Wilson v. Federal Bureau of Investigation

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 23-137

Opinion Date: January 29, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

John Wilson, the plaintiff-appellant, made several requests under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the defendant-appellee, to release records concerning him. Dissatisfied with the FBI's response, Wilson filed a suit in the Southern District of New York, alleging that the FBI failed to conduct an adequate search. The District Court ruled in favor of Wilson, partially granting his motion for summary judgment by ordering the FBI to conduct a search of an additional database. However, the search did not yield any new disclosures to Wilson. Subsequently, Wilson filed a motion seeking attorneys’ fees and costs under FOIA's fee-shifting provision, arguing that he was a substantially prevailing party. The District Court denied his motion, applying the criteria set by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in a previous case, Pietrangelo v. United States Army. Wilson appealed this decision.

On appeal, the Second Circuit Court affirmed the decision of the District Court, concluding that the District Court correctly applied the Pietrangelo factors and did not abuse its discretion in ruling that those factors weighed against an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. The Second Circuit Court found that the public benefit derived from Wilson's case was minimal, Wilson's interest in the records was personal rather than public, and the FBI had a reasonable basis for withholding the requested information. As such, it concluded that the District Court did not err in denying Wilson's motion for attorneys’ fees and costs.

Favela v. Collier

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-40415

Opinion Date: January 31, 2024

Judge: Graves

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

An inmate in Texas, Raul Gerardo Favela, Jr., alleged that prison officials had ignored warnings and failed to prevent him from being assaulted by another inmate. Favela sued several employees of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that their failure to protect him violated his constitutional rights. However, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, stating that Favela had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court, finding that the summary judgment was inappropriate. Favela's declaration that he had filed and timely submitted grievances relating to his claims was found to be sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact, thereby meeting his burden to counter the defendant's prima facie case. The court concluded that the matter of the credibility of Favela's statement was a matter for trial, and not for summary judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

USA v. Pena

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-10167

Opinion Date: January 31, 2024

Judge: James Earl Graves, Jr.

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

Eric Salvador Pena, a convicted felon, sold a firearm to a confidential informant working for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”). He was subsequently arrested for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and pleaded guilty. At sentencing, the district court applied an enhanced offense level as the firearm sold was capable of accepting a large-capacity magazine, offering a guideline range of 51 to 63 months of incarceration. Pena objected, arguing that the firearm could not function with a fully loaded magazine and therefore did not meet the definition of being "capable of accepting a large capacity magazine".

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed with Pena's argument. It held that the firearm in question met the definition because it could accept and function with a magazine containing more than 15 rounds of ammunition, even though it had jammed during a test when fully loaded. The court also determined that the district court had not erred procedurally or substantively in sentencing. It affirmed the district court’s decision to impose a 63-month sentence of incarceration and 3 years of supervised release.

Pak v. Biden

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-1392

Opinion Date: January 31, 2024

Judge: WOOD

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law

Four Iranian nationals, who had previously completed mandatory military service in Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), were denied visas to enter the United States. Their family members, three U.S. citizens and one lawful permanent resident, filed a suit against the President and several federal officials responsible for visa applications. They alleged that the defendants unlawfully deprived visa applicants the opportunity to establish eligibility for terrorism-related inadmissibility grounds (TRIG) exemptions, violating their rights under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The district court dismissed the case under the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, which bars judicial review of consular decisions. The Plaintiffs appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability applied, and that the plaintiffs failed to show any evidence of bad faith that could overcome this doctrine. The court also held that the applicants were not entitled to any more explanation for their visa denials than the citation to the section of the law on which the denial was based.

Felts v. Green

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1042

Opinion Date: January 29, 2024

Judge: BENTON

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a lower court's ruling in a case involving Sarah Felts, who had been blocked on Twitter by Lewis E. Reed, the then-President of the St. Louis Board of Aldermen. Felts sued Reed in his official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated. The district court ruled in favor of Felts, granting her declaratory relief, nominal damages, costs, and attorney’s fees. On appeal, the Board’s new President, Megan E. Green, challenged the district court's ruling.

