Financial Oversight & Management Bd. v. Vazquez-Velazquez Group

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1829

Opinion Date: July 12, 2023

Judge: Sandra Lea Lynch

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Transportation Law

The First Circuit affirmed the determination of the Title III court, during the course of its confirmation of the Modified Fifth Amended Title III Plan of Adjustment (Plan) for the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (PRHTA), that the Vazquez-Valezquez Group's claims for additional compensation made in a separate federal lawsuit were dischargeable, holding that there was no error.

The Group, which was composed of sixty-nine current and former PRHTA employees who received extra compensation under PRHTA Regulation 12-2017, with which the PRHTA later broke. At issue was the Group's objection to the Title III court's determination that the Group's claims for additional compensation were dischargeable under the Plan. After the Title III court entered an order and judgment confirming the plan the Group appealed, arguing that its members' claims were nondischargeable. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the claims for additional compensation were not exempt from discharge.

Vazquez-Velazquez v. P.R. Highway & Transportation Authority

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 21-1739

Opinion Date: July 12, 2023

Judge: Sandra Lea Lynch

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Contracts, Government & Administrative Law, Transportation Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (PRHTA) and its executive directors (collectively, Appellees) and dismissing this complaint brought by sixty-nine current and former employees of the PRHTA (collectively, Appellants), holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.

Appellants brought this action challenging the PRHTA's decision no longer to give effect to a regulation providing Appellants with additional compensation. Specifically, Appellants claimed that the decision was contrary to P.R. Act No. 66-2014, giving rise to violations of the Contracts Clause and Due Process Clause. The district court granted summary judgment for the PRHTA on the federal constitutional claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Appellants' claims under Puerto Rico law. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in concluding that Appellants could not establish their federal constitutional claims; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise jurisdiction over Appellants' remaining Puerto Rico law claims.

Dynasty Healthcare, LLC v. Nat'l Gov't Services, Inc.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 21-1622

Opinion Date: July 7, 2023

Judge: LOHIER

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

Third-Party Plaintiff Dynasty Healthcare, LLC, a medical billing firm, claimed that a Medicare Administrative Contractor (“MAC”) negligently processed and misclassified the enrollment and payment application of one of Dynasty’s clients, a medical services supplier, and that. As a result, the client was underpaid for providing Medicare services. When the client sued Dynasty for the error, Dynasty sued the MAC, blaming it for the error. The district court dismissed Dynasty’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Dynasty failed to pursue administrative channels through the United  States Department of Health and Human Services before seeking judicial review. At issue on appeal is whether Dynasty’s claims “arise under” the Medicare Act, such that the administrative channeling requirement set forth in 42 U.S.C. 14 Section 405(h) applies; and second, if so, whether the district court nonetheless had jurisdiction based on a narrow exception to the  Medicare Act’s jurisdiction stripping provision recognized in Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc.
 
The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the claims arise under the Medicare Act and that the Illinois Council exception does not apply to these claims. The court explained that Dynasty is not entitled to the exception because Retina’s financial interests in the claims alleged in this case were aligned with Dynasty’s interests at all relevant times, and Retina had both the incentive and the ability to seek administrative review. That Retina pursued a different course is irrelevant to the court's analysis under Illinois Council’s “objective inquiry.”

Talarico Bros. Bldg. Corp., et al. v. Union Carbide Corp., et al.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 21-1354

Opinion Date: July 13, 2023

Judge: DENNIS JACOBS

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Consumer Law, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

Twenty-eight individuals and businesses commenced this citizen suit under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), which creates a private right of action against any entity that has “contributed . . . to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment.” Plaintiffs complained of elevated levels of radiation detected on their land and seek to hold responsible three entities that operated nearby chemical plants during the twentieth century. The district court dismissed their complaints, holding, among other things, that the radioactive materials found on the plaintiffs’ properties fall outside the scope of RCRA because they were recycled industrial byproducts rather than discarded waste. Defendants raised a host of additional arguments in support of dismissal.
 
The Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court explained that as to Defendants Union Carbide Corporation and Occidental Chemical Corporation, the complaint plausibly alleged the elements of a citizen suit under RCRA, or the Plaintiffs have identified extrinsic evidence that may render amendment fruitful. However, as against defendant Bayer CropScience Inc., there are no particularized allegations from which liability can reasonably be inferred. The court reasoned that there is one probative allegation implicating Bayer: Stauffer’s Lewiston plant was located within 2,000 feet of the Robert Street properties and within a mile of four of the Plaintiffs’ other properties. But proximity alone is insufficient to make Bayer’s contribution plausible.

