Glossip v. Oklahoma

Court: U.S. Supreme Court

Docket: 22-7466

Opinion Date: February 25, 2025

Judge: Sonia Sotomayor

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 1997, Justin Sneed murdered Barry Van Treese at an Oklahoma hotel managed by Richard Glossip. Sneed claimed Glossip orchestrated the murder to steal Van Treese's money. Glossip denied involvement but was convicted and sentenced to death based on Sneed's testimony. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) overturned the initial conviction due to ineffective defense counsel but upheld a second conviction despite inconsistencies in Sneed's testimony and new evidence suggesting prosecutorial misconduct.

The OCCA initially reversed Glossip's conviction due to ineffective assistance of counsel but affirmed his second conviction, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence to support Sneed's testimony. Glossip's subsequent habeas petitions were unsuccessful. An independent investigation commissioned by Oklahoma legislators raised doubts about the conviction, revealing prosecutorial misconduct, including the destruction of evidence and false portrayal of Sneed. The State disclosed previously withheld documents, including evidence of Sneed's bipolar disorder and false testimony about his lithium prescription.

The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case, focusing on whether the prosecution violated its constitutional obligation to correct false testimony under Napue v. Illinois. The Court found that the prosecution knowingly allowed Sneed to falsely testify about his lithium prescription and failed to correct it. This error was material, as Sneed's credibility was crucial to Glossip's conviction. The Court held that the prosecution's failure to correct the false testimony violated Glossip's due process rights, warranting a new trial. The judgment of the OCCA was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Laird v. Secretary of Dept. of Corrections

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 17-9000

Opinion Date: February 26, 2025

Judge: D. Michael Fisher

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the early morning of December 15, 1987, Richard Laird and Frank Chester brutally murdered Anthony Milano in a wooded area in Bristol, Pennsylvania. Milano, a 26-year-old homosexual man, was beaten and had his neck and throat slashed multiple times, leading to his death. Laird and Chester were arrested and tried for first-degree murder, among other charges. Both were convicted and sentenced to death. Laird's defense included claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, particularly regarding the failure to present expert testimony on the sexual abuse he suffered as a child.

Laird's initial conviction and death sentence were affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1991. He sought post-conviction relief, which was denied by the PCRA Court and affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1999. Laird then filed a federal habeas petition, which resulted in the vacating of his first-degree murder conviction and death sentence in 2001. The case was remanded for a retrial, and in 2007, Laird was again convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed this conviction and sentence in 2010.

Laird filed another PCRA petition, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present an expert on childhood sexual abuse. The PCRA Court denied relief, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the additional expert testimony would have been cumulative and not likely to change the outcome. Laird then filed a federal habeas petition, which was denied by the District Court.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on whether counsel was ineffective for not presenting an additional expert on childhood sexual abuse. The court held that the PCRA Court's decision was reasonable and that counsel's performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. The court affirmed the District Court's denial of the habeas petition.

USA v. Ashe

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 24-1027

Opinion Date: February 27, 2025

Judge: Luis Felipe Restrepo

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Rodney Ashe was pulled over by police on October 3, 2022, for failing to maintain his lane. During the stop, officers observed a handgun in his sweatshirt pocket, leading to his arrest and the impoundment of his car. Six months later, while Ashe was incarcerated, a duffle bag containing an AK-style pistol and ammunition was found in the trunk of his car by a towing company employee. Ashe pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm related to the handgun found during the traffic stop.

The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey held a sentencing hearing on December 21, 2023. Both the Government and the defense argued for a total offense level of 12, but the District Court found a total offense level of 17, applying an enhancement for possession of the AK-style pistol. The court determined that a preponderance of the evidence supported Ashe’s constructive possession of the AK pistol, based on its location in his trunk and his history of firearm-related offenses. Ashe was sentenced to 37 months of imprisonment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the District Court erred in applying the enhancement without sufficient evidence that Ashe possessed the AK pistol. The appellate court noted that the six-month gap between Ashe’s arrest and the discovery of the firearm, combined with the lack of direct evidence linking Ashe to the AK pistol, did not meet the preponderance of the evidence standard required for constructive possession. Consequently, the Third Circuit vacated Ashe’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing without the enhanced base offense level.

USA v. Cammarata

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 23-2110

Opinion Date: February 24, 2025

Judge: David Brooks Smith

Areas of Law: Business Law, Criminal Law, Securities Law, White Collar Crime

Joseph Cammarata and his associates, Eric Cohen and David Punturieri, created Alpha Plus Recovery, LLC, a claims aggregator that submitted fraudulent claims to securities class action settlement funds. They falsely represented that three entities, Nimello, Quartis, and Invergasa, had traded in securities involved in class action settlements, obtaining over $40 million. The fraudulent claims included falsified trade data and fabricated reports. The scheme unraveled when a claims administrator, KCC, discovered the fraud, leading to the rejection of the claims and subsequent legal action.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania charged the defendants with conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, wire fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and money laundering. Cohen and Punturieri pled guilty, while Cammarata proceeded to trial and was found guilty on all counts. The District Court sentenced Cammarata to 120 months in prison, ordered restitution, and forfeiture of certain property.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld most of the District Court's rulings but found issues with the restitution order and the forfeiture of Cammarata's vacation home. The court held that the restitution order did not fully compensate the victims, as required by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), and remanded for reconsideration. The court also found procedural error in the forfeiture process, as Cammarata was deprived of his right to a jury determination on the forfeitability of his property. The court vacated the forfeiture order in part and remanded for the Government to amend the order to reflect that the property is forfeitable as a substitute asset under 21 U.S.C. § 853(p).

In re Rendelman

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-257

Opinion Date: February 21, 2025

Judge: Albert Diaz

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Scott Rendelman was convicted in 2008 for mailing threatening communications under 18 U.S.C. § 876(c). The district court instructed the jury that the government only needed to prove that a “reasonable person” would find Rendelman’s communications threatening. In 2023, the Supreme Court held in Counterman v. Colorado that the First Amendment requires the government to prove that the defendant was subjectively aware of the threatening nature of his statements. Rendelman now seeks authorization to file a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his conviction based on this new ruling.

Previously, the district court denied Rendelman’s first § 2255 motion, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit declined to authorize a second § 2255 motion. Rendelman’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed Rendelman’s motion for authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion. The court concluded that Rendelman satisfied the gatekeeping requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h), as the Supreme Court’s decision in Counterman announced a new rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively and was previously unavailable to Rendelman. The court rejected the government’s argument that Rendelman must also show a plausible claim for relief, adhering to the standard that a prima facie showing of possible merit is sufficient. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit granted Rendelman’s motion for authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion.

MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Lundbeck LLC

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 24-1043

Opinion Date: February 26, 2025

Judge: James Wynn

Areas of Law: Class Action, Consumer Law, Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

Plaintiffs, business entities owning recovery rights assigned by health insurers and other third-party Medicare payors, alleged that Defendants, including a drug manufacturer, a specialty pharmacy, and healthcare nonprofits, colluded to inflate the price and quantity of the drug Xenazine. This alleged scheme purportedly violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and various state laws, causing the Assignors to reimburse inflated Xenazine prescriptions at supra-competitive prices.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the class-action complaint with prejudice, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to adequately allege that Defendants’ conduct proximately caused their injuries. The court emphasized that RICO’s proximate-causation requirement focuses on the directness of the harm, not its foreseeability. The court found the alleged causal chain too attenuated, involving numerous independent actors like physicians and pharmacists, and dismissed the state-law claims for similar reasons.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the federal RICO claims, agreeing that Plaintiffs failed to establish proximate causation. The court noted that the alleged scheme had more direct victims, such as distributors and wholesalers, and that the volume of Xenazine prescriptions depended on the independent decisions of doctors. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the state-law consumer-protection and unjust-enrichment claims, finding them insufficiently pleaded.

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s conclusion that Plaintiffs had standing to bring claims on behalf of unidentified assignors, remanding those claims for dismissal without prejudice. The court upheld the district court’s denial of post-judgment relief and leave to amend the complaint, concluding that further amendment would be futile.

United States v. Parham

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-4249

Opinion Date: February 26, 2025

Judge: DeAndrea G. Benjamin

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In early 2021, Jarohn Parham was stopped by Newport News, Virginia police for driving with an expired registration. During the stop, officers observed Parham reaching towards the center console and subsequently found a .25 caliber semi-automatic pistol in the vehicle. Parham, a convicted felon, was arrested and later indicted by a federal grand jury for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He pled guilty to the charge without a plea agreement but with a stipulated statement of facts.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia calculated Parham’s Sentencing Guidelines range, determining his base offense level to be 20 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), based on a prior conviction for Virginia common law robbery, which the court deemed a crime of violence. Parham objected, arguing that his prior conviction did not qualify as a crime of violence under the Guidelines. The district court overruled his objections, finding that Virginia robbery met the generic definition of robbery and imposed an 84-month sentence.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with Parham, finding that Virginia robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. The court noted that Virginia robbery can be committed by threatening to accuse the victim of sodomy, which does not involve the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s judgment, vacated Parham’s sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing. The appellate court also instructed the district court to consider whether Parham’s conviction for use of a firearm during a robbery qualifies as a crime of violence.

