United States v. Valdez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Dockets: 22-1543, 22-1552

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case involves the defendant-appellant, Augusto Valdez, who appealed from his guilty plea and conviction for which he received 120 months' imprisonment, followed by a five-year term of supervised release. Valdez raised two issues: firstly, he asserted that the district court should have granted his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because he conspired only with a confidential source and not a co-conspirator, and that the court did not ensure that he knew he couldn't conspire illegally with a government agent. Secondly, he sought to vacate his sentence because the district court should have, on its own initiative, verified his eligibility for the safety valve under U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The court found that Valdez knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty plea and was not misled about the nature of the conspiracy charge, thereby rejecting his argument that his plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. His argument that he could not be convicted for conspiring only with a government agent was rejected because the facts revealed two true conspirators: Valdez and a Texas source. The court also found that Valdez waived his right to argue for the application of the safety valve because he failed to object to the PSR and requested the mandatory minimum sentence, which was inconsistent with his later argument for the application of the safety valve.

USA v. Jordan

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 22-2153

Opinion Date: December 12, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit heard an appeal by Mark Jordan regarding his conviction for armed bank robbery and associated gun charges. The main issue was whether armed bank robbery can be considered a "crime of violence" under a federal gun statute. Jordan argued that armed bank robbery could be committed recklessly, and therefore should not count as a crime of violence.

The court, however, found that the federal armed bank robbery statute is divisible into different crimes, and the specific crime that Jordan pleaded guilty to required purpose or knowledge, not recklessness. Therefore, using the modified categorical approach, the court held that armed bank robbery is a crime of violence. The court also held that whenever a federal crime is predicated on committing another crime, the elements of the predicate crime are considered elements of the first crime as well.

In regards to the facts of the case, Jordan committed three bank robberies, during two of which he fired a gun. He was charged with three counts of armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) and two gun charges under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). He pleaded guilty to all five counts and was sentenced to 318 months in prison. He later challenged his sentence, arguing that § 2113(d) is not a "crime of violence" under § 924(c), which is what the court ultimately disagreed with.

Easterbrook v. Kijakazi

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 21-2193

Opinion Date: December 11, 2023

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

In this case heard before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the plaintiff, Daniella Easterbrook, appealed the denial of her application for disability benefits by the Social Security Administration. Easterbrook, who has suffered from persistent back pain since 2011, argued that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) failed to provide a "good reason," supported by substantial evidence, for not giving adequate weight to the opinions of her treating physician, Dr. John Kim.

The court agreed with Easterbrook, stating that the ALJ erred in not applying the "treating source rule" to Dr. Kim's opinions and not providing a sufficient justification for giving his opinions less weight. The court noted that Dr. Kim's opinions were well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and were consistent with the substantial evidence in the record.

The court also found that the ALJ's reasons for discounting Dr. Kim's opinions, such as Easterbrook's decision not to undergo certain treatments, were inappropriate and did not constitute "good reasons." The court stated that a patient's refusal to pursue a specific type of medical treatment does not automatically call into question the severity of her pain.

As a result, the court reversed the Commissioner's decision and remanded the case for a determination consistent with its opinion.

US v. Vandivere

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 22-6118

Opinion Date: December 8, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

In this appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, James Dow Vandivere challenged a district court decision denying his motion for release from civil commitment under the Adam Walsh Act. Vandivere, who had been convicted of multiple crimes involving the sexual exploitation of minors and sentenced to almost twenty years in prison, was nearing the end of his sentence when the government moved to civilly commit him. The government argued, and the district court agreed, that Vandivere remained sexually dangerous. Vandivere filed a motion for discharge and, following a hearing, the district court found he remained sexually dangerous and denied his motion. Vandivere appealed, arguing that he was wrongly forced to bear the burden of proof at the hearing and that the district court erred in determining that he remained sexually dangerous.

