Johnson v. City of Biddeford

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1399

Opinion Date: February 13, 2024

Judge: Lynch

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the plaintiffs, Susan Johnson and Jocelyne Welch, brought an action against the City of Biddeford, Chief of Police Roger P. Beapure, and Officer Edward Dexter of the Biddeford Police Department, alleging a violation of substantive due process rights under the state-created danger test. Johnson and Welch's action stems from a violent incident involving their landlord, James Pak. Pak became agitated about the number of cars parked in the driveway of the property he rented to Johnson and her son, Thompson. During a confrontation, Pak made gun-shaped hand gestures and said "bang." Thompson called the police and Officer Dexter responded.

Officer Dexter spoke with both parties separately. During his conversation with Pak, Pak expressed his anger and frustration, making various threatening remarks. Despite these threats, Officer Dexter did not arrest, detain, or initiate a mental health intervention for Pak. After speaking with Pak, Officer Dexter returned to Johnson and Thompson's apartment, informing them that Pak was "obviously extremely upset" but did not relay the specific threats made by Pak. A few minutes after Officer Dexter left, Pak entered Johnson and Thompson's apartment and shot Johnson, Thompson, and Welch.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that Officer Dexter was entitled to qualified immunity against the plaintiffs' claim of violation of substantive due process rights under the enhancement-of-danger prong of the state-created danger test. The court found that a reasonable officer in Dexter's position would not have understood, based on the facts of the case, that he was violating any such rights by his actions and inactions.

Rhode Island Truck Ctr v. Daimler Trucks North America

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1913

Opinion Date: February 9, 2024

Judge: Barron

Areas of Law: Business Law, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

In Rhode Island Truck Center, LLC v. Daimler Trucks North America, LLC, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was asked to determine whether a Rhode Island truck dealer could challenge a ruling by a Rhode Island state agency that it lacked jurisdiction to grant relief for alleged violations of a Rhode Island law regulating motor-vehicle dealers and manufacturers. The violations in question were committed by an out-of-state truck manufacturer. The plaintiff, Rhode Island Truck Center, LLC ("RITC"), argued that the manufacturer's establishment of a dealership outside of Rhode Island violated the law and harmed RITC's business. The District Court granted summary judgment to the manufacturer, Daimler Trucks North America, LLC, arguing that the state agency lacked authority to apply Rhode Island law extraterritorially.

The Court of Appeals concluded that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the case under the federal-question jurisdiction. The court then certified a question of state law to the Rhode Island Supreme Court concerning whether a "relevant market area" specified in Rhode Island law could extend beyond Rhode Island's borders. The court affirmed the District Court's grant of summary judgment on another claim, where RITC challenged the Board's dismissal of a claim related to Daimler's denial of a Western Star franchise to RITC. The court held that the District Court did not err in concluding that the relief requested would have an extraterritorial effect that violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.

Borough of Longport v. Netflix Inc

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 22-2139

Opinion Date: February 29, 2024

Judge: Roth

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Communications Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the Borough of Longport and the Township of Irvington, two New Jersey municipalities, sued Netflix, Inc. and Hulu, LLC, two popular video streaming companies. The municipalities sought to enforce a provision of the New Jersey Cable Television Act (CTA), which requires cable television entities to pay franchise fees to municipalities. The CTA, however, does not provide an express right of action for municipalities to enforce its provisions. The court had to determine whether the CTA implies such a right. The court concluded that it does not and affirmed the judgment of the District Court. The court found that the CTA expressly vests all enforcement authority in the Board of Public Utilities (BPU) and that it would be inconsistent with the purposes of the CTA to infer the existence of a private right of action for municipalities. The court rejected the municipalities' argument that the New Jersey Constitution recognizes that municipalities have powers of "necessary or fair implication", stating that this cannot change the plain meaning of statutes or provide municipalities with statutory enforcement authority that would directly conflict with the statute.

Continental Cement Company v. Secretary of Labor

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2213

Opinion Date: February 28, 2024

Judge: Arnold

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

The case was an appeal by the Continental Cement Company (Continental) against a decision by the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission. The Commission had determined that Continental had acted discriminatorily towards one of its employees, Tara Otten, by paying her less than she would have earned had she been working, instead of accompanying mine inspectors during an inspection, an activity known as her "walkaround right".

