Ford v. Sandhills Medical Foundation, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-2268

Opinion Date: March 29, 2024

Judge: THACKER

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled on a case involving a plaintiff, Joann Ford, and a healthcare provider, Sandhills Medical Foundation, Inc. Ford, a former patient of Sandhills, alleged negligence, breach of implied contract, invasion of privacy, and breach of confidentiality against Sandhills for failure to protect her personally identifying information (PII). Her PII was stolen from Sandhills' third-party computer system in a cyberattack after she had ceased being a patient.

The district court had previously granted Sandhills immunity from the suit, concluding that the theft of Ford's PII arose out of Sandhills' performance of “medical, surgical, dental, or related functions,” as per 42 U.S.C. § 233(a), thus substituting the United States as the defendant. However, the Fourth Circuit Court disagreed with the lower court's interpretation of § 233(a).

The appellate court determined that data security does not fall under a “related function” within the meaning of the statute. The court emphasized that § 233(a) immunity applies when alleged damages arise from the provision of healthcare, which was not the case here. Ford’s injury did not arise from Sandhills’ provision of healthcare, but from a data security breach that occurred at least a year after she ceased being a patient at Sandhills.

Therefore, the court concluded that Sandhills was not immune from the suit under § 233(a) and that the United States could not be substituted as the defendant. The case was vacated and remanded for further proceedings.

Shaiban v. Jaddou

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-2010

Opinion Date: April 3, 2024

Judge: FLOYD

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law

The case involves Saleh Shaiban, a Yemeni national who entered the U.S. in 1999 using a false passport and B-2 visitor visa. He was eventually granted asylum in 2006. He subsequently applied for adjustment of status to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), which was denied on terrorism grounds. Shaiban appealed the decision but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over his appeal and dismissed it.

Shaiban initially applied for asylum in December 2000, but his application was denied in 2002. He appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which also dismissed his appeal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded his case to a new Immigration Judge for a de novo hearing, which resulted in his asylum grant.

In 2008, Shaiban applied for permanent residence. USCIS put his case on hold in 2013 due to terrorism-related grounds of inadmissibility under the Immigration and Nationality Act. In 2018, USCIS denied his application after determining that his participation in certain Yemeni organizations qualified as terrorist activities.

Shaiban filed a suit under the Administrative Procedures Act to compel adjudication of his application for permanent residence. He argued that the government was collaterally estopped from denying his application since his previous asylum grant had determined that the terrorism bar did not apply. However, the district court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment, leading to Shaiban’s appeal to the Fourth Circuit.

The Fourth Circuit declared that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Shaiban's case, pointing to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, which identifies when courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review claims from noncitizens, and 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b), which states that the decision to adjust the status of a noncitizen granted asylum lies in the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General of the United States. The court determined that the plain language of the statutes and the Supreme Court’s precedential interpretation in Patel v. Garland led to the conclusion that the court did not have jurisdiction over Shaiban’s appeal.

Career Colleges and Schools of Texas v. United States Department of Education

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-50491

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Judge: Jones

Areas of Law: Education Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case revolves around a dispute between the Career Colleges and Schools of Texas (CCST) and the United States Department of Education over new regulations that will facilitate certain student loan discharges. The contested rule overturns recent regulations issued by the previous administration and alters thirty years of regulatory practice. The CCST challenged the regulations, arguing that they create uncertainty and potentially significant liability for its members. The district court declined to issue a preliminary injunction against the rule, stating that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated irreparable harm.

CCST argued that the new regulations are beyond the Department of Education's statutory authority, violate the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and infringe on the due process rights of its members. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the lower court's findings, concluding that CCST is likely to succeed on the merits of its challenge and that its members will face immediate and irreparable harm if the new regulations are allowed to go into effect.

The court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enjoin and postpone the effective date of the challenged provisions pending final judgment. The court ruled that the Department of Education's new regulations are likely unlawful and that their implementation would cause immediate and irreparable harm to CCST and its members. The court ordered the lower court to issue a preliminary injunction to delay the implementation of the new regulations until the case is finally resolved.

