Bah v. USA

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 22-3162

Opinion Date: January 18, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

In this case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, a US citizen, Abdoulai Bah, had his life savings of $71,613 seized by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) under suspicion of being the proceeds of illegal activities. The CBP returned the money with interest two-and-a-half years later. Bah then sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), seeking damages for personal injury and property damage, arguing that the seizure of his money prevented him from conducting business, caused him to lose his livelihood, and resulted in health problems.

The District Court dismissed Bah's case, asserting that the United States was immune from Bah's claims. The court held that the FTCA did not permit Bah's claims as they were seeking prejudgment interest— a type of relief for which the United States has not waived sovereign immunity.

Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the District Court's decision. The appellate court held that the Detention Exception of the FTCA, under which Bah's claim was filed, only waives sovereign immunity for "injury or loss of goods, merchandise, or other property while in the possession of any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer," but it does not waive immunity for personal "injury" or "loss" incurred due to the government's seizure of property. As such, the court concluded that Bah's cash was not injured or lost in the sense meant by the FTCA, and his personal injuries were not covered under the Act. Furthermore, the court determined that Bah's claim of "loss" was really a claim for "loss of use" of his cash, which is not covered under the FTCA. Thus, the court affirmed the dismissal of Bah's case.

American Precision v. Mineral Wells

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-10558

Opinion Date: January 12, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Contracts, Government & Administrative Law

This case involves a dispute between American Precision Ammunition, L.L.C. (APA) and the City of Mineral Wells in Texas. APA and the City entered into a Tax Abatement Agreement ("Agreement") where the City promised to gift APA $150,000 and provide APA ten years of tax abatements. However, the City terminated the Agreement, claiming that the $150,000 gift was illegal under the Texas Constitution. APA sued the City for breach of contract, violation of the Texas Open Meetings Act (TOMA), and denial of federal due process and due course of law under the Texas Constitution. The district court dismissed all claims, and APA appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. It held that the Agreement was illegal and unenforceable under Texas law because the City's contractual obligation to "gift" APA $150,000 constitutes a gratuitous payment of public money. The court also dismissed APA's TOMA claim as moot because there was no "agreement" to reinstate given that the Agreement was unenforceable. Furthermore, the court found that APA's due process claims failed because the promise for the $150,000 gift was void and did not constitute a contract, and therefore, APA had no protected property interest in the gift. Even assuming that APA had a property interest in the tax abatements, the court held that APA's due process and due course of law claims still fail because Texas law affords APA sufficient opportunity to pursue that claim in state court.

Consumers’ Research v. Consumer Product Safety Commission

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-40328

Opinion Date: January 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case was an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit against a lower court's decision that the structure of the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs, By Two, L.P., and Consumers’ Research, argued that the CPSC's structure violated the separation-of-powers doctrine because the President could only remove the CPSC's commissioners for cause. The district court agreed with the plaintiffs, but the appellate court reversed this decision.

The appellate court held that the CPSC's structure was constitutional and did not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. The court based its decision on the Supreme Court's precedent in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, which allowed for-cause removal protections for commissioners of independent agencies like the CPSC. The court noted that while the CPSC does exercise substantial executive power, this alone does not remove it from the protection of the Humphrey’s Executor exception. The court also pointed out that the CPSC's structure was not novel or lacking historical precedent, which further supported its constitutionality.

The court emphasized that any changes to the Humphrey’s Executor exception would have to be made by the Supreme Court, not the lower courts. Until such a change occurred, the CPSC's structure remained constitutional. Thus, the court reversed the district court's decision and sent the case back to the lower court for further proceedings.

Hodge v. Engleman

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-11210

Opinion Date: January 16, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was presented with a case involving police officers who shot and killed Schaston Hodge after he refused to pull over his vehicle, led the officers on a chase, and exited his car with a gun in his hands. The officers' actions were captured on their bodycam footage. Hodge's mother, Shandra Hodge, filed a suit against the officers, Joshua Engleman and Robert Litvin, as well as the Texas Department of Public Safety (TDPS) and the City of Dallas, alleging excessive force and failure to train and supervise. The district court granted the officers' motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity (QI), treating the dismissal as an implicit conversion to summary judgment, even though the footage was not included in the pleadings.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the lower court's decision. The court found that the bodycam footage showed a complete account of the incident, including Hodge raising a gun and pointing it at one of the officers. The court concluded that the officers' use of deadly force was reasonable given the circumstances they faced. As a result, the court held that the officers did not violate Hodge's Fourth Amendment rights and were entitled to QI. Therefore, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the officers.

