Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. Smith & Wesson Brands Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1823

Opinion Date: January 22, 2024

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, International Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed a lower court's dismissal of a lawsuit brought by the government of Mexico against several U.S. gun manufacturers and a gun distributor. The lawsuit alleges that these companies facilitated illegal gun trafficking into Mexico, causing significant harm to the country. The lower court had dismissed the case based on the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), which generally prohibits lawsuits against gun manufacturers and sellers for harm caused by the criminal misuse of their products. On appeal, the First Circuit held that the PLCAA does apply to lawsuits initiated by foreign governments for harm suffered outside the United States. However, the court also found that Mexico's lawsuit plausibly alleges a type of claim that is statutorily exempt from the PLCAA's general prohibition, specifically, that the defendants knowingly violated federal and state statutes applicable to the sale or marketing of firearms, and that this violation was a proximate cause of the harm Mexico suffered. The case was remanded back to the lower court for further proceedings.

Electric Power Supply Associat v. FERC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 21-3205

Opinion Date: January 4, 2024

Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law

In a consolidated action before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, several parties, including PJM Power Providers Group, Electric Power Supply Association, and Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, challenged a tariff filed by PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., concerning energy resources subject to price mitigation in interstate capacity auctions. The revised tariff, which took effect by operation of law in 2021, was the outcome of a deadlock between the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) commissioners. The court found that the deadlock was to be treated as an affirmative order by the FERC, allowing for judicial review under Section 205(g) of the Federal Power Act (FPA). The court held that it was required to review the FERC order under the same deferential standards set forth in the FPA and the Administrative Procedure Act. The court’s review included the entire record, including the deadlock commissioners' written statements explaining their reasoning. Upon review, the court denied all three petitions, holding that FERC’s acceptance of PJM’s tariff was neither arbitrary nor capricious and was supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Pennsylvania Public Utility Co v. FERC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 21-3243

Opinion Date: January 4, 2024

Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this consolidated action, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed a case concerning the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) acceptance of a tariff filed by PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM), which took effect by operation of law in 2021. The tariff was at the center of a dispute over whether state-subsidized energy resources should be subject to price mitigation in interstate capacity auctions. Petitioners – the PJM Power Providers Group (P3), the Electric Power Supply Association (EPSA), and the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission and Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (State Entities) – sought review under Section 205(g) of the Federal Power Act (FPA), a provision allowing for review of FERC's action by inaction. The court held that its review of FERC action, whether actual or constructive, proceeds under the same deferential standards set forth in the FPA and Administrative Procedure Act. The court further held that its review properly encompasses the Commissioners’ statements setting forth their reasons for approving or denying the tariff filing. After reviewing the petitions, the court denied all three, finding FERC’s acceptance of PJM’s tariff was neither arbitrary nor capricious and was supported by substantial evidence in the record.

PJM Power Providers Group v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 21-3068

Opinion Date: January 24, 2024

Judge: Roth

Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied petitions from energy generators and state utility commissions challenging the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) acceptance of a tariff filed by PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. The court held that FERC's constructive acceptance of the tariff was neither arbitrary nor capricious and was supported by substantial evidence in the record. The tariff, filed under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act (FPA), sought to change the Minimum Offer Price Rule (MOPR) used in interstate capacity auctions. The MOPR is designed to prevent the exercise of monopsony power by net buyers in the market. The new tariff would mitigate offers only where a capacity resource has the ability and incentive to exercise buyer-side market power or where a capacity resource receives state subsidies under a state program that is likely preempted by the FPA. The petitioners argued that the tariff was unjust, unreasonable, and discriminatory. They also argued that the FERC failed to adequately address potential reliance interests and unlawfully discriminates against competitive power suppliers. The court rejected these claims and upheld FERC's acceptance of the tariff.