Rodriguez v. Safeco

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-11070

Opinion Date: July 12, 2023

Judge: Dana M. Douglas

Areas of Law: Contracts, Government & Administrative Law, Insurance Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s summary judgment of his claims against Safeco Insurance Company of Indiana (“Safeco”) for violating Section 541 and Section 542 of the Texas Insurance Code.
 
The Fifth Circuit explained that in 2017, the Texas legislature amended Section 542, raising an important issue of Texas insurance law as to which there is no controlling Texas Supreme Court authority, and the authority from the intermediate state appellate courts provides insufficient guidance. Thus, the court certified the following question of state law to the Supreme Court of Texas: In an action under Chapter 542A of the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act, does an insurer’s payment of the full appraisal award plus any possible statutory interest preclude recovery of attorney’s fees?

United States v. Stewart

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Dockets: 22-3682, 22-3881

Opinion Date: July 10, 2023

Judge: Larsen

Areas of Law: Aerospace/Defense, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

Stewart obtained his private pilot airman’s certificate in 1978. In 2013, he flew at altitudes and in weather conditions for which he was not authorized. The FAA notified Stewart that it planned to suspend his airman’s certificate. He could: surrender his certificate and begin the 180-day suspension; submit evidence that he had not violated the regulations; discuss the matter informally with an FAA attorney; or request an appeal to the NTSB. Stewart instead sent a letter stating that the agency lacked jurisdiction over private pilots. The FAA suspended Stewart’s certificate and assessed a $5,000 civil penalty for failure to turn in his certificate. Stewart kept flying. When he failed to properly deploy his plane’s landing gear, the FAA flagged his plane for inspection. Stewart did not comply. The FAA suspended the airworthiness certificate for his plane. Stewart kept flying and again landed his plane with the landing gear up. The FAA revoked Stewart’s airman’s certificate and again assessed a civil penalty. Stewart continued flying.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed Stewart's convictions for knowingly and willfully serving as an airman without an airman’s certificate authorizing the individual to serve in that capacity, 49 U.S.C. 46306(b)(7), rejecting Stewart’s argument that he was not “without” a certificate because he still had physical possession of his. The statute required Stewart to have FAA permission to fly at the time of the flights in question.

State of Missouri v. U.S. Department of Interior

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 21-3408

Opinion Date: July 10, 2023

Judge: GRASZ

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

In September 2018, the United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation (“the Bureau”) decided to move forward with a water project in North Dakota. The State of Missouri challenged the decision under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. Sections 701–706, the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. Sections 4321–4347, and the Water Supply Act of 1958 (“Water Supply Act”). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.
 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Water Supply Act itself. Simply put, Congressional approval is Congressional approval. If the Bureau and the other defendants had sufficient project-specific authorization, they need not seek additional approval again under the Water Supply Act. The court further concluded that Missouri has not met its burden to show the Bureau’s reliance on the Garrison Diversion Act was erroneous here. First, Missouri has not shown the Central North Dakota Project is outside the scope of the 1984 Garrison Diversion Final Report. Second, Missouri’s only argument that the Central North Dakota Project involves an out-of-basin transfer is to point to its connection with the Red River Valley Project’s main transmission pipeline.

CARA JONES, ET AL V. GOOGLE LLC, ET AL

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 21-16281

Opinion Date: July 13, 2023

Judge: McKeown

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Consumer Law, Government & Administrative Law, Internet Law

Google owns YouTube, an online video-sharing platform that is popular among children. Google’s targeted advertising is aided by technology that delivers curated, customized advertising based on information about specific users. Google’s technology depends partly on what Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) regulations call “persistent identifiers,” information “that can be used to recognize a user over time and across different Web sites or online services.” In 2013, the FTC adopted regulations under COPPA that barred the collection of children’s “persistent identifiers” without parental consent. The plaintiff class alleged that Google used persistent identifiers to collect data and track their online behavior surreptitiously and without their consent. They pleaded only state law causes of action but also alleged that Google’s activities violated COPPA. The district court held that the “core allegations” in the third amended complaint were preempted by COPPA.
 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the third amended complaint on preemption grounds. The court remanded so that the district court can consider, in the first instance, the alternative arguments for dismissal to the extent those arguments were properly preserved. The panel held that state laws that supplement, or require the same thing as federal law, do not stand as an obstacle to Congress’s objectives, and are not “inconsistent.” The panel was not persuaded that the insertion of “treatment” in the preemption clause evinced clear congressional intent to create an exclusive remedial scheme for enforcement of COPPA requirements. The panel concluded that COPPA’s preemption clause does not bar state-law causes of action that are parallel to or proscribe the same conduct forbidden by COPPA.