Citizens for Clean Air & Clean Water in Brazoria County v. United States Department of Transportation

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-60027

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Judge: Douglas

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, a government agency had approved a license to construct and operate a massive deepwater oil facility off the coast of Texas. Several environmental organizations alleged that the approval was unreasonable, arguing that the agency failed to adequately support its decision with a thorough environmental impact analysis. The groups claimed this was in violation of the Deepwater Port Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. They contended that the agency's approval was arbitrary or capricious. The environmental organizations asserted that operating the facility would produce emissions equivalent to more than 80 new coal-fired power plants and could increase the likelihood of mass oil spills along miles of the Texas coastline. They also voiced concerns about potential threats to the Gulf's marine environment.

After their concerns were initially dismissed by the agency overseeing the project, the environmental organizations appealed the licensing decision. They claimed the agency had not conducted the appropriate level of review in its environmental impact statement and had not followed relevant statutory provisions during the approval process.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the agency had adequately considered the environmental consequences of the facility before approving its deepwater port license. The court found that the agency's decision was not arbitrary or capricious, and as such, it denied the petition for review brought by the environmental organizations. The court ruled that the agency had taken a "hard look" at the environmental consequences of the project, provided sufficient detail for the public to understand and consider the relevant environmental influences, and evaluated alternatives in a way that permitted a reasoned choice among different courses of action.

Bray v. Bon Secours Mercy Health, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-3357

Opinion Date: March 29, 2024

Judge: Gibbons

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury

A medical malpractice lawsuit was filed by Dwan and Aaron Bray, individually and on behalf of their minor child, against Dr. Timothy J. Thress and various other medical entities. The suit, which was initially filed in state court, related to alleged negligence in Dwan Bray's prenatal care and the subsequent birth of their child. However, Thress was employed by a federally funded health center during his treatment of Bray. Under the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act (FSHCAA), the lawsuit was removed to federal court and the United States was substituted as the defendant.

The U.S. government moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the Federal Tort Claims Act’s (FTCA) administrative exhaustion requirement. The plaintiffs countered by moving to remand the action to state court, arguing that the FSHCAA did not apply. The district court denied both of plaintiffs’ motions, finding the FSHCAA applicable and any attempt to amend plaintiffs’ complaint futile. The district court dismissed plaintiffs’ FTCA claim without prejudice and remanded plaintiffs’ claims against the remaining defendants to state court. The plaintiffs appealed the district court’s denial of their motion to remand and its dismissal of their FTCA claim.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions. It held that Thress's conduct was covered by the FSHCAA, and that the plaintiffs' attempts to amend their complaint were futile since they had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under the FTCA before instituting the lawsuit.

United States v. Agrawal

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-5931

Opinion Date: April 1, 2024

Judge: Murphy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the defendant, Jyoti Agrawal, was convicted of three financial crimes. Agrawal had obtained over $1.5 million in federal and state grants to research and develop a scanning electron microscope. However, she forged a letter in her company’s application to the Department of Energy, and later lied about how the funds were spent. She diverted a portion of the grant funds for personal expenses, including her MBA. The district court found that Agrawal's conduct caused a loss of $1,548,255, which was used to calculate her sentencing guidelines range. She was also ordered to pay restitution of the same amount.

On appeal, Agrawal challenged the district court’s evidentiary and instructional rulings at trial, its estimate of the amount of loss from her fraud, and its decision to find her personal property forfeitable due to the fraud. However, the Court of Appeals found that the alleged evidentiary and instructional errors were harmless, the district court properly refused to offset its loss amount by her project expenses, and the court properly subjected her personal property to forfeiture because she commingled that property with grant funds.

Furthermore, the court rejected Agrawal's challenges to her sentence, including her claim that the court identified an incorrect guidelines range, miscalculated the restitution amounts, and entered an illegal forfeiture judgment. The court affirmed the lower court's decision.

USA v. White

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2014

Opinion Date: April 2, 2024

Judge: Sykes

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case arose from a drug trafficking operation led by Keith White in an Indiana prison. White, along with others, was indicted for conspiracy to distribute heroin after three inmates died of drug overdoses. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced under enhanced penalties due to his criminal history, which included two felony convictions for cocaine dealing. This was his second appeal challenging his sentence.

