Milton, MA v. FAA

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1521

Opinion Date: November 30, 2023

Areas of Law: Aviation, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law, Transportation Law

In this case, the Town of Milton, Massachusetts, petitioned for a judicial review of the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) final order authorizing a new flight procedure at Boston's Logan International Airport. The new procedure, aimed at increasing safety and efficiency, covers a narrower swath of airspace over the Town of Milton. The Town argued that the FAA's environmental analysis of the noise impacts failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). However, the United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit dismissed the Town's petition, ruling that the Town does not have standing to challenge the FAA's final order. The court concluded that the harms the Town asserted, including the impact of noise on its residents and the time and money spent addressing these issues, were not legally cognizable harms to the Town itself. The court agreed with other courts of appeals that have dismissed municipal NEPA challenges to FAA orders for lack of Article III standing because those challenges failed to show cognizable injury to the municipalities themselves.

PJM Power Providers Group v. FERC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 21-3068

Opinion Date: December 1, 2023

Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed a consolidated action related to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) acceptance of a tariff filed by PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM), a Regional Transmission Organization managing a system that serves around fifty million consumers in thirteen mid-Atlantic and Midwestern states and the District of Columbia. The tariff was challenged by PJM Power Providers Group and Electric Power Supply Association, two nonprofit associations representing energy generators, and Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission and Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. The challengers argued that the tariff, which was approved by inaction due to a deadlock among FERC commissioners, was arbitrary and capricious. The court disagreed, ruling that FERC's acceptance of the tariff was not arbitrary or capricious and was supported by substantial evidence. The court also confirmed that it could review FERC's inaction under the Federal Power Act.

Thomas v. City of Harrisburg

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 21-2963

Opinion Date: December 6, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed a case involving the estate of Terelle Thomas who died after ingesting a large amount of cocaine while in police custody. The plaintiffs, acting on behalf of the estate, brought a suit against the City of Harrisburg, PrimeCare Medical, and several individual law enforcement officers, alleging that they failed to render medical care and intervene to prevent a violation of the right to medical care. The officers moved to dismiss the case on the grounds of qualified immunity, but the District Court denied the motion.

On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity for the failure to render medical care claim as the plaintiffs successfully alleged a violation of the constitutional right to medical care. The court found that the officers had a clear indication that Thomas had ingested a significant amount of drugs and thus had a serious medical need, and their decision to book Thomas instead of taking him to a hospital demonstrated deliberate indifference to that need.

However, the court reversed on the failure to intervene claim. The court noted that neither the Third Circuit nor the Supreme Court had recognized a right to intervene in the context of rendering medical care. Therefore, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the failure to intervene claim. The case was remanded to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the failure to intervene claim.

Thomas v. City of Harrisburg

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 21-2963

Opinion Date: December 6, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

Sherelle Thomas, on behalf of the estate of Terelle Thomas, sued the City of Harrisburg, PrimeCare Medical, Inc., and several individual law enforcement officers (the Officers) alleging that they failed to provide medical care and to intervene in the prevention of a violation of Thomas's right to medical care. The Officers moved to dismiss the case on grounds of qualified immunity, but the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denied the motion. The Officers then appealed the decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, reviewing the case de novo, affirmed the District Court's denial of qualified immunity regarding the failure to render medical care. The court found that the Officers, based on their observations and knowledge, should have recognized that Thomas had ingested a significant amount of cocaine, presenting a serious medical need. The Officers' decision not to take Thomas to the hospital amounted to deliberate indifference to that need, constituting a violation of Thomas' constitutional right to medical care.

However, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's recognition of a claim of failure to intervene. The court explained that neither the Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit have recognized a right to intervene in the context of rendering medical care. As such, the Officers were entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

The case was remanded to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the claim regarding the Officers' failure to intervene.