NUDE NICOTINE INC. V. FDA

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 21-71321

Opinion Date: July 7, 2023

Judge: Bade

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Health Law

The FDA issued marketing denial orders for Petitioners’ flavored products, finding that Petitioners’ applications lacked sufficient evidence showing that their flavored products would provide a benefit to adult use.
 
The Ninth Circuit denied petitions for review challenging the denial of Petitioners’ premarket tobacco product applications seeking FDA authorization to sell nicotine-containing e-liquids in the United States. The panel held that the text of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (the “Tobacco Control) Act”) plainly authorizes the FDA to require that manufacturers submit comparative health risk data, which necessarily includes comparisons of flavored e-liquids to tobacco-flavored e-liquids. The panel also held that the FDA did not arbitrarily or capriciously deny Petitioners’ applications and that any error the agency committed by failing to consider Petitioners’ marketing plans was harmless.
 
The panel held that the FDA did not introduce a new evidentiary standard; rather, it consistently required evidence that evaluated the impacts of flavored versus non-flavored products on initiation and cessation. Further,the panel concluded that, even if the agency erred by failing to consider Petitioners’ marketing plans, any error was harmless, and it would not remand on this basis. Finally, the panel addressed Petitioners’ post-argument motions to supplement the administrative record and file supplemental briefing, seeking judicial notice of a premarket tobacco product application deficiency letter, FDA internal memoranda, and FDA press releases.

Center for Biological, et al. v. US Department of the Interior, et al.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 21-4098

Opinion Date: July 10, 2023

Judge: Timothy M. Tymkovich

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

This case arose from the Bureau of Reclamation’s ("Reclamation") Environmental Analysis of a proposed water contract between it and Utah involving water in the Green River Basin. The Green River Block Exchange contract allowed Utah to draw water from releases from Flaming Gorge Reservoir instead of depleting water from the Green River and its tributary flows to which Utah was entitled under Article XV(b) of the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact of 1948. Conservation groups sued Reclamation and the U.S. Department of the Interior alleging violations of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court found that Reclamation’s NEPA analysis was not arbitrary and capricious, that the agency took a “hard look” at cumulative impacts, and that it properly determined that an Environmental Impact Statement was not required. The Tenth Circuit affirmed: the record adequately demonstrated that Reclamation took a hard look at the proposed action and provided a reasoned explanation of its decision.

Smith, et al. v. FRS

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 21-9538

Opinion Date: July 11, 2023

Judge: Eid

Areas of Law: Banking, Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System brought an enforcement action against Petitioners Frank Smith and Mark Kiolbasa, who were employees at Farmers State Bank at the time, after finding they committed misconduct at Central Bank & Trust where they had previously worked. This resulted in their removal as officers and directors of Farmers Bank and the imposition of restrictions on their abilities to serve as officers, directors, or employees of other banks in the future. Petitioners sought review from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the Board did not have authority to bring this enforcement action against them because the Board was not the “appropriate Federal banking agency,” as defined by 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q)(3), with authority over the bank where the misconduct took place. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that, because the Board had authority over Petitioners at the time the action commenced, the Board was an appropriate federal banking agency and had authority to initiate the proceeding. The appellate court also declined to review Petitioners’ Appointments Clause challenge because they did not raise it at trial.

American Public Gas Association v. DOE

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 22-1107

Opinion Date: July 7, 2023

Judge: Wilkins

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law, Utilities Law

Last year, the court ordered the Department of Energy to address three different categories of comments raised during its informal rulemaking establishing more stringent energy efficiency standards for commercial packaged boilers ("Final Rule"). In response, the Department of Energy published a supplement to the Final Rule.

