Mohr v. Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 23-1924

Opinion Date: February 21, 2024

Judge: PORTER

Areas of Law: Class Action, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

In a class action suit, the plaintiffs, a group of patients, alleged that the Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania (Penn), who operate the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania Health System (Penn Medicine), were in violation of Pennsylvania privacy law. The plaintiffs claimed that Penn Medicine shared sensitive health information and online activity of its patients with Facebook through its patient portal. Penn removed the case to federal court, asserting that it was "acting under" the federal government, referencing the federal-officer removal statute. However, the District Court rejected this argument and returned the case to state court.

This case was primarily focused on whether Penn was "acting under" the federal government in its operation of Penn Medicine's patient portal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision to remand the case back to state court. The Court of Appeals determined that Penn was not "acting under" the federal government, as it did not demonstrate that it was performing a delegated governmental task. The court declared that Penn was merely complying with federal laws and regulations, which does not qualify as "acting under" the federal government. The court noted that just because a private party has a contractual relationship with the federal government does not mean that it is "acting under" the federal authority. In conclusion, the court determined that the relationship between Penn and the federal government did not meet the requirements for Penn to be considered as "acting under" the federal government, thus the case was correctly returned to state court.

Mohamed v. Bank of America, N.A.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-1954

Opinion Date: February 16, 2024

Judge: HEYTENS

Areas of Law: Banking, Government & Administrative Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Yagoub Mohamed, a self-employed mechanic, sued Bank of America, alleging that the bank's conduct and error-claim procedures violated the federal Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) and various state laws. Mohamed had applied for unemployment benefits during the COVID-19 pandemic and was found eligible to receive $14,644, which he elected to receive via a Bank of America-issued debit card. However, by the time he received and activated his card, the entire benefit amount had been spent on transactions he did not recognize. The bank opened an error claim and later froze his account due to possible fraud.

The district court granted Bank of America's motion to dismiss Mohamed's federal claim, stating that the unemployment benefits he was to receive via a prepaid debit card were not protected by the EFTA. The court did not exercise jurisdiction over the state-law claims.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that the account in which Mohamed's benefits were held qualified as a "government benefit account" under the EFTA and its implementing regulations. As such, the court concluded that Mohamed had stated a claim under the Act. The court rejected the bank's arguments that it had established the account in question, asserting that the account was established by the state of Maryland, and the bank acted solely under its contract with the state.

The court's holding is significant because it clarifies the scope of protection offered by the EFTA for government benefits distributed via prepaid debit cards, and it underlines the responsibilities of banks in managing such accounts.

USA v. King

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-20620

Opinion Date: February 21, 2024

Judge: Jones

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

In a healthcare fraud case involving Medicare kickbacks, defendants Lindell King and Ynedra Diggs appealed their convictions and sentences. They challenged the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas's decision to admit recordings involving them and other co-conspirators, and disputed the court's calculation of the improper benefit received for the purpose of their sentence, as well as the restitution award. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit examined these arguments and ruled in favor of the lower court.

The defendants were accused of receiving bribes from a Medicare provider, Dr. Paulo Bettega, for referring Medicare beneficiaries to him for unnecessary treatment or non-provided treatment. The Court of Appeals rejected the defendants' Confrontation Clause arguments, stating the recordings were not testimonial and did not violate the Confrontation Clause. It further dismissed the defendants' assertion that the recordings were impermissible hearsay.

Regarding the calculation of the improper benefit, the court concluded that the government had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the entire operation was fraudulent. The defendants failed to provide rebuttal evidence of any legitimate medical expenses that should offset the amount paid to Bettega for treatment provided to residents of their group homes.

The Court of Appeals also upheld the restitution award. It rejected the defendants' argument that their maximum restitution was limited to the $70,000 they received in kickbacks. The court held the defendants jointly and severally liable for all foreseeable losses within the scope of their conspiracy.

In conclusion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and sentence of the district court, finding no error in its proceedings or decisions.

Lawler v. Hardeman County

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-5898

Opinion Date: February 16, 2024

Judge: Murphy

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

In July 2018, Brian Lawler, a pretrial detainee, committed suicide at a county jail in Hardeman County, Tennessee. Lawler's father, Jerry Lawler, brought a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officers had been deliberately indifferent to the risk that Brian would commit suicide. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because the laws in place at the time of the suicide did not clearly establish that the officers’ actions violated the Constitution. The court noted that in 2018, to hold officers liable for failing to prevent a pretrial detainee’s suicide, it was necessary to prove that the officers subjectively believed there was a strong likelihood the inmate would commit suicide. The evidence showed that the officers did not subjectively believe that Lawler was likely to take his life. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to the officers.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD V. VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC DBA DESERT SPRINGS HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENT

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-137

Opinion Date: February 20, 2024

Judge: O'Scannlain

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that employers cannot unilaterally stop deducting union dues from employee paychecks after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement. The case involved Valley Hospital Medical Center and Desert Springs Hospital Medical Center (collectively known as the "Hospitals") and the Service Employees International Union, Local 1107 ("the Union”). The Union and the Hospitals had entered into collective bargaining agreements that included checkoff provisions requiring the Hospitals to deduct union dues from participating employees’ paychecks and to remit those dues to the Union. After the agreements expired, the Hospitals ceased dues checkoff, arguing that the written assignments authorizing this did not include express language concerning revocability upon expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. They believed this omission violated the Labor Management Relations Act, also known as the Taft-Hartley Act. The Union filed unfair labor practice charges, and the National Labor Relations Board determined that the Hospitals had committed an unfair labor practice by unilaterally ceasing dues checkoff. The court held that the Taft-Hartley Act did not require specific language in the written assignments, so the Hospitals could not rely on that statute to justify their unilateral action. Consequently, the court granted the Board’s application for enforcement, denied the Hospitals' petition for review, and enforced the Board’s order in full.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD V. VALLEY HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-1978

Opinion Date: February 20, 2024

Judge: O'Scannlain

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

In a dispute between Valley Hospital Medical Center and the National Labor Relations Board, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied the Hospital's petition for review, granted the Board's cross-application for enforcement, and enforced the Board's order. The court previously remanded the case to the Board to better explain its decision that an employer may unilaterally cease union dues checkoff after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement. Upon remand, the Board reversed its prior decision, readopting its rule prohibiting employers from unilaterally ceasing dues checkoff after expiration of a collective bargaining agreement, and found that Valley Hospital engaged in an unfair labor practice. Valley Hospital contended that the Board exceeded its mandate from the court, which only authorized supplementing its reasoning, not changing its interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act. However, the Ninth Circuit held that its earlier mandate did not explicitly prohibit the Board from reconsidering its rule, so the Board was not bound by its prior decision. The court also found that the Board's new decision was rational and consistent with the Act. Thus, the Board's order was enforced.

Hoskins v. Withers

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-4081

Opinion Date: February 20, 2024

Judge: BACHARACH

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In November 2018, Joseph Hoskins was stopped by a Utah state trooper, Jared Withers, because his Illinois license plate was partially obscured. The situation escalated when Trooper Withers conducted a dog sniff of the car, which led him to search the car and find a large amount of cash. Mr. Hoskins was arrested, and his DNA was collected. Mr. Hoskins sued Trooper Withers and Jess Anderson, Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety, alleging violations of the First and Fourth Amendments and state law.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that Trooper Withers had reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop because Utah law requires license plates to be legible, and this applies to out-of-state plates. The court also found that the dog sniff did not unlawfully prolong the traffic stop, as Mr. Hoskins was searching for his proof of insurance at the time. The court ruled that the trooper's protective measures, including pointing a gun at Mr. Hoskins, handcuffing him, and conducting a patdown, did not elevate the stop into an arrest due to Mr. Hoskins's confrontational behavior.

The court further held that the dog's reaction to the car created arguable probable cause to search the car and that the discovery of a large amount of cash provided arguable probable cause to arrest Mr. Hoskins. The court found that Trooper Withers did not violate any clearly established constitutional rights by pointing a gun at Mr. Hoskins in retaliation for protected speech or as excessive force. Lastly, the court found no violation of Mr. Hoskins's due process rights related to the handling of his DNA sample, as neither the Due Process Clause nor state law created a protected interest in a procedure to ensure the destruction of his DNA sample.

Smart v. England

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-11738

Opinion Date: February 16, 2024

Judge: PRYOR

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

Inmate Germaine Smart alleged that prison officials Ronald England, Gary Malone, and Larry Baker violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for reporting an alleged sexual assault by England. Smart claimed that England sexually assaulted him during a pat-down search, but after an internal investigation, Smart's allegations were found to be unfounded and England charged Smart with lying. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the officials did not violate Smart's First Amendment rights. The court stated that a prisoner's violation of a prison regulation is not protected by the First Amendment, and in this case, the prison tribunal's finding that Smart lied, which was based on due process and some evidence, was conclusive. Therefore, the officials were entitled to qualified immunity.

American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc. v. NLRB

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 22-1261

Opinion Date: February 16, 2024

Judge: Rao

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

The case involves American Medical Response of Connecticut (AMR), a company that operates ambulances and employs emergency medical technicians and paramedics, and the International Association of EMTs and Paramedics (Union). The Union and AMR had a collective bargaining agreement that was in effect from 2019 through 2021. During the COVID-19 pandemic, AMR invoked an emergency provision in the agreement and cut shifts due to reduced demand. The Union raised concerns about AMR's actions and requested specific information from AMR to investigate potential grievances. AMR refused to provide some of the requested information, arguing that the emergency provision in the agreement excused it from providing the information during the pandemic. The Union filed a charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging that AMR's refusal to provide the information violated the duty to bargain under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The NLRB sided with the Union, and AMR sought review of this decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed with the NLRB's decision. The court held that the NLRB was required to determine whether the collective bargaining agreement relieved AMR of the duty to provide the requested information. The court explained that the NLRA requires the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements, including those provisions that limit a union's information rights. The court expressed that the NLRB had put the cart before the horse by concluding that AMR failed to provide information before determining whether AMR had a contractual duty to provide such information. As a result, the court granted AMR’s petition for review, denied the NLRB's cross-application for enforcement, vacated the NLRB's order, and remanded the case back to the NLRB for it to consider whether the collective bargaining agreement excused AMR from providing the requested information.

