United States ex rel. Zotos v. Town of Hingham

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1694

Opinion Date: April 8, 2024

Judge: Selya

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts, Government & Administrative Law, Government Contracts

Frederic P. Zotos, an attorney residing in Cohasset, Massachusetts, filed a qui tam complaint against the Town of Hingham and several of its officials. Zotos alleged that the town and its officials posted speed limit signs and advisory speed plaques that did not comply with applicable federal and state laws and regulations. He further claimed that the town applied for and received reimbursements for these signs and plaques from both the federal government and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Zotos asserted that the town fraudulently induced the federal government to pay it roughly $3,300,000 and the Commonwealth to pay it approximately $7,300,000.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed Zotos's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court concluded that the qui tam action was not barred by either claim or issue preclusion. However, it found that Zotos's claims fell short of the False Claims Act (FCA) and Massachusetts False Claims Act's (MFCA) requirements. Specifically, it ruled that Zotos failed to sufficiently plead that the alleged misrepresentations were material to the federal government's and the Commonwealth's respective decisions.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that Zotos's complaint did not adequately allege that the defendants' purported misrepresentations were material. It noted that the essence of the bargain under the Federal-Aid Highway Program (FAHP) and the Chapter 90 program was that the defendants incurred permissible costs on projects that were duly reimbursed. The court concluded that Zotos's allegations amounted to ancillary violations that, without more, were insufficient to establish materiality.

Rivera v. Redfern

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 23-1554

Opinion Date: April 11, 2024

Judge: Hardiman

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

Michael Rivera, a Pennsylvania state prisoner, was in an open-air telephone cage when he overheard prison officials preparing to forcibly extract another inmate, Ryan Miller, from a nearby cell. Anticipating the use of pepper spray, Rivera informed the officials that exposure to the spray would trigger his asthma. Despite his pleas to be moved back to his cell, the officials refused, citing the lack of available personnel due to the ongoing preparations for Miller's extraction. After the pepper spray was deployed, Rivera suffered an asthma attack. He sued the prison officials for damages, alleging they had acted with deliberate indifference to the substantial risk of serious harm to him, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment in favor of the prison officials. The court concluded that the law was not clearly established to the extent that the officials would have known that their actions violated the Eighth Amendment.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court found that the prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity because their actions did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. The court noted that the officials were confronted with competing institutional concerns and that the cited case law did not clearly establish that the officials' decision to prioritize one prisoner's health and safety over another's violated the Eighth Amendment.

Vanda Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-1457

Opinion Date: April 10, 2024

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Government Contracts, Health Law

The case involves Vanda Pharmaceuticals, a drug manufacturer, and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). Vanda challenged a 2020 regulation by CMS that expanded the definition of a "line extension" drug under the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program. This program requires drug manufacturers to reimburse Medicaid if they increase their prices faster than inflation. A "line extension" drug, which is a new formulation of an existing drug, can also be liable for price increases of the original drug. Vanda argued that the regulation expanded the definition of a line extension beyond what the Medicaid statute permitted.

Previously, the district court granted summary judgment to CMS, disagreeing with Vanda's argument. The court held that the agency's regulation was within the bounds of the Medicaid statute.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the agency's definitions of "line extension" and "new formulation" were within the Medicaid statute's ambit. It also held that the agency's interpretation of the oral-solid-dosage-form requirement was not contrary to law. The court rejected Vanda's argument that the agency's rulemaking process was arbitrary and capricious, finding that the agency had reasonably considered the relevant issues and explained its decision.

Cheejati v. Blinken

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-40398

Opinion Date: April 9, 2024

Judge: Ramirez

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law

A group of Indian nationals, legally present in the United States on employment-based visas, filed a lawsuit against the Secretary of State and the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). The plaintiffs were seeking permanent residency and challenged the defendants' approach to distributing immigrant visas. They argued that the defendants' policies of deferring adjudication of their applications until a visa number becomes available violated the statute governing adjustment of status for nonimmigrants. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief under the Administrative Procedure Act and the federal Declaratory Judgment Act.

