Table of Contents
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Doe v. Mass. Institute of Technology
Education Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
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Dor v. Garland
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law
US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
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United States v. Greebel
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
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Kirtz v. Trans Union LLC
Consumer Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
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Shark River Cleanup Coalition v. Township of Wall
Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
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New Lansing Gardens Housing Limited Partnership v. Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority
Contracts, Government & Administrative Law, Government Contracts, Landlord - Tenant, Real Estate & Property Law
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
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Sherwood v. Tennessee Valley Authority
Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
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Bohanon v. City of Indianapolis
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
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Brooks v. Commonwealth Edison Co.
Criminal Law, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law, White Collar Crime
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
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Northshore Mining Company v. Secretary of Labor
Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law
US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
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Trellus Richmond v. Mario J. Badia
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury
US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
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CREW v. DOJ
Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
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Gordon Price v. Merrick Garland
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
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In re Dominick D.
Civil Procedure, Family Law, Government & Administrative Law, Native American Law
California Courts of Appeal
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In re Ricky R.
Family Law, Government & Administrative Law, Native American Law
California Courts of Appeal
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West Coast University, Inc. v. Board of Registered Nursing
Education Law, Government & Administrative Law
California Courts of Appeal
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Chambers v. Idaho Board of Pharmacy
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Professional Malpractice & Ethics
Idaho Supreme Court - Civil
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Hartman v. Canyon County
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law
Idaho Supreme Court - Civil
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Deal v. Perkins et al.
Civil Procedure, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law
Louisiana Supreme Court
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Spiegel v. Board of Education of Howard County
Constitutional Law, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law
Maryland Court of Appeals
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Nation Ford Baptist Church, Inc. v. Davis
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
North Carolina Supreme Court
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In re Benoit Conversion Application
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use
Vermont Supreme Court
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In re Burns 12 Weston Street NOV
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use
Vermont Supreme Court
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Hill & Stout, PLLC v. Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co.
Civil Procedure, Class Action, Government & Administrative Law, International Law
Washington Supreme Court
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City of Rawlins v. Schofield
Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law
Wyoming Supreme Court
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McBride v. State, ex rel. Department of Workforce Services
Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury
Wyoming Supreme Court
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Wyo. Department of Revenue v. WPX Energy Rocky Mountain, LLC
Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law
Wyoming Supreme Court
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Government & Administrative Law Opinions
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Doe v. Mass. Institute of Technology
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Docket:
22-1056
Opinion Date: August 24, 2022
Judge:
Selya
Areas of Law:
Education Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court denying Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed under a pseudonym, holding that the district court did not apply the appropriate standard for adjudicating such motions.
Plaintiff filed suit against Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) alleging breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and denial of basic fairness related to the investigation of Plaintiff for sexual harassment while he was a student at MIT. In his complaint, Plaintiff challenged the findings of the Committee on Discipline and the ensuing sanction of expulsion. On the same day he filed suit Plaintiff filed an ex parte motion to proceed by pseudonym. The district court denied the motion in a minute order. The First Circuit vacated the order, holding that the district court did not apply the appropriate standard for adjudicating motions for leave to proceed under pseudonyms, requiring remand.
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Dor v. Garland
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Docket:
20-1694
Opinion Date: August 19, 2022
Judge:
Ojetta Rogeriee Thompson
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law
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The Supreme Court remanded this immigration case to the Boards of Immigration Appeals (BIA) after it affirmed an immigration judge's (IJ) decision to deny Petitioner's applications for relief from removal based on two marijuana offenses found by the IJ and the BIA to be "particularly serious" pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) and 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii), holding that remand was required.
The IJ found Petitioner removable based on two Massachusetts state court convictions involving marijuana. The BIA upheld the IJ's determination that Petitioner was ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal for having been convicted of a particularly serious crime. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for review, holding that there was not a sufficient rational explanation to explain the BIA's conclusion that Petitioner's minor marijuana offenses were particularly serious crimes and that remand was required.
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United States v. Greebel
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Docket:
21-993
Opinion Date: August 24, 2022
Judge:
WESLEY
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury
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Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud and ordered to pay restitution. The district court granted the Government’s application for writs of garnishment seeking access to Defendant’s 401(k) retirement accounts. Defendant appealed.