Tawakkol v. Vasquez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-50434

Opinion Date: December 6, 2023

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law

Sammy Tawakkol sued two Texas state officials, alleging that they violated his right to procedural due process when they notified him that he was required to register as a sex offender under Texas law. The district court ruled in Tawakkol's favor. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that Tawakkol's suit was barred by sovereign immunity and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the case.

The case began when Tawakkol was required to register as a sex offender under the federal Sex Offender Registry and Notification Act (SORNA) because of a crime he committed while he was a cadet at the United States Air Force Academy. After he moved to Houston, Texas, state officials determined that he also needed to register as a sex offender under Texas's system. Tawakkol sued the state officials, alleging that their registration determination violated his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The district court ruled in favor of Tawakkol, but the Court of Appeals vacated this decision and remanded the case back to the district court with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals found that the suit was barred by sovereign immunity, a legal doctrine that prevents certain lawsuits against state officials. The court concluded that Tawakkol's case did not meet the criteria for an exception to sovereign immunity established in Ex parte Young, a Supreme Court case that allows lawsuits against state officials to prevent them from enforcing state laws that violate federal law.

The court reasoned that unlike in Ex parte Young, the district court's order did not enjoin the state officials from enforcing a state law that violated federal law. Instead, the district court invalidated federal law and prohibited the state officials from enforcing a state law that was consistent with that federal law. The court determined that this type of relief fell outside the narrow parameters of the Ex parte Young exception and did not serve its purpose, which is to vindicate federal rights.

USA v. Abbott, No. 23-50632 (5th Cir. 2023)

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-50632

Opinion Date: December 1, 2023

Areas of Law: Admiralty & Maritime Law, Government & Administrative Law, International Law

In 2023, the State of Texas, under the direction of Governor Greg Abbott, installed a floating barrier in the Rio Grande near Eagle Pass, Texas. The United States government filed a civil enforcement action against Texas, alleging that the installation of the barrier violated the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 (“RHA”). The United States sought a preliminary injunction, which was granted by the district court, ordering Texas to cease work on the barrier and to relocate it to the Texas riverbank. Texas appealed this decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Court of Appeals found that the United States demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of its RHA claims. The court determined that the part of the Rio Grande where the barrier was installed was a navigable waterway and that the barrier constituted an obstruction to this waterway. The court also found that the barrier was a structure as defined by the RHA and that it had been constructed without necessary authorization.

In addition, the court found that the United States had demonstrated that it was likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief. The court noted that the barrier strained diplomatic relations with Mexico, interfered with the ability of the International Boundary and Water Commission to implement the provisions of a treaty concerning the allocation of waters in the Rio Grande, and posed a risk to human life.

The court also held that the balance of equities favored the United States and that the issuance of a preliminary injunction was in the public interest. Specifically, the court noted that the barrier threatened navigation and federal government operations on the Rio Grande, and also posed a potential threat to human life.

Taking all of these factors into account, the court ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction ordering Texas to cease work on the barrier and to relocate it.

Island Creek Coal Co. v. Elizabeth Maynard

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-3238

Opinion Date: December 4, 2023

Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Jennings Maynard, a coal miner with severe respiratory issues, filed a claim for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act. After his death while the claim was pending, his widow, Elizabeth Maynard, filed a claim for survivor’s benefits. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) awarded benefits to Elizabeth Maynard on behalf of her late husband and as his surviving spouse. The Benefits Review Board affirmed this decision. The petitioner, Island Creek Coal Company, sought review of the award.

The court denied the petition for review. The court explained that Maynard had worked in the coal mining industry for over forty-three years and had developed severe respiratory issues. Maynard's widow, Elizabeth, filed a claim for survivor's benefits after her husband's death. The ALJ awarded benefits to Elizabeth, both on behalf of her late husband and as his surviving spouse. The Benefits Review Board affirmed this decision.

