Table of Contents
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Golf Village North, LLC v. City of Powell, Ohio
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Construction Law, Government & Administrative Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
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Miles v. Anton
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
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Citadel Securities LLC v. SEC
Government & Administrative Law, Securities Law
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
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Finnbin, LLC v. CPSC
Consumer Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
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Tyler Brennan v. Stephen Dickson
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
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Vicentin S.A.I.C. v. United States
Antitrust & Trade Regulation, Government & Administrative Law
US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
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County of Butte v. Dep't of Water Resources
Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
Supreme Court of California
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Essick v. County of Sonoma
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law
California Courts of Appeal
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IDHW v. John Doe
Civil Procedure, Family Law, Government & Administrative Law, Internet Law
Idaho Supreme Court - Civil
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Town of Upper Marlboro v. Prince George's County Council
Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law
Maryland Court of Appeals
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Haven Center, Inc. v. Town of Bourne
Government & Administrative Law
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
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Jordan v. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs.
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury
Michigan Supreme Court
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Rouch World LLC v. Department Of Civil Rights
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law
Michigan Supreme Court
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Wayne County School District v. Quitman School District
Education Law, Government & Administrative Law
Supreme Court of Mississippi
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East Bay Drywall, LLC v. Department of Labor and Workforce Development
Business Law, Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law
Supreme Court of New Jersey
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New Jersey v. F.E.D.
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law
Supreme Court of New Jersey
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B.C. v. NDDHS
Civil Procedure, Family Law, Government & Administrative Law
North Dakota Supreme Court
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Procive v. WSI
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury, Public Benefits
North Dakota Supreme Court
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McLinko v. Penna. Dept. of State, et al.
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
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Christenson v. Crowned Ridge Wind, LLC
Construction Law, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law
South Dakota Supreme Court
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Christenson v. Crowned Ridge Wind, LLC
Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use
South Dakota Supreme Court
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Government & Administrative Law Opinions
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Golf Village North, LLC v. City of Powell, Ohio
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Docket:
21-3728
Opinion Date: August 2, 2022
Judge:
Thapar
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Construction Law, Government & Administrative Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use
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The Sixth Circuit affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Powell, Ohio and dismissing Golf Village North LLC's claims brought under 28 U.S.C. 1983 for violating its procedural and substantive due process rights, holding that there was no error.
Golf Village, a developer, sought to build a "residential hotel" on its property in Powell, Ohio but never filed the required zoning application. Instead, Golf Village requested that the City confirm the residential hotel was a permitted use of the property. The City directed Golf Village to file an appropriate application for "zoning Certificate approval" to receive an answer. Rather than reply, Golf Village sued the City. The district court granted summary judgment for the City. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Golf Village's procedural due process and substantive due process rights were not violated in this case.
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Miles v. Anton
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Docket:
21-2796
Opinion Date: August 2, 2022
Judge:
Diane Pamela Wood
Areas of Law:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The Seventh Circuit reversed the order of the district court granting summary judgment and dismissing this complaint brought by Plaintiff after he was fired from his commissary job while incarcerated at Indiana State Prison, holding that the district court erred in finding that Plaintiff failed to comply with the Prison Litigation Reform Act's (PLRA) exhaustion requirement, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a).
Plaintiff was hired for a job in the commissary with the understanding that he would miss work on Fridays to attend the prison's weekly Jumu'ah Muslim prayer service. When Officer Julie Anton refused to allow Plaintiff to attend Jumu'ah and he went anyway, Anton fired Plaintiff based on a work evaluation accusing Plaintiff of theft. Plaintiff sued Anton under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the complaint because Plaintiff did not file a formal grievance before bringing suit. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the prison's grievance policy excepted Plaintiff's claim from the prison's administrative process.
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Citadel Securities LLC v. SEC
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Docket:
20-1424
Opinion Date: July 29, 2022
Judge:
Justin R. Walker
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law, Securities Law
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In 2005, the SEC promulgated a series of initiatives dubbed “Regulation NMS,” which stands for National Market System. One of those initiatives established the concept of the “[n]ational best bid and national best offer,” which are the best bid and best offer for a security, from the taker’s point of view, across all U.S. securities exchanges. Regulation NMS also classifies some providers’ orders as “protected” bids or offers (collectively “protected quotations”). Protected quotations are “automated,” publicly displayed, and the national best bid or offer.