United States v. Pliego-Pineda

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-4286

Opinion Date: February 24, 2025

Judge: Mary Geiger Lewis

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

In 2019, the FBI and DEA, along with local law enforcement, investigated a Mexican drug trafficking organization operating in Mexico, California, Georgia, and North Carolina. Oscar Pliego-Pineda, based in Atlanta, Georgia, was identified as a key figure in coordinating methamphetamine deliveries and managing drug proceeds. He arranged multiple drug transactions and coordinated logistics for methamphetamine shipments, including converting liquid methamphetamine to crystal form.

The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina sentenced Pliego-Pineda to 120 months in prison after he pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and conspiracy to commit money laundering. The court applied a three-level managerial role enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which Pliego-Pineda contested, arguing that the district court erred in applying the enhancement and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the district court's application of the managerial role enhancement, finding that Pliego-Pineda exercised significant decision-making authority, participated extensively in the conspiracy, and managed the logistics of drug transactions. The court noted that the conspiracy involved at least ten individuals and large quantities of methamphetamine. Despite an error in considering Pliego-Pineda's supervision of an undercover officer, the court found sufficient evidence to support the enhancement.

The Fourth Circuit also found Pliego-Pineda's sentence substantively reasonable, affirming the district court's decision. The court emphasized that the sentence was within the properly calculated Guidelines range and thus presumptively reasonable. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Pliego-Pineda.

US v. Davis

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-4174

Opinion Date: February 27, 2025

Judge: William Osteen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

William Davis Jr. was arrested for reckless driving after police observed him using a handheld device while driving. During the arrest, officers discovered a firearm hidden in his waistband. Davis, a convicted felon, pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. At sentencing, the district court varied upward from the Sentencing Guidelines range of 21 to 27 months and imposed a sentence of 72 months. Davis appealed, arguing that the sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia initially calculated Davis's Sentencing Guidelines range as 57 to 71 months, based on a base offense level of 24 due to his prior felony convictions for controlled substance offenses. However, the court later applied the categorical approach from United States v. Campbell, which led to a recalculated base offense level of 14 and a revised Guidelines range of 21 to 27 months. Despite this, the district court granted the government's motion for an upward variance, citing Davis's extensive criminal history and the seriousness of his offense.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that the district court had conducted an individualized assessment of the facts and arguments, adequately explained its reasoning, and properly considered the § 3553(a) factors. The court emphasized that the district court's findings regarding the seriousness of Davis's offense and his extensive criminal history justified the upward variance. The appellate court concluded that the 72-month sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable.

US v. Notgrass

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-4377

Opinion Date: February 27, 2025

Judge: Julius Richardson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Public Benefits

Rhonda and Robert Notgrass fraudulently obtained benefits from the Pandemic Unemployment Assistance program by falsely claiming unemployment due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Robert, a minister, and Rhonda, his wife, were ineligible for these benefits as Robert was fired for reasons unrelated to the pandemic, and Rhonda had not lost her job. They both pleaded guilty to misdemeanors and were sentenced to probation by the district court.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia sentenced the Notgrasses to five years of probation, including several conditions. The Notgrasses appealed four of these conditions: obtaining permission before leaving their judicial district, prohibition on possessing dangerous weapons, registering with an unemployment agency, and Robert's participation in a supervised mental-health treatment program. They argued that these conditions were both procedurally and substantively unreasonable.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court first determined that the Notgrasses' appellate waiver did not cover challenges to probation conditions, allowing the appeal to proceed. On the merits, the court found that the district court had adequately explained the conditions in light of the Notgrasses' objections. The travel-permission and weapons prohibition conditions were standard and self-evident, while the unemployment registration and mental-health treatment conditions were tailored to the Notgrasses' specific circumstances. The court held that all four conditions were reasonably related to the § 3553(a) sentencing factors and were not an abuse of discretion.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's sentences, finding the probation conditions both procedurally and substantively reasonable.

Valladares v. Ray

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Docket: 23-6932

Opinion Date: February 25, 2025

Judge: Roger Gregory

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Robert Valladares, who struggled with drug addiction, distributed fentanyl to a friend who subsequently overdosed and died. Valladares was initially charged with distribution resulting in death but ultimately pleaded guilty to lesser charges without the death-resulting enhancement. He was sentenced to 144 months in prison. Valladares sought to earn time credits under the First Step Act, which allows incarcerated individuals to earn credits for participating in recidivism reduction programs, except for those convicted of certain offenses, including drug offenses resulting in death.

The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) deemed Valladares ineligible for time credits, citing his conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) and the resulting death. Valladares challenged this decision through BOP’s administrative process and then filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia. The district court denied his petition, agreeing with BOP that Valladares was ineligible due to the death associated with his crime.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the First Step Act’s ineligibility provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D)(lviii), applies only to those convicted of the death-resulting enhancement element. Since Valladares was not convicted of this enhancement, he is eligible to earn time credits. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case, allowing Valladares to earn time credits under the First Step Act.

Bakutis v. Dean

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 24-10271

Opinion Date: February 25, 2025

Judge: Kurt Engelhardt

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

A neighbor called the Fort Worth Police Department at 2:25 a.m. on October 12, 2019, to report that Atatiana Jefferson's front door was open, which was unusual. Officer Aaron Dean and another officer responded, arriving at 2:28 a.m. and 2:29 a.m., respectively. Following protocol, they parked out of view and did not use emergency lights or sirens. They conducted a perimeter sweep of the house, using flashlights to look for signs of a break-in. Jefferson, who was home with her nephew, noticed someone outside and approached the window. Dean, without announcing himself as an officer, commanded Jefferson to show her hands and then fired a shot, killing her.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied Dean's motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity and stayed discovery. Dean appealed the denial of qualified immunity.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's judgment regarding the excessive force claim, holding that Dean's use of deadly force without warning was objectively unreasonable under clearly established law. However, the court reversed the district court's judgment on the unreasonable search claim, finding that Dean was performing a community caretaking function and that there was no clearly established law indicating his actions were unreasonable. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

United States v. Risner

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 24-5394

Opinion Date: February 21, 2025

Judge: Stephanie Dawkins Davis

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Raymon Risner was charged with several drug trafficking and firearms offenses. He moved to dismiss the firearm-related counts, arguing that the statutes violated the Second Amendment. The district court denied his motion, and Risner pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. He retained the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss and filed a timely appeal.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky denied Risner’s motion to dismiss the firearm-related counts. Risner then pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. The district court dismissed the felon-in-possession charge pursuant to the plea agreement.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Risner lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) because the charge was dismissed and there were no collateral consequences. The court also held that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) did not violate the Second Amendment, as the statute’s restriction on using a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime was consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court concluded that the Second Amendment does not protect the possession of weapons for unlawful purposes, and Risner’s challenge failed.

United States v. Simmons

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 24-1057

Opinion Date: February 24, 2025

Judge: John Nalbandian

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Lamon Simmons was investigated for drug trafficking by the Grand Rapids Vice Unit, which used a reliable informant to conduct controlled buys of cocaine from Simmons. The police obtained a warrant to search Simmons's primary residence on Weatherwood Drive and another house on Holly Street, based on evidence from the controlled buys and surveillance. The search of the Weatherwood home yielded firearms, cash, marijuana, and a money counter, while the Holly Street home contained various drugs, firearms, and other contraband. Simmons was charged with multiple drug and firearm offenses.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan denied Simmons's motion to suppress evidence from the Weatherwood home, finding that the warrant was supported by probable cause. The court noted that the affidavit detailed Simmons's ongoing drug trafficking and the likelihood that evidence would be found at his residence. The court also found that even if the warrant lacked probable cause, the good-faith exception would apply.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the warrant affidavit provided a substantial basis for finding probable cause, given the informant's reliability, the controlled buys, and the surveillance confirming Simmons's residence. The court emphasized that ongoing drug trafficking activities create a reasonable inference that evidence would be found at the dealer's home. The court also noted that the affidavit was supported by the officer's extensive experience in drug investigations. Thus, the search of Simmons's Weatherwood home was deemed constitutional, and the motion to suppress was properly denied.

United States v. Underwood

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-1667

Opinion Date: February 26, 2025

Judge: Jane Stranch

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Duane Gary Underwood, II was convicted of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, possession of a stolen firearm, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Underwood appealed his conviction on ten grounds, including the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), the legality of his detention and search, the validity of a search warrant for his phone, the admissibility of certain evidence, voir dire procedures, the sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions, and the licensure status of the prosecuting Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA).