The court held that the act of blocking Felts on Twitter constituted a final municipal policy decision in the area of the City’s business associated with the office of the President of the Board of Aldermen. It also held that Reed administered the account under color of law as an official government account, and that blocking Felts violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court further concluded that Reed, as the President of the Board of Aldermen, had the authority to establish the final social media policy for his office and that his decision to block Felts was a deliberate choice of a guiding principle and procedure to silence online critics. Therefore, the City of St. Louis was held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court affirmed the district court's judgment granting Felts declaratory relief and nominal damages.

Stewart v. Precythe

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3297

Opinion Date: January 30, 2024

Judge: SHEPHERD

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Curtis Stewart, an inmate in the Missouri correctional system, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against various Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC) officials, including MDOC Director Anne Precythe. Stewart alleged that he was subjected to excessive force and cruel and unusual punishment due to a policy of handcuffing and shackling prisoners to a steel bench for hours. Precythe filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that she was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied Precythe’s motion with respect to qualified immunity.

The appeal court reversed the district court's decision. It held that Stewart failed to plausibly allege that Precythe authorized a policy that permitted jailers to use excessive force where it was unnecessary or unprovoked. The court also found that the complaint did not plausibly allege that Precythe acquiesced in any such practice of unprovoked or unwarranted excessive force because it failed to allege a pattern of such conduct.

The court further noted that Stewart’s allegations against Precythe regarding the restraint policy did not violate the Eighth Amendment. The court held that the allegations represented the kind of punishment necessary “to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” There were no allegations that Precythe’s conduct in adopting and promulgating the policy was “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Therefore, the court concluded that Precythe was entitled to qualified immunity. The court reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to Precythe and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

MANEY V. BROWN

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-35218

Opinion Date: February 1, 2024

Judge: Sung

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Class Action, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

A group of current and former inmates, or their representatives, filed a class action lawsuit against Kate Brown, the Governor of Oregon, and Patrick Allen, the Director of the Oregon Health Authority, claiming that the state's COVID-19 vaccine rollout plan, which prioritized corrections officers over inmates, violated their Eighth Amendment rights. The defendants moved to dismiss the claim, asserting immunity under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act. The district court denied the motion, and the defendants appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, finding that the defendants were immune from liability for the vaccine prioritization claim under the PREP Act. The court held that the statutory requirements for PREP Act immunity were met because the "administration" of a covered countermeasure includes prioritization of that countermeasure when its supply is limited. The court further concluded that the PREP Act's provisions extend immunity to persons who make policy-level decisions regarding the administration or use of covered countermeasures. The court also held that the PREP Act provides immunity from suit and liability for constitutional claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even if those claims are federal constitutional claims.

MARTINEZ V. HIGH

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-16335

Opinion Date: January 26, 2024

Judge: DESAI

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Desiree Martinez, sued Channon High, a City of Clovis police officer, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Officer High violated her due process rights by disclosing her confidential domestic violence report to her abuser, Kyle Pennington, who was also a Clovis police officer. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to Officer High.

The appellate court held that while Officer High did violate Ms. Martinez's due process rights under the state-created danger doctrine by disclosing her confidential domestic violence report to Mr. Pennington, the right was not clearly established at the time of the violation. The court explained that state actors are generally not liable for failing to prevent the acts of private parties, but an exception applies where the state affirmatively places the plaintiff in danger by acting with deliberate indifference to a known or obvious danger. In this case, Officer High's disclosure of Ms. Martinez's confidential report to Pennington, whom she knew was an alleged abuser, placed Ms. Martinez in actual, foreseeable danger. However, it was not clearly established in 2013 that Officer High’s actions violated Ms. Martinez’s substantive due process rights. The court clarified that going forward, an officer would be liable under the state-created danger doctrine when the officer discloses a victim’s confidential report to a violent perpetrator in a manner that increases the risk of retaliation against the victim.

CONYERS v. MCDONOUGH

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 23-1525

Opinion Date: January 30, 2024

Judge: REYNA

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Military Law

In this case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Vincent Curtis Conyers, an army veteran, sought employment benefits under the Veteran Readiness and Employment program, which is administered by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs. His application was denied by the VA, and this denial was subsequently upheld by the Board of Veterans' Appeals and the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. During his appeal, Mr. Conyers requested that certain documents be added to the administrative record under the doctrine of constructive possession. The Veterans Court denied his request, reasoning that the documents did not have a "direct relationship" to his claim, a standard of review that the court derived from a previous decision in Euzebio v. Wilkie.

