Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz

Court: US Supreme Court

Docket: 22-846

Opinion Date: February 8, 2024

Judge: Neil M. Gorsuch

Areas of Law: Consumer Law, Government & Administrative Law

A consumer, Reginald Kirtz, secured a loan from the Rural Housing Service, part of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Although Kirtz repaid his loan by mid-2018, the USDA continued to tell credit report company TransUnion that his account was past due, harming his credit score. The USDA failed to correct its records after being notified of the error, and Kirtz sued the agency under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

The USDA argued that the case should be dismissed based on sovereign immunity, since the Supreme Court has held that the federal government is immune from suits for damages unless Congress waives that immunity. The agency claimed that the FCRA does not make the federal government amenable to suit for a violation. The district court agreed, but the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the FCRA authorizes suits for damages against any person who violates the Act, and “person” is defined to include any government agency.

The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Third Circuit, finding that sovereign immunity did not bar Kirtz’s claim. The Court held that the federal government is susceptible to suit when it provides false information to credit reporting agencies. It noted that dismissing a suit like Kirtz’s case would effectively negate a claim that Congress has clearly authorized. The Court’s ruling resolved a circuit split between the Third, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits, with which the Court agreed, and the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, with which it disagreed.

Public Interest Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Bellows

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1361

Opinion Date: February 2, 2024

Judge: GELPÍ

Areas of Law: Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves a dispute about the interpretation of the National Voter Registration Act ("NVRA"), specifically Section 8(i)(1). The plaintiff, Public Interest Legal Foundation, Inc. ("PILF"), requested a copy of the Maine Party/Campaign Use Voter File ("Voter File") from the Secretary of State for the State of Maine, Shenna Bellows. The Secretary denied the request under Exception J of Maine's Privacy Law, which restricts the use and publication of the Voter File.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that Section 8(i)(1) of the NVRA applies to the Voter File and that Maine's restrictions on the use and publication of the Voter File are preempted by the NVRA. The court reasoned that both federal and state law require Maine election officials to create and update voter registration records, and these activities fall within Section 8(i)(1). The Voter File, as an electronic report generated from the Central Voter Registration system, reflects the additions and changes made by Maine election officials in carrying out voter list registration and maintenance activities. Therefore, it is a record concerning the implementation of those activities, and its use is subject to disclosure under Section 8(i)(1). The Use Ban and Publication Ban under Exception J, as applied to PILF, were found to be preempted by the NVRA, and the fines for violating these restrictions were also preempted.

Avena v. Avena

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 22-3132

Opinion Date: February 6, 2024

Judge: PORTER

Areas of Law: Admiralty & Maritime Law, Government & Administrative Law

This case involves a lawsuit against the United States for allegations of negligence in a search-and-rescue mission by the U.S. Coast Guard. The plaintiffs, the estate of Aaron Greenberg (who drowned in a boating accident), Adrian Avena (who survived the accident), and AA Commercial, LLC, claimed that the Coast Guard was negligent in its response to the distress signal from their capsized vessel. They argued that the Coast Guard broadcasted incorrect information about the vessel in distress and did not deploy the closest helicopter for the rescue mission.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the case, stating that the United States was immune from such a suit. According to the court, the plaintiffs failed to show how the Coast Guard's alleged negligence "increased the risk of physical harm" to Greenberg. The court noted that under the "Good Samaritan" doctrine, the Coast Guard would only be liable if its actions increased the risk of harm or if harm was suffered because of the plaintiffs' reliance on the Coast Guard. In this case, the court found that even if the Coast Guard had done nothing, the outcome would have been the same, thus the Coast Guard did not increase the risk of harm to Greenberg.

Furthermore, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend their complaint, stating it would be futile as they had not identified any set of facts that could demonstrate how the Coast Guard's actions increased the risk of physical harm to Greenberg.

United States v. Duffey

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-10265

Opinion Date: February 2, 2024

Judge: Wilson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In 2009, defendants Corey Deyon Duffey, Jarvis Dupree Ross, and Tony R. Hewitt were convicted on numerous counts of conspiracy, attempted bank robbery, and bank robbery, as well as using a firearm in furtherance thereof, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Following several appeals, resentencings, and unsuccessful motions to vacate their sentences, the defendants appealed once again, this time arguing that § 403 of the First Step Act should apply to their resentencing. This Act eliminates sentence stacking, so each defendant would be subject to only the five-year mandatory minimum sentence set by § 924(c) rather than the 25-year mandatory minimums for every additional § 924(c) conviction that they were serving.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that § 403 of the First Step Act does not apply to the defendants' resentencing. The court's decision was based on the interpretation of the phrase "a sentence" in § 403(b) of the Act, which the court concluded refers to any sentence that has been imposed for the offense, even one that was subsequently vacated. Therefore, because sentences for the defendants' offenses had been imposed upon them prior to the First Step’s Act’s December 21, 2018 enactment date, § 403(a) of the First Step Act does not apply to their resentencing.