SAS Associates v. City Council of Chesapeake

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-1690

Opinion Date: January 24, 2024

Judge: Wilkinson

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The case revolves around two developers, SAS Associates 1, LLC and Military 1121, LLC, who filed a complaint against the City Council of Chesapeake, Virginia, alleging that their equal protection rights were violated when their rezoning applications were denied by the council. The developers owned several parcels of land in Chesapeake and sought to combine them to create a 90-acre development involving housing units, commercial space, and a conservation district. Their plans required rezoning, which was denied by the Council citing community opposition and the ability to develop under existing zoning classifications. The developers filed a complaint alleging that their application was denied even though similar applications from other developers were approved, and the council's reasons for denial were irrational and arbitrary.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to dismiss the developers' claim. The Court of Appeals found that the developers failed to demonstrate that they were treated differently from others who were similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of discriminatory animus. Furthermore, the court highlighted that zoning decisions are primarily the responsibility of local governments and that the Developers did not provide any valid comparators to support their claim of discriminatory treatment. The court noted the lack of any evidence to infer discriminatory intent on the part of the City Council members and ruled that the Developers' disagreement with the Council's decision does not render the Council's judgment call pretextual. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint.

United States v. Smart

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-4209

Opinion Date: January 24, 2024

Judge: Richardson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the defendant, Trezith Rashad Smart, appealed his drug-trafficking convictions. He argued that his prosecution violated the Speedy Trial Act and that the district court erred in not granting his motion to suppress evidence from two traffic stops.

Smart was initially stopped for speeding in Louisiana in 2017. During this stop, a drug-sniffing dog was deployed and alerted officers to the presence of cocaine in Smart's car. Smart was later linked to a drug dealing operation in Virginia and further evidence of drug trafficking was gathered during a second stop in 2018. He was subsequently arrested and charged with one count of conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine.

On appeal, the court rejected Smart's arguments. It held that there was no violation of the Speedy Trial Act, noting that delays in the proceedings, including changes of counsel and the complexity of the case, were justified and fell within the exceptions provided in the Act. It also held that both traffic stops were constitutional. Specifically, the court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to extend the first traffic stop and deploy a drug-sniffing dog based on Smart's extreme nervousness, inconsistent answers about his travel plans, and the presence of a gas can in his car, which the officer, based on experience, associated with drug trafficking. Consequently, the court affirmed Smart's conviction.

US v. Hart

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 20-4534

Opinion Date: January 25, 2024

Judge: RICHARDSON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

Kenneth Hart was convicted of drug dealing, sex trafficking, and witness tampering. He appealed his convictions, arguing that the government violated the Speedy Trial Act by failing to indict him for the witness tampering charge within thirty days of his arrest. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed that the government violated the Speedy Trial Act on the witness tampering conviction, but rejected his evidentiary challenges.

The court held that the government failed to indict Hart for witness tampering within the Speedy Trial Act’s thirty-day window. So it vacated only Hart’s witness-tampering conviction and remanded the case for resentencing on the four counts added by the superseding indictment. Hart also contended that the district court erred by allowing certain prejudicial evidence at trial, but the court disagreed and affirmed the district court’s rulings on these evidentiary challenges.

Seago v. O'Malley

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-40001

Opinion Date: January 22, 2024

Judge: Catharina Haynes

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Public Benefits

This case arose from an appeal against the grant of summary judgment by a district court on a claim related to disability benefits. The appellant, Emily Seago, had contended that Nancy Berryhill was unlawfully serving as the acting Social Security Commissioner in July 2018 when she ratified the appointment of the Administrative Law Judge who later denied Seago’s claim.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected Seago's argument and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The court held that Berryhill was lawfully serving as Acting SSA Commissioner under 5 U.S.C. § 3346(a)(2) when she ratified the appointments of all SSA Administrative Law Judges in July 2018.

The court noted that 5 U.S.C. § 3346(a) provides for two independent periods of acting service, during the 210-day period following a vacancy, and for the duration of a nomination's pendency in the Senate. The court found that these periods can operate independently, as indicated by the use of the word "or" to separate the two subsections. The court noted that the statutory text does not suggest that service under one subsection excludes someone from also serving under the other.

The court also found that this interpretation aligned with the statutory purpose, providing an incentive for the President to submit timely nominations without denying vital public services to the American people due to delays in the Senate confirmation process.