White argued that his status as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines was improperly determined based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Kisor v. Wilkie. He contended that the guideline’s definition of a “controlled substance offense” unambiguously excluded inchoate offenses, such as conspiracy, and thus the application note expanding this definition deserved no deference.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed. It noted that the Supreme Court’s decision in Kisor did not unsettle Stinson v. United States, which provided that commentary in the Guidelines interpreting or explaining a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution, a federal statute, or is inconsistent with the guideline. Thus, the court deferred to the Sentencing Commission’s interpretation of the career-offender guideline.

Additionally, the court rejected White's argument that the “major questions doctrine” invalidated the application note. The court concluded that the application note was not a “transformative expansion” of the Sentencing Commission’s authority, and, therefore, the doctrine did not apply. The court affirmed the judgment.

Beard v. Falkenrath

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2893

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Judge: STRAS

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

In the case, Sease Beard, a transgender inmate, alleges mistreatment and retaliation by prison officials. Beard, who identifies as a transgender woman, has been provided hormone-replacement therapy by the Missouri Department of Corrections since 2019. The issue in the case centers on whether the prison officials are shielded by qualified immunity.

Beard was involved in multiple incidents with guards. In one particular incident, when a guard expressed disapproval of Beard's attire, Beard refused to change. Subsequently, several guards physically restrained Beard, used pepper spray, removed Beard's clothes, and carried Beard through the prison's hallways in view of other inmates. Following this incident, Beard filed a lawsuit against nearly everyone involved, claiming violations of state law and the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

The lower court, the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, denied the officials' motion to dismiss the case, asserting their claim to qualified immunity.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision in part and reversed in part. The court found that certain prison officials were not entitled to qualified immunity for some of Beard's claims, including a Fourth Amendment claim regarding a strip search and First Amendment retaliation claims related to denial of a promotion, restriction of shower access, and confiscation of personal property. However, the court found that other officials were entitled to qualified immunity for claims related to the denial of mental health treatment and the supervisors' inaction. The case was sent back to the district court for further proceedings.

Smith-Dandridge v. Geanolous

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-2459

Opinion Date: March 29, 2024

Judge: Kelly

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves the death of Andrew Dawson Bell, who committed suicide while detained at the Washington County Detention Center (WCDC) in Fayetteville, Arkansas. Bell's mother, Judy Lynn Smith-Dandridge, filed a lawsuit against several Fayetteville Police Department officers, WCDC employees, nurses, and Washington County itself, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to Bell's serious medical needs, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, Arkansas Code Ann. § 16-123-105. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants, and Smith-Dandridge appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

Bell had a history of mental illness and substance abuse. On the day he died, Bell had called the police several times, reporting hallucinations of people trying to break into his apartment. Officers responded but found no evidence of a break-in. They arrested Bell for terroristic threats, disorderly conduct, and carrying a weapon. When Bell was processed into WCDC, he informed the intake officers of his mental health history, including a history of suicidal ideation. Despite this, he was placed in the general population.

The main issue on appeal was whether the police officers and WCDC personnel had knowledge of Bell's substantial risk of suicide and deliberately disregarded it. Smith-Dandridge argued that the officers’ interactions with Bell and their review of his arrest history established they had the requisite knowledge to establish deliberate indifference. However, the court found that while Bell's behavior put the officers on notice of signs of mental illness, it did not make it obvious to them that Bell had a substantial risk of suicide. Similarly, the court found that the WCDC personnel's inaction to prevent Bell's suicide did not constitute criminal recklessness.

The court also dismissed Smith-Dandridge's claim that Washington County was deliberately indifferent in its failure to train jail staff. The court found that Smith-Dandridge failed to show that the alleged deficient training caused WCDC personnel to be deliberately indifferent to Bell's substantial risk of suicide. As such, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of all defendants.

RIEMAN V. VAZQUEZ

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-56054

Opinion Date: April 2, 2024

Judge: Smith

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Family Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to deny absolute and qualified immunity to two social workers, Gloria Vazquez and Mirta Johnson, in a case brought against them by Sydney Rieman and her child, K.B. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by (1) failing to provide them with notice of a juvenile detention hearing where the County’s Child and Family Services sought custody of K.B., and (2) providing false information to the Juvenile Court about why Ms. Rieman was not noticed for the hearing.