Otten was a miner and designated miners' representative who had been trained to operate mobile equipment. Normally, she would receive a higher wage when operating this equipment. However, when she was performing her walkaround duty, Continental had stopped paying her the higher wage. This action was directed by a human resources specialist at Continental, who based the decision on the collective bargaining agreement.

Otten subsequently filed a complaint against Continental with the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), and the Secretary of Labor filed a discrimination claim on Otten's behalf with the Commission. The Commission sided with the Secretary, agreeing that Continental had discriminated against Otten by causing her to suffer a loss of pay because she exercised her walkaround right. The Commission further held that Continental's decision was motivated by Otten's protected activity.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, however, disagreed with the Commission's decision. The Court held that while Otten did suffer a loss of pay, which was a violation of the law, it did not automatically mean that Continental had discriminated against Otten. The Court clarified that discrimination occurs when an employer intentionally treats a person worse because of a protected characteristic. In this case, the Court found no evidence that Continental paid Otten less for the reason that she exercised her walkaround right. The Court, therefore, reversed the Commission's determination that Continental violated the discrimination law.

The Arc of Iowa v. Reynolds

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3338

Opinion Date: February 27, 2024

Judge: Erickson

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the plaintiffs, The Arc of Iowa and several parents of children with disabilities, sought to challenge a provision of the Iowa Code that prevents schools from imposing mask mandates unless required by other laws. They had received a preliminary injunction from a lower court that had been vacated by this court due to changing circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic. On remand, the district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, declaring that the phrase 'other provisions of law' in the contested Iowa Code section includes Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and that the contested Iowa Code section cannot be cited as the sole basis for denying a student's request for reasonable modification or accommodation under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act that requires others to wear masks.

The defendants, the Governor of Iowa and the Director of the Iowa Department of Education, appealed to the Eighth Circuit, raising issues of exhaustion of remedies under the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA), standing of the plaintiffs, and the propriety and necessity of the relief granted by the district court.

The appellate court, after de novo review, found that the plaintiffs failed to meet the requirements for standing, which include having suffered an injury in fact, traceability of the injury to the defendant's conduct, and the likelihood of redress by a favorable judicial decision. The court found that the general risks associated with COVID-19 were not enough to constitute "imminent and substantial" harm for standing. It also concluded that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the alleged injuries were fairly traceable to the conduct of the Governor or the Director of the Department of Education. As a result, the court vacated the district court's order and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss due to lack of standing.

United States v. Linnell

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2121

Opinion Date: February 26, 2024

Judge: Shepherd

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the defendant Mary Linnell appealed her conviction for possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. The case arose after a traffic stop during which law enforcement officers found methamphetamine, cocaine, and drug paraphernalia in the vehicle in which she was a passenger. Linnell moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the patrol officer lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop. The district court denied the motion, and Linnell entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving her right to appeal the suppression ruling. She was sentenced to 92 months’ imprisonment with 5 years of supervised release to follow.

On appeal, Linnell contended that the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress, asserting that the officer lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop. The appellate court disagreed, ruling that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the officer observed three traffic violations (running a stop sign, following another vehicle too closely, and speeding), and therefore had probable cause to conduct the traffic stop. The court gave deference to the lower court's credibility determination of the officer's testimony, noting that the officer had several years of experience and had been involved in hundreds of traffic stops. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.

USA V. ALAHMEDALABDALOKLAH

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 18-10435

Opinion Date: February 28, 2024

Judge: Christen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, International Law

The defendant, Ahmed Alahmedalabdaloklah, a Syrian national, was convicted after a jury trial for participating in a conspiracy that targeted US military personnel and property in Iraq. The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed some convictions and reversed others. The court agreed with both parties that Alahmedalabdaloklah's convictions for conspiring to possess a destructive device in furtherance of a crime of violence and aiding and abetting the same could not stand after the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Davis. The court reversed these convictions and remanded to the district court to vacate them. However, the court affirmed Alahmedalabdaloklah's convictions for conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction and conspiring to damage US government property by means of an explosive. The court held that the statutes under which Alahmedalabdaloklah was convicted applied extraterritorially, meaning they applied to acts committed outside the United States. The court also held that the district court properly used procedures set forth in the Classified Information Procedures Act to withhold or substitute classified information from discovery. Despite several errors by the government in invoking the state-secrets privilege, the court excused these errors because remanding for proper invocation would be of little or no benefit. Finally, the court held that the use of overseas deposition testimony did not violate Alahmedalabdaloklah's rights under the Confrontation Clause or other constitutional and evidentiary rules. The court remanded the case to the district court for resentencing.