The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan denied Underwood's pretrial motions to suppress evidence and dismiss charges. The court admitted evidence from Underwood's phone and grand jury testimony under Rule 803(5). The jury convicted Underwood on all counts, and he was sentenced to 180 months' imprisonment. Post-trial, Underwood moved to dismiss his conviction, arguing that the AUSA's administrative suspension for nonpayment of bar dues constituted prosecutorial misconduct and a jurisdictional defect. The district court denied this motion.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) is constitutional, the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain and search Underwood, and the search warrant for Underwood's phone was valid. The court found no abuse of discretion in admitting the contested evidence or in the voir dire procedures. The evidence was deemed sufficient to support the convictions, and the jury instructions were appropriate. The court also ruled that the AUSA's administrative suspension did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct or create a jurisdictional defect, and there was no Brady violation.

United States v Malinowski

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 24-1831

Opinion Date: February 21, 2025

Judge: Michael Scudder

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Michael Malinowski was sentenced to 150 months in prison followed by a lifetime of supervised release after pleading guilty to receiving child pornography. His release conditions included participating in sex-offender treatment, avoiding committing another crime, and not having deliberate contact with children. After moving to the Northern District of Illinois, Malinowski underwent a psychosexual assessment, leading to a recommendation that he refrain from accessing any pornography. A probation officer proposed modifying his supervised release conditions to include a prohibition on possessing or accessing any pornographic or sexually stimulating materials, which Malinowski accepted without a hearing.

In 2022, Malinowski violated his supervised release by cashing a fraudulent check and failing to attend a therapy session. The district court did not revoke his release but warned him to comply with his conditions. A week later, Malinowski was found in a school with a child, violating his release conditions. The district court found him guilty of three violations and sentenced him to 12 months in prison, above the advisory range but below the statutory maximum. The court also modified his supervised release conditions, including a prohibition on possessing sexually stimulating materials and a condition barring children from entering his home.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Malinowski's 12-month sentence, finding no procedural error. However, it vacated the two challenged supervised release conditions. The court found the condition barring possession of sexually stimulating materials to be overbroad and unconstitutional, requiring revision consistent with United States v. Adkins. The court also noted a conflict between the district court's oral pronouncement and written judgment regarding the condition barring children from entering Malinowski's home, requiring correction on remand.

U.S. v. Black

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 24-1425

Opinion Date: February 25, 2025

Judge: Raymond Gruender

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Christopher Black pleaded guilty to three counts of production of child pornography, one count of receipt of child pornography, and one count of possession of child pornography. He was sentenced to 720 months’ imprisonment. Black appealed, arguing that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained through two warrantless searches and challenging the substantive reasonableness of his sentence.

The FBI began investigating the disappearance of a fourteen-year-old girl, A.W., in December 2021. They traced her phone to Keokuk, Iowa, and linked it to Black, who had a history of sex crimes involving juveniles. The FBI conducted a warrantless search of an Airbnb in Keokuk where Black and A.W. were believed to be staying, finding evidence suggesting A.W. was there. Later, Black and A.W. were found at another Airbnb in Minneapolis, leading to another warrantless search. Evidence from these searches led to Black’s indictment.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa denied Black’s motion to suppress, finding the warrantless searches justified by exigent circumstances. Black entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling. He was sentenced to 720 months, below the advisory guidelines term of 1,560 months.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. They upheld the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress, agreeing that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless searches. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s sentencing, noting that the sentence was already below the guidelines range and that the district court did not err in its judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.

United States v. Ellis

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-3276

Opinion Date: February 25, 2025

Judge: Bobby Shepherd

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In the summer of 2021, the Southeast Iowa Narcotics Task Force (SEINT) received tips about heroin distribution in Burlington, Iowa. Following a search warrant at Michael Brown’s home, detectives found evidence of narcotics distribution. Subsequent investigations and controlled buys revealed that Gilbert Ellis, Christopher Ellis, and Joshua Townsen were involved in distributing methamphetamine and heroin. Gilbert, who used a wheelchair, directed others in drug transactions. Christopher and Townsen also participated in the distribution network, with Townsen procuring methamphetamine for Gilbert.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa handled the initial proceedings. Gilbert pled guilty to multiple counts of drug distribution and conspiracy without a plea agreement. The court applied a “manager or supervisor” enhancement to his sentence, resulting in 240 months’ imprisonment. Christopher, classified as a career offender, received 200 months’ imprisonment. Townsen, deemed ineligible for safety-valve relief due to a prior burglary conviction, was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s judgments. It found no clear error in applying the “manager or supervisor” enhancement to Gilbert’s sentence, as evidence showed he directed drug transactions. The court also upheld the career-offender enhancement for Christopher, rejecting his argument that his prior marijuana conviction did not qualify as a controlled substance offense. Finally, the court confirmed Townsen’s ineligibility for safety-valve relief, consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Pulsifer v. United States. The appellate court concluded that the sentences were procedurally and substantively reasonable.

United States v. Lazzaro

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-3411

Opinion Date: February 25, 2025

Judge: Bobby Shepherd

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Anton “Tony” Lazzaro was convicted by a jury of sex trafficking minors and conspiracy to commit sex trafficking. He appealed the district court's denial of his motions, arguing that the federal sex trafficking statute is unconstitutionally vague, the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, he should have been allowed to introduce evidence of the state age of consent, and his trial was tainted by prosecutorial and juror misconduct.

The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota denied Lazzaro's motion to dismiss the indictment, finding the statute was not unconstitutionally vague. The court also granted the Government's motion to exclude evidence of the state age of consent, ruling it irrelevant to the federal charges. During the trial, the court denied Lazzaro's motions for judgment of acquittal, and the jury found him guilty on all counts. Post-trial, the district court denied Lazzaro's motion for a new trial based on alleged juror and prosecutorial misconduct, concluding the evidence was not newly discovered and the claims lacked merit.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decisions. The court held that the federal sex trafficking statute provided adequate notice and did not lend itself to arbitrary enforcement. The evidence was sufficient to support Lazzaro's convictions, as his conduct clearly fell within the statute's prohibitions. The court also found no abuse of discretion in excluding evidence of the state age of consent, as it was irrelevant and potentially confusing to the jury. The court rejected Lazzaro's claims of prosecutorial misconduct, noting that any potential prejudice was mitigated by the district court's curative instructions. Finally, the court upheld the denial of a new trial based on juror misconduct, finding no evidence of dishonesty or bias that would have warranted a different outcome.

United States v. Worthy

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-3778

Opinion Date: February 21, 2025

Judge: Ralph Erickson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Kenneth Worthy was convicted by a jury of sexual exploitation of a minor and receipt and distribution of child pornography. During the investigation, law enforcement interviewed Worthy and conducted a consensual search of his phone, uncovering evidence of molestation. Worthy moved to suppress the statements from his interview and the evidence from his phone, claiming coercion. The district court denied both motions, and Worthy was sentenced to 480 months in prison. The court added eight points to his criminal history under the Sentencing Guidelines.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied Worthy's motions to suppress, finding that he was not in custody during the interview and had knowingly waived his Miranda rights. The court also found that Worthy consented to the phone search without coercion. Worthy was convicted and sentenced to a below-Guidelines sentence of 360 months for sexual exploitation and a consecutive 120 months for receipt and distribution of child pornography.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Worthy's motions to suppress, finding that Worthy voluntarily consented to the search of his phone and knowingly waived his Miranda rights. The court also upheld the admission of a photo as intrinsic evidence and found no abuse of discretion. Additionally, the court affirmed the application of the sentencing enhancements under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1, concluding that the evidence supported the enhancements for sexual acts, distribution, sadistic conduct, and the relationship between Worthy and the minor. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.

USA V. HOLMES

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 22-10312

Opinion Date: February 24, 2025

Judge: Jacqueline Nguyen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law, White Collar Crime

Elizabeth Holmes and Ramesh "Sunny" Balwani, founders of Theranos, were convicted of defrauding investors about the capabilities of their company's blood-testing technology. Theranos claimed it could run accurate tests with just a drop of blood, attracting significant investments. However, the technology was unreliable, and the company misled investors about its financial health, partnerships, and the validation of its technology by pharmaceutical companies.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California severed their trials due to Holmes's allegations of abuse by Balwani. Holmes was convicted on four counts related to investor fraud, while Balwani was convicted on all counts, including conspiracy to commit wire fraud against investors and patients. Holmes was sentenced to 135 months, and Balwani to 155 months in prison. The district court also ordered them to pay $452 million in restitution.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the convictions, sentences, and restitution order. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony from former Theranos employees, even if some of it veered into expert territory. The court found any errors in admitting this testimony to be harmless due to the weight of other evidence against the defendants.

The Ninth Circuit also upheld the district court's decision to admit a report from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, finding it relevant to Holmes's knowledge and intent. The court rejected Holmes's argument that the district court violated her Confrontation Clause rights by limiting cross-examination of a former Theranos lab director. Additionally, the court found no merit in Balwani's claims of constructive amendment of the indictment and Napue violations. The court concluded that the district court's factual findings on loss causation and the number of victims were not clearly erroneous and affirmed the restitution order.