However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the Veterans Court applied an erroneous legal standard in its review of the doctrine of constructive possession. The Federal Circuit stated that the correct standard for constructive possession is one of "relevance and reasonableness," not the "direct relationship" standard applied by the Veterans Court. The Federal Circuit noted that its standard aligns with the VA's statutory duty to assist veterans in substantiating their claims and ensures that all record documents reasonably expected to be part of a veteran’s claim are included in the administrative record. Therefore, the court vacated the decision of the Veterans Court and remanded it for further proceedings, with the instruction to apply the correct standard of "relevance and reasonableness" in its review of the doctrine of constructive possession.

BARRIGA v ADES/PRECISION

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Docket: CV-22-0231-PR

Opinion Date: January 26, 2024

Judge: BEENE

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

In this case, Pedro Barriga, an auto detailer at Precision Auto Body, LLC, quit his job due to a dispute with a coworker over the placement of a cooling fan and a perceived favoritism shown by his supervisor towards his coworker. Barriga then applied for unemployment benefits from the Arizona Department of Economic Security (“ADES”), claiming he quit due to an intolerable work situation. The ADES initially denied his benefits, but an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) reversed this decision. Precision Auto Body appealed to the ADES Appellate Services Administration Appeals Board, which reversed the ALJ's decision, finding that the working conditions at Precision did not rise to the level of an intolerable work situation.

Barriga appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals, which vacated the Appeals Board’s decision, interpreting the factors in Arizona's regulation R6-3-50515(C)(2) as non-exhaustive and remanding the case back to the Appeals Board.

The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona, however, disagreed with the Court of Appeals, vacating its opinion and affirming the Appeals Board’s decision. The court held that while the factors in R6-3-50515(C)(2) meant to determine whether a workplace situation is intolerable are not exhaustive, Barriga failed to present evidence of any unbearable condition to establish an intolerable work situation. A dispute over a cooler placement, while unpleasant, was not intolerable. The court also found that Barriga did not adequately attempt to adjust his grievance before leaving his employment. The court also concluded that Barriga waived his claim that he quit because of a health condition by failing to sufficiently raise this issue at earlier stages of the proceedings.

Abney v. State Dept. of Health Care Services

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A164775(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 31, 2024

Judge: Richman

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Public Benefits, Tax Law

In the case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Two, the appellant, Debra Abney, challenged the decision of the State Department of Health Care Services and the City and County of San Francisco to consider money garnished from her Social Security payments as income for the purposes of determining her eligibility for benefits under Medi-Cal.

Abney's Social Security payments were being reduced by nearly $600 each month to satisfy a debt she owed to the IRS. The authorities considered this garnished money as income, which led to Abney being ineligible to receive Medi-Cal benefits without contributing a share of cost. Abney argued that the money being garnished was not income “actually available to meet her needs” under the regulations implementing the Medi-Cal program.

The trial court rejected Abney's argument, and she appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision. The Court of Appeal held that the tax garnishment was "actually available" to meet Abney's needs because it benefitted her financially by helping to extinguish her debt to the IRS. Therefore, the garnished money was correctly considered as income for the purpose of calculating her eligibility for the Medi-Cal program.

City of Norwalk v. City of Cerritos

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B327413(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 1, 2024

Judge: HOFFSTADT

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Transportation Law

The case revolves around a dispute between two cities, Norwalk and Cerritos, both located in California. In 1974, Cerritos enacted an ordinance restricting commercial and heavy truck traffic to certain major arteries within the city. The ordinance was amended in 2019 and 2020, resulting in the removal of one of these arteries. Consequently, Norwalk sued Cerritos, arguing that the ordinance created a public nuisance by diverting extra truck traffic through Norwalk and thus causing various "adverse effects" linked to heavier traffic flow. Cerritos claimed immunity under Civil Code section 3482, which shields a city from public nuisance liability for actions "done or maintained under the express authority of a statute". The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District found that the Vehicle Code explicitly authorized cities to regulate the use of their streets by commercial or heavy vehicles. Therefore, the court held that Cerritos was immune from liability for the public nuisance of diverting traffic into Norwalk. The court stated that the immunity conferred by Civil Code section 3482 applied not only to the specific act expressly authorized by the statute, but also to the consequences that necessarily stemmed from that act. The court affirmed the judgment in favor of Cerritos.