Petitioners, trade associations and natural gas utilities that asserted they were negatively affected by a Final Rule issued by the Department of Energy, claim that the Department of Energy's Final Rule again failed to support its reasoning and did not provide notice and comment as required under the Administrative Procedure Act.

The D.C. Circuit granted Petitioners' request to vacate a Final Rule and Supplement imposed by the Department of Energy, finding that the Department failed to offer a sufficient explanation in response to comments challenging a key assumption in its analysis.

Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Intl. Dev. Finance Corp

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 22-5095

Opinion Date: July 7, 2023

Judge: CHILDS

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

The Sunshine Act’s “agency” definition only encompasses those with a majority of Board members whom the President appoints and the Senate confirms to such position. Government in the Sunshine Act (Sunshine Act). For years, the Center for Biological Diversity, Friends of the Earth, and the Center for International Environmental Law (collectively, CBD) enjoyed the benefits from the Sunshine Act’s application to the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). By statute, it reorganized OPIC into the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC).  Congress shrunk DFC’s Board of Directors (the Board) from fifteen members to nine. DFC’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) serves by virtue of their appointment to DFC instead of to the Board itself. Thus, DFC thought its Board majority was composed only of ex officio members. Accordingly, it promulgated a rule exempting itself from the Sunshine Act without notice-and-comment. CBD sued. The district court granted DFC’s motion to dismiss.
 
The DC Circuit affirmed. The court held that CBD clearly had informational standing because the information it statutorily sought is from the agency itself. Next, the court held that the Sunshine Act does not apply to DFC because a majority of its Board members serves ex officio by virtue of their appointments to other positions. Finally, the court held that CBD’s claim that DFC violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by not engaging in notice-and-comment rulemaking fails because CBD did not demonstrate any prejudice arising from the asserted APA violation distinct from the legal question of Sunshine Act compliance.

GMS Mine Repair v. MSHR

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 22-1143

Opinion Date: July 7, 2023

Judge: CHILDS

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

GMS Mine Repair and Maintenance, Inc. (GMS) is a mining contractor that provides “specialized services” to mines in North America. GMS provided contract services at the Mountaineer II Mine in West Virginia on April 20 and 27, 2021, during which time the MSHA issued several citations against it. Although GMS stipulated the “findings of gravity and negligence,” it contested the $7,331 proposed penalty. Thereafter, GMS went before an ALJ to dispute the MSHA’s method of calculating the penalty. The Secretary, representing the MSHA, argued that all citations and orders that have become final during the 15-month look-back period are counted toward an operator’s history of violations, “regardless of when [the citations or orders] were issued.” The ALJ deferred to the Secretary’s reading, deeming the regulation ambiguous “on its face.” GMS petitioned the Commission to review the ALJ’s determination, and when the Commission did not act, the ALJ’s determination became the final decision.
 
The DC Circuit denied the petition. The court concluded that the regulation at issue is ambiguous, the Secretary’s interpretation is reasonable, and that interpretation is entitled to deference. The court explained that the Secretary’s interpretation reflects its official and steadfast practice (circa 1982) of including a violation in an operator’s history as of the date the violation becomes final. Second, the subject matter of the regulation is within the Secretary’s wheelhouse and implicates the Secretary’s expertise.

Hecate Energy Greene County 3 LLC v. FERC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 21-1192

Opinion Date: July 7, 2023

Judge: Justin R. Walker

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Utilities Law

Congress requires transmission operators to charge reasonable rates, which must be submitted to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission through a tariff before the rates can be levied on generators. Here, a generator, Hectate Energy, accuses a transmission grid operator, the New York Independent System Operator, of charging a rate that it had not filed with FERC. Hecate argues that the System Operator’s filed tariff was not detailed enough and that Hectate was surprised when the System Operator charged it $10 million in grid-upgrade costs to connect its power plant to the grid.

FERC rejected Hectate's argument, finding that the tariff imposed by the New York Independent System Operator put Hectate on notice of the cost of grid-update costs.

The D.C. Circuit agreed with FERC, denying Hectates' Petition for Review, finding the tariff was detailed enough and gave notice that the System Operator would include non-jurisdictional projects in its interconnection study to determine responsibility for upgrade costs. FERC’s order pointed to three cross-referenced sections of the tariff to find sufficient notice that the interconnection study would include information about non-jurisdictional projects.