At issue is not whether companies like Petitioner may seek advantages in the market by using advanced technology and ingenious trading strategies, but instead whether the SEC may allow an exchange to innovate, with the D-Limit order, in a way that offers new opportunities to long-term investors.
The D.C. Circuit approved the SEC's rule, finding that substantial evidence supported the SEC’s findings and the SEC’s conclusions were reasonable and reasonably explained.
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Finnbin, LLC v. CPSC
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Docket:
21-1180
Opinion Date: August 2, 2022
Judge:
KATSAS
Areas of Law:
Consumer Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC or Commission) promulgated a mandatory safety standard governing all previously unregulated infant sleep products, including ones for which there was no voluntary safety standard in effect. Finnbin, LLC sold baby boxes, an infant flat sleep product covered by the final rule. Finnbin’s boxes lack a firm stand and elevation, so Finnbin may no longer sell them as designed. Finnbin sought judicial review of the final rule.
The DC Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part Petitioner’s motion seeking judicial review of the final review. Finnbin made two arguments why, in its view, the final rule exceeds the CPSC’s statutory authority under section 104. The court held that because the extant voluntary standard here covers only inclined sleep products, the Commission could not impose a broader standard extending to previously unregulated flat sleep products.
Finnbin further contended that section 104 permits the CPSC to impose safety standards but not product bans, which it says must be done under 15 U.S.C. Section 2057. Moreover, Finnbin continues, the final rule bans products like baby boxes. The court explained that by its terms, the final rule creates performance requirements for infant sleep products not already covered by a section 104 standard. Finnbin provides no reason to think that the rule effectively bans any discrete product.
Finally, the court explained in contending the CPSC failed to provide an adequate explanation, Finnbin highlights cases faulting the Commission for relying on imprecise injury reports. But these cases involved rules promulgated under the Consumer Product Safety Act—which, unlike section 104, requires a rigorous cost-benefit analysis.
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Tyler Brennan v. Stephen Dickson
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Docket:
21-1087
Opinion Date: July 29, 2022
Judge:
Cornelia Thayer Livingston Pillard
Areas of Law:
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
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Out of concern about the increasing use of drones and the effect they have on airspace, the FAA passed the Remote ID rule, which drones in flight to emit publicly readable radio signals reflecting certain identifying information, including their serial number, location, and
performance information. Petitioners, a drone user and drone retailer, challenged the FAA Remote ID rule on several grounds, including under the Fourth Amendment.
The D.C. Circuit denied petitioners' petition for review, finding that the Remote ID rule does not violate the Fourth Amendment because it does not authorize warrantless searches in violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy.
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Vicentin S.A.I.C. v. United States
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Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Docket:
21-1988
Opinion Date: August 2, 2022
Judge:
Todd Michael Hughes
Areas of Law:
Antitrust & Trade Regulation, Government & Administrative Law
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In this appeal from an antidumping investigation of biodiesel from Argentina the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of the United States Court of International Trade, holding that two challenged calculations Commerce used to determine antidumping duties were supported by substantial evidence.
The two calculations at issue were export price and constructed value of the subject biodiesel, a renewable fuels subject to traceable tax credits. In calculating export price, Commerce subtracted the value of the traceable credits, calling them price adjustments under 19 C.F.R. 351.401(c). Calculating constructed normal value of the biodiesel, Commerce used an international market price for soybeans, the price of which is subsidized in Argentina. Appellant argued that correcting for the soybean subsidy in the export price constituted an improper double remedy. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the value Commerce used for the traceable "price adjustment" credits; and (2) substantial evidence supported the constructed value calculation, and the calculation did not result in a double remedy.
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County of Butte v. Dep't of Water Resources
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Court: Supreme Court of California
Docket:
S258574
Opinion Date: August 1, 2022
Judge:
Goodwin Liu
Areas of Law:
Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
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In this lawsuit challenging the sufficiency of an environmental impact report (EIR) prepared by California's Department of Water Resources (DWR) the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeal finding that the claims brought by Butte and Plumas Counties under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), Cal. Pub. Res. Code 21000 et seq., were preempted, holding that the court of appeal erred in part.
