Jones v. Solomon

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-7239

Opinion Date: January 3, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, Jordan Jones, a prisoner at North Carolina’s Avery-Mitchell Correctional Institution, sued multiple prison officials under § 1983. The suit challenged the conditions of his confinement and a transfer to another prison that he alleged was retaliatory. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants.

Jones had been placed in a “dry” cell, with the water turned off, for about 17 hours after he was suspected of having ingested contraband. He was allowed to clean himself only with toilet paper, despite having to defecate three times in a portable toilet. He also had to eat a meal with his hands, which he was unable to wash. The court concluded that while the conditions of Jones's confinement were deplorable, the officials were entitled to qualified immunity on this claim because it was not clearly established in April 2015 that these conditions posed a substantial risk of serious harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

However, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant Gregory Taylor on Jones's claim that his transfer to another prison was in retaliation for his filing of grievances. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that Taylor ordered the transfer in retaliation for Jones's grievances, and that Taylor was not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim because it was clearly established at the time of the transfer that such retaliation violated the First Amendment. The court remanded for further proceedings on this claim.

Banks v. Herbrich

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-20107

Opinion Date: January 3, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Family Law, Government & Administrative Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Jessica Banks sued the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) for removing her four-year-old son R.B. from her custody without parental consent or a court order, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court denied DFPS's motion for summary judgment, finding that its employees were not entitled to qualified immunity as they had violated clearly established law.

DFPS appealed the decision, but the appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court found that the removal of R.B. violated the constitutional rights of both the child and Banks, as there were no exigent circumstances that justified a warrantless removal from his mother. The court emphasized that the mere possibility of danger in the future was not enough to constitute exigent circumstances. The court also held that the law was clearly established that removing a child from their home without consent, a court order, or exigent circumstances was a constitutional violation.

However, the court reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity for Linda Juarez, an Investigation Supervisor at DFPS. The court ruled that Juarez was not the ultimate decision-maker and was not actively involved in the decision to remove R.B., thereby entitling her to qualified immunity.

NAACP v. Tindell

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-60647

Opinion Date: January 4, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied the NAACP and other plaintiffs' emergency motions for an injunction to halt the implementation of Mississippi's House Bill 1020 (H.B. 1020). This law created a new lower court for Jackson’s Capitol Complex Improvement District (CCID), which allegedly has a disproportionate share of Jackson's white residents. The judge and prosecutors for this new court would be appointed by the Chief Justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court and the Mississippi Attorney General, respectively, rather than by locally elected officials, as is typical for other municipal courts in Mississippi. The plaintiffs claimed that this appointment process violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection of the law.

However, the court found that plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to demonstrate a legally protected interest in the accountability of the CCID court to locally elected officials, or that H.B. 1020 would affect their voting rights by diluting the local government's control over the enforcement of its laws within the CCID's borders. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' claim of stigmatic harm, finding that they did not allege discriminatory treatment as required. Finally, the court found no merit in the argument that benefits from the CCID court would primarily go to a disproportionately white population, as the plaintiffs failed to show how H.B. 1020 would erect a barrier making it more difficult for members of one group to obtain benefits than another.

Texas v. Becerra

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-10246

Opinion Date: January 2, 2024

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

In a case involving the State of Texas, the American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians & Gynecologists, and the Christian Medical & Dental Associations as plaintiffs, and the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), its Secretary Xavier Becerra, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), and other officials as defendants, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The plaintiffs challenged HHS's guidance on the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), which they alleged mandated providers to perform elective abortions beyond HHS's authority and contrary to state law. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the enforcement of this guidance. The district court granted the injunction within Texas or against any member of a plaintiff organization, and HHS appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that the HHS guidance constituted a final agency action as it binds HHS to a particular legal position and has clear legal consequences should a physician or hospital violate it. The court found that HHS's guidance exceeds the statutory language of EMTALA, which does not mandate any specific type of medical treatment, let alone abortion care. The court also held that HHS was required to subject the guidance to notice and comment as it "establishes or changes a substantive legal standard." The court affirmed the injunction, finding it not overbroad, but rather tailored based on the parties, issues, and evidence before it.

