Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association v. Attorney General New Jersey

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 22-2209

Opinion Date: February 14, 2024

Judge: Freeman

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

This case involves a dispute over the interpretation of the federal Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2004 (LEOSA), which allows certain qualified retired law enforcement officers to carry concealed firearms, and its relation to New Jersey’s more restrictive retired police officer permitting law. The retired law enforcement officers from various agencies claimed that LEOSA provided them with a federal right to carry concealed firearms in New Jersey, superseding the state law. The State of New Jersey argued that LEOSA did not provide an enforceable right and, if it did, it would only apply to officers who retired from federal or out-of-state law enforcement agencies—not to officers who retired from New Jersey law enforcement agencies.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that LEOSA does provide certain retired officers who meet all the statutory requirements with an enforceable right, and that right extends equally to officers who retired from New Jersey agencies and those who retired from federal or out-of-state agencies. The court held that the federal statute also preempts contrary aspects of New Jersey law. Therefore, the court affirmed the District Court’s order granting declaratory and injunctive relief to the retired officers, allowing them to carry concealed firearms.

Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association v. Attorney General New Jersey

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 22-2209

Opinion Date: February 14, 2024

Judge: Freeman

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

This case involved a dispute over the rights of retired law enforcement officers to carry concealed firearms in New Jersey. The plaintiffs, three retired officers and two organizations, sued New Jersey officials, arguing that a federal statute, the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act (LEOSA), gives them a federal right to carry a concealed firearm anywhere in the United States, including within New Jersey, and that LEOSA preempts any more burdensome state requirements. The state countered that the federal statute does not provide such an enforceable right, and even if it did, it would only apply to officers who retired from federal or out-of-state law enforcement agencies. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that LEOSA does provide certain retired officers with an enforceable right to carry concealed firearms, and that this right extends equally to officers who retired from New Jersey agencies and those who retired from federal or out-of-state agencies. The court concluded that LEOSA also preempts contrary aspects of New Jersey law. Therefore, the court affirmed the District Court’s order granting declaratory and injunctive relief to the retired officers.

Rhone v. City of Texas City

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-40551

Opinion Date: February 14, 2024

Judge: Southwick

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

Thomas Rhone, a property owner in Texas City, Texas, had his apartments declared a nuisance by a Municipal Court of Record. Rhone disputed this decision in state court, but the City moved the case to federal district court. There, Rhone's claims were dismissed on summary judgment. Rhone appealed the district court's decision, challenging the standard of review and its conclusions regarding his constitutional claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ordered a limited remand for the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the role of the City Attorney in finalizing the Municipal Court’s order of abatement.

Rhone's property, three apartment buildings, passed a city inspection in 2013 without any issues regarding a lack of a certificate of occupancy being raised. However, following an inspection in 2020, Texas City informed Rhone that his buildings were substandard and that he would need a certificate of occupancy to operate them. Rhone argued that city officials interfered with his efforts to remedy the violations claimed by the City and imposed conditions that made it impossible for him to preserve the value of his property by repairing the apartment buildings to bring them into compliance with the Texas City Code instead of demolishing the structures.

After the city filed an administrative action in its Municipal Court of Record, the court ordered the demolition of the apartment buildings, finding them to be "dilapidated, substandard, unfit for human habitation, a hazard to the public health, safety, and welfare," and a nuisance. Rhone appealed this order in the 122nd Judicial District Court of Galveston County, but the City removed the action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas in Galveston under federal-question jurisdiction. The federal district court ultimately granted partial summary judgment in favor of Texas City.

The Court of Appeals held that any of Rhone's claims that would only interfere with the demolition of the buildings on his property were moot due to the demolition of the buildings. However, the court also held that the demolition did not eliminate a potential takings claim. The court ordered a limited remand for the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the role of the City Attorney in finalizing the Municipal Court’s order of abatement. The court also held that Rhone has not shown that an initial inspection by a city fire marshal and an issuance of a citation that has consequences on his use of the property violate federal law.

