld by the San Francisco County Superior Court.
Previously, the Commission had denied Sutter’s application for more tables, concluding that the San Jose ballot measure authorizing the increase did not comply with the GCA. The superior court denied writ relief, and Sutter appealed. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, rejecting Sutter's arguments that recent state legislation validated San Jose’s ordinance and abrogated the Commission’s decision denying permission to expand.
In the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sutter argued that the Commission lacked authority to deny a gambling expansion application on the ground that a local authorizing measure fails to comply with state law. However, the court rejected each argument and concluded that the trial court did not err in denying Sutter’s writ petition. The court held that the Commission had the authority to refuse an application that conflicted with state law. The court also found that Measure H did not substantially comply with the GCA's requirements for ballot language. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's decision.
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Symons Emergency Specialties v. City of Riverside
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Court: California Courts of Appeal
Docket:
E078113(Fourth Appellate District)
Opinion Date: February 7, 2024
Judge:
Fields
Areas of Law:
Antitrust & Trade Regulation, Business Law, Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law
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The case involves Symons Emergency Specialties (Symons), a provider of ambulance services, and the City of Riverside. The City regulates ambulance services within its limits under the Riverside Municipal Code (RMC), which requires operators to obtain a valid franchise or permit. Symons filed a civil complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the City, arguing that the RMC section requiring a permit is invalid under the Emergency Medical Services System and Prehospital Emergency Medical Care Act (EMS Act). The dispute centered on whether the City had regulated nonemergency ambulance services as of June 1, 1980, which would allow it to continue doing so under the EMS Act's grandfathering provisions.
The trial court found in favor of the City, concluding that Symons had failed to meet its burden of proof. Symons appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting certain testimonies, that the court's factual finding was not supported by substantial evidence, and that the RMC section violated federal anti-trust law.
The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found no error in the admission of testimonies, concluded that substantial evidence supported the trial court's findings, and rejected Symons's anti-trust argument. The court held that the City's regulation of ambulance services did not violate the EMS Act or federal anti-trust law.
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Kirkwood Institute, Inc. v. Sand
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Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Docket:
23-0201
Opinion Date: April 26, 2024
Judge:
McDermott
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law
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The case revolves around the Kirkwood Institute's request for public records from the Office of the Auditor of State in Iowa. The Institute sought emails between the Auditor's office and two investigative reporters. The Auditor's office withheld ten email chains, citing Iowa Code § 11.42 and § 22.7(18), which protect certain types of information. Kirkwood sued, arguing that the Auditor's office failed to show that these exceptions applied to the withheld emails. Additionally, Kirkwood claimed that the Auditor's office failed to disclose an eleventh email chain that had been quoted in a reporter's blog.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Auditor's office, holding that the ten email chains were exempt from production and that no violation occurred with the late turnover of the eleventh email chain. Kirkwood appealed this decision.
The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case. The court found that there was a factual issue as to whether the delay in producing the eleventh email was reasonable. It also found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the Auditor's office's withholding of nine emails under § 11.42, as it was not immediately apparent that these emails were received in the course of an audit or examination. However, the court affirmed the district court's decision regarding the tenth email withheld under § 22.7(18), agreeing that it fell within the exception created in this statute.
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BROOME VS. RIALS
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Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Docket:
2023-C-01108
Opinion Date: April 26, 2024
Judge:
Crain
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use
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The case involves a dispute over the incorporation of the proposed City of St. George in Louisiana. The petition for incorporation was filed in 2018 and was approved by the governor, leading to a special election in which 54% of voters approved the incorporation. However, a legal challenge was filed by Baton Rouge’s Mayor-President and a Metropolitan Councilman, arguing that the petition for incorporation was deficient and that the proposed city would be unable to provide public services within a reasonable period of time. They also contended that the incorporation would have an adverse impact on Baton Rouge.