Riddick v City of Malibu

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B323731(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 1, 2024

Judge: KIM

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

This case involves a dispute between a group of plaintiffs (Jason and Elizabeth Riddick, and Renee Sperling) and the City of Malibu, the Malibu City Council, and the Malibu Planning Department (collectively referred to as the City). The plaintiffs sought to add an accessory dwelling unit (ADU) to their residence but their permit application was denied by the City. The plaintiffs petitioned the trial court for relief and obtained an order directing the City to process the proposed ADU as exempt from coastal development permit (CDP) requirements. The City appealed this decision, arguing that the trial court misinterpreted the City ordinance governing exemptions from the state’s CDP requirement. The plaintiffs cross-appealed, arguing that they established a right to a permit under state ADU standards as a matter of law, and therefore the court should have ordered the permit to be issued immediately.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Five held that the City's interpretation of the ordinance was not entitled to deference. The court interpreted the ordinance's language to include ADUs directly attached to existing residences in the class of improvements exempt from the CDP requirement. As such, the court affirmed the trial court's decision requiring the City to process the plaintiffs' permit application under state ADU standards. The court also affirmed the trial court's rejection of the plaintiffs' argument that they were automatically entitled to a permit.

In re Delaware Public Schools Litigation

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Docket: 138, 2023

Opinion Date: January 30, 2024

Judge: VALIHURA

Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Non-Profit Corporations

In the State of Delaware, a lawsuit was brought by two non-profit organizations against multiple public officials, including tax collectors in Delaware's three counties. The organizations sought increased funding for Delaware’s public schools. The Court of Chancery held that the organizations were entitled to attorneys’ fees and expenses. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware held that the Court of Chancery erred in its application of the "common benefit doctrine" and its expansion of a precedent case, Korn v. New Castle County, beyond taxpayer suits. The Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court's award of expenses, but reversed the award of attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court held that the litigation brought by the organizations was to compel the defendant county governments to comply with the law, a benefit that did not warrant an exception to the "American Rule" which states that each party bears its own attorneys' fees, absent certain exceptions. The Court also held that, even if this case were a taxpayer suit, it does not meet the standard set forth in Korn because there was not a quantifiable, non-speculative monetary benefit for all taxpayers.

Idaho State Athletic Commission v. Office of the Administrative Rules Coordinator

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 51211

Opinion Date: January 29, 2024

Judge: ZAHN

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the Idaho State Athletic Commission and the Idaho Division of Occupational and Professional Licenses sought a declaratory ruling that provisions of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requiring legislative approval of pending administrative fee rules violated the Idaho Constitution. They also sought a Writ of Mandamus directing the Office of the Administrative Rules Coordinator to publish the Athletic Commission’s 2022 administrative rules in the Idaho Administrative Code. The Idaho Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction to consider the case, but dismissed the petition for a declaration of unconstitutionality and denied the petition for a Writ of Mandamus. The court concluded that the APA requirement for legislative approval of pending administrative rules did not violate the Idaho Constitution's separation of powers, enactment, presentment, or administrative rules provisions. In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized that administrative rulemaking authority was a legislative delegation, not a constitutional power, and that the legislature was free to modify the process by which administrative rules were enacted.