USA V. POWERS

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-2218

Opinion Date: February 24, 2025

Judge: Bridget S. Bade

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Philip A. Powers III was convicted of seven misdemeanor counts related to setting three fires in national forests in Arizona. Powers, who was hiking and became lost, set the fires to signal for help. The fires, named the Taylor Fire, the Sycamore Fire, and the Sycamore 2 Fire, caused significant damage, with the Sycamore Fire burning 230 acres and incurring substantial fire suppression costs.

The case was first heard by a magistrate judge in a bench trial. Powers admitted to setting the fires but claimed he did so out of necessity, as he was out of food and water, had no cell phone service, and believed his life was in danger. The magistrate judge rejected the necessity defense, finding that Powers was not facing imminent harm when he set the Taylor Fire and that his actions in setting and abandoning the fires were objectively unreasonable. Powers was found guilty on all counts, sentenced to supervised probation, and ordered to pay restitution.

Powers appealed to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, which affirmed the magistrate judge's decision, agreeing that the necessity defense did not apply. Powers then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The Ninth Circuit held that Powers did not demonstrate he was facing imminent harm when he set the Taylor Fire and that his actions in setting and abandoning the fires were objectively unreasonable. The court affirmed the magistrate judge's findings and upheld Powers's convictions and the order of restitution. The court emphasized that the necessity defense requires the defendant to act reasonably, which Powers failed to do in this case.

United States v. Brooks

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 24-6034

Opinion Date: February 25, 2025

Judge: Paul Kelly

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Jimmy Lee Brooks was convicted by a jury of being a felon in possession of ammunition and witness tampering. The incident involved Brooks becoming irate at a beauty supply store, threatening his girlfriend S.J. with a knife, and subsequently shooting at a vehicle she was in, injuring her. Brooks was arrested after a search led police to his cousin's apartment, where he had expressed intent to kill S.J. and her family.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma sentenced Brooks to 235 months in prison, applying a cross-reference to the sentencing guidelines for attempted murder, which requires a finding of specific intent to kill. Brooks appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding of specific intent to kill.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that the district court had found by a preponderance of the evidence that Brooks shot at S.J. with the specific intent to kill her. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, stating that the evidence, including surveillance footage and witness testimony, supported the finding that Brooks acted with specific intent to kill. The court emphasized that firing a gun at another person can support an inference of intent to kill and found that the district court did not err in applying the cross-reference for attempted murder. The Tenth Circuit thus affirmed Brooks' sentence.

United States v. Brown

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-7041

Opinion Date: February 25, 2025

Judge: Bobby Baldock

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendant William Clayton Brown, while under the influence of methamphetamine, broke into a locked bathroom and fatally stabbed Damion Martin, who was embracing Brown's sister, Lacie Watson. Brown claimed he believed Martin was going to kill Watson. The Government charged Brown with First-Degree Murder in Indian Country. Brown requested jury instructions on defense of another and involuntary manslaughter, but the district court refused, citing insufficient evidence for the defense of another and omitting the involuntary manslaughter instruction without explanation.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma convicted Brown of first-degree murder. However, the court later granted Brown's Rule 29 motion for acquittal on the first-degree murder charge, finding insufficient evidence of premeditation, and entered a judgment of guilty for second-degree murder, sentencing Brown to life imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court plainly erred by omitting the involuntary manslaughter instruction based on the theory of imperfect defense of another. The Tenth Circuit found that Brown presented sufficient evidence to warrant the instruction, as multiple witnesses testified that Brown believed Martin was going to harm Watson. The omission of this instruction affected Brown's substantial rights and the fairness of the judicial proceedings. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit reversed Brown's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.

United States v. Davis

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 24-5018

Opinion Date: February 25, 2025

Judge: Paul Kelly

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Coti D’Shayne Davis pled guilty to failing to register as a sex offender and was sentenced to 87 months’ imprisonment followed by 10 years of supervised release. In a prior appeal, the Tenth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for resentencing to allow Davis to allocute and to make specific findings concerning a special condition of supervised release. On remand, the district court allowed Davis to allocute, struck the special condition, but again imposed the same sentence.

Davis appealed, challenging a two-point addition to his criminal history score based on a misdemeanor conviction for consumption of liquor by a minor. The district court had overruled Davis’s objection, construing it as an argument that the conviction should be considered a juvenile status offense and thus not counted in his criminal history score. The court concluded that the conviction did not fit the definition of a juvenile status offense because Davis was over 18 when it occurred.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Davis’s underage drinking conviction, which he received at 20 years old, is “similar to” a juvenile status offense under the guidelines. The court reasoned that the elements of the offense and the conduct underlying the conviction were similar to a juvenile status offense, and that common sense dictated that the conviction should not be included in Davis’s criminal history score. The Tenth Circuit remanded the case to the district court with instructions to vacate Davis’s sentence and resentence him without the two-point addition.

United States v. Earls

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 22-7051

Opinion Date: February 21, 2025

Judge: David Ebel

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

David Leroy Earls was convicted by a jury on three counts of engaging in a sex act with a person incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct, specifically the intellectually disabled daughter of his long-time girlfriend. Earls admitted to having sex with the victim, C.P., and the primary questions at trial were whether C.P. was incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct and whether Earls knew of her incapacity. The jury resolved both questions against Earls.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma sentenced Earls to 140 months in prison. Earls appealed, arguing insufficient evidence for the jury's findings and alleging trial errors. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court found sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings, including testimony about C.P.'s intellectual disability and mental illnesses, and Earls' own admissions. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's handling of expert testimony and rejected Earls' claims of prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments.

However, the Government conceded that the district court erred in calculating Earls' sentence by incorrectly adding two criminal history points. The Tenth Circuit affirmed Earls' convictions but remanded the case to the district court to vacate Earls' sentence and resentence him consistent with their opinion.

United States v. Kee

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 23-2189

Opinion Date: February 27, 2025

Judge: Stephanie Seymour

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Christopher Kee was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon in Indian country following an altercation with his then-girlfriend, Candace Chinchillas, in April 2020. The couple had a tumultuous relationship marked by excessive drinking and mutual accusations of abuse. Kee claimed that the stabbing incident was an act of self-defense, while Chinchillas described it as a violent attack. Kee was acquitted of three other counts of assault, which had more corroborative evidence, but was convicted on Count 2, which relied heavily on the conflicting testimonies of Kee and Chinchillas.

The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico presided over Kee's trial. Kee did not object during the trial to the prosecution's use of his post-Miranda silence to impeach his testimony. After being convicted and sentenced, Kee filed a timely appeal, arguing that his due process rights were violated under Doyle v. Ohio, which prohibits the use of a defendant's post-Miranda silence for impeachment purposes.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed Kee's appeal. The court agreed with Kee that the prosecution's repeated references to his post-Miranda silence constituted a clear violation of Doyle. The court applied the plain error review standard, which requires showing that the error was plain, affected substantial rights, and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. The court found that the Doyle violation affected Kee's substantial rights because the case hinged on the credibility of Kee and Chinchillas, and the improper impeachment could have influenced the jury's verdict.

The Tenth Circuit vacated Kee's conviction and sentence and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

United States v. Valdez

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 24-2025

Opinion Date: February 24, 2025

Judge: Joel Carson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendant Ted Joseph Valdez was involved in a conspiracy to transport two undocumented immigrants within the United States. After a car accident, he moved to Mexico and later accepted an offer to drive the immigrants for $1,000. He was followed by a border patrol agent for twenty-seven miles, during which he exhibited erratic driving behavior. Valdez confessed to knowing the immigrants were in the country illegally.

Valdez pleaded guilty to the charge of conspiring to transport aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii). The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico calculated his base offense level as 12, with reductions for his minor role and acceptance of responsibility, resulting in a total offense level of 8 and a criminal history category of II. This recommended a sentencing range of four to ten months. Valdez requested a time-served sentence of six months, while the government sought a high-end sentence. The district court sentenced Valdez to twenty-four months, citing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and his criminal history.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reiterated that the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory, not mandatory. The district court's decision to impose a sentence outside the Guidelines range was based on Valdez's criminal history, the need for deterrence, and public safety concerns. The Tenth Circuit found that the district court provided a thorough explanation for the upward variance, considering all relevant factors and justifying the sentence. The court affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that the sentence was substantively reasonable and within the bounds of permissible choice.