Wages and White Lion Invest v. FDA

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 21-60766

Opinion Date: January 3, 2024

Areas of Law: Drugs & Biotech, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

In the case of Wages and White Lion Investments, L.L.C., doing business as Triton Distribution; Vapetasia, L.L.C., versus the Food & Drug Administration, the court found that the FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its denial of Premarket Tobacco Product Applications (PMTAs) for flavored e-cigarette products.

The petitioners, Triton Distribution and Vapetasia, are manufacturers of flavored e-cigarette liquids. They filed PMTAs for their products, as required by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, which prohibits the sale of any “new tobacco product” without authorization from the FDA. The FDA, after issuing detailed guidance on the information it required for approval of e-cigarette products, subsequently denied all flavored e-cigarette applications, including those of the petitioners, on the grounds that they failed to predict new testing requirements imposed by the FDA without notice.

The court found that the FDA had failed to provide the manufacturers with fair notice of the rules, had not acknowledged or explained its change in position, and had ignored the reasonable and serious reliance interests that manufacturers had in the pre-denial guidance. Furthermore, the FDA attempted to cover up its mistakes with post hoc justifications at oral argument.

As a result, the court granted the petitions for review, set aside the FDA's marketing denial orders, and remanded the matters to the FDA. The court rejected FDA's argument that even if it arbitrarily and capriciously denied petitioners’ applications, that error was harmless, stating that the harmless error doctrine is narrow and does not apply to discretionary administrative decisions. The court also rejected FDA's contention that it gave manufacturers fair notice of their obligations to perform long-term scientific studies in its pre-denial guidance documents.

Moses v. City of Perry, Mich.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-1262

Opinion Date: January 4, 2024

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision that the motion to intervene by Local Roots Cannabis Company (Local Roots) was moot due to a settlement between the plaintiffs, Liberty Wellness, LLC and Jonathan Moses, and the defendant, the City of Perry, Michigan. The litigation arose after the City refused to implement a voter-approved marijuana facility licensing scheme, which the plaintiffs sought to compel through a declaratory relief action. While the litigation was pending, Local Roots, which received a license under the City's alternative licensing regime, moved to intervene. However, before the court ruled on the intervention motion, the plaintiffs and the City settled their dispute and dismissed the case, causing the court to deem the intervention motion moot. Local Roots appealed, arguing that the stipulation of dismissal was invalid because it did not consent to it and that its intervention motion was not moot because the lower court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. The appeals court held that Local Roots did not become a party under Rule 41 until the district court granted its motion to intervene and that it did not need to sign the stipulation for it to be effective, confirming the validity of the stipulation of dismissal. Furthermore, the court clarified that the dismissal of the case mooted Local Roots' motion to intervene as the lower court only retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement and not to reopen the whole case.

USA V. MOTLEY

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 21-10296

Opinion Date: December 29, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the defendant, Myron Motley, was convicted and sentenced for his involvement in a conspiracy to distribute controlled substances—oxycodone and hydrocodone. Motley appealed his conviction, arguing that the evidence obtained from two GPS tracking warrants and a wiretap warrant was obtained illegally.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision to deny Motley's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the GPS tracking warrants. The court held that Motley had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his opioid prescription records maintained in Nevada's Prescription Monitoring Program database due to the government's long-standing and pervasive regulation of opioids. Therefore, the Fourth Amendment challenge to the GPS tracking warrants failed.

Additionally, the court affirmed the lower court's determination that the wiretap warrant was supported by probable cause and was necessary. The court found that the affidavit supporting the wiretap warrant application contained sufficient evidence establishing probable cause that Motley was engaged in a conspiracy to illegally distribute prescription opioids. The affidavit also contained enough information for the court to reasonably conclude that a wiretap was necessary to identify the full scope of the conspiracy.

The court dismissed Motley's counterarguments, stating that the government's need for a wiretap was not negated simply because it managed to obtain some evidence of a conspiracy without a wiretap. The court explained that the government has a powerful interest in identifying all conspirators and the full scope of the conspiracy. For these reasons, the court affirmed the lower court's decisions.