USA v. Dinkins

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-30249

Opinion Date: February 14, 2024

Judge: Higginbotham

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to order Marty Johnson, the owner of a mental health rehabilitation clinic, and Keesha Dinkins, an employee of the clinic, to pay $3.5 million in restitution. Johnson and Dinkins had pleaded guilty to charges related to a fraudulent billing scheme targeting Medicaid that lasted from 2014 to 2018. On the day before their jury trial was set to begin, both defendants pled guilty to their respective charges and agreed in their plea deals to recommend $3.5 million in restitution. However, after their pleas were accepted, both defendants objected to the restitution order, arguing that it was erroneous. Johnson challenged the loss and restitution calculation while Dinkins argued that the entire loss should not have been attributed to her. The court held that the defendants were bound by the plea agreements they had made and affirmed the district court’s order for each defendant to pay $3.5 million in restitution. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the pleas, the restitution amount did not exceed the actual loss, and the district court appropriately used the total loss amount when calculating Dinkins’s sentence.

Hughes v. Duncan

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-6004

Opinion Date: February 15, 2024

Judge: Readler

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

In a case heard before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, plaintiff Jeffrey Hughes, an inmate in a Tennessee state prison, sued the Tennessee Board of Parole, alleging that the Board's refusal to move up his parole hearing date resulted in his overincarceration. Hughes believed that a recent change in state law entitled him to an earlier parole hearing. The Board refused his request, and he was paroled about three months after the date he believed he became eligible for release. The district court dismissed the case on the ground that the defendants, members of the Board, were absolutely immune from suit for their acts. Hughes then appealed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the members of the Tennessee Board of Parole were entitled to absolute immunity from damages suits challenging its decision on when to hold a parole hearing. The court found that the Board's decision to schedule (or not to reschedule) a parole hearing was a judicial act, akin to a judge scheduling a court hearing. As such, the defendants were acting in a quasi-judicial capacity and were entitled to absolute immunity. The court also rejected Hughes's arguments of judicial estoppel and res judicata, stating that the defendants could not have raised their immunity defense in the previous state suit and thus were not barred from raising it in the present federal suit.

Patel v. Jaddou

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-5867

Opinion Date: February 9, 2024

Judge: Sutton

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law

The case involves Indian citizens Sanket and Nehaben Patel who sued the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Ur Jaddou, under the Administrative Procedure Act for unreasonable delay in processing their applications for U visas. After their visas were granted, the Director moved to dismiss the case for mootness and attached an exhibit showing the applications' approval. The Director then realized she had not filed the exhibit under seal, violating the rule prohibiting the disclosure of information relating to noncitizens who are U visa applicants and recipients. The Patels sought civil penalties for the disclosure of their personal information. The district court dismissed the case and denied the Patels' motion for civil penalties, stating that any disclosure was not willful.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Director's disclosure of the Patels' visa application status was not "willful" under 8 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The court reasoned that the term "willful" refers to actions that are intentional or knowing, as opposed to accidental. The court noted that the Director realized her mistake in not filing the exhibit under seal, promptly contacted the court to seal the exhibit, and the information disclosed was already revealed in the Patels’ unsealed complaint. Therefore, the disclosure was not considered willful but at most amounted to negligence.

Estate of Nash v. Folsom

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2860

Opinion Date: February 9, 2024

Judge: SMITH

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered an appeal by several Missouri public officials who were denied qualified immunity by a lower court regarding five claims arising from a murder prosecution. The murder case, involving Donald Nash who was eventually convicted for the murder of Judy Spencer, was reopened in 2007, 25 years after the crime occurred. The officials based their case on a theory that DNA evidence found under Spencer's fingernails belonged to Nash, which they asserted could not have remained present if Spencer had washed her hair after their last encounter.

