Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos

Court: U.S. Supreme Court

Docket: 23-1141

Opinion Date: June 5, 2025

Judge: Elena Kagan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, International Law, Personal Injury, Products Liability

The Government of Mexico filed a lawsuit against seven American gun manufacturers, alleging that the companies aided and abetted unlawful gun sales that routed firearms to Mexican drug cartels. Mexico claimed that the manufacturers failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent trafficking of their guns into Mexico, resulting in harm from the weapons' misuse. The complaint included allegations that the manufacturers knowingly supplied firearms to retail dealers who sold them illegally to Mexican traffickers, failed to impose controls on their distribution networks, and made design and marketing decisions to stimulate demand among cartel members.

The U.S. District Court dismissed the complaint, but the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the decision. The First Circuit found that Mexico had plausibly alleged that the defendants aided and abetted illegal firearms sales, thus satisfying the predicate exception under the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA).

The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that Mexico's complaint did not plausibly allege that the defendant gun manufacturers aided and abetted gun dealers' unlawful sales of firearms to Mexican traffickers. The Court concluded that the allegations did not meet the requirements for aiding and abetting liability, as they did not show that the manufacturers took affirmative acts to facilitate the illegal sales or intended to promote the criminal activities. Consequently, PLCAA barred the lawsuit, and the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

United States v. Aceituno

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 24-1206

Opinion Date: June 2, 2025

Judge: Sandra Lea Lynch

Areas of Law: Banking, Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

Lester Aceituno was convicted of conspiracy to commit bank fraud and two counts of aggravated identity theft. The fraudulent scheme involved using stolen identification information to open bank accounts, change addresses to rented mailboxes, deposit fraudulent checks, and withdraw funds using debit cards. Aceituno opened accounts in New Hampshire and Massachusetts using stolen identities and signed documents attesting to the accuracy of the information. He also created a mailbox using a stolen identity. The scheme was led by a man known as "Abby," who provided the stolen information.

The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire denied Aceituno's Rule 29 motion, which argued insufficient evidence to prove he knew he was using real persons' identifying information. The court also rejected his claim of prosecutorial misconduct during the government's closing argument and rebuttal. Aceituno was sentenced to 30 months in prison.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that sufficient evidence supported the jury's finding that Aceituno knew the identification information belonged to real people. The evidence included Aceituno's repeated use of stolen identities, the bank's verification process, and testimony from a co-conspirator. The court also found that the prosecution's statements during closing arguments were fair inferences from the evidence and did not constitute misconduct. The court affirmed Aceituno's conviction.

United States v. Melendez-Rivera

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1665

Opinion Date: June 4, 2025

Judge: Ojetta Rogeriee Thompson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

José Luis Meléndez-Rivera and an associate committed a carjacking in Bayamón, Puerto Rico, during which Meléndez shot one of the victims in the face. Meléndez was arrested and charged with multiple offenses, including carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury and firearm-related charges. He initially pled not guilty but later negotiated a plea agreement with the government, agreeing to plead guilty to the carjacking charge in exchange for the dismissal of other charges.

The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico did not accept the initial plea agreement, prompting Meléndez to withdraw his plea. A new plea agreement was reached, recommending a 180-month sentence for the carjacking charge. At sentencing, the court considered the presentence investigation report (PSR), the plea agreement, and Meléndez's sentencing memorandum, which detailed his difficult upbringing and history of recidivism. The court ultimately imposed a 198-month sentence, citing Meléndez's extensive criminal history and the need for deterrence and punishment.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Meléndez argued that the government breached the plea agreement by failing to meaningfully advocate for the recommended 180-month sentence and that the sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the court did not consider his mitigation arguments. The First Circuit found no plain error in the government's conduct, concluding that the prosecutor fulfilled her obligation by requesting the agreed-upon sentence. The court also held that the sentence was procedurally reasonable, as the district court had considered the relevant factors and Meléndez's mitigation arguments, even if it did not explicitly address each one. The First Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment.

United States v. Pullman

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Dockets: 23-1508, 23-1510

Opinion Date: June 2, 2025

Judge: William Kayatta

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

Dana A. Pullman, a former Massachusetts State Police trooper and president of the State Police Association of Massachusetts (the Union), and Anne M. Lynch, head of the lobbying firm Lynch Associates, were involved in a kickback scheme. Pullman hired Lynch Associates to assist with a grievance negotiation, initially agreeing to a $200,000 fee. Later, Pullman verbally agreed to increase the fee to $350,000. After the Union received reimbursement from the Commonwealth, Pullman pressured the Union treasurer to issue a $250,000 check to Lynch Associates. Lynch then paid $20,000 to Pullman's wife. Both Pullman and Lynch were convicted of honest-services wire fraud, among other charges.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts convicted Pullman and Lynch of honest-services wire fraud, wire fraud, obstruction of justice, conspiracy to defraud the United States, and a racketeering conspiracy. Pullman and Lynch challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the jury instructions, particularly regarding the honest-services wire fraud convictions. They argued that the evidence did not support a quid pro quo arrangement and that the jury instructions improperly suggested Pullman owed a fiduciary duty to the Commonwealth.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found sufficient evidence to support the honest-services wire fraud convictions, noting the jury could reasonably infer a quid pro quo arrangement. The court also held that any instructional error regarding Pullman's fiduciary duty to the Commonwealth was harmless, as the evidence overwhelmingly showed he breached his fiduciary duty to the Union. The court reversed the wire fraud convictions and one of Lynch's tax fraud convictions based on the government's concession. The court affirmed the other convictions, including those for honest-services wire fraud, obstruction of justice, and the RICO conspiracy. The case was remanded for resentencing.

United States v. Vega-Figueroa

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1125

Opinion Date: June 4, 2025

Judge: Gustavo Gelpí

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law

In the 1990s, José A. Vega-Figueroa was involved in a drug-trafficking operation in Puerto Rico. He was charged in 1994 with multiple offenses, including first-degree murder, but was acquitted by a jury in 1995. In 1997, a federal grand jury indicted him for his role in a criminal enterprise involving the distribution of various drugs and related violent acts. After a thirty-day trial, he was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to multiple life sentences. Vega has since made several unsuccessful attempts to challenge his conviction and sentence.

In February 2021, Vega filed a motion for compassionate release in the District of Puerto Rico, citing his health conditions and the risk of COVID-19 complications. He also argued that his rehabilitation efforts and the double jeopardy of being tried for the same conduct warranted his release. The district court denied his motion, finding that the Bureau of Prisons had taken adequate measures to protect inmates from COVID-19 and that Vega's health conditions did not meet the criteria for compassionate release. The court also determined that Vega remained a danger to the community, given his criminal history and prison infractions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that Vega's health conditions and the measures taken by the Bureau of Prisons did not constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons for release. The appellate court also upheld the district court's assessment that Vega continued to pose a danger to the community, thus justifying the denial of his motion for compassionate release.

US v. Vavic

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 22-1787

Opinion Date: May 30, 2025

Judge: Julie Rikelman

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Education Law, White Collar Crime

The case involves Jovan Vavic, a former head coach of the men's and women's water polo teams at the University of Southern California (USC), who was implicated in the "Varsity Blues" college admissions scandal. Vavic was accused of facilitating the admission of students as fake athletic recruits in exchange for payments from Rick Singer, a college consultant orchestrating the scheme. The payments were allegedly made to benefit Vavic's water polo program and his sons' private school tuition.

In the lower court, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts presided over the case. A jury convicted Vavic on three counts: conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud and honest services mail and wire fraud, conspiracy to commit federal programs bribery, and wire fraud and honest services wire fraud. However, the district court granted Vavic a new trial, concluding that certain statements made by the government during its rebuttal closing amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. The court found that the government's statements misrepresented the law and facts, particularly regarding the payments to USC and the alleged $100,000 bribe for Agustina Huneeus's recruitment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's order for a new trial on the honest services fraud charge (Count Sixteen) due to a Yates error, as it was impossible to determine if the jury's verdict rested on an invalid legal theory following the decision in United States v. Abdelaziz. However, the appellate court reversed the new trial order for the federal programs bribery conspiracy charge (Count Three), concluding that the government's statements did not constitute plain error and that there was no prejudicial variance or Napue error. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion.

United States v. Concepcion

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 23-6337

Opinion Date: June 4, 2025

Judge: Michael H. Park

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In this case, the defendant met a sixteen-year-old runaway in the Bronx and, along with two associates, lured her to their apartment. There, they gave her drug-laced alcohol, sexually assaulted her, and began prostituting her over a period of three weeks. The group took explicit photos, posted online advertisements, arranged clients, and used violence and threats to control the victim. Although the victim initially claimed to be eighteen, the defendant and his associates became suspicious of her age and eventually learned she was sixteen, but continued the operation. The defendant left the group after being injured in a shooting, but remained in contact with his co-conspirators. The victim was eventually rescued by law enforcement, and the defendant was arrested after several months as a fugitive.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presided over the trial. The government charged the defendant with sex trafficking conspiracy, sex trafficking a minor, and conspiracy to use interstate commerce to promote unlawful activity. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted on all counts. The defendant moved for acquittal on the sex trafficking count, arguing that the government failed to prove he knew the victim was underage, and objected to the jury instructions, claiming the relevant statutory language was unconstitutionally vague.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c), which allows conviction for sex trafficking a minor if the defendant had a “reasonable opportunity to observe” the victim, is not unconstitutionally vague. The court also found no error in the district court’s use of a general verdict form rather than a special verdict form. The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.

United States v. Lawrence

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 24-419

Opinion Date: June 2, 2025

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Andrew Lawrence pleaded guilty to selling drugs, including crack cocaine, and was sentenced to 36 months of imprisonment and a three-year term of supervised release. Lawrence challenged the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence, arguing that the district court failed to address the Sentencing Guidelines’ differential treatment of crack and powder cocaine and that a supervised release condition permitting him to be searched upon reasonable suspicion lacked adequate on-the-record justification.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York sentenced Lawrence within the Guidelines range of 33 to 41 months, rejecting the parties' proposal to treat the crack cocaine as powder cocaine, which would have resulted in a lower sentencing range. The court emphasized Lawrence's criminal history and the need for him to change his life trajectory. The court also adopted the search condition from the Pre-Sentence Report (PSR), which included a detailed discussion of Lawrence's background and offense conduct.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and rejected Lawrence's arguments. The court held that the district court acted within its discretion in treating crack and powder cocaine offenses differently and did not need to address the parties' policy arguments. The appellate court also found that the district court reasonably imposed the search condition, justified by the PSR's recommendations. The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that Lawrence's sentence and conditions of supervised release were procedurally and substantively reasonable.

