Chisom v. State of Louisiana

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-30320

Opinion Date: October 25, 2023

Judge: Jacques L. Wiener, Jr

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Legal Ethics

Defendant State of Louisiana, ex rel. Jeff Landry (“the State”) sought to dissolve a consent decree that pertains to the method of selecting justices for the Louisiana Supreme Court. The State attempted to dissolve the consent judgment under the first and third clauses of Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The State contended that the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged because the State has substantially complied with the decree for more than thirty years and the decree was intended to terminate at a defined milestone. The State further contended that it is no longer equitable to enforce the consent judgment prospectively because of widespread malapportionment in Louisiana’s supreme court election districts. The district court denied the State’s motion to dissolve.
 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the dissolution motion, as the State has failed to meet its evidentiary burdens under both the first and third clauses of Rule 60(b)(5). The court explained that the State did not meet the evidentiary burden associated with Rufo’s first prong, which requires a showing of changed factual or legal circumstances that warrant reexamination of a consent decree. The State only makes very general claims about malapportionment and asserts that “new policy concerns” have arisen which satisfy Rufo. But the State offers almost no evidentiary support for this argument. Further, the court wrote that the State’s argument that continued enforcement of the Consent Judgment is detrimental to the public interest is unavailing.

National Press v. McCraw

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-50337

Opinion Date: October 23, 2023

Judge: Don R. Willett

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

Chapter 423 of the Texas Government Code governs the operation of unmanned aerial vehicles—drones—in Texas airspace. In this case, Plaintiffs claimed a sweeping First Amendment right to use unmanned aerial drones to film private individuals and property without their consent. They also assert a constitutional right to fly drones at low altitudes over critical infrastructure facilities like prisons and large sports venues.
 
The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in Defendants’ favor on the constitutional claims. The court explained that it disagreed with Plaintiffs claim that a sweeping First Amendment right to use unmanned aerial drones to film private individuals and property without their consent. The court explained that though it does not foreclose any as-applied constitutional defenses to any hypothetical future prosecutions under the drone laws, we hold that these facial challenges fail. The court also rejected Plaintiffs’ cross-appeal claiming that federal regulations occupy the entire field of drone regulation. On this issue, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the field-preemption claim. The court explained that federal law expressly contemplates concurrent non-federal regulation of drones, especially where privacy and critical infrastructure are concerned.

Ellison v. United States Postal Service

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 22-1967

Opinion Date: October 24, 2023

Judge: Pryor

Areas of Law: Business Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Shelbyville Post Office is the closest one to Ellison’s home and the largest in that area of Indiana. Ellison keeps a P.O. box at Shelbyville or her non-profit organization, which educates the public about accessibility for people with disabilities. Ellison cannot enter the Shelbyville Post Office because it has only one customer entrance: at the top of its front steps. Ellison can ask for help from the loading dock or from a van-accessible parking space, use the Postal Service’s website, or visit wheelchair-accessible locations in surrounding towns. After multiple complaints about the inconvenience of those options, the City of Shelbyville offered to pay for a ramp at the front entrance. The Postal Service declined, citing a policy of refusing donations for exterior physical improvements.

In a suit under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a), the district court entered summary judgment, concluding that Ellison could meaningfully access the program through its website and three wheelchair-accessible locations within a 15-minute drive of her home. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for consideration of whether Ellison’s proposed accommodation (a ramp) is reasonable. The Shelbyville Post Office does not provide a significant level of access, and the alternative locations are further away and open for fewer hours than Shelbyville.

Vidal-Martinez v. United States Department Of Homeland Security

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Dockets: 22-2445, 23-1900

Opinion Date: October 24, 2023

Judge: Brennan

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Communications Law, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

Vidal-Martinez, a non-citizen, was arrested three times for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. DHS detained him and initiated deportation. Vidal-Martinez filed a habeas petition, arguing that his detention was unconstitutional because it impeded his ability to defend himself against the drunk-driving charges. ICE transferred Vidal-Martinez to county custody “until the completion of [the] criminal matter, then released to his ICE detainer.” Vidal-Martinez was convicted of DUI and sentenced to 236 days in jail. He was then returned to ICE custody. Due to a lack of evidence that he posed a flight risk or a danger to the community, the district court granted Vidal-Martinez’s habeas petition and ordered his release.