The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The court held that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) authorizes garnishment of Defendant’s 401(k) retirement funds. The court remanded to the district court, however, to determine whether the ten-percent early withdrawal tax will be imposed upon garnishment, limiting the Government’s access to Defendant’s retirement funds. The court also held that the Consumer Credit Protection Act’s 25-percent cap on garnishments does not apply to limit the Government’s garnishment.
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Kirtz v. Trans Union LLC
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Docket:
21-2149
Opinion Date: August 24, 2022
Judge:
Krause
Areas of Law:
Consumer Law, Government & Administrative Law
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Kirtz obtained loans from the Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency (AES), a “public corporation” that makes, guarantees, and services student loans, and the USDA through the Rural Housing Service, which issues loans to promote the development of affordable housing in rural communities. Kirtz alleges that, as of June 2018, both of his loan accounts were closed with a balance of zero. AES and the USDA continued to report the status of Kirtz’s accounts as “120 Days Past Due Date” on his Trans Union credit file, resulting in damage to his credit score. Kirtz sent Trans Union a letter disputing the inaccurate statements. Trans Union gave AES and USDA notice of the dispute, as required by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681. According to Kirtz, neither AES nor the USDA took any action to investigate or correct the disputed information.
The district court dismissed Kirtz’s lawsuit, concluding that FCRA did not clearly waive the United States’ sovereign immunity. Courts of Appeals that have considered this issue are split. The Third Circuit reversed. FCRA’s plain text clearly and unambiguously authorizes suits for civil damages against the federal government. In reaching a contrary conclusion, the district court relied on its determination that applying the FCRA’s literal text would produce results that seem implausible. Implausibility is not ambiguity, and where Congress has clearly expressed its intent, courts may neither second-guess its choices nor decline to apply the law as written.
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Shark River Cleanup Coalition v. Township of Wall
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Docket:
21-2060
Opinion Date: August 24, 2022
Judge:
Smith
Areas of Law:
Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The Clean Water Act empowers citizens to sue for violations of the Act, 33 U.S.C. 1365(a)(1); a citizen-suit plaintiff must “give[] notice of the alleged violation” to the “alleged violator,” and also to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and to the state in which the alleged violation occurs. After the plaintiff has provided the required notice, it must wait 60 days before suing, to give the alleged violator an opportunity to bring itself into complete compliance. Shark River Cleanup Coalition, a non-profit citizen’s group, delivered a notice letter alleging a Clean Water Act violation.
The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Coalition's subsequent suit. Under the applicable regulation, Notice regarding an alleged violation “shall include sufficient information to permit the recipient to identify the specific standard, limitation, or order alleged to have been violated, the activity alleged to constitute a violation, the person or persons responsible for the alleged violation, the location of the alleged violation, the date or dates of such violation, and the full name, address, and telephone number of the person giving notice, 40 C.F.R. 135.3(a). The Coalition’s Notice was deficient in that it did not “include sufficient information to permit [Defendants] to identify the specific standard, limitation, or order alleged to have been violated[.]”
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New Lansing Gardens Housing Limited Partnership v. Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Docket:
21-3942
Opinion Date: August 24, 2022
Judge:
Jane Branstetter Stranch
Areas of Law:
Contracts, Government & Administrative Law, Government Contracts, Landlord - Tenant, Real Estate & Property Law
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The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) oversees the Section 8 low-income housing assistance program, 42 U.S.C. 1437f. New Lansing renewed its Section 8 contract with Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority in 2014 for a 20-year term. In 2019, at the contractual time for its fifth-year rent adjustment, New Lansing submitted a rent comparability study (RCS) to assist CM Authority in determining the new contract rents. Following the 2017 HUD Section 8 Guidebook, CM Authority forwarded New Lansing’s RCS to HUD, which obtained an independent RCS. Based on the independent RCS undertaken pursuant to HUD’s Guidebook requirements, the Housing Authority lowered New Lansing’s contract rents amount.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of New Lansing’s suit for breach of contract. The Renewal Contract requires only that the Housing Authority “make any adjustments in the monthly contract rents, as reasonably determined by the contract administrator in accordance with HUD requirements, necessary to set the contract rents for all unit sizes at comparable market rents.” HUD has authority to prescribe how to determine comparable market rents, the Renewal Contract adopted those requirements, and thus the Housing Authority was required to follow those HUD methods. The Housing Authority did not act unreasonably by following the requirements in the 2017 HUD guidance.