The court held that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's findings that Maynard was totally disabled due to his elevated PCO2 values and that the petitioner failed to provide persuasive contrary evidence. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's conclusion that the petitioner failed to rebut the presumption that Maynard's respiratory impairment, which contributed to his total disability, arose out of coal mine employment. The court determined that the ALJ properly discredited the medical opinions offered by the petitioner's experts because these opinions were inconsistent with the regulations of the Black Lung Benefits Act and the Department of Labor's determinations. The court therefore denied the petitioner's request for review.

Hilger v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1145

Opinion Date: December 6, 2023

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

In November 2020, Autumn Hilger visited the Mount Rushmore National Memorial and slipped on a temporary access mat that was installed due to renovations, which resulted in her breaking her wrist. Hilger filed a negligence claim against the United States Government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), seeking $2 million for her injuries. The Government denied her claim, leading her to sue and allege that the National Park Service (NPS), a government agency, negligently installed and maintained the access mat and failed to warn of its danger. The district court dismissed her claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, applying the discretionary-function exception to the FTCA. Hilger appealed the dismissal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court used a two-step test to determine whether the discretionary-function exception applies, first asking whether the challenged conduct or omission is discretionary, meaning it involves judgment or choice and is not controlled by mandatory statutes or regulations. Hilger had conceded in her appeal that there were no such controlling statutes or regulations, leading the court to agree with the district court that the challenged conduct was discretionary. The second inquiry was whether the judgment or choice was based on considerations of social, economic, and political policy. The court found that Hilger's complaint did not contain sufficient factual allegations to rebut the presumption that the discretion was grounded in policy considerations. The court concluded that the decisions regarding the mat were susceptible to policy analysis and that safety concerns, which Hilger argued were key in this case, are a typical policy consideration when applying the discretionary-function exception. As such, the court affirmed the district court's order dismissing Hilger's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Strategic Technology Institute v. NLRB

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 22-2958

Opinion Date: December 6, 2023

Areas of Law: Aerospace/Defense, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

The case involves Strategic Technology Institute, Inc. ("STI") and the National Labor Relations Board. STI had a contract to maintain engines and propellers for the U.S. Air Force from August 2017 until July 2020. During this time, STI's employees at a Little Rock facility began discussing unionizing. In response to this, Tyler Boyd of STI fired 17 employees — three on September 27, 2019, and fourteen on October 9, 2019. The administrative law judge and the Board found that these terminations violated subsections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, which prohibits employers from interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in their right to engage in union activities and from discriminating in regard to hire or tenure of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.

STI petitioned for a review of the Board's order, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit granted the petition, vacated the order, and remanded the case. The court found that there was no substantial evidence to support the Board's finding that the terminations were motivated by anti-union animus. The court noted that the only evidence of STI's knowledge of the union activities were two phone calls informing Tyler Boyd that the employees were considering unionizing and the timing of the firings. The court held that this was not sufficient to establish that STI acted with an anti-union motive when it terminated the employees. The court also found that the Board's reliance on the "small plant doctrine" to infer employer knowledge of union activity was not applicable in this case since there was no other evidence indicating a likelihood that Boyd knew of the union activities. Furthermore, the court held that the Board erred in finding that STI's reasons for the firings were pretextual because they were based on legitimate factors such as performance, attendance, and interpersonal skills. The court concluded that the General Counsel failed to meet its burden of providing substantial evidence that STI harbored anti-union animus and that the terminations were motivated by animus. Consequently, the court vacated the Board's order and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its opinion.

CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. DEB HAALAND

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-15809

Opinion Date: December 4, 2023

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated a Biological Opinion (BiOp) by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (the Service) and remanded the case for further consideration. The case involved a dispute over the use of water from the San Pedro River Basin in Arizona by the U.S. Army's Fort Huachuca. The Army uses water from the basin, which is also home to several species protected under the Endangered Species Act. To compensate for the water use, the federal government proposed a "conservation easement" that would limit the use of nearby land for agricultural purposes, therefore saving water and protecting the wildlife that depend on the basin. The plaintiffs, environmental organizations, argued that the BiOp lacked evidence to support the claim of water savings from the easement. The Ninth Circuit agreed, stating that the government's determination that the easement would not jeopardize wildlife was arbitrary and capricious due to the lack of evidence supporting the claimed water savings. The court stated that the government must show that the benefit from the conservation easement would be "reasonably certain" under the relevant regulations. The court also held that the government's conclusion that reduced flow in the Babocomari River, a tributary of the San Pedro River, would not jeopardize the northern Mexican gartersnake was not arbitrary and capricious.

EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-16751

Opinion Date: December 7, 2023

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the U.S. Forest Service in a case brought by Earth Island Institute and the Center for Biological Diversity. The plaintiffs challenged the Forest Service's approval of the Three Creeks Project, which aimed to restore the Inyo National Forest to its pre-European settlement conditions by thinning excess trees, removing excess fire fuel, and using prescribed fire. The plaintiffs argued that the Forest Service failed to adequately consider alternatives to logging, failed to solicit public comments following its 2018 Environmental Assessment, and failed to supplement its National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analysis following a 2020 bark-beetle outbreak. The court found that the plaintiff had not shown that the Service's approval of the Three Creeks Project was arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise unlawful. The Service considered a reasonable range of alternatives, offered the public a reasonable opportunity to comment, and was not required to conduct further NEPA analysis following the bark-beetle outbreak. The court also held that the plaintiff had not properly raised its proposed alternatives during the comment period, and therefore it failed to exhaust its argument. Additionally, the court did not consider the plaintiff's claim regarding the Inyo Craters Project since it was not included in its amended complaint.

JIGAR BABARIA, ET AL V. ANTONY BLINKEN, ET AL

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-16700

Opinion Date: December 1, 2023

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law

A group of individuals from India, who have been lawfully working in the United States for years and waiting in line for more than a decade for their immigrant visas, sued the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and U.S. Department of State. They sought to compel the USCIS to act on their applications for adjustment of status to become lawful permanent residents. However, the USCIS had not processed their applications because the State Department revised its forecast and concluded that it had hit the visa cap for the year. The plaintiffs argued that the USCIS and the State Department were improperly interpreting the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) by requiring an immigrant visa to be available at the time of adjudication rather than at the time of filing the application.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district courts' denials of injunctive relief. The court concluded that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims. The court found that the government's interpretation of the INA, requiring an immigrant visa to be available before the government can adjudicate an application for adjustment of status, was consistent with the INA and reasonably filled in a procedural detail left open by Congress. The court also noted that the regulation was not in conflict with the statutory text and was left in the government's discretion by Congress. The court further opined that the plaintiffs' proposed rule could result in inefficiency and further delay.

BP America Production Company v. Davis, et al.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-8024

Opinion Date: December 6, 2023

Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the case involving BP America Production Company and Debra Anne Haaland, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling upholding the agency order requiring BP to pay nearly $700,000 in correctly assessed royalty underpayments. BP argued that the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Simplification and Fairness Act shielded it from these payments. However, the court rejected BP's interpretation of the Act. The court found that BP's obligation was a single monetary obligation of $905,348.24, not each of the 443 constituent royalty obligations. Therefore, BP did not meet the statutory condition of less than $10,000 for relief from liability for payments. The court also rejected BP's argument that the Secretary's "deemed" final decision lacked a reasoned basis and thus violated the Administrative Procedure Act. The court found that the Secretary's deemed final decision adopted the ONRR Director's decision on the issues raised.

Hampton v. Utah Department of Corrections

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 21-4127

Opinion Date: December 4, 2023

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the plaintiff, Robert Hampton, sued his former employer, the Utah Department of Corrections (UDC), alleging violations of the Rehabilitation Act. Hampton, who was born without the second and fifth digits on both hands, claimed that UDC refused to accommodate his disability, treated him disparately based on that disability, and retaliated against him for requesting accommodation.