The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court found that under the Adam Walsh Act, the burden of proof at an Adam Walsh Act discharge hearing is on the detainee to show his recovery by a preponderance of the evidence. The court also found this allocation of burden does not violate the detainee’s due process rights. Further, the appellate court found no error in the district court's conclusion that Vandivere remained sexually dangerous, stating that the district court had appropriately considered Vandivere's behavior while in custody, his persistent cognitive distortions about sexual abuse, his refusal to participate in sex offender therapy, and his proposed release plan.

USA v. Jackson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-10803

Opinion Date: December 13, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the appellant, Brian Jackson, challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his guilty plea for attempted interference with commerce by robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Jackson and two co-conspirators had attempted to rob a convenience store, and in the course of the incident, the store was closed for about three hours, causing it to lose $600 in potential earnings. Jackson argued that the record did not sufficiently show that the attempted robbery impacted interstate commerce.

The court, however, ruled that Jackson's plea agreement contained sufficient factual admissions to satisfy the Hobbs Act’s commerce element. It noted that Jackson admitted to attempting to rob the store with the intent to affect interstate commerce. In addition, the court found that the temporary closure of the store resulting from the attempted robbery affected interstate commerce, as it depleted the store's assets by $600, impeding its ability to engage in future interstate commerce. The court also inferred from the record that the store likely dealt in goods originating from outside Texas and therefore engaged in interstate commerce.

Jackson's argument that he would not have pled guilty if he had known the facts were insufficient under the commerce element was dismissed by the court. The court noted that Jackson had pled guilty despite believing that the facts were insufficient to support the commerce prong, and he had admitted that his purpose in pleading guilty was to avoid potential conviction under a statute carrying longer sentences.

The court thus found no reversible error and affirmed the lower court's decision.

Heyward v. Cooper

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 22-3781

Opinion Date: December 13, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, a prisoner named Lyle Heyward filed a complaint alleging that prison officials frustrated his attempts to celebrate Ramadan, a holy month for Muslims, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). He also alleges that officials retaliated against him for filing grievances in violation of the First Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Heyward’s Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) claim, as RLUIPA does not permit money damages claims against state prison officials in their individual capacities, and his requests for injunctive relief were mooted by his transfer to a different prison facility.

However, the court reversed the dismissal of Heyward’s First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Guise, finding that Heyward had adequately pleaded a retaliation claim. Specifically, Heyward alleged that after he filed a grievance against Guise, she threatened members of the Cultural Awareness Inmate Group to kick Heyward out of the organization or else the organization would be shut down. The court found these allegations sufficient to suggest that Guise's action was motivated at least in part by Heyward’s grievance-filing.

The court also reversed the dismissal of Heyward’s Equal Protection Clause claim against Defendants Cooper, Smith, Davis, and Factor. Heyward alleged these officials treated members of other faith traditions differently than they treated Muslims. The court found that Heyward’s allegations of a facially discriminatory distinction between different religious groups sufficiently alleged an equal-protection violation.

The case was remanded for further proceedings.

USA v. Krahenbuhl

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-3264

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Military Law

In 2023, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the disorderly conduct convictions of Jamison Krahenbuhl, an Air Force veteran. Krahenbuhl had been convicted following an incident at the Milo C. Huempfner Veterans Affairs Outpatient Clinic in Green Bay, Wisconsin. During a respiratory therapy appointment, Krahenbuhl became agitated and engaged in abusive language and disruptive behavior that led to the clinic staff summoning VA police. He was subsequently charged with two counts of disorderly conduct under 38 C.F.R. § 1.218(a)(5), (b)(11) and was found guilty on both counts.

On appeal, Krahenbuhl argued that his convictions violated his First Amendment rights, and that the government failed to prove all the elements of the crimes. The appellate court, however, disagreed. It determined that the clinic was a nonpublic forum, where greater regulation of speech is permissible. The court found that the regulation under which Krahenbuhl was convicted was viewpoint neutral and reasonable, given the clinic's primary aim of providing medical care to veterans. The court also rejected Krahenbuhl's argument that the government failed to prove that the clinic was under the charge and control of the VA and not under the charge and control of the General Services Administration, finding that this was an invited error. Consequently, Krahenbuhl's convictions were affirmed.