Nash was convicted and spent 11 years in prison until the Missouri Supreme Court set aside his conviction in 2020. The charges were dismissed after DNA testing on the shoelace used to strangle Spencer supported Nash’s noninvolvement. Nash and his wife filed a lawsuit against the officials, claiming violations of rights including unlawful arrest and detention, fabrication of evidence, failure to investigate, violations of rights of access to courts, and violation of the right to familial and marital associations.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and dismissed in part the appeals on the denial of qualified immunity. The court held that the officials were not entitled to qualified immunity on the claim of unlawful arrest and detention, finding that the omission of certain exculpatory facts from the probable cause affidavit negated probable cause for Nash's arrest. However, the court reversed the denial of qualified immunity for the claim alleging violation of the right to familial and marital associations, as this was not a clearly established constitutional right in 2008. The court dismissed the officials' appeal on the remaining claims due to lack of jurisdiction, as these involved genuine disputes of material fact to be resolved by a jury.

United States v. Rogers

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1461

Opinion Date: February 9, 2024

Judge: COLLOTON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case heard before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the appellant, Dewanis Rogers, sought a reduced sentence under the First Step Act of 2018. Rogers had been found guilty in 2008 of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a protected location, following two or more prior felony drug convictions. He received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, as prescribed by statute. In 2022, Rogers requested that his sentence be reduced under the provisions of the First Step Act. The district court denied this motion, determining that Rogers was ineligible for relief under the Act. Rogers appealed this decision, disputing his ineligibility.

Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that even if Rogers was eligible for relief under the First Step Act, the district court could not have lawfully reduced his sentence due to the mandatory term of imprisonment prescribed by statute. The court explained that Congress had not expressly repealed the mandatory punishment for Rogers’s offense in the First Step Act, and that the change in law cited by Rogers did not appear in the sections of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 made retroactive by the First Step Act. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision.

Monroe v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 21-14409

Opinion Date: February 15, 2024

Judge: Carnes

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the plaintiff, Taquila Monroe, was a former employee of Fort Valley State University's Head Start and Early Head Start department. She sued the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia (the "Board") under the False Claims Act's (FCA) anti-retaliation provision, alleging that she was terminated for reporting mismanagement and misuse of federal and state funds meant for the Head Start programs. The district court granted the Board's motion to dismiss, citing the Board's sovereign immunity. The central issue on appeal was whether the FCA's anti-retaliation provision abrogates sovereign immunity for lawsuits against states, and whether the Board is an arm of the state entitled to the same immunity.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court concluded that Congress did not unequivocally express its intent to subject states to suits under the FCA's anti-retaliation provision, and therefore did not abrogate sovereign immunity. The court also held that the Board is an arm of the state and thus entitled to sovereign immunity. In reaching these conclusions, the court considered how Georgia law defines the Board, the degree of control the state exercises over the Board, the Board's source of funding, and who would be responsible for a judgment against the Board. The court found that all of these factors pointed to the Board being an arm of the state that is entitled to sovereign immunity.

GREAT NORTHERN PROPERTIES, L.P. v. US

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 22-2086

Opinion Date: February 15, 2024

Judge: Dyk

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law

The plaintiff, Great Northern Properties, L.P. ("GNP"), filed a lawsuit against the United States, alleging a Fifth Amendment taking of its coal leases on the Otter Creek property in Montana. GNP claimed that the federal government, through the Montana state regulatory authority, denied the necessary permits for coal mining. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the Court of Federal Claims, which dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that GNP could not establish that Montana's actions were coerced by the federal government or that Montana acted as an agent of the federal government. The court also noted that the federal government did not dictate the outcome in individual permitting cases and that state law governed the permitting process. Therefore, the federal government was not responsible for the permit denial, as Montana was not coerced to enact its own regulatory program following the passage of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. Furthermore, the court rejected GNP's claim that the existence of federal standards created an agency relationship between the federal government and Montana.