Hampton, who had previously worked as a corrections officer in Arizona, was hired by UDC in 2016. He was required to qualify on UDC-approved firearms, including a Glock 17 handgun. Hampton requested an accommodation to use a different handgun, a Springfield 1911, due to difficulties he encountered in handling the Glock due to his disability. This request was denied, and Hampton was later terminated from his position.

The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Hampton's failure-to-accommodate claim and remanded for further proceedings. The court found that Hampton’s request for a different handgun could be considered a reasonable accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act, and that the district court erred in determining that using a Glock handgun was an essential function of Hampton’s job based solely on the UDC’s firearms policy.

However, the court affirmed the district court’s grants of summary judgment on Hampton’s claims of disparate treatment and retaliation. It found that Hampton had not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that his disability was a determining factor in his termination or that his reassignment to a different position constituted an adverse employment action.

SAHA THAI STEEL PIPE PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED v. US

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 22-1175

Opinion Date: December 4, 2023

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, International Law, International Trade

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was asked to review a decision by the United States Court of International Trade. The dispute arose from an anti-dumping investigation conducted by the Department of Commerce into the sale of certain welded carbon steel pipes from Thailand, specifically those sold by Saha Thai Steel Pipe Public Company Limited and Thai Premium Pipe Company Ltd.

The Department of Commerce initially found that the costs of producing these pipes were distorted by a "particular market situation" (PMS) in Thailand that affected the cost of hot rolled steel coil, a crucial component in the production of these pipes. As a result, the Department made upward adjustments to the production costs of these companies when calculating the anti-dumping margins, which impacted the duty rates assigned to each company. This decision was challenged in the Court of International Trade, which found that the Department had overstepped its statutory authority.

The Court of International Trade ruled, based on the precedent set in Hyundai Steel Co. v. United States, that the Department of Commerce was not allowed to make a PMS adjustment to the cost of production when determining anti-dumping margins. The court remanded the case to the Department to recalculate the dumping margins without the PMS adjustment.

The case was subsequently appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The appellant, Wheatland Tube Company, argued that this case could be distinguished from Hyundai Steel because the Department had relied on a subsection of the statute to adjust the cost of production upward to account for a PMS by framing it as a constructed value calculation. The Court of Appeals disagreed, affirming the lower court's decision and holding that the statute does not authorize PMS adjustments to cost of production calculations, regardless of how the Department attempted to frame it.

MCMICHAEL-GOMBAR v PHOENIX CIVIL SERVICE

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Docket: CV-22-0176-PR

Opinion Date: December 5, 2023

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona, Phoenix Police Sergeant Stefani McMichael-Gombar appealed against her suspension for posting content on Facebook that violated the Phoenix Police Department’s Social Media Policy. She argued that the policy was overbroad and violated the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, or that she reasonably believed she had a First Amendment right to make the post. The Phoenix Civil Service Board upheld the suspension, and McMichael-Gombar sought relief in the superior court. The superior court dismissed her complaint, stating that the Phoenix City Charter neither requires nor authorizes the Board to consider the constitutionality of the City’s policies, and this is only tasked with determining if the allegations against an employee are true and if the level of discipline was appropriate. The court of appeals vacated this ruling, determining that the Board must consider whether the disciplinary action properly regards McMichael-Gombar’s constitutional rights.

The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona affirmed the superior court’s decision, holding that the Board does not have the authority to decide whether a city policy is unconstitutional, as this power is not explicitly granted to it by the Phoenix City Charter, the rules governing disciplinary proceedings, or the Peace Officers Bill of Rights. However, the court did agree that McMichael-Gombar was entitled to argue and introduce supporting evidence that she reasonably believed she was acting within her First Amendment rights. The court concluded that McMichael-Gombar did not meet her burden to show that the Board precluded her from doing so. Thus, the court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and affirmed the superior court’s order dismissing McMichael-Gombar’s special action complaint.