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Sherwood v. Tennessee Valley Authority
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Docket:
21-5927
Opinion Date: August 22, 2022
Judge:
John M. Rogers
Areas of Law:
Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law
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TVA's “15-foot rule” provided that TVA would remove all trees from rights-of-way if the trees had the potential to grow over 15 feet tall, even if the trees did not pose a threat to power lines. Owners claimed that the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) required the TVA to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) for the rule because it was a new major federal action. Following two remands, TVA conceded that the rule violated NEPA and asserted that it had published a notice in the Federal Register to inform the public that it would prepare a programmatic EIS to evaluate the 15-foot rule. The court issued an injunction but stated that the plaintiffs would need to file a separate lawsuit to challenge the sufficiency of the EIS. TVA later successfully moved to dissolve the injunction, claiming that it had held a statutory public comment period and issued a final programmatic EIS, rejecting the 15-foot rule and adopting “Alternative C: Condition-Based Control Strategy.”
The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court has not yet determined, in light of the administrative record, whether TVA took a hard look at the environmental consequences of its action, and TVA’s action has not been shown to be so different from the 15-foot rule as to warrant a whole new suit to obtain judicial review.
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Bohanon v. City of Indianapolis
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Docket:
20-3125
Opinion Date: August 22, 2022
Judge:
Diane S. Sykes
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
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Indianapolis Police Officers went to Mikie’s Pub in Indianapolis. Both officers were off duty and in plain clothes. Bohanon argued with the bartender about his bill. The officers intervened and brutally beat Bohanon in the parking lot. Bohanon sued Indianapolis under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that the officers used excessive force and that his injuries were caused by the city’s policies, which prohibit off-duty officers with any alcohol in their blood from performing law-enforcement functions subject to a narrow exception. An officer may do so only in an “extreme emergency situation[]” where police “action is required to prevent injury to the off duty [officer] or another, or to prevent the commission of a felony or other serious offense.” Bohanon argued that the city was deliberately indifferent to the obvious risk of constitutional violations. A jury awarded Bohanon $1.24 million. The judge granted Indianapolis judgment as a matter of law.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. For the city to be liable, a municipal policy or custom must have caused Bohanon’s constitutional injury. The narrow exception in the city’s substance-abuse policy did not present a policy “gap” that made it glaringly obvious that off-duty officers would use excessive force. Because no extreme emergency situation existed at the time of the incident, those policies expressly prohibited the officers’ conduct and were not the “moving force” cause of Bohanon’s injury.
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Brooks v. Commonwealth Edison Co.
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Dockets:
21-2873, 21-2861, 21-2872
Opinion Date: August 22, 2022
Judge:
Kirsch
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law, White Collar Crime
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Nine Illinois energy consumers sued their electricity provider, ComEd, and its parent, Exelon, on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated for damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) alleging injury from increased electricity rates. These rates increased, they allege, because ComEd bribed former Illinois Speaker of the House Michael Madigan to shepherd three bills through the state’s legislature: the Energy Infrastructure and Modernization Act of 2011 (EIMA); 2013 amendments to that legislation; and the Future Energy Jobs Act of 2016. Although Illinois law still required public utilities to file rates with the Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC), EIMA implemented statutorily prescribed, performance-based rate increases that limited ICC discretion in reviewing rates and authorized at least $2.6 billion in ComEd spending on smart meters and smart grid infrastructure, costs that were required to be passed on to customers. In 2016, FEJA provided $2.35 billion in funding for nuclear power plants operated, paid for through a new fee for utility customers, and allowed ComEd to charge ratepayers for all energy efficiency programs and for some expenses relating to employee incentive compensation, pensions, and other post-employment benefits.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Paying a state’s required filed utility rate is not a cognizable injury for a RICO damages claim.
