English v. Clarke

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-1788

Opinion Date: January 5, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, plaintiffs Kewon English and Earl Powell were arrested for sexual assault and burglary and detained for over a year before their cases were nolle prossed and they were released. They sued Senior Investigator Joseph Clarke of the Richland County Sheriff’s Department, alleging that he had coerced them into signing false confessions. They also sued Sheriff Leon Lott and the Richland County Sheriff's Department for damages under § 1983, claiming their constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments were violated. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment on English’s claims and dismissed Clarke’s cross-appeal. The court determined that there was probable cause to arrest English based on the victim’s identifications. Regarding English's malicious prosecution claim, the court held that even assuming probable cause was negated, Clarke cannot be held responsible for English’s continued detention. The court found no evidence that the Richland County Sheriff's Department had any unconstitutional policy or custom, and that Clarke could not be held liable for the continued detention of English. Furthermore, the court dismissed Clarke's cross-appeal, ruling that the appeal turned on a question of fact and was therefore not suitable for interlocutory treatment.

State of West Virginia v. EPA

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-1418

Opinion Date: January 10, 2024

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied a motion filed by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to transfer a case brought by the state of West Virginia to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia or to dismiss it due to improper venue. The case pertains to the EPA's disapproval of West Virginia's State Implementation Plan (SIP), which the state had submitted as part of its obligation under the Clean Air Act to address the emission of gases contributing to the formation of ground-level ozone. The EPA had disapproved West Virginia's SIP because it found that the plan did not sufficiently reduce ozone-forming emissions that were adversely affecting air quality in downwind states. The Fourth Circuit court also granted the state of West Virginia's motion to stay the EPA's final action pending the outcome of its petition for review. The court's decision on venue was based on its interpretation of the Clean Air Act, which stipulates that the venue for review of EPA actions depends on whether the action is nationally applicable or locally or regionally applicable. The court concluded that the EPA's disapproval of West Virginia's SIP was based on circumstances particular to West Virginia and therefore was locally or regionally applicable.

Bagley v. Guillen

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-20644

Opinion Date: January 10, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dismissed an appeal by police officer Rudy Guillen, who was seeking qualified immunity in a lawsuit brought against him by Akeem Bagley. Bagley had sued Guillen under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force, unlawful arrest, and illegal detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The lawsuit stemmed from an incident in which Guillen had pulled Bagley over for a minor traffic violation and subsequently tased him. The district court had granted Guillen qualified immunity as to Bagley’s unlawful arrest and illegal detention claims, but denied it as to Bagley’s excessive force claim.

On appeal, the court held that at the time of the conduct in question, it was clearly established that an officer may not use force on a suspect who is complying with his commands. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Bagley, the court found that Bagley had presented sufficient evidence of excessive force to defeat qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Commodity Futures v. EOX Holdings

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-20622

Opinion Date: January 8, 2024

Areas of Law: Business Law, Government & Administrative Law, Securities Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and vacated parts of a judgment against EOX Holdings, L.L.C., and Andrew Gizienski ("Defendants") in a case initiated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"). The CFTC had accused the defendants of violating a rule that prevents commodities traders from "taking the other side of orders" without clients' consent. The court ruled that the defendants lacked fair notice of the CFTC's interpretation of this rule. The case revolved around Gizienski's actions while working as a broker for EOX, where he had discretion to make specific trades on behalf of one of his clients, Jason Vaccaro. The CFTC argued that Gizienski's actions violated the rule because he was making decisions to trade opposite the orders of other clients without their knowledge or consent. The court, however, ruled that the CFTC's interpretation of the rule was overly broad, as it did not provide sufficient notice that such conduct would be considered taking the other side of an order. The court reversed the penalty judgment against the defendants, vacated part of the injunction against them, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Louisiana v. DOE