Insider Inc. v. GSA

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 22-5330

Opinion Date: February 16, 2024

Judge: Childs

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Government & Administrative Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that the General Services Administration (GSA) properly redacted the names of several low-level team members from spreadsheets of salary and benefits costs for outgoing transition teams of President Trump and Vice President Pence. The news organization Insider, Inc. had requested these documents under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The court found that the transition team members had a strong privacy interest in their personal information, which outweighed the public interest in disclosure. The court rejected Insider's argument that disclosure would reveal possible ethical concerns and facilitate interviews that would illuminate the transition process. The court held that these interests were not cognizable under FOIA, as they related to activities of private actors and former executive officials, not current government actors. The court concluded that, given the information already disclosed by the GSA, the incremental value served by disclosing the names of low-level transition team members did not outweigh their privacy interests.

Public Citizen, Inc. v. FERC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 22-1251

Opinion Date: February 16, 2024

Judge: Garcia

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was asked to review a decision by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regarding the regulatory jurisdiction over a proposed liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility in Port St. Joe, Florida. The facility was being planned by Nopetro LNG, LLC, which sought a ruling from the FERC that the facility fell outside of its regulatory jurisdiction under Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act. FERC agreed, issuing a declaratory order to this effect, which it upheld on rehearing. Public Citizen, a nonprofit consumer advocacy group, sought review of the FERC's decision.

However, before the appeal was heard, the FERC informed the court that Nopetro had abandoned its plans to build the facility due to market conditions. In light of this, the court found that the case was moot and dismissed Public Citizen's petition for review. The court also vacated the FERC's orders, stating that since the appeal was moot, it would exercise its equitable authority to vacate the orders at issue. The court noted that no party argued against vacatur and it would further the public interest by precluding any potential reliance on the challenged orders the court lacked authority to review.

Row 1 Inc. v. Becerra

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 23-5020

Opinion Date: February 16, 2024

Judge: Edwards

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled in a case involving Regenative Labs ("Regenative"), a manufacturer of medical products containing human cells, tissues, or cellular or tissue-based products ("HCT/Ps"), and the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Following the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS") issuing two technical direction letters instructing Medicare contractors to deny reimbursement for claims for products manufactured by Regenative, the company filed suit challenging these letters without first exhausting administrative remedies. The District Court dismissed the case due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction as Regenative had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s dismissal, in part for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and in part on grounds of mootness. The Court concluded that the claims raised by Regenative arose under the Medicare Act and had to be pursued through the statutorily-prescribed administrative process. The Court also found that the company’s request for the court to vacate the contested policy was moot because the policy had already been rescinded by CMS. Finally, the court rejected Regenative's argument for mandamus jurisdiction, finding that it did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements for this relief.

W. J. v. Health and Human Services

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 22-2119

Opinion Date: February 21, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

In this case, the parents of W.J., a young man with a chromosomal abnormality and autism, brought a case under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 against the Secretary of Health and Human Services, claiming that the Measles, Mumps, and Rubella vaccine administered to their son had caused or significantly aggravated his health issues. They filed their petition more than 15 years after the vaccine was administered, well beyond the Act's three-year statute of limitations. The parents argued that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled due to their son's mental incapacitation, his minority status, and the government's alleged fraudulent concealment of a connection between the vaccine and autism.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims, which had denied the parents' petition for review and confirmed a special master’s decision to dismiss the case as untimely. The court concluded that the mental incapacitation of the son did not qualify as an "extraordinary circumstance" warranting equitable tolling because the parents, as his legal guardians, had failed to demonstrate that they were unable to file a claim on his behalf. The court also rejected the arguments for minority tolling and fraudulent concealment, finding no basis for these in the Vaccine Act or its legislative history. The court further held that the special master had not erred in raising the issue of the statute of limitations, nor in dismissing the claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

P. v. Clark

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S275746

Opinion Date: February 22, 2024

Judge: Kruger

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of California was asked to interpret the "collective engagement" requirement under the California Penal Code section 186.22(f) and its application to the proof of predicate offenses. This requirement was introduced through Assembly Bill 333, which amended gang sentencing provisions. The defendant, Kejuan Darcell Clark, a member of the Northside Parkland street gang, was charged with several offenses related to a home invasion and assault. The prosecution sought to apply gang enhancements under section 186.22, subdivision (b).

The court held that the term "collective engagement" in section 186.22(f) does not require that each predicate offense must have been committed by at least two gang members acting in concert. Rather, the court interpreted the term to require a showing that links the two predicate offenses to the gang as an organized, collective enterprise. This can be demonstrated by evidence linking the predicate offenses to the gang's organizational structure, its primary activities, or its common goals and principles.

