Table of Contents
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Peterson v. Heinen
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
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United States v. Browne
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
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USA V. GUERRERO
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
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Watkinson v. State of Alaska
Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law
Alaska Supreme Court
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Castanares v. Super. Ct.
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law
California Courts of Appeal
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P. v. Campbell
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
California Courts of Appeal
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State v. Pickell
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
Supreme Court of Hawaii
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Shumway v. IDOL
Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law
Idaho Supreme Court - Civil
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Office of the Public Advocate v. Public Utilities Commission
Government & Administrative Law, Utilities Law
Maine Supreme Judicial Court
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MCCORD VS. STATE
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
Supreme Court of Nevada
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Appeal of New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services; Appeal of North Country Environmental Services, Inc.
Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
New Hampshire Supreme Court
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Government & Administrative Law Opinions
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Peterson v. Heinen
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Docket:
22-1603
Opinion Date: December 26, 2023
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The case involves Brandon Peterson, an inmate at Washington County Jail (WCJ), who filed a lawsuit alleging violations of his constitutional rights by various jail officials. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, reviewing the case, had to decide on numerous instances of alleged excessive force, failure to intervene, and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, as well as constitutional and state law claims.
The court found that on several occasions of alleged excessive force, the officers' actions were justified given Peterson's disruptive and threatening behavior. Consequently, the court granted qualified immunity to the officers involved in these incidents. In the case of the failure to intervene claims, the court decided that without an underlying constitutional violation, there can be no liability for failure to intervene, resulting in the officers being granted qualified immunity for these claims as well.
On the issue of deliberate indifference to Peterson's mental health condition, the court found that the prison officials had made efforts to address his condition and had not acted with deliberate disregard for his health. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to the officials involved.
Regarding Peterson's claim of being subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement, the court remanded the case to the district court for it to address this issue. The court also remanded the case to the district court to decide on the state law and Monell claims. As such, the Appeals Court reversed in part, dismissed in part, and vacated in part the district court's decision, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with the court’s opinion.
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United States v. Browne
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Docket:
22-3333
Opinion Date: December 27, 2023
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the sentences of Theodore Browne and Karley Ann Smith, both of whom had pled guilty to conspiring to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. Browne claimed that the district court erred in determining that he transported 10 pounds of meth, which influenced his base offense level. However, the Appeals Court ruled that the district court's approximation of the drug quantity, based on witness testimonies, was not clearly erroneous. Browne also argued that the district court wrongly applied a 4-level role enhancement, contending that there was insufficient evidence to show he was an "organizer or leader" of the conspiracy. The Appeals Court disagreed, ruling that the district court's finding was not clearly erroneous based on witness testimonies. Smith argued that the district court abused its discretion by considering late-filed evidence in the government’s sentencing memorandum, which resulted in the imposition of an obstruction enhancement and the denial of an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. The Appeals Court ruled that Smith had sufficient time to review and respond to the challenged exhibits, and that the district court did not err in finding obstruction of justice and rejecting the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction.
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USA V. GUERRERO
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Docket:
22-10042
Opinion Date: December 26, 2023
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
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In this case, the defendant, Christopher De Leon Guerrero, was convicted on two counts of attempted enticement of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and was sentenced to ten years in prison and five years of supervised release. Guerrero appealed his conviction and sentence.
Guerrero's conviction was based on his online conversations with a fictional 13-year-old girl named "Emily," who was actually a federal agent. He made plans to meet "Emily" at Andersen Air Force Base for sexual activities. Guerrero argued that he could not be charged under Guam law for actions that took place on a federal enclave, Andersen Air Force Base. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed, citing a precedent set in United States v. Lopez.
The court affirmed Guerrero’s convictions under § 2422(b) by referencing another predicate offense, not specified in the indictment, with which he could have been charged. They concluded that both of Guerrero’s convictions could be supported by § 13.10, the Guam criminal attempt statute.
As for the sentence, the court agreed with both parties that Guerrero’s sentence should be reversed, vacated, and remanded to the district court for reconsideration of three special conditions imposed on his supervised release. These conditions were that Guerrero must not go to places where children under the age of 18 are likely to be, must not view or possess any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct, and must participate in a sex offense-specific treatment program.
The court affirmed the convictions but reversed, vacated, and remanded the sentence to the district court for reconsideration of the three special conditions of supervised release.