Vidal-Martinez filed a FOIA request, 5 U.S.C. 552, seeking disclosure from ICE of documents related to his custody transfer. ICE produced 561 pages of responsive documents, some of which contained redactions. Vidal-Martinez challenged ICE’s redactions. ICE submitted a Vaughn index and a declaration from its FOIA officer explaining the legal justification for each redaction, citing attorney-client, work product, deliberative process privileges, and identifying information of government employees. Vidal-Martinez responded that ICE committed criminal conduct by transferring him to Indiana, so the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege applied. The district court granted ICE summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no factual foundation in the record for criminal conduct or misconduct by ICE. The district court had an adequate factual basis to evaluate ICE’s withholdings.

Frank, et al. v. Wyoming Secretary of State, et al.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 21-8058

Opinion Date: October 23, 2023

Judge: Rossman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law

Plaintiff John Frank sued Wyoming state and local officials in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending Wyoming's electioneering statute violated the First Amendment, facially and as applied. Frank, a Wyoming citizen, and alleging the statute unconstitutionally prevented him from handing out campaign literature and displaying bumper stickers on his car within the 300-foot buffer zone. Frank also claimed the statute was overbroad because it violated the First Amendment rights of third parties who could not display campaign signs on private property falling within the statutory buffer zones. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court granted each in part, striking down some parts of the electioneering statute and upholding the rest. Specifically, the district court held the ban on electioneering within 300 feet of polling places on election day was unconstitutional, as was the ban on bumper stickers within the election day and absentee period buffer zones. But the district court upheld the statute’s prohibition on electioneering within 100 feet of absentee polling places. It also concluded there was an insufficient factual basis to consider Plaintiff’s overbreadth claim. After its review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The Court upheld the electioneering statute against Frank’s First Amendment challenge to the size of, and conduct proscribed within, the 300-foot election-day buffer zone. The Court reversed and remanded on Frank’s constitutional challenge to the absentee buffer zone, including the electioneering conduct proscribed within that zone. Finally, the Court remanded for the district court to adjudicate in the first instance Frank’s facial overbreadth challenge.

City of Gilroy v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: H049552(Sixth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 23, 2023

Judge: Greenwood

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Government & Administrative Law

Gilroy Police Department (GPD) receives complaints about homeless encampments, including on the property of the Santa Clara Valley Water District. When requested by the Water District, GPD assists with the cleanup of homeless encampments (sweeps) on Water District property. The Water District is responsible for collecting belongings left at the site. GPD collects and stores some items, such as identification cards. GPD officers assisting with homeless encampment cleanups have body-worn cameras, which they activate during “criminal investigation or enforcement" actions.
Bodycam video footage is retained for one year, then automatically deleted by a computer system unless flagged for preservation.

After receiving complaints from homeless persons that their personal property was being destroyed during sweeps, Law Foundation made numerous public record requests and sought declaratory relief under the California Public Records Act (CPRA; Gov. Code, 7920.000).

The court of appeal held that the trial court erred in granting declaratory relief on the basis that Gilroy’s past conduct in responding to Law Foundation’s public records requests violated the CPRA. The trial court did not err by denying Law Foundation’s request for a declaration that Gilroy violated the CPRA by failing to preserve responsive records it claimed were exempt while the records requests were pending. CPRA is not a records retention statute.