Additionally, the court ruled that the district court properly applied a two-level sentencing enhancement for physical restraint of a victim during a robbery to defendant Duffey's sentence, as the court's findings showed that in each robbery, the bank managers were held at gunpoint and moved to the vault.

Finally, the court affirmed the district court's decision that it did not have jurisdiction to vacate defendant Hewitt's remaining § 924(c) convictions, as these convictions fell outside of the authorization for Hewitt’s motion to vacate his sentence.

As a result, the court affirmed the district court's decisions on all issues.

Hess v. O'Malley

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2694

Opinion Date: February 7, 2024

Judge: RIPPLE

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Public Benefits

The plaintiff, Todd Hess, applied for supplemental security income, disability insurance benefits, and disabled adult child benefits, all of which are administered by the Social Security Administration. While his claims for supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits were approved, his claim for disabled adult child benefits was denied. To qualify for disabled adult child benefits, Hess had to prove that he had a disability that continued uninterrupted from before his 22nd birthday until the filing of his application for benefits. He claimed that his depression, panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and other impairments made him disabled during that entire period. However, after two hearings, an Administrative Law Judge disagreed, concluding that Hess was disabled as of June 9, 2009, but not before then. The ALJ's decision was based on gaps in Hess's treatment history, notes from his physicians, and occasional work he performed as an independent contractor. The Appeals Council did not assume jurisdiction, and the district court found that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed and affirmed the judgment of the district court.

United States v. Lester

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2176

Opinion Date: February 8, 2024

Judge: SHEPHERD

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In 2006, Charles H. Lester, Jr. was sentenced to 188 months' imprisonment and 5 years of supervised release for conspiring to distribute methamphetamine. After serving a portion of his supervised release term, the United States Probation Office filed a report recommending the early termination of Lester's supervision, citing his low risk of recidivism and compliance with the conditions of his supervision. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri denied this request, asserting that it did not have the authority to terminate Lester's supervised release early due to the requirement in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) that a five-year term of supervised release be imposed, which the court interpreted as precluding early termination under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1).

Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit disagreed with the district court's interpretation. The appellate court held that the language of § 841(b)(1)(A) requires the imposition of a five-year term of supervised release, but does not impact a district court's ability to later terminate an individual's supervised release after the individual has served at least one year, as provided in § 3583(e)(1). Thus, the district court retained discretion to consider whether Lester's supervised release could be terminated early under § 3583(e)(1). Consequently, the appellate court reversed the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

SCANLON V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 21-55999

Opinion Date: February 2, 2024

Judge: Bybee

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Family Law, Government & Administrative Law

In a case involving the Department of Child and Family Services of the County of Los Angeles and individual social workers, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a mixed ruling. The case arose from the removal of two minor children from their parents' custody following an anonymous report that the parents were using medical marijuana to treat one child's severe autism. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s judgment.

The Circuit Court reversed the district court's summary judgment for the defendants on the parents' claim of judicial deception. The court concluded that the application submitted by the defendants in support of the warrant for removal contained misrepresentations and omissions and a reasonable trier of fact could find these misrepresentations material.

The Circuit Court also reversed the district court's summary judgment for defendants on the parents' intentional infliction of emotional distress claim and their Monell claim, which argued that the county had an unofficial policy of encouraging social workers to omit exculpatory information from warrant applications.

However, the Circuit Court affirmed the district court’s judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim concerning the social worker's interview of one child at her school, finding that the social worker was entitled to qualified immunity. The court also found no error in the district court's handling of a jury question during trial.

The court remanded the case for further proceedings on the claims of judicial deception, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the Monell claim.

The case was remanded for further proceedings on these issues.