In Re CHESTEK PLLC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 22-1843

Opinion Date: February 13, 2024

Judge: LOURIE

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Intellectual Property, Trademark

In 2020, the law firm Chestek PLLC applied for a trademark for the mark "CHESTEK LEGAL" but provided only a P.O. box as its domicile address. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) refused the application because it did not comply with the domicile address requirement. Chestek argued that the rules enforcing this requirement were improperly promulgated under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board affirmed the examiner's refusal. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Chestek argued that the domicile address requirement was improperly promulgated for two reasons: the USPTO was required to comply with the requirements of notice-and-comment rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. § 553 but failed to do so because the proposed rule did not provide notice of the domicile address requirement adopted in the final rule, and the domicile address requirement is arbitrary and capricious because the final rule failed to offer a satisfactory explanation for the domicile address requirement and failed to consider important aspects of the problem it purports to address, such as privacy. The Federal Circuit found the domicile address requirement to be a procedural rule that is exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking. Furthermore, the USPTO's decision to require the address provided by all applicants to be a domicile address was not arbitrary or capricious for failure to provide a reasoned justification. The court affirmed the Board's refusal to register Chestek's mark.

University of South Florida Board of Trustees v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 22-2248

Opinion Date: February 9, 2024

Judge: TARANTO

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Intellectual Property, Patents

In this case, the University of South Florida Board of Trustees (USF) sued the United States, claiming that the latter infringed a patent owned by USF regarding genetically modified mice for Alzheimer's Disease research. The USF contended that The Jackson Laboratory, with the government's authorization and consent, had been producing and using mice covered by the patent for the government. The government countered the claim by asserting it had a license to practice the patent under a provision of the Bayh-Dole Act, which addresses patent rights in work funded by the federal government. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that the provision does apply and therefore affirmed the judgment of noninfringement. The court confirmed that the April 1997 work, the first actual reduction to practice of the invention, was "in the performance of work under a funding agreement." The court also rejected USF's contention that a funding agreement must be in place at the time of the relevant work, clarifying that the Act can cover work already performed before a funding agreement is executed or becomes effective.

California Privacy Protection Agency v. Superior Court

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C099130(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 9, 2024

Judge: Duarte

Areas of Law: Consumer Law, Government & Administrative Law

This case pertains to the enforcement of the California Privacy Rights Act of 2020 (the Act), a voter-enacted statute that expanded and amended the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018. The California Privacy Protection Agency (the Agency) failed to adopt final regulations by the July 1, 2022 deadline set out in the Act. The California Chamber of Commerce sought a court order to delay enforcement of the Act until one year after the agency adopted all required regulations. The trial court granted the petition in part, ruling that the Agency could not enforce any regulation until one year after that regulation became final. The Agency appealed, arguing that the Act did not mandate a one-year delay between the approval of a final regulation and its enforcement. The appellate court agreed with the Agency, finding that the Act's language did not unambiguously require a one-year delay between approval and enforcement. The court ordered a new trial court order denying the Chamber's petition and allowing the trial court to consider any remaining issues regarding the prompt development of regulations.

Gardena Hospital, L.P. v. Baass

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B316529(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 9, 2024

Judge: WILEY

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

In this case, Gardena Hospital in California appealed a decision regarding its reporting of patient days for the purpose of calculating Medi-Cal reimbursement. The controversy centered around whether "bed hold" days — days when a patient is not physically in the hospital's subacute section but is expected to return — should be included in the reported patient days. If these days were included, it would result in a smaller per diem reimbursement to the hospital by the state. The hospital argued that bed hold days should be excluded, pointing to the Accounting and Reporting Manual for California Hospitals (the "Hospital Manual"), which does not specifically mention bed holds. The state, on the other hand, referred to the Accounting and Reporting Manual for California Long-Term Care Facilities (the "Long-Term Manual"), which specifically states that bed hold days should be included in total patient days.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight ruled in favor of the state, affirming the lower court's decision. The court held that where two state manuals guide health care facility accounting, the one that specifically addresses the issue at hand — in this case, the Long-Term Manual's explicit reference to bed holds — governs. The court reasoned that the specific provision controls the general one and can be regarded as a correction to it. Thus, according to this holding, Gardena Hospital must include bed hold days in its reported patient days for the calculation of Medi-Cal reimbursement.