The trial court denied the incorporation, finding that the petition minimally satisfied the statutory requirements and that the incorporation was unreasonable. The court found that St. George would operate at a deficit, affecting the timely provision of public services, and that lost tax revenue would significantly impact Baton Rouge. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of incorporation, finding the petition deficient as it failed to include a plan for the provision of services.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that the lower courts erred in their calculations of St. George's operating costs and potential revenues. The court also found that the lower courts failed to consider the cost savings that would result from Baton Rouge no longer having to provide services to St. George. The court concluded that St. George could provide public services within a reasonable period of time and that the incorporation was reasonable. The court therefore rendered judgment in favor of the proponents of incorporation.
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Mack v. District Attorney for the Bristol District
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Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Docket:
SJC-13468
Opinion Date: April 26, 2024
Judge:
Gaziano
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law
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The case revolves around a public records request made by Eric Mack, whose brother, Anthony Harden, was fatally shot by police. Mack sought records related to the shooting under Massachusetts public records law. The district attorney's office, which had investigated the shooting, argued that the requested records were exempt from disclosure under three exemptions: the privacy exemption, the policy deliberation exemption, and the investigatory exemption. The Superior Court granted Mack's motion for summary judgment, ordering the disclosure of the requested documents with minor exceptions. The district attorney's office appealed.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case. The court held that the privacy exemption did not apply to the requested records because they related to a law enforcement misconduct investigation. The court also held that the policy deliberation exemption did not apply to the draft of the preliminary district attorney's office report, except for the "Applicable Laws" and "Conclusion" sections, which could be redacted. The court remanded the case to the Superior Court to determine whether the investigatory exemption applied to the videotaped public employee interviews and the investigator's interview questions. The court rejected the district attorney's office's argument that the Massachusetts Peace Officer Standards and Training Commission had exclusive authority to release officers' names.
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Phoenix Capital v. Board of Oil & Gas
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Court: Montana Supreme Court
Citation:
2024 MT 89
Opinion Date: April 30, 2024
Judge:
Rice
Areas of Law:
Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law
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Phoenix Capital Group Holdings, LLC, an oil and gas mineral rights investment firm, acquired mineral interests on two sections of real property in Richland County, Montana. The previous owner, Katherine Solis, had been approached multiple times by Kraken Oil and Gas LLC, an energy production company, to secure a lease of the mineral interests or to participate in drilling wells. Solis consistently refused to engage with Kraken. After Phoenix acquired the mineral interests, it expressed a desire to participate in the oil and gas production from the wells being drilled by Kraken. However, Kraken responded that the mineral interests had been deemed “non-consent” due to Solis’s lack of participation, and it was authorized to recover risk penalties.
The Board of Oil and Gas Conservation of the State of Montana held a hearing and determined that Kraken had made unsuccessful, good faith attempts to acquire voluntary pooling in the spacing unit, and that Phoenix, as a successor in interest, was bound to Solis’s decision not to participate. The Board therefore determined that the mineral interests owned by Phoenix would be subject to forced pooling and that Kraken could recover risk penalties from Phoenix. Phoenix requested a rehearing from the Board, but that request was denied. Phoenix then filed a Complaint seeking injunctive relief from the Board decision in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County. The District Court issued an Order granting Kraken and the Board’s motions for summary judgment, and dismissing Phoenix’s Complaint.
In the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, Phoenix appealed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the Board correctly interpreted the statutory force-pooling requirements, and that its decision to force pool Phoenix’s mineral interests was reasonable. The court also held that Kraken’s letters to Solis constituted written demands that gave Solis the option to either participate or face assessment of risk penalties. The court concluded that risk penalties were imposed, not pursuant to the presumption in § 82-11-202(3), MCA (2021), but under § 82-11-202(2), MCA, which requires an owner pay risk penalties when “after written demand, [the owner] has failed or refused to pay the owner’s share of the costs of development or other operations . . . .”
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State ex rel. Ottinger v. B&B Wrecking & Excavating, Inc.
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Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Citation:
2024-Ohio-1656
Opinion Date: May 2, 2024
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law
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The case revolves around a workers' compensation claim filed by Billy J. Ottinger, who suffered a severe injury while working for B&B Wrecking & Excavating, Inc. Ottinger fell from a roof and landed on his legs, resulting in significant weakness and immobility. The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation awarded Ottinger compensation for the loss of use of both legs. However, the Industrial Commission of Ohio later vacated this decision, denying Ottinger's request for loss-of-use compensation.