The Counties brought a challenge to the environmental sufficiency of a settlement DWR prepared as part of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) proceedings, 16 U.S.C. 817(1), and to the sufficiency of the EIR more generally. The court of appeals found that the action was preempted by the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 791a et seq. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the Counties' claims were preempted to the extent they attempted to unwind the terms of a settlement agreement reached through a federal process and sought to enjoin DWR from operating certain facilities; but (2) the court of appeals erred in finding the Counties' CEQA claims entirely preempted.
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Essick v. County of Sonoma
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Court: California Courts of Appeal
Docket:
A162887A(First Appellate District)
Opinion Date: July 29, 2022
Judge:
Streeter
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law
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Sonoma County received a harassment complaint lodged against the elected sheriff of the county, Mark Essick. An independent investigator, Amy Oppenheimer, prepared a written report. A local newspaper requested the County release the complaint, the report, and various related documents (collectively, the Oppenheimer Report) pursuant to the California Public Records Act (CPRA) Sheriff Essick objected to the County’s release of the Oppenheimer Report. In this “reverse” CPRA action, the trial court denied his request for a preliminary injunction barring the Oppenheimer Report’s release. Sheriff Essick appealed, contending the trial court erred because: (1) the Oppenheimer Report should have been classified as confidential under an exemption to the CPRA either as a “peace officer[]” “personnel record[],” or because it constituted a “report[] or findings” relating to a complaint by a member of the public against a peace officer; and (2) the County should have been estopped to release the Oppenheimer Report because it promised him that, in conducting its investigation, it would abide by the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act POBRA), and it therefore should have been bound to keep the results of the investigation confidential. The Court of Appeal disagreed on both points and affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
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IDHW v. John Doe
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Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil
Docket:
49375
Opinion Date: August 2, 2022
Judge:
Stegner
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Family Law, Government & Administrative Law, Internet Law
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John Doe (Father) appealed a magistrate court’s decision to terminate his parental rights to his three children: John Doe I (age 12), Jane Doe (age 11), and John Doe II (age 7). The children and their biological mother (Mother) lived in Idaho when the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (the Department) petitioned to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Mother eventually voluntarily stipulated to the termination of her rights. Father resided in Tennessee during these proceedings and could not be located by the Department for several months. The Department amended its original petition in Idaho to establish jurisdiction over Father. The Department then moved to obtain authorization to serve the petition on Father by publication in the Tennessee city where Father resided. The magistrate court granted the Department’s request. Ultimately, Father was located in Tennessee and accepted personal service. The Department then filed petitioned to terminate his parental rights. Father participated in the termination trial via Zoom from Tennessee. Throughout the proceeding, Father’s internet connection proved to be unreliable, and he was repeatedly disconnected from the proceeding. Father rejoined the proceeding when the connection was reestablished. Father moved to continue the trial because of the connectivity issue, which the magistrate court denied, noting that it had given the parties the option of joining the proceedings remotely, but that they were required to ensure they had a reliable internet connection. Following the trial, the magistrate court terminated Father’s parental rights based on the grounds of abandonment, neglect, and the inability to discharge parental responsibilities. Father appealed. Finding no reversible error in the magistrate court's judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed it.
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Town of Upper Marlboro v. Prince George's County Council
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Court: Maryland Court of Appeals
Docket:
55/21
Opinion Date: August 1, 2022
Judge:
Hotten
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law
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In this action challenging a proposed amendment that would remove two schoolhouses from a county list of historically protected sites the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the court of special appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court finding that the adoption of CR-72-2019 was not arbitrary and capricious and was supported by substantial evidence, holding that Prince George's County Council acted within its legal boundaries when it adopted the minor amendment CR-72-2019.
Specifically, the Court of Appeals held (1) the arguments raised by the Town of Upper Marlboro had not been waived because CR 72-2019 was not a final appealable decision; (2) CR 98-2019 was a final agency action subject to judicial review, and the Town was permitted to challenge CR 98-2019 by alleging deficiencies in CR-72-2019; and (3) CR-72-2019 was not procedurally deficient because the resolution adequately provided the purpose and scope of the minor amendment pursuant to Prince George's County Code 2727-642.
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Haven Center, Inc. v. Town of Bourne
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Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Docket:
SJC-13198
Opinion Date: July 28, 2022
Judge:
Budd
Areas of Law:
Government & Administrative Law
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The Supreme Judicial Court held that the Town of Bourne properly adopted an amendment to a general bylaw banning recreational marijuana establishments from the community and that the ban was valid.