Intellistop Inc. v. DOT

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 22-1260

Opinion Date: July 7, 2023

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

Intellistop, Inc. (Intellistop) invented and sells a module that fits into a commercial motor vehicle’s existing brake light system and pulses the brake lights with each application of the brakes. Because the module replaces the steady-burning lights with pulsing lights when installed, Intellistop applied for an exemption. The FMCSA denied Intellistop’s application, and Intellistop petitioned for review, arguing that the FMCSA’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.
 
The DC Circuit denied Intellistop’s petition. The court explained that the FMCSA sufficiently explained the difference between Intellistop’s application and the exemptions it had previously approved. The FMCSA explained that the “crucial distinction” between Intellistop and the previous exemption applicants was that only Intellistop’s technology modified “the functionality of original equipment manufacturers’ lamps, which are covered by an existing FMVSS.” The FMCSA adequately explained that it treated Intellistop’s application differently because Intellistop was the only exemption applicant that altered the vehicle’s brake light system to function in a way that would not maintain steady-burning brake lights.
 
Finally, the FMCSA’s concern that Intellistop’s exemption would alter original equipment manufacturer's lights covered by an FMVSS buttresses its conclusion that monitoring Intellistop’s module would be more difficult than monitoring other exemptions. Because previous exemptions used a supplemental pulsing light while maintaining steady-burning brake lights, they did not present the monitoring complication both the FMCSA and the NHTSA feared could result from Intellistop’s module.

Jones Lang Lasalle Brokerage, Inc. v. 1441 L Associates, LLC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 22-7046

Opinion Date: July 7, 2023

Judge: SRINIVASAN

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Landlord - Tenant, Real Estate & Property Law

Jones Lang LaSalle Brokerage, Inc. (JLL) represented both parties to an agreement to lease property in northwest Washington, D.C. Because dual representations of that kind pose inherent conflicts of interest, the District of Columbia’s Brokerage Act required JLL to obtain the written consent of all clients on both sides. JLL’s client on the landlord side of the transaction, 1441 L Associates, LLC, declined to pay JLL’s commission. JLL then brought this action to recover the commission. In defending against the suit, 1441 L argued that JLL, when disclosing its dual representation, failed to adhere to certain formatting specifications set out in the Brokerage Act that aim to highlight such a disclosure. The district court granted summary judgment to 1441 L.
 
The DC Circuit vacated and remand for further proceedings. The court concluded that that the Act does not invariably require adherence to those formatting specifications. Rather, the specifications go to whether the broker can gain an optional presumption that it secured the required written consent for its dual representation. Even without the benefit of that presumption, a broker can still demonstrate that it obtained the requisite written consent.

County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S274927

Opinion Date: July 10, 2023

Judge: Guerrero

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Health Law, Public Benefits

The Supreme Court held that a claim for reimbursement of emergency medical services may be maintained against a health care service plan when the plan is operated by a public entity and that the Government Claims Act, Cal. Gov. Code 810 et seq., did not immunize the County of Santa Clara from such a claim in this case.

Two hospitals submitted reimbursement claims for the emergency medical services they provided to three individuals enrolled in a County-operated health care service plan. The hospitals sued for the remaining amounts based on the reimbursement provision of the Knox-Keene Act, and the trial court concluded that the hospitals could state a quantum merit claim against the County. The court of appeal reversed, determining that the County was immune from suit under the Government Claims Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the County was not immune from suit under the circumstances of this case and that the hospitals' claims may proceed.

City of Hesperia v. Lake Arrowhead Community Services Dist.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D079956(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 12, 2023