The court rejected the defendants' claim that they were entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken in their quasi-prosecutorial role as social workers. The court determined that the failure to provide notice of the hearing and the provision of false information to the Juvenile Court were not similar to discretionary decisions about whether to prosecute. Therefore, absolute immunity did not apply.

The court also held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity from suit for failing to provide notice of the hearing and for providing false information to the Juvenile Court. The court affirmed that Ms. Rieman had a due process right to such notice and that this right was clearly established. It was also clear that providing false information to the court constituted judicial deception. The court concluded that a reasonable social worker in the defendants' position would have understood that their actions were violating the plaintiffs' constitutional rights.

USA v. Handlon

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-13699

Opinion Date: April 3, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed an appeal by Quinton Handlon, a prisoner convicted of producing, coercing, and possessing child pornography. Handlon had requested compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) because his elderly father needed a caregiver. The district court denied the request as Handlon failed to provide substantial evidence about his father's condition or proving that he was the only available caretaker. Handlon appealed this decision.

The Appeals Court upheld the district court's decision, affirming that Handlon's case did not meet the extraordinary and compelling reasons necessary for compassionate release under the policy statement of the U.S. Sentencing Commission. At the time of Handlon's motion, the policy statement recognized four categories for compassionate release, none of which included the incapacitation of a parent when the defendant could serve as a caregiver.

The court noted that a recent amendment to the policy statement now includes such a scenario, but clarified that it could not be applied retroactively in this appeal because it was a substantive amendment, not a clarifying one. The court affirmed the denial of Handlon's motion for compassionate release, but hinted that Handlon might be able to file a new motion for compassionate release under the updated policy.

Hikvision USA, Inc. v. FCC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 23-1032

Opinion Date: April 2, 2024

Judge: Pan

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Government & Administrative Law, International Law

The case involves two Chinese-owned companies, Hikvision USA, Inc. and Dahua Technology USA Inc., that manufacture video cameras and video-surveillance equipment. They challenged an order by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) that implemented the Secure Equipment Act (SEA), which prevented the marketing or sale in the U.S. of their products listed on the “Covered List,” a list of communications equipment considered a threat to U.S. national security.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the SEA ratified the composition of the Covered List and left no room for the petitioners to challenge the placement of their products on that list under a predecessor statute. However, the court agreed with the petitioners that the FCC’s definition of “critical infrastructure” was overly broad.

The court concluded that the FCC's order prohibiting the authorization of petitioners' equipment for sale and marketing in the U.S. for use in the physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure was upheld. However, the portions of the FCC’s order defining “critical infrastructure” were vacated, and the case was remanded to the Commission to align its definition and justification for it with the statutory text of the National Defense Authorization Act.

Sierra Club v. FERC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 22-1233

Opinion Date: March 29, 2024

Judge: Pan

Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves two separate petitions for review of decisions made by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to grant extensions of time for the completion of natural gas pipeline projects. The petitioners are Sierra Club and Public Citizen, and the respondents are FERC and the project developers, National Fuel Gas Supply Corporation, Empire Pipeline Inc., Cheniere Corpus Christi Pipeline L.P, and Corpus Christi Liquefaction LLC.

The petitions primarily contend that FERC was overly generous in finding "good cause" to grant extensions for the completion of the pipeline projects. The petitioners argue that due to changes in circumstances, such as the introduction of New York's 2019 Climate Act, FERC was obliged to reconsider its original findings of market need for the projects.

The court upheld FERC's decisions, finding that it exercised its broad discretion reasonably in both cases. It concluded that FERC's determinations of "good cause" were supported by the record, including National Fuel's litigation over water-quality certification and Cheniere's disrupted investment decision due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The court also found that FERC appropriately decided not to reevaluate its prior findings of market need for the pipeline projects. The court ruled that the petitioners' proposed stricter approach to assessing extension requests was unsupported by the Natural Gas Act and the Administrative Procedure Act. Therefore, the petitions for review were denied.