United States v. Novis

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 23-6877

Opinion Date: June 2, 2025

Judge: Jose Cabranes

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

Defendants Gary Denkberg and Sean Novis were involved in a mass-mailing fraud scheme from 2004 to 2016, sending fake prize notices to consumers, leading them to believe they had won large cash prizes. Victims were instructed to pay a small processing fee to claim their prizes, but instead received a "sweepstakes report" with publicly available information. The scheme generated approximately $80 million from over three million transactions. Despite complaints and a 2012 cease-and-desist agreement with the USPS, Defendants continued their fraudulent activities using new shell companies.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York convicted Denkberg and Novis of multiple counts of mail fraud, wire fraud, use of fictitious names, and aiding and abetting mail fraud. The jury acquitted Denkberg on some counts but found both defendants guilty on the remaining charges. Denkberg was sentenced to 66 months in prison, while Novis received 90 months. Both were also ordered to pay significant fines and forfeitures.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that sufficient evidence supported the convictions, including evidence of fraudulent intent and material misrepresentations. The court found that the District Court's supplemental jury instructions were not in error and that the admitted testimony and letters from state attorneys general were not hearsay. The court also determined that the admission of the letters did not violate the Confrontation Clause and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting defense counsel from introducing certain evidence due to a failure to comply with a protective order. The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgments of conviction.

United States v. Ray

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 23-6114

Opinion Date: June 2, 2025

Judge: Joseph Bianco

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

Lawrence Ray was convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for multiple crimes, including racketeering conspiracy, extortion, sex trafficking, forced labor, money laundering, tax evasion, and committing a violent crime in aid of a racketeering enterprise. These convictions stemmed from Ray's operation of a criminal enterprise that targeted young adults, primarily his daughter's college roommates, for indoctrination and exploitation, including sex trafficking and forced labor in Pinehurst, North Carolina.

The district court sentenced Ray to 720 months of imprisonment, followed by a lifetime term of supervised release. Ray appealed his conviction, arguing insufficient evidence to support his convictions, the unconstitutionality of the racketeering statutes, improper admission of expert testimony, and the substantive unreasonableness of his sentence.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed Ray's appeal. The court found sufficient evidence to support Ray's convictions, including the existence of an enterprise, the commission of violent crimes to maintain or increase his position in the enterprise, and the coercion of victims into sex trafficking and forced labor. The court also rejected Ray's constitutional challenge to the racketeering statutes, noting that such challenges have been consistently rejected in the past.

Regarding the expert testimony, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of Dr. Hughes, a clinical and forensic psychologist, who provided general background on coercive control tactics without directly linking her testimony to Ray or his victims. The court also found that the district court properly balanced the probative value of the testimony against its potential prejudicial effect.

Finally, the court concluded that Ray's 720-month sentence was substantively reasonable, given the gravity of his crimes and the need for deterrence, incapacitation, and just punishment. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Benton v. Layton

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-1680

Opinion Date: June 3, 2025

Judge: DeAndrea G. Benjamin

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

On January 9, 2021, Xzavier D. Hill, an 18-year-old, was shot and killed by Virginia State Troopers Seth W. Layton and Benjamin I. Bone. Hill's estate, represented by his mother, LaToya K. Benton, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging that the troopers used excessive force in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and committed state law torts. The troopers moved for summary judgment, claiming qualified immunity. The district court granted the motion, finding that the troopers' actions were objectively reasonable and that no clearly established law indicated their conduct was unconstitutional.

The district court found that the troopers were entitled to qualified immunity on both the constitutional and clearly established prongs. The court determined that the troopers reasonably believed Hill posed a danger by disobeying commands and reaching towards what they perceived to be a handgun. The court also concluded that there was no precedent clearly establishing that the troopers' actions were unlawful. Consequently, the court dismissed the state law tort claims, as they were dependent on the success of the federal excessive force claim.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the troopers were entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that all three Graham factors—severity of the crime, immediate threat to officers, and resisting arrest or evading arrest by flight—favored the troopers. The court also determined that there was no Supreme Court or Fourth Circuit precedent that clearly established the troopers' conduct as unconstitutional. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Hsieh v. Bondi

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 24-1013

Opinion Date: June 4, 2025

Judge: Paul Niemeyer

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

Kevin Hsieh, a native and citizen of India, was convicted of inducing a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). Following his conviction, an immigration judge (IJ) ordered his removal from the United States, citing his conviction as an aggravated felony of sexual abuse of a minor and a crime of child abuse under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Hsieh appealed the removal order, arguing that the statute of conviction is broader than the generic offenses of sexual abuse of a minor and child abuse.

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Hsieh's appeal, agreeing with the IJ's determination that Hsieh's conviction under § 2422(b) categorically matched both the aggravated felony of sexual abuse of a minor and the crime of child abuse as defined in the INA. Hsieh then filed a petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

The Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that a conviction under § 2422(b) does indeed categorically constitute a match for both the aggravated felony of sexual abuse of a minor and the crime of child abuse under the INA. The court noted that § 2422(b) targets conduct directed toward minors, involves a mental element focused on sexual gratification, and includes both physical and nonphysical misuse or maltreatment of minors. The court also determined that the statute's mens rea requirement and the harm caused by the offense align with the definitions of sexual abuse of a minor and child abuse.

Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit denied Hsieh's petition for review, upholding the BIA's decision that Hsieh's conviction warranted his removal from the United States.

United States v. Purks

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-4495

Opinion Date: June 5, 2025

Judge: Roger Gregory

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Stephen Purks orchestrated a multi-state methamphetamine distribution conspiracy from his Florida state prison cell. The government indicted him on fourteen counts of methamphetamine distribution and one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. A jury found him guilty on all counts. Purks appealed his convictions, challenging the district court's denial of his motion to suppress statements made to law enforcement and arguing improper venue for his prosecution.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia held an evidentiary hearing on Purks's motion to suppress. Purks claimed that his statements were involuntary due to a beating by Florida Department of Corrections officers before his interview with DEA agents. The court found that Purks was read his Miranda rights and voluntarily waived them, crediting the DEA agent's testimony over Purks's. The court also found that the interview was conducted respectfully and without coercion, and denied the motion to suppress. At trial, the district court denied Purks's Rule 29 motion for acquittal based on improper venue, instructing the jury that venue was proper in the Western District of Virginia.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, holding that Purks's statements were voluntary and that the agents did not coerce him. The court also affirmed the district court's venue instruction, holding that the distribution of methamphetamine is a continuing offense that can be prosecuted in any district where the offense was begun, continued, or completed. The court found that the distribution was completed in the Western District of Virginia, making it a proper venue for prosecution.

US v. Contreras-Avalos

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-4048

Opinion Date: June 3, 2025

Judge: J. Harvie Wilkinson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Three defendants, Brayan Alexander Contreras-Avalos, Jairo Arnaldo Jacome, and Luis Arnoldo Flores-Reyes, were charged with various crimes related to their involvement in the MS-13 gang, including racketeering conspiracy, murder in aid of racketeering, and drug distribution conspiracy. The charges stemmed from a series of violent acts, including the murders of Anner Duarte-Lopez and Raymond Wood. After a two-week trial, the jury found all three defendants guilty on all counts, and the district court sentenced each to life in prison.

The defendants appealed their convictions. Jacome and Flores-Reyes argued that two misstatements in the district court’s oral jury instructions, which were corrected in the written instructions, required the reversal of their convictions for murder in aid of racketeering. All three defendants also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence against them. The district court had denied their motions for acquittal or a new trial.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the two misstatements in the oral jury instructions did not require reversal because the written instructions provided to the jury were correct, and the evidence against the defendants was overwhelming. The court also found that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s findings that Jacome and Flores-Reyes committed or aided and abetted the murders and that Contreras-Avalos was involved in the racketeering and drug distribution conspiracies. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the convictions and sentences of all three defendants.

US v. Ray

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 24-4024

Opinion Date: June 3, 2025

Judge: Stephanie Thacker

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Military Law

In October 2022, NCIS investigators obtained a military warrant to seize but not search Joshua Lee Ray's cell phone. Despite this, they searched the phone and found evidence of child sexual abuse material. Ray moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search violated the Fourth Amendment as the warrant did not authorize it. The district court granted the motion.

The Government appealed, conceding the warrant did not authorize the search, there was no verbal authorization, and the warrant did not incorporate an affidavit requesting authorization. The Government argued the search was justified under the good faith exception.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Government could not rely on the good faith exception because the warrant was not deficient; it simply did not authorize the search. The court emphasized that the NCIS exceeded the scope of the valid warrant, and the good faith exception did not apply to such conduct. The court affirmed the district court's decision to suppress the evidence.

United States v. Cockerell

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 24-10687

Opinion Date: June 5, 2025

Judge: Carl Stewart

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law, White Collar Crime

Quintan Cockerell, a marketer for two compounding pharmacies, was convicted for receiving illegal kickbacks as part of a conspiracy to induce physicians to prescribe highly lucrative prescriptions. These pharmacies, including Xpress Compounding, focused on formulating expensive topical creams, resulting in significant reimbursements from federal insurers like TRICARE. Cockerell was involved in recruiting physicians, developing new formulas, and receiving commissions disguised as payments to his then-wife. He also provided financial incentives to physicians, including lavish vacations and investment opportunities, to encourage them to prescribe these creams.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas convicted Cockerell of violating the Anti-Kickback Statute, conspiracy, and money laundering. He was sentenced to 29 months of imprisonment, two years of supervised release, and ordered to pay $59,879,871 in restitution. Cockerell appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, alleged misstatements of law by the Government during trial, and the restitution order.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and found that a reasonable jury could have convicted Cockerell based on the evidence presented. The court held that the Government provided sufficient evidence of Cockerell's involvement in the illegal kickback scheme and his intent to influence physicians. The court also found no reversible error in the Government's statements during closing arguments and upheld the restitution order, noting that Cockerell failed to provide evidence of legitimate services to offset the loss amount. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment.

United States v. Jubert

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 24-60199

Opinion Date: June 4, 2025

Judge: Carl Stewart

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The defendant, Justin Gregory Jubert, was charged with cyberstalking under 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(B) and transmitting a threatening communication in interstate commerce. The charges arose from a prolonged online campaign where Jubert used multiple Facebook accounts to threaten, harass, and intimidate the victim, M.R., his wife, and their two minor daughters. The harassment included posting threats, insults, and personal information, escalating to threats of violence and tracking the daughters' activities. The family took significant security measures in response, including installing cameras and contacting law enforcement.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi denied Jubert's motion to dismiss the charges, rejecting his facial challenge to the statute but deferring the as-applied challenge. Jubert then pleaded guilty to the cyberstalking charge, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. The district court sentenced him to 27 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. Jubert appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and addressed two main questions: whether the statute is facially overbroad and whether Jubert's conduct qualifies as a true threat. The court concluded that the statute is not overbroad and that Jubert's conduct constituted true threats, which are not protected by the First Amendment. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(B) is constitutional as applied to Jubert and does not violate his right to freedom of speech. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.

USA v. Betancourt

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 24-20070

Opinion Date: June 4, 2025

Judge: Catharina Haynes

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Joseph Lee Betancourt was convicted for firearms possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the felon-in-possession statute. The case arose when Harris County Sheriff’s deputies responded to a 911 call reporting that Betancourt had brandished a firearm during an argument. Upon searching his home, deputies found firearms, ammunition, and body armor. Betancourt had prior felony convictions for aggravated assault, which served as the predicate for his prosecution under § 922(g)(1).