The Bureau's decision was initially challenged by the Industrial Commission, which argued that there was a lack of medical evidence to support the award for loss-of-use compensation. The Commission exercised its continuing jurisdiction and vacated the Bureau's decision, citing a clear mistake of fact and law. The Commission found that the Bureau's decision was based on an incorrect diagnosis of paraplegia, leading to the incorrect conclusion that Ottinger was completely paralyzed.
Ottinger appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals, seeking a writ of mandamus to reinstate the Bureau's decision. However, the court of appeals denied the request, concluding that the Commission's decision was supported by some evidence and that awarding Ottinger loss-of-use compensation based on that evidence was a clear mistake of law.
The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Tenth District's judgment. The court found that the Commission did not abuse its discretion by exercising its continuing jurisdiction to vacate the Bureau's order awarding Ottinger loss-of-use compensation based on a clear mistake of fact. The court also concluded that the Commission did not abuse its discretion by denying Ottinger's motion for loss-of-use compensation, as the decision was supported by some evidence.
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City of Pawtucket v. Department of Revenue
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Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
Docket:
21-185
Opinion Date: May 2, 2024
Judge:
Robinson
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law
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The City of Pawtucket petitioned the Supreme Court of Rhode Island to review a judgment in favor of the Rhode Island Department of Revenue (DOR) and other defendants. The case revolved around two properties owned by The Memorial Hospital, which were deemed ineligible for state aid under the Payment in Lieu of Taxes (PILOT) Act for fiscal years 2021 and 2022. The City argued that the hearing justice erred in upholding the DOR’s interpretation of the PILOT Act, which stated that the properties were not eligible for PILOT funds.
Previously, the Superior Court had ruled in favor of the defendants, stating that the DOR's interpretation of the PILOT Act was not arbitrary or capricious, unsupported in the record, or an abuse of discretion. The court concluded that the properties were not owned by a licensed hospital and were therefore ineligible for consideration under the PILOT statute. The City appealed this decision, arguing that the properties should be eligible for PILOT funds because they were still being used for medical care and treatment, even though they were not owned and licensed by the same entity.
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. The court found that the PILOT Act's definition of a "nonprofit hospital facility" required that the hospital-owner of the property also be the holder of a state-issued license. Since Memorial Hospital's license was deactivated in 2018, the properties were deemed ineligible for PILOT funds. The court concluded that the City's argument conflating tax-exempt status with PILOT fund eligibility was unpersuasive, and that the DOR's decision to deny the disbursement of PILOT funds for the properties was not erroneous.
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Fuller Mill Realty, LLC v. Department of Revenue
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Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
Docket:
22-122
Opinion Date: May 2, 2024
Judge:
Robinson
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law
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The case involves Fuller Mill Realty, LLC (Fuller Mill) and the Rhode Island Department of Revenue Division of Taxation (the Division). Fuller Mill was part of the Rhode Island Historic Preservation Tax Credits Program, administered by the Division. Fuller Mill entered into an agreement with the Division in 2016 for a project. In 2018, the Division notified Fuller Mill that it had forfeited its rights to any historic tax credits for its project due to inactivity. After administrative proceedings and providing supplemental documentation, Fuller Mill's tax credits were reinstated. However, due to delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Division rescinded Fuller Mill's tax credits in 2020 for failing to complete the project by the agreed deadline. Fuller Mill requested an administrative hearing to challenge the rescission.
The Division denied the request for a hearing, leading Fuller Mill to file an appeal in the District Court. The Division filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that Fuller Mill had waived its right to an administrative hearing and appeal in a stipulation of settlement and dismissal. The District Court denied the Division's motion to dismiss, leading the Division to file a petition for writ of certiorari, which was granted by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island found that the terms of the April 2021 stipulation were clear and unambiguous, stating that Fuller Mill had knowingly and voluntarily waived its right to an administrative hearing and to a District Court appeal. The court concluded that the hearing judge erred in denying the Division's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court quashed the order of the District Court and remanded the case to the District Court with directions to dismiss the case.