ARKANSAS VOTER INTEGRITY INITIATIVE, INC., AND CONRAD REYNOLDS v. JOHN THURSTON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ARKANSAS SECRETARY OF STATE; THE ARKANSAS STATE BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS, IN ITS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; AND ELECTION SYSTEMS AND SOFTWARE, LLC

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 43

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Consumer Law, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves the Arkansas Voter Integrity Initiative, Inc., and Conrad Reynolds (appellants) who filed a complaint against John Thurston, the Arkansas Secretary of State, the Arkansas State Board of Election Commissioners, and Election Systems and Software, LLC (appellees). The appellants claimed that the voting machines approved by the state did not comply with the Arkansas Code and the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) because voters could not independently verify their selections on the ballot before casting their votes. They argued that the machines printed ballots with both bar codes and the voter's selections in English, but the vote tabulator only scanned the bar codes. Since most voters cannot read bar codes, the appellants claimed that voters were unable to verify their votes as required by state and federal law. They also alleged that the appellees committed an illegal exaction by using public funds for the purchase and maintenance of these machines and that Election Systems and Software, LLC violated the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and committed fraud by claiming that its machines complied with state and federal law.

The Pulaski County Circuit Court dismissed the appellants' complaint. The court found that the voting machines complied with the Arkansas Code and HAVA. The court also denied the appellants' motion for recusal and their motion for a new trial. The appellants appealed these decisions.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the voting process complied with the Arkansas Code and HAVA. The court also found that the appellants failed to demonstrate evidence of bias or prejudice sufficient to warrant the recusal of the circuit court judge. Finally, the court found that the appellants were not deprived of their right to a jury trial and that the circuit court did not err by denying their motion for a new trial.

Cammacho v. City of Joliet

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 129263

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Judge: Overstreet

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Transportation Law

The case involves the City of Joliet and five commercial truck drivers who were fined for violating city ordinances prohibiting overweight and/or overlength vehicles on nondesignated highways. The drivers challenged the city's jurisdiction to administratively adjudicate the ordinance violations, arguing they were entitled to have the violations dismissed because applicable law required that they be adjudicated in the circuit court. The hearing officer overruled the drivers' objections and denied their motions to dismiss. The drivers then filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court of Will County, which affirmed the decisions of the hearing officer.

The appellate court reversed the decisions of the circuit court and hearing officer, following a previous First District's opinion which held that home rule municipalities are prohibited from administratively adjudicating "traffic regulations governing the movement of vehicles," in addition to "reportable offense[s] under Section 6-204 of the Illinois Vehicle Code." The City of Joliet appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Illinois.

The Supreme Court of Illinois found that section 1-2.1-2 of the Illinois Municipal Code does not preempt the City of Joliet's home rule authority to administratively adjudicate violations of its ordinances. Therefore, it vacated that part of the appellate court's judgment. However, the court also found that the hearing officer's administrative decisions were precluded by the Joliet Code of Ordinances, and thus affirmed, on different grounds, that part of the appellate court's judgment that reversed the judgment of the circuit court and the administrative decisions of the City. The court concluded that the administrative decisions were reversed, and the circuit court judgment was reversed.

Petition of the Off. Of People's Counsel

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Docket: 11/23

Opinion Date: March 21, 2024

Judge: Booth

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Utilities Law

The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed a decision by the Maryland Public Service Commission ("Commission") that approved a rate increase for the Washington Gas and Light Company ("Washington Gas"). The rate increase came after the Commission approved the acquisition of Washington Gas by AltaGas Limited ("AltaGas"). The Commission had imposed conditions on the merger, including a condition that required Washington Gas customer rates to reflect "merger-related savings" of "not less than $800,000 per year over the five years" following the merger’s closing. The Office of People’s Counsel ("OPC") objected to the Commission's interpretation of this condition and the approved rate increase.

The court held that the appropriate standard of review for the Commission’s interpretation of its own prior order is the arbitrary or capricious standard. Using this standard, the court found that the Commission’s interpretation of the merger-related savings condition was not arbitrary or capricious. The court determined that the Commission had reasonably explained the inclusion of the condition in the merger order and OPC had not shown that this explanation was arbitrary or capricious. Therefore, the court affirmed the Commission's decision to approve the rate increase for Washington Gas.