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Betancourt’s motion to dismiss the indictment, which argued that § 922(g)(1) violated the Second Amendment. Betancourt entered a plea agreement, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to time served and three years of supervised release. Betancourt then appealed the district court’s decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court applied the framework from New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, which requires determining if the Second Amendment’s plain text covers the regulated conduct and if the regulation is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court also referenced United States v. Rahimi, which upheld prohibitions on firearm possession by individuals posing a credible threat to safety.

The Fifth Circuit held that Betancourt’s as-applied Second Amendment challenge failed. The court found that Betancourt’s aggravated assault convictions, which involved reckless driving and causing serious injuries, demonstrated that he posed a threat to public safety. The court concluded that disarming Betancourt was consistent with historical traditions of firearm regulation. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment.

USA v. Branson

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 24-60417

Opinion Date: June 4, 2025

Judge: James Graves

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2018, Marcus Delars Branson was convicted of bank robbery in Texas and sentenced to thirty-seven months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release. A condition of his release was that he not possess a firearm. In March 2023, a probation officer found two firearms in Branson's apartment, leading to his indictment for possession of a firearm by a felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Branson moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(1) violated the Second Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The district court denied his motion, and Branson pled guilty, receiving a forty-one-month prison sentence, consecutive to a twenty-four-month revocation sentence, followed by three years of supervised release.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi denied Branson's motion to dismiss the indictment. Branson then pled guilty and was sentenced to a total of sixty-five months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release. Branson appealed, presenting both preserved and unpreserved constitutional challenges.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Branson's appeal. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Branson's facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges were foreclosed by precedent, specifically United States v. Diaz and United States v. Schnur. The court also rejected Branson's Commerce Clause and Fifth Amendment challenges, citing previous rulings that had addressed similar arguments. Finally, the court found that Branson's void-for-vagueness challenge lacked merit, as § 922(g)(1) clearly defined the prohibited conduct, and Branson had fair notice that his actions were unlawful. The court reviewed the unpreserved challenges for plain error and found none. Thus, the district court's sentence was affirmed.

USA v. Riojas

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 24-40378

Opinion Date: June 4, 2025

Judge: Carl Stewart

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

At approximately 2:00 a.m. on September 10, 2020, Corpus Christi Police Officers Perez and Alfaro stopped Isaac Riojas after observing him roll through a stop sign. Riojas, known to the officers from prior investigations, opened his car door and threw his keys outside. Officer Perez noticed a strong odor of marijuana and ashes on Riojas’s lap. Riojas was detained, and a search of his vehicle revealed multiple bags of synthetic cannabinoid, marijuana, and methamphetamine. Riojas was arrested and charged with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Riojas’s motion to suppress the evidence, holding that the search fell within the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment. Riojas then entered an unconditional guilty plea and was sentenced to 121 months of imprisonment. He appealed the denial of his motion to suppress.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that an unconditional guilty plea typically waives prior non-jurisdictional challenges, including suppression rulings. However, the government did not invoke this waiver on appeal, leading the court to consider whether it must raise the waiver sua sponte. The court decided not to raise the waiver on its own motion and proceeded to review the merits of the search.

The Fifth Circuit concluded that the search was lawful under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment. The court held that the officers had probable cause to search Riojas’s vehicle based on the smell of marijuana, the visible ashes, and the partially smoked marijuana joint. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress and upheld Riojas’s conviction and sentence.

United States v. Hinojosa

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 24-1150

Opinion Date: May 30, 2025

Judge: Eric Murphy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Leonel Hinojosa was originally sentenced to 240 months in prison for shooting a man during a robbery. The sentence was vacated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit because it was unclear whether the district court properly used one of Hinojosa’s prior convictions to calculate his guidelines range. The court could only rely on this prior conviction if it resulted in Hinojosa’s incarceration during any time in the 15 years before he committed his current offenses.

On remand, the government presented additional evidence about Hinojosa’s criminal history. The district court found that the prior conviction met the guideline’s standards for inclusion in the criminal history score. This resulted in a guidelines range of 120 to 150 months for his robbery and felon-in-possession offenses, plus a consecutive 120-month minimum sentence for discharging a firearm during a crime of violence. The district court reimposed the same 240-month sentence.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the “but for” causal connection between the prior conviction and the extra incarceration satisfied the guideline’s “resulted in” language. The court also found that the district court reasonably sentenced Hinojosa to 240 months due to his history of violence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence, rejecting Hinojosa’s procedural and substantive challenges. The court concluded that the district court properly calculated the guidelines range and reasonably balanced the sentencing factors, including the seriousness of the offense and Hinojosa’s history of violent behavior.

United States v. Shaw

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 24-5461

Opinion Date: June 5, 2025

Judge: Helene White

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Tracey Shaw was indicted in January 2023 for knowingly possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Shaw pleaded guilty and, as part of his plea agreement, waived his right to appeal any sentence within the applicable guideline range. At the sentencing hearing, the district court determined Shaw’s guideline range to be 87 to 108 months and sentenced him to 92 months in prison and three years of supervised release. The court did not make a recommendation about substance-abuse treatment during incarceration but left it to the Bureau of Prisons. For supervised release, the court stated that Shaw might be required to participate in substance-abuse treatment if directed by the probation office.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee issued a written judgment stating that Shaw must participate in substance-abuse testing and treatment as directed by the probation officer. Shaw appealed, arguing that the written judgment conflicted with the oral pronouncement, which he interpreted as delegating the decision to the probation office.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Shaw’s appeal was not barred by his plea agreement’s appeal waiver because he was challenging the written judgment, not the sentence itself. The court found that the oral sentence was ambiguous regarding the substance-abuse treatment condition. The written judgment clarified this ambiguity by specifying that Shaw must participate in substance-abuse treatment as directed by the probation officer. The court concluded that this language met constitutional requirements by mandating treatment while allowing the probation officer to handle the details. Therefore, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s written judgment.

Johnson v Sevier

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 21-3239

Opinion Date: May 30, 2025

Judge: John Z. Lee

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Mark Johnson was convicted by an Indiana jury of felony rape, felony criminal confinement, and misdemeanor battery. He appealed, arguing that the exclusion of certain DNA evidence and the destruction of the victim's blood sample before toxicology testing violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The Indiana Court of Appeals vacated his convictions for criminal confinement and battery on double jeopardy grounds but affirmed the rape conviction. Johnson's petition to transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court was denied. He then sought post-conviction review in state court and, after exhausting state remedies, sought federal habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana denied Johnson's habeas petition, concluding that his DNA-related claim was procedurally defaulted and that the state court reasonably applied federal law in determining that the State had not acted in bad faith when discarding the blood sample. Johnson appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Johnson's claim regarding the exclusion of DNA evidence was procedurally defaulted because he failed to raise it in his petition for transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court. Additionally, the court found that the Indiana Court of Appeals reasonably applied federal law in determining that the police had not acted in bad faith when disposing of the blood sample, as the evidence was only potentially exculpatory and there was no clear indication of bad faith. The court concluded that the state court's decision did not deviate from established federal law or constitute an unreasonable determination of the facts.

Lindsey v Neal

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-2789

Opinion Date: May 30, 2025

Judge: Nancy Maldonado

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Steven Lindsey was convicted of murdering his wife in 2016 after three trials. He was sentenced to fifty-five years in prison. Lindsey appealed his conviction, but the Court of Appeals of Indiana denied his appeal, and the Indiana Supreme Court declined to hear his case. In 2019, Lindsey filed a pro se postconviction petition in state court, which has seen little progress over six years due to state court inaction and prosecution delays.

The state court appointed a public defender for Lindsey nearly two years after he filed his petition, despite his wish to represent himself. The case experienced multiple delays, including the appointment and withdrawal of special prosecutors and the state court's failure to rule on Lindsey's motions. Lindsey actively tried to move his case forward, filing motions and responding to discovery requests, but the state court and prosecution's actions significantly delayed the proceedings.

Lindsey then filed a federal habeas petition in the Northern District of Indiana in 2023, arguing that the inordinate delay in his state postconviction proceedings should excuse the exhaustion requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The district court dismissed his petition, finding the delays reasonable and attributing them to Lindsey's legal inexperience. Lindsey appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case.

The Seventh Circuit found that the six-year delay in Lindsey's state postconviction proceedings was inordinate and attributable to the state. The court held that the delay rendered the state process ineffective in protecting Lindsey's rights, excusing him from the exhaustion requirement. The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings on the merits of Lindsey's habeas petition.

United States v Tyler

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 24-2000

Opinion Date: June 5, 2025

Judge: David Hamilton

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In January 2017, Deaunta Tyler, along with Ledell Tyler and Dalvent Jackson, forcibly entered a home in Rock Island, Illinois, armed with firearms, searching for cocaine. They found a family instead and, brandishing weapons, demanded the non-existent drugs. The intruders moved the family around the house at gunpoint, passing firearms among themselves and threatening to kill the victims. Jackson fired a handgun inside the house. The intruders eventually left with cash and a small amount of marijuana. The next day, police identified the men, leading to a high-speed chase and Tyler's eventual arrest.

A grand jury indicted Tyler on three counts: attempted Hobbs Act robbery, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Tyler was convicted on all counts. The district court sentenced him to 330 months in prison. Following the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Taylor, which held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), Tyler moved to vacate his § 924(c) conviction. The district court granted the motion, vacated the § 924(c) conviction, and resentenced Tyler to 240 months.

Tyler appealed his revised sentence, arguing that the district court failed to address his key arguments in mitigation and provided an inadequate explanation for the sentence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Tyler waived any procedural objection regarding the court’s failure to consider his arguments in mitigation by confirming that the court had addressed his principal points. Additionally, the appellate court found that the district court adequately explained its reasons for imposing a revised sentence within the guideline range.

USA v Wilkinson

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-1863

Opinion Date: June 2, 2025

Judge: Doris Pryor

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Thomas Wilkinson was charged with drug and firearm offenses, including possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The indictment noted two prior state drug convictions relevant to sentencing. Wilkinson initially pleaded not guilty but later changed his plea to guilty. The government filed a notice under 21 U.S.C. § 851 to enhance Wilkinson's sentence based on one prior drug-trafficking conviction.

The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois accepted Wilkinson's guilty plea. However, before sentencing, it was discovered that the prior conviction cited in the § 851 notice did not qualify as a "serious drug felony" under federal law. The government then sought to use a different prior conviction, not mentioned in the § 851 notice, to enhance Wilkinson's sentence. The district court agreed, finding that the government had substantially complied with § 851's requirements, and sentenced Wilkinson to a total of twenty years in prison.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the government failed to comply with the notice requirements of 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) by not providing written notice of the specific prior conviction it intended to use for the sentence enhancement before Wilkinson's guilty plea. The court found that this error was not harmless, as it affected Wilkinson's ability to make an informed decision about his plea and the district court's sentencing decision. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit vacated Wilkinson's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.