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-60146

Opinion Date: January 8, 2024

Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law

In 2022, the Department of Energy (DOE) repealed regulations, known as the 2020 Rules, that had created new classes of dishwashers and laundry machines with shorter cycle times, arguing the 2020 rules were illegal. Several states, led by Louisiana, petitioned for the review of the repeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of the states, finding that the DOE's repeal was arbitrary and capricious for failing to consider the performance characteristics of the appliances, the substitution effects, and the evidence showing that the Department’s conservation standards were leading Americans to use more energy and water. The court also noted that the DOE failed to consider other remedies short of repealing the 2020 rules entirely. The court did not reach a conclusion on whether the DOE had the statutory authority to regulate water use in dishwashers and clothes washers. The court granted the petition and remanded the case back to the DOE for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

McNeal v. LeBlanc

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-30180

Opinion Date: January 5, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

In 2015, Brian McNeal was found guilty of possessing cocaine and drug paraphernalia in Louisiana. He was given a five-year suspended sentence with five years of probation. In 2017, McNeal was arrested for violating probation and subsequently sentenced to serve 90 days at an in-patient substance abuse program. The Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (DPSC) determined McNeal's release date was to be November 1, 2017. However, McNeal was not released until December 12, 2017, 41 days after his proper release date. In 2018, McNeal sued James LeBlanc, the DPSC Secretary, in his individual capacity for wrongfully detaining him after his sentence expired. LeBlanc filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of qualified immunity, which the district court denied. LeBlanc then appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, finding that McNeal's claims were not barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), a case that limits certain legal claims if they would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence. The court reasoned that McNeal did not challenge his conviction or attendant sentence, but rather the 41 days he was imprisoned beyond his release date. Therefore, Heck did not apply.

The court also rejected LeBlanc's argument that he was entitled to qualified immunity, a legal doctrine that shields government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. The court determined that McNeal had sufficiently alleged that LeBlanc was deliberately indifferent to a pattern of overdetention in the DPSC. Furthermore, the court found that the right to a timely release from prison was clearly established at the time of McNeal's overdetention. Consequently, the court concluded that LeBlanc was not entitled to qualified immunity in this case.

State of Texas v. Environmental Protection Agency

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 17-60088

Opinion Date: January 11, 2024

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

In a dispute over the classification of two Texas counties under the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) established by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the EPA's decision to designate the counties as "nonattainment" for sulfur dioxide emissions. The dispute arose when the EPA initially designated Rusk and Panola counties as nonattainment based on data submitted by the Sierra Club. The EPA later proposed to change the designation to "unclassifiable" after it found the initial data to be potentially erroneous. However, in June 2021, the EPA withdrew the proposal and upheld the initial nonattainment designation. The State of Texas and Luminant Generation Company, companies adversely affected by the nonattainment designation, petitioned for a review of the EPA's decision. The court held that the EPA's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful, but rather a valid exercise of the agency's discretion based on its technical expertise and review of complex scientific data. The court also found that the EPA did not misconceive its legal authority or fail to treat like cases alike in its decision-making process.

Mosier v. Evans

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-5189

Opinion Date: January 9, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, Timmy Mosier, a man arrested for public intoxication, brought federal civil rights and state tort claims against Officer Joseph Evans and Crockett County, Tennessee. Mosier alleged that Officer Evans used excessive force resulting in serious injury when he pulled Mosier to the ground causing him to hit his head. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that Officer Evans was entitled to qualified immunity on Mosier's federal excessive-force and inadequate-medical-care claims because Mosier failed to demonstrate that Evans violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right. The court also affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Crockett County on Mosier's federal municipal-liability claim, finding that Mosier failed to show that a municipal policy or custom caused the alleged violation of his rights. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Mosier's state-law negligence claims against Evans in his official capacity and against Crockett County under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act's civil-rights exception. However, the court reversed the dismissal of Mosier's negligence claim against Evans in his personal capacity.

United States v. O'Lear

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-3835

Opinion Date: January 8, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the defendant, Thomas O’Lear, was convicted of healthcare fraud, making a false statement in connection with healthcare services, and aggravated identity theft. O’Lear ran a company that provided mobile x-ray services to residents in nursing homes. However, he used the company to defraud Medicare and Medicaid programs by billing for fictitious x-rays using the identities of nursing-home residents. When an audit revealed the fraud, O’Lear attempted to conceal it by forging staff names and duplicating x-rays in the patient files.