Logsdon v. United States Marshal Service

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-7008

Opinion Date: February 5, 2024

Judge: Hartz

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the plaintiff, Donald Ray Logsdon, Jr., alleged that Deputy United States Marshals used excessive force when executing a state-court warrant for Logsdon's arrest. The plaintiff relied on a precedent, Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, which established a cause of action against federal agents for violations of the Bill of Rights. However, the district court dismissed Logsdon's case, holding that the Bivens claim was not applicable, and the plaintiff appealed.

The Appeals Court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that Logsdon had no claim under Bivens. The court found that there were two "special factors" that distinguished this case from Bivens and thus justified not recognizing a Bivens claim.

Firstly, the court stated that agents of the United States Marshal Service (USMS) were a new category of defendant not considered by the Supreme Court in Bivens. The USMS is required by statute to partner with state and local law-enforcement authorities to create Fugitive Apprehension Task Forces. The court found that the potential chilling effect on such partnerships of recognizing Bivens liability for USMS officers was a special factor that suggested that Congress, not the courts, should create a remedy.

Secondly, the court found that the availability of alternative remedies for misconduct by Deputy U.S. Marshals, including the internal USMS grievance procedure and the Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) investigation procedure, was a special factor suggesting that the courts should not create a remedy. The court stated that the judiciary should not assess the adequacy of such remedies, indicating that this was the role of Congress or the Executive.

The Appeals Court also rejected Logsdon's argument that the district court abused its discretion by granting the defendants' motion to reconsider its initial ruling that Logsdon had a Bivens claim. The court held that the district court had the discretion to reconsider any order short of a final decree.

Dupree v. Owens

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Dockets: 21-12571, 21-13198

Opinion Date: February 6, 2024

Judge: Wilson

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

In a case heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, plaintiffs Jennifer Dupree and Detrich Battle challenged the dismissal of their Title V claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) on the basis of sovereign immunity. Dupree, who worked for the Georgia Department of Human Services, and Battle, an employee of the Georgia Department of Corrections, had requested accommodations at their respective workplaces due to their health conditions. After their requests were denied and their employment terminated, they filed claims under Title V, alleging retaliation.

The court, however, found that sovereign immunity applies to Title V claims when brought in conjunction with Title I claims. This meant that the plaintiffs' claims could not proceed. Importantly, the court clarified that dismissals based on sovereign immunity, a jurisdictional issue, should be entered without prejudice. Not specifying this in the dismissal could lead to misunderstandings about the nature of the dismissal. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded the case for the limited purpose of allowing the district court to dismiss the case without prejudice.

GOOGLE LLC v. ECOFACTOR, INC.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 22-1750

Opinion Date: February 7, 2024

Judge: REYNA

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Intellectual Property, Patents

The appellants, Google LLC and ecobee, Inc. had appealed from a decision of the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board. The Board had found that the challenged claims of U.S. Patent No. 8,498,753, owned by EcoFactor, Inc., were not unpatentable. Google argued that the Board had made an erroneous claim construction of a limitation in Claim 1 and that Google had not been given notice or an opportunity to address the Board’s construction, thereby violating the Administrative Procedure Act. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the Board had indeed construed Claim 1 and that its construction was erroneous. The court vacated the Board’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings under the correct construction of the [1m] limitation in Claim 1.

NEPTUNE SWIMMING FOUNDATION v CITY OF SCOTTSDALE

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Docket: CV-23-0076-PR

Opinion Date: February 6, 2024

Judge: Timmer

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona addressed two key issues related to the City of Scottsdale's decision not to award a license to operate competitive youth swimming programs at its public aquatic centers to Neptune Swimming Foundation, despite Neptune submitting a financially lucrative proposal through a request-for-proposal (RFP) process. Instead, the City chose to extend an existing license agreement with Scottsdale Aquatic Club (SAC), which had operated programs at the centers for over fifty years.

The court first addressed whether a bid from a higher bidder should be considered when determining whether the City violated the Arizona Constitution's Gift Clause, which prohibits public entities from making donations or grants to any individual, association, or corporation. The court held that the higher bid in the RFP process was relevant, but not conclusive, in determining the fair market value of the license. A public entity does not necessarily violate the Gift Clause by choosing a less profitable arrangement. The court affirmed the lower court's summary judgment in favor of the City on this issue.