LAW INDUSTRIES, LLC VS. STATE

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Docket: 2023-CC-00794

Opinion Date: January 26, 2024

Judge: HUGHES

Areas of Law: Contracts, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law

In a dispute arising from a contract for refurbishing an elementary school, the Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled that no unfair trade practices claim could be stated against the State of Louisiana, Department of Education, Recovery School District (the “State”). The plaintiff, Advanced Environmental Consulting, Inc. (“AEC”), had subcontracted to perform asbestos abatement services for Law Industries, LLC, the general contractor. When the State terminated the contract due to unsatisfactory asbestos remediation progress, AEC amended its answer to Law Industries' breach of contract suit to include a claim of unfair trade practices under the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (“LUTPA”). The State had objected to this claim, arguing that AEC had no cause of action and that the claim was perempted (time-barred). The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that AEC had failed to state a valid LUTPA cause of action against the State. It concluded that the State's actions were in furtherance of its governmental function of providing safe educational facilities for schoolchildren. The State, in this case, was a consumer of construction services, not a participant in "trade or commerce" as defined in the LUTPA, and was therefore not subject to a LUTPA claim. The court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its ruling.

Office of the Public Advocte v. Public Utilities Commission

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2024 ME 11

Opinion Date: January 30, 2024

Judge: CONNORS

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Utilities Law

In this case before the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, the Office of the Public Advocate (OPA) contested an order by the Public Utilities Commission (Commission) that extended the waiver of the standard depreciation rate for the Maine Water Company - Millinocket Division (MWC). The OPA raised three claims: (1) the Commission erred in applying Chapter 110 of its rules to waive the depreciation rate set in Chapter 68, which according to the OPA already contained a waiver provision; (2) the Commission abused its discretion and set unjust and unreasonable rates by approving an arbitrarily low depreciation expense; and (3) the Commission relied on information that was not included in the evidentiary record.

The court disagreed with all three claims raised by the OPA. Regarding the first claim, the court stated that Chapter 68 did not contain a waiver provision and that the Commission rightly applied the general waiver provision contained in Chapter 110. Concerning the second claim, the court found that the Commission did not abuse its discretion when it extended the waiver in anticipation of a gradual return to full depreciation expenses. The court determined that the Commission's decision aligned with the statutory rate-setting goal and prevented rate shock. Lastly, the court determined that the OPA waived its third claim by not raising the issue about the lack of an evidentiary record earlier in the proceedings. As such, the court affirmed the Commission's order.

Utsch v. Department of Environmental Protection

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2024 ME 10

Opinion Date: January 30, 2024

Judge: STANFILL

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves Hans Utsch and Julia H. Merck's appeal against a denial of their petition for judicial review of an email from the mining coordinator of the Department of Environmental Protection. The case originates from Harold MacQuinn, Inc.'s intent to restart quarry operations in Hall Quarry, Mount Desert. Under Maine law, quarry operations must comply with performance standards, and those intending to operate a quarry must file a “notice of intent to comply” (NOITC) with these performance standards. The email that Utsch and Merck challenge is about whether MacQuinn is required to file a NOITC.

From 2012 to 2015, the mining coordinator asserted that MacQuinn did not need to file a NOITC, as the quarry operated before 1970 and was thus grandfathered into the performance standards for quarries. In 2017, the Legislature passed an act that added temporal language to the performance standards for quarries, limiting the one-acre threshold to areas excavated since January 1, 1970. MacQuinn modified its excavation plan so that the total area excavated would not exceed one acre, thus not requiring a NOITC according to the mining coordinator.

Utsch and Merck, who live near the quarry, filed a petition for review of the mining coordinator’s email, claiming that the Department violated statutory provisions by determining that MacQuinn does not have to file a NOITC before operating the quarry. The Superior Court denied their petition, on the basis that the email was a final agency action and Utsch and Merck had standing to appeal it.

On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Superior Court’s judgment and remanded for dismissal of the petition. The court held that the mining coordinator’s email was not a final agency action, as it did not affect anyone’s “legal rights, duties or privileges” under the Maine Administrative Procedure Act. The court further held that Utsch and Merck's petition was not ripe for consideration as a declaratory judgment action because it fails both prongs required for ripeness, as their allegations were too uncertain and speculative.

City of St. Louis v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Docket: SC99876

Opinion Date: January 30, 2024

Judge: BRONIEC

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the case of City of St. Louis and Heather Taylor (“Appellants”) versus State of Missouri (“State”), the Supreme Court of Missouri analyzed Senate Bill No. 26 (“SB 26”) that was challenged for being unconstitutional. SB 26, introduced in December 2020 and signed into law in July 2021, contained 88 sections related to public safety, including procedures for imposing discipline on law enforcement officers and provisions for the offense of “unlawful traffic interference.”