USA v. Horn

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-13327

Opinion Date: February 24, 2025

Judge: Stanley Marcus

Areas of Law: Business Law, Criminal Law, Securities Law

Jeffrey Horn, a former registered stockbroker, was convicted by a jury in April 2022 of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, conspiracy to commit securities fraud, and securities fraud. The district court sentenced him to 100 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay restitution of $1,469,702. Horn appealed his convictions, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and alleging cumulative error. He also raised objections regarding the calculation of his loss, restitution, and offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially reviewed the case. The jury found Horn guilty on all counts, and the district court sentenced him accordingly. Horn's co-defendant, Omar Leon Plummer, was also convicted and sentenced. Horn's appeal followed, raising several issues related to the trial and sentencing.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, finding that the evidence was sufficient to support Horn's convictions. The court held that Horn acted with the requisite intent to defraud, as evidenced by his distribution of materially false information to investors and his role in the fraudulent scheme. The court also rejected Horn's arguments regarding cumulative error, finding no merit in his claims.

Regarding sentencing, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines. The court found no clear error in the district court's determination that Horn was an organizer or leader of the criminal activity, justifying a four-level enhancement. The court also affirmed the use of intended loss rather than actual loss for sentencing purposes, consistent with the Guidelines and relevant case law. The court concluded that the district court's loss calculation and restitution order were supported by reliable and specific evidence.

Cypert v. State

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 Ark. 11

Opinion Date: February 27, 2025

Judge: Nicholas J. Bronni

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Eathan Cypert was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment plus 15 years for killing his wife, Kristina. The incident occurred around 2 a.m. on July 2, 2022, when Cypert shot Kristina in the back with an AR-15 following an argument. Evidence included a trail of blood, six bullet casings, and testimony from a medical examiner and on-scene investigator. Cypert was apprehended later that night, and his clothing tested positive for gunshot residue. He was charged with first-degree murder and a firearm enhancement. During the trial, the court allowed testimony about Kristina's prior bruising and Cypert's violent behavior. The jury found Cypert guilty, and he was sentenced accordingly.

The Crawford County Circuit Court entered the judgment and sentence on January 29, 2024. After the verdict, a juror informed Cypert’s counsel of potential juror misconduct during deliberations. Cypert filed a motion for a new trial based on this information, which the circuit court denied on February 27, 2024. Cypert did not amend his notice of appeal to include this denial, nor did he request the voir dire or post-trial hearing transcript in the appellate record.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case. They concluded that they lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of Cypert’s post-trial motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct because he failed to amend his notice of appeal to cover that order. Additionally, the court held that Cypert was not entitled to a second-degree murder instruction because the record did not support that instruction. The court affirmed the conviction and sentence, finding no error in the lower court's rulings.

In re Tuilaepa

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B310753(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 24, 2025

Judge: Gonzalo Martinez

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In March 2016, Paul Palalaua Tuilaepa filed his third petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court, claiming his 1987 death sentence violated Atkins v. Virginia because he was intellectually disabled. He provided declarations from experts diagnosing him with an intellectual disability and another declaration recanting flawed testimony from his original trial. In November 2016, California voters enacted Proposition 66, which aimed to expedite death penalty appeals and postconviction proceedings. The trial court concluded Tuilaepa’s petition was procedurally barred under section 1509 and did not state a prima facie case for relief based on intellectual disability.

The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Tuilaepa’s habeas petition in December 2020, ruling it was procedurally barred due to substantial delay and did not state a prima facie case for relief. The court found the expert declarations insufficient and inconsistent with other evidence in the record. Tuilaepa appealed, and the California Court of Appeal granted a certificate of appealability on whether the superior court erred in dismissing the petition as successive and without issuing an order to show cause.

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case and concluded that section 1509, subdivision (d), applied retroactively to Tuilaepa’s petition. The court found that Tuilaepa’s petition was not procedurally barred because he established a prima facie case for relief based on intellectual disability. The court reversed the superior court’s order and remanded the case with directions to issue an order to show cause on Tuilaepa’s Atkins claim.

P. v. Planchard

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C099609(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 27, 2025

Judge: Laurie M. Earl

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Family Law

David Paul Planchard was convicted by a jury of stalking Debra Doe and violating a protective order. Planchard and Doe had a relationship from 1997 to 2000 and had a son together in 2006. Despite a restraining order issued in 2020, Planchard continued to harass Doe through public Facebook posts from 2016 to 2023. These posts included threats, derogatory comments, and references to Doe's past trauma. Planchard also showed up at Doe's house in May 2023, violating the protective order.

The Superior Court of Sacramento County found Planchard guilty of stalking and violating a protective order. The jury determined that Planchard's actions, including his Facebook posts and visit to Doe's house, constituted a credible threat and harassment. The court sentenced him to five years for stalking and a stayed term of six months for violating the protective order.

The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. Planchard argued that his Facebook posts did not constitute direct contact and thus could not be considered harassment under the stalking statute. The court disagreed, citing precedent that indirect threats and harassment through third parties or public posts can still meet the statutory requirements for stalking. The court found sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict, noting that the posts were intended to harass and threaten Doe, and it was reasonably foreseeable that she would see them.

The court also addressed Planchard's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, finding no merit in his arguments. The court concluded that the Facebook posts were relevant and admissible, and that any failure to object by his counsel did not constitute ineffective assistance. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed.

People v. Wilson

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A168965(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 27, 2025

Judge: Victor Rodriguez

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2018, Charles David Wilson was charged with 14 felony counts. In 2022, he pled no contest to one count of kidnapping, admitted to using a firearm, and acknowledged an aggravating factor. In exchange, the prosecution dismissed the remaining charges and enhancements. Wilson received a 12-year prison sentence, consisting of an eight-year term for kidnapping and a four-year term for the firearm enhancement.

Wilson later petitioned the trial court for resentencing under former section 1172.1, citing a new directive from the Alameda County District Attorney’s Office aimed at reducing reliance on enhancements and allegations. The directive suggested that prosecutors should generally not file or require defendants to plead to sentence enhancements and allowed for probation as the presumptive offer for certain felonies. However, the trial court determined it lacked jurisdiction to entertain Wilson’s petition because it had not recalled the sentence within 120 days of the original commitment, and Wilson did not have standing to file such a motion himself.

The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the directive from the district attorney’s office did not constitute a prosecutorial stipulation or recommendation for resentencing under section 1172.1. The court emphasized that internal directives do not create enforceable duties for prosecutors to recommend resentencing. Consequently, Wilson’s petition was deemed a defendant-initiated request for the court to exercise its own-motion jurisdiction, which the court lacked. The appeal was dismissed due to the lack of jurisdiction to consider Wilson’s petition or any other arguments.

State v. Jones

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20840

Opinion Date: February 25, 2025

Judge: Nora Dannehy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant was convicted of murder in connection with the shooting death of the victim. The victim was shot while talking to her boyfriend outside her apartment building. The defendant, along with two other individuals, fired several shots toward the victim’s residence, and one bullet struck the victim in the head, causing her death. The initial investigation did not result in charges, but years later, new information from witnesses led to the defendant’s arrest.

The Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford tried the case, and the jury found the defendant guilty of murder. The defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of his alleged gang affiliation and his actions after law enforcement attempted to arrest him. The trial court had allowed the gang affiliation evidence to establish a motive for the shooting and admitted evidence of the defendant’s evasive conduct as indicative of his consciousness of guilt.

The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the gang affiliation evidence, as it was relevant to establishing a motive for the shooting and its probative value outweighed any unfair prejudicial impact. The court also found that the trial court properly admitted evidence of the defendant’s evasive conduct after law enforcement attempted to arrest him, as it was probative of the defendant’s consciousness of guilt. The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

In re T.B.

Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Docket: 22-FS-0138

Opinion Date: February 20, 2025

Judge: Phyllis Thompson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

T.B., a juvenile, was adjudged delinquent by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for carrying a pistol without a license and possessing unregistered ammunition. The case arose from two Instagram live videos observed by Officer Moore of the Metropolitan Police Department. In the first video, T.B. was seen displaying a black Glock-style handgun. In the second video, T.B. was seen with a light-colored object in his waistband, which officers believed to be a firearm. When officers arrived at the scene, they found a tan-gold-colored pistol on the ground near where T.B. had been standing.

The Superior Court incorporated Officer Moore’s testimony from a suppression hearing into the trial. Officer Moore testified about the events leading to T.B.'s arrest and the officers' observations from the Instagram videos. Officer Laielli also testified, describing T.B.'s behavior in the second video as characteristic of an armed gunman. The court found the evidence sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that T.B. possessed the tan-gold-colored pistol and committed him to the Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services for up to one year.

On appeal, T.B. argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s findings and that the trial court erred in admitting the officers’ testimony. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that the evidence, including the Instagram videos and the officers’ observations, was sufficient to support the trial court’s findings. The appellate court also concluded that any error in admitting the officers’ testimony was harmless, as the trial court’s findings were based on its own viewing of the video evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of delinquency.