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Northshore Mining Company v. Secretary of Labor
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Docket:
21-1334
Opinion Date: August 22, 2022
Judge:
Lavenski R. Smith
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law
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Northshore Mining Company filed a petition for review of a Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) order stating that Northshore had failed to maintain the walkway in good condition after an employee was injured in 2016. The order attributed the violation to Northshore’s reckless disregard of and unwarrantable failure to comply with the walkway-maintenance mandatory standard. In addition, MSHA designated the violation as “flagrant.” Commission’s conclusions on reckless.
The Secretary cross-petitioned for review of the Commission’s conclusions on the flagrant designation and individual liability. The Eighth Circuit denied Northshore’s petition on the issue of the company's reckless disregard and unwarrantable failure and granted the Secretary’s cross-petition for review of the Commission’s conclusions on the flagrant designation and individual liability.
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Trellus Richmond v. Mario J. Badia
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Docket:
20-14337
Opinion Date: August 22, 2022
Judge:
Brasher
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury
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Plaintiff, a middle school student, was brought to school by his mother. He was wearing a hoodie over his head because he was embarrassed of his haircut. When Plaintiff’s mother told him to pull down the hoodie, Plaintiff got upset and a school employee called Defendant, the school resource officer. Defendant spoke with Plaintiff for two minutes before pushing him to the ground, pinning him down, and then pushing him in the back as he walked away. Defendant entered a guilty plea to a criminal battery charge.
In this civil case, the district court entered summary judgment in Defendant’s favor on each of Plaintiff’s claims, finding he was entitled to qualified immunity. However, on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed as to the excessive force and battery claims, finding that the force used by Defendant was excessive and that a reasonable jury could find that Defendant acted maliciously.
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CREW v. DOJ
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Docket:
21-5113
Opinion Date: August 19, 2022
Judge:
SRINIVASAN
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law
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Upon completing his investigation of Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election, Special Counsel Robert Mueller delivered a two-volume, 448-page report documenting his findings to Attorney General William Barr. Attorney General Barr sent a letter to Congress providing his overview of it. Plaintiff Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington filed a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act seeking disclosure of the memorandum and related records. The Department sought to withhold nearly all of the memorandum based on the deliberative-process privilege, which protects records documenting an agency’s internal deliberations en route to a governmental decision. The district court rejected the Department’s reliance on the deliberative-process privilege and ordered the Department to disclose the memorandum in full.
The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Department’s submissions in the district court gave no indication that the memorandum related to Attorney General Barr’s decision about making a public statement on the Mueller Report. Because the Department did not tie the memorandum to deliberations about the relevant decision, the Department failed to justify its reliance on the deliberative-process privilege. The court reiterated that its decision is narrow. The court held only that, in the unique circumstances of this case, in which a charging decision concededly was off the table and the agency failed to invoke an alternative rationale that might well have justified its invocation of the privilege, the district court did not err in granting judgment against the agency.
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Gordon Price v. Merrick Garland
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Docket:
21-5073
Opinion Date: August 23, 2022
Judge:
GINSBURG
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
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Appellee, an independent filmmaker, filmed parts of a feature film on land administered by the National Park Service (NPS) without having obtained the requisite permit and having paid the requisite fee. The Government charged him with a misdemeanor but later dismissed the charge. Appellee then sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing the permit-and-fee requirements are facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The district court agreed with Appellee, holding the permit-and-fee requirements do not satisfy the heightened scrutiny applicable to restrictions on speech in a public forum.
The DC Circuit reversed the district court’s order. The court held that regulation of filmmaking on government-controlled property is subject only to a “reasonableness” standard, even when the filmmaking is conducted in a public forum. Here, the court found, that the permit-and-fee requirements are reasonable. The court explained that although filmmaking is protected by the First Amendment, the specific speech-protective rules of a public forum apply only to communicative activity. Consequently, regulations governing filmmaking on government-controlled property need only be “reasonable,” which the permit-and-fee requirements for commercial filmmaking on NPS land surely are.
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In re Dominick D.