People v. Kimble

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C097389A(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 9, 2024

Judge: Krause

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the defendant, Kelly Vaughn Kimble, who was sentenced to 25 years to life under the former Three Strikes law, plus an additional year for a prior prison term enhancement, sought resentencing under Senate Bill No. 483. He argued that the trial court erred in resentencing him under Senate Bill 483 without applying the revised penalty provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. He further contended that he was entitled to application of the Reform Act’s revised penalties at his resentencing. However, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District disagreed. The court held that the Reform Act created a specific resentencing process for offenders sentenced under the former Three Strikes law, which requires consideration of various factors, such as the offender's criminal history, disciplinary record, and other relevant information. The court further noted that the Reform Act provided the only path for relief under the Reform Act for defendants who had already been sentenced. Thus, the court ruled that the defendant was not entitled to automatic resentencing under the Reform Act as part of his resentencing under Senate Bill 483. The court, therefore, affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

San Bernardino County Fire Protection Dist. v. Page

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E079130(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 14, 2024

Judge: CODRINGTON

Areas of Law: Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the state of California, a group known as the Real Parties circulated an initiative petition to repeal a special tax within Service Zone Five of the San Bernardino County Fire Protection District. The District attempted to prevent this initiative from appearing on the June 2022 ballot by filing a writ petition and complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief, asserting that the initiative contained false and misleading information in violation of Elections Code section 18600. The trial court found the initiative to be invalid due to these false and misleading statements, but it was too late to prevent it from appearing on the ballot. The electorate voted on the initiative, and it passed.

The Real Parties appealed the trial court's order, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that the initiative contained false and misleading statements and that intent was not required to prove a violation of section 18600. The District cross-appealed, arguing that the initiative was invalid due to additional grounds.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two affirmed the trial court's order, concluding that the initiative was invalid because it contained false and misleading information. The court also agreed with the trial court that it was not necessary for the District to establish intent under section 18600. The court dismissed the District's cross-appeal as moot because it raised additional grounds for disqualifying the initiative, which were unnecessary to address given the court's conclusion that the initiative was already invalid.

McGuiness v. State

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Docket: 438, 2022

Opinion Date: February 13, 2024

Judge: Legrow

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

Kathleen McGuiness, an elected state official in Delaware, was indicted and tried on various criminal charges related to her conduct while in office. She was convicted of three charges and acquitted of two others. She appealed, claiming that the trial was fundamentally unfair and unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Delaware held that the trial was fair and rejected most of McGuiness's arguments. However, the court agreed with McGuiness that the legal insufficiency of one of the charges resulted in a spillover of evidence that prejudiced the jury’s consideration of a closely linked charge. Therefore, the court reversed McGuiness's conviction for Official Misconduct. The case was remanded for further proceedings. The court also affirmed the trial court's decisions and McGuiness's convictions on all other charges.

Teising v. State of Indiana

Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Docket: 24S-CR-00055

Opinion Date: February 15, 2024

Judge: Molter

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Indiana Supreme Court vacated the theft convictions of Jennifer Teising, a former township trustee. Teising had been convicted on 21 counts of theft after she moved out of the township she represented and continued to collect her salary while working remotely. The court held that the state did not present sufficient evidence that Teising had the required criminal intent for theft, specifically that she believed she was not supposed to continue collecting her salary. Therefore, the court ruled that without criminal intent, the only available remedies were civil, such as a quo warranto action to remove Teising from office or a conversion claim to recover allegedly misappropriated money.