The court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal as to Clark's gang enhancement and remanded the case for further proceedings to apply this interpretation of the collective engagement requirement.

City of Lancaster v. Netflix, Inc.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B321481(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 22, 2024

Judge: LAVIN

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves the City of Lancaster, California, and the companies Netflix, Inc. and Hulu, LLC. The City claimed that Netflix and Hulu were required under the Digital Infrastructure and Video Competition Act of 2006 to pay franchise fees to local governments for using public rights-of-way to provide video service in their jurisdictions. According to the City, the companies had been providing video service without paying these fees.

However, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County dismissed the City's claims, and the City appealed. On appeal, the court affirmed the dismissal, finding that the Act does not authorize local governments to seek franchise fees from non-franchise holders. The Act allows local governments to sue franchise holders over unpaid or underpaid franchise fees, but it does not extend this right of action to companies that do not hold a state franchise. The court further noted that the Act empowers the state's public utilities commission to enforce franchise-related issues, including the issuance of franchises and the collection of associated fees.

The court also rejected the City's claim for declaratory relief, which sought a court order compelling Netflix and Hulu to obtain state franchises and pay franchise fees going forward. The court found that this claim was "wholly derivative" of the City's claim for damages under the Act and that the enforcement of franchise-related issues is a matter for the public utilities commission, not the courts.

The court's ruling means that local governments in California cannot sue video service providers like Netflix and Hulu for failing to pay franchise fees unless those companies hold a state franchise.

City of Norwalk v. City of Cerritos

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B327413M(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 22, 2024

Judge: HOFFSTADT

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Transportation Law

The City of Norwalk sued the City of Cerritos, alleging that Cerritos' ordinance limiting commercial and heavy truck traffic to certain major arteries caused extra truck traffic to be diverted through Norwalk, constituting a public nuisance. The City of Cerritos demurred, arguing that it was immune from liability as the ordinance was enacted under the express authority of the Vehicle Code sections 35701 and 21101. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and Norwalk appealed this decision. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the public nuisance alleged by Norwalk, namely, the diversion of heavy truck traffic and its adverse effects, necessarily and inescapably flowed from the enactment of the Cerritos ordinance, which was expressly authorized by the Vehicle Code. As such, Cerritos was immune from liability for public nuisance under Civil Code section 3482. In addition, the court found no merit in Norwalk's arguments that the ordinance was unreasonable and that Cerritos failed to obtain the state's permission to regulate certain streets.

Hilltop Group, Inc. v. County of San Diego

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D081124(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 16, 2024

Judge: O’ROURKE

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, addressed an appeal from Hilltop Group, Inc., and ADJ Holdings, LLC (Hilltop Group), regarding a dispute with the County of San Diego (County), over the proposed North County Environmental Resources Project (NCER Project), a recycling facility. The Hilltop Group applied to develop the NCER Project on a parcel of land that was designated for industrial use by the County as part of its General Plan Update (GPU) in 2011. However, the project faced significant opposition from community members, homeowners associations, and the nearby City of Escondido due to concerns over potential environmental impacts.

The County staff initially required Hilltop Group to conduct environmental studies. Based on these studies, the County concluded that the NCER Project qualified for a California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) exemption under section 21083.3, meaning that no further environmental review would be needed. However, this decision was appealed to the Board of Supervisors, who voted to grant the appeals and require further environmental review. The Hilltop Group challenged this decision in court, arguing that the NCER Project did not have any significant and peculiar environmental effects that were not already evaluated by the program Environmental Impact Report (EIR) for the GPU.

The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Hilltop Group, finding that the Board of Supervisors did not proceed in a manner required by law when they denied the exemption and failed to limit further environmental review to those effects enumerated in Guidelines section 15183, subdivision (b)(1) through (4). The court concluded that the Board of Supervisors' findings of peculiar environmental effects in the areas of aesthetics, noise, traffic, air quality, and GHG emissions were not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Therefore, the court held that the Board of Supervisors' decision denying the CEQA exemption and requiring the preparation of an EIR constituted a prejudicial abuse of discretion. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and directed it to enter a new judgment granting the petition and issuing a peremptory writ of mandate directing the County to set aside its decision granting the administrative appeals and requiring the preparation of an EIR.

P. v. Kim

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B327473(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 16, 2024

Judge: Kim

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the Los Angeles County District Attorney appealed an order denying the prosecution’s attempt to reinstate charges accusing two defendants, Woodrow Kim and Jonathan Miramontes, of filing false peace officer reports. The charges were related to a police incident involving a high-speed chase and subsequent officer-involved shooting. The defendants, both deputies with the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, were accused of falsely reporting that a suspect, Martinez, had walked into their patrol vehicle and remained standing, when in fact, video evidence showed that the patrol car’s door had hit Martinez with enough force to knock him to the ground. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reversed the lower court's decision, concluding that there was a rational basis for believing that both deputies had filed false reports in violation of Penal Code section 118.1. The court ordered the lower court to reinstate the complaint and return the matter to the magistrate for further proceedings.