Laible v. Lanter

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-5496

Opinion Date: January 23, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

In August 2020, a joint federal task force between the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) and the Cincinnati Police Department (CPD) attempted to arrest Mason Meyer. While fleeing from CPD officers, Meyer crashed into a restaurant, killing Gayle and Raymond Laible and severely injuring Steven and Maribeth Klein. The Laibles’ estate and the Kleins filed a lawsuit alleging that three CPD officers were negligent in their execution of the high-speed car chase. The officers claimed they were federal employees and therefore immune from common-law tort actions due to their participation in the federal task force. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that CPD Sergeant Donald Scalf was a federal employee acting within the scope of his employment during the chase and therefore immune under the Westfall Act. However, it affirmed the district court's denial of immunity for Sergeant Timothy Lanter and Officer Brett Thomas, as they were not federal employees at the time of the incident.

Lambro v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 22-2249

Opinion Date: January 22, 2024

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Jason Lambro, worked as a studio technician for the Voice of America (VOA), a federal agency, under a series of contracts. Lambro alleged that he should have been classified as an employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and thus entitled to benefits such as overtime pay. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the FLSA itself, through its definitional provisions, provides the applicable standard for recognizing an employment relationship for FLSA purposes. Therefore, the court had to evaluate whether Lambro was employed by VOA under the FLSA's own standard for being employed. The court rejected the lower court's conclusion that the FLSA does not cover a person asserting coverage as a federal government employee unless a congressional authorization outside the FLSA creates the asserted employment relationship with the federal government. The court vacated the lower court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Ex parte Louie

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: SC-2023-0201

Opinion Date: January 19, 2024

Areas of Law: Education Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Alabama, Emma Louie, Garry Rice, and Toice Goodson, employees of the Greene County Board of Education, sought a writ of mandamus directing the Greene Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor, asserting that they are protected by State-agent immunity. The claims against them were brought by Ester Eaton and Anthony Eaton, who alleged negligence and loss of consortium after Ester Eaton, a substitute teacher, was attacked while supervising a classroom of students in the Alternative Program and in-school suspension (ISS). The defendants argued that their supposed violations of school policies were in fact based on discretionary decisions, not violations of specific, mandatory rules, thus entitling them to State-agent immunity.

The Supreme Court of Alabama agreed with the defendants, ruling that the school guidelines in question were not specific, nondiscretionary rules, but rather allowed for administrative discretion. As such, the court found that the defendants' actions fell within the scope of their discretion as state agents, and they were therefore entitled to State-agent immunity. Consequently, the court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to enter a summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

Natural Resources Defense Council v. City of Los Angeles

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D080902(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 22, 2024

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

In a case involving the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and others (appellants) against the City of Los Angeles and others (respondents), the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reversed and remanded a lower court's decision for further proceedings. The case revolved around the preparation of a supplemental environmental impact report (SEIR) under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) for the continued operation of the China Shipping Container Terminal located in the Port of Los Angeles. The appellants alleged that the SEIR violated CEQA in multiple ways, including the failure to ensure that mitigation measures were enforceable and the failure to adequately analyze the emissions impacts of the project. The trial court agreed with some of the appellants' claims and ordered the Port to set aside the certification of the 2019 SEIR and prepare a revised SEIR that complies with CEQA. However, the court did not impose further remedies, such as the cessation of Port activities or the required implementation of certain mitigation measures. The court's decision was appealed by the appellants, who argued that the trial court erred in its determination of the remedy and that certain other mitigation measures in the SEIR were not supported by substantial evidence. The appellate court agreed with some of these claims and reversed the trial court's decision. It remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings, including the consideration of its authority to fashion an appropriate remedy in light of the CEQA violations.