Coreslab Structures v. NLRB

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-9502

Opinion Date: February 28, 2024

Judge: Rossman

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

A company named Coreslab Structures was found to have violated several provisions of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The court affirmed the National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) findings that Coreslab had engaged in unfair labor practices, including unilateral changes to its pension and profit-sharing plans, discrimination against union members, interference with an employee's right to speak with union representatives, and withdrawal of recognition from the union.

Coreslab, which produces bridge components and other structural materials at its facility in Tulsa, Oklahoma, had recognized the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 627, AFL-CIO (the Union) as the bargaining representative of the company’s production and maintenance employees from 2004 until 2019. Starting in 2011, Coreslab made pension contributions only for hours worked by unit employees who were members of the Union, while providing annual profit-sharing payments to non-Union bargaining unit employees.

The court held that substantial evidence supported the Board's findings that the Union lacked knowledge of the pension contribution/profit-sharing scheme until Coreslab informed the Union in September 2019. The court further held that Coreslab violated the NLRA by discriminating against union members and failing to bargain collectively with the Union. It also found that Coreslab's withdrawal of recognition from the Union was unlawful.

However, the court found that the Board exceeded its statutory authority by ordering back-payments without offset and requiring Coreslab to retain the unlawfully-created profit-sharing program. The court remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Electric Clouds v. FDA

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 21-9577

Opinion Date: February 27, 2024

Judge: BACHARACH

Areas of Law: Business Law, Government & Administrative Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied the petitions for judicial review by Electric Clouds, Inc. and Cloud 9 Vapor Products, L.L.C. against the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The two companies had sought review of the FDA's rejection of their applications to market their flavored e-liquids, arguing that the FDA had misled them about the application process and had not adequately reviewed their proposed marketing plans. The court ruled that the FDA did not mislead the companies and acted reasonably in concluding that their evidence was inadequate to approve the applications. The court also found that even if the FDA erred in not reviewing the marketing plans, any such error was harmless because the FDA had previously found such plans to be ineffective in preventing youth access to e-cigarettes.

Utah v. Environmental Protection Agency

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-9509

Opinion Date: February 27, 2024

Judge: Moritz

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has decided to transfer petitions for review to the D.C. Circuit. The petitions challenge a final rule by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In the contested rule, the EPA disapproved state implementation plans (SIPs) for 21 states, including Oklahoma and Utah, considering that these states failed to sufficiently address their contributions to air-quality problems in downwind states. The EPA argued that the petitions should be reviewed in the D.C. Circuit because the disputed rule is nationally applicable. The Tenth Circuit agreed, stating that the jurisdiction for review depends on the nature of the EPA's final action, not the specifics of the petitioner’s grievance. The Tenth Circuit ruled that, on its face, the final EPA action being challenged is nationally applicable, hence, any challenge to that rule belongs in the D.C. Circuit. Therefore, the court granted the EPA's motion to transfer the petitions.

United States v. Gray

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-13516

Opinion Date: February 29, 2024

Judge: Grant

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Raquan Emahl Gray was convicted of conspiracy to commit a controlled-substances offense, after helping transport a car filled with drugs to a state prison. Gray appealed his conviction, arguing that the government failed to prove that he knowingly possessed a Schedule II controlled substance, namely methamphetamine, rather than a controlled substance generally. The appeals court affirmed Gray's conviction, holding that the government only needed to prove general knowledge to obtain a controlled-substances conviction, which it did. Gray also argued that the district court erred when it denied his renewed motion for judgment of acquittal due to his failure to timely renew the motion at the conclusion of the evidence. The appeals court acknowledged that Gray's renewed motion was timely, but deemed the district court's error as harmless because enough evidence supported Gray's conviction.