Encompass Health Rehabilitation Hospital of Flowood, LLC v. Mississippi Methodist Hospital and Rehabilitation Center, Inc.

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2023-SA-00370-SCT

Opinion Date: March 28, 2024

Judge: KING

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

The Supreme Court of Mississippi was asked to decide whether the Mississippi State Department of Health (MSDH) was required to admit evidence of a concurrent Certificate of Need (CON) application during the CON hearing for another healthcare facility. The MSDH had simultaneously considered two CON applications, one from Encompass Health Rehabilitation Hospital and one from Baptist Memorial Rehabilitation Hospital, for the same category of services. The MSDH did not admit the Baptist application or certificate, and the chancery court reversed the decision solely on this issue.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that the chancery court was in error, and that the MSDH's decision on relevance or its decision not to reopen a closed hearing was not reversible error. The Supreme Court found that the MSDH did not abuse its discretion or violate due process in determining that the Baptist CON application was not relevant to the Encompass' CON application proceedings.

The Supreme Court vacated the chancery court’s decision and remanded the case to the chancery court for a decision on the merits of Methodist’s appeal. The chancery court had failed to address the substance of Methodist’s appeal regarding the granting of a CON to Encompass, and the issue was not squarely before the Supreme Court.

MO CANN Do, Inc. vs. Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Docket: SC100172

Opinion Date: April 2, 2024

Judge: Powell

Areas of Law: Drugs & Biotech, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

In 2019, MO CANN Do, Inc. (MCD) applied for a medical marijuana cultivation license in Missouri. However, the Department of Health and Senior Services (DHSS) rejected MCD's application as it failed to include a certificate of good standing demonstrating its authorization to operate as a business in Missouri. An administrative hearing commission upheld DHSS's decision, and MCD appealed to the circuit court, which also affirmed the decision.

The Supreme Court of Missouri found that MCD's application did not meet the minimum standards for licensure, as it failed to provide a certificate of good standing from the Secretary of State, as required by DHSS's regulations. MCD argued that its certificate of incorporation satisfied the standard requiring proof of authorization to operate as a business in Missouri, but the Court disagreed, stating that the regulatory language was unambiguous and the certificate of good standing was a specific requirement.

MCD further argued that DHSS waived the certificate of good standing requirement by failing to specify it in the deficiency letter sent to MCD. The Court rejected this argument, stating that DHSS never affirmatively waived the deficiencies in MCD's application.

Lastly, MCD claimed that DHSS should be estopped from denying its application based on the missing certificate of good standing due to its failure to notify MCD of this specific deficiency. The Court denied this claim, stating that it is generally inappropriate to estop governmental agencies tasked with administrating licensure in highly regulated industries, which include the marijuana industry. In conclusion, the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court’s judgment.

State v. Thornton

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 54

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Judge: Tufte

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case revolves around a plea agreement between the State and Michael Brenum in a criminal case. The court ordered a pre-plea presentence investigation (PSI) and combined the change of plea and sentencing hearing. The risk assessment score from the PSI triggered a secondary phase of the assessment, which was referred to the North Dakota Department of Health and Human Services (Department) and Dr. Hein-Kolo. They refused to approve the secondary process of the assessment based on a pre-plea PSI, arguing that the risk assessment process should be used only after a conviction has occurred according to assessment guidelines. The district court held the Department and Dr. Hein-Kolo in contempt for not completing the risk assessment.

The Department and Dr. Hein-Kolo petitioned the Supreme Court of North Dakota to exercise its original jurisdiction and issue a supervisory writ, arguing that the district court misinterpreted the law by ordering a risk assessment before acceptance of a guilty plea and that there is no other adequate remedy. They also argued that the issue is not appealable and no adequate alternative remedy exists.