Planning and Conservation League v. Dept. of Water Resources

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C096304M(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 25, 2024

Judge: MESIWALA

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District considered whether the planning and implementation of amendments to long-term contracts with local government agencies that receive water through the State Water Project violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Reform Act (Delta Reform Act), and the public trust doctrine. The Department of Water Resources (the department) had determined that these amendments, which extended the contract terms to 2085 and made financial changes to the contracts, would not have an environmental impact. The department then filed an action to validate the amendments. Several conservation groups and public agencies contested this action, bringing separate actions challenging the amendments. After a coordinated proceeding, the trial court ruled in favor of the department. The appellants appealed this decision, but the Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's ruling. The court found that the department had followed the correct procedures under CEQA, that the amendments did not violate the Delta Reform Act or the public trust doctrine, and that it was not necessary to recirculate the Environmental Impact Report for further public comment. The court also rejected the appellants' arguments that the department had improperly segmented its environmental analysis and that its project description was inaccurate or unstable. Finally, the court held that the amendments were not a "covered action" under the Delta Reform Act requiring a consistency certification with the Delta Plan.

Shalghoun v. North Los Angeles County Regional Center, Inc.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B323186(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 25, 2024

Judge: HOFFSTADT

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Health Law, Personal Injury

In the case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Two, the plaintiff, Ali Shalghoun, appealed a judgment from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County in favor of the defendant, North Los Angeles County Regional Center, Inc. Shalghoun, an administrator of a residential facility for developmentally disabled persons, sued the regional center after he was attacked by a resident at the facility. The resident, known as J.C., was a client of the regional center, which had arranged for his placement at the facility.

The central issue in the case was whether the regional center had a legal duty to protect the employees of a residential facility from a developmentally disabled person who had been placed there. The plaintiff argued that the regional center was negligent in failing to immediately move J.C. to another facility after being informed that the facility could no longer provide the level of care he required.

However, the appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding that the regional center did not owe a duty of care to the facility's employees. The court reasoned that the regional center's duty, as mandated by the Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act, was to provide services and support to the developmentally disabled person (the "consumer"), not to protect third-party employees at a residential facility. The court also noted that the regional center did not have the unilateral power to relocate a consumer; it depended on the acceptance of the consumer by another residential facility.

According to the court, the imposition of liability on regional centers for injuries inflicted by consumers could potentially drive the centers out of business, disrupt the entire system of services and support for developmentally disabled individuals, and contradict the Act's mandate to place consumers in the least restrictive environment. The court therefore concluded that public policy factors weighed against recognizing a duty of care running from the regional center to the employees of the residential facility.

Kaiser v. Aurora Urban Renewal Authority

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 CO 4

Opinion Date: January 22, 2024

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reviewed a case involving a dispute over the methodology for implementing Tax Increment Financing (TIF) under Colorado's Urban Renewal Law (URL). The respondents, collectively known as AURA, argued that the methodology applied by the Colorado State Property Tax Administrator and the Arapahoe County Assessor was in violation of the URL because it differentiated between direct and indirect benefits when adjusting the base and increment values of blighted property in urban renewal areas. They contended that this methodology deprived urban renewal authorities of property tax revenues they should receive due to enhanced market perceptions of properties located in a TIF plan. The court of appeals agreed with AURA and reversed the district court's summary judgment favoring the Assessor. However, the Supreme Court held that the Administrator's methodology does not violate the URL. The URL does not prescribe a specific methodology but gives the Administrator broad authority to determine how to calculate and proportionately adjust the base and increment values. The court concluded that the Administrator's differentiation between direct and indirect benefits does not conflict with the URL, and therefore, reversed the portion of the division’s judgment concerning the Administrator’s methodology and affirmed that the district court correctly entered summary judgment.

Arlington Heights Police Pension Fund v. Pritzker

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 129471

Opinion Date: January 19, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the state of Illinois, a group of active and retired members of local police and firefighter pension funds filed a complaint against the Governor and other officials, challenging the constitutionality of Public Act 101-610. This Act amended the Illinois Pension Code and consolidated all local police and firefighter pension fund assets into two statewide pension investment funds. The plaintiffs claimed the Act violated two provisions of the Illinois Constitution: the pension protection clause and the takings clause. They argued that the Act diminished their pension benefits by diluting their voting power and control over investment decisions, and by imposing costs associated with the Act's implementation, including repayment of any transition loans. The Supreme Court of Illinois disagreed with the plaintiffs, affirming the lower courts' decisions. The court ruled that the Act does not violate the pension protection clause because the ability to vote in local pension board elections and control local pension fund investments are not constitutionally protected benefits. They also ruled that the Act does not violate the takings clause because the plaintiffs do not have a private property right in the funds that are to be transferred to the new statewide funds. The Act only changes how local fund assets are managed and invested without affecting the ultimate use of those assets to pay the benefits of local fund members. Thus, the Act remains in effect.