BEAUDETTE v. MCDONOUGH

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 22-1264

Opinion Date: February 27, 2024

Judge: Moore

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Military Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) that granted a petition for a writ of mandamus permitting the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) to hear appeals of adverse decisions rendered under the Program of Comprehensive Assistance for Family Caregivers (Caregiver Program). The claimants were Jeremy Beaudette, a Marine Corps veteran who was rated 100% disabled due to multiple concussions that resulted in traumatic brain injury and legal blindness, and his wife Maya Beaudette. They applied for benefits under the Caregiver Program in March 2013 and were found eligible. However, in February 2018, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) notified them that they were no longer eligible for Caregiver Program benefits. They appealed this decision through the VA Clinical Appeals process, but their appeals were denied. The Beaudettes then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Veterans Court to permit Board review of adverse Caregiver Program decisions. In April 2021, a majority of a three-judge panel granted the Beaudettes' petition and certified the request for a class.

The Veterans Court held that Congress mandated Board review of all Caregiver Program decisions, disagreeing with the VA's position that the phrase "medical determination" in § 1720G(c)(1) is a reference to a longstanding VA rule excluding medical determinations from Board review. The VA appealed this decision to the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court's decision, holding that § 1720G(c)(1) of the Caregiver Act only bars judicial review of Caregiver Program decisions on the furnishing of assistance or support. The court concluded that the Beaudettes and other similarly situated veterans and caregivers have an indisputable right to judicial review of Caregiver Program decisions that do not affect the furnishing of support or assistance.

Zackery v. Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Gadsden

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: SC-2023-0530

Opinion Date: February 23, 2024

Judge: Sellers

Areas of Law: Contracts, Government & Administrative Law, Government Contracts, Utilities Law

In this case, Fred Zackery sought access to confidential settlement agreements between the Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Gadsden ("the Board") and various carpet and chemical manufacturers. Zackery requested these agreements under the Open Records Act. The Board had sued the manufacturers, alleging they contaminated the Board's raw water intake. The Board settled with all the manufacturers and planned to use the settlement funds to build and maintain a new water-treatment facility.

Zackery, a citizen of Gadsden and a local radio station manager, intervened in the lawsuit specifically to request disclosure of the settlement agreements. The trial court granted his intervention but ruled that the Board didn't have to disclose the agreements until it had accepted a bid for the construction of the water-treatment facility. This decision was grounded in Alabama's Competitive Bid Law, which is designed to guard against corruption and favoritism in awarding contracts for public projects.

The Supreme Court of Alabama upheld the trial court's decision, affirming that the immediate disclosure of the settlements could interfere with the competitive bid process, potentially driving bids upwards and leaving fewer funds for the long-term operation and maintenance of the new facility. This situation, the court reasoned, could cause rate hikes for the Board's customers. Therefore, the court concluded that an exception to the Open Records Act justified nondisclosure of the settlement agreements until the competitive-bid process was complete.

Bekkerman v. California Department Of Tax and Fee Administration

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C093763(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 27, 2024

Judge: MESIWALA

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law

This case involves a dispute over the taxation of cell phones sold in California as part of a "bundled transaction," in which a consumer purchases the phone at a reduced price from a wireless service provider in exchange for signing a contract for future wireless service. The plaintiffs challenged a state regulation that calculates sales tax on the full, unbundled price of the phone, rather than the discounted price paid by the consumer. They argued that this regulation violated the Revenue and Taxation Code and was not properly adopted under the Administrative Procedures Act.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, rejected these arguments. It concluded that the Department of Tax and Fee Administration could allocate a portion of the contract price in a bundled transaction to the cell phone and tax it accordingly. It also found that the regulation was properly adopted under the Administrative Procedures Act.

The court noted that, while services are not taxable under California law, the sale of a cell phone as part of a bundled transaction is not a true discount because the wireless service provider recoups the cost of the phone through the service contract. Therefore, the Department could reasonably allocate a portion of the contract price to the phone and tax it accordingly. The court also concluded that the regulation had been properly adopted under the Administrative Procedures Act, rejecting the plaintiffs' arguments that the Department had failed to properly assess the regulation's economic impact and provide adequate notice to the public.