Mary's Kitchen v. City of Orange

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G061693(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 25, 2023

Judge: Sanchez

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

Defendant City of Orange (the City) appealed an order denying an anti-SLAPP motion. The underlying lawsuit alleged a violation of the Ralph M. Brown Act (Brown Act). Plaintiff Mary’s Kitchen provided homeless services in the City of Orange. Prior to the filing of this lawsuit, the city manager for the City terminated Mary’s Kitchen’s license, citing safety concerns. Subsequently, the city council held an executive (i.e., closed) session to discuss potential unspecified litigation. Afterward, the city attorney exited the meeting and declared that the council had “unanimously confirmed” the termination of Mary’s Kitchen’s license. The Brown Act required that any contemplated action or topic of discussion be posted in an agenda at least 72 hours prior to the meeting; the meeting agenda pertinent here did not mention anything about Mary’s Kitchen’s license. Plaintiffs Mary’s Kitchen and Gloria Suess (chief executive officer and president of Mary’s Kitchen) filed a verified complaint/petition for writ of mandate against the City. The City filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that because the agenda described the meeting as discussing legal matters, the complaint/petition arose out of protected activity. The City took the position that no action was taken at the meeting, and that the unanimous approval described in the minutes simply reflected inaction—i.e., that the city council chose to do nothing to override the city manager’s decision to terminate the license. The court denied the motion, concluding the complaint targeted the City’s failure to provide adequate notice of the confirmation of the license termination rather than anything that was said at the meeting. To this the Court of Appeal agreed with this assessment and further concluded that the “unanimous confirm[ation]” was evidence of an action: ratification.

One Technologies, LLC v. Franchise Tax Bd.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B318787(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 23, 2023

Judge: BENDIX

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law

Proposition 39 established a program to promote the creation of clean energy jobs. Under Proposition 39, a multistate business must apportion its tax based on a single factor—in-state sales. The proposition further provided for cable companies spending $250 million or more in California on certain expenditures to exclude half of their in-state sales when apportioning, thus lowering their tax burden under the single factor tax regime. Paintiff One Technologies, LLC, a Texas-based provider of credit score and credit reporting services, paid tax to California calculated under the single-factor method. Plaintiff then filed a complaint for refund against Defendant Franchise Tax Board (the Board). Plaintiff alleged Proposition 39 was invalid under the single-subject rule for ballot initiatives. The trial court disagreed and sustained the Board’s demurrer.
 
The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that Proposition 39 did not violate the single-subject rule. The purpose of the proposition was to fund a clean energy job creation program by raising taxes on some multistate businesses. The provisions of the proposition were both reasonably germane and functionally related to that purpose because those provisions established a funding mechanism and the means of directing that funding to clean energy job creation. The special rules for cable companies reflect a determination by the proposition’s drafters that some businesses should bear the funding burden more than others, but that is still within the scope of the proposition’s purpose.

Snoeck v. ExakTime Innovations

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B321566(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 25, 2023

Judge: EGERTON

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

The court awarded Plaintiff fees after he prevailed on one of his six causes of action against his former employer ExakTime Innovations, Inc., on his complaint for disability discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and related causes of action. The jury awarded Plaintiff $130,088 in damages on his claim ExakTime failed to engage in a good faith interactive process with him. Plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s order awarding him $686,795.62 in attorney fees after the court applied a .4 negative multiplier to its $1,144,659.36 adjusted lodestar calculation “to account for [p]laintiff’s counsel’s . . . lack of civility throughout the entire course of this litigation.” Plaintiff contends the $457,863 reduction in attorney fees based on his counsel’s incivility must be reversed.
 
The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court agreed with the trial court that it may consider an attorney’s pervasive incivility in determining the reasonableness of the requested fees. A court may apply, in its discretion, a positive or negative multiplier to adjust the lodestar calculation—a reasonable rate times a reasonable number of hours—to account for various factors, including attorney skill. The court explained that the record amply supports the trial court’s finding that Plaintiff’s counsel was repeatedly, and apparently intentionally, uncivil to defense counsel—and to the court— throughout the litigation.