People v. Ferenz

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: H049430(Sixth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 21, 2024

Judge: Greenwood

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case decided by the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, the defendant, Ronald Gordon Ferenz, had pleaded no contest to charges of rape of an unconscious person, forcible rape, and dissuading a witness. He was sentenced to a 12-year term in state prison and was imposed a criminal justice administration fee. On appeal, Ferenz challenged the trial court's denial of his post-plea motion to substitute his counsel, the court's decision to not strike certain exhibits attached to the prosecutor’s statement of view, and the imposition of the criminal justice administration fee.

The appellate court held that the trial court did not err in denying Ferenz’s motion to substitute his counsel as there was no showing of a breakdown in communication between Ferenz and his counsel, nor was there any evidence that the counsel's conduct fell below the standard of care. The court also held that the trial court did not err in declining to strike portions of the prosecutor’s statement of view as the material was not expressly precluded by section 1203.01 and the court had inherent authority to accept the material. However, the court agreed with Ferenz that the criminal justice administration fee must be stricken due to the effect of Assembly Bill No. 1869 which rendered such fees unenforceable and uncollectible after July 1, 2021.

The court modified the judgment to vacate the $129.75 criminal justice administration fee, and affirmed the judgment as modified.

People v. Franco

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B324852M(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 22, 2024

Judge: HOFFSTADT

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the early 1980s, Arturo Franco, the defendant, committed two sexual offenses against his minor stepdaughter. After serving his sentence and completing his probation, Franco complied with the requirement to register as a sex offender for 37 years. In 2021, Franco petitioned to be removed from California's registry of sex offenders, arguing that he had lived a law-abiding life for over three decades since his conviction. However, the People opposed the petition, primarily arguing that one of Franco's crimes would render him ineligible for removal from the registry if prosecuted under a statute enacted 21 years after his conviction.

The trial court denied Franco's petition, giving significant weight to the egregious nature of the underlying offenses and the age of the victim, despite Franco's 37 years of law-abiding behavior and no evidence suggesting a current risk of reoffending. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Two reversed the trial court's decision, finding that it contravened the precedent set in People v. Thai, which held that mere focus on the nature of the initial crime without evidence of the defendant's current likelihood of reoffending was not sufficient to deny removal from the sex offender registry. The appellate court also rejected the People's argument that Franco "could have been convicted" of a crime that did not exist at the time of his offense, noting that the relevant legislation tied tier placement in the registry to the offense for which the defendant "was convicted".

People v. Yeager-Reiman

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B331175(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 16, 2024

Judge: KIM

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Military Law, White Collar Crime

In this case, defendant Charles Yeager-Reiman, a veteran, pleaded guilty to misdemeanor grand theft in connection with fraudulent activities related to veterans' benefits from the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Yeager-Reiman appealed his conviction, arguing that his prosecution was preempted by federal law, as his offenses concerned the theft of benefits from the VA.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Five disagreed with Yeager-Reiman's contention, and affirmed the lower court's judgement. The court ruled that federal preemption did not apply in this case. While federal law establishes the guidelines and regulations for VA benefits, it does not prohibit state-level criminal prosecutions for fraudulent activities related to these benefits.

In terms of field preemption, the court determined that the provisions of the federal law did not indicate an intent by Congress to occupy the field of criminal prosecution of veterans in connection with the theft of VA benefits. As for obstacle preemption, the court found that allowing state-level prosecutions for theft of VA benefits actually promotes Congress's purpose of aiding veterans by preserving funds for veterans' benefits through deterrence.

Therefore, the court concluded that neither field preemption nor obstacle preemption deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to hear Yeager-Reiman's case.

Riddick v. City of Malibu

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B323731M(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 22, 2024

Judge: KIM

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

In a dispute between plaintiffs Jason Riddick, Elizabeth Riddick, and Renee Sperling, and the City of Malibu in the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District, the court affirmed the lower court's decision. The plaintiffs sought to construct an accessory dwelling unit (ADU) attached to their existing single-family residence and applied for a permit. However, the City of Malibu denied the application, asserting that a coastal development permit (CDP) was required. The plaintiffs argued that their project was exempt from the CDP requirement under a local ordinance. The Superior Court agreed with the plaintiffs and ordered the City to process the proposed ADU as exempt from the CDP requirements. The City appealed this decision.

The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding that the local ordinance did indeed exempt improvements directly attached to existing single-family residences, including ADUs, from the CDP requirement. Moreover, the court decided that the City's interpretation of the ordinance was not entitled to deference and rejected the City's contention that the ordinance language was internally inconsistent or at odds with other provisions of the statutory scheme. In a cross-appeal, the plaintiffs contended that they were entitled to a permit within 60 days of their completed application, but the court held that this issue was not properly before it on the cross-appeal because it arose from matters occurring after the final ruling. Their cross-appeal was therefore limited to the judgment, which the court affirmed in its entirety.