Fisher v. Jordan

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-1246

Opinion Date: January 18, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Leslie Fisher sued officers Randall Jordan, Matthew Rice, and John Trefelet of the Michigan State Police for violating federal and state law by arresting her without probable cause. Fisher and her husband were arrested after the officers executed a search warrant and found marijuana growing in their garage. All charges against Fisher were eventually dismissed in state court. She then filed a federal lawsuit against the arresting officers.

The officers moved for summary judgment, invoking qualified immunity in response to Fisher's federal claims of arrest and prosecution without probable cause under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and governmental immunity for her state claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers, concluding that they had probable cause to arrest Fisher.

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the officers had probable cause to believe that Fisher had committed the crime of possession of at least 5,000 grams of marijuana with the intent to distribute, based on various pieces of evidence. This included the fact that Fisher lived at and owned the site of the marijuana cultivation operation, and that she admitted to using marijuana grown by her husband. The court also found that the large quantity of marijuana in the Fishers' garage supported probable cause to infer intent to distribute.

The court further concluded that the officers were entitled to governmental immunity from Fisher's state law claims, as the probable cause analysis for federal Fourth Amendment claims is the same under Michigan law. Since the officers had probable cause to suspect that Fisher possessed an illegal quantity of marijuana with the intent to distribute, they were entitled to governmental immunity from Fisher's state law claims.

East Texas Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 22-1166

Opinion Date: January 12, 2024

Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the case between East Texas Electric Cooperative, Inc., and others, against the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and American Electric Power Service Corporation (AEP), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed FERC's decision regarding AEP's calculation of its 2019 transmission rates. The petitioners, customers of AEP, challenged the calculation, but FERC rejected their claims. The petitioners then sought a review of the agency's decision.

The court stated that FERC had correctly interpreted AEP's tariff terms and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously. FERC's ruling was upheld on several points, including the denial of retroactive relief for alleged errors in previous rate years, the inclusion of certain coal-related costs in the 2019 rate, the classification of certain tax credits as prepayments for tax liabilities, and the classification of employee pension and benefit costs as non-contingent liabilities. Therefore, the court denied the petition for review.

T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 22-1310

Opinion Date: January 12, 2024

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was asked to review a decision from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRB had determined that T-Mobile had unlawfully dominated an organization it created known as T-Voice, which the NLRB classified as a "labor organization" under the National Labor Relations Act. The issue arose when T-Mobile, a national wireless telecommunications carrier, established T-Voice and selected employees to serve as representatives to raise issues with management. The Communications Workers of America filed an unfair labor practice charge against T-Mobile, alleging that T-Voice was a labor organization and that T-Mobile had unlawfully dominated it.

In its decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRB's determination. The court held that the NLRB was correct in finding that T-Voice was a labor organization because the organization existed at least in part to deal with T-Mobile over working conditions, which is a key criterion for qualifying as a labor organization under federal law. The court further affirmed the NLRB's finding that T-Mobile had dominated T-Voice, which is prohibited by federal law. Consequently, the court denied T-Mobile's petition for review and granted the NLRB's cross-application for enforcement of its order.

Tara R. v. State of Alaska

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-18586

Opinion Date: January 12, 2024

Areas of Law: Family Law, Government & Administrative Law

This case concerned the Office of Children’s Services' (OCS) decision to take emergency custody of a baby who tested positive for drugs at birth, and the subsequent legal proceedings that ensued. Both parents initially expressed interest in voluntarily relinquishing their parental rights, but the court found that the relinquishments were not valid because the forms were not dated or signed by an OCS witness. The foster parents opposed OCS's plan to move the baby from their home to her maternal aunt’s home and were granted permission to intervene for a placement review hearing. After the hearing, the court concluded that OCS had abused its discretion in deciding to move the child and granted the mother's motion to withdraw her putative relinquishment. The foster parents then filed a motion to reconsider the order allowing the mother to withdraw her relinquishment. The court granted the foster parents’ motion and reversed its order withdrawing the relinquishment. The court then terminated the parental rights of both parents without holding an evidentiary hearing. OCS and both parents appealed the superior court’s decisions. The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska held that it was error to allow the foster parents’ continued intervention, to reinstate the relinquishments, and to terminate parental rights. The court vacated all the orders relating to those errors and remanded the case to the superior court for further proceedings. The court clarified that it was an abuse of discretion to permit the foster parents to continue to intervene regarding the validity of the parents’ relinquishments, to revisit the validity of the relinquishments, and to issue termination orders without providing the parties with notice and an opportunity to be heard, as well as a legal error to issue a termination order without making a best interests finding.