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Court: California Courts of Appeal
Docket:
E078370(Fourth Appellate District)
Opinion Date: August 23, 2022
Judge:
Menetrez
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Family Law, Government & Administrative Law, Native American Law
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T.T. (Mother) challenged a juvenile court’s finding that the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) did not apply to the dependency proceedings concerning her son, Dominick D. She argued the juvenile court failed to ensure that San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) discharged its duty of initial inquiry into Dominick’s possible Indian ancestry under California Welfare & Institutions Code section 224.2(b). To this, the Court of Appeal agreed, but declined to address the parties’ arguments concerning harmlessness, because ICWA inquiry and notice errors did not warrant reversal of the juvenile court’s jurisdictional or dispositional findings and orders other than the finding that ICWA did not apply. The Court accordingly vacated that finding and remanded for compliance with ICWA and related California law, but otherwise affirmed.
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In re Ricky R.
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Court: California Courts of Appeal
Docket:
E078646(Fourth Appellate District)
Opinion Date: August 25, 2022
Judge:
Menetrez
Areas of Law:
Family Law, Government & Administrative Law, Native American Law
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N.G. (Mother) appealed a juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights to her children, Ricky R. and Jayden R. Mother argued the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) failed to discharge its duty of initial inquiry under state law implementing the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA). DPSS did not dispute that it failed to discharge its duty of initial inquiry, but it argued that the error was harmless. DPSS also moved to dismiss the appeal as moot on the basis of postjudgment evidence, and it asked the Court of Appeal to consider that evidence under several theories. After review, the Court concluded DPSS prejudicially erred by failing to comply with its duty of initial inquiry under ICWA-related state law. The Court also denied DPSS’s motion to dismiss the appeal and declined to consider the postjudgment evidence of ICWA inquiries conducted while this appeal was pending. To this end, the Court held the juvenile court should consider that evidence in the first instance and determine whether DPSS discharged its duties under ICWA and related state law.
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West Coast University, Inc. v. Board of Registered Nursing
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Court: California Courts of Appeal
Docket:
C094077(Third Appellate District)
Opinion Date: August 24, 2022
Judge:
Louis Mauro
Areas of Law:
Education Law, Government & Administrative Law
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One of the California Board of Registered Nursing (the Board) regulations stated: “An approved nursing program shall not make a substantive change without prior board authorization,” which included changes such as a change in location, a change in ownership, an addition of a new campus or location, and, for certain nursing programs, a significant change in the agreement between the nursing program and the institution of higher education with which it is affiliated. Here, the Board determined that West Coast University, Inc. (West Coast) made a substantive change under the regulation when it increased its annual student enrollment from 500 to 850 over a five-year period. After West Coast sought a writ of mandate, the trial court denied each of West Coast’s claims and entered judgment in favor of the Board and its executive officer. The Court of Appeal concluded the Board could consider the change in enrollment to be a substantive change under the regulation.
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Chambers v. Idaho Board of Pharmacy
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Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil
Docket:
49356
Opinion Date: August 24, 2022
Judge:
Moeller
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Professional Malpractice & Ethics
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The Idaho Board of Pharmacy (“Board”) filed an administrative complaint against pharmacist Cindy Chambers, alleging that she dispensed a controlled substance without a valid prescription. Chambers prevailed before the Board and it determined that she was entitled to recover her reasonable attorney fees and costs; however, she failed to comply with the 14-day deadline for requesting her award. When she filed a request almost seven months after the deadline had passed, the Board denied her request upon finding that she failed to show good cause for the late filing. Chambers then sought judicial review from the district court, which dismissed her petition. Chambers then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, maintaining that both the Board and the district court erred by applying the wrong legal standard. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed.