Sonoma Luxury Resort v. California Regional Water Quality Control Board North Coast Region

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A165227(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 25, 2023

Judge: Goldman

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

The Regional Water Quality Control Board issued a civil liability complaint against SLR and, after a hearing, imposed more than $6,000,000 in penalties for SLR’s pollution of protected waterways during its construction of a Healdsburg residential resort. SLR unsuccessfully asked the State Water Resources Control Board to review the decision. SLR sought administrative mandamus against both Boards, missing the 30-day filing deadline by three weeks. On that ground, the trial courts dismissed, also noting that the State Board’s declination to review the Regional decision is not subject to judicial review.

SLR claimed the Regional Board “divested itself” of jurisdiction by conducting the hearing by videoconference over SLR’s objection, as authorized by Executive Order during the pandemic. SLR argued that the Order violated the separation of powers; the Regional Board unlawfully extended it to “non-emergency” hearings; the hearing was “quasi-criminal” so that the Order denied SLR’s Due Process and Sixth Amendment rights; the Board “committed a prejudicial abuse of discretion” by applying the Order rather than the Judicial Council’s Emergency Rule; and the Order did not apply without evidence that the Board satisfied the ADA and the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

The court of appeal upheld the dismissals, rejecting an argument that a plaintiff challenging an agency’s adjudicative decision may avoid the statute of limitations if the plaintiff contends that the agency acted without subject matter jurisdiction. Water Code section 133301 prohibits all judicial review of the decision except in accordance with the statute.

Summerfield v. City of Inglewood

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B324117(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 25, 2023

Judge: STRATTON

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

Appellants filed a wrongful death action for the death of the Appellants’ son against the City of Inglewood (the City). Appellants alleged the City was negligent and created a “dangerous condition” in a public park by failing to install security cameras in an area with ongoing criminal activity, which caused an unknown third party to fatally shoot their son. The trial court sustained the City’s demurrer to the complaint with leave to amend. Appellants filed a first amended complaint, which the trial court sustained, this time without leave to amend. The trial court then entered a judgment of dismissal.
 
The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that Appellants’ dangerous and negligence claims failed and the trial court did not err in declining to grant leave to amend. The court explained that here Appellants’ proposed allegations about “additional problematic criminal activity in Darby Park” and “crime in the areas of Inglewood immediately surrounding Darby Park” are vague and not specific. Appellants in no way explain how these proposed amendments would change the legal effect of the allegations in their FAC and merely state in a conclusory fashion that they “could have created a dangerous condition and a duty to warn.” Furthermore, the court wrote that Appellants failed to propose any new facts addressing the main issue of the FAC.

Colo. State Bd. of Educ. v. Adams Cnty. Sch. Dist. 14

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 CO 52

Opinion Date: October 16, 2023

Judge: Monica M. Márquez

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

The “rule of Martin,” applied to state agencies, political subdivisions, and officials acting in their official capacity, was a judicially created rule that precluded standing to challenge a government entity’s decision when: (1) the state agency, political subdivision, or official seeking review is subordinate to the government entity whose action is challenged; and (2) no statutory or constitutional provision expressly authorizes the subordinate party to seek judicial review of the superior government entity’s action. The Colorado State Board of Education (“the State Board”) invoked this doctrine in successfully moving to dismiss claims brought by Adams County School District 14 (“Adams 14”) challenging the State Board’s decision to remove its accreditation and order its reorganization. Adams 14 challenged the district court’s dismissal of its claims and the political subdivision doctrine itself, contending that the doctrine has become unmoored from its jurisprudential origins and results in the unfair denial of judicial relief to public entities that have been injured by state agencies and statutes. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the political subdivision doctrine and its articulation in the rule of Martin generated unnecessary confusion and were ultimately duplicative of the two-part test for standing set forth in Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 570 P.2d 535 (Colo. 1977). The Court therefore abandoned the doctrine and the rule of Martin and instead hold that Wimberly supplied the sole test for determining whether a party has standing in Colorado. Evaluating each of Adams 14’s claims under Wimberly, the Court further held that all were correctly dismissed for lack of standing.