Appellants argued that SB 26 violated the Missouri Constitution on several grounds, including that it violated the original-purpose and single-subject rules, that it created an unfunded mandate, that it imposed additional duties on officers and employees of a constitutional charter city, that it used public funds for private purposes, and that it created unequal treatment between law enforcement officers and other city employees.

The Supreme Court of Missouri found that the City had sufficiently pleaded the elements of a Hancock Amendment violation, which prohibits the state from requiring new or expanded activities by counties and other political subdivisions without full state financing. Therefore, the circuit court's judgment was reversed on this point and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

However, the court affirmed the judgment with respect to Appellants' other points. It found that SB 26 had the same purpose as enacted as introduced, did not impose new duties on city employees or allocate funds for public purposes, and had a rational basis for treating law enforcement officers differently from other city employees. The court also found that SB 26 did not violate the original-purpose and single-subject rules, did not impose additional duties on officers and employees of a constitutional charter city, did not use public funds for private purposes, and did not create unequal treatment between law enforcement officers and other city employees.

Rupnow v. State Auditor

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 14

Opinion Date: January 30, 2024

Judge: Gustafson

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the state of Montana, William James Rupnow Jr., a licensed bail bondsman, was accused of criminal offenses after he tried to apprehend a client, Victorianne Dahl, who had violated her bail conditions. Dahl had consistently been late with payments and had violated other conditions of her release. Rupnow resorted to using pepper spray in his attempt to detain Dahl, leading to the State charging him with felony assault with a weapon and aggravated assault. Rupnow was ultimately acquitted on the aggravated assault charge, but the jury could not reach a verdict on the assault with a weapon charge. In response, Rupnow filed a lawsuit against the Montana State Auditor and Commissioner of Insurance, Mike Winsor, Jennifer Hudson, and XYZ government subdivision, alleging malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and violation of his rights under the Montana Constitution. The defendants requested the case be dismissed based on prosecutorial immunity, a motion which the District Court granted. Rupnow appealed the decision, arguing that as a bail bondsman, he had the authority to arrest Dahl without a warrant.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss Rupnow's case. The Court found that Montana's statutory scheme for pre-trial release, or bail, did not provide bail bondsmen with an unfettered right to remit a bail bond client to jail without an outstanding warrant. The Court reasoned that the legislature did not intend to grant bail bondsmen arrest authority that far exceeded that of law enforcement officers. Therefore, Rupnow did not have the authority to arrest Dahl without a warrant, meaning there was probable cause to charge Rupnow with the crimes he was accused of. The Court concluded that Rupnow's claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process failed as a matter of law.

Abbott v. City of Henderson

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 140 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 3

Opinion Date: January 25, 2024

Judge: Bell

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

In September 2019, Kathryn Abbott was assisting her child on a slide at Vivaldi Park in Henderson when she slipped and fractured her leg in multiple places. Abbott and her husband, Andrew Dodgson-Field, sued the City of Henderson, alleging negligence arising from premises liability and loss of consortium, respectively. The City of Henderson claimed immunity under Nevada's recreational use statute, NRS 41.510, and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, finding the City of Henderson immune from suit.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that NRS 41.510's protections can apply to any premises, superseding a previous ruling that limited the statute's application to "rural, semi-rural, or nonresidential" property. The court determined that Abbott was engaged in a "recreational activity" as defined by the statute when she was injured, as walking and assisting a child playing on a playground is similar to the enumerated activities listed in the statute. The court also concluded that Abbott failed to present evidence to establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the City of Henderson willfully or maliciously failed to guard or warn against a dangerous condition. Therefore, the City of Henderson was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the district court correctly granted summary judgment in its favor.