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Hartman v. Canyon County
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Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil
Docket:
48731
Opinion Date: August 22, 2022
Judge:
Zahn
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law
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Canyon County employed William Hartman as a heavy equipment operator at the Pickles Butte landfill in Nampa, Idaho, from 2012 until 2017. In February 2017, Hartman reported to Canyon County’s Human Resources Office that a female co-worker was being sexually harassed. The next month, Hartman, who was an army veteran, told both the director of the landfill, David Loper, and his immediate supervisor that he was taking narcotics prescribed to him for chronic pain. Canyon County requested Hartman provide, by a set deadline, medical documentation confirming his prescription and verifying that his use of narcotics would not adversely impact his ability to safely operate equipment. Hartman stated he was attempting to obtain the documentation, but he failed to provide it within the requested timeframe. On April 28, 2017, Loper sent Hartman a “Notice of Intent to Terminate,” informing him that his employment with Canyon County would be terminated effective May 2, 2017. The notice stated that pursuant to Rule 11.04 of the Canyon County Personnel Manual and “I.C. § 72-1701 et. seq. [sic],” Hartman could request a good faith hearing concerning the termination within two days of receiving the letter. Prior to Hartman’s receipt of the notice, Canyon County paid Hartman the balance of his accrued leave. Hartman did not request a good faith hearing. Hartman filed a notice of tort claim with Canyon County on July 27, 2017, alleging he had been unlawfully terminated. He filed a charge of discrimination with the Idaho Human Rights Commission on August 3, 2017. On November 28, 2018, Hartman filed a complaint against Canyon County, alleging: (1) disability-based discrimination in violation of the Idaho Human Rights Act (“IHRA”) and Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); (2) unlawful retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”); and (3) unlawful termination in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”). Hartman later voluntarily dismissed his USERRA claim. After considering the parties’ supplemental briefing the district court issued a written decision, granting Canyon County’s motion for summary judgment. Finding that the district court erred in its grant of summary judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
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Deal v. Perkins et al.
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Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Docket:
2022-C-01212
Opinion Date: August 19, 2022
Judge:
John L. Weimer
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law
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Adrian Perkins, the then-current mayor of Shreveport, Louisiana, sought reelection to that office. On July 22, 2022, Perkins signed and filed a notice of candidacy form, as required by La. R.S. 18:461 to become a candidate in a primary election. The requirements for the notice of candidacy set forth in La. R.S. 18:463 include a requirement that the candidate certify nine items. It was undisputed Perkins signed the form certifying all required statements and that his certification as to Item 8 on the notice of candidacy form, was incorrect. Perkins has two residences–Stratmore Circle and Marshall Street– both within the city of Shreveport. Although Perkins was registered to vote at the Stratmore Circle address at the time of his qualification, it was undisputed he maintained a homestead exemption at the Marshall Street residence. The two residences were in different voting precincts. Francis Deal, a qualified elector, filed a “Petition in Objection to Candidacy” asserting Perkins’ false certification on the notice of candidacy form disqualified him from being a candidate for mayor pursuant to La. R.S. 18:492. Deal also asserted that pursuant to La. R.S. 18:101(B), Perkins was required to be registered to vote in the precinct where he claimed his homestead exemption, and his failure to do so caused him to be an unqualified elector and candidate. After considering the evidence, the district court disqualified Perkins as a candidate in the primary election for the office of the Mayor of the city of Shreveport. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that only those false certifications specifically listed in La. R.S. 18:492(A)(5) through (7) constituted grounds for objecting to a candidate. Because the certification at issue in this case was not specifically listed in La. R.S. 18:492, it could not serve as a basis to disqualify the candidate here.
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Spiegel v. Board of Education of Howard County
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Court: Maryland Court of Appeals
Docket:
18/21
Opinion Date: August 24, 2022
Judge:
Gould
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Petitioner's complaint seeking an injunction and declaratory relief to enjoin a student member on the Board of Education of Howard County from exercising any voting power and a declaration that the election process for the student member violates the Maryland Constitution, holding that there was no error.
After relying on remote learning for schooling during the Covid-19 pandemic, at the end of 2020, the Board of Education of Howard County held votes on motions to resume in-person instruction. Each motion failed by a stalemate vote, with the student member causing the stalemate. After the Board decided to continue with remote learning Petitioners brought this action seeking an injunction and a declaration that the statute creating the student member on the Board is unconstitutional. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Board, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the provisions of section 3-701 of the Education Article concerning the student member position on the Board do not violate the Maryland Constitution.