Middlebury v. Fraternal Order of Police, Middlebury Lodge No. 34

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20733

Opinion Date: October 24, 2023

Judge: Alexander

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court determining that the State Board of Labor Relations did not act unreasonably, illegally, arbitrarily, or in abuse of its discretion when it applied the clear and unmistakable waiver standard to a union's claim that the town's unilateral change to its pension plan constituted a refusal to bargain collectively in good faith, holding that there was no error.

The Town of Middlebury appealed the labor board's determination that the Town violated the Municipal Employee Relations act (MERA), Mass. Gen. Stat. 7-467 et seq., by unilaterally changing the Town's practice of including extra pay duty in calculating pension benefits for members of the Fraternal Order of Police, Middlebury Lodge No. 34. The appellate court concluded that the labor board did not abuse its discretion or act unreasonably, illegally, or arbitrarily when it declined to apply the "contract coverage" standard adopted by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in 2019. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that it was proper for the appellate court to apply the clear and unmistakable waiver standard, rather than the contract coverage standard, in determining when whether the union had waived its statutory right to bargain collective regarding the manner in which the Town calculated its members' pension benefits.

In re: JUDGE G. Michael Canaday

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Docket: 2023-O-00735

Opinion Date: October 20, 2023

Judge: Crain

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

In Louisiana v. Bartie, 14th Judicial District Court Case Number 12615-16, Div. G, Judge Michael Canaday presided over multiple hearings relating to the defendant’s indigency and his request for ancillary funding for defense experts. Because the hearings involved the disclosure of defense strategy, they were conducted without the district attorney, and the transcripts were sealed. Judge Canaday found the defendant was not indigent and denied his request for funding. The defense filed a writ application with the Third Circuit Court of Appeal challenging the indigency ruling. To facilitate filing the application, Judge Canaday granted defense counsel’s request for transcripts of the hearings. After defense counsel moved to obtain a missing transcript, Judge Canaday ordered the transcript be given to defense counsel and handwrote that it be “release[d] from seal.” Judge Canaday then received an email from the district attorney’s office asking whether his order gave the district attorney’s office access to the transcripts, or only defense counsel and the Third Circuit. Defense counsel was not copied with this email. Judge Canaday replied: “Since I don’t believe the state could appeal my granting relief to the defense on funding, I don’t think they can support the courts [sic] position to deny. The courts [sic] reasons will be sufficient for the 3rd to review. If the 3rd requests a states [sic] response obviously they could access the record.” Defense counsel was not included in these communications. The district attorney’s office then filed a “Motion to Unseal All Documents and Transcripts in Regards to Determining Indigency of the Defendant.” This motion was styled neither ex parte nor unopposed. Without a hearing, Judge Canaday signed an order granting the district attorney’s office the requested relief. Defense counsel did not have an opportunity to respond. The materials released by Judge Canaday included a transcript of a closed hearing where defense strategy specific to Bartie was discussed, including experts and their expected testimony. Defense counsel successfully argued for Judge Canaday’s recusal from the Bartie case. Writ applications seeking reversal of the recusal were denied by both the Third Circuit and the Louisiana Supreme Court. The recusal and subsequent related writ applications resulted in the expenditure of significant time, effort, and funds by both the state and defense counsel. There were negative media reports concerning Judge Canaday’s actions. Media reports prompted a Judiciary Commission investigation. The Commission found Judge Canaday engaged in improper ex parte communications and inappropriately granted a state motion to release documents from seal without holding a hearing or otherwise allowing defense counsel the opportunity to respond. The Commission recommended that he be publicly censured and pay costs. The Louisiana Supreme Court concurred with the censure recommendation.