Sorensen v. United States

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1593

Opinion Date: June 2, 2025

Judge: Jane Kelly

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Shawn Russell Sorensen was convicted of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment based on prior state convictions for drug offenses. He filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for not contesting the qualification of his prior convictions as "felony drug offenses" under 21 U.S.C. § 841’s sentencing enhancement scheme.

The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota dismissed Sorensen's motion. The court found that his counsel's performance was not deficient, as the argument regarding the categorical approach to his prior convictions was considered novel at the time of sentencing. Sorensen appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that even if counsel's performance was deficient, Sorensen failed to demonstrate prejudice. The court applied the categorical and modified categorical approaches to determine that Sorensen's prior convictions under Arizona and South Dakota statutes qualified as felony drug offenses. The Arizona statute was found to be divisible, and Sorensen's conviction for possession of methamphetamine matched the federal definition of a felony drug offense. Similarly, the South Dakota statute was also deemed divisible, and Sorensen's conviction for possession of methamphetamine under this statute qualified as a felony drug offense. Therefore, Sorensen's sentence was upheld, and the district court's judgment was affirmed.

Stewart v. Garcia

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2872

Opinion Date: June 5, 2025

Judge: Jane Kelly

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Clayton Stewart was involved in a police incident where Officer Victor Garcia of the Jonesboro, Arkansas police department tased him while he was climbing a fence. Stewart fell and was paralyzed as a result. Stewart filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Garcia, Jonesboro Chief of Police Rick Elliot, and the City of Jonesboro, alleging violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims, and Stewart appealed.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding no genuine disputes of material fact that would preclude summary judgment. Stewart argued that Garcia lacked probable cause to arrest him, used excessive force, and was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. He also claimed that Elliot was liable as Garcia’s supervisor and that the police department’s policies were unconstitutional.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Garcia had at least arguable probable cause to arrest Stewart for misdemeanor assault and fleeing. Regarding the excessive force claim, the court found that while tasing Stewart in an elevated position could be considered deadly force, Stewart’s right to be free from such force was not clearly established at the time of the incident, entitling Garcia to qualified immunity. On the deliberate indifference claim, the court concluded that although a reasonable jury could find Garcia was aware of Stewart’s serious medical needs, Stewart failed to show that the right was clearly established, granting Garcia qualified immunity. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the supervisory liability claim against Elliot and the municipal liability claim against the City of Jonesboro, finding no evidence of a pattern of unconstitutional acts or inadequate policies. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in full.

United States v. Boyd

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 24-1314

Opinion Date: May 30, 2025

Judge: Jonathan Kobes

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Sam Boyd was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance and being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm and ammunition. Boyd filed motions to dismiss the indictment, arguing that his Speedy Trial Act rights were violated, and to sever the gun counts from the conspiracy count. Both motions were denied.

The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota issued a continuance on November 7, 2022, due to Boyd's motions to dismiss and suppress evidence. The hearing was delayed due to disputes over the witness list and difficulties in procuring testimony. Boyd filed additional documents in February 2023, and the magistrate judge recommended denying Boyd's motions in June. The district court adopted the report and recommendation in August and denied Boyd's motion to dismiss the indictment and motion to sever the firearm counts from the drug conspiracy count. The case proceeded to trial, and Boyd was convicted.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the continuance and denying the motion to dismiss, as the continuance was justified by the complexity of the motions and witness issues. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying the motion to sever, as the evidence of the guns and drugs would be admissible in separate trials under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions.

United States v. Bull

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 24-2197

Opinion Date: June 2, 2025

Judge: James Loken

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech, Health Law

Evan Brown Bull was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to distribute 500 or more grams of methamphetamine. The government presented evidence from thirteen witnesses and various forms of documentation, including videos and Facebook messages, detailing Brown Bull's drug dealings from 2016 to 2023. The Probation Office's Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) recommended a base offense level of 32, with adjustments that increased the total offense level to 40, resulting in an advisory guidelines sentencing range of 360 months to life imprisonment. Brown Bull objected to the PSR's findings and requested a downward variance to 180 months.

The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota overruled Brown Bull's objections and applied three sentencing enhancements: a two-level increase for obstruction of justice, a four-level increase for being an organizer or leader of a criminal activity involving five or more participants, and a two-level increase for committing the offense as part of a pattern of criminal conduct engaged in as a livelihood. The court ultimately sentenced Brown Bull to 400 months imprisonment and five years of supervised release.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found no clear error in the district court's application of the sentencing enhancements. The court held that Brown Bull's pretrial jail messages and Facebook post constituted obstruction of justice, that he was an organizer or leader of the drug conspiracy, and that his criminal conduct was part of his livelihood. The court concluded that the district court's findings were supported by the evidence and upheld the 400-month sentence.

United States v. McKinney

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 24-1182

Opinion Date: June 5, 2025

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Booker Deon McKinney pleaded guilty to possession of ammunition as an unlawful drug user, violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(3) and 924(a)(2). He was sentenced to 120 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. McKinney later moved to withdraw his guilty plea and dismiss his indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(3) violated the Second Amendment. The district court denied his motion.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa initially reviewed the case. McKinney was indicted in January 2023 and pleaded guilty in June 2023. In January 2024, he filed a motion to withdraw his plea and dismiss the indictment, which the district court denied. McKinney was sentenced on January 26, 2024, and subsequently appealed the decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. McKinney argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and dismiss the indictment, miscalculated his base offense level, relied on inadmissible hearsay evidence, and improperly weighed the § 3553(a) factors at sentencing. The Eighth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decisions. The court held that there was no intervening change in the law that justified McKinney's belated request to withdraw his plea. The court also upheld the district court's calculation of the base offense level and its reliance on hearsay evidence, finding it sufficiently reliable. Finally, the court found McKinney's sentence substantively reasonable, noting that the district court had appropriately considered the § 3553(a) factors. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment.

United States v. Midder

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-3041

Opinion Date: June 4, 2025

Judge: Jane Kelly

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In June 2022, law enforcement officers in Sarpy County received a tip that Rolando Midder was sex trafficking a 16-year-old girl, J.C. Officers met with J.C., who showed signs of physical abuse, and took her to a hospital for a sexual assault exam. After two weeks of investigation, Midder was arrested and charged with one count of sex trafficking a minor and two counts of sexually exploiting a minor. A jury convicted him on all counts.

The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska admitted social media evidence and witness testimony during the trial. Midder appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by admitting this evidence and that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. He also challenged the scope of testimony given by a nurse who performed J.C.'s sexual assault exam, but he failed to provide any argument on this issue, resulting in a waiver of appellate review.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion and found that the government presented sufficient evidence connecting Midder to the cellphone and social media accounts used in the crimes. The court also upheld the admission of testimony from Eran Peatrowsky under Rule 404(b), finding it relevant to proving Midder’s knowledge, intent, and motive. Additionally, the court found sufficient evidence to support Midder’s convictions for sex trafficking a minor and sexual exploitation of a minor, based on the evidence presented at trial.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings and upheld Midder’s convictions on all counts.

United States v. Tate

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 24-2617

Opinion Date: June 5, 2025

Judge: Bobby Shepherd

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

A police officer in Bismarck, North Dakota, smelled marijuana in a hotel and traced the scent to Room 118, occupied by Leonard Tate. The officer obtained a search warrant based on the smell and Tate's criminal history. The search revealed fentanyl, cash, firearm parts, and other items. Tate was charged with three drug-related crimes and moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the warrant lacked probable cause and the search exceeded its scope. The district court denied the motion, and Tate pled guilty to one count of conspiracy, preserving his right to appeal the suppression order.

The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota found that the search warrant was supported by probable cause, the search did not exceed the warrant's scope, and the good-faith exception applied. Tate appealed the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing the warrant was not supported by probable cause and that the search exceeded its scope.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the smell of marijuana alone provided substantial support for probable cause, especially given the officer's training and experience. The court also found that the search did not exceed the warrant's scope, as the items seized were in plain view and their incriminating nature was immediately apparent. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Tate's motion to suppress.

A. V. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 24-3092

Opinion Date: June 2, 2025

Judge: Lucy H. Koh

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Petitioners Joshua Davis and N.A. were victims of a cryptocurrency theft and extortion scheme. The defendants impersonated Davis to gain control of his cellphone number, hacked his email accounts, and stole both Davis's and N.A.'s Ether. Davis reported the crime to the FBI and filed a petition for remission, while N.A. also reported the theft and filed similar petitions. The government, however, failed to properly calculate the restitution amounts, leading to the district court ordering restitution that significantly understated the value of the stolen Ether.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California sentenced the defendants and ordered restitution of $43,000 to Davis and $40,000 to N.A., based on the government's incorrect calculations. Petitioners later discovered the errors and filed motions to reopen the restitution orders, arguing that the correct value of their stolen Ether was much higher. The district court acknowledged the government's mistakes but denied the motions, concluding that Petitioners did not "discover further losses subsequent to sentencing" under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and granted the petitions for writs of mandamus. The court held that Petitioners were entitled to seek mandamus relief under the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3), and that the limitations on motions to reopen a sentence set forth in § 3771(d)(5) do not apply to petitions to reopen restitution brought under § 3664(d)(5). The court concluded that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5), allows crime victims to petition to reopen restitution when they "subsequently discover" that a district court's restitution order failed to include recoverable losses. The case was remanded to the district court to consider whether Petitioners met the additional good cause and timing requirements set forth in the MVRA.

Hogan v. Bean

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 18-99004

Opinion Date: June 4, 2025

Judge: Jay Bybee

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Michael Hogan, a death row inmate in Nevada, appealed the denial of his habeas corpus petition. Hogan challenged the district court's denial of relief on two certified issues and sought to expand the certificate of appealability (COA) on five additional issues. The case predates the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

Hogan's first certified claim alleged ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) for failing to investigate his 1971 Iowa manslaughter conviction, which was used as an aggravating factor in his Nevada penalty proceeding. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding that Hogan's trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision to challenge the Iowa conviction in Nevada rather than in Iowa. The court also found that Hogan could not demonstrate prejudice from his counsel's failure to challenge the Iowa conviction as a crime of violence under Nevada law.

Hogan's second certified claim argued that the procedural default of his trial-court IAC claims should be excused under Martinez v. Ryan. The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court's reasons for concluding that Hogan failed to establish "cause" under Martinez. The court held that Martinez applies to procedural defaults based on state timeliness rules and that Hogan's failure to raise the trial IAC claims in his second petition did not preclude Martinez relief. The court remanded Claims 2(A)-(G) and (I)-(O) to the district court for further proceedings.

The Ninth Circuit granted Hogan's motion to expand the COA to include whether the district court erred in dismissing his challenges to the aggravating circumstances (Claims 5(A) and (B)) as procedurally defaulted. The court held that these claims were properly exhausted and that Nevada's procedural rules were not consistently applied as of 1990, allowing federal review of the merits. The court affirmed the district court's judgment on the merits of these claims.

The Ninth Circuit declined to expand the COA to cover four other issues, including Hogan's Confrontation Clause claim, jury instructional errors, lethal injection claim, and cumulative errors claim. The court affirmed the district court's judgment on these issues.