On appeal, O’Lear raised several questions. Firstly, he questioned whether his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury was violated by excluding individuals who had not been vaccinated against COVID-19 from the jury pool. The court ruled that the unvaccinated do not qualify as a “distinctive group” that can trigger Sixth Amendment concerns. Secondly, O’Lear questioned whether the nursing-home residents were “victims” of his fraud under a “vulnerable victims” sentencing enhancement, even though the monetary losses were suffered by Medicare and Medicaid. The court ruled that the residents were indeed victims, as O’Lear had used their identities and health records without their permission, which constituted taking advantage of them.

O’Lear also challenged his two aggravated-identity-theft convictions and objected to his 180-month sentence on various grounds, but these arguments were also dismissed by the court. Ultimately, the court affirmed O’Lear's conviction and sentence.

USA v. Thompson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-2254

Opinion Date: January 8, 2024

Areas of Law: Banking, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the defendant, Patrick Thompson, was convicted of making false statements about his loans to financial institutions. Thompson took out three loans from a bank totaling $219,000. After the bank failed, its receiver, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and a loan servicer, Planet Home, attempted to recoup the money owed by Thompson. However, Thompson disputed the loan balance, insisting that he had only borrowed $110,000. He was subsequently charged with and convicted of making false statements to influence the FDIC and a mortgage lending business, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014.

On appeal, Thompson argued that his statements were not “false” under § 1014 because they were literally true, and that the jury lacked sufficient evidence to convict him. He also claimed that the government constructively amended the indictment and that the district court lacked the authority to order him to pay restitution to the FDIC.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected Thompson's arguments and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court held that under its precedent, § 1014 criminalizes misleading representations, and Thompson's statements were misleading. The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to support Thompson's conviction and that the indictment was not constructively amended. Finally, the court held that the district court properly awarded restitution to the FDIC, as the FDIC had suffered a financial loss as a direct and proximate result of Thompson's false statements.

Jennifer Morgan-Tyra v. Andrei Nikolov

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-3193

Opinion Date: January 8, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Officer Andrei Nikolov, who had been sued for excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case arose from an incident in which the officer shot Jennifer Morgan-Tyra multiple times after responding to a domestic-disturbance call. Upon arrival at the scene, the officer encountered an angry Morgan-Tyra holding a gun and shouting expletives at someone out of his view. When she did not comply with a command to drop the gun, Officer Nikolov fired at least nine shots, several of which struck Morgan-Tyra and caused severe and lasting injuries.

In affirming the district court's judgment, the appeals court found that, even if Officer Nikolov's decision to shoot without warning was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances, he did not violate a clearly established right. The court noted that officers may use deadly force when there is probable cause to believe that a suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, and that a warning is less likely to be feasible in a high-pressure situation that requires a split-second judgment. The court also found that a reasonable officer in Nikolov's position would not have known whether Morgan-Tyra was the initial aggressor or a victim who had fought back, and that it was not clearly unreasonable to shoot her under the circumstances. Even considering Morgan-Tyra's version of facts, the court held that she was wielding the gun in a menacing fashion and appeared ready to shoot. Thus, the court concluded that Officer Nikolov is entitled to qualified immunity.

The State of Missouri v. The Peoples Republic of China

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2495

Opinion Date: January 10, 2024

Areas of Law: Antitrust & Trade Regulation, Business Law, Government & Administrative Law, International Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled in a case brought by the State of Missouri against several Chinese entities, including the government of the People's Republic of China, the Wuhan Institute of Virology, and others. Missouri accused the defendants of negligence in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, alleging that they allowed the virus to spread worldwide, engaged in a campaign to keep other countries from learning about the virus, and hoarded personal protective equipment (PPE). The court decided that most of Missouri's claims were blocked by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which generally protects foreign states from lawsuits in U.S. courts. However, the court allowed one claim to proceed: the allegation that China hoarded PPE while the rest of the world was unaware of the extent of the virus. The court held that this claim fell under the "commercial activity" exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, as it involved alleged anti-competitive behavior that had a direct effect in the United States. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this claim.