City of Rock Falls v. Aims Industrial Services, LLC

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2024 IL 129164

Opinion Date: January 19, 2024

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, the City of Rock Falls filed a petition against Aims Industrial Services, LLC. The petition sought to enforce compliance with a City ordinance requiring the replacement of a private sewage disposal system with a connection to the City’s public sewage disposal system upon the sale or transfer of any property within the City limits. The trial court determined it would be inequitable to grant the City an injunction and denied the City’s petition. The appellate court reversed this decision, holding that the trial court erred in considering the equities when deciding whether to grant the injunction, as the City sought enforcement of an ordinance that specifically authorized injunctive relief.

The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, stating that when a statute or ordinance expressly authorizes injunctive relief, the court has no discretion to refuse to grant the injunctive relief once a violation of the statute or ordinance has been established. The Supreme Court clarified that in such cases, balancing of the equities is not necessary since a violation of the statute or ordinance implies a harm to the public. Therefore, the trial court's refusal to grant the injunction based on its own balancing of the equities was an error.

Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Usan

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Docket: 6/23

Opinion Date: January 25, 2024

Judge: Hotten

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Transportation Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Maryland held that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) did not err in concluding that law enforcement had reasonable grounds to believe that Rahq Deika Montana Usan was driving a vehicle while impaired by alcohol, drugs, or both. The ALJ found substantial evidence to support this belief, including Usan's erratic driving, red and glassy eyes, slow and sluggish movement, and failure to perform three Standardized Field Sobriety Tests (SFSTs) successfully. The court also affirmed the ALJ's finding that law enforcement, having reasonable suspicion of a driver impaired by alcohol, drugs, or both, may request testing pursuant to the Maryland Transportation Article § 16-205.1. The court further held that Usan violated the statute by refusing to submit to the requested testing. As a result, the Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the decision of the Circuit Court for Charles County, which had overturned the ALJ's decision to suspend Usan's driver's license.

Clarke County, Mississippi v. Quitman School District

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2022-CA-00471-SCT

Opinion Date: January 18, 2024

Areas of Law: Bankruptcy, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court of Mississippi examined whether a school district was entitled to funds recovered by a county from the bankruptcy proceedings of a delinquent taxpayer. The taxes, if collected normally, would have been used to fund the school district. However, the county board of supervisors had anticipated the delinquency and adjusted the levy of ad valorem taxes to compensate, ensuring the school district did not experience a shortfall. The school district argued it was entitled to its original portion of the recovered bankruptcy funds, but the county claimed that this would result in a double recovery outside the statutory scheme for public school funding. The Supreme Court of Mississippi found in favor of the county, ruling that the recovery of delinquent taxes through bankruptcy proceedings is outside the statutory funding scheme for public school districts in Mississippi. The court found that the school district was not entitled to receive delinquent taxes recovered years later in bankruptcy proceedings and reversed and remanded the lower court's award to the school district.

State v. Horne

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 315 Neb. 766

Opinion Date: January 19, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The defendant, Tristan T. Horne, was charged with attempted possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. As part of a plea agreement, Horne was admitted into a problem-solving court program (Wellness Court) designed to assist defendants with mental health diagnoses. The program defers sentencing and provides treatment, supervision, and judicial oversight. Successful completion of the program may result in the defendant being allowed to withdraw their plea and have their charges dismissed. However, if the participant is removed from the program or withdraws before successful completion, the conviction stands and the case proceeds to sentencing.

Throughout Horne's participation in the program, he repeatedly violated program requirements. These violations included missed drug tests, dishonesty with probation officers, not completing community service hours ordered by the District Court, failing to successfully complete multiple residential treatment programs, testing positive for marijuana, removing his court-ordered GPS monitoring device, and failing to report to jail as ordered after leaving a treatment program. Following these violations, the State moved to remove Horne from the program. The District Court accepted Horne's admission to the violations and removed him from the program. Subsequently, Horne was sentenced to a term of imprisonment.