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. DAVIS

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2023-SC-0178-DG

Opinion Date: February 15, 2024

Judge: Keller

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

In November 2013, Ahmad Rashad Davis was indicted for Medicaid fraud and theft by deception for defrauding Medicaid of $14,505.36 by falsifying timesheets over two years. In May 2014, the Commonwealth of Kentucky and Davis entered into a plea agreement in which Davis agreed to plead guilty to Medicaid fraud, and in exchange, the Commonwealth recommended to the trial court that Davis's theft by deception charge be dismissed. The trial court accepted Davis's guilty plea and sentenced him to one year of imprisonment, probated for three years or until restitution was paid in full, and dismissed the theft by deception charge. In December 2021, Davis filed a petition to expunge the theft by deception charge. The Commonwealth objected, arguing that the charge was dismissed in exchange for Davis's guilty plea to Medicaid fraud, making it ineligible for expungement under Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 431.076(1)(b). The circuit court granted Davis's petition without holding a hearing, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. The Supreme Court of Kentucky granted discretionary review and reversed the decisions of the lower courts.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that a circuit court can look beyond the sentencing court's final judgment to determine whether a dismissal was granted in exchange for a guilty plea to another charge. The court ruled that the circuit court erred in failing to do so in Davis's case. As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and vacated the circuit court's order granting expungement.

In the Matter of an Impounded Case

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13465

Opinion Date: February 14, 2024

Judge: Lowy

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Juvenile Law

In this case, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was called upon to determine which law applied to the sealing of records from youthful offender proceedings - G. L. c. 276, § 100A, the adult criminal record sealing statute or G. L. c. 276, § 100B, the juvenile delinquency sealing statute. The case arose when the Commissioner of Probation denied the petitioner's request to have his youthful offender records sealed under § 100B and instead applied the adult criminal record sealing statute, § 100A.

The court, after examining both statutes and considering the legislative intent, concluded that § 100B, the juvenile delinquency sealing statute, was the proper statute for the sealing of records of youthful offenders. The court found that the Legislature’s intent to aid, encourage, and guide juveniles, which includes youthful offenders, was more consistent with the process outlined in § 100B.

The court held that it was an error for the Commissioner of Probation to refuse to seal the petitioner's Juvenile Court records under § 100B, as the petitioner had satisfied all the requirements under the statute. Therefore, the case was remanded back to the county court for the entry of a judgment in favor of the petitioner.

Crown Diversified Industries Corp. v. Zimmerman

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Docket: SC100219

Opinion Date: February 14, 2024

Judge: Fischer

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Tax Law

The Missouri Supreme Court ruled in a case involving the St. Louis County Assessor ("Assessor") and a group of St. Louis County commercial property owners, referred to as "Taxpayers." The Taxpayers alleged that their properties were assessed at a higher percentage of fair market value (FMV) than other commercial properties in the county. This claim is known as a "ratio discrimination" claim. The Taxpayers appealed their assessments to the local board of equalization ("BOE") and the Missouri State Tax Commission ("STC"). In some of the appeals, the BOE and STC did not change the Assessor's original FMV and assessed value, while in others, they ordered reductions in the estimated FMV of the property, resulting in a lower assessed value and decreased tax liability.

The STC found that the Taxpayers did not provide substantial and persuasive evidence of discrimination. The Taxpayers then filed a petition for judicial review, and the circuit court reversed the STC's decision and order and remanded the case for retrial. The Assessor appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court, which found that the STC's decision was authorized by law and supported by substantial evidence. The Court agreed with the STC that the Taxpayers did not provide persuasive evidence of discriminatory assessment. The Court held that the actual assessment level used to analyze a claim of discriminatory assessment and taxation is based on the assessed value that actually determines the tax liability. The Court also found that the STC did not abuse its discretion by denying certain discovery requests and quashing subpoenas for the deposition of the Assessor and several staff appraisers. The circuit court's judgment was vacated, and the STC's decision and order was reinstated.

Wright v. Southwest Airlines Co.