Center for Biological Diversity v. Public Utilities Com.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A167721N(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 16, 2024

Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law, Utilities Law

In this case, the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District reviewed a decision by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) to adopt a new net energy metering (NEM) tariff. The PUC was required by the Legislature to create a successor tariff to the existing NEM scheme, which utilities argued overcompensated owners of renewable energy systems for their exported energy, raising electricity costs for customers without such systems.

The petitioners, Center for Biological Diversity, Inc., Environmental Working Group, and The Protect our Communities Foundation, contended that the successor tariff did not comply with various requirements of section 2827.1 of the Public Utilities Code. The petitioners argued that the tariff failed to consider the social benefits of customer-generated power, improperly favored the interests of utility customers who did not own renewable systems, failed to promote sustainable growth of renewable energy, and neglected alternatives to promote the growth of renewable systems among customers in disadvantaged communities.

The court affirmed the PUC's decision. It held that the PUC had appropriately balanced the various objectives set out by the Legislature in section 2827.1. The court found that the successor tariff was designed to reduce the financial advantage previously given to owners of renewable energy systems under the NEM tariff, which the court said was consistent with the Legislature's aim of balancing costs and benefits to all customers. The court also noted that the PUC had adopted programs to make renewable energy systems more accessible to low-income customers, satisfying the requirement to ensure growth among residential customers in disadvantaged communities.

Lastly, the court concluded that the PUC's decision to apply the same tariff to both residential and nonresidential customers was justified, as the nonresidential NEM 2.0 tariff, while cost-effective for the electrical system as a whole, did not balance costs and benefits among all customers.

In re P.H.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B321592(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 12, 2024

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Juvenile Law, Native American Law

In the juvenile dependency case involving P.H., Jr., the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Five affirmed the jurisdiction and disposition orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. This case revolved around the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), and whether the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) and the juvenile court were obligated to formally notify certain tribes of the proceedings.

The minor, P.H., Jr., lived with his parents, P.H. (Father) and A.R. (Mother), when the Department filed a juvenile dependency petition alleging that the minor was at substantial risk due to physical abuse by the mother, the father's failure to protect the minor, and unsanitary living conditions. The parents filed ICWA-020 Parental Notification of Indian Status forms indicating possible affiliation with federally recognized Indian tribes.

The appellate court held that no formal ICWA notice was required in this case because none of the statements by the minor’s parents or other family members provided a reason to know he was an Indian child for purposes of the relevant statutes. The ICWA and related California law define an "Indian child" as a child who is either a member of an Indian tribe or is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe. The court found that at most, the statements by the parents and other family members suggested that the minor might have some Indian ancestry, but tribal ancestry alone is not sufficient to trigger the formal notice requirement. The court affirmed the lower court's jurisdiction and disposition orders.

Ventura County Employees' Retirement Association v. Criminal Justice Attorneys Association of Ventura County

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B325277(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 18, 2024

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

The Court of Appeals of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Six, ruled in favor of the Ventura County Employees’ Retirement Association (VCERA) in a dispute over the calculation of retirement benefits for county employees. VCERA had adopted a resolution excluding compensation for accrued but unused annual leave hours exceeding a calendar year allowance from the calculation of retirement benefits, following a Supreme Court decision in a similar case (Alameda County Deputy Sheriff’s Assn. v. Alameda County Employees’ Retirement Assn.). VCERA sought a judicial declaration that its resolution was legal, which was granted by the trial court. The Criminal Justice Attorneys Association of Ventura and Ventura County Professional Peace Officers’ Association appealed this decision, arguing that the resolution was not mandated by the Supreme Court decision or the relevant statutes. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that VCERA was required to comply with the Supreme Court decision and the relevant statutes, which were designed to prevent pension spiking by excluding income designed to artificially inflate a pension benefit.