Shalghoun v. North Los Angeles County Regional Center, Inc.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B323186M(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 22, 2024

Judge: HOFFSTADT

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

In this case, the plaintiff, Ali Shalghoun, was the administrator of a residential facility, Hargis Home, where a client of the North Los Angeles County Regional Center, Inc. (the Regional Center), a man identified as J.C. with developmental disabilities and a history of violent outbursts, was housed. In May 2018, Hargis Home notified the Regional Center that it could no longer meet J.C.'s needs and requested help in finding alternative placement for him. While the Regional Center was searching for a new facility, J.C. attacked Shalghoun in July 2018, causing him serious injuries. Shalghoun sued the Regional Center for his injuries, arguing that it had a duty to protect him from harm.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District, however, disagreed. It held that the Regional Center had no legal duty of care towards Shalghoun. While the Regional Center has a responsibility to provide services and support to developmentally disabled persons, it does not have a duty to protect the employees of a residential facility. The court further noted that the Regional Center could not unilaterally relocate J.C. without the agreement of another facility to accept him. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Regional Center.

Hice v. Giron

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 CO 9

Opinion Date: February 20, 2024

Judge: Hood

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado was called upon to decide a matter related to the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA). The case involved a wrongful death action brought by the family and estate representatives of two brothers, Walter and Samuel Giron, who died when Officer Justin Hice accidentally collided with their van while pursuing a suspected speeder. Officer Hice and his employer, the Town of Olathe, claimed immunity under the CGIA. The Plaintiffs countered that the Defendants were not entitled to immunity because Officer Hice failed to use his emergency lights or siren continuously while speeding before the accident.

The court had to interpret the CGIA and related traffic code provisions to determine the relevant time period for an officer’s failure to use emergency alerts. The court concluded that the CGIA requires a minimal causal connection between a plaintiff’s injuries and the fact that an officer did not use emergency signals while speeding. This means that an officer has access to immunity while speeding only during those times when the officer is using alerts.

The court disagreed with the lower court's interpretation that an officer who fails to use his alerts at any point during the pursuit waives immunity for the entire pursuit. Instead, the court held that under section 24-10-106(1)(a) an emergency driver waives immunity only if the plaintiff’s injuries could have resulted from the emergency driver’s failure to use alerts.

The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for the court of appeals to determine if Officer Hice’s failure to use his lights or siren until the final five to ten seconds of his pursuit could have contributed to the accident.

VANTAGE CANCER CENTERS OF GEORGIA, LLC v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY HEALTH

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Dockets: S23G0405, S23G0408, S23G0409

Opinion Date: February 20, 2024

Judge: Boggs

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

This case concerns the standard of review that the Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Community Health must apply when reviewing the decision of a hearing officer on an application for a certificate of need to establish a new health service. The Supreme Court of Georgia vacated the Court of Appeals’ judgment, set forth the standard applicable to the Commissioner’s review, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court clarified that "competent substantial evidence" in the context of the Commissioner's review means evidence that is "relevant" such that "a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to support" a finding of fact, and that is admissible. The court also determined that the Commissioner must provide sufficient detail in his order from which a reviewing court can determine whether the Commissioner has or has not improperly substituted his judgment for the findings of fact of the hearing officer.

In the Matter of SmartEnergy

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Docket: 1/23

Opinion Date: February 22, 2024

Judge: Booth

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Consumer Law, Government & Administrative Law

SmartEnergy Holdings, LLC, a retail electricity supplier, was found to have violated various provisions of Maryland law governing retail electricity suppliers, including engaging in deceptive, misleading, and unfair trade practices. The Supreme Court of Maryland upheld the decisions of lower courts and the Maryland Public Service Commission, affirming that the Commission has the authority to determine whether electricity suppliers under its jurisdiction have violated Maryland’s consumer protection laws, including the Maryland Telephone Solicitations Act (MTSA). The court also determined that the MTSA applies to SmartEnergy’s business practices, as it applies to sales made over the telephone where the consumer places the telephone call to the merchant in response to a merchant’s marketing materials. The court found substantial evidence in the record to support the Commission's factual findings and determined that the remedies imposed by the Commission were within its discretion and not arbitrary or capricious.

Vancos v. Montana Department of Transportation

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 34N

Opinion Date: February 20, 2024

Judge: Baker

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

This case was a negligence action brought by Dennis Vancos against the State of Montana, Department of Transportation, for injuries he sustained when struck by a car at an intersection. Vancos alleged that the traffic control device at the intersection was inadequately designed, installed, and maintained, leading to the accident. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana addressed three issues on appeal. The first was whether the District Court made an error in handling evidence of Vancos’s consumption of alcohol. The court found that the District Court did err by allowing evidence of Vancos's alcohol consumption but refusing to take judicial notice of his blood alcohol content (BAC), which was not deemed to be in evidence. The court held that a party need not introduce evidence of a fact judicially noticed, and therefore, the District Court's interpretation of the rule was incorrect, and it abused its discretion by refusing to take judicial notice of Vancos's BAC.