Coalition on Homelessness v. City of San Francisco

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-15087

Opinion Date: January 11, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiffs, a coalition on homelessness and seven current or formerly homeless residents of San Francisco, who sought to prevent the City and County of San Francisco from enforcing any ordinance that punishes sleeping, lodging, or camping on public property. The plaintiffs argued that such enforcement violated the Eighth Amendment. On appeal, the defendants argued, for the first time, that the enforcement actions did not leave unhoused individuals with nowhere else to go, but instead required them to relocate from specific encampment sites and only at certain times. The Ninth Circuit deemed this argument waived as it was not brought up in the lower court and even if it was considered, the argument would not change the outcome as the defendants' enforcement of the laws were no narrower in scope than the laws at issue in prior cases, Martin v. City of Boise and Johnson v. City of Grants Pass. The court held that the defendants have yet to show that the preliminary injunction was improper based on the arguments and evidentiary record before the district court.

CROSS V. O'MALLEY

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-35096

Opinion Date: January 5, 2024

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Public Benefits

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court, which upheld the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of a claimant's application for supplemental security income. The claimant argued that the Social Security Administration's 2017 revised regulations for evaluating medical opinions were partially invalid because they did not provide a reasoned explanation for permitting an administrative law judge to avoid articulating how he or she accounts for the "examining relationship" or "specialization" factors under the Social Security Act or the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The court found that the Commissioner's decision to promulgate the 2017 medical evidence regulations fell within his wide latitude to make rules and regulations, particularly those governing the nature and extent of the proofs and evidence to establish the right to benefits. The court also joined the Eleventh Circuit in holding that the regulations were valid under the APA, as the agency's response to public comment and reasoned explanation for the regulatory changes established that the regulations were not arbitrary or capricious.

MUNOZ V. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-55941

Opinion Date: January 9, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

In a case involving a putative class of plaintiffs who alleged that the Superior Court of Los Angeles County and Judge Eric C. Taylor set cash bail that they could not afford and unlawfully detained them pretrial, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action. The court held that actions against state courts and state court judges in their judicial capacity are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Superior Court of California was found to have sovereign immunity as an arm of the state. The court concluded that the exception in the Ex parte Young case did not apply because the Superior Court cannot be sued in an individual capacity. The court also held that Judge Taylor had Eleventh Amendment immunity because state court judges cannot be sued in federal court in their judicial capacity under the Eleventh Amendment. The court overruled any interpretation of a previous case (Wolfe v. Strankman) that suggested the Ex parte Young exception allowed injunctions against judges acting in their judicial capacity, finding such interpretation to be clearly irreconcilable with a more recent Supreme Court decision (Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson). The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve claims brought against state courts or state court judges acting in a judicial capacity due to Eleventh Amendment immunity.

SILBERSHER V. VALEANT PHARMACEUTICALS INT'L

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 20-16176

Opinion Date: January 5, 2024

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Intellectual Property

In this case, Zachary Silbersher, a relator, filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act against Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. and others. Silbersher alleged that Valeant fraudulently obtained patents related to a drug and asserted these patents to stifle competition from generic drugmakers. He also claimed that Valeant defrauded the federal government by charging an artificially inflated price for the drug while falsely certifying that its price was fair and reasonable.

The district court dismissed Silbersher’s action under the False Claims Act’s public disclosure bar, ruling that his allegations had already been publicly disclosed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court.

The Court of Appeals held that an inter partes patent review proceeding, in which the Patent and Trademark Office invalidated one of Valeant's patents, did not qualify as a public disclosure under the False Claims Act because the government was not a party to that proceeding, and its primary function was not investigative. The Court of Appeals also held that the allegations in Silbersher's qui tam action were not "substantially the same" as the information that had been publicly disclosed. None of the qualifying public disclosures made a direct claim that Valeant committed fraud, nor did they disclose a combination of facts sufficient to permit a reasonable inference of fraud. Therefore, the public disclosure bar did not apply. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