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United States of America v. Clemons
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Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
Docket:
28202
Opinion Date: May 1, 2024
Judge:
HILL
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
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Patrick Clemons, a convicted felon, was found guilty of possessing a firearm. He had two prior convictions for Criminal Domestic Violence of a High and Aggravated Nature (CDVHAN) and one for Assault and Battery Second Degree (AB2d) in South Carolina. Due to these prior convictions, Clemons was classified as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), leading to a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years. Clemons appealed his enhanced sentence, arguing that both CDVHAN and AB2d could be committed through reckless or negligent conduct, and therefore, neither should qualify as a predicate offense for enhanced sentencing under the ACCA's "elements clause."
Clemons' appeal reached the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which certified two questions to the South Carolina Supreme Court. The questions sought to clarify the mental state required to commit AB2d and CDVHAN in South Carolina. The South Carolina Supreme Court rephrased the questions to ask whether a defendant could be convicted of these offenses with a mens rea of recklessness as defined by the Model Penal Code.
The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the answer to both questions was "yes." The court explained that the South Carolina Legislature had chosen to criminalize multiple types of conduct under the statutes for AB2d and CDVHAN. Therefore, there was not a single mens rea required for a conviction under either statute. Instead, the required mens rea depended on the actus reus of the crime being prosecuted. The court concluded that under some circumstances, a person could be convicted of AB2d and CDVHAN with a mens rea of recklessness.
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Avera St. Mary’s Hospital V. Sully County
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Court: South Dakota Supreme Court
Citation:
2024 S.D. 25
Opinion Date: May 1, 2024
Judge:
Myren
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law, Health Law
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A Mexican national, J.R., who worked seasonally in Sully County, South Dakota, required emergency medical treatment for appendicitis. He was taken to Avera St. Mary’s Hospital in Hughes County, where he received treatment and incurred medical bills totaling over $75,000. J.R. had no health insurance, few assets, and returned to Mexico without paying the bills. Avera sought reimbursement from Sully County under county poor-relief statutes.
The Sully County Board of Commissioners denied Avera's application for reimbursement, citing J.R.'s status as a nonresident of Sully County. Avera appealed this decision to the circuit court, which remanded the case back to the Commission for a more detailed factual record. After a hearing, the Commission again denied Avera's claim, determining that J.R. was indigent by design and was not in distress in Sully County at the time the county was notified. Avera appealed this decision to the circuit court, which affirmed the Commission's decision.
The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the county's obligation to support poor persons is statutory, not common law. The court interpreted the poor-relief statutes to require every county to support all poor and indigent persons who have established residency therein. However, the parties agreed that J.R. was not a resident of Sully County. The court found that the county had no statutory obligation to reimburse Avera for J.R.'s emergency medical services, as he was a nonresident indigent who had left Sully County before the Commission learned he was in distress. The court concluded that in these circumstances, where temporary relief had already been administered to the nonresident indigent by a third party in another county, Sully County had no statutory obligation to reimburse Avera for J.R.'s emergency medical services.
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EX PARTE MCMILLAN
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Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Docket:
WR-88,970-01
Opinion Date: May 1, 2024
Judge:
Richardson
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The case revolves around a woman who was convicted of theft in 2015. The prosecution used her 2001 federal felony conviction from Alaska to enhance the theft offense to a first-degree felony, resulting in a forty-year sentence and a $10,000 fine. The woman argued that her 2001 federal conviction was not final when the theft occurred, and thus, the offense was unlawfully enhanced, leading to an illegal sentence.
Prior to reaching the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, the case had been reviewed by lower courts. The main issue was whether Texas law or the law of another jurisdiction should be used to determine if a prior conviction is final for the purpose of enhancing the punishment of an offense under Section 12.42 of the Texas Penal Code.
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas was asked to determine whether there was ever a time prior to a previous case, Ex parte Pue, when other states were allowed to unilaterally dictate the laws and public policy of Texas. The court held that the rule in Pue, which stated that Texas law should define whether a prior conviction is final for the purposes of enhancing the punishment of an offense, applies retroactively. Furthermore, the court held that the woman's federal felony conviction was final under the rule in Pue. The court concluded that the woman's federal conviction was final under Texas law and denied her relief.