MIGRANT CLINICIANS NETWORK V. USEPA

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 21-70719

Opinion Date: December 13, 2023

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) failed to comply with both the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in its decision to amend the registration of streptomycin for use on citrus crops. The case was brought by a group of environmental advocacy and public interest organizations against the EPA.

The EPA had concluded that the registration of streptomycin for use on citrus would not cause "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment." However, the court disagreed, finding a lack of substantial evidence for some of the EPA’s conclusions. In particular, the court held that the EPA’s assessment of the risk to pollinators (bees) was incomplete or inadequately explained, and the agency failed to provide a sufficient explanation for the registration labels’ suggestion that streptomycin could be used to prevent citrus diseases.

Furthermore, the court also found that the EPA failed to comply with the ESA. According to the ESA, the EPA should have determined whether the pesticide registration "may affect" any endangered species or critical habitat, which it failed to do.

As a result, the court vacated the EPA’s amended registration of streptomycin for use on citrus crops and remanded the case back to the agency to address the errors in its FIFRA analysis and to conduct an ESA effects determination.

STANARD V. DY

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 21-35582

Opinion Date: December 11, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, a plaintiff named Robert A. Stanard, who was an inmate in the federal prison system, sued several prison officials, claiming they violated his Eighth Amendment rights by denying him treatment for Hepatitis C, and his Fifth Amendment rights by discriminating against him due to his pre-trial status. Stanard sought damages under Bivens, a precedent that allows individuals to sue federal officers for constitutional rights violations. The district court dismissed Stanard’s complaint, and he appealed.

The Ninth Circuit partly affirmed and partly reversed the district court’s decision. First, the court reversed the dismissal of Stanard’s Eighth Amendment claim. The court found that his claim was not a new context for a Bivens action because it was similar to a previous case, Carlson v. Green, where the Supreme Court recognized a Bivens remedy for prison officials who were deliberately indifferent to an inmate's medical needs. The court rejected the defendants' argument that the prison officials in Stanard's case denied him care due to a Bureau of Prisons policy, while the officials in Carlson acted so inappropriately as to evidence intentional maltreatment causing death, holding that the difference in degree was not a meaningful difference that would create a new context.

However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Stanard’s Fifth Amendment claim. The court found that this claim did present a new Bivens context because it involved disparate treatment of pre-sentencing and post-sentencing inmates, a situation not previously addressed in Bivens cases. Given that this was a new context, the court then determined that special factors counseled against extending a Bivens remedy. Specifically, the existence of alternative remedial structures, such as the Bureau of Prisons' administrative remedy process, indicated that Congress, rather than the courts, should decide whether to create a new damages remedy.

Stefano v. State of Alaska, Department of Corrections

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-82

Opinion Date: December 8, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reversed the Superior Court's decision and held that the Department of Corrections' policy change regarding the definition of "firm release date" for prisoners was a regulation that required compliance with the rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The Department of Corrections had changed its interpretation of "firm release date" twice. Initially, a prisoner's release date on discretionary parole was not considered a "firm release date." In 2016, the Department changed this interpretation and considered a discretionary parole release date as a "firm release date." However, in 2019, the Department reverted to its initial interpretation. The plaintiff, Trevor Stefano, a prisoner, argued that this change in policy violated the APA because it amounted to revising a regulation without going through the APA’s rulemaking process. The Supreme Court agreed with Stefano, noting that the Department's actions were a changed interpretation of existing regulation that had to be adopted through rulemaking. Because the Department did not follow the rulemaking procedure, the Court reversed the Superior Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In re N.R.

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S274943

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Family Law, Government & Administrative Law

A person identified as O.R. appealed the decision of the Los Angeles County Superior Court to place his child, N.R., under the jurisdiction of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) based on allegations of substance abuse. The Supreme Court of California reviewed two issues concerning the interpretation of the Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(D), which allows for jurisdiction over a child in cases where the parent’s substance abuse results in an inability to provide regular care for the child and causes or could cause the child serious physical harm or illness.