People v. Dye

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 CO 2

Opinion Date: January 16, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this criminal case, James Herman Dye was charged with murdering a woman over forty years ago. During pretrial hearings, Dye indicated that he might present evidence suggesting another person, an alternate suspect, committed the crime. The Supreme Court of Colorado clarified that the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure (“Discovery and Procedure Before Trial”) Rule 16(II)(c) requires a defendant to disclose the nature of any defense, including an alternate suspect defense, prior to trial. The Court also clarified that the requirement to disclose the nature of a defense includes identifying any alternate suspects, along with their addresses if they are to be called to testify at trial. However, the Court found that the lower court's order for Dye to disclose "all evidence" related to the alternate suspect defense was overbroad. The Court ruled that the prosecution should conduct its own investigation into any alternate suspect identified. The Court also held that disputes over the admissibility of alternate suspect evidence should be resolved prior to trial. The Court therefore vacated the lower court’s discovery order and directed the lower court to follow the procedures outlined in its opinion.

COLLINGTON v. CLAYTON COUNTY

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S22G1146

Opinion Date: January 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

In August 2018, Mary Collington was involved in a motor vehicle accident with Jesse Curney, a deputy with the Clayton County Sheriff’s Department, who was acting within the scope of his official duties at the time. Initially believing Deputy Curney was a Clayton County police officer, Collington sent notice of her claims to the Clayton County Chief of Police, the Clayton County Commissioners, and the District Attorney of Clayton County. Collington later filed a lawsuit against Clayton County, asserting that she suffered injuries caused by the negligence of Deputy Curney.

Upon motion to dismiss by the defendants, the trial court dismissed Collington's claims, concluding that Collington's claims against the Sheriff should be dismissed as she had failed to present timely notice to the Sheriff's office under OCGA § 36-11-1. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari to determine whether OCGA § 36-11-1 applies to official-capacity claims against a county sheriff for the negligent use of a motor vehicle, and if so, whether presenting such a claim to the county commission satisfies the claimant's duty under the statute.

The Supreme Court of Georgia held that OCGA § 36-11-1 does apply to official-capacity claims against a county sheriff for the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle. Furthermore, the court decided that because a claim against a county sheriff in his official capacity for the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle is a claim against a county under OCGA § 36-11-1, presenting the claim to the county governing authority satisfies the statute's presentment requirement. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

LOVELL v. RAFFENSPERGER

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S23A0887

Opinion Date: January 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

In Georgia, plaintiffs Kristen Lovell, Lori Tullos, and Virginia McFaddin filed complaints against Brad Raffensperger (in his official capacity as the Secretary of State of Georgia), the Columbia County Board of Elections, the Morgan County Board of Elections and Registration, and various individuals associated with these entities, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The superior courts dismissed the actions, reasoning that they were barred by sovereign immunity as they failed to name the proper defendants as required by the Georgia Constitution.

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the lower courts' dismissal of the actions. The court ruled that under the Georgia Constitution's Paragraph V, which provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for actions seeking declaratory relief from acts of the state, actions must be brought exclusively against the state and in the name of the State of Georgia or against the relevant local government entities. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to comply with this requirement as they named as defendants the Secretary of State (not the State of Georgia) and their local boards of election and their board members (not the relevant counties). Due to this failure to comply, the trial courts were correct to dismiss the actions.

South Valley Ground Water v. Idaho Dept of Water Resources

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 49632

Opinion Date: January 12, 2024

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho held that the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources (IDWR) had the authority under Idaho Code section 42-237a.g. to initiate administrative proceedings to curtail the withdrawal of water from any well during any period where water to fill a water right in said well was not available. The proceedings stemmed from a district court decision involving the adjudication of water rights in the Wood River Valley during an unprecedented drought in 2021. The Director of the IDWR initiated an administrative proceeding to determine whether water was available to fill junior groundwater rights in the aquifer beneath the Bellevue Triangle. After a six-day hearing, the Director issued a Final Order that found water was unavailable to fill the junior rights because pumping from the aquifer was affecting the use of senior surface water rights. The South Valley Ground Water District and Galena Ground Water District challenged the Director's authority to initiate proceedings under Idaho Code section 42-237a.g., arguing that the Director did not comply with the prior appropriation doctrine because the Director had not formally designated an area of common groundwater supply, or determined "material injury" had been sustained by senior surface water rights holders. The Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, ruling that the Director had the authority to initiate administrative proceedings under Idaho Code section 42-237a.g. and that the Director did not violate the prior appropriation doctrine. It held that the Director had the discretion to limit or prohibit the withdrawal of groundwater from any well during any period when water was not available to fill a water right in said well, and was not required to establish an area of common groundwater supply before he is allowed to curtail groundwater pumping. The Court also held that the Director's decision to reject the proposed mitigation plan without a hearing was not properly before the Court on appeal.