The second issue was whether the District Court erred by not accepting Vancos’s proposed jury instruction on pedestrian rights-of-way. The court found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it rejected Vancos’s proposed instruction and instead chose to instruct the jury on the entirety of the law.

The third issue, which was not addressed due to the requirement for a new trial determined by the first issue, was whether the District Court erred by not striking a prospective juror for cause. Due to the error in handling evidence of Vancos's alcohol consumption, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded the case to the District Court for a new trial.

SID No. 596 v. THG Development

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 315 Neb. 926

Opinion Date: February 16, 2024

Judge: Cassel

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

This case involves two consolidated appeals related to Sanitary and Improvement District No. 596 of Douglas County, Nebraska (SID 596) and THG Development, L.L.C. (THG), a real estate owner whose property adjoins but is outside of SID 596's boundaries. The first appeal is from a condemnation action in which SID 596 sought to condemn part of THG's property for public use and the second appeal is from a separate action in which SID 596 sought to levy a special assessment on THG's property, which is outside of SID 596's boundaries, alleging that the property received special benefits from improvements made by SID 596.

On the first appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment, finding no merit in THG's claims that the lower court erred in allowing the mention of "special benefits" and in permitting certain expert testimony. The Supreme Court also found no merit in the claim that the trial court erred in denying THG's motion for a new trial based on alleged improper conduct by SID 596's counsel during closing argument.

In the second appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment granting THG's motion for summary judgment and dismissing SID 596's complaint. The court interpreted the relevant statute, § 31-752, as not authorizing an SID to levy a special assessment on property located outside of the SID's boundaries. As such, the court concluded that SID 596's complaint seeking to levy a special assessment on THG's property was without merit. The court also found no merit in THG's cross-appeal arguing that the lower court erred in denying its motion for attorney fees.

Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. v MUFG Union Bank, N.A.

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2024 NY Slip Op 00851

Opinion Date: February 20, 2024

Judge: Troutman

Areas of Law: Business Law, Commercial Law, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law, International Law

In 2016, Venezuela's state-owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), offered a bond swap whereby its noteholders could exchange unsecured notes due in 2017 for new, secured notes due in 2020. PDVSA defaulted in 2019, and the National Assembly of Venezuela passed a resolution declaring the bond swap a "national public contract" requiring its approval under Article 150 of the Venezuelan Constitution. PDVSA, along with its subsidiaries PDVSA Petróleo S.A. and PDV Holding, Inc., initiated a lawsuit seeking a judgment declaring the 2020 Notes and their governing documents "invalid, illegal, null, and void ab initio, and thus unenforceable." The case was taken to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which certified three questions to the New York Court of Appeals.

The New York Court of Appeals, in answering the first question, ruled that Venezuelan law governs the validity of the notes under Uniform Commercial Code § 8-110 (a) (1), which encompasses plaintiffs' arguments concerning whether the issuance of the notes was duly authorized by the Venezuelan National Assembly under the Venezuelan Constitution. However, New York law governs the transaction in all other respects, including the consequences if a security was "issued with a defect going to its validity." Given the court's answer to the first certified question, it did not answer the remaining questions.

Garaas v. Petro-Hunt

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 34

Opinion Date: February 22, 2024

Judge: Bahr

Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law, Trusts & Estates

In this case, Jonathan Garaas and David Garaas, serving as co-trustees of multiple family trusts, appealed a dismissal of their complaint against Petro-Hunt, L.L.C., an oil company operating on land in which the trusts own mineral interests. The trusts claimed that Petro-Hunt had decreased their royalty interest without proper basis and sought both a declaratory judgment affirming their higher royalty interest and damages for underpayment. The district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice, stating that the trusts had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before the North Dakota Industrial Commission.

The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, stating that the trusts needed to exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing their claims to the court. The court reasoned that the issues raised by the trusts involved factual matters related to the correlative rights of landowners within the drilling unit, which fall within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission. The court held that the commission should first consider these issues, make findings of fact, and develop a complete record before the case proceeds to the district court. It further noted that, after exhausting their administrative remedies, the trusts could then bring an appropriate action for declaratory relief or damages in district court.

State v. Rinde

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 33

Opinion Date: February 22, 2024

Judge: Bahr

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Rozalyn Rinde appealed from a criminal judgment after the district court revoked her probation and resentenced her. Rinde was initially charged with five counts, including unlawful possession of a controlled substance and endangerment of a child or vulnerable adult. She pleaded guilty to both charges and was sentenced to 360 days with the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, with all but 63 days suspended for two years of supervised probation. However, after multiple violations of her probation, the court revoked her probation and resentenced her to 360 days on the misdemeanor count and to five years on the felony count. Rinde argued that the court imposed an illegal sentence, exceeding the maximum penalty allowed at the time of her original offenses. She also claimed that the sentence violated the prohibition on ex post facto laws.