First, the court clarified the term “substance abuse” as used in the statute. It rejected O.R.’s argument that “substance abuse” must be shown through a medical diagnosis or by meeting the criteria for a substance use disorder as outlined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). The court held that “substance abuse” in this context should be given its ordinary meaning, which refers to the excessive use of drugs or alcohol. The court cautioned that to establish dependency jurisdiction, the abuse must render the parent unable to provide regular care for the child and either cause the child serious physical harm or illness, or place the child at substantial risk of such harm or illness.

Second, the court rejected the so-called “tender years presumption,” which holds that substance abuse by a parent is prima facie evidence of an inability to provide regular care and a substantial risk of serious physical harm when the child is very young. The court held that this presumption is not supported by the language of the statute or the legislative intent, and improperly simplifies the analysis required under section 300(b)(1)(D). Instead, the court held that the government must establish each element of the statute separately, without shifting the burden to the parent to rebut a presumption created by a finding of substance abuse.

The court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

P. ex rel. Schlesinger v. Sachs

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G061838M(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 13, 2023

Areas of Law: Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three, the court heard an appeal from a quo warranto judgment which ordered the removal of Ed Sachs, Wendy Bucknum, and Greg Raths from their positions as members of the City of Mission Viejo City Council. The quo warranto judgment was based on the finding that their respective two-year terms of office, which they had been elected to in November 2018, had expired in December 2020. Despite this, Sachs, Bucknum, Raths, and Mission Viejo continued to hold office.

The defendants argued that Elections Code section 14029, which authorizes broad remedies for violations of the California Voting Rights Act of 2001, did not permit the implementation of two-year terms of office for city councilmembers because Government Code section 57377 imposes an ironclad requirement of four-year terms. They contended that they must be deemed to have been elected in November 2018 as councilmembers to four-year terms of office and were entitled to stay in office past their two-year terms.

However, the Court of Appeal rejected this argument, stating that even if their interpretation of Elections Code section 14029 and section 57377 was correct, the result they propose – that they receive four-year terms of office – was not. In November 2018, Sachs, Bucknum, and Raths were elected for two-year terms, not four-year terms. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment for quo warranto, stating that they were unlawfully holding office.

People v. Manzoor

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A164739S(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The case concerns Junaid Manzoor, who pleaded guilty in 2006 to a felony violation of attempting to distribute harmful material to a minor. As a result of his conviction, he was required to register as a sex offender for life under former section 290 of the Penal Code. Almost 14 years later, the trial court granted his petition to reduce his conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b) of the Penal Code. After the Legislature amended section 290 to provide for a tiered system of registration time periods, Manzoor filed a petition for relief from the registration requirements. The court summarily denied his petition. On appeal, Manzoor argued that due to the amendments to section 290, he was entitled to relief from the registration requirements because the reduction of his felony conviction to a misdemeanor placed him in "tier one" under the statute. The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District affirmed the trial court's order denying Manzoor's petition for relief. The court held that the reduction of Manzoor’s felony conviction to a misdemeanor did not qualify him for relief from the registration requirements, because subdivision (e) of section 17 of the Penal Code bars courts from granting such relief when the defendant was found guilty of an offense for which lifetime registration is required, and the amendments to section 290 do not reflect a legislative intent to create an exception to this rule.

Alave v. City of Chicago

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2023 IL 128602

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

In the case of Clark Alave v. The City of Chicago, the plaintiff, Clark Alave, filed a complaint against the City of Chicago after he was injured when his bicycle struck a pothole. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the city did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care under section 3-102(a) of the Tort Immunity Act. The court based this decision on the lack of any affirmative physical manifestations, such as signs or pavement markings, that the city intended for the roadway to be used for bicycling. The court also considered the Divvy bicycle rental station located nearby, but found that this station only indicated that the city permitted, not intended, bicycling on the roadway. The court therefore concluded that the plaintiff was not both a permitted and intended user of the roadway, and thus the city owed him no duty of care. The court reversed the judgment of the appellate court and affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint.