State v. Eaton

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 51402

Opinion Date: February 27, 2025

Judge: Gregory W. Moeller

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Lea Anne Eaton was arrested and charged with felony burglary under Idaho Code section 18-1401 for using discarded Walmart receipts to return stolen items for a refund. Shortly after her charge, a new statute, Idaho Code section 18-1401A, creating a misdemeanor offense of "commercial burglary," became effective. Eaton filed a motion to reduce her felony charge to the new misdemeanor charge, which the district court denied. Eaton entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving her right to appeal the denied motion, and was sentenced to a unified ten-year sentence with four years fixed. She subsequently filed motions for reconsideration and to correct an illegal sentence, both of which were denied. Eaton appealed these decisions.

The Idaho Court of Appeals upheld Eaton's conviction and sentence. Eaton then filed a Petition for Review, which the Idaho Supreme Court granted. The Supreme Court reviewed whether the district court erred in denying Eaton's motion to reduce her charge and her motion to correct an illegal sentence.

The Idaho Supreme Court held that the commercial burglary statute, Idaho Code section 18-1401A, was not retroactive and did not apply to Eaton's conduct, which occurred before the statute's enactment. The Court found that the statute created a new offense with distinct elements from the general burglary statute and did not amend the penalties for general burglary. Therefore, Eaton was properly charged and convicted under the general burglary statute, Idaho Code section 18-1401. The Court also held that Eaton's sentence was not illegal, as she was not entitled to the lesser penalty under the commercial burglary statute. Consequently, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment and the denial of Eaton's Rule 35(a) motion.

State v. Marble

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 50239

Opinion Date: February 25, 2025

Judge: Gregory W. Moeller

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Kadence Dawn Marble was a passenger in a vehicle stopped for speeding in Bonner County, Idaho. During the stop, the officer detected the smell of marijuana and found marijuana and drug paraphernalia in the vehicle. Marble admitted to knowing about the marijuana. She was charged with violating Idaho’s “frequenting” law, which makes it a misdemeanor to be present at a place where illegal controlled substances are held for distribution or use. Marble filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that a moving vehicle is not a “place” under the statute. The magistrate court agreed and dismissed the case.

The State appealed to the District Court of the First Judicial District, which reversed the magistrate court’s decision. The district court concluded that Marble’s motion to dismiss was procedurally improper and that the question of whether a moving vehicle could be considered a “place” was a factual issue to be resolved at trial. Marble then appealed to the Supreme Court of Idaho.

The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the district court erred in failing to rule on the merits of the State’s appeal. The Supreme Court determined that whether a moving vehicle constitutes a “place” under Idaho Code section 37-2732(d) is a question of law, not fact. The Court held that a moving vehicle can be considered a “place” where illegal controlled substances are present. Additionally, the Court found that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Marble’s conduct. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to remand it to the magistrate court for a trial on the merits.

State v. Regan

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 52260

Opinion Date: February 21, 2025

Judge: Cynthia Meyer

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Josina Marie Regan was convicted of three counts of conspiracy related to possession of methamphetamine, grand theft, and possession of bath salts. The charges stemmed from an incident where Regan shot and killed her boyfriend, John Baker, and subsequently removed various items, including drugs and cash, from his residence with the help of Todd Potter and Robert Glenn. These items were later found in a motel room rented by Regan.

The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho provided jury instructions that included the term "and/or" between Regan's name and the names of the alleged co-conspirators. Regan appealed, arguing that these instructions were fundamentally erroneous as they allowed the jury to convict her without finding that she was a party to the agreement beyond a reasonable doubt. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the instructions were not erroneous and that the evidence was properly admitted.

The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and agreed with Regan, finding that the district court's jury instructions were indeed erroneous. The instructions misled the jury by not requiring them to find that Regan was a party to the agreement, thus relieving the State of its burden to prove this essential element beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court held that this error was clear from the record and was not harmless, as it affected the outcome of the trial. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated Regan's conspiracy convictions.

State v. Webb

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 50705

Opinion Date: February 27, 2025

Judge: Colleen Zahn

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In April 2021, a confidential informant (CI) working for the Blaine County Sheriff’s Office was introduced to Kelly D. Webb. The CI, at the request of the Sheriff’s Office, attempted to purchase methamphetamine from Webb. Webb sold the CI more than 28 grams of methamphetamine on two occasions, leading to his indictment by a grand jury for two counts of felony trafficking in methamphetamine. Webb pleaded not guilty and filed a motion in limine to present a defense of "charge entrapment," arguing that he was induced by law enforcement to sell a larger quantity of drugs than he intended. The district court denied his motion, and Webb entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial.

The District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of Idaho reviewed Webb's motion and held hearings on the matter. The court determined it had the authority to recognize charge entrapment as an extension of the common law defense of entrapment but ultimately declined to do so. The court noted that charge entrapment is a minority position in other jurisdictions and is typically associated with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which differ from Idaho’s mandatory minimum sentencing laws. Webb was sentenced to a unified sentence of 7 years, with 3 years fixed, and a $10,000 fine, which are the mandatory minimums for trafficking in methamphetamine.

The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court declined to recognize the defense of charge entrapment, noting that Idaho’s traditional entrapment defense is intended to protect innocent individuals from being induced to commit crimes, which did not apply to Webb’s case. The court also found that the rationale behind charge entrapment in federal cases, which is based on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, does not apply to Idaho’s mandatory minimum sentencing scheme. Therefore, the court upheld the district court's denial of Webb's motion in limine.

Brown v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Docket: 24S-CR-00288

Opinion Date: February 24, 2025

Judge: Christopher M. Goff

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

Johnny Brown was born on August 27, 1998. On August 26, 2019, the State filed a delinquency petition in juvenile court alleging that Brown committed child molesting between June 1, 2015, and August 31, 2016. The juvenile court authorized the petition and held an initial hearing. After Brown turned twenty-one, he objected to the juvenile court's jurisdiction, but the court denied his objection and later waived the case to adult court. Brown was convicted of Class C felony child molesting in adult court.

Brown filed a motion to correct error, arguing that the adult court lacked jurisdiction because he was over twenty-one at the time of the waiver hearing. The trial court denied his motion and sentenced him to four years, with credit for time served and the remainder suspended to probation. Brown appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed his conviction, holding that retroactive application of new jurisdictional amendments would violate the ex post facto clause of the U.S. Constitution.

The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction at the time of Brown's trial because he fell into a jurisdictional gap identified in previous cases. The court also determined that the amendments to the jurisdiction statutes, enacted while Brown's case was pending, did not apply retroactively. As a result, the Indiana Supreme Court reversed Brown's conviction and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

State of Iowa v. Kieffer

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 23-0598

Opinion Date: February 21, 2025

Judge: Dana Oxley

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Ezekiel Kieffer was convicted of domestic abuse assault impeding the flow of air or blood and domestic abuse assault causing injury after an altercation with his girlfriend, Daphne. The incident occurred after they returned intoxicated from a community event, leading to a physical confrontation where Kieffer strangled Daphne. Law enforcement was called, and Kieffer was charged and later convicted by a jury. He was sentenced to 180 days (with 93 days suspended) on each count, to be served concurrently, and was also subject to a firearm prohibition.

In the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Kieffer was found guilty on both charges. He appealed, arguing insufficient evidence of cohabitation with Daphne, a violation of the district court’s order in limine, and that the firearm prohibition violated his constitutional rights. The district court had denied his motion for a mistrial based on the State’s alleged violations of the order in limine and included a firearm prohibition in his sentencing order.

The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the convictions and sentence. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Kieffer and Daphne were cohabiting, as they were in a serious relationship, and Daphne had moved in with Kieffer. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kieffer’s motion for a mistrial, as the alleged violations of the order in limine were promptly addressed and cured. Lastly, the court rejected Kieffer’s constitutional challenge to the firearm prohibition under the Second Amendment, citing recent federal jurisprudence upholding similar prohibitions. The court did not address the state constitutional challenge under article I, section 1A, as it was not necessary for the disposition of the case.

State v. Barnes

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 125739

Opinion Date: February 21, 2025

Judge: Evelyn Z. Wilson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Clyde James Barnes Jr. was convicted by a jury of first-degree premeditated murder, aggravated burglary, tampering with electronic monitoring equipment, criminal threat, and violation of a protective order. The case arose after Barnes, who was on house arrest, tampered with his GPS ankle bracelet and traveled to the residence of his ex-partner, Jessica Leigh Smith. Barnes broke into Smith's home and brutally murdered her with a mattock. The crime was captured on surveillance cameras, and forensic evidence linked Barnes to the scene.

The Johnson County District Court found Barnes guilty on all counts and sentenced him to life imprisonment with a mandatory minimum of 620 months for the murder, plus additional consecutive sentences for the other charges. Barnes appealed, raising several issues, including the constitutionality of the territorial jurisdiction statute under which he was prosecuted for tampering with electronic monitoring equipment, claims of prosecutorial error, the admission of graphic photographs, the jury instructions on premeditation, and the sufficiency of the evidence for the tampering conviction.