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Andrade v. City of Milwaukee Board of Fire and Police Commissioners
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Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Docket:
2020AP000333
Opinion Date: April 30, 2024
Judge:
Hagedorn
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law
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The case involves Erik A. Andrade, a former Milwaukee Police Officer, who was terminated for a series of posts and comments he made on Facebook. The posts attracted significant local and national attention following a civil rights lawsuit that brought them to light. The Milwaukee Police Department conducted an internal investigation into the posts, informed Andrade of the policies he potentially violated, and scheduled an interview. Following the internal investigation, the Department formally charged Andrade with violating two policies, both citing Andrade's posts as the basis for the violations. The Chief of Police, Alfonso Morales, determined his guilt and imposed the appropriate punishment. The Chief had internal affairs reach out to the Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office, which explained that Andrade's posts would diminish his credibility in court so severely that they would no longer use him as a witness. Given the critical importance of testifying in police work, this fact convinced the Chief that termination was appropriate.
The Chief's decision was reviewed by the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners. After a full evidentiary trial, the Board issued a detailed decision determining that Andrade was guilty of the violations and the punishments he received were appropriate. Andrade then filed two actions in the circuit court. The first was a statutory appeal focused on whether there was just cause to sustain the charges. The second was a petition for a writ of certiorari alleging that the Board committed legal and jurisdictional errors. The circuit court upheld the Board's decision, Andrade appealed on his certiorari petition, and the court of appeals affirmed.
Before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, Andrade challenged his termination on procedural grounds. He contended that it fell short of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee. He argued that due process required the Department to explain why Chief Morales terminated him instead of imposing a lesser form of discipline. As such, the Department should have told him that Chief Morales made his decision based on the DA's determination that they would no longer use Andrade as a witness. Andrade insisted that the Department's failure to tell him this prior to termination means he was not given an explanation of the evidence supporting his termination in violation of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin disagreed with Andrade's claim and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals.
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Richardson v. State of Wyoming, Ex Rel. Wyoming Department of Health
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Court: Wyoming Supreme Court
Citation:
2024 WY 47
Opinion Date: April 29, 2024
Judge:
Boomgaarden
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law, Health Law
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The case revolves around Gracie and Jeff Richardson, the legal guardians of their adult son, JMR, who suffers from severe developmental and intellectual disabilities. JMR requires full-time care and receives the highest level of Medicaid benefits offered through the Home and Community Based Services Waiver Program (HCBS Program) administered by the Wyoming Department of Health. The HCBS Program offers numerous services to participants like JMR to meet their individually assessed needs. In 2017, the Department entered into a settlement agreement with the Richardsons to establish an individual plan of care for JMR that permitted him to spend his individual budget amount on adult day services, residential habilitation services (community living services), and respite services.
In 2021, the Department reviewed JMR’s individual plan of care pursuant to a quality improvement review. The Department discovered JMR’s providers had been billing for respite services at the same time JMR had been receiving community living services. Under the Department’s Comprehensive and Supports Waiver Service Index (the Index), providers are not authorized to bill for both the daily rate of community living services and the fifteen-minute units of respite services. The Department, relying on the Index, notified the Richardsons that it was required to remove respite services from JMR’s individual plan of care. The Richardsons requested an administrative hearing, which upheld the Department’s decision. The Richardsons appealed to the district court, which affirmed the decision. The Richardsons then appealed to the Supreme Court of Wyoming.
The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the Department acted in accordance with law when it removed respite services from JMR’s individual plan of care. The court held that the Index, which was incorporated by reference in the Department’s Medicaid regulations, constituted a rule with the force and effect of law. The court also found that the Department’s quality improvement review, which was used to identify the billing deemed erroneous under the Index, was not considered a “rule” under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act and therefore did not require the rulemaking process before implementation. Finally, the court concluded that the Department’s removal of respite services from JMR’s individual plan of care did not violate the parties’ 2017 Settlement Agreement.
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