Nelson v. Sellers

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-14205

Opinion Date: January 5, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed an appeal of a lower court's denial of qualified immunity to a jail intake officer, Keyvon Sellers. The case arose from an incident in which a black man, Jayvon Hatchett, attacked and killed his white cellmate, Eddie Nelson, in county jail. Before the attack, Hatchett had told Sellers that he had previously stabbed a white man after watching videos of white police officers shooting black men. Despite this admission, Sellers did not inform other jail staff of Hatchett's racially motivated violence. Nelson's survivors sued Sellers, alleging that his failure to share this information constituted deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to Nelson, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that Sellers violated Nelson's clearly established constitutional right by failing to protect him from a known risk of harm. The court concluded that Sellers had fair warning that his inaction was unconstitutional. Therefore, he was not entitled to qualified immunity.

Young Israel of Tampa, Inc. v. Hillsborough Area Regional Transit Authority

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-11787

Opinion Date: January 10, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Young Israel of Tampa, Inc., an Orthodox Jewish synagogue, sued the Hillsborough Area Regional Transit Authority (HART) for rejecting its proposed advertisement for a Chanukah on Ice event. The synagogue argued that HART’s policy, which prohibited advertisements that “primarily promote a religious faith or religious organization,” violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Young Israel on two grounds: 1) HART’s policy violated the First Amendment because it discriminated on the basis of viewpoint, and 2) even if the policy was viewpoint neutral, it was unreasonable because it lacked objective and workable standards and was inconsistently and haphazardly applied. The court subsequently issued a permanent injunction against HART, prohibiting it from rejecting any advertisement on the ground that it primarily promotes a religious faith or religious organization, including any future policies.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, but on narrower grounds. The appellate court concluded that HART's policy was unreasonable under the Supreme Court's decision in Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky because it failed to define key terms, lacked any official guidance, and vested too much discretion in those who applied it. The court declined to address the question of whether the policy constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination. However, the court concluded that the permanent injunction issued by the district court needed to be revised to apply only to HART’s current policy, rather than any future policies, and remanded the case to the district court for that purpose.

Campaign Legal Center v. FEC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 22-5339

Opinion Date: January 5, 2024

Areas of Law: Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the Federal Election Commission's (FEC) dismissal of an administrative complaint by the Campaign Legal Center (CLC). The CLC alleged campaign finance violations by two presidential campaign committees, claiming that they concealed over $750 million in expenditures by routing them through sham payments to two LLCs. The FEC dismissed the complaint, invoking prosecutorial discretion. The CLC argued that the FEC's invocation of discretion was dependent on legal analysis and was thus subject to judicial review under the Federal Election Campaign Act. The district court concluded that the FEC's reliance on considerations of prosecutorial discretion was separate from its legal analysis and precluded judicial review.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the FEC's reasons for dismissal, which included resource allocation concerns, potential litigation risks, and a shifting regulatory landscape, were distinct considerations of prosecutorial discretion that did not solely rest on legal interpretation, and therefore were not reviewable by the court. The court rejected the CLC's argument that the FEC's invocation of discretion was intertwined with its legal analysis, stating that the agency's estimation of the resource demands of the proposed investigation and its potential size and scope bore no discernable relationship to any legal inquiry.

Adams v. Dept of Corrections and Rehabilitation

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G062782(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 9, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

In the early morning hours of August 1, 2018, Gwendolyn Adams and Glenn Tyler Bolden were pursued in a high-speed chase by Michael William Becker, a peace officer employed by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Becker suspected Adams and Bolden of wrongdoing, although his suspicions were unfounded. The pursuit resulted in a catastrophic accident that caused severe injuries and, ultimately, the death of Adams's son, D'son Woods.

Adams and Bolden filed a lawsuit against the CDCR, alleging negligence causing wrongful death, assault and battery, and violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act. The CDCR sought summary judgment, arguing that Becker was not acting within the scope of his employment during the pursuit. The trial court agreed and entered judgment in favor of CDCR.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three reversed and remanded the case. The appellate court found that whether Becker was acting within the scope of his employment when he pursued Adams and Bolden was a question of fact that should be decided by a jury. The court noted that Becker’s actions may have been influenced by his role as a peace officer, and it was not clear whether he was acting as a private citizen or a law enforcement officer during the pursuit. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the CDCR.