JOHNSON V. USA

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 19-55717

Opinion Date: June 3, 2025

Judge: Morgan Christen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Antoine Johnson was convicted of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, Hobbs Act robbery, and the use and discharge of a firearm causing death during a crime of violence. The charges stemmed from the robbery of an armored truck in which a guard was fatally shot. Johnson argued that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) was unlawful because intervening Supreme Court case law invalidated § 924(c)’s residual clause, and thus, the jury must have based his conviction on invalid crime-of-violence predicates.

The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Johnson’s motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court held that Johnson’s § 924(c) conviction was based on at least one valid predicate pursuant to the elements clause: Hobbs Act robbery. The court also ruled that any error in the jury instructions was harmless because no reasonable juror could have found Johnson guilty of § 924(c) based solely on his participation in the conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and not the commission of the robbery itself.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling on two alternative grounds. First, the Ninth Circuit held that there was no error in the jury instructions because the district court correctly instructed the jury that it could rely on either of two valid predicate crimes of violence: the direct commission of Hobbs Act robbery or Hobbs Act robbery under a Pinkerton theory of liability. Second, the Ninth Circuit concluded that even if the trial court had instructed the jury that it could rely on one invalid predicate in addition to the valid theories of Hobbs Act robbery, the error would have been harmless on the facts of this case.

United States v. Nahkai

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 24-4058

Opinion Date: June 3, 2025

Judge: Paul Kelly

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Native American Law

Andy Nahkai was charged with two counts of abusive sexual contact with a child and one count of abusive sexual contact with a child aged 12-16, all occurring within Indian country. During the investigation, Nahkai made incriminating statements to law enforcement officers while being interviewed in an unlocked police vehicle parked outside his home. The officers did not administer Miranda warnings before the interview.

The United States District Court for the District of Utah granted Nahkai’s motion to suppress the statements he made during the interview. The court concluded that the interrogation was custodial, and the statements were not voluntary under the Fifth Amendment. The court based its decision on the officers' failure to inform Nahkai that he was free to leave, the accusatory nature of the questioning, and the police-dominated atmosphere of the encounter.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Nahkai was not in custody for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona. The court found that the totality of the circumstances did not support the conclusion that Nahkai’s freedom of action was curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest. The court noted that Nahkai was not physically restrained, the vehicle doors were unlocked, and the questioning, although accusatory, was not unusually confrontational. The court reversed the district court’s order suppressing Nahkai’s statements and remanded the case for further proceedings.

United States v. Peppers

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-3112

Opinion Date: May 30, 2025

Judge: David Ebel

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the defendant, Dante Peppers, was convicted in 2023 for conspiring to possess methamphetamine with the intent to distribute it and for using a communication facility to facilitate the conspiracy. The investigation began in 2019 and 2020, focusing on Tyrone Millsap, who was distributing methamphetamine in Kansas. Peppers was implicated through Facebook Messenger communications and involvement in methamphetamine sales arranged by Millsap. Peppers was also found to have been involved in a traffic stop where methamphetamine was found.

The United States District Court for the District of Kansas tried Peppers, and the jury convicted him of conspiracy and using a communication facility to facilitate the conspiracy. However, the jury acquitted him of two counts of distributing methamphetamine. The district court sentenced Peppers to sixty months in prison for the conspiracy charge and forty-eight months for the communication facility charge, to run concurrently.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. Peppers argued that the superseding indictment's conspiracy count was constructively amended at trial and that the district court abused its discretion in excluding a defense investigator’s hearsay testimony. The Tenth Circuit concluded that there was no constructive amendment and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the hearsay testimony. The court affirmed Peppers' 2023 convictions.

Additionally, Peppers challenged the revocation of his supervised release for a 2016 felon-in-possession conviction, which was based on his 2023 drug-trafficking convictions. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court had jurisdiction to revoke Peppers' supervised release, even though the term expired before the conclusion of the 2023 prosecution, as the delay was reasonably necessary. The court affirmed the revocation of Peppers' supervised release.

Lovett v. State

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 Ark. 100

Opinion Date: June 5, 2025

Judge: Karen R. Baker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Raymond Lovett was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment plus a fifteen-year firearm enhancement by a Pulaski County Circuit Court jury. The conviction stemmed from the shooting death of Leighton Whitfield at St. Vincent North Hospital in Sherwood. Lovett shot Whitfield multiple times after a confrontation. Lovett then turned himself in at a nearby gas station. Lovett testified that he shot Whitfield because he felt threatened when Whitfield stood up after Lovett had shown him a gun.

The Pulaski County Circuit Court jury found Lovett guilty of capital murder and imposed the sentence. Lovett appealed, challenging the prosecution’s statements during closing arguments. He argued that the prosecutor’s comments violated the “golden rule” by asking jurors to put themselves in the position of a party or victim. However, Lovett did not obtain a ruling on this objection at trial, nor did he make the golden-rule argument below, leading the court to decline to consider this argument on appeal. Lovett also argued that the circuit court’s failure to give an admonition or curative instruction constituted an abuse of discretion, but the court found no manifest abuse of discretion.

The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that Lovett’s arguments regarding the prosecutor’s statements were not preserved for review because he failed to obtain a ruling at trial and did not develop the arguments below. The court also found no reversible error upon reviewing the record for all errors prejudicial to Lovett.

Overton v. State

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 Ark. 105

Opinion Date: June 5, 2025

Judge: Cody Hiland

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

A twelve-year-old child disclosed to a school counselor that she had been communicating with a twenty-six-year-old man, later identified as Eric Overton, via Snapchat. The child’s mother confirmed the communication, obtained evidence from the phone, and contacted law enforcement. The investigation revealed that Overton and the child had exchanged nude photographs and sexually explicit messages, and that Overton had picked up the child from her home on three occasions, during which they engaged in sexual intercourse. The child provided detailed testimony at trial regarding these encounters.

The Hot Spring County Circuit Court presided over the trial, during which Overton objected to the prosecutor’s voir dire questioning about whether a conviction could be based on the testimony of a single credible witness. The court overruled the objection and denied a subsequent motion for mistrial, emphasizing that the jury would be instructed on the law at the end of the case. The jury was later instructed on the presumption of innocence and the State’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury found Overton guilty of rape and internet stalking of a child, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment on each count.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed whether there was substantial evidence to support the rape conviction and whether the circuit court erred in its handling of voir dire and jury instructions. The court held that the evidence, including the victim’s testimony, was sufficient to support the conviction, and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mistrial. The court affirmed the convictions, finding no prejudicial error in the proceedings.

Turnbo v. State

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 Ark. 106

Opinion Date: June 5, 2025

Judge: Cody Hiland

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Clarence Turnbo was convicted of rape by a Pulaski County jury, and his conviction was affirmed on appeal. Turnbo subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1. He argued that his trial counsel failed in several areas, including impeaching a witness, challenging DNA evidence, seeking expert testimony, objecting to the prosecutor's opening statement, calling him to testify, investigating the victim's prior sexual history, and "federalizing" his arguments.

The Pulaski County Circuit Court denied Turnbo's petition, finding that he did not demonstrate entitlement to relief. The court noted that many of Turnbo's claims were either conclusory or addressed strategic decisions by counsel, which are generally not grounds for postconviction relief. The court also found that Turnbo failed to show prejudice resulting from his counsel's actions, as required under the Strickland v. Washington standard for ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Turnbo did not meet the burden of proving that his counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. The court also noted that many of Turnbo's arguments were raised for the first time on appeal and could not be considered. Additionally, the court found that the trial court did not err in denying an evidentiary hearing, as the record conclusively showed that Turnbo was not entitled to relief.

In conclusion, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Turnbo's petition for postconviction relief, holding that he failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel and was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

P. v. Emanuel

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S280551

Opinion Date: June 2, 2025

Judge: Kelli M. Evans

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Louis Sanchez Emanuel was convicted of first-degree murder under the felony-murder rule after his co-defendant, Jacob Craig Whitley, fatally shot John Cody Sonenberg during a robbery. Emanuel and Whitley had planned to rob Sonenberg of marijuana. During the robbery, Whitley unexpectedly pulled out a gun and shot Sonenberg, who resisted giving up the marijuana. Emanuel was convicted based on his participation in the robbery, which was considered an inherently dangerous felony.

The Santa Clara County Superior Court denied Emanuel's petition for resentencing under Senate Bill No. 1437, which narrowed the felony-murder rule to require that a defendant be a major participant in the felony and act with reckless indifference to human life. The trial court found that Emanuel was a major participant and acted with reckless indifference. The Court of Appeal affirmed this decision, agreeing that Emanuel had the ability to prevent the robbery and could have done more to stop Whitley from shooting Sonenberg.

The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and found the evidence insufficient to support a finding that Emanuel acted with reckless indifference to human life. The court noted that Emanuel did not know Whitley was armed or likely to use lethal force, and the robbery was planned to occur in a public place during daylight hours, which could minimize the risk of violence. Emanuel attempted to leave the scene when the situation escalated and did not have a meaningful opportunity to restrain Whitley or aid Sonenberg. The court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remanded the case to the trial court to grant Emanuel's petition for resentencing, vacate his murder conviction, and resentence him.

People v. Grajeda

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B337664(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 3, 2025

Judge: John Segal

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2012, Daniel Tomas Grajeda was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon. The jury also found true the gang and firearm allegations, and the trial court found true that Grajeda had served four prior prison terms. He was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 59 years to life. In 2024, during a resentencing hearing under Penal Code section 1172.75, Grajeda appeared remotely and requested a postponement to speak with his attorney, which the court denied. The court resentenced him to 50 years to life. Grajeda argued that the court abused its discretion by denying his request to continue the hearing and by not considering striking the firearm enhancement. He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially sentenced Grajeda to 62 years to life, which was later reduced to 59 years to life on direct appeal. The court held a resentencing hearing under section 1172.75 after the Legislature invalidated certain prior prison term enhancements. Grajeda's counsel requested the court to strike the four prior prison term enhancements and the two-year gang enhancement, but did not request to strike the firearm enhancement. The court denied Grajeda's request to postpone the hearing to consult with his attorney and proceeded with the resentencing.

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Grajeda was entitled to a full resentencing and had a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at the resentencing hearing. The court found that the superior court violated this right by refusing to grant a short continuance or a brief break to allow Grajeda to speak with his attorney. The appellate court reversed the judgment and directed the superior court to allow Grajeda to consult with his attorney and hold another resentencing hearing under section 1172.75 and any other applicable ameliorative legislation.

People v. Nino

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B333606(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 4, 2025

Judge: Gail Ruderman Feuer

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 1991, Jesus Izaguirre Nino pleaded guilty to the second-degree murder of Fernando Avalos and admitted to using a firearm during the crime. Nino later petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, which the superior court denied at the prima facie review stage, citing preliminary hearing testimony that indicated Nino was the actual killer. The Supreme Court's decision in People v. Patton, which allows preliminary hearing testimony to be considered at the prima facie review stage, was issued while Nino's appeal was pending. The preliminary hearing testimony showed Nino shot and killed Fernando alone.