After the amendment was adopted, Plaintiffs brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment that the amendment was invalid. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the amendment (1) was not a zoning bylaw subject to the requirements of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A; and (2) the amendment was not void under the Home Rule Amendment and was not inconsistent with Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94G, 3(a).
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Jordan v. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs.
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Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Docket:
162485
Opinion Date: July 28, 2022
Judge:
Per Curiam
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury
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Helen Jordan, a nurse who was formerly employed by the predecessor to the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services, challenged in the Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission (MCAC) the decision of a magistrate that she was not entitled to disability benefits under the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA). In 1995, plaintiff was working for defendant’s predecessor when she was injured during an altercation with a patient. Plaintiff was prescribed opioid medication to treat leg and back pain that she said resulted from the 1995 injury, and she used the opioid medication continuously after the incident and became dependent upon it. Plaintiff began receiving disability benefits under the WDCA in 1996. In 2015, plaintiff underwent an independent medical examination at defendant’s request pursuant to MCL 418.385. The doctor who conducted the examination concluded that any disability experienced by plaintiff was not the result of the 1995 incident, and defendant subsequently discontinued plaintiff’s benefits. Plaintiff applied for reinstatement of her benefits under the WDCA. The Michigan Supreme Court determined the agency record was too incomplete to facilitate “meaningful” appellate review: “Despite the MCAC’s conclusion, whether the experts agreed that plaintiff had a limitation of her wage-earning capacity in work suitable to her qualifications and training was not clear from the record.” Therefore, the Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred by deciding this case as a matter of law because further administrative proceedings were needed.
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Rouch World LLC v. Department Of Civil Rights
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Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Docket:
162482
Opinion Date: July 28, 2022
Judge:
Clement
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law
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Rouch World, LLC, and Uprooted Electrolysis, LLC, brought an action before the Michigan Court of Claims against the Department of Civil Rights and its director, seeking, among other relief, a declaratory judgment that the prohibition of sex discrimination in places of public accommodation under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA) did not bar discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. The owners of Rouch World had denied a request to host the same-sex wedding of Natalie Johnson and Megan Oswalt at their facility, claiming that doing so would violate their religious beliefs. The owner of Uprooted Electrolysis had denied hair-removal services to Marissa Wolfe, a transgender woman, on the same basis. Johnson, Oswald, and Wolfe filed complaints with the Department of Civil Rights, which had issued an interpretive statement in 2018 indicating that the ELCRA’s prohibition against discrimination based on sex included sexual orientation and gender identity. The Department of Civil Rights opened an investigation into both of these incidents, but the investigations were stayed when plaintiffs brought this action. The Michigan Supreme Court held that the ELCRA encompasses discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The Court overruled the Court of Appeals decision in Barbour v. Dept. of Social Servs, 497 NW2d 216 (1993), and reversed in part the Court of Claims decision below.
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Wayne County School District v. Quitman School District
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Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi
Citation:
2020-CA-00499-SCT
Opinion Date: July 28, 2022
Judge:
Josiah D. Coleman
Areas of Law:
Education Law, Government & Administrative Law
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Two Mississippi school districts disputed whether the disbursement of past revenues generated from sixteenth section land located in townships shared by the two school districts and received by one, should have been shared by the other. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that the applicable governing statutes placed the burden on the noncustodial school district to provide student lists to the custodial school district, and made it unlawful for the custodial school district to pay over “until the lists . . . have been made.” Because the one-year period delineated in Section 29-3-119(4) did not place a time limit on litigation but rather a time limit on when a noncustodial district could make a claim with a custodial district, it was not a statute of limitations. Commensurate with its duty to presume the validity of legislative enactments, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and render judgment in favor of the custodial district, Wayne County School District, because Quitman School District’s claims were outside the prescribed time limit in the statute.