The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the tampering charge under K.S.A. 21-5106(b)(3), as the proximate result of Barnes' tampering occurred in Kansas. The court also found no prosecutorial error in the closing arguments, determining that the prosecutor's statements were fair comments on the evidence. The court ruled that the admission of the photographs was not an abuse of discretion, as they were relevant and not unduly prejudicial. The court upheld the premeditation jury instruction, finding it accurately stated the law. Finally, the court concluded that sufficient evidence supported Barnes' conviction for tampering with electronic monitoring equipment and that cumulative error did not deny him a fair trial.

State v. Younger

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Docket: 124601

Opinion Date: February 21, 2025

Judge: Eric Rosen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Kimberley S. Younger was convicted of capital murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, solicitation to commit first-degree murder, and theft. She was accused of orchestrating the murders of Alfred and Pauline Carpenter at the Barton County fairgrounds. Younger, along with her coconspirators, was involved in a complex scheme that included manipulating others through fake social media accounts and convincing them of a fictional crime syndicate led by "Frank Zaitchik." The Carpenters were killed, and their bodies were disposed of in Arkansas. Younger was arrested and made several incriminating statements to the police.

The Barton District Court conducted a nine-day jury trial, during which Younger was found guilty on all counts. The court sentenced her to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the capital murder charge, along with additional consecutive sentences for the other charges. Younger appealed, challenging several evidentiary rulings, including the admission of her statements to the police, the testimony of a remote witness, and the denial of her motions for mistrial based on comments about her credibility.

The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and addressed each of Younger's claims. The court held that the trial court did not err in allowing the remote testimony of Frank Zaitshik due to COVID-19 concerns, as the trial court made specific findings justifying the necessity of remote testimony. The court also found that Younger's statements to the police were voluntary and that she had reinitiated the interview after invoking her right to counsel. The court determined that the comments about Younger's credibility by witnesses did not warrant a mistrial and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing a key witness to remain in the courtroom.

The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed Younger's convictions but reversed the restitution order in part, finding that the State failed to justify the amount requested for State Farm Insurance. The court also held that the inclusion of court costs in the restitution order was illegal and remanded the case for correction of the judgment relating to restitution.

Commonwealth v. Moore

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Dockets: 2023-SC-0433-DG, 2023-SC-0457-DG

Opinion Date: February 20, 2025

Judge: Kelly Thompson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law

Melzena Moore pled guilty to first-degree manslaughter of Raymond Jackson under extreme emotional disturbance (EED) as part of a plea agreement. The issue on appeal is whether the Laurel Circuit Court erred in denying Moore the domestic violence exemption to the mandatory minimum sentence for parole eligibility. This exemption would allow Moore to be considered for parole after serving 20% of her eighteen-year sentence and qualify her for counseling and rehabilitation programs.

The Laurel Circuit Court found that Moore was a victim of domestic violence based on a single corroborated incident but concluded that her shooting of Jackson did not occur "with regard to" the domestic violence. The court denied Moore the exemption, citing a lack of corroborating evidence for her account of the events leading up to the shooting and questioning her credibility. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, instructing the trial court to grant the exemption, arguing that the trial court failed to properly apply the "some connection" standard and did not adequately consider the expert testimony provided by Moore.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and determined that the trial court erred in its analysis by not making sufficient factual findings regarding the totality of the evidence of domestic violence. The court emphasized that the "some connection" standard does not require a direct causal link or contemporaneous act of domestic violence. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's order and remanded the case for further factual findings and proper application of the legal standard to determine if Moore qualifies for the domestic violence exemption.

Ford v. Commonwealth

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2024-SC-0008-DG

Opinion Date: February 20, 2025

Judge: Robert Conley

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Dillian Ford was sentenced to fifteen years in prison and ordered to pay $10,972 in jail fees for the 422 days he was held in custody. The jail fees were imposed based on a stipulation that Carlisle County would pay McCracken County twenty-six dollars a day for housing inmates. Ford challenged the imposition of these fees, arguing that there was no evidence of a jail reimbursement policy adopted by the county jailer with the approval of the county's governing body, as required by KRS 441.265(2)(a).

The Carlisle Circuit Court imposed the jail fees based on the stipulation. Ford appealed, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the imposition of the fees. Ford then sought discretionary review from the Supreme Court of Kentucky, arguing both the lack of evidence for the jail fees and a new argument regarding an amendment to KRS 441.265(1)(a) that he claimed removed the trial court's authority to impose jail fees.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and found that the stipulation regarding the agreement between Carlisle and McCracken counties did not meet the evidentiary burden required by Capstraw v. Commonwealth. The Court held that there was no evidence in the record of a jail reimbursement policy adopted by the county jailer with the approval of the county's governing body. Therefore, the imposition of jail fees was not justified. The Court vacated the portion of Ford's sentence imposing the jail fees but did not address the validity of the fifteen-year sentence for the underlying convictions. The Court of Appeals' decision was reversed.

State of Maine v. Lester

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2025 ME 21

Opinion Date: February 25, 2025

Judge: Catherine Connors

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Raymond N. Lester was convicted of intentional or knowing murder after a jury trial. The victim's body was found at the Schoodic Institute at Acadia National Park during a retreat. Witnesses testified that Lester had been seen screaming at the victim and driving recklessly while appearing intoxicated the night before the body was discovered. Tire tracks led from the road to the location where the body was found, and the victim died from blunt force injuries.

Lester was charged in June 2022 and indicted in August 2022. He pleaded not guilty, and a four-day trial was held in November 2023. During the trial, Lester's attorney objected to the jury instructions on intent, motive, and premeditation, arguing they lessened the State's burden of proof. The court overruled the objection, and the jury found Lester guilty. At the sentencing hearing, the court set the basic sentence at forty years, considering the domestic violence nature of the crime and Lester's intentional conduct. The final sentence was forty-eight years after weighing aggravating and mitigating factors.

Lester appealed the conviction and sentence. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that the jury instructions on motive, intent, and premeditation were legally accurate and not erroneous. The court also determined that there was no obvious error in the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on intoxication, as there was insufficient evidence that Lester was intoxicated at the time of the crime. Finally, the court held that the trial court did not misapply legal principles in setting the basic sentence at forty years. The judgment and sentence were affirmed.

Commonwealth v. Chism

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13161

Opinion Date: February 25, 2025

Judge: Frank M. Gaziano

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In the early morning of October 23, 2013, Colleen Ritzer, a Danvers High School math teacher, was found dead in the woods outside the high school. She had been raped, strangled, and stabbed. The defendant, a fourteen-year-old student in her class, was convicted by a Superior Court jury of first-degree murder, aggravated rape, and armed robbery. The primary issue at trial was whether the defendant lacked criminal responsibility due to mental illness.

The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial judge impeded his ability to present his defense. He raised several issues: the exclusion of expert testimony on brain scans, limitations on expert testimony regarding his statements, improper cross-examination of defense experts, forced disclosure of psychological test data, the use of suppressed statements by the Commonwealth's expert, the denial of a jury instruction on adolescent brain development, insufficient evidence for the aggravated rape and armed robbery convictions, the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, improper prosecutorial conduct in closing arguments, the denial of a change of venue due to pretrial publicity, and the proportionality of his sentence under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and affirmed the convictions. The court held that the exclusion of the brain scan evidence was within the judge's discretion due to its limited probative value and potential for unfair prejudice. The limitations on expert testimony were also upheld, since the defendant was able to present sufficient evidence of his mental state. The court found no abuse of discretion in the cross-examination of defense experts or the disclosure of psychological test data. The use of the suppressed statements by the Commonwealth's expert did not warrant exclusion of the testimony. The court also found no error in the denial of the jury instruction on adolescent brain development, the sufficiency of the evidence for the aggravated rape and armed robbery convictions, the denial of the motion to suppress, or the prosecutor's closing arguments. The court concluded that the defendant was not entitled to a change of venue and that his sentence was not disproportionate under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

State of Minnesota vs. Bee

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A23-1257

Opinion Date: February 19, 2025

Judge: Anne K. McKeig

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

A deputy from the Ramsey County Sheriff’s Department stopped Kyaw Be Bee’s vehicle on a public roadway in Saint Paul and found a BB gun under the driver’s seat. Bee was charged with carrying a BB gun in a public place, a gross misdemeanor under Minn. Stat. § 624.7181, subd. 2 (2024). The statute defines “public place” to include property owned or controlled by a governmental unit and private property open to the public, excluding certain private properties and specific locations.

The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause, ruling that the interior of a motor vehicle on a public roadway is not a “public place” under the statute. The State appealed, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the term “public place” unambiguously includes the interior of a motor vehicle on a public roadway, referencing the statutory context and a related exemption for transporting firearms in vehicles.

The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether the interior of a private motor vehicle on a public road is a “public place” under Minn. Stat. § 624.7181, subd. 1(c). The court concluded that the term “public place” unambiguously includes the interior of a motor vehicle on a public roadway. The court reasoned that the statute’s exemptions and related provisions indicate that a motor vehicle on a public road is considered a public place. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, reinstating the charge against Bee.