On appeal, Horne challenged his removal from the program, the fact that the District Court did not order a presentence investigation before sentencing him, and the length of his sentence. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's decision, finding no reversible error. It held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in removing Horne from the program given his multiple failures to comply with program requirements. The Supreme Court also held that the District Court did not plainly err in not ordering a presentence investigation before sentencing Horne. Lastly, the Supreme Court found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Horne.

Hoover v. NDDOT

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 ND 8

Opinion Date: January 22, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Daynen Hoover contested a district court judgment that affirmed a decision by the North Dakota Department of Transportation (Department) to suspend his driving privileges for 91 days. This penalty was the result of Hoover being arrested for being in control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, with a blood alcohol concentration of .085 percent by weight. The Department conducted an administrative hearing by video conference, during which they introduced eight foundational exhibits from the State Crime Laboratory. Hoover objected to this on the grounds that he and his counsel did not have copies of these exhibits to review and analyze. Despite these objections, the hearing officer admitted the exhibits and the Department subsequently suspended Hoover's driving privileges for 91 days.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the district court's decision. The court concluded that the procedure used by the Department, which admitted exhibits into evidence without providing Hoover a meaningful opportunity to examine them, deprived him of a fair hearing. The court noted that the Department's notice of information did not offer copies of the exhibits or specifically identify which documents maintained by the Department or available on the attorney general's website would be introduced at the hearing. The court found that this violated the requirement for parties to be afforded an opportunity to examine exhibits before they are admitted into evidence. Therefore, the court ruled that the Department's procedures did not comply with state law and substantially prejudiced Hoover's procedural rights. The court's decision emphasized the importance of a party's ability to examine exhibits introduced against them as a critical procedural protection in adjudicative proceedings.

State ex rel. AWMS Water Solutions, L.L.C. v. Mertz

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-200

Opinion Date: January 24, 2024

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the decision of the lower court in a case involving AWMS Water Solutions, L.L.C., et al. (AWMS) and the Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR). AWMS sought a writ of mandamus to compel the ODNR to initiate property appropriation proceedings, arguing that the state had effectuated a regulatory taking of AWMS’s property by suspending operations at its saltwater-injection well. The court of appeals initially granted summary judgment in favor of the state, but the Supreme Court reversed this decision and remanded the case, directing the court of appeals to weigh the parties' evidence related to AWMS’s total and partial takings claims.

On remand, the court of appeals denied the writ, arguing that AWMS did not have a cognizable property interest for purposes of a takings analysis. AWMS appealed this decision, and the Supreme Court found that the court of appeals had failed to comply with its remand order to weigh the parties' evidence and had violated the law-of-the-case doctrine by revisiting whether AWMS had a cognizable property interest.

The Supreme Court ruled that AWMS did possess a cognizable property interest in its leasehold right to operate the saltwater-injection well, a point that had been established in the previous appeal and was thus the law of the case. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case once again, instructing the lower court to weigh the evidence to determine whether a total or partial regulatory taking had occurred.

State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Wilson

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-182

Opinion Date: January 23, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

The Cincinnati Enquirer sought a writ of mandamus to compel Andy Wilson, the director of the Ohio Department of Public Safety, to produce records related to the travel and expenses of Ohio State Highway Patrol troopers and staff who attended the 2022 Super Bowl in Los Angeles, California, with Governor Mike DeWine. The department withheld the requested records, claiming they were "security records" and therefore exempt from disclosure.

The Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that the requested records did qualify as "security records" under R.C. 149.433(A)(1), which defines a security record as any record that contains information directly used for protecting or maintaining the security of a public office against attack, interference, or sabotage. The court found that the records contained information that the department used for protecting and maintaining the safety of the governor's office. The department's evidence showed that release of the requested records would pose a substantial risk to the governor’s safety by revealing the security detail’s planning, techniques, and patterns, and by exposing security limitations and vulnerabilities.

The court also rejected the Cincinnati Enquirer's argument that the department violated the Public Records Act by failing to produce redacted versions of the requested records. The court explained that under R.C. 149.433(B)(1), a security record is not a public record and is consequently not subject to mandatory release or disclosure.