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Watkinson v. State of Alaska
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Court: Alaska Supreme Court
Docket:
S-17941
Opinion Date: December 22, 2023
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska, the case involved a self-represented prisoner who sued the Department of Corrections (DOC) for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The prisoner alleged that DOC held him in administrative segregation (solitary confinement) for 504 days and that corrections officers denied him any meaningful opportunity to appeal or be heard regarding his segregation. The prisoner contended that the corrections officers’ actions amounted to extreme and outrageous conduct that caused him severe emotional distress. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of DOC, reasoning that DOC’s conduct was not extreme and outrageous and that the prisoner’s distress was not severe enough to give rise to liability.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska concluded that the superior court abused its discretion in dismissing the prisoner's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment in DOC’s favor as to the prisoner’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The Supreme Court also vacated the superior court’s order approving the attorney general’s certification that individual corrections officers acted within the scope of their employment, reversed the court’s denial of the prisoner’s request to compel certain discovery, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to the prisoner’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim.
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Castanares v. Super. Ct.
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Court: California Courts of Appeal
Docket:
D082048(Fourth Appellate District)
Opinion Date: December 27, 2023
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law
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A California appellate court ruled on a case where a journalist, Arturo Castañares, sought access to video footage recorded by drones operated by the City of Chula Vista Police Department. Castañares filed a request under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) for video footage from all drone flights for a specific month. The City provided Castañares with all the information he requested except for the video footage, leading Castañares to file a lawsuit. The trial court ruled that the video footage was exempt from disclosure due to being classified as records of investigations and that the burden of redacting the footage outweighed the benefit of disclosing. Upon appeal, the appellate court found that the trial court erred in determining that all drone footage was exempt from disclosure under the CPRA. The court determined that the drone footage could be divided into three categories: footage that is part of an investigatory file, footage of investigations, and footage of factual inquiries. The first two categories are exempt from disclosure under the CPRA, while the third is not. The case was remanded for further proceedings, with the City asked to categorize the footage accordingly and argue why the catchall provision applies to the third category.
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P. v. Campbell
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Court: California Courts of Appeal
Docket:
A162472A(First Appellate District)
Opinion Date: December 28, 2023
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
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In a case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California, the appellants, Stephon Anthony, Rafael Campbell, Samuel Flowers, and Anthony B. Price, were seeking relief from their first degree murder convictions on multiple grounds. The court found that the trial court was entitled to consider the jury's intent-to-kill findings at the prima facie stage, but that these findings did not preclude relief as a matter of law. The case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6 of the Penal Code. Furthermore, the court agreed with the People that recent amendment of the gang statutes requires retrial or resentencing on gang-related special-circumstance and enhancement allegations. The court also ordered a remand to strike the multiple-murder special circumstance for Campbell, Flowers, and Price, and to reconsider sentencing on their Vehicle Code convictions in light of recent legislative changes. The court affirmed the trial court's decision not to strike the enhancements and prior strikes.
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State v. Pickell
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Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii
Docket:
SCWC-21-0000530
Opinion Date: December 26, 2023
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i affirmed the judgment of the Intermediate Court of Appeals upholding the conviction of Michael Pickell for operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant. The case centered around the legality of a traffic stop initiated by a Maui County police officer who observed Pickell executing a U-turn at a highway intersection with left turn only markings and signage but no signage explicitly prohibiting U-turns. Pickell argued that in the absence of an express sign prohibiting U-turns, as required by Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291C-82(c), the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to make the traffic stop. The court held that the Maui County ordinance, which requires drivers to follow the directional movements exhibited on markings and signage at intersections, was neither preempted by HRS § 291C-82(c) nor in conflict with it. Therefore, the officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop based on a violation of the Maui County ordinance, and the motion to suppress evidence from the stop was properly denied.
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Shumway v. IDOL
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Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil
Docket:
50045
Opinion Date: December 28, 2023
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law
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Amy Shumway was employed as a receptionist at Evans Chiropractic in Idaho. Her employment was terminated by Dr. John Hitchcock, one of the owners, for insubordination. Following her termination, Shumway applied for unemployment benefits. Her application was initially approved by an Appeals Examiner from the Idaho Department of Labor (IDOL) who found Shumway eligible for benefits despite her termination for insubordination. On appeal by Evans Chiropractic, the Industrial Commission affirmed the decision, but on different grounds. Evans Chiropractic then appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho.