Sullivan v. Lincoln County Water District

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 140 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 4

Opinion Date: January 25, 2024

Judge: Lee

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada considered whether the Nevada State Engineer had the authority to combine multiple existing hydrographic basins into one "superbasin" for the purposes of water administration and management based on a shared source of water. The State Engineer had combined seven basins into one superbasin, the Lower White River Flow System (LWRFS), after determining that the waters of these basins were interconnected such that withdrawals from one basin affected the amount of water in the other basins. The State Engineer also found that the previously granted appropriations of water exceeded the rate of recharge in the LWRFS. Various entities who owned water rights throughout the new superbasin challenged the State Engineer's decision, claiming that he lacked the authority to manage surface waters and groundwater jointly and that his decision violated their due process rights.

The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada held that the State Engineer indeed had the authority to manage surface waters and groundwater conjunctively and to jointly administer multiple basins. The court also found that the State Engineer did not violate the rights holders' due process rights because they received notice and had an opportunity to be heard. The court reversed the lower court's decision that had granted the rights holders' petitions for judicial review and remanded the matter back to the lower court for further proceedings to determine whether substantial evidence supported the State Engineer's factual determinations.

Hardy v. Chester Arms, LLC

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-0348

Opinion Date: January 30, 2024

Judge: BASSETT

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

In a case before the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, the plaintiffs, two police officers injured in a shooting, filed a suit against Chester Arms, LLC (the seller of the firearm used in the shooting), and the New Hampshire Department of Safety (DOS) (which conducted the background check for the sale of the firearm). The suit accused Chester Arms of negligent entrustment and DOS of negligent entrustment and negligence per se. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants on the basis of immunity under state law. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision.

The court of appeals found that the state law barring lawsuits against firearms manufacturers and sellers for damages resulting from the criminal or unlawful use of their products by a third party was constitutional and not preempted by federal law. The court found that the law was designed to safeguard citizens' fundamental right to bear arms by limiting suits against the firearms industry, thereby protecting its solvency and ensuring law-abiding citizens have access to firearms. The court also found that the law did not violate the plaintiffs' constitutional right to equal protection or right to a remedy.

Regarding the suit against DOS, the court found that DOS had not been negligent in its background check as the shooter was not disqualified from owning a firearm at the relevant time under federal law. Therefore, the court concluded that any alleged error in the trial court's immunity analysis was harmless as DOS was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

State ex rel. Schreiner v. Erie Cty. Bd. of Elections

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-290

Opinion Date: January 29, 2024

Areas of Law: Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case before the Supreme Court of Ohio, Dennis Schreiner petitioned for a writ of prohibition against the Erie County Board of Elections and its members. Schreiner sought to remove Steven Kraus, a candidate for the Ohio House of Representatives, from the March 2024 primary election ballot. Schreiner's argument was based on Kraus' previous conviction of a disqualifying offense and his subsequent claim that the office of state representative involves substantial management or control over the property of a state agency, political subdivision, or private entity, as defined by R.C. 2961.02(B).

However, the court found that a state representative does not have direct management or control over the property of any state agency, political subdivision, or private entity. Schreiner failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that the office of state representative involves substantial management or control over such property. The court, therefore, ruled that the board of elections did not abuse its discretion or act in clear disregard of applicable law in keeping Kraus on the primary-election ballot. Consequently, the court denied Schreiner's petition for a writ of prohibition.

Knopp v. Griffin-Valade

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Docket: S070456

Opinion Date: February 1, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

In 2022, Oregon voters approved Ballot Measure 113, amending the state constitution to disqualify any state legislator who accumulates 10 or more unexcused absences during a legislative session from holding office "for the term following the election after the member’s current term is completed." The Secretary of State interpreted this to mean that the disqualification applies to a legislator’s immediate next term. However, a group of legislators challenged this interpretation, arguing that the disqualification should apply one term later.

The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon held that the measure's disqualification applies to the legislator’s immediate next term of office. The Court found that the text of the amendment was capable of supporting the Secretary's interpretation. This interpretation was also supported by the ballot title and the voters’ pamphlet, which repeatedly described the disqualification as occurring immediately following the legislator’s current term. The Court concluded that voters would have understood the amendment in light of these materials. Therefore, the Court upheld the Secretary's rules implementing the amendment.