In re L.B.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: F086109(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 9, 2024

Areas of Law: Family Law, Government & Administrative Law, Juvenile Law

In an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County, five minors, aged between one and fourteen years, challenged the juvenile court's decision to order reunification services for their parents, identified as A.B. (mother) and A.S. (father). The minors were adjudged dependent children due to ongoing domestic violence and substance abuse in their home. The court had to interpret and apply the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13), which allows a court to bypass reunification services for parents with a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of drugs or alcohol who have resisted prior court-ordered treatment in the three years prior to the filing of the petition.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District concluded that the juvenile court had misapplied the law when it decided it could not deny reunification services to the parents while they were participating in treatment. The court emphasized that the statute requires proof of the parent’s resistance during the three years preceding the petition, regardless of their engagement in treatment at the time of the disposition hearing.

The court reversed the juvenile court's dispositional order providing reunification services to the parents for all five children and remanded the case for a new disposition hearing based on the family's present circumstances. This decision was made despite subsequent events that rendered the case potentially moot, as the court deemed the issue of statutory interpretation important.

Perez v. Oakdale Irrigation Dist.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: F084621(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 8, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, Maria Ruiz Perez and minor children of the deceased, Hector Evangelista and Giselle Evangelista, filed a lawsuit against the Oakdale Irrigation District (OID) after a tragic accident resulted in the deaths of Hector and Giselle. The accident occurred when their vehicle overturned and landed in a drain, leading to their drowning. The plaintiffs contended that the water level in the drain, which was a public property managed by the OID, was a dangerous condition that led to the fatalities. However, the Superior Court of Stanislaus County granted summary judgment in favor of OID, citing "canal immunity" under Government Code, § 831.8, subd. (b), which immunizes the state or an irrigation district from liability for injuries caused by the condition of canals, conduits, or drains if the injured party was using the property for a purpose other than its intended use.

The plaintiffs appealed this decision, arguing that canal immunity should apply only when the injured party intentionally used the public property in a manner not intended by the government. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District rejected this interpretation. Instead, the appellate court held that canal immunity applies when the injured person interacts with the canal, conduit, or drain in a manner not intended by the government, regardless of whether that interaction was intentional or involuntary. The court based this interpretation on the legislative intent behind the statute, which was to define the scope of immunity in terms of how foreseeable the injury was to the government, rather than the degree of responsibility assumed by the injured party. Thus, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of OID.

Planning and Conservation League v. Dept. of Water Resources

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C096304(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 5, 2024

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

In the case of Planning and Conservation League et al., v. Department of Water Resources heard in the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, the court considered whether the Department of Water Resources’ (department) approval of amendments to long-term contracts with local government agencies that receive water through the State Water Project violated various laws. The amendments extended the contracts to 2085 and expanded the facilities listed as eligible for revenue bond financing. Several conservation groups and public agencies challenged the amendments, arguing they violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Reform Act (Delta Reform Act), and the public trust doctrine. However, the court held that the department did not violate CEQA, the Delta Reform Act, or the public trust doctrine, and therefore affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the department. The court found that the department used the correct baseline for its environmental impact report (EIR), properly segmented the amendments from related projects, and adequately considered the direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts of the amendments. The court also held that the department adequately described the project and considered a reasonable range of alternatives, and that recirculation of the EIR was not required. The court rejected arguments that the amendments violated the Delta Reform Act or the public trust doctrine, finding that they did not impact "water that is imbued with the public trust." The court concluded that the department acted within its authority in approving and executing the amendments.