Miske v. DNRC

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 MT 241

Opinion Date: December 12, 2023

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

In the case heard by the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, Caryn Miske, the plaintiff and appellant, was appealing a district court decision that granted the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) summary judgment on all of her claims that arose from her termination by the DNRC from the Flathead Basin Commission.

The primary facts of the case involve Miske's employment as the Executive Director of the Flathead Basin Commission, a body established by the 1983 Legislature to protect the environment of Flathead Lake and its tributaries. The Commission is administratively attached to the DNRC, a relationship that Miske argued allowed the Commission independent authority over staffing decisions. However, the DNRC contended that the Commission and DNRC share concurrent authority over staffing decisions.

The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the DNRC on all of Miske's claims. It held that, based on the plain language and structure of the relevant statutes, the DNRC and the Commission have concurrent authority over staffing decisions, and therefore, Miske was a DNRC employee.

The court also ruled that the DNRC didn't commit intentional interference with contractual relations as it wasn't a stranger to Miske's relationship with the Commission. Additionally, the court found that Miske's lobbying efforts on behalf of the Commission were made in her capacity as a DNRC employee and thus were not protected political speech. Lastly, the court held that the DNRC had good cause to terminate Miske due to her repeated failures to provide the DNRC with state-issued credit card statements, which constituted a legitimate business reason for her termination.

Stand Up Montana v. Msla Co. Schools

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 MT 240

Opinion Date: December 12, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the State of Montana, a group of parents and the non-profit organization Stand Up Montana sued several school districts in Missoula County over the implementation of mask mandates in schools during the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs argued that the mask mandates violated their substantive due process rights. The Fourth Judicial District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the school districts, finding the mask mandates did not violate the plaintiffs' substantive due process rights. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court reiterated that the mask mandates did not implicate any fundamental rights under Article II of the Montana Constitution, and therefore, the rational basis test was the appropriate standard of review. Under the rational basis test, the court found that the mask mandates were rationally related to the legitimate government interest of stemming the spread of COVID-19, as the school districts had considered information and recommendations from reputable public and private health care providers and agencies, including the CDC, which all recommended universal masking. The court also affirmed the lower court's decision to grant a motion in limine to exclude testimony from the plaintiffs' hybrid witnesses, as the proffered testimony was not relevant to whether the mask policies were rationally related to stemming the spread of COVID-19.

Watson v. FWP

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 MT 239

Opinion Date: December 12, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the petitioner, Jay Watson, filed a grievance against his employer, the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks (FWP or agency), claiming he was underpaid for six years due to an agency error in implementing a new pay system. The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, ruled in favor of Watson and reversed the Final Agency Decision issued by the Board of Personnel Appeals (BOPA or Board). The court also awarded attorney fees to Watson. FWP appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana.

The Supreme Court held that the District Court did not err in reversing BOPA’s decision. The court found that BOPA incorrectly applied the Montana Wage Payment Act (MWPA) to Watson's grievance, which was pursued under the agency's grievance process. The court found that the MWPA provides a process independent from the agency grievance process and its restrictions and benefits do not apply to Watson's claim. As such, the MWPA's three-year limitation does not apply to Watson’s claim, and the court affirmed the District Court’s reinstatement of the Hearing Officer’s pay determination.

However, the Supreme Court held that the District Court erred in awarding attorney fees to Watson. The court noted that Montana follows the “American Rule” regarding fee awards, which provides that “absent statutory or contractual authority, attorney’s fees will not be awarded to the prevailing party in a lawsuit.” There was no contractual or statutory authority providing for attorney fee awards for prevailing parties in this case, and the court found that this case was not frivolous litigation or litigated inappropriately by FWP. Therefore, an exception to the generally applicable American Rule was not established. The court reversed the attorney fee award and remanded for entry of an amended judgment.

American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire v. New Hampshire Division of State Police

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2022-0321

Opinion Date: November 29, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

In a dispute between the American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire (ACLU) and the New Hampshire Division of State Police (the Division), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed a lower court's decision permitting the ACLU's request for access to public records about a former state trooper under the Right-to-Know Law. The Division had argued that these records were exempt from disclosure under RSA 105:13-b and their release would constitute an invasion of privacy. The ACLU had requested reports, investigatory files, personnel, and disciplinary records related to adverse employment action against the former trooper.