Dept of Comm and Econ Dev v. City of Chester

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 12 & 15 MAP 2023

Opinion Date: January 29, 2024

Judge: Wecht

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the decision of the Commonwealth Court confirming certain modifications to a recovery plan for the City of Chester under the Municipalities Financial Recovery Act, commonly known as Act 47. The case arose from the City of Chester's financial distress, which led to the appointment of a receiver. The receiver sought to modify the existing recovery plan due to the City’s challenges and the failure of local officials to cooperate with his efforts. The City objected to several initiatives in the modified plan, arguing they unlawfully deprived its elected officials of their authority to govern on behalf of the residents. The Supreme Court held that the modifications were necessary to achieve financial stability in the City and were not arbitrary, capricious, or wholly inadequate to alleviate the City's fiscal emergency. The court emphasized that the financial health of the municipality was paramount and that local officials must accept the measures necessary for recovery, whether they like it or not.

Carson v. Albany County School District #1 Board of Trustees

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 WY 11

Opinion Date: January 26, 2024

Judge: BOOMGAARDEN

Areas of Law: Education Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the case before the Supreme Court, State of Wyoming, the Petitioners, Kenneth Carson and Anna Leigh Anderson, parents of two children living in a remote family ranch in Wyoming, sought to compel the Albany County School District Board of Trustees, the Superintendent of Schools for Albany County, and the Superintendent of Public Instruction for the State of Wyoming (collectively, Respondents) to establish a rural school, named "The Buckle School," on their ranch. The proposal for this school was initially approved by the Albany County School District Board of Trustees and the Director of the State Construction Department. However, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction later denied the approval, citing the cost-effectiveness of the proposed school and the availability of virtual education options for the children.

The Petitioners then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the district court, which was dismissed. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court, State of Wyoming, affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the Petitioners failed to demonstrate that the Respondents had a ministerial duty to form the school. A ministerial duty is a duty that is absolute, clear, and indisputable, involving merely execution of a specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts. The court found that the relevant statutes provided the Respondents with discretionary judgment, not a ministerial duty to approve or deny the formation of a rural school. The court further noted that the Petitioners had not shown that they had requested or were denied any transportation or maintenance payments, which the relevant statutes provide for in lieu of establishing a school. Therefore, the court concluded that the Petitioners had failed to state a claim upon which mandamus relief could be granted.

City of Laramie, Wyoming v. University of Wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 WY 13

Opinion Date: January 31, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

In this case, the City of Laramie, Wyoming, sued the University of Wyoming and its Board of Trustees, challenging the drilling and operation of certain water wells. The city argued that the university was in violation of a 1965 deed covenant prohibiting the drilling of one of the wells and was also in violation of a city ordinance. The city also claimed that legislation exempting the university from this city ordinance was unconstitutional. The district court dismissed some of the city's claims and granted summary judgment in favor of the university on the remaining claims. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the university was protected by sovereign immunity from the city's attempts to enforce the deed covenant. It also held that the state law exempting the university from the city ordinance was constitutional. The court further noted that the law precluded the city from enforcing its ordinance against the university.

Nagel v. State of Wyoming, Ex Rel. Department of Workforce Services

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 WY 15

Opinion Date: February 1, 2024

Judge: Kautz

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

In this case, the appellant, Bjay Nagel, who was employed as a caretaker by Sand Creek Country Club, broke his ankle while working. He had been drinking alcohol prior to the accident. The Wyoming Department of Workforce Services, Workers' Compensation Division initially awarded benefits but later denied further benefits after discovering that Nagel was intoxicated at the time of his injury. The Wyoming Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upheld the Division's denial of benefits, finding that Nagel's intoxication was a substantial factor causing his injury. Nagel appealed the decision, claiming that the OAH's decision was contrary to substantial evidence, arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.

The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the decision of the lower court. The Court found that there was substantial evidence supporting the OAH's decision that Nagel's intoxication was a substantial factor causing his injury. The Court also found that the decision was not arbitrary or capricious because there was a rational basis for it, and the decision was in accordance with the law. Nagel's intoxication at the time of his injury was established by a blood alcohol content test which showed a level of .183%. Furthermore, an expert opinion was provided which stated that it was more likely than not that Nagel's intoxication was a substantial factor causing his injury.