Kousisis v. United States

Court: U.S. Supreme Court

Docket: 23-909

Opinion Date: May 22, 2025

Judge: Neil Gorsuch

Areas of Law: Contracts, Criminal Law, Government Contracts, White Collar Crime

Stamatios Kousisis and Alpha Painting and Construction Co. were awarded two contracts by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) for painting projects in Philadelphia. Federal regulations required subcontracting a portion of the contract to a disadvantaged business enterprise. Kousisis falsely represented that Alpha would obtain paint supplies from Markias, Inc., a prequalified disadvantaged business. However, Markias functioned only as a pass-through entity, funneling checks and invoices to and from Alpha’s actual suppliers, violating the requirement that disadvantaged businesses perform a commercially useful function. Despite this, Alpha completed the projects to PennDOT’s satisfaction and earned over $20 million in gross profit.

The Government charged Alpha and Kousisis with wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud, based on the fraudulent-inducement theory. After a jury convicted them, they moved for acquittal, arguing that PennDOT received the full economic benefit of its bargain, so the Government could not prove they schemed to defraud PennDOT of money or property. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected this argument, affirming the convictions and deepening the division over the validity of a federal fraud conviction when the defendant did not seek to cause the victim net pecuniary loss.

The Supreme Court of the United States held that a defendant who induces a victim to enter into a transaction under materially false pretenses may be convicted of federal fraud even if the defendant did not seek to cause the victim economic loss. The Court explained that the text of the wire fraud statute does not mention economic loss and that the common law did not establish a general rule requiring economic loss in all fraud cases. The Court affirmed the Third Circuit’s decision, concluding that the fraudulent-inducement theory is consistent with both the text of the statute and the Court’s precedent.

Anderson v. Divris

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1533

Opinion Date: May 28, 2025

Judge: Seth R. Aframe

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Bruce Anderson killed his estranged wife in 1983 and was convicted of first-degree murder by a Massachusetts jury in 1989, receiving a life sentence without parole. After an unsuccessful appeal to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Anderson filed a federal habeas corpus petition in 1991, which was denied by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The First Circuit affirmed the denial, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1994.

In 2019, Anderson filed a second habeas petition under section 2254, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel by Attorney Stephen Hrones, who represented him at trial, on direct appeal, and during the first federal habeas proceedings. The district court dismissed the petition without prejudice, citing it as a "second or successive habeas corpus application" that lacked authorization from the First Circuit. Anderson did not appeal this dismissal but instead sought authorization from the First Circuit, which was denied.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed whether Anderson's second habeas petition was "a second or successive habeas corpus application" under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). The court concluded that it was, emphasizing that pre-AEDPA practice and AEDPA's purposes support treating such petitions as successive. The court noted that Anderson's choice to retain the same counsel for his first habeas petition did not exempt his second petition from being considered successive. The court vacated the district court's denial of the petition and remanded it with instructions to dismiss. The court also affirmed the district court's decision that any Rule 60(b) motion by Anderson would be untimely.

U.S. v. Pires

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 24-1062

Opinion Date: May 28, 2025

Judge: Gustavo Gelpí

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the defendant, Admilson Pires, was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit sex trafficking of a minor and sex trafficking of a minor. The case began when the Norwood Police Department received a tip about a missing sixteen-year-old girl, Daisy, who was found at an apartment in Norwood, Massachusetts. Daisy revealed that she had been engaging in commercial sex. During the investigation, it was discovered that Pires and another individual, Sandro Rosa (known as Eli), were involved in trafficking Daisy.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts conducted the trial, where Pires was found guilty on both counts. He was sentenced to 132 months' imprisonment for each count, to be served consecutively. Pires appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conspiracy conviction and that there were errors in the trial, including the admission of expert testimony and statements made by the prosecution during summation.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the conspiracy conviction, noting that Eli's involvement went beyond merely providing shelter and included actions that indicated a tacit agreement to traffic Daisy. The court also held that the expert testimony about typical patterns of sex trafficking was admissible and relevant to the case, and that the prosecutor's statements during summation did not amount to misconduct that would warrant a reversal of the conviction.

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding Pires's convictions and sentences.

United States v. Basilici

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 23-1456

Opinion Date: May 23, 2025

Judge: Gustavo Gelpí

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Anthony Basilici was convicted by a jury of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute heroin, commit kidnapping, and obstruct justice. He was also convicted of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, which was discharged, resulting in an enhanced sentence. Basilici appealed his firearm conviction, arguing trial errors and insufficient evidence.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts heard the case initially. The jury found Basilici guilty on all counts, including the firearm charge under Count Five. Basilici filed motions for acquittal and a new trial, which the district court denied, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. Basilici contended that the evidence was insufficient to support his firearm conviction under the Pinkerton doctrine, which holds conspirators liable for reasonably foreseeable crimes committed by co-conspirators. He also argued that the jury instructions were misleading and confusing, and that the supplemental instruction given in response to a jury question was improper.

The First Circuit affirmed the conviction, finding that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the firearm discharge was reasonably foreseeable to Basilici. The court held that the district court did not err in giving the Pinkerton instruction and that the supplemental instruction was appropriate. The court also found no plain error in the district court's handling of the jury's note and the supplemental instruction.

United States v. Rosario-Ramos

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 21-1507

Opinion Date: May 28, 2025

Judge: William Kayatta

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Eliezer Rosario-Ramos and his brother were indicted for carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury and bank larceny after assaulting and robbing an elderly woman, Zulma Lebrón-Serrano. Rosario-Ramos pled guilty to the carjacking offense and proposed a fifteen-year sentence. The district court, citing the brutal nature of the attack and the victim's subsequent death, sentenced him to twenty-three years. Rosario-Ramos appealed, claiming procedural and substantive defects in his sentence.

The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico initially reviewed the case. Rosario-Ramos contested the Probation Office's recommendation of a twenty-five-year sentence, arguing against the application of the murder cross-reference. The district court declined to apply the murder cross-reference but found that the attack contributed to the victim's death, leading to a twenty-three-year sentence.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, finding no procedural error in the determination that the attack contributed to the victim's death. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing an upward variance based on the brutal nature of the attack and the personal connection between Rosario-Ramos and the victim. The court found the sentence substantively reasonable despite being higher than the Guidelines range and the sentence proposed by both parties, noting the district court's thorough explanation of the aggravating factors. The court concluded that the district court's rationale was plausible and the sentencing outcome defensible.

United States v. Soto-Sanchez

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 24-1184

Opinion Date: May 27, 2025

Judge: Julie Rikelman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Victor Soto-Sanchez was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was violated when a police officer testified about an informant's tip. He also challenged the application of a two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice in his sentencing.

The United States District Court for the District of Maine allowed the police officer's testimony, overruling Soto-Sanchez's objections on Confrontation Clause and hearsay grounds. The court provided a limiting instruction to the jury, stating that the informant's statements were not to be considered for their truth but to explain the officer's investigative steps. The jury found Soto-Sanchez guilty, and the court applied the obstruction of justice enhancement based on Soto-Sanchez's alleged attempts to influence a witness.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed that Soto-Sanchez's Sixth Amendment rights were violated but deemed the error harmless due to overwhelming evidence against him, including physical evidence and witness testimony. The court also rejected Soto-Sanchez's sentencing challenge, concluding that he had waived his arguments regarding the obstruction of justice enhancement. Consequently, the First Circuit affirmed Soto-Sanchez's conviction and sentence.

United States v. Sterkaj

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 23-8088

Opinion Date: May 23, 2025

Judge: Jose Cabranes

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Klaudio Sterkaj was charged with transporting aliens within the United States after being stopped by the New York State Police while driving two Albanian citizens who had entered the U.S. illegally. He waived indictment and pleaded guilty to the charge. The government recommended a sentence of 6 to 12 months, while the U.S. Probation Office suggested 0 to 6 months. However, the District Court imposed a 24-month sentence, citing Sterkaj's refusal to cooperate with the government as a factor.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York adopted the Probation Office's findings but varied upward from the recommended sentence due to Sterkaj's lack of cooperation. Sterkaj's counsel objected to the sentence as being outside the guidelines, preserving the argument for appeal. Sterkaj then appealed the sentence, arguing that the District Court committed procedural error by considering his refusal to cooperate.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that the District Court's decision to increase Sterkaj's sentence based on his refusal to cooperate was procedurally unreasonable. The Court of Appeals held that under United States v. Stratton, a district court may not increase a defendant's sentence due to their refusal to cooperate. The Court rejected the government's argument that intervening Supreme Court decisions had cast doubt on Stratton, maintaining that Stratton remains binding precedent.

The Court of Appeals vacated the sentence component of Sterkaj's judgment of conviction and remanded the case to the District Court for resentencing by a different judge to preserve the appearance of justice.

United States v. Outlaw

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 24-2114

Opinion Date: May 28, 2025

Judge: Marjorie Rendell

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

On December 31, 2020, four plainclothes police officers in unmarked cars patrolled a high-crime area in Newark. Detective Marc Castro observed a parked Audi with its engine running, sunroof open, and heavily tinted windows. As Castro approached, he smelled burning marijuana and decided to conduct a vehicle stop. Upon approaching the vehicle, Castro saw smoke emanating from the driver's side window and detected a stronger smell of marijuana. The driver, Abdul Outlaw, provided his documents without any suspicious behavior. Castro asked Outlaw to step out of the vehicle and conducted a pat-down, finding a firearm and a prescription bottle with raw marijuana on Outlaw's person. Outlaw was arrested, and the officers issued motor vehicle summonses and charged him with various offenses.

The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey reviewed the case. Outlaw moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search. After an evidentiary hearing and supplemental briefing, the District Court granted Outlaw’s motion, reasoning that while the vehicle stop was lawful, Castro did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to search Outlaw’s person.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that while the smell of marijuana can create probable cause to search a vehicle, it does not necessarily create probable cause to arrest an individual without additional facts connecting the smell to that person. The court found that Castro’s observations did not establish probable cause to arrest Outlaw, as there were no signs that Outlaw was under the influence or had been smoking marijuana. The court affirmed the District Court’s order suppressing the evidence obtained from the unlawful search.