As a result, the court reversed the portion of the lower court judgment that invalidated the regulation and prohibited the Department from applying it to bundled transactions. It remanded the case with instructions to deny the plaintiffs' petition for a writ of prohibition.

Conservatorship of T.B.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A167919(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 27, 2024

Judge: Richman

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

In a case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Two, a woman, T.B., was found to be gravely disabled and was appointed a conservator under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act. T.B. appealed, arguing that her trial did not commence within 10 days of her demanding one, violating section 5350, subdivision (d)(2) of the Welfare and Institutions Code, and denying her due process. This statute was amended in January 1, 2023, to state that the failure to commence the trial within the time period is grounds for dismissal. The court concluded that the time limit for commencing trials is directory, not mandatory, and that dismissal for the failure to comply with the time limit is discretionary. The court found that the trial court did abuse its discretion in denying T.B.’s motions to dismiss the proceedings, but no reversal was required because T.B. did not demonstrate prejudice. The court also found that T.B. did not demonstrate a violation of her due process rights by the delay. Therefore, the court affirmed the conservatorship order.

Geffner v. Board of Psychology

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B322991(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 28, 2024

Judge: EDMON

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In this case, the California Board of Psychology revoked the license of Dr. Robert Geffner after it found that he had violated the American Psychological Association’s Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct. The violations were based on his evaluation of two children for suicide risk without their father’s consent, failure to consult their existing therapist, making recommendations beyond the scope of an emergency risk assessment, and delegating the duty to warn the father of one child's thoughts about killing him. Dr. Geffner petitioned for a writ of mandamus to vacate the Board’s decision, but the trial court denied the petition. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial court's decision, finding that the evidence did not support the trial court’s conclusions. The appellate court clarified that the father's consent was not necessary in cases of emergency, as the circumstances suggested, and that Dr. Geffner did not make any custody recommendations. Moreover, the court found no evidence to suggest that Dr. Geffner had a duty to personally warn the father of his son's threat, and thus did not violate any ethical standards. The court directed the trial court to grant Dr. Geffner's petition and reverse the Board's findings.

People v. McDowell

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G062263(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 23, 2024

Judge: O’LEARY

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the case presented, Wesley McDowell Jr. was convicted of human trafficking of a minor and other offenses, leading to a sentence of 23 years to life in prison. McDowell appealed this sentence, arguing that the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss his elevated sentence of 15 years to life under section 236.1(c)(2) of the Penal Code, which pertains to human trafficking of a minor with aggravating circumstances. He cited Senate Bill 81, claiming it compelled the sentencing courts to dismiss enhancements under certain circumstances, applicable to his elevated sentence.

However, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three held that Senate Bill 81 applies only to enhancements--additional terms of imprisonment added to the base term. As McDowell conceded, section 236.1(c)(2) provides an alternative punishment for the underlying offense and is therefore not an enhancement. Thus, Senate Bill 81 did not apply to McDowell’s elevated sentence under section 236.1(c)(2). The court affirmed the original sentence.

Persiani v. Superior Court

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G062648(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 28, 2024

Judge: MOTOIKE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

The case involved Rhonda Persiani, a defendant charged with multiple counts of driving under the influence (DUI) in California. Due to doubts about Persiani's mental competence, the criminal proceedings were suspended, and she was found mentally incompetent to stand trial. Persiani was evaluated and found suitable for outpatient treatment through mental health diversion. However, the court and parties believed Persiani was ineligible for such treatment due to a California Vehicle Code section that prohibits diversion in cases where a defendant is charged with DUI. Persiani sought dismissal of her cases, asserting that dismissal was required under the Penal Code because she was ineligible for any of the treatment options. The court denied Persiani’s motion to dismiss and imposed mental health treatment provisions as conditions of her release. In an appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District held that a trial court has the authority under the Penal Code to order treatment through mental health diversion for a mentally incompetent misdemeanor defendant charged with DUI. The court concluded that the Vehicle Code section that prohibits diversion for DUI does not prevent a court from ordering a mentally incompetent misdemeanor defendant to receive treatment through mental health diversion after criminal proceedings have been suspended. The matter was remanded back to the lower court to determine whether to order Persiani to receive mental health diversion treatment.