The plaintiffs had initially moved for a preliminary injunction in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, but their motion was denied. They appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

The Fifth Circuit, however, found that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case. The court cited the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which strips federal courts of jurisdiction to address many challenges brought in the context of immigration proceedings. The court concluded that the INA's jurisdiction-stripping provisions precluded it from hearing the plaintiffs' challenge. The court vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Culberson v. Clay County

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-60310

Opinion Date: April 8, 2024

Judge: Stephen Andrew Higginson

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

The estate and heirs of Dale O'Neal, a pre-trial detainee who was murdered by his cellmate in Clay County's jail, filed a lawsuit against several officers and the county under Section 1983. They alleged that the defendants failed to protect O'Neal, thereby violating his Fourteenth Amendment rights. The case centered around the actions of the intake officer, Annie Avant, who assigned O'Neal's murderer, Cameron Henderson, to the same cell as O'Neal. The parties disputed what information was conveyed to Avant about Henderson's violent behavior and whether the booking system would have revealed that Henderson was previously determined to be a threat.

The district court agreed with the magistrate judge's decision to exclude a late-designated expert and the accompanying report, which the plaintiffs relied on to establish the County's liability. The court then granted summary judgment to all defendants, concluding that the plaintiffs could not create a fact question as to whether the individual defendants acted with deliberate indifference. The court also found that Avant had qualified immunity.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the plaintiffs argued that it was an abuse of discretion to exclude the expert and error to grant summary judgment to Avant. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision. It found no abuse of discretion in excluding the late-designated expert, considering factors such as the explanation for the failure to identify the witness, the importance of the testimony, potential prejudice in allowing the testimony, and the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice. The court also affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Avant on the basis of qualified immunity, noting that the plaintiffs failed to point to any case supporting the proposition that the alleged constitutional violation was of clearly established law.

In re: Chamber of Commerce

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 24-10266

Opinion Date: April 5, 2024

Judge: Willett

Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure, Consumer Law, Government & Administrative Law

A group of business associations, including the Fort Worth Chamber of Commerce, filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Texas against the Consumer Protection Financial Bureau (CFPB). The plaintiffs challenged a new Final Rule issued by the CFPB regarding credit card late fees and sought a preliminary injunction against the rule. The plaintiffs requested expedited briefing and review due to the imminent effect of the rule and the substantial compliance it required.

The district court, instead of ruling on the motion for a preliminary injunction, considered whether venue was appropriate in the Northern District of Texas and invited the CFPB to file a motion to transfer the case. The CFPB complied, and the district court granted its motion, transferring the case to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs then petitioned for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by transferring the case while their appeal was pending and, alternatively, lacked jurisdiction to transfer the case.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs, stating that the district court acted without jurisdiction. The court explained that once a party properly appeals something a district court has done, in this case, the effective denial of a preliminary injunction, the district court has no jurisdiction to do anything that alters the case’s status. The court clarified that its decision was not about the correctness of the district court’s transfer order but rather about whether the court had jurisdiction to enter it. The court concluded that the district court did not have jurisdiction to transfer the case.

The court granted the petition for mandamus, vacated the district court’s transfer order, and ordered the district court to reopen the case. The court also instructed the district court to notify the District of Columbia that its transfer was without jurisdiction and should be disregarded.

Johnson v. Miller

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-60199

Opinion Date: April 10, 2024

Judge: Willett

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

The case revolves around the procedural interplay between two Mississippi statutes—the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) and the Mississippi Whistleblower Protection Act (MWPA). Mark Johnson, the plaintiff, filed a retaliation complaint under the MWPA, alleging that he was fired from his position as general manager of the Clarksdale Public Utilities Authority (CPU) for reporting inefficiency and incompetence. Johnson later added claims for First Amendment retaliation and breach of contract.

The district court held that the procedural requirements of the MTCA applied to Johnson’s MWPA claim, and because the court concluded he didn’t comply with them, it dismissed his claim. The district court also concluded that Johnson’s First Amendment retaliation and breach-of-contract claims were time-barred because the three-year statute of limitations for these claims ran after Johnson filed his first complaint but before he amended to add these claims—and neither claim relates back. Johnson appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was unable to make a reliable Erie guess as to whether the MTCA’s procedural requirements apply to MWPA claims because it lacked clear guidance from Mississippi courts on how the two statutes interrelate. Therefore, the court certified this question to the Supreme Court of Mississippi: When a plaintiff brings a claim against the government and its employees for tortious conduct under the MWPA, is that claim subject to the procedural requirements of the MTCA?