The second issue was whether the City abused its discretion by failing to follow its own procurement process rules when it canceled the RFP and extended SAC's existing license agreement. The court found that there were material factual disputes about whether the City violated its own procurement process, which should have precluded summary judgment for the City on this issue. The court therefore reversed the lower court's summary judgment in favor of the City on this issue and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Jackson v. Board of Civil Service Commissioners

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B328414(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 8, 2024

Judge: SEGAL

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

The case involves Nathan Jackson, a detention officer with the Los Angeles Police Department, who was suspended for 10 days due to several misconduct charges. These charges included reporting late for duty, reporting unfit for duty, leaving his post without authorization, and refusing to provide a doctor's note as directed. Jackson appealed his suspension to the Board of Civil Service Commissioners, which upheld the suspension. He then filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, asking the court to set aside his suspension and award him back pay.

The superior court granted the petition in part, setting aside the suspension but upholding the findings on three of the four counts. The court also ordered the Board to reconsider whether the City's amendment of one of the counts after initial notice of proposed discipline prejudiced Jackson's defense and entitled him to back pay. The court also ordered the Board to reconsider the appropriate penalty.

Jackson appealed the judgment, arguing that substantial evidence did not support the findings on any of the counts and that he was entitled to back pay as a matter of law. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, however, dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the superior court's judgment was not a final appealable judgment because it vacated the suspension and remanded the matter back to the Board for reconsideration, allowing Jackson an opportunity to challenge any ultimate adverse disciplinary action.

Mojave Pistachios, LLC v. Superior Court

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G062327(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 8, 2024

Judge: GOETHALS

Areas of Law: Agriculture Law, Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

In the case, Mojave Pistachios, LLC (Mojave) and other petitioners sought to challenge a replenishment fee on groundwater extractions imposed by the Indian Wells Valley Groundwater Authority (the Authority) in California. Mojave, which owns approximately 1,600 acres of land in the Mojave Desert, uses groundwater to irrigate its pistachio orchard. The Authority, created under the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA), determined that all groundwater extractions in the water basin where Mojave’s orchard is located would be subject to a replenishment fee, which Mojave refused to pay. The Superior Court of Orange County sustained the Authority’s demurrer to certain causes of action in Mojave's third amended complaint, finding the claims were barred by California’s “pay first, litigate later” rule which requires a taxpayer to pay a tax before commencing a court action to challenge the tax’s collection.

Mojave petitioned the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three for a writ of mandate overruling the lower court's order. The appellate court concluded that the well-established “pay first” rule applies to lawsuits challenging fees imposed by a local groundwater sustainability agency under SGMA. As such, because any alleged economic harm to Mojave stems from the imposition of the replenishment fee, the “pay first” rule bars the challenged causes of action. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision and denied Mojave's petition for a writ of mandate.

County of Jefferson v. Stickle

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 CO 7

Opinion Date: February 5, 2024

Judge: Hart

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury, Real Estate & Property Law

In this case, Beverly Stickle sued Jefferson County after sustaining an injury from a fall in a parking structure adjacent to a county building. She claimed that a poorly marked curb, which created an optical illusion and made the walkway and parking area appear as a single flat surface, was a dangerous condition that caused her injury. The county argued for dismissal on the grounds of immunity under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), asserting that the parking structure was not a "building" and that the condition causing the injury was solely due to the parking lot's design. However, the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the lower courts' decisions, holding that the parking structure qualified as a "building" under the CGIA. The court also held that the optical illusion was not solely attributable to the parking lot's design but was also, at least in part, a result of the maintenance of the facility. As such, the county was not immune from the lawsuit under the CGIA, and Stickle's claim could proceed.

Lynch v. State

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20646

Opinion Date: February 6, 2024

Judge: Alexander

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury

A case in Connecticut involved a couple, Aaron Lynch and Jean-Marie Monroe-Lynch, who sought damages for alleged medical malpractice by the state of Connecticut in relation to therapeutic donor insemination (TDI) services and prenatal care provided at a state hospital. The couple were unable to conceive without medical assistance and pursued TDI services. The hospital staff failed to adhere to guidelines regarding the use of cytomegalovirus (CMV) positive donor sperm for CMV negative patients, leading to Jean-Marie being inseminated with CMV positive donor sperm. Jean-Marie later became pregnant with twins. During her pregnancy, an ultrasound revealed conditions associated with an in utero CMV infection, however, the hospital staff failed to inform Jean-Marie or take appropriate follow-up action. One of the twins died in utero from a severe CMV infection and the other was born with severe, lifelong medical conditions as a result of congenital CMV.