SIMS v. DEXTER PAYNE, DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 Ark. 187

Opinion Date: December 7, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the denial of declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus petitions filed by Charles Sims, an inmate in the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC). Sims had sought a declaration that he was eligible for parole, contrary to the determination made by ADC. The court affirmed the circuit court's finding that Sims was ineligible for parole according to the Arkansas Code.

Sims had pleaded guilty to first-degree murder in 1995 and was paroled in 2007. In 2010, he pleaded guilty to first-degree battery and kidnapping, and was sentenced to concurrent terms of 180 months' imprisonment to run concurrently with his remaining sentence for first-degree murder. ADC records applied section 16-93-609 to Sims’s sentence for battery and kidnapping, determining him ineligible for parole.

The court held that Sims had failed to establish a justiciable controversy or that he had a legal interest in the controversy, two prerequisites for declaratory relief. The court also noted that parole eligibility determinations fall within the purview of ADC, not the judiciary. The court further held that the absence of a reference to the parole-eligibility statute in the judgment did not constitute a requirement for parole eligibility.

The court also dismissed Sims's argument that section 5-4-501(d)(2) was inapplicable to him, holding that the court has applied the relevant sections when the prior conviction consisted of only one offense. The court concluded that Sims had not established a right to parole eligibility, and therefore had no basis for the issuance of a writ of mandamus. The court affirmed the circuit court's decisions, ruling it did not clearly err or abuse its discretion when it denied and dismissed Sims's petitions for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus.

Conway v. Superior Court

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B325986(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 1, 2023

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In this case, the petitioner, Cedrick Conway, is awaiting trial on a petition to commit him as a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). In preparation for the trial, he requested a court order directing a Department of State Hospitals (DSH) evaluator to update a previous evaluation of Conway which was done several years earlier and concluded that he did not meet the criteria for commitment as an SVP. The trial court denied the request, believing that the pertinent statute only allows the prosecution (the party seeking commitment) to request an updated evaluation—not the defense. Conway challenged this ruling, leading to the present case.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Five concluded that the trial court had misunderstood the statute. While the SVPA does allow the prosecution to request an updated evaluation from DSH, the court found nothing in the statute that would prohibit the defense from obtaining an updated evaluation if authorized by a court order. The court therefore held that the trial court erred in denying Conway’s request for an updated evaluation based on a mistaken understanding of the statute.

The court also rejected the defense’s claim that the prosecution was not entitled to oppose the defense motion for an updated evaluation. The court determined that the trial court has discretion to decide whether to entertain opposition from the prosecution. The court therefore issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to reconsider Conway’s request for an updated evaluation, taking into account the court's discretion to authorize such an evaluation for the defense.

Villarroel v. Recology

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A165515(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 1, 2023

Areas of Law: Business Law, Class Action, Government & Administrative Law

This case revolves around the filed rate doctrine and its applicability in instances where rates approved by a municipal board are questioned. The plaintiffs, a group of customers, sued Recology, a waste management company, alleging that the company violated the Unfair Competition Law and other laws by bribing a city official to facilitate the approval of Recology’s application for increased refuse collection rates. The trial court ruled in favor of Recology, holding that the claims were barred by the filed rate doctrine. The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three reversed the decision, stating that the California version of the filed rate doctrine does not bar this action because the purposes underlying the doctrine – “nondiscrimination” and “nonjusticiability” strands – are not implicated by plaintiffs’ claims. The court also concluded that the judgment in the prior law enforcement action does not pose a res judicata bar to this putative class action. The court remanded the case for the trial court’s consideration of Recology’s remaining challenges in the first instance.