The Supreme Court of North Dakota found that the district court had not imposed an illegal sentence. The court stated that the determining factor in applying the statute governing probation revocation (N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-07(6)) was the date of the original convictions and sentencing, not the date of the offense. Since Rinde’s original conviction and sentencing occurred after the August 2021 amendment of the statute, which removed the restriction on a court’s ability to resentence a defendant in the case of a suspended sentence, the court was not limited by the pre-amendment version of the statute. Therefore, the court was within its rights to resentence Rinde to five years on her felony count. The court also rejected Rinde's claim of an "ex post facto application," stating that the amendment did not increase the maximum possible punishment for her crime, nor did it make an innocent act criminal, aggravate the crime, or relax the evidence required to prove the offense. As such, the court affirmed the lower court's decision.

State ex rel. Ware v. Beggs

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-611

Opinion Date: February 22, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court of Ohio denied a writ of mandamus brought by Kimani E. Ware, an inmate at the Trumbull Correctional Institution (TCI), against Lori Beggs, the manager of TCI's cashier’s office, and TCI itself. Ware had requested certain public records related to his personal account at TCI, and claimed that he had not received the requested documents. Beggs, however, provided evidence that she had printed and mailed the requested records. The court found that Ware did not provide clear and convincing evidence that Beggs failed to send the requested records, and concluded that the mandamus claim was moot because Beggs had fulfilled her duty by mailing the records. The court also denied Ware's request for statutory damages because he did not meet the necessary burden of proof to demonstrate that Beggs failed to comply with her obligations under the Public Records Act at the time he filed the action.

State ex rel. Ware v. Galonski

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-613

Opinion Date: February 22, 2024

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law

The case in discussion was brought before the Supreme Court of Ohio and involved an inmate, Kimani E. Ware, who filed an original action in mandamus under Ohio’s Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43. Ware sought to compel the Summit County Clerk of Courts, Tavia Galonski, to provide documents in response to a public-records request and sought an award of statutory damages under R.C. 149.43(C)(2). Ware alleged that he sent the request by certified mail in May 2022 and that the clerk’s office received the request in June 2022. The clerk asserted that her office did not receive Ware’s public-records request and that her office sent the requested records to Ware only after he filed his complaint in February 2023.

The court denied Ware's motions, denied the mandamus claim as moot, and denied the request for statutory damages. The court found that Ware's mandamus claim was moot as the requested records had been provided. The court also found that Ware had not proven by clear and convincing evidence that he delivered his public-records request to the clerk by certified mail and that the clerk failed to comply with an obligation under R.C. 149.43(B). Therefore, Ware was not entitled to statutory damages. Further, the court found no evidence of bad faith on the part of the clerk.

Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association, Inc. v. Campbell

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 71-72 MAP 2022

Opinion Date: February 21, 2024

Judge: MUNDY

Areas of Law: Business Law, Government & Administrative Law, Non-Profit Corporations

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association (PIAA) is subject to the Right to Know Law’s record-disclosure mandates. The PIAA is a non-profit corporation and voluntary-member organization which organizes interscholastic athletics and promotes uniform standards in interscholastic sports. In 2020, Simon Campbell, a private citizen, filed a records request under the Right to Know Law seeking eight categories of records from the PIAA. The PIAA objected, asserting it is not a Commonwealth authority or entity subject to the Right to Know Law, and noted its intent to litigate the issue. The court found that the inclusion of PIAA in the definition of a state-affiliated entity, a subset of the definition of a Commonwealth agency, indicates that the General Assembly intended to subject PIAA to the Right to Know Law's record-disclosure scheme. Furthermore, the court found that the General Assembly did not mean the phrase "Commonwealth entity" to be strictly limited to official government agencies. Instead, the Assembly intended the phrase to include organizations that perform some role associated with statewide governance.

MORATH v. LAMPASAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT

Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Docket: 22-0169

Opinion Date: February 16, 2024

Judge: Devine

Areas of Law: Education Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court of Texas evaluated a case in which a land development company, Bellpas, Inc., sought to detach property from one school district and annex it to another. According to the Texas Education Code, if the school boards of the affected districts disagree on the petition, the Commissioner of Education can resolve the issue in an administrative appeal. However, the Lampasas Independent School District (LISD) board neglected to approve or disapprove the petition, leading to a disagreement over whether the Commissioner of Education had jurisdiction over the administrative appeal.

The Supreme Court of Texas held that the Commissioner of Education did have jurisdiction over the administrative appeal. The court reasoned that a school board "disapproves" a petition if it does not approve it within a reasonable time after a hearing, as per the plain reading of the Education Code. The court also concluded that the Commissioner did not lose jurisdiction by failing to issue a ruling within 180 days, as the statute's deadline is not jurisdictional.

The case was returned to the Court of Appeals to resolve the appeal on its merits. The Supreme Court of Texas stressed that the delay in the administrative appeal process should not deprive the appellant of a decision on the merits of their petition and criticized the school board for refusing to make a decision, thus avoiding any ruling on the merits.

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