In the Matter of SIRS Appeal by Nobility Home Health Care, Inc

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A21-1477

Opinion Date: January 10, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

In a dispute with the Department of Human Services (DHS) in Minnesota, Nobility Home Health Care, Inc. (Nobility) was found to have violated Minnesota Statutes section 256B.064 and Minnesota Rule 9505.2165 by failing to maintain health service records as required by law and by submitting claims for services for which underlying health service records were inadequate. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that such conduct constitutes "abuse" under the statute, even if there was no intent to deceive the DHS. However, the court declined to interpret or apply the phrase "improperly paid... as a result of" abuse in the statute, which governs the grounds for monetary recovery. The court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the DHS for further analysis of this issue. The court's decision means that DHS's demand for an overpayment for Nobility’s first-time paperwork errors may not be reversed unless the DHS also establishes that the provider was improperly paid because of that abuse.

State of Minnesota vs. Allison

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A22-0793

Opinion Date: January 10, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In Minnesota, a man convicted of taking pornographic photographs of a child was ordered by a district court to pay restitution for therapy costs and lost wages incurred by the child's mother. The appellant argued that the mother, as a secondary victim, was only eligible for restitution for losses suffered directly by the child. The State contended that under Minnesota Statutes section 611A.01, family members of the direct victim are part of a singular class of victims because when a child suffers, their parents suffer as well. The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed with the State's argument and affirmed the lower court's decision. It held that Minnesota Statutes section 611A.01(b) creates a singular class of victims that includes the direct victims of a crime and, if the direct victim is a minor, those family members of the minor who incur a personal loss or harm as a direct result of the crime.

State ex rel. Gilreath v. Cuyahoga Job & Family Services

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-103

Opinion Date: January 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

This case pertains to a public records request made by Marcellus Gilreath to the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (ODJFS) and its director, Matt Damschroder. Gilreath sought access to specific records related to him, including his case history in the Client Registry Information System Enhanced (CRIS-E), his Ohio Benefits case history, his overpayment records, and records of any investigation into his alleged theft of food stamps.

After not receiving a response from ODJFS or Damschroder for several months, Gilreath filed a mandamus action, following which ODJFS provided him with some of the requested records. Gilreath then requested that the court issue a writ of mandamus to compel ODJFS and Damschroder to allow him to inspect the provided documents in their native electronic format, to search for additional records, and to organize and maintain their emails in a manner that they can be made available for inspection. He also sought an award of statutory damages, court costs, and attorney fees.

The Supreme Court of Ohio denied Gilreath's request for a writ of mandamus, finding that ODJFS and Damschroder had no obligation to allow him to inspect the records in their native electronic format. The court also found that ODJFS and Damschroder did not possess or control the county emails Gilreath sought, and that his request for these emails was not sufficiently clear. Furthermore, the court determined that Gilreath had not requested ODJFS and Damschroder to organize and maintain their emails in his original complaint.

However, the court did grant Gilreath's request for an award of statutory damages, awarding him $1,000 due to the significant delay in ODJFS's response to his public records request. The court denied his requests for court costs and attorney fees.

State ex rel. Mobley v. Powers

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-104

Opinion Date: January 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

Alphonso Mobley Jr. filed an original action in mandamus under Ohio’s Public Records Act against Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney Melissa A. Powers, seeking records related to former R.C. 309.16 and a records-retention schedule. He also requested awards of statutory damages and costs. The Supreme Court of Ohio granted a limited writ of mandamus in part and denied in part. The court denied the writ as moot concerning some of the requested records, granted a limited writ regarding others, deferred ruling on the request for an award of statutory damages, and denied the request for an award of costs.