Lozano v. Collier

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-40116

Opinion Date: April 11, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

Eric Demond Lozano, a Texas state prisoner and Sunni Muslim, filed a lawsuit against three officials of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the Establishment Clause. Lozano claimed that his ability to practice his religion was substantially burdened due to the conditions in the prison. His claims included the inability to shower privately before Jumah, a weekly prayer service, due to non-Muslim inmates being allowed to shower at the same time; insufficient space to pray in his cell due to hostile cellmates; and lack of access to religious programming and instruction, specifically Taleem and Quranic studies, due to the absence of Muslim volunteers.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of the TDCJ officials. The court found that Lozano failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact on whether the absence of a Muslim-designated unit or dorm violated the Establishment Clause. The court also concluded that Lozano provided no evidence to support his allegation that the faith-based dorms required inmates to study Christian materials.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment on Lozano's RLUIPA claims regarding Jumah showers and adequate prayer space. The appellate court found that there was a genuine dispute of material fact on whether Lozano's ability to practice his religion was substantially burdened. The court also vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment on Lozano's RLUIPA claim regarding additional religious programming and his Establishment Clause claim, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Abdulahad v. Garland

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-3743

Opinion Date: April 11, 2024

Judge: Karen Nelson Moore

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law

The case involves Walid Abdulahad, an Iraqi national who sought review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) denial of his motion to reopen his removal proceedings based on changed country conditions in Iraq. Abdulahad, who had been living in the U.S. since 1997, was ordered removed in absentia in 2006 following a criminal conviction in Aruba. He remained in the U.S. under supervision and filed multiple motions to reopen his case, arguing that he faced a risk of torture if returned to Iraq due to his status as a Chaldean Christian and his ties to the U.S.

The BIA denied Abdulahad's latest motion to reopen, finding that his evidence was cumulative of evidence submitted with prior motions, and that he had not established a particularized risk of torture or that each step in his causal-chain claim was more likely than not to occur. Abdulahad petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for review of the BIA's decision.

The Sixth Circuit granted the petition, vacated the BIA's decision, and remanded the case back to the BIA. The court found that the BIA had applied the incorrect legal standards when determining whether Abdulahad's evidence was new, cumulative, or material, and had failed to assess Abdulahad's claims in the aggregate. The court also found that the BIA had not sufficiently explained or considered the evidence related to Abdulahad's particularized likelihood of torture.

Warnell v. O'Malley

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-1632

Opinion Date: April 8, 2024

Judge: SCUDDER

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Public Benefits

The case revolves around Brenda Warnell, who applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under the Social Security Act in 2019. Warnell claimed she was unable to work due to debilitating migraines and chronic pain in her back, shoulders, and neck. Her medical record was mixed, with some physicians assessing her as having severely limited functional capacity, while others found her capable of limited physical exertion.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied Warnell's claim, finding that the medical evidence did not substantiate the severity of her alleged functional limitations. The ALJ concluded that Warnell's pain symptoms did not prevent her from performing light work with moderate noise and limited physical requirements. The ALJ's decision was affirmed by the district court.

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Warnell challenged the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ needed to provide more detailed accounts of the medical evidence. The court rejected this argument, stating that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence and met the light standard set by the Supreme Court. The court found that the ALJ had provided a sufficient explanation for her decision, highlighting specific evidence that contradicted Warnell's claims and addressing conflicting evidence. The court affirmed the ALJ's decision, rejecting Warnell's claim that the ALJ needed to provide more detailed accounts of the medical evidence.

National Labor Relations Board v. Noah's Ark Processors, LLC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1895

Opinion Date: April 8, 2024

Judge: STRAS

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

The case involves Noah’s Ark Processors, LLC, and the United Food and Commercial Workers’ Union. After the expiration of their previous collective-bargaining agreement, the parties began negotiations for a new one. The company's representative, however, had no decision-making authority, and the negotiations were brief and ineffective. Frustrated, the union filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRB filed a petition against Noah’s Ark in federal district court for injunctive relief, which was granted, ordering the company to return to the negotiating table. However, the company declared it was unwilling to negotiate and presented another final offer. The district court issued a contempt finding, and the NLRB determined that Noah’s Ark had failed to bargain in good faith.

The parties met seven more times over the next two months, but the negotiations were unsuccessful. Noah’s Ark extended another final offer, which included terms the union had already rejected. The company declared another impasse and made changes unilaterally. The union filed another complaint, and an administrative-law judge found that Noah’s Ark had both bargained in bad faith and prematurely declared an impasse. The NLRB ordered Noah’s Ark to continue negotiating, provide backpay to its employees, reimburse the union for its bargaining expenses, and have its CEO read a remedial notice at an all-employee meeting.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that substantial evidence supported the NLRB's order and granted enforcement. The court found that Noah’s Ark did not take the negotiations seriously and did not approach the renewed negotiations with an open mind and sincere intention to reach an agreement. The court also agreed with the NLRB's finding that there was no good-faith impasse. The court did not consider Noah’s Ark's objections to the remedies imposed by the NLRB, as the company had not raised these specific objections before the NLRB.