Drumm v. Freedom of Information Commission

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20656

Opinion Date: February 27, 2024

Judge: Mullins

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

In a dispute between John Drumm, Chief of Police, et al. and the Freedom of Information Commission in Connecticut, the court was tasked with interpreting a provision of the Freedom of Information Act. The provision in question exempts from disclosure records of law enforcement agencies compiled in connection with the detection or investigation of a crime, if the disclosure of such records would result in the disclosure of information to be used in a prospective law enforcement action if prejudicial to such action. The case arose from a request for documents related to a 2010 unsolved murder case by a filmmaker who was working on a documentary about the case. The request was denied by the police department, and the filmmaker filed a complaint with the Freedom of Information Commission. The commission ruled in favor of the filmmaker and ordered the documents be provided. The police department appealed the decision, arguing that the commission failed to apply the correct legal standard.

The court held that a "prospective law enforcement action" refers to a future law enforcement action that has at least a reasonable possibility of occurring, meaning that the occurrence is more than theoretically possible but not necessarily likely or probable. The court also clarified that under the first prong of the exception, a respondent before the commission must establish only that it is at least reasonably possible that the information contained in a requested document will be used in support of an arrest or prosecution. Because the commission had not applied this standard and had made clearly erroneous factual findings, the court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings before the commission.

GenConn Energy, LLC v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20716

Opinion Date: February 27, 2024

Judge: McDonald

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Utilities Law

In the case, GenConn Energy, LLC, an electricity supplier, appealed to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, arguing that the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) overstepped its authority by reducing GenConn's proposed return on capital for two of its peaking generation facilities. These facilities provide additional electricity to Connecticut consumers during times of increased demand. GenConn claimed that PURA was not allowed to lower GenConn's debt rate or to use the general rate-making principles found in a different statute when making its decision.

However, the court rejected these arguments. It held that PURA acted within its statutory authority under § 16-243u when it reviewed GenConn's recovery of costs in line with the general rate-making principles of § 16-19e. The court highlighted the interrelated nature of cost recovery and rate setting, and deduced that PURA must be able to protect the interests of ratepayers if it determines that a company is overrecovering. The court also rejected GenConn's argument that PURA's decision was arbitrary and capricious. The court found substantial evidence in the record to support PURA's final decision and concluded that the decision did not constitute an arbitrary and capricious one. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of GenConn's appeal.

The court's ruling implies that PURA has the authority to review a peaking generation facility's recoverable costs to ensure that the rates are "sufficient, but no more than sufficient," to cover the facility's operating costs. The decision also emphasizes the importance of PURA’s regulatory authority and the necessity of protecting ratepayers from bearing the financial burden of a company's overrecovery.

Petition of the Off. Of People's Counsel

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Docket: 11/23

Opinion Date: February 23, 2024

Judge: Booth

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Utilities Law

In a dispute regarding a Maryland Public Service Commission (PSC) decision to approve a rate increase for Washington Gas and Light Company (Washington Gas), the Supreme Court of Maryland held that a reviewing court must apply an arbitrary or capricious standard of review to the Commission’s interpretation of its own prior order. The issue arose from the interpretation of Condition 44, a provision in the merger order which mandated a certain level of savings for customers following the merger. The Public Service Commission interpreted this condition to mean that Washington Gas’s post-merger costs must be $800,000 per year less than they would have been without the merger. The Maryland Office of People’s Counsel (OPC) disagreed, arguing that the condition required Washington Gas’s post-merger costs to be $800,000 per year less than they were the year before the merger. The court found the Commission’s interpretation was not arbitrary or capricious, affirming the decisions of the lower courts.