The court determined that the prosecutor had provided Mobley with the records-retention schedule and the records created to meet the requirements of former R.C. 309.16(A)(2) for the years 2016 through 2020. However, the court found a genuine question of fact regarding whether the prosecutor provided Mobley with all the records that her office created to meet the requirements of former R.C. 309.16(A)(1) for the years 2016 through 2020. The court thus ordered the prosecutor to provide these records or certify that they do not exist. The court deferred ruling on Mobley’s request for statutory damages until the prosecutor has complied with the limited writ. Mobley’s request for an award of court costs was denied as he had filed an affidavit of indigency.

State ex rel. Yost v. FirstEnergy Corp.

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-101

Opinion Date: January 16, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Utilities Law

This case involves an appeal from the Tenth District Court of Appeals of Ohio. The appellant is the State of Ohio, represented by the Attorney General, and the appellees are FirstEnergy Corporation, Samuel Randazzo, and a consulting company controlled by Randazzo. Randazzo, the former chairman of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO), allegedly received a $4.3 million bribe from FirstEnergy Corporation. The state of Ohio filed a civil action against Randazzo and his consulting company to recover the proceeds of the bribe. The state sought attachment orders to prevent Randazzo from draining his bank and brokerage accounts. The trial court granted the state’s motion ex parte, without notice to Randazzo and his attorneys. After learning about the court's decision, Randazzo requested a hearing and moved to vacate the orders. The court held a hearing with both sides present and declined to discharge the orders of attachment. Randazzo appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals, which found the orders of attachment had been improperly granted. The Court of Appeals determined that the state had failed to meet its burden at the ex parte hearing to establish the irreparable injury requirement.

Upon appeal by the state, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the orders of the trial court. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred by basing its decision on the ex parte requirements. The Supreme Court ruled that the court of appeals should have reviewed the trial court's denial of the motion to vacate the attachment rather than the irreparable injury requirement for an ex parte order. The Supreme Court concluded that the proper remedy for a party dissatisfied with an ex parte attachment order is to request a hearing on the order at which both parties may be heard. It also concluded that Randazzo failed to demonstrate any prejudice from the use of improper garnishment forms.

Applied Building Sciences v. SC Dept of Commerce

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 28184

Opinion Date: January 17, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

In this case, the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a state statute that limits reimbursement of reestablishment expenses in condemnation proceedings to $50,000. The appellant, Applied Building Sciences, Inc., an engineering firm, was forced to move its operations when its leased building was condemned for public use by the South Carolina Department of Commerce, Division of Public Railways. The company sought reimbursement for reestablishment expenses exceeding $560,000 but was limited by state statute to $50,000. The company argued that the cap was unconstitutional under the Takings Clauses of the South Carolina and United States Constitutions. The court found that reestablishment expenses are separate from damages awardable as just compensation under both constitutions, thus upholding the constitutionality of the statutory cap. The court affirmed the lower court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the Department of Commerce, Division of Public Railways.

In re Petition of Vermont Gas Systems, Inc.

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 VT 2

Opinion Date: January 12, 2024

Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Vermont Public Utility Commission approving a contract under 30 V.S.A. § 248(i) for the purchase of out-of-state renewable natural gas by Vermont Gas Systems, Inc. (VGS). The contract, which was proposed to last for fourteen-and-a-half years, required VGS to purchase a minimum volume of renewable natural gas that would be produced and transported from a landfill in New York. The contract was part of VGS's efforts to invest in nonfossil gas and incorporate renewable natural gas into its gas supply to meet regulatory requirements and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

The appellant, Catherine Bock, a ratepaying customer of VGS, challenged the Commission's findings with respect to the contract’s contribution towards satisfying emissions reductions under the Vermont Global Warming Solutions Act of 2020. Bock also disputed the Commission’s finding that the contract, with a condition imposed by the Commission, would comply with least-cost planning principles.

The court rejected Bock's arguments, finding that the Commission's conclusions were supported by the evidence in the record and were not clearly erroneous. The court noted that the contract was only one of VGS's strategies to reduce emissions pursuant to the Vermont Global Warming Solutions Act of 2020. It also pointed out that there was sufficient evidence to support the Commission's determination that the contract was cost-effective and consistent with least-cost planning principles.