United States v. Joseph

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 24-4108

Opinion Date: May 28, 2025

Judge: Toby Heytens

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Samuel Joseph was convicted of drug and firearm offenses. He appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during two encounters with law enforcement. The first encounter occurred in Charleston, West Virginia, where an officer, after receiving a tip about possible drug activity, observed Joseph's suspicious behavior and items consistent with drug distribution in a motel room. Joseph was apprehended after fleeing from officers, and a search of his duffel bag, which he abandoned during the chase, revealed drugs and firearms.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia denied Joseph's motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the encounters. Joseph argued that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him and that the search and seizure violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion based on their observations and Joseph's behavior, and that the subsequent search and seizure were lawful.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Joseph based on their observations and his unprovoked flight. The court also found that the officers' actions following the stop, including the use of a drug-detection dog and obtaining a search warrant for the duffel bag, were permissible and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, the court rejected Joseph's arguments regarding the lack of bodycam footage and the reliability of the initial tip, as well as his claim that the traffic stop in Parkersburg was impermissibly prolonged. The court concluded that the district court's factual findings were not clearly erroneous and upheld the denial of the motion to suppress.

United States v. Prather

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 24-3300

Opinion Date: May 27, 2025

Judge: Joan Larsen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

In this case, Kelli Prather was convicted by a jury of bank fraud, wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, and making a false statement on a loan application. The charges stemmed from her fraudulent applications for Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) and Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) funds under the CARES Act, which were intended to provide financial relief during the COVID-19 pandemic. Prather submitted multiple fraudulent loan applications for non-operational businesses and used the identity of her mentally disabled nephew, D.P., to apply for additional loans.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio sentenced Prather to 84 months in prison. Prather appealed her conviction and sentence, arguing insufficient evidence for her aggravated identity theft conviction, improper admission of certain testimonies, and errors in the jury instructions and sentencing enhancements.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that there was ample evidence to support Prather's aggravated identity theft conviction, including testimony that D.P. did not understand the loan application process and that Prather used his identity without lawful authority. The court also determined that the testimonies of Special Agent Reier and Prather's ex-fiancé, Darrell Willis, did not constitute plain error and were cumulative of other evidence presented at trial.

Regarding the jury instructions, the court held that the district court correctly informed the jury that Prather did not need to know the interstate nature of her acts to be convicted of wire fraud. Finally, the court upheld the district court's application of the vulnerable victim enhancement, finding that D.P. was indeed a victim of Prather's fraudulent scheme.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed Prather's conviction and sentence, concluding that there were no reversible errors in the district court's proceedings.

United States v. Hodge

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-2881

Opinion Date: May 28, 2025

Judge: Michael B. Brennan

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Kevin Hodge was involved in a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and pleaded guilty to the charge. The indictment specified that the conspiracy involved more than 50 grams of methamphetamine, which typically carries a ten-year statutory minimum sentence. However, Hodge met the criteria for the statutory "safety valve," which allows courts to disregard mandatory minimum sentences. Despite this, the district court sentenced him to ten years without discussing his eligibility for safety valve relief.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois initially handled the case. Hodge pleaded not guilty but later changed his plea to guilty. The court granted multiple continuances for his sentencing, partly due to his wife's serious health issues. The presentence investigation report (PSR) confirmed Hodge's eligibility for the safety valve, recommending a Guidelines range of 135 to 168 months. Hodge requested a sentence of time served, citing his wife's health and his role as primary caregiver. The district court sentenced him to 120 months, acknowledging his wife's health issues but emphasizing the large quantity of drugs involved. The court did not address Hodge's safety valve argument.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court had committed procedural error by not addressing Hodge's statutory safety valve argument, which is a principal mitigating argument. The Seventh Circuit noted that the district court's silence on this issue left uncertainty about whether it considered the safety valve's applicability. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit vacated Hodge's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, requiring the district court to engage with the safety valve argument.

U.S. v. Woods

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 24-1102

Opinion Date: May 23, 2025

Judge: William D. Benton

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

David Michael Woods was convicted by a jury of four counts related to the production, distribution, and possession of child pornography. The charges stemmed from his sexual abuse of his 12-year-old foster son and 15-year-old adopted son, which he documented and distributed. The district court sentenced him to a total of 1,200 months in prison. Woods appealed his conviction and sentence.

In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, Woods was allowed to represent himself after a Faretta hearing, despite the court's warnings about the dangers of self-representation. The jury found him guilty on all counts. Woods did not object to the court's decision to allow him to represent himself at trial.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Woods argued that he did not validly waive his right to counsel, but the court found that the district court's Faretta inquiry was sufficient. The court also rejected Woods's claims regarding the district court's reasonable doubt instruction, the alleged coercion of his decision not to testify, and the warning given to a potential witness about perjury. Additionally, the court found no cumulative error that would warrant a new trial.

Woods also challenged the imposition of a $2,500 assessment under the Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act, arguing that he lacked the ability to pay. The court held that Woods did not meet his burden to prove indigence and noted that he could earn money while serving his sentence.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding Woods's conviction and sentence.

United States v. Agena

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 24-1323

Opinion Date: May 28, 2025

Judge: Steven Colloton

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In June 2022, Angelica Agena was stopped by deputies in Lancaster County, Nebraska, for a traffic violation. During the stop, the deputies observed suspicious behavior and an open alcohol container in the vehicle. Neither Agena nor the driver, Gary Payton, had a valid driver’s license. The deputies found a butane torch lighter and, upon searching the vehicle, discovered methamphetamine in Agena’s purse. Agena was charged with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine.

The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska denied Agena’s motion to suppress the evidence seized during the traffic stop. The case proceeded to trial, where a jury found Agena guilty on both counts. She was sentenced to fifty-four months in prison and five years of supervised release.

Agena appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, challenging the denial of her motion to suppress, the admission of certain evidence at trial, and the sufficiency of the evidence to convict her. The Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.

The Eighth Circuit held that the traffic stop was justified based on the defective taillight and that the officers had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop due to the open container violation. The court also found that the search of Agena’s purse was supported by probable cause. Additionally, the court ruled that the admission of text messages and expert testimony about drug slang was not an abuse of discretion. Finally, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support Agena’s convictions. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.

United States v. Puig Valdes

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-3214

Opinion Date: May 29, 2025

Judge: Daniel P. Collins

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Yasiel Puig Valdes signed a pre-indictment plea agreement with the Government, agreeing to plead guilty to making false statements to federal officers in exchange for a reduced sentence and the Government's promise not to bring an additional charge of obstruction of justice. Puig later decided not to plead guilty, leading the Government to declare him in breach of the plea agreement and seek to enforce a provision waiving all evidentiary objections to the admission of the plea agreement’s factual basis at trial, including objections based on Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

The United States District Court for the Central District of California ruled that Rule 410 remained applicable and excluded the factual basis of Puig’s plea agreement from being admitted at trial. The court held that the plea agreement was unenforceable because it had not been approved by the court, as required for agreements under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(A). The Government appealed this decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The Ninth Circuit held that Puig’s waiver of the protections of Rule 410 was contingent on a court finding that there was a breach of an enforceable agreement. Since the plea agreement required court approval and such approval had not occurred, the agreement was not enforceable. Consequently, the waiver did not apply, and Rule 410 barred the admission of the factual basis of Puig’s plea agreement at trial. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court correctly excluded the factual basis under Rule 410.

USA V. GREENE

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-4097

Opinion Date: May 23, 2025

Judge: Morgan Christen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Namir Malik Ali Greene committed a series of convenience store and gas station robberies during a three-week period in March and April 2023. He used a BB gun to intimidate store clerks and stole between $100 and $2,000 from each location. Greene also stole three cars, two by using the BB gun to intimidate the owners and one by stealing the keys. He was eventually arrested after a high-speed pursuit. Greene was charged with nine counts of interference with commerce by robbery and one count of carjacking.

Greene pleaded guilty to one count of Hobbs Act robbery and stipulated to facts establishing seven additional Hobbs Act robberies and one car theft. The presentence report treated the car theft as a carjacking pseudo-count and calculated an adjusted offense level of 26 for that offense. The district court adopted the presentence report’s calculation, including the use of carjacking as the greater of the adjusted offense levels, and sentenced Greene to 120 months in prison.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case for plain error because Greene did not object to the district court’s reliance on carjacking to calculate his offense level. The Ninth Circuit agreed with Greene that the district court erred by using the carjacking pseudo-count because the elements of federal carjacking were not specifically established by his plea agreement. The stipulated facts did not establish that Greene acted with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, which is required for federal carjacking. The Ninth Circuit held that this error was plain and affected Greene’s substantial rights. The court exercised its discretion to correct the error and remanded the case for resentencing on an open record.

USA V. WATSON

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 24-1865

Opinion Date: May 23, 2025

Judge: Morgan Christen

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Tyler Jay Watson was investigated by a police task force in Nampa, Idaho, for drug distribution based on information from a confidential informant. Watson, who was on parole, had his vehicle and residence searched by law enforcement and probation officers. Methamphetamine was found in his vehicle, and during a subsequent search of his residence, Watson was detained in a patrol car. After being read his Miranda rights, Watson admitted to having more drugs at his grandmother's home. Officers obtained consent to search the grandmother's garage, where they found fentanyl, methamphetamine, and cash.

Watson was charged with possession with intent to distribute fentanyl. He filed a motion to suppress his incriminating statements and the evidence found, arguing that his parole conditions compelled him to cooperate with law enforcement under threat of parole revocation, violating his Fifth Amendment rights. The United States District Court for the District of Idaho denied the motion, finding the searches constitutional and Watson's statements not involuntarily compelled. Watson conditionally pled guilty and was sentenced to 188 months in prison.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Watson's statements were not involuntarily compelled because his parole conditions required cooperation only with his parole officer, not all law enforcement officers. Additionally, Watson was properly Mirandized before making the incriminating statements, and there was no indication that he was told refusal to cooperate would result in parole revocation. Thus, the court concluded that Watson was not subject to a penalty situation under these circumstances.