Knight v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2022-KA-01138-SCT

Opinion Date: February 20, 2025

Judge: Robert P. Chamberlin

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In November 2019, Sarah and her two minor children lived with her boyfriend, William Jeffrey Knight. Suspecting infidelity, Sarah searched Knight's phone and discovered a pornographic video of her twelve-year-old daughter, Jane. Sarah took the phone to the Petal Police Department, where officers viewed the video and conducted further investigation. Knight was indicted on two counts of child exploitation and one count of touching a child for lustful purposes.

The Forrest County Circuit Court held a jury trial, where Knight was found guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to ninety-five years in prison and required to register as a sex offender. Knight filed motions to suppress evidence obtained from his phone, arguing that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The motions were denied, and Knight appealed the decision.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case. Knight raised several issues on appeal, including the legality of the warrantless search of his phone, prosecutorial misconduct, the validity of the search warrants, the presentation of false testimony, the proportionality of his sentence, and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found that the private search doctrine applied to the warrantless search of Knight's phone, as the police did not exceed the scope of Sarah's initial search. The court also determined that the prosecutor's conduct during cross-examination did not amount to misconduct and that the search warrants, despite clerical errors, were valid. The court found no evidence that the State knowingly presented false testimony and ruled that Knight's sentence was within statutory limits.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed Knight's convictions and sentences, finding no cumulative error that would warrant reversal.

Watts v. State of Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2023-KA-00893-SCT

Opinion Date: February 20, 2025

Judge: Mike Randolph

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In October 2020, Terrance Watts was indicted for the first-degree murder of his half-brother, Yancy Williams, by a grand jury in Hinds County, Mississippi. The incident occurred at a Marathon gas station where Williams was shot in the head by Watts. Surveillance footage and witness testimonies indicated that Williams was intoxicated and aggressive, leading to a physical altercation with Watts. Watts later turned himself in and admitted to the shooting, claiming he panicked.

The Hinds County Circuit Court tried Watts in July 2023, where he was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Watts filed a post-trial motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, which was denied by the trial judge. Watts then appealed, raising three issues: the sufficiency of the evidence, the propriety of jury instruction S-4 on deliberate design killing, and the propriety of jury instruction S-2 regarding malice aforethought inferred from the use of a deadly weapon.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and found no error. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, as a rational juror could find each element of first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also found that jury instruction S-4 was proper and did not prejudice Watts, as it accurately stated the law. Additionally, the court held that jury instruction S-2 did not improperly comment on the weight of the evidence, as it was consistent with established legal principles. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the conviction and sentence.

State v. Walla

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 MT 42

Opinion Date: February 25, 2025

Judge: Jim Shea

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Kevin Charles Walla was charged with Deliberate Homicide after shooting and killing Richard Allen Bowers in his apartment on December 31, 2019. Walla claimed he acted in self-defense, citing Bowers' history of drug use, criminal behavior, and aggression. The State sought to exclude Walla's testimony about Bowers' character. During the trial, the parties reached an agreement on certain evidentiary disputes and jury instructions, including a provision allowing Walla's counsel to make an offer of proof about Walla's testimony outside the jury's presence. However, Walla ultimately decided not to testify.

The Sixth Judicial District Court, Sweet Grass County, presided over the trial. Walla's counsel agreed to strike the provision regarding the offer of proof after Walla decided not to testify. Walla also proposed a supplemental verdict form to ensure the jury's unanimous decision on his self-defense claim, which the court rejected, stating that the standard verdict form and jury instructions were sufficient. The jury found Walla guilty of Deliberate Homicide, and he was sentenced to 100 years in prison, with an additional 10-year Weapons Enhancement.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the District Court did not improperly reject the procedural agreement's provision, as Walla's decision not to testify rendered the issue moot. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in rejecting the supplemental verdict form, as the jury instructions clearly required a unanimous verdict and adequately informed the jury of the State's burden to prove Walla's actions were not justified. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's judgment and sentence.

Hoistad v. NDDOT

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 ND 45

Opinion Date: February 27, 2025

Judge: Douglas Bahr

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In May 2024, Darren Hoistad was arrested for driving under the influence and consented to a chemical breath test, which showed a result above the legal limit of 0.08. During the test, the arresting officer instructed Hoistad to continue blowing into the Intoxilyzer 8000 even after the tone stopped and the instrument displayed a zero before the decimal point. Hoistad argued that this deviation from the approved method rendered the test results inadmissible.

The hearing officer overruled Hoistad’s objection and suspended his driving privileges for 91 days. Hoistad appealed to the District Court of Richland County, Southeast Judicial District, which affirmed the hearing officer’s decision. The court found that the Intoxilyzer test was administered in accordance with the approved method and that the deviation did not affect the test's accuracy.

The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the hearing officer’s finding that the test was conducted in accordance with the approved method was not supported by the evidence. The court noted that the approved method requires the subject to stop blowing when the tone stops, and the officer’s repeated instructions to continue blowing constituted a deviation from the approved method. The court held that the Department of Transportation failed to provide expert testimony on the effect of this deviation on the test’s accuracy and reliability. Consequently, the court determined that the test was not fairly administered and the hearing officer abused his discretion in admitting the test results.

The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and the hearing officer’s decision to suspend Hoistad’s driving privileges. However, the court denied Hoistad’s request for attorney’s fees and costs, concluding that the Department acted with substantial justification in its decision.

State v. Williams

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 ND 46

Opinion Date: February 27, 2025

Judge: Daniel Crothers

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In October 2022, officers responded to a shooting in Bismarck, North Dakota, where Christopher Sebastian was found dead in a vehicle with multiple gunshot wounds. Benjamin Williams was charged with murder and unlawful possession of a firearm. Evidence collected included a black sweatshirt, face mask, glove, jeans, a .40 caliber pistol, cartridges, and ammunition magazines. Williams's trial began on April 1, 2024, and after six days, the jury found him guilty of both charges. He was sentenced to life without parole for murder and five years for unlawful possession of a firearm, to be served concurrently. Williams appealed the decision.

The District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, presided over by Judge Cynthia M. Feland, denied Williams's motion to exclude new witness testimony that was not disclosed by the State before the trial. Williams argued that the State's failure to provide this information constituted a Brady violation. The court also rejected Williams's claim of prosecutorial misconduct and his motion for sanctions regarding the non-disclosure of a witness's personnel file.

The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that no Brady violation occurred because Williams could have obtained the information with reasonable diligence. The court also found that the State did not engage in prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments, as the statements made were fair comments on the evidence. Additionally, the court declined to address the merits of the claim regarding the non-disclosure of the witness's personnel file, as the issue was not preserved for review. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's judgment.

The State v. McSwain

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 28263

Opinion Date: February 26, 2025

Judge: John Kittredge

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2004, Jason McSwain, a former teacher, pled guilty to two counts of criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the second degree and one count of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. After serving his prison sentence, he registered as a sex offender as required by South Carolina's Sex Offender Registry Act (SORA). Initially, SORA mandated lifetime registration for all sex offenders. In 2022, the General Assembly amended SORA to implement a three-tier system based on the severity of the offense, with tier II offenders, like McSwain, required to register for 25 years before seeking removal.

McSwain applied for removal from the registry in 2022, but the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) denied his application as premature. He then filed a motion in the circuit court, arguing that the tier system and mandatory wait times violated his right to substantive due process. The circuit court denied his motion, finding that the amendments to SORA were rationally related to the government's interest in public safety and law enforcement.

The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the circuit court's decision. The Court found that the tiered-registration system and corresponding mandatory-minimum time periods for registration were rationally related to SORA's legislative purposes of protecting the public and aiding law enforcement. The Court emphasized that the amendments brought SORA in line with federal law and the approach taken by a majority of states. Consequently, the Court held that McSwain failed to establish that SORA violated his right to substantive due process and affirmed the circuit court's decision.

MAHMOUD v. STATE

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: AP-77,082

Opinion Date: February 26, 2025

Judge: Scott Walker

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The appellant was convicted of capital murder in July 2018 by a Harris County jury for killing Gelareh Bagherzadeh and Coty Beavers in different criminal transactions but as part of the same scheme or course of conduct. The trial court sentenced him to death based on the jury's answers to special issues. The appellant raised thirty points of error on direct appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

In the lower court, the appellant was tried and convicted in the 184th Judicial District Court of Harris County. The jury found him guilty of capital murder, and the trial court sentenced him to death. The appellant's conviction and sentence were automatically appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the appellant's thirty points of error and found no reversible error. The court addressed various issues, including the admissibility of evidence, the conduct of the trial, and the constitutionality of the capital murder statute as applied. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the appellant's prior bad acts, including his attempts to kill his daughter and his involvement in drug smuggling. The court also found that the trial court properly handled the appellant's objections to the prosecution's questions and the conduct of the jurors. Additionally, the court rejected the appellant's claim that the capital murder statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to his case.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed the trial court's judgment of conviction and sentence of death.