The Supreme Court ruled that the exemption cited by the Division, RSA 105:13-b, which pertains to the confidentiality of police personnel files, does not categorically prohibit disclosure of such records under the Right-to-Know Law. The court's interpretation of RSA 105:13-b is that it operates within the context of a specific criminal trial and does not prohibit disclosure in all instances or further regulate the information. Consequently, the Division's argument that the law establishes a scheme in which police personnel records may not be disclosed outside narrow exceptions was rejected.

The court also found no absurdity in the coexistence of different statutory frameworks for seeking information in a police personnel file for different purposes. It ruled that the material disclosed under the Right-to-Know Law and RSA 105:13-b is tailored to the purposes of the respective laws, reflecting the different purposes served by each statutory scheme.

In re Wang v James

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2023 NY Slip Op 06405

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury

An incarcerated individual developed a mass under his armpit and was referred to a surgeon who had a contract with the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS). The surgeon performed a biopsy, which was then sent to the pathology department at the Cortland Regional Medical Center (CRMC) for examination. Dr. Jun Wang, the Medical Director of CRMC's pathology department and a member of Cortland Pathology, examined the specimen and determined that the mass was benign. A year later, the patient was diagnosed with Hodgkin's lymphoma.

The patient initiated a medical malpractice lawsuit against CRMC and others, alleging that they misdiagnosed his condition and failed to promptly diagnose or refer him for treatment. Dr. Wang sought defense and indemnification from the State, claiming that he was entitled to coverage under Public Officers Law § 17 and Correction Law § 24-a because his actions arose from treating an incarcerated individual at the request of DOCCS. The Attorney General rejected Dr. Wang's request, stating that he treated the patient through his employment arrangement with CRMC, not directly at the request of the State, and thus the State had no obligation to provide defense or indemnification.

The New York Court of Appeals held that the State is not obligated to indemnify or defend Dr. Wang in a medical malpractice lawsuit. The court ruled that under the Correction Law § 24-a, the State's obligation to defend and indemnify only applies when there has been an explicit request by DOCCS for the services of a specific provider—an arrangement or understanding made in advance between DOCCS and the healthcare professional. In this case, no such express request or direct agreement existed between DOCCS and Dr. Wang, therefore, the State had no obligation to defend or indemnify him. The court also stated that the Attorney General's interpretation of the statute was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Hence, the court affirmed the order of the Appellate Division.

Matter of Lazalee v Wegman's Food Mkts., Inc.

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2023 NY Slip Op 06343

Opinion Date: December 12, 2023

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

In 2018, a worker, Thomas Lazalee, filed a claim for benefits after suffering a right thumb injury and carpal tunnel syndrome, for which he underwent surgery. His employer, Wegman's Food Markets, Inc., did not challenge the claim and compensated Lazalee at the temporary total disability rate. In 2019, Lazalee was diagnosed with similar injuries to his left hand, and again, Wegman's compensated him at the temporary total disability rate. Lazalee then requested a hearing to amend the previous award to include these additional injuries.

At the hearing, Wegman's accepted liability but sought to cross-examine Lazalee's doctor regarding the degree of impairment during Lazalee's most recent period out of work. The Workers' Compensation Law Judge (WCLJ) denied this request, ruling that Lazalee's 11.2-week absence was not excessive. This decision was affirmed by the Workers' Compensation Board and the Appellate Division, with the latter finding that Wegman's request to cross-examine the doctor was disingenuous because it came after Wegman's had already paid Lazalee at the total disability rate until his return to work, and was based solely on the employer's counsel's interpretation of the medical reports without any credible medical evidence to the contrary.