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Nation Ford Baptist Church, Inc. v. Davis
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Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
Docket:
390A21
Opinion Date: August 19, 2022
Judge:
Earls
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the trial court denying Nation Ford Baptist Church Inc.'s (Church) motion to dismiss the underlying complaint with respect to Pastor Phillip R.J. Davis's claim for a declaratory judgment, holding that certain claims must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Pastor Davis filed a complaint against the Church and Nation Ford's Board of Directors, arguing that the Board exceeded its authority under the Church's corporate bylaws when it purported to terminate him by vote of the Board because the governing bylaws allowed termination only by vote of the Church's congregation at a special general meeting. The trial court denied the Church's motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Pastor Davis's claim for a declaratory judgment regarding the various bylaws can proceed; and (2) First Amendment principles required the dismissal of Pastor Davis's other claims.
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In re Benoit Conversion Application
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Court: Vermont Supreme Court
Citation:
2022 VT 39
Opinion Date: August 19, 2022
Judge:
Cohen
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use
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The Benoits sought to set aside a 2008 judgment under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5). The Benoits owned real property in the City of St. Albans, Vermont, which they purchased from the Hayfords in 2003. The property had a main building with multiple rental units and a separate building in the rear of the property. In 1987, the Hayfords converted the rear building to an additional residential unit without first obtaining a zoning permit or site-plan approval, as required by the applicable zoning regulations. The City adopted new zoning regulations in 1998, which made the property more nonconforming in several respects. Both the denial of the certificate of occupancy and a subsequent denial of the Hayfords’ request for variances were not appealed and became final. In 2001, the zoning administrator issued a notice of violation (NOV), alleging that only four of the six residential units on the property had been approved. The Hayfords appealed to the Development Review Board and again applied for variances. The Board upheld the NOV and denied the variance requests based on the unappealed 1998 decision. The Hayfords then appealed to the environmental court, which in 2003 decision, the court upheld the variance denial and upheld the NOV with respect to the sixth residential unit in the rear building. The Hayfords, and later the Benoits, nonetheless “continued to rent out the sixth residence in the rear building despite the notice of violation.” In 2004, the City brought an enforcement action against the Benoits and the Hayfords. The Benoits and Hayfords argued that the actions were barred by the fifteen-year statute of limitations in 24 V.S.A. § 4454(a). The environmental court concluded that “although the Hayfords’ failure to obtain a permit and site-plan approval in 1987 occurred more than fifteen years before the instant enforcement action, a new and independent violation occurred in 1998 when the City adopted its new zoning regulations.” It ordered the Hayfords and the Benoits to stop using the rear building as a residential unit and imposed fines. Appealing the 2004 judgment, an order was issued in 2008, leading to the underlying issue on appeal here: the Benoits contended that decision was effectively overruled by a later case involving different parties. The Environmental Division denied their request and the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed its decision.
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In re Burns 12 Weston Street NOV
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Court: Vermont Supreme Court
Citation:
2022 VT 37
Opinion Date: August 19, 2022
Judge:
Carroll
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use
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Neighbors appealed an Environmental Division order vacating a municipal notice of violation (NOV) alleging owners were using a two-unit building as an unpermitted duplex. The Environmental Division concluded that a 2006 amendment to the City of Burlington’s zoning ordinance did not automatically reclassify the status or use of the building from a duplex to a single-family home with an accessory dwelling. It also held that a 2014 interior reconfiguration by owners did not change the property’s use, and the zoning statute of limitations, 24 V.S.A. § 4454(a), barred the City’s enforcement action in any case. Finding no reversible error in this judgement, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed.
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Hill & Stout, PLLC v. Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co.