Toolpushers Supply Co. v. Mississippi Department of Revenue

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2021-CT-01186-SCT

Opinion Date: February 22, 2024

Judge: Maxwell

Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law

The case involves Toolpushers Supply Co., a Wyoming-based company with a retail location in Mississippi that sells supplies and items used in the oil-and-gas industry. In 2016, the Mississippi Department of Revenue (MDOR) audited Toolpushers’ sales and concluded that the company owed an additional $124,728 based on the failure to remit sales tax on certain sales. Toolpushers considered these sales wholesale and thus tax-exempt, but the MDOR determined they were not qualified as wholesale. Toolpushers appealed to the MDOR’s Board of Review, which affirmed the decision. The company then appealed to the Mississippi Board of Tax Appeals, which also affirmed. Toolpushers continued to appeal to the Hinds County Chancery Court, First Judicial District, and both Toolpushers and the MDOR sought summary judgment. The chancellor denied Toolpushers’ motion and granted the MDOR’s. Toolpushers then appealed to the Supreme Court of Mississippi.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi stated that the chancery court correctly applied the de novo standard of review. The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the chancery court, which in turn affirmed the MDOR’s decision. The Supreme Court agreed with the chancery court that Toolpushers could not establish its claim that the sales were wholesale. The court emphasized that the amended Mississippi Code Section 27-77-7(5) made it clear that the chancery court should give no deference to the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals, the Board of Review, or the Department of Revenue when trying the case de novo and conducting a full evidentiary judicial hearing on all factual and legal issues raised by the taxpayer. The court declared that the Court of Appeals' decision to discuss and apply caselaw addressing the pre-2015 version of Section 27-65-77, seemingly giving deference to the MDOR’s tax decision, was an error but was not reversible.

Montana Trout Unlimited v. Tintina

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 36

Opinion Date: February 26, 2024

Judge: BAKER

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

This case involves an appeal by the Montana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) and Tintina Montana Incorporated (Tintina) of a district court's order revoking a permit granted to Tintina to construct and operate the Black Butte Copper Mine. The district court revoked the permit on the grounds that the DEQ failed to adhere to two statutory schemes governing the state permitting process: Montana’s Metal Mine Reclamation Act (MMRA) and the Montana Environmental Policy Act (MEPA). The Supreme Court of Montana found that DEQ demonstrated compliance with both laws and accordingly reversed the district court's order and reinstated Tintina's permit.

The Supreme Court held that DEQ satisfied MMRA and MEPA in approving Tintina’s proposed cemented tailings facility. The court concluded that DEQ had evaluated the science and made a reasoned decision, supported by substantial evidence, that the surface tailings at the Black Butte Copper Mine would be stable and non-flowable.

The court also held that DEQ satisfied MEPA by rationally evaluating the environmental impact of the mine’s total nitrogen discharges into Sheep Creek. After considering relevant data, DEQ articulated a reasoned explanation for its rationale, and its determination was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary, random, or seemingly unmotivated based on the existing record.

Furthermore, the court held that DEQ satisfied MEPA when it considered and dismissed alternatives to the proposed action. DEQ had appropriately had its independent consultant take a deeper look when Tintina’s working group emphasized cost considerations in dismissing the depyritization alternatives. ERM identified technical feasibility issues it suggested be considered more carefully, and DEQ’s final review shows that the agency considered those challenges and decided to accept the cemented paste tailings option (with modification) as the preferred action. MTU has not demonstrated that DEQ failed its responsibility under MEPA to consider reasonable alternatives to the proposed action.

The case was remanded to the district court to reinstate DEQ’s decision to grant Tintina’s permit.

State v. Lear

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 316 Neb. 14

Opinion Date: February 23, 2024

Judge: Cassel

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The defendant, Melvin Lear, was charged with a felony offense by the State of Nebraska. Lear requested a continuance in order to conduct additional discovery, which was granted by the court. However, the continuance extended the trial date beyond the statutory six-month period. Lear then filed a motion for absolute discharge on statutory speedy trial grounds. The district court denied the motion, finding that Lear had waived his statutory right to a speedy trial by requesting a continuance that extended the trial date beyond the statutory limit. Lear appealed the decision, arguing that the waiver provision in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(b) only applies to a continuance granted at the sole request of the defendant, not a request joined in by the State. The Nebraska Supreme Court rejected Lear's argument, interpreting the waiver provision to apply to a continuance granted at the request of the defendant or his or her counsel, regardless of whether the State joins the request, when the period of delay resulting from the continuance extends a trial date beyond the statutory six-month period. The court therefore affirmed the district court's decision to deny Lear's motion for absolute discharge.