United States v. Jackson

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-6047

Opinion Date: May 28, 2025

Judge: Michael R. Murphy

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Barry Jackson was convicted of illegally possessing two firearms as a domestic violence misdemeanant. After his conviction, but before pleading guilty, he was found with three additional firearms, one of which had a large-capacity magazine. Jackson challenged the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) and the reasonableness of his sentence.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma denied Jackson's motion to declare § 922(g)(9) unconstitutional. Jackson then pleaded guilty without a plea agreement. At sentencing, the court determined that Jackson's possession of firearms on two separate occasions constituted relevant conduct, leading to a higher advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. Jackson was sentenced to 72 months in prison.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that § 922(g)(9) is constitutional as applied to Jackson, consistent with the principles established in United States v. Rahimi and United States v. Rogers. The court found that Jackson's prior domestic violence convictions demonstrated a propensity for violence, justifying his disarmament under § 922(g)(9). The court also upheld the district court's determination that Jackson's possession of additional firearms was relevant conduct, supporting the sentence imposed.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment of conviction and sentence, concluding that the sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable.

United States v. Maryboy

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-4117

Opinion Date: May 29, 2025

Judge: Gregory Alan Phillips

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Perry Maryboy was convicted of second-degree murder for the shooting death of Antonio Montowine. The incident occurred on April 13, 2018, near Bluff, Utah. Maryboy claimed the shooting was accidental, occurring when his firearm discharged prematurely as he attempted to fire a warning shot. The government argued that Maryboy intentionally shot Montowine in the back of the head or acted with extreme recklessness.

The United States District Court for the District of Utah presided over Maryboy's trial. Initially, a mistrial was declared due to Covid-19 complications. In a subsequent trial, the jury found Maryboy guilty of second-degree murder and discharging a firearm during a crime of violence. Maryboy was sentenced to 180 months for the murder and an additional mandatory 120 months for the firearm charge. Maryboy appealed, arguing that the government’s expert witness improperly opined on his mental state and that the district court failed to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the expert witness's testimony violated Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) by opining on Maryboy's mental state, which could have influenced the jury's decision on the degree of recklessness. Additionally, the court determined that the jury instructions were flawed because they did not require the government to disprove imperfect self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt for the second-degree murder charge. These errors were deemed to have affected Maryboy's substantial rights and the fairness of the judicial proceedings.

The Tenth Circuit reversed Maryboy's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, emphasizing the importance of proper jury instructions and adherence to evidentiary rules.

USA v. Campos

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 21-3051

Opinion Date: May 23, 2025

Judge: Judith Rogers

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The appellant was convicted by a jury of conspiracy with intent to distribute cocaine and manufacture and distribute methamphetamine into the United States. The district court sentenced her to 264 months’ imprisonment, 60 months’ supervised release, and ordered her to forfeit $18,000,000. The appellant sought reversal on multiple grounds, including lack of proper venue, ineffective assistance of counsel, and errors in sentencing and forfeiture.

The appellant was indicted in the District of Columbia in 2016 for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and manufacture methamphetamine, knowing the drugs would be imported into the United States. The drug trafficking occurred in various countries, including Colombia, Mexico, and the United States. The appellant was arrested in Bogotá, Colombia, in 2017 and voluntarily accompanied DEA agents to the United States. She challenged her prosecution in the District of Columbia, arguing that no part of the conspiracy occurred there.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that venue was proper under 18 U.S.C. § 3238, which allows for trial in the District of Columbia when the offense is committed outside the United States and the offender is not arrested or brought into any district. The court also found that the evidence supported the jury’s finding of a single conspiracy, as the appellant played a central role in coordinating the drug trafficking operations. The court rejected the appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, noting that counsel’s performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.

Regarding sentencing, the court found no clear error in the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines, including enhancements for using non-commercial aircraft, bribing law enforcement, maintaining a drug premises, and being an organizer or leader of the conspiracy. The court also upheld the $18,000,000 forfeiture order, finding that the appellant obtained the proceeds directly and indirectly from the drug trafficking operations under her control. The court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

BREAK v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 Ark. 95

Opinion Date: May 29, 2025

Judge: Shawn Womack

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Terry Break was convicted in 2021 of multiple child sexual abuse offenses, including rape, second-degree sexual assault, and sexual indecency with a child, involving three minor victims. He received six life sentences plus 488 years in prison and $425,000 in fines. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Break then filed a Rule 37 petition for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on several grounds.

The Boone County Circuit Court denied Break's petition. The court found that the State had provided sufficient evidence of "sexual gratification or desire" for the offenses, and thus, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge this element. The court also found that the prosecutor's comment during closing arguments, referring to Break as a "proven liar," was based on Break's own admissions and was not improper. Additionally, the court determined that the prosecutor's opening statement did not shift the burden of proof, as it referred to Break's demeanor during a recorded interview rather than his silence at trial. Lastly, the court acknowledged that the prosecutor's biblical reference during closing arguments was improper but concluded that Break failed to show that trial counsel's failure to object constituted ineffective assistance.

The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that Break failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel's performance was deficient or that any alleged deficiencies prejudiced the outcome of his trial. The court emphasized that Break did not provide sufficient evidence to support his claims of ineffective assistance and that the decisions made by his trial counsel fell within the range of reasonable professional judgment.

SPENCER v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 Ark. 91

Opinion Date: May 29, 2025

Judge: Courtney Hudson Goodson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Aaron Spencer was charged with second-degree murder and a firearm enhancement for the shooting death of Michael Fosler. Fosler had been charged with sexual offenses against Spencer’s daughter and was out on bond. On the night of the incident, Spencer found his daughter in Fosler’s truck and forced it off the road, resulting in an altercation where Spencer shot Fosler, who died at the scene. The case garnered significant media attention, leading the State to request a gag order to preserve the integrity of the jury pool and ensure a fair trial.

The Lonoke County Circuit Court granted the State’s motion for a gag order without holding a hearing. The order restricted various parties, including attorneys, public officials, and Spencer’s family, from making public statements about the case. Spencer opposed the gag order, arguing it violated his constitutional rights to a fair and public trial and free speech. He filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Arkansas Supreme Court, seeking to vacate the gag order.

The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the gag order was overly broad, vague, and lacked a factual basis. The court held that the order constituted a plain, manifest, clear, and gross abuse of discretion. The court emphasized that gag orders should be a last resort and must be narrowly tailored based on specific factual findings. The court granted Spencer’s petition for writ of certiorari, issued the writ, and vacated the circuit court’s gag order. The court did not preclude the possibility of a subsequent, more narrowly tailored gag order after an evidentiary hearing.

STATE OF ARKANSAS v. RUSSELL

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 Ark. 89

Opinion Date: May 29, 2025

Judge: Courtney Hudson Goodson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Ronald Russell was charged with internet stalking of a child after engaging in online conversations with a police detective posing as a fourteen-year-old girl. The detective, using the Whisper social media app, arranged a meeting with Russell, who was subsequently arrested. During discovery, it was revealed that the State did not possess earlier communications between Russell and the detective, as they had been deleted by the detective. Russell filed a motion in limine to exclude the preserved communications, arguing that without the context of the deleted messages, the evidence would be misleading and prejudicial.

The Benton County Circuit Court granted Russell’s motion in limine, ruling that the preserved messages were inadmissible. The court did not find a Brady violation but analyzed the issue under due process principles from California v. Trombetta and Arizona v. Youngblood. The court concluded that the State failed to show the deleted messages had no exculpatory value, were available by other means, or were deleted in good faith according to standard procedures.

The State of Arkansas appealed to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, arguing that the circuit court erred in its ruling. However, the Supreme Court of Arkansas dismissed the appeal, stating that it lacked jurisdiction under Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure–Criminal 3(a). The court determined that the appeal was from an order granting a motion in limine, not a motion to suppress seized evidence as required by Rule 3(a)(1). Consequently, the appeal did not meet the criteria for interlocutory review, and the motion to dismiss the appeal was granted.

WILDER v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 Ark. 88

Opinion Date: May 29, 2025

Judge: Courtney Hudson Goodson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Lavoyce Wilder was convicted of two counts of rape, three counts of first-degree sexual assault, and two counts of sexual indecency with a child. He was sentenced to two life terms, three thirty-year terms, and two six-year terms, all to run concurrently. Wilder appealed, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences. Wilder then filed a petition for postconviction relief under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1, which was denied and dismissed by the Pike County Circuit Court.

In his petition, Wilder argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for various reasons, including failing to preserve the record, provide witness statements, and introduce evidence. He also claimed prosecutorial misconduct, denial of a fair trial, and a violation of his right to a speedy trial. The trial court found that most of Wilder’s claims were related to trial strategy and did not demonstrate entitlement to relief. The court specifically addressed two claims: the inability of a witness to testify due to a stroke and the alleged impact of trial counsel’s hearing-aid malfunction, finding neither would have changed the trial's outcome.

The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court noted that most of Wilder’s claims on appeal were not raised in the lower court and thus could not be addressed. The court also found that Wilder’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel were either not substantiated or were matters of trial strategy. The court concluded that Wilder failed to demonstrate he was entitled to postconviction relief and affirmed the denial of his Rule 37.1 petition.

P. v. The North River Ins. Co.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: F088076(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: May 28, 2025

Judge: Donald R. Franson Jr.

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In May 2022, Martin Marroquin was arrested and charged with two counts of burglary in Stanislaus County. He posted a $40,000 bail through The North River Insurance Company and Bad Boys Bail Bonds (collectively, Surety) and was released. Marroquin failed to appear in court on July 14, 2022, leading to the forfeiture of his bail and the issuance of a bench warrant. Surety was notified and had 180 days to return Marroquin to custody. Marroquin was later found to be in custody in North Kern State Prison on other charges, with a hold placed on him for the Stanislaus County charges.

The Superior Court of Stanislaus County initially tolled the 180-day deadline for Surety to return Marroquin to custody. Surety later moved to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bail, arguing that Marroquin was in custody on other charges and a hold had been placed on him. The People opposed, arguing that future transportation costs for returning Marroquin to Stanislaus County should be settled first. The trial court denied Surety's motion but extended the tolling period.

The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that under Penal Code section 1305, the trial court must vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bail if the defendant is arrested outside the county where the case is located. The court found that the trial court erred by conditioning the relief on the resolution of future transportation costs under section 1306. The appellate court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

People v. Duenas

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B335274(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: May 27, 2025

Judge: Victor Viramontes

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2011, Robert Duenas was convicted by a jury of assault with a semiautomatic firearm, with enhancements for gang involvement, firearm use, and inflicting great bodily injury. He was sentenced to 23 years in prison. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, and the California Supreme Court denied his petition for review in January 2013.