Judge: McConnell

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

This appeal was the second relating to a suit brought by the City of Hesperia (the City) against respondents Lake Arrowhead Community Services District and the Board of Directors of Lake Arrowhead Community Services District (jointly, the District) regarding a proposed 0.96-megawatt solar photovoltaic project (the Solar Project) that the District had been planning to develop on six acres of a 350-acre property it owned, known as the Hesperia Farms Property. The Hesperia Farms Property was located within the City’s municipal boundary and was generally subject to the City’s zoning regulations. The District first approved its Solar Project in December 2015, after determining that the project was either absolutely exempt from the City’s zoning regulations under Government Code section 53091, or qualifiedly exempt under Government Code section 53096. The City sought a writ of mandate prohibiting the District from further pursuing the Solar Project. In Hesperia I, the Court of Appeal determined the District’s Solar Project was not exempt from the City’s zoning regulations under Government Code section 53091’s absolute exemption, or under Government Code section 53096’s qualified exemption. The Court concluded, however, that Government Code section 52096’s qualified exemption did not apply to the District’s approval of the Solar Project only because the District had failed to provide substantial evidence to support its conclusion that there was no other feasible alternative to its proposed location for the Solar Project. This result left open the possibility that the District could undertake further analyses and show that there was no feasible alternative to the Solar Project’s proposed location in order to avoid application of the City’s zoning ordinances. A few months after the District made its second no-feasible-alternative determination with respect to the Solar Project, the City filed a second petition for writ of mandate and complaint challenging the Solar Project. The trial court ultimately denied the City’s second petition. When the City appealed, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not err in rejecting the City’s petition for writ of mandate.

Grace v. The Walt Disney Company

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G061004(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 13, 2023

Judge: Moore

Areas of Law: Class Action, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Tax Law

In 2018, Anaheim voters approved a Living Wage Ordinance (LWO). The LWO applied to hospitality employers in the Anaheim or Disneyland Resort areas that benefited from a “City Subsidy.” In 2019, Kathleen Grace and other plaintiffs (“Employees”) filed a class action complaint against the Walt Disney Company, Walt Disney Parks and Resorts, U.S., Inc. (“Disney”) and Sodexo, Inc., and Sodexomagic, LLC (“Sodexo”) alleging a violation of the LWO (Sodexo operated restaurants in Disney’s theme parks). Disney moved for summary judgment and Sodexo joined. It was undisputed the Employees were not being paid the required minimum hourly wage under the LWO. However, Disney argued it was not covered under the LWO as a matter of law because it was not benefitting from a “City Subsidy.” The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeal disagreed: “A 'City Subsidy’ is any agreement with the city pursuant to which a person other than the city has a right to receive a rebate of transient occupancy tax, sales tax, entertainment tax, property tax or other taxes, presently or in the future, matured or unmatured.” The Court determined that through a "reimbursement agreement," Disney had the right to a rebate on transient occupancy taxes (paid by hotel guests), sales taxes (paid by consumers), and property taxes (paid by Disney), in any years when the City’s tax revenues were sufficient to meet certain bond obligations. Consequently, the Court found Disney received a “City Subsidy” within the meaning of the LWO and was therefore obligated to pay its employees the designated minimum wages.

Olen Properties Corp. v. City of Newport Beach

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: G061427(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 7, 2023

Judge: Sanchez

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

Plaintiff Olen Properties Corp. owned commercial property in the City of Newport Beach (the City) within an area known as the Koll Center. The Koll Center was a mixed-use development area, near the John Wayne Airport, San Joaquin Freshwater Marsh Reserve, and the University of California, Irvine. It was located within the “Airport Area,” a portion of the City adjacent to John Wayne Airport, governed by the City’s Airport Business Area Integrated Conceptual Development Plan. In 2020 and 2021, the City considered and approved the request of Real Party in Interest TPG (KCN) Acquisition, LLC (TPG) to develop a five-story, 312-unit residential housing project (the Project) on an existing surface parking lot serving the Koll Center’s existing commercial tenants. In an effort to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the City obtained an addendum (the Addendum) to an existing environmental impact report prepared in 2006 (the 2006 EIR) as part of its general plan update. The Addendum considered a wide range of possible environmental impacts but concluded the Project’s impacts “would either be the same or not substantially greater than those described by the [2006 EIR].” Plaintiff opposed approval of the Project before the City. Among other things, plaintiff argued the City could not rely upon an addendum to the 2006 EIR and was legally required to obtain a subsequent EIR. After the City’s approval of the Project, plaintiff filed suit, seeking a writ of mandate compelling the City to void its approval for violation of CEQA, and for injunctive relief, barring construction at the site. The trial court explained its denial in an extensive written ruling, addressing and rejecting each of plaintiff's arguments. The Court of Appeal concurred with the trial court's judgment and affirmed.