Howard Industries, Inc. v. Hayes

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2021-CT-00694-SCT

Opinion Date: October 19, 2023

Judge: James W. Kitchens

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

The Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Commission imposed a $1,000 sanction against an employer’s attorney for submitting misleading documentation to an Administrative Judge (AJ). The Court of Appeals affirmed the sanction and the Commission’s award of permanent disability benefits to the employee. On certiorari review, the Luisiana Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the sanction should have been affirmed.

Stevens v. N.Y. State Division of Criminal Justice Services

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2023 NY Slip Op 05351

Opinion Date: October 24, 2023

Judge: Wilson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Court of Appeals held that the legislature's grant of rulemaking authority to the Commission on Forensic Sciences was sufficient to authorize the Commission's promulgation of the Familial DNA Search (FDS) Regulations codified at 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 6192.1 and 6192.3.

In 2017, the DNA Subcommittee submitted to the Commission a recommendation to authorize familial DNA searches. The Commission adopted the recommendation, and the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) formally adopted the recommendation as part of the FDS Regulations. Petitioners brought this N.Y. C.L.P.R. 78 proceeding arguing that Respondents lacked statutory authority to promulgate the FDA Regulations, therefore violating the New York Constitution's separation of powers doctrine. Supreme Court denied the petition on the merits, and the appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Commission had the statutory authority to promulgate the FDS Regulations.

Town of Midland v. Harrell

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 120A22

Opinion Date: October 20, 2023

Judge: Allen

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the Town of Midland ordering Defendants to pay the Town a total of $97,400 in civil penalties but remanding the trial court's mandatory permanent injunction and abatement order and reversing the trial court's denial of Defendants' request for attorney's fees, holding that there was no error.

In an earlier round of litigation, the court of appeals determined that Defendants were under a continuing responsibility to maintain the roads in a residential subdivision. The zoning administrator later sent Defendants a demand letter informing them that they owed civil penalties. When Defendants took no action, the Town filed suit, seeking a mandatory injunction and order of abatement requirement Defendants to repair the roads at issue. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Town. The court of appeals affirmed the civil penalties but reversed the permanent injunction and abatement order for failure to survive appellate scrutiny. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Town had standing to bring this suit; and (2) the court of appeals correctly determined that it was bound by the prior decision of another panel holding Defendants responsible for the subdivision's roads.

Interest of A.I.

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 ND 203

Opinion Date: October 26, 2023

Judge: Jensen

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

A.I. appealed a district court’s order continuing her commitment to the North Dakota State Hospital (“NDSH”) for a period not to exceed 180 days. She argued the court erred in not ordering a less restrictive alternative treatment as testimony supported A.I.’s needs could be met with a lower level of care. In addition, A.I. asserted the entry of an order, that indicated a waiver of the continuing treatment hearing filed after a hearing was held, was clearly erroneous. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the court’s order to continue her hospitalization was not clearly erroneous, and the court’s order following waiver of treatment or continuing treatment hearing, as conceded by both parties, was entered in error. The Court affirmed the district court’s order for continued treatment and vacated the superfluous order entered in the record at docket entry 43.

State ex rel. Payne v. Rose

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2023-Ohio-3801

Opinion Date: October 24, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief in this action brought under Ohio's Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, by Kevin Payne against Kelly Rose, an inspector at the Richland Correctional Institution (RCI), holding that Payne did not have a cognizable claim in mandamus.

Payne, an inmate at RCI, sent a public-records request to Rose for a copy of, among other things, JPay support ticket number MACI 1220002928. Rose responded that she obtained the requested record and provided a copy of it to Payne. Payne brought this action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering Rose to produce the requested record and statutory damages. The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief, holding (1) because Payne received his requested record before instituting this action he never had a cognizable claim in mandamus; and (2) statutory damages did not accrue.

Webinar: Is Hyperconnectivity Helping or Harming the Legal Professional?

Justia Team

In a fast-paced, always-connected world, it is no secret that technology plays a significant role in our daily lives. How is our constantly connected culture impacting the mental health of lawyers? How should the legal profession react? Join us in an upcoming webinar exploring the answers to these questions.

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