In June 2022, Duenas filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, challenging his sentence. The Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause, leading the trial court to stay the three-year great bodily injury enhancement but leave the other enhancements and the six-year midterm unchanged, reducing his sentence to 20 years. Duenas appealed, arguing that the trial court should have conducted a full resentencing hearing, including considering recent ameliorative legislation.

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, agreed with Duenas. The court held that once a trial court determines a defendant is entitled to resentencing on habeas review, the original sentence is vacated, and the trial court must conduct a full resentencing hearing. This includes applying new ameliorative legislation retroactively. The court cited the California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Padilla, which established that a judgment becomes nonfinal when a sentence is vacated on habeas review, requiring the trial court to reconsider the entire sentence.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing, directing the trial court to consider all components of Duenas’s sentence, including the application of recent ameliorative legislation.

People v. Shively

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D082912(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: May 27, 2025

Judge: Jose Scher Castillo

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Gregory Jerome Shively was convicted by a jury of 57 counts, including conspiracy, burglary, attempted burglary, and robbery, with gang allegations found true for some counts. The trial court sentenced him to 45 years and eight months in prison. Shively's appellate counsel filed a brief under People v. Wende and Anders v. California, indicating no arguable issues for reversal. Shively did not file his own brief. The Court of Appeal reviewed the record and requested supplemental briefing on two issues.

The Superior Court of San Diego County initially found Shively guilty on all counts and true on some gang allegations. The court sentenced him to a lengthy prison term, considering various factors, including his prior offenses and aggravating circumstances. Shively's counsel filed a Wende brief, and the Court of Appeal independently reviewed the record, identifying potential issues for supplemental briefing.

The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case and found insufficient evidence to support the gang allegations. The court determined that the prosecution failed to prove the predicate offenses provided a nonreputational common benefit to the gang. Consequently, the court reversed the true findings on the gang allegations for counts 3 through 35 and 46 through 57. The court affirmed the judgment in all other respects and remanded the case to the trial court for full resentencing consistent with its opinion.

Schneider v. Superior Court

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B341712(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: May 29, 2025

Judge: Natalie Stone

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Robert Schneider, charged with murder, filed a discovery motion under Pitchess v. Superior Court and Brady v. Maryland, seeking Brady information from the confidential personnel records of six deputies with the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD). The trial court found good cause for an in camera review and determined that four of the six deputies' files contained Brady material. However, the court only ordered the disclosure of the names, addresses, and phone numbers of individuals who had witnessed or complained about the conduct, not the Brady material itself.

Schneider petitioned for a writ of mandate, challenging the limited disclosure. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court should have ordered LASD to disclose all Brady material in the four deputies’ personnel files, including documents and any audio-video materials.

The Court of Appeal held that while the Pitchess procedures must be followed to obtain Brady information in officers’ confidential personnel files, the limitations on disclosure under Pitchess do not apply to Brady material. The court emphasized that Brady material must be fully disclosed, including any relevant complaints, reports, or audio-visual evidence, to ensure the defendant's right to a fair trial. The petition was granted, directing the trial court to vacate its previous order and conduct a further in camera review to identify and produce all Brady material to Schneider’s counsel.

Bonde v. People

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Docket: 23SC784

Opinion Date: May 27, 2025

Judge: Monica Márquez

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Ryan Wallace Bonde was sentenced to two concurrent, four-year community corrections sentences as part of a plea agreement. After successfully completing the residential portion, he was transferred to nonresidential status. However, following his arrest for new offenses, his nonresidential status was terminated, and he was resentenced to the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC). Bonde requested presentence confinement credit (PSCC) for the 355 days served during the nonresidential portion of his community corrections sentences, which the district court denied based on the precedent set in People v. Hoecher.

The district court ruled that Bonde was not entitled to PSCC for time served on nonresidential status but could qualify for good time and earned time credit. Bonde was resentenced to two concurrent, four-year sentences in the CDOC, receiving PSCC for time served in jail and during the residential portion of his community corrections sentences, along with 153 days of earned time credit. Bonde appealed, arguing that the reasoning in Hoecher had been undermined by subsequent legislative amendments, which now support granting PSCC for time served on nonresidential status.

The Colorado Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that it was bound by the express holding in Hoecher, which denies PSCC for time served during nonresidential community corrections sentences. The court noted that Bonde did not demonstrate that nonresidential offenders face liberty restraints that constitute "confinement" under the PSCC statute.

The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, reaffirming the holding in Hoecher. The court concluded that nonresidential community corrections sentences do not qualify for PSCC, as the freedoms associated with nonresidential status are inconsistent with the notion of confinement under section 18-1.3-405. The court emphasized that any policy-based changes to grant PSCC for nonresidential community corrections sentences should be directed to the legislature.

People v. Ganaway

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Docket: 24SA244

Opinion Date: May 27, 2025

Judge: Brian Boatright

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The police were conducting an operation to arrest Anthony Veloz at a motel when they encountered Oscar Jonas Ganaway walking toward the motel. An officer asked Ganaway where he was going, and Ganaway pointed to Veloz's room. A detective then asked Ganaway if he could pat him down for weapons, and Ganaway consented. During the patdown, the detective found methamphetamine and arrested Ganaway. Ganaway moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the initial encounter was a seizure and the evidence should be suppressed.

The Arapahoe County District Court granted Ganaway's motion to suppress, finding that the initial encounter was a seizure and that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion. The court concluded that the evidence obtained from the search must be suppressed. The People appealed the trial court's order.

The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that the initial encounter between the police and Ganaway was not a seizure, meaning it did not trigger Fourth Amendment protections. The court further held that Ganaway voluntarily consented to the patdown. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the trial court's suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Snow v. People

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Docket: 23SC775

Opinion Date: May 27, 2025

Judge: Carlos Armando Samour Jr.

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Shaun Jeff Snow was charged with multiple offenses, including first-degree murder and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. He entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to second-degree murder in exchange for the dismissal of other charges and a stipulated sentencing range of sixteen to twenty-four years. The plea agreement did not mention restitution. At the sentencing hearing, the court imposed a twenty-year prison sentence and deferred the issue of restitution for sixty days. Seventy-eight days later, the prosecution filed a motion for restitution, and 108 days after sentencing, the court entered a post-sentencing restitution order for $13,852.60.

Snow did not appeal his conviction or sentence but later filed a motion to waive restitution, which the district court denied. Snow then appealed, arguing that his sentence was illegal under the precedent set by People v. Weeks. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the post-sentencing restitution order, concluding that Snow's Crim. P. 35(a) claim was an illegal manner claim and thus time-barred.

The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that the district court's deferral of the restitution issue in its entirety at sentencing was not authorized by law, making Snow's sentence illegal. The court concluded that the post-sentencing restitution order must be vacated. The court remanded the case with instructions to the district court to enter an order reflecting that Snow owes no restitution. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory requirements for restitution orders and ensuring timely and effective assessment of restitution.

Tennyson v. People

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Dockets: 23SC767, 23SC168, 23SC525, 23SC583, 23SC622, 24SC53, 23SC884, 22SC583

Opinion Date: May 27, 2025

Judge: Carlos Armando Samour Jr.

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Audrey Lee Tennyson committed a series of robberies in 2007 and was charged with fifty counts. He entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to two counts of aggravated robbery in exchange for a sentencing range of ten to thirty-two years in the Department of Corrections, to be served concurrently with sentences in three other felony cases. The plea agreement included a stipulation that Tennyson was liable for restitution, with the amount to be determined within ninety days of sentencing.

The district court sentenced Tennyson to twenty-six years for each count of aggravated robbery, to run concurrently, and deferred the determination of the restitution amount. The prosecution submitted a proposed restitution order within the ninety-day period, which the court approved 136 days after sentencing. Tennyson did not object to the restitution amount within the given timeframe. Approximately ten years later, Tennyson filed a Crim. P. 35(a) claim, arguing that his sentence was illegal due to the untimely determination of the restitution amount.

The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that Tennyson's claim was an illegal manner claim, not an illegal sentence claim, and was therefore time-barred as it was not filed within 120 days after sentencing.

The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that the district court's failure to set the restitution amount within the statutory deadline did not render Tennyson's sentence illegal. Instead, it constituted an illegal manner claim, which must be brought within 120 days after sentencing. Since Tennyson did not file his claim within this period, it was time-barred. The court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.

Toure v. United States

Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Docket: 19-CF-0902

Opinion Date: May 29, 2025

Judge: Vijay Shanker

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

A woman from North Carolina was found raped and murdered in a Washington, D.C. apartment in March 2017. The victim’s body was discovered bound and stabbed, with evidence of sexual assault. Surveillance footage and ATM records showed her car and credit cards being used in the days following her death. The investigation led to the arrest of El Hadji A. Toure, whose DNA was found at the crime scene and on items used to bind the victim. Video evidence placed Toure near the victim’s apartment shortly before the crime, and he was later seen using her credit and debit cards, always entering the correct PIN. After the murder, Toure’s financial situation improved markedly, as he paid cash for a hotel stay and a car.

A jury in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia convicted Toure of multiple offenses, including first-degree murder, sexual abuse, kidnapping, and related charges. He was sentenced to life without release. While his appeal was pending, Toure moved for a new trial, arguing that the government failed to timely disclose disciplinary records (QCARs) for forensic witnesses, in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The Superior Court denied the motion, finding that, even assuming suppression of favorable evidence, there was no reasonable probability the outcome would have been different given the strength of the other evidence.

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed both the convictions and the denial of a new trial. The court held that, although the government failed to timely disclose impeachment evidence, the suppressed material was not material under Brady because the remaining evidence against Toure was overwhelming. The court also found that the prosecutor’s conduct in eliciting certain testimony violated Toure’s confrontation and due process rights, but concluded that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The convictions and denial of a new trial were affirmed, with a remand for merger and resentencing as necessary.

CRAFT v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S25A0134

Opinion Date: May 28, 2025

Judge: Carla W. McMillian

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Ozell Craft was convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Marcus Sims. The incident occurred on September 9, 2019, when Craft, then 17, sold a pistol to his friend Khalil Rogers. Later, they met Sims to buy marijuana. Sims expressed interest in buying the pistol, but Rogers refused. Sims then forcibly took the pistol from Rogers, leading to a struggle. Craft shot Sims once in the chest, and after Sims fell to the ground, Craft shot him nine more times, resulting in Sims' death.