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 315 Neb. 911

Opinion Date: February 9, 2024

Judge: Papik

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

In the case before the Nebraska Supreme Court, Kathryn Wright was employed as a customer service agent for Southwest Airlines Co. (Southwest). In her volunteer role on a workplace social committee, she was found to have not kept adequate records of expenditures and to have spent committee funds for personal purposes. Consequently, Southwest terminated her employment. Wright then applied for unemployment insurance benefits, which were initially granted by the Nebraska Department of Labor (DOL) adjudicator. However, this decision was overturned by the DOL appeal tribunal, disqualifying her from receiving unemployment benefits for the week of the discharge and the 14 weeks thereafter. The district court affirmed this decision and Wright appealed.

The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Wright had committed misconduct connected with her work under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-628.10 (Reissue 2021). The court found that Wright's failure to keep a ledger and maintain supporting documentation for all committee expenses was misconduct connected with her work, regardless of the fact that her work on the committee was volunteer and separate from her paid job duties. The court also disagreed with Wright's argument that the committee funds were not Southwest's but her coworkers'. The court reasoned that the funds were contributed to the committee organized, promoted, supported, and regulated by Southwest, which had an interest in ensuring that the funds were spent appropriately. Therefore, Wright's failure to follow the rules harmed Southwest and was misconduct connected with her work.

State ex rel. Cassens Corp. v. Indus. Comm.

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-526

Opinion Date: February 14, 2024

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the decision of the lower court, granting a writ of mandamus to Cassens Corp., a self-insuring employer, against the Industrial Commission of Ohio. The case involved an employee, Luis Ybarra, who was injured on the job when he was struck by a vehicle driven by a coworker who had failed to clear the snow and ice from the windshield. The Commission had found that Cassens Corp. violated a specific safety requirement (VSSR) and granted an application for an additional workers' compensation award. Cassens Corp. sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Commission to vacate its order. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the Commission erred in finding that the outdoor yard where Ybarra was injured constituted a "workshop" under the applicable administrative code. Therefore, the company could not have committed a VSSR under the code. As a result, Cassens Corp. was entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering the Commission to vacate its decision and refund all additional compensation paid by Cassens Corp. in accordance with the Commission's order.

JACKSON COUNTY EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICE DISTRICT v. KIRKLAND

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 OK 4

Opinion Date: February 13, 2024

Judge: KAUGER

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

An ambulance, driven by an employee of the Jackson County Emergency Medical Services District (JCEMSD) in the State of Oklahoma, collided with a turnpike tollbooth, injuring the toll-worker. The toll-worker filed a lawsuit against the ambulance driver and the JCEMSD. The JCEMSD sought to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that it was entitled to governmental immunity under the Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA), and that the Act prohibited recovery because the toll-worker had already recovered workers compensation benefits. The trial court denied the dismissal, leading the JCEMSD to file an Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction and Petition for Writ of Prohibition in the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma to prevent the trial court from proceeding further.

The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma assumed original jurisdiction and granted the writ of prohibition. The court held that although the JCEMSD is a unique entity, it is subject to lawsuits through its board of trustees to the same extent as any Oklahoma municipality or county, pursuant to the Okla. Const. art. 10, §9C. The court also held that the GTCA is applicable to preclude recovery, as the toll-worker had already received workers compensation benefits.

Ivy Hill Cong. of Jehovah Witnesses v. DHS

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 65 MAP 2022

Opinion Date: February 13, 2024

Judge: Todd

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled in favor of the Ivy Hill Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, finding that the Commonwealth Court violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule by dismissing the Congregation's petition against the Department of Human Services. According to the faith's tenets, congregation elders are obligated to maintain the confidentiality of confessions, which might include confessions of child abuse. The Pennsylvania Child Protective Services Law (“CPSL”) identifies certain individuals, including clergymen, as mandated reporters of child abuse. The Congregation filed a petition for review, asking for a declaration on whether their elders are entitled to the clergyman privilege, which would protect them from the mandatory reporting requirements of the CPSL. The Commonwealth Court dismissed the petition, reasoning that the Department of Human Services was not a proper defendant and that declaratory relief would not terminate the controversy. However, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that this dismissal violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule as it directly contradicted the Commonwealth Court's prior determination on the same issues. The case was remanded for further proceedings.