The Supreme Court of North Dakota agreed with the Department and Dr. Hein-Kolo, stating that the plain language of the statute gives the Department the authority to approve the secondary process of the risk assessment and the responsibility to perform that secondary process. The court also clarified that a risk assessment is conducted on “a person that committed an offense,” and a person is considered to have committed an offense only after a conviction. The court concluded that the district court may order a PSI at any time, but it may not require the Department to perform the risk assessment other than by its approved process or before the substantive requirements are met. The Supreme Court of North Dakota exercised its supervisory jurisdiction and vacated the district court’s order directing the Department to conduct a pre-plea risk assessment and the order holding the Department and Dr. Hein-Kolo in contempt.

INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT #52 OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY v. WALTERS

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 OK 23

Opinion Date: April 2, 2024

Judge: Winchester

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law

Several school districts in Oklahoma launched a legal action claiming they had received insufficient State Aid payments for several years due to incorrect calculation by the Oklahoma State Department of Education. They sought to compel the Oklahoma State Board of Education to recover excessive State Aid payments made to other school districts and redirect them to the underfunded districts. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the intervening school districts, stating that the State Board of Education had no duty to seek repayment of excessive State Aid payments until an audit approved by the State Auditor and Inspector was performed.

The case was brought before the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, which agreed with the lower court. However, the court raised the issue of the school districts' standing to compel legislative appropriations and remanded the case for adjudication of standing. Upon remand, the district court granted summary judgment to the appellees, concluding that the school districts failed to demonstrate that they initiated their action before the expiry of any State Aid appropriations from which they sought additional funds. The case was dismissed based on the school districts' lack of standing.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the school districts lacked a legally cognizable aggrieved interest and therefore didn't have standing. The court stated that the school districts sought funds that were previously appropriated and had now lapsed. Hence, the districts had no cause of action to obtain legislatively appropriated funds because those funds had expired by application of the Oklahoma Constitution.

Stitt v. Treat

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 OK 21

Opinion Date: April 2, 2024

Judge: Rowe

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Native American Law

This case, decided by the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, involved a dispute between the Governor of Oklahoma and the state's legislative leaders. The Governor sought a declaration that the legislative leaders did not have the authority to pass two bills related to Tribal compacts on behalf of the state.

The case has its roots in previous US Supreme Court decisions that allowed Oklahoma to tax tobacco products sold on Indian lands to non-tribal members and to enter into agreements with tribal nations regarding these taxes. Following these decisions, Oklahoma's governor negotiated and entered into compacts with tribal nations regarding excise taxes on tobacco products and motor vehicle licensing and registration fees.

The current dispute revolves around compacts negotiated in 2013. The Governor argued that the legislature lacked the authority to pass two bills extending the expiration of these compacts, alleging that the bills were the product of an unlawful concurrent special legislative session, that they violated the separation of powers by exercising powers that belong to the Executive branch, and that they contradicted his exclusive authority to negotiate state-tribal compacts.

The court held that the legislature had the constitutional authority to consider the bills during a concurrent special session, and that the legislation did not exceed the call of the special session. The court also held that the Governor's authority to negotiate state-tribal compacts is statutory, not constitutional, and that the passage of the bills was not an infringement on the Governor's statutory authority to negotiate and enter into state-tribal compacts. Therefore, the court denied the Governor's request for declaratory relief.

State v. Keller

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 101,171-7

Opinion Date: April 4, 2024

Judge: McCloud

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In May 2020, Austin River Keller drove his car into a ditch and subsequently failed a breath alcohol test. The Kitsap County District Court suppressed the breath alcohol test results produced from the Dräger Alcotest 9510 machines in Keller’s case and in all other DUI cases in Kitsap County District Court. The district court concluded that the breath test results violated state statutes and regulations. The district court found that state law places strict limits on the admission of breath test results into evidence. The court also found that the Dräger machine had never rounded the mean before calculating the plus or minus 10 percent range, as required by state regulations. Instead, the Dräger was programmed to truncate the mean before performing that calculation. The district court ruled that the machine’s failure to do those necessary mathematical calculations itself rendered the results invalid and inadmissible under state law and court precedent.

The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reversed the district court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the relevant statutes and regulations do not require the Dräger machine itself to perform the mean and the plus or minus 10 percent range calculation at the time of the test. The court found that the State could establish those required pieces of the foundation for admission of breath test results by doing the math discussed above in a different manner. The court reversed the district court’s evidentiary rulings and suppression order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.