However, the New York Court of Appeals reversed these decisions, holding that under the rules of the Workers' Compensation Board, if an employer wishes to cross-examine an attending physician whose report is on file, the referee must grant an adjournment for such purpose. The court found that the WCLJ did not have the discretion to deny Wegman's request for cross-examination made at the hearing before the WCLJ had rendered a decision on the merits. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division with instructions to remand to the Workers' Compensation Board for further proceedings in accordance with the Court of Appeals' opinion.

CANTWELL v. FLEX-N-GATE

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 OK 116

Opinion Date: December 12, 2023

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

Kevin Cantwell worked for Flex-N-Gate for 28 years during which he sustained numerous work-related injuries. He was awarded permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits for these injuries under the law as it existed before February 1, 2014, referred to as Title 85. After this date, workers' compensation claims were governed by a new law, Title 85A, under the Administrative Workers' Compensation Act (AWCA). Cantwell sustained three more injuries after the enactment of AWCA and was again awarded PPD benefits. However, the Workers' Compensation Commission denied payment of these benefits based on their interpretation of Section 46(H) of the AWCA, which limited the total weeks of PPD benefits to 350.

The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, in this case, disagreed with the Commission's interpretation. The court determined that the 100% limitation on PPD benefits under Section 45(C)(1) of the AWCA controls over the number of weeks when awarding compensation for PPD. This is particularly applicable where a claimant has compensable awards for job-related injuries that occurred both before and after February 1, 2014. The court vacated the Commission's order in each case and remanded the cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Maple Run Unified School District v. Vermont Human Rights Commission

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 VT 63

Opinion Date: December 8, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Education Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the case, Maple Run Unified School District (the District) appealed a trial court order which granted the Vermont Human Rights Commission (the Commission) a motion to dismiss the District’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The dispute arose from a complaint of sexual harassment filed by a student in the District. The student's mother later filed a complaint with the Commission alleging that the District failed to comply with the Vermont Public Accommodations Act (VPAA), the anti-harassment provisions in Title 16, and the school’s own policy. The Commission decided to investigate the matter. The District filed a motion with the Commission to dismiss the investigation, arguing that federal regulations preempted Title 16 and the complaint failed to state a prima facie case of discrimination under the VPAA. The Commission denied the District’s motion and decided to continue the investigation. The District then filed a Rule 75 petition in the civil division against the Commission, which the Commission moved to dismiss arguing that there was no cognizable avenue for relief under Rule 75 and the superior court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review the petition. The court dismissed the District’s complaint. The District appealed claiming that subject-matter jurisdiction had been established under Rule 75 via either mandamus or prohibition. The Supreme Court of Vermont held that the Commission’s determination that the complaint states a prima facie case of discrimination under the VPAA is not reviewable under Rule 75 via either mandamus or prohibition, and therefore, the superior court did not err in dismissing the District’s petition.

Commonwealth v. Delaune

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Docket: 230127

Opinion Date: December 14, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Virginia was asked to interpret Code § 19.2-306.1, a statute enacted in 2021 that addresses the range of punishment a court may impose upon the revocation of a suspended sentence. The defendant, Emily Katherine Delaune, was convicted of three drug offenses in 2019 and was sentenced to six years of incarceration, with four years suspended. After her release, she violated the terms of her probation by using drugs and absconding from supervision. The Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach revoked Delaune's suspended sentence based on these violations and ordered her to serve 60 days of active incarceration.

Delaune appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, arguing that under Code § 19.2-306.1, the circuit court was prohibited from imposing more than 14 days of active incarceration based on her technical violations. The Attorney General asserted that Code § 19.2-306.1 did not retroactively apply to Delaune’s probation violations.

The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the Court of Appeals' ruling that the parties had implicitly agreed to proceed under Code § 19.2-306.1 during the probation revocation hearing, and that the Attorney General was bound by this agreement. The Supreme Court of Virginia also agreed with the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Code § 19.2-306.1, stating that the circuit court could not impose a term of active incarceration based on Delaune’s drug use, which constituted a first technical violation under the statute, and could impose a maximum of 14 days of active incarceration for Delaune’s absconding violation, which was automatically classified as a second technical violation under the statute. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, holding that the circuit court erred when it ordered Delaune to serve 60 days of active incarceration.

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