CP Anchorage Hotel 2, LLC v. National Labor Relations Board

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 23-1029

Opinion Date: April 9, 2024

Judge: EDWARDS

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

This case involves a dispute between CP Anchorage Hotel 2, LLC, doing business as Hilton Anchorage, and Unite Here! Local 878, AFL-CIO, a union representing the hotel's housekeepers. The conflict arose in 2018 when the hotel underwent substantial renovations, including replacing old bathtub showers with walk-in, glass-walled showers in about half of the guest rooms. After the renovations, the hotel required the housekeepers to meet the same room-cleaning quotas as before, despite the housekeepers' claims that the rooms were now harder to clean and required different skills and equipment. The hotel also threatened to discipline housekeepers who failed to meet these quotas. The union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), arguing that the hotel's unilateral actions affected bargaining unit employees.

The NLRB found that the hotel had committed unfair labor practices by failing to provide the union with requested information relevant to bargaining, unilaterally changing its housekeepers' duties by increasing the work required per room but maintaining the same room-cleaning quota, and threatening its housekeepers with discipline if they failed to comply with the increased workload requirements. The NLRB ordered the hotel to rescind the unlawful changes to the housekeepers' working conditions and to compensate the housekeepers for any loss of earnings due to the hotel's unlawful conduct.

The hotel petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review, arguing that decisions like the renovation decision did not require bargaining with a union. The court disagreed, finding that the hotel had an obligation to give the union a meaningful opportunity to bargain over the changes to the housekeepers' duties. The court denied the hotel's petition for review and granted the NLRB's cross-application for enforcement of its order.

National Association of Realtors v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 23-5065

Opinion Date: April 5, 2024

Judge: PAN

Areas of Law: Antitrust & Trade Regulation, Business Law, Contracts, Government & Administrative Law

The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) initiated an investigation into potentially anti-competitive practices in the real estate industry by the National Association of Realtors (NAR). In November 2020, the DOJ and NAR reached a settlement, and the DOJ sent a letter to NAR stating that it had closed its investigation and that NAR was not required to respond to two outstanding investigative subpoenas. However, in July 2021, the DOJ withdrew the proposed consent judgment, reopened its investigation, and issued a new investigative subpoena. NAR petitioned the district court to set aside the subpoena, arguing that its issuance violated a promise made by the DOJ in the 2020 closing letter. The district court granted NAR’s petition, concluding that the new subpoena was barred by a validly executed settlement agreement.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed with the district court's decision. The court held that the plain language of the disputed 2020 letter permits the DOJ to reopen its investigation. The court noted that the closing of an investigation does not guarantee that the investigation would stay closed forever. The court also pointed out that NAR gained several benefits from the closing of the DOJ’s pending investigation in 2020, including relief from its obligation to respond to the two outstanding subpoenas. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the district court.

Ohio v. EPA

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 22-1081

Opinion Date: April 9, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves a challenge to a decision by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to reinstate a waiver granted to California under the Clean Air Act. The waiver allows California to set its own standards for automobile emissions, which are stricter than federal standards. The petitioners, a group of states and fuel industry entities, argued that the EPA's decision was not authorized under the Clean Air Act and violated a constitutional requirement that the federal government treat states equally in terms of their sovereign authority.

The lower courts had upheld the EPA's decision, finding that the petitioners lacked standing to challenge the decision. The petitioners appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that the fuel industry petitioners lacked standing to raise their statutory claim, and that the state petitioners lacked standing to raise their preemption claim, because neither group had demonstrated that their claimed injuries would be redressed by a favorable decision by the court. The court also rejected the state petitioners' constitutional claim on the merits, holding that the EPA's decision did not violate the constitutional requirement of equal sovereignty among the states.

Nolan v. 2600 Holdings, LLC

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 50

Opinion Date: April 11, 2024

Judge: Rhonda K. Wood

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Drugs & Biotech, Government & Administrative Law

The case revolves around a dispute over a medical marijuana cultivation license issued by the Arkansas Medical Marijuana Commission to Bennett Scott “Storm” Nolan II. 2600 Holdings, LLC, an unsuccessful applicant for the same license, filed a lawsuit against the Commission and other state entities, alleging that Nolan's application did not meet the minimum merit selection criteria and that the Commission violated its own rules and the Arkansas Constitution in awarding the license to Nolan. Nolan was not initially named as a defendant or joined as a party in the lawsuit.