A DeKalb County grand jury indicted Craft on multiple charges, including malice murder and felony murder. At trial, the jury found Craft guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Craft to life in prison for malice murder, with additional consecutive sentences for aggravated assault and firearm possession. The felony murder count was vacated by law, and one aggravated assault count should have merged with the malice murder count for sentencing purposes. Craft's motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. Craft's sole argument on appeal was that the trial court committed plain error by failing to provide an additional jury instruction on his defense of habitation theory of justification. The court found that although the trial court agreed to give the instruction, it was inadvertently omitted. However, the Supreme Court held that Craft failed to show that this omission likely affected the trial's outcome. The evidence against Craft was overwhelming, particularly regarding the nine additional shots fired after Sims was incapacitated. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Craft's convictions and sentences.

FRENCH v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S25A0421

Opinion Date: May 28, 2025

Judge: Charlie Bethel

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In January 2008, Arthur James Mosley, an elderly farmer, was found dead in his home with multiple sharp-force injuries. Mosley's wallet was later discovered in a neighbor's yard, partially burned. DNA testing advancements between 2008 and 2013 revealed a partial DNA profile consistent with Timothy French on Mosley's pants. French was subsequently indicted for malice murder, felony murder, and armed robbery in April 2014. After a mistrial in April 2015, French was retried in June 2015 and found guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to life in prison for malice murder and a concurrent life sentence for armed robbery, with the felony murder count vacated by law.

French filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court in August 2024. He then appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia, arguing that the trial court erred in four respects.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found no error in the trial court's decisions. The court held that the trial court correctly rejected French's Batson challenge to the State’s peremptory strike of a black potential juror, as the prosecutor provided a race-neutral explanation based on the juror's employment with the Division of Family and Children Services. The court also upheld the trial court's denial of French's motion for funds to retain a defense expert, noting that French failed to provide specific information necessary for the trial court to assess the need for assistance. Additionally, the court deemed French's third and fourth claims of error abandoned due to his failure to provide substantive argument or legal authority in support of those claims. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's judgment.

JACKSON v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S25A0399

Opinion Date: May 28, 2025

Judge: John Ellington

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Carey Jackson was found guilty by a DeKalb County jury of felony murder, aggravated assault, first-degree criminal damage to property, and a violation of the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act in connection with the shooting death of Arnold Leslie and the assaults of seven other individuals. The crimes occurred on April 6, 2020, and Jackson was indicted on December 1, 2020. The jury found Jackson not guilty of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony but guilty of the remaining counts. Jackson was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole for felony murder, along with additional consecutive and concurrent prison terms for the other charges.

Jackson filed a motion for a new trial on January 18, 2022, which was amended through new counsel on April 9, 2024. The trial court denied the motion on June 26, 2024. Jackson then filed a notice of appeal on July 16, 2024, and the case was docketed in the Supreme Court of Georgia for the term beginning in December 2024.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed Jackson's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a jury instruction related to the Street Gang Act. Jackson argued that the instruction created a constitutionally impermissible mandatory presumption. The court found that the instruction did not create a mandatory presumption or shift the burden of proof to the defendant. Instead, it explained the meaning of the phrase "further the interests of the gang" and required the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime committed was the sort of crime the gang engaged in. Consequently, the court held that Jackson's trial counsel was not deficient for failing to object to the instruction and affirmed the trial court's decision.

POLLARD v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S25A0658

Opinion Date: May 28, 2025

Judge: Carla W. McMillian

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Ray Eugene Pollard was convicted of malice murder for the shooting death of Jonathon McAfee. The incident occurred on October 3, 2020, and Pollard was indicted on multiple charges, including malice murder and aggravated assault. During the trial, evidence showed that Pollard had a history of threatening behavior towards McAfee and had been at the scene of the shooting. Pollard's vehicle was found with damage consistent with evidence collected near the crime scene. Additionally, Pollard's inconsistent statements to police and his admission of being at the scene further implicated him.

The Baldwin County trial court entered a nolle prosequi for one count and a jury found Pollard guilty of the remaining charges. Pollard was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder. His conviction for aggravated assault merged with the malice murder conviction for sentencing purposes. Pollard filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case on appeal. Pollard argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of cell-site location information (CSLI) obtained without a search warrant. The court assumed, without deciding, that the trial counsel's performance was deficient. However, the court found that Pollard did not demonstrate that the outcome of the trial would have been different without the CSLI evidence. The court noted that the other evidence against Pollard was strong, including his presence at the scene, physical evidence, and his threatening behavior. Consequently, the court affirmed Pollard's conviction, concluding that he did not suffer prejudice from the alleged deficiency in his counsel's performance.

PORTER v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S25A0244

Opinion Date: May 28, 2025

Judge: John Ellington

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

James Porter was convicted of malice murder for the stabbing death of Deborah Miles. The crime occurred on October 8, 2017, in Statesboro, Georgia. Porter and Miles had a troubled relationship due to Porter’s alcohol abuse. On the morning of the murder, Miles failed to show up for work, prompting her co-worker and supervisor to check on her. They found her dead in her apartment later that day. Porter was seen near the crime scene and confessed to a friend that he had stabbed someone. He was arrested on October 9, 2017.

A Bulloch County grand jury indicted Porter for malice murder on November 6, 2017. At his trial in April 2019, a jury found him guilty, and he was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Porter filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied in June 2024. He then filed a timely notice of appeal.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the conviction. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction under the standard set by Jackson v. Virginia. The court found that Porter’s confession, corroborated by other evidence, was enough for a rational jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also ruled that the trial court did not err in refusing to give Porter’s requested jury instruction on the State’s burden to prove his identity as the perpetrator beyond a reasonable doubt, as the principle was adequately covered by other parts of the jury charge.

SHORT v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S25A0048

Opinion Date: May 28, 2025

Judge: Shawn Ellen LaGrua

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Angelo Short was convicted of malice murder and related crimes, including burglary, theft, robbery, and obstruction of an officer, following the stabbing death of Peggy Gamble in November 2016. Short was sentenced to life in prison without parole plus 40 years. He appealed, challenging the trial court's admission of his incriminating statements made during custodial interviews with Columbus Police Department officers, arguing that his confession was induced by promises of benefit and threats of harm.

The Muscogee County grand jury indicted Short on multiple charges, and he was tried and found guilty on all counts by a jury in November 2019. Short filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court after an evidentiary hearing. He then filed a timely notice of appeal.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that Short's confession was admissible, as it was not induced by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury, as required by OCGA § 24-8-824. The court found that the officers' statements during the interviews did not amount to promises of reduced punishment or threats that would render the confession involuntary. The court also noted that any statements made by the officers about potential plea deals or sentencing were noncommittal and did not constitute improper inducements. Additionally, the court found no evidence that Short's fear of harm from other inmates was used by the officers to coerce his confession. Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment and the admissibility of Short's confession and the physical evidence obtained as a result.

SIMS v. THE STATE

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S25A0058

Opinion Date: May 28, 2025

Judge: Charlie Bethel

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Colton Jerrod Sims and Monte Glover were convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of DeCoby Barlow and the aggravated assault of Landon Brown. The incident occurred on December 8-9, 2018, following a dispute at a nightclub. Sims and his friend Colby Toles had a confrontation with Glover and co-defendant Jalon Edwards, which escalated into a gunfight outside the club. Barlow was fatally shot during the crossfire, and Brown, a security guard, was also assaulted.

A Henry County grand jury indicted Sims, Glover, and Edwards on multiple charges, including malice murder and aggravated assault. Sims and Glover were tried together and found guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced them to life in prison for malice murder, with additional concurrent and consecutive sentences for other charges. Sims and Glover filed motions for new trials, which were denied by the trial court.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. Sims and Glover challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, claiming it did not support their convictions. Sims also raised four claims of trial court error and argued that his trial counsel was ineffective. Glover similarly argued ineffective assistance of counsel. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, as eyewitness testimony and ballistics evidence confirmed their involvement in the gunfight. The court also found no merit in Sims' claims of trial court error and ineffective assistance of counsel, noting that strategic decisions by trial counsel were reasonable and did not prejudice the defendants.

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the convictions and sentences of Sims and Glover, concluding that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the jury's verdicts and that there was no reversible error in the trial proceedings.

THE STATE v. WIERSON

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24G1299

Opinion Date: May 28, 2025

Judge: Andrew Pinson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law

Michelle Wierson was charged with vehicular homicide after allegedly causing a fatal car accident while speeding. Two psychiatrists concluded that Wierson lacked the mental capacity to distinguish right from wrong and suffered from a delusional compulsion at the time of the accident. Wierson filed a notice of intent to plead not guilty by reason of insanity. The State moved to introduce evidence that Wierson had stopped taking some of her psychiatric medications before the accident. The trial court granted the State's motion.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that evidence of medication non-compliance was not relevant to the statutory defenses of insanity. The court explained that the insanity-defense statutes do not mention how or why a defendant may have come to her mental state, only that she is not guilty if she has that mental state at the time of the offense. The court also held that evidence of medication non-compliance was not relevant to show Wierson’s intent to commit vehicular homicide and reckless driving.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to determine whether evidence that a defendant voluntarily contributed to her mental state is relevant to the statutory insanity defenses and whether the precedent set in Bailey v. State should be reconsidered. The court concluded that the plain language of the insanity-defense statutes does not provide any exception for voluntary inducement of the mental state. The court overruled Bailey, which had held that the insanity defenses are not available to a defendant who voluntarily induced the relevant mental state. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment, holding that evidence of Wierson’s medication non-compliance was not admissible to show that she voluntarily induced her lack of mental capacity or delusional compulsion.

State v. Rose

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 52062

Opinion Date: May 27, 2025

Judge: Gregory W. Moeller

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In December 2018, Misty Dawn Rose was charged with Delivery of a Controlled Substance and later indicted on additional charges, to which she pleaded guilty. The district court sentenced her to multiple terms, which were to be served consecutively, but retained jurisdiction and sent her on a rider. After successfully completing the rider, Rose was placed on supervised probation. In November 2021, a Probation Violation Report was filed, citing multiple violations, including failure to attend substance abuse treatment and committing a new misdemeanor. The district court issued a bench warrant and, after a hearing, decided to give Rose another chance with a second rider, specifying that she must be admitted to drug court or mental health court to remain on probation.