The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the state could not claim sovereign immunity as the plaintiffs' fertility treatment claims were medical malpractice claims, not informed consent claims. The court also held that the plaintiffs' son, who was born with severe medical conditions as a result of the state's negligence, was entitled to compensation. The court found no merit in the state's claim that the damages awarded were speculative or predicated on the concept that nonexistence can be preferable to impaired existence. The court concluded that common-law negligence principles were adaptable to provide a remedy for injuries such as those sustained by the plaintiffs' son. This decision affirms the trial court's award of over $34 million in damages to the plaintiffs.

KENNESTONE HOSPITAL, INC. v. EMORY UNIVERSITY

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S22G1282

Opinion Date: February 6, 2024

Judge: Peterson

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

The case revolves around Windy Hill Hospital's request to change from a long-term care hospital to a short-term care hospital in Georgia, without obtaining a new Certificate of Need (CON) from the Department of Community Health. The case addresses two preliminary questions: whether a CON confers a private right or a public right on a hospital, and the proper framework for interpreting the Department's CON regulations.

The Supreme Court of Georgia held that a CON confers a private right as it provides the individual, usually a corporate entity, with the right to operate a particular kind of hospital. This is because the right to use one's property in a particular way is a traditional property right. The Court also clarified the framework for interpreting administrative rules, stating that courts may defer to an agency's interpretation of its own rule only if the rule's meaning is ambiguous. In this case, the Court did not definitively determine if the Court of Appeals had applied this framework correctly in interpreting the Department's regulations relevant to this case.

The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, without deciding several other issues that could be dispositive of this case. The Court did not rule on whether Windy Hill Hospital ever held a CON to operate as a long-term care hospital, whether the hospital's 1996 correspondence with the State Health Planning Agency constituted a "CON process", and whether any rights purportedly conferred by a CON ultimately vested.

State v. Smith

Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Docket: 24S-MI-00046

Opinion Date: February 5, 2024

Judge: Rush

Areas of Law: Animal / Dog Law, Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

This case before the Indiana Supreme Court involved the intersection of a successful Section 1983 federal action and Indiana’s public-employee indemnification statute. The plaintiff, Kailee Leonard, hit and killed a dog belonging to a state conservation officer, Scott Johnson. In response, Officer Johnson pursued misdemeanor charges against Leonard for leaving the scene of the accident. Leonard was subsequently charged but never arrested, and the charges were later dropped at Officer Johnson's request. Leonard then filed a federal lawsuit against Officer Johnson, claiming false arrest. The jury found in Leonard's favor, awarding her $10,000 in damages and $52,462 in attorney’s fees and costs. Unable to pay the full amount, Officer Johnson assigned his indemnification rights against the State to Leonard and her attorney. Leonard subsequently sued the State for a declaratory judgment that the State had a duty to indemnify Officer Johnson and pay the judgment. The trial court found in Leonard's favor, but the State appealed, arguing that Officer Johnson's actions constituted a criminal act.

The Indiana Supreme Court held that Leonard had shown that Officer Johnson’s conduct was noncriminal, and the State did not rebut that showing. The Court clarified that a party seeking indemnification under the Indiana public-employee indemnification statute must initially show that the loss occurred because of a noncriminal act or omission. The burden then shifts to the State to rebut that showing by producing evidence establishing a prima facie case of criminal conduct. In this case, Leonard met her burden of producing evidence that Officer Johnson’s conduct was noncriminal, and the State failed to establish a prima facie case that he had committed the crime of false informing. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's decision ordering the State to indemnify Officer Johnson and pay the federal judgment.

Friends of the Rail Bridge v. Dep't of Water Resources

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 22

Opinion Date: February 8, 2024

Judge: McEvers

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

In North Dakota, Friends of the Rail Bridge (FORB), Downtown Business Association of Bismarck (DBAB), and CD Holdings, LLC appealed from a judgment dismissing their administrative appeal due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The case arose when BNSF Railway Company applied for permits to construct a new rail bridge and remove the existing rail bridge across the Missouri River. FORB and DBAB requested the Department of Water Resources (DWR) to conduct a public hearing or meeting regarding the permits. After the permits were issued, FORB, DBAB, and CD Holdings appealed to the district court. The court dismissed the appeal, concluding they did not request a hearing under N.D.C.C. § 61-03-22, therefore it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of North Dakota, in an opinion written by Justice McEvers, affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the appellants failed to perfect their appeal and the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal because the appellants did not request a hearing within 30 days after DWR’s issuance of the permits. Therefore, no hearing was held, nor was a hearing request denied by DWR. The court further clarified that the public meetings held were not hearings under N.D.C.C. § 61-03-22 and should not be confused with adjudicative proceedings.