Raper v. Commissioner of Social Security

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-11103

Opinion Date: January 3, 2024

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

In this appeal, Marcus Raper contested the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) 2020 denial of his claim for disability insurance benefits. Raper raised three arguments: (1) that the administrative law judge's (ALJ) initial lack of constitutional appointment under the Appointments Clause tainted his later constitutionally appointed review of his case, (2) that the ALJ failed to clearly articulate good cause for not fully crediting his treating physician’s medical opinion, and (3) that the ALJ wrongly discredited his subjective complaints of pain by not properly considering evidence other than objective medical evidence.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision. First, the court found no Appointments Clause violation as the ALJ's initial decision, made when he was unconstitutionally appointed, had been vacated on the merits and the case was remanded to the same ALJ who was then constitutionally appointed. Second, the court held that the ALJ articulated good cause for discounting Raper's treating physician’s opinion, finding the opinion inconsistent with the record. Lastly, the court found that the ALJ had properly considered Raper’s subjective complaints in light of the record as a whole and adequately explained his decision not to fully credit Raper’s alleged limitations on his ability to work.

City of Lincoln v. FERC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 22-1205

Opinion Date: January 2, 2024

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Utilities Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit examined a case involving the City of Lincoln, also known as Lincoln Electric, a public utility providing electricity to the Lincoln, Nebraska area. Lincoln Electric had invested in the Laramie River Station facilities (LRS) in eastern Wyoming as a source of generation and transmission, despite only serving customers in the Lincoln area.

When Lincoln Electric joined the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) in 2009, it transferred control of all its facilities in the Lincoln area to SPP, but retained control of its LRS interest. In 2021, the SPP proposed that Lincoln Electric recover its LRS costs from Zone 19 customers, where LRS is physically located. Other co-owners of the LRS facilities recover their costs from Zone 19 customers.

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) rejected the SPP proposal as unjust and unreasonable because Zone 19 customers neither caused Lincoln Electric's LRS investment nor benefited from it, thus violating the cost-causation principle. Lincoln Electric petitioned for review of the relevant FERC orders and the SPP intervened on Lincoln Electric's behalf.

The court upheld FERC's decision, ruling that Lincoln Electric failed to demonstrate that the proposed rates were just and reasonable. The court concluded that cost allocation must reflect the costs actually caused by the customer who must pay them. In this case, Lincoln Electric's investment in the LRS was for the benefit of its own Zone 16 customers, not Zone 19 customers. As such, the court found that allocating Lincoln Electric's LRS costs to Zone 19 would violate the cost-causation principle. The petition for review was denied.

Sitka Tribe of Alaska v. State of Alaska

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-18114

Opinion Date: December 29, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Native American Law

In this case, the Sitka Tribe of Alaska challenged the State of Alaska's management of a commercial fishery, arguing that it harmed a subsistence fishery. The tribe argued that the state violated the subsistence priority statute and the common use and sustained yield clauses in the Alaska Constitution. The tribe also claimed that the state was misinterpreting a regulation controlling the fishery and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the state from managing the fishery according to that interpretation during the upcoming season. The superior court denied the preliminary injunction.

The tribe eventually won on its statutory and regulatory claim, but the superior court denied its constitutional claim and its request for attorney’s fees. The tribe appealed to the Supreme Court of Alaska.

The Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s decisions. It held that the hard look doctrine, requiring agencies to consider all relevant information, already existed and there was no need to create a constitutional requirement not in the plain language of Article VIII, Section 4 of the Alaska Constitution. The court also declined to review the tribe’s motion for a preliminary injunction under the public interest exception, as the issue was moot and did not justify application of the public interest exception. Lastly, the court held that the superior court did not abuse its discretion by declining to award attorney’s fees as the tribe had not shown that the superior court's decision was arbitrary, capricious, manifestly unreasonable, or stemmed from an improper motive.

First Amendment Coalition v. Super. Ct.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A165888(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 29, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

In the case brought before the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, the petitioners, First Amendment Coalition and KQED Inc., sought public access to certain records in the possession of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice, relating to peace officers and custodial officers. The records primarily pertained to instances of use of force, discharge of firearms, and sustained findings of dishonesty or sexual assault by an officer, which were considered nonconfidential under section 832.7(b) of the Penal Code.

However, the Department withheld certain records citing exemptions under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) due to other state laws prohibiting their disclosure. The petitioners filed a motion for judgment compelling disclosure of these withheld documents but were denied by the trial court.