The superior court denied Nino's petition, concluding he was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 because he was the actual killer. Nino appealed, arguing that he could have been convicted of second-degree felony murder based on the now-invalid theory of imputed malice, as he intended only to scare Fernando, not kill him.

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court held that an actual killer could still be eligible for relief under section 1172.6 if the conviction was based on the now-invalid theory of second-degree felony murder. The court found that the record did not conclusively establish that Nino could not have been convicted of second-degree felony murder based on imputed malice. Therefore, the court reversed the superior court's order denying Nino's petition for resentencing and remanded the case with directions for the superior court to issue an order to show cause and set an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d).

People v. Nixon

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C101167(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: June 5, 2025

Judge: Louis R. Mauro

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The defendant was convicted of threatening a police officer via social media while on mandatory supervision. As a condition of his postrelease community supervision, the trial court prohibited him from creating or using social media accounts and from accessing social media websites. The defendant challenged this condition as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.

The Superior Court of Sacramento County initially sentenced the defendant to a split sentence for various offenses, including carrying a concealed weapon and perjury. While on mandatory supervision, the defendant was convicted of making a criminal threat using his Facebook account. The trial court executed the previously imposed sentence and added a consecutive sentence for the new conviction. On appeal, the Court of Appeal vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. The trial court then imposed a revised sentence, and the defendant was released on postrelease supervision with the challenged social media condition.

The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the social media prohibition was not unconstitutionally vague, as it clearly defined the prohibited conduct. The court also found that the condition was not overbroad, as it was closely related to the defendant's use of social media to commit the crime. The court concluded that the prohibition was a reasonable measure to protect the state's interest in the defendant's reformation and rehabilitation. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed.

State v. Walter

Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii

Docket: SCWC-22-0000536

Opinion Date: June 5, 2025

Judge: Mark Recktenwald

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Waiser Walter, who stabbed his adoptive sister, Imaculata Roke, and her four-year-old son, J.R. Roke survived, but J.R. died from his injuries. Walter was charged with attempted murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree, and attempted murder in the second degree. He pleaded guilty to the latter two charges under a plea agreement and was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole.

The Circuit Court of the First Circuit convicted Walter based on his guilty plea. Walter later sought to withdraw his plea, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, the circuit court's failure to engage in a colloquy regarding his request for new counsel, and an appearance of impropriety due to the relationship between the circuit court and one of the State’s witnesses. The circuit court denied his motion to withdraw the plea and his motion to disqualify the judge.

The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed the circuit court's decision, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Walter’s motions. The ICA applied the multi-factor framework from State v. Pedro and concluded that most factors weighed against allowing Walter to withdraw his plea. The ICA also found no abuse of discretion in the circuit court's denial of the motion to disqualify the judge.

The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i reviewed the case and held that "fair and just reasons" warranted the withdrawal of Walter’s guilty plea, particularly due to his consistent assertion of lack of penal responsibility and the lack of a meaningful colloquy regarding his request for new counsel. The court vacated the ICA’s judgment, the circuit court’s judgment of conviction and sentence, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not find an abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s denial of the motion to disqualify the judge.

People v. Smart

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2025 IL 130127

Opinion Date: June 5, 2025

Judge: P. Scott Neville

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Cecil Smart was indicted on three counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse involving a minor, J.P., who alleged that Smart molested him during two separate overnight stays in July 2018. The prosecution sought to introduce evidence of Smart's prior misconduct with other teenage boys to establish intent. The Cook County Circuit Court allowed evidence of one prior incident where Smart allegedly grabbed a boy's buttocks, deeming it relevant to show intent.

The Appellate Court reversed Smart's conviction, ruling that the trial court erred in admitting the prior misconduct evidence since Smart did not contest intent. The appellate court found the error prejudicial and ordered a new trial.

The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the trial court erred in admitting the prior misconduct evidence because it relied on a propensity inference, which is generally inadmissible unless it meets specific statutory criteria. The court found that the evidence did not meet these criteria and should have been excluded. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court's conclusion that the error required reversal. The Supreme Court determined that the error was harmless because there was no reasonable probability that the trial court's decision would have been different without the inadmissible evidence. The case was remanded to the appellate court for further consideration of unresolved arguments.

People v. Spencer

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2025 IL 130015

Opinion Date: June 5, 2025

Judge: P. Scott Neville

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Eugene Spencer was charged with first-degree murder, attempted murder, and home invasion for crimes committed on September 9, 2012, when he was 20 years old. He was convicted by a jury on March 5, 2019, and sentenced to an aggregate of 100 years in prison by the Circuit Court of Cook County on January 31, 2021. Spencer appealed, arguing that his sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution as it constituted a de facto life sentence.

The appellate court disagreed with Spencer, finding that his eligibility for parole after 20 years, as per section 5-4.5-115 of the Unified Code of Corrections, meant his 100-year sentence was not a de facto life sentence. The appellate court upheld the sentence, and Spencer petitioned for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court.

The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court's judgment. The court held that Miller v. Alabama, which prohibits mandatory life without parole for juveniles, does not apply to emerging adults like Spencer. The court also found that Spencer's eligibility for parole after 20 years precluded his sentence from being a de facto life sentence. However, the court noted that Spencer is not foreclosed from bringing an as-applied challenge to his sentence under the Illinois proportionate penalties clause in a postconviction proceeding. The court emphasized that such challenges require a sufficiently developed evidentiary record, which is best addressed in postconviction proceedings.

Christensen v. Iowa District Court For Story County

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 24-0289

Opinion Date: May 30, 2025

Judge: Matthew McDermott

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

A criminal defendant was charged with operating while intoxicated after being pulled over for speeding. The arresting officer used radar to determine the defendant's speed. The assistant county attorney, Theron Christensen, prosecuted the case. After the defense exposed weaknesses in the State's case during depositions, Christensen filed a motion in limine to exclude certain evidence. The defendant resisted and moved for sanctions against Christensen, arguing the motion was frivolous and in bad faith. Christensen later withdrew the motion and dismissed the case, allegedly to avoid the officer testifying about radar calibration issues.

The Iowa District Court for Story County dismissed the charges and later imposed a $2,072 monetary sanction on Christensen under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.413 and Iowa Code § 619.19, finding his actions sanctionable. Christensen filed a petition for writ of certiorari, challenging the sanctions.

The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that neither Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.413 nor Iowa Code § 619.19 applies to criminal cases. The court emphasized that these rules and statutes are intended for civil cases only and that the rules of civil procedure do not apply to criminal proceedings unless explicitly stated. The court held that the district court erred in imposing monetary sanctions on Christensen based on these civil rules and statutes. Consequently, the Iowa Supreme Court sustained the writ and reversed the sanctions order and the monetary sanction imposed on Christensen.

State v. Wilson

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 125283

Opinion Date: May 30, 2025

Judge: Caleb Stegall

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Two Wichita police officers stopped Gina Wilson after observing her fail to signal properly. Wilson admitted her license was suspended and refused consent to search her vehicle. Officers called for a K-9 unit, which arrived nine minutes later. The dog, Oden, indicated the presence of drugs, leading officers to search the car and find 30 oxycodone pills. Wilson was arrested and charged with possession of an opiate and driving while suspended.

Wilson moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The Sedgwick District Court denied the motion, finding no constitutional violation as the stop was not meaningfully extended. A jury convicted Wilson. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that the dog sniff did not extend the stop's duration and thus did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether the search was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. The court held that a drug dog's sniff of a vehicle's exterior is not a search under the Fourth Amendment. Since Wilson's car was legally parked and she admitted to driving with a suspended license, the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle based on the dog's alert. The court affirmed the lower courts' rulings, concluding the search was constitutional and the evidence was properly admitted.

State of Maine v. Lipscombe

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2025 ME 46

Opinion Date: June 3, 2025

Judge: Wayne R. Douglas

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Jarae Lipscombe was convicted by a jury of hindering apprehension or prosecution (Class B) for actions taken to delay or prevent the apprehension of his brother, who was later charged with homicide in Waterville. Lipscombe provided false information to the police and assisted his brother in avoiding capture. Five months after his conviction, Lipscombe moved for a new trial, arguing that his brother's acquittal of murder would likely lead to a different outcome in his own case. The trial court denied the motion, and Lipscombe appealed.

The Kennebec County trial court held a three-day jury trial where Lipscombe's defense focused on his lack of knowledge regarding his brother's involvement in the homicide. The State presented evidence showing that Lipscombe gave a false description to the police, knew the police were seeking his brother, and made arrangements for his brother to stay at a friend's house. Additionally, Lipscombe confessed to witnessing his brother shoot the victim and offered money to retrieve the weapon. After the jury found Lipscombe guilty, he appealed the judgment, which was affirmed by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed Lipscombe's appeal of the trial court's denial of his motion for a new trial. The court held that the acquittal of Lipscombe's brother was irrelevant to Lipscombe's conviction. The court explained that the statute defining hindering apprehension or prosecution does not require proof of the brother's guilt but rather that Lipscombe knew of his brother's conduct that could render him liable to a charge of murder. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the brother's acquittal did not change the factual circumstances of the conduct Lipscombe witnessed.

Commonwealth v. Andrade

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13636

Opinion Date: June 4, 2025

Judge: Kimberly S. Budd

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant was convicted of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon after stabbing his father at a family barbecue. The incident occurred when the victim became upset and yelled at the defendant's wife, leading to a confrontation between the defendant and the victim. The victim pushed the defendant first, and the defendant responded by stabbing the victim in the chest. The defendant claimed he acted in self-defense and sought to introduce evidence of the victim's subsequent violent act to support his claim.

The case was initially tried in the Superior Court, where the defendant was convicted. The judge denied the defendant's motion to introduce evidence of the victim's subsequent violent act, concluding that such evidence was not admissible under Commonwealth v. Adjutant. The defendant appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case from the Appeals Court on its own initiative.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and held that the judge erred in believing that Adjutant evidence is not applicable to subsequent acts of violence. However, the court affirmed the conviction, stating that the evidence was correctly excluded because the identity of the first aggressor was not in dispute, and the defendant was the first to use deadly force. The court also held that the judge did not err in failing to instruct the jury on defense of another, as the defendant did not rely on this theory at trial, and no evidence suggested that the defendant reasonably believed he had to use deadly force to protect his wife. The judgment was affirmed.

Commonwealth v. Govan

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13600

Opinion Date: June 4, 2025

Judge: Frank M. Gaziano

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case involves the admissibility of location data obtained from a GPS device imposed on the defendant as a condition of pretrial release. The defendant was involved in a domestic violence incident on December 26, 2019, where he threatened his ex-wife, C.P., and discharged a firearm. He was later apprehended in July 2020 and released on bail with conditions, including GPS monitoring. In August 2020, following a shooting incident, police retrieved the defendant's GPS data to determine his proximity to the crime scene.

The Superior Court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the GPS evidence, and he entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling. The case was transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

The Supreme Judicial Court addressed two main issues: whether the initial imposition of GPS monitoring was an unreasonable search under Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and whether the subsequent retrieval and review of the defendant's GPS data constituted an unreasonable search.