Rancheria v. Martin

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C096097(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 12, 2023

Judge: Robie

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law, Native American Law

Plaintiff Greenville Rancheria (Greenville) was a sovereign Indian tribe that owned administrative and medical offices (property) in the City of Red Bluff. Following a contested election, defendant Angela Martin was elected as Greenville’s chairperson, which included the authority to act as Greenville’s chief executive officer. After her election, Martin, along with approximately 20 people, including defendants Andrea Cazares-Diego, Andrew Gonzales, Hallie Hugo, Elijah Martin, and Adrian Hugo, entered the property and refused to leave despite the remaining members of the tribal council ordering them to leave and removing Martin’s authority as chairperson under Greenville’s constitution. Because of defendants’ failure to vacate the property, Greenville filed a verified emergency complaint for trespass and injunctive relief. The trial court granted Greenville a temporary restraining order, but later granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Greenville appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed: defendants did not point to any authority demonstrating the federal government’s intent to preempt state law or deprive state courts of subject matter jurisdiction in property disputes between tribal members occurring on lands outside tribal trust lands. "To conclude we lack jurisdiction over property disputes between tribal members on nontribal lands would limit tribal members’ access to state court, especially considering California courts have subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Public Law 280 over property disputes between tribal members on tribal trust lands. (Section 1360.) Consequently, the state court has jurisdiction to hear Greenville’s dispute against defendants regarding land it owns in fee simple that is not held in trust by the federal government."

Thai v. International Business Machines Corp.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A165390(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 11, 2023

Judge: Simons

Areas of Law: Business Law, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

Thai was an IBM employee. To accomplish his duties, he required, among other things, internet access, telephone service, a telephone headset, and a computer and accessories. On March 19, 2020, Governor Newsom signed the COVID-19 “stay home” order. IBM directed Thai and thousands of his coworkers to continue performing their regular job duties from home. Thai and his coworkers personally paid for the services and equipment necessary to do their jobs while working from home. IBM never reimbursed its employees for these expenses.

The court of appeal reversed the dismissal of a complaint under California’s Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA; Labor Code 2699). Section 2802(a)) requires an employer to reimburse an employee “for all necessary expenditures . . . incurred by the employee in direct consequence of the discharge of his or her duties.” The trial court’s conclusion that the Governor’s order was an intervening cause of the work-from-home expenses that absolved IBM of liability under section 2802 is inconsistent with the statutory language. The work-from-home expenses were inherent to IBM’s business and the work performed was for the benefit of IBM.

Bradbury v. City of Lewiston

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 49667

Opinion Date: July 10, 2023

Judge: Moeller

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

Petitioner-appellant John Bradbury was resident of the City of Lewiston, Idaho and was an elected member of its city council. While serving in that capacity, he filed a petition alleging nine causes of action concerning various City funds and services, including those related to water, sanitation, wastewater, city streets, the library, and the municipally-owned Bryden Canyon Golf Course. Bradbury contended the City had been collecting excessive utility fees and improperly spending municipal funds. Bradbury sought declaratory and equitable relief. He appealed when the district court dismissed most of his claims at summary judgment, and raised additional errors for appellate review. The Idaho Supreme Court determined only that the district court erred in determining that the Idaho Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”) precluded recovery on a constitutional claim seeking equitable relief. The Court determined a remand was unnecessary where Bradbury conceded he was seeking no such remedy for himself. The Court affirmed the district court in all other respects.

In re Parental Rights as to G.R.S.

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 139 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 16

Opinion Date: July 6, 2023

Judge: Herndon

Areas of Law: Family Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court terminating Father's parental rights to Child, holding that the record did not support the district court's findings of parental fault or that termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interest.

Father was abusing prescription drugs and illegal substances when Child was removed from his care. For the first sixteen months of the protective custody action, Father consistently visited child and completed the required parenting classes. By the time of the trial on the Department of Family Service's (DFS) motion to terminate Father's parental rights Father had been sober for several months and successfully participating in the drug court program. After learning that successful completion of the program would take Father at least another eight months the district court proceeded with the termination trial and subsequently terminated Father's parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when there is evidence that a parent has been successfully attempting to overcome an addiction to substances, the district court can lawfully continue the termination proceedings to allow the parent to make further progress and complete their case plan; and (2) substantial evidence did not support the district court's findings in this case.

Providence Corp. Development v. Buma

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 139 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 19

Opinion Date: July 13, 2023

Judge: Stiglich

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court concluding that an appeals officer erred in denying benefits to the widow and child of an employee who died while on a work trip, holding that there is no requirement that an employee's activities be foreseeable to his employer in order for the employee to recover workers' compensation benefits.