Accordingly, the court denied the writ of mandamus, as well as the Cincinnati Enquirer's requests for statutory damages, court costs, and attorney fees.

State ex rel. Mobarak v. Brown

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-221

Opinion Date: January 25, 2024

Judge: Massa

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

The case involves appellant Soleiman Mobarak, who appealed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals dismissing his petition for a writ of mandamus against appellee, Franklin County Court of Common Pleas Judge Jeffrey M. Brown. Mobarak had sought to vacate his criminal convictions for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in the trial court. The court of appeals held that the trial court had jurisdiction over Mobarak’s criminal case and that Mobarak had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.

In 2012, Mobarak was indicted on charges of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, aggravated trafficking in drugs, and aggravated possession of drugs. The charges alleged that Mobarak had possessed and sold a controlled-substance analog commonly known as bath salts. In his petition, Mobarak asserted that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over his criminal case on several grounds including that there was no statute prohibiting the possession or sale of bath salts at the time his offenses were alleged to have occurred, and that the controlled-substance-analogs law was unconstitutionally vague.

The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Tenth District Court of Appeals' judgment dismissing Mobarak’s petition. The court held that Mobarak’s petition failed to state a mandamus claim because he had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law and failed to show that the trial court had patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over his criminal case. The court found that by virtue of the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 2931.03, the trial court had jurisdiction over Mobarak’s criminal case. The court also noted that Mobarak’s arguments were similar to those raised and rejected in his prior appeals. The court stated that extraordinary writs may not be used as a substitute for an otherwise barred second appeal or to gain successive appellate reviews of the same issue.

Walterboro Comm Hospital v. SCDHEC

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 28189

Opinion Date: January 24, 2024

Judge: FEW

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

In South Carolina, two hospitals, Walterboro Community Hospital and Trident Medical Center, appealed an Administrative Law Court (ALC) order which approved the certificate of need (CON) for the Medical University Hospital Authority (MUHA). MUHA had applied for a CON to construct a new general hospital in Berkeley County to address capacity issues at its existing hospital in Charleston. The appellant hospitals raised four issues against ALC's decision: 1) the ALC's dismissal of certain errors in the review by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC), 2) a misinterpretation of the State Health Plan by the ALC, 3) the ALC's approval of MUHA's application conditional on the closure of a freestanding emergency department planned by MUHA, and 4) the appeal bond required by South Carolina law is unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the ALC's decision and held that despite errors in DHEC's review process and decision, the ALC's de novo review rendered these errors harmless. The court also agreed with ALC's interpretation of the State Health Plan and found no issue in the ALC's condition of approval. The court further held that the appeal bond requirement was not unconstitutional, as the appellant hospitals were statutory affected persons and there was a rational basis for different treatment for a party opposing an approved CON and a party appealing the denial of its own CON application. However, the court did instruct that the appeal bond be voided and returned to Trident Medical Center.

Alvarado v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 WY 9

Opinion Date: January 23, 2024

Judge: GRAY

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case revolves around Leopoldo Alvarado, who sought to terminate his duty to register as a sex offender after having registered for at least ten years, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-304 of the Wyoming Sex Offender Registration Act. The District Court denied his petition on the grounds that the time he spent on probation did not count toward the ten-year statutory prerequisite.

However, the Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming disagreed and reversed the decision of the District Court. The Supreme Court found that the clear and unambiguous language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-304 does not require probation to be completed before the ten-year registration period begins to run. The court ruled that probation is not listed as a tolling event, and the court will not read words into a statute when the legislature has chosen not to include them.

The Supreme Court stated that the District Court should have considered whether Mr. Alvarado should be relieved of the duty to continue registration after demonstrating he had maintained a clean record by meeting all four conditions during the ten-year registration period. These conditions included having no conviction of any offense for which imprisonment for more than one year may be imposed, having no conviction of any sex offense, successfully completing any periods of supervised release, probation, and parole, and successfully completing any sex offender treatment previously ordered by the trial court or his probation or parole agent. The case was remanded for further consideration.