The Pulaski County Circuit Court denied Nolan's multiple motions to join the lawsuit as an indispensable party under Rule 19(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure and granted summary judgment in favor of 2600 Holdings. The court ruled that the Commission had exceeded its discretion and violated the Arkansas Constitution and its own rules in awarding the license to Nolan.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the lower court's decision, finding that Nolan was indeed an indispensable party under Rule 19(a)(2). The court held that the lower court erred in not joining Nolan as an indispensable party to the litigation. As a result, the court vacated the order granting summary judgment to 2600 Holdings and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not address Nolan's remaining issues as they were deemed moot due to the reversal and remand.

State v. Aldrich

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2022-SA-01088-SCT

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Judge: ISHEE

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

This case involves a dispute over approximately one acre of coastal land in Mississippi. The disagreement is between John Aldrich and the State of Mississippi, with the main point of contention being whether the land in question is privately owned by Aldrich or is State-owned tideland. The dispute originated from a map published by the secretary of state in 1994, which marked the boundaries between private property and Public Trust Tidelands. According to the map, the land in question was designated as State-owned tideland. Aldrich disagreed with this designation and challenged the boundary in Harrison County Chancery Court in 1998. The State responded with a counterclaim, asserting that it held fee simple title to the property.

After more than two decades of inactivity and extended litigation, the chancellor ruled in favor of Aldrich in 2022, vesting title in him and adjusting the tideland boundary. The chancellor made five consequential findings, all of which the State labeled as error on appeal. The most significant finding was that a 1784 Spanish land grant, which is the root of Aldrich’s title, negated the State’s claim to fee simple title. This finding called into question which lands passed from the federal government to Mississippi upon statehood.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the chancery court’s decision. The court found that the 1784 Spanish land grant was valid and vested title in Aldrich. The court also found that the State failed to meet its burden of proof that the artificial filling of the land was not done pursuant to a constitutional legislative enactment and for a higher public purpose. Therefore, the court concluded that the property belongs to Aldrich.

In re F.A.

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 77N

Opinion Date: April 9, 2024

Judge: Sandefur

Areas of Law: Family Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves T.S. (Mother) and A.A. (Father) who appealed the termination of their parental rights to their minor children (D.A., L.A., and F.A.) by the Montana Second Judicial District Court. The Child and Family Services Division of the Montana Department of Health and Human Services (Department) became involved with the family in August 2019 when two of the children were found wandering the streets unsupervised. The Department had previously been involved with the family due to allegations of child abuse or neglect. In August 2019, the Department removed the children from the parents' care and placed them in a protective kinship placement. The parents were given treatment plans to follow for potential reunification with their children.

Despite multiple extensions to complete their treatment plans, neither parent had successfully completed all requirements by January 2022. As a result, the Department transitioned to court-ordered guardianships as the new permanency plan for the children. In March 2022, the Department petitioned for termination of parental rights due to the parents' failure to complete their treatment plans and their inability to provide adequate parental care. The District Court issued judgments terminating the parents' respective parental rights.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the District Court's findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence and that the parents had failed to demonstrate that any material District Court finding of fact was clearly erroneous. The court also held that the District Court did not terminate the parents' respective parental rights without clear and convincing evidence that the Department made reasonable family preservation and reunification efforts. The court concluded that the District Court correctly terminated the parents' respective parental rights under § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA.

Brooks v. Benore Logistics System, Inc.

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 28198

Opinion Date: April 10, 2024

Judge: KITTREDGE

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

The case revolves around a workers' compensation claim filed by Dale Brooks, an employee of Benore Logistics Systems, Inc. Brooks claimed that he suffered a work-related repetitive trauma injury to his back due to the nature of his job as a "switcher" truck operator, which involved moving semitruck trailers and ocean freight containers to various points in a shipping yard. He substantiated his claim with medical evidence and testimony. However, his employer commissioned an ergonomics report that concluded his injury was statistically unlikely to have been caused by his work activities.