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East Bay Drywall, LLC v. Department of Labor and Workforce Development
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Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey
Docket:
A-7-21
Opinion Date: August 2, 2022
Judge:
Fuentes
Areas of Law:
Business Law, Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law
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East Bay Drywall, LLC was a drywall installation business that hired on a per-job basis. Once a builder accepts East Bay’s bid for a particular project, East Bay contacts workers -- whom it alleged to be subcontractors -- to see who is available. Workers are free to accept or decline East Bay’s offer of employment, and some workers have left mid-installation if they found a better job. In this appeal, the issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether those workers were properly classified as employees or independent contractors under the Unemployment Compensation Law, which set forth a test -- commonly referred to as the “ABC test” -- to determine whether an individual serves as an employee. On June 30, 2013, East Bay, a business registered as an employer up to that point, ceased reporting wages to the Department of Labor and Workforce Development. Consequently, an auditor for the Department conducted a status audit that reviewed the workers East Bay hired between 2013 and 2016 to determine whether they were independent contractors, as defined by the ABC test. The auditor ultimately found that approximately half of the alleged subcontractors working for East Bay between 2013 and 2016 -- four individuals and twelve business entities -- should have been classified as employees. The Department informed East Bay that it owed $42,120.79 in unpaid unemployment and temporary disability contributions. The Supreme Court was satisfied that all sixteen workers in question were properly classified as employees, but it remanded the case back to the Department for calculation of the appropriate back-owed contributions.
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New Jersey v. F.E.D.
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Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey
Docket:
A-12-21
Opinion Date: August 3, 2022
Judge:
Anne M. Patterson
Areas of Law:
Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law
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Petitioner F.E.D., seventy-three years old, was convicted of three counts of first-degree murder and would not be eligible for parole until 2040. In February 2021, the Managing Physician of the New Jersey Department of Corrections submitted to the Commissioner of Corrections a Request for Compassionate Release on behalf of F.E.D. Based on the diagnoses provided by the attesting physicians, the Managing Physician found that F.E.D. “meets the medical conditions established” by N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(d)(1), the Commissioner issued a Certificate of Eligibility for Compassionate Release. A trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion. With regard to whether F.E.D. suffered from a “permanent physical incapacity” as defined in N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(1), the trial court relied on the list of “activities of daily living” enumerated in the administration of New Jersey’s Medicaid program, which the court identified to be bathing, dressing, toileting, locomotion, transfers, eating and bed mobility. Applying that standard to the medical diagnoses presented in F.E.D.’s petition for compassionate release, the trial court observed that the attesting physicians had found a diminished ability in instrumental activities of daily living but not an inability to perform activities of basic daily living. The court accordingly found that F.E.D. had not presented clear and convincing evidence that he suffered from a “permanent physical incapacity” within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(d)(1). The Appellate Division found that the Certificate of Eligibility for compassionate release that the Department issued to F.E.D. was invalid based on its view that the Compassionate Release Statute applied only to inmates whose medical conditions rendered them unable to perform any of the activities of basic daily living, and to be inapplicable to any inmate who could conduct one or more of those activities. The New Jersey Supreme Court found that the Compassionate Release Statute did not require that an inmate prove that he is unable to perform any activity of basic daily living in order to establish a “permanent physical incapacity” under N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(l). Rather, the statute required clear and convincing evidence that the inmate’s condition rendered him permanently unable to perform two or more activities of basic daily living, necessitating twenty-four-hour care. Assessing F.E.D.’s proofs in accordance with the statutory standard, the Supreme Court found he did not present clear and convincing evidence that his medical condition gave rise to a permanent physical incapacity under N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(f)(1).
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B.C. v. NDDHS
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Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Citation:
2022 ND 152
Opinion Date: August 4, 2022
Judge:
Gerald W. VandeWalle
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Family Law, Government & Administrative Law
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B.C., by and through his parent Michelle Cox, appealed from a district court judgment affirming the Department of Human Services (“Department”) decision to deny autism voucher program funding for a gazebo. B.C. argued the Department’s rationale for rejecting the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) recommendation was insufficient, its interpretation of its regulation was unreasonable, and its conclusions of law were not supported by its findings of fact. After review of the agency and trial court record, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the agency unreasonably interpreted the regulation, and its conclusions of law were not supported by its findings of facts. The Supreme Court reversed the district court judgment affirming the Department’s denial of the autism voucher program funding for the gazebo.