Visalia Unified School Dist. v. Pub. Employment Relations Bd.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: F084032(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 9, 2024

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

In this case, the California School Employees Association (CSEA) filed a complaint with the Public Employment Relations Board (Board or PERB) alleging that the Visalia Unified School District (VUSD) violated Government Code section 3543.5, subdivision (a), by terminating an employee in retaliation for her union activities. The employee was a secretary and local union chapter president. The Board found in favor of the employee, concluding that her status as a union officer was protected activity under the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA), and that VUSD had retaliated against her for her union activity. VUSD appealed this decision.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, held that holding a union office is protected activity under the EERA. The court also concluded that the Board correctly found an inference that VUSD had retaliated against the employee for her union activity. However, the court disagreed with the Board's conclusion that VUSD failed to prove its affirmative defense, that it would have terminated the employee for poor performance regardless of any protected activity. The court found that the record compelled a finding that VUSD would have justifiably terminated the employee notwithstanding her protected union activity. Therefore, the court granted VUSD's petition and set aside the Board's decision.

GSN Capital, LLC v. Shoshone City & Rural Fire District

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 49279

Opinion Date: January 11, 2024

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the lower court's judgment dismissing a negligence claim filed by GSN Capital, LLC and Dave Zortman against the Shoshone City & Rural Fire District. GSN's sawmill property was destroyed by a wildfire, and they argued that the Fire District was negligent in not calling for additional aid, not deploying fire units to protect their property, and not performing a mitigation and salvage operation to save part of their property. However, the court concluded that the Fire District did not owe GSN a duty in tort for any of the challenged decisions. The court found that the Fire District did not have custody or control over GSN's property and did not owe a duty to protect individual properties within its territory. The court also held that the Fire District did not undertake any firefighting efforts for GSN until after the fire was contained, and thus did not assume a duty to GSN.

TCR, LLC v. Teton County

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 49487

Opinion Date: January 11, 2024

Areas of Law: Contracts, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho ruled on a dispute between TCR, LLC, a developer, and Teton County. The developer had sought to record a condominium plat for a planned unit development, but the County refused to do so, arguing that the developer had not submitted final site plans, architectural designs, or landscape drawings for review. The developer filed suit, alleging breach of contract and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the County to record the condominium plat. The district court granted the developer's motion for summary judgment on its declaratory and injunctive relief claim and denied the County's motion for summary judgment on the same claim. The court also denied all motions to reconsider. The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the County's refusal to record the condominium plat violated the Idaho Condominium Property Act and that the County did not have a valid reason for its refusal. The court also found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the County on the developer's breach of contract claim, concluding that genuine issues of material fact remained. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

Carroll v. Select Board of Norwell

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13410

Opinion Date: January 5, 2024

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

In this case, several residents of the town of Norwell, Massachusetts filed a lawsuit to compel the town's select board to transfer municipal land to the town's conservation commission. The select board had previously designated the land for the development of affordable housing. The main issue on appeal was whether the land was "held by a city or town . . . for a specific purpose" under Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 40, Section 15A. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the Land Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the select board. The Supreme Judicial Court held that town-owned land is held for a specific municipal purpose under Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 40, Section 15A, where the totality of the circumstances indicates a clear and unequivocal intent by the town to hold the land for such purpose. Applying this totality of the circumstances test, the court found no material dispute of fact regarding the town's intent to dedicate the municipal land at issue for the purpose of affordable housing. Therefore, the court concluded that the allowance of summary judgment for the select board was correct.

Sender v. City of St. Louis

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Docket: SC100110

Opinion Date: January 9, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

On August 12, 2018, Rachel Sender suffered injuries in a bicycle accident on a bike path in Forest Park, St. Louis. Sender claimed her injuries were due to a defect on the path, and she notified the City of St. Louis of her injury, as per section 82.210. This statute states that a claimant should provide the mayor of the city with notice within 90 days of an injury occurring due to a defect in any city property listed in the statute. The City of St. Louis responded that Sender's notice was inadequate as it did not sufficiently identify the location of the incident. After the 90-day statutory period, Sender provided further information to the City. The City moved to dismiss Sender's claims based on the insufficiency of the notice, which was allowed by the circuit court.

Sender appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Missouri. The court first had to decide whether the bike path is considered a "thoroughfare" as per section 82.210. It concluded that the bike path was a thoroughfare because it was a publicly maintained exterior improvement facilitating pedestrian traffic. As such, Sender was required to provide notice of her claim to the City.