Rose completed the second rider but was not admitted to either treatment court due to eligibility issues. Despite her efforts, she was not accepted into any program. The district court set a probation review hearing, stating that failure to be accepted into a treatment court would be a violation of probation. Rose failed to appear at the review hearing because she was in custody in another county. The district court found her in violation of probation for not being admitted to a treatment court and for failing to appear at the hearing, and subsequently revoked her probation and imposed her sentences.

The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that Rose's failure to be admitted to a treatment court was not willful but upheld the finding that her failure to appear was willful. The case was remanded for a probation disposition hearing. Rose petitioned for review, which the Idaho Supreme Court granted.

The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court's order revoking probation, holding that Rose's non-acceptance into a treatment court was not willful and that she was not given proper notice that her failure to appear at the hearing would be a ground for revocation. The judgment imposing her sentence was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings before a different district judge.

State of Iowa v. Clark

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 23-0964

Opinion Date: May 23, 2025

Judge: Susan Christensen

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

The defendant was pulled over by deputies in Des Moines County after they responded to a reckless-driver complaint and observed her driving erratically. The deputies noted symptoms of intoxication and conducted field sobriety tests, which the defendant failed to complete. She requested an attorney when asked to submit to a preliminary breath test and was arrested. At the jail, she was given her phone and informed of her rights, including the right to contact an attorney, but she did not make any attempt to do so.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI), first offense. She filed a motion to suppress evidence, claiming her rights were violated under Iowa Code section 804.20 when the deputies did not permit her to call an attorney. The Iowa District Court for Des Moines County denied her motion, and the case proceeded to a jury trial. The district court also denied her motion in limine to suppress alleged hearsay evidence. The jury found the defendant guilty, and she appealed the decision, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the denial of her motions.

The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decisions. The Iowa Supreme Court granted further review but adopted the court of appeals' opinion for all claims except the motion to suppress issue concerning Iowa Code section 804.20. The Supreme Court determined that Iowa Code section 804.20 was not violated, as the defendant was given a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney without unnecessary delay. The decision of the court of appeals and the district court judgment were affirmed.

State v. Boatwright

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 125851

Opinion Date: May 23, 2025

Judge: Eric Rosen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

James D. Boatwright was convicted of first-degree murder, criminal discharge of a firearm, and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. The State's case relied heavily on the testimony of Boatwright's friend, who was driving the car from which Boatwright allegedly fired the fatal shots. Boatwright disputed this testimony, claiming he was not at the scene. The State presented evidence of close relationships among individuals involved, animosities, and events leading up to the shooting. Key evidence included text messages, phone calls, and a firearm linked to the crime found in Boatwright's residence.

The Shawnee District Court found Boatwright guilty on all charges. Boatwright was sentenced to a hard 50 life sentence for premeditated murder, 131 months for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and a concurrent term of 59 months for criminal discharge of a firearm. Boatwright appealed, arguing errors in jury instructions and prosecutorial misconduct.

The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case. Boatwright contended the district court erred by not giving an accomplice testimony instruction. The court found no clear error, noting the jury received a general credibility instruction and that Ivy's credibility was thoroughly examined during the trial. Boatwright also argued prosecutorial misconduct, claiming the prosecutor improperly commented on his right to remain silent, accused him of lying, vouched for Ivy's credibility, shifted the burden of proof, and appealed to community interests. The court found no prosecutorial error, determining the prosecutor's statements were within permissible bounds and based on evidence presented.

The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed Boatwright's conviction, concluding there were no errors warranting reversal.

State v. Johnson

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 127275

Opinion Date: May 23, 2025

Judge: Eric Rosen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Ronald Johnson, serving a life sentence for a 2003 premeditated murder conviction, filed a motion in 2023 for postconviction DNA testing. Johnson was convicted of killing Dorothy Griffin, with evidence including a blood-stained Adidas jacket found in his sister's washing machine. Johnson's motion requested retesting of various items, including the washing machine hose, car parts, and the Adidas jacket, alleging that updated technology could prove his innocence.

The Wyandotte District Court denied Johnson's motion. The State argued that Johnson failed to specify biological material in its possession for testing and that none of the items Johnson wanted tested were in law enforcement's custody. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, where Johnson testified and clarified his requests. The court found that Johnson did not prove the State had the items he wanted tested and denied his motion.

The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that Johnson's petition sufficiently stated a claim for testing only the washing machine hose, as it alleged the presence of blood. However, the petition was insufficient for other items, as it did not allege the presence of biological material. The court affirmed the district court's finding that Johnson failed to prove the State had the washing machine hose in its possession. Johnson's arguments for remand and due process violations were unpreserved and unsupported. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision denying Johnson's petition for postconviction DNA testing.

Commonwealth v. Gannett

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13659

Opinion Date: May 23, 2025

Judge: Kimberly S. Budd

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (OUI), third offense, resisting arrest, and three civil motor vehicle violations. After being stopped by police, the defendant exhibited signs of intoxication and was arrested. At the police station, he refused a breath test and was taken to a hospital where blood tests were conducted as part of his medical treatment. The police obtained a search warrant for the defendant's blood samples and sent them to the State police crime laboratory for analysis. The defendant moved to suppress the blood sample evidence, arguing he did not consent to the blood test.

The motion to suppress was allowed by the lower court, which ruled that the blood sample and any analysis conducted by the State police were inadmissible. The Commonwealth obtained the defendant's medical records, which included the blood test results, and a forensic scientist converted these results to a blood alcohol content (BAC) percentage. The defendant moved to exclude this converted BAC evidence, and the trial judge agreed, reasoning that it was derived from suppressed evidence. The Commonwealth's motion for reconsideration was denied, and they petitioned for extraordinary relief.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and held that the consent provision of General Laws c. 90, § 24 (1) (e), which requires a defendant's consent for the admissibility of blood or breath test results conducted by or at the direction of police, does not apply to the mathematical conversion of serum/plasma ethanol results from medical records to a BAC percentage. The court concluded that this conversion is not a "chemical analysis" as defined by the statute. Therefore, the converted BAC evidence is admissible, and the lower court's decision to exclude it was reversed. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

State v. D. Summers

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 MT 109

Opinion Date: May 27, 2025

Judge: Beth Baker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Donna Elizabeth Summers was stopped by Ravalli County Detective Nick Monaco for speeding in May 2022. During the stop, Summers appeared nervous, and Monaco discovered she had a history of drug possession. After issuing a warning for speeding and returning her documents, Monaco asked if he could ask additional questions, to which Summers consented. She admitted to past drug use and allowed Monaco to search her vehicle, where he found methamphetamine and paraphernalia. Summers was charged with felony possession of dangerous drugs and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. She filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing the stop was unlawfully prolonged without particularized suspicion.

The Twenty-First Judicial District Court denied Summers’s motion to suppress, finding that Monaco had particularized suspicion to extend the stop and that Summers consented to the additional questioning and search. Summers then pleaded no contest to the charges but reserved the right to appeal the suppression ruling.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and concluded that Detective Monaco lacked particularized suspicion to transition the traffic stop into a drug investigation. However, the court held that under the totality of the circumstances, Summers’s constitutional rights were not violated because she voluntarily consented to the additional questioning and search. The court affirmed the District Court’s denial of Summers’s motion to suppress evidence.

State v. Dellar

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 MT 111

Opinion Date: May 27, 2025

Judge: Laurie McKinnon

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In May 2020, Tommy Jonathan Seth Dellar was receiving dialysis treatment at DaVita Dialysis when he exhibited symptoms of PTSD. After being asked to lower his noise level by technician Ashley Cray, Dellar demanded to be taken off the machine and made threatening statements towards Cray and others in the facility. Law enforcement found Dellar outside the center, where he reiterated his threats. Dellar was charged with felony intimidation under Montana law.

The Eighth Judicial District Court in Cascade County held a one-day jury trial in November 2022. Dellar moved for a directed verdict based on insufficient evidence, which the court denied. Dellar also requested that disorderly conduct be considered as a lesser-included offense, but the court rejected this request. The jury found Dellar guilty of felony intimidation. At sentencing, Dellar requested a waiver of all fees, and the State stipulated to waive all except the $50 victim surcharge, which the court imposed.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to consider whether Dellar had the intended purpose to cause Cray to perform the act of removing him from dialysis when he made his statements. The court also held that disorderly conduct is not a lesser-included offense of intimidation as a matter of law, as each offense requires proof of at least one element the other does not. Additionally, the court found that Dellar’s ineffective assistance claim was not record-based and not suitable for review on direct appeal. Finally, the court concluded that the District Court did consider Dellar’s ability to pay the $50 victim surcharge. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decisions.

State v. Roberts

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 MT 110

Opinion Date: May 27, 2025

Judge: James A. Rice

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

An eighteen-year-old defendant attended a post-high school graduation event at the Sweet Grass County fairgrounds, where alcohol and drug use were prohibited. A chaperone reported to the Sweet Grass County Sheriff’s Office that the defendant appeared intoxicated. Deputy Whaley arrived later, conducted alcohol tests on attendees, and observed the defendant and another individual walking towards a vehicle. The deputy, familiar with the defendant’s prior offenses and court-ordered conditions, approached and requested consent to search the vehicle, which the defendant refused. Using a flashlight, the deputy saw a marijuana smoking device in plain view inside the vehicle. The vehicle was seized, and a search warrant was obtained, leading to the discovery of marijuana, paraphernalia, and alcoholic beverages. The defendant was charged with two counts of underage possession of an intoxicating substance (UPIS), one for alcohol and one for marijuana.

The defendant pled guilty in justice court and was sentenced for UPIS (3rd and 4th offenses), with sentences running concurrently. He appealed to the District Court, filing motions to suppress evidence for lack of particularized suspicion and to dismiss one count for double jeopardy. The District Court denied both motions, ruling that the plain view doctrine justified the seizure of the vehicle and that the two charges did not violate the multiple conviction statute.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that Deputy Whaley’s initial approach did not constitute a seizure requiring particularized suspicion and that the use of a flashlight to view the marijuana device did not violate the plain view doctrine. The court also held that the two charges for possession of different intoxicating substances did not violate the multiple conviction statute. The court affirmed the District Court’s rulings.