Workforce Safety and Insurance v. Kringlie

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 26

Opinion Date: February 8, 2024

Judge: Bahr

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

In the State of North Dakota, Dale Kringlie suffered a work-related injury to his right shoulder and wrist while using a concrete drill in April 2019. Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) accepted the claim and paid the associated medical expenses and disability benefits. WSI later issued a vocational rehabilitation plan for Kringlie, which he contested, asserting his inability to perform any of the jobs due to a neuropsychological condition. Kringlie sought the opinion of Dr. Swenson, who supported his claim. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) reversed WSI’s decision, basing his judgment heavily on Dr. Swenson's opinion. WSI appealed this decision to the district court, arguing that the ALJ erred by considering Kringlie’s functional limitations at the time of the vocational rehabilitation report issuance. The district court reversed the ALJ's decision, stating that WSI was only required to consider Kringlie's functional limitations at the time of his work-related injury. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that the ALJ misapplied the law. The court held that the ALJ erred in considering Kringlie’s functional limitations at the time WSI issued the vocational rehabilitation report, rather than at the time of the work-related injury. Furthermore, the court ruled that the ALJ wrongfully relied on Dr. Swenson's opinion, which was not permitted under N.D.C.C. § 65-05-08.1.

State v. Grissett

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 28192

Opinion Date: February 7, 2024

Judge: KITTREDGE

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In South Carolina, the case revolves around the interpretation of a law concerning the calculation of the one-year maximum Community Supervision Program (CSP) revocation sentence. The key question is whether inmates arrested for alleged CSP violations should receive credit towards their potential CSP revocation sentence for the time they spent in jail awaiting the adjudication of the CSP violation charge. The Petitioner, Stacardo Grissett, violated the terms of his CSP and was denied credit for roughly six months he spent in jail awaiting his CSP revocation hearing. His appeal was dismissed as moot because he had completed his CSP revocation sentence and original sentence by the time it reached the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court of South Carolina, however, chose to review the case due to its potential for repetition and the need for clarification. The court ruled that inmates must be given credit for any time served awaiting their CSP revocation hearing towards their CSP revocation sentence. The court's decision hinged on the interpretation of Section 24-21-560(C), which states that an inmate who is incarcerated for a CSP violation is not eligible to earn credits that would reduce the sentence. The court held that time served does not "reduce" a sentence, but only affects the date on which the sentence begins, thereby ruling in favor of the Petitioner.

Bohn V. Bueno

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 S.D. 6

Opinion Date: February 7, 2024

Judge: Myren

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota, petitioners Tammy Bohn, Justin Bohn, and Brenda Vasknetz (collectively, the Citizens) sought a writ of mandamus against several city officials after the finance officer for the City of Sturgis declined to certify their petition to hold an election to remove the position of city manager from the City’s government. The circuit court denied the writ by granting summary judgment in favor of the City. The Citizens appealed this decision.

The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reversed the circuit court’s decision. The Court concluded that the finance officer had a clear duty under administrative rules to certify the petition and present it to the city council, as long as the petition was in the correct form, contained the necessary number of valid signatures, and met the requirements in terms of header and verification. The Court held that neither the finance officer nor the city council had the authority to delay the scheduling of an election to vote on the submitted petition. Their attempts to do so were based on their mistaken belief that the law does not allow citizens to request an election on whether the City should no longer utilize a city manager.

As a result, the Court remanded the case to the circuit court to enter a writ of mandamus directing the city council to schedule and hold an election consistent with the relevant statute as presented in the petition. The Court also concluded that the Citizens were not entitled to attorney fees, but, as the prevailing party, they were entitled to costs.

Google’s Bard AI Makes Its Official Transition to Gemini

Justia Team

Google updated its AI chatbot, Bard, to Gemini (its latest and most advanced AI model), offering its own Android app and introducing a paid version named Gemini Advanced.

Read More

Justia Webinars: Charisma In-Person and on LinkedIn: Business Development for Attorneys

Justia Team

Sometimes, it is not enough just to have a business card and a website to tell people, “I am here.” In a competitive legal landscape filled with people who have business cards and websites, you need more to draw the eyes of potential clientele and build your law firm. You need charisma.

Read More