The court held that the initial imposition of GPS monitoring was a search but was reasonable under Article 14 due to the legitimate governmental interests in protecting the alleged victims and ensuring compliance with the conditions of pretrial release. The court found that the defendant's privacy expectations were outweighed by these interests.

Regarding the retrieval and review of the GPS data, the court concluded that it did not constitute a search under Article 14. The defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the specific location data retrieved, as it was limited in scope and duration, and the defendant was aware that his movements could be monitored for compliance with pretrial conditions.

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's order denying the motion to suppress.

Coleman v. State of Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2023-KA-01103-SCT

Opinion Date: May 29, 2025

Judge: David Sullivan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In October 2019, April Jones and Will Polk were reported missing. The investigation stalled until 2021 when Keith Coleman, Jr. confessed to shooting and dismembering them. Coleman was indicted on two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of desecration of a corpse. At trial, Coleman claimed his girlfriend, Chelsea Golden, was the actual shooter, and he had previously confessed to protect her. The jury found Coleman guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to two consecutive life terms for the murders and three years for each desecration count, to run concurrently.

Coleman appealed his convictions, arguing that the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. He claimed his confession was coerced to protect Golden and that the State's witnesses were unreliable. The Mississippi Supreme Court reviewed the case, noting that the jury is responsible for resolving conflicts in testimony and determining witness credibility. The court found that the jury had ample testimonial evidence to support the verdict, despite the lack of physical evidence directly linking Coleman to the crime.

The Mississippi Supreme Court held that the jury's verdict was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence and affirmed Coleman's convictions. The court emphasized that issues of witness credibility and conflicting testimony are for the jury to resolve, and the absence of physical evidence does not negate a conviction when there is sufficient testimonial evidence.

State v. Demarie

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 MT 115

Opinion Date: June 3, 2025

Judge: Cory J. Swanson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 1992, the defendant was sentenced to 100 years in prison for deliberate homicide, with an additional 10-year enhancement for weapon use. In 2008, he became parole eligible but was consistently denied parole. In 2018, he planned an escape from prison, involving two former prisoners. He used a cellphone to coordinate the escape, but prison staff discovered his plan and transferred him to more secure housing. Despite this, he continued to communicate with one of the former prisoners to delete incriminating evidence.

The Third Judicial District Court in Powell County found the defendant guilty of Conspiracy to Commit Escape and Conspiracy to Commit Tampering With or Fabricating Physical Evidence. He was sentenced to 8 years for each count, to run concurrently but consecutively to his prior sentence. The court dismissed charges of Transferring of Illegal Articles and Solicitation to Commit Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Person. The defendant appealed, arguing his sentence violated his First Amendment rights and that there was insufficient evidence for the tampering conviction. He also sought pretrial credit for time served.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the defendant did not properly object to his sentence on First Amendment grounds during the trial, and thus did not preserve the issue for appeal. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the tampering conviction, as the defendant's actions demonstrated an intent to delete incriminating evidence. Lastly, the court ruled that the defendant was not entitled to pretrial credit for time served, as he was already serving a sentence for a prior conviction and was not detained specifically for the new charges. The court affirmed the lower court's decision.

State v. Langley

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 319 Neb. 67

Opinion Date: May 30, 2025

Judge: John Freudenberg

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The defendant was charged with two counts of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. During a search of his residence by his probation officer, alcohol and a loaded rifle were found, violating his probation conditions. The probation officer also found an empty handgun box, and the defendant gave conflicting accounts of the handgun's location. Later, the defendant's girlfriend and her mother, along with the defendant's son, searched the house and found a locked case believed to contain the handgun. They handed the case to a law enforcement officer, who later obtained a warrant to open it, confirming it contained the handgun.

The district court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the handgun, finding that the officer did not conduct a search but merely accepted the case from private individuals. The court also found that the officer entered the residence with consent. The defendant was found guilty of possessing the handgun but acquitted of possessing the rifle.

The Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, agreeing that the officer entered the residence with consent and that the recovery of the locked case was not the result of a search by law enforcement. The court also found that any error in overruling the motion to suppress was harmless because the defendant did not object to the testimony and evidence presented at trial.

The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the Fourth Amendment was not violated because the search that discovered the locked case was conducted by private individuals who were not acting as government agents. The court concluded that the officer's acceptance of the case did not constitute a search and that the subsequent warrant to open the case was valid.

State v. Trail

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 319 Neb. 84

Opinion Date: May 30, 2025

Judge: William Cassel

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Aubrey C. Trail filed a motion for postconviction relief nearly 14 months after the conclusion of his direct appeal. Trail had previously been found guilty of first-degree murder and criminal conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and was sentenced to death by a three-judge panel. Trail's direct appeal was unsuccessful, and he did not apply for a stay or file a motion for rehearing. After the mandate issued, Trail requested the appointment of postconviction counsel, which was eventually granted. However, due to various delays, including the withdrawal and replacement of postconviction counsel, Trail filed his motion for postconviction relief on February 14, 2024.

The district court for Saline County denied Trail's motion without a hearing, finding it untimely under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3001(4)(a), which requires postconviction motions to be filed within one year of the conclusion of a direct appeal. The court noted that Trail did not raise any arguments regarding the timeliness of his motion in response to the State's assertion that it was time barred.

The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the one-year limitation period for filing postconviction motions under § 29-3001(4) is not subject to equitable tolling, even in capital cases. The court also found that Trail did not demonstrate that an impediment created by state action prevented him from filing his motion within the statutory period. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion or violate Trail's due process rights by denying the motion as time barred without providing an additional opportunity for Trail to present his timeliness arguments.

State v. District Court (Brown)

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Citation: 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 27

Opinion Date: June 5, 2025

Judge: Lidia Stiglich

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Raymond Brown pleaded guilty to residential burglary and was sentenced to probation. The State of Nevada filed a motion to correct the sentence, arguing that Brown's prior burglary convictions made him ineligible for probation under NRS 205.060(3). The district court denied the motion after a hearing. The State then petitioned for a writ of mandamus or prohibition, challenging the district court's order.

The Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada reviewed the case and denied the State's motion to correct Brown's sentence. The State argued that the district court abused its discretion and acted beyond its jurisdiction by placing Brown on probation. The State also contended that it could not appeal the order denying its motion, thus justifying the need for writ relief.

The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and determined that the State had an adequate legal remedy in the form of an appeal from the order denying the motion to correct an illegal sentence. The court concluded that the State had the right to appeal the district court's order, as motions to correct an illegal sentence are considered postconviction challenges to a judgment of conviction. The court analogized such motions to motions for a new trial, which are appealable by either party under NRS 177.015(1)(b). Consequently, the Supreme Court of Nevada denied the State's petition for writ relief, as the State had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the form of an appeal.

Gonzalez v. State

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 ND 109

Opinion Date: June 5, 2025

Judge: Lisa Fair McEvers

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Garron Gonzalez pled guilty in 2004 to two counts of gross sexual imposition and was sentenced to five years on each count, concurrently, with most of the sentence suspended for probation. His probation was revoked in 2005, and he was resentenced to five years on each count, concurrently, with part of the sentence suspended. In 2011, his probation was revoked again, and he was resentenced to 20 years on each count, consecutively. In 2013, a postconviction relief application led to a new revocation hearing, and in 2014, he was resentenced to 20 years on each count, concurrently. In 2023, another postconviction relief application resulted in a resentencing to five years on each count, consecutively. This was reversed on appeal, and in February 2024, he was resentenced to five years on each count, concurrently, with credit for time served.

Gonzalez filed a postconviction relief application in May 2024, arguing that his 2005 sentence was illegal and that his credit for time served was incorrect. The State opposed his application. Gonzalez waived the postconviction hearing, and after submitting a closing brief, the district court denied his application, concluding he failed to show his sentence was illegal or that his credit for time served was incorrect.

The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and considered the issue of mootness. The court noted that Gonzalez had completed his sentence under the 2024 judgment, which rendered his arguments about the 2005 sentence and credit for time served moot. The court concluded that any collateral consequences Gonzalez claimed were speculative and would not be remedied by a favorable ruling. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed as moot.

State v. Landsberger

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 ND 108

Opinion Date: June 5, 2025

Judge: Daniel Crothers

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Hope Marie Landsberger was found guilty of providing false information to law enforcement. She reported that Nathan Vetter, with whom she shares custody of their infant child, returned the child with a mouth injury and refused to explain how it occurred. However, a recording of the exchange showed that Landsberger did not speak to Vetter during the exchange, contradicting her claims. Additionally, Vetter had previously explained a different incident involving their child, to which Landsberger had acknowledged. The officer noted that Landsberger's report misled law enforcement and that she had a history of filing unfounded police reports against Vetter.

The District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, held a jury trial where Landsberger was found guilty of willfully giving false information to a law enforcement officer in violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-11-03(1). Landsberger appealed, arguing that the district court erred by not instructing the jury on the essential elements of the offense with sufficient specificity.

The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the jury instructions provided by the district court were correct and adequately informed the jury of the applicable law. The instructions specified the date, location, and all elements of the offense as required by the statute. The court found that Landsberger's requested modifications to the jury instructions would have added elements not required by the statute and increased the State's burden of proof. The court concluded that the instructions, taken as a whole, were not erroneous and did not affect a substantial right of the defendant. Therefore, the conviction was upheld.

State v. Leingang

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 ND 103

Opinion Date: June 5, 2025

Judge: Jon Jay Jensen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In October 2023, a truck was stolen from a shop in Burleigh County, North Dakota. Surveillance video captured images of an individual at the shop, and shortly thereafter, the truck was driven away without permission. The next morning, the truck was found engulfed in flames with a rag in the fuel port. Jason Allen Leingang was observed wearing clothing identical to the individual in the surveillance video shortly after the truck was discovered.

Leingang was charged with theft of property over $50,000, a class A felony. During a preliminary hearing in December 2023, a Bismarck Police Department officer testified about the original surveillance video, which was not preserved. Only two brief video clips were available, showing an individual walking through the parking lot and the truck leaving. In February 2024, Leingang filed a motion to suppress testimony related to the surveillance video, which the district court denied. During the May 2024 trial, Leingang objected again to the admission of the testimony, but the objection was overruled, and the video clips were admitted into evidence. The jury found Leingang guilty.

The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. Leingang argued that the district court erred in admitting the two video clips and the testimony about the entire surveillance video. The Supreme Court noted that Leingang did not object to the video clips at trial and did not argue obvious error on appeal. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony about the entire surveillance video under Rule 1004(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, as the original video was lost without bad faith by the state. The Supreme Court affirmed the criminal judgment.

State v. Walsh

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Docket: S070940

Opinion Date: June 5, 2025

Judge: Stephen K. Bushong

Areas of Law: Contracts, Criminal Law

The case involves a criminal matter where the defendant was charged with four Measure 11 offenses, including first-degree unlawful sexual penetration and three counts of first-degree sexual abuse against a child under twelve. The parties reached a plea agreement where the defendant pleaded guilty to a lesser-included offense of attempted first-degree unlawful sexual penetration and one count of first-degree sexual abuse, with the remaining charges to be dismissed. The plea agreement included a stipulation that the court "may impose" consecutive sentences on the two charges.