BRASSFIELD v. STATE

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 OK 9

Opinion Date: February 27, 2024

Judge: Winchester

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma considered whether an ongoing investigation into potential criminal charges constituted a "pending charge" for the purposes of expungement. The appellant, Andrew Dale Brassfield, sought to expunge his arrest records under Oklahoma law. The Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation objected, arguing that Brassfield was not qualified for expungement because he had pending charges against him due to an ongoing investigation by the federal government and the Cherokee Tribe. The district court and Court of Civil Appeals affirmed this decision.

However, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reversed these decisions. The court held that an ongoing investigation into potential criminal charges is not a pending charge under the relevant Oklahoma statute, and therefore, the appellant qualified to seek expungement. The court reasoned that a criminal investigation into whether an individual's conduct is chargeable as a crime is not the same as the individual having a pending felony or misdemeanor charge. The court also found that the requirement that the prosecuting agency will not refile the charge is satisfied, as the State of Oklahoma lacks jurisdiction to do so in this case. The court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.

State v. Kurtz

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 S.D. 13

Opinion Date: February 28, 2024

Judge: Devaney

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In South Dakota, Kenneth Leroy Kurtz pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance. The circuit court determined there were aggravating circumstances that justified a departure from the presumptive probation sentence, and Kurtz was sentenced to five years in prison. Kurtz appealed the decision, arguing that he did not pose a significant risk to the public and therefore should have received probation. Alternatively, he claimed the court abused its discretion by imposing the maximum prison sentence.

The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and determined that the circuit court had wrongly applied the statute for presumptive probation. The court noted that while the circuit court had identified aggravating circumstances, it had also found that Kurtz did not pose a significant risk to the public. The Supreme Court pointed out that the law allows for a departure from presumptive probation only if aggravating circumstances that pose a significant risk to the public are found.

The court concluded that the circuit court's statement that punishment was warranted regardless of whether Kurtz posed a threat to society contradicted the mandate in the statute. Therefore, the Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's sentence and remanded the case for the circuit court to issue a sentence of probation.

Stowe Aviation, LLC et al. v. Agency of Commerce & Community Development

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 VT 11

Opinion Date: February 23, 2024

Judge: Carroll

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Contracts, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the plaintiffs, Stowe Aviation, LLC and Stowe Airport Investment, LP, appealed from a denial of their motion to reopen a breach-of-contract case with the Vermont Agency of Commerce and Community Development. The plaintiffs had signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Agency in 2014, outlining their intention to develop and expand the Morrisville-Stowe State Airport using funds secured through the EB-5 program. However, the Agency later transferred its obligations under the MOU to the Department of Financial Regulation (DFR) without informing the plaintiffs, leading to the failure of the airport project.

The plaintiffs filed a complaint against the Agency, alleging that the Agency breached its contract by failing to perform under the MOU and by transferring its obligations to the DFR without notice. The trial court dismissed the claims, and the case was closed. The plaintiffs then moved to reopen the case and amend their complaint, but the trial court denied their motion. The plaintiffs appealed this order.

The Supreme Court of Vermont reversed the order and remanded the case, holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion to reopen the case. The Supreme Court reasoned that plaintiffs could potentially obtain relief to cure a pleading deficiency under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), and it was inappropriate for the trial court to deny relief simply because plaintiffs did not request leave to amend in their opposition papers before the court entered judgment. On remand, the plaintiffs must demonstrate a valid basis to vacate the previously entered judgment to prevent manifest injustice before they can file their amended complaint.

Peterson v. Laramie City Council

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 WY 23

Opinion Date: February 28, 2024

Judge: Kautz

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

In Wyoming, Jerry Peterson brought a case against the Laramie City Council, alleging that the council violated the Wyoming Public Meetings Act by holding its meetings remotely during and after the COVID-19 pandemic. Peterson argued that this remote format presented a barrier to attendance at the council meetings, violating a section of the Act that states a member of the public should not be required to fulfill any condition precedent to their attendance. The District Court dismissed the case on the grounds of laches, asserting that Peterson had delayed unreasonably in filing the suit. However, the Supreme Court of Wyoming reversed this decision and remanded the case back to the lower court. The Supreme Court found that the District Court had incorrectly determined Peterson's claims all accrued at the same time and that it had improperly taken judicial notice of the City Council's evidence. The Supreme Court also concluded that the District Court had made an erroneous conclusory determination that the City Council would be prejudiced by Peterson’s delay in bringing his action.