Stokes v. Jackson Sales & Storage Co

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2022-CA-00371-SCT

Opinion Date: November 30, 2023

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law

In Mississippi, Jackson Sales & Storage Co. (JSSC), a subsidiary of National Presto Industries, was granted an annual exemption from ad valorem property taxes by Hinds County for almost forty years. This exemption was based on a free-port-warehouse license issued to JSSC by the State Tax Commission in 1981. In 2019, however, Hinds County denied the exemption and assessed JSSC back taxes for 2012-18, arguing JSSC lacked the requisite free-port-warehouse license. JSSC sought relief in Hinds County Circuit Court, which held that JSSC’s license remained valid and in effect since 1981 and was not subject to renewal. The Circuit Court also ruled that JSSC owed no taxes for 2012-19. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi partially affirmed and partially reversed the lower court's ruling. The Supreme Court agreed that JSSC's license was valid since 1981 and that JSSC owed no taxes for 2012-18. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court’s finding that the license wasn’t subject to renewal and that JSSC owed no taxes for 2019. The Supreme Court held that the county could require JSSC to renew its license and that JSSC owes Hinds County the remaining $290,724.52 in ad valorem taxes for 2019. The court clarified that moving forward, the board of supervisors has discretion over whether it grants JSSC an exemption and over the period of time that exemption is in effect.

PNW Metal Recycling, Inc. v. DEQ

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Docket: S069412

Opinion Date: December 7, 2023

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

In the case of PNW Metal Recycling, Inc., et al. v. Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the Department of Environmental Quality's (DEQ) internal decision to adopt a new interpretation of a statute did not constitute a "rule" under the Oregon Administrative Procedures Act (APA).

The case emerged when the DEQ changed its interpretation of the "auto-dismantler exception" in the solid waste management regulations. Previously, facilities dismantling and recycling used vehicles were not required to obtain a permit for solid waste disposal, even if they also disposed of non-vehicle solid waste. However, in 2018, the DEQ informed the petitioners that it had revised its interpretation of the relevant statutes, and the facilities would now be required to obtain permits.

The petitioners, who operate such facilities, challenged this change, arguing that the DEQ's new position constituted a "rule", meaning it should have been adopted following the APA rulemaking procedures. The Court of Appeals agreed with the petitioners and held the DEQ's decision invalid.

However, the Oregon Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and dismissed the judicial review. The court reasoned that an agency's internal decision to adopt a new statutory interpretation is not, by itself, a "rule" under the APA. Instead, a "rule" is a more formal, generally applicable agency directive, standard, regulation, or statement that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy.

The court highlighted that the APA provides different avenues for agencies to announce policy, not all of which require formal rulemaking. Specifically, an agency can announce a general policy applicable to a case and future similar cases during a contested case proceeding, without going through formal rulemaking procedures. The court concluded that the DEQ's revised interpretation of the auto-dismantler exception and its stated intention to require the petitioners to obtain a permit were precursors to an enforcement action that may lead to a contested case proceeding, not a rule. The decision of the Court of Appeals was vacated, and the judicial review was dismissed.

Jan Charles Gray v. Converse County Assessor

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 WY 116

Opinion Date: December 5, 2023

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law

This case involves a dispute over the tax assessments of 115 vacant lots in the Sunup Ridge subdivision in Converse County, Wyoming, owned by Jan Gray. Gray appealed the Converse County Board of Equalization’s decisions upholding the Converse County Assessor’s tax assessments for the years 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2020. He contended that the County Assessor failed to physically inspect each lot as required by law, and that the tax assessments were not supported by substantial evidence. Additionally, he argued that the County Board did not provide an adequate record on appeal and that he was denied an opportunity for proper discovery.

The Supreme Court of Wyoming upheld the County Board's decisions. The court found that the County Assessor had complied with the requirement to physically inspect the properties, and that the tax assessments were supported by substantial evidence. Furthermore, the court determined that the County Board had provided an adequate record for appeal and that Gray had not been denied an opportunity for discovery. Therefore, the court affirmed the County Board's tax assessments for the years in question.

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Justia Team

Are you interested in new and developing areas of the law? Content creation is arguably one of the newest professions in our social media society. Lawyers, you’re invited to learn more about the applicable legal concerns in this new niche.

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