At sentencing, the defendant argued that Oregon law required the trial court to make specific findings under ORS 137.123(5) before imposing consecutive sentences, as the offenses arose from a continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct. The state contended that the stipulation in the plea agreement allowed the court to impose consecutive sentences without making those findings. After a discussion, the defendant withdrew his legal argument and affirmed that the court could impose consecutive sentences without the statutory findings. The trial court then imposed consecutive sentences totaling 180 months.

The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the plea agreement did not prevent the defendant from arguing that consecutive sentences were legally impermissible without the required findings, and that the trial court erred in concluding that there was no plea agreement. The state petitioned for review.

The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the plea agreement's stipulation that the court "may impose" consecutive sentences was ambiguous. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in addressing the ambiguity by seeking clarification and proceeding to sentence the defendant after he withdrew his legal argument. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the trial court acted appropriately under the circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Muhammad

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 109 MAP 2023

Opinion Date: May 30, 2025

Judge: Kevin M. Dougherty

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

On December 18, 2018, police responded to a report of check fraud at a bank involving two suspects. One suspect exited the bank and approached a Kia Soul before returning inside. Police located the vehicle with Rasheed Muhammad in the driver’s seat. Upon approaching, the officer detected marijuana and observed Muhammad searching the car’s center console and other areas. Muhammad provided a rental agreement for the car, which was in his name. After backup arrived, Muhammad was asked to exit the vehicle, and a search revealed a loaded firearm in the center console. Muhammad did not have a license to carry a firearm and was arrested after attempting to flee.

The Delaware County Court of Common Pleas convicted Muhammad of carrying a firearm without a license and resisting arrest. Muhammad’s motion for acquittal was denied, and he was sentenced to 3 ½ to 7 years in prison for the firearm charge, followed by 2 years of probation for resisting arrest. The Superior Court affirmed the judgment, finding sufficient evidence to support the conviction based on the circumstances, including Muhammad’s proximity to the firearm and his behavior indicating knowledge and intent to conceal it.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether the jury’s negative answer to a special interrogatory about Muhammad’s possession and control of the firearm rendered the evidence insufficient for his conviction. The court found no conflict between the jury’s answer and the conviction, noting that the interrogatory’s conjunctive phrasing did not negate the elements required for carrying a firearm without a license. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s order, upholding Muhammad’s judgment of sentence.

Commonwealth v. Shifflett

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 26 MAP 2024

Opinion Date: May 30, 2025

Judge: Debra Todd

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2012, George Thomas Shifflett was charged with driving under the influence (DUI) and accepted into an Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) program. In 2022, Shifflett was involved in another DUI incident and was charged as a second-time offender based on his previous ARD acceptance. Shifflett pled guilty to the 2022 DUI but contested the use of his 2012 ARD as a prior offense for sentencing purposes, arguing it was unconstitutional under Alleyne v. United States.

The Adams County Court of Common Pleas granted Shifflett's motion to exclude evidence of his 2012 ARD and sentenced him as a first-time offender. The Commonwealth appealed, and the Superior Court vacated the sentence, remanding for resentencing as a second-time offender, citing recent Superior Court decisions that overruled Commonwealth v. Chichkin, which had held that using ARD as a prior offense for sentencing was unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case to determine if considering Shifflett's ARD as a prior offense for sentencing violated Alleyne. The Court held that ARD does not equate to a conviction because it lacks the procedural safeguards of a criminal trial, such as the right to a jury trial and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, using ARD as a prior offense for sentencing enhancement is unconstitutional under Alleyne.

The Court concluded that Section 3806 of the Motor Vehicle Code, which includes ARD in the definition of a prior offense, is facially unconstitutional to the extent it allows ARD to be used for sentencing enhancement. The Court reversed the Superior Court's order and remanded the case for reinstatement of Shifflett's original sentence as a first-time offender.

EX PARTE ESTEVEZ

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0581-24

Opinion Date: June 4, 2025

Judge: Mary Lou Keel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The appellant was charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI) and sought habeas relief to avoid prosecution, arguing she had already been prosecuted and punished for contempt for the same DWI. The contempt order was void for lack of notice and was withdrawn by the trial court. However, her claim of multiple punishments was found to be meritorious.

The trial court initially charged the appellant with misdemeanor DWI in November 2021, with bond conditions including not committing any crimes. In 2022, while the first DWI was pending, she was charged with additional offenses, including a second DWI. The trial court ordered her to show cause for contempt for violating bond conditions, specifically for the second DWI. Despite objections to the notice, the appellant was found guilty of contempt and sentenced to three days in jail, probated for nine months. The contempt judgment was later withdrawn due to lack of notice. The trial court denied her habeas corpus application, and she appealed.

The First Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the contempt judgment was void and that the appellant had not been placed in jeopardy since the contempt order was vacated.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and held that the appellant's successive prosecution claim was without merit due to the void contempt order. However, the court found that her multiple punishments claim was valid. The court determined that the appellant was punished for the second DWI through the contempt judgment, and any further punishment for the same offense would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for dismissal of the DWI charge.

OWENS v. STATE OF TEXAS

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0075-24

Opinion Date: June 4, 2025

Judge: Mary Lou Keel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the Texas electronic communications harassment statute, arguing that his prosecution was based on the content of his messages, which he claimed were protected under the First Amendment. The State contended that the prosecution was not content-based and, even if it was, it served a compelling interest in protecting individuals from abuse.

The appellant was convicted in a trial court for sending approximately three dozen electronic messages to his former therapist over a 15-week period. The messages were sent to her professional accounts and contained content that the therapist found disturbing and harassing. The trial court admitted the messages into evidence and overruled the appellant's objections based on First Amendment protections. The jury found the appellant guilty of two counts of harassment, and he was sentenced to 180 days in jail and a $500 fine.

The Seventh Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, reasoning that the statute regulated conduct rather than speech and that the appellant's messages were integral to criminal conduct, thus not protected by the First Amendment. The court of appeals concluded that the statute was not unconstitutional as applied to the appellant.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and determined that the appellant was indeed prosecuted for the content of his messages, which violated his First Amendment rights. The court held that the statute, as applied to the appellant, was a content-based restriction on speech and did not meet the strict scrutiny standard required to justify such restrictions. Consequently, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for dismissal of the indictment.

Commonwealth v. Kartozia

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Docket: 240294

Opinion Date: June 5, 2025

Judge: S. Bernard Goodwyn

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Luka Kartozia was observed by a security guard at Turnberry Tower, a condominium high rise, acting erratically and using an outside power outlet to charge his phone. When approached by security, Kartozia claimed to know a resident, Phil Yang, but refused offers to contact him. After repeated requests to leave by security and police, Kartozia was arrested for trespassing.

Kartozia was found guilty of trespassing in the Arlington County General District Court and appealed to the Arlington County Circuit Court. At the circuit court trial, Kartozia proposed a jury instruction on a good-faith claim-of-right defense, which the court denied, finding insufficient evidence to support it. The jury convicted Kartozia, and he was fined $1,000.

The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the circuit court’s judgment, vacated the conviction, and remanded the case for retrial, ruling that the circuit court abused its discretion by not giving the proposed jury instruction. The Court of Appeals found that there was more than a scintilla of evidence supporting Kartozia’s claim that he believed he had a right to be on the property.

The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the jury instruction. The court found no credible evidence that Kartozia had a reasonable, good-faith belief that he was authorized to remain on the property after being asked to leave multiple times. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and reinstated the circuit court’s judgment, affirming Kartozia’s conviction.

State v. Lewis

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

Docket: 22-822

Opinion Date: June 2, 2025

Judge: William Wooton

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The petitioner, David Hunter Lewis, was convicted in the Circuit Court of Marion County, West Virginia, of second-degree murder and use of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The incident occurred on December 15, 2020, when the petitioner shot the victim, Dylan Harr, after an argument at an apartment. The petitioner claimed the shooting was accidental, while the State argued it was intentional. The petitioner was sentenced to concurrent forty- and ten-year terms of imprisonment.

In the lower court, the petitioner moved to suppress statements made to police, arguing they were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. The circuit court ruled that statements made after the petitioner signed a waiver of rights at the police station were admissible, despite his earlier invocation of the right to remain silent at the time of his arrest. The petitioner also filed post-trial motions challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the admission of character evidence about the victim, which the circuit court denied.

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the State's introduction of extensive character evidence about the victim, which was irrelevant to the petitioner's guilt or innocence, constituted plain error. The court held that this error affected the petitioner's substantial rights and seriously impacted the fairness of the trial. The court also addressed the admissibility of the petitioner's statements to police, concluding that the circuit court did not err in admitting the statements made after the petitioner signed a waiver of rights at the police station. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the petitioner's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.

Herrera v. The State of Wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 WY 62

Opinion Date: June 2, 2025

Judge: Robert Jarosh

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

David Herrera, Jr. pled guilty to aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon and was sentenced to five to eight years in prison by the district court, which recommended his placement in the Youthful Offender Transition Program (YOTP). Herrera filed a motion for sentence reduction upon nearing completion of the YOTP, asserting that the district court had promised to reduce his sentence if he successfully completed the program.

The district court denied Herrera’s motion for sentence reduction without holding a hearing or providing an explanation. Herrera appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion and violated his constitutional rights by not honoring the promise made during sentencing.

The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court’s oral pronouncement at sentencing, which stated Herrera “will get a sentence reduction” if he completed the YOTP, constituted an express commitment. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by denying the motion for sentence reduction without justification, given the prior commitment. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further sentencing proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Marquez v. The State of Wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 WY 61

Opinion Date: May 30, 2025

Judge: Robert Jarosh

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In July 2021, Ryan Schroeder was reported missing, leading to an investigation by the Casper Police Department. Schroeder's last known location was in Denver, and his cell phone records showed communication with Justin Marquez until June 26, 2021. Detectives interviewed Marquez, who admitted to being in Denver but denied picking up Schroeder. Another witness, Jeremiah Cox, last saw Schroeder getting into a maroon SUV with Marquez. Detectives obtained a warrant for Marquez's cell phone records and discovered he owned a maroon Hyundai SUV. A search of the vehicle revealed blood stains and a decomposition odor, leading to further investigation and the discovery of Schroeder's body.

The District Court of Natrona County denied Marquez's motion to designate an expert witness after the deadline and two motions to suppress evidence. Marquez argued the search of his vehicle exceeded the warrant's scope and that the warrant contained misrepresentations and omissions. The court found the Hyundai was the intended subject of the warrant and denied the motions to suppress.

The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the late expert witness designation, as Marquez's own conduct caused the delay. The court also found no violation of Marquez's right to compulsory process. Regarding the motions to suppress, the court concluded the search warrant and accompanying affidavits sufficiently described the Hyundai, and there was no reasonable probability of mistakenly searching another premise. The court also found no clear error in the district court's conclusion that Marquez failed to prove intentional or reckless misrepresentation or omission of material information in the affidavits. The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the district court's rulings and Marquez's conviction.