The single commissioner ruled in Brooks's favor, but an appellate panel of the Workers' Compensation Commission relied on the ergonomics report, reversed the single commissioner, and denied Brooks's claim. The appellate panel concluded that Brooks's job was not repetitive and that it was statistically unlikely that his back injury was caused by his work duties. The court of appeals reversed this decision, holding that the appellate panel did not have the authority to determine whether Brooks's job was repetitive and that any reliance on the ergonomics report was impermissible.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the decision of the court of appeals as modified. The court agreed that the appellate panel erred in its reliance on the ergonomics report to deny Brooks's claim. The court held that while the Commission does have the authority to determine whether an employee's job is repetitive, the appellate panel's decision that Brooks's job was not repetitive was unsupported by the substantial evidence in the record. Furthermore, the court ruled that any reliance on an ergonomics report in a work-related repetitive trauma injury case is contrary to the rule of law and constituted reversible error by the appellate panel. The court remanded the matter to the Commission for it to calculate the benefits to which Brooks is entitled.

Reidburn v. Department of Labor & Regulation

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 S.D. 19

Opinion Date: April 10, 2024

Judge: Devaney

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Public Benefits

Lonnie Reidburn, a self-employed insurance agent, appealed a decision by the South Dakota Department of Labor, Reemployment Assistance Division (Department) that he must repay $24,690 in pandemic unemployment benefits he received. Reidburn's income was based on commissions he received for new policies and renewals, which required in-person visits to clients' homes or businesses. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Reidburn experienced a significant reduction in his ability to procure new policies and renewals because clients did not want him to make in-person visits. As a result, Reidburn's income decreased. He applied for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) through the Department and received benefits for 39 weeks. However, the Department later determined that Reidburn's loss of income was not the direct result of the pandemic and issued a determination of ineligibility.

The administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the Department's determination of ineligibility, reasoning that the individual decisions of Reidburn's clients to preclude him from entering their homes or places of business were not a direct result of the pandemic. However, the ALJ rejected the Department's at-fault determination and found that Reidburn was not at fault for the overpayment. The ALJ also concluded that Reidburn's request for a waiver was untimely. Reidburn appealed the ALJ's decision to the circuit court, which affirmed the ALJ's decision.

The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reversed the ALJ's determination that Reidburn was ineligible to receive PUA benefits for 35 of the 39 weeks at issue, based on its recent decision in Bracken v. South Dakota Department of Labor and Regulation, Reemployment Assistance Division. The court declined to address the Department's argument that Reidburn failed to present sufficient evidence to support his testimony that he experienced a significant reduction in services, as the Department did not raise this argument at Reidburn's administrative hearing. The court affirmed the circuit court's denial of Reidburn's motion for attorney fees.

Benton County Water Conservancy Board v. Department of Ecology

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 101,838-0

Opinion Date: April 11, 2024

Judge: Debra Stephens

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The case revolves around the Benton County Water Conservancy Board (the Board) and the Washington State Department of Ecology (the Department). The Department primarily manages the state's water resources, while the Board has coextensive authority to process voluntary water right transfers between water right holders. The dispute arose when the Board challenged a department policy (Policy 1070) concerning certain water right transfers. The Board claimed that it suffered injury-in-fact from the Department's refusal to accept certain administrative division forms pursuant to the policy.

The case was first heard in the superior court, which granted summary judgment to the Board and directed the Department to accept administrative division requests from the Board. The Department appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, holding that the Board lacked standing to challenge the Department's action.

The Supreme Court of the State of Washington affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court held that the Board lacked standing to challenge Department Policy 1070. The Board failed to demonstrate how it suffered injury-in-fact from the Department’s refusal to accept certain administrative division forms pursuant to the policy. The Board suffered no prejudice and its interests would not be redressed by invalidating the policy. The court concluded that the Board's interests were indirect and inchoate, and it failed to establish injury-in-fact under the Administrative Procedure Act. Therefore, the Board lacked standing to pursue this challenge to the Department’s use of Policy 1070.

Cousins v. Department of Corrections

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 101,769-3

Opinion Date: April 11, 2024

Judge: Yu

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

The case revolves around Terry Cousins' efforts to obtain public records related to her sister, who died while in the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC). Cousins alleged that the DOC's response to her public records request violated the Public Records Act (PRA). The main issue was whether Cousins' PRA action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations.

Previously, the DOC had responded to Cousins' request by producing multiple installments of records and then sent Cousins a letter in January 2019 stating that her request was "now closed". Cousins asked about specific records she believed were missing, and the DOC reopened Cousins' original PRA request to conduct an additional search, leading to the production of hundreds of pages of previously undisclosed responsive records, followed by a second letter stating that the request was "now closed" in June 2021.

The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that the June 2021 closing letter was DOC’s final, definitive response to Cousins’ PRA request. The court ruled that Cousins' PRA action was not barred by the statute of limitations. The court reversed the decision of the lower court and remanded the case for further proceedings.