State v. Bowman

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 49A24

Opinion Date: May 23, 2025

Judge: Allison Riggs

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

James Bowman was indicted for seven criminal offenses, including two counts of first-degree forcible sexual offense, after an incident involving S.B. on September 8, 2019. S.B. testified that Bowman, armed with a firearm, forced her to engage in various sexual acts, including anal intercourse and fellatio, against her will. Bowman was found guilty on all charges by a jury in his second trial.

The Superior Court of Durham County sentenced Bowman to 365 to 498 months of active imprisonment. Bowman appealed, arguing that the trial court's jury instructions violated his right to a unanimous verdict. The Court of Appeals, in a split decision, agreed with Bowman, finding that the trial court's instructions were erroneous and jeopardized his right to a unanimous verdict. The court ordered a new trial for the two counts of first-degree forcible sexual offense.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's jury instructions, when read as a whole, required a unanimous verdict and did not violate Bowman's right to a unanimous jury verdict. The court emphasized that the instructions clearly defined the elements of the offense and the need for unanimity. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address Bowman's remaining arguments.

State v. Chambers

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 56PA24

Opinion Date: May 23, 2025

Judge: Paul Martin Newby

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The defendant was charged with first-degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury after a shooting at a Raleigh motel. The defendant represented himself at trial and chose to be absent from the courtroom after his closing argument was cut off by the trial court. During jury deliberations, Juror #5 was excused for a medical appointment, and an alternate juror was substituted. The trial court instructed the jury to restart deliberations from the beginning. The jury found the defendant guilty of both charges, and he was sentenced to life in prison without parole for the murder conviction and additional imprisonment for the assault conviction.

The defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the North Carolina Court of Appeals, arguing that the substitution of an alternate juror during deliberations violated his state constitutional right to a twelve-person jury. The Court of Appeals unanimously agreed, holding that the substitution resulted in a jury of thirteen people, which violated the state constitution. The court vacated the defendant's convictions and remanded for a new trial.

The State sought discretionary review by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, which reviewed the constitutionality of the statute allowing mid-deliberation juror substitution. The Supreme Court held that the statute did not violate the defendant's constitutional right to a jury of twelve, as it required the jury to begin deliberations anew following the substitution. The court presumed that the jury followed the trial court's instructions to restart deliberations, ensuring that the verdict was rendered by a properly constituted jury of twelve. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

State ex rel. Dodson v. Smith

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2025-Ohio-1878

Opinion Date: May 29, 2025

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Ricardo Dodson is serving prison sentences for convictions in two separate cases. In the first case, Dodson was indicted on multiple counts of rape, attempted rape, and kidnapping. The jury returned guilty verdicts, but the jury-verdict forms mistakenly listed his surname as Jackson instead of Dodson. The trial-court judge read the wrong name into the record and sentenced Dodson to consecutive prison terms for each count. In the second case, Dodson was indicted on another count of rape and kidnapping. He was found guilty and sentenced to serve this sentence consecutively to the sentences from the first case, even though he had not yet started serving those sentences.

Dodson petitioned the Seventh District Court of Appeals for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the mistyping of his surname on the jury-verdict forms stripped the trial court of jurisdiction and that the sentences imposed were ambiguous. He claimed that the sentence in the first case should be considered concurrent due to the lack of specificity in the sentencing entry and that the sentence in the second case was ambiguous because it referred to a sentence "already being served" when he had not yet started serving the first sentence.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals dismissed Dodson’s petition, determining that his claims were not cognizable in habeas corpus. The court found that the alleged errors did not affect the trial court’s jurisdiction and that Dodson had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law through direct appeal. Dodson appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio.

The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Seventh District’s judgment, holding that the trial court had jurisdiction over Dodson’s case and that the sentencing entries were not ambiguous. The court concluded that Dodson’s arguments could have been addressed through direct appeal and did not warrant habeas corpus relief.

Bailey v State of Oklahoma ex rel. Service Oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 OK 34

Opinion Date: May 28, 2025

Judge: Dana Kuehn

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

Treyton Bailey was stopped for a traffic violation and subsequently arrested for suspicion of DUI after officers observed signs of impairment. Although Bailey consented to a blood test, the result was excluded due to a discrepancy in the chain of custody. Despite the lack of a valid test result, Service Oklahoma revoked Bailey's license. Bailey argued that Service Oklahoma lacked statutory authority to mail the revocation notice by regular mail, that revocation is invalid absent a certificate or affidavit of mailing even where the licensee received and acted upon the notice, and that revocation cannot be sustained without a valid test result when the driver did not refuse testing.

The district court rejected Bailey's arguments, finding that Section 2-116 applies to Service Oklahoma and authorizes the agency to serve revocation notice by regular mail. The court also found that the State's proof of service was admissible and sufficient to establish adequate proof that notice was properly served. Additionally, the court determined that despite the exclusion of the blood result, the State met its burden of proof based on other competent evidence. The district court entered a Final Order Sustaining Revocation, which Bailey appealed.

The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma affirmed the district court's order. The court held that Service Oklahoma is authorized to provide revocation notice by regular mail under Title 47, Section 2-116, and that this interpretation is necessary to preserve the coherence of the statutory scheme following the Legislature's transfer of authority to Service Oklahoma. The court also held that Bailey's due process challenge failed, as the record reflected that he received written notice of the revocation and acted upon it by filing a petition for judicial review. Finally, the court held that the district court properly sustained the revocation of Bailey's license based on the officer's sworn report and other competent evidence, despite the exclusion of the blood test result.

State v. Hay

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 23-235

Opinion Date: May 29, 2025

Judge: William P. Robinson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

On June 26, 2018, a fatal shooting occurred near 100 Lowell Avenue in Providence, Rhode Island, resulting in the death of David Page. The investigation into the murder led to the arrest of Chandanoeuth Hay and his codefendant, Jaythan Hang. Hay was charged with ten counts, including first-degree murder, conspiracy, assault with a dangerous weapon, and firearm-related offenses. A grand jury indicted Hay on December 9, 2019. During the trial, the prosecution presented evidence linking Hay to the crime, including testimony from a cooperating witness, Kennedy Terrero, who described gang affiliations and prior violent incidents involving Hay.

The Providence County Superior Court held pretrial hearings on several motions filed by Hay, including motions to suppress evidence and exclude certain testimonies and photographs. The trial justice denied these motions, allowing the evidence to be presented at trial. Hay was subsequently found guilty on all counts by a jury on October 6, 2022. Hay filed motions for a new trial and judgment of acquittal, which were denied by the trial justice. On February 13, 2023, Hay was sentenced to multiple consecutive and concurrent prison terms, including two life sentences.

The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed Hay's appeal, which raised four grounds for reversal: the admission of lay opinion testimony by a police sergeant, the denial of a Franks hearing, the admission of testimony about unrelated shootings, and the admission of certain photographs. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment, finding no abuse of discretion in the trial justice's rulings. The Court held that the lay opinion testimony was properly admitted, the denial of the Franks hearing was justified, the Rule 404(b) evidence was relevant and not overly prejudicial, and the photographs were admissible to demonstrate Hay's relationship with Terrero and access to firearms.

Rivers v. State

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 28285

Opinion Date: May 28, 2025

Judge: Letitia H. Verdin

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Mitchell Rivers was convicted of Homicide by Child Abuse (HCA) following the death of his four-month-old adoptive child, who died from asphyxiation. During the trial, the State introduced evidence of the child's prior injuries, which were unrelated to the cause of death. Rivers' trial attorney objected to this evidence pretrial but failed to renew the objection during the trial, leaving the issue unpreserved for appeal. Rivers subsequently filed for post-conviction relief (PCR), claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.

The PCR court denied relief, finding that Rivers was not prejudiced by his attorney's failure to renew the objection. However, the court of appeals reversed this decision, holding that Rivers was prejudiced by his attorney's errors, as there was no nexus between the collateral injury evidence and the circumstances surrounding the child's death.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the court of appeals' decision. The Supreme Court found that even if the collateral injury evidence had been excluded, there was no reasonable probability that the jury's verdict would have been different. The court noted that Rivers' actions, including his failure to seek medical assistance after the child resumed wheezing and his inability to perform CPR, demonstrated a conscious disregard for the risk of the child's death, thus establishing extreme indifference beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, Rivers failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel. The decision of the court of appeals was reversed.

ARMSTRONG v. THE STATE OF TEXAS

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0409-22

Opinion Date: May 28, 2025

Judge: Jesse McClure

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

On August 12, 2019, Officer Logan Rogers received a dispatch call about a white Chevrolet pickup driving erratically in the Steeple Chase apartment complex. The vehicle was registered to Joshua Armstrong. Witnesses described the driver as a white male with dark hair, a goatee, tattoos, and wearing a red shirt. Officer Rogers located the vehicle and, based on information from a resident, went to an apartment where Armstrong was found. Armstrong appeared intoxicated, admitted to taking Suboxone, and was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI) without a warrant.

The trial court denied Armstrong's motion to suppress the blood-test results, arguing that his warrantless arrest was not supported by exigent circumstances as required by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 14.03. Armstrong was found guilty by a jury of DWI. On appeal, the Fifth Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the State failed to establish exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless arrest, relying on State v. McGuire.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case to determine if Article 14.03(a)(1) requires exigent circumstances for a warrantless arrest. The court concluded that the statute does not impose an exigency requirement. The court emphasized that the plain language of the statute and its legislative history do not support an exigency requirement. The court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if Armstrong's arrest was justified under the totality of the circumstances test without considering exigency.

GREEN v. THE STATE OF TEXAS

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: AP-77,088

Opinion Date: May 28, 2025

Judge: Mary Lou Keel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

After stealing a pickup truck and a gun from a ranch in Odessa, the appellant was stranded at a convenience store in McCamey. His suspicious behavior drew the attention of Upton County sheriff’s deputies Thomas Stiles and Billy Kennedy. When the deputies began investigating, the appellant instigated a shootout, resulting in the death of Deputy Kennedy.

A Nueces County jury convicted the appellant of capital murder for killing Deputy Kennedy. Based on the jury’s answers to special issues during the punishment phase, the trial court sentenced him to death. The appellant raised two points of error challenging his conviction and seven points challenging his sentence.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case. The appellant argued that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of murder, claiming a juror could have doubted whether he knew Kennedy was a peace officer. The court rejected this argument, stating the appellant did not preserve the issue and that no evidence supported the need for such an instruction. The appellant also claimed that the trial court’s refusal to submit the murder instruction violated his constitutional rights, but the court found no evidence to support this claim.

The appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence regarding his future dangerousness, arguing his injuries and inevitable incarceration mitigated this risk. The court found the evidence legally sufficient, citing the circumstances of the offense, the appellant’s history of violence, lack of remorse, and misbehavior in custody.

The appellant also contested the admission of hearsay evidence and the denial of a mistrial due to the State’s failure to provide notice of extraneous misconduct evidence. The court found no abuse of discretion in these rulings. Additionally, the court deemed the prosecutor’s improper argument referencing facts outside the record as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, the appellant’s constitutional challenge to the future dangerousness special issue was not preserved for review. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment and sentence.

In re GREEN

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: WR-91,714-02

Opinion Date: May 28, 2025

Judge: Gina Parker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The relator was found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to death. While his direct appeal was pending, he filed an initial habeas application and a motion to recuse the district judge from presiding over post-conviction proceedings. The motion was granted, and a visiting judge, Judge Wright, was assigned to the habeas proceeding. The District Attorney objected to Judge Wright’s assignment under Texas Government Code § 74.053(d), leading to her replacement by another visiting judge, Judge Reed. The relator sought mandamus relief, arguing that the State should not have an automatic veto over the assignment of the habeas judge.

The 112th Judicial District Court in Upton County initially handled the case. The relator's motion to recuse the district judge was granted without issue. However, the District Attorney's objection to Judge Wright's assignment was sustained, and Judge Reed was appointed instead. The relator then sought mandamus relief, contending that the administrative presiding judge lacked the authority to grant the State an automatic veto over the assignment of the habeas judge.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case. The court held that Texas Government Code § 74.053(d) applies only to civil cases, as established in the precedent Lanford v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals. The court found no sufficient justification to overrule Lanford, despite amendments to the statute. Consequently, the administrative presiding judge was incorrect to remove the visiting judge under that provision. The court granted mandamus relief, ordering the administrative presiding judge to rescind the order removing Judge Wright. The court did not address the State's alternative argument regarding Judge Wright's qualifications, as it was not considered by the administrative presiding judge.

State v. Pettit

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0186-24

Opinion Date: May 28, 2025

Judge: David Newell

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A vehicle was stopped by Trooper Ryan Wilkinson in Smith County for speeding, having an expired temporary tag, and an inoperative brake light. The driver, Bridgett Tobler, did not have a valid driver’s license, and the passenger, Justin Heath Pettit, was on probation. After confirming there were no warrants for either individual, Trooper Wilkinson prolonged the stop to wait for a K-9 unit, which arrived nearly an hour later. The K-9 alerted to the presence of drugs, leading to a search that uncovered prescription medication, syringes, and a sawed-off shotgun. Pettit was charged with possession of a prohibited weapon.

The trial court granted Pettit’s motion to suppress the evidence, concluding that the detention was unreasonably prolonged without reasonable suspicion, violating the Fourth Amendment. The State appealed, arguing that Pettit, as a passenger, lacked standing to challenge the search. The Twelfth Court of Appeals agreed with the State, reversing the trial court’s decision and holding that Pettit did not have standing to contest the search.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and held that Pettit had standing to challenge the search of the vehicle. The court reasoned that both drivers and passengers have a reasonable expectation of privacy in not being detained longer than necessary for a traffic stop. The search of the vehicle was deemed the fruit of the unreasonably prolonged detention. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further consideration of whether the prolonged detention was reasonable.

State v. Andrus

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 UT 15

Opinion Date: May 29, 2025

Judge: Matthew Durrant

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A thirty-four-year-old man engaged in a months-long sexual relationship with a sixteen-year-old girl, whom he met online. The relationship involved repeated sexual encounters, the exchange of nude photographs and explicit video calls, and the provision of marijuana and offers of other gifts. The girl reported the relationship to police, who struggled to identify the perpetrator due to his use of pseudonyms and anonymous messaging apps. State detectives, working as part of a federal task force, requested that federal officers use federal administrative subpoenas to obtain electronic records from service providers, which ultimately led to the identification and arrest of the defendant. A search of his home yielded physical evidence linking him to the victim.

The Second District Court in Davis County denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the electronic records obtained via federal subpoenas, rejected his motions to arrest judgment and for a directed verdict on several charges, and admitted evidence of uncharged conduct from another county. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts, and the court partially granted a post-trial motion to arrest judgment, but left convictions for human trafficking of a child and sexual exploitation of a minor intact. The defendant appealed.

The Supreme Court of the State of Utah held that Utah’s Electronic Information or Data Privacy Act (EIDPA) does not require suppression of evidence lawfully obtained by federal officers under federal law and then shared with state officers, and that the Utah Constitution does not mandate exclusion of such evidence. The court vacated the conviction for human trafficking of a child, holding that the statute requires proof that something of value was actually given or received in exchange for a sexual act, not merely offered. The court affirmed the convictions for sexual exploitation of a minor and distribution of a controlled substance, and found no reversible error in the admission of evidence related to uncharged conduct.

Commonwealth v. Paxton

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Docket: 240326

Opinion Date: May 29, 2025

Judge: Cleo Powell

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Jamar Paxton was arrested in May 2020 for robbery and use of a firearm following the death of his girlfriend, Dominique Danzy. During interrogation, Paxton initially denied killing Danzy but later made incriminating statements after invoking his right to remain silent. The trial court found that Paxton had unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent but denied his motion to suppress the statements, ruling that Paxton voluntarily reinitiated the interrogation. Evidence presented at trial included Paxton's purchase of a rifle, forensic evidence linking the rifle to Danzy's murder, and Paxton's possession of Danzy's car keys and a cartridge casing.

The jury found Paxton guilty of second-degree murder and use of a firearm in the commission of murder, and he was sentenced to 33 years in prison with 16 years suspended. Paxton appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, which ruled that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress his statements. The Court of Appeals held that the error was not harmless because Paxton's incriminating statements were powerful evidence in a case with circumstantial evidence. The court also ruled that Paxton did not waive his challenge by testifying.

The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and determined that any error in admitting Paxton's statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court noted that the Commonwealth downplayed the importance of Paxton's statements during closing arguments and focused on the physical evidence linking Paxton to the murder. The court concluded that the overall strength of the Commonwealth's case, including forensic evidence and Paxton's possession of Danzy's car keys, established that a rational jury would have found Paxton guilty even without the statements. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed Paxton's convictions.

State v. Hall-Haught

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 102,405-3

Opinion Date: May 29, 2025

Judge: G. Helen Whitener

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Samantha Hall-Haught was involved in a head-on collision, leading to the discovery of drug paraphernalia in her vehicle. At the hospital, a state trooper observed signs of drug use and obtained a warrant to test her blood, which revealed the presence of THC. Hall-Haught was charged with vehicular assault, and at her trial, a lab supervisor testified about the blood test results instead of the technician who conducted the test. Hall-Haught objected, arguing that her right to confront the witness against her was violated.

The trial court admitted the lab results, and Hall-Haught was convicted. She appealed, and the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, reasoning that the supervisor's independent review and testimony did not violate the confrontation clause. The court relied on the precedent set in State v. Lui, which allowed expert witnesses to testify based on data prepared by others.

The Supreme Court of Washington reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the confrontation clause was violated because the lab report was testimonial, and the technician who performed the test was the actual witness against Hall-Haught. The court emphasized that the supervisor's testimony, which relied on the technician's report, was admitted for its truth, thus implicating the confrontation clause. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

State of West Virginia v. Miller

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

Docket: 23-318

Opinion Date: May 28, 2025

Judge: Haley Bunn

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Andrew Miller was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court of Raleigh County, West Virginia, of wanton endangerment, malicious wounding, and felony possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. The jury also found him to be a recidivist felon, leading to a life sentence with the possibility of parole. The case arose from an incident where Miller allegedly shot Anthony Goard during a dispute over drugs at Niesha Dotson’s apartment. Miller claimed that another individual, J.T., was the actual shooter.

At trial, the State presented testimony from Dotson and Goard, both of whom had used drugs at the time of the incident. Dotson testified about a disagreement over drugs between her and Miller, while Goard identified Miller as the shooter but initially told hospital staff he did not know who shot him. The State also introduced a 9 millimeter firearm with Miller’s DNA, although Goard identified a different firearm as the one used in the shooting. Miller testified in his defense, asserting that J.T. shot Goard and that he left the scene to avoid being implicated due to his parole status.

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case, focusing on Miller’s claim that his constitutional right to silence was violated. The court found that the circuit court erred by allowing the State to cross-examine Miller about his post-arrest silence, which was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court noted that this improper questioning directly prejudiced Miller’s defense, as it suggested to the jury that Miller fabricated his story about J.T. being the shooter.

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia vacated Miller’s convictions and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the constitutional error was not harmless and affected the jury’s verdict.

Testerman v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 WY 58

Opinion Date: May 23, 2025

Judge: Robert Jarosh

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Gabriel Lee Testerman was found guilty by a jury of one count of first-degree sexual assault. The case involved two victims, CB and CM. CB testified that after meeting Testerman at a bar and later going to his house, she became disoriented after drinking a beverage he made. She alleged that Testerman sexually assaulted her while she was incapacitated. CM, Testerman's former girlfriend, testified that he had previously forced her into non-consensual sexual acts, including using a spreader bar and engaging in anal sex while she was asleep.

The District Court of Laramie County admitted evidence of prior bad acts under Wyoming Rule of Evidence 404(b) after a pretrial hearing. Testerman was charged with three counts of first-degree sexual assault, two related to CB and one to CM. The jury acquitted him of the charges related to CB but found him guilty of the charge related to CM. He was sentenced to ten to fifteen years in prison.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Wyoming, Testerman argued that the prosecutor committed misconduct by introducing unnoticed Rule 404(b) evidence and vouching for witnesses during closing arguments. The court reviewed the alleged unnoticed Rule 404(b) evidence and found that five instances were indeed unnoticed but concluded that Testerman was not materially prejudiced by their admission. The court also found that the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments did not constitute improper vouching.

The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence and that Testerman was not deprived of a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct or cumulative error.