The court then had to determine whether Sender's notice was sufficient. However, Sender did not provide any record of the evidentiary hearing held by the circuit court to determine the sufficiency of the notice. The Supreme Court thus affirmed the circuit court's decision to dismiss Sender's claims, as it could not review the sufficiency of the notice without the transcript of the hearing.

Meyers v. State Health Benefits Commission

Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey

Docket: A-27-22

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division in a case concerning the New Jersey State Health Benefits Program Act. The case was brought by James Meyers, a retired state police officer, who challenged the State Health Benefits Commission's (SHBC) decision that he was not exempt from health benefits premium-sharing obligations imposed by the Act. The Act requires public employees to contribute towards the cost of their healthcare benefits upon retirement, with an exemption for employees who had 20 or more years of creditable service in a state or locally administered retirement system as of June 28, 2011. Meyers had 17 years and 9 months of creditable service at that time. Upon his retirement in 2015, he was erroneously offered retiree health benefits at no premium cost. This mistake was discovered in 2017, and the state began deducting premium-sharing contributions from his pension payments.

The Court held that Meyers was not eligible for the exemption under the Act, and correcting the erroneous exemption was proper. The court found that neither Meyers' subsequent service nor his purchase of four years of military service credit could change the fact that he did not meet the Act's requirement as of June 28, 2011. The court also agreed with the Appellate Division's determination that it was not necessary to reach the issue of equitable estoppel. The court noted that a governmental entity cannot be estopped from refusing to take an action that it was never authorized to take under the law, even if it had mistakenly agreed to that action. In this case, the SHBC was never authorized to offer Meyers free healthcare benefits, an act beyond the jurisdiction of the SHBC and therefore ultra vires in the primary sense. Thus, the doctrine of equitable estoppel did not apply.

Mclane Western, Inc. v. South Dakota Department Of Revenue

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: INC. v. S.D. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 2024 S.D. 1

Opinion Date: January 10, 2024

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law

In South Dakota, McLane Western, Inc. and McLane Minnesota, Inc., South Dakota-licensed wholesalers of tobacco products, purchased Other Tobacco Products (OTP) from U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Brands, Inc. (UST Sales), who in turn purchased the products from U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Manufacturing Company, LLC (UST Manufacturing), a federally licensed tobacco manufacturer. McLane brought the OTP into South Dakota and paid the state's 35% tobacco tax. They calculated the tobacco tax they owed using the amount they paid to UST Sales for the OTP, a price higher than what UST Sales paid UST Manufacturing for the same OTP. McLane later submitted numerous refund requests to the South Dakota Department of Revenue, arguing that they overpaid their tax obligations as their tax should have been based on the price UST Sales paid UST Manufacturing.

The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota agreed that McLane overpaid its tobacco tax as it was based on the higher price it paid to UST Sales instead of the price at which UST Manufacturing sold tobacco products to UST Sales. However, the court also concluded that McLane was not entitled to a refund for the overpaid amounts. The court reasoned that although McLane overpaid its advance tax obligation, it fully recovered the advance tax it paid from the dealers to whom it subsequently sold the OTP. The dealers then recovered that tax from the consumers who purchased the OTP. Thus, McLane was made whole by its resale of the OTP and is not entitled to any refund. The court affirmed the Department’s denial of McLane’s request for a refund.

McKitrick v. Gibson

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 UT 1

Opinion Date: January 11, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, Cathy McKitrick, an investigative journalist, sought access to certain records under the Government Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA). The Ogden City Records Review Board ordered the city to release redacted versions of the records. Kerry Gibson, the subject of the records, petitioned the district court to prevent their release. McKitrick intervened in the proceedings and moved to dismiss Gibson's petition for lack of standing. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah held that Gibson lacked standing. Before the district court dismissed the case, McKitrick moved for an award of attorney fees and litigation costs, which was denied by the district court. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah reversed the district court’s interpretation of the fee provision but did not hold that McKitrick was entitled to a fee award. Because the district court did not consider substantive aspects of the fee provision, the Supreme Court remanded the case for it to do so.