Jason Buma died when he traveled from Nevada to Texas for a work conference and had an accident one evening while riding an ATV around a ranch owned by his coworker. Plaintiffs, Buma's wife and child, requested workers' compensation benefits, but the request was denied. An appeals officer upheld the denial. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the appeals officer failed to apply the traveling employee rule. On remand, the appeals officer again denied benefits on the grounds that there was no evidence in the record that Jason's employer could have foreseen that Jason would be riding ATVs. The district court granted Plaintiffs' petition for judicial review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appeals officer misinterpreted this Court's decision in Buma I and that this Court did not impose a requirement that an employee's activities need be foreseeable to his employer in order for the employee to recover workers' compensation benefits.

Mickelson, et al. v. City of Rolla

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2023 ND 128

Opinion Date: July 7, 2023

Judge: Jerod E. Tufte

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

Cameron and Danielle Mickelson appealed a district court order granting summary judgment to the City of Rolla and the subsequently entered judgment. Their attorney, Rachael Mickelson Hendrickson, requested records from the City under the state’s open records statute, N.D.C.C. § 44-04-18. The City argued that the district court properly granted summary judgment because, among other things, the Mickelsons failed to give the City notice under N.D.C.C. § 44-04-21.2(3). Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed.

Mill Creek Metropolitan Park District Bd. of Commissioners v. Less

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2023-Ohio-2332

Opinion Date: July 11, 2023

Judge: Stewart

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals determining that the Mill Creek Metropolitan Park District Board of Commissioners failed to comply with Ohio Rev. Code 1545.11 when it initiated appropriation proceedings to take private property owed by Landowner, holding that the trial court's orders denying Landowner's motions for summary judgment were not final, appealable orders.

The Park District initiated appropriation proceedings against Landowner. Landowner answered by denying the necessity of the appropriation and the Park District's authority to appropriate the property. The trial court denied Landowner's motions for summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed and remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for Landowner. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' judgment, holding that the court erred in determining that the trial court's orders denying Landowner's motions for summary judgment were final, appealable orders.

Bundy v. NuStar GP LLC, et al.

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Docket: S069448

Opinion Date: July 7, 2023

Judge: DeHoog

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

At issue in this case was whether the Oregon legislature intended to create an exception to ORS 656.018, the so-called “exclusive remedy” provision of the Workers’ Compensation Law, for injured workers whose claims have been deemed noncompensable on “major contributing cause” grounds. While employed by defendant Shore Terminals, LLC as a terminal operator, plaintiff Danny Bundy was assigned to stay and monitor the air quality from malfunctioning machinery without being given safety equipment, and he was exposed to dangerous levels of diesel, gasoline and ethanol fumes. After that incident, defendant initially accepted a workers’ compensation claim for "non-disabling exposure to gasoline vapors." Later, plaintiff asked defendant to accept and pay compensation for additional conditions arising out of the same incident, including "somatization disorder" and "undifferentiated somatoform disorder." Defendant specified that it was treating each of plaintiff’s subsequent requests as a "consequential condition claim" and was denying those claims on the basis that plaintiff’s work exposure was not the major contributing cause of the subsequent conditions. Plaintiff challenged those denials through the workers’ compensation system, but he was unable to establish that the work incident was the major contributing cause of his somatoform disorders. The Workers’ Compensation Board ultimately issued a final order determining that the disorders were not compensable conditions because plaintiff failed to establish that his work-related incident was the major contributing cause. Plaintiff acknowledged that the Workers’ Compensation Law generally immunized covered employers against civil liability for injuries arising out of a worker’s employment. Plaintiff argued, however, that his case fell within a statutory exception to that rule and that the trial court and Court of Appeals, both of which ruled in defendant’s favor on that legal question, erred in concluding otherwise. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff’s statutory argument failed, and that the trial court and Court of Appeals therefore did not err.

Explore This Year’s Key Decisions From the United States Supreme Court

Justia Team

After an eventful Supreme Court term, there is plenty to talk about! Lawyers, you’re invited to join Justia Webinars for a free presentation in which Illinois Law Dean and Professor Vikram Amar and Cornell Law Professor Michael Dorf discuss some of the most important (and interesting) decisions this term. Keep reading for more details.

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