The court, applying rules of statutory construction, concluded that section 832.7(b) of the Penal Code supersedes state law disclosure exemptions that conflict with its decree that records within its scope are not confidential and shall be made available to the public. As such, the court ordered a directive for the respondent court to vacate its judgment to the extent it denies the petitioners’ motion for judgment based on Government Code section 11183, which prohibits the disclosure of subpoenaed records. In all other respects, the petition for writ of mandate was denied.

Gonzales v. California Victim Compensation Bd.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B323360(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 29, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the case of Joshua Zamora Gonzales v. California Victim Compensation Board, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Two affirmed a lower court ruling that upheld the California Victim Compensation Board's denial of compensation to Gonzales. Gonzales was previously convicted of a gang-related shooting but had his convictions overturned by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit due to insufficiency of evidence. Subsequently, he applied for compensation for the time he was wrongfully imprisoned. The Board denied his claim, finding that he failed to prove his factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence. Gonzales then filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandamus, which was denied by the lower court. Upon appeal, the appellate court upheld the lower court's decision, concluding substantial evidence supported the Board's ruling that Gonzales failed to establish his factual innocence.

HART v. Ward

Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii

Docket: SCAP-22-0000335

Opinion Date: December 29, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

This case involves a dispute between the City and County of Honolulu, acting through the Honolulu Authority for Rapid Transportation (HART), and Victoria Ward, Limited, over the amount of just compensation to be paid for two acres of easements on property previously owned by Victoria Ward. The easements were obtained by HART for the construction of a fixed rail system and a proposed Kaka'ako Station. The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i ruled that the circuit court had erred in granting summary judgment on many of the issues in the case. The supreme court ruled that the circuit court had incorrectly used summary judgment to resolve disputed factual issues including whether Victoria Ward was estopped from seeking severance damages, whether Victoria Ward's claims relating to a "lost tower" were too speculative, and whether Victoria Ward was precluded from seeking severance damages for impacts to non-taken properties. The supreme court affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment on some issues, but vacated others and remanded the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings. The supreme court affirmed the circuit court's pause of the accrual of "blight of summons" interest during the pendency of the appeal.

Skehan v. ISP

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 49547

Opinion Date: January 3, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Idaho, Michael W. Skehan appealed a decision affirming the Idaho Central Sex Offender Registry's ruling that he must register as a sex offender in Idaho. Skehan had been convicted of sexual abuse in the third degree in Oregon in 2001 and later moved to Idaho. He argued that the procedures used by the Registry were improper and that he should not be required to register.

The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that Skehan failed to demonstrate that the Registry's ruling was deficient under Idaho Code section 67-5279(3). The court also found that Skehan failed to preserve several arguments for appeal, offered little rebuttal to the Registry's position, and did not provide a sufficient record to substantiate his claims on appeal.

The court also held that Skehan failed to demonstrate that the Registry's consideration of other information in addition to the Oregon and Idaho statutes was arbitrary and capricious. Additionally, the court found that the Registry did not abuse its discretion by not considering whether his Oregon conviction was a misdemeanor or felony. Lastly, the court concluded that the Registry was not required to compare Skehan’s Oregon conviction to Idaho offenses that do not require registration.

The Registry was awarded its reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-117.

Penny v. City of Winterset

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 22-1026

Opinion Date: December 29, 2023

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed a case where a plaintiff, James Penny, brought a lawsuit against the City of Winterset and a police officer, Christian Dekker, for damages caused by a collision. Officer Dekker was responding to an emergency call and had his overhead lights and siren on. He was traveling northbound and James Penny was traveling westbound when their vehicles collided at an intersection. As a result of the collision, Penny sustained several injuries. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that the police officer's conduct was not reckless. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision.

On further review, the Supreme Court of Iowa found that Officer Dekker's conduct did not rise to the level of recklessness under Iowa law, affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment. The court noted that while Officer Dekker did not come to a complete stop at the stop sign, he was not required to do so under Iowa Code section 321.231(3)(a) if he slowed down to a speed "necessary for safe operation." The court concluded that while it may have been negligent for Officer Dekker not to have perceived the lights to his right as coming from Penny's vehicle rather than a farmhouse, this failure did not rise to the level of recklessness. Thus, the court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the district court's judgment.