In the Supreme Court, Evans Chiropractic argued that Shumway should not be eligible for benefits because her employment was terminated for job-related misconduct, namely her refusal to meet with Dr. Hitchcock for discussions about her behavior at work. The Supreme Court agreed, finding that the Commission erred in its application of the law. The Court noted that the Commission had focused on Shumway's subjective reasons for not meeting with Hitchcock, rather than the employer's expectations. The Court found that Hitchcock directly communicated his expectation for Shumway to meet with him and that her refusal to do so constituted insubordination, which is a form of job-related misconduct. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Commission’s decision and held that Shumway was ineligible for unemployment benefits as a matter of law.
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Office of the Public Advocate v. Public Utilities Commission
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Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court
Citation:
2023 ME 77
Opinion Date: December 28, 2023
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law, Utilities Law
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In the case before the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, the Office of the Public Advocate (the appellant) contested a decision by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) that approved an amended special rate contract between Bangor Natural Gas Company and Bucksport Generation LLC. The appellant argued that the PUC applied the wrong standard in reviewing the contract, which led to unjust or unreasonable rates and undue or unreasonable preference for Bucksport Generation over other Bangor Gas customers. The appellant also argued that the PUC's order should be vacated because it relied on evidence not included in the record.
The court disagreed with the appellant's first argument and found the second argument waived, thereby affirming the PUC's order. The court held that the PUC was within its discretion to apply different standards of review for special rate contracts depending on the type of utility service at issue. Given the competitive nature of the natural gas market in Maine, the court deemed the PUC's standard reasonable.
Regarding the rates, the court found that the PUC’s approval of the special rate contract did not result in unjust, unreasonable, or discriminatory rates for other Bangor Gas customers. The court noted that incentivizing continued financial contributions from Bucksport Generation to Bangor Gas’s fixed costs was justifiable.
Finally, the court ruled that the appellant's argument about the PUC's failure to create an evidentiary record was waived due to the appellant's failure to raise the issue at the PUC level. However, the court acknowledged the appellant's point and advised the PUC to clarify its regulations regarding what materials constitute the evidentiary record in proceedings where an evidentiary hearing is not held.
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MCCORD VS. STATE
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Court: Supreme Court of Nevada
Citation:
139 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 59
Opinion Date: December 28, 2023
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed a case involving appellant David McCord, who was stopped by law enforcement due to a license plate frame partially covering the word "NEVADA." Law enforcement subsequently found contraband in McCord's car, leading to his conviction for trafficking in a controlled substance. McCord contested the legality of the traffic stop, arguing that the license plate frame did not constitute "foreign materials" as outlined in NRS 482.275(4), and that his license plate was "clearly legible" as the statute requires.
The court held that a license plate frame does not constitute "foreign materials" under NRS 482.275(4), and that a license plate is "clearly legible" if the required registration information is readily identifiable. The court reasoned that the term "foreign materials" should not be interpreted to include all license plate frames, as this could potentially lead to arbitrary or pretextual traffic stops. It also determined that even though the license plate frame partially covered the word "NEVADA," the license plate was still legible as the essential information was readily identifiable.
The court concluded that the law enforcement officer lacked probable cause to justify the traffic stop for a violation of NRS 482.275(4). Consequently, the district court had erred in finding that the traffic stop was reasonable and in denying the motion to suppress evidence seized during the stop. The court reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings.
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Appeal of New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services; Appeal of North Country Environmental Services, Inc.
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Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court
Dockets:
2022-0690, 2022-0691
Opinion Date: December 28, 2023
Areas of Law:
Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed a decision by the New Hampshire Waste Management Council (Council) that had found the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services (DES) acted unlawfully in issuing a permit to North Country Environmental Services, Inc. (NCES) for the expansion of a landfill. The Council had ruled in favor of the Conservation Law Foundation (CLF), which argued the permit did not meet the "capacity need" as required by law. The Supreme Court ruled that the Council erred in its interpretation of "capacity need" under RSA 149-M:11, V(d) and concluded that DES has the discretion to determine whether a capacity need exists. The Court also found that the CLF had standing to appeal the permit to the Council.
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