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Court: Washington Supreme Court
Docket:
100,211-4
Opinion Date: August 25, 2022
Judge:
G. Helen Whitener
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Class Action, Government & Administrative Law, International Law
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In early 2020, to help curtail the spread of COVID-19, Washington Governor Inslee issued Proclamation 20-24 prohibiting non emergency dental care. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review centered on the lost business income from the Proclamation and the interpretation of an insurance contract under which the insurance company covered lost business income for the “direct physical loss of or damage to Covered Property” and excluded coverage for loss or damage caused by a “virus.” Drs. Sarah Hill and Joseph Stout were dentists who operated two dental offices under their business Hill and Stout PLLC (HS). HS bought a property insurance policy from Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Company (MOE) that covered business income lost due to “direct physical loss of or damage to” the properties. HS sued MOE for coverage because of its inability to use its offices for nonemergency dental practice under the Proclamation and later amended to add a putative class action. MOE moved to dismiss, arguing that HS failed to show a “direct physical loss of or damage to” the property and that the virus exclusion applied. The trial court denied the motion. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of MOE. “It is unreasonable to read 'direct physical loss of . . . property’ in a property insurance policy to include constructive loss of intended use of property. Such a loss is not 'physical.’ Accordingly, the Proclamation did not trigger coverage under the policy.”
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City of Rawlins v. Schofield
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Court: Wyoming Supreme Court
Citation:
2022 WY 103
Opinion Date: August 24, 2022
Judge:
Gray
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law
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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court determining that the procedures leading to the dismissal of Petitioner from the City of Rawlins Fire Department violated Petitioner's right to due process and ordering her to be reinstated with back pay, holding that the Rawlins Fire Department Civil Service Commission's decision terminating Petitioner's employment was supported by substantial evidence in accordance with law.
The Commission concluded that the reason for Petitioner's discharge was "sufficient and established" pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. 15-5-112(b) because Petitioner violated Civil Service Commission Rules 21.3 and 2.7 and ordered Petitioner's employment be terminated. In so concluding, the Commission explicitly rejected Petitioner's argument that she was denied due process. The trial court reversed, finding that Petitioner's due process rights were violated. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Petitioner was afforded due process prior to her discharge by the Commission; and (2) the Commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious.
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McBride v. State, ex rel. Department of Workforce Services
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Court: Wyoming Supreme Court
Citation:
2022 WY 100
Opinion Date: August 19, 2022
Judge:
Gray
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury
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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court reversing the decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) awarding Plaintiff permanent partial disability benefits (PPD) after she injured her back and left hip while working as a registered nurse, holding that the district court did not err.
The OAH awarded Plaintiff benefits after finding that she had made a tangible effort to seek suitable employment given her health, education, training, and experience. The district court reversed, finding that Plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence that she actively sought work and did not present expert medical testimony showing she was incapable of working. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the OAH decision was not supported by substantial evidence because Plaintiff did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that there was no suitable work given her health.
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Wyo. Department of Revenue v. WPX Energy Rocky Mountain, LLC
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Court: Wyoming Supreme Court
Citation:
2022 WY 104
Opinion Date: August 24, 2022
Judge:
Boomgaarden
Areas of Law:
Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the Wyoming Board of Equalization (Board) concluding that WPX Energy Rocky Mountain, LLC was entitled to deduct some of its "reservation fees," holding that the Board erred in interpreting the plain language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 39-14-203(b)(vi)(C) in its decision.
At issue on appeal was whether and to what extent WPX was entitled to deduct "reservation fees" under the "netback" severance tax valuation method, section(vi)(C), for natural gas production years 2013-2015. The Board concluded that WPX was entitled to deduct some of its reservation fees. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the statute allows WPX to fully deduct its pipeline reservation fees for months when some but not the full reserve capacity of gas was transported on that pipeline; (2) the statute does not allow WPX to deduct its Bison Pipeline reservation fees for months when it shipped no gas on the pipeline; and (3) the Board's conclusion that WPX cannot deduct any portion of its Bison Pipeline reservation fees it used to recoup pipeline construction costs was contrary to the plain language of the statute and the Bison agreement.
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New on Verdict
Legal Analysis and Commentary
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The Trigger Has Been Pulled: Texas’s Criminal Ban on Abortion Takes Effect
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JOANNA L. GROSSMAN
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SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman describes the current status of abortion rights and access in Texas in light of the “Roe trigger ban” taking effect today, August 25, 2022. Professor Grossman explains the history of abortion in Texas and highlights the inhumanity of a law that prefers to let a pregnant woman die when a safe medical procedure would have saved her life, rather than permit her to terminate a pregnancy, even a non-viable one, unless she is on the brink of death or substantial bodily impairment.
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