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Procive v. WSI
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Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Citation:
2022 ND 159
Opinion Date: August 4, 2022
Judge:
Gerald W. VandeWalle
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury, Public Benefits
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Robert Procive appealed when a district court dismissed his appeal of an Administrative Law Judge’s order that denied his claim for Workforce Safety and Insurance (“WSI”) benefits. Procive submitted his first claim in 2020, alleging he suffered carpal tunnel syndrome due to injuries to both wrists, elbows, and shoulders resulting from repetitive digging, hammering and driving stakes, steel posts, and iron rods into the ground. He claimed his original injury occurred in western North Dakota, and he notified his employer of his injury in November 2004 and October 2016. WSI accepted liability for Procive’s right carpal tunnel injury, but denied for the left. Later WSI issued its order reversing its acceptance of liability for the right carpal tunnel, finding Procive willfully made false statements about whether he had prior injuries or received treatment. WSI ordered Procive to repay past benefits he received. After a hearing the ALJ affirmed WSI’s decisions denying coverage. Procive appealed to the district court in Stutsman County. WSI moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Procive was required to file his appeal in the county where the injury occurred or the county where he resided. To this, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, finding the district court did not have jurisdiction.
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McLinko v. Penna. Dept. of State, et al.
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Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Docket:
14, 15, 17, 18 & 19 MAP 2022
Opinion Date: August 2, 2022
Judge:
Donohue
Areas of Law:
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Election Law, Government & Administrative Law
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered a question of whether the General Assembly overstepped its constitutional authority by enacting legislation that allowed for universal mail-in voting. Among other things, "Act 77" effected major amendments to the Pennsylvania Election Code, including universal, state-wide mail-in voting. On November 21, 2020, eight petitioners – including a Republican congressman and Republican candidates for the United States House of Representatives and the Pennsylvania House of Representatives – filed a petition for review with the Commonwealth Court seeking to halt the certification of the 2020 General Election, and including a facial challenge to the portions of Act 77 that established universal mail-in voting. The Supreme Court exercised extraordinary jurisdiction over the matter, and found a “complete failure to act with due diligence in commencing [the] facial constitutional challenge, which was ascertainable upon Act 77’s enactment[,]” as the petitioners waited until the ballots from the General Election were in the process of being tallied, and the results were becoming apparent, to raise their claim. Thus, the Court found the claim barred by the doctrine of laches. The Court found no restriction in the Pennsylvania Constitution on the General Assembly's ability to create universal mail-in voting.
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Christenson v. Crowned Ridge Wind, LLC
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Court: South Dakota Supreme Court
Citation:
LLC, 2022 S.D. 46
Opinion Date: August 3, 2022
Judge:
Salter
Areas of Law:
Construction Law, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the South Dakota Public Utilities Commission (PUC) approving the application of Crowned Ridge Wind II, LLC to construct a large wind energy farm in northeast South Dakota, holding that the PUC followed the applicable statutory directives in granting the construction permit and properly determined that Crowned Ridge satisfied its burden of proof under S.D. Codified Laws 49-41B-22.
After a contested hearing, the PUC issued a written decision approving the permit. Two individuals who lived in rural areas near the project and had intervened to oppose Crowned Ridge's application sought review. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the PUC did not err when it determined that Crowned Ridge met its burden of proof to comply with all applicable laws and rules; and (2) the PUC's findings were not clearly erroneous as they related to crowned Ridge's burden under S.D. Codified Laws 49-41B-22(3).
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Christenson v. Crowned Ridge Wind, LLC
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Court: South Dakota Supreme Court
Citation:
LLC, 2022 S.D. 45
Opinion Date: August 3, 2022
Judge:
Salter
Areas of Law:
Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use
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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the South Dakota Public Utilities Commission (PUC) approving the application of Crowned Ridge Wind, LLC for a permit to construct a wind energy farm in northeast South Dakota, holding that the PUC acted within its discretion in this case.
After a contested hearing, the PUC issued a written decision approving the permit. Two individuals who lived in rural areas near the project and had intervened to oppose Crowned Ridge's application sought review. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) neither of the Intervenors' evidentiary claims were sustainable; and (2) even if the Intervenors' claims were preserved for appeal, the PUC acted within its discretion when it denied the Intervenors' challenges to certain testimony.
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New on Verdict
Legal Analysis and Commentary
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What the Divided Argument in the SCOTUS Affirmative Action Cases Could Mean
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MICHAEL C. DORF
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Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on the possible significance of the Supreme Court’s decision to divide, rather than consolidate, argument in the affirmative action cases it will be deciding next term. Professor Dorf suggests the decision would allow Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson to participate in one of the cases and could also allow the Court to attend to at least two important factual and legal differences between the two cases.
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